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45,000 Indian POWs into Mohan Singh’s sphere of influence. By the end of 1942, forty thousand men expressed their willingness to join t he INA. It was repeatedly made clear at various meetings of leaders of the Indian community and of Indian Army officers that the INA would go into action only on the invitation of the Indian National Congress and the people of India. The 1NA was also seen by many as a means of checking the misconduct of the

<s>[INST]45,000 Indian POWs into Mohan Singh’s sphere of influence. By the end of 1942, forty thousand men expressed their willingness to join t he INA. It was repeatedly made clear at various meetings of leaders of the Indian community and of Indian Army officers that the INA would go into action only on the invitation of the Indian National Congress and the people of India. The 1NA was also seen by many as a means of checking the misconduct of the[/INST]

477 | The Quit India Movement and the INA Japanese against Indians in South -East Asia and a bulwark against a future Japanese occupation of India. The outbreak of the Quit India Movement gave a fillip to the [NA as well. Anti -British demonstrat ions were organized in Malaya. On 1 September 1942 the first division of the INA was formed with 16,300 men. The Japanese were by now more amenable to the idea of an armed Indian wing because they were contemplating an Indian invasion. But, by December 194 2, serious differences emerged between the Indian army officers led by Mohan Singh and the Japanese over the role that the INA was to play. Mohan Singh and Niranjan Singh Gill, the senior -most Indian officer to join the INA, were arrested . The Japanese, it turned out, wanted only a token force of 2,000 men, while Mohan Singh wanted to raise an Indian National Army of 20,000 . The second phase of the 1NA began when Subhas Chandra Bose was brought to Singapore on 2 July 1943, by means of German and Japanese s ubmarines. He went to Tokyo and Prime Minister Tojo declared that Japan had no territorial designs on India. Bose returned to Singapore and set up the Provisional Govern ment of Free India on 21 October1943. The Provisional Govern ment then declared war on Britain and the United State and was recognised by the Axis powers and their satellites. Subhas Bose se t up two I NA headquarters, in Rangoon and in Singapore, and began to reorganize the INA. Recruits were sought from civilians, funds were gathered, and ev en a women’s regiment called the Rani J hansi regim ent was formed. On 6 July 1944, Subhas Bose, in a broadcast on Azad Hind Radio addressed to Gandhiji, said: ‘India’s last war of independence has begun. . . Father of our Nation! In this holy war of India’s liberation, we ask for your blessing and good wishes.’ One INA battalion commanded by Shah Nawaz was allowed to accompany the Japanese Army to the Indo -Burma front and

<s>[INST]477 | The Quit India Movement and the INA Japanese against Indians in South -East Asia and a bulwark against a future Japanese occupation of India. The outbreak of the Quit India Movement gave a fillip to the [NA as well. Anti -British demonstrat ions were organized in Malaya. On 1 September 1942 the first division of the INA was formed with 16,300 men. The Japanese were by now more amenable to the idea of an armed Indian wing because they were contemplating an Indian invasion. But, by December 194 2, serious differences emerged between the Indian army officers led by Mohan Singh and the Japanese over the role that the INA was to play. Mohan Singh and Niranjan Singh Gill, the senior -most Indian officer to join the INA, were arrested . The Japanese, it turned out, wanted only a token force of 2,000 men, while Mohan Singh wanted to raise an Indian National Army of 20,000 . The second phase of the 1NA began when Subhas Chandra Bose was brought to Singapore on 2 July 1943, by means of German and Japanese s ubmarines. He went to Tokyo and Prime Minister Tojo declared that Japan had no territorial designs on India. Bose returned to Singapore and set up the Provisional Govern ment of Free India on 21 October1943. The Provisional Govern ment then declared war on Britain and the United State and was recognised by the Axis powers and their satellites. Subhas Bose se t up two I NA headquarters, in Rangoon and in Singapore, and began to reorganize the INA. Recruits were sought from civilians, funds were gathered, and ev en a women’s regiment called the Rani J hansi regim ent was formed. On 6 July 1944, Subhas Bose, in a broadcast on Azad Hind Radio addressed to Gandhiji, said: ‘India’s last war of independence has begun. . . Father of our Nation! In this holy war of India’s liberation, we ask for your blessing and good wishes.’ One INA battalion commanded by Shah Nawaz was allowed to accompany the Japanese Army to the Indo -Burma front and[/INST]

to accompany the Japanese Army to the Indo -Burma front and participate in the Imphal campaign. But the discriminatory treatment which Included being denied rations, arms and being made to do menial work for the Japanese units, completely demoralized the INA men. The failure of the Imphal campaign , and the steady Japanese retreat thereafter, quashed any hop es of the INA liberating the nation. The re treat which began in mid - 1944 continued till mid -1945 and ended only with the final

<s>[INST]to accompany the Japanese Army to the Indo -Burma front and participate in the Imphal campaign. But the discriminatory treatment which Included being denied rations, arms and being made to do menial work for the Japanese units, completely demoralized the INA men. The failure of the Imphal campaign , and the steady Japanese retreat thereafter, quashed any hop es of the INA liberating the nation. The re treat which began in mid - 1944 continued till mid -1945 and ended only with the final[/INST]

478 | India’s Struggle For Independence surrender to the British in South -East Asia. But, when the INA men were brought back home and threatened with serious punishment, a powerful movement was to emerge in thei r defence.

<s>[INST]478 | India’s Struggle For Independence surrender to the British in South -East Asia. But, when the INA men were brought back home and threatened with serious punishment, a powerful movement was to emerge in thei r defence.[/INST]

479 | Post - War National Upsurge CHAPTER 36. POST - WAR NATIONAL UPSURGE The end of World War II marked a dramatic change. From then till the dawn of freedom in 1947 the political stage witnessed a wide spectrum of popular initiative. We are constrained to leave out of our purview the struggles of workers, peasants and people of the native states, which took the form of the country -wide strike wave, the Tebhaga Movement, the Warlis Revolt, the Punjab kisan morchas, the Travancore people’s struggle (espec ially the Punnapra -Vayalar episode) and the Telengana Movement. These movements had an anti -imperialist edge — as the direct oppressors they challenged were also the vested interests that constituted the social support of the Raj — but they did not come in to direct conflict with the colonial regime. We shall confine ourselves to that stream of anti - imperialist activity which directly challenged the legitimacy of British rule and was perceived to be doing so by the colonial authorities. * The end of the War was greeted in India with a vast sigh of relief. Its few benefits such as windfall gains and super -profits for the capitalists and employment opportunities for the middle classes were far outweighed by the ravages and miseries wrought by it. The colony re eled under the heavy yoke of the war effort. Famine, inflation, scarcity, hoarding and black -marketing plagued the land. The heroic action of a leaderless people notwithstanding, the Quit India Movement was snuffled out in eight weeks. Pockets of resistanc e, where the torch was kept ablaze, could not hold out for long. When Congress leaders emerged from jail in mid -June 1945, they expected to find a demoralized people, benumbed by the repression of 1942, bewildered by the absence of leadership and battered by the privations that the War brought. To their

<s>[INST]479 | Post - War National Upsurge CHAPTER 36. POST - WAR NATIONAL UPSURGE The end of World War II marked a dramatic change. From then till the dawn of freedom in 1947 the political stage witnessed a wide spectrum of popular initiative. We are constrained to leave out of our purview the struggles of workers, peasants and people of the native states, which took the form of the country -wide strike wave, the Tebhaga Movement, the Warlis Revolt, the Punjab kisan morchas, the Travancore people’s struggle (espec ially the Punnapra -Vayalar episode) and the Telengana Movement. These movements had an anti -imperialist edge — as the direct oppressors they challenged were also the vested interests that constituted the social support of the Raj — but they did not come in to direct conflict with the colonial regime. We shall confine ourselves to that stream of anti - imperialist activity which directly challenged the legitimacy of British rule and was perceived to be doing so by the colonial authorities. * The end of the War was greeted in India with a vast sigh of relief. Its few benefits such as windfall gains and super -profits for the capitalists and employment opportunities for the middle classes were far outweighed by the ravages and miseries wrought by it. The colony re eled under the heavy yoke of the war effort. Famine, inflation, scarcity, hoarding and black -marketing plagued the land. The heroic action of a leaderless people notwithstanding, the Quit India Movement was snuffled out in eight weeks. Pockets of resistanc e, where the torch was kept ablaze, could not hold out for long. When Congress leaders emerged from jail in mid -June 1945, they expected to find a demoralized people, benumbed by the repression of 1942, bewildered by the absence of leadership and battered by the privations that the War brought. To their[/INST]

480 | India’s Struggle For Independence surprise, they found tumultuous crowds waiting for them, impatient to do something, restless and determinedly anti - British. Repression had steeled the brave and stirred the conscience of the fence -sitter. P olitical energies were surfacing after more than three years of repression and the expectations of the people were now heightened by the release of their leaders. The popular belief was that the release would mark the beginning of a period of rapid politic al progress. Crowds thronged the gates of Almora jail on hearing that Jawaharlal Nehru was to be released. They waited a long while outside Bankura jail where Maulana Azad was lodged. When the Congress Working Committee met, more than half a million people lined the streets of Bombay, braving the rain to welcome their leaders. Similar scenes were witnessed when the leaders went to Simla to attend the conference called by the Viceroy. Villagers from places far away from Simla converged and sat atop trees, wa iting for hours to catch a glimpse of their leaders. The Labour Party, which had come to power in Britain after the War, was in a hurry to settle the Indian problem. As a result the ban on the Congress was lifted and elections declared. People were elated at the prospect of popular ministries and turned out in large numbers at election meetings — 50,000 on an average, and a lakh or so when all India leaders were expected. Nehru, a seasoned campaigner of the 1937 elections, confessed that he had not previou sly seen such crowds, such frenzied excitement. Except in constituencies where nationalist Muslims were put up, candidates did not really need to canvass for votes or spend money. The election results indicated that people had not only flocked to the meeti ngs but had rallied behind the Congress at the ballot -box too. The Congress won over 90 percent of the general seats (including twenty -three of the thirty -six labour

<s>[INST]480 | India’s Struggle For Independence surprise, they found tumultuous crowds waiting for them, impatient to do something, restless and determinedly anti - British. Repression had steeled the brave and stirred the conscience of the fence -sitter. P olitical energies were surfacing after more than three years of repression and the expectations of the people were now heightened by the release of their leaders. The popular belief was that the release would mark the beginning of a period of rapid politic al progress. Crowds thronged the gates of Almora jail on hearing that Jawaharlal Nehru was to be released. They waited a long while outside Bankura jail where Maulana Azad was lodged. When the Congress Working Committee met, more than half a million people lined the streets of Bombay, braving the rain to welcome their leaders. Similar scenes were witnessed when the leaders went to Simla to attend the conference called by the Viceroy. Villagers from places far away from Simla converged and sat atop trees, wa iting for hours to catch a glimpse of their leaders. The Labour Party, which had come to power in Britain after the War, was in a hurry to settle the Indian problem. As a result the ban on the Congress was lifted and elections declared. People were elated at the prospect of popular ministries and turned out in large numbers at election meetings — 50,000 on an average, and a lakh or so when all India leaders were expected. Nehru, a seasoned campaigner of the 1937 elections, confessed that he had not previou sly seen such crowds, such frenzied excitement. Except in constituencies where nationalist Muslims were put up, candidates did not really need to canvass for votes or spend money. The election results indicated that people had not only flocked to the meeti ngs but had rallied behind the Congress at the ballot -box too. The Congress won over 90 percent of the general seats (including twenty -three of the thirty -six labour[/INST]

seats) in the provincial elections while the Muslim League made a similar sweep in the Mus lim constituencies. But, perhaps, the most significant feature of the election campaign was that it sought to mobilize Indians against the British, not merely voters for the elections. This was evident from the two issues which were taken up and made the m ain plank of the election campaign — the repression in 1942 and the Indian National Army trials. The question of official excesses during 1942 was taken up by Congress leaders soon after release from jail. Glorification of

<s>[INST]seats) in the provincial elections while the Muslim League made a similar sweep in the Mus lim constituencies. But, perhaps, the most significant feature of the election campaign was that it sought to mobilize Indians against the British, not merely voters for the elections. This was evident from the two issues which were taken up and made the m ain plank of the election campaign — the repression in 1942 and the Indian National Army trials. The question of official excesses during 1942 was taken up by Congress leaders soon after release from jail. Glorification of[/INST]

481 | Post - War National Upsurge martyrs was one side of the coin , condemnation of official action the other. Congressmen lauded the brave resistance offered by the leaderless people, martyrs’ memorials were erected in many places and relief funds organized for sufferers. Stories of repression were recounted in grim det ail, the officials responsible condemned, often by name, promises of enquires held out, and threats of punishment freely made. While such speeches, which the Government failed to check, had a devastating effect on the morale of the services, that was more alarming for the officials was the rising crescendo of demands for enquiries into official actions. The forthcoming elections were likely to bring the Congress ministries back to power, significantly in those provinces where repression had been most brutal . The U.P. Governor, Wylie, confessed on 19th February, 1946 that officials in U.P. in 1942 ‘used on occasion methods which I cannot condone and which, dragged out in the cold light of 1946, nobody could defend.” The Viceroy concluded that only a ‘gentlema n’s agreement’ with the Congress could resolve the matter. However, the issue which most caught the popular imagination was the fate of the members of Subhas Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army (INA), who were captured by the British in the eastern theatr e of War. An announcement by the Government, limiting trials of the INA personnel to those guilty of brutality or active complicity, was due to be made by the end of August, 1945. However, before this statement could be issued. Nehru raised the demand for leniency at a meeting in Srinagar on 16 August 1945 — making the proposed statement seem a response to his call rather than an act of generosity on the part of the Government. Hailing them as patriots, albeit misguided, Nehru called for their judicious tre atment by the authorities in view of the British promise that ‘big changes’ are impending in

<s>[INST]481 | Post - War National Upsurge martyrs was one side of the coin , condemnation of official action the other. Congressmen lauded the brave resistance offered by the leaderless people, martyrs’ memorials were erected in many places and relief funds organized for sufferers. Stories of repression were recounted in grim det ail, the officials responsible condemned, often by name, promises of enquires held out, and threats of punishment freely made. While such speeches, which the Government failed to check, had a devastating effect on the morale of the services, that was more alarming for the officials was the rising crescendo of demands for enquiries into official actions. The forthcoming elections were likely to bring the Congress ministries back to power, significantly in those provinces where repression had been most brutal . The U.P. Governor, Wylie, confessed on 19th February, 1946 that officials in U.P. in 1942 ‘used on occasion methods which I cannot condone and which, dragged out in the cold light of 1946, nobody could defend.” The Viceroy concluded that only a ‘gentlema n’s agreement’ with the Congress could resolve the matter. However, the issue which most caught the popular imagination was the fate of the members of Subhas Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army (INA), who were captured by the British in the eastern theatr e of War. An announcement by the Government, limiting trials of the INA personnel to those guilty of brutality or active complicity, was due to be made by the end of August, 1945. However, before this statement could be issued. Nehru raised the demand for leniency at a meeting in Srinagar on 16 August 1945 — making the proposed statement seem a response to his call rather than an act of generosity on the part of the Government. Hailing them as patriots, albeit misguided, Nehru called for their judicious tre atment by the authorities in view of the British promise that ‘big changes’ are impending in[/INST]

India. Other Congress leaders soon took up the issue and the AICC at its first post -War session held in Bombay from 21 to 23 September 1945, adopted a strong reso lution declaring its support for the cause. The defence of the INA prisoners was taken up by the Congress and Bhulabhaj Desai, Tej Bahadur Sapru, K.N. Katju, Nehru and Asaf All appeared in court at the historic Red Fort trials. The Congress organised an IN A Relief and Enquiry Committee, which provided small sums of money and food to the men on their release, and attempted, though with marginal success, to secure employment for these men. The

<s>[INST]India. Other Congress leaders soon took up the issue and the AICC at its first post -War session held in Bombay from 21 to 23 September 1945, adopted a strong reso lution declaring its support for the cause. The defence of the INA prisoners was taken up by the Congress and Bhulabhaj Desai, Tej Bahadur Sapru, K.N. Katju, Nehru and Asaf All appeared in court at the historic Red Fort trials. The Congress organised an IN A Relief and Enquiry Committee, which provided small sums of money and food to the men on their release, and attempted, though with marginal success, to secure employment for these men. The[/INST]

482 | India’s Struggle For Independence Congress authorized the Central INA Fund Committee, the Mayor’s Fu nd in Bombay, the AICC and the PCC offices and Sarat Bose to collect funds. The INA question was the main issue highlighted from the Congress platform in meetings held all over the country — in fact, very often it was difficult to distinguish between an INA and an election meeting. In view of Nehru’s early championing of the INA cause and the varied involvement of the Congress later, the oft made charge that the Congress jumped on to the INA bandwagon and merely used the issue as an election stunt does not appear to have any validity. The I NA agitation was a landmark on many counts. Firstly, the high pitch or intensity at which the campaign for the release of INA prisoners was conducted was unprecedented. This was evident from the press coverage and other pu blicity it got, from the threats of revenge that were publicly made and also from the large number of meetings held. Initially, the appeals in the press were for clemency to ‘misguided’ men, but by November 1945, when the first Red Fort trials began, ther e were daily editorials hailing the INA men as the most heroic patriots and criticizing the Government stand. Priority coverage was given to the INA trials and to the [NA campaign, eclipsing international news. Pamphlets, the most popular one being ‘Patrio ts Not Traitors,’ were widely circulated, ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Quit India’ were scrawled on walls of buildings in Ajmer. Posters threatening death to ‘20 English dogs’ for every [NA man sentenced, were pasted all over Delhi. In Banaras, it was declared at a pub lic gathering that ‘if INA men were not saved, revenge would be taken on European children.’ One hundred and sixty political meetings were held in the Central Provinces and Berar alone in the first fortnight of October 1945 where the demand for clemency fo r INA prisoners was raised. INA Day was observed on 12 November and INA Week from 5 to II

<s>[INST]482 | India’s Struggle For Independence Congress authorized the Central INA Fund Committee, the Mayor’s Fu nd in Bombay, the AICC and the PCC offices and Sarat Bose to collect funds. The INA question was the main issue highlighted from the Congress platform in meetings held all over the country — in fact, very often it was difficult to distinguish between an INA and an election meeting. In view of Nehru’s early championing of the INA cause and the varied involvement of the Congress later, the oft made charge that the Congress jumped on to the INA bandwagon and merely used the issue as an election stunt does not appear to have any validity. The I NA agitation was a landmark on many counts. Firstly, the high pitch or intensity at which the campaign for the release of INA prisoners was conducted was unprecedented. This was evident from the press coverage and other pu blicity it got, from the threats of revenge that were publicly made and also from the large number of meetings held. Initially, the appeals in the press were for clemency to ‘misguided’ men, but by November 1945, when the first Red Fort trials began, ther e were daily editorials hailing the INA men as the most heroic patriots and criticizing the Government stand. Priority coverage was given to the INA trials and to the [NA campaign, eclipsing international news. Pamphlets, the most popular one being ‘Patrio ts Not Traitors,’ were widely circulated, ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Quit India’ were scrawled on walls of buildings in Ajmer. Posters threatening death to ‘20 English dogs’ for every [NA man sentenced, were pasted all over Delhi. In Banaras, it was declared at a pub lic gathering that ‘if INA men were not saved, revenge would be taken on European children.’ One hundred and sixty political meetings were held in the Central Provinces and Berar alone in the first fortnight of October 1945 where the demand for clemency fo r INA prisoners was raised. INA Day was observed on 12 November and INA Week from 5 to II[/INST]

Day was observed on 12 November and INA Week from 5 to II November 1945. While 50,000 people would turn out for the larger meetings, the largest meeting was the one held in Deshapriya Park, Calcutta. Organized by the INA Rel ief Committee, it was addressed by Sarat Bose, Nehru and Patel. Estimates of attendance ranged from to two to three lakhs to Nehru’s five to seven Iakhs.

<s>[INST]Day was observed on 12 November and INA Week from 5 to II November 1945. While 50,000 people would turn out for the larger meetings, the largest meeting was the one held in Deshapriya Park, Calcutta. Organized by the INA Rel ief Committee, it was addressed by Sarat Bose, Nehru and Patel. Estimates of attendance ranged from to two to three lakhs to Nehru’s five to seven Iakhs.[/INST]

483 | Post - War National Upsurge The second significant feature of the INA campaign was its wide geographical reach and the participat ion of diverse social groups and political parties. This had two aspects. One was the generally extensive nature of the agitation, the other was the spread of pro -INA sentiment to social groups hitherto outside the nationalist pale. The Director of the Intelligence Bureau Conceded: ‘There has seldom been a matter which has attracted so much Indian public interest, and, it is safe to say, sympathy.’ ‘Anxious enquiries’ and ‘profuse sympathies’ were forthcoming from the ‘remotest villages’ from all men, ‘Irr espective of Caste, colour and creed.’ Nehru confirmed the same: ‘Never before in Indian history had such unified sentiments and feelings been manifested by various divergent sections of the Indian population as it had been done with regard to the question of the Azad Hind Fauj.’ While the cities of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras and the towns of U.P. and Punjab were the nerve centres of the agitation, what was more noteworthy was the spreading of the agitation to places as distant as Coorg, Baluchistan and Assam. Participation was of many kinds — some contributed funds, others attended or organized meetings, shopkeepers downed shutters and political parties and organizations raised the demand for the release of the prisoners. Municipal Committees, Indians abroad and Gurdwara committees subscribed liberally to INA funds. The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar donated Rs 7000 and set aside another Rs 10,000 for relief. The Poona City Municipality, the Kanpur City Fund and a local district board in Madras Presidency cont ributed Rs 1,000 each. More newsworthy contributions were those by film stars in Bombay and Calcutta, by the Cambridge Majlis and the tongawallas of Amraoti. Students, whose role in the campaign was outstanding, held meetings and rallies and boycotted classes

<s>[INST]483 | Post - War National Upsurge The second significant feature of the INA campaign was its wide geographical reach and the participat ion of diverse social groups and political parties. This had two aspects. One was the generally extensive nature of the agitation, the other was the spread of pro -INA sentiment to social groups hitherto outside the nationalist pale. The Director of the Intelligence Bureau Conceded: ‘There has seldom been a matter which has attracted so much Indian public interest, and, it is safe to say, sympathy.’ ‘Anxious enquiries’ and ‘profuse sympathies’ were forthcoming from the ‘remotest villages’ from all men, ‘Irr espective of Caste, colour and creed.’ Nehru confirmed the same: ‘Never before in Indian history had such unified sentiments and feelings been manifested by various divergent sections of the Indian population as it had been done with regard to the question of the Azad Hind Fauj.’ While the cities of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras and the towns of U.P. and Punjab were the nerve centres of the agitation, what was more noteworthy was the spreading of the agitation to places as distant as Coorg, Baluchistan and Assam. Participation was of many kinds — some contributed funds, others attended or organized meetings, shopkeepers downed shutters and political parties and organizations raised the demand for the release of the prisoners. Municipal Committees, Indians abroad and Gurdwara committees subscribed liberally to INA funds. The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar donated Rs 7000 and set aside another Rs 10,000 for relief. The Poona City Municipality, the Kanpur City Fund and a local district board in Madras Presidency cont ributed Rs 1,000 each. More newsworthy contributions were those by film stars in Bombay and Calcutta, by the Cambridge Majlis and the tongawallas of Amraoti. Students, whose role in the campaign was outstanding, held meetings and rallies and boycotted classes[/INST]

from Salem in the south to Rawalpindi in the north. Commercial institutions, shops and markets stopped business on the day the first trial began, 5 November 1945, on NA Day and during NA Week. Demands for release were rais ed at kisan Conferences in Dhamangaon and Shola pur on 16 November 1945 and at the tenth session of the All India Women’s Conference in Hyderabad on 29 December 1945. ‘Even English intellectuals, birds of a year or two’s sojourn in India, were taking a keen interest in the rig hts

<s>[INST]from Salem in the south to Rawalpindi in the north. Commercial institutions, shops and markets stopped business on the day the first trial began, 5 November 1945, on NA Day and during NA Week. Demands for release were rais ed at kisan Conferences in Dhamangaon and Shola pur on 16 November 1945 and at the tenth session of the All India Women’s Conference in Hyderabad on 29 December 1945. ‘Even English intellectuals, birds of a year or two’s sojourn in India, were taking a keen interest in the rig hts[/INST]

484 | India’s Struggle For Independence and wrongs, and the degrees of wrong, of the INA men,’ according to General Tuker of the Eastern Command. Diwali was not celebrated in some areas in sympathy with the NA men. Calcutta Gurdwaras became a campaigning centre for the NA cause. The Muslim League, the Communist Party of India, the Unionist Party, the Akalis, the Justice Party, the Abrars in Rawalpindi, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh League supported the NA cause in varying degrees. The Viceroy noted that ‘all parties have taken the same line though Congress are more vociferous than the others.’ The most notable feature of the INA agitation was the effect it had on the traditional bulwarks of the Raj. Significant sections of Government empl oyees, loyalist sections and even men of the armed forces we re submerged in the tide of pro -INA sentiment. Many officials saw in this a most disquieting trend. The Governor of Northwest Frontier Province warned that ‘every day that passes now brings over m ore and more well - disposed Indians to the anti-British camp’ . The Director of the Intelligence Bureau observed that ‘sympathy for the INA is not the monopoly of those who are ordinarily against Government,’ and that it was ‘usually the case that INA men belonged to families which had traditions of loyalty.’ In Punjab (to which province 48.07 per cent of the INA men released till February 1946 belonged) the return of the released men to their villages’ stimulated interest among groups which had hitherto re mained politically unaffected. Local interest was further fuelled by virtue of many of the INA officers belonging to influential families in the region. P.K. Sehgal, one of the trios tried in the first Red Fort trial, was the son of Dewan Achhru Rain, an e x-Judge of the Punjab High Court. The gentlemen with titles who defended men accused of war time treason did not glorify’ the action of INA men — they appealed to

<s>[INST]484 | India’s Struggle For Independence and wrongs, and the degrees of wrong, of the INA men,’ according to General Tuker of the Eastern Command. Diwali was not celebrated in some areas in sympathy with the NA men. Calcutta Gurdwaras became a campaigning centre for the NA cause. The Muslim League, the Communist Party of India, the Unionist Party, the Akalis, the Justice Party, the Abrars in Rawalpindi, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh League supported the NA cause in varying degrees. The Viceroy noted that ‘all parties have taken the same line though Congress are more vociferous than the others.’ The most notable feature of the INA agitation was the effect it had on the traditional bulwarks of the Raj. Significant sections of Government empl oyees, loyalist sections and even men of the armed forces we re submerged in the tide of pro -INA sentiment. Many officials saw in this a most disquieting trend. The Governor of Northwest Frontier Province warned that ‘every day that passes now brings over m ore and more well - disposed Indians to the anti-British camp’ . The Director of the Intelligence Bureau observed that ‘sympathy for the INA is not the monopoly of those who are ordinarily against Government,’ and that it was ‘usually the case that INA men belonged to families which had traditions of loyalty.’ In Punjab (to which province 48.07 per cent of the INA men released till February 1946 belonged) the return of the released men to their villages’ stimulated interest among groups which had hitherto re mained politically unaffected. Local interest was further fuelled by virtue of many of the INA officers belonging to influential families in the region. P.K. Sehgal, one of the trios tried in the first Red Fort trial, was the son of Dewan Achhru Rain, an e x-Judge of the Punjab High Court. The gentlemen with titles who defended men accused of war time treason did not glorify’ the action of INA men — they appealed to[/INST]

the Government to abandon the trials in the interest of good relations between India and Brit ain. Government officials generally sympathized privately, but there were some instances, as in the Central Provinces and Berar, where railway officials collected finds. The response of the armed forces was unexpectedly sympathetic, belying the official p erception that loyal soldiers were very hostile to the INA ‘traitors’. Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) men in Kohat attended Shah Nawaz’s meetings and army

<s>[INST]the Government to abandon the trials in the interest of good relations between India and Brit ain. Government officials generally sympathized privately, but there were some instances, as in the Central Provinces and Berar, where railway officials collected finds. The response of the armed forces was unexpectedly sympathetic, belying the official p erception that loyal soldiers were very hostile to the INA ‘traitors’. Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) men in Kohat attended Shah Nawaz’s meetings and army[/INST]

485 | Post - War National Upsurge men in UP and Punjab attended INA meetings, often in uniform. RIAF men in Calcutta, Kohat, Allahabad, Bamrauli and Kanpur contributed money for the INA defence, as did other service personnel in U.P. Apart from these instances of overt support, a ‘growing feeling of sympathy for the [NA’ pervaded the Indian army, according to the Commander -in-Chief. He co ncluded that the ‘general opinion in the Army is in favour of leniency’ and recommended to Whitehall that leniency be shown by the Government. Interestingly, the question of the right or wrong of the NA men’s action was never debated. What was in question was the right of Britain to decide a matter concerning Indians. As Nehru often stressed, if the British were sincere in their declaration that Indo-British relations were to be transformed; they should demonstrate their good faith by leaving it to Indians to decide the INA issue. Even the appeals by liberal Indians were made in the interest of good future relations between India and Britain. The British realised this political significance of the INA issue. The Governor of North -West Frontier Province advoc ated that the trials be abandoned, on the ground that with each day the issue became ‘more and more purely Indian versus British.’ The growing nationalist sentiment, that reached a crescendo around the INA trials, developed into violent confrontations with authority in the winter of 1945 -46. There were three upsurges — one on 21 November 1945 in Calcutta over the INA trials; the second on 11 February 1946 in Calcutta to protest against the seven year sentence given to an [NA officer, Rashid Mi; and the third in Bombay of 18 February 1946 when the ratings of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) went on strike. The upsurges followed a fairly similar pattern an initial stage when a group (such as students or ratings) defied authority and was repressed, a second stage when people in the city joined in, and finally a third stage

<s>[INST]485 | Post - War National Upsurge men in UP and Punjab attended INA meetings, often in uniform. RIAF men in Calcutta, Kohat, Allahabad, Bamrauli and Kanpur contributed money for the INA defence, as did other service personnel in U.P. Apart from these instances of overt support, a ‘growing feeling of sympathy for the [NA’ pervaded the Indian army, according to the Commander -in-Chief. He co ncluded that the ‘general opinion in the Army is in favour of leniency’ and recommended to Whitehall that leniency be shown by the Government. Interestingly, the question of the right or wrong of the NA men’s action was never debated. What was in question was the right of Britain to decide a matter concerning Indians. As Nehru often stressed, if the British were sincere in their declaration that Indo-British relations were to be transformed; they should demonstrate their good faith by leaving it to Indians to decide the INA issue. Even the appeals by liberal Indians were made in the interest of good future relations between India and Britain. The British realised this political significance of the INA issue. The Governor of North -West Frontier Province advoc ated that the trials be abandoned, on the ground that with each day the issue became ‘more and more purely Indian versus British.’ The growing nationalist sentiment, that reached a crescendo around the INA trials, developed into violent confrontations with authority in the winter of 1945 -46. There were three upsurges — one on 21 November 1945 in Calcutta over the INA trials; the second on 11 February 1946 in Calcutta to protest against the seven year sentence given to an [NA officer, Rashid Mi; and the third in Bombay of 18 February 1946 when the ratings of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) went on strike. The upsurges followed a fairly similar pattern an initial stage when a group (such as students or ratings) defied authority and was repressed, a second stage when people in the city joined in, and finally a third stage[/INST]

when people in other parts of the country expressed sympathy and solidarity. The first stage began with the students’ and ratings’ challenge to authority and ended in repression. On 21 November 1945, a procession of students, consisting of Forward Bloc sympathizers and joined by Students Federation activists and Islamia College students, marched to Dalhousie Square, the seat of the Government in Calcutta, and refused to disperse. Upon a lathi-charg e., the processionists retaliated with stones and

<s>[INST]when people in other parts of the country expressed sympathy and solidarity. The first stage began with the students’ and ratings’ challenge to authority and ended in repression. On 21 November 1945, a procession of students, consisting of Forward Bloc sympathizers and joined by Students Federation activists and Islamia College students, marched to Dalhousie Square, the seat of the Government in Calcutta, and refused to disperse. Upon a lathi-charg e., the processionists retaliated with stones and[/INST]

486 | India’s Struggle For Independence brickbats which the police, in turn, met with firing and two persons died, while fifty- two were injured. On 11 February 1946, Muslim League students led the procession, Congress and Comm uniist student orga nizations joined in and this time some arrests were made on Dharamatola Street. This provoked the large body of students to defy Section 144 imposed in the Dalhousie Square area and more arrests, in addition to a lathi - charge, ensued. The RIN revolt started on 18 February when 1100 naval ratings of HMIS Ta lwar struck work at Bombay to protest against the treatment meted out to them — flagrant racial discrimination, unpalatable food and abuses to boot. The arrest of B.C. Dutt, a rating, for scrawling ‘Quit India’ on the HMIS Ta lwar, was sorely resented. The next day, ratings from Castle and Fort Barracks joined the strike and on hearing that the HUJS Talwar ratings had been fired upon (which was incorrect) left their posts and went around Bombay in lorries, holding aloft Congress flags. threatening Europeans and policemen and occasionally tweaking a shop window or two. The second stage of these upsurges , when people in the city joined in. was marked by a virulent anti -British mood and resulted in the virtual paralysis of the two great cities of Calcutta and Bombay. Meetings and processions to express sympathy, as also strikes and hartals, were quickly overshadowed by the barricades that came up. the pitched battles fought from housetops and by-lanes, the attacks on Europeans, and the burning of police stations, post offices, shops, tram depots, railway stations, banks, grain shops, and even a YMCA centre. This was the pattern that was visible in all the three cases. The RIN revolt and popular fbry in Bombay al one accounted for, according to official estimates, the destruction of thirty shops, ten post offices, ten police chowkis, sixty-four food grains shops and 200 street lamps. Normal life in the city was completely

<s>[INST]486 | India’s Struggle For Independence brickbats which the police, in turn, met with firing and two persons died, while fifty- two were injured. On 11 February 1946, Muslim League students led the procession, Congress and Comm uniist student orga nizations joined in and this time some arrests were made on Dharamatola Street. This provoked the large body of students to defy Section 144 imposed in the Dalhousie Square area and more arrests, in addition to a lathi - charge, ensued. The RIN revolt started on 18 February when 1100 naval ratings of HMIS Ta lwar struck work at Bombay to protest against the treatment meted out to them — flagrant racial discrimination, unpalatable food and abuses to boot. The arrest of B.C. Dutt, a rating, for scrawling ‘Quit India’ on the HMIS Ta lwar, was sorely resented. The next day, ratings from Castle and Fort Barracks joined the strike and on hearing that the HUJS Talwar ratings had been fired upon (which was incorrect) left their posts and went around Bombay in lorries, holding aloft Congress flags. threatening Europeans and policemen and occasionally tweaking a shop window or two. The second stage of these upsurges , when people in the city joined in. was marked by a virulent anti -British mood and resulted in the virtual paralysis of the two great cities of Calcutta and Bombay. Meetings and processions to express sympathy, as also strikes and hartals, were quickly overshadowed by the barricades that came up. the pitched battles fought from housetops and by-lanes, the attacks on Europeans, and the burning of police stations, post offices, shops, tram depots, railway stations, banks, grain shops, and even a YMCA centre. This was the pattern that was visible in all the three cases. The RIN revolt and popular fbry in Bombay al one accounted for, according to official estimates, the destruction of thirty shops, ten post offices, ten police chowkis, sixty-four food grains shops and 200 street lamps. Normal life in the city was completely[/INST]

200 street lamps. Normal life in the city was completely disrupted. The Communist call for a genera) strike brought lakhs of workers out of their factories into the streets. Hartals by shopkeepers, merchants and hotel -owners and strikes by student workers, both in industry and public transport services almost brought the whole city to a grinding halt. Fo rcible stopping of trains by squatting on rail -tracks, stoning and burning of police and military lorries and barricading of streets did the rest.

<s>[INST]200 street lamps. Normal life in the city was completely disrupted. The Communist call for a genera) strike brought lakhs of workers out of their factories into the streets. Hartals by shopkeepers, merchants and hotel -owners and strikes by student workers, both in industry and public transport services almost brought the whole city to a grinding halt. Fo rcible stopping of trains by squatting on rail -tracks, stoning and burning of police and military lorries and barricading of streets did the rest.[/INST]

487 | Post - War National Upsurge The third phase was characterized by a display of solidarity by people in other parts of the county. Students boycotted classes, hartals and processions were organized to express sympathy with the students and ratings and to condemn official repression. In the RIN revolt, Karachi was a major centre, second only to Bombay. The news reached Karachi on 19 February, upon which the HMIS Hindustan along with one more ship and three shore establishments, went on a lightning strike. Sympathetic token strikes took place in military establishments in Madras. Vishakhapatnam. Calcutta, Delhi, Cochin, Jamnagar, the Andamans, B ahrain and Aden Seventy eight ships and 20 shore establishments, involving 20,000 ratings, were affected. RJAF men went on sympathetic strikes in the Marine Drive, Andheri and Sion areas of Bombay and in Poona, Calcutta, Jessore and Ambala units. Sepoys at Jabalpur went on strike while the Colaba canton ment showed ominous ‘restlessness.’ What was th e significance of these events? There is no doubt that these three upsurges were significant in as much as they gave expression to the militancy in the popular mind. Action, however reckless, was fearless and the crowds which faced police firing by temporarily retreating, only to return to their posts, won the Bengal Governor’s grudging admiration. The RIN revolt remains a legend to this day. When it took place, it had a dramatic impact on popular Consciousness. A revolt in the armed forces, even if soon suppressed, had a great liberating effect on the minds of people. The RIN revolt was seen as an event which marked the end of British rule almost as finally as Independence Day, 1947. But reality and how men perceive that reality often proves to be different, and this was true of these dramatic moments in 1945 -46. Contemporary perceptions and later radical scholarship have infused these historical events with more than a symbolic significance. ’ These events are imbued with

<s>[INST]487 | Post - War National Upsurge The third phase was characterized by a display of solidarity by people in other parts of the county. Students boycotted classes, hartals and processions were organized to express sympathy with the students and ratings and to condemn official repression. In the RIN revolt, Karachi was a major centre, second only to Bombay. The news reached Karachi on 19 February, upon which the HMIS Hindustan along with one more ship and three shore establishments, went on a lightning strike. Sympathetic token strikes took place in military establishments in Madras. Vishakhapatnam. Calcutta, Delhi, Cochin, Jamnagar, the Andamans, B ahrain and Aden Seventy eight ships and 20 shore establishments, involving 20,000 ratings, were affected. RJAF men went on sympathetic strikes in the Marine Drive, Andheri and Sion areas of Bombay and in Poona, Calcutta, Jessore and Ambala units. Sepoys at Jabalpur went on strike while the Colaba canton ment showed ominous ‘restlessness.’ What was th e significance of these events? There is no doubt that these three upsurges were significant in as much as they gave expression to the militancy in the popular mind. Action, however reckless, was fearless and the crowds which faced police firing by temporarily retreating, only to return to their posts, won the Bengal Governor’s grudging admiration. The RIN revolt remains a legend to this day. When it took place, it had a dramatic impact on popular Consciousness. A revolt in the armed forces, even if soon suppressed, had a great liberating effect on the minds of people. The RIN revolt was seen as an event which marked the end of British rule almost as finally as Independence Day, 1947. But reality and how men perceive that reality often proves to be different, and this was true of these dramatic moments in 1945 -46. Contemporary perceptions and later radical scholarship have infused these historical events with more than a symbolic significance. ’ These events are imbued with[/INST]

an unrealized potential and a realized impact which is quite out of touch with reality. A larger than life picture is drawn of their militancy, reach and effectiveness. India is seen to be on the brink of a revolution. The argument goes that the communal unity witnessed during these events could, if built upon, have offered a way out of the communal deadlock. When we examine these upsurges closely we f ind that the form they took, that of an extrem e, direct and violent conflict with

<s>[INST]an unrealized potential and a realized impact which is quite out of touch with reality. A larger than life picture is drawn of their militancy, reach and effectiveness. India is seen to be on the brink of a revolution. The argument goes that the communal unity witnessed during these events could, if built upon, have offered a way out of the communal deadlock. When we examine these upsurges closely we f ind that the form they took, that of an extrem e, direct and violent conflict with[/INST]

488 | India’s Struggle For Independence authority, had certain limitations. Only the most militant sections of society could participate. There was no place for the liberal and conservative groups which had rallied to the INA cause earlier or for the men and w omen of small towns and villages who had formed the backbone of the mass movements in earlier decades. Besides, these upsurges were short -lived, as the tide of popular fury - surged forth, only to subside all too quickly. Interestingly, Calcutta, the scene of tremendous enthusiasm from 11 to 13 February 1946, was relatively quiet during the R IN revolt a week later. One lak h workers went on a one day strike, but the rest of the city, barring the organized working class, remained subdued, despite a seven -thy ratings strike in Calcutta which had to be broken by a siege by troops. In addition, the upheavals were confined to a few urban centres, while the general INA agitation reached the remotest villages. This urban concentration made it easy for the authorities to deploy troops and effectively suppress the upsurge. The communal unity witnessed was more organizational unity than unity of the people. Moreover, the organizations came together only for a specific agitation that lasted a few days, as was the case in Calcutta on the issue of Rashid Mi’s trial. Calcutta, the scene of ‘the almost revolution’ in February 1946, according to Gautam Chattopadhaya”, became the battle ground of communal frenzy only six months later, on 16 August 1946. The communal unity evide nt in the RIN revolt was limited, despite the Congress, League and Communist flags being jointly hoisted on the ships’ masts. Muslim ratings went to the League to seek advice on future action, while the rest went to the Congress and the Socialists; Jinnah’ s advice to surrender was addressed to Muslim ratings alone, who duly heeded It. The view that communal unity forged in the struggles of 1945 - 46 could, if

<s>[INST]488 | India’s Struggle For Independence authority, had certain limitations. Only the most militant sections of society could participate. There was no place for the liberal and conservative groups which had rallied to the INA cause earlier or for the men and w omen of small towns and villages who had formed the backbone of the mass movements in earlier decades. Besides, these upsurges were short -lived, as the tide of popular fury - surged forth, only to subside all too quickly. Interestingly, Calcutta, the scene of tremendous enthusiasm from 11 to 13 February 1946, was relatively quiet during the R IN revolt a week later. One lak h workers went on a one day strike, but the rest of the city, barring the organized working class, remained subdued, despite a seven -thy ratings strike in Calcutta which had to be broken by a siege by troops. In addition, the upheavals were confined to a few urban centres, while the general INA agitation reached the remotest villages. This urban concentration made it easy for the authorities to deploy troops and effectively suppress the upsurge. The communal unity witnessed was more organizational unity than unity of the people. Moreover, the organizations came together only for a specific agitation that lasted a few days, as was the case in Calcutta on the issue of Rashid Mi’s trial. Calcutta, the scene of ‘the almost revolution’ in February 1946, according to Gautam Chattopadhaya”, became the battle ground of communal frenzy only six months later, on 16 August 1946. The communal unity evide nt in the RIN revolt was limited, despite the Congress, League and Communist flags being jointly hoisted on the ships’ masts. Muslim ratings went to the League to seek advice on future action, while the rest went to the Congress and the Socialists; Jinnah’ s advice to surrender was addressed to Muslim ratings alone, who duly heeded It. The view that communal unity forged in the struggles of 1945 - 46 could, if[/INST]

taken further, have averted partition, seems to be based on wishful thinking rather than concrete historical possibility. The ‘unity at the barricades’ did not show this promise. Popular perceptions differ from reality when it comes to the response these upsurges, especially the JUN revolt, evoked from the colonial authorities . It is believed that ‘the RAN revolt shook the mighty British Empire to its foundations.’ In fact these upsurges demonstrated that despite considerable erosion of the morale of the bureaucracy and the steadfastness of the armed

<s>[INST]taken further, have averted partition, seems to be based on wishful thinking rather than concrete historical possibility. The ‘unity at the barricades’ did not show this promise. Popular perceptions differ from reality when it comes to the response these upsurges, especially the JUN revolt, evoked from the colonial authorities . It is believed that ‘the RAN revolt shook the mighty British Empire to its foundations.’ In fact these upsurges demonstrated that despite considerable erosion of the morale of the bureaucracy and the steadfastness of the armed[/INST]

489 | Post - War National Upsurge forces by this time, the British wherewithal to repres s was intact. The soldier -Viceroy, Wavell, gave a clean chit to the army a few days after the naval strike: ‘On the whole, the Indian army has been most commendably steady.” Those who believed that the British would succumb to popular pressure if only it was exerted forcefully were proved wrong. It was one thing for the British Government to question its own stand of holding the INA trials when faced with opposition from the army and the people. It was quite another matter when they faced challenges to thei r authority. Challenges to the peace, the British were clear, had to be repressed. Events in November 1945 in Calcutta had the troops standing by, but the Governor of Bengal preferred to and was able to control the situation with the police. Troops were c alled in on 12 February 1946 in Calcutta and thirty -six civilians were killed in the firing. Similarly, during the JUN revolt, ratings were forced to surrender in Karachi and six of them were killed in the process. Contrary to the popular belief that India n troops in Bombay had refused to fire on their countrymen, it was a Maratha batta lion in Bombay that rounded up the ratings and restored them to their barr acks. In Bombay, troop subdued not only the ratings but also the people, who had earlier supported the ratings with food and s ympathy and later joined them in paralyzing Bombay. The British Prime Minister, Attlee , announced in the House of Commons that Royal Navy ships were on their way to Bombay A dmiral Godfrey, of the RIN gave the ratings a stem ultima tum after which troop s circled the ships and bombers were flown over them The Amrita Bazar Patrika referred to the virtual steel ring around Bombay. Two hundred aid twenty eight civilians died in Bombay while 1046 were injured . The corollary to the above argument is the att ribution of the sending of Cabinet Mission to the Imp act of the RIN revolt. R.P.

<s>[INST]489 | Post - War National Upsurge forces by this time, the British wherewithal to repres s was intact. The soldier -Viceroy, Wavell, gave a clean chit to the army a few days after the naval strike: ‘On the whole, the Indian army has been most commendably steady.” Those who believed that the British would succumb to popular pressure if only it was exerted forcefully were proved wrong. It was one thing for the British Government to question its own stand of holding the INA trials when faced with opposition from the army and the people. It was quite another matter when they faced challenges to thei r authority. Challenges to the peace, the British were clear, had to be repressed. Events in November 1945 in Calcutta had the troops standing by, but the Governor of Bengal preferred to and was able to control the situation with the police. Troops were c alled in on 12 February 1946 in Calcutta and thirty -six civilians were killed in the firing. Similarly, during the JUN revolt, ratings were forced to surrender in Karachi and six of them were killed in the process. Contrary to the popular belief that India n troops in Bombay had refused to fire on their countrymen, it was a Maratha batta lion in Bombay that rounded up the ratings and restored them to their barr acks. In Bombay, troop subdued not only the ratings but also the people, who had earlier supported the ratings with food and s ympathy and later joined them in paralyzing Bombay. The British Prime Minister, Attlee , announced in the House of Commons that Royal Navy ships were on their way to Bombay A dmiral Godfrey, of the RIN gave the ratings a stem ultima tum after which troop s circled the ships and bombers were flown over them The Amrita Bazar Patrika referred to the virtual steel ring around Bombay. Two hundred aid twenty eight civilians died in Bombay while 1046 were injured . The corollary to the above argument is the att ribution of the sending of Cabinet Mission to the Imp act of the RIN revolt. R.P.[/INST]

Dutt had yoked the two together many years ago – On February 18 the Bombay Naval strike began. On 19 February, Attlee in the House of Commons announced the decision to desp atch the Cabinet mission.’ This is obviously untenable. The decision to send out the mission was taken by the British Cabinet on 22 January 1946 and even as announcement on 19 February 1946 had been slated a week earlier . Others have explai ned the

<s>[INST]Dutt had yoked the two together many years ago – On February 18 the Bombay Naval strike began. On 19 February, Attlee in the House of Commons announced the decision to desp atch the Cabinet mission.’ This is obviously untenable. The decision to send out the mission was taken by the British Cabinet on 22 January 1946 and even as announcement on 19 February 1946 had been slated a week earlier . Others have explai ned the[/INST]

490 | India’s Struggle For Independence willingness of the British to make substantial political concessions at this point of time to the combined impact of the popu lar militant struggles. However, as we shall see in the next chapter , the B ritish decision to transfer power was not merely a response to the immed iate situation preva iling in the winter of 1945 -46, but a result of their rea lization that their legitimacy to rule had been irrevocably eroded over the years . The relationship between these upsurges and the Congress is seen as one of opposition, or at best dissociation. These agitations are believed to have been led by the Communists, the S ociali sts or Forward Blocists or all of them together. The Congress role is seen as one of defusing the revolutionary situation, prompted by its fear that the situation would go out of its control or by the concern that disciplined armed forces were vital in the free India that the party would rule soon The Congress is seen to be immersed in negotiations and ministry-making and hankering for power. The belief is that if the Congress leaders had not surrendered to their desire for power, a different path to independence would have emerged. In our view, the three upsurges were an extension of the earlier nationalist activity with which the Congress w as integrally associated. It was the strong anti -imperialist sentiment fostered by the Congress through its election campaign, its advocacy of the INA cause and its highlighting of the excesses of 1942 that found expression in the three upsurges that took place between November 1945 and February 1946. The Home Department’s provincial level enquiry into the causes of these ‘disturbances’ came to the conclusion that they were the outcome of the ‘inflammatory atmosphere created by the intemperate speeches of Congress leaders in the last three months.’ The Viceroy had no doubt that the primary cause of the REN ‘mutiny’ was the

<s>[INST]490 | India’s Struggle For Independence willingness of the British to make substantial political concessions at this point of time to the combined impact of the popu lar militant struggles. However, as we shall see in the next chapter , the B ritish decision to transfer power was not merely a response to the immed iate situation preva iling in the winter of 1945 -46, but a result of their rea lization that their legitimacy to rule had been irrevocably eroded over the years . The relationship between these upsurges and the Congress is seen as one of opposition, or at best dissociation. These agitations are believed to have been led by the Communists, the S ociali sts or Forward Blocists or all of them together. The Congress role is seen as one of defusing the revolutionary situation, prompted by its fear that the situation would go out of its control or by the concern that disciplined armed forces were vital in the free India that the party would rule soon The Congress is seen to be immersed in negotiations and ministry-making and hankering for power. The belief is that if the Congress leaders had not surrendered to their desire for power, a different path to independence would have emerged. In our view, the three upsurges were an extension of the earlier nationalist activity with which the Congress w as integrally associated. It was the strong anti -imperialist sentiment fostered by the Congress through its election campaign, its advocacy of the INA cause and its highlighting of the excesses of 1942 that found expression in the three upsurges that took place between November 1945 and February 1946. The Home Department’s provincial level enquiry into the causes of these ‘disturbances’ came to the conclusion that they were the outcome of the ‘inflammatory atmosphere created by the intemperate speeches of Congress leaders in the last three months.’ The Viceroy had no doubt that the primary cause of the REN ‘mutiny’ was the[/INST]

doubt that the primary cause of the REN ‘mutiny’ was the ‘speeches of Congress leaders since September last.” In fact, the Punjab CID authorities warned the Director of the Intelligence Bureau o f the ‘considerable danger,’ while dealing with the Communists, ‘of putting the cart before the horse and of failing to recognize Congress as the main enemy. ’ These three upsurges were distinguishable from the activity preceding them because the form of ar ticulation of protest was different. They took the form of a violent, flagrant challenge to authority. The earlier activity was a peaceful demonstration of

<s>[INST]doubt that the primary cause of the REN ‘mutiny’ was the ‘speeches of Congress leaders since September last.” In fact, the Punjab CID authorities warned the Director of the Intelligence Bureau o f the ‘considerable danger,’ while dealing with the Communists, ‘of putting the cart before the horse and of failing to recognize Congress as the main enemy. ’ These three upsurges were distinguishable from the activity preceding them because the form of ar ticulation of protest was different. They took the form of a violent, flagrant challenge to authority. The earlier activity was a peaceful demonstration of[/INST]

491 | Post - War National Upsurge nationalist solidarity. One was an explosion, the other a groundswell. The Congress did not give th e call for these upsurges; in fact, no political organization did. People rallied in sympathy with the students and ratings as well as to voice their anger at the repression that was let loose. Individual Congressmen participated actively as did individual Communists and others. Student sympathizers of the Congress, the Congress Socialist Party, the Forward Bloc and the Communist Party of India jointly led the 21 November 1945 demonstration in Calcutta. The Congress lauded the spirit of the people and conde mned the repression by the Government. It did not officially support these struggles as it felt their tactics and timing were wrong. It was evident to Congress leaders that the Government was able and determined to repress. Vallabhbhai Patel asked the rati ngs to surrender because he saw the British mobilization for repression in Bombay. He wrote to Nehru on 22 February 1946: ‘The overpowering force of both naval and military personnel gathered here is so strong that they can be exterminated altogether and they have been also threatened with such a contingency.’2° Congress leaders were not the only ones who felt the need to restore peace. Communists joined hands with Congressmen in advising the people of Calcutta in November 1945 and February 1946 to return t o their homes. Communist and Congress peace vans did the rounds of Karachi during the JUN revolt. The contention that ‘fear of popular excesses made Congress leaders cling to the path of negotiations and compromise, and eventually even accept Partition as a necessary price,’ has little validity. Negotiations were an integral part of Congress strategy, a possibility which had to be exhausted before a mass movement was launched. As late as 22 September 1945 this had been reiterated in a resolution on Congres s policy passed by the AICC: ‘The method of negotiation and conciliation

<s>[INST]491 | Post - War National Upsurge nationalist solidarity. One was an explosion, the other a groundswell. The Congress did not give th e call for these upsurges; in fact, no political organization did. People rallied in sympathy with the students and ratings as well as to voice their anger at the repression that was let loose. Individual Congressmen participated actively as did individual Communists and others. Student sympathizers of the Congress, the Congress Socialist Party, the Forward Bloc and the Communist Party of India jointly led the 21 November 1945 demonstration in Calcutta. The Congress lauded the spirit of the people and conde mned the repression by the Government. It did not officially support these struggles as it felt their tactics and timing were wrong. It was evident to Congress leaders that the Government was able and determined to repress. Vallabhbhai Patel asked the rati ngs to surrender because he saw the British mobilization for repression in Bombay. He wrote to Nehru on 22 February 1946: ‘The overpowering force of both naval and military personnel gathered here is so strong that they can be exterminated altogether and they have been also threatened with such a contingency.’2° Congress leaders were not the only ones who felt the need to restore peace. Communists joined hands with Congressmen in advising the people of Calcutta in November 1945 and February 1946 to return t o their homes. Communist and Congress peace vans did the rounds of Karachi during the JUN revolt. The contention that ‘fear of popular excesses made Congress leaders cling to the path of negotiations and compromise, and eventually even accept Partition as a necessary price,’ has little validity. Negotiations were an integral part of Congress strategy, a possibility which had to be exhausted before a mass movement was launched. As late as 22 September 1945 this had been reiterated in a resolution on Congres s policy passed by the AICC: ‘The method of negotiation and conciliation[/INST]

which is the keynote of peaceful policy can never be abandoned by the Congress, no matter how grave may be the provocation, any more than can that of non -cooperation , complete or modi fied. Hence the guiding maxim of the Congress must remain: negotiations and settlement when possible and non -cooperation and direct action when necessary.’

<s>[INST]which is the keynote of peaceful policy can never be abandoned by the Congress, no matter how grave may be the provocation, any more than can that of non -cooperation , complete or modi fied. Hence the guiding maxim of the Congress must remain: negotiations and settlement when possible and non -cooperation and direct action when necessary.’[/INST]

492 | India’s Struggle For Independence In 1946, exploring the o ption of negotiation before launching a movement was seen to be crucial sin ce the British were likely to leave India within two to five years, according to Nehru. The Secretary of State’s New Year statement and the British Prime Minister’s announcement of the decision to send a Cabinet Mission on 19 February 1946 spoke of Indian independence coming soon. However, pressure had to be kept up on the British to reach a settlement and to this end preparedness for a movement (built steadily through 1945 by refurbishing the organization, electioneering and spearheading the [NA agitation) was sought to be maintained. But the card of negotiation was to be, played first, that of mass movement was to be held in reserve. Gandhiji, in three statements that he published in Harm, on 3 March 1946, indicated the perils of the path that had been recently taken by the people. ‘It is a matter of great relief that the ratings have listened to Sardar Patel’s advice to surrender. They have not surrendered their honour. So far as I can see, in resorting to mutiny they were badly advised. If it was for grievance, fancied or real, they should have waited for the guidance and intervention of political leaders of their choice. If they mutinied for the freedom of India, they were doubly wrong. They could not do so without a call from a prepared revolutionary party. They were thoughtless and igno.ant, if they bel ieved that by their might they would deliver India from foreign domination... ‘Lokamanya Tilak has taught us that Home Rule or Swaraj is our birthright. That Swaraj is not to be obtained by what is going on now in Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi... ‘They who incited the mutineers did not know what they were doing. The latter were bound to submit ultimately. . . Aruna would “rather unite Hindus and Muslims at the barricade than on the constitution front.” Even in terms of violence, this is a

<s>[INST]492 | India’s Struggle For Independence In 1946, exploring the o ption of negotiation before launching a movement was seen to be crucial sin ce the British were likely to leave India within two to five years, according to Nehru. The Secretary of State’s New Year statement and the British Prime Minister’s announcement of the decision to send a Cabinet Mission on 19 February 1946 spoke of Indian independence coming soon. However, pressure had to be kept up on the British to reach a settlement and to this end preparedness for a movement (built steadily through 1945 by refurbishing the organization, electioneering and spearheading the [NA agitation) was sought to be maintained. But the card of negotiation was to be, played first, that of mass movement was to be held in reserve. Gandhiji, in three statements that he published in Harm, on 3 March 1946, indicated the perils of the path that had been recently taken by the people. ‘It is a matter of great relief that the ratings have listened to Sardar Patel’s advice to surrender. They have not surrendered their honour. So far as I can see, in resorting to mutiny they were badly advised. If it was for grievance, fancied or real, they should have waited for the guidance and intervention of political leaders of their choice. If they mutinied for the freedom of India, they were doubly wrong. They could not do so without a call from a prepared revolutionary party. They were thoughtless and igno.ant, if they bel ieved that by their might they would deliver India from foreign domination... ‘Lokamanya Tilak has taught us that Home Rule or Swaraj is our birthright. That Swaraj is not to be obtained by what is going on now in Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi... ‘They who incited the mutineers did not know what they were doing. The latter were bound to submit ultimately. . . Aruna would “rather unite Hindus and Muslims at the barricade than on the constitution front.” Even in terms of violence, this is a[/INST]

misleading proposition. If the union at the barricade is honest there must be union also at the constitutional front. Fighters do not always live at the barricade. They are too wise to commit suicide. The barricade life has always to be followed by the constitutional. That front is not taboo for ever. ‘Gandhiji went on to outline the path that should be followed by the nation: ‘Emphatically it betrays want of foresight to disbelieve British declarations and precipitate a qua rrel in anticipation. Is the official deputation coming to deceive a great nation? It is neither

<s>[INST]misleading proposition. If the union at the barricade is honest there must be union also at the constitutional front. Fighters do not always live at the barricade. They are too wise to commit suicide. The barricade life has always to be followed by the constitutional. That front is not taboo for ever. ‘Gandhiji went on to outline the path that should be followed by the nation: ‘Emphatically it betrays want of foresight to disbelieve British declarations and precipitate a qua rrel in anticipation. Is the official deputation coming to deceive a great nation? It is neither[/INST]

493 | Post - War National Upsurge manly or womanly to think so. What would be lost by waiting? Let the official deputation prove for the last time that British declarations are unreliable. The nation will gain by trusting. The deceiver loses when there is correct response from the deceived . . . The rulers have declared their intention to ‘quit’ in favour of Indian rule. ‘But the nation too has to play the game. If it does, the barricade must b e left aside, at least for the time being.’

<s>[INST]493 | Post - War National Upsurge manly or womanly to think so. What would be lost by waiting? Let the official deputation prove for the last time that British declarations are unreliable. The nation will gain by trusting. The deceiver loses when there is correct response from the deceived . . . The rulers have declared their intention to ‘quit’ in favour of Indian rule. ‘But the nation too has to play the game. If it does, the barricade must b e left aside, at least for the time being.’[/INST]

494 | India’s Struggle For Independence CHAPTER 37. FREEDOM AND PARTITION The contradictory nature of the reality of 15 August 1947 continues to intrigue historians and torment people on both sides of the border to this day. A hard-earned, p rized freedom was won after long, glorious years of struggle but a bloody, tragic Partition rent asunder the fabric of the emerging free nation. Two questions arise. Why did the British finally quit? Why was Partition accepted by the Congre ss? The imperialist answer is that independence was simply the fulfilment of Britain’s self -appointed mission to assist the Indian people to self - government. Partition was the unfortunate consequence of the age old Hindu -Muslim rift, of the two communiti es’ failure to agree on how and to whom power was to be transferred. The radical view is that independence was finally wrested by the mass actions of 1946 -47 in which many Communists participated, often as leaders. But the bourgeois leaders of the Congress , frightened by the revolutionary upsurge struck a deal with the imperialist power by which power was transferred to them and the nation paid the price of Partition. These visions of noble design or revolutionary intent frustrated by traditional religious conflict or worldly profit, attractive as they may seem, blur, rather than illumine, th e sombre reality. In fact, the Independence -Partition duality reflects the success -failure dichotomy of the anti -imperialist movement led by the Congress. The Congress had a two -fold task: structuring diverse classes, communities, groups and regions into a nation and securing independence from the British rulers for this emerging nation. While the Congress succeeded in building up nationalist consciousness sufficient to exert pressure on the British to quit India, it could not complete the task of welding the nation and particularly failed to integrate the Muslims into this nation. It is this contradiction — the success

<s>[INST]494 | India’s Struggle For Independence CHAPTER 37. FREEDOM AND PARTITION The contradictory nature of the reality of 15 August 1947 continues to intrigue historians and torment people on both sides of the border to this day. A hard-earned, p rized freedom was won after long, glorious years of struggle but a bloody, tragic Partition rent asunder the fabric of the emerging free nation. Two questions arise. Why did the British finally quit? Why was Partition accepted by the Congre ss? The imperialist answer is that independence was simply the fulfilment of Britain’s self -appointed mission to assist the Indian people to self - government. Partition was the unfortunate consequence of the age old Hindu -Muslim rift, of the two communiti es’ failure to agree on how and to whom power was to be transferred. The radical view is that independence was finally wrested by the mass actions of 1946 -47 in which many Communists participated, often as leaders. But the bourgeois leaders of the Congress , frightened by the revolutionary upsurge struck a deal with the imperialist power by which power was transferred to them and the nation paid the price of Partition. These visions of noble design or revolutionary intent frustrated by traditional religious conflict or worldly profit, attractive as they may seem, blur, rather than illumine, th e sombre reality. In fact, the Independence -Partition duality reflects the success -failure dichotomy of the anti -imperialist movement led by the Congress. The Congress had a two -fold task: structuring diverse classes, communities, groups and regions into a nation and securing independence from the British rulers for this emerging nation. While the Congress succeeded in building up nationalist consciousness sufficient to exert pressure on the British to quit India, it could not complete the task of welding the nation and particularly failed to integrate the Muslims into this nation. It is this contradiction — the success[/INST]

and failure of the national movement — which is refl ected in the other contradiction — independence, but with it Partition.

<s>[INST]and failure of the national movement — which is refl ected in the other contradiction — independence, but with it Partition.[/INST]

495 | Freedom and Partition * The success of the nationalist forces in the struggle for hegemony over Indian society was fairly evident by the end of the War. The British rulers had won the war against Hitler, b ut lost the one in India. The space occupied by the national movement was far larger than that over which the Raj cast its shadow. Hitherto unpoliticized areas and apolitical groups had fallen in line with the rest of the country in the agitation over the INA trials. As seen in the previous chapter, men in the armed forces and bureaucracy openly attended meetings, contributed money, voted for the Congress and let it be known that they were doing so. The militancy of the politicized sections was evident in t he heroic actions of 1942 and in the fearlessness with which students and others expressed their 3Olidarity with INA and RIN men. The success of the nationalist movement could be plotted on a graph of swelling crowds, wide reach, and deep intensity of nationalist sentiment and the nationalist fervour of the people. A corresponding graph could also be drawn of the demoralization of the British officials and the changing loyalties of Indian officials and loyalists, which would tell the same story of national ist success, but differently. In this tale, nationalism would not come across as a force, whose overwhelming presence left no place for the British. Rather, it would show the concrete way in which the national movement eroded imperialist hegemony, gnawed a t the pillars of the colonial structure and reduced British political strategy to a mess of contradictions.’ An important point to be noted is that British rule was maintained in part on the basis of the consent or at least acquiescence of many sections o f the Indian people. The social base of the colonial regime was among the zamindars and upper classes etc., the ‘loyalists’ who received the main share of British favours and offices. These were the Indians who manned the

<s>[INST]495 | Freedom and Partition * The success of the nationalist forces in the struggle for hegemony over Indian society was fairly evident by the end of the War. The British rulers had won the war against Hitler, b ut lost the one in India. The space occupied by the national movement was far larger than that over which the Raj cast its shadow. Hitherto unpoliticized areas and apolitical groups had fallen in line with the rest of the country in the agitation over the INA trials. As seen in the previous chapter, men in the armed forces and bureaucracy openly attended meetings, contributed money, voted for the Congress and let it be known that they were doing so. The militancy of the politicized sections was evident in t he heroic actions of 1942 and in the fearlessness with which students and others expressed their 3Olidarity with INA and RIN men. The success of the nationalist movement could be plotted on a graph of swelling crowds, wide reach, and deep intensity of nationalist sentiment and the nationalist fervour of the people. A corresponding graph could also be drawn of the demoralization of the British officials and the changing loyalties of Indian officials and loyalists, which would tell the same story of national ist success, but differently. In this tale, nationalism would not come across as a force, whose overwhelming presence left no place for the British. Rather, it would show the concrete way in which the national movement eroded imperialist hegemony, gnawed a t the pillars of the colonial structure and reduced British political strategy to a mess of contradictions.’ An important point to be noted is that British rule was maintained in part on the basis of the consent or at least acquiescence of many sections o f the Indian people. The social base of the colonial regime was among the zamindars and upper classes etc., the ‘loyalists’ who received the main share of British favours and offices. These were the Indians who manned the[/INST]

favours and offices. These were the Indians who manned the administration, supported governme nt policy and worked the reforms the British reluctantly and belatedly introduced. The British also secured the consent of the people to their rule by successfully getting them to believe in British justice and fairplay, accept the British officer as the mai-baap of his people, and appreciate the prevalence of Pax Brittanica. Few genuinely

<s>[INST]favours and offices. These were the Indians who manned the administration, supported governme nt policy and worked the reforms the British reluctantly and belatedly introduced. The British also secured the consent of the people to their rule by successfully getting them to believe in British justice and fairplay, accept the British officer as the mai-baap of his people, and appreciate the prevalence of Pax Brittanica. Few genuinely[/INST]

496 | India’s Struggle For Independence believed in ‘Angrezi Raj ki Barkaten’, but it sufficed for the British if people were impressed by the aura of stolidity the Raj exuded and concluded that its foundations were unshakable. The Raj to a large extent ran on prestige and the embodiment of this prestige was the district officer who belonged to the Indian Civil Service (ICS), the ‘heaven -born service’ much vaunted as ‘the steel frame of the Raj.’ When the loyal ists began to jump overboard, when prestige was rocked, when the district officer and secretariat official left the helm, it became clear that the ship was sinking, and sinking fast. It was the result of years of ravage wrought from two quarters — the rot within and the battering without. Paucity of European recruits to the ICS, combined with a policy of Indianization (partly conceded in response to popular demand) , ended British domination of the ICS as early as the First World War. By 1939 British and In dian members had achieved parity. Overall recruitment was first cut in order to maintain this balance, and later stopped in 1943. Between 1940 and 1946, the total number of ICS officials fell from 1201 to 939, that of British ICS officials from 587 to 429 and Indian ICS officials from 614 to 510. By 1946, only 19 British ICS officials were available in Bengal for 65 posts.2 Besides, the men coming in were no longer Oxbridge graduates from aristocratic families whose fathers and uncles were ‘old India hands’ and who believed m the destiny of the British nation to govern the ‘child -people’ of India. They were increasingly grammar school and polytechnic boys for whom serving the Raj was a career, not a mission. The War had compounded the problem. By 1945, war -weariness was acute and long absences from home were telling on morale. Economic worries had set in because of inflation. Many were due to retire, others were expected to seek premature retirement. It

<s>[INST]496 | India’s Struggle For Independence believed in ‘Angrezi Raj ki Barkaten’, but it sufficed for the British if people were impressed by the aura of stolidity the Raj exuded and concluded that its foundations were unshakable. The Raj to a large extent ran on prestige and the embodiment of this prestige was the district officer who belonged to the Indian Civil Service (ICS), the ‘heaven -born service’ much vaunted as ‘the steel frame of the Raj.’ When the loyal ists began to jump overboard, when prestige was rocked, when the district officer and secretariat official left the helm, it became clear that the ship was sinking, and sinking fast. It was the result of years of ravage wrought from two quarters — the rot within and the battering without. Paucity of European recruits to the ICS, combined with a policy of Indianization (partly conceded in response to popular demand) , ended British domination of the ICS as early as the First World War. By 1939 British and In dian members had achieved parity. Overall recruitment was first cut in order to maintain this balance, and later stopped in 1943. Between 1940 and 1946, the total number of ICS officials fell from 1201 to 939, that of British ICS officials from 587 to 429 and Indian ICS officials from 614 to 510. By 1946, only 19 British ICS officials were available in Bengal for 65 posts.2 Besides, the men coming in were no longer Oxbridge graduates from aristocratic families whose fathers and uncles were ‘old India hands’ and who believed m the destiny of the British nation to govern the ‘child -people’ of India. They were increasingly grammar school and polytechnic boys for whom serving the Raj was a career, not a mission. The War had compounded the problem. By 1945, war -weariness was acute and long absences from home were telling on morale. Economic worries had set in because of inflation. Many were due to retire, others were expected to seek premature retirement. It[/INST]

was a vastly -depleted, war -weary bureaucracy, battered b y the 1942 movement that remained. However, much more than manpower shortage, it was the coming to the fore of contradictions in the British strategy of countering nationalism that debilitated the ICS and the Raj. The British had relied over the years on a twin policy of conciliation and repression to contain the growing national movement. But after the Cripps Offer of 1942, there was little left to be offered as

<s>[INST]was a vastly -depleted, war -weary bureaucracy, battered b y the 1942 movement that remained. However, much more than manpower shortage, it was the coming to the fore of contradictions in the British strategy of countering nationalism that debilitated the ICS and the Raj. The British had relied over the years on a twin policy of conciliation and repression to contain the growing national movement. But after the Cripps Offer of 1942, there was little left to be offered as[/INST]

497 | Freedom and Partition a concession except transfer of power — full freedom itself. But the strategy of the national movement, of a multi -faceted struggle combining non -violent mass movement with working Constitutional reforms proved to be more than a match for them. When non -violent movements were met with repression, the naked force behind the government stood exposed, whereas if government did not clamp down on ‘sedition,’ or effected a truce (as in 1931 when the Gandhi -Irwin Pact was signed) or conceded provincial autonomy under the Government of India Act 1935, it was seen to be too weak to wield control and its auth ority and prestige were undermined. On the other hand, the brutal repression of the 1942 movement offended the sensibilities of both liberals and loyalists. So did the government’s refusal to release Gandhi, even when he seemed close to death during his 21 day fast in February -March 1943, and its decision to go ahead with the INA trials despite fervent appeals from liberals and loyalists to abandon them. The friends of the British were upset when the Government appeared to be placating its enemies — as in 1945-46, when it was believed that the Government was wooing the Congress into a settlement and into joining the government. The powerlessness of those in authority dismayed loyalists. Officials stood by, while the violence of Congress speeches rent the air . This shook the faith of the loyalists in the might of the ‘Raj.’ If the loyalists’ crisis was one of faith, the services’ dilemma was that of action. Action could be decisive only if policy was clear-cut — repression or conciliation — not both. The poli cy mix could not but create problems when the same set of officials had to implement both poles of policy. This dilemma first arose in the mid-1930s when officials were worried by the prospect of popular ministries as the Congressmen they repressed during the Civil Disobedience Movement were likely to become their political

<s>[INST]497 | Freedom and Partition a concession except transfer of power — full freedom itself. But the strategy of the national movement, of a multi -faceted struggle combining non -violent mass movement with working Constitutional reforms proved to be more than a match for them. When non -violent movements were met with repression, the naked force behind the government stood exposed, whereas if government did not clamp down on ‘sedition,’ or effected a truce (as in 1931 when the Gandhi -Irwin Pact was signed) or conceded provincial autonomy under the Government of India Act 1935, it was seen to be too weak to wield control and its auth ority and prestige were undermined. On the other hand, the brutal repression of the 1942 movement offended the sensibilities of both liberals and loyalists. So did the government’s refusal to release Gandhi, even when he seemed close to death during his 21 day fast in February -March 1943, and its decision to go ahead with the INA trials despite fervent appeals from liberals and loyalists to abandon them. The friends of the British were upset when the Government appeared to be placating its enemies — as in 1945-46, when it was believed that the Government was wooing the Congress into a settlement and into joining the government. The powerlessness of those in authority dismayed loyalists. Officials stood by, while the violence of Congress speeches rent the air . This shook the faith of the loyalists in the might of the ‘Raj.’ If the loyalists’ crisis was one of faith, the services’ dilemma was that of action. Action could be decisive only if policy was clear-cut — repression or conciliation — not both. The poli cy mix could not but create problems when the same set of officials had to implement both poles of policy. This dilemma first arose in the mid-1930s when officials were worried by the prospect of popular ministries as the Congressmen they repressed during the Civil Disobedience Movement were likely to become their political[/INST]

Disobedience Movement were likely to become their political masters in the provincial Ministries. This prospect soon became a reality in eight provinces. Constitutionalism wrecked services morale as effectively as the mass movement before it, th ough this is seldom realized. If fear of authority was exorcised by mass non -violent action, confidence was gained because of ‘Congress Raj.’ People could not fail to notice that the British Chief Secretary in Madras took to wearing khadi or that the Reven ue Secretary in Bombay, on

<s>[INST]Disobedience Movement were likely to become their political masters in the provincial Ministries. This prospect soon became a reality in eight provinces. Constitutionalism wrecked services morale as effectively as the mass movement before it, th ough this is seldom realized. If fear of authority was exorcised by mass non -violent action, confidence was gained because of ‘Congress Raj.’ People could not fail to notice that the British Chief Secretary in Madras took to wearing khadi or that the Reven ue Secretary in Bombay, on[/INST]

498 | India’s Struggle For Independence tour with the Revenue Minister, Morarji Desai, would scurry across the railway platform from his first -class compartment to the latter’s third -class carriage so that the Honourable Minister my not be kept waiting. Among Indian of ficials disloyalty was not evident, but where loyalty to the Raj was paraded earlier, ‘it was the done thing to parade one’s patriotism and, if possible, a third cousin twice removed who had been to jail in the civil disobedience movement.” But most impor tantly, the likelihood of Congress returning to power became a consideration with officials when dealing with subsequent Congress agitations. There was no refusal to carry out orders, but in some p laces this consideration resulted in half - hearted action ag ainst the individual disobedience movement in U.P. in 1940 and even against the 1942 rebels in East UP and Bihar. But action was generally harsh in 1942 and this was to create concrete entanglements between repression and conciliation at the end of the War when Congressmen were released and provincial Ministries were again on the cards. Morale of officials nosedived when Congressmen’s demands for enquiries and calls for revenge were not proceeded against on the ground that some latitude had to be allowed du ring electioneering. The previous Viceroy, Linlithgow, had pledged that there would be no enquiries, but the services had little faith in the Government’s ability to withstand Congress pressure. The then Viceroy, Wave ll, confessed that enquiries were the m ost difficult issue posed by the formation of provincial Ministries. By the end of the War, the portents were clear to those officials and policy -makers who understood the dynamics of power and authority. The demand for leniency to [NA men from within the army and the revolt in a section of the RJN further conveyed to the far -sighted officials, as much as a full -scale mutiny would to others more brashly confident, that the storm

<s>[INST]498 | India’s Struggle For Independence tour with the Revenue Minister, Morarji Desai, would scurry across the railway platform from his first -class compartment to the latter’s third -class carriage so that the Honourable Minister my not be kept waiting. Among Indian of ficials disloyalty was not evident, but where loyalty to the Raj was paraded earlier, ‘it was the done thing to parade one’s patriotism and, if possible, a third cousin twice removed who had been to jail in the civil disobedience movement.” But most impor tantly, the likelihood of Congress returning to power became a consideration with officials when dealing with subsequent Congress agitations. There was no refusal to carry out orders, but in some p laces this consideration resulted in half - hearted action ag ainst the individual disobedience movement in U.P. in 1940 and even against the 1942 rebels in East UP and Bihar. But action was generally harsh in 1942 and this was to create concrete entanglements between repression and conciliation at the end of the War when Congressmen were released and provincial Ministries were again on the cards. Morale of officials nosedived when Congressmen’s demands for enquiries and calls for revenge were not proceeded against on the ground that some latitude had to be allowed du ring electioneering. The previous Viceroy, Linlithgow, had pledged that there would be no enquiries, but the services had little faith in the Government’s ability to withstand Congress pressure. The then Viceroy, Wave ll, confessed that enquiries were the m ost difficult issue posed by the formation of provincial Ministries. By the end of the War, the portents were clear to those officials and policy -makers who understood the dynamics of power and authority. The demand for leniency to [NA men from within the army and the revolt in a section of the RJN further conveyed to the far -sighted officials, as much as a full -scale mutiny would to others more brashly confident, that the storm[/INST]

mutiny would to others more brashly confident, that the storm brewing this time may prove irrepressible. The structure was still intact, but it was feared that the services and armed forces may not be reliable if Congress started a mass movement of the 1942 type after the elections, which provincial Ministries would aid, not control. The Viceroy summed up the prospect: ‘We could still probably suppress such a revoke’ but ‘we have nothing to put in its place and should be driven to an almost entirely official rule,

<s>[INST]mutiny would to others more brashly confident, that the storm brewing this time may prove irrepressible. The structure was still intact, but it was feared that the services and armed forces may not be reliable if Congress started a mass movement of the 1942 type after the elections, which provincial Ministries would aid, not control. The Viceroy summed up the prospect: ‘We could still probably suppress such a revoke’ but ‘we have nothing to put in its place and should be driven to an almost entirely official rule,[/INST]

499 | Freedom and Partition for which the necessary numbers of efficient officials do not exist.’ Once it was recognized that British rule could not survive on the old basis for long, a graceful withdrawal from India, to be effected after a settlement had been reached on the modalities of transfer of power and the nature of the post -imperial relationship between Britain and India, became the overarching aim of Br itish policy -makers.’ The British Government was clear that a settlement was a must both for good future relations and to bury the ghost of a mass movement. Since failure could not be afforded, the concessions had to be such as would largely meet Congress demands. With the Congress demand being that the British quit India, the Cabinet Mission went out to India in March 1946 to negotiate the setting up of a national government and to set into motion a machinery for transfer of power. It was not an empty gest ure like the Cripps Mission in 1942 — the Cabinet Mission was prepared for a long stay. The situation seemed ripe for a settlement as the imperialist rulers were cognisant of the necessity of a settlement and the nationalist leaders were willing to negoti ate with them. But rivers of blood were to flow before Indian independence, tacitly accepted in early 1946, became a reality in mid 1947. By early 1946 the imperialism nationalism conflict, being resolved in principle, receded from the spotlight. The stage was then taken over by the warring conceptions of the post -imperial order held by the British, the Congress and the Muslim League. The Congress demand was for transfer of power to one centre, with minorities’ demands being worked out in a framework rangi ng from autonomy to Muslim provinces to self - determination on secession from the Indian Union — but after the British left. The British bid was for a united India, friendly with Britain and an active partner in Commonwealth defence. It was believed that a divided India would lack depth in defence,

<s>[INST]499 | Freedom and Partition for which the necessary numbers of efficient officials do not exist.’ Once it was recognized that British rule could not survive on the old basis for long, a graceful withdrawal from India, to be effected after a settlement had been reached on the modalities of transfer of power and the nature of the post -imperial relationship between Britain and India, became the overarching aim of Br itish policy -makers.’ The British Government was clear that a settlement was a must both for good future relations and to bury the ghost of a mass movement. Since failure could not be afforded, the concessions had to be such as would largely meet Congress demands. With the Congress demand being that the British quit India, the Cabinet Mission went out to India in March 1946 to negotiate the setting up of a national government and to set into motion a machinery for transfer of power. It was not an empty gest ure like the Cripps Mission in 1942 — the Cabinet Mission was prepared for a long stay. The situation seemed ripe for a settlement as the imperialist rulers were cognisant of the necessity of a settlement and the nationalist leaders were willing to negoti ate with them. But rivers of blood were to flow before Indian independence, tacitly accepted in early 1946, became a reality in mid 1947. By early 1946 the imperialism nationalism conflict, being resolved in principle, receded from the spotlight. The stage was then taken over by the warring conceptions of the post -imperial order held by the British, the Congress and the Muslim League. The Congress demand was for transfer of power to one centre, with minorities’ demands being worked out in a framework rangi ng from autonomy to Muslim provinces to self - determination on secession from the Indian Union — but after the British left. The British bid was for a united India, friendly with Britain and an active partner in Commonwealth defence. It was believed that a divided India would lack depth in defence,[/INST]

was believed that a divided India would lack depth in defence, frustrate joint defence plans and be a blot on Britain’s diplomacy. Pakistan was not seen by Britain as her natural future ally, as the Government’s policy of fostering the League ever since its inception in 1906 and the alignment today between Pakistan and the Western imperialist bloc may suggest.

<s>[INST]was believed that a divided India would lack depth in defence, frustrate joint defence plans and be a blot on Britain’s diplomacy. Pakistan was not seen by Britain as her natural future ally, as the Government’s policy of fostering the League ever since its inception in 1906 and the alignment today between Pakistan and the Western imperialist bloc may suggest.[/INST]

500 | India’s Struggle For Independence British policy in 1946 clearly reflected this preference for a united India, in sharp contrast to earlier declarations. Attlee’s 15 March 1946 statement that a ‘minorit y will not be allowed to place a veto on the progress of the majority’ was a far cry from Wavell’s allowing Jinnah to wreck the Simla Conference in June - July 1945 by his insistence on nominating all Muslims. The Cabinet Mission was convinced that Pakistan was not viable and that the minorities’ autonomy must somehow be safeguarded within the framework of a united India. The Mission Plan conceived three sections, A — comprising Madras, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, C.P. and Orissa; B — consisting of Punjab, NWFP and Sind; and C — of Bengal a nd Assam — which would meet separately to decide on group constitutions. There would be a common centre controlling defence, foreign affairs and communications. After the first general elections a province could come out o f a group. After ten years a province could call for a reconsideration of the group or union constitution. Congress wanted that a province need not wait till the first elections to leave a group, it should have the option not to join it in the first place. It had Congress - ruled provinces of Assam and NWFP (which were in Sections C and B respectively) in mind when it raised this question. The League wanted provinces to have the right to question the union constitution now, not wait for ten years. There was obviously a problem in that the Mission Plan was ambivalent on whether grouping was compulsory or optional. It declared that grouping was optional but sections were compulsory. This was a contradiction, which rather than removing, the Mission deliberately quibbled about in the hope of somehow reconciling the irreconcilable. The Congress and League interpreted the Mission Plan in their own way, both seeing it as a confirmation of their stand. Thus, Patel maintained that the Mission’s Plan was against

<s>[INST]500 | India’s Struggle For Independence British policy in 1946 clearly reflected this preference for a united India, in sharp contrast to earlier declarations. Attlee’s 15 March 1946 statement that a ‘minorit y will not be allowed to place a veto on the progress of the majority’ was a far cry from Wavell’s allowing Jinnah to wreck the Simla Conference in June - July 1945 by his insistence on nominating all Muslims. The Cabinet Mission was convinced that Pakistan was not viable and that the minorities’ autonomy must somehow be safeguarded within the framework of a united India. The Mission Plan conceived three sections, A — comprising Madras, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, C.P. and Orissa; B — consisting of Punjab, NWFP and Sind; and C — of Bengal a nd Assam — which would meet separately to decide on group constitutions. There would be a common centre controlling defence, foreign affairs and communications. After the first general elections a province could come out o f a group. After ten years a province could call for a reconsideration of the group or union constitution. Congress wanted that a province need not wait till the first elections to leave a group, it should have the option not to join it in the first place. It had Congress - ruled provinces of Assam and NWFP (which were in Sections C and B respectively) in mind when it raised this question. The League wanted provinces to have the right to question the union constitution now, not wait for ten years. There was obviously a problem in that the Mission Plan was ambivalent on whether grouping was compulsory or optional. It declared that grouping was optional but sections were compulsory. This was a contradiction, which rather than removing, the Mission deliberately quibbled about in the hope of somehow reconciling the irreconcilable. The Congress and League interpreted the Mission Plan in their own way, both seeing it as a confirmation of their stand. Thus, Patel maintained that the Mission’s Plan was against[/INST]

Thus, Patel maintained that the Mission’s Plan was against Pakist an, that the League’s veto was gone and that one Constituent Assembly was envisaged. The League announced its acceptance of the Plan on 6 June in so far as the basis of Pakistan was implied in the Mission’s plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping. Nehru asserted the Congress working Committee’s particular interpretation of the plan in his speech to the AICC on 7 July 1946: ‘We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly.’ The implication was that the Ass embly was sovereign and would

<s>[INST]Thus, Patel maintained that the Mission’s Plan was against Pakist an, that the League’s veto was gone and that one Constituent Assembly was envisaged. The League announced its acceptance of the Plan on 6 June in so far as the basis of Pakistan was implied in the Mission’s plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping. Nehru asserted the Congress working Committee’s particular interpretation of the plan in his speech to the AICC on 7 July 1946: ‘We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly.’ The implication was that the Ass embly was sovereign and would[/INST]

501 | Freedom and Partition decide rules of procedure. Jinnah seized the opportunity provided by Nehru’s speech to withdraw the League’s acceptance of the Mission Plan on 29th July, 1946. The dilemma before the Government was whether to go ahead and for m the Interim Government wi th the Congress or await League agreement to the plan. Wavell, who had opted for the second course at the Simla Conference a year earlier, preferred to do the same again. But His Majesty’s Government , especially the Secretary of State , argued that it was vital to get Congress cooperation. Thus, the Interim Government was formed on 2nd September 1946 with Congress members alone with Nehru as de facto head. This was against the League’s insistence that all settlements be acceptable to it. The British in 1946, in keeping with their s trategi c interests in the post -independence Indian subcontinent, took up a stance different from their earlier posture of encouraging communal forces and denying the legitimacy of nationalism and the repre sentative nature of the Congress. Continuance of rule had demanded one stance, withdrawal and post -imperial links dictated a contrary posture. However, Jinnah had no intention of allowing the British to break w ith their past. His thinly veiled threat to A ttlee that he should ‘avoid compelling the Muslims to shed their blood... (by a) surrender to the Congress had already been sent out and the weapon of Direct Action forged. Jin nah had become ‘answerable to the wider electorate of the streets.” With the bat tle cry, Lekar rahenge Pakistan , Larke lenge Pakistan . Muslim communal groups provoked communal frenzy in Calcutta 16 August 1946. Hindu communal groups retaliated in equal measure and the cost was 5000 lives lost. The British authorities were worried that they had lost control over the ‘Frankenstein monster’ they had helped to create but fe lt it was too late to tame it. They were frightened into appeasing the League by Jinnah’s

<s>[INST]501 | Freedom and Partition decide rules of procedure. Jinnah seized the opportunity provided by Nehru’s speech to withdraw the League’s acceptance of the Mission Plan on 29th July, 1946. The dilemma before the Government was whether to go ahead and for m the Interim Government wi th the Congress or await League agreement to the plan. Wavell, who had opted for the second course at the Simla Conference a year earlier, preferred to do the same again. But His Majesty’s Government , especially the Secretary of State , argued that it was vital to get Congress cooperation. Thus, the Interim Government was formed on 2nd September 1946 with Congress members alone with Nehru as de facto head. This was against the League’s insistence that all settlements be acceptable to it. The British in 1946, in keeping with their s trategi c interests in the post -independence Indian subcontinent, took up a stance different from their earlier posture of encouraging communal forces and denying the legitimacy of nationalism and the repre sentative nature of the Congress. Continuance of rule had demanded one stance, withdrawal and post -imperial links dictated a contrary posture. However, Jinnah had no intention of allowing the British to break w ith their past. His thinly veiled threat to A ttlee that he should ‘avoid compelling the Muslims to shed their blood... (by a) surrender to the Congress had already been sent out and the weapon of Direct Action forged. Jin nah had become ‘answerable to the wider electorate of the streets.” With the bat tle cry, Lekar rahenge Pakistan , Larke lenge Pakistan . Muslim communal groups provoked communal frenzy in Calcutta 16 August 1946. Hindu communal groups retaliated in equal measure and the cost was 5000 lives lost. The British authorities were worried that they had lost control over the ‘Frankenstein monster’ they had helped to create but fe lt it was too late to tame it. They were frightened into appeasing the League by Jinnah’s[/INST]

it. They were frightened into appeasing the League by Jinnah’s ability to unleash civil war. Wavell quickly brought the League into the Inter im Government on 26 October 1946 though it had not accepted either the short or long term provisions of the Cabinet Mission Plan and had not given up its policy of Direct Action. The Secretary of State argued that without the League’s presence in the Gover nment civil war would have been inevitable. Jinnah had succeeded in keeping the British in his grip.

<s>[INST]it. They were frightened into appeasing the League by Jinnah’s ability to unleash civil war. Wavell quickly brought the League into the Inter im Government on 26 October 1946 though it had not accepted either the short or long term provisions of the Cabinet Mission Plan and had not given up its policy of Direct Action. The Secretary of State argued that without the League’s presence in the Gover nment civil war would have been inevitable. Jinnah had succeeded in keeping the British in his grip.[/INST]

502 | India’s Struggle For Independence The Congress demand that the British get the League to modify its attitude in the Interim Government or quit was voiced almost from the tine the League me mbers were sworn in. Except Liaqat Ali Khan, all the League nominees were second -raters, indicating that what was at stake was power, not responsibility to run the country. Jinnah had realized that it was fatal to leave the administration in Congress hands and had sought a foothold in the Government to fight for Pakistan. For him, the Interim Government was the continuation of civil war by other means. League ministers questioned actions taken by Congress members, including appointments made, and refused t o attend the informal meetings which Neh ru had devised as a means of arriving at decisions without reference to Wavell . Their disruptionist tactics convinced Congress leaders of the futility of the Interim Government as an exercise in Congress -League coope ration But they held on till 5th February 1947 when nine members of the Interim Government wrote to the Viceroy demanding that the League members resign. The League’s demand for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly that had met for the first time on 9th December 1946 had proved to be the last straw. Earlier it had refused to join the constituent Assembly despite assurances from His Majesty’s Government in their 6th December 1946 statement that the League’s interpretation of grouping was the correct o ne. A direct bid for Pakistan, rather than through the Mission Plan, seemed to be the card Jinnah now sought to play. This developing crisis was temporarily defused by the statement made by Attlee in Parliament on 20 February, 1947, The date for British w ithdrawal from India was fixed as 30 June 1948 and the appointment of a new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, was announced. The hope was that the date would shock the parties into agreement on the main question and avert the

<s>[INST]502 | India’s Struggle For Independence The Congress demand that the British get the League to modify its attitude in the Interim Government or quit was voiced almost from the tine the League me mbers were sworn in. Except Liaqat Ali Khan, all the League nominees were second -raters, indicating that what was at stake was power, not responsibility to run the country. Jinnah had realized that it was fatal to leave the administration in Congress hands and had sought a foothold in the Government to fight for Pakistan. For him, the Interim Government was the continuation of civil war by other means. League ministers questioned actions taken by Congress members, including appointments made, and refused t o attend the informal meetings which Neh ru had devised as a means of arriving at decisions without reference to Wavell . Their disruptionist tactics convinced Congress leaders of the futility of the Interim Government as an exercise in Congress -League coope ration But they held on till 5th February 1947 when nine members of the Interim Government wrote to the Viceroy demanding that the League members resign. The League’s demand for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly that had met for the first time on 9th December 1946 had proved to be the last straw. Earlier it had refused to join the constituent Assembly despite assurances from His Majesty’s Government in their 6th December 1946 statement that the League’s interpretation of grouping was the correct o ne. A direct bid for Pakistan, rather than through the Mission Plan, seemed to be the card Jinnah now sought to play. This developing crisis was temporarily defused by the statement made by Attlee in Parliament on 20 February, 1947, The date for British w ithdrawal from India was fixed as 30 June 1948 and the appointment of a new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, was announced. The hope was that the date would shock the parties into agreement on the main question and avert the[/INST]

parties into agreement on the main question and avert the constitutional crisis that threatened . Besides, Indians would be finally convinced that the British were sincere about conceding independence, however, both these hopes were introduced into the terminal date notion after it had been accepted. The basic reason why the Attlee Government accepte d the need for a final date was because they could not deny the truth of Wavell’s assessment that an irreversible decline of Government authority had taken place. They could dismiss the Viceroy, on the ground that he was pessimistic, which they d id in the most discourteous

<s>[INST]parties into agreement on the main question and avert the constitutional crisis that threatened . Besides, Indians would be finally convinced that the British were sincere about conceding independence, however, both these hopes were introduced into the terminal date notion after it had been accepted. The basic reason why the Attlee Government accepte d the need for a final date was because they could not deny the truth of Wavell’s assessment that an irreversible decline of Government authority had taken place. They could dismiss the Viceroy, on the ground that he was pessimistic, which they d id in the most discourteous[/INST]

503 | Freedom and Partition mann er possible. The news was common gossip in New Delhi before Wavell was even informed of it. But they could not dismiss the truth of what he said. So the 20 February statement was really an acceptance of the dismissed Viceroy, Wavell’s reading of the Indian situation. The anticipation of freedom from imperial rule lifted the gloom that had set in with continuous internal wrangling. The statement was enthusiastically received in Congress circles as a final proof of British sincerity to quit. Partition of the country was implied in the proviso that if the Constituent Assembly was not fully representative (i.e. if Muslim majority provinces did not join) power would be transferred to more than one central Government. But even this was accep table to the Congress as it meant that the existing Assembly could go ahead and frame a constitution for the areas represented in it. It offered a way out of the existing deadlock, in which the League not only refused to join the Constituent Assembly but d emanded that it be dissolved. Nehru appealed to Liaqat All Khan: ‘The British are fading out of the picture and the burden of this decision must rest on all of us here. It seems desirable that we should face this question squarely and not speak to each other from a distance.’ There seemed some chance of fulfilment of Attlee’s hopes that the date would force the two political parties in India to come together.’ This was an illusory hope, for Jinnah was more convinced than ever that he only had to bide his time in order to reach his goal. This is precisely what Conservative members of Parliament had warned would happen, in the contentious debate that followi ng the 20th February statement. Godfrey Nicolson had said of Cripps’ speech — ‘if ever there was a spee ch which was a direct invitation to the Muslim League to stick their toes in and hold out for Pakistan that was one.” The Punjab Governor, Evan Jenkins

<s>[INST]503 | Freedom and Partition mann er possible. The news was common gossip in New Delhi before Wavell was even informed of it. But they could not dismiss the truth of what he said. So the 20 February statement was really an acceptance of the dismissed Viceroy, Wavell’s reading of the Indian situation. The anticipation of freedom from imperial rule lifted the gloom that had set in with continuous internal wrangling. The statement was enthusiastically received in Congress circles as a final proof of British sincerity to quit. Partition of the country was implied in the proviso that if the Constituent Assembly was not fully representative (i.e. if Muslim majority provinces did not join) power would be transferred to more than one central Government. But even this was accep table to the Congress as it meant that the existing Assembly could go ahead and frame a constitution for the areas represented in it. It offered a way out of the existing deadlock, in which the League not only refused to join the Constituent Assembly but d emanded that it be dissolved. Nehru appealed to Liaqat All Khan: ‘The British are fading out of the picture and the burden of this decision must rest on all of us here. It seems desirable that we should face this question squarely and not speak to each other from a distance.’ There seemed some chance of fulfilment of Attlee’s hopes that the date would force the two political parties in India to come together.’ This was an illusory hope, for Jinnah was more convinced than ever that he only had to bide his time in order to reach his goal. This is precisely what Conservative members of Parliament had warned would happen, in the contentious debate that followi ng the 20th February statement. Godfrey Nicolson had said of Cripps’ speech — ‘if ever there was a spee ch which was a direct invitation to the Muslim League to stick their toes in and hold out for Pakistan that was one.” The Punjab Governor, Evan Jenkins[/INST]

for Pakistan that was one.” The Punjab Governor, Evan Jenkins was equally emphatic — ‘the statement will be regarded as the prelude to the final communal showdown,’ w ith everyone out to ‘seize as much power as they can — if necessary by force.” Jenkins’ prophecy took immediate shape with the League launching civil disobedience in Punjab and bringing down the Unionist Akali - Congress coalition ministry led by Khi zr Haya t Khan. Wavell wrote in his diary on 13th March 1941 -- ‘Khizr’s resignation was prompted largely by the statement of February 20.’

<s>[INST]for Pakistan that was one.” The Punjab Governor, Evan Jenkins was equally emphatic — ‘the statement will be regarded as the prelude to the final communal showdown,’ w ith everyone out to ‘seize as much power as they can — if necessary by force.” Jenkins’ prophecy took immediate shape with the League launching civil disobedience in Punjab and bringing down the Unionist Akali - Congress coalition ministry led by Khi zr Haya t Khan. Wavell wrote in his diary on 13th March 1941 -- ‘Khizr’s resignation was prompted largely by the statement of February 20.’[/INST]

504 | India’s Struggle For Independence This was the situation in which Mountbatten came to India as Viceroy. He was the last Viceroy and charged with the task of winding up the Raj by 30th June 1948. Mountbatten has claimed to have introduced the time limit into the 20 February settlement: ‘I made the great point about it. I had thought of the time and I had great difficulty in bringing him (Attlee) upto it. . I think the time limit was fundamental. I believe if I’d gone out without a time limit, I’d still be there.” This is so obviously untrue that it should need no refutation, but Lapierre and Collins in Freedom at Midnight and others have passed off as history Mountbatten’s self -proclamations of determining history single - handedly. The idea of a fixed date was o riginally Wavell’s, 31 March 1948 being the date by which he expected a stage of responsibility without power to set in. Attlee thought mid -1948 should b e the date aimed at. Mountbatten insisted it be a calendar date and got 30th June 1948. Mountbatten’s claim of having plenipotentiary powers, such that he need make no reference b ack to London, is equally misleading. It is true that he had more independen ce than the Viceroys preceding him and his views were given due consideration by the Labour Government. Yet he referred bac k to London at each stage of the evolution of his Plan, sent his aide Ismay to London and finally went himself to get Attlee and his Cabinet to agree to the 3rd June Plan. Mountbatten had a clear cut directive from His Majesty’s Government, he did not write his own ticket, as he has claimed. He was directed to explore the options of unity and division till October, 1947 after which he was to advise His Majesty’s Government on the form transfer of power should take. Here again he soon discovered that he had little real choice. The broad contours of the scenario that was to emerge were discernible even before he came out. Mountbatten foun d out within two months of

<s>[INST]504 | India’s Struggle For Independence This was the situation in which Mountbatten came to India as Viceroy. He was the last Viceroy and charged with the task of winding up the Raj by 30th June 1948. Mountbatten has claimed to have introduced the time limit into the 20 February settlement: ‘I made the great point about it. I had thought of the time and I had great difficulty in bringing him (Attlee) upto it. . I think the time limit was fundamental. I believe if I’d gone out without a time limit, I’d still be there.” This is so obviously untrue that it should need no refutation, but Lapierre and Collins in Freedom at Midnight and others have passed off as history Mountbatten’s self -proclamations of determining history single - handedly. The idea of a fixed date was o riginally Wavell’s, 31 March 1948 being the date by which he expected a stage of responsibility without power to set in. Attlee thought mid -1948 should b e the date aimed at. Mountbatten insisted it be a calendar date and got 30th June 1948. Mountbatten’s claim of having plenipotentiary powers, such that he need make no reference b ack to London, is equally misleading. It is true that he had more independen ce than the Viceroys preceding him and his views were given due consideration by the Labour Government. Yet he referred bac k to London at each stage of the evolution of his Plan, sent his aide Ismay to London and finally went himself to get Attlee and his Cabinet to agree to the 3rd June Plan. Mountbatten had a clear cut directive from His Majesty’s Government, he did not write his own ticket, as he has claimed. He was directed to explore the options of unity and division till October, 1947 after which he was to advise His Majesty’s Government on the form transfer of power should take. Here again he soon discovered that he had little real choice. The broad contours of the scenario that was to emerge were discernible even before he came out. Mountbatten foun d out within two months of[/INST]

his arrival that more flogging would not push the Cabinet Mission Plan forward. I t was a dead horse. Jinnah was obdurate that the Muslims would settle for nothing less than a sovereign state. Mountbatten found himself unable to m ove Jinnah from this stand: ‘He gave the impression that he was not listening. He was impossible to argue with... He was, whatever was said, intent on his Pakistan.”

<s>[INST]his arrival that more flogging would not push the Cabinet Mission Plan forward. I t was a dead horse. Jinnah was obdurate that the Muslims would settle for nothing less than a sovereign state. Mountbatten found himself unable to m ove Jinnah from this stand: ‘He gave the impression that he was not listening. He was impossible to argue with... He was, whatever was said, intent on his Pakistan.”[/INST]

505 | Freedom and Partition The British could keep India united only if they gave up their role as mediators trying to effect a solution Indians had agreed upon. Unity needed positive intervention in its favour, including putting down communal elements with a firm hand. This they chose not to do. Attlee wrote later — ‘We would have preferred a United India. We couldn’t get it, though we tried hard.” They in fact took the easy way out. A serious attempt at retaining unity would involve identifying with the forces that wanted a unified India and countering those who opposed it. Rather than doing that, they preferred to woo bo th sides into friendly collaboration with Britain on strategic and defence issues. The British preference for a united Indian subcontinent that would be a strong ally in Commonwealth defence was modified to two dominions, both of which would be Britain’s allies and together serve the purpose a united India was expected to do. The poser now was, how was friendship of both India and Pakistan to be secured? Mountbatten’s formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity. The country would be partitioned bu t so would Punjab and Bengal, so that the limited Pakistan that emerged would meet both the Congress and League’s positions to some extent. The League’s position on Pakistan was conceded to the extent that it would be created, but the Congress position on unity would be taken into account to make Pakistan as small as possible. Since Congress were asked to concede their main point i.e. a unified India, all their other points would be met. Whether it was ruling out independence for the princes or unity for Be ngal or Hyderabad’s joining up with Pakistan instead of India, Mountbatten firmly supported C ongress on these issues. He got His Majesty’s Government to agree to his argument that Congress goodwill was vital if India was to remain in the commonwealth . The Mountbatten Plan, as the 3rd June, 1947 Plan came to

<s>[INST]505 | Freedom and Partition The British could keep India united only if they gave up their role as mediators trying to effect a solution Indians had agreed upon. Unity needed positive intervention in its favour, including putting down communal elements with a firm hand. This they chose not to do. Attlee wrote later — ‘We would have preferred a United India. We couldn’t get it, though we tried hard.” They in fact took the easy way out. A serious attempt at retaining unity would involve identifying with the forces that wanted a unified India and countering those who opposed it. Rather than doing that, they preferred to woo bo th sides into friendly collaboration with Britain on strategic and defence issues. The British preference for a united Indian subcontinent that would be a strong ally in Commonwealth defence was modified to two dominions, both of which would be Britain’s allies and together serve the purpose a united India was expected to do. The poser now was, how was friendship of both India and Pakistan to be secured? Mountbatten’s formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity. The country would be partitioned bu t so would Punjab and Bengal, so that the limited Pakistan that emerged would meet both the Congress and League’s positions to some extent. The League’s position on Pakistan was conceded to the extent that it would be created, but the Congress position on unity would be taken into account to make Pakistan as small as possible. Since Congress were asked to concede their main point i.e. a unified India, all their other points would be met. Whether it was ruling out independence for the princes or unity for Be ngal or Hyderabad’s joining up with Pakistan instead of India, Mountbatten firmly supported C ongress on these issues. He got His Majesty’s Government to agree to his argument that Congress goodwill was vital if India was to remain in the commonwealth . The Mountbatten Plan, as the 3rd June, 1947 Plan came to[/INST]

The Mountbatten Plan, as the 3rd June, 1947 Plan came to be known, sought to effect an early transfer of power on the basis of Dominion Status to two successor states , India and Pakistan. Congress was willing to accept Dominion Status for a while because it f elt it must assume full power immediately and meet boldly the explosive situation in the country. As Nehru put it, Murder stalks the streets and the most amazing cruelties are indulged in by both the individual and the mob.” Besides Dominion Status gave br eathing time to the new administration as British officers and civil service officials could stay on for a

<s>[INST]The Mountbatten Plan, as the 3rd June, 1947 Plan came to be known, sought to effect an early transfer of power on the basis of Dominion Status to two successor states , India and Pakistan. Congress was willing to accept Dominion Status for a while because it f elt it must assume full power immediately and meet boldly the explosive situation in the country. As Nehru put it, Murder stalks the streets and the most amazing cruelties are indulged in by both the individual and the mob.” Besides Dominion Status gave br eathing time to the new administration as British officers and civil service officials could stay on for a[/INST]

506 | India’s Struggle For Independence while and let Indians settle in easier into their ne w positions of authority. For Britain, Dominion Status offered a chance of keeping India in the C ommonwealth, even if temporarily, a prize not to be spurned. Though Jinnah offered to bring Pakistan into the Commonwealth, a greater store was laid by India’s membership of the Commonwealth, as India’s economic strength and defence potential were deemed s ounder and Britain had a greater value of trade and Investment there. The rationale for the early date for transfer of power, 15th August 1947 as securing Congress agreement to Dominion Status. The additional benefit was that the British could escape responsibility for the rapidly deteriorating communal situation. As it is, some officials were more than happy to pack their bags and leave the Indian s to stew in their own juice. As Patel said to the Viceroy, the situation was one where you won’t go vern yours elf, and you won’t let us govern.” Mountbatten was to defend his advancing the date to 15th A ugust, 1947 on the ground that things w ould have blown up under their feet had they not got out when th ey did. Ismay, the Viceroy’s Chief of Staff, felt that Augus t, 1947 was too late, rather than too early. From the British point of view, a hasty retreat was perhaps the most suitable action. That does not make it the inevitable option, as Mountbatten and Ismay would have us believe. Despite the stea dy erosion of g overnment authority, the situation of responsibility w ithout power was still a prospect rather than a reality. In the short term the British could assert their authority, but did not care to, as Kripalani, then Congress President, pertinently pointed out t o Mountbatten.’ Moreover, the situation, rather than warranting withdrawal of authority, cried out for someone to wield it. If abdication of responsibility was callous, the speed with which it was done made it worse. The seventy -two day timetable,

<s>[INST]506 | India’s Struggle For Independence while and let Indians settle in easier into their ne w positions of authority. For Britain, Dominion Status offered a chance of keeping India in the C ommonwealth, even if temporarily, a prize not to be spurned. Though Jinnah offered to bring Pakistan into the Commonwealth, a greater store was laid by India’s membership of the Commonwealth, as India’s economic strength and defence potential were deemed s ounder and Britain had a greater value of trade and Investment there. The rationale for the early date for transfer of power, 15th August 1947 as securing Congress agreement to Dominion Status. The additional benefit was that the British could escape responsibility for the rapidly deteriorating communal situation. As it is, some officials were more than happy to pack their bags and leave the Indian s to stew in their own juice. As Patel said to the Viceroy, the situation was one where you won’t go vern yours elf, and you won’t let us govern.” Mountbatten was to defend his advancing the date to 15th A ugust, 1947 on the ground that things w ould have blown up under their feet had they not got out when th ey did. Ismay, the Viceroy’s Chief of Staff, felt that Augus t, 1947 was too late, rather than too early. From the British point of view, a hasty retreat was perhaps the most suitable action. That does not make it the inevitable option, as Mountbatten and Ismay would have us believe. Despite the stea dy erosion of g overnment authority, the situation of responsibility w ithout power was still a prospect rather than a reality. In the short term the British could assert their authority, but did not care to, as Kripalani, then Congress President, pertinently pointed out t o Mountbatten.’ Moreover, the situation, rather than warranting withdrawal of authority, cried out for someone to wield it. If abdication of responsibility was callous, the speed with which it was done made it worse. The seventy -two day timetable,[/INST]

3rd Jun e to 15th August 1947, for both transfer of power and division of the country, was to prove disastrous. Senior officials in India like the Punjab Governor, Jenkins and the Commander - in-Chief, Auchinleck, felt that peaceful division could take a few years a t the very least. As it happened, the Partition Council had to divide assets, down to typewriters and printing presses, in a few weeks. There were no transitional institutional structures within which the knotty problems spilling over from division

<s>[INST]3rd Jun e to 15th August 1947, for both transfer of power and division of the country, was to prove disastrous. Senior officials in India like the Punjab Governor, Jenkins and the Commander - in-Chief, Auchinleck, felt that peaceful division could take a few years a t the very least. As it happened, the Partition Council had to divide assets, down to typewriters and printing presses, in a few weeks. There were no transitional institutional structures within which the knotty problems spilling over from division[/INST]

507 | Freedom and Partition could b e tackled. Mountbatten had hoped to be common Governor -General of India and Pakistan and provide the necessary link but this was not to be as Jinnah wanted the position himself. Hence even the joint defence machinery set up failed to last beyond December 1 947 by which time Kashmir had already been the scene of a military conflict rather than a political settlement. The Punjab massacres that accompanied Partition were the final indictment of Mountbatten. His loyal aide, Ismay, wrote to his wife on 16 Septem ber 1947: ‘Our mission was so very nearly a success: it is sad that it has ended up such a grim and total failure.”9 The early date, 15th August 1947, and the delay in announcing the Boundary Commission Award, both Mountbatten’s decisions, compounded the t ragedy that took place. A senior army official, Brigadier Bristow, posted in Punjab in 1947, was of the view that the Punjab tragedy would not have occurred had partition been deferred for a year or so. Lockhart, Commander -in-Chief of the Indian Army from 15 August to 31 December 1947, endorsed this view: ‘Had officials in every grade in the civil services, and all the personnel of the armed services, been in position in their respective new countries before Independence Day, it seems there would have been a better chance of preventing widespread disorder.’ The Boundary Commission Award was ready by 12th August, 1947 but Mountbatten decided to make it public after Independence Day, so that the responsibility would not fall on the British. Independence Day in Punjab and Bengal saw strange scenes. Flags of both India and Pakistan were flown in villages between Lahore and Amritsar as people of both communities believed that they were on the right side of the border. The morrow after freedom was to find them alie ns in their own homes, exiled by executive fiat. Why and how did the Congress come to accept Partition? That the League should assertively demand it and get its

<s>[INST]507 | Freedom and Partition could b e tackled. Mountbatten had hoped to be common Governor -General of India and Pakistan and provide the necessary link but this was not to be as Jinnah wanted the position himself. Hence even the joint defence machinery set up failed to last beyond December 1 947 by which time Kashmir had already been the scene of a military conflict rather than a political settlement. The Punjab massacres that accompanied Partition were the final indictment of Mountbatten. His loyal aide, Ismay, wrote to his wife on 16 Septem ber 1947: ‘Our mission was so very nearly a success: it is sad that it has ended up such a grim and total failure.”9 The early date, 15th August 1947, and the delay in announcing the Boundary Commission Award, both Mountbatten’s decisions, compounded the t ragedy that took place. A senior army official, Brigadier Bristow, posted in Punjab in 1947, was of the view that the Punjab tragedy would not have occurred had partition been deferred for a year or so. Lockhart, Commander -in-Chief of the Indian Army from 15 August to 31 December 1947, endorsed this view: ‘Had officials in every grade in the civil services, and all the personnel of the armed services, been in position in their respective new countries before Independence Day, it seems there would have been a better chance of preventing widespread disorder.’ The Boundary Commission Award was ready by 12th August, 1947 but Mountbatten decided to make it public after Independence Day, so that the responsibility would not fall on the British. Independence Day in Punjab and Bengal saw strange scenes. Flags of both India and Pakistan were flown in villages between Lahore and Amritsar as people of both communities believed that they were on the right side of the border. The morrow after freedom was to find them alie ns in their own homes, exiled by executive fiat. Why and how did the Congress come to accept Partition? That the League should assertively demand it and get its[/INST]

That the League should assertively demand it and get its Shylockian pound of flesh, or that the British should concede it, being unable to get out of t he web of their own making. seems explicable. But why the Congress wedded to a belief in one Indian nation, accepted the division of the country, remains a question difficult to answer. Why did Nehru and Patel advocate acceptance of the 3rd June Plan and the Congress Working Committee and

<s>[INST]That the League should assertively demand it and get its Shylockian pound of flesh, or that the British should concede it, being unable to get out of t he web of their own making. seems explicable. But why the Congress wedded to a belief in one Indian nation, accepted the division of the country, remains a question difficult to answer. Why did Nehru and Patel advocate acceptance of the 3rd June Plan and the Congress Working Committee and[/INST]

508 | India’s Struggle For Independence AICC pass a resolution in favour of it? Most surprising of all, why did Gandhi acquiesce? Nehru and Patel’s acceptance of Partition has been popularly interpreted as stemming from their lust for quick and easy power, which made them betray the people. Gandhiji’s counsels are believed to have been ignored and it is argued that he felt betrayed by his disciples and even wished to end his life, but heroically fought communal frenzy single - handedly ‘a one man boundary force,’ a s Mountbatten called him. It is forgotten that Nehru, Patel and Gandhiji in 1947 were only accepting what had become inevitable because of the long - term failure of the Congress to draw in the Muslim masses into the national movement and stem the surging w aves of Muslim communalism, which, especially since 1937, had been beating with increasing fury. This failure was revealed with stark clarity by the 1946 elections in which the League won 90 per cent Muslim seats. Though the war against Jinnah was lost by early 1946, defeat was conceded only after the final battle was mercilessly aged an the streets of Calcutta and Rawalpindi and the village lanes of Noakha li and Bihar. The Congress leaders felt by June 1947 that only an immediate transfer of power could forestall the spread of Direct Action and communal disturbances. The virtual collapse of the Interim Government 4150 made Pakistan appear to be an unavoidable reality. Patel argued in the AICC meeting on 14th June, 1947 that we have to face up to the fact t hat Pa kistan was functioning in Punjab, Bengal and in the Interim Government. Nehru was dismayed at the turning of the Interim Government into an arena of struggle. Ministers wrangled, met separately to reach decisions and L iaquat A li Khan as Finance Membe r hamstrung the functioning of the other ministri es. In the face of the Interim Government’s powerlessness to check Governors from abetting the League and the Bengal

<s>[INST]508 | India’s Struggle For Independence AICC pass a resolution in favour of it? Most surprising of all, why did Gandhi acquiesce? Nehru and Patel’s acceptance of Partition has been popularly interpreted as stemming from their lust for quick and easy power, which made them betray the people. Gandhiji’s counsels are believed to have been ignored and it is argued that he felt betrayed by his disciples and even wished to end his life, but heroically fought communal frenzy single - handedly ‘a one man boundary force,’ a s Mountbatten called him. It is forgotten that Nehru, Patel and Gandhiji in 1947 were only accepting what had become inevitable because of the long - term failure of the Congress to draw in the Muslim masses into the national movement and stem the surging w aves of Muslim communalism, which, especially since 1937, had been beating with increasing fury. This failure was revealed with stark clarity by the 1946 elections in which the League won 90 per cent Muslim seats. Though the war against Jinnah was lost by early 1946, defeat was conceded only after the final battle was mercilessly aged an the streets of Calcutta and Rawalpindi and the village lanes of Noakha li and Bihar. The Congress leaders felt by June 1947 that only an immediate transfer of power could forestall the spread of Direct Action and communal disturbances. The virtual collapse of the Interim Government 4150 made Pakistan appear to be an unavoidable reality. Patel argued in the AICC meeting on 14th June, 1947 that we have to face up to the fact t hat Pa kistan was functioning in Punjab, Bengal and in the Interim Government. Nehru was dismayed at the turning of the Interim Government into an arena of struggle. Ministers wrangled, met separately to reach decisions and L iaquat A li Khan as Finance Membe r hamstrung the functioning of the other ministri es. In the face of the Interim Government’s powerlessness to check Governors from abetting the League and the Bengal[/INST]

to check Governors from abetting the League and the Bengal provincial Ministry’s inaction and even complicity in riots, Nehru wondered whether there was any Point in continuing in the Interim Government while people were being butchered. Immediate transfer of power would at least mean the setting up of a government which could exercise the control it was now expected to wield, but was powerless to exer cise. There was an additional consideration in accepting immediate transfer of power to two dominions. The prospect of balkanisation was ruled out as the provinces and princes were

<s>[INST]to check Governors from abetting the League and the Bengal provincial Ministry’s inaction and even complicity in riots, Nehru wondered whether there was any Point in continuing in the Interim Government while people were being butchered. Immediate transfer of power would at least mean the setting up of a government which could exercise the control it was now expected to wield, but was powerless to exer cise. There was an additional consideration in accepting immediate transfer of power to two dominions. The prospect of balkanisation was ruled out as the provinces and princes were[/INST]

509 | Freedom and Partition not given the option to be independent — the latter were, in fact, much to their chagrin, cajoled and coerced into joining one or the other dominion. This was no mean achievement. Princely states standing out would have meant a graver blow to Indian unity than Pakistan was. The acceptance of Partition in 1947 was, thus, only the final act of a process of step by step concession to the League’s intransigent championing of a sovereign Muslim state. Autonomy of Muslim majority provinces was accepted in 1942 at the time of the Cripps Mission. Gandhiji went a step further and accepted the right of self -determination of Muslim majority provinces in his talks with Jinnah in 1944. In June 1946, Congress conceded the possibility of Muslim majority provinces (which formed Group B and C of the Cabinet Mission Plan) setting up a separate Cons tituent Assembly, but opposed compulsory grouping and upheld the right of NWFP and Assam not to join their groups if they so wished. But by the end of the year, Nehru said he would accept the ruling of the Federal Court on whether grouping was compulsory o r optional. The Congress accepted without demur the clarification by the British Cabinet in December, 1946 that grouping was compulsory. Congress officially referred to Partition in early March 1947 when a resolution was passed in the Congress Working Comm ittee that Punjab (and by implication Bengal) must be partitioned if the country was divided. The final act of surrender to the League’s demands was in June 1947 when Congress ended up accepting Partition under the 3rd June Plan. The brave words of the leaders contrasted starkl y with the tragic retreat of the Congress. While loudly asserting the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly, the Congress quietly accepted compulsory grouping and abandoned NWFP to Pakistan. Similarly the Congress leaders finally a ccepted Partition most of all because they could not stop communal riots,

<s>[INST]509 | Freedom and Partition not given the option to be independent — the latter were, in fact, much to their chagrin, cajoled and coerced into joining one or the other dominion. This was no mean achievement. Princely states standing out would have meant a graver blow to Indian unity than Pakistan was. The acceptance of Partition in 1947 was, thus, only the final act of a process of step by step concession to the League’s intransigent championing of a sovereign Muslim state. Autonomy of Muslim majority provinces was accepted in 1942 at the time of the Cripps Mission. Gandhiji went a step further and accepted the right of self -determination of Muslim majority provinces in his talks with Jinnah in 1944. In June 1946, Congress conceded the possibility of Muslim majority provinces (which formed Group B and C of the Cabinet Mission Plan) setting up a separate Cons tituent Assembly, but opposed compulsory grouping and upheld the right of NWFP and Assam not to join their groups if they so wished. But by the end of the year, Nehru said he would accept the ruling of the Federal Court on whether grouping was compulsory o r optional. The Congress accepted without demur the clarification by the British Cabinet in December, 1946 that grouping was compulsory. Congress officially referred to Partition in early March 1947 when a resolution was passed in the Congress Working Comm ittee that Punjab (and by implication Bengal) must be partitioned if the country was divided. The final act of surrender to the League’s demands was in June 1947 when Congress ended up accepting Partition under the 3rd June Plan. The brave words of the leaders contrasted starkl y with the tragic retreat of the Congress. While loudly asserting the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly, the Congress quietly accepted compulsory grouping and abandoned NWFP to Pakistan. Similarly the Congress leaders finally a ccepted Partition most of all because they could not stop communal riots,[/INST]

but their words were all about not surrendering to the blackmail of violence. Nehru wrote to Wavell on 22nd August 1946: ‘We are not going to shake hands with murder or allow it to d etermine the country’s policy .’ What was involved here was a refusal to accept the reality that the logic of their past failure could not be reversed by their

<s>[INST]but their words were all about not surrendering to the blackmail of violence. Nehru wrote to Wavell on 22nd August 1946: ‘We are not going to shake hands with murder or allow it to d etermine the country’s policy .’ What was involved here was a refusal to accept the reality that the logic of their past failure could not be reversed by their[/INST]

510 | India’s Struggle For Independence present words or action. This was hardly surprising at the time for hardly anybody had either ant icipated the quick pace of the unfolding tragedy or was prepared to accept it as irrevocable. It is a fact that millions of people on both sides of the new border refused to accept the finality of Partition long after it was announced, and that is one majo r reason why the transfer of population became such a frenzied, last -minute affair. Wishful thinking, clinging to fond hopes and a certain lack of appreciation of the dynamics of communal feeling characterized the Congress stand, especially Nehru’s. The ri ght of secession was conceded by the Congress as it was believed that ‘the Muslims would not exercise it but rather use it to shed their fears.’ It was not realised that what was in evidence in the mid - 1940s was not the communalism of the 1920s or even 193 0s when minority fears were being assiduously fanned, but an assertive ‘Muslim nation,’ led by an obdurate leader, determined to have a separate state by any means. The result was that each concession of the Congress, rather than cutting the ground from under the communalists’ feet, consolidated their position further as success drew more Muslims towards them. Jinnah pitched his claim high , seeing that Congress was yielding. Hindu communalism got a chance to grow by vaunting itself as the true protector of Hindu interests, which, it alleged, the Congress was sacrificing at the altar of unity. Another unreal hope was that once the British left, differences would be patched up and a free India built by both Hindus and Muslims. This belief underestimated the a utonomy of communalism by this time — it was no longer merely propped up by the British, in fact it had thrown away that crutch and was assertively independent, defying even the British. Yet another fond hope was that Partition was temporary — it had becam e unavoidable because of the present psyche of Hindus and

<s>[INST]510 | India’s Struggle For Independence present words or action. This was hardly surprising at the time for hardly anybody had either ant icipated the quick pace of the unfolding tragedy or was prepared to accept it as irrevocable. It is a fact that millions of people on both sides of the new border refused to accept the finality of Partition long after it was announced, and that is one majo r reason why the transfer of population became such a frenzied, last -minute affair. Wishful thinking, clinging to fond hopes and a certain lack of appreciation of the dynamics of communal feeling characterized the Congress stand, especially Nehru’s. The ri ght of secession was conceded by the Congress as it was believed that ‘the Muslims would not exercise it but rather use it to shed their fears.’ It was not realised that what was in evidence in the mid - 1940s was not the communalism of the 1920s or even 193 0s when minority fears were being assiduously fanned, but an assertive ‘Muslim nation,’ led by an obdurate leader, determined to have a separate state by any means. The result was that each concession of the Congress, rather than cutting the ground from under the communalists’ feet, consolidated their position further as success drew more Muslims towards them. Jinnah pitched his claim high , seeing that Congress was yielding. Hindu communalism got a chance to grow by vaunting itself as the true protector of Hindu interests, which, it alleged, the Congress was sacrificing at the altar of unity. Another unreal hope was that once the British left, differences would be patched up and a free India built by both Hindus and Muslims. This belief underestimated the a utonomy of communalism by this time — it was no longer merely propped up by the British, in fact it had thrown away that crutch and was assertively independent, defying even the British. Yet another fond hope was that Partition was temporary — it had becam e unavoidable because of the present psyche of Hindus and[/INST]

unavoidable because of the present psyche of Hindus and Muslims but was reversible once communal passions subsided and sanity returned. Gandhiji often told people that Pakistan could not exist for long if people refused to accept Partition in their heart s. Nehru wrote to Cariappa: ‘But of one thing I am convinced that ultimately there will be a united and strong India. We have often to go through the valley of the shadow before we reach the sun -lit mountain tops.’

<s>[INST]unavoidable because of the present psyche of Hindus and Muslims but was reversible once communal passions subsided and sanity returned. Gandhiji often told people that Pakistan could not exist for long if people refused to accept Partition in their heart s. Nehru wrote to Cariappa: ‘But of one thing I am convinced that ultimately there will be a united and strong India. We have often to go through the valley of the shadow before we reach the sun -lit mountain tops.’[/INST]

511 | Freedom and Partition The most unreal belief, given what actua lly happened was the one that Partition would be peaceful. No riots were anticipated. No transfers of population planned, as it was assumed that once Pakistan was conceded, what was there to fight over? Nehru continued to believe as always in the goodness of his people, despite the spate of riots which plagued India from August 1946 onwards. The hope was that madness would be exorcised by a clean surgical cut. But the body was so diseased, the instruments used infected, that the operation proved to be terribly botchy. Worse horrors were to accompany Partition than those that preceded it. What about Gandhiji? Gandhiji’s unhappiness and helplessness have often being pointed out. His inaction has been explained in terms of his forced isolation from the Congres s decision making councils and his inability to condemn his disciples, Nehru and Patel, for having succumbed to the lust for power, as they had followed him faithfully for many years. at great personal sacrifice. In our view, the root of Gandhiji’s helple ssness was neither Jinnah’s intransigence nor his disciples’ alleged lust for power. but the communalisation of his people. At his prayer meeting on 4th June 1947 he explained that Congress accepted Partition because the people wanted it: ‘The demand has b een granted because you asked for it. The Congress never asked for it . . . But the Congress can feel the pulse of the people. It realized that the Khalsa as also the Hindus desired it.’ It was the Hindus’ and Sikhs’ desire for Partition that rendered him ineffective, blind, impotent. The Muslims already considered him their enemy. What was a mass leader without masses who would follow his call? How could he base a movement to fight communalism on a communalised people? He could defy the leaders’ counsels, as he had done in 1942, when he saw clearly that the moment was right for a struggle. But he could not ‘create a situation,’ as he

<s>[INST]511 | Freedom and Partition The most unreal belief, given what actua lly happened was the one that Partition would be peaceful. No riots were anticipated. No transfers of population planned, as it was assumed that once Pakistan was conceded, what was there to fight over? Nehru continued to believe as always in the goodness of his people, despite the spate of riots which plagued India from August 1946 onwards. The hope was that madness would be exorcised by a clean surgical cut. But the body was so diseased, the instruments used infected, that the operation proved to be terribly botchy. Worse horrors were to accompany Partition than those that preceded it. What about Gandhiji? Gandhiji’s unhappiness and helplessness have often being pointed out. His inaction has been explained in terms of his forced isolation from the Congres s decision making councils and his inability to condemn his disciples, Nehru and Patel, for having succumbed to the lust for power, as they had followed him faithfully for many years. at great personal sacrifice. In our view, the root of Gandhiji’s helple ssness was neither Jinnah’s intransigence nor his disciples’ alleged lust for power. but the communalisation of his people. At his prayer meeting on 4th June 1947 he explained that Congress accepted Partition because the people wanted it: ‘The demand has b een granted because you asked for it. The Congress never asked for it . . . But the Congress can feel the pulse of the people. It realized that the Khalsa as also the Hindus desired it.’ It was the Hindus’ and Sikhs’ desire for Partition that rendered him ineffective, blind, impotent. The Muslims already considered him their enemy. What was a mass leader without masses who would follow his call? How could he base a movement to fight communalism on a communalised people? He could defy the leaders’ counsels, as he had done in 1942, when he saw clearly that the moment was right for a struggle. But he could not ‘create a situation,’ as he[/INST]

honestly told N.K. Bose, who asked him to do so. His special ability, in his own words, only lay in being able to instinctive ly feel what is stirring in the hearts of the masses’ and ‘giving a shape to what was already there.’ In 1947, there were no ‘forces of good’ which Gandhiji could ‘seize upon’ to ‘build up a programme’ -— ‘Toy I see no sign of such a healthy feeling. And,

<s>[INST]honestly told N.K. Bose, who asked him to do so. His special ability, in his own words, only lay in being able to instinctive ly feel what is stirring in the hearts of the masses’ and ‘giving a shape to what was already there.’ In 1947, there were no ‘forces of good’ which Gandhiji could ‘seize upon’ to ‘build up a programme’ -— ‘Toy I see no sign of such a healthy feeling. And,[/INST]

512 | India’s Struggle For Independence therefore, I shall have to wait until the time comes.’ But , political developments did not wait till a ‘blind man groping in the dark all alone’ found a way to the light. The Mountbatten Plan confronted him and Gandhiji saw the inevitability of Partition i n the ugly gashes left by riots on the country’s face and in the rigor mortis the Interim Government had fallen into. He walked bravely into the AICC meeting on 14 June, 1947 and asked Congressmen to accept Partition as an unavoidable necessity in the giv en circumstances, but to tight it in the long run by not accepting it in their hearts. He did not accept it in his heart and kept alive, like Nehru, his faith in his people. He chose to plough a lonely furrow, walking barefoot through the villages of Noakh ali, bringing confidence h his presence to the Muslims in Bihar and preventing riots by persuasion and threats of a fast in Calcutta. Ekla Cholo had long been his favourite song — ‘if no one heeds your call, walk alone, walk alone.’ He did just that. 15th August 1947, dawned revealing the dual reality of independence and Partition. As always, between the two of them, Gandhiji and Nehru mirrored the feelings of the Indian people. Gandhiji prayed in Calcutta for an end to the carnage taking place. His close follower, Mridula Sarabhai, sat consoling a homeless, abducted 15 -year-old girl in a room somewhere in Bombay. Gandhiji’s prayers were reflective of the goings on in the dark, the murders, abductions and rapes. Nehru’s eyes were on the light on the horizon , the new dawn, the birth of a free India. ‘At the stroke of the midnight hour when the world sleeps India shall awake to light and freedom.’ His poetic words, ‘Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny,’ reminded the people that their angry bewildermen t today was not the only truth. There was a greater truth — that of a glorious struggle, hard -fought and hard - won, in which many fell martyrs and countless others made

<s>[INST]512 | India’s Struggle For Independence therefore, I shall have to wait until the time comes.’ But , political developments did not wait till a ‘blind man groping in the dark all alone’ found a way to the light. The Mountbatten Plan confronted him and Gandhiji saw the inevitability of Partition i n the ugly gashes left by riots on the country’s face and in the rigor mortis the Interim Government had fallen into. He walked bravely into the AICC meeting on 14 June, 1947 and asked Congressmen to accept Partition as an unavoidable necessity in the giv en circumstances, but to tight it in the long run by not accepting it in their hearts. He did not accept it in his heart and kept alive, like Nehru, his faith in his people. He chose to plough a lonely furrow, walking barefoot through the villages of Noakh ali, bringing confidence h his presence to the Muslims in Bihar and preventing riots by persuasion and threats of a fast in Calcutta. Ekla Cholo had long been his favourite song — ‘if no one heeds your call, walk alone, walk alone.’ He did just that. 15th August 1947, dawned revealing the dual reality of independence and Partition. As always, between the two of them, Gandhiji and Nehru mirrored the feelings of the Indian people. Gandhiji prayed in Calcutta for an end to the carnage taking place. His close follower, Mridula Sarabhai, sat consoling a homeless, abducted 15 -year-old girl in a room somewhere in Bombay. Gandhiji’s prayers were reflective of the goings on in the dark, the murders, abductions and rapes. Nehru’s eyes were on the light on the horizon , the new dawn, the birth of a free India. ‘At the stroke of the midnight hour when the world sleeps India shall awake to light and freedom.’ His poetic words, ‘Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny,’ reminded the people that their angry bewildermen t today was not the only truth. There was a greater truth — that of a glorious struggle, hard -fought and hard - won, in which many fell martyrs and countless others made[/INST]

won, in which many fell martyrs and countless others made sacrifices, dreaming of the day India would be free. That day had come. The people of In dia saw that too, and on 15 August — despite the sorrow in their hearts for the division of their land danced in the streets with abandon and joy.

<s>[INST]won, in which many fell martyrs and countless others made sacrifices, dreaming of the day India would be free. That day had come. The people of In dia saw that too, and on 15 August — despite the sorrow in their hearts for the division of their land danced in the streets with abandon and joy.[/INST]

513 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement CHAPTER 38. THE LONG -TERM STRATEGY OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMEN T A very basic aspect of the long -term dynamics of the Indian national movement was the strategy it adopted in its prolonged struggle against colonial rule. The capacity of a people to struggle depends not only on the fact of exploitation and domination and on its comprehension by the people but also on the strategy and tactics on which their struggle is based. The existing writings on the subject have failed to deal with, or even discuss, the strategy adopted by the national movement. It appears as if t he movement was a mere conglomeration of different struggles or, in the case of its Gandhian phase, certain principles such as non -violence and certain forms of struggle such as satyagraha, picketing, etc., but without an overall strategy. One reason for t his failure in the existing writings on the subject is the largely untheorized character of the nationalist strategy. Unlike the leaders of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, the leaders of the Indian national movement were not theoretically inclined and did not write books and articles putting forth their political strategy in an explicit form. But, in fact, the various phases of the struggle, phases of constitutional activity, constructive work, basic political decisions, forms of struggle, non -violence , Satyagraha, etc., cannot be properly understood or historically evaluated unless they are seen as integral parts of a basic strategy. Large elements of the nationalist strategy were evolved during the Moderate and the Extremist phases of the movement; it was structured and came to fruition during the Gandhian phase of the movement and in Gandhiji’s political practice. Historians and other social scientists, as also contemporary commentators, have tended to concentrate on Gandhiji’s

<s>[INST]513 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement CHAPTER 38. THE LONG -TERM STRATEGY OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMEN T A very basic aspect of the long -term dynamics of the Indian national movement was the strategy it adopted in its prolonged struggle against colonial rule. The capacity of a people to struggle depends not only on the fact of exploitation and domination and on its comprehension by the people but also on the strategy and tactics on which their struggle is based. The existing writings on the subject have failed to deal with, or even discuss, the strategy adopted by the national movement. It appears as if t he movement was a mere conglomeration of different struggles or, in the case of its Gandhian phase, certain principles such as non -violence and certain forms of struggle such as satyagraha, picketing, etc., but without an overall strategy. One reason for t his failure in the existing writings on the subject is the largely untheorized character of the nationalist strategy. Unlike the leaders of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, the leaders of the Indian national movement were not theoretically inclined and did not write books and articles putting forth their political strategy in an explicit form. But, in fact, the various phases of the struggle, phases of constitutional activity, constructive work, basic political decisions, forms of struggle, non -violence , Satyagraha, etc., cannot be properly understood or historically evaluated unless they are seen as integral parts of a basic strategy. Large elements of the nationalist strategy were evolved during the Moderate and the Extremist phases of the movement; it was structured and came to fruition during the Gandhian phase of the movement and in Gandhiji’s political practice. Historians and other social scientists, as also contemporary commentators, have tended to concentrate on Gandhiji’s[/INST]

commentators, have tended to concentrate on Gandhiji’s philosophy of life. Bu t, in fact, his philosophy of life had only a limited impact on the people. It was as a political leader and

<s>[INST]commentators, have tended to concentrate on Gandhiji’s philosophy of life. Bu t, in fact, his philosophy of life had only a limited impact on the people. It was as a political leader and[/INST]

514 | India’s Struggle For Independence through his political strategy and tactics of struggle that he moved millions into political action. At the very outset, it is to be noted that th e nationalist strategy was based on the specific nature and character of British rule and the colonial state. While fu lly grasping the exploitative and dominational character of colonial rule, Indian leaders also realized that the colonial state was semi -hegem onic and semi - authoritarian in character. It was not like Hitler’s Germany or Czarist Russia, or Chiang Kai -shek’s China, or Batista’s Cuba. Its character could, perhaps, be best described as legal authoritarianism. The colonial state was established by force and force remained its ultimate sanction. Naked force was often used to suppress peaceful movements. But it was not based just on force. It was also based on the creation of certain civil institutions, such as elected assemblies, local government institutions, courts, and schools and colleges, and, above all, on the rule of law. It provided a certain amount of civil liberties in non - movement periods. Moreover, often, even while suppressing popular opposition, it observed certain rules of law and codes of administration. In other words it was semi -democratic, semi - authoritarian. The semi -hegemonic character of the colonial state arose from the fact that it relied very heavily for the acquiescence of the Indian people in their rule on two notions c arefully inculcated over a long period of time. One as the notion that the foreign rulers were benevolent and just, that they were the Mai-Baap of the people, that they were economically and socially and culturally developing or modernizing’ India. The sec ond notion was that the colonial rulers were invincible, that it was futile to oppose them, that the Indian people were too weak and disunited to oppose them successfully, that they would crush all opposition except to the extent they themselves permitted it, that all

<s>[INST]514 | India’s Struggle For Independence through his political strategy and tactics of struggle that he moved millions into political action. At the very outset, it is to be noted that th e nationalist strategy was based on the specific nature and character of British rule and the colonial state. While fu lly grasping the exploitative and dominational character of colonial rule, Indian leaders also realized that the colonial state was semi -hegem onic and semi - authoritarian in character. It was not like Hitler’s Germany or Czarist Russia, or Chiang Kai -shek’s China, or Batista’s Cuba. Its character could, perhaps, be best described as legal authoritarianism. The colonial state was established by force and force remained its ultimate sanction. Naked force was often used to suppress peaceful movements. But it was not based just on force. It was also based on the creation of certain civil institutions, such as elected assemblies, local government institutions, courts, and schools and colleges, and, above all, on the rule of law. It provided a certain amount of civil liberties in non - movement periods. Moreover, often, even while suppressing popular opposition, it observed certain rules of law and codes of administration. In other words it was semi -democratic, semi - authoritarian. The semi -hegemonic character of the colonial state arose from the fact that it relied very heavily for the acquiescence of the Indian people in their rule on two notions c arefully inculcated over a long period of time. One as the notion that the foreign rulers were benevolent and just, that they were the Mai-Baap of the people, that they were economically and socially and culturally developing or modernizing’ India. The sec ond notion was that the colonial rulers were invincible, that it was futile to oppose them, that the Indian people were too weak and disunited to oppose them successfully, that they would crush all opposition except to the extent they themselves permitted it, that all[/INST]

except to the extent they themselves permitted it, that all opposition had, therefore, to proceed along constitutional lines. The colonial rulers also offered constitutional, economic and other concessions to popular movements and did not rely on their repression alone; they followed a policy of the ca rrot and the stick

<s>[INST]except to the extent they themselves permitted it, that all opposition had, therefore, to proceed along constitutional lines. The colonial rulers also offered constitutional, economic and other concessions to popular movements and did not rely on their repression alone; they followed a policy of the ca rrot and the stick[/INST]

515 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement It was in the context of and in opposition to this semi - hegemonic, semi -authoritarian colonial state that the national movement gradually evolved its strategy and tactics. The basic strategic perspective of the national movement was to wage a long -drawn out hegemonic struggle, or, in Gramscian terms, a war of position. By hegemonic struggle, we mean a struggle for the minds and hearts of men and women so that the nationalist influence would continuously grow among the people through dif ferent channels and through the different phases and stages of the national movement. The movement alternated between phases of extra -legal or law -breaking mass movements and phases of functioning within the four walls of the law. But both phases were gear ed to expanding the influence of the national movement among the people. The basic strategy of the national movement was, moreover, not a strategy of gradual reform. It was a strategy of active struggle with the objective of wresting power from the colonia l rulers. The effectiveness and validity of the nationalist strategy lay in the active participation of the masses in the movement. The masses had, therefore, to be politicized and activized. The political passivity of the masses, especially in the villag es, consciously inculcated and nurtured by the colonial authorities, was a basic factor in the stability of colonial rule. A major objective of the movements of the Gandhian era was to bring the masses into active politics and political action. As Gandhiji repeatedly declared, people ‘ can have Swaraj for the asking’ when they ‘have attained the power to take it.’ The second objective of the nationalist strategy was to erode the hegemony or ideological influence of the colonial rulers inch by inch and in eve ry area of life. Since the British did not rule primarily by force but by’ a carefully organized belief system or

<s>[INST]515 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement It was in the context of and in opposition to this semi - hegemonic, semi -authoritarian colonial state that the national movement gradually evolved its strategy and tactics. The basic strategic perspective of the national movement was to wage a long -drawn out hegemonic struggle, or, in Gramscian terms, a war of position. By hegemonic struggle, we mean a struggle for the minds and hearts of men and women so that the nationalist influence would continuously grow among the people through dif ferent channels and through the different phases and stages of the national movement. The movement alternated between phases of extra -legal or law -breaking mass movements and phases of functioning within the four walls of the law. But both phases were gear ed to expanding the influence of the national movement among the people. The basic strategy of the national movement was, moreover, not a strategy of gradual reform. It was a strategy of active struggle with the objective of wresting power from the colonia l rulers. The effectiveness and validity of the nationalist strategy lay in the active participation of the masses in the movement. The masses had, therefore, to be politicized and activized. The political passivity of the masses, especially in the villag es, consciously inculcated and nurtured by the colonial authorities, was a basic factor in the stability of colonial rule. A major objective of the movements of the Gandhian era was to bring the masses into active politics and political action. As Gandhiji repeatedly declared, people ‘ can have Swaraj for the asking’ when they ‘have attained the power to take it.’ The second objective of the nationalist strategy was to erode the hegemony or ideological influence of the colonial rulers inch by inch and in eve ry area of life. Since the British did not rule primarily by force but by’ a carefully organized belief system or[/INST]

ideology, it was necessary to undermine and overthrow this belief system. The battle then had to be one of ideas. The objective was to have mo re and more people adopt nationalist ideas and ideology. A major objective of the hegemonic colonial ideology was to hide the face of the real enemy — colonialism — that is, to hide the primary contradiction between the interests of the Indian people and colonialism. The basic task of the counter hegemonic nationalist movement was to expose the face

<s>[INST]ideology, it was necessary to undermine and overthrow this belief system. The battle then had to be one of ideas. The objective was to have mo re and more people adopt nationalist ideas and ideology. A major objective of the hegemonic colonial ideology was to hide the face of the real enemy — colonialism — that is, to hide the primary contradiction between the interests of the Indian people and colonialism. The basic task of the counter hegemonic nationalist movement was to expose the face[/INST]

516 | India’s Struggle For Independence of the colonial enemy and the prima ry contradiction to the light of day. Hence the most important element of nationalist strategy was its ideological -political work. Above all, this meant the undermining of the twin notions of the benevolence and invincibility of British rule. The process of undermining the first, i.e., the notion of benevolence, and creating an intellectual framework for it was initiated and performed brilliantly by Dadabhai Naoroji, Justice Ranade, R.C. Dutt and other Moderates. This framework was carried to the lower middle classes by the Extremists and to the masses during the Gandhian era. The sturdily independent newspapers of the late 19t h century, the work in the legislative councils by leaders like Pherozeshah Mehta and G.K. Gokhale, the bold propaganda of Lokamanya Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose and other Extremists, and the death -defying deeds of the Revolutionary Terrorists frontally challeng ed the notion of the invincibility of the colonial state. But it was the law -breaking mass movements of the post - 1918 period which basically performed the task among the mass of the Indian people. The basic objective of these movements was to destroy the notion that British rule could not be challenged, to create among the people fearlessness and courage and the capacity to fight and make sacrifices, and to inculcate the notion that no people could be ruled without their consent. A third objective of the Congress strategy was to undermine the hold of the colo nial state on the members of its own state apparatuses — members of the civil services, the police and the armed forces — and to win them over to the nationalist cause or at least to weaken their loyal ty and obedience to the colonial regime. The nationalist movement was, in fact, quite successful in this task. Gradually, the behaviour of the police and jail officials underwent a qualitative change. A large number of

<s>[INST]516 | India’s Struggle For Independence of the colonial enemy and the prima ry contradiction to the light of day. Hence the most important element of nationalist strategy was its ideological -political work. Above all, this meant the undermining of the twin notions of the benevolence and invincibility of British rule. The process of undermining the first, i.e., the notion of benevolence, and creating an intellectual framework for it was initiated and performed brilliantly by Dadabhai Naoroji, Justice Ranade, R.C. Dutt and other Moderates. This framework was carried to the lower middle classes by the Extremists and to the masses during the Gandhian era. The sturdily independent newspapers of the late 19t h century, the work in the legislative councils by leaders like Pherozeshah Mehta and G.K. Gokhale, the bold propaganda of Lokamanya Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose and other Extremists, and the death -defying deeds of the Revolutionary Terrorists frontally challeng ed the notion of the invincibility of the colonial state. But it was the law -breaking mass movements of the post - 1918 period which basically performed the task among the mass of the Indian people. The basic objective of these movements was to destroy the notion that British rule could not be challenged, to create among the people fearlessness and courage and the capacity to fight and make sacrifices, and to inculcate the notion that no people could be ruled without their consent. A third objective of the Congress strategy was to undermine the hold of the colo nial state on the members of its own state apparatuses — members of the civil services, the police and the armed forces — and to win them over to the nationalist cause or at least to weaken their loyal ty and obedience to the colonial regime. The nationalist movement was, in fact, quite successful in this task. Gradually, the behaviour of the police and jail officials underwent a qualitative change. A large number of[/INST]

officials underwent a qualitative change. A large number of officials of all types actively helpe d the 1942 movement at great personal risk, As we have seen earlier, the virtual disappearance of loyalty among the police, army and bureaucracy after 1945 and the consequent disarray of the British administrative structure were major reasons for the Briti sh decision to finally quit India. The national movement, from the beginning, made efforts to weaken the hegemony of colonial ideology among the British

<s>[INST]officials underwent a qualitative change. A large number of officials of all types actively helpe d the 1942 movement at great personal risk, As we have seen earlier, the virtual disappearance of loyalty among the police, army and bureaucracy after 1945 and the consequent disarray of the British administrative structure were major reasons for the Briti sh decision to finally quit India. The national movement, from the beginning, made efforts to weaken the hegemony of colonial ideology among the British[/INST]

517 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement people and public opinion. There was a basic continuity in this respect from the work of the British C ommittee of the National Congress during the 1890s using the services of William Digby, William Wedderbu rn, and others to the work of the India League in which persons like V.K. Krishna Menon and Fenner Brockway were active. This as well as efforts to win the support of non -Congress leaders and public opinion within India also aided the achievement of a fourth objective of the nationalist strategy: to constantly expand the semi - democratic political space, and to prevent the colonial authorities from limit ing the existing space, within which legal activities and peaceful mass struggles could be organized. The second major aspect of nationalist strategy was the long-drawn out character of the hegemonic struggle. Under this strategy, which may be described a s Struggle -Truce -Struggle or S-T-S’, a phase of vigorous extra -legal mass movement and open confrontation with colonial authority was followed by a phase during which direct confrontation was withdrawn, and political concessions, if any, wrested from the c olonial regime were worked and shown to be inadequate. During this latter, more ‘passive,’ phase, intense political and ideological work was carried on among the masses within the existing legal and constitutional framework, and forces were gathered for an other mass movement at a higher level. The culmination of this strategy of S -T-S’ came with a call for ‘Quit India’ and the achievement of independence. Both phases of the movement were utilized, each in its own way, to undermine colonial hegemony, to recr uit and train nationalist workers and to build up the people’s capacity to struggle. The entire political process of S -T-S’ was an upward spiralling one. This strategy also assumed advance through stages. Each stage represented an advance over the previou s one.

<s>[INST]517 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement people and public opinion. There was a basic continuity in this respect from the work of the British C ommittee of the National Congress during the 1890s using the services of William Digby, William Wedderbu rn, and others to the work of the India League in which persons like V.K. Krishna Menon and Fenner Brockway were active. This as well as efforts to win the support of non -Congress leaders and public opinion within India also aided the achievement of a fourth objective of the nationalist strategy: to constantly expand the semi - democratic political space, and to prevent the colonial authorities from limit ing the existing space, within which legal activities and peaceful mass struggles could be organized. The second major aspect of nationalist strategy was the long-drawn out character of the hegemonic struggle. Under this strategy, which may be described a s Struggle -Truce -Struggle or S-T-S’, a phase of vigorous extra -legal mass movement and open confrontation with colonial authority was followed by a phase during which direct confrontation was withdrawn, and political concessions, if any, wrested from the c olonial regime were worked and shown to be inadequate. During this latter, more ‘passive,’ phase, intense political and ideological work was carried on among the masses within the existing legal and constitutional framework, and forces were gathered for an other mass movement at a higher level. The culmination of this strategy of S -T-S’ came with a call for ‘Quit India’ and the achievement of independence. Both phases of the movement were utilized, each in its own way, to undermine colonial hegemony, to recr uit and train nationalist workers and to build up the people’s capacity to struggle. The entire political process of S -T-S’ was an upward spiralling one. This strategy also assumed advance through stages. Each stage represented an advance over the previou s one.[/INST]

At the same time, it was realized that the task of national liberation was incomplete till state power was transferred. Even an advanced stage of constitutional reforms did not mean tha t freedom had been partially tra nsferred. Freedom was a whole; t ill it was fully won, it was not wo n at all. Any other view would tend to make Indians ‘partners’ of colonialism during the ‘reform’ phases of the movement, and the national movement would tend

<s>[INST]At the same time, it was realized that the task of national liberation was incomplete till state power was transferred. Even an advanced stage of constitutional reforms did not mean tha t freedom had been partially tra nsferred. Freedom was a whole; t ill it was fully won, it was not wo n at all. Any other view would tend to make Indians ‘partners’ of colonialism during the ‘reform’ phases of the movement, and the national movement would tend[/INST]

518 | India’s Struggle For Independence to be co -opted by the colonial state. The Indian nationalists avoided this trap by treating the non -mass movement phases also as phases of political, anti -colonial struggle. The working of the reforms was not equated with the working of the colonial system. A basic feature of the nationalist strategy was to move from stage to stage without getting co -opted by the colonial regime which was opposed and struggled against at each stage. Only the form of struggle changed. In the extra -legal mass movement phases, laws were broken and civil disobedience was practised: in the non-mass movement or ‘passive’ phases , there was mass agitation. intense ideological work, including extensive tours by leaders, organization of public meetings on an extensive scale, and the organization of workers, peasants and students and youth and their struggles, mostly by the l eft-wing, during the late 1920s and the 1930s. Thus, both types of phases were seen as political phases of the anti -imperialist struggle equally rich in anti-imperialist content, and parts of the same anti -imperialist strategy . So the p olitical struggle was perpetual only its forms underwent change. As Gandhiji put it , ‘suspension of civil disobedience does not mean suspension of war. The latter can only end when India has a Constitution of her own making. ’ A basic question reg arding the S -T-S’ strategy is: why did there have to be two types of phases in the national movement? Why should a phase of non -mass movement or war of position’ inevitably follow a phase of extra -legal mass struggle or ‘war of movement’ in Gramscian terms ? Why could the national movement not take the form of one continuous mass struggle till freedom was won? Would this not have brought freedom much earlier? The nationalist strategy, under Gandhiji’s leadership, was based on the assumptions that by its very nature a mass movement could not be carried on or sustained indefinitely or for

<s>[INST]518 | India’s Struggle For Independence to be co -opted by the colonial state. The Indian nationalists avoided this trap by treating the non -mass movement phases also as phases of political, anti -colonial struggle. The working of the reforms was not equated with the working of the colonial system. A basic feature of the nationalist strategy was to move from stage to stage without getting co -opted by the colonial regime which was opposed and struggled against at each stage. Only the form of struggle changed. In the extra -legal mass movement phases, laws were broken and civil disobedience was practised: in the non-mass movement or ‘passive’ phases , there was mass agitation. intense ideological work, including extensive tours by leaders, organization of public meetings on an extensive scale, and the organization of workers, peasants and students and youth and their struggles, mostly by the l eft-wing, during the late 1920s and the 1930s. Thus, both types of phases were seen as political phases of the anti -imperialist struggle equally rich in anti-imperialist content, and parts of the same anti -imperialist strategy . So the p olitical struggle was perpetual only its forms underwent change. As Gandhiji put it , ‘suspension of civil disobedience does not mean suspension of war. The latter can only end when India has a Constitution of her own making. ’ A basic question reg arding the S -T-S’ strategy is: why did there have to be two types of phases in the national movement? Why should a phase of non -mass movement or war of position’ inevitably follow a phase of extra -legal mass struggle or ‘war of movement’ in Gramscian terms ? Why could the national movement not take the form of one continuous mass struggle till freedom was won? Would this not have brought freedom much earlier? The nationalist strategy, under Gandhiji’s leadership, was based on the assumptions that by its very nature a mass movement could not be carried on or sustained indefinitely or for[/INST]

a prolonged period, that a mass movement must ebb sooner or later, that mass movements had to be short lived, and that periods of rest and consolidation, of ‘breathing time,’ must intervene so that the movement could consolidate, recuperate and gather strength for the next round of struggle. This was so because the masses on whom the movement was based invariably got exhausted after some time. Their capacity to confront the st ate or to face state repre ssion imprisonment, brutal lath i-charges, heavy fines, confiscation of

<s>[INST]a prolonged period, that a mass movement must ebb sooner or later, that mass movements had to be short lived, and that periods of rest and consolidation, of ‘breathing time,’ must intervene so that the movement could consolidate, recuperate and gather strength for the next round of struggle. This was so because the masses on whom the movement was based invariably got exhausted after some time. Their capacity to confront the st ate or to face state repre ssion imprisonment, brutal lath i-charges, heavy fines, confiscation of[/INST]

519 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement houses, land and other property — or to make sacrifices was not unlimited. The national leadership made continuous efforts to increase the people’s capacity to sacrifice and face colonial repression through ideological work. Simultaneously, it recognized the limits of their capacity to suffer, and therefore did not overstrain this capacity over much. It also based its tactics on the fact that the colonial state was not yet, at least till 1945, in disarray, that its state apparatuses were still loyal to it, that it was till 1945 a strong state, and that it had, consequently, a considerable capacity to crush a movement, as it did in 1932 -33 and 1942. The strategic perspective that there should be two types of phases of the national movement was also based on the perception that though a mass movement needed a ‘standing army’ or ‘steel frame’ of whole time political workers, it could not be based only on them. Its r eal striking power could come only from the masses. The national movement produced thousands of these whole time workers who devoted their entire lives to the freedom struggle. They spent their entire lives in jails, or Ashrams, or khadi bhandars, or trade union and kisan sabha offices. But while they played a crucial role -in organizing and mobilizing the masses, the movement had to be based on the masses. Consequently, recourse to a mass movement that confronted the colonial state and then its shift to a phase of non - confrontation were an inherent part of a strategy of political struggle that was based on the masses. The Gandhian strategy was thus based on a specific understanding of the limits to which both the people and the Government could go. Once it was realized that the S -T-S’ strategy of the mass movement required the launching of a massive mass movement as well as shifting it to a non -mass movement phase, the decision to shift from one phase to the other became a purely tactical one

<s>[INST]519 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement houses, land and other property — or to make sacrifices was not unlimited. The national leadership made continuous efforts to increase the people’s capacity to sacrifice and face colonial repression through ideological work. Simultaneously, it recognized the limits of their capacity to suffer, and therefore did not overstrain this capacity over much. It also based its tactics on the fact that the colonial state was not yet, at least till 1945, in disarray, that its state apparatuses were still loyal to it, that it was till 1945 a strong state, and that it had, consequently, a considerable capacity to crush a movement, as it did in 1932 -33 and 1942. The strategic perspective that there should be two types of phases of the national movement was also based on the perception that though a mass movement needed a ‘standing army’ or ‘steel frame’ of whole time political workers, it could not be based only on them. Its r eal striking power could come only from the masses. The national movement produced thousands of these whole time workers who devoted their entire lives to the freedom struggle. They spent their entire lives in jails, or Ashrams, or khadi bhandars, or trade union and kisan sabha offices. But while they played a crucial role -in organizing and mobilizing the masses, the movement had to be based on the masses. Consequently, recourse to a mass movement that confronted the colonial state and then its shift to a phase of non - confrontation were an inherent part of a strategy of political struggle that was based on the masses. The Gandhian strategy was thus based on a specific understanding of the limits to which both the people and the Government could go. Once it was realized that the S -T-S’ strategy of the mass movement required the launching of a massive mass movement as well as shifting it to a non -mass movement phase, the decision to shift from one phase to the other became a purely tactical one[/INST]

and not a matt er of principle. The question then was: When was the decision to make the shift to be made in keeping with the reality on the ground? In two of the rare instances when Gandhiji theorized his political practice, he gave an inkling of how he perceived the ro le of leadership in this context. He wrote in 1938: ‘A wise general does not wait till he is actually routed: he withdraws in time in an orderly ma nner from a posit ion which he know s he would not be able to hold,. And again in 1939: An able

<s>[INST]and not a matt er of principle. The question then was: When was the decision to make the shift to be made in keeping with the reality on the ground? In two of the rare instances when Gandhiji theorized his political practice, he gave an inkling of how he perceived the ro le of leadership in this context. He wrote in 1938: ‘A wise general does not wait till he is actually routed: he withdraws in time in an orderly ma nner from a posit ion which he know s he would not be able to hold,. And again in 1939: An able[/INST]

520 | India’s Struggle For Independence general always gives battle in his own time on the ground of his choice. He always retains the initiative in these respects and never allows it to pass into the hands of the enemy. In a Satyagraha campaign the mode of fight and the choice of tactics, e.g., whether to adv ance or retreat, offer civil resistance or organize non -violent strength through constructive work and purely’ selfless humanitarian service, are determined according to the exigencies of the situation.’ In other words, the very important question of the timing of starting or withdrawing a movement was decided by Gandhiji and the national leadership on the basis of their perception of the strength or weakness of the movement the staying power of the masses and the political and administrative reserves of t he Government. Similar ly, the question was not whether negotiations with the Government should or should not be held. The question was —- when one negotiated, how did one choose the right psychological moment to negotiate, how did one actually negotiate, what did one negotiate about, what would the outcome of the negotiations he, and what would the terms on which a truce was signed be, if there was a truce. As the AICC resolution on Congress Policy, adopted on 22 September 1945, stated: ‘The method of nego tiation and conciliation which is the key note of peaceful policy can never he abandoned by the Congress, no matter how grave may be the provocation, any more than can that of non -cooperation, complete or modified. Hence, the guiding maxim of the Congress must remain: negotiation and settlement when possible and non -cooperation and direct action when necessary.’ Constructive work played an important role in Gandhian (and even pre Gandhian) strategy. It was primarily organized around the promotion of khadi, spinning and village industries, national education and, Hindu Muslim unity, the struggle against

<s>[INST]520 | India’s Struggle For Independence general always gives battle in his own time on the ground of his choice. He always retains the initiative in these respects and never allows it to pass into the hands of the enemy. In a Satyagraha campaign the mode of fight and the choice of tactics, e.g., whether to adv ance or retreat, offer civil resistance or organize non -violent strength through constructive work and purely’ selfless humanitarian service, are determined according to the exigencies of the situation.’ In other words, the very important question of the timing of starting or withdrawing a movement was decided by Gandhiji and the national leadership on the basis of their perception of the strength or weakness of the movement the staying power of the masses and the political and administrative reserves of t he Government. Similar ly, the question was not whether negotiations with the Government should or should not be held. The question was —- when one negotiated, how did one choose the right psychological moment to negotiate, how did one actually negotiate, what did one negotiate about, what would the outcome of the negotiations he, and what would the terms on which a truce was signed be, if there was a truce. As the AICC resolution on Congress Policy, adopted on 22 September 1945, stated: ‘The method of nego tiation and conciliation which is the key note of peaceful policy can never he abandoned by the Congress, no matter how grave may be the provocation, any more than can that of non -cooperation, complete or modified. Hence, the guiding maxim of the Congress must remain: negotiation and settlement when possible and non -cooperation and direct action when necessary.’ Constructive work played an important role in Gandhian (and even pre Gandhian) strategy. It was primarily organized around the promotion of khadi, spinning and village industries, national education and, Hindu Muslim unity, the struggle against[/INST]

untouchability and the social upliftment of the Harijans. and the boycott of foreign cloth and liquor. Constructive work was symbolized by hundreds of Ashrams which came up all over the country, almost entirely in the villages. Constructive work was basic to a war of position. It played a crucial role during the ‘passive’ or non -mass movement phase in

<s>[INST]untouchability and the social upliftment of the Harijans. and the boycott of foreign cloth and liquor. Constructive work was symbolized by hundreds of Ashrams which came up all over the country, almost entirely in the villages. Constructive work was basic to a war of position. It played a crucial role during the ‘passive’ or non -mass movement phase in[/INST]

521 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement filling the political space left vacant by the withdrawal o f civil disobedience. It solved a basic problem that a mass movement faces —- the sustenance of a sense of activism in the non -mass movement phases of the struggle. Constructive work had also the advantage of involving a large number of people. Parliamenta ry and intellectual work could be done by relatively few, constructive work could involve millions. Moreover, not all could go to jail. But constructive work was within the reach of all. The hard core of constructive workers also provided a large cadre fo r the Civil Disobedience Movement. They were Gandhiji’s steel-frame or standing ar my. Constitutional reforms and legislative councils formed a basic element of the complex colonial strategy to meet the challenge of Indian nationalism. The Indians had to e volve an equally complex approach towards legislatures. Complexity also arose from the fact that, on the one hand, the constitutional structure and constitutional reforms represented instruments of colonial domination and of colonial efforts to co -opt and derail the national movement; while, on the other hand, they represented the fruits of the anti -colonial struggle of the Indian people, a measure of the changing balance of forces and the widening of the democratic space in which, the national movement cou ld operate. The colonial authorities hoped that constitutional work would weaken the nationalist urge to take to mass politics, promote dissensions and splits within the nationalist ranks on the basis of constitutionalist vs. non - constitutionalist and Righ t vs. Left. In opposing the colonial strategy, the national leaders had to follow the logic of the constitutional reforms as well as the logic of their own strategy. Once colonialism was forced to yield a political space the space had to he occupied so th at political - ideological struggle against colonialism could be waged from it.

<s>[INST]521 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement filling the political space left vacant by the withdrawal o f civil disobedience. It solved a basic problem that a mass movement faces —- the sustenance of a sense of activism in the non -mass movement phases of the struggle. Constructive work had also the advantage of involving a large number of people. Parliamenta ry and intellectual work could be done by relatively few, constructive work could involve millions. Moreover, not all could go to jail. But constructive work was within the reach of all. The hard core of constructive workers also provided a large cadre fo r the Civil Disobedience Movement. They were Gandhiji’s steel-frame or standing ar my. Constitutional reforms and legislative councils formed a basic element of the complex colonial strategy to meet the challenge of Indian nationalism. The Indians had to e volve an equally complex approach towards legislatures. Complexity also arose from the fact that, on the one hand, the constitutional structure and constitutional reforms represented instruments of colonial domination and of colonial efforts to co -opt and derail the national movement; while, on the other hand, they represented the fruits of the anti -colonial struggle of the Indian people, a measure of the changing balance of forces and the widening of the democratic space in which, the national movement cou ld operate. The colonial authorities hoped that constitutional work would weaken the nationalist urge to take to mass politics, promote dissensions and splits within the nationalist ranks on the basis of constitutionalist vs. non - constitutionalist and Righ t vs. Left. In opposing the colonial strategy, the national leaders had to follow the logic of the constitutional reforms as well as the logic of their own strategy. Once colonialism was forced to yield a political space the space had to he occupied so th at political - ideological struggle against colonialism could be waged from it.[/INST]

The reforms had to be worked; the question was in what manner. The answer, found after a great deal of experimentation and debate within the nationalist ranks, was to work the re forms but in a way that would upset imperialist calculations and advance the nationalist cause. In fact, the dominant sections of the national leadership from 1880 onwards looked upon the councils in the wider perspective of undermining colonial hegemony. Work

<s>[INST]The reforms had to be worked; the question was in what manner. The answer, found after a great deal of experimentation and debate within the nationalist ranks, was to work the re forms but in a way that would upset imperialist calculations and advance the nationalist cause. In fact, the dominant sections of the national leadership from 1880 onwards looked upon the councils in the wider perspective of undermining colonial hegemony. Work[/INST]

522 | India’s Struggle For Independence in the legislative councils, municipal bodies, and, after 1937, through popular ministries was also used to promote reforms so as to give relief to the hard -pressed people, to build up confidence among the people in their capacity to govern themselves and to acquire prestige for the Congress and the national movement. For a people who had been for long deprived of political power, and subjected to the colonial ideology that they were incapable of exercising political power or challenging the colonial rulers, the strong speeches of a Pherozeshah Mehta, or a O.K. Gokhale, or a C.R. Das, or a Motilal Nehru in the legislative councils, the defeats of the Government in the legislatures during the 1920s, the wielding of elements of state power in the 1930s b y the Congress ministries, and the nationalist exercise of municipal power in numerous cities, towns and districts, provided a boost to their sense of self -worth and self -confidence. The nationalist strategy vis -a-vis legislative councils and constitution al reforms did register considerable success. Work in the councils did fill the political void at a time when the national movement was recouping its strength. And those working in the legislatures and municipal bodies did, on the whole, avoid getting co-opted or absorbed by the colonial state. They also successfully exposed the hollowness of colonial reforms and showed that India was, despite these reforms, being ruled from Britain in British interests and with the aid of ‘lawless laws’ whenever the rulers found it in their interests to do so. The National Congress also successfully avoided a split once the lessons of the Surat split of 1907 had been learnt. All this was possible because Congressmen after 1919 were as a whole committed to mass politics and not to constitutional politics. Whenever the mass upsurge came, Congressmen abandoned the legislatures and plunged into the mass movement. They’ saw

<s>[INST]522 | India’s Struggle For Independence in the legislative councils, municipal bodies, and, after 1937, through popular ministries was also used to promote reforms so as to give relief to the hard -pressed people, to build up confidence among the people in their capacity to govern themselves and to acquire prestige for the Congress and the national movement. For a people who had been for long deprived of political power, and subjected to the colonial ideology that they were incapable of exercising political power or challenging the colonial rulers, the strong speeches of a Pherozeshah Mehta, or a O.K. Gokhale, or a C.R. Das, or a Motilal Nehru in the legislative councils, the defeats of the Government in the legislatures during the 1920s, the wielding of elements of state power in the 1930s b y the Congress ministries, and the nationalist exercise of municipal power in numerous cities, towns and districts, provided a boost to their sense of self -worth and self -confidence. The nationalist strategy vis -a-vis legislative councils and constitution al reforms did register considerable success. Work in the councils did fill the political void at a time when the national movement was recouping its strength. And those working in the legislatures and municipal bodies did, on the whole, avoid getting co-opted or absorbed by the colonial state. They also successfully exposed the hollowness of colonial reforms and showed that India was, despite these reforms, being ruled from Britain in British interests and with the aid of ‘lawless laws’ whenever the rulers found it in their interests to do so. The National Congress also successfully avoided a split once the lessons of the Surat split of 1907 had been learnt. All this was possible because Congressmen after 1919 were as a whole committed to mass politics and not to constitutional politics. Whenever the mass upsurge came, Congressmen abandoned the legislatures and plunged into the mass movement. They’ saw[/INST]

legislatures and plunged into the mass movement. They’ saw legislatures not as instruments of the gradual reform of the colonial structure but as arenas for the stru ggle against, or rather the struggle for the overthrow of, the colonial state. For Gandhiji non -violence was a matter of principle. But for most of his contemporaries in the Congress — C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Aza d, Sardar Patel, Acharya Narendra Dev, and so on — it was a matter of policy. As policy and as a form of political action and behaviour, it was an

<s>[INST]legislatures and plunged into the mass movement. They’ saw legislatures not as instruments of the gradual reform of the colonial structure but as arenas for the stru ggle against, or rather the struggle for the overthrow of, the colonial state. For Gandhiji non -violence was a matter of principle. But for most of his contemporaries in the Congress — C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Aza d, Sardar Patel, Acharya Narendra Dev, and so on — it was a matter of policy. As policy and as a form of political action and behaviour, it was an[/INST]

523 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement essential component of the overall strategy of the National Congress. In fact, non -violence was in some essential ways integr al to the nature of the Indian national movement as a hegemonic movement based on wide mass mobilization It was because of this hegemonic and mass character of the national movement that non -violence became one of its basic elements. The adoption of non -violent forms of struggle enabled the participation of the mass of the people who could not have participated in a similar manner in a movement that adopted violent forms. This was particularly true of women’s participation. Women would have found it diffic ult to join an armed struggle in large numbers. But when it came to undergoing suffering, facing lathi-charges, picketing for hours on end in the summer or the winter, women were probably stronger than men. Non -violence as a form of struggle and political behaviour was also linked to the semi- hegem onic, semi authoritarian character of the colonial state and the democra tic character of the polity in Britain. Non-violence meant above all fighting on the terrain of moral force. Non -violent mass movements pla ced the colonial authorities in the wrong and exposed the underpinning of colonial state power in brute force, when the authorities used armed force against peaceful Satyagrahis. In fact, a non -violent mass movement put the rulers on the horns of a dilemma . If they hesitated to suppress it because it was peaceful, they lost an important part of their hegemony, because the civ il resisters did break existing colonial laws; not to take action against them amounted to the abdication of administrative authority and a confession of the lack of strength to rule. If they suppressed the movement by use of force, they still lost, for it was morally difficult to justify the suppression of a peaceful movement and non-violent law -breakers through the use of force. They w ere in a

<s>[INST]523 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement essential component of the overall strategy of the National Congress. In fact, non -violence was in some essential ways integr al to the nature of the Indian national movement as a hegemonic movement based on wide mass mobilization It was because of this hegemonic and mass character of the national movement that non -violence became one of its basic elements. The adoption of non -violent forms of struggle enabled the participation of the mass of the people who could not have participated in a similar manner in a movement that adopted violent forms. This was particularly true of women’s participation. Women would have found it diffic ult to join an armed struggle in large numbers. But when it came to undergoing suffering, facing lathi-charges, picketing for hours on end in the summer or the winter, women were probably stronger than men. Non -violence as a form of struggle and political behaviour was also linked to the semi- hegem onic, semi authoritarian character of the colonial state and the democra tic character of the polity in Britain. Non-violence meant above all fighting on the terrain of moral force. Non -violent mass movements pla ced the colonial authorities in the wrong and exposed the underpinning of colonial state power in brute force, when the authorities used armed force against peaceful Satyagrahis. In fact, a non -violent mass movement put the rulers on the horns of a dilemma . If they hesitated to suppress it because it was peaceful, they lost an important part of their hegemony, because the civ il resisters did break existing colonial laws; not to take action against them amounted to the abdication of administrative authority and a confession of the lack of strength to rule. If they suppressed the movement by use of force, they still lost, for it was morally difficult to justify the suppression of a peaceful movement and non-violent law -breakers through the use of force. They w ere in a[/INST]

no-win situation. The national movement had, on the other hand, a winning strategy: a semi -democratic rule had no answer to a mass movement that was non -violent and had massive popular support. In practice, the colonial authorities constantly vaci llated between the two choices, usually plumping in the end for suppression. By taking recourse to suppression of a non -violent movement, they had to suffer constant erosion of hegemony by exposing the basic underpinnings of colonial rule in force and

<s>[INST]no-win situation. The national movement had, on the other hand, a winning strategy: a semi -democratic rule had no answer to a mass movement that was non -violent and had massive popular support. In practice, the colonial authorities constantly vaci llated between the two choices, usually plumping in the end for suppression. By taking recourse to suppression of a non -violent movement, they had to suffer constant erosion of hegemony by exposing the basic underpinnings of colonial rule in force and[/INST]

524 | India’s Struggle For Independence coercion. Consequently, the hegemony of colonial rule or its moral basis was destroyed bit by bit. The adoption of non -violence was also linked to the fact that a disarmed people had hardly any other alternative. The colonial state had, through an elaborate s ystem, completely disarmed the Indian people since 1858 and made it difficult, indeed nearly impossible, for them to obtain arms or training in their use. The leaders of the national movement understood from the beginning that Indians did not possess the m aterial resources necessary to wage an armed struggle against the strong colonial state. In non - violent mass struggle, on the other hand, it was moral strength and the force of massive and mobilized public opinion that counted. And here the disarmed Indian people were not at a disadvantage. In other words, in a war of position, the non - violence of a mass movement was a way of becoming equal in political resources to the armed colonial state. Basic here was also the understanding that the disarmed Indian pe ople would not be able to withstand massive government repression, and that the use of violence would provide justification to the Government for launching a massive attack on the popular movement. Such heavy repression it was believed, would demoralize th e people and lead to political passivity. Two further remarks may be made in this context. First, the question whether a mass movement could assume a violent form or as suggested by Jawaharlal Nehru and Bhagat Singh in short but pregnant statements, do ma ss movements in which millions participate as distinguished from cadre -based movements — have to be, by their very nature, non -violent Second, in India’s case, non -violent struggle was as revolutionary in character as an armed struggle in other contexts: a part of a revolutionary strategy of hegemonic struggle of a Gramscian war of position — for changes in the structure of state and society.

<s>[INST]524 | India’s Struggle For Independence coercion. Consequently, the hegemony of colonial rule or its moral basis was destroyed bit by bit. The adoption of non -violence was also linked to the fact that a disarmed people had hardly any other alternative. The colonial state had, through an elaborate s ystem, completely disarmed the Indian people since 1858 and made it difficult, indeed nearly impossible, for them to obtain arms or training in their use. The leaders of the national movement understood from the beginning that Indians did not possess the m aterial resources necessary to wage an armed struggle against the strong colonial state. In non - violent mass struggle, on the other hand, it was moral strength and the force of massive and mobilized public opinion that counted. And here the disarmed Indian people were not at a disadvantage. In other words, in a war of position, the non - violence of a mass movement was a way of becoming equal in political resources to the armed colonial state. Basic here was also the understanding that the disarmed Indian pe ople would not be able to withstand massive government repression, and that the use of violence would provide justification to the Government for launching a massive attack on the popular movement. Such heavy repression it was believed, would demoralize th e people and lead to political passivity. Two further remarks may be made in this context. First, the question whether a mass movement could assume a violent form or as suggested by Jawaharlal Nehru and Bhagat Singh in short but pregnant statements, do ma ss movements in which millions participate as distinguished from cadre -based movements — have to be, by their very nature, non -violent Second, in India’s case, non -violent struggle was as revolutionary in character as an armed struggle in other contexts: a part of a revolutionary strategy of hegemonic struggle of a Gramscian war of position — for changes in the structure of state and society.[/INST]

for changes in the structure of state and society. Once the basic character and objectives of the nationalist strategy are grasped, once it is realised that both phas es of the national movement were geared to the twin tasks of winning the hearts and minds of the Indian people and making them active participants in the movement and makers of their own history, the successes and failures of the different phases of the

<s>[INST]for changes in the structure of state and society. Once the basic character and objectives of the nationalist strategy are grasped, once it is realised that both phas es of the national movement were geared to the twin tasks of winning the hearts and minds of the Indian people and making them active participants in the movement and makers of their own history, the successes and failures of the different phases of the[/INST]

525 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement movement and of its basic strategy have to be evaluated in a new manner. The criterion of Success or failure here is the extent to which the colonial hegemony over the Indian people was undermined and the people were politicized and prepared for struggle. Ju dged in this light, we would see that these objectives were progressively achieved through successive waves of mass movements alternating with phases of truce. Even when the mass movements were suppressed (1932, 1942), withdrawn (1922), ignored and suppres sed (1940 -41) or ended in compromise (1930 -31) and were apparently defeated in terms of their stated objectives of winning freedom; in terms of hegemony, these movements were great successes, and marked leaps in mass political consciousness . The strategic practice of the Indian national movement, especially during its leadership b y Gandhiji, has a certain significance in world history comparable to that of the British, French, Russian, Chinese, Cuban an d Vietnamese revolutions. India is the only actual hist orical example of a semi -democratic or democratic type of state structure being replaced or transformed, of the broadly Gramscian theoretical perspective of a war of position being successfully practised. The study of its experience can yield many insights into the processes of historical change and state transformation, both in the past and the present, both to the historian and the political activist. It is the one concrete example of a long -drawn out hegemonic struggle in which state power is not seized in a single historical moment of revolution but through a prolonged political process, in which the main terrain of popular struggle is the ‘national -popular,’ that is, the moral, political and ideological on a national or societal plane, in which the res erves of counter - hegemony are patiently built up over the years, in which mass movements are occasional but politics is perpetual, in which the

<s>[INST]525 | The Long -Term Strategy of the National Movement movement and of its basic strategy have to be evaluated in a new manner. The criterion of Success or failure here is the extent to which the colonial hegemony over the Indian people was undermined and the people were politicized and prepared for struggle. Ju dged in this light, we would see that these objectives were progressively achieved through successive waves of mass movements alternating with phases of truce. Even when the mass movements were suppressed (1932, 1942), withdrawn (1922), ignored and suppres sed (1940 -41) or ended in compromise (1930 -31) and were apparently defeated in terms of their stated objectives of winning freedom; in terms of hegemony, these movements were great successes, and marked leaps in mass political consciousness . The strategic practice of the Indian national movement, especially during its leadership b y Gandhiji, has a certain significance in world history comparable to that of the British, French, Russian, Chinese, Cuban an d Vietnamese revolutions. India is the only actual hist orical example of a semi -democratic or democratic type of state structure being replaced or transformed, of the broadly Gramscian theoretical perspective of a war of position being successfully practised. The study of its experience can yield many insights into the processes of historical change and state transformation, both in the past and the present, both to the historian and the political activist. It is the one concrete example of a long -drawn out hegemonic struggle in which state power is not seized in a single historical moment of revolution but through a prolonged political process, in which the main terrain of popular struggle is the ‘national -popular,’ that is, the moral, political and ideological on a national or societal plane, in which the res erves of counter - hegemony are patiently built up over the years, in which mass movements are occasional but politics is perpetual, in which the[/INST]

struggle for state power goes through stages, each stage marking a step forward over the previous one, in which masses play an active part and do not depend upon a ‘standing army’ of cadres and yet the cadres play a critical role, in which the movement goes through the inevitable ‘passive’ phases but the popular political morale is not only kept up but enhanced. The problems of popular mobilization, of waging national - popular and hegemonic struggle or a war of position in societies functioning

<s>[INST]struggle for state power goes through stages, each stage marking a step forward over the previous one, in which masses play an active part and do not depend upon a ‘standing army’ of cadres and yet the cadres play a critical role, in which the movement goes through the inevitable ‘passive’ phases but the popular political morale is not only kept up but enhanced. The problems of popular mobilization, of waging national - popular and hegemonic struggle or a war of position in societies functioning[/INST]

526 | India’s Struggle For Independence within the confines of the rule of law and a democratic and basically civil libertarian polity have something in common, wit h the problems and circumstances of the Indian national movement. It is unquestionable that the study of the rich experience of the Indian national movement and in particular of Gandhian political strategy and style of leadership, as distinguished from Gan dhian philosophy, has a certain significance for the revolutionary, that is, basic transformation of democratic, hegemonic states and societies.

<s>[INST]526 | India’s Struggle For Independence within the confines of the rule of law and a democratic and basically civil libertarian polity have something in common, wit h the problems and circumstances of the Indian national movement. It is unquestionable that the study of the rich experience of the Indian national movement and in particular of Gandhian political strategy and style of leadership, as distinguished from Gan dhian philosophy, has a certain significance for the revolutionary, that is, basic transformation of democratic, hegemonic states and societies.[/INST]

527 | The Indian National Movement —the Ideological Dimension CHAPTER 39. THE INDIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT —THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION The Indian national movement was basically the product of the central contradiction between colonialism and the interests of the Indian people. The leadership of the movement gradually arrived at, and based itself on a clear, scientific and firm understanding of colonialism — that the British were using their political control to subordinate the Indian economy and society to the needs of the British economy and society. It began to perceive that overall the country was regressing and underdevelopin g. On this basis, it evolved an understanding of the Indian reality and gradually generated and formed a clear -cut anti -colonial ideology. Already, by the end of the 19th century, the founding fathers of the national movement had worked out a clear unders tanding of all the three modes of colonial exploitation: through plunder, taxation and the employment of Englishmen in India, through free and unequal trade, and through the investment of British capital. They had also grasped that India’s colonial relatio nship was not an accident of history or a result of political policy but sprang rather from the very character of British society and India’s subordination to it. Their entire critique of colonialism got its focus in the theory of the drain of wealth from India — the theory that a large part of India’s capital and wealth were being transferred to Britain. This understanding of the complex economic mechanism of modem imperialism was further advanced after 1918 under the impact of the anti -imperialist mass m ovements and the spread of Marxist ideas. The nationalist leadership also understood that the central contradiction could be resolved only through the transformation or overthrow of colonial economic relations. Moreover, at each stage of the movement’s dev elopment, the

<s>[INST]527 | The Indian National Movement —the Ideological Dimension CHAPTER 39. THE INDIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT —THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION The Indian national movement was basically the product of the central contradiction between colonialism and the interests of the Indian people. The leadership of the movement gradually arrived at, and based itself on a clear, scientific and firm understanding of colonialism — that the British were using their political control to subordinate the Indian economy and society to the needs of the British economy and society. It began to perceive that overall the country was regressing and underdevelopin g. On this basis, it evolved an understanding of the Indian reality and gradually generated and formed a clear -cut anti -colonial ideology. Already, by the end of the 19th century, the founding fathers of the national movement had worked out a clear unders tanding of all the three modes of colonial exploitation: through plunder, taxation and the employment of Englishmen in India, through free and unequal trade, and through the investment of British capital. They had also grasped that India’s colonial relatio nship was not an accident of history or a result of political policy but sprang rather from the very character of British society and India’s subordination to it. Their entire critique of colonialism got its focus in the theory of the drain of wealth from India — the theory that a large part of India’s capital and wealth were being transferred to Britain. This understanding of the complex economic mechanism of modem imperialism was further advanced after 1918 under the impact of the anti -imperialist mass m ovements and the spread of Marxist ideas. The nationalist leadership also understood that the central contradiction could be resolved only through the transformation or overthrow of colonial economic relations. Moreover, at each stage of the movement’s dev elopment, the[/INST]

Moreover, at each stage of the movement’s dev elopment, the leadership linked its analysis to the analysis of colonialism.

<s>[INST]Moreover, at each stage of the movement’s dev elopment, the leadership linked its analysis to the analysis of colonialism.[/INST]

528 | India’s Struggle For Independence This anti -colonial world view was fully internalized by the lowermost cadres of the national movement. During the Gandhian era of mass politics, they disseminated this critique o f colonialism among the common people in the urban as well as the rural areas. The twin themes of the drain of wealth and the use of India as a market for Britain’s manufactured goods and the consequent destruction of the Indian handicraft industries forme d the very pith and marrow of their agitation. This agitation undermined the foundations of colonial rule in the minds of the Indian people — it destroyed the carefully inculcated colonial myth that the British ruled India for the benefit of Indians. that they were the Mai-Baap of the common people. Thus, if the primary contradiction provided the material or structural basis of the national movement, its grasping through the anti -co1onial ideology provided its ideological basis. This opened the way to a fir m and consistent anti -imperialist movement, which could follow highly flexible tactics precisely because of its rootedness in and adherence to the anti - colonial principle. This strong anti -colonial basis of the movement was also very important because in any mass movement ideology plays a crucial role. I n normal politics, passive support or opposition to, or voting for and against, a regime do not require very strong motivation. But active participation in a mass movement, involving immense sacrifice, can not take place only on the basis of a sense of being poor or being exploited. It requires a strong. a very strong ideological commitment based on an understanding of the causes of the social condition. Therefore, it was the movement’s scientific anti -colon ial ideology which became the prime mover in its anti -imperialist struggle. Along with the anti - colonial world view, certain other ideological elements constituted the broad socio -economic -political vision of the Indian national

<s>[INST]528 | India’s Struggle For Independence This anti -colonial world view was fully internalized by the lowermost cadres of the national movement. During the Gandhian era of mass politics, they disseminated this critique o f colonialism among the common people in the urban as well as the rural areas. The twin themes of the drain of wealth and the use of India as a market for Britain’s manufactured goods and the consequent destruction of the Indian handicraft industries forme d the very pith and marrow of their agitation. This agitation undermined the foundations of colonial rule in the minds of the Indian people — it destroyed the carefully inculcated colonial myth that the British ruled India for the benefit of Indians. that they were the Mai-Baap of the common people. Thus, if the primary contradiction provided the material or structural basis of the national movement, its grasping through the anti -co1onial ideology provided its ideological basis. This opened the way to a fir m and consistent anti -imperialist movement, which could follow highly flexible tactics precisely because of its rootedness in and adherence to the anti - colonial principle. This strong anti -colonial basis of the movement was also very important because in any mass movement ideology plays a crucial role. I n normal politics, passive support or opposition to, or voting for and against, a regime do not require very strong motivation. But active participation in a mass movement, involving immense sacrifice, can not take place only on the basis of a sense of being poor or being exploited. It requires a strong. a very strong ideological commitment based on an understanding of the causes of the social condition. Therefore, it was the movement’s scientific anti -colon ial ideology which became the prime mover in its anti -imperialist struggle. Along with the anti - colonial world view, certain other ideological elements constituted the broad socio -economic -political vision of the Indian national[/INST]