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1 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 CHAPTER 1. THE FIRST MAJOR CHALLENGE: THE REVOLT OF 1857 It was the morning of 11 May 1 857. The city of De1h had not yet woken up when a band of Sepoys from Meerut, who had defied and killed the European officers the previous day, crossed the Jamuna, set the toll house on fire and marched to the Red Fort. They entered the Red Fort through the Raj Gha t gate, followed by an excited crowd, to appeal to Bahadur Shah II, the Moghul Emperor — a pensioner of the British East India Company, who possessed nothing but the name of the mighty Mughals — to become their leader, thus, give legitimacy to their cause. Bahadur Shah vacillated as he was neither sure of the intentions of the sepoys nor of his own ability to play an effective role. He was however persuaded, if not coerced, to give in and was proclaimed the Shahenshah -e-Hindustan. The sepoys, then, set out t o capture and control the imperial city of Delhi. Si mon Fraser, the Political Agent and several other Englishmen were killed; the public offices were either occupied or destroyed. The Revolt of an unsuccessful but heroic effort to eliminate foreign rule, h ad begun. The capture of Delhi and the proclamation of Bahadur Shah as the Empero r of Hindustan gave a positive political meaning to the revolt and provided a rallying point for the rebels b y recalling the past glory of the imperial city. The Revolt at Mee rut and the capture of Delhi was the precursor to a widespread mutiny by the sepoys and rebellion almost all over North India, as well as Central and Western India. South India remained quiet and Punjab and Bengal were only marginally affected. Almost half the Company’s sepoy strength of 2,32,224 opted out of their loyalty to their regimental colors and overcame the ideology of the army, meticulously constructed over a period of time through training and discipline.
<s>[INST]1 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 CHAPTER 1. THE FIRST MAJOR CHALLENGE: THE REVOLT OF 1857 It was the morning of 11 May 1 857. The city of De1h had not yet woken up when a band of Sepoys from Meerut, who had defied and killed the European officers the previous day, crossed the Jamuna, set the toll house on fire and marched to the Red Fort. They entered the Red Fort through the Raj Gha t gate, followed by an excited crowd, to appeal to Bahadur Shah II, the Moghul Emperor — a pensioner of the British East India Company, who possessed nothing but the name of the mighty Mughals — to become their leader, thus, give legitimacy to their cause. Bahadur Shah vacillated as he was neither sure of the intentions of the sepoys nor of his own ability to play an effective role. He was however persuaded, if not coerced, to give in and was proclaimed the Shahenshah -e-Hindustan. The sepoys, then, set out t o capture and control the imperial city of Delhi. Si mon Fraser, the Political Agent and several other Englishmen were killed; the public offices were either occupied or destroyed. The Revolt of an unsuccessful but heroic effort to eliminate foreign rule, h ad begun. The capture of Delhi and the proclamation of Bahadur Shah as the Empero r of Hindustan gave a positive political meaning to the revolt and provided a rallying point for the rebels b y recalling the past glory of the imperial city. The Revolt at Mee rut and the capture of Delhi was the precursor to a widespread mutiny by the sepoys and rebellion almost all over North India, as well as Central and Western India. South India remained quiet and Punjab and Bengal were only marginally affected. Almost half the Company’s sepoy strength of 2,32,224 opted out of their loyalty to their regimental colors and overcame the ideology of the army, meticulously constructed over a period of time through training and discipline.[/INST]
a period of time through training and discipline. Even before the Meerut incident, there w ere rumblings of resentment in various cantonments. The 19th Native Infantry at
<s>[INST]a period of time through training and discipline. Even before the Meerut incident, there w ere rumblings of resentment in various cantonments. The 19th Native Infantry at[/INST]
2 | India’s S truggle for Independence Berhampur which refused to use the newly introduced Enfield Rifle, was disbanded in March 1857. A young sepoy of the 34th Native Infantry, Mangal Pande, went a step further an d fired at the Sergeant Major of his regiment. He was overpowered and executed and his regiment too, was disbanded. The 7th Oudh regiment which defied its officers met with a similar fate . Within a month of capture of Delhi , the Revolt spread to different parts of the country: Kanpur, Lucknow, Benares, Allahabad, Bareilly, Jagdishp ur and Jhansi. The rebel activity was marked by intense anti -British feelings and the administ ration was invariably toppled. In the absence of any leaders from their own ranks, th e insurgents turned to the traditional leaders of Indian society — the territorial aristocrats and feudal chiefs who had suffered at the hands of the British. At Kanpur, the natural choice was Nana Saheb, the adopted son of the last Peshw a,Baji Rao II . He had ref used the family title and, banished fro m Poona, was living near Kanpur . Begum Hazrat Mahal took over the reigns where popular sympathy was overwhelmingly in favour of the deposed Nawab. Her son, Birjis Qadir, was proclaimed the Nawab and a regular administration was organized with important offices shared equally by Muslims and Hindus. At Barielly, Khan Bahadur, a descendant of the former ruler of Rohilkhand was placed in command. Living on a pension granted by the British , he was not too enthusia stic about this and had in fact, warned the Commissioner of the impending mutiny. Yet, once the Revolt broke out, he assumed the administration, organized an army of 40,000 soldiers and offered stiff resistance to the British. * In Bihar the Revolt was le d by Kunwar Singh, the zamindar of Jagdishpur, a 70 year -old man on the brink of bankruptcy. He nursed a grudge against the British. He had been deprived of his estates by them and his repeated appeals to be entrusted with
<s>[INST]2 | India’s S truggle for Independence Berhampur which refused to use the newly introduced Enfield Rifle, was disbanded in March 1857. A young sepoy of the 34th Native Infantry, Mangal Pande, went a step further an d fired at the Sergeant Major of his regiment. He was overpowered and executed and his regiment too, was disbanded. The 7th Oudh regiment which defied its officers met with a similar fate . Within a month of capture of Delhi , the Revolt spread to different parts of the country: Kanpur, Lucknow, Benares, Allahabad, Bareilly, Jagdishp ur and Jhansi. The rebel activity was marked by intense anti -British feelings and the administ ration was invariably toppled. In the absence of any leaders from their own ranks, th e insurgents turned to the traditional leaders of Indian society — the territorial aristocrats and feudal chiefs who had suffered at the hands of the British. At Kanpur, the natural choice was Nana Saheb, the adopted son of the last Peshw a,Baji Rao II . He had ref used the family title and, banished fro m Poona, was living near Kanpur . Begum Hazrat Mahal took over the reigns where popular sympathy was overwhelmingly in favour of the deposed Nawab. Her son, Birjis Qadir, was proclaimed the Nawab and a regular administration was organized with important offices shared equally by Muslims and Hindus. At Barielly, Khan Bahadur, a descendant of the former ruler of Rohilkhand was placed in command. Living on a pension granted by the British , he was not too enthusia stic about this and had in fact, warned the Commissioner of the impending mutiny. Yet, once the Revolt broke out, he assumed the administration, organized an army of 40,000 soldiers and offered stiff resistance to the British. * In Bihar the Revolt was le d by Kunwar Singh, the zamindar of Jagdishpur, a 70 year -old man on the brink of bankruptcy. He nursed a grudge against the British. He had been deprived of his estates by them and his repeated appeals to be entrusted with[/INST]
estates by them and his repeated appeals to be entrusted with their management again fell on dea f ears. Even though he had not planned an uprising, he unhesitatingly joined the sepoys when they reached Arrah from Dinapore.
<s>[INST]estates by them and his repeated appeals to be entrusted with their management again fell on dea f ears. Even though he had not planned an uprising, he unhesitatingly joined the sepoys when they reached Arrah from Dinapore.[/INST]
3 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 The most outstanding leader of the Revolt was Rani Lakshmib ai, who assumed the leadership of the sepoys at Jhansi. Lord Dalhousi e, the Governor -General, had refused to allow her adopted son to succeed to the throne after her husband died and had annexed the state by the application of the Doctrine of Lapse. The Rani had tried everything to reverse the deci sion. She even offered to keep J hansi ‘safe’ for the British if they would grant her wishes. When it was clear nothing was working she joined the sepoys and, in time, became one of the most formidable enemies the British had to contend with. The Revolt was not confined to these ma jor centres. It had embraced almost every cantonment in the Bengal and a few in Bombay. Only the Madras army remained totally loyal. Why did the sepoys revolt? It was considered prestigious to be in the service of the Company; it provided economic stabilit y. Why, then, did the sepoys choose to forego these advantages for the sake of an uncertain future? A proclamation issued at Delhi indicates the immediate cause: ‘it is well known that in these days all the English have entertained these evil designs — first, to destroy the religion of the whole Hindustani Army, and then to make the people by compulsion Christians. Therefore, we, solely on accou nt of our religion, have combined with the people, and have not spared alive one infidel, and have re -established the Delhi dynasty on these terms’. It is certainly true that the conditions of service in the Company’s army and cantonments increasingly came in to conflict with the religious beliefs and prejudices of the sepoys, who were predominantly drawn from the upp er caste Hindus of the North Western Provinces and Oudh. Initially, the administration sought to accommodate the sepoys’ demands: facilities were provided to them to live according to the dictates of their caste and religion. But, with the extension of the Army’s
<s>[INST]3 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 The most outstanding leader of the Revolt was Rani Lakshmib ai, who assumed the leadership of the sepoys at Jhansi. Lord Dalhousi e, the Governor -General, had refused to allow her adopted son to succeed to the throne after her husband died and had annexed the state by the application of the Doctrine of Lapse. The Rani had tried everything to reverse the deci sion. She even offered to keep J hansi ‘safe’ for the British if they would grant her wishes. When it was clear nothing was working she joined the sepoys and, in time, became one of the most formidable enemies the British had to contend with. The Revolt was not confined to these ma jor centres. It had embraced almost every cantonment in the Bengal and a few in Bombay. Only the Madras army remained totally loyal. Why did the sepoys revolt? It was considered prestigious to be in the service of the Company; it provided economic stabilit y. Why, then, did the sepoys choose to forego these advantages for the sake of an uncertain future? A proclamation issued at Delhi indicates the immediate cause: ‘it is well known that in these days all the English have entertained these evil designs — first, to destroy the religion of the whole Hindustani Army, and then to make the people by compulsion Christians. Therefore, we, solely on accou nt of our religion, have combined with the people, and have not spared alive one infidel, and have re -established the Delhi dynasty on these terms’. It is certainly true that the conditions of service in the Company’s army and cantonments increasingly came in to conflict with the religious beliefs and prejudices of the sepoys, who were predominantly drawn from the upp er caste Hindus of the North Western Provinces and Oudh. Initially, the administration sought to accommodate the sepoys’ demands: facilities were provided to them to live according to the dictates of their caste and religion. But, with the extension of the Army’s[/INST]
operation not only to various parts of India, but also to countries outside, it was not possible to do so any more. Moreover, caste distinctions and segregation within a regiment were not conducive to the cohesiveness of a fighting unit. To begin w ith, the administration thought of an easy way out: discourage the recruitment of Brahmins; this apparently did not succeed and, by
<s>[INST]operation not only to various parts of India, but also to countries outside, it was not possible to do so any more. Moreover, caste distinctions and segregation within a regiment were not conducive to the cohesiveness of a fighting unit. To begin w ith, the administration thought of an easy way out: discourage the recruitment of Brahmins; this apparently did not succeed and, by[/INST]
4 | India’s S truggle for Independence the middle of the nineteenth century, the upper castes predominated in the Bengal Army, for instance. The unhappiness of th e sepoys first surfaced in 1824 when the 47th Regiment at Barrackpur was ordered to go to Burma. To the religious Hindu, crossing the sea meant loss of caste. The sepoys, therefore, refused to comply. The regiment was disbanded and those who led the opposi tion were hanged. The religious sensibilities of the sepoys who participated in the Afghan War were more seriously affected. During the arduous and disastrous campaigns, the fleeing sepoys were forc ed to eat and drink whatever cam e their way. When they ret urned to India, those at home correctly sensed that they could not have observed caste stipulations and therefore, were hesitant to welcome them back into the b iradiri (caste fraternity). Sitaram who had gone to Afghanistan found himself outcaste not only in his village, but even in his own barracks. The Prestige of being in the pay of the Company was not enough to hold his Position in society; religion and caste proved to be more powerful. * The rumours about the Government’s secret designs to promote conv ersions to Christianity further exasperated the sepoys. The official -missionary nexus gave credence to the rumour. In some cantonments missionaries were permitted to preach openly and their diatribe against other religions angered the sepoys. The reports a bout the mixing of bone dust in atta and the introduction of the Enfield rifle enhanced the sepoys’ growing disaffection with the Government. The cartridges of the new rifle had to be bitten off before loading and the grease was reportedly made of beef and pig fat. The army administration did nothing to allay these fears, and the sepoys felt their religion was in real danger. The sepoys’ discontent was not limited to religion alone. They were equally unhappy with their emoluments. A sepoy in
<s>[INST]4 | India’s S truggle for Independence the middle of the nineteenth century, the upper castes predominated in the Bengal Army, for instance. The unhappiness of th e sepoys first surfaced in 1824 when the 47th Regiment at Barrackpur was ordered to go to Burma. To the religious Hindu, crossing the sea meant loss of caste. The sepoys, therefore, refused to comply. The regiment was disbanded and those who led the opposi tion were hanged. The religious sensibilities of the sepoys who participated in the Afghan War were more seriously affected. During the arduous and disastrous campaigns, the fleeing sepoys were forc ed to eat and drink whatever cam e their way. When they ret urned to India, those at home correctly sensed that they could not have observed caste stipulations and therefore, were hesitant to welcome them back into the b iradiri (caste fraternity). Sitaram who had gone to Afghanistan found himself outcaste not only in his village, but even in his own barracks. The Prestige of being in the pay of the Company was not enough to hold his Position in society; religion and caste proved to be more powerful. * The rumours about the Government’s secret designs to promote conv ersions to Christianity further exasperated the sepoys. The official -missionary nexus gave credence to the rumour. In some cantonments missionaries were permitted to preach openly and their diatribe against other religions angered the sepoys. The reports a bout the mixing of bone dust in atta and the introduction of the Enfield rifle enhanced the sepoys’ growing disaffection with the Government. The cartridges of the new rifle had to be bitten off before loading and the grease was reportedly made of beef and pig fat. The army administration did nothing to allay these fears, and the sepoys felt their religion was in real danger. The sepoys’ discontent was not limited to religion alone. They were equally unhappy with their emoluments. A sepoy in[/INST]
They were equally unhappy with their emoluments. A sepoy in the infantry g ot seven rupees a month. A sawar in the cavalry was paid Rs. 27, out of which he had to pay for his own uniform, food and the upkeep of his mount, and he was ultimately left with only a rupee or two. What was more galling was the sense of deprivation compa red to his British counterparts. He was made
<s>[INST]They were equally unhappy with their emoluments. A sepoy in the infantry g ot seven rupees a month. A sawar in the cavalry was paid Rs. 27, out of which he had to pay for his own uniform, food and the upkeep of his mount, and he was ultimately left with only a rupee or two. What was more galling was the sense of deprivation compa red to his British counterparts. He was made[/INST]
5 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 to feel a subordinate at every step and was discriminated against racially and in matters of promotion and privileges. ‘Though he might give the signs of a military genius of Hyder,’ wrote T.R. Holmes, ‘he knew that he could never attain the pay of an English subaltern and that the rank to which he might attain, after 30 years of faithful service, would not protect him from the insolent dictation of an ensign fresh from England.” The discontent of the sepoys was not limited to matters military; they felt the general disenchantment with and opposition to British rule. The sepoy, in fact, was a peasant in uniform,’ whose consciousness was not divorced from that of the rural population. A military officer had warned Dalhousie about the possible consequences of his policies: ‘Your army is derived from the peasantry of the country who have rights and if those rights are infringed upon, you will no longer have to depend on the fidelity of the army . . . If you infringe the institutions of the people of India, that army will sympathize with them; for they are part of the population, and in every infringement you may make upon the rights of the individuals, you infringe upon the rights of men who are either themselves in th e army or upon their sons, their fathers or their relations.’ * Almost every agricultural family in Oudh had a representative in the army; there were 75,000 men from Oudh. Whatever happened there was of immediate concern to the sepoy. The new land revenue system introduced after the annexation and the confiscation of lands attached to charitable institutions affected his well -being. That accounted for the 14,000 petitions received from the sepoys about the hardships of the revenue system. A proclamation iss ued by the Delhi rebels clearly reflected the sepoy’s awareness of the misery brought about by British rule. The mutiny in itself, therefore, was a revolt against
<s>[INST]5 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 to feel a subordinate at every step and was discriminated against racially and in matters of promotion and privileges. ‘Though he might give the signs of a military genius of Hyder,’ wrote T.R. Holmes, ‘he knew that he could never attain the pay of an English subaltern and that the rank to which he might attain, after 30 years of faithful service, would not protect him from the insolent dictation of an ensign fresh from England.” The discontent of the sepoys was not limited to matters military; they felt the general disenchantment with and opposition to British rule. The sepoy, in fact, was a peasant in uniform,’ whose consciousness was not divorced from that of the rural population. A military officer had warned Dalhousie about the possible consequences of his policies: ‘Your army is derived from the peasantry of the country who have rights and if those rights are infringed upon, you will no longer have to depend on the fidelity of the army . . . If you infringe the institutions of the people of India, that army will sympathize with them; for they are part of the population, and in every infringement you may make upon the rights of the individuals, you infringe upon the rights of men who are either themselves in th e army or upon their sons, their fathers or their relations.’ * Almost every agricultural family in Oudh had a representative in the army; there were 75,000 men from Oudh. Whatever happened there was of immediate concern to the sepoy. The new land revenue system introduced after the annexation and the confiscation of lands attached to charitable institutions affected his well -being. That accounted for the 14,000 petitions received from the sepoys about the hardships of the revenue system. A proclamation iss ued by the Delhi rebels clearly reflected the sepoy’s awareness of the misery brought about by British rule. The mutiny in itself, therefore, was a revolt against[/INST]
the British and, thus, a political act. What imparted this character to the mutiny was the se poy’s identity of interests with the general population. The Revolt of the sepoys was accompanied by a rebellion of the civil population, particularly in the North Western Provinces
<s>[INST]the British and, thus, a political act. What imparted this character to the mutiny was the se poy’s identity of interests with the general population. The Revolt of the sepoys was accompanied by a rebellion of the civil population, particularly in the North Western Provinces[/INST]
6 | India’s S truggle for Independence and Oudh, the two areas from which the sepoys of the Bengal army were rec ruited. Except in Muzzafarnagar and Saharanpur, civil rebellion followed the Revolt of the sepoys. The action of the sepoys released the rural population from fear of the state and the control exercised by the administration. Their accumulated grievances f ound immediate expression and they rose en masse to give vent to their opposition to British rule. Government buildings were destroyed, the “treasury was plundered, the magazine was sacked, barracks and court houses were burnt and prison gates were flung o pen.” The civil rebellion had a broad social base, embracing all sections of society — the territorial magnates, peasants, artisans, religious mendicants and priests, civil servants, shopkeepers and boatmen. The Revolt of the sepoys, thus, resulted in a po pular uprising. * The reason for this mass upsurge has to be sought in the nature of British rule which adversely affected the interests of almost all sections of s ociety Under the burden of excessive taxes the peasantry became progressively indebted and impoverished. The only interest of the Company was the realization of maximum revenue with minimum effort. Consequently settlements were hurriedly undertaken, often without any regard for the resources of the land. For instance, in the district of Bareill y in 1812, the settlement was completed in the record time often months with a dramatic increase of Rs. 14.73,188 over the earlier settlement. Delighted by this increase, the Government congratulated the officers for their ‘zeal, ability and indefatigable labour.’ It did not occur to the authorities that such a sharp and sudden increase would have disastrous consequences on the cultivators. Naturally, the revenue could not be collected without coercion and torture: in Rohilkhand there were as many as 2 ,37,3 88 coercive collections during 1848 -56.
<s>[INST]6 | India’s S truggle for Independence and Oudh, the two areas from which the sepoys of the Bengal army were rec ruited. Except in Muzzafarnagar and Saharanpur, civil rebellion followed the Revolt of the sepoys. The action of the sepoys released the rural population from fear of the state and the control exercised by the administration. Their accumulated grievances f ound immediate expression and they rose en masse to give vent to their opposition to British rule. Government buildings were destroyed, the “treasury was plundered, the magazine was sacked, barracks and court houses were burnt and prison gates were flung o pen.” The civil rebellion had a broad social base, embracing all sections of society — the territorial magnates, peasants, artisans, religious mendicants and priests, civil servants, shopkeepers and boatmen. The Revolt of the sepoys, thus, resulted in a po pular uprising. * The reason for this mass upsurge has to be sought in the nature of British rule which adversely affected the interests of almost all sections of s ociety Under the burden of excessive taxes the peasantry became progressively indebted and impoverished. The only interest of the Company was the realization of maximum revenue with minimum effort. Consequently settlements were hurriedly undertaken, often without any regard for the resources of the land. For instance, in the district of Bareill y in 1812, the settlement was completed in the record time often months with a dramatic increase of Rs. 14.73,188 over the earlier settlement. Delighted by this increase, the Government congratulated the officers for their ‘zeal, ability and indefatigable labour.’ It did not occur to the authorities that such a sharp and sudden increase would have disastrous consequences on the cultivators. Naturally, the revenue could not be collected without coercion and torture: in Rohilkhand there were as many as 2 ,37,3 88 coercive collections during 1848 -56.[/INST]
Whatever the conditions, the Government was keen on collecting revenue. Even in very adverse circumstances, remissions were rarely granted. A collector, who repeatedly reported his inability to realize revenue from a n estate, as only grass was grown there, was told that grass was a very good produce and it should be sold for collecting revenue!
<s>[INST]Whatever the conditions, the Government was keen on collecting revenue. Even in very adverse circumstances, remissions were rarely granted. A collector, who repeatedly reported his inability to realize revenue from a n estate, as only grass was grown there, was told that grass was a very good produce and it should be sold for collecting revenue![/INST]
7 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 The traditional landed aristocracy suffered no less. In Oudh, which was a storm centre of the Revolt, the taluqdars lost all their power and privileges. About 21,000 taluqdars whose estates were confiscated suddenly found themselves without a source of income, ‘unable to work, ashamed to beg, condemned to penury.’ These dispossessed taluqdars smarting under the humiliation heaped on them, seized the opportunity presented by the Sepoy Revolt to oppose the British and regain what they had lost. * British rule also meant misery to the artisans and handicraftsmen. The annexation of Indian states by the Company cut off their major s ource of patronage. Added to this, British policy discouraged Indian handicrafts and promoted British goods. The highly skilled Indian craftsmen were deprived of their source of income and were forced to look for alternate sources of employment that hardly existed, as the destruction of Indian handicrafts was not accompanied by the development of modem industries. The reforming zeal of British officials under the influence of utilitarianism had aroused considerable suspicion, resentment, and opposition. Th e orthodox Hindus and Muslims feared that through social legislation the British were trying to destroy their religion and culture. Moreover, they believed that legislation was undertaken to aid the missionaries in their quest for evangelization. The ortho dox and the religious, therefore, arrayed against the British. Several proclamations of the rebels expressed this cultural concern in no uncertain terms. The coalition of the Revolt of the sepoys and that of the civil population made the 1857 movement an unprecedented popular upsurge. Was it an organized and methodically planned Revolt or a spontaneous insurrection? In the absence of any reliable account left behind by the rebels it is difficult to be certain. The attitude and activities of the leaders har dly suggest any planning
<s>[INST]7 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 The traditional landed aristocracy suffered no less. In Oudh, which was a storm centre of the Revolt, the taluqdars lost all their power and privileges. About 21,000 taluqdars whose estates were confiscated suddenly found themselves without a source of income, ‘unable to work, ashamed to beg, condemned to penury.’ These dispossessed taluqdars smarting under the humiliation heaped on them, seized the opportunity presented by the Sepoy Revolt to oppose the British and regain what they had lost. * British rule also meant misery to the artisans and handicraftsmen. The annexation of Indian states by the Company cut off their major s ource of patronage. Added to this, British policy discouraged Indian handicrafts and promoted British goods. The highly skilled Indian craftsmen were deprived of their source of income and were forced to look for alternate sources of employment that hardly existed, as the destruction of Indian handicrafts was not accompanied by the development of modem industries. The reforming zeal of British officials under the influence of utilitarianism had aroused considerable suspicion, resentment, and opposition. Th e orthodox Hindus and Muslims feared that through social legislation the British were trying to destroy their religion and culture. Moreover, they believed that legislation was undertaken to aid the missionaries in their quest for evangelization. The ortho dox and the religious, therefore, arrayed against the British. Several proclamations of the rebels expressed this cultural concern in no uncertain terms. The coalition of the Revolt of the sepoys and that of the civil population made the 1857 movement an unprecedented popular upsurge. Was it an organized and methodically planned Revolt or a spontaneous insurrection? In the absence of any reliable account left behind by the rebels it is difficult to be certain. The attitude and activities of the leaders har dly suggest any planning[/INST]
or conspiracy on their part and if at all it existed it was at an embryonic stage.
<s>[INST]or conspiracy on their part and if at all it existed it was at an embryonic stage.[/INST]
8 | India’s S truggle for Independence When the sepoys arrived from Meerut, Bahadur Shah seems to have been taken by surprise and promptly conveyed the news to the Lt. Governor at Agra. So did Rani Lakshmibhai of Jhansi who took quite some time before openly joining the rebels. Whether Nana Saheb and Maulvi Ahmad Shah of Faizabad had established links with various cantonments and were instrumental in instigating Revolt is yet to be prove d beyond doubt. Similarly, the message conveyed by the circulation of chappatis and lotus flowers is also uncertain. The only positive factor is that within a month of the Meerut incident the Revolt became quite widespread. * Even if there was no planning and organization before the revolt, it was important that it was done, once it started. Immediately after the capture of Delhi a letter was addressed to the rulers of all the neighboring states and of Rajasthan soliciting their support and inviting them t o participate. In Delhi, a court of administrators was established which was responsible for all matters of state. The court consisted of ten members, six from the army and four from the civilian departments. All decisions were taken by a majority vote. Th e court conducted the affairs of the state in the name of the Emperor. ‘The Government at Delhi,’ wrote a British official, ‘seems to have been a sort of constitutional Milocracy. The king was king and honoured as such, like a constitutional monarch; but i nstead of a Parliament , he had a council of soldiers, in whom power rested, and of whom he was no degree a military commander.’ In other centres, also attempts were made to bring about an organization. Bahadur Shah was recognized as the Emperor by all reb el leaders Coins were struck and orders were issued in his name. At Bareilly, Khan Bahadur Khan conducted the administration in the name of the Mughal Emperor. It is also significant that the first impulse of the rebels was always to proceed to Delhi wheth er
<s>[INST]8 | India’s S truggle for Independence When the sepoys arrived from Meerut, Bahadur Shah seems to have been taken by surprise and promptly conveyed the news to the Lt. Governor at Agra. So did Rani Lakshmibhai of Jhansi who took quite some time before openly joining the rebels. Whether Nana Saheb and Maulvi Ahmad Shah of Faizabad had established links with various cantonments and were instrumental in instigating Revolt is yet to be prove d beyond doubt. Similarly, the message conveyed by the circulation of chappatis and lotus flowers is also uncertain. The only positive factor is that within a month of the Meerut incident the Revolt became quite widespread. * Even if there was no planning and organization before the revolt, it was important that it was done, once it started. Immediately after the capture of Delhi a letter was addressed to the rulers of all the neighboring states and of Rajasthan soliciting their support and inviting them t o participate. In Delhi, a court of administrators was established which was responsible for all matters of state. The court consisted of ten members, six from the army and four from the civilian departments. All decisions were taken by a majority vote. Th e court conducted the affairs of the state in the name of the Emperor. ‘The Government at Delhi,’ wrote a British official, ‘seems to have been a sort of constitutional Milocracy. The king was king and honoured as such, like a constitutional monarch; but i nstead of a Parliament , he had a council of soldiers, in whom power rested, and of whom he was no degree a military commander.’ In other centres, also attempts were made to bring about an organization. Bahadur Shah was recognized as the Emperor by all reb el leaders Coins were struck and orders were issued in his name. At Bareilly, Khan Bahadur Khan conducted the administration in the name of the Mughal Emperor. It is also significant that the first impulse of the rebels was always to proceed to Delhi wheth er[/INST]
they were at Meerut, Kanpur or Jhansi. The need to create an organization and a political institution to preserve the gains was certainly felt. But in the face of the British counter -offensive, there was no chance to build on these early nebulous ideas.
<s>[INST]they were at Meerut, Kanpur or Jhansi. The need to create an organization and a political institution to preserve the gains was certainly felt. But in the face of the British counter -offensive, there was no chance to build on these early nebulous ideas.[/INST]
9 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 For more than a year, the rebels carried on their struggle against heavy odds. They had no source of arms and ammunition; what they had captured from the British arsenals could not carry them far. They ‘were often forced to fight with swords and pikes ag ainst an enemy supplied with the most modern weapons. They had no quick system of communication at their command and, hence, no coordination was possible. Consequently, they were unaware of the strength and weaknesses of their compatriots and as a result c ould not come to each other’s rescue in times of distress. Every one was left to play a lonely hand. * Although the rebels received the sympathy of the people, the country as a whole was not behind them. The merchants, intelligentsia and Indian rulers n ot only kept aloof, but actively supported the British. Meetings were organized in Calcutta and Bombay by them to pray for the success of the British. Despite the Doctrine of Lapse, the Indian rulers who expected their future to be safer with the British l iberally provided them with men and materials. Indeed, the sepoys might have made a better fight of it if they had received their support. Almost half the Indian soldiers not only did not Revolt but fought against their own countrymen. The recapture of De lhi was effected by five columns consisting of 1700 British troops and 3200 Indians. The blowing up of Kashmere Gate was conducted by six British officers and NCOs and twenty -four Indians, of whom ten were Punjabis and fourteen were from Agra and Oudh. Apart from some honourable exceptions like the Rani of Thansi, Kunwa r Singh and Maulv i Ahmadullah, the rebels were poorly served by their leaders. Most of them failed to realize the significance of the Revolt and simply did not do enough. Bahadur Shah and Ze enat Mahal had no faith in the sepoys and negotiated with the British to secure their safety. Most of the
<s>[INST]9 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 For more than a year, the rebels carried on their struggle against heavy odds. They had no source of arms and ammunition; what they had captured from the British arsenals could not carry them far. They ‘were often forced to fight with swords and pikes ag ainst an enemy supplied with the most modern weapons. They had no quick system of communication at their command and, hence, no coordination was possible. Consequently, they were unaware of the strength and weaknesses of their compatriots and as a result c ould not come to each other’s rescue in times of distress. Every one was left to play a lonely hand. * Although the rebels received the sympathy of the people, the country as a whole was not behind them. The merchants, intelligentsia and Indian rulers n ot only kept aloof, but actively supported the British. Meetings were organized in Calcutta and Bombay by them to pray for the success of the British. Despite the Doctrine of Lapse, the Indian rulers who expected their future to be safer with the British l iberally provided them with men and materials. Indeed, the sepoys might have made a better fight of it if they had received their support. Almost half the Indian soldiers not only did not Revolt but fought against their own countrymen. The recapture of De lhi was effected by five columns consisting of 1700 British troops and 3200 Indians. The blowing up of Kashmere Gate was conducted by six British officers and NCOs and twenty -four Indians, of whom ten were Punjabis and fourteen were from Agra and Oudh. Apart from some honourable exceptions like the Rani of Thansi, Kunwa r Singh and Maulv i Ahmadullah, the rebels were poorly served by their leaders. Most of them failed to realize the significance of the Revolt and simply did not do enough. Bahadur Shah and Ze enat Mahal had no faith in the sepoys and negotiated with the British to secure their safety. Most of the[/INST]
taluqd ars tried only to protect their own interests. Some of them,
<s>[INST]taluqd ars tried only to protect their own interests. Some of them,[/INST]
10 | India’s S truggle for Independence like Man Singh, changed sides several times depending on which side had the upper h and. Apart from a commonly shared hatred for alien rule, the rebels had no political perspective or a definite vision of the future. They were all prisoners of their own past, fighting primarily to regain their lost privileges. Unsurprisingly, they proved incapable of ushering in a new political order. John Lawrence rightly remarked that had a single leader of ability arisen among them (the rebels) we must have been lost beyond redemption.’ That was not to be, yet the rebels showed exemplary courage , dedication and commitment. Thousands of men courted death, fighting for a cause they held dear. Their heroism alone, however, could not stem the onslaught of a much superior British army. The first to fall was Delhi on 20 September 1857 after a prolonged battl e. Bahadur Shah, who took refuge in Humayun’s tomb, was captured, tried and deported to Burma. With that the back of the Revolt was broken, since Delhi was the only possible rallying point. The British military then dealt with the rebels in one centre afte r another. The Rani of Jhansi died fighting on 17 June 1858. General Hugh Rose, who defeated her, paid high tribute to his enemy when he said that ‘here lay the woman who was the only man among the rebels.’ Nana Saheb refused to give in and finally escaped to Nepal in the beginning of 1859, hoping to renew the struggle. Kunwar Singh, despite his old age, was too quick for the British troops and constantly kept them guessing till his death on 9 May 1858. Tantia Tope, who successfully carried on guerrilla war fare against the British until April 1859, was betrayed by a zamindar, captured and put to ‘death by the British. Thus, came to an end the most formidable challenge the British Empire had to face in India. It is a matter of speculation as to what the cour se of history would have been had the rebels
<s>[INST]10 | India’s S truggle for Independence like Man Singh, changed sides several times depending on which side had the upper h and. Apart from a commonly shared hatred for alien rule, the rebels had no political perspective or a definite vision of the future. They were all prisoners of their own past, fighting primarily to regain their lost privileges. Unsurprisingly, they proved incapable of ushering in a new political order. John Lawrence rightly remarked that had a single leader of ability arisen among them (the rebels) we must have been lost beyond redemption.’ That was not to be, yet the rebels showed exemplary courage , dedication and commitment. Thousands of men courted death, fighting for a cause they held dear. Their heroism alone, however, could not stem the onslaught of a much superior British army. The first to fall was Delhi on 20 September 1857 after a prolonged battl e. Bahadur Shah, who took refuge in Humayun’s tomb, was captured, tried and deported to Burma. With that the back of the Revolt was broken, since Delhi was the only possible rallying point. The British military then dealt with the rebels in one centre afte r another. The Rani of Jhansi died fighting on 17 June 1858. General Hugh Rose, who defeated her, paid high tribute to his enemy when he said that ‘here lay the woman who was the only man among the rebels.’ Nana Saheb refused to give in and finally escaped to Nepal in the beginning of 1859, hoping to renew the struggle. Kunwar Singh, despite his old age, was too quick for the British troops and constantly kept them guessing till his death on 9 May 1858. Tantia Tope, who successfully carried on guerrilla war fare against the British until April 1859, was betrayed by a zamindar, captured and put to ‘death by the British. Thus, came to an end the most formidable challenge the British Empire had to face in India. It is a matter of speculation as to what the cour se of history would have been had the rebels[/INST]
succeeded. Whether they would have put the clock back’ and resurrected and reinforced a feudal order need not detain us here; although that w as not necessarily the only option. Despite the sepoys’ limitations an d weaknesses, their effort to emancipate the country from foreign rule was a patriotic act and a Progressive step. If the importance of a historical event is not
<s>[INST]succeeded. Whether they would have put the clock back’ and resurrected and reinforced a feudal order need not detain us here; although that w as not necessarily the only option. Despite the sepoys’ limitations an d weaknesses, their effort to emancipate the country from foreign rule was a patriotic act and a Progressive step. If the importance of a historical event is not[/INST]
11 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 limited to its immediate achievements the Revolt of 1857 was not a pure historical tragedy. Ev en in failure it served a grand purpose: a source of inspiration for the national liberation movement which later achieved what the Revolt could not.
<s>[INST]11 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857 limited to its immediate achievements the Revolt of 1857 was not a pure historical tragedy. Ev en in failure it served a grand purpose: a source of inspiration for the national liberation movement which later achieved what the Revolt could not.[/INST]
12 | India’s S truggle for Independence CHAPTER 2. CIVIL REBELLIONS AND TRIBAL UPRISINGS The Revolt of 1857 was the most dramatic instance of traditional India’s struggle against foreign rule. But it was no sudden occurrence. It was the culmination of a century long tradition of fierce popular resistance to British domination. The establishment of British power in India was a prolonged process of piecemeal conquest and consolidation and the colonialization of the economy and society. This process produced discontent, resentment and resistance at every stage. This popular resistance took three broad forms: civil rebellions, tribal uprisings and peasant movements. We will discuss the first two in this chapter. * The series of civil rebellions, which run like a thread through the first 100 years of British rule, were often led by deposed rajas and nawabs or their descendants, uprooted and impoverished zamindars, landlords and poligars (landed military magnates in South India), and ex-retainers and officials of the conquered Indian states. The backbone of the rebellions, their mass base and striking power came from the rack -rented peasants, ruined artisans and demobilized soldiers. These sudden, localized revolts often took place because of local grievances although for short periods they acquired a broad sweep, involving armed bands of a few hundreds to several thousands. The major cause of all these civil rebellions taken as a whole was the rapid changes the British introduced in the economy, administration and land revenue system. These changes led to the disruption of the agrarian society, causing prolonged and widespread su ffering among its constituents Above all, the colonial policy of intensifying demands for land revenue
<s>[INST]12 | India’s S truggle for Independence CHAPTER 2. CIVIL REBELLIONS AND TRIBAL UPRISINGS The Revolt of 1857 was the most dramatic instance of traditional India’s struggle against foreign rule. But it was no sudden occurrence. It was the culmination of a century long tradition of fierce popular resistance to British domination. The establishment of British power in India was a prolonged process of piecemeal conquest and consolidation and the colonialization of the economy and society. This process produced discontent, resentment and resistance at every stage. This popular resistance took three broad forms: civil rebellions, tribal uprisings and peasant movements. We will discuss the first two in this chapter. * The series of civil rebellions, which run like a thread through the first 100 years of British rule, were often led by deposed rajas and nawabs or their descendants, uprooted and impoverished zamindars, landlords and poligars (landed military magnates in South India), and ex-retainers and officials of the conquered Indian states. The backbone of the rebellions, their mass base and striking power came from the rack -rented peasants, ruined artisans and demobilized soldiers. These sudden, localized revolts often took place because of local grievances although for short periods they acquired a broad sweep, involving armed bands of a few hundreds to several thousands. The major cause of all these civil rebellions taken as a whole was the rapid changes the British introduced in the economy, administration and land revenue system. These changes led to the disruption of the agrarian society, causing prolonged and widespread su ffering among its constituents Above all, the colonial policy of intensifying demands for land revenue[/INST]
13 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings and extracting as large an amount as possible produced a veritable upheaval in Indian villages. In Bengal, for example, in less than thirty years land re venue collection was raised to nearly double the amount collected under the Mughals. The pattern was repeated in other us of the country as British rule spread. And aggravating the unhappiness of the farmers was the fact that not even a part of the enhance d revenue was spent on the development of agriculture or the welfare of the cultivator. Thousands of zamindars and poligars lost control over their land and its revenues either due to the extinction of their rights by the colonial state or by the forced s ale of their rights over land because of their inability to meet the exorbitant land revenue demanded. The proud zamindars and poligars resented this loss even more when they were displaced by rank outsiders — government officials and the new men of money — merchants and moneylenders. Thus they, as also the old chiefs, who had lost their principalities, had personal scores to settle with the new rulers. Peasants and artisans, as we have seen earlier, had their own reasons to rise up in arms and side with t he traditional elite. Increasing demands for land revenue were forcing large numbers of peasants into growing indebtedness or into selling their lands. The new landlords, bereft of any traditional paternalism towards their tenants, pushed up rents to ruino us heights and evicted them in the case of non -payment. The economic decline of the peasantry was reflected in twelve major and numerous minor famines from 1770 to 1857. The new courts and legal system gave a further fillip to the dispossessors of land an d encouraged the rich to oppress the poor. Flogging, torture and jailing of the cultivators for arrears of rent or land revenue or interest on debt were quite common. The ordinary people were also hard hit by the prevalence of
<s>[INST]13 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings and extracting as large an amount as possible produced a veritable upheaval in Indian villages. In Bengal, for example, in less than thirty years land re venue collection was raised to nearly double the amount collected under the Mughals. The pattern was repeated in other us of the country as British rule spread. And aggravating the unhappiness of the farmers was the fact that not even a part of the enhance d revenue was spent on the development of agriculture or the welfare of the cultivator. Thousands of zamindars and poligars lost control over their land and its revenues either due to the extinction of their rights by the colonial state or by the forced s ale of their rights over land because of their inability to meet the exorbitant land revenue demanded. The proud zamindars and poligars resented this loss even more when they were displaced by rank outsiders — government officials and the new men of money — merchants and moneylenders. Thus they, as also the old chiefs, who had lost their principalities, had personal scores to settle with the new rulers. Peasants and artisans, as we have seen earlier, had their own reasons to rise up in arms and side with t he traditional elite. Increasing demands for land revenue were forcing large numbers of peasants into growing indebtedness or into selling their lands. The new landlords, bereft of any traditional paternalism towards their tenants, pushed up rents to ruino us heights and evicted them in the case of non -payment. The economic decline of the peasantry was reflected in twelve major and numerous minor famines from 1770 to 1857. The new courts and legal system gave a further fillip to the dispossessors of land an d encouraged the rich to oppress the poor. Flogging, torture and jailing of the cultivators for arrears of rent or land revenue or interest on debt were quite common. The ordinary people were also hard hit by the prevalence of[/INST]
ordinary people were also hard hit by the prevalence of corruption at the lower level s of the police, judiciary and general administration. The petty officials enriched themselves freely at the cost of the poor. The police looted, oppressed and tortured the common people at will. William Edwards, a British official, wrote in 1859 that the police were ‘a scourge to the people’ and
<s>[INST]ordinary people were also hard hit by the prevalence of corruption at the lower level s of the police, judiciary and general administration. The petty officials enriched themselves freely at the cost of the poor. The police looted, oppressed and tortured the common people at will. William Edwards, a British official, wrote in 1859 that the police were ‘a scourge to the people’ and[/INST]
14 | India’s S truggle for Independence that ‘their oppression and exactions form one of the chief grounds of dissatisfaction with our government.’ The ruin of Indian handicraft industries, as a result of the imposition of free trade in India and levy o f discriminatory tariffs against Indian goods in Britain, pauperized millions of artisans. The misery of the artisans was further compounded by the disappearance of their traditional patrons and buyers, the princes, chieftains, and zamindars. The scholarl y and priestly classes were also active in inciting hatred and rebellion against foreign rule. The traditional rulers and ruling elite had financially supported scholars, religious preachers, priests, pandits and maulvis and men of arts and literature. Wit h the coming of the British and the ruin of the traditional landed and bureaucratic elite, this patronage came to an end, and all those who had depended on it were impoverished. Another major cause of the rebellions was the very foreign character of Briti sh rule. Like any other people, the Indian people too felt humiliated at being under a foreigner’s heel. This feeling of hurt pride inspired efforts to expel the foreigner from their lands. The civil rebellions began as British rule was established in Bengal and Bihar, arid they occurred in area after area as it was incorporated into colonial rule. There was hardly a year without armed opposition or a decade without a major armed rebellion in one part of the country or the other. From 1763 to 1856, there were more than forty major rebellions apart from hundreds of minor ones. Displaced peasants and demobilized soldiers of Bengal led by religious monks and dispossessed zamindars were the first to rise up in the Sanyasi rebellion, made famous by Bankim Chandr a Chatterjee in his novel Anand Math, that lasted from 1763 to 1800. It was followed by the Chuar uprising which covered five districts of Bengal and Bihar from 1766 to 1772 and
<s>[INST]14 | India’s S truggle for Independence that ‘their oppression and exactions form one of the chief grounds of dissatisfaction with our government.’ The ruin of Indian handicraft industries, as a result of the imposition of free trade in India and levy o f discriminatory tariffs against Indian goods in Britain, pauperized millions of artisans. The misery of the artisans was further compounded by the disappearance of their traditional patrons and buyers, the princes, chieftains, and zamindars. The scholarl y and priestly classes were also active in inciting hatred and rebellion against foreign rule. The traditional rulers and ruling elite had financially supported scholars, religious preachers, priests, pandits and maulvis and men of arts and literature. Wit h the coming of the British and the ruin of the traditional landed and bureaucratic elite, this patronage came to an end, and all those who had depended on it were impoverished. Another major cause of the rebellions was the very foreign character of Briti sh rule. Like any other people, the Indian people too felt humiliated at being under a foreigner’s heel. This feeling of hurt pride inspired efforts to expel the foreigner from their lands. The civil rebellions began as British rule was established in Bengal and Bihar, arid they occurred in area after area as it was incorporated into colonial rule. There was hardly a year without armed opposition or a decade without a major armed rebellion in one part of the country or the other. From 1763 to 1856, there were more than forty major rebellions apart from hundreds of minor ones. Displaced peasants and demobilized soldiers of Bengal led by religious monks and dispossessed zamindars were the first to rise up in the Sanyasi rebellion, made famous by Bankim Chandr a Chatterjee in his novel Anand Math, that lasted from 1763 to 1800. It was followed by the Chuar uprising which covered five districts of Bengal and Bihar from 1766 to 1772 and[/INST]
then, again, from 1795 to 1816. Other major rebellions in Eastern India were t hose of Rangpur and Dinajpur, 1783; Bishnupur and Birbhum, 1799; Orissa zamindars, 1804 -17; and Sambalpur, 1827 -40.
<s>[INST]then, again, from 1795 to 1816. Other major rebellions in Eastern India were t hose of Rangpur and Dinajpur, 1783; Bishnupur and Birbhum, 1799; Orissa zamindars, 1804 -17; and Sambalpur, 1827 -40.[/INST]
15 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings In South India, the Raja of Vizianagram revolted in 1794, the poligars of Tamil Nadu during the 1790’s, of Malabar and coastal Andhra durin g the first decade of the 19th century, of Parlekamedi during 1813 - 14. Dewan Velu Thampi of Travancore organized a heroic revolt in 1805. The Mysore peasants too revolted in 1830 -31. There were major uprisings in Visakhapatnam from 1830 -34, Ganjam in 1835 and Ku rnool in 1846 -47. In Western India, the chiefs of Saurashtra rebelled repeatedly from 1816 to 1832. The Kolis of Gujarat did the same during 1824 -28, 1839 and 1849. Maharashtra was in a perpetual state of revolt after the final defeat of the Peshwa . Prominent were the Bhil uprisings, 1818 -31; the Kittur uprising, led by Chinnava, 1824; the Satara uprising, 1841; and the revolt of the Gadkaris. 1844. Northern India was no less turbulent. The present states of Western U.P. and Haryana rose up in arms in 1824. Other major rebellions were those of Bilaspur, 1805; the taluqdars of Aligarh, 18 14 -17; the Bundelas of Jabalpur, 1842; and Khandesh, 1852. The second Punjab War in 1848 - 49 was also in the nature of a popular revolt by the people and the army. These almost continuous rebellions were massive in their totality, but were wholly local in their spread and isolated from each other. They were the result of local causes and grievances, and were also localized in their effects. They often bore the same character not because they represented national or common efforts but because they represented common conditions though separated in time and space. Socially, economically and politically, the semi -feudal leaders of these rebellions were backward looking and traditional in outlook. They still lived in the old world, blissfully unaware and oblivious of the modern world which had knocked down the defences of their society. Their resistance represented no societal alternative. It was centuries -old in form and ideological and
<s>[INST]15 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings In South India, the Raja of Vizianagram revolted in 1794, the poligars of Tamil Nadu during the 1790’s, of Malabar and coastal Andhra durin g the first decade of the 19th century, of Parlekamedi during 1813 - 14. Dewan Velu Thampi of Travancore organized a heroic revolt in 1805. The Mysore peasants too revolted in 1830 -31. There were major uprisings in Visakhapatnam from 1830 -34, Ganjam in 1835 and Ku rnool in 1846 -47. In Western India, the chiefs of Saurashtra rebelled repeatedly from 1816 to 1832. The Kolis of Gujarat did the same during 1824 -28, 1839 and 1849. Maharashtra was in a perpetual state of revolt after the final defeat of the Peshwa . Prominent were the Bhil uprisings, 1818 -31; the Kittur uprising, led by Chinnava, 1824; the Satara uprising, 1841; and the revolt of the Gadkaris. 1844. Northern India was no less turbulent. The present states of Western U.P. and Haryana rose up in arms in 1824. Other major rebellions were those of Bilaspur, 1805; the taluqdars of Aligarh, 18 14 -17; the Bundelas of Jabalpur, 1842; and Khandesh, 1852. The second Punjab War in 1848 - 49 was also in the nature of a popular revolt by the people and the army. These almost continuous rebellions were massive in their totality, but were wholly local in their spread and isolated from each other. They were the result of local causes and grievances, and were also localized in their effects. They often bore the same character not because they represented national or common efforts but because they represented common conditions though separated in time and space. Socially, economically and politically, the semi -feudal leaders of these rebellions were backward looking and traditional in outlook. They still lived in the old world, blissfully unaware and oblivious of the modern world which had knocked down the defences of their society. Their resistance represented no societal alternative. It was centuries -old in form and ideological and[/INST]
cultural content. Its basic objective was to restore earlier forms of rule and social relations. Such backward looking and scattered, sporadic and disunited uprisings were incapable of fending off or
<s>[INST]cultural content. Its basic objective was to restore earlier forms of rule and social relations. Such backward looking and scattered, sporadic and disunited uprisings were incapable of fending off or[/INST]
16 | India’s S truggle for Independence overthrowing foreign rule. The British succeeded in pacifying the rebel areas one by one. They also gave concessions to the less fiery rebel chiefs and zamindars in the form of reinstatement, the restoration of their estates and reduction in revenue assessments so long as they agreed to live pe acefully under alien authority. The more recalcitrant ones were physically wiped out. Velu Thampi was, for example, publicly hanged even after he was dead. The suppression of the civil rebellions was a major reason why the Revolt of 1857 did not spread to South India and most of Eastern and Western India. The historical significance of these civil uprisings lies in that they established strong and valuable local traditions of resistance to British rule. The Indian people were to draw inspiration from these traditions in the later nationalist struggle for freedom. The tribal people, spread over a large part of India, organized hundreds of militant outbreaks and insurrections during the 19th century. These uprisings were marked by immense courage and sacrifi ce on their part and brutal suppression and veritable butchery on the part of the rulers. The tribals had cause to be upset for a variety of reasons. The colonial administration ended their relative isolation and brought them fully within the ambit of colo nialism. It recognized the tribal chiefs as zamindars and introduced a new system of land revenue and taxation of tribal products. It encouraged the influx of Christian missionaries into the tribal areas. Above all, it introduced a large number of moneylen ders, traders arid revenue farmers as middlemen among the tribals. These middlemen were the chief instruments for bringing the tribal people within the vortex of the colonial economy and exploitation. The middlemen were outsiders who increasingly took poss ession of tribal lands and ensnared the tribals in a web of debt. hi time, the tribal
<s>[INST]16 | India’s S truggle for Independence overthrowing foreign rule. The British succeeded in pacifying the rebel areas one by one. They also gave concessions to the less fiery rebel chiefs and zamindars in the form of reinstatement, the restoration of their estates and reduction in revenue assessments so long as they agreed to live pe acefully under alien authority. The more recalcitrant ones were physically wiped out. Velu Thampi was, for example, publicly hanged even after he was dead. The suppression of the civil rebellions was a major reason why the Revolt of 1857 did not spread to South India and most of Eastern and Western India. The historical significance of these civil uprisings lies in that they established strong and valuable local traditions of resistance to British rule. The Indian people were to draw inspiration from these traditions in the later nationalist struggle for freedom. The tribal people, spread over a large part of India, organized hundreds of militant outbreaks and insurrections during the 19th century. These uprisings were marked by immense courage and sacrifi ce on their part and brutal suppression and veritable butchery on the part of the rulers. The tribals had cause to be upset for a variety of reasons. The colonial administration ended their relative isolation and brought them fully within the ambit of colo nialism. It recognized the tribal chiefs as zamindars and introduced a new system of land revenue and taxation of tribal products. It encouraged the influx of Christian missionaries into the tribal areas. Above all, it introduced a large number of moneylen ders, traders arid revenue farmers as middlemen among the tribals. These middlemen were the chief instruments for bringing the tribal people within the vortex of the colonial economy and exploitation. The middlemen were outsiders who increasingly took poss ession of tribal lands and ensnared the tribals in a web of debt. hi time, the tribal[/INST]
and ensnared the tribals in a web of debt. hi time, the tribal people increasingly lost their lands and were redu ced to the position of agricultural labourers, share -croppers and rack - rented tenants on the land they had earlier broug ht under cultivation and held on a communal basis. Colonialism also transformed their relationship with the forest. They had depended on the forest for food, fuel and cattle - feed. They practiced shifting cultivation (jhum, podu, etc.), taking
<s>[INST]and ensnared the tribals in a web of debt. hi time, the tribal people increasingly lost their lands and were redu ced to the position of agricultural labourers, share -croppers and rack - rented tenants on the land they had earlier broug ht under cultivation and held on a communal basis. Colonialism also transformed their relationship with the forest. They had depended on the forest for food, fuel and cattle - feed. They practiced shifting cultivation (jhum, podu, etc.), taking[/INST]
17 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings recourse to fresh forest lands when their existing lands showed signs of exhaustion. The colonial government changed all this. It usurped the forest lands and placed restrictions on access to forest products, forest lands and village common lands. It refused to let cu ltivation shift to new areas. Oppression and extortion by policemen and other petty officials further aggravated distress among the tribals. The revenue farmers and government agents also intensified and expanded the system of begar — making the tribals p erform unpaid labour. All this differed in intensity from region to region, but the complete disruption of the old agrarian order of the tribal communities provided the common factor for all the tribal uprisings. These uprisings were broad -based, involvin g thousands of tribals, often the entire population of a region. The colonial intrusion and the triumvirate of trader, moneylender and revenue farmer in sum disrupted the tribal identity to a lesser or greater degree. In fact, ethnic ties were a basic fea ture of the tribal rebellions. The rebels saw themselves not as a discreet class but as having a tribal identity. At this level the solidarity shown was of a very high order. Fellow tribals were never attacked unless they had collaborated with the enemy. At the same time, not all outsiders were attacked as enemies. Often there was no violence against the non -tribal poor, who worked in tribal villages in supportive economic roles, or who had social relations with the tribals such as telis, gwalas, lohars, carpenters, potters, weavers, washermen, barbers, drummers, and bonded labourers and domestic servants of the outsiders. They were not only spared, but were seen as allies. In many cases, the rural poor formed a part of the rebellious tribal bands. The reb ellions normally began at the point where the tribals felt so oppressed that they felt they had no alternative but to
<s>[INST]17 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings recourse to fresh forest lands when their existing lands showed signs of exhaustion. The colonial government changed all this. It usurped the forest lands and placed restrictions on access to forest products, forest lands and village common lands. It refused to let cu ltivation shift to new areas. Oppression and extortion by policemen and other petty officials further aggravated distress among the tribals. The revenue farmers and government agents also intensified and expanded the system of begar — making the tribals p erform unpaid labour. All this differed in intensity from region to region, but the complete disruption of the old agrarian order of the tribal communities provided the common factor for all the tribal uprisings. These uprisings were broad -based, involvin g thousands of tribals, often the entire population of a region. The colonial intrusion and the triumvirate of trader, moneylender and revenue farmer in sum disrupted the tribal identity to a lesser or greater degree. In fact, ethnic ties were a basic fea ture of the tribal rebellions. The rebels saw themselves not as a discreet class but as having a tribal identity. At this level the solidarity shown was of a very high order. Fellow tribals were never attacked unless they had collaborated with the enemy. At the same time, not all outsiders were attacked as enemies. Often there was no violence against the non -tribal poor, who worked in tribal villages in supportive economic roles, or who had social relations with the tribals such as telis, gwalas, lohars, carpenters, potters, weavers, washermen, barbers, drummers, and bonded labourers and domestic servants of the outsiders. They were not only spared, but were seen as allies. In many cases, the rural poor formed a part of the rebellious tribal bands. The reb ellions normally began at the point where the tribals felt so oppressed that they felt they had no alternative but to[/INST]
fight. This often took the form of spontaneous attacks on outsiders, looting their property and expelling them from their
<s>[INST]fight. This often took the form of spontaneous attacks on outsiders, looting their property and expelling them from their[/INST]
18 | India’s S truggle for Independence villages. This l ed to clashes with the colonial authorities. When this happened, the tribals began to move towards armed resistance and elementary organization. Often, religious and charismatic leaders — messiahs emerged at this stage and promised divine intervention and an end to their suffering at the hands of the outsiders, and asked their fellow tribals to rise and rebel against foreign authority. Most of these leaders claimed to derive their authority from God. They also often claimed that they possessed magical powe rs, for example, the power to make the enemies’ bullets ineffective. Filled with hope and confidence, the tribal masses tended to follow these leaders to the very end. The warfare between the tribal rebels and the British armed forces was totally unequal. On one side were drilled regiments armed with the latest weapons and on the other were men and women fighting in roving bands armed with primitive weapons such as stones, axes, spears and bows and arrows, believing in the magical powers of their commander s. The tribals died in lakhs in this unequal warfare. * Among the numerous tribal revolts, the Santhal hool or uprising was the most massive. The Santhals, who live in the area between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal, known as Daman -i-koh, rose in revolt; made a d etermined attempt to expel the outsiders — the dikus — and proclaimed the complete ‘annihilation’ of the alien regime. The social conditions which drove them to insurrection were described by a contemporary in the Calcutta Review as follows: ‘Zamindars, the police, the revenue and court alas have exercised a combined system of extortions, oppressive exactions, forcible dispossession of property, abuse and personal violence and a variety of petty tyrannies upon the timid and yielding Santhals. Usurious inte rest on loans of money ranging from 50 to 500 per cent; false measures at the haul and the market; wilful and uncharitable trespass by the rich by
<s>[INST]18 | India’s S truggle for Independence villages. This l ed to clashes with the colonial authorities. When this happened, the tribals began to move towards armed resistance and elementary organization. Often, religious and charismatic leaders — messiahs emerged at this stage and promised divine intervention and an end to their suffering at the hands of the outsiders, and asked their fellow tribals to rise and rebel against foreign authority. Most of these leaders claimed to derive their authority from God. They also often claimed that they possessed magical powe rs, for example, the power to make the enemies’ bullets ineffective. Filled with hope and confidence, the tribal masses tended to follow these leaders to the very end. The warfare between the tribal rebels and the British armed forces was totally unequal. On one side were drilled regiments armed with the latest weapons and on the other were men and women fighting in roving bands armed with primitive weapons such as stones, axes, spears and bows and arrows, believing in the magical powers of their commander s. The tribals died in lakhs in this unequal warfare. * Among the numerous tribal revolts, the Santhal hool or uprising was the most massive. The Santhals, who live in the area between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal, known as Daman -i-koh, rose in revolt; made a d etermined attempt to expel the outsiders — the dikus — and proclaimed the complete ‘annihilation’ of the alien regime. The social conditions which drove them to insurrection were described by a contemporary in the Calcutta Review as follows: ‘Zamindars, the police, the revenue and court alas have exercised a combined system of extortions, oppressive exactions, forcible dispossession of property, abuse and personal violence and a variety of petty tyrannies upon the timid and yielding Santhals. Usurious inte rest on loans of money ranging from 50 to 500 per cent; false measures at the haul and the market; wilful and uncharitable trespass by the rich by[/INST]
the market; wilful and uncharitable trespass by the rich by means of their untethered cattle, tattoos, ponies and even elephants, on the growing crops of the poorer race ; and, such like illegalities have been prevalent.’
<s>[INST]the market; wilful and uncharitable trespass by the rich by means of their untethered cattle, tattoos, ponies and even elephants, on the growing crops of the poorer race ; and, such like illegalities have been prevalent.’[/INST]
19 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings The Santhals considered the dikus and government servants morally corrupt being given to beggary, stealing, lying and drunkenness. By 1854, the tribal heads, the majhis and parganites, had begun to meet and discuss the possibility of revolting. Stray cases of the robbing of zamindars and moneylenders began to occur. The tribal leaders called an assembly of nearly 6000 Santhals, representing 400 villages, at Bhaganidihi on 30 June 1855. It was decided to r aise the banner of revolt, get rid of the outsiders and their colonial masters once and for all, the usher in Salyug, ‘The Reign of Truth,’ and ‘True Justice.’ The Santhals believed that their actions had the blessings of God. Sido and Kanhu, the principa l rebel leaders, claimed that Thakur (God) had communicated with them and told them to take up arms and fight for independence. Sido told the authorities in a proclamation: ‘The Thacoor has ordered me saying that the country is not Sahibs . . . The Thacoor himself will fight. Therefore, you Sahibs and Soldiers (will) fight the Thacoor himself.’ The leaders mobilized the Santhal men and women by organizing huge processions through the villages accompanied by drummers and other musicians. The leaders rode at the “d on horses and elephants and in palkis. Soon nearly 60,000 S anthals had been mobilized. Forming bands of 1,500 to 2,000, but rallying in many thousands at the call of drums on particular occasions, they attacked the mahajans and zamindars and their houses, police stations, railway construction sites, the dak (post) carriers — in fact all the symbols of dila4 exploitation and colonial power. The Santhal insurrection was helped by a large number of non-tribal and poor dikus. Gwalas (milkmen) and others helped the rebels with provisions and services; lohars (blacksmiths) accompanied the rebel bands, keeping their weapons in good shape. Once the Government realized the scale of the rebellion, it
<s>[INST]19 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings The Santhals considered the dikus and government servants morally corrupt being given to beggary, stealing, lying and drunkenness. By 1854, the tribal heads, the majhis and parganites, had begun to meet and discuss the possibility of revolting. Stray cases of the robbing of zamindars and moneylenders began to occur. The tribal leaders called an assembly of nearly 6000 Santhals, representing 400 villages, at Bhaganidihi on 30 June 1855. It was decided to r aise the banner of revolt, get rid of the outsiders and their colonial masters once and for all, the usher in Salyug, ‘The Reign of Truth,’ and ‘True Justice.’ The Santhals believed that their actions had the blessings of God. Sido and Kanhu, the principa l rebel leaders, claimed that Thakur (God) had communicated with them and told them to take up arms and fight for independence. Sido told the authorities in a proclamation: ‘The Thacoor has ordered me saying that the country is not Sahibs . . . The Thacoor himself will fight. Therefore, you Sahibs and Soldiers (will) fight the Thacoor himself.’ The leaders mobilized the Santhal men and women by organizing huge processions through the villages accompanied by drummers and other musicians. The leaders rode at the “d on horses and elephants and in palkis. Soon nearly 60,000 S anthals had been mobilized. Forming bands of 1,500 to 2,000, but rallying in many thousands at the call of drums on particular occasions, they attacked the mahajans and zamindars and their houses, police stations, railway construction sites, the dak (post) carriers — in fact all the symbols of dila4 exploitation and colonial power. The Santhal insurrection was helped by a large number of non-tribal and poor dikus. Gwalas (milkmen) and others helped the rebels with provisions and services; lohars (blacksmiths) accompanied the rebel bands, keeping their weapons in good shape. Once the Government realized the scale of the rebellion, it[/INST]
Once the Government realized the scale of the rebellion, it organized a major military campaign against the rebels. It mobilized tens of regiments under the command of a major -
<s>[INST]Once the Government realized the scale of the rebellion, it organized a major military campaign against the rebels. It mobilized tens of regiments under the command of a major -[/INST]
20 | India’s S truggle for Independence general, declared Martial Law in the affected areas and offered rewards of upto Rs. 10,000 for the capture of various leaders. The rebellion was crushed ruthlessly. More than 15,000 Santhals were ki lled while tens of villages were destroyed . Sido was betrayed and captured and killed in August 1855 while Kanhu was arrested by accident at the tail -end of the rebellion in February 1866. And ‘the Rajmahal Hills were drenched with the blood of the fightin g Santhal peasantry.’ One typical instance of the heroism of Santhal rebels has been narrated by L.S.S. O’Malley: ‘They showed the most reckless courage never knowing when they were beaten and refusing to surrender. On one occasion, forty - five Santhals to ok refuge in a mud hut which they held against the Sepoy’s . Volley after volley was fired into it… Each time the Santhals replied with a discharge of arrows. At last, when their fire ceased, the Sepoys entered the hut and found only one old man was left al ive. A Sepoy called on him to surrender, whereupon the old man rushed upon him and cut him down with his battle axe.” * I shall describe briefly three other major tribal rebellions. The Kols of Chhotanagpur rebelled from 1820 to 1837. Thousands of them were massacred before British authority could be re -imposed. The hill tribesmen of Rampa in coastal Andhra revolted in March 1879 against the depredations of the government -supported mansabdar and the new restrictive forest regulations. The authorities had to mobilize regiments of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and two companies of sappers and miners before the rebels, numbering several thousands, could be defeated by the end of 1880. The rebellion (ulgulan) of the Munda tribesmen, led by Birsa Munda, occurr ed during 1899 -19. For over thirty years the Munda sardars had been struggling against the destruction of their system of common land holdings by the intrusion of
<s>[INST]20 | India’s S truggle for Independence general, declared Martial Law in the affected areas and offered rewards of upto Rs. 10,000 for the capture of various leaders. The rebellion was crushed ruthlessly. More than 15,000 Santhals were ki lled while tens of villages were destroyed . Sido was betrayed and captured and killed in August 1855 while Kanhu was arrested by accident at the tail -end of the rebellion in February 1866. And ‘the Rajmahal Hills were drenched with the blood of the fightin g Santhal peasantry.’ One typical instance of the heroism of Santhal rebels has been narrated by L.S.S. O’Malley: ‘They showed the most reckless courage never knowing when they were beaten and refusing to surrender. On one occasion, forty - five Santhals to ok refuge in a mud hut which they held against the Sepoy’s . Volley after volley was fired into it… Each time the Santhals replied with a discharge of arrows. At last, when their fire ceased, the Sepoys entered the hut and found only one old man was left al ive. A Sepoy called on him to surrender, whereupon the old man rushed upon him and cut him down with his battle axe.” * I shall describe briefly three other major tribal rebellions. The Kols of Chhotanagpur rebelled from 1820 to 1837. Thousands of them were massacred before British authority could be re -imposed. The hill tribesmen of Rampa in coastal Andhra revolted in March 1879 against the depredations of the government -supported mansabdar and the new restrictive forest regulations. The authorities had to mobilize regiments of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and two companies of sappers and miners before the rebels, numbering several thousands, could be defeated by the end of 1880. The rebellion (ulgulan) of the Munda tribesmen, led by Birsa Munda, occurr ed during 1899 -19. For over thirty years the Munda sardars had been struggling against the destruction of their system of common land holdings by the intrusion of[/INST]
their system of common land holdings by the intrusion of jagirdar, thikadar (revenue farmers) and merchant moneylenders. Birsa, born in a poor share -cropper household in 1874, had a vision of God in 1895. He declared himself to be a divine messenger, possessing miraculous healing powers. Thousands
<s>[INST]their system of common land holdings by the intrusion of jagirdar, thikadar (revenue farmers) and merchant moneylenders. Birsa, born in a poor share -cropper household in 1874, had a vision of God in 1895. He declared himself to be a divine messenger, possessing miraculous healing powers. Thousands[/INST]
21 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings gathered around him seeing in him a Messiah with a new religious message. Under the influence of the religi ous movement soon acquired an agrarian and political Birsa began to move from village to village, organizing rallies and m obilizing his followers on religious and political grounds. On Christmas Eve, 1899, Birsa proclaimed a rebellion to establish Munda ru le in the land and encouraged ‘the killing of thikadars and jagirdars and Rajas and Hakims (rulers) and Christians.’ Saiyug would be established in place of the present -day Kalyug. He declared that ‘there was going to be a fight with the dikus, the ground would be as red as the red flag with their blood.’ The non-tribal poor were not to be attacked. To bring about liberation, Birsa gathered a force of 6,000 Mundas armed with swords, spears, battle -axes, and bows and arrows. He w, however, captured in the beginning of February 1900 and he died in jail in June. The rebellion had failed. But Birsa entered the realms of legend.
<s>[INST]21 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings gathered around him seeing in him a Messiah with a new religious message. Under the influence of the religi ous movement soon acquired an agrarian and political Birsa began to move from village to village, organizing rallies and m obilizing his followers on religious and political grounds. On Christmas Eve, 1899, Birsa proclaimed a rebellion to establish Munda ru le in the land and encouraged ‘the killing of thikadars and jagirdars and Rajas and Hakims (rulers) and Christians.’ Saiyug would be established in place of the present -day Kalyug. He declared that ‘there was going to be a fight with the dikus, the ground would be as red as the red flag with their blood.’ The non-tribal poor were not to be attacked. To bring about liberation, Birsa gathered a force of 6,000 Mundas armed with swords, spears, battle -axes, and bows and arrows. He w, however, captured in the beginning of February 1900 and he died in jail in June. The rebellion had failed. But Birsa entered the realms of legend.[/INST]
22 | India’s S truggle for Independence CHAPTER 3. PEASANT MOVEMENTS AND UPRISINGS AFTER 1857 It is worth taking a look at the effects of colonial exp loitation of the Indian peasants. Colonial economic policies, the new land revenue system, the colonial administrative and judicial systems, and the ruin of handi craft leading to the over -crowding of land, transformed the agrarian structure and impoverishe d the peasan try. In the vast zamindari areas, the peasants were left to the tender mercies of the zamindars who rack -rented them and compelled them to pay the illegal dues and perform begar. In Ryotwari areas, the Government itself levied heavy land revenu e. This forced the peasants to borrow money from the moneylenders. Gradually, over large areas, the actual cultivators were reduced to the status of tenants -at-will, share -croppers and landless labourers, while their lands, crops and cattle passed into the hands of landlords, trader -moneylenders and rich peasants. When the peasants could take it no longer, they resisted against the oppression and exploitation; and, they found whether their target was the indigenous exploiter or the colonial administration, that their real enemy, after the barriers were down, was the colonial state. One form of elemental protest, especially when individuals and small groups found that collective action was not possible though their social condition was becoming intolerable, was to take to crime. Many dispossessed peasants took to robbery, dacoity and what has been called social banditry, preferring these to starvation and social degradation. * The most militant and widespread of the peasant movements was the Indigo Revolt o f 1859 -60. The indigo planters, nearly all Europeans, compelled the tenants to grow indigo which they processed in factories set up in rural (mofussil) areas. From
<s>[INST]22 | India’s S truggle for Independence CHAPTER 3. PEASANT MOVEMENTS AND UPRISINGS AFTER 1857 It is worth taking a look at the effects of colonial exp loitation of the Indian peasants. Colonial economic policies, the new land revenue system, the colonial administrative and judicial systems, and the ruin of handi craft leading to the over -crowding of land, transformed the agrarian structure and impoverishe d the peasan try. In the vast zamindari areas, the peasants were left to the tender mercies of the zamindars who rack -rented them and compelled them to pay the illegal dues and perform begar. In Ryotwari areas, the Government itself levied heavy land revenu e. This forced the peasants to borrow money from the moneylenders. Gradually, over large areas, the actual cultivators were reduced to the status of tenants -at-will, share -croppers and landless labourers, while their lands, crops and cattle passed into the hands of landlords, trader -moneylenders and rich peasants. When the peasants could take it no longer, they resisted against the oppression and exploitation; and, they found whether their target was the indigenous exploiter or the colonial administration, that their real enemy, after the barriers were down, was the colonial state. One form of elemental protest, especially when individuals and small groups found that collective action was not possible though their social condition was becoming intolerable, was to take to crime. Many dispossessed peasants took to robbery, dacoity and what has been called social banditry, preferring these to starvation and social degradation. * The most militant and widespread of the peasant movements was the Indigo Revolt o f 1859 -60. The indigo planters, nearly all Europeans, compelled the tenants to grow indigo which they processed in factories set up in rural (mofussil) areas. From[/INST]
23 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 the beginning, indigo was grown under an extremely oppressive system which involved great lo ss to the cultivators. The planters forced the peasants to take a meager amount as advance and enter into fraudulent contracts. The price paid for the indigo plants was far below the market price. The comment of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, J.B. Gran t, was that ‘the root of the whole question is the struggle to make the raiyats grow indigo plant, witho ut paying them the price of it.’ The peasant was forced to grow indigo on the best land he had whether or not he wanted to devote his land and labour to more paying crops like rice. At the time of delivery, he was cheated even of the due low price. He also had to pay regular bribes to the planter’s officials. He was forced to accept an advance. Often he was not in a position to repay it, but even if he co uld he was not allowed to do so. The advance was used by the planters to compel him to go on cultivating indigo. Since the enforcement of forced and fraudulent contracts through the courts was a difficult and prolonged process, the planters resorted to a reign of terror to coerce the peasants. Kidnapping, illegal confinement in factory godowns, flogging, attacks on women and children, carrying off cattle, looting, burning and demolition of houses and destruction of crops and fruit trees were some of the me thods used by the planters. They hired or maintained bands of lathya ls (armed retainers) for the purpose. In practice, the planters were also above the law. With a few exceptions, the magistrates, mostly European, favoured the planters with whom they dine d and hunted regularly. Those few who tried to be fair were soon transferred. Twenty -nine planters and a solitary Indian zamindar were appointed as Honorary Magistrates in 1857, which gave birth to the popular saying ‘je rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer).
<s>[INST]23 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 the beginning, indigo was grown under an extremely oppressive system which involved great lo ss to the cultivators. The planters forced the peasants to take a meager amount as advance and enter into fraudulent contracts. The price paid for the indigo plants was far below the market price. The comment of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, J.B. Gran t, was that ‘the root of the whole question is the struggle to make the raiyats grow indigo plant, witho ut paying them the price of it.’ The peasant was forced to grow indigo on the best land he had whether or not he wanted to devote his land and labour to more paying crops like rice. At the time of delivery, he was cheated even of the due low price. He also had to pay regular bribes to the planter’s officials. He was forced to accept an advance. Often he was not in a position to repay it, but even if he co uld he was not allowed to do so. The advance was used by the planters to compel him to go on cultivating indigo. Since the enforcement of forced and fraudulent contracts through the courts was a difficult and prolonged process, the planters resorted to a reign of terror to coerce the peasants. Kidnapping, illegal confinement in factory godowns, flogging, attacks on women and children, carrying off cattle, looting, burning and demolition of houses and destruction of crops and fruit trees were some of the me thods used by the planters. They hired or maintained bands of lathya ls (armed retainers) for the purpose. In practice, the planters were also above the law. With a few exceptions, the magistrates, mostly European, favoured the planters with whom they dine d and hunted regularly. Those few who tried to be fair were soon transferred. Twenty -nine planters and a solitary Indian zamindar were appointed as Honorary Magistrates in 1857, which gave birth to the popular saying ‘je rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer).[/INST]
rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer). The discontent of indigo growers in Bengal boiled over in the autumn of 1859 when their case seemed to get Government support. Misreading an official letter and exceeding his authority, Hem Chandra Kar, Deputy Magistrate of Kalaroa, published on 17 August a proclamation to policemen that ‘in case of disputes relating to Indigo Ryots, they (ryots) shall retain possession of
<s>[INST]rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer). The discontent of indigo growers in Bengal boiled over in the autumn of 1859 when their case seemed to get Government support. Misreading an official letter and exceeding his authority, Hem Chandra Kar, Deputy Magistrate of Kalaroa, published on 17 August a proclamation to policemen that ‘in case of disputes relating to Indigo Ryots, they (ryots) shall retain possession of[/INST]
24 | India’s S truggle for Independence their own lands, and shall sow on them what crops they please, and the Police will be careful that no Indigo Plant er nor anyone else be able to interface in the matter. The news of Kar’s proclamation spre ad all over Bengal, and peasant felt that the time for overthrowing the hated system had come. Initially, the peasants made an attempt to get redressal through peacef ul means. They sent numerous petitions to the authorities and organized peaceful demonstrations. Their anger exploded in September 1859 when they asserted their right not to grow indigo under duress and resisted the physical pressure of the planters and th eir lathiyals backed by the police and the courts. The beginning was made by the ryots of Govindpur village in Nadia district when, under the leadership of Digambar Biswas and Bishnu Biswas, ex -employees of a planter, they gave up indigo cultivation. And when, on 13 September, the planter sent a band of 100 lathya ls to attack their village, they organized a counter force armed with lathis and spears and fought back. The peasant disturbances and indigo strikes spread rapidly to other areas. The peasants re fused to take advances and enter into contracts, pledged not to sow indigo, and defended themselves from the planters’ attacks with whatever weapons came to hand — spears, slings, lathis, bows and arrows, bricks, bhel-fruit, and earthen -pots (thrown by wom en). The indigo strikes and disturbances flared up again in the spring of 1860 and encompassed all the indigo districts of Bengal. Factory after factory was attacked by hundreds of peasants and village after village bravely defended itself. In many cases, the efforts of the police to intervene and arrest peasant leaders were met with an attack on policemen and police posts. The planters then attacked with another weapon, their zamindari powers. They threatened the rebellious ryots with eviction or enhance ment of rent. The ryots replied by going on a
<s>[INST]24 | India’s S truggle for Independence their own lands, and shall sow on them what crops they please, and the Police will be careful that no Indigo Plant er nor anyone else be able to interface in the matter. The news of Kar’s proclamation spre ad all over Bengal, and peasant felt that the time for overthrowing the hated system had come. Initially, the peasants made an attempt to get redressal through peacef ul means. They sent numerous petitions to the authorities and organized peaceful demonstrations. Their anger exploded in September 1859 when they asserted their right not to grow indigo under duress and resisted the physical pressure of the planters and th eir lathiyals backed by the police and the courts. The beginning was made by the ryots of Govindpur village in Nadia district when, under the leadership of Digambar Biswas and Bishnu Biswas, ex -employees of a planter, they gave up indigo cultivation. And when, on 13 September, the planter sent a band of 100 lathya ls to attack their village, they organized a counter force armed with lathis and spears and fought back. The peasant disturbances and indigo strikes spread rapidly to other areas. The peasants re fused to take advances and enter into contracts, pledged not to sow indigo, and defended themselves from the planters’ attacks with whatever weapons came to hand — spears, slings, lathis, bows and arrows, bricks, bhel-fruit, and earthen -pots (thrown by wom en). The indigo strikes and disturbances flared up again in the spring of 1860 and encompassed all the indigo districts of Bengal. Factory after factory was attacked by hundreds of peasants and village after village bravely defended itself. In many cases, the efforts of the police to intervene and arrest peasant leaders were met with an attack on policemen and police posts. The planters then attacked with another weapon, their zamindari powers. They threatened the rebellious ryots with eviction or enhance ment of rent. The ryots replied by going on a[/INST]
rent strike. They refused to pay the enhanced rents; and they physically resisted attempts to evict them. They also gradually learnt to use the legal machinery to enforce their rights. They joined together and raised funds to fight court cases filed against them, and they initiated legal action on their own against the
<s>[INST]rent strike. They refused to pay the enhanced rents; and they physically resisted attempts to evict them. They also gradually learnt to use the legal machinery to enforce their rights. They joined together and raised funds to fight court cases filed against them, and they initiated legal action on their own against the[/INST]
25 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 planters. They also used the weapon of social boycott to force a planter’s servants to leave him. Ultimately, the planters could not withstand th e united resistance of the ryots, and they gradually began to close their factories. The cultivation of indigo was virtually wiped out from the districts of Bengal by the end of 1860. A major reason for the success of the Indigo Revolt was the tremendous initiative, cooperation, organization and discipline of the r yots. Another was the complete unity among Hindu and Muslim peasants. Leadership for the movement was provided by the more well -off ryots and in some cases by petty zamindars, moneylenders and ex -employees of the planters. A significant feature of the Indigo Revolt was the role of the intelligentsia of Bengal which organized a powerful campaign in support of the rebellious peasantry. It carried on newspaper campaigns, organized mass meetings, pre pared memoranda on peasants’ grievances and supported them in their legal battles. Outstanding in this respect was the role of Harish Chandra Mukherji, editor of the Hindoo Patriot. He published regular reports from his correspondents in the rural areas on planters’ oppression, officials’ partisanship and peasant resistance. He himself wrote with passion, anger and deep knowledge of the problem which, he raised to a high political plane. Revealing an insight into the historical and political significance of the Indigo Revolt, he wrote in May 1860: Bengal might well be proud of its peasantry. . Wanting power, wealth, political knowledge and even leadership, the peasantry of Bengal have brought about a revolution inferior in magnitude and importance to none th at has happened in the social history of any other country . . . With the Government against them, the law against them, the tribunals against them, the Press against them, they have achieved a success of which the benefits will reach all orders and the mo st
<s>[INST]25 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 planters. They also used the weapon of social boycott to force a planter’s servants to leave him. Ultimately, the planters could not withstand th e united resistance of the ryots, and they gradually began to close their factories. The cultivation of indigo was virtually wiped out from the districts of Bengal by the end of 1860. A major reason for the success of the Indigo Revolt was the tremendous initiative, cooperation, organization and discipline of the r yots. Another was the complete unity among Hindu and Muslim peasants. Leadership for the movement was provided by the more well -off ryots and in some cases by petty zamindars, moneylenders and ex -employees of the planters. A significant feature of the Indigo Revolt was the role of the intelligentsia of Bengal which organized a powerful campaign in support of the rebellious peasantry. It carried on newspaper campaigns, organized mass meetings, pre pared memoranda on peasants’ grievances and supported them in their legal battles. Outstanding in this respect was the role of Harish Chandra Mukherji, editor of the Hindoo Patriot. He published regular reports from his correspondents in the rural areas on planters’ oppression, officials’ partisanship and peasant resistance. He himself wrote with passion, anger and deep knowledge of the problem which, he raised to a high political plane. Revealing an insight into the historical and political significance of the Indigo Revolt, he wrote in May 1860: Bengal might well be proud of its peasantry. . Wanting power, wealth, political knowledge and even leadership, the peasantry of Bengal have brought about a revolution inferior in magnitude and importance to none th at has happened in the social history of any other country . . . With the Government against them, the law against them, the tribunals against them, the Press against them, they have achieved a success of which the benefits will reach all orders and the mo st[/INST]
distant generations of our countrymen.’ Din Bandhu Mitra’s play, Neel Darpan, was to gain great fame for vividly portraying the oppression by the planters. The intelligentsia’s role in the Indigo Revolt was to have an abiding impact on the emerging nat ionalist intellectuals. In their
<s>[INST]distant generations of our countrymen.’ Din Bandhu Mitra’s play, Neel Darpan, was to gain great fame for vividly portraying the oppression by the planters. The intelligentsia’s role in the Indigo Revolt was to have an abiding impact on the emerging nat ionalist intellectuals. In their[/INST]
26 | India’s S truggle for Independence very political childhood they had given support to a popular peasant movement against the foreign planters. This was to establish a tradition with long run implications for the national movement. Missionaries were another group which extended active support to the indigo ryots in their struggle. The Government’s response to the Revolt was rather restrained and not as harsh as in the case of civil rebellions a nd tribal uprisings. It had just undergone the harrowing experien ce of the Santhal uprising and the Revolt of 1857. It was also able to see, in time, the changed temper of the peasantry and was influenced by the support extended to the Revolt by the intelligentsia and the missionaries. It appointed a commission to inqui re into the problem of indigo cultivation. Evidence brought before the Indigo Commission and its final report exposed the coercion and corruptio0 underlying the entire system of indigo cultivation. The result was the mitigation of the worst abuses of the s ystem. The Government issued a notification in November 1860 that ryots could not be compelled to sow indigo and that it would ensure that all disputes were settled by legal means. But the planters were already closing down the factories they felt that they could not make their enterprises pay without the use of force and fraud. * Large parts of East Bengal were engulfed by agrarian unrest during the 1870s and early 1880s. The unrest was caused by the efforts of the zamindars to enhance rent beyond legal l imits and to prevent the tenants from acquiring occupancy rights under Act X of 1859. This they tried to achieve through illegal coercive methods such as forced eviction and seizure of crops and cattle as well as by dragging the tenants into costly litigat ion in the courts. The peasants were no longer in a mood to tolerate such oppression. In May 1873, an agrarian league or combination was formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the
<s>[INST]26 | India’s S truggle for Independence very political childhood they had given support to a popular peasant movement against the foreign planters. This was to establish a tradition with long run implications for the national movement. Missionaries were another group which extended active support to the indigo ryots in their struggle. The Government’s response to the Revolt was rather restrained and not as harsh as in the case of civil rebellions a nd tribal uprisings. It had just undergone the harrowing experien ce of the Santhal uprising and the Revolt of 1857. It was also able to see, in time, the changed temper of the peasantry and was influenced by the support extended to the Revolt by the intelligentsia and the missionaries. It appointed a commission to inqui re into the problem of indigo cultivation. Evidence brought before the Indigo Commission and its final report exposed the coercion and corruptio0 underlying the entire system of indigo cultivation. The result was the mitigation of the worst abuses of the s ystem. The Government issued a notification in November 1860 that ryots could not be compelled to sow indigo and that it would ensure that all disputes were settled by legal means. But the planters were already closing down the factories they felt that they could not make their enterprises pay without the use of force and fraud. * Large parts of East Bengal were engulfed by agrarian unrest during the 1870s and early 1880s. The unrest was caused by the efforts of the zamindars to enhance rent beyond legal l imits and to prevent the tenants from acquiring occupancy rights under Act X of 1859. This they tried to achieve through illegal coercive methods such as forced eviction and seizure of crops and cattle as well as by dragging the tenants into costly litigat ion in the courts. The peasants were no longer in a mood to tolerate such oppression. In May 1873, an agrarian league or combination was formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the[/INST]
formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the demands of the zamindars. The league organized mass meet ings
<s>[INST]formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the demands of the zamindars. The league organized mass meet ings[/INST]
27 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 of peasants. Large crowds of peasants would gather and march through villages frightening the zamindars and appealing to other peasants to join them. The league organized a rent - strike — the ryots were to refuse to pay the enhanced rents — and challe nged the zamindars in the courts. Funds were raised from the ryots to meet the costs. The struggle gradually spread throughout Pabna and then to the other districts of East Bengal. Everywhere agrarian leagues were organized, rents were withheld and zaminda rs fought in the courts. The main form of struggle was that of legal resistance. There was very little violence — it only occurred when the zamindars tried to compel the ryots to submit to their terms by force. There were only a few cases of looting of the houses of the zamindars. A few attacks on police stations took place and the peasants also resisted attempts to execute court decrees. But such cases were rather rare. Hardly any zamindar or zamindar‘s agent was killed or seriously injured. In the course of the movement, the ryots developed a strong awareness of the law and their legal rights and the ability to combine and form associations for peaceful agitation. Though peasant discontent smouldered till 1885, many of the disputes were settled partially under official pressure and persuasion and partially out of the zamindar‘s fear that the united peasantry would drag them into prolonged and costly litigation. Many peasants were able to acquire occupancy rights and resist enhanced rents. The Government r ose to the defence of the zamindars wherever violence took place. Peasants were then arrested on a large sale. But it assumed a position of neutrality as far as legal battles or peaceful agitations were concerned. The Government also promised to undertake legislation to protect the tenants from the worst aspects of zamindari oppression, a promise it fulfilled however imperfectly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was
<s>[INST]27 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 of peasants. Large crowds of peasants would gather and march through villages frightening the zamindars and appealing to other peasants to join them. The league organized a rent - strike — the ryots were to refuse to pay the enhanced rents — and challe nged the zamindars in the courts. Funds were raised from the ryots to meet the costs. The struggle gradually spread throughout Pabna and then to the other districts of East Bengal. Everywhere agrarian leagues were organized, rents were withheld and zaminda rs fought in the courts. The main form of struggle was that of legal resistance. There was very little violence — it only occurred when the zamindars tried to compel the ryots to submit to their terms by force. There were only a few cases of looting of the houses of the zamindars. A few attacks on police stations took place and the peasants also resisted attempts to execute court decrees. But such cases were rather rare. Hardly any zamindar or zamindar‘s agent was killed or seriously injured. In the course of the movement, the ryots developed a strong awareness of the law and their legal rights and the ability to combine and form associations for peaceful agitation. Though peasant discontent smouldered till 1885, many of the disputes were settled partially under official pressure and persuasion and partially out of the zamindar‘s fear that the united peasantry would drag them into prolonged and costly litigation. Many peasants were able to acquire occupancy rights and resist enhanced rents. The Government r ose to the defence of the zamindars wherever violence took place. Peasants were then arrested on a large sale. But it assumed a position of neutrality as far as legal battles or peaceful agitations were concerned. The Government also promised to undertake legislation to protect the tenants from the worst aspects of zamindari oppression, a promise it fulfilled however imperfectly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was[/INST]
however imperfectly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was passed. What persuaded the zamindars and the colonial regime to reconcile themselves to t he movement was the fact that its aims were limited to the redressal of the immediate grievances of the peasants and the enforcement of the existing legal rights and norms. It was not aimed at the zamindari system. It also did not
<s>[INST]however imperfectly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was passed. What persuaded the zamindars and the colonial regime to reconcile themselves to t he movement was the fact that its aims were limited to the redressal of the immediate grievances of the peasants and the enforcement of the existing legal rights and norms. It was not aimed at the zamindari system. It also did not[/INST]
28 | India’s S truggle for Independence have at any stage an anti-colonial political edge. The agrarian leagues kept within the bounds of law, used the legal machinery to fight the zamindars, and raised no anti-British demands. The leaders often argued that they were against zamindars and not the British. In fact, the l eaders raised the slogan that the peasants want ‘to be the ryots of Her Majesty the Queen and of Her only.’ For this reason, official action was based on the enforcement of the Indian Penal Code and it did not take the form of armed repression as in the ca se of the Santhal and Munda uprisings. Once again the Bengal peasants showed complete Hindu - Muslim solidarity, even though the majority of the ryots were Muslim and the majority of zamindars Hindu. There was also no effort to create peasant solidarity on the grounds of religion or caste. In this case, too, a number of young Indian intellectuals supported the peasants’ cause. These included Bankim Chandra Chatterjea and R.C. Dutt . Later, in the early I 880s, during the discussion of the Bengal Tenancy Bill , the Indian Association, led by Surendranath Banerjee, Anand Mohan Bose and Dwarkanath Ganguli, campaigned for the rights of tenants, helped form r yot’ unions, and organized huge meetings of upto 20,000 peasants in the districts in support of the Rent Bil l. The Indian Association and many of the nationalist newspapers went further than the Bill. They asked for permanent fixation of the tenant’s rent. They warned that since the Bill would confer occupancy rights even on non-cultivators, it would lead to the growth of middlemen — the jotedars — who would be as oppressive as the zamindars so far as the actual cultivators were concerned. They, therefore, demanded that the right of occupancy should go with actual cultivation of the soil, that is, in most cases t o the under ryots and the tenants -at-will. * A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and
<s>[INST]28 | India’s S truggle for Independence have at any stage an anti-colonial political edge. The agrarian leagues kept within the bounds of law, used the legal machinery to fight the zamindars, and raised no anti-British demands. The leaders often argued that they were against zamindars and not the British. In fact, the l eaders raised the slogan that the peasants want ‘to be the ryots of Her Majesty the Queen and of Her only.’ For this reason, official action was based on the enforcement of the Indian Penal Code and it did not take the form of armed repression as in the ca se of the Santhal and Munda uprisings. Once again the Bengal peasants showed complete Hindu - Muslim solidarity, even though the majority of the ryots were Muslim and the majority of zamindars Hindu. There was also no effort to create peasant solidarity on the grounds of religion or caste. In this case, too, a number of young Indian intellectuals supported the peasants’ cause. These included Bankim Chandra Chatterjea and R.C. Dutt . Later, in the early I 880s, during the discussion of the Bengal Tenancy Bill , the Indian Association, led by Surendranath Banerjee, Anand Mohan Bose and Dwarkanath Ganguli, campaigned for the rights of tenants, helped form r yot’ unions, and organized huge meetings of upto 20,000 peasants in the districts in support of the Rent Bil l. The Indian Association and many of the nationalist newspapers went further than the Bill. They asked for permanent fixation of the tenant’s rent. They warned that since the Bill would confer occupancy rights even on non-cultivators, it would lead to the growth of middlemen — the jotedars — who would be as oppressive as the zamindars so far as the actual cultivators were concerned. They, therefore, demanded that the right of occupancy should go with actual cultivation of the soil, that is, in most cases t o the under ryots and the tenants -at-will. * A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and[/INST]
* A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and Ahmednagar districts of Maharashtra in 1875. Here, as part of the Ryotwari system, land revenue was settled directly with the peasant who was also recognized as the owner of his land. Like the peasants in other Ryotwari areas, the Deccan peasant also
<s>[INST]* A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and Ahmednagar districts of Maharashtra in 1875. Here, as part of the Ryotwari system, land revenue was settled directly with the peasant who was also recognized as the owner of his land. Like the peasants in other Ryotwari areas, the Deccan peasant also[/INST]
29 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 found it difficult to pay land revenue without getting into the clutches of the moneylender and increasingly losing his land. This led to growing tension between the peasants and the moneylenders most of whom were outsiders — Marwaris or Gujaratis. Three other developments occurred at this time. During the early I 860s, the American Civil War had led to a rise in cotton exports which had pushed up prices. The end o f the Civil War in 1864 brought about an acute depression in cotton exports and a crash in prices. The ground slipped from under the peasants’ feet. Simultaneously, in 1867, ‘the Government raised land revenue by nearly 50 per cent. The situation was worse ned by a succession of bad harvests. To pay the land revenue under these conditions, the peasants had to go to the moneylender who took the opportunity to further tighten his grip on the peasant and his land. The peasant began to turn against the perceived cause of his misery, the moneylender. Only a spark was needed to kindle the fire. A spontaneous protest movement began in December 1874 in Kardab village in Sirur taluq. When the peasants of the village failed to convince the local moneylender, Kalooram, that he should not act on a court decree and pull down a peasant’s house, they organized a complete social boycott of the ‘outsider’ moneylenders to compel them to accept their demands a peaceful manner. They refused to buy from their shops. No pe asant would cultivate their fields. The bullotedars (village servants) — barbers, washermen, carpenters, ironsmiths, shoemakers and others would not serve them. No domestic servant would work in their houses and when the socially isolated moneylenders decided to run away to the taluq headquarters, nobody would agree to drive their carts. The peasants also imposed social sanctions against those peasants and bullotedars who would not join the boycott of
<s>[INST]29 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 found it difficult to pay land revenue without getting into the clutches of the moneylender and increasingly losing his land. This led to growing tension between the peasants and the moneylenders most of whom were outsiders — Marwaris or Gujaratis. Three other developments occurred at this time. During the early I 860s, the American Civil War had led to a rise in cotton exports which had pushed up prices. The end o f the Civil War in 1864 brought about an acute depression in cotton exports and a crash in prices. The ground slipped from under the peasants’ feet. Simultaneously, in 1867, ‘the Government raised land revenue by nearly 50 per cent. The situation was worse ned by a succession of bad harvests. To pay the land revenue under these conditions, the peasants had to go to the moneylender who took the opportunity to further tighten his grip on the peasant and his land. The peasant began to turn against the perceived cause of his misery, the moneylender. Only a spark was needed to kindle the fire. A spontaneous protest movement began in December 1874 in Kardab village in Sirur taluq. When the peasants of the village failed to convince the local moneylender, Kalooram, that he should not act on a court decree and pull down a peasant’s house, they organized a complete social boycott of the ‘outsider’ moneylenders to compel them to accept their demands a peaceful manner. They refused to buy from their shops. No pe asant would cultivate their fields. The bullotedars (village servants) — barbers, washermen, carpenters, ironsmiths, shoemakers and others would not serve them. No domestic servant would work in their houses and when the socially isolated moneylenders decided to run away to the taluq headquarters, nobody would agree to drive their carts. The peasants also imposed social sanctions against those peasants and bullotedars who would not join the boycott of[/INST]
moneylenders. This social boycott spread rapidly to the villages of Poona, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Satara districts. The social boycott was soon transformed into agrarian riots when it did not pro ve very effective. On 12 May, peasants gathered in Supa, in Bhimthari taluq, on the bazar day and
<s>[INST]moneylenders. This social boycott spread rapidly to the villages of Poona, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Satara districts. The social boycott was soon transformed into agrarian riots when it did not pro ve very effective. On 12 May, peasants gathered in Supa, in Bhimthari taluq, on the bazar day and[/INST]
30 | India’s S truggle for Independence began a systematic attac k on the moneylenders’ houses and shops. They seized and publicly burnt debt bonds and deeds — signed under pressure, in ignorance, or through fraud — decrees, and other documents dealing with their debts. Within days the disturbances spread to other villa ges of the Poona and Ahmednagar districts. There was very little violence in this settling of accounts. Once the moneylenders’ instruments of oppression — debt bonds — were surrendered, no need for further violence was felt. In most places, the ‘riots’ we re demonstrations of popular feeling and of the peasants’ newly acquired unity and strength. Though moneylenders’ houses and shops were looted and burnt in Supa, this did not occur in other places. The Government acted with speed and soon succeeded in repressing the movement. The active phase of the movement lasted about three weeks, though stray incidents occurred for another month or two. As in the case of the Pabna Revolt, the Deccan disturbances had very limited objectives. There was once again an abse nce of anti -colonial consciousness. It was, therefore, possible for the colonial regime to extend them a certain protection against the moneylenders through the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act of 1879. Once again, the modern nationalist intelligentsia o f Maharashtra supported the peasants’ cause. Already, in 1873 - 74, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, led by Justice Ranade, had organized a successful campaign among the peasants, as well as at Poona and Bombay against the land revenue settlement of 1867. Under its impact, a large number of peasants had refused to pay the enhanced revenue. This agitation had generated a mentality of resistance among the peasants which contributed to the rise of peasant protest in 1875. The Sabha as well as many of the nationalist newspapers also supported the D.A.R. Bill. Peasant resistance also developed in other parts of the
<s>[INST]30 | India’s S truggle for Independence began a systematic attac k on the moneylenders’ houses and shops. They seized and publicly burnt debt bonds and deeds — signed under pressure, in ignorance, or through fraud — decrees, and other documents dealing with their debts. Within days the disturbances spread to other villa ges of the Poona and Ahmednagar districts. There was very little violence in this settling of accounts. Once the moneylenders’ instruments of oppression — debt bonds — were surrendered, no need for further violence was felt. In most places, the ‘riots’ we re demonstrations of popular feeling and of the peasants’ newly acquired unity and strength. Though moneylenders’ houses and shops were looted and burnt in Supa, this did not occur in other places. The Government acted with speed and soon succeeded in repressing the movement. The active phase of the movement lasted about three weeks, though stray incidents occurred for another month or two. As in the case of the Pabna Revolt, the Deccan disturbances had very limited objectives. There was once again an abse nce of anti -colonial consciousness. It was, therefore, possible for the colonial regime to extend them a certain protection against the moneylenders through the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act of 1879. Once again, the modern nationalist intelligentsia o f Maharashtra supported the peasants’ cause. Already, in 1873 - 74, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, led by Justice Ranade, had organized a successful campaign among the peasants, as well as at Poona and Bombay against the land revenue settlement of 1867. Under its impact, a large number of peasants had refused to pay the enhanced revenue. This agitation had generated a mentality of resistance among the peasants which contributed to the rise of peasant protest in 1875. The Sabha as well as many of the nationalist newspapers also supported the D.A.R. Bill. Peasant resistance also developed in other parts of the[/INST]
Peasant resistance also developed in other parts of the country . Mappila outbreaks were endemic in Malabar. Vasudev Balwant Phadke, an educated clerk, raised a Ramosi peasant force of about 50 in Maharashtra duri ng 1879, and organized social banditry on a significant scale. The Kuka Revolt in Punjab was led by Baba Ram Singh and had elements of a messianic movement. It was crushed when 49 of the rebels were blown up
<s>[INST]Peasant resistance also developed in other parts of the country . Mappila outbreaks were endemic in Malabar. Vasudev Balwant Phadke, an educated clerk, raised a Ramosi peasant force of about 50 in Maharashtra duri ng 1879, and organized social banditry on a significant scale. The Kuka Revolt in Punjab was led by Baba Ram Singh and had elements of a messianic movement. It was crushed when 49 of the rebels were blown up[/INST]
31 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 by a cannon in 1872. High land revenue assessmen t led to a series of peasant riots in the plains of Assam during 1893 -94. Scores were killed in brutal firings and bayonet charges. * There was a certain shift in the nature of peasant movements after 1857. Princes, chiefs and landlords having been crushe d or co -opted, peasants emerged as the main force in agrarian movements. They now fought directly for their own demands, centered almost wholly on economic issues, and against their immediate enemies, foreign planters and indigenous zamindaris and moneylen ders. Their struggles were directed towards specific and limited objectives and redressal of particular grievances. They did not make colonialism their target. Nor was their objective the ending of the system of their subordination and exploitation. They d id not aim at turning the world upside down.’ The territorial reach of these movements was also limited. They were confined to particular localities with no mutual communication or linkages. They also lacked continuity of struggle or long -term organizatio n. Once the specific objectives of a movement were achieved, its organization, as also peasant solidarity built around it, dissolved and disappeared. Thus, the Indigo strike, the Pabna agrarian leagues and the social -boycott movement of the Deccan ryots left behind no successors. Consequently, at no stage did these movements threaten British supremacy or even undermine it. Peasant protest after 1857 often represented an instinctive and spontaneous response of the peasantry to its social condition. It was t he result of excessive and unbearable oppression, undue and unusual deprivation and exploitation, and a threat to the peasant’s existing, established position. The peasant often rebelled only when he felt that it was not possible to carry on in the existin g manner. He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what
<s>[INST]31 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 by a cannon in 1872. High land revenue assessmen t led to a series of peasant riots in the plains of Assam during 1893 -94. Scores were killed in brutal firings and bayonet charges. * There was a certain shift in the nature of peasant movements after 1857. Princes, chiefs and landlords having been crushe d or co -opted, peasants emerged as the main force in agrarian movements. They now fought directly for their own demands, centered almost wholly on economic issues, and against their immediate enemies, foreign planters and indigenous zamindaris and moneylen ders. Their struggles were directed towards specific and limited objectives and redressal of particular grievances. They did not make colonialism their target. Nor was their objective the ending of the system of their subordination and exploitation. They d id not aim at turning the world upside down.’ The territorial reach of these movements was also limited. They were confined to particular localities with no mutual communication or linkages. They also lacked continuity of struggle or long -term organizatio n. Once the specific objectives of a movement were achieved, its organization, as also peasant solidarity built around it, dissolved and disappeared. Thus, the Indigo strike, the Pabna agrarian leagues and the social -boycott movement of the Deccan ryots left behind no successors. Consequently, at no stage did these movements threaten British supremacy or even undermine it. Peasant protest after 1857 often represented an instinctive and spontaneous response of the peasantry to its social condition. It was t he result of excessive and unbearable oppression, undue and unusual deprivation and exploitation, and a threat to the peasant’s existing, established position. The peasant often rebelled only when he felt that it was not possible to carry on in the existin g manner. He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what[/INST]
He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what was justifiable and what was not. That is why he did not fight for land ownership or against landlordism but against eviction and
<s>[INST]He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what was justifiable and what was not. That is why he did not fight for land ownership or against landlordism but against eviction and[/INST]
32 | India’s S truggle for Independence undue enhancement of rent. He did not object to paying i nterest on the sums he had borrowed; he hit back against fraud and chicanery by the moneylender and when the latter went against tradition in depriving him of his land. He did not deny the state’s right to collect a tax on land but objected when the level of taxation overstepped all traditional bounds. He did not object to the foreign planter becoming his zamindar but resisted the planter when he took away his freedom to decide what crops to grow and refused to pay him a proper price for his crop. The peas ant also developed a strong awareness of his legal rights and asserted them in and outside the courts. And if an effort was made to deprive him of his legal rights by extra -legal means or by manipulation of the law and law courts, he countered with extra -legal means of his own. Quite often, he believed that the legally -constituted authority approved his actions or at least supported his claims and cause. In all the three movements discussed here, he acted in the name of this authority, the sarkar. In these movements, the Indian peasants showed great courage and a spirit of sacrifice, remarkable organizational abilities, and a solidarity that cut across religious and caste lines. They were also able to wring considerable concessions from the colonial state. The latter, too, not being directly challenged, was willing to compromise and mitigate the harshness of the agrarian system though within the broad limits of the colonial economic and political structure. In this respect, the colonial regime’s treatment of the post -1857 peasant rebels was qualitatively different from its treatment of the participants in the civil rebellions, the Revolt of 1857 and the tribal uprisings which directly challenged colonial political power. A major weakness of the 19th century peasant movements was the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism — of
<s>[INST]32 | India’s S truggle for Independence undue enhancement of rent. He did not object to paying i nterest on the sums he had borrowed; he hit back against fraud and chicanery by the moneylender and when the latter went against tradition in depriving him of his land. He did not deny the state’s right to collect a tax on land but objected when the level of taxation overstepped all traditional bounds. He did not object to the foreign planter becoming his zamindar but resisted the planter when he took away his freedom to decide what crops to grow and refused to pay him a proper price for his crop. The peas ant also developed a strong awareness of his legal rights and asserted them in and outside the courts. And if an effort was made to deprive him of his legal rights by extra -legal means or by manipulation of the law and law courts, he countered with extra -legal means of his own. Quite often, he believed that the legally -constituted authority approved his actions or at least supported his claims and cause. In all the three movements discussed here, he acted in the name of this authority, the sarkar. In these movements, the Indian peasants showed great courage and a spirit of sacrifice, remarkable organizational abilities, and a solidarity that cut across religious and caste lines. They were also able to wring considerable concessions from the colonial state. The latter, too, not being directly challenged, was willing to compromise and mitigate the harshness of the agrarian system though within the broad limits of the colonial economic and political structure. In this respect, the colonial regime’s treatment of the post -1857 peasant rebels was qualitatively different from its treatment of the participants in the civil rebellions, the Revolt of 1857 and the tribal uprisings which directly challenged colonial political power. A major weakness of the 19th century peasant movements was the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism — of[/INST]
was the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism — of colonial economic structure and the colonial state — and of the social framework of the movements themselves. Nor did the 19th century peasants possess a new ideology and a new social, economic and political programme based on an analysis of the newly constituted colonial society. Their struggles, however militant, occurred within the framework of the old societal order.
<s>[INST]was the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism — of colonial economic structure and the colonial state — and of the social framework of the movements themselves. Nor did the 19th century peasants possess a new ideology and a new social, economic and political programme based on an analysis of the newly constituted colonial society. Their struggles, however militant, occurred within the framework of the old societal order.[/INST]
33 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 They lacked a positive conception of an alternative socie ty — a conception which would unite the people in a common struggle on a wide regional and all-India plane and help develop long -term political movements. An all-India leadership capable of evolving a strategy of struggle that would unify and mobilize peasants and other sections of society for nation -wide political activity could be formed only on the basis of such a new conception, such a fresh vision of society. In the absence of such a flew ideology, programme, leadership and strategy of struggle, it was not to difficult for the colonial state, on the one hand, to reach a Conciliation and calm down the rebellious peasants by the grant of some concessions arid on the other hand, to suppress them with the full use of its force. This weakness was, of course, not a blemish on the character of the peasantry which was perhaps incapable of grasping on its own the new and complex phenomenon of colonialism. That needed the efforts of a modem intelligentsia which was itself just coming into existence. Most of these weaknesses were overcome in the 20th century when peasant discontent was merged with the general anti-imperialist discontent and their political activity became a part of the wider anti-imperialist movement. And, of course, the peasants’ participation in t he larger national movement not only strengthened the fight against the foreigner it also, simultaneously, enabled them to organize powerful struggles around their class demands and to create modem peasant organization.
<s>[INST]33 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857 They lacked a positive conception of an alternative socie ty — a conception which would unite the people in a common struggle on a wide regional and all-India plane and help develop long -term political movements. An all-India leadership capable of evolving a strategy of struggle that would unify and mobilize peasants and other sections of society for nation -wide political activity could be formed only on the basis of such a new conception, such a fresh vision of society. In the absence of such a flew ideology, programme, leadership and strategy of struggle, it was not to difficult for the colonial state, on the one hand, to reach a Conciliation and calm down the rebellious peasants by the grant of some concessions arid on the other hand, to suppress them with the full use of its force. This weakness was, of course, not a blemish on the character of the peasantry which was perhaps incapable of grasping on its own the new and complex phenomenon of colonialism. That needed the efforts of a modem intelligentsia which was itself just coming into existence. Most of these weaknesses were overcome in the 20th century when peasant discontent was merged with the general anti-imperialist discontent and their political activity became a part of the wider anti-imperialist movement. And, of course, the peasants’ participation in t he larger national movement not only strengthened the fight against the foreigner it also, simultaneously, enabled them to organize powerful struggles around their class demands and to create modem peasant organization.[/INST]
34 | India’s S truggle for Independence CHAPTER 4. FOUNDATION OF TH E CONGRESS: THE MYTH Indian National Congress was founded in December 1885 by seventy -two political workers. It was the first organized expression of Indian nationalism on an all -India scale. A.O. Hume, a retired English ICS officer, played an important role in its formation. But why was it founded by these seventy - two men and why at that time? A powerful and long-lasting myth, the myth of ‘the safety valve,’ has arisen around this question. Generations of students and political act ivists have been fed on this myth. But despite widespread popular belief, this myth has little basis in historical fact. The myth is that the Indian National Congress was started by A.O. Hume and others under the official direction, guidance and advice of no less a person than Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, to provide a safe, mild, peaceful, and constitutional outlet or safety valve for the rising discontent among the masses, which was inevitably leading towards a popular and violent revolution. Consequently, the revolutionary potential was nipped in the bud. The core of the myth, that a violent revolution was on the cards at the time and was avoided only by the foundations of the Congress, is accepted by most writers; the liberaIs welcome it, the radicals use it to prove that the Congress has always been compromising if not loyalist vis -a-vis imperialism, the extreme right use it to show that the Congress has been anti -national from the beginning. All of them agree that the manner of its birth affected the bas ic character and future work of the Congress in a crucial manner. In his Young India published in 1916, the Extremist leader Lala Lajpat Ra i used the safety -valve theory to attack the Moderates in the Congress. Having discussed the theory at length and su ggested that the Congress ‘was a product of Lord Dufferin’s brain,’ he argued that ‘the Congress was started more
<s>[INST]34 | India’s S truggle for Independence CHAPTER 4. FOUNDATION OF TH E CONGRESS: THE MYTH Indian National Congress was founded in December 1885 by seventy -two political workers. It was the first organized expression of Indian nationalism on an all -India scale. A.O. Hume, a retired English ICS officer, played an important role in its formation. But why was it founded by these seventy - two men and why at that time? A powerful and long-lasting myth, the myth of ‘the safety valve,’ has arisen around this question. Generations of students and political act ivists have been fed on this myth. But despite widespread popular belief, this myth has little basis in historical fact. The myth is that the Indian National Congress was started by A.O. Hume and others under the official direction, guidance and advice of no less a person than Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, to provide a safe, mild, peaceful, and constitutional outlet or safety valve for the rising discontent among the masses, which was inevitably leading towards a popular and violent revolution. Consequently, the revolutionary potential was nipped in the bud. The core of the myth, that a violent revolution was on the cards at the time and was avoided only by the foundations of the Congress, is accepted by most writers; the liberaIs welcome it, the radicals use it to prove that the Congress has always been compromising if not loyalist vis -a-vis imperialism, the extreme right use it to show that the Congress has been anti -national from the beginning. All of them agree that the manner of its birth affected the bas ic character and future work of the Congress in a crucial manner. In his Young India published in 1916, the Extremist leader Lala Lajpat Ra i used the safety -valve theory to attack the Moderates in the Congress. Having discussed the theory at length and su ggested that the Congress ‘was a product of Lord Dufferin’s brain,’ he argued that ‘the Congress was started more[/INST]
with the object of saving the British Empire from danger than with that of winning political liberty for India. The interests of the British E mpire were primary and those of India only secondary.’
<s>[INST]with the object of saving the British Empire from danger than with that of winning political liberty for India. The interests of the British E mpire were primary and those of India only secondary.’[/INST]
35 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth And he added: ‘No one can say that the Congress has not been true to that ideal.’ His conclusion was: ‘So this is the genesis of the Congress, and this is sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of the ad vanced Nationalists.” More than a quarter century later, R. Palme Dutt’s authoritative work India Today made the myth of the safety -valve a staple of left -wing opinion. Emphasizing the myth, Dutt wrote that the Congress was brought into existence through direct Governmental initiative and guidance and through ‘a plan secretly pre -arranged with the Viceroy’ so that it (the Government) could use it ‘as an intended weapon for safeguarding British rule against the rising forces of popular unrest and anti -British feeling.’ It was ‘an attempt to defeat, or rather forestall, an impending revolution.’ The Congress did, of course, in time become a nationalist body; ‘the national character began to overshadow the loyalist character.’ It also became the vehicle of mas s movements. But the ‘original sin’ of the manner of its birth left a permanent mark on its politics. Its ‘two -fold character’ as an institution which was created by the Government and yet became the organizer of the anti -imperialist movement ‘ran right th rough its history.’ It both fought and collaborated with imperialism. It led the mass movements and when the masses moved towards the revolutionary path, it betrayed the movement to imperialism. The Congress, thus, had two strands: ‘On the one hand, the st rand of cooperation with imperialism against the “menace” of the mass movement; on the other hand, the strand of leadership of the masses in the national struggle.’ This duality of the Congress leadership from Gokhale to Gandhi, said Dutt, in fact reflecte d the two -fold and vacillating character of the Indian bourgeoisie itself; ‘at once in conflict with the British bourgeoisie and desiring to lead the Indian people, yet
<s>[INST]35 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth And he added: ‘No one can say that the Congress has not been true to that ideal.’ His conclusion was: ‘So this is the genesis of the Congress, and this is sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of the ad vanced Nationalists.” More than a quarter century later, R. Palme Dutt’s authoritative work India Today made the myth of the safety -valve a staple of left -wing opinion. Emphasizing the myth, Dutt wrote that the Congress was brought into existence through direct Governmental initiative and guidance and through ‘a plan secretly pre -arranged with the Viceroy’ so that it (the Government) could use it ‘as an intended weapon for safeguarding British rule against the rising forces of popular unrest and anti -British feeling.’ It was ‘an attempt to defeat, or rather forestall, an impending revolution.’ The Congress did, of course, in time become a nationalist body; ‘the national character began to overshadow the loyalist character.’ It also became the vehicle of mas s movements. But the ‘original sin’ of the manner of its birth left a permanent mark on its politics. Its ‘two -fold character’ as an institution which was created by the Government and yet became the organizer of the anti -imperialist movement ‘ran right th rough its history.’ It both fought and collaborated with imperialism. It led the mass movements and when the masses moved towards the revolutionary path, it betrayed the movement to imperialism. The Congress, thus, had two strands: ‘On the one hand, the st rand of cooperation with imperialism against the “menace” of the mass movement; on the other hand, the strand of leadership of the masses in the national struggle.’ This duality of the Congress leadership from Gokhale to Gandhi, said Dutt, in fact reflecte d the two -fold and vacillating character of the Indian bourgeoisie itself; ‘at once in conflict with the British bourgeoisie and desiring to lead the Indian people, yet[/INST]
feeling that “too rapid” advance may end in destroying its privileges along with those of the imperialists.’ The Congress had, thus, become an organ of opposition to real revolution, that is, a violent revolution. But this role did not date from Gandhiji; ‘this principle was implanted in it by imperialism at the outset as its intended offici al role.’ The culmination of this dual role was its ‘final capitulation with the Mountbatten Settlement.’ Earlier, in 1939, M.S. Golwalkar, the RSS chief, had also found the safety -valve theory handy in attacking the Congress for
<s>[INST]feeling that “too rapid” advance may end in destroying its privileges along with those of the imperialists.’ The Congress had, thus, become an organ of opposition to real revolution, that is, a violent revolution. But this role did not date from Gandhiji; ‘this principle was implanted in it by imperialism at the outset as its intended offici al role.’ The culmination of this dual role was its ‘final capitulation with the Mountbatten Settlement.’ Earlier, in 1939, M.S. Golwalkar, the RSS chief, had also found the safety -valve theory handy in attacking the Congress for[/INST]
36 | India’s S truggle for Independence its secularism and, theref ore, anti -nationalism. In his pamphlet We Golwalkar complained that Hindu national consciousness had been destroyed by those claiming to be ‘nationalists’ who had pushed the ‘notions of democracy’ and the perverse notion that ‘our old invaders and foes’, t he Muslims, had something in common with Hindus. Consequently, ‘we have allowed our foes to be our friends and with our hands are undermining true nationality.’ In fact, the tight in India was not between Indians and the British only. It was ‘a triangular fight.’ Hindus were at war with Muslims on the one hand and with the British on the other. What had led Hindus to enter the path of ‘denationalization,’ said Golwalkar, were the aims and policy laid down by flume, Cotton, and Wedderburn in 1885; ‘the Congr ess they founded as a “safety valve” to “seething nationalism,” as a toy which would lull the awakening giant into slumber, an instrument to destroy National consciousness, has been, as far as they are concerned, a success.’ The liberal C.F. Andrews and Gi rija Mukherji fully accepted the safety -valve theory in their work, The Rise and Growth of the Congress in India published in 1938. They were happy with it because it had helped avoid ‘useless bloodshed.’ Before as well as after 1947, tens of scholars and hundreds of popular writers have repeated some version of these points of view. * Historical proof of the safety -valve theory was provided by the seven volumes of secret reports which flume claimed to have read at Simla in the summer of 1878 and which con vinced him of the existence of ‘seething discontent’ and a vast conspiracy among the lower classes to violently overthrow British rule. Before we unravel the mystery of the seven volumes, let us briefly trace the history of its rise and growth. It was firs t mentioned in William Wedderburn’s biography of A.O. flume published in 1913. Wedderburn (ICS) found an undated
<s>[INST]36 | India’s S truggle for Independence its secularism and, theref ore, anti -nationalism. In his pamphlet We Golwalkar complained that Hindu national consciousness had been destroyed by those claiming to be ‘nationalists’ who had pushed the ‘notions of democracy’ and the perverse notion that ‘our old invaders and foes’, t he Muslims, had something in common with Hindus. Consequently, ‘we have allowed our foes to be our friends and with our hands are undermining true nationality.’ In fact, the tight in India was not between Indians and the British only. It was ‘a triangular fight.’ Hindus were at war with Muslims on the one hand and with the British on the other. What had led Hindus to enter the path of ‘denationalization,’ said Golwalkar, were the aims and policy laid down by flume, Cotton, and Wedderburn in 1885; ‘the Congr ess they founded as a “safety valve” to “seething nationalism,” as a toy which would lull the awakening giant into slumber, an instrument to destroy National consciousness, has been, as far as they are concerned, a success.’ The liberal C.F. Andrews and Gi rija Mukherji fully accepted the safety -valve theory in their work, The Rise and Growth of the Congress in India published in 1938. They were happy with it because it had helped avoid ‘useless bloodshed.’ Before as well as after 1947, tens of scholars and hundreds of popular writers have repeated some version of these points of view. * Historical proof of the safety -valve theory was provided by the seven volumes of secret reports which flume claimed to have read at Simla in the summer of 1878 and which con vinced him of the existence of ‘seething discontent’ and a vast conspiracy among the lower classes to violently overthrow British rule. Before we unravel the mystery of the seven volumes, let us briefly trace the history of its rise and growth. It was firs t mentioned in William Wedderburn’s biography of A.O. flume published in 1913. Wedderburn (ICS) found an undated[/INST]
published in 1913. Wedderburn (ICS) found an undated memorandum in Hume’s papers which dealt with the foundation of the Congress. He quoted at length from this document. To keep the mystery alive so that the reader may go along with the writer step by step towards its solution, I will withhold an account of Wedderburn’s writing, initially giving only those paragraphs
<s>[INST]published in 1913. Wedderburn (ICS) found an undated memorandum in Hume’s papers which dealt with the foundation of the Congress. He quoted at length from this document. To keep the mystery alive so that the reader may go along with the writer step by step towards its solution, I will withhold an account of Wedderburn’s writing, initially giving only those paragraphs[/INST]
37 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth which were quoted by the subsequent writers. According to Lajpat Rai, despite the fact that Hume was ‘a lover of liberty and wanted political liberty for India under the aegis of the British crown,’ he was above all ‘an English patriot.’ Once he saw that British rule was threatened with ‘an impending calamity’ he decided to create a saf ety valve for the discontent. As decisive proof of this Lajpat Ra i provided a long quotation from Hume’s memorandum that Wedderburn had mentioned along with his own comments in his book. Since this passage is quoted or cited by all subsequent authors, it is necessary to reproduce it here at length. “I was shown,” wrote Hume, “several large volumes containing a vast number of entries; English abstracts or translations longer or shorter — of vernacular reports or communications of one kind or another, all ar ranged according to districts (not identical with ours) The number of these entries was enormous; there were said, at the time to be communications from over 30,000 different reporters.” He (Hume) mentions that he had the volumes in his possession only for a week... Many of the entries reported conversations between men of the lowest classes, “all going to show that these poor men were pervaded with a sense of the hopelessness of the existing state of affairs; that they were convinced that they would starve and die, and that they wanted to do something, and stand by each other, and that something meant violence. a certain small number of the educated classes, at the time desperately, perhaps unreasonably, biller against the Government, would join the movemen t assume here and there the lead, give the outbreak cohesion, and direct it as a national revolt.”’ Very soon, the seven volumes, whose character, origin, etc., were left undefined in Lajpat Rai’s quotation, started undergoing a metamorphosis. In 1933, in Gurmukh Nihal Singh’s hands, they became ‘government reports.’ Andrews and Mukherji
<s>[INST]37 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth which were quoted by the subsequent writers. According to Lajpat Rai, despite the fact that Hume was ‘a lover of liberty and wanted political liberty for India under the aegis of the British crown,’ he was above all ‘an English patriot.’ Once he saw that British rule was threatened with ‘an impending calamity’ he decided to create a saf ety valve for the discontent. As decisive proof of this Lajpat Ra i provided a long quotation from Hume’s memorandum that Wedderburn had mentioned along with his own comments in his book. Since this passage is quoted or cited by all subsequent authors, it is necessary to reproduce it here at length. “I was shown,” wrote Hume, “several large volumes containing a vast number of entries; English abstracts or translations longer or shorter — of vernacular reports or communications of one kind or another, all ar ranged according to districts (not identical with ours) The number of these entries was enormous; there were said, at the time to be communications from over 30,000 different reporters.” He (Hume) mentions that he had the volumes in his possession only for a week... Many of the entries reported conversations between men of the lowest classes, “all going to show that these poor men were pervaded with a sense of the hopelessness of the existing state of affairs; that they were convinced that they would starve and die, and that they wanted to do something, and stand by each other, and that something meant violence. a certain small number of the educated classes, at the time desperately, perhaps unreasonably, biller against the Government, would join the movemen t assume here and there the lead, give the outbreak cohesion, and direct it as a national revolt.”’ Very soon, the seven volumes, whose character, origin, etc., were left undefined in Lajpat Rai’s quotation, started undergoing a metamorphosis. In 1933, in Gurmukh Nihal Singh’s hands, they became ‘government reports.’ Andrews and Mukherji[/INST]
they became ‘government reports.’ Andrews and Mukherji transformed them into ‘several volumes of secret reports from the CID’ which came into Hume’s possession ‘in his official capacity.’ The classical and most influential sta tement came from R. Pa lme Dutt. After quoting the passage quoted by Lajpat Rai from Wedderb urn, Du tt wrote: ‘Hume in his official capacity had received possession of the voluminous secret police reports.”
<s>[INST]they became ‘government reports.’ Andrews and Mukherji transformed them into ‘several volumes of secret reports from the CID’ which came into Hume’s possession ‘in his official capacity.’ The classical and most influential sta tement came from R. Pa lme Dutt. After quoting the passage quoted by Lajpat Rai from Wedderb urn, Du tt wrote: ‘Hume in his official capacity had received possession of the voluminous secret police reports.”[/INST]
38 | India’s S truggle for Independence Numerous other historians of the national movement including recent ones such as R.C. Maju mdar and Tara Chand, were to accept this product of the creative imagination of these writers as historical fact. So deeply rooted had become the belief in Hume’s volumes as official documents that in the 1950s a lar ge number of historians and would -be historians, including the present writer, devoted a great deal of time and energy searching for them in the National Archives. And when their search proved futile, they consoled themselves with the thought that the Brit ish had destroyed them before their departure in 1947. Yet only if the historians had applied a minimum of their historiographic sense to the question and looked at the professed evidence a bit more carefully, they would not have been taken for a ride. Thr ee levels of historical evidence and logic were available to them even before the private papers of Ripon and Dufferin became available. The first level pertains to the system under which the Government of India functioned in the 1870s. In 1878, Flume was Secretary to the Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce. How could the Secretary of these departments get access to Home Department files or CID reports? Also he was then in Simla while Home Department files were kept in Delhi; they were not sent to Simla. And from where would 30,000 reporters come? The intelligence departments could not have employed more than a few hundred persons at the time! And, as Lajpat Rai noted, if Congress was founded out of the fear of an outbreak, why did Flume and Bri tish officialdom wait for seven long years? If these volumes were not government documents, what were they? The clue was there in Wedderburn’s book and it was easily available if a writer would go to the book itself and not rely on extracts from it reprod uced by previous authors as nearly all the later writers seem to have done. This brings us to the second
<s>[INST]38 | India’s S truggle for Independence Numerous other historians of the national movement including recent ones such as R.C. Maju mdar and Tara Chand, were to accept this product of the creative imagination of these writers as historical fact. So deeply rooted had become the belief in Hume’s volumes as official documents that in the 1950s a lar ge number of historians and would -be historians, including the present writer, devoted a great deal of time and energy searching for them in the National Archives. And when their search proved futile, they consoled themselves with the thought that the Brit ish had destroyed them before their departure in 1947. Yet only if the historians had applied a minimum of their historiographic sense to the question and looked at the professed evidence a bit more carefully, they would not have been taken for a ride. Thr ee levels of historical evidence and logic were available to them even before the private papers of Ripon and Dufferin became available. The first level pertains to the system under which the Government of India functioned in the 1870s. In 1878, Flume was Secretary to the Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce. How could the Secretary of these departments get access to Home Department files or CID reports? Also he was then in Simla while Home Department files were kept in Delhi; they were not sent to Simla. And from where would 30,000 reporters come? The intelligence departments could not have employed more than a few hundred persons at the time! And, as Lajpat Rai noted, if Congress was founded out of the fear of an outbreak, why did Flume and Bri tish officialdom wait for seven long years? If these volumes were not government documents, what were they? The clue was there in Wedderburn’s book and it was easily available if a writer would go to the book itself and not rely on extracts from it reprod uced by previous authors as nearly all the later writers seem to have done. This brings us to the second[/INST]
level of historical evidence already available in Wedderburn. The passages quoted by Lajpat Rai, R. Palme Du tt and others are on pages 80 -81 of Wedder burn’s book. Two pages earlier, pages 78 -80, and one page later, 82 -83, Wedderburn tells the reader what these volumes were and who provided them to Hume. The heading of the section where the quoted passages
<s>[INST]level of historical evidence already available in Wedderburn. The passages quoted by Lajpat Rai, R. Palme Du tt and others are on pages 80 -81 of Wedder burn’s book. Two pages earlier, pages 78 -80, and one page later, 82 -83, Wedderburn tells the reader what these volumes were and who provided them to Hume. The heading of the section where the quoted passages[/INST]
39 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth occur is ‘ Indian religious leaders.’ In the very beginning of the section, Wedderbu rn writes that a warning of the threatened danger came to Flume ‘from a very special source that is, from the leaders among those devoted, in all parts of India , to a religious life.’ Hume referred in his memorandum to th e legions of secret quasi -religious orders, with literally their millions of members, which form so important a factor in the Indian problem.” These religious sects and orders were headed by Gurus, “men of the highest quality who . . have purged themselves from earthly desires, and fixed their desires on the highest good.” And “these religious leaders, through their Chelas or disciples, are hilly informed of all that goes on under the surface, and their influence is great in forming public opinion.” It was with these Gurus, writes Wedderburn, ‘that Mr. Hume came in touch, towards the end of Lord Lytton’s Viceroyalty.’ These Gurus approached Hume because Hume was a keen student of Eastern religions, but also because they “feared that the ominous ‘ unrest’ throughout the country… would lead to terrible outbreak” and it was only men like Hume who had access to the Government who could help ‘avert a catastrophe.’ “This,” wrote Hume, “is how the case was put to me.” With this background the passages on pages 80 -81 become clearer. In other words, the evidence of the seven volumes was shown to Hume by the Gurus who had been sent reports by thousands of Chelas. But why should Hume believe that these reports ‘must necessarily be true?’ Because Chelas were persons of a special breed who did not belong to any particular sect or religion or rather belonged to all religions. Moreover they were ‘bound by vows and conditions, over and above those of ordinary initiates of low grade.’ They were ‘all initiates in some of the man y branches of the secret knowledge’ and were ‘all bound by vows,
<s>[INST]39 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth occur is ‘ Indian religious leaders.’ In the very beginning of the section, Wedderbu rn writes that a warning of the threatened danger came to Flume ‘from a very special source that is, from the leaders among those devoted, in all parts of India , to a religious life.’ Hume referred in his memorandum to th e legions of secret quasi -religious orders, with literally their millions of members, which form so important a factor in the Indian problem.” These religious sects and orders were headed by Gurus, “men of the highest quality who . . have purged themselves from earthly desires, and fixed their desires on the highest good.” And “these religious leaders, through their Chelas or disciples, are hilly informed of all that goes on under the surface, and their influence is great in forming public opinion.” It was with these Gurus, writes Wedderburn, ‘that Mr. Hume came in touch, towards the end of Lord Lytton’s Viceroyalty.’ These Gurus approached Hume because Hume was a keen student of Eastern religions, but also because they “feared that the ominous ‘ unrest’ throughout the country… would lead to terrible outbreak” and it was only men like Hume who had access to the Government who could help ‘avert a catastrophe.’ “This,” wrote Hume, “is how the case was put to me.” With this background the passages on pages 80 -81 become clearer. In other words, the evidence of the seven volumes was shown to Hume by the Gurus who had been sent reports by thousands of Chelas. But why should Hume believe that these reports ‘must necessarily be true?’ Because Chelas were persons of a special breed who did not belong to any particular sect or religion or rather belonged to all religions. Moreover they were ‘bound by vows and conditions, over and above those of ordinary initiates of low grade.’ They were ‘all initiates in some of the man y branches of the secret knowledge’ and were ‘all bound by vows,[/INST]
branches of the secret knowledge’ and were ‘all bound by vows, they cannot practically break, to some farther advanced seeker than themselves.’ The leaders were of ‘no sect and no religion, but of all sects and all religions.’ But why did hardly anyone i n India know of the existence of these myriads of Gurus and Chelas? Because, explained Hume, absolute secrecy was an essential feature in their lives. They had communicated with Hume only because they were anxious to avert calamity. And, finally, we come to the third level of historiography, the level of profound belief and absolute fantasy. The full character of
<s>[INST]branches of the secret knowledge’ and were ‘all bound by vows, they cannot practically break, to some farther advanced seeker than themselves.’ The leaders were of ‘no sect and no religion, but of all sects and all religions.’ But why did hardly anyone i n India know of the existence of these myriads of Gurus and Chelas? Because, explained Hume, absolute secrecy was an essential feature in their lives. They had communicated with Hume only because they were anxious to avert calamity. And, finally, we come to the third level of historiography, the level of profound belief and absolute fantasy. The full character of[/INST]
40 | India’s S truggle for Independence the Gurus and Chelas was still not revealed by Wedderburn, for he was sheltering the reputation of his old friend, as friendly biographers usuall y do. The impression given by him was that these Gurus and Chelas were ordinary mortal men. This was, however, not the case. Reconstructing the facts on the basis of some books of Theosophy and Madame Blavatsky and the private papers of the Viceroys Ripon and Dufferin, we discover that these Gurus were persons who, because of their practice of ‘peculiar Eastern religious thought,’ were supposed to possess supernatural occult powers; they could communicate and direct from thousands of mites, enter any place go anywhere, sit anywhere unseen, and direct men’s thoughts and opinions without their being aware of it. * In 1881, Hume came under the spell of Madame Blavatsky who claimed be in touch with these Gurus who were described by her as mahatmas. These mahatm as lived as part of a secret brotherhood in Tibet, but they could contact or ‘correspond’ with persons anywhere in the world because of their occult powers. Blavatsky enabled Hume to get in touch with one of these mahatmas named ‘Koot Hoomi Lal Singh.’ It is this invisible brotherhood that gathered secret information on Indian affairs through their Chelas. In a book published in 1880, A.P. Sinnet, editor of the Pioneer and another follower of Blavatsky, had quoted a letter from Koot Hoomi that these mahatma s had used their power in 1857 to control the Indian masses and saved the British Empire and that they would do the same in future. Hume believed all this. He was keen to acquire these occult powers by which the Chelas could know all about the present and the future. He started a ‘correspondence’ with the mahatmas in Tibet. By 1883 Hume had quarreled with Blavatsky, but his faith in the Gurus or mahatmas continued unabated. He also began to use his connection with the mahatmas to promote
<s>[INST]40 | India’s S truggle for Independence the Gurus and Chelas was still not revealed by Wedderburn, for he was sheltering the reputation of his old friend, as friendly biographers usuall y do. The impression given by him was that these Gurus and Chelas were ordinary mortal men. This was, however, not the case. Reconstructing the facts on the basis of some books of Theosophy and Madame Blavatsky and the private papers of the Viceroys Ripon and Dufferin, we discover that these Gurus were persons who, because of their practice of ‘peculiar Eastern religious thought,’ were supposed to possess supernatural occult powers; they could communicate and direct from thousands of mites, enter any place go anywhere, sit anywhere unseen, and direct men’s thoughts and opinions without their being aware of it. * In 1881, Hume came under the spell of Madame Blavatsky who claimed be in touch with these Gurus who were described by her as mahatmas. These mahatm as lived as part of a secret brotherhood in Tibet, but they could contact or ‘correspond’ with persons anywhere in the world because of their occult powers. Blavatsky enabled Hume to get in touch with one of these mahatmas named ‘Koot Hoomi Lal Singh.’ It is this invisible brotherhood that gathered secret information on Indian affairs through their Chelas. In a book published in 1880, A.P. Sinnet, editor of the Pioneer and another follower of Blavatsky, had quoted a letter from Koot Hoomi that these mahatma s had used their power in 1857 to control the Indian masses and saved the British Empire and that they would do the same in future. Hume believed all this. He was keen to acquire these occult powers by which the Chelas could know all about the present and the future. He started a ‘correspondence’ with the mahatmas in Tibet. By 1883 Hume had quarreled with Blavatsky, but his faith in the Gurus or mahatmas continued unabated. He also began to use his connection with the mahatmas to promote[/INST]
began to use his connection with the mahatmas to promote political objectiv es dear to his heart — attempting to reform Indian administration and make it more responsive to Indian opinion. In December 1883, he wrote to Ripon: ‘I am associated with men, who though never seen by the masses . . . are yet
<s>[INST]began to use his connection with the mahatmas to promote political objectiv es dear to his heart — attempting to reform Indian administration and make it more responsive to Indian opinion. In December 1883, he wrote to Ripon: ‘I am associated with men, who though never seen by the masses . . . are yet[/INST]
41 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth reverenced by them as Gods . . . and who feel every pulse of public feeling.’ He claimed a Superior knowledge ‘of the native mind’ because ‘a body of men, mostly of Asiatic origin . . . who possess facilities which no other man or body of men living do, for gauging the feelings of th e natives. . . have seen fit. . . to give me their confidence to a certain limited extent.’ In January 1884, he informed Ripon that even earlier, in 1848, he had been in contact with the brotherhood or association of his mystical advisers and that it was t heir intervention which had defeated the revolutions of 1848 in Europe and the ‘mutiny’ of 1857. From distant Tibet they were now acting through him and others like him to help Ripon introduce reforms and avoid ‘the possibility of such a cataclysm recurrin g.’ This association of mahatmas was also helping him, he told Ripon, to persuade the Queen to give a second term as Viceroy to Ripon and to ‘tranquilize the native press. Hume tried to play a similar role with Dufferin, but more hesitatingly, not sharing with him the information that his advisers were astral, occult figures so that even many historians have assumed that these advisers were his fellow Congress leaders! Only once did he lift the veil before Dufferin when the latter during 1887 angrily presse d him to reveal the source through which he claimed to have gained access to the Viceroy’s secret letter to the Secretary of State. Pressed to the wall, Hume told him copies of the letter had been obtained by his friends through occult methods or ‘through the medium of supernatural photography.’ And when Dufferin showed him the original letter, proving that the copy w as false, Hume had no answer.’ Once earlier, too, Hume had indirectly tried to tell Dufferin that his advisers were not ordinary political lea ders but ‘advanced initiates’ and mahatmas ; but he had done so in a guarded fashion. In a letter to Dufferin in November 1886, he
<s>[INST]41 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth reverenced by them as Gods . . . and who feel every pulse of public feeling.’ He claimed a Superior knowledge ‘of the native mind’ because ‘a body of men, mostly of Asiatic origin . . . who possess facilities which no other man or body of men living do, for gauging the feelings of th e natives. . . have seen fit. . . to give me their confidence to a certain limited extent.’ In January 1884, he informed Ripon that even earlier, in 1848, he had been in contact with the brotherhood or association of his mystical advisers and that it was t heir intervention which had defeated the revolutions of 1848 in Europe and the ‘mutiny’ of 1857. From distant Tibet they were now acting through him and others like him to help Ripon introduce reforms and avoid ‘the possibility of such a cataclysm recurrin g.’ This association of mahatmas was also helping him, he told Ripon, to persuade the Queen to give a second term as Viceroy to Ripon and to ‘tranquilize the native press. Hume tried to play a similar role with Dufferin, but more hesitatingly, not sharing with him the information that his advisers were astral, occult figures so that even many historians have assumed that these advisers were his fellow Congress leaders! Only once did he lift the veil before Dufferin when the latter during 1887 angrily presse d him to reveal the source through which he claimed to have gained access to the Viceroy’s secret letter to the Secretary of State. Pressed to the wall, Hume told him copies of the letter had been obtained by his friends through occult methods or ‘through the medium of supernatural photography.’ And when Dufferin showed him the original letter, proving that the copy w as false, Hume had no answer.’ Once earlier, too, Hume had indirectly tried to tell Dufferin that his advisers were not ordinary political lea ders but ‘advanced initiates’ and mahatmas ; but he had done so in a guarded fashion. In a letter to Dufferin in November 1886, he[/INST]
guarded fashion. In a letter to Dufferin in November 1886, he said that he had been trying to persuade those who had shown him the volumes in Simla to also show them to Dufferin so that the Viceroy could get their veracity checked by his own sources. But, at present they say that this is impossible.’ Nor would they agree to communicate with the Viceroy directly. ‘Most of them, I believe , could not. You have not done, and would not do, what is required to enable them to communicate with you directly after their fashion.’ But there was hope. ‘My own special friend’ who
<s>[INST]guarded fashion. In a letter to Dufferin in November 1886, he said that he had been trying to persuade those who had shown him the volumes in Simla to also show them to Dufferin so that the Viceroy could get their veracity checked by his own sources. But, at present they say that this is impossible.’ Nor would they agree to communicate with the Viceroy directly. ‘Most of them, I believe , could not. You have not done, and would not do, what is required to enable them to communicate with you directly after their fashion.’ But there was hope. ‘My own special friend’ who[/INST]
42 | India’s S truggle for Independence spent more than a month with Hume in Simla (in 1878), and who was often in India might agree to see the Viceroy. Hume suggeste d: ‘if ever a native gentleman comes to the Private Secretary and says that Mr. Hume said the Viceroy would like to see him, see him at once. You will not talk to him ten minutes without finding out that he is no ordinary man. You may never get the chance — goodness knows — they move in a mysterious way their wonders to But Hume was worried that he could offer no visible or direct proof of his knowledge or connections. He told the Viceroy that he was ‘getting gradually very angry and disgusted’ because he was not able to get ‘this vouching for directly.’ None of the ‘advanced initiates’ under whose advice and guidance’ he was working would ‘publicly stand by me,’ so that most Europeans in India ‘look upon me either as a lunatic or a liar.’ And hence, he informed the Viceroy, while he had decided to continue the political work, he had decided to ‘drop all references to my friends.” Thus, it turns out that the seven volumes which Hume saw were prepared by mahatmas and Gurus, and his friends and advisers were these occult figures and not Congressmen! * Further proof offered for the safety -valve theory was based on W.C. B annerjee’ s statement in 1898 in Indian Politics that the Congress, ‘as it was originally started and as it has since been carried on, is in re ality the work of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava.’ He stated that Flume had, in 1884, thought of bringing together leading political Indians once a year “to discuss social matters” and did not “desire that politics should form part of their discussion.” B ut Dufferin asked flume to do the opposite and start a body to discuss politics so that the Government could keep itself informed of Indian opinion. Such a body could also perform ‘the functions which Her Majest y’s Opposition did in England.”
<s>[INST]42 | India’s S truggle for Independence spent more than a month with Hume in Simla (in 1878), and who was often in India might agree to see the Viceroy. Hume suggeste d: ‘if ever a native gentleman comes to the Private Secretary and says that Mr. Hume said the Viceroy would like to see him, see him at once. You will not talk to him ten minutes without finding out that he is no ordinary man. You may never get the chance — goodness knows — they move in a mysterious way their wonders to But Hume was worried that he could offer no visible or direct proof of his knowledge or connections. He told the Viceroy that he was ‘getting gradually very angry and disgusted’ because he was not able to get ‘this vouching for directly.’ None of the ‘advanced initiates’ under whose advice and guidance’ he was working would ‘publicly stand by me,’ so that most Europeans in India ‘look upon me either as a lunatic or a liar.’ And hence, he informed the Viceroy, while he had decided to continue the political work, he had decided to ‘drop all references to my friends.” Thus, it turns out that the seven volumes which Hume saw were prepared by mahatmas and Gurus, and his friends and advisers were these occult figures and not Congressmen! * Further proof offered for the safety -valve theory was based on W.C. B annerjee’ s statement in 1898 in Indian Politics that the Congress, ‘as it was originally started and as it has since been carried on, is in re ality the work of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava.’ He stated that Flume had, in 1884, thought of bringing together leading political Indians once a year “to discuss social matters” and did not “desire that politics should form part of their discussion.” B ut Dufferin asked flume to do the opposite and start a body to discuss politics so that the Government could keep itself informed of Indian opinion. Such a body could also perform ‘the functions which Her Majest y’s Opposition did in England.”[/INST]
England.” Clearly, eith er W.C. B annerjee’s memory was failing or he was trying to protect the National Congress from the wrath of the late 19th century imperialist reaction, for contemporary evidence
<s>[INST]England.” Clearly, eith er W.C. B annerjee’s memory was failing or he was trying to protect the National Congress from the wrath of the late 19th century imperialist reaction, for contemporary evidence[/INST]
43 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth clearly indicated the opposite. All the discussions Hume had with Indian leader s regarding the holding of an annual conference referred to a political gathering. Almost the entire work of earlier associations like the Bombay Presidency Association, Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, Madras Mahajan Sabha and Indian Association was political. Sin ce his retirement from the Indian Civil Service in 1882, Hume had been publicly urging Indians to take to politics. He had also been asking his Indian friends not to get divided on social questions. When, in January 1885, his friend B.M. Malabari wrote some editorials in the Indian Spectator urging educated Indians to inaugurate a movement for social reform, Hume wrote a letter to the Indian Spectator criticizing Malabari’s proposals, warning against the dangerous potential of such a move, and arguing that political reforms should take precedence over social reform.’ Dufferin, on his part, in his St. Andrews’ Day dinner speech in 1888, publicly criticized the Congress for pursuing politics to serve narrow interests rather than take to social reform which would benefit millions.’5 Earlier he had expressed the same sentiment in a private letter to the Secretary of State. A perusal of Dufferin’s private papers, thrown open to scholars in the late 1950s, should have put an end to the myth of Dufferin’s sponsor of or support to the Congress. It was only after Hume had sent him a Copy of the letter to the Indian Spectator with a covering note deprecating Malabari’s views on social reform that Dufferin expressed agreement with Hume and asked him to meet him. Defini te confirmation of the fact that Hume never proposed a social gathering but rather a political one comes in Dufferin’s letter to Lord Reay, Governor of Bombay, after his f meeting with Hume in May 1885: “At his last interview he told me that he and his fri ends were going to assemble a political
<s>[INST]43 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth clearly indicated the opposite. All the discussions Hume had with Indian leader s regarding the holding of an annual conference referred to a political gathering. Almost the entire work of earlier associations like the Bombay Presidency Association, Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, Madras Mahajan Sabha and Indian Association was political. Sin ce his retirement from the Indian Civil Service in 1882, Hume had been publicly urging Indians to take to politics. He had also been asking his Indian friends not to get divided on social questions. When, in January 1885, his friend B.M. Malabari wrote some editorials in the Indian Spectator urging educated Indians to inaugurate a movement for social reform, Hume wrote a letter to the Indian Spectator criticizing Malabari’s proposals, warning against the dangerous potential of such a move, and arguing that political reforms should take precedence over social reform.’ Dufferin, on his part, in his St. Andrews’ Day dinner speech in 1888, publicly criticized the Congress for pursuing politics to serve narrow interests rather than take to social reform which would benefit millions.’5 Earlier he had expressed the same sentiment in a private letter to the Secretary of State. A perusal of Dufferin’s private papers, thrown open to scholars in the late 1950s, should have put an end to the myth of Dufferin’s sponsor of or support to the Congress. It was only after Hume had sent him a Copy of the letter to the Indian Spectator with a covering note deprecating Malabari’s views on social reform that Dufferin expressed agreement with Hume and asked him to meet him. Defini te confirmation of the fact that Hume never proposed a social gathering but rather a political one comes in Dufferin’s letter to Lord Reay, Governor of Bombay, after his f meeting with Hume in May 1885: “At his last interview he told me that he and his fri ends were going to assemble a political[/INST]
that he and his fri ends were going to assemble a political convention of delegates, as far as I understood, on the lines adopted by O’Connell previous to Catholic emancipation.” Neither Dufferin and his fellow -liberal Governors of Bombay and Madras nor his conservative offic ials like Alfred and J.B. Lyall, D.M Wallace, A. Colvin and S.C. Bayley were sympathetic to the Congress . It was not only in 1888 that Dufferin attacked the Congress in a vicious manner by writing that he would consider ‘in what way the happy despatch may be best applied to
<s>[INST]that he and his fri ends were going to assemble a political convention of delegates, as far as I understood, on the lines adopted by O’Connell previous to Catholic emancipation.” Neither Dufferin and his fellow -liberal Governors of Bombay and Madras nor his conservative offic ials like Alfred and J.B. Lyall, D.M Wallace, A. Colvin and S.C. Bayley were sympathetic to the Congress . It was not only in 1888 that Dufferin attacked the Congress in a vicious manner by writing that he would consider ‘in what way the happy despatch may be best applied to[/INST]
44 | India’s S truggle for Independence the Congress,’ for ‘we cannot allow the Congress to continue to exist.” In May 1885 itself, he had written to Reay asking him to be careful about Hume’s Congress, telling him that it would be unwise to identify with either the reformers or the reactionaries. Reay in turn, in a letter in June 1885, referred with apprehension to the new political activists as ‘the National Party of India’ and warned against Indian delegates, like Irish delegates, making their appearance on the British polit ical scene. Earlier, in May, Reay had cautioned Dufferin that Hume was ‘the head -centre of an organization . . . (which) has for its object to bring native opinion into a focus.’ In fact, from the end of May 1885, Dufferin had grown cool to Hume and began to keep him at an arm’s length. From 1886 onwards he also began to attack the ‘Bengali Baboos and Mahratta Brahmins’ for being ‘inspired by questionable motives’ and for wanting to start Irish -type revolutionary agitations in India.20 And, during May -June 1886. he was describing Hume as ‘cleverish, a little cracked, excessively vain, and absolutely indifferent to truth,’ his main fault being that he was ‘one of the chief stimulants of the Indian Home Rule movement. To conclude, it is high time that the saf ety-valve theory of the genesis of the Congress was confined to the care of the mahatmas from whom perhaps it originated!
<s>[INST]44 | India’s S truggle for Independence the Congress,’ for ‘we cannot allow the Congress to continue to exist.” In May 1885 itself, he had written to Reay asking him to be careful about Hume’s Congress, telling him that it would be unwise to identify with either the reformers or the reactionaries. Reay in turn, in a letter in June 1885, referred with apprehension to the new political activists as ‘the National Party of India’ and warned against Indian delegates, like Irish delegates, making their appearance on the British polit ical scene. Earlier, in May, Reay had cautioned Dufferin that Hume was ‘the head -centre of an organization . . . (which) has for its object to bring native opinion into a focus.’ In fact, from the end of May 1885, Dufferin had grown cool to Hume and began to keep him at an arm’s length. From 1886 onwards he also began to attack the ‘Bengali Baboos and Mahratta Brahmins’ for being ‘inspired by questionable motives’ and for wanting to start Irish -type revolutionary agitations in India.20 And, during May -June 1886. he was describing Hume as ‘cleverish, a little cracked, excessively vain, and absolutely indifferent to truth,’ his main fault being that he was ‘one of the chief stimulants of the Indian Home Rule movement. To conclude, it is high time that the saf ety-valve theory of the genesis of the Congress was confined to the care of the mahatmas from whom perhaps it originated![/INST]
45 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality CHAPTER 5. FOUNDATION OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS :THE REALITY In the last chapter we began the story of the foundation of the Indian National Congress. We could not, however, make much headway because the cobwebs had to be cleared, the myth of the safety -valve had to be laid to rest, the mystery of the ‘missing volumes’ had to be solve d, and Hume’s mahatmas had to be sent back to their resting place in Tibet. In this chapter we resume the more serious part of the story of the emergence of the Indian National Congress as the apex nationalist organization that was to guide the destiny of the Indian national movement till the attainment of independence. The foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was not a sudden event, or a historical accident. It was the culmination of a process of political awakening that had its beginnings i n the 1860s and 1870s and took a major leap forward in the late 1870s and early 1880s. The year 1885 marked a turning point in this process, for that was the year the political Indians, the modem intellectuals interested in politics, who no longer saw them selves as spokesmen of narrow group interests, but as representatives of national interest vis -a-vis foreign rule, as a ‘national party,’ saw their efforts bear fruit. The all -India nationalist body that they brought into being was to be the platform, the organizer, the headquarters, the symbol of the new national spirit and politics. British officialdom, too, was not slow in reading the new messages that were being conveyed through the nati onalist political activity leadin g to the founding of the Congress, and watched them with suspicion, and a sense of foreboding. As this political activity gathered force, the prospect of disloyalty, sedition and Irish -type agitations began to haunt the Government.
<s>[INST]45 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality CHAPTER 5. FOUNDATION OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS :THE REALITY In the last chapter we began the story of the foundation of the Indian National Congress. We could not, however, make much headway because the cobwebs had to be cleared, the myth of the safety -valve had to be laid to rest, the mystery of the ‘missing volumes’ had to be solve d, and Hume’s mahatmas had to be sent back to their resting place in Tibet. In this chapter we resume the more serious part of the story of the emergence of the Indian National Congress as the apex nationalist organization that was to guide the destiny of the Indian national movement till the attainment of independence. The foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was not a sudden event, or a historical accident. It was the culmination of a process of political awakening that had its beginnings i n the 1860s and 1870s and took a major leap forward in the late 1870s and early 1880s. The year 1885 marked a turning point in this process, for that was the year the political Indians, the modem intellectuals interested in politics, who no longer saw them selves as spokesmen of narrow group interests, but as representatives of national interest vis -a-vis foreign rule, as a ‘national party,’ saw their efforts bear fruit. The all -India nationalist body that they brought into being was to be the platform, the organizer, the headquarters, the symbol of the new national spirit and politics. British officialdom, too, was not slow in reading the new messages that were being conveyed through the nati onalist political activity leadin g to the founding of the Congress, and watched them with suspicion, and a sense of foreboding. As this political activity gathered force, the prospect of disloyalty, sedition and Irish -type agitations began to haunt the Government.[/INST]
46 | India’s S truggle for Independence The official suspicion was not merely the over -anxious response of an administration that had not yet recovered from the mutiny complex, but was in fact, well -founded. On the surface, the nationalist Indian demands of those years — no reduction of import duties on textile import no expansion in Afghanistan or Bu rma, the right to bear arms, freedom of the Press, reduction of military expenditure, higher expenditure on famine relief, Indianization of the civil services, the right of Indians to join the semi -military volunteer corps, the right of Indian judges to tr y Europeans in criminal cases, the appeal to British voters to vote for a party which would listen to Indians — look rather mild, especially when considered separately. But these were demands which a colonial regime could not easily concede, for that would undermine its hegemony over the colonial people. It is true that any criticism or demand no matter how innocuous its appearance but which cannot be accommodated by a system is in the long -run subversive of the system. The new political thrust in the year s between 1875 and 1885 was the creation of the younger, more radical nationalist intellectuals most of whom entered politics during this period. They established new associations, having found that the older associations were too narrowly conceived in ter ms of their programmes and political activity as well as social bases. For example, the British Indian Association of Bengal had increasingly identified itself with the interests of the zamindars and, thus, gradually lost its anti -British edge. The Bombay Association and Madras Native Association had become reactionary and moribund. And so the younger nationalists of Bengal, led by Surendranath Banerjea and Anand Mohan Bose, founded the Indian Association in 1876. Younger men of Madras — M. Viraraghavachari ar, G. Subramaniya Iyer, P. Ananda Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in
<s>[INST]46 | India’s S truggle for Independence The official suspicion was not merely the over -anxious response of an administration that had not yet recovered from the mutiny complex, but was in fact, well -founded. On the surface, the nationalist Indian demands of those years — no reduction of import duties on textile import no expansion in Afghanistan or Bu rma, the right to bear arms, freedom of the Press, reduction of military expenditure, higher expenditure on famine relief, Indianization of the civil services, the right of Indians to join the semi -military volunteer corps, the right of Indian judges to tr y Europeans in criminal cases, the appeal to British voters to vote for a party which would listen to Indians — look rather mild, especially when considered separately. But these were demands which a colonial regime could not easily concede, for that would undermine its hegemony over the colonial people. It is true that any criticism or demand no matter how innocuous its appearance but which cannot be accommodated by a system is in the long -run subversive of the system. The new political thrust in the year s between 1875 and 1885 was the creation of the younger, more radical nationalist intellectuals most of whom entered politics during this period. They established new associations, having found that the older associations were too narrowly conceived in ter ms of their programmes and political activity as well as social bases. For example, the British Indian Association of Bengal had increasingly identified itself with the interests of the zamindars and, thus, gradually lost its anti -British edge. The Bombay Association and Madras Native Association had become reactionary and moribund. And so the younger nationalists of Bengal, led by Surendranath Banerjea and Anand Mohan Bose, founded the Indian Association in 1876. Younger men of Madras — M. Viraraghavachari ar, G. Subramaniya Iyer, P. Ananda Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in[/INST]
Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in 1884. In Bombay, the more militant intellectuals like K.T. Telang and Pherozeshah Mehta broke away from older leaders like Dadabhai Framji and Dinshaw Petit on politi cal grounds and formed the Bombay Presidency Association in 1885. Among the older associations only the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha carried on as before. But, then, it was already in the hands of nationalist intellectuals.
<s>[INST]Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in 1884. In Bombay, the more militant intellectuals like K.T. Telang and Pherozeshah Mehta broke away from older leaders like Dadabhai Framji and Dinshaw Petit on politi cal grounds and formed the Bombay Presidency Association in 1885. Among the older associations only the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha carried on as before. But, then, it was already in the hands of nationalist intellectuals.[/INST]
47 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality A sign of new political life in the c ountry was the coming into existence during these years of nearly all the major nationalist newspapers which were to dominate the Indian scene till 1918 — The Hindu, Tribune, Bengalee, Mahraua and Kesari. The one exception was the Amrita Bazar Patrika which was already edited by new and younger men. It became an English language newspaper only in 1878. By 1885, the formation of an all -India political organization had become an objective necessity, and the necessity was being recognized by nationalists all over the country. Many recent scholars have furnished detailed information on the many moves that were made in that direction from 1877. These moves acquired a greater sense of urgency especially from 1883 and there was intense political activity. The Indian Mirror of Calcutta was carrying on a continuous campaign on the question. The Indian Association had already in December 1883 organized an All-India National Conference and given a call for another one in December 1885. Surendranath Banerjea , who was in volved in the All-India National Conference, could not for that reason attend the founding session of the National Congress in 1885). Meanwhile, the Indians had gained experience, as well as confidence, from the large number of agitations they had organiz ed in the preceding ten years. Since 1875, there had been a continuous campaign around cotton import duties which Indians wanted to stay in the interests of the Indian textile industry. A massive campaign had been organized during 1877 - 88 around the demand for the lndianization of Government services. The Indians had opposed the Afghan adventure of Lord Lytton and then compelled the British Government to contribute towards the cost of the Second Afghan War. The Indian Press had waged a major campaign agains t the efforts of the Government to control it through the Vernacular Press Act. The Indians had also
<s>[INST]47 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality A sign of new political life in the c ountry was the coming into existence during these years of nearly all the major nationalist newspapers which were to dominate the Indian scene till 1918 — The Hindu, Tribune, Bengalee, Mahraua and Kesari. The one exception was the Amrita Bazar Patrika which was already edited by new and younger men. It became an English language newspaper only in 1878. By 1885, the formation of an all -India political organization had become an objective necessity, and the necessity was being recognized by nationalists all over the country. Many recent scholars have furnished detailed information on the many moves that were made in that direction from 1877. These moves acquired a greater sense of urgency especially from 1883 and there was intense political activity. The Indian Mirror of Calcutta was carrying on a continuous campaign on the question. The Indian Association had already in December 1883 organized an All-India National Conference and given a call for another one in December 1885. Surendranath Banerjea , who was in volved in the All-India National Conference, could not for that reason attend the founding session of the National Congress in 1885). Meanwhile, the Indians had gained experience, as well as confidence, from the large number of agitations they had organiz ed in the preceding ten years. Since 1875, there had been a continuous campaign around cotton import duties which Indians wanted to stay in the interests of the Indian textile industry. A massive campaign had been organized during 1877 - 88 around the demand for the lndianization of Government services. The Indians had opposed the Afghan adventure of Lord Lytton and then compelled the British Government to contribute towards the cost of the Second Afghan War. The Indian Press had waged a major campaign agains t the efforts of the Government to control it through the Vernacular Press Act. The Indians had also[/INST]
opposed the effort to disarm them through the Arms Act. In 1881 -82 they had organized a protest against the Plantation Labour and the Inland Emigration Act which condemned plantation labourers to serfdom. A major agitation was organized during 1883 in favour of the Ilbert Bill which would enable Indian magistrates to try Europeans. This Bill was successfully thwarted by the Europeans. The Indians had been qu ick to draw the political lesson. Their efforts had failed because they had not
<s>[INST]opposed the effort to disarm them through the Arms Act. In 1881 -82 they had organized a protest against the Plantation Labour and the Inland Emigration Act which condemned plantation labourers to serfdom. A major agitation was organized during 1883 in favour of the Ilbert Bill which would enable Indian magistrates to try Europeans. This Bill was successfully thwarted by the Europeans. The Indians had been qu ick to draw the political lesson. Their efforts had failed because they had not[/INST]
48 | India’s S truggle for Independence been coordinated on an all -India basis. On the other hand, the Europeans had acted in a concerted manner. Again in July 1883 a massive all -India effort was made to raise a Nati onal Fund which would be used to promote political agitation in India as well as England. In 1885, Indians fought for the right to join the volunteer corps restricted to Europeans, and then organized an appeal to British voters to vote for those candidates who were friendly towards India. Several Indians were sent to Britain to put the Indian case before British voters through public speeches, and other means. * It thus, becomes clear that the foundation of the Congress was the natural culmination of the p olitical work of the previous years: By 1885, a stage had been reached in the political development of India when certain basic tasks or objectives had to be laid down and struggled for. Moreover these objectives were correlated and could only be fulfilled by the coming together of political workers in a single organization formed on an all - India basis. The men who met in Bombay on 28 December 1885 were inspired by these objectives and hoped to initiate the process of achieving them. The success or failure and the future character of the Congress would be determined not by who founded it but by the extent to which these objectives were achieved in the initial years. * India had just entered the process of becoming a nation or a people. The first major obje ctive of the founders of the Indian national movement was to promote this process, to weld Indians into a nation, to create an Indian people. It was common for colonial administrators and ideologues to assert that Indians could not be united or freed becau se they were not a nation or a people but a geographical expression, a mere congeries of hundreds of diverse races and creeds. The Indians did not deny this but asserted that t hey were now becoming a nation. India
<s>[INST]48 | India’s S truggle for Independence been coordinated on an all -India basis. On the other hand, the Europeans had acted in a concerted manner. Again in July 1883 a massive all -India effort was made to raise a Nati onal Fund which would be used to promote political agitation in India as well as England. In 1885, Indians fought for the right to join the volunteer corps restricted to Europeans, and then organized an appeal to British voters to vote for those candidates who were friendly towards India. Several Indians were sent to Britain to put the Indian case before British voters through public speeches, and other means. * It thus, becomes clear that the foundation of the Congress was the natural culmination of the p olitical work of the previous years: By 1885, a stage had been reached in the political development of India when certain basic tasks or objectives had to be laid down and struggled for. Moreover these objectives were correlated and could only be fulfilled by the coming together of political workers in a single organization formed on an all - India basis. The men who met in Bombay on 28 December 1885 were inspired by these objectives and hoped to initiate the process of achieving them. The success or failure and the future character of the Congress would be determined not by who founded it but by the extent to which these objectives were achieved in the initial years. * India had just entered the process of becoming a nation or a people. The first major obje ctive of the founders of the Indian national movement was to promote this process, to weld Indians into a nation, to create an Indian people. It was common for colonial administrators and ideologues to assert that Indians could not be united or freed becau se they were not a nation or a people but a geographical expression, a mere congeries of hundreds of diverse races and creeds. The Indians did not deny this but asserted that t hey were now becoming a nation. India[/INST]
this but asserted that t hey were now becoming a nation. India was as Tilak, Surendranath Banerjea and ma ny others were fond of saying — a nation -in-the-making . The Congress leaders recognized that objective historical forces were bringing the
<s>[INST]this but asserted that t hey were now becoming a nation. India was as Tilak, Surendranath Banerjea and ma ny others were fond of saying — a nation -in-the-making . The Congress leaders recognized that objective historical forces were bringing the[/INST]
49 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality Indian people together. But they also realized that the people had to become subjectively aware of the objective proc ess and that for this it was necessarily to promote the feeling of national unity and nationalism among them. Above all, India being a nation -in-the-making its nationhood could not be taken for granted. It had to be constantly developed and consolidated. The promotion of national unity was a major objective of the Congress and later its major achievement For example, P. Ananda Charlu in his presidential address to the Congress in 1891 described it ‘as a mighty nat ionalizer’ and said that this was its most ‘glorious’ role.’ Among the three basic aims and objectives of the Congress laid down by its first President, W.C. Bannerji, was that of ‘the fuller development and Foundation of the Indian National Congress: The Reality consolidation of those sentiments of national unity.’ The Russian traveller, I.P. Minaye ff wrote in his d iary that, when travelling with Bonnerji, he asked, ‘what practical results did the Congress leaders expect from the Con gress,’ Bonnerji replied: ‘Growth of national feeling and unity o f Indians.’ Similai.ly commenting on the first Congress session, the Indu Prakash of Bombay wrote: ‘It was the beginning of a new life . . . it will greatly help in creating a national feeling and binding together distant people by common sympathy and comm on ends.’ The making of India into a nation was to be a prolonged historical process. Moreover, the Congress leaders realized that the diversity of India was such that special efforts unknown to other parts of the world would have to be made and national unity caref ully nurtured. In an effort to reach all regions, it was decided to rotate the Congress session among different parts of the country. The President was to belong to a region other than where the Congress session was being held.
<s>[INST]49 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality Indian people together. But they also realized that the people had to become subjectively aware of the objective proc ess and that for this it was necessarily to promote the feeling of national unity and nationalism among them. Above all, India being a nation -in-the-making its nationhood could not be taken for granted. It had to be constantly developed and consolidated. The promotion of national unity was a major objective of the Congress and later its major achievement For example, P. Ananda Charlu in his presidential address to the Congress in 1891 described it ‘as a mighty nat ionalizer’ and said that this was its most ‘glorious’ role.’ Among the three basic aims and objectives of the Congress laid down by its first President, W.C. Bannerji, was that of ‘the fuller development and Foundation of the Indian National Congress: The Reality consolidation of those sentiments of national unity.’ The Russian traveller, I.P. Minaye ff wrote in his d iary that, when travelling with Bonnerji, he asked, ‘what practical results did the Congress leaders expect from the Con gress,’ Bonnerji replied: ‘Growth of national feeling and unity o f Indians.’ Similai.ly commenting on the first Congress session, the Indu Prakash of Bombay wrote: ‘It was the beginning of a new life . . . it will greatly help in creating a national feeling and binding together distant people by common sympathy and comm on ends.’ The making of India into a nation was to be a prolonged historical process. Moreover, the Congress leaders realized that the diversity of India was such that special efforts unknown to other parts of the world would have to be made and national unity caref ully nurtured. In an effort to reach all regions, it was decided to rotate the Congress session among different parts of the country. The President was to belong to a region other than where the Congress session was being held.[/INST]
where the Congress session was being held. To reach out to t he followers of all religions and to remove the fears of the minorities a rule was made at the 1888 session that no resolution was to be passed to which an overwhelming majority of Hindu or Muslim delegates objected. In 1889, a minority clause was adopted in the resolution demanding refo rm of legislative councils. According to the clause, wherever Parsis, Christians , Muslims or Hindus were a minority their nu mber elected to the Councils would not be less than the ir proportion in
<s>[INST]where the Congress session was being held. To reach out to t he followers of all religions and to remove the fears of the minorities a rule was made at the 1888 session that no resolution was to be passed to which an overwhelming majority of Hindu or Muslim delegates objected. In 1889, a minority clause was adopted in the resolution demanding refo rm of legislative councils. According to the clause, wherever Parsis, Christians , Muslims or Hindus were a minority their nu mber elected to the Councils would not be less than the ir proportion in[/INST]
50 | India’s S truggle for Independence the Population. The reason g iven by the mover of the resolution was that India was not yet a homogenous country and political methods here had, therefore, to differ from those in Europe. The early national leaders were also determined to build a secular nation, the Congress itself b eing intensely secular. * The second major objective of the early Congress was to create a common political platform or programme around which political workers in different parts of the country could gather and Conduct their political activities, educati ng and mobilizing people on an all -India basis. This was to be accomplished by taking up those grievances and fighting for those rights which Indians had in common in relation to the rulers. For the same reason the Congress was not to take up questions of social reform . At its second session, the President of the Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji, laid down this rule and said that ‘A National Congress must confine itself to questions in which the entire nation has a direct participation.’ Congress was, therefore, not the right place to discuss social reforms. ‘We are met together,’ he said, ‘as a political body to represent to our rulers our political aspirations.’ Modern politics — the politics of popular participation, agitation mobilization — was new to India. The notion that politics was not the preserve of the few but the domain of everyone was not yet familiar to the people. No modern political movement was possible till people realized this. And, then, on the basis of this realization, an informed and determ ined political opinion had to be created. The arousal, training, organization and consolidation of public opinion was seen as a major task by the Congress leaders. All initial activity of the early nationalism was geared towards this end. The first step w as seen to be the politicization and unification of the opinion of the educated, and then of other
<s>[INST]50 | India’s S truggle for Independence the Population. The reason g iven by the mover of the resolution was that India was not yet a homogenous country and political methods here had, therefore, to differ from those in Europe. The early national leaders were also determined to build a secular nation, the Congress itself b eing intensely secular. * The second major objective of the early Congress was to create a common political platform or programme around which political workers in different parts of the country could gather and Conduct their political activities, educati ng and mobilizing people on an all -India basis. This was to be accomplished by taking up those grievances and fighting for those rights which Indians had in common in relation to the rulers. For the same reason the Congress was not to take up questions of social reform . At its second session, the President of the Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji, laid down this rule and said that ‘A National Congress must confine itself to questions in which the entire nation has a direct participation.’ Congress was, therefore, not the right place to discuss social reforms. ‘We are met together,’ he said, ‘as a political body to represent to our rulers our political aspirations.’ Modern politics — the politics of popular participation, agitation mobilization — was new to India. The notion that politics was not the preserve of the few but the domain of everyone was not yet familiar to the people. No modern political movement was possible till people realized this. And, then, on the basis of this realization, an informed and determ ined political opinion had to be created. The arousal, training, organization and consolidation of public opinion was seen as a major task by the Congress leaders. All initial activity of the early nationalism was geared towards this end. The first step w as seen to be the politicization and unification of the opinion of the educated, and then of other[/INST]
unification of the opinion of the educated, and then of other sections. The primary objective was to go beyond the redressal of immediate grievances and organize sustained political activity along the lines of the Anti-Corn Law League (formed in Britain by
<s>[INST]unification of the opinion of the educated, and then of other sections. The primary objective was to go beyond the redressal of immediate grievances and organize sustained political activity along the lines of the Anti-Corn Law League (formed in Britain by[/INST]
51 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality Cobden and Bright in 1838 to secure reform of Corn Laws). The leaders as well as the people also had to gain confidence in their own capacity to organize political opposition to the most powerful state of the day. All this was no easy task. A prolonged period of politicization would be needed. Many later writers and critics have concentrated on the methods of political struggle of the early nationalist leaders, on their petitions, prayers and memorials. It is, of cours e, true that they did not organize mass movements and mass struggles. But the critics have missed out the most important part of their activity — that all of it led to politics, to the politicization of the people. Justice Ranade, who was known as a politi cal sage, had, in his usual perceptive manner, seen this as early as 1891 When the young and impatient twenty -six-year-old Gokhale expressed disappointment when the Government sent a two line reply to a carefully and laboriously prepared memorial by the Po ona Sarvajanik Sabha, Ranade reassured him: ‘You don’t realize our place in the history of our country. These memorials are nominally addressed to Government, in reality they are addressed to the people, so that they may learn how to think in these matters . This work must be done for many years, without expecting any other result, because politics of this kind is altogether new in this land.” * As part of the basic objective of giving birth to a national movement, it was necessary to create a common all -India national -political leadership, that is, to construct what Antonio Gramsci, the famous Italian Marxist, calls the headquarters of a movement. Nations and people become capable of meaningful and effective political action only when they are organized. They become a people or ‘historical subjects’ only when they are organized as such. The first step in a national movement is taken
<s>[INST]51 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality Cobden and Bright in 1838 to secure reform of Corn Laws). The leaders as well as the people also had to gain confidence in their own capacity to organize political opposition to the most powerful state of the day. All this was no easy task. A prolonged period of politicization would be needed. Many later writers and critics have concentrated on the methods of political struggle of the early nationalist leaders, on their petitions, prayers and memorials. It is, of cours e, true that they did not organize mass movements and mass struggles. But the critics have missed out the most important part of their activity — that all of it led to politics, to the politicization of the people. Justice Ranade, who was known as a politi cal sage, had, in his usual perceptive manner, seen this as early as 1891 When the young and impatient twenty -six-year-old Gokhale expressed disappointment when the Government sent a two line reply to a carefully and laboriously prepared memorial by the Po ona Sarvajanik Sabha, Ranade reassured him: ‘You don’t realize our place in the history of our country. These memorials are nominally addressed to Government, in reality they are addressed to the people, so that they may learn how to think in these matters . This work must be done for many years, without expecting any other result, because politics of this kind is altogether new in this land.” * As part of the basic objective of giving birth to a national movement, it was necessary to create a common all -India national -political leadership, that is, to construct what Antonio Gramsci, the famous Italian Marxist, calls the headquarters of a movement. Nations and people become capable of meaningful and effective political action only when they are organized. They become a people or ‘historical subjects’ only when they are organized as such. The first step in a national movement is taken[/INST]
when the ‘carriers’ of national feeling or national identity begin to organize the people. But to be able to do so successfully , these ‘carriers’ or leaders must themselves be unified; they must share a collective identification, that is, they must come to know each other and share and evolve a common outlook, perspective, sense of purpose, as also common feelings. According to th e circular
<s>[INST]when the ‘carriers’ of national feeling or national identity begin to organize the people. But to be able to do so successfully , these ‘carriers’ or leaders must themselves be unified; they must share a collective identification, that is, they must come to know each other and share and evolve a common outlook, perspective, sense of purpose, as also common feelings. According to th e circular[/INST]
52 | India’s S truggle for Independence which, in March 1885, informed political workers of the coming Congress session, the Congress was intended ‘to enable all the most earnest labourers in the cause of national progress to become personally known to each other.’9 W.C. Bonnerji, as the first Congress President, reiterated that one of the Congress objectives was the ‘eradication, by direct friendly personal intercourse, of all possible race, creed, or provincial prejudices amongst all lovers of our country,’ and ‘the promotion of pers onal intimacy and friendship amongst all the more earnest workers in our country’s cause in (all) parts of the Empire.” In other words, the founders of the Congress understood that the first requirement of a national movement was a national leadership. The social - ideological complexion that this leadership would acquire was a question that was different from the main objective of the creation of a national movement. This complexion would depend on a host of factors: the role of different social classes, id eological influences, outcomes of ideological struggles, and so on. The early nationalist leaders saw the internalization and indigenization of political democracy as one of their main objectives. They based their politics on the doctrine of the sovereign ty of the people, or, as Dadabhai Naoroji put it, on ‘the new lesson that Kings are made for the people, not peoples for their Kings.’ From the beginning, the Congress was organized in the form of a Parliament. In fact, the word Congress was borrowed from North American history to connote an assembly of the’ people. The proceedings of the Congress sessions were conducted democratically, issues being decided through debate and discussion and occasionally through voting. It was, in fact, the Congress, and no t the bureaucratic and authoritarian colonial state, as some writers wrongly argue, which indigenized, popularized and rooted parliamentary democracy in India.
<s>[INST]52 | India’s S truggle for Independence which, in March 1885, informed political workers of the coming Congress session, the Congress was intended ‘to enable all the most earnest labourers in the cause of national progress to become personally known to each other.’9 W.C. Bonnerji, as the first Congress President, reiterated that one of the Congress objectives was the ‘eradication, by direct friendly personal intercourse, of all possible race, creed, or provincial prejudices amongst all lovers of our country,’ and ‘the promotion of pers onal intimacy and friendship amongst all the more earnest workers in our country’s cause in (all) parts of the Empire.” In other words, the founders of the Congress understood that the first requirement of a national movement was a national leadership. The social - ideological complexion that this leadership would acquire was a question that was different from the main objective of the creation of a national movement. This complexion would depend on a host of factors: the role of different social classes, id eological influences, outcomes of ideological struggles, and so on. The early nationalist leaders saw the internalization and indigenization of political democracy as one of their main objectives. They based their politics on the doctrine of the sovereign ty of the people, or, as Dadabhai Naoroji put it, on ‘the new lesson that Kings are made for the people, not peoples for their Kings.’ From the beginning, the Congress was organized in the form of a Parliament. In fact, the word Congress was borrowed from North American history to connote an assembly of the’ people. The proceedings of the Congress sessions were conducted democratically, issues being decided through debate and discussion and occasionally through voting. It was, in fact, the Congress, and no t the bureaucratic and authoritarian colonial state, as some writers wrongly argue, which indigenized, popularized and rooted parliamentary democracy in India.[/INST]
popularized and rooted parliamentary democracy in India. Similarly, the early national leaders made maintenance of civil liberties and their extension a n integral part of the national movement. They fought against every infringement of the freedom of the Press and speech and opposed every attempt to curtail them. They struggled for separation of the judicial and executive powers and fought against racial discrimination.
<s>[INST]popularized and rooted parliamentary democracy in India. Similarly, the early national leaders made maintenance of civil liberties and their extension a n integral part of the national movement. They fought against every infringement of the freedom of the Press and speech and opposed every attempt to curtail them. They struggled for separation of the judicial and executive powers and fought against racial discrimination.[/INST]
53 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality * It was necessary to evolve an understanding of colonialism and then a nationalist ideology based on this understanding. In this respect, the early nationalist leaders were simultaneously learners and teachers. No ready - made anti -colonia l understanding or ideology was available to them in the 1870s and 1880s. They had to develop their own anti -colonial ideology on the basis of a concrete study of the reality and of their own practice. There could have been no national struggle without an ideological struggle clarifying the concept of we as a nation against colonialism as an enemy They had to find answers to many questions. For example, is Britain ruling India for India’s benefit? Are the interests of the rulers and the ruled in harmony, or does a basic contradiction exist between the two? Is the contradiction of the Indian people with British bureaucrats in India, or with the British Government, or with the system of colonialism as such? Are the Indian people capable of fighting the mighty British empire? And how is the fight to be waged? In finding answers to these and other questions many mistakes were made. For example, the early nationalists failed to understand, at least till the beginning of the 20th century, the character of the col onial state. But, then, some mistakes are an inevitable part of any serious effort to grapple with reality. In a way, despite mistakes and setbacks, it was perhaps no misfortune that no ready -made, cut and dried, symmetrical formulae were available to them . Such formulae are often lifeless and, therefore, poor guides to action. True, the early national leaders did not organize mass movements against the British. But they did carry out an ideological struggle against them. It should not be forgotten that nationalist or anti -imperialist struggle is a struggle about colonialism before it becomes a struggle against colonialism. And
<s>[INST]53 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality * It was necessary to evolve an understanding of colonialism and then a nationalist ideology based on this understanding. In this respect, the early nationalist leaders were simultaneously learners and teachers. No ready - made anti -colonia l understanding or ideology was available to them in the 1870s and 1880s. They had to develop their own anti -colonial ideology on the basis of a concrete study of the reality and of their own practice. There could have been no national struggle without an ideological struggle clarifying the concept of we as a nation against colonialism as an enemy They had to find answers to many questions. For example, is Britain ruling India for India’s benefit? Are the interests of the rulers and the ruled in harmony, or does a basic contradiction exist between the two? Is the contradiction of the Indian people with British bureaucrats in India, or with the British Government, or with the system of colonialism as such? Are the Indian people capable of fighting the mighty British empire? And how is the fight to be waged? In finding answers to these and other questions many mistakes were made. For example, the early nationalists failed to understand, at least till the beginning of the 20th century, the character of the col onial state. But, then, some mistakes are an inevitable part of any serious effort to grapple with reality. In a way, despite mistakes and setbacks, it was perhaps no misfortune that no ready -made, cut and dried, symmetrical formulae were available to them . Such formulae are often lifeless and, therefore, poor guides to action. True, the early national leaders did not organize mass movements against the British. But they did carry out an ideological struggle against them. It should not be forgotten that nationalist or anti -imperialist struggle is a struggle about colonialism before it becomes a struggle against colonialism. And[/INST]
the founding fathers of the Congress carried out this ‘struggle about colonialism’ in a brilliant fashion. *
<s>[INST]the founding fathers of the Congress carried out this ‘struggle about colonialism’ in a brilliant fashion. *[/INST]
54 | India’s S truggle for Independence From the beginning, t he Congress was conceived not as a party but as a movement. Except for agreement on the very broad objectives discussed earlier, it did not require any particular political or ideological commitment from its activists. It also did not try to limit its following to any social class or group. As a movement, it incorporated different political trends, ideologies and social classes and groups so long as the commitment to democratic and secular nationalism was there. From the outset, the Congress included in the ranks of its leadership persons with diverse political thinking, widely disparate levels of political militancy and varying economic approaches. To sum up: The basic objectives of the early nationalist leaders were to lay the foundations of a secular and democratic national movement, to politicize and politically educate the people, to form the headquarters of the movement, that is, to form an all-India leadership group, and to develop and propagate an anti-colonial nationalist ideology. History will jud ge the extent of the success or failure of the early national movement not by an abstract, ahistorical standard but by the extent to which it was able to attain the basic objectives it had laid down for itself. By this standard, its achievements were quite substantial and that is why it grew from humble beginnings in the 1880s into the most spectacular of popular mass movements in the 20th century. Historians are not likely to disagree with the assessment of its work in the early phase by two of its major leaders. Referring to the preparatory nature of the Congress work from 1885 to 1905, Dadabhai Naoroji wrote to D.E. Wacha in January 1905: ‘The very discontent and impatience it (the Congress) has evoked against itself as slow and non -progressive among the rising generation are among its best results or fruit. It is its own evolution and progress ….(the task is) to evolve the required revolution
<s>[INST]54 | India’s S truggle for Independence From the beginning, t he Congress was conceived not as a party but as a movement. Except for agreement on the very broad objectives discussed earlier, it did not require any particular political or ideological commitment from its activists. It also did not try to limit its following to any social class or group. As a movement, it incorporated different political trends, ideologies and social classes and groups so long as the commitment to democratic and secular nationalism was there. From the outset, the Congress included in the ranks of its leadership persons with diverse political thinking, widely disparate levels of political militancy and varying economic approaches. To sum up: The basic objectives of the early nationalist leaders were to lay the foundations of a secular and democratic national movement, to politicize and politically educate the people, to form the headquarters of the movement, that is, to form an all-India leadership group, and to develop and propagate an anti-colonial nationalist ideology. History will jud ge the extent of the success or failure of the early national movement not by an abstract, ahistorical standard but by the extent to which it was able to attain the basic objectives it had laid down for itself. By this standard, its achievements were quite substantial and that is why it grew from humble beginnings in the 1880s into the most spectacular of popular mass movements in the 20th century. Historians are not likely to disagree with the assessment of its work in the early phase by two of its major leaders. Referring to the preparatory nature of the Congress work from 1885 to 1905, Dadabhai Naoroji wrote to D.E. Wacha in January 1905: ‘The very discontent and impatience it (the Congress) has evoked against itself as slow and non -progressive among the rising generation are among its best results or fruit. It is its own evolution and progress ….(the task is) to evolve the required revolution[/INST]