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different forms of mass mobili zation. Public meetings and
processions emerged as major methods of mass mobilization and
simultaneously as forms of popular expression. Numerous
meetings and processions organized at the district, taluqa and
village levels, in cities and towns, both testi fied to the depth of
Swadeshi sentiment and acted as vehicles for its further spread.
These forms were to retain their pre -eminence in later phases of
the national movement. | <s>[INST]different forms of mass mobili zation. Public meetings and
processions emerged as major methods of mass mobilization and
simultaneously as forms of popular expression. Numerous
meetings and processions organized at the district, taluqa and
village levels, in cities and towns, both testi fied to the depth of
Swadeshi sentiment and acted as vehicles for its further spread.
These forms were to retain their pre -eminence in later phases of
the national movement.[/INST] |
108 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Corps of volunteers (or samitis as they were called) were
another major form of m ass mobilization widely used by the
Swadeshi Movement. The Swadesh Bandhab Samiti set up by
Ashwini Kumar Dutt, a school teacher, in Barisal was the most
well known volunteer organization of them all. Through the
activities of this Samiti, whose 159 branch es reached out to the
remotest corners of the district, Dutt was able to generate an
unparalleled mass following among the predominantly Muslim
Peasantry of the region. The samitis took the Swadeshi message
to the villages through magic lantern lectures an d Swadeshi
songs, gave physical and moral training to the members, did
social work during famines and epidemics, organized schools,
training in Swadeshi craft and arbitrtj011 courts. By August
1906 the Barisal Samiti reportedly settled 523 disputes through
eighty -nine arbitration committees. Though the samitis stuck
their deepest roots in Barisal, they had expanded to other parts
of Bengal as well. British officialdom was genuinely alarmed by
their activities, their growing popularity with the rural masses.
The Swadeshi period also saw the creative use of traditional
popular festivals and melas as a means of reaching out to the
masses. The Ganapati arid Shivaji festivals, popularized by Tilak,
became a medium for Swadeshi propaganda not only in Western
India but also in Bengal. Traditional folk theatre forms such as
jatras i.e. extensively used in disseminating the Swadeshi
message in an intelligible form to vast sections of the people,
many of whom were being introduced to modern political ideas
for the first time.
Another important aspect of the Swadeshi Movement was
the great emphasis given to self -reliance or ‘Atmasakti’ as a
necessary part of the struggle against the Government. Self
reliance in various fields meant the re-asserting of national
dignity, honor and confidence. Further, self -help and | <s>[INST]108 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Corps of volunteers (or samitis as they were called) were
another major form of m ass mobilization widely used by the
Swadeshi Movement. The Swadesh Bandhab Samiti set up by
Ashwini Kumar Dutt, a school teacher, in Barisal was the most
well known volunteer organization of them all. Through the
activities of this Samiti, whose 159 branch es reached out to the
remotest corners of the district, Dutt was able to generate an
unparalleled mass following among the predominantly Muslim
Peasantry of the region. The samitis took the Swadeshi message
to the villages through magic lantern lectures an d Swadeshi
songs, gave physical and moral training to the members, did
social work during famines and epidemics, organized schools,
training in Swadeshi craft and arbitrtj011 courts. By August
1906 the Barisal Samiti reportedly settled 523 disputes through
eighty -nine arbitration committees. Though the samitis stuck
their deepest roots in Barisal, they had expanded to other parts
of Bengal as well. British officialdom was genuinely alarmed by
their activities, their growing popularity with the rural masses.
The Swadeshi period also saw the creative use of traditional
popular festivals and melas as a means of reaching out to the
masses. The Ganapati arid Shivaji festivals, popularized by Tilak,
became a medium for Swadeshi propaganda not only in Western
India but also in Bengal. Traditional folk theatre forms such as
jatras i.e. extensively used in disseminating the Swadeshi
message in an intelligible form to vast sections of the people,
many of whom were being introduced to modern political ideas
for the first time.
Another important aspect of the Swadeshi Movement was
the great emphasis given to self -reliance or ‘Atmasakti’ as a
necessary part of the struggle against the Government. Self
reliance in various fields meant the re-asserting of national
dignity, honor and confidence. Further, self -help and[/INST] |
dignity, honor and confidence. Further, self -help and
constructive work at the village level was envisaged as a means of
bringing about the social and economic regeneration of the
villages and of reaching the rural masses. In actual terms this
meant social reform and campaigns against evils such as caste
oppression, early marriage, the dowry system, consumption of
alcohol, etc. One of the major planks of the programme of self -
reliance was Swadeshi or national education. Taking a cue from
Tagore’s Shantiniketan, the Bengal National College was founded, | <s>[INST]dignity, honor and confidence. Further, self -help and
constructive work at the village level was envisaged as a means of
bringing about the social and economic regeneration of the
villages and of reaching the rural masses. In actual terms this
meant social reform and campaigns against evils such as caste
oppression, early marriage, the dowry system, consumption of
alcohol, etc. One of the major planks of the programme of self -
reliance was Swadeshi or national education. Taking a cue from
Tagore’s Shantiniketan, the Bengal National College was founded,[/INST] |
109 |The Swadeshi Movement ---1903 -08
with Aurobindo as the principal. Scores of national schools
sprang up all over the country within a short period. In August
1906, the National Council of Education was established. The
Council, consisting of virtually all the distinguished persons of
the country at the time, defined its objectives in this way. . . ‘to
organize a system of Education Literary; Scientific and Technical
— on National lines and under National control from the primary
to the university level. The chief medium of instruction was to be
the vernacular to enable the widest possible reach. For technical
education, the Bengal Technical institute was set and funds were
raise to send students to Japan for advanced learning.
Self-reliance also meant a n effort to set up Swadeshi or
indigenous enterprises. The period saw a mushrooming of
Swadeshi textile mills, soap and match factories ; - tanneries,
banks, insurance companies, shops, etc. While many of these
enterprises, whose promoters were more endowe d with patriotic
zeal than with business acumen were unable to survive for long,
some others such as Acharya P.C. Ray’s Bengal Chemicals
Factory, became successful and famous.
It was, perhaps, in the cultural sphere that the impact of
the Swadeshi Movement was most marked. The songs composed
at that time by Rabindranath Tagore, Rajani Kanta Sen,
Dwijendralal Ray, Mukunda Das, Syed Abu Mohammed, and
others later became the moving spirit for nationalists of all hues,
‘terrorists, Gandhian or Communists’ and a re still popular.
Rabindranath’s Amar Sonar Bangla, written at that time, was to
later inspire the liberation struggle of Bangladesh and was
adopted as the national anthem of the country in 1971. The
Swadeshi influence could be seen in Bengali folk music p opular
among Hindu and Muslim villagers (Palligeet and Jan Gàn) and it
evoked collections of India fairy tales such as, Thakurmar
Jhuli(Grandmother’s tales) written by Daksinaranjan Mitra | <s>[INST]109 |The Swadeshi Movement ---1903 -08
with Aurobindo as the principal. Scores of national schools
sprang up all over the country within a short period. In August
1906, the National Council of Education was established. The
Council, consisting of virtually all the distinguished persons of
the country at the time, defined its objectives in this way. . . ‘to
organize a system of Education Literary; Scientific and Technical
— on National lines and under National control from the primary
to the university level. The chief medium of instruction was to be
the vernacular to enable the widest possible reach. For technical
education, the Bengal Technical institute was set and funds were
raise to send students to Japan for advanced learning.
Self-reliance also meant a n effort to set up Swadeshi or
indigenous enterprises. The period saw a mushrooming of
Swadeshi textile mills, soap and match factories ; - tanneries,
banks, insurance companies, shops, etc. While many of these
enterprises, whose promoters were more endowe d with patriotic
zeal than with business acumen were unable to survive for long,
some others such as Acharya P.C. Ray’s Bengal Chemicals
Factory, became successful and famous.
It was, perhaps, in the cultural sphere that the impact of
the Swadeshi Movement was most marked. The songs composed
at that time by Rabindranath Tagore, Rajani Kanta Sen,
Dwijendralal Ray, Mukunda Das, Syed Abu Mohammed, and
others later became the moving spirit for nationalists of all hues,
‘terrorists, Gandhian or Communists’ and a re still popular.
Rabindranath’s Amar Sonar Bangla, written at that time, was to
later inspire the liberation struggle of Bangladesh and was
adopted as the national anthem of the country in 1971. The
Swadeshi influence could be seen in Bengali folk music p opular
among Hindu and Muslim villagers (Palligeet and Jan Gàn) and it
evoked collections of India fairy tales such as, Thakurmar
Jhuli(Grandmother’s tales) written by Daksinaranjan Mitra[/INST] |
Jhuli(Grandmother’s tales) written by Daksinaranjan Mitra
Majumdar which delights Bengai children to this day. In art, this
was the period when Abanindranath Tagore broke the
domination of Victorian naturalism over Indian art and sought
inspiration from the rich indigenous traditions of Mughal, Rajput
and Ajanta paintings. Nandalal Bose, who left a major imprint on
Indian art, was the first recipient of a scholarship offered by the
Indian Society of Oriental Art founded in 1907. In science, | <s>[INST]Jhuli(Grandmother’s tales) written by Daksinaranjan Mitra
Majumdar which delights Bengai children to this day. In art, this
was the period when Abanindranath Tagore broke the
domination of Victorian naturalism over Indian art and sought
inspiration from the rich indigenous traditions of Mughal, Rajput
and Ajanta paintings. Nandalal Bose, who left a major imprint on
Indian art, was the first recipient of a scholarship offered by the
Indian Society of Oriental Art founded in 1907. In science,[/INST] |
110 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Jagdish Chandra Bose, Prafulla Chandra Ray, and others
pioneered original research that was praised the world over.
*
In sum, the Swadeshi Mo vement with its multi -faceted
programme and activity was able to draw for the first time large
sections of society into active participation in modern nationalist
into the ambit of modern political ideas.
The social base of the national movements now exten ded to
include a certain zamindari section, the lower middle class in the
cities and small towns and school and college students on a
massive scale. Women c ame out of their homes for the first time
and joined processions and p icketing. This period saw, aga in for
the first time, an attempt being made to give a political direction
to the economic grievances of the working class. Efforts were
Swadeshi l eaders, s ome of whom were influenced by
International socialist currents such as those in Germany and
Russia, to organize strikes in foreign managed concerns such as
Eastern India Railway and Clive Jute Mills, etc.
While it is argued that the movement was unable to make
much headway in mobilizing the peasantry especially its lower
rungs except in certain areas, s uch as the district of Barisal,
there can be no gainsaying the fact that even if the movement
was able to mobilize the peasantry only in a limited area that
alone would count for a lot. This is so peasant participation in
the Swadeshi Movement marked the v ery beginnings of modem
mass politics in India. After all, even in the later, post -Swadeshi
movements, intense political mobilization and activity among the
peasantry largely remained concentrated in specific pockets.
Also, while it is true that during the Swadeshi phase the
peasantry was not organized .around peasant demands, and that
the peasants in most parts did not actively join in certain forms
of struggle such as, boycott or passive resistance, large sections | <s>[INST]110 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Jagdish Chandra Bose, Prafulla Chandra Ray, and others
pioneered original research that was praised the world over.
*
In sum, the Swadeshi Mo vement with its multi -faceted
programme and activity was able to draw for the first time large
sections of society into active participation in modern nationalist
into the ambit of modern political ideas.
The social base of the national movements now exten ded to
include a certain zamindari section, the lower middle class in the
cities and small towns and school and college students on a
massive scale. Women c ame out of their homes for the first time
and joined processions and p icketing. This period saw, aga in for
the first time, an attempt being made to give a political direction
to the economic grievances of the working class. Efforts were
Swadeshi l eaders, s ome of whom were influenced by
International socialist currents such as those in Germany and
Russia, to organize strikes in foreign managed concerns such as
Eastern India Railway and Clive Jute Mills, etc.
While it is argued that the movement was unable to make
much headway in mobilizing the peasantry especially its lower
rungs except in certain areas, s uch as the district of Barisal,
there can be no gainsaying the fact that even if the movement
was able to mobilize the peasantry only in a limited area that
alone would count for a lot. This is so peasant participation in
the Swadeshi Movement marked the v ery beginnings of modem
mass politics in India. After all, even in the later, post -Swadeshi
movements, intense political mobilization and activity among the
peasantry largely remained concentrated in specific pockets.
Also, while it is true that during the Swadeshi phase the
peasantry was not organized .around peasant demands, and that
the peasants in most parts did not actively join in certain forms
of struggle such as, boycott or passive resistance, large sections[/INST] |
of the peasants, through meetings, jatras , constructive work, and
so on were exposed for the first time to modem nationalist ideas
and politics.
The main drawback of the Swadeshi Movement was that it
was not able to gamer the support of the mass of Muslims and | <s>[INST]of the peasants, through meetings, jatras , constructive work, and
so on were exposed for the first time to modem nationalist ideas
and politics.
The main drawback of the Swadeshi Movement was that it
was not able to gamer the support of the mass of Muslims and[/INST] |
111 |The Swadeshi Movement ---1903 -08
especially of the Muslim peasantry. The British policy of
consciously attempting to use communalism to turn the Muslims
against the Swadeshi Movement was to a large extent responsible
for this. The Government was helped in its designs by the
peculiar situation obtaining in large pasts of Be ngal where
Hindus and Muslims were divided along class lines with the
former being the landlords and the latter constituting the
peasantry. This was the period when the All India Muslim League
was set up with the active guidance and support of the
Governme nt. More specifically, in Bengal, people like Nawab
Salimullah of Dacca were propped up so cen tres of opposition to
the Swadeshi Movement. Mullahs and maulvis were pressed into
service and, unsurprisingly, at the height of the Swadeshi
Movement communal riots broke out in Bengal.
Given this background, some of the forms of mobilization
adopted by the Swadeshi Movement had certain unintended
negative consequences. The use of traditional popular customs,
festivals and institutions for mobilizing the masses —a technique
used widely in most parts of world to generate mass movements,
especially in the initial stages —was misinterpreted and distorted
by communalists backed by the state. The communal forces saw
narrow religious identities in the traditional forms utilized by the
Swadeshi movements whereas in fact these forms generally
reflected common popular cultural traditions which had evolved
as a synthesis of different religious ‘prevalent among the people.
*
By mid -1908, the open movement with its popular mass
character had all but spent itself. This was due to several
reasons. First, the g overnment, seeing the revolutionary potential
of the movement, came down with a heavy hand. Repression took
the form of controls and bans on public meetings, processions
and the press. Student participants were expelled from
Government schools and colleges, debarred from Government | <s>[INST]111 |The Swadeshi Movement ---1903 -08
especially of the Muslim peasantry. The British policy of
consciously attempting to use communalism to turn the Muslims
against the Swadeshi Movement was to a large extent responsible
for this. The Government was helped in its designs by the
peculiar situation obtaining in large pasts of Be ngal where
Hindus and Muslims were divided along class lines with the
former being the landlords and the latter constituting the
peasantry. This was the period when the All India Muslim League
was set up with the active guidance and support of the
Governme nt. More specifically, in Bengal, people like Nawab
Salimullah of Dacca were propped up so cen tres of opposition to
the Swadeshi Movement. Mullahs and maulvis were pressed into
service and, unsurprisingly, at the height of the Swadeshi
Movement communal riots broke out in Bengal.
Given this background, some of the forms of mobilization
adopted by the Swadeshi Movement had certain unintended
negative consequences. The use of traditional popular customs,
festivals and institutions for mobilizing the masses —a technique
used widely in most parts of world to generate mass movements,
especially in the initial stages —was misinterpreted and distorted
by communalists backed by the state. The communal forces saw
narrow religious identities in the traditional forms utilized by the
Swadeshi movements whereas in fact these forms generally
reflected common popular cultural traditions which had evolved
as a synthesis of different religious ‘prevalent among the people.
*
By mid -1908, the open movement with its popular mass
character had all but spent itself. This was due to several
reasons. First, the g overnment, seeing the revolutionary potential
of the movement, came down with a heavy hand. Repression took
the form of controls and bans on public meetings, processions
and the press. Student participants were expelled from
Government schools and colleges, debarred from Government[/INST] |
Government schools and colleges, debarred from Government
service, fined and at times beaten up by the police. The case of
the 1906 Barisal Conference, where the police forcibly dispersed
the conference and brutally beat up a large number of the
participants, is a telling example of the government’s attitude and
policy. | <s>[INST]Government schools and colleges, debarred from Government
service, fined and at times beaten up by the police. The case of
the 1906 Barisal Conference, where the police forcibly dispersed
the conference and brutally beat up a large number of the
participants, is a telling example of the government’s attitude and
policy.[/INST] |
112 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Second, the internal squabbles, and especially, the split, in
1907 in the Congress, the apex all -India organization , weakened
the movement . Also, though the Swadeshi Movement had spread
outside Bengal, the rest of the country was not as yet fully
prepared to adopt the new style and stage of politics. Both these
factors strengthened the hands of the government. Between 1907
and 1908, nine major leaders in Bengal including Ashwini Kumar
Dutt and Krishna Kumar Mitra were d eported, Tilak was given a
sentence of six years imprisonment, Ajit Singh and Lajpat Rai of
Punjab were deported and Chidambaram Pillai and
Harisarvottam Rao from Madras and Andhra were arrested. Bipin
Chandra Pal and Aurobindo Ghosh retired from active politics, a
decision not unconnected with the repressive measures of the
Government Almost with one stroke the entire movement was
rendered leaderless.
Third, the Swadeshi Move ment lacked an effective
organization and party structure. The movement had thrown up
programmatically the entire gamut of Gandhian techniques such
as passive resistance, non -violent non -cooperation, the call to fill
the British jails, social reform, const ructive work, etc. It was,
however, unable to give these techniques a centralized,
disciplined focus, carry - the bulk of political - India, and convert
these techniques into actual, practical political practice, as
Gandhiji was able to do later.
Lastly, th e movement declined partially because of the very
logic of mass movements itself —they cannot be sustained
endlessly at the same pitch of militancy and self -sacrifice,
especially when faced with severe repression, but need to pause,
to consolidate its forces for yet another struggle.
*
However, the decline of the open movement by mid -1908
engendered yet another trend in the Swadeshi phase i.e., the rise
of revolutionary terrorism. The youth of the county, who had
been part of the mass movement, now found th emselves unable | <s>[INST]112 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Second, the internal squabbles, and especially, the split, in
1907 in the Congress, the apex all -India organization , weakened
the movement . Also, though the Swadeshi Movement had spread
outside Bengal, the rest of the country was not as yet fully
prepared to adopt the new style and stage of politics. Both these
factors strengthened the hands of the government. Between 1907
and 1908, nine major leaders in Bengal including Ashwini Kumar
Dutt and Krishna Kumar Mitra were d eported, Tilak was given a
sentence of six years imprisonment, Ajit Singh and Lajpat Rai of
Punjab were deported and Chidambaram Pillai and
Harisarvottam Rao from Madras and Andhra were arrested. Bipin
Chandra Pal and Aurobindo Ghosh retired from active politics, a
decision not unconnected with the repressive measures of the
Government Almost with one stroke the entire movement was
rendered leaderless.
Third, the Swadeshi Move ment lacked an effective
organization and party structure. The movement had thrown up
programmatically the entire gamut of Gandhian techniques such
as passive resistance, non -violent non -cooperation, the call to fill
the British jails, social reform, const ructive work, etc. It was,
however, unable to give these techniques a centralized,
disciplined focus, carry - the bulk of political - India, and convert
these techniques into actual, practical political practice, as
Gandhiji was able to do later.
Lastly, th e movement declined partially because of the very
logic of mass movements itself —they cannot be sustained
endlessly at the same pitch of militancy and self -sacrifice,
especially when faced with severe repression, but need to pause,
to consolidate its forces for yet another struggle.
*
However, the decline of the open movement by mid -1908
engendered yet another trend in the Swadeshi phase i.e., the rise
of revolutionary terrorism. The youth of the county, who had
been part of the mass movement, now found th emselves unable[/INST] |
been part of the mass movement, now found th emselves unable
to disappear tamely into the background once the movement
itself grew moribund and Government repression was stepped
up. Frustrated, some among them opted for ‘individual heroism’
as distinct from the earlier attempts at mass action. | <s>[INST]been part of the mass movement, now found th emselves unable
to disappear tamely into the background once the movement
itself grew moribund and Government repression was stepped
up. Frustrated, some among them opted for ‘individual heroism’
as distinct from the earlier attempts at mass action.[/INST] |
113 |The Swadeshi Movement ---1903 -08
With the subsiding of the mass movement, one era in the Indian
freedom struggle was over. It would be wrong, however, to see the
Swadeshi Movement as a failure. The movement made a major
contribution in taking the idea of nationalism, in a truly creative
fashio n, to many sections of the people, hitherto untouched by it.
By doing so, it further eroded the hegemony of colonial ideas and
institutions. Swadeshi influence in the realm of culture and ideas
was crucial in this regard and has remained unparalleled in
Indian history, except, perhaps, for the cultural upsurge of the
I93Os this time under the influence of the Left.
Further, the movement evolved several new methods and
techniques of mass mobilization and mass action though it was
not able to put them all into practice successfully. Just as the
Moderates’ achievement in the realm of developing an economic
critique of colonialism is not minimized by the fact that they
could not themselves carry this critique to large masses of people,
similarly the achievement of the Extremists and the Swadeshi
Movement in evolving new methods of mass mobilization and
action is not diminished by the fact that they could not
themselves fully utilize these methods. The legacy they
bequeathed was one on which the later national mo vement was
to draw heavily.
Swadeshi Movement was only the first round in the national
popular struggle against colonialism. It was to borrow this
imagery used by Antonio Gramsci an important battle’ in the long
drawn out and complex ‘war of position’ for Indian independence. | <s>[INST]113 |The Swadeshi Movement ---1903 -08
With the subsiding of the mass movement, one era in the Indian
freedom struggle was over. It would be wrong, however, to see the
Swadeshi Movement as a failure. The movement made a major
contribution in taking the idea of nationalism, in a truly creative
fashio n, to many sections of the people, hitherto untouched by it.
By doing so, it further eroded the hegemony of colonial ideas and
institutions. Swadeshi influence in the realm of culture and ideas
was crucial in this regard and has remained unparalleled in
Indian history, except, perhaps, for the cultural upsurge of the
I93Os this time under the influence of the Left.
Further, the movement evolved several new methods and
techniques of mass mobilization and mass action though it was
not able to put them all into practice successfully. Just as the
Moderates’ achievement in the realm of developing an economic
critique of colonialism is not minimized by the fact that they
could not themselves carry this critique to large masses of people,
similarly the achievement of the Extremists and the Swadeshi
Movement in evolving new methods of mass mobilization and
action is not diminished by the fact that they could not
themselves fully utilize these methods. The legacy they
bequeathed was one on which the later national mo vement was
to draw heavily.
Swadeshi Movement was only the first round in the national
popular struggle against colonialism. It was to borrow this
imagery used by Antonio Gramsci an important battle’ in the long
drawn out and complex ‘war of position’ for Indian independence.[/INST] |
114 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 11. THE SPLIT IN THE
CONGRESS AND THE
RISE OF
REVOLUTIONARY
TERRORISM
The Indian National Congress split in December 1907.
Almost at the n ame time revolu tionary terrorism made its
appearance in Bengal. The two events were not unconnected.
*
By 1907, the Moderate nationalists had exhausted their
historical role. Their achievements, as we have seen in the
previous chapter, we immense, considering the low lev el of
political consciousness and the immense difficulties they had to
face when they began. Their failures too were numerous. They
lacked faith in the common people, did no work among them and
consequently failed to acquire any roots among them. Even their
propaganda did not reach them. Nor did they organize any all -
India campaigns and when, during 1905 -07, such an all-India
campaign did come up in the form of the Swadeshi and Boycott
Movement, they were not its leader& (though the Bengal
Moderates did play an active role in their own province). Their
politics were based on the belief that they would be able to
persuade the rulers to introduce economic and political reforms
but their practical achievements in this respect were meagre.
Instead of respectin g them for their moderation, the British
treated them with contempt, sneered at their politics and met
popular agitations with repression.
Their basic failure, however, was that of not keeping pace
with events. They could not see that their own achievemen ts had
made their Politics obsolete. They failed to meet the demands of | <s>[INST]114 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 11. THE SPLIT IN THE
CONGRESS AND THE
RISE OF
REVOLUTIONARY
TERRORISM
The Indian National Congress split in December 1907.
Almost at the n ame time revolu tionary terrorism made its
appearance in Bengal. The two events were not unconnected.
*
By 1907, the Moderate nationalists had exhausted their
historical role. Their achievements, as we have seen in the
previous chapter, we immense, considering the low lev el of
political consciousness and the immense difficulties they had to
face when they began. Their failures too were numerous. They
lacked faith in the common people, did no work among them and
consequently failed to acquire any roots among them. Even their
propaganda did not reach them. Nor did they organize any all -
India campaigns and when, during 1905 -07, such an all-India
campaign did come up in the form of the Swadeshi and Boycott
Movement, they were not its leader& (though the Bengal
Moderates did play an active role in their own province). Their
politics were based on the belief that they would be able to
persuade the rulers to introduce economic and political reforms
but their practical achievements in this respect were meagre.
Instead of respectin g them for their moderation, the British
treated them with contempt, sneered at their politics and met
popular agitations with repression.
Their basic failure, however, was that of not keeping pace
with events. They could not see that their own achievemen ts had
made their Politics obsolete. They failed to meet the demands of[/INST] |
115 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
the new stage of the national movement) Visible proof f this was
their failure to attract the younger generation.
*
The British had been suspicious of the National Congress
from its inception. But they had not been overtly hostile, in the
first few years of its existence because they believed its activities
would remain academic and confined to a handful of
intellectuals. However, as soon as it became apparent that the
Congress would not remain so narrowly confined, and that it was
becoming a focus of Indian nationalism, the officials turned
openly critical of the Congress, the nationalist leaders and the
Press.
They now began to brand the nationalists as ‘disloyal babus’
‘seditious Brahmins,’ and ‘violent villains.’ The Congress was
described as ‘a factory of sedition’ and Congressmen as
‘disappointed candidates for office and discontented lawyers who
represent no one but themselves.’ In 1888, Dufferin, the Viceroy,
attacked the Natio nal Congress in a public speech and ridiculed
it as representing only the elite ‘a microscopic minority.” George
Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, accused the Congress
leaders of possessing ‘seditious and double sided character.’
This hostility did not abate when the Moderates, who then
controlled the Congress, began to distance themselves from the
rising militant nationalist tendencies of certain sections of the
Congress which became apparent when the government
unleashed a repressive policy against the Indian Press in 1897.
Instead the British appeared even more eager to attack and finish
the Congress. Why was this so? First, because however moderate
and loyal in their political perception the Moderates were, they
were still nationalists and propagat ors of anti-colonialist politics
and ideas. As Curzon, the Viceroy, put it in 1905: ‘Gokhale either
does not see where he is going, or if he does see it, then he is | <s>[INST]115 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
the new stage of the national movement) Visible proof f this was
their failure to attract the younger generation.
*
The British had been suspicious of the National Congress
from its inception. But they had not been overtly hostile, in the
first few years of its existence because they believed its activities
would remain academic and confined to a handful of
intellectuals. However, as soon as it became apparent that the
Congress would not remain so narrowly confined, and that it was
becoming a focus of Indian nationalism, the officials turned
openly critical of the Congress, the nationalist leaders and the
Press.
They now began to brand the nationalists as ‘disloyal babus’
‘seditious Brahmins,’ and ‘violent villains.’ The Congress was
described as ‘a factory of sedition’ and Congressmen as
‘disappointed candidates for office and discontented lawyers who
represent no one but themselves.’ In 1888, Dufferin, the Viceroy,
attacked the Natio nal Congress in a public speech and ridiculed
it as representing only the elite ‘a microscopic minority.” George
Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, accused the Congress
leaders of possessing ‘seditious and double sided character.’
This hostility did not abate when the Moderates, who then
controlled the Congress, began to distance themselves from the
rising militant nationalist tendencies of certain sections of the
Congress which became apparent when the government
unleashed a repressive policy against the Indian Press in 1897.
Instead the British appeared even more eager to attack and finish
the Congress. Why was this so? First, because however moderate
and loyal in their political perception the Moderates were, they
were still nationalists and propagat ors of anti-colonialist politics
and ideas. As Curzon, the Viceroy, put it in 1905: ‘Gokhale either
does not see where he is going, or if he does see it, then he is[/INST] |
dishonest or his pretensions. You Cannot awaken and appeal to
the spirit of nationality in India and at the same time, profess
loyal acceptance of British rule.’ Or, as George Hamilton, the
Secretary of State, had complained to Dadabhai Naoroji an 1900:
‘You announce yourself as a sincere supporter of British rule; you | <s>[INST]dishonest or his pretensions. You Cannot awaken and appeal to
the spirit of nationality in India and at the same time, profess
loyal acceptance of British rule.’ Or, as George Hamilton, the
Secretary of State, had complained to Dadabhai Naoroji an 1900:
‘You announce yourself as a sincere supporter of British rule; you[/INST] |
116 | India’s Struggle For Independence
vehemently denounce the c ondition, and consequences which are
it ins eparable from the maintenance of that rule.”
Second, the British policy -makers felt that the Moderate -led
Congress could be easily finished because it was weak and
without a popular base. Curzon, in particular, s upported by
George Hamilton, pursued this policy. He declared in 1900: ‘The
Congress is tottering to its fall, and one of my greatest ambitions
while in India is to assist it to a peaceful demise’. In 1903, he
wrote to the Madras Governor: ‘My policy, ever since I came to
India, has been to reduce the Congress to impotence.’ In 1904, he
had insulted the Congress by refusing to meet its delegation
headed by its President.
This policy was changed once the powerful Swadeshi, and
Boycott Movement began and the militant nationalist trend
became strong. An alternative policy of weakening the nationalist
movement was now to be followed. Instead of sneering at the
Moderates, the policy was to be that of ‘rallying’ them as John
Morley, the new Secretary of State for India, put it in 1907. The
new policy, known as the policy of the carrot and the stick, was
to be a three pronged one. It may be described as a policy of
repression -conciliation -suppression. The Extremists, as we shall
refer to the militant nationalists f rom now on, were to be
repressed, though mildly in the first stage, the purpose being to
frighten the Moderates. The Moderates were then to be placated
through some concessions and promises and hints were to be
given that further concessions would be forth coming if they
disassociated themselves from the Extremists. The entire
objective of the new policy was to isolate the Extremists. Once the
Moderates fell into the trap, the Extremists could be suppressed
through the use of the full might of the state. The Moderates, in
turn, could then be ignored. Unfortunately for the national
movement, neither the Moderates nor the Extremists were able to | <s>[INST]116 | India’s Struggle For Independence
vehemently denounce the c ondition, and consequences which are
it ins eparable from the maintenance of that rule.”
Second, the British policy -makers felt that the Moderate -led
Congress could be easily finished because it was weak and
without a popular base. Curzon, in particular, s upported by
George Hamilton, pursued this policy. He declared in 1900: ‘The
Congress is tottering to its fall, and one of my greatest ambitions
while in India is to assist it to a peaceful demise’. In 1903, he
wrote to the Madras Governor: ‘My policy, ever since I came to
India, has been to reduce the Congress to impotence.’ In 1904, he
had insulted the Congress by refusing to meet its delegation
headed by its President.
This policy was changed once the powerful Swadeshi, and
Boycott Movement began and the militant nationalist trend
became strong. An alternative policy of weakening the nationalist
movement was now to be followed. Instead of sneering at the
Moderates, the policy was to be that of ‘rallying’ them as John
Morley, the new Secretary of State for India, put it in 1907. The
new policy, known as the policy of the carrot and the stick, was
to be a three pronged one. It may be described as a policy of
repression -conciliation -suppression. The Extremists, as we shall
refer to the militant nationalists f rom now on, were to be
repressed, though mildly in the first stage, the purpose being to
frighten the Moderates. The Moderates were then to be placated
through some concessions and promises and hints were to be
given that further concessions would be forth coming if they
disassociated themselves from the Extremists. The entire
objective of the new policy was to isolate the Extremists. Once the
Moderates fell into the trap, the Extremists could be suppressed
through the use of the full might of the state. The Moderates, in
turn, could then be ignored. Unfortunately for the national
movement, neither the Moderates nor the Extremists were able to[/INST] |
understand the official strategy and consequently suffered a
number of reverses.
*
The Government of India, headed b y Lord Minto as Viceroy
and John Morley as the Secretary of State, offered a bait of fresh
reforms in the Legislative Councils and in the beginning of 1906 | <s>[INST]understand the official strategy and consequently suffered a
number of reverses.
*
The Government of India, headed b y Lord Minto as Viceroy
and John Morley as the Secretary of State, offered a bait of fresh
reforms in the Legislative Councils and in the beginning of 1906[/INST] |
117 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
began discussing them with the Moderate leadership of the
Congress. The Moderates agreed to cooperat e with the
Government and discuss reforms even while a vigorous popular
movement, which the Government was trying to suppress, was
going on in the country. The result was a total split in the
nationalist ranks.
Before we take up this split at some length, it is of some
interest to note that the British were to follow this tactic of
dividing the Moderates from the militants in later years also — for
example in 1924, vis -a-vis Swarajists, in 1936, vis -a-vis Nehru
and the leftists, and so on . The difference w as that in the later
years the national leadership had learnt a
lesson from the events of 1907 -1909, and refused to rise to the
bait, remaining united despite deep differences.
*
There was a great deal of public debate and disagreement
among Moderates an d Extremists in the years 1905 -1907, even
when they were working together against the partitioning of
Bengal. The Extremists wanted to extend the Swadeshi and the
Boycott Movement from Bengal to the rest of the country. They
also wanted to gradually extend the boycott from foreign goods to
every form of association or cooperation with the colonial
Government. The Moderates wanted to confine the boycott part of
the movement to Bengal and were totally opposed to its extension
to the Government.
Matters nearl y came to a head at the Calcutta Congress in
1906 over the question of its Presidentship. A split was avoided
by choosing Dadabhai Naoroji, who was respected by all the
nationalists as a great patriot. Four compromise resolutions on
the Swadeshi, Boycott, National Education, and Self -Government
demands were passed. Throughout 1907 the two sides fought
over differing interpretations of the four resolutions. By the end of
1907, they were looking upon each other as the min political | <s>[INST]117 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
began discussing them with the Moderate leadership of the
Congress. The Moderates agreed to cooperat e with the
Government and discuss reforms even while a vigorous popular
movement, which the Government was trying to suppress, was
going on in the country. The result was a total split in the
nationalist ranks.
Before we take up this split at some length, it is of some
interest to note that the British were to follow this tactic of
dividing the Moderates from the militants in later years also — for
example in 1924, vis -a-vis Swarajists, in 1936, vis -a-vis Nehru
and the leftists, and so on . The difference w as that in the later
years the national leadership had learnt a
lesson from the events of 1907 -1909, and refused to rise to the
bait, remaining united despite deep differences.
*
There was a great deal of public debate and disagreement
among Moderates an d Extremists in the years 1905 -1907, even
when they were working together against the partitioning of
Bengal. The Extremists wanted to extend the Swadeshi and the
Boycott Movement from Bengal to the rest of the country. They
also wanted to gradually extend the boycott from foreign goods to
every form of association or cooperation with the colonial
Government. The Moderates wanted to confine the boycott part of
the movement to Bengal and were totally opposed to its extension
to the Government.
Matters nearl y came to a head at the Calcutta Congress in
1906 over the question of its Presidentship. A split was avoided
by choosing Dadabhai Naoroji, who was respected by all the
nationalists as a great patriot. Four compromise resolutions on
the Swadeshi, Boycott, National Education, and Self -Government
demands were passed. Throughout 1907 the two sides fought
over differing interpretations of the four resolutions. By the end of
1907, they were looking upon each other as the min political[/INST] |
1907, they were looking upon each other as the min political
enemy. The Extremists were convinced that the battle for freedom
had begun as the people had been roused. They felt it was time
for the big push and in their view the Moderates were a big drag
on the movement. Most of them, led by Aurobindo Ghose, felt
that the time had come to part company with the Moderates, | <s>[INST]1907, they were looking upon each other as the min political
enemy. The Extremists were convinced that the battle for freedom
had begun as the people had been roused. They felt it was time
for the big push and in their view the Moderates were a big drag
on the movement. Most of them, led by Aurobindo Ghose, felt
that the time had come to part company with the Moderates,[/INST] |
118 | India’s Struggle For Independence
push them out of the leadership of the Congress, and split the
organization if the Moderates could not be deposed.
Most of the Moderates, led by Pherozeshah Mehta, were no
less determined on a split. To remain with the Extremi sts was,
they felt, to enter dangerous waters. They were afraid that the
Congress organization built carefully over the last twenty years,
would be shattered. The Government was bound to suppress any
large-scale antiimPerIat1st movement; why invite prematu re
repression? As Gokhale put it in 1907, ‘You (the Extremists) do
not realize the enormous reserve of power behind the
Government, if the Congress were to do anything such as you
suggest, the Government would have no difficulty in throttling it
in five mi nutes.’ Minto and Morley were holding up hopes of
brighter prospects. Many Moderates thought that their dream of
Indians sharing political and administrative power was going to
come true. Any hasty action by the Congress under Extremist
pressure could anno y the Liberals in power in Britain. Why not
get rid of the Extremists while there was still time?
As H.A. Wadya, representing Pherozeshah Mehta’s thinking,
wrote in an article in which, after referring to ‘he Extremists as
‘the worst enemies of our cause, ’ said: ‘The union of these men
with the Congress is the union of a diseased limb to a healthy
body, and the only remedy is surgical severance, if the Congress
is to be saved from death by blood poisoning.’
Both sides had it wrong — from the nationalist po int of view
as well as their own factional point of view. The Moderates did
not see that the colonial state was negotiating with them not
because of their inherent political strength but because of the
fear of the Extremists. The Extremists did not see tha t the
Moderates were their natural outer defence line (in terms of civil
liberties and so on) and that they did not possess the required
strength to face the colonial state’s juggernaut. Neither saw that | <s>[INST]118 | India’s Struggle For Independence
push them out of the leadership of the Congress, and split the
organization if the Moderates could not be deposed.
Most of the Moderates, led by Pherozeshah Mehta, were no
less determined on a split. To remain with the Extremi sts was,
they felt, to enter dangerous waters. They were afraid that the
Congress organization built carefully over the last twenty years,
would be shattered. The Government was bound to suppress any
large-scale antiimPerIat1st movement; why invite prematu re
repression? As Gokhale put it in 1907, ‘You (the Extremists) do
not realize the enormous reserve of power behind the
Government, if the Congress were to do anything such as you
suggest, the Government would have no difficulty in throttling it
in five mi nutes.’ Minto and Morley were holding up hopes of
brighter prospects. Many Moderates thought that their dream of
Indians sharing political and administrative power was going to
come true. Any hasty action by the Congress under Extremist
pressure could anno y the Liberals in power in Britain. Why not
get rid of the Extremists while there was still time?
As H.A. Wadya, representing Pherozeshah Mehta’s thinking,
wrote in an article in which, after referring to ‘he Extremists as
‘the worst enemies of our cause, ’ said: ‘The union of these men
with the Congress is the union of a diseased limb to a healthy
body, and the only remedy is surgical severance, if the Congress
is to be saved from death by blood poisoning.’
Both sides had it wrong — from the nationalist po int of view
as well as their own factional point of view. The Moderates did
not see that the colonial state was negotiating with them not
because of their inherent political strength but because of the
fear of the Extremists. The Extremists did not see tha t the
Moderates were their natural outer defence line (in terms of civil
liberties and so on) and that they did not possess the required
strength to face the colonial state’s juggernaut. Neither saw that[/INST] |
in a vast country like India ruled by a powerful imperialist nation
only a broad - based united movement had any chance of success.
It wasn’t as though the whole leadership was blind to the danger.
The main public leaders of the two wings, Tilak (of the
Extremists) and Gokhale (of the Moderates) were mature
politicians who had a clear grasp of the dangers of disunity in the
nationalist ranks. Tilak did not want the united national front to | <s>[INST]in a vast country like India ruled by a powerful imperialist nation
only a broad - based united movement had any chance of success.
It wasn’t as though the whole leadership was blind to the danger.
The main public leaders of the two wings, Tilak (of the
Extremists) and Gokhale (of the Moderates) were mature
politicians who had a clear grasp of the dangers of disunity in the
nationalist ranks. Tilak did not want the united national front to[/INST] |
119 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
break. He saw clearly that a powerful movement could not be
built up at that stage nor political demands successfully pre ssed
on the rulers without the unity of different political trends. His
tactics were to organize massive support for his political line and,
thus, force a favourable compromise on the Moderates. But
having roused his followers in Maharashtra arid pushed on by
the more extreme elements of Bengal. Tilak found that he could
not afford to dismount from the tiger he found himself riding.
When it came to the crunch, he had to go with the more extreme
leaders like Aurobindo Ghose.
Gokhale, too, saw the dangers of a split in the nationalist
ranks and tried to avoid it. Already, in October 1907, he had
written to a friend: ‘If a split does come it means a disaster, for
the Bureaucracy will then put down both sections without much
difficulty.’ But he did not have the personality to stand upto a
wilful autocrat like Pherozeshah Mehta. He, too, knuckled under
pressure of his own extremists.
The Congress session was held on 26 December, 1907 at
Surat, on the banks of the river Tapti. The Extremists were
excited by the r umours that the Moderates wanted to scuttle the
four Calcutta resolutions. The Moderates were deeply hurt by the
ridicule and venom poured on them in mass meetings held at
Surat on the previous three days. The delegates, thus, met in an
atmosphere surcharg ed with excitement and anger.
The Extremists wanted a guarantee that the four resolutions
would be passed. To force the Moderates to do so they decided to
object to the duly elected President for the year, Rash Behari
Ghose. Both sides came to the session prepared for a
confrontation. In no time, the 1600 delegates were shouting,
coming to blows and hurling chairs at each other. En the
meantime, some unknown person hurled a shoe at the dais
which hit Pherozeshah Mehta and Surendranath Banerjea. The | <s>[INST]119 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
break. He saw clearly that a powerful movement could not be
built up at that stage nor political demands successfully pre ssed
on the rulers without the unity of different political trends. His
tactics were to organize massive support for his political line and,
thus, force a favourable compromise on the Moderates. But
having roused his followers in Maharashtra arid pushed on by
the more extreme elements of Bengal. Tilak found that he could
not afford to dismount from the tiger he found himself riding.
When it came to the crunch, he had to go with the more extreme
leaders like Aurobindo Ghose.
Gokhale, too, saw the dangers of a split in the nationalist
ranks and tried to avoid it. Already, in October 1907, he had
written to a friend: ‘If a split does come it means a disaster, for
the Bureaucracy will then put down both sections without much
difficulty.’ But he did not have the personality to stand upto a
wilful autocrat like Pherozeshah Mehta. He, too, knuckled under
pressure of his own extremists.
The Congress session was held on 26 December, 1907 at
Surat, on the banks of the river Tapti. The Extremists were
excited by the r umours that the Moderates wanted to scuttle the
four Calcutta resolutions. The Moderates were deeply hurt by the
ridicule and venom poured on them in mass meetings held at
Surat on the previous three days. The delegates, thus, met in an
atmosphere surcharg ed with excitement and anger.
The Extremists wanted a guarantee that the four resolutions
would be passed. To force the Moderates to do so they decided to
object to the duly elected President for the year, Rash Behari
Ghose. Both sides came to the session prepared for a
confrontation. In no time, the 1600 delegates were shouting,
coming to blows and hurling chairs at each other. En the
meantime, some unknown person hurled a shoe at the dais
which hit Pherozeshah Mehta and Surendranath Banerjea. The[/INST] |
which hit Pherozeshah Mehta and Surendranath Banerjea. The
police came and cleared the hall. The Congress session was over.
The only victorious party was the rulers. Minto immediately wrote
to Morley that the ‘Congress collapse’ at Surat was ‘a great
triumph for us.”
Tilak had seen the coming danger and made last minute
efforts to avoid it. But he was helpless before his followers. Lajpat
Rai, a participant in the events from the Extremist side, wrote | <s>[INST]which hit Pherozeshah Mehta and Surendranath Banerjea. The
police came and cleared the hall. The Congress session was over.
The only victorious party was the rulers. Minto immediately wrote
to Morley that the ‘Congress collapse’ at Surat was ‘a great
triumph for us.”
Tilak had seen the coming danger and made last minute
efforts to avoid it. But he was helpless before his followers. Lajpat
Rai, a participant in the events from the Extremist side, wrote[/INST] |
120 | India’s Struggle For Independence
later: ‘Instead of leading his party, he (Tilak) allowed himself to be
led by some of its wild spirits. Twice on my reques t, at Surat, he
agreed to waive his opposition to the election of Dr. Rash Behari
Ghose and leave the matter of the four Calcutta resolutions to the
Subjects Committee, but the moment I left him he found himself
helpless before the volume of opinion that s urrounded him.”
The suddenness of the Surat fiasco took Tilak by surprise.
He had not bargained for it because , as Aurobindo Ghose wrote
later, Tilak viewed the split as a ‘catastrophe.’ He valued the
Congress ‘as a great national fact and for its unreali zed
possibilities.”He now tried to undo the damage. He sent a virtual
letter of regret to his opponents, accepted Rash Behari Ghose as
the President of the Congress and offered his cooperation in
working fm Congress unity. But Pherozeshah Mehta and his
colleagues would not relent. They thought they were on a sure
wicket. The Government immediately launched a massive attack
on the Extremists. Extremist newspapers were suppressed. Tilak,
their main leader, was sent to Mandalay jail for six years.
Aurobindo Gh ose, their ideologue, was involved in a revolutionary
Conspiracy case and immediately after being judged innocent
gave up politics and escaped to Pondicherry to take up religion.
B.C. Pal temporarily retired from politics and Lajpat Rai, who had
been a hel pless onlooker at Surat, left for Britain in 1908 to come
back in 1909 and then to go off to the United States for an
extended stay. The Extremists were not able to organize an
effective alternative party or to sustain the movement. The
Government had won, at least for the moment.’
The Moderates were indulging their own foolish beliefs. They
gave up all the radical measures adopted at the Benaras and
Calcutta sessions of the Congress, spurned all overtures for unity
from the Extremists and excluded them fr om the party. They | <s>[INST]120 | India’s Struggle For Independence
later: ‘Instead of leading his party, he (Tilak) allowed himself to be
led by some of its wild spirits. Twice on my reques t, at Surat, he
agreed to waive his opposition to the election of Dr. Rash Behari
Ghose and leave the matter of the four Calcutta resolutions to the
Subjects Committee, but the moment I left him he found himself
helpless before the volume of opinion that s urrounded him.”
The suddenness of the Surat fiasco took Tilak by surprise.
He had not bargained for it because , as Aurobindo Ghose wrote
later, Tilak viewed the split as a ‘catastrophe.’ He valued the
Congress ‘as a great national fact and for its unreali zed
possibilities.”He now tried to undo the damage. He sent a virtual
letter of regret to his opponents, accepted Rash Behari Ghose as
the President of the Congress and offered his cooperation in
working fm Congress unity. But Pherozeshah Mehta and his
colleagues would not relent. They thought they were on a sure
wicket. The Government immediately launched a massive attack
on the Extremists. Extremist newspapers were suppressed. Tilak,
their main leader, was sent to Mandalay jail for six years.
Aurobindo Gh ose, their ideologue, was involved in a revolutionary
Conspiracy case and immediately after being judged innocent
gave up politics and escaped to Pondicherry to take up religion.
B.C. Pal temporarily retired from politics and Lajpat Rai, who had
been a hel pless onlooker at Surat, left for Britain in 1908 to come
back in 1909 and then to go off to the United States for an
extended stay. The Extremists were not able to organize an
effective alternative party or to sustain the movement. The
Government had won, at least for the moment.’
The Moderates were indulging their own foolish beliefs. They
gave up all the radical measures adopted at the Benaras and
Calcutta sessions of the Congress, spurned all overtures for unity
from the Extremists and excluded them fr om the party. They[/INST] |
from the Extremists and excluded them fr om the party. They
thought they were going to rebuild, to quote Pherozeshah Mehta,
a ‘resuscitated, renovated, reincarnated Congress.’ But the spirit
had gone out of the Congress and all efforts to restore it failed.
They had lost the respect and support o f the political Indians,
especially the youth, and were reduced to a small coterie. Most of
the Moderate leaders withdrew into their shells; only Gokhale
plodded on, with the aid of a small band of co -workers from the
Servants of India Society. And the vas t majority of politically | <s>[INST]from the Extremists and excluded them fr om the party. They
thought they were going to rebuild, to quote Pherozeshah Mehta,
a ‘resuscitated, renovated, reincarnated Congress.’ But the spirit
had gone out of the Congress and all efforts to restore it failed.
They had lost the respect and support o f the political Indians,
especially the youth, and were reduced to a small coterie. Most of
the Moderate leaders withdrew into their shells; only Gokhale
plodded on, with the aid of a small band of co -workers from the
Servants of India Society. And the vas t majority of politically[/INST] |
121 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
conscious Indians extended their support, however passive, to
Lokamanya Tilak and the militant nationalists.
After 1908 the national movement as a whole declined. In
1909, Aurobindo Ghose noted the change: ‘When I went to jail
the whole country was alive with the cry of Bande Mataram , alive
with the hope of a nation, the hope of millions of men who had
newly risen out of degradation. When I came out of jail I listened
for that cry, but there was instead a silence. A hush had falle n on
the country.” But while the upsurge was gone, the arouse
nationalist sentiments did not disappear. The people waited for
the next phase. In 1914, Tilak was released and he picked up the
threads of the movement.
*
The Moderates and the country as a wh ole were
disappointed by the ‘constitutional’ reforms of 1909. The Indian
Councils Act of 1909 increased the number of elected members in
the imperial Legislative Council and the provincial legislative
councils. Most of the elected members were still elect ed
indirectly. An Indian was to be appointed a member of the
Governor -General’s Executive Council. Of the sixty -eight
members of the Imperial Legislative Council, thirty -six were
officials and five were nominated non -officials. Out of twenty -
seven elected members, six were elected by big landlords and two
by British capitalists. The Act permitted members to introduce
resoluti9r s; it also increased their power to ask questions. Voting
on separate budget items was allowed. But the reformed councils
still enj oyed no real power and remained mere advisory bodies.
They also did not introduce an element of democracy or self -
government. The undemocratic, foreign and exploitative character
of British rule remained unchanged.
Morley openly declared in Parliament: ‘ If it could be said
that this chapter of reforms led directly or necessarily up to the
establishment of a Parliamentary system in India, I, for one, | <s>[INST]121 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
conscious Indians extended their support, however passive, to
Lokamanya Tilak and the militant nationalists.
After 1908 the national movement as a whole declined. In
1909, Aurobindo Ghose noted the change: ‘When I went to jail
the whole country was alive with the cry of Bande Mataram , alive
with the hope of a nation, the hope of millions of men who had
newly risen out of degradation. When I came out of jail I listened
for that cry, but there was instead a silence. A hush had falle n on
the country.” But while the upsurge was gone, the arouse
nationalist sentiments did not disappear. The people waited for
the next phase. In 1914, Tilak was released and he picked up the
threads of the movement.
*
The Moderates and the country as a wh ole were
disappointed by the ‘constitutional’ reforms of 1909. The Indian
Councils Act of 1909 increased the number of elected members in
the imperial Legislative Council and the provincial legislative
councils. Most of the elected members were still elect ed
indirectly. An Indian was to be appointed a member of the
Governor -General’s Executive Council. Of the sixty -eight
members of the Imperial Legislative Council, thirty -six were
officials and five were nominated non -officials. Out of twenty -
seven elected members, six were elected by big landlords and two
by British capitalists. The Act permitted members to introduce
resoluti9r s; it also increased their power to ask questions. Voting
on separate budget items was allowed. But the reformed councils
still enj oyed no real power and remained mere advisory bodies.
They also did not introduce an element of democracy or self -
government. The undemocratic, foreign and exploitative character
of British rule remained unchanged.
Morley openly declared in Parliament: ‘ If it could be said
that this chapter of reforms led directly or necessarily up to the
establishment of a Parliamentary system in India, I, for one,[/INST] |
establishment of a Parliamentary system in India, I, for one,
would have nothing at all to do with it.’
The real purpose of the Morley -Minto Reforms was to divide
the na tionalist ranks and to check the growing unity among
Indians by encouraging the growth of Muslim communalism. To | <s>[INST]establishment of a Parliamentary system in India, I, for one,
would have nothing at all to do with it.’
The real purpose of the Morley -Minto Reforms was to divide
the na tionalist ranks and to check the growing unity among
Indians by encouraging the growth of Muslim communalism. To[/INST] |
122 | India’s Struggle For Independence
achieve the latter objective, the Reforms introduced the system of
separate electorates under which Muslims could only vote for
Muslim candidat es in constituencies specially reserved for them.
This was done to encourage the notion that the political,
economic and cultural interests of Hindus and Muslims were
separate and not common. The institution of separate electorates
was one of the poisonous trees which was to yield a bitter harvest
in later years.
*
The end of 1907 brought another political trend to the fore.
The impatient young men of Bengal took to the path of individual
heroism arid revolutionary terrorism (a term we use without any
pejorative meaning and for want of a different term). This was
primarily because they could find no other way of expressing
their patriotism It is necessary at this point to reiterate the fact
that, while the youth of Bengal might have been incensed at the
official arrogance and repression and the ‘mendicancy’ of the
Congress Moderates, they were also led to ‘the politics of the
bomb’ by the Extremists’ failure to give a positive lead to the
people. The Extremists had made a sharp and on the whole
correct and e ffective critique of the Moderates. They had rightly
emphasized the role of the masses and the need to go beyond
propaganda and agitation. They had advocated persistent
opposition to the Government and put forward a militant
programme of passive resistance and boycott of foreign cloth,
foreigners’ courts, education and so on. They had demanded self -
sacrifice from the youth. They had talked and written about
direct action.
But they had failed to find forms through which all these
ideas could find practical expression. They could neither create a
viable organization to lead the movement nor could they really
define the movement in a way that differed from that of the
Moderates. They were more mi1itant their critique of British rule | <s>[INST]122 | India’s Struggle For Independence
achieve the latter objective, the Reforms introduced the system of
separate electorates under which Muslims could only vote for
Muslim candidat es in constituencies specially reserved for them.
This was done to encourage the notion that the political,
economic and cultural interests of Hindus and Muslims were
separate and not common. The institution of separate electorates
was one of the poisonous trees which was to yield a bitter harvest
in later years.
*
The end of 1907 brought another political trend to the fore.
The impatient young men of Bengal took to the path of individual
heroism arid revolutionary terrorism (a term we use without any
pejorative meaning and for want of a different term). This was
primarily because they could find no other way of expressing
their patriotism It is necessary at this point to reiterate the fact
that, while the youth of Bengal might have been incensed at the
official arrogance and repression and the ‘mendicancy’ of the
Congress Moderates, they were also led to ‘the politics of the
bomb’ by the Extremists’ failure to give a positive lead to the
people. The Extremists had made a sharp and on the whole
correct and e ffective critique of the Moderates. They had rightly
emphasized the role of the masses and the need to go beyond
propaganda and agitation. They had advocated persistent
opposition to the Government and put forward a militant
programme of passive resistance and boycott of foreign cloth,
foreigners’ courts, education and so on. They had demanded self -
sacrifice from the youth. They had talked and written about
direct action.
But they had failed to find forms through which all these
ideas could find practical expression. They could neither create a
viable organization to lead the movement nor could they really
define the movement in a way that differed from that of the
Moderates. They were more mi1itant their critique of British rule[/INST] |
was couched in stronger lan guage, they were willing to make
greater sacrifices and undergo greater suffering, but they did not
know how to go beyond more vigorous agitation. They were not
able to put before people new forms of political struggle or mass
movements. Consequently, they too had come to a political dead | <s>[INST]was couched in stronger lan guage, they were willing to make
greater sacrifices and undergo greater suffering, but they did not
know how to go beyond more vigorous agitation. They were not
able to put before people new forms of political struggle or mass
movements. Consequently, they too had come to a political dead[/INST] |
123 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
end by the end of 1907. Perhaps that is one reason why they
expended so much of their energy in criticizing the Moderates
and capturing the Congress. Unsurprisingly, the Extremists’
waffling failed to impress the youth who decided to take recourse
to physical force. The Yugantar, a newspaper echoing this feeling
of disaffection, wrote in April 1906, after the police assault on the
peaceful Barisal Conference: ‘The thirty crores of people
inhabiting India must raise their si xty crores of hands to stop
this curse of oppression. Force must be stopped by force.’
But the question was what form would this movement
based on force take. Organizing a popular mass uprising would
necessarily be an uphill and prolonged task. Many thoug ht of
trying to subvert the loyalty of the army, but they knew it would
not be easy. However, these two objectives were kept as long -term
goals and, for the present, revolutionary youth decided to copy
the methods of the fish nationalists and Russian nihil ists and
populists. That is to say, they decided to organize the
assassination of unpopular British officials. Such assassinations
would strike terror into the hearts of the rulers, amuse the
patriotic instincts of the people, inspire them and remove the f ear
of authority from their minds. Each assassination, and if the
assassins were caught, the consequent trial of the revolutionaries
involved, would act as ‘propaganda by deed’’ All that this form of
struggle needed was numbers of young people ready to sac rifice
their lives.
Inevitably, it appealed to the idealism of the youth; it
aroused their latent sense of heroism. A steadily increasing
number of young men turned to this form of political struggle.
Here again the Extremist leadership let the young peo ple
down, While it praised their sense of self -sacrifice and courage, it
failed to provide a positive outlet for their revolutionary energies | <s>[INST]123 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
end by the end of 1907. Perhaps that is one reason why they
expended so much of their energy in criticizing the Moderates
and capturing the Congress. Unsurprisingly, the Extremists’
waffling failed to impress the youth who decided to take recourse
to physical force. The Yugantar, a newspaper echoing this feeling
of disaffection, wrote in April 1906, after the police assault on the
peaceful Barisal Conference: ‘The thirty crores of people
inhabiting India must raise their si xty crores of hands to stop
this curse of oppression. Force must be stopped by force.’
But the question was what form would this movement
based on force take. Organizing a popular mass uprising would
necessarily be an uphill and prolonged task. Many thoug ht of
trying to subvert the loyalty of the army, but they knew it would
not be easy. However, these two objectives were kept as long -term
goals and, for the present, revolutionary youth decided to copy
the methods of the fish nationalists and Russian nihil ists and
populists. That is to say, they decided to organize the
assassination of unpopular British officials. Such assassinations
would strike terror into the hearts of the rulers, amuse the
patriotic instincts of the people, inspire them and remove the f ear
of authority from their minds. Each assassination, and if the
assassins were caught, the consequent trial of the revolutionaries
involved, would act as ‘propaganda by deed’’ All that this form of
struggle needed was numbers of young people ready to sac rifice
their lives.
Inevitably, it appealed to the idealism of the youth; it
aroused their latent sense of heroism. A steadily increasing
number of young men turned to this form of political struggle.
Here again the Extremist leadership let the young peo ple
down, While it praised their sense of self -sacrifice and courage, it
failed to provide a positive outlet for their revolutionary energies[/INST] |
and to educate them on the political difference between a
evolution based on the activity of the masses and a revo lutionary
feeling based on individual action, however heroic. It also failed to
oppose the notion that to be a revolutionary meant to be a
believer in violent action. In fact, Aurobindo Ghose encouraged
this notion. Perhaps the actions of the Extremist lea dership were
constrained by the feeling that it was not proper to politically
criticize the heroic youth who were being condemned and hunted | <s>[INST]and to educate them on the political difference between a
evolution based on the activity of the masses and a revo lutionary
feeling based on individual action, however heroic. It also failed to
oppose the notion that to be a revolutionary meant to be a
believer in violent action. In fact, Aurobindo Ghose encouraged
this notion. Perhaps the actions of the Extremist lea dership were
constrained by the feeling that it was not proper to politically
criticize the heroic youth who were being condemned and hunted[/INST] |
124 | India’s Struggle For Independence
by the authorities. But this failure to politically and ideologically
oppose the young revolutionaries proved a gri evous error, for it
enabled the individualistic and terrorist conception of revolution
to take root in Bengal.
In 1904, V.D. Sarvarkar organized Abhinav Bharat as a
secret society of revolutionaries. After 1905 several newspapers
openly (and a few leaders secretly) began to advocate
revolutionary terrorism. In 1907, an unsuccessful attempt was
made on the life of the Lieutenant -Governor of Bengal. In April
1908, Prafulla Chaki and Khudiram Bose threw a bomb at a
carriage which they believed was occupied by Kingsford, the
unpopular judge at Muzzafarpur. Unfortunately, they killed two
English ladies instead. Prafulla Chaki shot himself dead while
Khudiram Bose was tried and hanged. Thousands wept at his
death and he and Chaki entered the ranks of popular nati onalist
heroes about whom folk songs were composed and sung all over
the country
The era of revolutionary terrorism had begun. Very soon
secret societies of revolutionaries came up all over the country,
the most famous and long lasting being Anushilan Sami ty and
Jugantar. Their activities took two forms ---the assassination of
oppressive officials and informers and traitors from their own
ranks and dacoities to raise funds for purchase of arms etc. The
latter came to be popularly known as Swadeshi dacoities! Two of
the most spectacular revolutionary terrorist actions of the period
were the unsuccessful attempt under the leadership of Rash
Behari Bose and Sachin Sanyal to kill the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge
who was w ounded by the bomb thrown at him while he was
riding an elephant in a state procession — and the assassination
of Curzon -Wylie in London by Madan Lal Dhingra. In all 186
revolutionaries were killed or convicted between the years 1908 -
1918. The revolutionary terrorists also established centres
abroad. Th e more famous of them were Shyamji Krishnavarma, | <s>[INST]124 | India’s Struggle For Independence
by the authorities. But this failure to politically and ideologically
oppose the young revolutionaries proved a gri evous error, for it
enabled the individualistic and terrorist conception of revolution
to take root in Bengal.
In 1904, V.D. Sarvarkar organized Abhinav Bharat as a
secret society of revolutionaries. After 1905 several newspapers
openly (and a few leaders secretly) began to advocate
revolutionary terrorism. In 1907, an unsuccessful attempt was
made on the life of the Lieutenant -Governor of Bengal. In April
1908, Prafulla Chaki and Khudiram Bose threw a bomb at a
carriage which they believed was occupied by Kingsford, the
unpopular judge at Muzzafarpur. Unfortunately, they killed two
English ladies instead. Prafulla Chaki shot himself dead while
Khudiram Bose was tried and hanged. Thousands wept at his
death and he and Chaki entered the ranks of popular nati onalist
heroes about whom folk songs were composed and sung all over
the country
The era of revolutionary terrorism had begun. Very soon
secret societies of revolutionaries came up all over the country,
the most famous and long lasting being Anushilan Sami ty and
Jugantar. Their activities took two forms ---the assassination of
oppressive officials and informers and traitors from their own
ranks and dacoities to raise funds for purchase of arms etc. The
latter came to be popularly known as Swadeshi dacoities! Two of
the most spectacular revolutionary terrorist actions of the period
were the unsuccessful attempt under the leadership of Rash
Behari Bose and Sachin Sanyal to kill the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge
who was w ounded by the bomb thrown at him while he was
riding an elephant in a state procession — and the assassination
of Curzon -Wylie in London by Madan Lal Dhingra. In all 186
revolutionaries were killed or convicted between the years 1908 -
1918. The revolutionary terrorists also established centres
abroad. Th e more famous of them were Shyamji Krishnavarma,[/INST] |
abroad. Th e more famous of them were Shyamji Krishnavarma,
V.D. Savarkar and Har Dayal in London and Madame Cama and
Ajit Singh in Europe.
Revolutionary terrorism gradually petered out. Lacking a
mass base, despite remarkable heroism, the individual
revolutionaries , organized in small secret groups, could not
withstand suppression by the still strong colonial state. But | <s>[INST]abroad. Th e more famous of them were Shyamji Krishnavarma,
V.D. Savarkar and Har Dayal in London and Madame Cama and
Ajit Singh in Europe.
Revolutionary terrorism gradually petered out. Lacking a
mass base, despite remarkable heroism, the individual
revolutionaries , organized in small secret groups, could not
withstand suppression by the still strong colonial state. But[/INST] |
125 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
despite their ‘small numbers and eventual failure, they made a
valuable contribution to the growth of nationalism in India. As a
historian has put i t, ‘they gave us back the pride of our
manhood.’ | <s>[INST]125 |The Split in the Congress and the Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism
despite their ‘small numbers and eventual failure, they made a
valuable contribution to the growth of nationalism in India. As a
historian has put i t, ‘they gave us back the pride of our
manhood.’[/INST] |
126 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 12. WORLD WAR I AND
INDIAN
NATIONALISM : THE
GHADAR
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 gave a new
lease of life to the nationalist movement which had been dormant
since the heady days of the Swadeshi Movement. Britain’s
difficulty was India’s ‘opportunity.’ This opportunity was seized,
in different ways arid with varying success, by the Ghadar
revolutionaries based in North America and by Lokamanya Tilak,
Annie Besant a nd their Home Rule Leagues in India. The
Ghadarites attempted a violent overthrow of British rule, while
the Home Rule Leaguers launched a nation -wide agitation for
securing Home Rule or Swaraj.
*
The West Coast of North America had, since 1904, become
home to a steadily increasing number of Punjabi immigrants.
Many of these were land -hungry peasants from the crowded
areas of Punjab, especially the Jullundur and Hoshiarpur
districts, in search of some means of survival. Some of them
came straight from their villages in Punjab while others had
emigrated earlier to seek employment in various places in the Far
East, in the Malay States, and in Fiji. Many among them were ex -
soldiers whose service in the British Indian Army had taken them
to distant lands and mad e them aware of the opportunities to be
had there. Pushed out from their homes by economic hardship
and lured by the prospect of building a new and prosperous life
for themselves and their kin, they pawned the belonging,
mortgaged or sold their land, and set out for the promised lands.
The welcome awaited the travel -weary immigrants in
Canada and the USA was , however not what they had expected.
Many were refused entry, especially those who came straight | <s>[INST]126 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 12. WORLD WAR I AND
INDIAN
NATIONALISM : THE
GHADAR
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 gave a new
lease of life to the nationalist movement which had been dormant
since the heady days of the Swadeshi Movement. Britain’s
difficulty was India’s ‘opportunity.’ This opportunity was seized,
in different ways arid with varying success, by the Ghadar
revolutionaries based in North America and by Lokamanya Tilak,
Annie Besant a nd their Home Rule Leagues in India. The
Ghadarites attempted a violent overthrow of British rule, while
the Home Rule Leaguers launched a nation -wide agitation for
securing Home Rule or Swaraj.
*
The West Coast of North America had, since 1904, become
home to a steadily increasing number of Punjabi immigrants.
Many of these were land -hungry peasants from the crowded
areas of Punjab, especially the Jullundur and Hoshiarpur
districts, in search of some means of survival. Some of them
came straight from their villages in Punjab while others had
emigrated earlier to seek employment in various places in the Far
East, in the Malay States, and in Fiji. Many among them were ex -
soldiers whose service in the British Indian Army had taken them
to distant lands and mad e them aware of the opportunities to be
had there. Pushed out from their homes by economic hardship
and lured by the prospect of building a new and prosperous life
for themselves and their kin, they pawned the belonging,
mortgaged or sold their land, and set out for the promised lands.
The welcome awaited the travel -weary immigrants in
Canada and the USA was , however not what they had expected.
Many were refused entry, especially those who came straight[/INST] |
127 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
from their villages and did not know Western Ways and manners
those who were allowed to stay not only had to face racial
Contempt but also the brunt of the hostility of the White labour
force and unions who resented the competition they offered.
Agitations against the entry of the Indians were launched by
native American labourers and these were supported by
politicians looking for the popular vote.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of State for India had his own
reasons for urging restrictions on immigration. For one, he
believed that the terms of close familiarity o f Indians with Whites
which would inevitably take place in America was not good for
British prestige; it was by prestige alone that India was held and
not by force. Further, he was worried that the immigrants would
get contaminated by socialist ideas, and that the racial
discrimination to which they were bound to be subjected would
become the source of nationalist agitation in India.’ The
combined pressure resulted in an effective restriction on Indian
immigration into Canada in 1908. Tarak Nath Das, an Indian
student, and one of the first leaders of the Indian community in
North America to start a paper (called Free Hindustan) realized
that while the British government was keen on Indians going to
Fiji to work as labourers for British planters, it did not w ant them
to go to North America where they might be infected by ideas of
liberty.
*
The discriminatory policies of the host countries soon
resulted in a flurry of political activity among Indian nationalists.
As early as 1907, Ramnath Purl, a political ex ile on the West
Coast, issued a Circular -e-Azadi (Circular of Liberty) in which he
also pledged support to the Swadeshi Movement; Tarak Nath Das
in Vancouver started the Free Hindustan and adopted a very
militant nationalist tone; G.D. Kumar set up a Swade sh Sevak
Home in Vancouver on the lines of the India House in London | <s>[INST]127 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
from their villages and did not know Western Ways and manners
those who were allowed to stay not only had to face racial
Contempt but also the brunt of the hostility of the White labour
force and unions who resented the competition they offered.
Agitations against the entry of the Indians were launched by
native American labourers and these were supported by
politicians looking for the popular vote.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of State for India had his own
reasons for urging restrictions on immigration. For one, he
believed that the terms of close familiarity o f Indians with Whites
which would inevitably take place in America was not good for
British prestige; it was by prestige alone that India was held and
not by force. Further, he was worried that the immigrants would
get contaminated by socialist ideas, and that the racial
discrimination to which they were bound to be subjected would
become the source of nationalist agitation in India.’ The
combined pressure resulted in an effective restriction on Indian
immigration into Canada in 1908. Tarak Nath Das, an Indian
student, and one of the first leaders of the Indian community in
North America to start a paper (called Free Hindustan) realized
that while the British government was keen on Indians going to
Fiji to work as labourers for British planters, it did not w ant them
to go to North America where they might be infected by ideas of
liberty.
*
The discriminatory policies of the host countries soon
resulted in a flurry of political activity among Indian nationalists.
As early as 1907, Ramnath Purl, a political ex ile on the West
Coast, issued a Circular -e-Azadi (Circular of Liberty) in which he
also pledged support to the Swadeshi Movement; Tarak Nath Das
in Vancouver started the Free Hindustan and adopted a very
militant nationalist tone; G.D. Kumar set up a Swade sh Sevak
Home in Vancouver on the lines of the India House in London[/INST] |
Home in Vancouver on the lines of the India House in London
and also began to bring out a Gurmukhi paper called Swadesh
Sevak which advocated social reform and also asked Indian
troops to rise in revolt against the British. In 1910, Tarak Nath
Das and G.D. Kumar, by now forced out of Vancouver, set up the
United India House in Seattle in the US, where every Saturday | <s>[INST]Home in Vancouver on the lines of the India House in London
and also began to bring out a Gurmukhi paper called Swadesh
Sevak which advocated social reform and also asked Indian
troops to rise in revolt against the British. In 1910, Tarak Nath
Das and G.D. Kumar, by now forced out of Vancouver, set up the
United India House in Seattle in the US, where every Saturday[/INST] |
128 | India’s Struggle For Independence
they lectured to a group of twenty -five Indian labourers. Close
links also developed between the United India House group,
consisting mainly of radical nationalist students, and the Khalsa
Diwan Society, and in 1913 they decided to send a deputation to
meet the Colonial Secretary in London and the Viceroy and other
officials in India The Colonial Secretary in London could not find
the ti me to see them even though they waited for a whole month,
but in India they succeed in meeting the Viceroy and the
Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab But, more important, their
visit became the occasion for a series of public meetings in
Lahore, Ludhiana, A mbala, Ferozepore, Jullundur, Amritsar
Lyallpur, Gujranwala, Sialkot and Simla and they received
enthusiastic support from the Press and the general public.
The result of this sustained agitation, both in Canada and
the United States, was the creation of a nationalist consciousness
and feeling of solidarity among immigrant Indians. Their inability
to get the Government of India or the British Government to
intercede on their behalf regarding immigration restrictions and
other disabilities, such as those imposed by the Alien Land law
which practically prohibited Indians from owning land in the US,
led to an impatience and a mood of discontent which blossomed
into a revolutionary movement.
*
The first fillip to the revolutionary movement was provided
by the v isit to Vancouver, in early 1913, of Bhagwan Singh, a
Sikh priest who had worked in Hong Kong and the Malay States.
He openly preached the gospel of violent overthrow of British rule
and urged the people to adopt Bande Mataram as a revolutionary
salute. Bh agwan Singh was externed from Canada after a stay of
three months.
The centre of revolutionary activity soon shifted to the US,
which provided a relatively free political atmosphere. The crucial
role was OW played by Lala Har Dayal, a political exile from | <s>[INST]128 | India’s Struggle For Independence
they lectured to a group of twenty -five Indian labourers. Close
links also developed between the United India House group,
consisting mainly of radical nationalist students, and the Khalsa
Diwan Society, and in 1913 they decided to send a deputation to
meet the Colonial Secretary in London and the Viceroy and other
officials in India The Colonial Secretary in London could not find
the ti me to see them even though they waited for a whole month,
but in India they succeed in meeting the Viceroy and the
Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab But, more important, their
visit became the occasion for a series of public meetings in
Lahore, Ludhiana, A mbala, Ferozepore, Jullundur, Amritsar
Lyallpur, Gujranwala, Sialkot and Simla and they received
enthusiastic support from the Press and the general public.
The result of this sustained agitation, both in Canada and
the United States, was the creation of a nationalist consciousness
and feeling of solidarity among immigrant Indians. Their inability
to get the Government of India or the British Government to
intercede on their behalf regarding immigration restrictions and
other disabilities, such as those imposed by the Alien Land law
which practically prohibited Indians from owning land in the US,
led to an impatience and a mood of discontent which blossomed
into a revolutionary movement.
*
The first fillip to the revolutionary movement was provided
by the v isit to Vancouver, in early 1913, of Bhagwan Singh, a
Sikh priest who had worked in Hong Kong and the Malay States.
He openly preached the gospel of violent overthrow of British rule
and urged the people to adopt Bande Mataram as a revolutionary
salute. Bh agwan Singh was externed from Canada after a stay of
three months.
The centre of revolutionary activity soon shifted to the US,
which provided a relatively free political atmosphere. The crucial
role was OW played by Lala Har Dayal, a political exile from[/INST] |
role was OW played by Lala Har Dayal, a political exile from
India. Har Dayal arrived in California in April 1911, taught briefly
at Stanford University, and soon immersed himself in political
activity. During the summer of 1912, he concentrated mainly on
delivering lectures on the anarchist and syndicalist movemen ts to
various American groups of intellectuals, radicals and workers, | <s>[INST]role was OW played by Lala Har Dayal, a political exile from
India. Har Dayal arrived in California in April 1911, taught briefly
at Stanford University, and soon immersed himself in political
activity. During the summer of 1912, he concentrated mainly on
delivering lectures on the anarchist and syndicalist movemen ts to
various American groups of intellectuals, radicals and workers,[/INST] |
129 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
and did not show much interest in the problems that were
agitating the immigrant4ndian community. But the bomb attack
on Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, in Delhi on 23 December,
1912, excited his imagination and roused the dormant Indian
revolutionary in him. His faith in the possibility of a revolutionary
overthrow of the British regime m India was renewed, and he
issued a Yugantar Circular praising the attack on the Viceroy.
Meanw hile, the Indians on the West Coast of the US had
been in search of a leader and had even thought of inviting Ajit
Singh, who had become famous in the agitation in Punjab in
1907. But Har Dayal was already there and, after December
1912, showed himself willing to play an active political role. Soon
the Hindi Association was set up in Portland in May 1913.
At he very first meeting of the Association, held in the house
of Kanshi Rain, and attended among others by Bhai Parmanand,
Sohan Singh Bhakna, and Harna m Singh ‘Tundilat,’ Har Dayal
set forth his plan of action: ‘Do not fight the Americans, but use
the free&wn that is available in the US to fight the British; you
will never be treated as equals by the Americans until you are
free in your own land, the roo t cause of Indian poverty and
degradation is British rule and it must be overthrown, not by
petitions but by aimed revolt; carry this message to the masses
and to the soldiers in the Indian Anny; go to India in large
numbers and enlist their support.’ Har Dayal’s ideas found
immediate acceptance. A Working Committee was set up and the
decision was taken to start a weekly paper, The Ghadar, for free
circulation, and to set up a headquarters called Yugantar Ashram
in San Francisco. A series of meetings held i n different towns and
centres and finally a representatives’ meeting in Astoria
confirmed and approved the decisions of the first meeting at
Portland. The Ghadar Movement had begun.
* | <s>[INST]129 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
and did not show much interest in the problems that were
agitating the immigrant4ndian community. But the bomb attack
on Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, in Delhi on 23 December,
1912, excited his imagination and roused the dormant Indian
revolutionary in him. His faith in the possibility of a revolutionary
overthrow of the British regime m India was renewed, and he
issued a Yugantar Circular praising the attack on the Viceroy.
Meanw hile, the Indians on the West Coast of the US had
been in search of a leader and had even thought of inviting Ajit
Singh, who had become famous in the agitation in Punjab in
1907. But Har Dayal was already there and, after December
1912, showed himself willing to play an active political role. Soon
the Hindi Association was set up in Portland in May 1913.
At he very first meeting of the Association, held in the house
of Kanshi Rain, and attended among others by Bhai Parmanand,
Sohan Singh Bhakna, and Harna m Singh ‘Tundilat,’ Har Dayal
set forth his plan of action: ‘Do not fight the Americans, but use
the free&wn that is available in the US to fight the British; you
will never be treated as equals by the Americans until you are
free in your own land, the roo t cause of Indian poverty and
degradation is British rule and it must be overthrown, not by
petitions but by aimed revolt; carry this message to the masses
and to the soldiers in the Indian Anny; go to India in large
numbers and enlist their support.’ Har Dayal’s ideas found
immediate acceptance. A Working Committee was set up and the
decision was taken to start a weekly paper, The Ghadar, for free
circulation, and to set up a headquarters called Yugantar Ashram
in San Francisco. A series of meetings held i n different towns and
centres and finally a representatives’ meeting in Astoria
confirmed and approved the decisions of the first meeting at
Portland. The Ghadar Movement had begun.
*[/INST] |
Portland. The Ghadar Movement had begun.
*
The Ghadar militants immediately began an extensive
propaganda Campaig n; they toured extensively, visiting mills and
farms where most of the Punjabi immigrant labour worked. The
Yugantar Ashram became the home and headquarters and refuge
of these political workers. | <s>[INST]Portland. The Ghadar Movement had begun.
*
The Ghadar militants immediately began an extensive
propaganda Campaig n; they toured extensively, visiting mills and
farms where most of the Punjabi immigrant labour worked. The
Yugantar Ashram became the home and headquarters and refuge
of these political workers.[/INST] |
130 | India’s Struggle For Independence
On 1 November 1913, the first issue of Ghadar, in Urdu was
published and on 9 December, the Grumukhi edition. The name
of the paper left no doubts as to its aim. Ghadar means Revolt.
And if any doubts remained, they were to be dispelled by the
captions on the masthead: ‘Angrezi Raj ka Dushman ’ or ‘An
Enemy of British Rule.’ On the front page of each issue was a
feature titled Angrezi Raj Ka Kacha Chittha or ‘An Expose of
British Rule.’ This Chittha consisted of fourteen points
enumerating the harmful effects of British rule, including the of
wealth, the low per cap ita income of Indians, the high land tax,
the contrast between the low expenditure on health and the high
expenditure on the military, the destruction of Indian arts and
industries, the recurrence of famines and plague that killed
millions of Indians, the use of Indian tax payers’ money for wars
in Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Persia and China the British
policy of promoting discord in the Indian States to extend their
own influence, the discriminatory lenient treatment given to
Englishmen who were guilty of killing Indians or dishonouring
Indian women the policy of helping Christian missionaries with
money raised from Hindus and Muslims, the effort to foment
discord between Hindus and Muslims: in sum, the entire critique
of British rule that had been formulat ed by the Indian national
movement was summarized and presented every week to Ghadar
readers. The last two points of the Chittha suggested the solution:
(1) The Indian population numbers seven crores in the Indian
States and 24 crores in British India, whi le there are only 79,614
officers and soldiers and 38,948 volunteers who are Englishmen.
(2) Fifty -six years have lapsed since the Revolt of 1857; now there
is urgent need for a second one.
Besides the powerful simplicity of the Chittha, the message
was also conveyed by serializing Savarkar’s The Indian War of
independence —1857. The Ghadar also contained references to | <s>[INST]130 | India’s Struggle For Independence
On 1 November 1913, the first issue of Ghadar, in Urdu was
published and on 9 December, the Grumukhi edition. The name
of the paper left no doubts as to its aim. Ghadar means Revolt.
And if any doubts remained, they were to be dispelled by the
captions on the masthead: ‘Angrezi Raj ka Dushman ’ or ‘An
Enemy of British Rule.’ On the front page of each issue was a
feature titled Angrezi Raj Ka Kacha Chittha or ‘An Expose of
British Rule.’ This Chittha consisted of fourteen points
enumerating the harmful effects of British rule, including the of
wealth, the low per cap ita income of Indians, the high land tax,
the contrast between the low expenditure on health and the high
expenditure on the military, the destruction of Indian arts and
industries, the recurrence of famines and plague that killed
millions of Indians, the use of Indian tax payers’ money for wars
in Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Persia and China the British
policy of promoting discord in the Indian States to extend their
own influence, the discriminatory lenient treatment given to
Englishmen who were guilty of killing Indians or dishonouring
Indian women the policy of helping Christian missionaries with
money raised from Hindus and Muslims, the effort to foment
discord between Hindus and Muslims: in sum, the entire critique
of British rule that had been formulat ed by the Indian national
movement was summarized and presented every week to Ghadar
readers. The last two points of the Chittha suggested the solution:
(1) The Indian population numbers seven crores in the Indian
States and 24 crores in British India, whi le there are only 79,614
officers and soldiers and 38,948 volunteers who are Englishmen.
(2) Fifty -six years have lapsed since the Revolt of 1857; now there
is urgent need for a second one.
Besides the powerful simplicity of the Chittha, the message
was also conveyed by serializing Savarkar’s The Indian War of
independence —1857. The Ghadar also contained references to[/INST] |
independence —1857. The Ghadar also contained references to
the contributions of Lokamanya Tilak, Sri Aurobjndo, V.D.
Savarkar, Madame Cama, Shyamji Krishna Varma, Ajit Singh
and Sufi Amba Prasad, as well as highlights of the daring deeds
of the Anushilan Samiti, the Yugantar group and the Russian
secret societies.
But, perhaps, the most powerful impact was made by the
poems that appeared in The Ghadar, soon collected and
published as Ghadar di Goonj and distributed free of cost. These | <s>[INST]independence —1857. The Ghadar also contained references to
the contributions of Lokamanya Tilak, Sri Aurobjndo, V.D.
Savarkar, Madame Cama, Shyamji Krishna Varma, Ajit Singh
and Sufi Amba Prasad, as well as highlights of the daring deeds
of the Anushilan Samiti, the Yugantar group and the Russian
secret societies.
But, perhaps, the most powerful impact was made by the
poems that appeared in The Ghadar, soon collected and
published as Ghadar di Goonj and distributed free of cost. These[/INST] |
131 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
poems were marked as much by their secular tone as by their
revolutionary zeal, as the following extract demonstrates:
Hindus, Sikhs, Pathans and Muslims,
Pay attention ye all people in the army.
Our country has been p lundered by the British,
We have to wage a war against them.
We do not need pandits and quazis,
We do not want to get our ship sunk.
The time of worship is over now,
It is time to take up the sword.
The Ghadar was circulated widely among Indians in No rth
America, and within a few months it had reached groups settled
in the Philippines, Hong Kong, China, the Malay States,
Singapore, Trinidad, the Honduras, and of course, India. It
evoked an unprecedented response, becoming the subject of
lively discussi on and debate. The poems it carried were recited at
gatherings of Punjabi immigrants, and were soon popular
everywhere.
Unsurprisingly, The Ghadár, succeeded, in a very brief time,
in changing the self -image of the Punjabi immigrant from that of
a loyal s oldier of the British Raj to that of a rebel whose only aim
was to destroy the British hold on his motherland. The Ghadar
consciously made the Punjabi aware of his loyalist past, made
him feel ashamed of it, and challenged him to atone for it in the
name o f his earlier tradition of res stance to oppression:
Why do you disgrace the name of Singhs?
How come! you have forgotten the majesty of ‘Lions’
Had the like of Dip Singh been alive today
How could the Singhs have been taunted?
People say that the Singhs are no good
Why did you turn the tides during the Delhi mutiny?
Cry aloud. ‘Let us kill the Whites’
Why do you sit quiet, shamelessly
Let the earth give way so we may drown
To what good were these thirty crores born.
The message went home, and ardent young militants began
thirsting for ‘action.’ Har Dayal himself was surprised by the
intensity of the response. He had, on occasion, spoken in terms | <s>[INST]131 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
poems were marked as much by their secular tone as by their
revolutionary zeal, as the following extract demonstrates:
Hindus, Sikhs, Pathans and Muslims,
Pay attention ye all people in the army.
Our country has been p lundered by the British,
We have to wage a war against them.
We do not need pandits and quazis,
We do not want to get our ship sunk.
The time of worship is over now,
It is time to take up the sword.
The Ghadar was circulated widely among Indians in No rth
America, and within a few months it had reached groups settled
in the Philippines, Hong Kong, China, the Malay States,
Singapore, Trinidad, the Honduras, and of course, India. It
evoked an unprecedented response, becoming the subject of
lively discussi on and debate. The poems it carried were recited at
gatherings of Punjabi immigrants, and were soon popular
everywhere.
Unsurprisingly, The Ghadár, succeeded, in a very brief time,
in changing the self -image of the Punjabi immigrant from that of
a loyal s oldier of the British Raj to that of a rebel whose only aim
was to destroy the British hold on his motherland. The Ghadar
consciously made the Punjabi aware of his loyalist past, made
him feel ashamed of it, and challenged him to atone for it in the
name o f his earlier tradition of res stance to oppression:
Why do you disgrace the name of Singhs?
How come! you have forgotten the majesty of ‘Lions’
Had the like of Dip Singh been alive today
How could the Singhs have been taunted?
People say that the Singhs are no good
Why did you turn the tides during the Delhi mutiny?
Cry aloud. ‘Let us kill the Whites’
Why do you sit quiet, shamelessly
Let the earth give way so we may drown
To what good were these thirty crores born.
The message went home, and ardent young militants began
thirsting for ‘action.’ Har Dayal himself was surprised by the
intensity of the response. He had, on occasion, spoken in terms[/INST] |
132 | India’s Struggle For Independence
of ‘ten years’ or ‘some years’ when asked how long it would take
to organize the revolution in India B ut those who read the heady
exhortations of The Ghadar were too impatient, and ten years
seemed a long time.
*
Fina11y, in 1914, three events influenced the course of the
Ghadar movement: the arrest and escape of Har Dayal, the
Komagata Maru incident, and the outbreak of the First World
War.
Dayal was arrested on 25 March 1914 on the stated ground
of his anarchist activities though everybody suspected that the
British Government had much to do with it. Released on bail, he
used the opportunity to slip out of the country. With that, his
active association with the Ghadar Movement came to an abrupt
end.
Meanwhile, n March 1914, the ship, Komagata Maru had
begun its fateful voyage to Canada. Canada had for some rears
imposed very strict restrictions on Indian immigration by means
of a law that forbade entry to all, except those who made a
continuous journey from India. This measure had proved effective
because there were no shipping lines that offered such a route.
But in November 1913, the Canadian Supreme Co urt allowed
entry to thirty -five Indians who had not made a continuous
journey. Encouraged by this judgment , ’Gurdit Singh, an Indian
contractor living in Singapore, decided to charter a ship and
carry to Vancouver, Indians who were living in various place s in
East and South -East Asia. Carrying a total of 376 Indian
passengers, the ship began its journey to Vancouver. Ghadar
activists visited the ship at Yokohama in Japan, gave lectures
and distributed literature. The Press in Punjab warned of serious
conse quences if the Indians were not allowed entry into Canada.
The Press in Canada took a different view and some newspapers
in Vancouver alerted the people to the ‘Mounting Oriental
Invasion.’ The Government of Canada had, meanwhile, plugged
the legal loophol es that had resulted in the November Supreme | <s>[INST]132 | India’s Struggle For Independence
of ‘ten years’ or ‘some years’ when asked how long it would take
to organize the revolution in India B ut those who read the heady
exhortations of The Ghadar were too impatient, and ten years
seemed a long time.
*
Fina11y, in 1914, three events influenced the course of the
Ghadar movement: the arrest and escape of Har Dayal, the
Komagata Maru incident, and the outbreak of the First World
War.
Dayal was arrested on 25 March 1914 on the stated ground
of his anarchist activities though everybody suspected that the
British Government had much to do with it. Released on bail, he
used the opportunity to slip out of the country. With that, his
active association with the Ghadar Movement came to an abrupt
end.
Meanwhile, n March 1914, the ship, Komagata Maru had
begun its fateful voyage to Canada. Canada had for some rears
imposed very strict restrictions on Indian immigration by means
of a law that forbade entry to all, except those who made a
continuous journey from India. This measure had proved effective
because there were no shipping lines that offered such a route.
But in November 1913, the Canadian Supreme Co urt allowed
entry to thirty -five Indians who had not made a continuous
journey. Encouraged by this judgment , ’Gurdit Singh, an Indian
contractor living in Singapore, decided to charter a ship and
carry to Vancouver, Indians who were living in various place s in
East and South -East Asia. Carrying a total of 376 Indian
passengers, the ship began its journey to Vancouver. Ghadar
activists visited the ship at Yokohama in Japan, gave lectures
and distributed literature. The Press in Punjab warned of serious
conse quences if the Indians were not allowed entry into Canada.
The Press in Canada took a different view and some newspapers
in Vancouver alerted the people to the ‘Mounting Oriental
Invasion.’ The Government of Canada had, meanwhile, plugged
the legal loophol es that had resulted in the November Supreme[/INST] |
the legal loophol es that had resulted in the November Supreme
Court judgment . The battle lines were clearly drawn. | <s>[INST]the legal loophol es that had resulted in the November Supreme
Court judgment . The battle lines were clearly drawn.[/INST] |
133 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
When the ship arrived in Vancouver, it was not allowed into
the port and was cordoned off by the police. To fight for the rights
of the passengers, a ‘Shore Committee’ was set up under the
leadership of Husain Rahim, Sohan Lal Pathak and Balwant
Singh, funds were raised, and protest meetings organized.
Rebellion against the British in India was threatened. In the
United States, under the leadership of Bhagwan Singh,
Baikatullah, Ram Chandra and Sohan Singh Bhakna, a powerful
campaign was organized and the people were advised to prepare
for rebellion.
Soon the Komagata Maru was forced out of Canadian
waters. Before it reached Yokohama, World War I broke out, and
the British Government passed orders that no passenger be
allowed to disembark anywhere on the way — not even at the
places from where they had joined the ship — but only at
Calcutta. At every port that the ship touched, it triggered off a
wave of resent ment and anger among the Indian community and
became the occasion for anti-British mobilization. On landing at
Budge Budge near Calcutta, the harassed and irate passengers,
provoked by the hostile attitude of the authorities, resisted the
police and this l ed to a clash in which eighteen passengers were
killed, and 202 arrested. A few of them succeeded in escaping.
The third and most important development that made the
Ghadar revolution imminent was the outbreak of the World War
1. After all, this was the o pportunity they had been told to seize.
True, they were not really prepared, but should they now let it
just pass by? A special meeting of the leading activists of the
Ghadar Movement decided that the opportunity must be seized,
that it was better to die than to do nothing at all, and that their
major weakness, the lack of arms, could be overcome by going to
India and winning over the Indian soldiers to their cause. The
Ailan -e-Jung or Proclamation of War of the Ghadar Party was | <s>[INST]133 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
When the ship arrived in Vancouver, it was not allowed into
the port and was cordoned off by the police. To fight for the rights
of the passengers, a ‘Shore Committee’ was set up under the
leadership of Husain Rahim, Sohan Lal Pathak and Balwant
Singh, funds were raised, and protest meetings organized.
Rebellion against the British in India was threatened. In the
United States, under the leadership of Bhagwan Singh,
Baikatullah, Ram Chandra and Sohan Singh Bhakna, a powerful
campaign was organized and the people were advised to prepare
for rebellion.
Soon the Komagata Maru was forced out of Canadian
waters. Before it reached Yokohama, World War I broke out, and
the British Government passed orders that no passenger be
allowed to disembark anywhere on the way — not even at the
places from where they had joined the ship — but only at
Calcutta. At every port that the ship touched, it triggered off a
wave of resent ment and anger among the Indian community and
became the occasion for anti-British mobilization. On landing at
Budge Budge near Calcutta, the harassed and irate passengers,
provoked by the hostile attitude of the authorities, resisted the
police and this l ed to a clash in which eighteen passengers were
killed, and 202 arrested. A few of them succeeded in escaping.
The third and most important development that made the
Ghadar revolution imminent was the outbreak of the World War
1. After all, this was the o pportunity they had been told to seize.
True, they were not really prepared, but should they now let it
just pass by? A special meeting of the leading activists of the
Ghadar Movement decided that the opportunity must be seized,
that it was better to die than to do nothing at all, and that their
major weakness, the lack of arms, could be overcome by going to
India and winning over the Indian soldiers to their cause. The
Ailan -e-Jung or Proclamation of War of the Ghadar Party was[/INST] |
Ailan -e-Jung or Proclamation of War of the Ghadar Party was
issued and circulated widely . Mohammed Barkatullah, Ram
Chandra and Bhagwan Singh organized and addressed a series of
public meetings to exhort Indians to go back to India and
organize an armed revolt. Prominent leaders were sent to
persuade Indians living in Japan, the Philippines, China, Hong
Kong, The Malay States, Singapore and Burma to return home
and join the rebels. The more impatient among the Ghadar
activists, such as Kartar Singh Sarabha, later hanged by the | <s>[INST]Ailan -e-Jung or Proclamation of War of the Ghadar Party was
issued and circulated widely . Mohammed Barkatullah, Ram
Chandra and Bhagwan Singh organized and addressed a series of
public meetings to exhort Indians to go back to India and
organize an armed revolt. Prominent leaders were sent to
persuade Indians living in Japan, the Philippines, China, Hong
Kong, The Malay States, Singapore and Burma to return home
and join the rebels. The more impatient among the Ghadar
activists, such as Kartar Singh Sarabha, later hanged by the[/INST] |
134 | India’s Struggle For Independence
British in a conspiracy case, and Raghubar Dayal G1rta
immediately left for India.
*
The Government of India, fully informed of the Ghadar
plans, which were, in any case, hardly a secret, armed itself with
the Ingress into India Ordinance and waited for the returning
emigrants. On arrival, the emigrants, were scrutinized, the ‘safe’
ones allowed to proceed home, the more ‘dangerous’ ones
arrested and the less dangerous’ ones ordered not to leave their
home villages. Of course, some of ‘the dangerous’ ones escaped
detection and went to Punjab to foment rebellion. Of an esti mated
8000 emigrants who returned to India, 5000 were allowed to
proceed unhindered. Precautionary measures were taken for
roughly 1500 men. Upto February 1915, 189 had been interned
and 704 restricted to their villages. Many who came via Colombo
and South India succeeded in reaching Punjab without being
found out.
But Punjab in 1914 was very different from what the
Ghadarites had been led to expect — they found the Punjabis
were in no mood to join the romantic adventure of the Ghadar.
The militants from a broad tried their best, they toured the
villages, addressed gatherings at melas and festivals, all to no
avail. The Chief Khalsa Diwan proclaiming its loyalty to the
sovereign, declared them to be ‘fallen’ Sikhs and criminals, and
helped the Government to track them down.
Frustrated and disillusioned with the attitude of the civilian
population, the Ghadarites turned their attention to the army
and made a number of naive attempts in November 1914 to get
the army units to mutiny. But the lack of an organized leadership
and central command frustrated all the Ghadar‘s efforts.
Frantically, the Ghadar made an attempt to find a leader;
Bengali revolutionaries were contacted and through the efforts of
Sachindranath Sanyal and Vishnu Ganesh Pingley, Rash Behari
Bose, the Bengali revolutionary who had become famous by his | <s>[INST]134 | India’s Struggle For Independence
British in a conspiracy case, and Raghubar Dayal G1rta
immediately left for India.
*
The Government of India, fully informed of the Ghadar
plans, which were, in any case, hardly a secret, armed itself with
the Ingress into India Ordinance and waited for the returning
emigrants. On arrival, the emigrants, were scrutinized, the ‘safe’
ones allowed to proceed home, the more ‘dangerous’ ones
arrested and the less dangerous’ ones ordered not to leave their
home villages. Of course, some of ‘the dangerous’ ones escaped
detection and went to Punjab to foment rebellion. Of an esti mated
8000 emigrants who returned to India, 5000 were allowed to
proceed unhindered. Precautionary measures were taken for
roughly 1500 men. Upto February 1915, 189 had been interned
and 704 restricted to their villages. Many who came via Colombo
and South India succeeded in reaching Punjab without being
found out.
But Punjab in 1914 was very different from what the
Ghadarites had been led to expect — they found the Punjabis
were in no mood to join the romantic adventure of the Ghadar.
The militants from a broad tried their best, they toured the
villages, addressed gatherings at melas and festivals, all to no
avail. The Chief Khalsa Diwan proclaiming its loyalty to the
sovereign, declared them to be ‘fallen’ Sikhs and criminals, and
helped the Government to track them down.
Frustrated and disillusioned with the attitude of the civilian
population, the Ghadarites turned their attention to the army
and made a number of naive attempts in November 1914 to get
the army units to mutiny. But the lack of an organized leadership
and central command frustrated all the Ghadar‘s efforts.
Frantically, the Ghadar made an attempt to find a leader;
Bengali revolutionaries were contacted and through the efforts of
Sachindranath Sanyal and Vishnu Ganesh Pingley, Rash Behari
Bose, the Bengali revolutionary who had become famous by his[/INST] |
Bose, the Bengali revolutionary who had become famous by his
daring attack on Hardinge, the Viceroy, finally arrived in Punjab
in mid -January 1915 to assume leadership of the revolt. | <s>[INST]Bose, the Bengali revolutionary who had become famous by his
daring attack on Hardinge, the Viceroy, finally arrived in Punjab
in mid -January 1915 to assume leadership of the revolt.[/INST] |
135 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
Bose established a semblance of an organization and sent
out men to contact army units in different centres, (from Bannu
in the North -West Frontier to Faizabad and Lucknow in the U.P.)
and report back by 11 February 1915. The emissaries returned
with optimistic reports, and the date for the mutiny was set first
for 21 and then fo r 19 February. But the Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) had succeeded in penetrating the organization,
from the very highest level down, and the Government succeeded
in taking effective pre -emptive measures. Most of the leaders were
arrested, though Bose escaped. For all practical purposes, the
Ghadar Movement was crushed. But the Government did not
stop there. In what was perhaps the most repressive action
experienced by the national movement this far, conspiracy trials
were held in Punjab and Manda lay, forty -five revolutionaries were
sentenced to death and over 200 to long terms of imprisonment.
An entire generation of the nationalist leadership of Punjab was,
thus, politically beheaded.
Some Indian revolutionaries who were operating from
Berlin, and who had links with the Ghadar leader Ram Chandra
in America, continued, with German help, to make attempts to
organize a mutiny among Indian troops stationed abroad. Raja
Mahendra Pratap and Barkatullah tried to enlist the help of the
Amir of Afghanista n and even, hopefully, set up a Provisional
Government in Kabul, but these and other attempts failed to
record any significant success. It appeared that violent opposition
to British rule was fated to fail.
*
Should we, therefore, conclude that the Ghadar ites fought
in vain? Or that, because they could not drive out the British,
their movement was a failure? Both these conclusions are not
necessarily correct because the success or failure of a political
movement is not always to be measured in terms of its
achievement of stated objectives. By that measure, all the major | <s>[INST]135 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
Bose established a semblance of an organization and sent
out men to contact army units in different centres, (from Bannu
in the North -West Frontier to Faizabad and Lucknow in the U.P.)
and report back by 11 February 1915. The emissaries returned
with optimistic reports, and the date for the mutiny was set first
for 21 and then fo r 19 February. But the Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) had succeeded in penetrating the organization,
from the very highest level down, and the Government succeeded
in taking effective pre -emptive measures. Most of the leaders were
arrested, though Bose escaped. For all practical purposes, the
Ghadar Movement was crushed. But the Government did not
stop there. In what was perhaps the most repressive action
experienced by the national movement this far, conspiracy trials
were held in Punjab and Manda lay, forty -five revolutionaries were
sentenced to death and over 200 to long terms of imprisonment.
An entire generation of the nationalist leadership of Punjab was,
thus, politically beheaded.
Some Indian revolutionaries who were operating from
Berlin, and who had links with the Ghadar leader Ram Chandra
in America, continued, with German help, to make attempts to
organize a mutiny among Indian troops stationed abroad. Raja
Mahendra Pratap and Barkatullah tried to enlist the help of the
Amir of Afghanista n and even, hopefully, set up a Provisional
Government in Kabul, but these and other attempts failed to
record any significant success. It appeared that violent opposition
to British rule was fated to fail.
*
Should we, therefore, conclude that the Ghadar ites fought
in vain? Or that, because they could not drive out the British,
their movement was a failure? Both these conclusions are not
necessarily correct because the success or failure of a political
movement is not always to be measured in terms of its
achievement of stated objectives. By that measure, all the major[/INST] |
national struggles whether of 1920 -22, 1930 -34, or 1942 would
have to be classified as failures, since none of them culminated in
Indian independence. But if success and failure are to be
measured in terms of the deepening of nationalist consciousness,
the evolution and testing of new strategies and methods of | <s>[INST]national struggles whether of 1920 -22, 1930 -34, or 1942 would
have to be classified as failures, since none of them culminated in
Indian independence. But if success and failure are to be
measured in terms of the deepening of nationalist consciousness,
the evolution and testing of new strategies and methods of[/INST] |
136 | India’s Struggle For Independence
struggle, the creation of tradition of resistance, of secularism, of
democracy, and of egalitarianism, then, the Ghadarites certainly
contributed their share to the struggle for India’s freedom.
Ironic though it may seem, it was in the realm of ideology
that Ghadar success was the greatest. Through the earlier
papers, but most of all through The Ghadar itself, the entire
nationalist cri tique of co1onialin, which was the most solid and
abiding contribution of the moderate nationalists, was carried, in
a powerful and simple form, to the mass of Indian immigrants,
many of whom were poor workers and agricultural labourers.
This huge propagan da effort motivated and educated an entire
generation. Though a majority of the leaders of the Ghadar
Movement, and most of the participants were drawn from among
the Silchs, the ideology that was created and spread through The
Ghadar and Ghadar di Goonj and other publications was strongly
secular in tone. Concern with religion was seen as petty and
narrow -minded, and unworthy of revolutionaries. That this was
not mere brave talk is seen by the ease with which leaders
belonging to, different religions and r egions were accepted by the
movement. Lala Har Dayal was a Hindu, and so were Ram
Chandra and many others, Barkatullah was a Muslim and Rash
Behari Bose a Hindu and a Bengali! But perhaps much more
important, the Ghadarites consciously set out to create a secular
consciousness among the Punjabis. A good example of this is the
way in which the term Turka Shahi (Turkish rule), which in
Punjabi was a synonym for oppression and high-handed behavior
, was sought to be reinterpreted and the Punjabis were urged to
look upon the ‘Turks’ (read Muslims) as their brothers who
fought hard for the country’s freedom. Further, the nationalist
salute Bande Mataram (and not any Sikh religious greeting such
as Sag Sri Akal) was urged upon and adopted as the rallying cry | <s>[INST]136 | India’s Struggle For Independence
struggle, the creation of tradition of resistance, of secularism, of
democracy, and of egalitarianism, then, the Ghadarites certainly
contributed their share to the struggle for India’s freedom.
Ironic though it may seem, it was in the realm of ideology
that Ghadar success was the greatest. Through the earlier
papers, but most of all through The Ghadar itself, the entire
nationalist cri tique of co1onialin, which was the most solid and
abiding contribution of the moderate nationalists, was carried, in
a powerful and simple form, to the mass of Indian immigrants,
many of whom were poor workers and agricultural labourers.
This huge propagan da effort motivated and educated an entire
generation. Though a majority of the leaders of the Ghadar
Movement, and most of the participants were drawn from among
the Silchs, the ideology that was created and spread through The
Ghadar and Ghadar di Goonj and other publications was strongly
secular in tone. Concern with religion was seen as petty and
narrow -minded, and unworthy of revolutionaries. That this was
not mere brave talk is seen by the ease with which leaders
belonging to, different religions and r egions were accepted by the
movement. Lala Har Dayal was a Hindu, and so were Ram
Chandra and many others, Barkatullah was a Muslim and Rash
Behari Bose a Hindu and a Bengali! But perhaps much more
important, the Ghadarites consciously set out to create a secular
consciousness among the Punjabis. A good example of this is the
way in which the term Turka Shahi (Turkish rule), which in
Punjabi was a synonym for oppression and high-handed behavior
, was sought to be reinterpreted and the Punjabis were urged to
look upon the ‘Turks’ (read Muslims) as their brothers who
fought hard for the country’s freedom. Further, the nationalist
salute Bande Mataram (and not any Sikh religious greeting such
as Sag Sri Akal) was urged upon and adopted as the rallying cry[/INST] |
of th e Ghadar Movement. The Ghadarites sought to give a new
meaning to religion as well. They urged that religion lay not in
observing the outward forms such as those signified by long hair
and Kirpan (sword), but in remaining true to the model of good
behavior that was enjoined by all religious teachings.
The ambiguities that remained in the Ghadar ideological
discourse, such as those evidenced by Har Dayal’s advocacy of
Khilafat as a religious cause of the Muslims, or when t h.e British
policy of not allowing Sikhs to carry arms was criticized, etc., | <s>[INST]of th e Ghadar Movement. The Ghadarites sought to give a new
meaning to religion as well. They urged that religion lay not in
observing the outward forms such as those signified by long hair
and Kirpan (sword), but in remaining true to the model of good
behavior that was enjoined by all religious teachings.
The ambiguities that remained in the Ghadar ideological
discourse, such as those evidenced by Har Dayal’s advocacy of
Khilafat as a religious cause of the Muslims, or when t h.e British
policy of not allowing Sikhs to carry arms was criticized, etc.,[/INST] |
137 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
were a product of the transitional stage in the evolution of a
secular nationalist ideology that was spanned by the Ghadar
Movement and its leaders. Also, the defence of religious interests
has to be seen as part of the whole aspect of cultural defence
against colonialism, and not necessarily as an aspect of
communalism or communal ideology and consciousness.
Nor did the Ghadarites betray any narrow regional loyalties.
Lokamanya Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose, Khudi Ram Bo se, Kanhia
Lal Du tt, Savarkar were all the heroes of the Ghadars. Rash
Behari Bose was importuned and accepted as the leader of the
abortive Ghadar revolt in 1915. Far from dwelling on the
greatness of the Sikhs or the Punjabis, the Ghadars constantly
criticized the loyalist role played by the Punjabis during 1857.
Similarly, the large Sikh presence in the British Indian Army was
not hailed as proof of the so -called ‘martial’ traditions of the
Sikhs, as became common later, but was seen as a matter of
shame and Sikh soldiers were asked to revolt against the British.
The self -image of the Punjabi, and especially of the Punjabi Sikh,
that was created by the Ghadar Movement was that of an Indian
who had betrayed his motherland in 1857 by siding with the
foreign er and who had, therefore, to make amends to Bharat
Mata, by fighting for her honor . In the words of Sohan Singh
Bhakna, who later became a major peasant and Communist
leader: ‘We were not Sikhs or Punjabis. Our religion was
patriotism.’
Another marked feature of Ghadar ideology was its
democratic and egalitarian content. It was clearly stated by the
Ghadarites that their objective was the establishment of an
independent republic of India. Also, deeply influenced as he was
by anarchist and syndicalist movem ents, and even by socialist
ideas, Har Dayal imparted to the movement an egalitarian
ideology. Perhaps this facilitated the transformation of many | <s>[INST]137 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
were a product of the transitional stage in the evolution of a
secular nationalist ideology that was spanned by the Ghadar
Movement and its leaders. Also, the defence of religious interests
has to be seen as part of the whole aspect of cultural defence
against colonialism, and not necessarily as an aspect of
communalism or communal ideology and consciousness.
Nor did the Ghadarites betray any narrow regional loyalties.
Lokamanya Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose, Khudi Ram Bo se, Kanhia
Lal Du tt, Savarkar were all the heroes of the Ghadars. Rash
Behari Bose was importuned and accepted as the leader of the
abortive Ghadar revolt in 1915. Far from dwelling on the
greatness of the Sikhs or the Punjabis, the Ghadars constantly
criticized the loyalist role played by the Punjabis during 1857.
Similarly, the large Sikh presence in the British Indian Army was
not hailed as proof of the so -called ‘martial’ traditions of the
Sikhs, as became common later, but was seen as a matter of
shame and Sikh soldiers were asked to revolt against the British.
The self -image of the Punjabi, and especially of the Punjabi Sikh,
that was created by the Ghadar Movement was that of an Indian
who had betrayed his motherland in 1857 by siding with the
foreign er and who had, therefore, to make amends to Bharat
Mata, by fighting for her honor . In the words of Sohan Singh
Bhakna, who later became a major peasant and Communist
leader: ‘We were not Sikhs or Punjabis. Our religion was
patriotism.’
Another marked feature of Ghadar ideology was its
democratic and egalitarian content. It was clearly stated by the
Ghadarites that their objective was the establishment of an
independent republic of India. Also, deeply influenced as he was
by anarchist and syndicalist movem ents, and even by socialist
ideas, Har Dayal imparted to the movement an egalitarian
ideology. Perhaps this facilitated the transformation of many[/INST] |
ideology. Perhaps this facilitated the transformation of many
Ghadarites into peasant leaders and Communist in the ‘20s and
‘30s.
Har Dayal’s other major contribution was the creation of a
truly internationalist outlook among the Ghadar revolutionaries.
His lectures and articles were full of references to Irish, Mexican,
and Russian revolutionaries. For example, he referred to Mexican
revolutionaries as ‘Mexican Ghadarites .”Ghadar militants were | <s>[INST]ideology. Perhaps this facilitated the transformation of many
Ghadarites into peasant leaders and Communist in the ‘20s and
‘30s.
Har Dayal’s other major contribution was the creation of a
truly internationalist outlook among the Ghadar revolutionaries.
His lectures and articles were full of references to Irish, Mexican,
and Russian revolutionaries. For example, he referred to Mexican
revolutionaries as ‘Mexican Ghadarites .”Ghadar militants were[/INST] |
138 | India’s Struggle For Independence
thus distinguished by their secular, egalitarian, democratic and
non-chauvinistic internationalist outlook.
This does not, however, mean that the Ghadar Movement
did not suffer from any weaknesses. The major weakness of the
Ghadar leaders was that they completely under -estimated the
extent and amount of preparation at every level — organizational,
ideological, strategic, tactical, financial — that was necessary
before an attempt at an armed revolt could be organized. Taken
by surpri se by the outbreak of the war and roused to a fever -
pitch by the Komagata Maru episode, they sounded the bugles of
war without examining the state of their army. They forgot that to
mobilize a few thousand discontented immigrant Indians, who
were already i n a highly charged emotional state because of the
racial discrimination they suffered at me hands of white
foreigners, was very different from the stupendous task of
mobilizing and motivating lakhs of peasants and soldiers in
India. They underestimated the strength of the British in India,
both their aimed and organizational might as well as the
ideological foundations of their rule and led themselves to
imagine that all that the masses of India lacked was a call to
revolt, which, once given, would strike a fatal blow to the
tottering structure of British rule.
The Ghadar Movement also failed to generate an effective
and sustained leadership that was capable of integrating the
various aspects of the movement. Har Dayal himself was
temperamentally totally un suited to the role of an organizer; he
was a propagandist, an inspirer, an ideologue. Even his ideas did
not form a structured whole but remained a shifting amalgam of
various theories that attracted him from time to time- Further,
his departure from the U .S. at a critical stage left his compatriots
floundering.
Another major weakness of the movement was its almost
none existent organizational structure; the Ghadar Movement | <s>[INST]138 | India’s Struggle For Independence
thus distinguished by their secular, egalitarian, democratic and
non-chauvinistic internationalist outlook.
This does not, however, mean that the Ghadar Movement
did not suffer from any weaknesses. The major weakness of the
Ghadar leaders was that they completely under -estimated the
extent and amount of preparation at every level — organizational,
ideological, strategic, tactical, financial — that was necessary
before an attempt at an armed revolt could be organized. Taken
by surpri se by the outbreak of the war and roused to a fever -
pitch by the Komagata Maru episode, they sounded the bugles of
war without examining the state of their army. They forgot that to
mobilize a few thousand discontented immigrant Indians, who
were already i n a highly charged emotional state because of the
racial discrimination they suffered at me hands of white
foreigners, was very different from the stupendous task of
mobilizing and motivating lakhs of peasants and soldiers in
India. They underestimated the strength of the British in India,
both their aimed and organizational might as well as the
ideological foundations of their rule and led themselves to
imagine that all that the masses of India lacked was a call to
revolt, which, once given, would strike a fatal blow to the
tottering structure of British rule.
The Ghadar Movement also failed to generate an effective
and sustained leadership that was capable of integrating the
various aspects of the movement. Har Dayal himself was
temperamentally totally un suited to the role of an organizer; he
was a propagandist, an inspirer, an ideologue. Even his ideas did
not form a structured whole but remained a shifting amalgam of
various theories that attracted him from time to time- Further,
his departure from the U .S. at a critical stage left his compatriots
floundering.
Another major weakness of the movement was its almost
none existent organizational structure; the Ghadar Movement[/INST] |
none existent organizational structure; the Ghadar Movement
was sustained, more by the enthusiasm of the militants than by
their effective organ ization.
These weaknesses of understanding, of leadership, of
organization, all resulted in what one can only call a tremendous
waste of valuable human resources. If we recall that forty’
Ghadarities were sentenced to be hanged and over 200 given long | <s>[INST]none existent organizational structure; the Ghadar Movement
was sustained, more by the enthusiasm of the militants than by
their effective organ ization.
These weaknesses of understanding, of leadership, of
organization, all resulted in what one can only call a tremendous
waste of valuable human resources. If we recall that forty’
Ghadarities were sentenced to be hanged and over 200 given long[/INST] |
139 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
terms of imprisonment, we can well realize that the particular
romantic adventure of 1914 -15 resulted in the beheading of an
entire generation of secular nationalist leadership, who could
perhaps have, if they had remained politically effective, given an
entirely different political complexion to Punjab in the following
years. They would certainly have given their strong secular
moorings, acted as a bulwark against the growth of communal
tendencies that were to raise their heads in later years. That this
is not just wild speculation is seen from the fact that, in the late
‘20s, and ‘30s, the few surviving Ghadarites helped lay the
foundations of a secular national and peasant movement in
Punjab. | <s>[INST]139 | World War I and Indian Nationalism: The Ghadar
terms of imprisonment, we can well realize that the particular
romantic adventure of 1914 -15 resulted in the beheading of an
entire generation of secular nationalist leadership, who could
perhaps have, if they had remained politically effective, given an
entirely different political complexion to Punjab in the following
years. They would certainly have given their strong secular
moorings, acted as a bulwark against the growth of communal
tendencies that were to raise their heads in later years. That this
is not just wild speculation is seen from the fact that, in the late
‘20s, and ‘30s, the few surviving Ghadarites helped lay the
foundations of a secular national and peasant movement in
Punjab.[/INST] |
140 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 13. THE HOME RULE
MOVEMENT AND ITS
FALLOUT
The romantic adventure of the Ghadar revolutionaries was
the dramatic response of Indians living abroad to the First World
War. We now turn to the less charged, but more effective, Indian
response — the Home Rule League Mov ement, led by Lokamanya
Tilak and Annie Besant.
*
On 16 June 1914, Bal Gangadhar Tilak was released after
serving a prison sentence of six years, most of which he had
spent in Mandalay in Burma. He returned to India very different
to the one he had been b anished from. Aurobindo Ghose, the
firebrand of the Swadeshi days, had taken sanyas in
Pondicherry, and Lala Lajpat Rai was away in the United States
of America. The Indian National Congress had yet to recover from
the combined effects of the split at Sura t in 1907, the heavy
government repression of the activists of the Swadeshi
Movement, and the disillusionment of the Moderates with the
constitutional reforms of 1909.
Tilak initially concentrated all his attention on seeking
readmission, for himself and other Extremists, into the Indian
National Congress. He was obviously convinced that the sanction
of this body, that had come to symbolize the Indian national
movement, was a necessary pre -condition for the success of any
political action. To conciliate th e Moderates and convince them of
his bonafides, as well as to stave off any possible government
repression, he publicly declared: I may state once for all that we
are trying in India, as the Irish Home -rulers have been doing in
Ireland, for a reform of the system of administration and not for
the overthrow of Government; aid I have no hesitation in saying
that the acts of violence which had been committed in the
different Parts of India are not only repugnant to me, but have, in | <s>[INST]140 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 13. THE HOME RULE
MOVEMENT AND ITS
FALLOUT
The romantic adventure of the Ghadar revolutionaries was
the dramatic response of Indians living abroad to the First World
War. We now turn to the less charged, but more effective, Indian
response — the Home Rule League Mov ement, led by Lokamanya
Tilak and Annie Besant.
*
On 16 June 1914, Bal Gangadhar Tilak was released after
serving a prison sentence of six years, most of which he had
spent in Mandalay in Burma. He returned to India very different
to the one he had been b anished from. Aurobindo Ghose, the
firebrand of the Swadeshi days, had taken sanyas in
Pondicherry, and Lala Lajpat Rai was away in the United States
of America. The Indian National Congress had yet to recover from
the combined effects of the split at Sura t in 1907, the heavy
government repression of the activists of the Swadeshi
Movement, and the disillusionment of the Moderates with the
constitutional reforms of 1909.
Tilak initially concentrated all his attention on seeking
readmission, for himself and other Extremists, into the Indian
National Congress. He was obviously convinced that the sanction
of this body, that had come to symbolize the Indian national
movement, was a necessary pre -condition for the success of any
political action. To conciliate th e Moderates and convince them of
his bonafides, as well as to stave off any possible government
repression, he publicly declared: I may state once for all that we
are trying in India, as the Irish Home -rulers have been doing in
Ireland, for a reform of the system of administration and not for
the overthrow of Government; aid I have no hesitation in saying
that the acts of violence which had been committed in the
different Parts of India are not only repugnant to me, but have, in[/INST] |
141 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
my opinion, only unfortunate ly retarded to a great extent, the
pace of our political progress.” He further assured the
Government of his loyalty to the Crown and urged all Indians to
assist the British Government in its hour of crisis.
Many of the Moderate leaders of the Congress we re also
unhappy with the choice they had made in 1907 at Surat, and
also with the fact that the Congress had lapsed into almost total
inactivity. They were, therefore, quite sympathetic to Tilak’s
overtures. Further, they were under considerable pressure f rom
Mrs. Annie Besant, who had just joined the Indian National
Congress and was keen to arouse nationalist political activity, to
admit the Extremists.
Annie Besant, already sixty -six in 1914, had begun her
political career in England as a proponent of Fr ee Thought,
Radicalism, Fabianism and Theosophy, and had come to India in
1893 to work for the Theosophical Society. Since 1907, she had
been spreading the message of Theosophy from her headquarters
in Adyar, a suburb of Madras, and had gained a large numb er of
followers among the educated members of many communities
that had experienced no cultural revival of their own. In 1914,
she decided to enlarge the sphere of her activities to include the
building of a movement for Home Rule on the lines of the Irish
Home Rule League. For this, she realized it was necessary both to
get the sanction of the Congress, as well as the active cooperation
of the Extremists. She devoted her energies, therefore, to
persuading the Moderate leaders to open the doors of the
Congr ess to’ Tilak and his fellow - Extremists.
But the annual Congress session in December 1914 was to
prove a disappointment — Pherozeshah Mehta and his Bombay
Moderate group succeeded, by winning over Gokhale and the
Bengal Moderates, in keeping out the Extr emists. Tilak and
Besant thereupon decided to revive political activity on their own, | <s>[INST]141 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
my opinion, only unfortunate ly retarded to a great extent, the
pace of our political progress.” He further assured the
Government of his loyalty to the Crown and urged all Indians to
assist the British Government in its hour of crisis.
Many of the Moderate leaders of the Congress we re also
unhappy with the choice they had made in 1907 at Surat, and
also with the fact that the Congress had lapsed into almost total
inactivity. They were, therefore, quite sympathetic to Tilak’s
overtures. Further, they were under considerable pressure f rom
Mrs. Annie Besant, who had just joined the Indian National
Congress and was keen to arouse nationalist political activity, to
admit the Extremists.
Annie Besant, already sixty -six in 1914, had begun her
political career in England as a proponent of Fr ee Thought,
Radicalism, Fabianism and Theosophy, and had come to India in
1893 to work for the Theosophical Society. Since 1907, she had
been spreading the message of Theosophy from her headquarters
in Adyar, a suburb of Madras, and had gained a large numb er of
followers among the educated members of many communities
that had experienced no cultural revival of their own. In 1914,
she decided to enlarge the sphere of her activities to include the
building of a movement for Home Rule on the lines of the Irish
Home Rule League. For this, she realized it was necessary both to
get the sanction of the Congress, as well as the active cooperation
of the Extremists. She devoted her energies, therefore, to
persuading the Moderate leaders to open the doors of the
Congr ess to’ Tilak and his fellow - Extremists.
But the annual Congress session in December 1914 was to
prove a disappointment — Pherozeshah Mehta and his Bombay
Moderate group succeeded, by winning over Gokhale and the
Bengal Moderates, in keeping out the Extr emists. Tilak and
Besant thereupon decided to revive political activity on their own,[/INST] |
while maintaining their pressure on the Congress to re -admit the
Extremist group.
*
In early 1915, Annie Besant launched a campaign through
her two papers, New India and Commonweal, and organized | <s>[INST]while maintaining their pressure on the Congress to re -admit the
Extremist group.
*
In early 1915, Annie Besant launched a campaign through
her two papers, New India and Commonweal, and organized[/INST] |
142 | India’s Struggle For Independence
public meetings and conferences to demand that India be granted
self-government on the lines of the White colonies after the War.
From April 1915, her tone became more peremptory and her
stance more aggressive.
Meanwhile, Lokaman ya began his political activities, but,
not yet saving gained admittance into the Congress, was careful
that he did not in any way alarm the Moderates or appear to be
by-passing the Congress. This is clear from the fact that at the
meeting of his followers convened at Poona in May 1915, it was
decided that their initial phase of action would be to set up an
agency ‘to enlighten the villagers regarding the objects and work
of the Congress.’2 The local associations that were set up in
many Maharashtra towns i n August and September of that year
also concentrated more on emphasizing the need for unity in the
Congress than on the stepping up of political activity. While
sometimes resorting to threats to pressurize the more
conservative among the Moderates, Tilak still hoped to persuade
the majority to accept him because of his reasonableness and
caution.
His efforts and those of Annie Besant were soon to meet
with success, and at the annual session of the Congress in
December 1915 it was decided that the Extremis ts be allowed to
rejoin the Congress. The opposition from the Bombay group had
been greatly weakened by the death of Pherozeshah Mehta. But
Annie Besant did not succeed in getting the Congress and the
Muslim League to support her decision to set up Home Ru le
Leagues. She did manage, however, to persuade the Congress to
commit itself to a programme of educative propaganda and to a
revival of the local level Congress committees. Knowing that the
Congress, as constituted at the time, was unlikely to implement
this, she had inserted a condition by which, if the Congress did
not start this activity by September 1916, she would be free to set
up her own League. | <s>[INST]142 | India’s Struggle For Independence
public meetings and conferences to demand that India be granted
self-government on the lines of the White colonies after the War.
From April 1915, her tone became more peremptory and her
stance more aggressive.
Meanwhile, Lokaman ya began his political activities, but,
not yet saving gained admittance into the Congress, was careful
that he did not in any way alarm the Moderates or appear to be
by-passing the Congress. This is clear from the fact that at the
meeting of his followers convened at Poona in May 1915, it was
decided that their initial phase of action would be to set up an
agency ‘to enlighten the villagers regarding the objects and work
of the Congress.’2 The local associations that were set up in
many Maharashtra towns i n August and September of that year
also concentrated more on emphasizing the need for unity in the
Congress than on the stepping up of political activity. While
sometimes resorting to threats to pressurize the more
conservative among the Moderates, Tilak still hoped to persuade
the majority to accept him because of his reasonableness and
caution.
His efforts and those of Annie Besant were soon to meet
with success, and at the annual session of the Congress in
December 1915 it was decided that the Extremis ts be allowed to
rejoin the Congress. The opposition from the Bombay group had
been greatly weakened by the death of Pherozeshah Mehta. But
Annie Besant did not succeed in getting the Congress and the
Muslim League to support her decision to set up Home Ru le
Leagues. She did manage, however, to persuade the Congress to
commit itself to a programme of educative propaganda and to a
revival of the local level Congress committees. Knowing that the
Congress, as constituted at the time, was unlikely to implement
this, she had inserted a condition by which, if the Congress did
not start this activity by September 1916, she would be free to set
up her own League.[/INST] |
up her own League.
Tilak, not bound by any such commitment, and having
gained the right of readmission, now took the lead and set up the
Home Rule League at the Bombay Provincial Conference held at
Belgaum in April 1916. Annie Besant’s impatient followers,
unhappy with her decision to wait till September, secured her
permission to start Home Rule groups. Jamnadas Dwarkadas, | <s>[INST]up her own League.
Tilak, not bound by any such commitment, and having
gained the right of readmission, now took the lead and set up the
Home Rule League at the Bombay Provincial Conference held at
Belgaum in April 1916. Annie Besant’s impatient followers,
unhappy with her decision to wait till September, secured her
permission to start Home Rule groups. Jamnadas Dwarkadas,[/INST] |
143 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
Shankerlal Banker and Indulal Yagnik set up a Bombay paper
Young India and launched an All India Propaganda Fund to
publish pamphlets in regional languages and in English. In
September 1916, as there were no signs of any Congress activity,
Annie Besant anno unced the formation of her Home Rule League,
with George Arundale, her Theosophical follower, as the
Organizing Secretary. The’ two Leagues avoided any friction by
demarcating their area of activity; Tilak’s League was to work in
Maharashtra, (excluding Bo mbay city), Karnataka, the Central
Provinces and Berar, and Annie Besant’s League was given
charge of the rest of India. The reason the two Leagues did not
merge was because, in Annie Besant’s words, ‘some of his
followers disliked me and some of mine disl iked him. We,
however, had no quarrel with each other.”
Tilak promoted the Home Rule campaign with a tour of
Maharashtra and through his lectures clarified and popularized
the demand for Home Rule. ‘India was like a son who had grown
up and attained matur ity it was right now that the trustee or the
father should give him what was his due. The people of India
must get this effected. They have a right to do so.’ He also linked
up the question of Swaraj with the demand for the formation of
linguistic states and education in the vernacular. ‘Form one
separate state each for Marathi, Telugu and Kanarese provinces .
. . The principle that education should be given through the
vernaculars is self - evident and clear. Do the English educate
their people through the French language? Do Germans do it
through English or the Turks through French?’ At the Bombay
Provincial Conference in 1915, he told V.B. Alur who got up to
support his condolence resolution on Gokhale’s death: ‘Speak in
Kannada to establish the right of K annada language.’ It is clear
that the Lokamanya had no trace of regional or linguistic Marathi
chauvinism.
His stand on the question of non -Brahmin representation | <s>[INST]143 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
Shankerlal Banker and Indulal Yagnik set up a Bombay paper
Young India and launched an All India Propaganda Fund to
publish pamphlets in regional languages and in English. In
September 1916, as there were no signs of any Congress activity,
Annie Besant anno unced the formation of her Home Rule League,
with George Arundale, her Theosophical follower, as the
Organizing Secretary. The’ two Leagues avoided any friction by
demarcating their area of activity; Tilak’s League was to work in
Maharashtra, (excluding Bo mbay city), Karnataka, the Central
Provinces and Berar, and Annie Besant’s League was given
charge of the rest of India. The reason the two Leagues did not
merge was because, in Annie Besant’s words, ‘some of his
followers disliked me and some of mine disl iked him. We,
however, had no quarrel with each other.”
Tilak promoted the Home Rule campaign with a tour of
Maharashtra and through his lectures clarified and popularized
the demand for Home Rule. ‘India was like a son who had grown
up and attained matur ity it was right now that the trustee or the
father should give him what was his due. The people of India
must get this effected. They have a right to do so.’ He also linked
up the question of Swaraj with the demand for the formation of
linguistic states and education in the vernacular. ‘Form one
separate state each for Marathi, Telugu and Kanarese provinces .
. . The principle that education should be given through the
vernaculars is self - evident and clear. Do the English educate
their people through the French language? Do Germans do it
through English or the Turks through French?’ At the Bombay
Provincial Conference in 1915, he told V.B. Alur who got up to
support his condolence resolution on Gokhale’s death: ‘Speak in
Kannada to establish the right of K annada language.’ It is clear
that the Lokamanya had no trace of regional or linguistic Marathi
chauvinism.
His stand on the question of non -Brahmin representation[/INST] |
His stand on the question of non -Brahmin representation
and on the issue of untouchability demonstrated that he was no
casteist either. When the no n-Brahmins in Maharashtra sent a
separate memorandum to the Government dissociating
themselves from the demands of the advanced classes, Tilak
urged those who opposed this to be patient: ‘If we can prove to
the non -Brahmins, by example, that we are wholly on their side
in their demands from the Government, I am sure that in times | <s>[INST]His stand on the question of non -Brahmin representation
and on the issue of untouchability demonstrated that he was no
casteist either. When the no n-Brahmins in Maharashtra sent a
separate memorandum to the Government dissociating
themselves from the demands of the advanced classes, Tilak
urged those who opposed this to be patient: ‘If we can prove to
the non -Brahmins, by example, that we are wholly on their side
in their demands from the Government, I am sure that in times[/INST] |
144 | India’s Struggle For Independence
to come their agitation, now based on social inequality, will merge
into our struggle.’ To the non -Brahmins, he explained that the
real difference was not between Brahmin and non-Brahmin, but
between the educated and the non -educated. Brahmins were
ahead of others in jobs because they were more educated, and
the Government, in spite of its sympathy for non -Brahmins and
hostility towards Brahmins, was forced to look to the needs of the
administration and give jobs to Brahmins. At a conference for the
removal of untouchability, Tilak declared: ‘If a God were to
tolerate untouchability, I would not recognize him as God at all.’
Nor can we discern in his speeches of this period any trace
of religious appeal; the demand for Home Rule was made on a
wholly secular basis. The British were aliens not because they
belonged to another religion but because they did not act in the
Indian interest. ‘He who does what is beneficial to the people of
this country, be he a Muhammedan or an Englishman, is not
alien. ‘Alienness’ has to do with interests. Alienness is certainly
not concerned with white or black skin . . . or re1igion.’
Tilak’s League furthered its propaganda efforts by
publishing six Marath i and two English pamphlets, of which
47,000 copies were sold. Pamphlets were brought out in Gujarati
and Kannada as well. The League was organized into six
branches, one each in Central Maharashtra, Bombay city,
Karnataka, and Central Provinces, and two i n Berar.
As soon as the movement for Home Rule began to gather
steam, the Government hit back, and it chose a particularly
auspicious day for the blow. The 23rd of July, 1916, was Tilak’s
sixtieth birthday, and, according to custom, it was the occasion
for a big celebration. A purse of Rs. one lakh was presented to
him. The same day the Government offered him their own
present: a notice asking him to show cause why he should not be
bound over for good behavior for a period of one year and | <s>[INST]144 | India’s Struggle For Independence
to come their agitation, now based on social inequality, will merge
into our struggle.’ To the non -Brahmins, he explained that the
real difference was not between Brahmin and non-Brahmin, but
between the educated and the non -educated. Brahmins were
ahead of others in jobs because they were more educated, and
the Government, in spite of its sympathy for non -Brahmins and
hostility towards Brahmins, was forced to look to the needs of the
administration and give jobs to Brahmins. At a conference for the
removal of untouchability, Tilak declared: ‘If a God were to
tolerate untouchability, I would not recognize him as God at all.’
Nor can we discern in his speeches of this period any trace
of religious appeal; the demand for Home Rule was made on a
wholly secular basis. The British were aliens not because they
belonged to another religion but because they did not act in the
Indian interest. ‘He who does what is beneficial to the people of
this country, be he a Muhammedan or an Englishman, is not
alien. ‘Alienness’ has to do with interests. Alienness is certainly
not concerned with white or black skin . . . or re1igion.’
Tilak’s League furthered its propaganda efforts by
publishing six Marath i and two English pamphlets, of which
47,000 copies were sold. Pamphlets were brought out in Gujarati
and Kannada as well. The League was organized into six
branches, one each in Central Maharashtra, Bombay city,
Karnataka, and Central Provinces, and two i n Berar.
As soon as the movement for Home Rule began to gather
steam, the Government hit back, and it chose a particularly
auspicious day for the blow. The 23rd of July, 1916, was Tilak’s
sixtieth birthday, and, according to custom, it was the occasion
for a big celebration. A purse of Rs. one lakh was presented to
him. The same day the Government offered him their own
present: a notice asking him to show cause why he should not be
bound over for good behavior for a period of one year and[/INST] |
bound over for good behavior for a period of one year and
demanding securit ies of Rs. 60,000. For Tilak, this was the best
gift he could have wanted for his birthday. ‘The Lord is with us,’
he said, ‘Home Rule will now spread like wildfire.’9 Repression
was sure to fan the fire of revolt.
Tilak was defended by a team of lawyers led by Mohammed
Au Jinnah. He lost the case in the Magistrate’s Court but was
exonerated by the High Court in November. The victory was | <s>[INST]bound over for good behavior for a period of one year and
demanding securit ies of Rs. 60,000. For Tilak, this was the best
gift he could have wanted for his birthday. ‘The Lord is with us,’
he said, ‘Home Rule will now spread like wildfire.’9 Repression
was sure to fan the fire of revolt.
Tilak was defended by a team of lawyers led by Mohammed
Au Jinnah. He lost the case in the Magistrate’s Court but was
exonerated by the High Court in November. The victory was[/INST] |
145 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
hailed all over the country. Gandhiji’s Young India summed up
the popular feeling: ‘Thus, a great victory has been won f or the
cause of Home Rule which has, thus, been freed from the chains
that were sought to be put upon it.”° Tilak immediately pushed
home the advantage by proclaiming in his public speeches that
Home Rule now had the sanction of the Government and he and
his colleagues intensified their propaganda campaign for Home
Rule. By April 1917 Tilak had enlisted 14,000 members.
*
Meanwhile, Annie Besant had gone ahead with the formal
founding of her League in September 1916. The organization of
her League was much looser than that of Tilak’s, and three
members could form a branch while in the case of Tilak’s League
each of the six branches had a clearly defined area and activities.
Two hundred branches of Besant’s League were established,
some consisting of a town and others of groups of villages. And
though a formal Executive Council of seven members was elected
for three years by thirty -four ‘founding branches,’ most of the
work was carried on by Annie Besant and her lieutenants —
Arundale, C.P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, and B.P. Wadia — from her
headquarters at Adyar. Nor was there any organized method for
passing on instructions —these were conveyed through individual
members and through Arundale’s column on Home Rule in New
India. The membership of Annie Besant’s League in creased at a
rate slower than that of Tilak’s. By March 1917, her League had
7,000 members. Besides her existing Theosophical followers,
many others including Jawaharlal Nehru in Allahabad and B.
Chakravarti and J. Banerjea in Calcutta joined the Home Rule
League. However, the strength of the League could not be judged
from the number of branches because, while many were
extremely active, others remained adjuncts of the Theosophical
societies. In Madras city, for example, though the number of | <s>[INST]145 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
hailed all over the country. Gandhiji’s Young India summed up
the popular feeling: ‘Thus, a great victory has been won f or the
cause of Home Rule which has, thus, been freed from the chains
that were sought to be put upon it.”° Tilak immediately pushed
home the advantage by proclaiming in his public speeches that
Home Rule now had the sanction of the Government and he and
his colleagues intensified their propaganda campaign for Home
Rule. By April 1917 Tilak had enlisted 14,000 members.
*
Meanwhile, Annie Besant had gone ahead with the formal
founding of her League in September 1916. The organization of
her League was much looser than that of Tilak’s, and three
members could form a branch while in the case of Tilak’s League
each of the six branches had a clearly defined area and activities.
Two hundred branches of Besant’s League were established,
some consisting of a town and others of groups of villages. And
though a formal Executive Council of seven members was elected
for three years by thirty -four ‘founding branches,’ most of the
work was carried on by Annie Besant and her lieutenants —
Arundale, C.P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, and B.P. Wadia — from her
headquarters at Adyar. Nor was there any organized method for
passing on instructions —these were conveyed through individual
members and through Arundale’s column on Home Rule in New
India. The membership of Annie Besant’s League in creased at a
rate slower than that of Tilak’s. By March 1917, her League had
7,000 members. Besides her existing Theosophical followers,
many others including Jawaharlal Nehru in Allahabad and B.
Chakravarti and J. Banerjea in Calcutta joined the Home Rule
League. However, the strength of the League could not be judged
from the number of branches because, while many were
extremely active, others remained adjuncts of the Theosophical
societies. In Madras city, for example, though the number of[/INST] |
societies. In Madras city, for example, though the number of
branches was v ery large, many were inactive, while the branch in
Bombay city, the four branches in the U.P. towns, and many
village branches in Gujarat were very active.
The main thrust of the activity was directed towards
building up an agitation around the demand for Home Rule. This
was to be achieved by promoting political education and | <s>[INST]societies. In Madras city, for example, though the number of
branches was v ery large, many were inactive, while the branch in
Bombay city, the four branches in the U.P. towns, and many
village branches in Gujarat were very active.
The main thrust of the activity was directed towards
building up an agitation around the demand for Home Rule. This
was to be achieved by promoting political education and[/INST] |
146 | India’s Struggle For Independence
discussion. Arundale, through New India, advised members to
promote political discussions, establish libraries containing
material on national politics, organize classes for students on
politics, print and circulate pamphlets, collect funds, organize
social work, take part in local government activities, arrange
political meetings and lectures, present arguments to friends in
favour of Home Rule and urge them to join the movement. At
least some of these activities were carried on by many of the
branches, and especially the task of promotion of political
discussion and debate.
Some idea of the immensity of the propaganda effort that was
launched can be gauged from the fact that by the t ime Annie
Besant’s League was formally founded in September 1916, the
Propaganda Fund started earlier in the year had already sold
300,000 copies of twenty -six English pamphlets which focused
mainly on the system of government existing in India and the
arguments for self -government. After the founding of the League,
these pamphlets were published again and, in addition, new ones
in Indian languages were brought out. Most branches were also
very active in holding public meetings and lectures. Further, they
would always respond when a nation -wide call was given for
protest on any specific issue. For example, when Annie Besant
was externed from the Central Provinces and Berar in November
1916, most of the branches, at Arundale’s instance, held
meetings and sent resolutions of protest to the Viceroy and the
Secretary of State. Tilak’s externment from Punjab and Delhi in
February 1917 elicited a similar response.
Many Moderate Congressmen, who were dissatisfied with
the inactivity into which the Congress had laps ed, joined the
Home Rule agitation. Members of Gokhale’s Servants of India
Society, though not permitted to become members of the League,
were encouraged to add their weight to the demand for Home | <s>[INST]146 | India’s Struggle For Independence
discussion. Arundale, through New India, advised members to
promote political discussions, establish libraries containing
material on national politics, organize classes for students on
politics, print and circulate pamphlets, collect funds, organize
social work, take part in local government activities, arrange
political meetings and lectures, present arguments to friends in
favour of Home Rule and urge them to join the movement. At
least some of these activities were carried on by many of the
branches, and especially the task of promotion of political
discussion and debate.
Some idea of the immensity of the propaganda effort that was
launched can be gauged from the fact that by the t ime Annie
Besant’s League was formally founded in September 1916, the
Propaganda Fund started earlier in the year had already sold
300,000 copies of twenty -six English pamphlets which focused
mainly on the system of government existing in India and the
arguments for self -government. After the founding of the League,
these pamphlets were published again and, in addition, new ones
in Indian languages were brought out. Most branches were also
very active in holding public meetings and lectures. Further, they
would always respond when a nation -wide call was given for
protest on any specific issue. For example, when Annie Besant
was externed from the Central Provinces and Berar in November
1916, most of the branches, at Arundale’s instance, held
meetings and sent resolutions of protest to the Viceroy and the
Secretary of State. Tilak’s externment from Punjab and Delhi in
February 1917 elicited a similar response.
Many Moderate Congressmen, who were dissatisfied with
the inactivity into which the Congress had laps ed, joined the
Home Rule agitation. Members of Gokhale’s Servants of India
Society, though not permitted to become members of the League,
were encouraged to add their weight to the demand for Home[/INST] |
were encouraged to add their weight to the demand for Home
Rule by undertaking lecture tours and publishing pamphlets.
Many other Moderate nationalists joined the Home Rule Leaguers
in U.P. in touring the surrounding towns and villages in
preparation for the Lucknow session of the Congress in
December 1916. Their meetings were usually organized in the
local Bar libraries, and attended by students, professionals,
businessmen and, if it was a market day, by agriculturists.
Speaking in Hindi, they contrasted India’s current poverty with
her glorious past, and also explained the main features of | <s>[INST]were encouraged to add their weight to the demand for Home
Rule by undertaking lecture tours and publishing pamphlets.
Many other Moderate nationalists joined the Home Rule Leaguers
in U.P. in touring the surrounding towns and villages in
preparation for the Lucknow session of the Congress in
December 1916. Their meetings were usually organized in the
local Bar libraries, and attended by students, professionals,
businessmen and, if it was a market day, by agriculturists.
Speaking in Hindi, they contrasted India’s current poverty with
her glorious past, and also explained the main features of[/INST] |
147 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
European independence movements . The participation of
Moderates was hardly Surprising, since the Home Rule Leagues
were after all only implementing the programme of political
propaganda and education that they had been advocating for so
long.
*
The Lucknow session of the Congress in December 1916
presented the Home Rule Leaguers with the long -awaited
opportunity of demonstrating their strength. Tilak’s Home Rule
League established a tradition that was to become an essential
part of later Congress annual sessions — a special train, known
variously as the ‘Congress Special’ and the ‘Home Rule Special,’
was organized to carry delegates from Western India to Lucknow.
Arundale asked every member of the League to get himself
elected as a delegate to the Lucknow session — the idea being
quite s imply to flood the Congress with Home Rule Leaguers.
Tilak and his men were welcomed back into the Congress by the
Moderate president, Ambika Charan Mazumdar: ‘After nearly 10
years of painful separation and wanderings through the
wilderness of misunderst andings and the mazes of unpleasant
controversies... both the wings of the Indian Nationalist party
have come to realize the fact that united they stand, but divided
they fall, and brothers have at last met brothers...’
The Lucknow Congress was significant also for the famous
Congress League Pact, popularly know as the Lucknow Pact.
Both Tilak and Annie Besant had played a leading role in
bringing about this agreement between the Congress and the
League, much against the wishes of many important leaders,
including Madan Mohan Malaviya. Answering the criticism that
the Pact had acceded too much to the Muslim League,
Lokamanya Tilak said: ‘It has been said, gentlemen, by some that
we Hindus have yielded too much to our Mohammedan brethren.
I am sure I represen t the sense of the Hindu community all over
India when I say that we could not have yielded too much. I | <s>[INST]147 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
European independence movements . The participation of
Moderates was hardly Surprising, since the Home Rule Leagues
were after all only implementing the programme of political
propaganda and education that they had been advocating for so
long.
*
The Lucknow session of the Congress in December 1916
presented the Home Rule Leaguers with the long -awaited
opportunity of demonstrating their strength. Tilak’s Home Rule
League established a tradition that was to become an essential
part of later Congress annual sessions — a special train, known
variously as the ‘Congress Special’ and the ‘Home Rule Special,’
was organized to carry delegates from Western India to Lucknow.
Arundale asked every member of the League to get himself
elected as a delegate to the Lucknow session — the idea being
quite s imply to flood the Congress with Home Rule Leaguers.
Tilak and his men were welcomed back into the Congress by the
Moderate president, Ambika Charan Mazumdar: ‘After nearly 10
years of painful separation and wanderings through the
wilderness of misunderst andings and the mazes of unpleasant
controversies... both the wings of the Indian Nationalist party
have come to realize the fact that united they stand, but divided
they fall, and brothers have at last met brothers...’
The Lucknow Congress was significant also for the famous
Congress League Pact, popularly know as the Lucknow Pact.
Both Tilak and Annie Besant had played a leading role in
bringing about this agreement between the Congress and the
League, much against the wishes of many important leaders,
including Madan Mohan Malaviya. Answering the criticism that
the Pact had acceded too much to the Muslim League,
Lokamanya Tilak said: ‘It has been said, gentlemen, by some that
we Hindus have yielded too much to our Mohammedan brethren.
I am sure I represen t the sense of the Hindu community all over
India when I say that we could not have yielded too much. I[/INST] |
India when I say that we could not have yielded too much. I
would not care if the rights of self -government are granted to the
Mohammedan community only. I would not care if they are
granted to the Rajputs. I wou ld not care if they are granted to the
lower and the lowest classes of the Hindu population provided | <s>[INST]India when I say that we could not have yielded too much. I
would not care if the rights of self -government are granted to the
Mohammedan community only. I would not care if they are
granted to the Rajputs. I wou ld not care if they are granted to the
lower and the lowest classes of the Hindu population provided[/INST] |
148 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the British Government consider them more fit than the educated
classes of India for exercising those rights. I would not care if
those rights are granted to any section of the Indian community.. .
When we have to fight against a third party — it is a very
important thing that we stand on this platform united, united in
race, united in religion, united as regards all different shades of
political creed.”
Faced with such a stand by one who was considered the
most orthodox of Hindus and the greatest scholar of the ancient
religious texts, the opposition stood little chance of success, and
faded away. And though the acceptance of the principle of
separate elector ates for Muslims was certainly a most
controversial decision, it cannot be denied that the Pact was
motivated by a sincere desire to allay minority fears about
majority domination.
The Lucknow Congress also demanded a further dose of
constitutional reform s as a step towards self -government. Though
this did not go as far as the Home Rule Leaguers wished, they
accepted it in the interests of Congress unity. Another very
significant proposal made by Tilak — that the Congress should
appoint a small and cohesiv e Working Committee that would
carry on the day to day affairs of the Congress and be responsible
for implementing the resolutions passed at the annual sessions,
a proposal by which he hoped to transform the Congress from a
deliberative body into one capab le of leading a sustained
movement — was unfortunately quashed by Moderate opposition.
Four years later, in 1920, when Mahatma Gandhi prepared a
reformed ‘constitution for the Congress, this was one of the major
changes considered necessary if the Congress was to lead a
sustained movement.
After the end of the Congress session, a joint meeting of the
two Home Rule Leagues was held in the same pandal, and was
attended by over 1,000 delegates. The Congress League Pact was | <s>[INST]148 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the British Government consider them more fit than the educated
classes of India for exercising those rights. I would not care if
those rights are granted to any section of the Indian community.. .
When we have to fight against a third party — it is a very
important thing that we stand on this platform united, united in
race, united in religion, united as regards all different shades of
political creed.”
Faced with such a stand by one who was considered the
most orthodox of Hindus and the greatest scholar of the ancient
religious texts, the opposition stood little chance of success, and
faded away. And though the acceptance of the principle of
separate elector ates for Muslims was certainly a most
controversial decision, it cannot be denied that the Pact was
motivated by a sincere desire to allay minority fears about
majority domination.
The Lucknow Congress also demanded a further dose of
constitutional reform s as a step towards self -government. Though
this did not go as far as the Home Rule Leaguers wished, they
accepted it in the interests of Congress unity. Another very
significant proposal made by Tilak — that the Congress should
appoint a small and cohesiv e Working Committee that would
carry on the day to day affairs of the Congress and be responsible
for implementing the resolutions passed at the annual sessions,
a proposal by which he hoped to transform the Congress from a
deliberative body into one capab le of leading a sustained
movement — was unfortunately quashed by Moderate opposition.
Four years later, in 1920, when Mahatma Gandhi prepared a
reformed ‘constitution for the Congress, this was one of the major
changes considered necessary if the Congress was to lead a
sustained movement.
After the end of the Congress session, a joint meeting of the
two Home Rule Leagues was held in the same pandal, and was
attended by over 1,000 delegates. The Congress League Pact was[/INST] |
attended by over 1,000 delegates. The Congress League Pact was
hailed and the gathering was address ed by both Annie Besant
and Tilak. On their return journeys, both the leaders made
triumphant tours through various parts of North, Central and
Eastern India.
The increasing popularity of the Home Rule Movement soon
attracted the Government’s wrath. The G overnment of Madras | <s>[INST]attended by over 1,000 delegates. The Congress League Pact was
hailed and the gathering was address ed by both Annie Besant
and Tilak. On their return journeys, both the leaders made
triumphant tours through various parts of North, Central and
Eastern India.
The increasing popularity of the Home Rule Movement soon
attracted the Government’s wrath. The G overnment of Madras[/INST] |
149 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
was the most harsh and first came out with an order banning
students from attending political meetings. This order was
universally condemned and Tilak commented: ‘The Government
is fully aware that the wave of patriotism strikes the stu dents
most, and if at all a nation is to prosper, it is through an
energetic new generation.”
*
The turning point in the movement came with the decision
of the Government of Madras in June 1917 to place Mrs. Besant
and her associates, B.P. Wadia and George Arundale, under
arrest. Their internment became the occasion for nation -wide
protest. In a dramatic gesture, Sir S. Subramania Aiyar
renounced his knighthood. Those who had stayed away,
including many Moderate leaders like Madan Mohan Malaviya,
Surendrana th Banerjea and M.A. Jinnah now enlisted as
members of the Home Rule Leagues to record their solidarity with
the internees and their condemnation of the Government’s
action. At a meeting of the AICC on 28 July, 1917, Tilak
advocated the use of the weapon of passive resistance or civil
disobedience if the Government refused to release the internees.
The proposal for adopting passive resistance was sent for
comment to all the Provincial Congress Committees, and while
Berar and Madras were willing to adopt it immediately, most of
the others were in favour of waiting for more time before taking a
decision. At Gandhiji’s instance, Shankerlal Banker and
Jamnadas Dwarkadas collected signatures of one thousand men
willing to defy the internment orders and march to B esant’s place
of detention. They also began to collect signatures of a million
Peasants and workers on a petition for Home Rule. They made
regular visits to Gujarat towns and villages and helped found
branches of the League. In short, repression only serve d to
harden the attitude of the agitators and strengthen their resolve
to resist the Government. Montague , writing in his Diary, | <s>[INST]149 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
was the most harsh and first came out with an order banning
students from attending political meetings. This order was
universally condemned and Tilak commented: ‘The Government
is fully aware that the wave of patriotism strikes the stu dents
most, and if at all a nation is to prosper, it is through an
energetic new generation.”
*
The turning point in the movement came with the decision
of the Government of Madras in June 1917 to place Mrs. Besant
and her associates, B.P. Wadia and George Arundale, under
arrest. Their internment became the occasion for nation -wide
protest. In a dramatic gesture, Sir S. Subramania Aiyar
renounced his knighthood. Those who had stayed away,
including many Moderate leaders like Madan Mohan Malaviya,
Surendrana th Banerjea and M.A. Jinnah now enlisted as
members of the Home Rule Leagues to record their solidarity with
the internees and their condemnation of the Government’s
action. At a meeting of the AICC on 28 July, 1917, Tilak
advocated the use of the weapon of passive resistance or civil
disobedience if the Government refused to release the internees.
The proposal for adopting passive resistance was sent for
comment to all the Provincial Congress Committees, and while
Berar and Madras were willing to adopt it immediately, most of
the others were in favour of waiting for more time before taking a
decision. At Gandhiji’s instance, Shankerlal Banker and
Jamnadas Dwarkadas collected signatures of one thousand men
willing to defy the internment orders and march to B esant’s place
of detention. They also began to collect signatures of a million
Peasants and workers on a petition for Home Rule. They made
regular visits to Gujarat towns and villages and helped found
branches of the League. In short, repression only serve d to
harden the attitude of the agitators and strengthen their resolve
to resist the Government. Montague , writing in his Diary,[/INST] |
to resist the Government. Montague , writing in his Diary,
commented: ‘...Shiva cut his wife into fifty -two pieces only to
discover that he had fifty -two wives. This is really what
happ ens to the Government of India when it interns Mrs. Besant.’
The Government in Britain decided to effect a change in
policy and adopt a conciliatory posture. The new Secretary of | <s>[INST]to resist the Government. Montague , writing in his Diary,
commented: ‘...Shiva cut his wife into fifty -two pieces only to
discover that he had fifty -two wives. This is really what
happ ens to the Government of India when it interns Mrs. Besant.’
The Government in Britain decided to effect a change in
policy and adopt a conciliatory posture. The new Secretary of[/INST] |
150 | India’s Struggle For Independence
State, Montague , made a historic declaration in the House of
Commons, On 20 A ugust, 1917 in which he stated: ‘The policy of
His Majesty’s Government . . . is that of the increasing
association of Indians in every branch of the administration and
the gradual development of self -governing institutions, with a
view to the progressive realization of responsible government in
India as an integral part of the British Empire.” This statement
was in marked contrast to that of Lord Morley who, while
introducing the Constitutional Reforms in 1909, had stated
categorically that these reforms w ere in no way intended to lead
to self -government. The importance of Montague ’s Declaration
was that after this the demand for Home Rule or self - government
could no longer be treated as seditious.
This did not, however, mean that the British Government
was about to grant self -government. The accompanying clause in
the statement which clarified that the nature and the timing of
the advance towards responsible government would be decided
by the Government alone gave it enough leeway to prevent any
real tran sfer of power to Indian hands for a long enough time.
In keeping with the conciliatory stance of the Montague
Declaration, Annie Besant was released in September 1917.
Annie Besant was at the height of her popularity and, at Tilak’s
suggestion, was electe d President at the annual session of the
Congress in December 1917.
*
During 1918, however, various factors combined to diffuse
the energies that had concentrated in the agitation for Home
Rule. The movement, instead of going forward after its great
advan ce in 1917, gradually dissolved. For one, the Moderates
who had joined the movement after Besant’s arrest were pacified
by the promise of reforms and by Besant’s release. They were also
put off by the talk of civil disobedience and did n attend the
Congres s from September 1918 onwards. The publication of the | <s>[INST]150 | India’s Struggle For Independence
State, Montague , made a historic declaration in the House of
Commons, On 20 A ugust, 1917 in which he stated: ‘The policy of
His Majesty’s Government . . . is that of the increasing
association of Indians in every branch of the administration and
the gradual development of self -governing institutions, with a
view to the progressive realization of responsible government in
India as an integral part of the British Empire.” This statement
was in marked contrast to that of Lord Morley who, while
introducing the Constitutional Reforms in 1909, had stated
categorically that these reforms w ere in no way intended to lead
to self -government. The importance of Montague ’s Declaration
was that after this the demand for Home Rule or self - government
could no longer be treated as seditious.
This did not, however, mean that the British Government
was about to grant self -government. The accompanying clause in
the statement which clarified that the nature and the timing of
the advance towards responsible government would be decided
by the Government alone gave it enough leeway to prevent any
real tran sfer of power to Indian hands for a long enough time.
In keeping with the conciliatory stance of the Montague
Declaration, Annie Besant was released in September 1917.
Annie Besant was at the height of her popularity and, at Tilak’s
suggestion, was electe d President at the annual session of the
Congress in December 1917.
*
During 1918, however, various factors combined to diffuse
the energies that had concentrated in the agitation for Home
Rule. The movement, instead of going forward after its great
advan ce in 1917, gradually dissolved. For one, the Moderates
who had joined the movement after Besant’s arrest were pacified
by the promise of reforms and by Besant’s release. They were also
put off by the talk of civil disobedience and did n attend the
Congres s from September 1918 onwards. The publication of the[/INST] |
Congres s from September 1918 onwards. The publication of the
scheme of Government reforms in July 1918 further divided the
nationalist ranks. Some wanted to accept it outright and others
to reject it outright, while many felt that, though inadequate, they
should be given a trial. Annie Besant herself indulged in a lot of
vacillation on this question as well as on the question of passive | <s>[INST]Congres s from September 1918 onwards. The publication of the
scheme of Government reforms in July 1918 further divided the
nationalist ranks. Some wanted to accept it outright and others
to reject it outright, while many felt that, though inadequate, they
should be given a trial. Annie Besant herself indulged in a lot of
vacillation on this question as well as on the question of passive[/INST] |
151 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
resistance. At times she would disavow passive resistance, and at
other times, under pressure from her younger followers, would
advocate it. Similarly, she initially, along with Tilak, considered
the reforms unworthy of Britain to offer and India to accept, but
later argued in favour of acceptance. Tilak was more consistent in
his approach, but given Besant’s vacillations, and the c hange in
the Moderate stance, there was little that he could do to sustain
the movement on his own. Also, towards the end of the year, he
decided to go to England to pursue the libel case that he had filed
against Valentine Chirol, the author of Indian Unr est, and was
away for many critical months. With Annie Besant unable to give
a firm lead, and Tilak away in England, the movement was left
leaderless.
The tremendous achievement of the Home Rule Movement
and its legacy was that it created a generation of ardent
nationalists who formed the backbone of the national movement
in the coming years when, under the leadership of the Mahatma,
it entered its truly mass phase. The Home Rule Leagues also
created organizational links between town and country which
were to prove invaluable in later years. And further, by
popularizing the idea of Home Rule or self -government, and
making it a commonplace thing, it generated a widespread pro -
nationalist atmosphere in the country
By the end of the First World War, in 1918, the new
generation of nationalists aroused to political awareness and
impatient with the pace of change, were looking for a means of
expressing themselves through effective political action. The
leaders of the Home Rule League, who themselves were
responsi ble for bringing them to this point, were unable to show
the way forward. The stage was thus set for the entry of
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, a man who had already made a
name for himself with his leadership of the struggle of Indians in | <s>[INST]151 |The Home R ule Movement and its Fallout
resistance. At times she would disavow passive resistance, and at
other times, under pressure from her younger followers, would
advocate it. Similarly, she initially, along with Tilak, considered
the reforms unworthy of Britain to offer and India to accept, but
later argued in favour of acceptance. Tilak was more consistent in
his approach, but given Besant’s vacillations, and the c hange in
the Moderate stance, there was little that he could do to sustain
the movement on his own. Also, towards the end of the year, he
decided to go to England to pursue the libel case that he had filed
against Valentine Chirol, the author of Indian Unr est, and was
away for many critical months. With Annie Besant unable to give
a firm lead, and Tilak away in England, the movement was left
leaderless.
The tremendous achievement of the Home Rule Movement
and its legacy was that it created a generation of ardent
nationalists who formed the backbone of the national movement
in the coming years when, under the leadership of the Mahatma,
it entered its truly mass phase. The Home Rule Leagues also
created organizational links between town and country which
were to prove invaluable in later years. And further, by
popularizing the idea of Home Rule or self -government, and
making it a commonplace thing, it generated a widespread pro -
nationalist atmosphere in the country
By the end of the First World War, in 1918, the new
generation of nationalists aroused to political awareness and
impatient with the pace of change, were looking for a means of
expressing themselves through effective political action. The
leaders of the Home Rule League, who themselves were
responsi ble for bringing them to this point, were unable to show
the way forward. The stage was thus set for the entry of
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, a man who had already made a
name for himself with his leadership of the struggle of Indians in[/INST] |
South Africa and b y leading the struggles of Indian peasants and
workers in Champaran, Ahmedabad and Kheda. And in March
1919, when he gave a call for a Satyagraha to protest against the
obnoxious ‘Rowlatt’ Act, he was the rallying point for almost all
those who had been aw akened to politics by the Home Rule
Movement. | <s>[INST]South Africa and b y leading the struggles of Indian peasants and
workers in Champaran, Ahmedabad and Kheda. And in March
1919, when he gave a call for a Satyagraha to protest against the
obnoxious ‘Rowlatt’ Act, he was the rallying point for almost all
those who had been aw akened to politics by the Home Rule
Movement.[/INST] |
152 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 14. GANDHIJI‘S EARLY
CAREER AND ACTIVISM
When Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi called for a nation -
wide Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act in March 1919, his first
attempt at lead ing an all India struggle, he was already in his
fiftieth year. To understand the man who was about to take over
the reins of the Indian national movement and guide its destinies
through its most climactic years, it is necessary to begin his story
at least twenty -five years earlier, in 1893, when as a twenty -four
old barrister, he began the struggle of Indians against racial
discrimination in South Africa.
*
The young barrister who landed at Durban in 1893 on a
one-year contract to sort out the legal probl ems of Dada
Abdullah, a Gujarati merchant, was to all appearances an
ordinary young man trying to make a living. But he was the first
Indian barrister, the first highly -educated Indian, to have come to
South Africa.
Indian immigration to South Africa had b egun in 1890 when
the White settlers recruited indentured Indian labour, mainly
from South India, to work on the sugar plantations. In their wake
had come Indian merchants, mostly Meman Muslims. Ex -
indentured labourers, who had settled down in South Africa after
the expiry of their contract, and their children, many born in
South Africa itself, constituted the third group of Indians that
was in South Africa prior to Gandhiji’s arrival. None of these
groups of Indians had much access to education and certain ly
very little education in English; even the wealthy merchants often
knew only a smattering of English necessary to carry on their
trade. The racial discrimination to which they were subjected, as
part of their daily existence, they had come to accept as a way of
life, and even if they resented it, they had little idea about how to
challenge it. | <s>[INST]152 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 14. GANDHIJI‘S EARLY
CAREER AND ACTIVISM
When Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi called for a nation -
wide Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act in March 1919, his first
attempt at lead ing an all India struggle, he was already in his
fiftieth year. To understand the man who was about to take over
the reins of the Indian national movement and guide its destinies
through its most climactic years, it is necessary to begin his story
at least twenty -five years earlier, in 1893, when as a twenty -four
old barrister, he began the struggle of Indians against racial
discrimination in South Africa.
*
The young barrister who landed at Durban in 1893 on a
one-year contract to sort out the legal probl ems of Dada
Abdullah, a Gujarati merchant, was to all appearances an
ordinary young man trying to make a living. But he was the first
Indian barrister, the first highly -educated Indian, to have come to
South Africa.
Indian immigration to South Africa had b egun in 1890 when
the White settlers recruited indentured Indian labour, mainly
from South India, to work on the sugar plantations. In their wake
had come Indian merchants, mostly Meman Muslims. Ex -
indentured labourers, who had settled down in South Africa after
the expiry of their contract, and their children, many born in
South Africa itself, constituted the third group of Indians that
was in South Africa prior to Gandhiji’s arrival. None of these
groups of Indians had much access to education and certain ly
very little education in English; even the wealthy merchants often
knew only a smattering of English necessary to carry on their
trade. The racial discrimination to which they were subjected, as
part of their daily existence, they had come to accept as a way of
life, and even if they resented it, they had little idea about how to
challenge it.[/INST] |
153 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
But young Mohandas Gandhi was not used to swallowing
racial insults in order to carry on with the business of making a
living. He was the son of a Dewan (Minister ) of an Indian state
whose family, though in straitened economic circumstances, was
widely respected in his native Kathiawad. Further, he had spent
three years in London studying for the Bar. Neither m India nor
in England had he ever come in contact with the overt racism
that confronted him within days of his arrival in South Africa.
His journey from Durban to Pretoria, which he undertook
within a week of his arrival on the continent, consisted of a series
of racial humiliations. Apart from the famous inc ident in which
he was bundled out of a first -class compartment by a White man
and left to spend the night shivering in the waiting room, he was
made to travel in the driver’s box in a coach for which he had
bought a first -class ticket, when he ignored the coach leader’s
order to vacate even that seat and sit on the foot -board, he was
soundly thrashed. On reaching Johannesburg, he found that all
the hotels became full up the moment he asked for a room to stay
the night. Having succeeded in securing a first -class train ticket
from Johannesburg to Pretoria (after quoting extensively from
railway regulations), he was almost pushed out again from his
railway compartment and was only saved this humiliation by the
intervention of a European passenger.’
On his arri val in Pretoria, where he was to work on the civil
suit that had brought him to South Africa, he immediately
convened a meeting of the Indians there. He offered to teach
English to anybody who wanted to learn and suggested that they
organize themselves and protest against oppression. He voiced
his protest through the Press as well. In an indignant letter to the
Natal Advertiser, he asked: ‘Is this Christian -like, is this fair play,
is this justice, is this civilization? I pause for a reply.’ Even | <s>[INST]153 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
But young Mohandas Gandhi was not used to swallowing
racial insults in order to carry on with the business of making a
living. He was the son of a Dewan (Minister ) of an Indian state
whose family, though in straitened economic circumstances, was
widely respected in his native Kathiawad. Further, he had spent
three years in London studying for the Bar. Neither m India nor
in England had he ever come in contact with the overt racism
that confronted him within days of his arrival in South Africa.
His journey from Durban to Pretoria, which he undertook
within a week of his arrival on the continent, consisted of a series
of racial humiliations. Apart from the famous inc ident in which
he was bundled out of a first -class compartment by a White man
and left to spend the night shivering in the waiting room, he was
made to travel in the driver’s box in a coach for which he had
bought a first -class ticket, when he ignored the coach leader’s
order to vacate even that seat and sit on the foot -board, he was
soundly thrashed. On reaching Johannesburg, he found that all
the hotels became full up the moment he asked for a room to stay
the night. Having succeeded in securing a first -class train ticket
from Johannesburg to Pretoria (after quoting extensively from
railway regulations), he was almost pushed out again from his
railway compartment and was only saved this humiliation by the
intervention of a European passenger.’
On his arri val in Pretoria, where he was to work on the civil
suit that had brought him to South Africa, he immediately
convened a meeting of the Indians there. He offered to teach
English to anybody who wanted to learn and suggested that they
organize themselves and protest against oppression. He voiced
his protest through the Press as well. In an indignant letter to the
Natal Advertiser, he asked: ‘Is this Christian -like, is this fair play,
is this justice, is this civilization? I pause for a reply.’ Even[/INST] |
though he had no plans of staying in South Africa at that stage,
he tried his best to arouse the Indians in Pretoria to a sense of
their own dignity as human beings and persuade them to resist
all types of racial disabilities.
Having settled the law suit for which he had come, Gandhiji
prepared to leave for India. But on the eve of his departure from
Durban, he raised the issue of the bill to disenfranchise Indians | <s>[INST]though he had no plans of staying in South Africa at that stage,
he tried his best to arouse the Indians in Pretoria to a sense of
their own dignity as human beings and persuade them to resist
all types of racial disabilities.
Having settled the law suit for which he had come, Gandhiji
prepared to leave for India. But on the eve of his departure from
Durban, he raised the issue of the bill to disenfranchise Indians[/INST] |
154 | India’s Struggle For Independence
which was in the process of being passed by the Natal legislature.
The Indians in South Africa begged Gandhiji to stay on for a
month and organize their protest as they could not do so on their
own, not knowing even enough English to draft petitions, and so
on. Gandhiji agreed to stay on for a month and stayed for twenty
years. He was then only twenty -five; when he left, he was forty-
five.
Gandhiji’s experience in South Africa was unique in one
respect. By virtue of being a British -educated barrister, he
demanded many things as a matter of right, such as first -class
train tickets and rooms in hotels, which other Indians before him
had never probably even had the courage to ask for. Perhaps,
they believed that they were discriminated against because they
were not ‘civilized,’ that is, ‘westernized.’ Gandhiji’s experience,
the first of a westernized Indian in South Africa, demonstrated
clearly, to him and to them, that the real cause lay elsewhere, in
the assumption of racial superiority by the White rulers.
His uniqueness in being the only western -educated Indian
also simultaneously placed on his shoulders th e responsibility of
leading the struggle of the Indians against increasing racial
discrimination. Wealthy Indian merchants, senior to the twenty -
five-year-old barrister in experience and age, appointed him as
their leader because he was the only one who co uld speak to the
rulers in their own language, the only one who understood the
intricacies of their laws and their system of government, the only
one who could draft their petitions, create their organizations,
and represent them before their rulers.
*
The story of Gandhiji in South Africa is a long one and we
present it here in its briefest outline only to highlight the wide
experience that Gandhiji had undergone before he came back to
India.
Gandhiji’s political activities from 1894 to 1906 may be
class ified as the ‘Moderate’ phase of the struggle of the South | <s>[INST]154 | India’s Struggle For Independence
which was in the process of being passed by the Natal legislature.
The Indians in South Africa begged Gandhiji to stay on for a
month and organize their protest as they could not do so on their
own, not knowing even enough English to draft petitions, and so
on. Gandhiji agreed to stay on for a month and stayed for twenty
years. He was then only twenty -five; when he left, he was forty-
five.
Gandhiji’s experience in South Africa was unique in one
respect. By virtue of being a British -educated barrister, he
demanded many things as a matter of right, such as first -class
train tickets and rooms in hotels, which other Indians before him
had never probably even had the courage to ask for. Perhaps,
they believed that they were discriminated against because they
were not ‘civilized,’ that is, ‘westernized.’ Gandhiji’s experience,
the first of a westernized Indian in South Africa, demonstrated
clearly, to him and to them, that the real cause lay elsewhere, in
the assumption of racial superiority by the White rulers.
His uniqueness in being the only western -educated Indian
also simultaneously placed on his shoulders th e responsibility of
leading the struggle of the Indians against increasing racial
discrimination. Wealthy Indian merchants, senior to the twenty -
five-year-old barrister in experience and age, appointed him as
their leader because he was the only one who co uld speak to the
rulers in their own language, the only one who understood the
intricacies of their laws and their system of government, the only
one who could draft their petitions, create their organizations,
and represent them before their rulers.
*
The story of Gandhiji in South Africa is a long one and we
present it here in its briefest outline only to highlight the wide
experience that Gandhiji had undergone before he came back to
India.
Gandhiji’s political activities from 1894 to 1906 may be
class ified as the ‘Moderate’ phase of the struggle of the South[/INST] |
African Indians. During this phase, he concentrated on
petitioning and sending memorials to the South African
legislatures, the Colonial Secretary in London and the British | <s>[INST]African Indians. During this phase, he concentrated on
petitioning and sending memorials to the South African
legislatures, the Colonial Secretary in London and the British[/INST] |
155 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
Parliament. He believed that if all the facts of the case were
presented to the Imperial Government, the British sense of
justice and fair play would be aroused and the Imperial
Government would intervene on behalf of Indians who were, after
all, British subjects. His attempt was to unite the different
sections of Indians, and to give their demands wide publicity.
This he tried to do through the setting up of the Natal Indian
Congress and by starting a paper called Indian Opinion.
Gandhiji’s abilities as an organizer, as a fund -raiser, as a
journalist and as a propagandist, all came to the fore during this
period. But, by 1906, Gandhiji, having fully tried the ‘Moderate’
methods of struggle, was becoming convinced that these would
not lead anywhere.
The second phase of the struggl e in South Africa, which
began in 1906, was characterized by the use of the method of
passive resistance or civil disobedience, which Gandhiji named
Satyagraha. It was first used when the Government enacted
legislation making it compulsory for Indians to t ake out
certificates of registration which held their finger prints. It was
essential to carry these on person at all times. At a huge public
meeting held on 11 September, 1906, in the Empire Theatre in
Johannesburg, Indians resolved that they would refuse to submit
to this law and would face the consequences. The Government
remained adamant, and so did the Indians. Gandhiji formed the
Passive Resistance Association to conduct the campaign. The last
date for registration being over, the Government started
proceedings against Gandhiji and twenty -six others. The passive
resisters pleaded guilty, were ordered to leave the country and,
on refusing to do so, were sent to jail. Others followed, and their
numbers swelled to 155. The fear of jail had disappeared, an d it
was popularly called King Edward’s Hotel.
General Smuts called Gandhiji for talks, and promised to | <s>[INST]155 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
Parliament. He believed that if all the facts of the case were
presented to the Imperial Government, the British sense of
justice and fair play would be aroused and the Imperial
Government would intervene on behalf of Indians who were, after
all, British subjects. His attempt was to unite the different
sections of Indians, and to give their demands wide publicity.
This he tried to do through the setting up of the Natal Indian
Congress and by starting a paper called Indian Opinion.
Gandhiji’s abilities as an organizer, as a fund -raiser, as a
journalist and as a propagandist, all came to the fore during this
period. But, by 1906, Gandhiji, having fully tried the ‘Moderate’
methods of struggle, was becoming convinced that these would
not lead anywhere.
The second phase of the struggl e in South Africa, which
began in 1906, was characterized by the use of the method of
passive resistance or civil disobedience, which Gandhiji named
Satyagraha. It was first used when the Government enacted
legislation making it compulsory for Indians to t ake out
certificates of registration which held their finger prints. It was
essential to carry these on person at all times. At a huge public
meeting held on 11 September, 1906, in the Empire Theatre in
Johannesburg, Indians resolved that they would refuse to submit
to this law and would face the consequences. The Government
remained adamant, and so did the Indians. Gandhiji formed the
Passive Resistance Association to conduct the campaign. The last
date for registration being over, the Government started
proceedings against Gandhiji and twenty -six others. The passive
resisters pleaded guilty, were ordered to leave the country and,
on refusing to do so, were sent to jail. Others followed, and their
numbers swelled to 155. The fear of jail had disappeared, an d it
was popularly called King Edward’s Hotel.
General Smuts called Gandhiji for talks, and promised to[/INST] |
General Smuts called Gandhiji for talks, and promised to
withdraw the legislation if Indians voluntarily agreed to register
themselves. Gandhiji accepted and was the first to register. But
Smuts had played a trick; he ordered that the voluntary
registrations be ratified under the law. The Indians under the
leadership of Gandhiji retaliated by publicly burning their
registration certificates. | <s>[INST]General Smuts called Gandhiji for talks, and promised to
withdraw the legislation if Indians voluntarily agreed to register
themselves. Gandhiji accepted and was the first to register. But
Smuts had played a trick; he ordered that the voluntary
registrations be ratified under the law. The Indians under the
leadership of Gandhiji retaliated by publicly burning their
registration certificates.[/INST] |
156 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Meanwhile, the Government brought in new legislation, this
time to r estrict Indian immigration. The campaign, widened to
oppose this. In August 1908, a number of prominent Indians
from Natal crossed the frontier into Transvaal to defy the new
immigration laws and were arrested. Other Indians from
Transvaal opposed the laws by hawking without a license ; traders
who had Licenses refused to produce them. All of them were
jailed. Gandhiji himself landed in jail in October 1908 and, along
with the other Indians, was sentenced to a prison term involving
hard physical labour and m iserable conditions. But
imprisonment failed to crush the spirit of the resisters, and the
Government resorted to deportation to India, especially of the
poorer Indians. Merchants were pressurized by threats to their
economic interests.
At this stage, the movement reached an impasse. The more
committed Satyagrahis continued to go in and out of jail, but the
majority were showing signs of fatigue. The struggle was
obviously going to be a protracted one, and the Government was
in no mood to relent. Gandhiji’ s visit to London in 1909 to meet
the authorities there yielded little result. The funds for
supporting the families of the Satyagrahis and for running Indian
Opinion were fast running out. Gandhiji’s own legal practice had
virtually ceased since 1906, the year he had started devoting all
his attention to the struggle. At this point, Gandhiji set up
Tolstoy Farm, made possible through the generosity of his
German architect friend, Kallenbach, to house the families of the
Satyagrahis and give them a way to s ustain themselves. Tolstoy
Farm was the precursor of the later Gandhian ashrams that were
to play so important a role in the Indian national movement.
Funds also came from India — Sir Ratan Tata sent Rs. 25,000
and the Congress and the Muslim League, as we ll as the Nizam of
Hyderabad, made their contributions. | <s>[INST]156 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Meanwhile, the Government brought in new legislation, this
time to r estrict Indian immigration. The campaign, widened to
oppose this. In August 1908, a number of prominent Indians
from Natal crossed the frontier into Transvaal to defy the new
immigration laws and were arrested. Other Indians from
Transvaal opposed the laws by hawking without a license ; traders
who had Licenses refused to produce them. All of them were
jailed. Gandhiji himself landed in jail in October 1908 and, along
with the other Indians, was sentenced to a prison term involving
hard physical labour and m iserable conditions. But
imprisonment failed to crush the spirit of the resisters, and the
Government resorted to deportation to India, especially of the
poorer Indians. Merchants were pressurized by threats to their
economic interests.
At this stage, the movement reached an impasse. The more
committed Satyagrahis continued to go in and out of jail, but the
majority were showing signs of fatigue. The struggle was
obviously going to be a protracted one, and the Government was
in no mood to relent. Gandhiji’ s visit to London in 1909 to meet
the authorities there yielded little result. The funds for
supporting the families of the Satyagrahis and for running Indian
Opinion were fast running out. Gandhiji’s own legal practice had
virtually ceased since 1906, the year he had started devoting all
his attention to the struggle. At this point, Gandhiji set up
Tolstoy Farm, made possible through the generosity of his
German architect friend, Kallenbach, to house the families of the
Satyagrahis and give them a way to s ustain themselves. Tolstoy
Farm was the precursor of the later Gandhian ashrams that were
to play so important a role in the Indian national movement.
Funds also came from India — Sir Ratan Tata sent Rs. 25,000
and the Congress and the Muslim League, as we ll as the Nizam of
Hyderabad, made their contributions.[/INST] |
Hyderabad, made their contributions.
In 1911, to coincide with the coronation of King George V,
an agreement was reached between the Government and the
Indians which, however, lasted only till the end of 1912.
Meanwhile, Gokhale paid a visit to South Africa, was treated as a
guest of the Government and was made a promise that all
discriminatory laws against Indians would be removed. The
promise was never kept, and Satyagraha was resumed in 1913.
This time the movement was widened further to include | <s>[INST]Hyderabad, made their contributions.
In 1911, to coincide with the coronation of King George V,
an agreement was reached between the Government and the
Indians which, however, lasted only till the end of 1912.
Meanwhile, Gokhale paid a visit to South Africa, was treated as a
guest of the Government and was made a promise that all
discriminatory laws against Indians would be removed. The
promise was never kept, and Satyagraha was resumed in 1913.
This time the movement was widened further to include[/INST] |
157 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
resistance to the poll tax of three pounds that was imposed on all
ex-indentured Indians. The inclusion of the demand for the
abolition of this tax, a particularly heavy charge on poor
labourers whose wages hardly averaged ten shillings a month ,
immediately drew the indentured and ex -indentured labourers
into the struggle, and Satyagraha could now take on a truly mass
character. Further fuel was added to the already raging fire by a
judgement of the Supreme Court which invalidated all marriages
not conducted according to Christian rites and registered by the
Registrar of Marriages. By implication, Hindu, Muslim and Parsi
marriages were illegal and the children born through these
marriages illegitimate. The Indians treated this judgment as an
insult to the honor of their women and many women were drawn
into the movement because of this indignity.
Gandhiji decided that the time had now come for the final
struggle into which all the resisters’ resources should be
channelled. The campaign was launche d by the illegal crossing of
the border by a group of sixteen Satyagrahis, including Kasturba,
Gandhiji’s wife, who marched from Phoenix Settlement in Natal to
Transvaal, and were immediately arrested. A group of eleven
women then marched from Tolstoy Farm in Transvaal and
crossed the border into Natal without a permit, and reached New
Castle, a mining town. Here, they talked to the Indian mine
workers, mostly Tamils, and before being arrested persuaded
them to go on strike.
Gandhiji reached New Castle and took charge of the
agitation. The employers retaliated by cutting off water and
electricity to the workers’ quarters, thus forcing them to leave
their homes. Gandhiji decided to march this army of over two
thousand men, women and children over the border and thus see
them lodged in Transvaal jails. During the course of the march,
Gandhiji was arrested twice, released, arrested a third time and | <s>[INST]157 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
resistance to the poll tax of three pounds that was imposed on all
ex-indentured Indians. The inclusion of the demand for the
abolition of this tax, a particularly heavy charge on poor
labourers whose wages hardly averaged ten shillings a month ,
immediately drew the indentured and ex -indentured labourers
into the struggle, and Satyagraha could now take on a truly mass
character. Further fuel was added to the already raging fire by a
judgement of the Supreme Court which invalidated all marriages
not conducted according to Christian rites and registered by the
Registrar of Marriages. By implication, Hindu, Muslim and Parsi
marriages were illegal and the children born through these
marriages illegitimate. The Indians treated this judgment as an
insult to the honor of their women and many women were drawn
into the movement because of this indignity.
Gandhiji decided that the time had now come for the final
struggle into which all the resisters’ resources should be
channelled. The campaign was launche d by the illegal crossing of
the border by a group of sixteen Satyagrahis, including Kasturba,
Gandhiji’s wife, who marched from Phoenix Settlement in Natal to
Transvaal, and were immediately arrested. A group of eleven
women then marched from Tolstoy Farm in Transvaal and
crossed the border into Natal without a permit, and reached New
Castle, a mining town. Here, they talked to the Indian mine
workers, mostly Tamils, and before being arrested persuaded
them to go on strike.
Gandhiji reached New Castle and took charge of the
agitation. The employers retaliated by cutting off water and
electricity to the workers’ quarters, thus forcing them to leave
their homes. Gandhiji decided to march this army of over two
thousand men, women and children over the border and thus see
them lodged in Transvaal jails. During the course of the march,
Gandhiji was arrested twice, released, arrested a third time and[/INST] |
sent to jail. The morale of the workers, however, was very high
and they continued the march till they were put in to trains and
sent back to Natal, where they were prosecuted and sent to jail.
The treatment that was meted out to these brave men and
women in jail included starvation and whipping, and being forced
to work in the mines by mounted military police. Gandhij i himself | <s>[INST]sent to jail. The morale of the workers, however, was very high
and they continued the march till they were put in to trains and
sent back to Natal, where they were prosecuted and sent to jail.
The treatment that was meted out to these brave men and
women in jail included starvation and whipping, and being forced
to work in the mines by mounted military police. Gandhij i himself[/INST] |
158 | India’s Struggle For Independence
was made to dig stones and sweep the compound. He was kept in
a dark cell, and taken to court handcuffed and manacled.
The Governments’ action inflamed the entire Indian
community; workers on the plantations and the mines went on a
lightning str ike. Gokhale toured the whole of India to arouse
Indian public opinion and even the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge,
condemned the repression as ‘one that would not be tolerated by
any country tha t calls itself civilized’ and called for an impartial
enquiry into th e charges of atrocities. The use of brutal force on
unarmed and peaceful men and women aroused widespread
indignation and condemnation.
Eventually, through a series of negotiations involving
Gandhiji, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, C.F. Andrews and General
Smuts, an agreement was reached by which the Government of
South Africa conceded the major Indian demands relating to the
poll tax, the registration certificates and marriages solemnized
according to Indian rites, and promised to treat the question of
India n immigration in a sympathetic manner.
*
Non-violent civil disobedience had succeeded in forcing the
opponents to the negotiating table and conceding the substance
of the demands put forward by the movement. The blueprint for
the ‘Gandhian’ method of stru ggle had been evolved and Gandhiji
started back for his native land. The South African ‘experiment’
was now to be tried on a much wider scale on the Indian sub -
continent.
In other respects, too, the South African experiment
prepared Gandhiji for leadershi p of the Indian national struggle.
He had had the invaluable experience of leading poor Indian
labourers, of seeing their capacity for sacrifice and for bearing
hardship, their morale in the face of repression. South Africa
built up his faith in the capaci ty of the Indian masses to
participate in and sacrifice for a cause that moved them.
Gandhiji also had had the opportunity of leading Indians | <s>[INST]158 | India’s Struggle For Independence
was made to dig stones and sweep the compound. He was kept in
a dark cell, and taken to court handcuffed and manacled.
The Governments’ action inflamed the entire Indian
community; workers on the plantations and the mines went on a
lightning str ike. Gokhale toured the whole of India to arouse
Indian public opinion and even the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge,
condemned the repression as ‘one that would not be tolerated by
any country tha t calls itself civilized’ and called for an impartial
enquiry into th e charges of atrocities. The use of brutal force on
unarmed and peaceful men and women aroused widespread
indignation and condemnation.
Eventually, through a series of negotiations involving
Gandhiji, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, C.F. Andrews and General
Smuts, an agreement was reached by which the Government of
South Africa conceded the major Indian demands relating to the
poll tax, the registration certificates and marriages solemnized
according to Indian rites, and promised to treat the question of
India n immigration in a sympathetic manner.
*
Non-violent civil disobedience had succeeded in forcing the
opponents to the negotiating table and conceding the substance
of the demands put forward by the movement. The blueprint for
the ‘Gandhian’ method of stru ggle had been evolved and Gandhiji
started back for his native land. The South African ‘experiment’
was now to be tried on a much wider scale on the Indian sub -
continent.
In other respects, too, the South African experiment
prepared Gandhiji for leadershi p of the Indian national struggle.
He had had the invaluable experience of leading poor Indian
labourers, of seeing their capacity for sacrifice and for bearing
hardship, their morale in the face of repression. South Africa
built up his faith in the capaci ty of the Indian masses to
participate in and sacrifice for a cause that moved them.
Gandhiji also had had the opportunity of leading Indians[/INST] |
Gandhiji also had had the opportunity of leading Indians
belonging to different religions: Hindus, Muslims, Christians and
Parsis were all united under his leadership in South Africa. They
also came from different regions, being mainly Gujaratis and | <s>[INST]Gandhiji also had had the opportunity of leading Indians
belonging to different religions: Hindus, Muslims, Christians and
Parsis were all united under his leadership in South Africa. They
also came from different regions, being mainly Gujaratis and[/INST] |
159 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
Tamils. They belonged to different social classes; rich merchants
combined with poor indentured labourers. Women came along
with the men.
Another aspect of the South African e xperience also stood
Gandhiji in good stead. He learnt, the hardest way, that
leadership involves facing the ire not only of the enemy but also
of one’s followers. There were two occasions on which Gandhiji
was faced with a serious threat to his life. Once , when a white
mob chased him down a street in Durban in 1896 and
surrounded the house where he was staying, asking for his
blood; he had to be whisked out in disguise. The second, when an
Indian, a Pathan, who was angry with him because of an
agreement he had reached with the Government assaulted him
on the street. Gandhiji learnt that leaders often have to take hard
decisions that are unpopular with enthusiastic followers.
South Africa, then, provided Gandhiji with an opportunity
for evolving his own sty le of politics and leadership, for trying out
new techniques of struggle, on a limited scale, untrammelled by
the opposition of contending political currents. In South Africa,
he had already taken the movement from its ‘Moderate’ phase
into its ‘Gandhian’ phase. He already knew the strengths and the
weaknesses of the Gandhian method and he was convinced that
it was the best method around. It now remained for him to
introduce it into India.
Gandhiji returned to India, in January 1915, and was
warmly welcome d. His work in South Africa was well -known, not
only to educated Indians, but, as he discovered on his visit to the
Kumbh Mela at Hardwar, even to the masses who flocked to him
for his ‘darshan.’ Gokhale had already hailed him as being
‘without doubt made of the stuff of which heroes and martyrs are
made.’ The veteran Indian leader noticed in Gandhiji an even
more important quality: ‘He has in him the marvelous spiritual
power to turn ordinary men around him into heroes and
martyrs.’ | <s>[INST]159 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
Tamils. They belonged to different social classes; rich merchants
combined with poor indentured labourers. Women came along
with the men.
Another aspect of the South African e xperience also stood
Gandhiji in good stead. He learnt, the hardest way, that
leadership involves facing the ire not only of the enemy but also
of one’s followers. There were two occasions on which Gandhiji
was faced with a serious threat to his life. Once , when a white
mob chased him down a street in Durban in 1896 and
surrounded the house where he was staying, asking for his
blood; he had to be whisked out in disguise. The second, when an
Indian, a Pathan, who was angry with him because of an
agreement he had reached with the Government assaulted him
on the street. Gandhiji learnt that leaders often have to take hard
decisions that are unpopular with enthusiastic followers.
South Africa, then, provided Gandhiji with an opportunity
for evolving his own sty le of politics and leadership, for trying out
new techniques of struggle, on a limited scale, untrammelled by
the opposition of contending political currents. In South Africa,
he had already taken the movement from its ‘Moderate’ phase
into its ‘Gandhian’ phase. He already knew the strengths and the
weaknesses of the Gandhian method and he was convinced that
it was the best method around. It now remained for him to
introduce it into India.
Gandhiji returned to India, in January 1915, and was
warmly welcome d. His work in South Africa was well -known, not
only to educated Indians, but, as he discovered on his visit to the
Kumbh Mela at Hardwar, even to the masses who flocked to him
for his ‘darshan.’ Gokhale had already hailed him as being
‘without doubt made of the stuff of which heroes and martyrs are
made.’ The veteran Indian leader noticed in Gandhiji an even
more important quality: ‘He has in him the marvelous spiritual
power to turn ordinary men around him into heroes and
martyrs.’[/INST] |
martyrs.’
On Gokhale’s advice, an d in keeping with his own style of
never intervening in a situation without first studying it with
great care, Gandhiji decided that for the first year he would not | <s>[INST]martyrs.’
On Gokhale’s advice, an d in keeping with his own style of
never intervening in a situation without first studying it with
great care, Gandhiji decided that for the first year he would not[/INST] |
160 | India’s Struggle For Independence
take a public stand on any political issue. He spent the year
travelling around the country , seeing things for himself, and in
organizing his ashram in Ahmedabad where he, and his devoted
band of followers who had come with him from South Africa,
would lead a community life. The next year as well, he continued
to maintain his distance from polit ical affairs, including the
Home Rule Movement that was gathering momentum at this
time. His own political understanding did not coincide with any of
the political currents that were active in India then. His faith in
‘Moderate’ methods was long eroded, no r did he agree with the
Home Rulers that the best time to agitate for Home Rule was
when the British were in difficulty because of the First World
War.
Further, he was deeply convinced that none of these
methods of political struggle were really viable; t he only answer
lay in Satyagraha. His reasons for not joining the existing
political organizations are best explained in his own words: ‘At
my time of life and with views firmly formed on several matters, I
could only join an organization to affect its pol icy and not be
affected by it. This does not mean that I would not now have an
open mind to receive new light. I simply wish to emphasize the
fact that the new light will have to be specially dazzling in order
to entrance me.” In other words, he could only join an
organization or a movement that adopted non -violent Satyagraha
as its method of struggle.
That did not, however, mean that Gandhiji was going to
remain politically idle. During the course of 1917 and early 1918,
he was involved in three significa nt struggles — in Champaran in
Bihar, in Ahmedabad and in Kheda in Gujarat. The common
feature of these struggles was that they related to specific local
issues and that they were fought for the economic demands of
the masses. Two of these struggles, Champ aran and Kheda,
involved the peasants and the one in Ahmedabad involved | <s>[INST]160 | India’s Struggle For Independence
take a public stand on any political issue. He spent the year
travelling around the country , seeing things for himself, and in
organizing his ashram in Ahmedabad where he, and his devoted
band of followers who had come with him from South Africa,
would lead a community life. The next year as well, he continued
to maintain his distance from polit ical affairs, including the
Home Rule Movement that was gathering momentum at this
time. His own political understanding did not coincide with any of
the political currents that were active in India then. His faith in
‘Moderate’ methods was long eroded, no r did he agree with the
Home Rulers that the best time to agitate for Home Rule was
when the British were in difficulty because of the First World
War.
Further, he was deeply convinced that none of these
methods of political struggle were really viable; t he only answer
lay in Satyagraha. His reasons for not joining the existing
political organizations are best explained in his own words: ‘At
my time of life and with views firmly formed on several matters, I
could only join an organization to affect its pol icy and not be
affected by it. This does not mean that I would not now have an
open mind to receive new light. I simply wish to emphasize the
fact that the new light will have to be specially dazzling in order
to entrance me.” In other words, he could only join an
organization or a movement that adopted non -violent Satyagraha
as its method of struggle.
That did not, however, mean that Gandhiji was going to
remain politically idle. During the course of 1917 and early 1918,
he was involved in three significa nt struggles — in Champaran in
Bihar, in Ahmedabad and in Kheda in Gujarat. The common
feature of these struggles was that they related to specific local
issues and that they were fought for the economic demands of
the masses. Two of these struggles, Champ aran and Kheda,
involved the peasants and the one in Ahmedabad involved[/INST] |
involved the peasants and the one in Ahmedabad involved
industrial workers.
*
The story of Champaran begins in the early nineteenth
century when European planters had involved the cultivators in
agreements that forced them to cultivate ind igo on 3/20th of | <s>[INST]involved the peasants and the one in Ahmedabad involved
industrial workers.
*
The story of Champaran begins in the early nineteenth
century when European planters had involved the cultivators in
agreements that forced them to cultivate ind igo on 3/20th of[/INST] |
161 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
their holdings (known as the tinkathia system). Towards the end
of the nineteenth century, German synthetic dyes forced indigo
out of the market and the European planters of Champaran,
keen to release the cultivators from the obligation of cultivating
indigo, tried to turn their necessity to their advantage by securing
enhancements in rent and other illegal dues as a price for the
release. Resistance had surfaced in 1908 as well, but the
exactions of the planters continued till Raj Kumar Sh ukla, a local
man, decided to follow Gandhiji all over the country to persuade
him to come to Champaran to investigate the problem. Raj
Kumar Shukla’s decision to get Gandhiji to Champaran is
indicative of the image he had acquired as one who fought for th e
rights of the exploited and the poor.
Gandhiji, on reaching Champaran, was ordered by the
Commissioner to immediately leave the district. But to the
surprise of all concerned, Gandhiji refused and preferred to take
the punishment for his defiance of the law. This was unusual, for
even Tilak and Annie Besant, when externed from a particular
province, obeyed the orders even though they organized public
protests against them. To offer passive resistance or civil
disobedience to an unjust order was indeed nov el. The
Government of India, not willing to make an issue of it and not
yet used to treating Gandhiji as a rebel, ordered the local
Government to retreat and allow Gandhiji to proceed with his
enquiry.
A victorious Gandhiji embarked on his investigation o f the
peasants’ grievances. Here, too, his method was striking. He and
his colleagues, who now included Brij Kishore, Rajendra Prasad
and other members of the Bihar intelligentsia, Mahadev Desai
and Narhari Parikh, two young men from Gujarat who had
thrown in their lot with Gandhiji, and J.B. Kripalani, toured the
villages and from dawn to dusk recorded the statements of | <s>[INST]161 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
their holdings (known as the tinkathia system). Towards the end
of the nineteenth century, German synthetic dyes forced indigo
out of the market and the European planters of Champaran,
keen to release the cultivators from the obligation of cultivating
indigo, tried to turn their necessity to their advantage by securing
enhancements in rent and other illegal dues as a price for the
release. Resistance had surfaced in 1908 as well, but the
exactions of the planters continued till Raj Kumar Sh ukla, a local
man, decided to follow Gandhiji all over the country to persuade
him to come to Champaran to investigate the problem. Raj
Kumar Shukla’s decision to get Gandhiji to Champaran is
indicative of the image he had acquired as one who fought for th e
rights of the exploited and the poor.
Gandhiji, on reaching Champaran, was ordered by the
Commissioner to immediately leave the district. But to the
surprise of all concerned, Gandhiji refused and preferred to take
the punishment for his defiance of the law. This was unusual, for
even Tilak and Annie Besant, when externed from a particular
province, obeyed the orders even though they organized public
protests against them. To offer passive resistance or civil
disobedience to an unjust order was indeed nov el. The
Government of India, not willing to make an issue of it and not
yet used to treating Gandhiji as a rebel, ordered the local
Government to retreat and allow Gandhiji to proceed with his
enquiry.
A victorious Gandhiji embarked on his investigation o f the
peasants’ grievances. Here, too, his method was striking. He and
his colleagues, who now included Brij Kishore, Rajendra Prasad
and other members of the Bihar intelligentsia, Mahadev Desai
and Narhari Parikh, two young men from Gujarat who had
thrown in their lot with Gandhiji, and J.B. Kripalani, toured the
villages and from dawn to dusk recorded the statements of[/INST] |