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political questions from a religious point of view.
The positive development within the Congress — discussed
in an earlier cha pter - and within the Mus lim League soon led to
broad political unity among the two, an important role in this
being played by Lokmanya Tilak and M.A. Jinnah. The two
organizations held their sessions at the d of 1916 at Lucknow,
signed a pact known as the Lucknow Pact, and pu t forward
common political demands before the Government including the
demand for self -government for India after the war. The Pact | <s>[INST]political questions from a religious point of view.
The positive development within the Congress — discussed
in an earlier cha pter - and within the Mus lim League soon led to
broad political unity among the two, an important role in this
being played by Lokmanya Tilak and M.A. Jinnah. The two
organizations held their sessions at the d of 1916 at Lucknow,
signed a pact known as the Lucknow Pact, and pu t forward
common political demands before the Government including the
demand for self -government for India after the war. The Pact[/INST] |
425 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
accepted separate electorates and the system of weightage and
reservation of seats for the minorities in the legislatures. While a
step forward in many respects — and it enthused the political
Indian — the Pact was also a step back. The Congress had
accepted separate electorates and formally recognized communal
politics. Above all, the Pact was tacitly based on the assumption
that India consisted of different communities with separate
interests of their own. It, therefore, left the way open to the future
resurgence of communalism in Indian politics.
The nationalist movement and Hindu -Muslim unity took
giant steps forward after Worl d War I during the agitation against
the Row latt Acts, and the Khilafat and the Non -Cooperation
Movements. As if to declare before the world the principle of
Hindu -Muslim unity in political action, Swami Shradhanand, a
staunch Arya Samajist, was asked by M uslims to preach from the
pulpit of the Jama Masjid at Delhi, while Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlu, a
Muslim, was given the keys to the Golden Temple, the Sikh
shrine at Amritsar. The entire country resounded to the cry of
‘Hindu -Muslim ki Jai’. The landlord -commun alists and ex-
bureaucrats increasingly disassociated themselves from the
Muslim League, while the League itself was overshadowed by the
Khilafat Committee as many of the League leaders — as also
many of the old Congress leaders — found it difficult to keep pace
with the politics of a mass movement. Even though the Khilafat
was a religious issue, it resulted in raising the national, anti -
imperialist consciousness of the Muslim masses and middle
classes. Moreover, there was nothing wrong in the nationalist
movement taking up a demand that affected Muslims only, just
as the Akali Movement affected the Sikhs only and the anti -
untouchability campaign Hindus only.
But there were also certain weaknesses involved. The
nationalist leadership failed to some extent i n raising the | <s>[INST]425 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
accepted separate electorates and the system of weightage and
reservation of seats for the minorities in the legislatures. While a
step forward in many respects — and it enthused the political
Indian — the Pact was also a step back. The Congress had
accepted separate electorates and formally recognized communal
politics. Above all, the Pact was tacitly based on the assumption
that India consisted of different communities with separate
interests of their own. It, therefore, left the way open to the future
resurgence of communalism in Indian politics.
The nationalist movement and Hindu -Muslim unity took
giant steps forward after Worl d War I during the agitation against
the Row latt Acts, and the Khilafat and the Non -Cooperation
Movements. As if to declare before the world the principle of
Hindu -Muslim unity in political action, Swami Shradhanand, a
staunch Arya Samajist, was asked by M uslims to preach from the
pulpit of the Jama Masjid at Delhi, while Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlu, a
Muslim, was given the keys to the Golden Temple, the Sikh
shrine at Amritsar. The entire country resounded to the cry of
‘Hindu -Muslim ki Jai’. The landlord -commun alists and ex-
bureaucrats increasingly disassociated themselves from the
Muslim League, while the League itself was overshadowed by the
Khilafat Committee as many of the League leaders — as also
many of the old Congress leaders — found it difficult to keep pace
with the politics of a mass movement. Even though the Khilafat
was a religious issue, it resulted in raising the national, anti -
imperialist consciousness of the Muslim masses and middle
classes. Moreover, there was nothing wrong in the nationalist
movement taking up a demand that affected Muslims only, just
as the Akali Movement affected the Sikhs only and the anti -
untouchability campaign Hindus only.
But there were also certain weaknesses involved. The
nationalist leadership failed to some extent i n raising the[/INST] |
nationalist leadership failed to some extent i n raising the
religious political consciousness of Muslims to the higher plane of
secular political consciousness. The Khilafat leaders, for example,
made appeals to religion and made full use of fatwas (opinion or
decision on a point of Islamic law given by a religious person of
standing) and other religious sanctions. Consequently, they
strengthened the hold of orthodoxy and priesthood over the
minds of men and women and encouraged the habit of looking at
political questions from the religious point of view. By doing so | <s>[INST]nationalist leadership failed to some extent i n raising the
religious political consciousness of Muslims to the higher plane of
secular political consciousness. The Khilafat leaders, for example,
made appeals to religion and made full use of fatwas (opinion or
decision on a point of Islamic law given by a religious person of
standing) and other religious sanctions. Consequently, they
strengthened the hold of orthodoxy and priesthood over the
minds of men and women and encouraged the habit of looking at
political questions from the religious point of view. By doing so[/INST] |
426 | India’s Struggle For Independence
and by emphasizing the notion of Muslim solidarity, they kept an
opening for communal ideology and politics to grow at a later
stage.
The Non -Cooperation Movement was withdrawn in February
1922. As the people felt disillusioned and frustra ted and the
Dyarchy became operational, communalism reared its ugly head
and in the post-1922 years the coun try was repeatedly plunged
into communal riots. Old communal organizations were revived
and fresh ones founded. The Muslim League once again became
active and was cleansed of radical and nationalist elements . The
upper class leaders with their open loyalism and fran kly
communal ideology once again came to the fore. The Hindu
Mahasabha was revived in 1923 and openly began to cater to
anti-Muslim sentim ents. Its proclaimed objective became ‘the
maintenance, protection and promotion of Hindu race, Hindu
culture and Hindu civilization for the advancement of Hindu
Rashtra .’
The Hindu as well as Muslims communalists tried to
inculcate the psychology of fear among Hindus and Muslims —
the fear of being deprived, surpassed, threatened, dominated,
suppressed, beaten down, and exterminated. It was during these
years that Sangathan and Shuddhi movements among Hindus
and Tanzeem and Tabligh movements among Muslims, working
for communal consolidation and religious conversion, came up.
The nationalists were openly reviled as apostates and as enemies
of their own religion and co-religionists.
A large number of nationalists were not able to withstand
communal pressure and began to adopt communal or semi-
communal positions. The Swarajists were split by communalism.
A group known as ‘responsivists’ offered cooperation to the
Government so that the so-called Hindu interests might be
safeguarded. Lajpat Rai, Ma dan Mohan Mal aviya and N .C. Kelkar
joined the Hindu Mahasabha and argued for Hindu communal
solidarity. The less responsible ‘responsivists’ and Hindu | <s>[INST]426 | India’s Struggle For Independence
and by emphasizing the notion of Muslim solidarity, they kept an
opening for communal ideology and politics to grow at a later
stage.
The Non -Cooperation Movement was withdrawn in February
1922. As the people felt disillusioned and frustra ted and the
Dyarchy became operational, communalism reared its ugly head
and in the post-1922 years the coun try was repeatedly plunged
into communal riots. Old communal organizations were revived
and fresh ones founded. The Muslim League once again became
active and was cleansed of radical and nationalist elements . The
upper class leaders with their open loyalism and fran kly
communal ideology once again came to the fore. The Hindu
Mahasabha was revived in 1923 and openly began to cater to
anti-Muslim sentim ents. Its proclaimed objective became ‘the
maintenance, protection and promotion of Hindu race, Hindu
culture and Hindu civilization for the advancement of Hindu
Rashtra .’
The Hindu as well as Muslims communalists tried to
inculcate the psychology of fear among Hindus and Muslims —
the fear of being deprived, surpassed, threatened, dominated,
suppressed, beaten down, and exterminated. It was during these
years that Sangathan and Shuddhi movements among Hindus
and Tanzeem and Tabligh movements among Muslims, working
for communal consolidation and religious conversion, came up.
The nationalists were openly reviled as apostates and as enemies
of their own religion and co-religionists.
A large number of nationalists were not able to withstand
communal pressure and began to adopt communal or semi-
communal positions. The Swarajists were split by communalism.
A group known as ‘responsivists’ offered cooperation to the
Government so that the so-called Hindu interests might be
safeguarded. Lajpat Rai, Ma dan Mohan Mal aviya and N .C. Kelkar
joined the Hindu Mahasabha and argued for Hindu communal
solidarity. The less responsible ‘responsivists’ and Hindu[/INST] |
solidarity. The less responsible ‘responsivists’ and Hindu
Mahasabhaites carried on a vi rulent campaign against secular
Congressmen. They accused MOWSI Nehru of letting down
Hindus, of being anti-Hindu and an Islam - lover, of favo.xmg
cow-slaughter, and of eating beef. Many old Khilafatists also now
turned communal . The most dramatic shift was that of Maulanas | <s>[INST]solidarity. The less responsible ‘responsivists’ and Hindu
Mahasabhaites carried on a vi rulent campaign against secular
Congressmen. They accused MOWSI Nehru of letting down
Hindus, of being anti-Hindu and an Islam - lover, of favo.xmg
cow-slaughter, and of eating beef. Many old Khilafatists also now
turned communal . The most dramatic shift was that of Maulanas[/INST] |
427 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
Moham med All and Shaukat All who now accused the Congress
of trying to establish a Hindu Government and Hindus of wanting
to dominate and suppress Muslims. The most v icious expression
of communalism were communal riots which broke o ut in major
North Indian cities during 1923 -24. According to the Simon
Commission Report, near ly 112 major communal riots occurred
between 1922 and 1927.
The nationalist 1eadership made strenuous efforts to
oppose communal political forces, but was not able to evolve an
effective line of action. What was the line of action that it adopted
and why did it fail? Its basic strategy was to try to br ing about
unity at the top with communal leaders through negotiations.
This meant that either the Congress leaders ac ted as mediators
or intermediaries between different communal groups or they
themselves tri ed to arrive at a compromise with Muslim
communal leaders on questions of ‘protection’ to and ‘safeguards’
of the interests of the minorities in terms of reservation of seats
in the legislatures and of jobs in the government.
The most well -known of such e fforts was made during 1928.
As an answer to the challenge of the Simon Commission , Indian
political leaders organized several all -India conferences to settle
communal issues and draw up an agreed constitution for India. A
large number of Muslim communal l eaders met at Delhi in
December 1927 and evolved four basic demands known as the
Delhi Proposals. These proposals were: (1) Sind should be made a
separate province; (2) the North -West Frontier Province should be
treated constitutionally on the same footing as other provinces;
(3) Muslims should have 33 1/3 per cent representation in the
central legislature; (4) in Punjab and Bengal, the proportion of
representation should be in accordance with the population, thus
guaranteeing a Muslim majority, and in other provinces, where
Muslims were a minority, the existing reservation of seats for | <s>[INST]427 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
Moham med All and Shaukat All who now accused the Congress
of trying to establish a Hindu Government and Hindus of wanting
to dominate and suppress Muslims. The most v icious expression
of communalism were communal riots which broke o ut in major
North Indian cities during 1923 -24. According to the Simon
Commission Report, near ly 112 major communal riots occurred
between 1922 and 1927.
The nationalist 1eadership made strenuous efforts to
oppose communal political forces, but was not able to evolve an
effective line of action. What was the line of action that it adopted
and why did it fail? Its basic strategy was to try to br ing about
unity at the top with communal leaders through negotiations.
This meant that either the Congress leaders ac ted as mediators
or intermediaries between different communal groups or they
themselves tri ed to arrive at a compromise with Muslim
communal leaders on questions of ‘protection’ to and ‘safeguards’
of the interests of the minorities in terms of reservation of seats
in the legislatures and of jobs in the government.
The most well -known of such e fforts was made during 1928.
As an answer to the challenge of the Simon Commission , Indian
political leaders organized several all -India conferences to settle
communal issues and draw up an agreed constitution for India. A
large number of Muslim communal l eaders met at Delhi in
December 1927 and evolved four basic demands known as the
Delhi Proposals. These proposals were: (1) Sind should be made a
separate province; (2) the North -West Frontier Province should be
treated constitutionally on the same footing as other provinces;
(3) Muslims should have 33 1/3 per cent representation in the
central legislature; (4) in Punjab and Bengal, the proportion of
representation should be in accordance with the population, thus
guaranteeing a Muslim majority, and in other provinces, where
Muslims were a minority, the existing reservation of seats for[/INST] |
Muslims were a minority, the existing reservation of seats for
Muslims should continue.
The Congress proposals came in the form of the Nehru
Report drafted by an all-parties committee. The Report was put
up for approval before an All -Party Convention at Calcutta at the
end of December 1928. Apart from other aspects, the Nehru
Report recommended that India should be a federation on the
basis of linguistic provinces and provincial autonomy, that | <s>[INST]Muslims were a minority, the existing reservation of seats for
Muslims should continue.
The Congress proposals came in the form of the Nehru
Report drafted by an all-parties committee. The Report was put
up for approval before an All -Party Convention at Calcutta at the
end of December 1928. Apart from other aspects, the Nehru
Report recommended that India should be a federation on the
basis of linguistic provinces and provincial autonomy, that[/INST] |
428 | India’s Struggle For Independence
elections be held on the basis of joint ele ctorates and that seats
in central and provincial legislatures be reserved for religious
minorities in proportion to their population. The Report
recommended the separation of Sind from Bombay and
constitutional reform in the North -West Frontier Province.
The Report could not be approved unanimously at the
Calcutta Convention. While there were wide differences among
Muslims communalists. a section of the League and the
Khilafatists were willing to accept joint electorates and other
proposals in the Report provided three amendments, moved by
M.A. Jinnah, were accepted. Two of these were the same as the
third and fourth demands in the Delhi Proposals, the first and
the second of these demands having been conceded by the Nehru
Report. The third was a fresh dem and that residuary powers
should vest in the provinces. A large section of the League led by
Mohammed Shafi and the Aga Khan and many other Muslim
communal groups refused to agree to these amendments; they
were not willing to give up separate electorates. The Hindu
Mahasabha and the Sikh League raised vehement objections to
the parts of the Report dealing with Sind, North -West Frontier
Province, Bengal and Punjab. They also refused to accept the
Jinnah amendments. The Congress leaders were not willing to
accept the weak centre that the Jinnah proposals envisioned.
Most of the Muslim communalists now joined hands and
Jinnah too decided to fall in line. Declaring that the Nehru Report
represented Hindu interests, he consolidated all the communal
demands made by different communal orga nizations at different
times into a single document which came to be k nown as
Jinnah’s Fourteen Po ints. The Fourteen Points basically
consisted of the four Delhi Proposals, the three Calcutta
amendments and demands for the continu ation of separate
electorates arid reservation of seats for Muslims in government | <s>[INST]428 | India’s Struggle For Independence
elections be held on the basis of joint ele ctorates and that seats
in central and provincial legislatures be reserved for religious
minorities in proportion to their population. The Report
recommended the separation of Sind from Bombay and
constitutional reform in the North -West Frontier Province.
The Report could not be approved unanimously at the
Calcutta Convention. While there were wide differences among
Muslims communalists. a section of the League and the
Khilafatists were willing to accept joint electorates and other
proposals in the Report provided three amendments, moved by
M.A. Jinnah, were accepted. Two of these were the same as the
third and fourth demands in the Delhi Proposals, the first and
the second of these demands having been conceded by the Nehru
Report. The third was a fresh dem and that residuary powers
should vest in the provinces. A large section of the League led by
Mohammed Shafi and the Aga Khan and many other Muslim
communal groups refused to agree to these amendments; they
were not willing to give up separate electorates. The Hindu
Mahasabha and the Sikh League raised vehement objections to
the parts of the Report dealing with Sind, North -West Frontier
Province, Bengal and Punjab. They also refused to accept the
Jinnah amendments. The Congress leaders were not willing to
accept the weak centre that the Jinnah proposals envisioned.
Most of the Muslim communalists now joined hands and
Jinnah too decided to fall in line. Declaring that the Nehru Report
represented Hindu interests, he consolidated all the communal
demands made by different communal orga nizations at different
times into a single document which came to be k nown as
Jinnah’s Fourteen Po ints. The Fourteen Points basically
consisted of the four Delhi Proposals, the three Calcutta
amendments and demands for the continu ation of separate
electorates arid reservation of seats for Muslims in government[/INST] |
services and self - governing bodies. The Fourteen Points were to
form the basis of all future communal propaganda in the
subsequent years.
This strategy of trying to solve t he communal problem
through an agreement or pact with the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh
communal leaders proved a complete failure and suffered from
certain inherent weaknesses. Above all it meant that the | <s>[INST]services and self - governing bodies. The Fourteen Points were to
form the basis of all future communal propaganda in the
subsequent years.
This strategy of trying to solve t he communal problem
through an agreement or pact with the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh
communal leaders proved a complete failure and suffered from
certain inherent weaknesses. Above all it meant that the[/INST] |
429 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
Congress tacitly or by implication accepted, to a certain extent,
the claim of the c ommunal leaders that they were representatives
of the communal interests of their respective ‘communities,’ and,
of course, that such communal interests and religious
communities existed in real life. By negotiating with communal
leaders, the Congress legitimized their politics and made them
respectable. It also weakened its right, as well as the will, to carry
on a hard political -ideological campaign against communal
parties and individuals. Constant negotiations with Muslim
comm unal leaders wakened the position of secular, anti -
imperialist Muslims and Muslim leaders like Azad, Ansari and
Asaf Al i. They also made it difficult to oppose and expose the
communalism and semi - communalism of leaders like Madan
Mohan Malaviya, Lajpat Ra i and Maulana Mohammed Ali who
often worked within the Congress ranks.
The strategy of negotiations at the top required generous
concessions by the majority to the minority communalism on the
question of jobs and seats in the legislatures. But communalism
was quite strong among the Hindu middle classes which too
suffered from the consequences of colonial underdevelopment.
The Congress leadership found it politically difficult to force
concessions to Muslim communalism down the throat of Hindu
and Sikh comm unalists. Thus, the failure to conciliate the
Muslim communalists helped them gain strength, while any
important concessions to them tended to produce a Hindu
communal backlash. In any case, even if by a supreme effort in
generosity and sagacity a compromi se with communal leaders
had been arrived at, it was likely to prove temporary as was the
case with the Lucknow Pact and to some extent the Nehru
Report. Not one communal leader or group or party had enough
authority over other communal groups and individu als to sign a
lasting agreement. Concessions only whetted the appetite of the | <s>[INST]429 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
Congress tacitly or by implication accepted, to a certain extent,
the claim of the c ommunal leaders that they were representatives
of the communal interests of their respective ‘communities,’ and,
of course, that such communal interests and religious
communities existed in real life. By negotiating with communal
leaders, the Congress legitimized their politics and made them
respectable. It also weakened its right, as well as the will, to carry
on a hard political -ideological campaign against communal
parties and individuals. Constant negotiations with Muslim
comm unal leaders wakened the position of secular, anti -
imperialist Muslims and Muslim leaders like Azad, Ansari and
Asaf Al i. They also made it difficult to oppose and expose the
communalism and semi - communalism of leaders like Madan
Mohan Malaviya, Lajpat Ra i and Maulana Mohammed Ali who
often worked within the Congress ranks.
The strategy of negotiations at the top required generous
concessions by the majority to the minority communalism on the
question of jobs and seats in the legislatures. But communalism
was quite strong among the Hindu middle classes which too
suffered from the consequences of colonial underdevelopment.
The Congress leadership found it politically difficult to force
concessions to Muslim communalism down the throat of Hindu
and Sikh comm unalists. Thus, the failure to conciliate the
Muslim communalists helped them gain strength, while any
important concessions to them tended to produce a Hindu
communal backlash. In any case, even if by a supreme effort in
generosity and sagacity a compromi se with communal leaders
had been arrived at, it was likely to prove temporary as was the
case with the Lucknow Pact and to some extent the Nehru
Report. Not one communal leader or group or party had enough
authority over other communal groups and individu als to sign a
lasting agreement. Concessions only whetted the appetite of the[/INST] |
communalists. A soon as one group was appeased, a more
‘extreme’ or recalcitrant leader or group emerged and pushed up
the communal demands. Consequently, often the more
‘reasona ble’ leader or group felt his communal hold over the
followers weakening and found it necessary to go back even on
the earlier partial or fuller agreement. This is what repeatedly
happened during 1928 -29 — and Jinnah’s was a typical example.
The fact was t hat so long as communal ideology flourished or the
socio -political conditions favouring communal politics persisted, | <s>[INST]communalists. A soon as one group was appeased, a more
‘extreme’ or recalcitrant leader or group emerged and pushed up
the communal demands. Consequently, often the more
‘reasona ble’ leader or group felt his communal hold over the
followers weakening and found it necessary to go back even on
the earlier partial or fuller agreement. This is what repeatedly
happened during 1928 -29 — and Jinnah’s was a typical example.
The fact was t hat so long as communal ideology flourished or the
socio -political conditions favouring communal politics persisted,[/INST] |
430 | India’s Struggle For Independence
it was difficult to appease or conciliate communal leaders
permanently or for any length of time.
The real answer lay in an all -out opposi tion to
communalism in all arenas — ideological, cultural, social and
political. Based on a scientific understanding of its ideology, its
social and ideological sources and roots, its social base, and the
reasons for its growth in the face of the nationali st work in favour
of Hindu -Muslim unity, an intense political -ideological struggle
had to be waged against communalism and communal political
forces. Moreover, it was necessary to take up the peasants’ cause
where their class struggle was being distorted i nto communal
channels. All this was not done, despite the deep commitment to
secularism of the bulk of the nationalist leadership from
Dadabhai Naoroji to Gandhiji and Nehru.
The need was to direct the debate with the communalists
into hard, rational, ana lytical channels so that the latter were
forced to fight on the terrain of reason and science and not of
emotion and bias. Gandhiji and the Congress did make Hindu -
Muslim unity one of the three basic items of the nationalist
political platform . They also, at crucial moments, refused to
appease the Hindu communalists. Gandhiji several times staked
his life for the secular cause. But Gandhiji and the Congress
provided no deeper analysis of the communal phenomenon.
Despite the intensified activities of commun al parties and
groups during the 1920s, communalism was not yet very
pervasive in Indian society. Communal riots were largely confined
to cities and their number, keeping in view the size of the
country, was not really large. The Hindu communalists
command ed little support among the masses. The social base of
the Muslim communalists was also quite narrow. The nationalist
Muslims, who were part of the Congress, still represented a major
political force. The rising trade union, peasant and youth | <s>[INST]430 | India’s Struggle For Independence
it was difficult to appease or conciliate communal leaders
permanently or for any length of time.
The real answer lay in an all -out opposi tion to
communalism in all arenas — ideological, cultural, social and
political. Based on a scientific understanding of its ideology, its
social and ideological sources and roots, its social base, and the
reasons for its growth in the face of the nationali st work in favour
of Hindu -Muslim unity, an intense political -ideological struggle
had to be waged against communalism and communal political
forces. Moreover, it was necessary to take up the peasants’ cause
where their class struggle was being distorted i nto communal
channels. All this was not done, despite the deep commitment to
secularism of the bulk of the nationalist leadership from
Dadabhai Naoroji to Gandhiji and Nehru.
The need was to direct the debate with the communalists
into hard, rational, ana lytical channels so that the latter were
forced to fight on the terrain of reason and science and not of
emotion and bias. Gandhiji and the Congress did make Hindu -
Muslim unity one of the three basic items of the nationalist
political platform . They also, at crucial moments, refused to
appease the Hindu communalists. Gandhiji several times staked
his life for the secular cause. But Gandhiji and the Congress
provided no deeper analysis of the communal phenomenon.
Despite the intensified activities of commun al parties and
groups during the 1920s, communalism was not yet very
pervasive in Indian society. Communal riots were largely confined
to cities and their number, keeping in view the size of the
country, was not really large. The Hindu communalists
command ed little support among the masses. The social base of
the Muslim communalists was also quite narrow. The nationalist
Muslims, who were part of the Congress, still represented a major
political force. The rising trade union, peasant and youth[/INST] |
political force. The rising trade union, peasant and youth
movements wer e fully secular. The reaction to the Simon
Commission further revealed the weakness of communal forces
when both the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha got
divided, some in favour of a boycott of the Commission and
others for cooperating with it.
The a nti-Simon Commission protest movement and then the
Second Civil Disobedience Movement from 1930 to 1934 swept | <s>[INST]political force. The rising trade union, peasant and youth
movements wer e fully secular. The reaction to the Simon
Commission further revealed the weakness of communal forces
when both the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha got
divided, some in favour of a boycott of the Commission and
others for cooperating with it.
The a nti-Simon Commission protest movement and then the
Second Civil Disobedience Movement from 1930 to 1934 swept[/INST] |
431 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
the entire country and once again pushed the communalists as a
whole into the background. Led by the Congress, Jamait -ul-
Ulama -i-Hind, Khudai Khid matgars and other organizations,
thousands of Muslims went to jail. The national movement
engulfed for the first time two new major areas with a Muslim
majority — the North -West Frontier Province and Kashmir.
The communal leaders got a chance to come into the limelight
during the Round Table Conferences of the early 1930s. At these
conferences, the communalists joined hands with the most
reactionary sections of the British ruling classes. Both the
Muslim and Hindu communalists made efforts to win the suppo rt
of British authorities to defend their so -called communal
interests. In 1932, at a meeting in the House of Commons, the
Aga Khan, the poet Mohammed lqbal and the historian Shafaat
Ahmad Khan stressed ‘the inherent impossibility of securing any
merger of Hindu and Muslim, political, or indeed social interests’
and ‘the impracticability of ever governing India through anything
but a British agency.’ Similarly, in 1933, presiding over the
Hindu Mahasabha session, Bhai Parmanand made a plea for
cooperation b etween Hindus and the British Government and
said: ‘I feel an impulse in me that Hindus would willingly
cooperate with Great Britain if their status and responsible
position as the premier community in India is recognized in the
political institutions of n ew India.’
The communal parties and groups remained quite weak and
narrow based till 1937. Most of the Muslim as also Hindu young
intellectuals, workers and peasants joined the mainstreams of
nationalism and socialism in the early 193 Os. In Bengal, many
joined the secular and radical Krishak Praja Party. Moreover, in
1932, in an effort to bolster the sagging Muslim communalism,
the British Government announced the Communal Award which
accepted virtually all the Muslim communal demands embodied | <s>[INST]431 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
the entire country and once again pushed the communalists as a
whole into the background. Led by the Congress, Jamait -ul-
Ulama -i-Hind, Khudai Khid matgars and other organizations,
thousands of Muslims went to jail. The national movement
engulfed for the first time two new major areas with a Muslim
majority — the North -West Frontier Province and Kashmir.
The communal leaders got a chance to come into the limelight
during the Round Table Conferences of the early 1930s. At these
conferences, the communalists joined hands with the most
reactionary sections of the British ruling classes. Both the
Muslim and Hindu communalists made efforts to win the suppo rt
of British authorities to defend their so -called communal
interests. In 1932, at a meeting in the House of Commons, the
Aga Khan, the poet Mohammed lqbal and the historian Shafaat
Ahmad Khan stressed ‘the inherent impossibility of securing any
merger of Hindu and Muslim, political, or indeed social interests’
and ‘the impracticability of ever governing India through anything
but a British agency.’ Similarly, in 1933, presiding over the
Hindu Mahasabha session, Bhai Parmanand made a plea for
cooperation b etween Hindus and the British Government and
said: ‘I feel an impulse in me that Hindus would willingly
cooperate with Great Britain if their status and responsible
position as the premier community in India is recognized in the
political institutions of n ew India.’
The communal parties and groups remained quite weak and
narrow based till 1937. Most of the Muslim as also Hindu young
intellectuals, workers and peasants joined the mainstreams of
nationalism and socialism in the early 193 Os. In Bengal, many
joined the secular and radical Krishak Praja Party. Moreover, in
1932, in an effort to bolster the sagging Muslim communalism,
the British Government announced the Communal Award which
accepted virtually all the Muslim communal demands embodied[/INST] |
accepted virtually all the Muslim communal demands embodied
in the Delhi Proposals of 1927 and Jinnah’s Fourteen Points of
1929. The communal forces were faced with an entirely new
situation; they could not carry on as before. The question was
where would they go from here. | <s>[INST]accepted virtually all the Muslim communal demands embodied
in the Delhi Proposals of 1927 and Jinnah’s Fourteen Points of
1929. The communal forces were faced with an entirely new
situation; they could not carry on as before. The question was
where would they go from here.[/INST] |
432 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 33 . JINNAH, GOLWALKAR
AND EXTREME
COMMUNALISM
Communalism remained at the second, liberal stage till
1937 when it increasingly started assuming a virulent, extremist
or fascist form. The liberal communalist argued that India
consisted of distinct religion -based communities which had their
own separate and special interests which often came into mutual
conflict. But he also accepted that the ultimate destiny of Indian
politics was the merger of the different communities into a single
nation: Thus, the liberal communalist dem anded separate
communal rights, safeguards, reservations, etc., within the broad
concept of one Indian nation -in-the-making. He accepted
national unity as the ultimate goal as also the concept of the
ultimate common interests of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and
Christians. Liberal communalism had also a rather narrow social
base. Politically, it was based mainly on the upper and
middle classes.
Extreme communalism was based on the politics of hatred,
fear psychosis and irrationality. The motifs of domination an d
suppression, always present in communal propaganda as we
have shown earlier, increasingly became the dominant theme of
communal propaganda. A campaign of hatred against the
followers of other religions was unleashed. The interests of
Hindus and Muslims w ere now declared to be permanently in
conflict. The communalists attacked the other ‘communities’
with, in W.C. Smith’s words, ‘fervour, fear, contempt and bitter
hatred,’ in the extremist or fascist phase of communalism after
1937. Phrases like oppression , suppression, domination, being
crushed, even physical extermination and extinction were used.
The communalists increasingly operated on the principle: the
bigger the lie the better. They poured venom on the National
Congress and Gandhiji, and, in particu lar, they viciously
attacked their co -religionists among the nationalists. | <s>[INST]432 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 33 . JINNAH, GOLWALKAR
AND EXTREME
COMMUNALISM
Communalism remained at the second, liberal stage till
1937 when it increasingly started assuming a virulent, extremist
or fascist form. The liberal communalist argued that India
consisted of distinct religion -based communities which had their
own separate and special interests which often came into mutual
conflict. But he also accepted that the ultimate destiny of Indian
politics was the merger of the different communities into a single
nation: Thus, the liberal communalist dem anded separate
communal rights, safeguards, reservations, etc., within the broad
concept of one Indian nation -in-the-making. He accepted
national unity as the ultimate goal as also the concept of the
ultimate common interests of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and
Christians. Liberal communalism had also a rather narrow social
base. Politically, it was based mainly on the upper and
middle classes.
Extreme communalism was based on the politics of hatred,
fear psychosis and irrationality. The motifs of domination an d
suppression, always present in communal propaganda as we
have shown earlier, increasingly became the dominant theme of
communal propaganda. A campaign of hatred against the
followers of other religions was unleashed. The interests of
Hindus and Muslims w ere now declared to be permanently in
conflict. The communalists attacked the other ‘communities’
with, in W.C. Smith’s words, ‘fervour, fear, contempt and bitter
hatred,’ in the extremist or fascist phase of communalism after
1937. Phrases like oppression , suppression, domination, being
crushed, even physical extermination and extinction were used.
The communalists increasingly operated on the principle: the
bigger the lie the better. They poured venom on the National
Congress and Gandhiji, and, in particu lar, they viciously
attacked their co -religionists among the nationalists.[/INST] |
433 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
Communalism also now, after 1937, increasingly acquired a
popular base, and began to mobilize popular mass opinion. It
was now sought to be organized as a mass movement around
aggressive, extremist communal politics among the urban lower
middle classes. This also required an issue or a slogan which
could arouse mass emotion. Because of the reactionary, upper
class base of communalism, an appeal to radical social issues
could not be made. In other words, communalism could not base
itself on a radical socio -economic, or political or ideological
programme. Hence, inevitably, an appeal was made to religion
and to irrational sentiments of fear and hatred.
Liberal communalism was transfor med into extremist
communalism for several reasons. As a consequence of the
growth of nationalism and in particular, of the Civil Disobedience
Movement of 1930 -34, the Congress emerged as the dominant
political force in the elections of 1937. Various polit ical parties of
landlords and other vested interests suffered a drastic decline.
Moreover, as we have seen, the youth as also the workers and
peasants were increasingly turning to the Left, and the national
movement as a whole was getting increasingly radi calized in its
economic and political programme and policies. The zamindars
and landlords — the jagirdari elements — finding that open
defence of landlords’ interests was no longer feasible, now, by
and large, switched over to communalism for their class d efence.
This was not only true in U.P. and Bihar but also in Punjab and
Bengal. In Punjab, for example, the big landlords of West Punjab
and the Muslim bureaucratic elite had supported the semi -
communal, semi -casteist and loyalist Unionist Party. But they
increasingly felt that the Unionist Party, being a provincial party,
could no longer protect them from Congress radicalism, and so,
during the years 1937 -45, they gradually shifted their support to | <s>[INST]433 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
Communalism also now, after 1937, increasingly acquired a
popular base, and began to mobilize popular mass opinion. It
was now sought to be organized as a mass movement around
aggressive, extremist communal politics among the urban lower
middle classes. This also required an issue or a slogan which
could arouse mass emotion. Because of the reactionary, upper
class base of communalism, an appeal to radical social issues
could not be made. In other words, communalism could not base
itself on a radical socio -economic, or political or ideological
programme. Hence, inevitably, an appeal was made to religion
and to irrational sentiments of fear and hatred.
Liberal communalism was transfor med into extremist
communalism for several reasons. As a consequence of the
growth of nationalism and in particular, of the Civil Disobedience
Movement of 1930 -34, the Congress emerged as the dominant
political force in the elections of 1937. Various polit ical parties of
landlords and other vested interests suffered a drastic decline.
Moreover, as we have seen, the youth as also the workers and
peasants were increasingly turning to the Left, and the national
movement as a whole was getting increasingly radi calized in its
economic and political programme and policies. The zamindars
and landlords — the jagirdari elements — finding that open
defence of landlords’ interests was no longer feasible, now, by
and large, switched over to communalism for their class d efence.
This was not only true in U.P. and Bihar but also in Punjab and
Bengal. In Punjab, for example, the big landlords of West Punjab
and the Muslim bureaucratic elite had supported the semi -
communal, semi -casteist and loyalist Unionist Party. But they
increasingly felt that the Unionist Party, being a provincial party,
could no longer protect them from Congress radicalism, and so,
during the years 1937 -45, they gradually shifted their support to[/INST] |
the Mus1im League which eagerly promised to protect their
interests. Very similar was the case of Muslim zamindars and
jotedars in Bengal. Hindu zamindars and landlords and
merchants and moneylenders in northern and western India too
began to shift towards Hindu communal parties and groups. To
attract them, V.D. Savarkar, the Hindu Mahasabha President,
began to condemn the ‘selfish’ class tussle between landlords and
tenants. Similarly, in Punjab, the Hindu communalists became
even more active than before in defending money lending and
trading interests. | <s>[INST]the Mus1im League which eagerly promised to protect their
interests. Very similar was the case of Muslim zamindars and
jotedars in Bengal. Hindu zamindars and landlords and
merchants and moneylenders in northern and western India too
began to shift towards Hindu communal parties and groups. To
attract them, V.D. Savarkar, the Hindu Mahasabha President,
began to condemn the ‘selfish’ class tussle between landlords and
tenants. Similarly, in Punjab, the Hindu communalists became
even more active than before in defending money lending and
trading interests.[/INST] |
434 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Communal ism also became, after 1937, the only political
recourse of colonial authorities and their policy of divide and
rule. This was because by this time, nearly all the other divisions,
antagonisms and divisive devices promoted and fostered earlier
by the colon ial authorities had been overcome by the national
movement, and had become politically non -viable from the
colonial point of view. The Non -Brahmin challenge in
Maharashtra and South India had fizzled out. The Scheduled
Castes and other backward castes coul d no longer be mobilized
against the Congress except in stray pockets. The Right and Left
wings of the Congress also refused to split. Inter -provincial and
inter-lingual rivalries had exhausted themselves much earlier,
after the Congress accepted the valid ity of linguistic states and
the cultural diversity of the Indian people. The effort to pit the
zamindars and landlords against the national movement had also
completely failed. The elections of 1937 showed that nearly all
the major social and political gr oups of colonialism lay shattered.
The communal card alone was available for playing against the
national movement and the rulers decided to use it to the limit,
to stake all on it. They threw all the weight of the colonial state
behind Muslim communalism, even though it was headed by a
man — M.A. Jinnah — whom they di sliked and feared for his
sturdy independence and outspoken anti -colonialism.
The outbreak of World War II, on 1 September, 1939 further
strengthened the reliance on the communal card. The Co ngress
withdrew its ministries and demanded that the British make a
declaration that India would get complete freedom after the War
and transfer of effective Government power immediately. For
countering the nationalist demand and dividing Indian opinion,
reliance was placed on the Muslim League whose politics and
demands were counterposed to the nationalist politics and | <s>[INST]434 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Communal ism also became, after 1937, the only political
recourse of colonial authorities and their policy of divide and
rule. This was because by this time, nearly all the other divisions,
antagonisms and divisive devices promoted and fostered earlier
by the colon ial authorities had been overcome by the national
movement, and had become politically non -viable from the
colonial point of view. The Non -Brahmin challenge in
Maharashtra and South India had fizzled out. The Scheduled
Castes and other backward castes coul d no longer be mobilized
against the Congress except in stray pockets. The Right and Left
wings of the Congress also refused to split. Inter -provincial and
inter-lingual rivalries had exhausted themselves much earlier,
after the Congress accepted the valid ity of linguistic states and
the cultural diversity of the Indian people. The effort to pit the
zamindars and landlords against the national movement had also
completely failed. The elections of 1937 showed that nearly all
the major social and political gr oups of colonialism lay shattered.
The communal card alone was available for playing against the
national movement and the rulers decided to use it to the limit,
to stake all on it. They threw all the weight of the colonial state
behind Muslim communalism, even though it was headed by a
man — M.A. Jinnah — whom they di sliked and feared for his
sturdy independence and outspoken anti -colonialism.
The outbreak of World War II, on 1 September, 1939 further
strengthened the reliance on the communal card. The Co ngress
withdrew its ministries and demanded that the British make a
declaration that India would get complete freedom after the War
and transfer of effective Government power immediately. For
countering the nationalist demand and dividing Indian opinion,
reliance was placed on the Muslim League whose politics and
demands were counterposed to the nationalist politics and[/INST] |
demands were counterposed to the nationalist politics and
demands. The League was recognized as the sole spokesperson
for Muslims and given the power to veto any political settlement.
India could n ot be given freedom, it was said, so long as Hindus
and Muslims did not unite. But such unity was made impossible
by the wholesale official backing of Muslim communalism. The
Muslim League, in turn, agreed to collaborate with the colonial
authorities and s erve as their political instrument of its own
reasons. The Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu and Sikh
communal organizations also offered to support the colonial
Government during the War. But the colonial authorities, while | <s>[INST]demands were counterposed to the nationalist politics and
demands. The League was recognized as the sole spokesperson
for Muslims and given the power to veto any political settlement.
India could n ot be given freedom, it was said, so long as Hindus
and Muslims did not unite. But such unity was made impossible
by the wholesale official backing of Muslim communalism. The
Muslim League, in turn, agreed to collaborate with the colonial
authorities and s erve as their political instrument of its own
reasons. The Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu and Sikh
communal organizations also offered to support the colonial
Government during the War. But the colonial authorities, while[/INST] |
435 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
accepting their support, could no longer divide their loyalties;
their commitment t o Muslim communalism was to remain total
during the course of the Wax, and even after.
Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha had
run the election campaign of 1937 on liberal communal lines —
they had incorporated much of the nationalist programme and
many of the Congress policies, except those relating to agrarian
issues, in their election manifestoes. But they had fared poorly in
the elections. The Muslim League, for example, won only 109 out
of the 482 seats allotted to Muslims under separate electorates,
securing only 4.8 per cent of the total Muslim votes. The Hindu
Mahasabha fared even worse.
The communalists now realized that they would gradually
wither away if they did not take to militant, mass -based politics.
Hitherto, organized mass movements and cadre -based politics
had been built by radical, anti -status quo nationalists. The
conservatives had shied away from mass movements. In the
1930s, a successful right -wing model of mass politics, wh ich
would not frighten away the vested interests, became available in
the form of the fascist movement. Both Hindu and Muslim
communalists decided to follow this model. Moreover, the
Congress had not yet acquired firm roots among all the masses,
especially among the Muslim masses; now was the time to take
advantage of their political immaturity, before it was too late.
Urgency was added to the need to shift to extreme Muslim
communalism because the Congress decided to initiate, under
Jawaharlal Nehru’s guid ance, a massive campaign to work
among the Muslim masses, known as the Muslim Mass Contact
Programme.
The logic of communalism also inexorably led to extreme
communalism. The Congress had gone quite far in the late 1920s
in accepting Muslim communal deman ds. In 1932, the
Communal Award and then the Government of India Act of 1935 | <s>[INST]435 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
accepting their support, could no longer divide their loyalties;
their commitment t o Muslim communalism was to remain total
during the course of the Wax, and even after.
Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha had
run the election campaign of 1937 on liberal communal lines —
they had incorporated much of the nationalist programme and
many of the Congress policies, except those relating to agrarian
issues, in their election manifestoes. But they had fared poorly in
the elections. The Muslim League, for example, won only 109 out
of the 482 seats allotted to Muslims under separate electorates,
securing only 4.8 per cent of the total Muslim votes. The Hindu
Mahasabha fared even worse.
The communalists now realized that they would gradually
wither away if they did not take to militant, mass -based politics.
Hitherto, organized mass movements and cadre -based politics
had been built by radical, anti -status quo nationalists. The
conservatives had shied away from mass movements. In the
1930s, a successful right -wing model of mass politics, wh ich
would not frighten away the vested interests, became available in
the form of the fascist movement. Both Hindu and Muslim
communalists decided to follow this model. Moreover, the
Congress had not yet acquired firm roots among all the masses,
especially among the Muslim masses; now was the time to take
advantage of their political immaturity, before it was too late.
Urgency was added to the need to shift to extreme Muslim
communalism because the Congress decided to initiate, under
Jawaharlal Nehru’s guid ance, a massive campaign to work
among the Muslim masses, known as the Muslim Mass Contact
Programme.
The logic of communalism also inexorably led to extreme
communalism. The Congress had gone quite far in the late 1920s
in accepting Muslim communal deman ds. In 1932, the
Communal Award and then the Government of India Act of 1935[/INST] |
Communal Award and then the Government of India Act of 1935
accepted nearly all the liberal communal demands. Nor did the
National Congress oppose these concessions to the
communalists. B ut such concessions would have no cast iron
guarante e behind them once the foreign rulers disappeared from
the scene and the country came to be ruled democratically.
Moreover, what would the communalists do next? Since their | <s>[INST]Communal Award and then the Government of India Act of 1935
accepted nearly all the liberal communal demands. Nor did the
National Congress oppose these concessions to the
communalists. B ut such concessions would have no cast iron
guarante e behind them once the foreign rulers disappeared from
the scene and the country came to be ruled democratically.
Moreover, what would the communalists do next? Since their[/INST] |
436 | India’s Struggle For Independence
demands had been accepted, they had either to dissolve their
political organization s, give up communalism and commit
political harakiri or discover new demands, new threats to their
communities, and inexorably and without necessarily, a
conscious design turn towards extreme communalism. Similarly,
the Hindu communalists had failed to gro w. Further, till 1937,
the Congress had permitted both Hindu and Muslim liberal
communalists to work within the Congress organization. Under
Jawaharlal Nehru’s and the Left’s pressure the Congress was
frontally attacking the communalists. Not only did it n ot
accommodate them in the elections of 1934 and 1937, it moved
towards expelling them from the Congress, and finally did so in
1938. The Hindu communalists were facing political extinction.
They also had to find a new basis and a new progr amme for their
survival and growth.
The proposition that communalism has a logic of its own
and, if not checked in its early stages, inevitably develops into its
‘higher’ stages is illustrated by the life history of Mohammed All
Jinnah. His case shows how communalism is an inclined plane
on which a constant slide down becomes inevitable unless
counter steps are taken. Once the basic digits of communal
ideology are accepted, the ideology takes over a pers on bit by bit,
independent of the subjective desires of the person. This is how a
person who started as the ‘Ambassador of Hindu -Muslim Unity’
ended up by demanding Pakistan.
M.A. Jinnah came back to India after becoming a Barrister
in 1906 as a secular, liberal nationalist, a follower of Dadabhai
Naoroji. On his r eturn, h e immediately joined the Congress and
acted as Dadabhai’s secretary at the Calcutta session of the
Cong ress in 1906 He was an opponent of the Muslim League
then being founded. The Aga Khan, the first president of the
League, was to write later that Jinnah was ‘our toughest
opponent in 1906’ and that he ‘came out in bitter hostility toward | <s>[INST]436 | India’s Struggle For Independence
demands had been accepted, they had either to dissolve their
political organization s, give up communalism and commit
political harakiri or discover new demands, new threats to their
communities, and inexorably and without necessarily, a
conscious design turn towards extreme communalism. Similarly,
the Hindu communalists had failed to gro w. Further, till 1937,
the Congress had permitted both Hindu and Muslim liberal
communalists to work within the Congress organization. Under
Jawaharlal Nehru’s and the Left’s pressure the Congress was
frontally attacking the communalists. Not only did it n ot
accommodate them in the elections of 1934 and 1937, it moved
towards expelling them from the Congress, and finally did so in
1938. The Hindu communalists were facing political extinction.
They also had to find a new basis and a new progr amme for their
survival and growth.
The proposition that communalism has a logic of its own
and, if not checked in its early stages, inevitably develops into its
‘higher’ stages is illustrated by the life history of Mohammed All
Jinnah. His case shows how communalism is an inclined plane
on which a constant slide down becomes inevitable unless
counter steps are taken. Once the basic digits of communal
ideology are accepted, the ideology takes over a pers on bit by bit,
independent of the subjective desires of the person. This is how a
person who started as the ‘Ambassador of Hindu -Muslim Unity’
ended up by demanding Pakistan.
M.A. Jinnah came back to India after becoming a Barrister
in 1906 as a secular, liberal nationalist, a follower of Dadabhai
Naoroji. On his r eturn, h e immediately joined the Congress and
acted as Dadabhai’s secretary at the Calcutta session of the
Cong ress in 1906 He was an opponent of the Muslim League
then being founded. The Aga Khan, the first president of the
League, was to write later that Jinnah was ‘our toughest
opponent in 1906’ and that he ‘came out in bitter hostility toward[/INST] |
all that I and my friends had done and were trying to do.. . He
said that our principle of separate electorates was dividing the
nation against itself.” From 1906 onwards, Jinnah propagated
the theme of national unity in the meetings that he addressed,
earning from Sarojini Naidu the title ‘Ambassador of Hindu -
Muslim Unity.’ | <s>[INST]all that I and my friends had done and were trying to do.. . He
said that our principle of separate electorates was dividing the
nation against itself.” From 1906 onwards, Jinnah propagated
the theme of national unity in the meetings that he addressed,
earning from Sarojini Naidu the title ‘Ambassador of Hindu -
Muslim Unity.’[/INST] |
437 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
The first step towards communalism was taken without any
desire of his own and perhaps against his own wishes when he
entered the Central Legislative Council from Bombay as a Muslim
member under the system of separate electorates. The real slide
down began when from a nationalist mire and simple he became
a communal nationalist in 1913 when he joined th e Muslim
League. This, of course, meant that he was still basically a
nationalist. He remained in the Congress ad still opposed
separate electorates arguing that it would divide India into ‘two
watertight compartments.’ But he also started assuming the rol e
of a spokesperson of the Muslim ‘community’ as a whole. These
dual roles reached the height of their effectiveness in the
Lucknow Congress -League Pact of which he and Tilak were the
joint authors. Acting as the spokesperson of Muslim
communalism, he got the Congress to accept separate electorates
and the system of communal reservations. But he still remained
fully committed to nationalism and secular politics. He resigned
from the Legislative Council as a protest against the passing of
the Rowlatt Bill. H e refused the communal assumption that self -
government in India would lead to Hindu rule; and argued that
the real political issue in India was Home Rule or ‘transfer of
power from bureaucracy to democracy.’
In 1919 -20, the Congress took a turn towards mas s politics
based on the peaceful breaking of existing laws. Jinnah disagreed
and did not find it possible to go along with Gandhi. Along with
many other liberals, who thought like him — persons such as
Surendranath Banerjea, Bipin Chandra Pal, Tej Bahadur Sapru,
C. Sankaran Nair, and many more — Jinnah left the Congress.
But he could also see that mere liberal politics had no future.
And he was not willing to go into political oblivion. Unlike most of
the other liberals, he turned to communal politics. He became a | <s>[INST]437 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
The first step towards communalism was taken without any
desire of his own and perhaps against his own wishes when he
entered the Central Legislative Council from Bombay as a Muslim
member under the system of separate electorates. The real slide
down began when from a nationalist mire and simple he became
a communal nationalist in 1913 when he joined th e Muslim
League. This, of course, meant that he was still basically a
nationalist. He remained in the Congress ad still opposed
separate electorates arguing that it would divide India into ‘two
watertight compartments.’ But he also started assuming the rol e
of a spokesperson of the Muslim ‘community’ as a whole. These
dual roles reached the height of their effectiveness in the
Lucknow Congress -League Pact of which he and Tilak were the
joint authors. Acting as the spokesperson of Muslim
communalism, he got the Congress to accept separate electorates
and the system of communal reservations. But he still remained
fully committed to nationalism and secular politics. He resigned
from the Legislative Council as a protest against the passing of
the Rowlatt Bill. H e refused the communal assumption that self -
government in India would lead to Hindu rule; and argued that
the real political issue in India was Home Rule or ‘transfer of
power from bureaucracy to democracy.’
In 1919 -20, the Congress took a turn towards mas s politics
based on the peaceful breaking of existing laws. Jinnah disagreed
and did not find it possible to go along with Gandhi. Along with
many other liberals, who thought like him — persons such as
Surendranath Banerjea, Bipin Chandra Pal, Tej Bahadur Sapru,
C. Sankaran Nair, and many more — Jinnah left the Congress.
But he could also see that mere liberal politics had no future.
And he was not willing to go into political oblivion. Unlike most of
the other liberals, he turned to communal politics. He became a[/INST] |
liberal communalist. The logic of communalism had asserted
itself and transformed him first from a nationalist into communal
nationalist and then into a liberal communalist.
During the 1920s, Jinnah’s nationalism was not fully
swallowed by communa lism. He revived the down -and-out
Muslim League in 1924 and started building it upon and around
the demand for safeguarding ‘the interests and rights of the
Muslims.’ His politics were now based on the basic communal
idea that ‘Muslims should organize them selves, stand united and | <s>[INST]liberal communalist. The logic of communalism had asserted
itself and transformed him first from a nationalist into communal
nationalist and then into a liberal communalist.
During the 1920s, Jinnah’s nationalism was not fully
swallowed by communa lism. He revived the down -and-out
Muslim League in 1924 and started building it upon and around
the demand for safeguarding ‘the interests and rights of the
Muslims.’ His politics were now based on the basic communal
idea that ‘Muslims should organize them selves, stand united and[/INST] |
438 | India’s Struggle For Independence
should press every reasonable point for the protection of their
community.’ At the same time, he still pleaded for Hindu -Muslim
unity on the basis of a fresh Lucknow Pact so as to fight the
British together, and he cooperated with the Swarajists in
opposing Government policies and measures in the Central
Legislative Assembly. As late as 1925, he told a young Muslim,
who said that he was a Muslim first: ‘My boy, no, you are an
Indian first and then a Muslim.’ In 1927 -28, he supported the
boycott of the Simon Commission, though he would not join in
the mass demonstrations against it.
But by now his entire social base comprised communal -
minded persons. He could not give up communalism without
losing all political influence . This became apparent in 1928 -29
during the discussions on the Nehru Report. Step by step he
surrendered to the more reactionary communalists, led by the
Aga Khan and M. Shafi, and in the end became the leader of
Muslim communalism as a whole, losing in the bargain the
support of nationalist leaders like MA. Ansari, T.A.K. Sherwani,
Syed Mahmud and his own erstwhile lieutenants like M.C.
Chagla. His slide down was symbolized by his becoming the
author of the famous 14 demands incorporating the demands of
the most reacti onary and virulent sections of Muslim
communalism.
Jinnah was further a lienated from the main currents of
nationalism as the Congress organized the massive mass
movement of 1930 and started moving towards a more radical
socio -econom ic programme. Moreover, the Muslim masses
especially the younger generation were increasingly shifting to
nationalist and left -wing politics and ideologies. Jinnah was faced
with a dilemma. He saw little light; and decided to stay mostly in
Britain.
But Jinnah was too much of a man of action and of politics
to stay there. He returned to India in 1936 to once again revive
the Muslim League. He initially wanted to do so on the basis of | <s>[INST]438 | India’s Struggle For Independence
should press every reasonable point for the protection of their
community.’ At the same time, he still pleaded for Hindu -Muslim
unity on the basis of a fresh Lucknow Pact so as to fight the
British together, and he cooperated with the Swarajists in
opposing Government policies and measures in the Central
Legislative Assembly. As late as 1925, he told a young Muslim,
who said that he was a Muslim first: ‘My boy, no, you are an
Indian first and then a Muslim.’ In 1927 -28, he supported the
boycott of the Simon Commission, though he would not join in
the mass demonstrations against it.
But by now his entire social base comprised communal -
minded persons. He could not give up communalism without
losing all political influence . This became apparent in 1928 -29
during the discussions on the Nehru Report. Step by step he
surrendered to the more reactionary communalists, led by the
Aga Khan and M. Shafi, and in the end became the leader of
Muslim communalism as a whole, losing in the bargain the
support of nationalist leaders like MA. Ansari, T.A.K. Sherwani,
Syed Mahmud and his own erstwhile lieutenants like M.C.
Chagla. His slide down was symbolized by his becoming the
author of the famous 14 demands incorporating the demands of
the most reacti onary and virulent sections of Muslim
communalism.
Jinnah was further a lienated from the main currents of
nationalism as the Congress organized the massive mass
movement of 1930 and started moving towards a more radical
socio -econom ic programme. Moreover, the Muslim masses
especially the younger generation were increasingly shifting to
nationalist and left -wing politics and ideologies. Jinnah was faced
with a dilemma. He saw little light; and decided to stay mostly in
Britain.
But Jinnah was too much of a man of action and of politics
to stay there. He returned to India in 1936 to once again revive
the Muslim League. He initially wanted to do so on the basis of[/INST] |
liberal communalism. Throughout 1936, he stressed his
nationalism and desire for freedom and spo ke for Hindu -Muslim
cooperation. For example, he said at Lahore in March 1936:
‘Whatever I have done. let me assure you there has been no
change in me, not the slightest, since the day when I joined the | <s>[INST]liberal communalism. Throughout 1936, he stressed his
nationalism and desire for freedom and spo ke for Hindu -Muslim
cooperation. For example, he said at Lahore in March 1936:
‘Whatever I have done. let me assure you there has been no
change in me, not the slightest, since the day when I joined the[/INST] |
439 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
Indian National Congress. It may be I have been wrong on some
occasions. But it has never been done in a partisan spirit. My
sole and only object has been the welfare of my country. I assure
you that India’s interest is and will be sacred to me and nothing
will make me budge an inch from that position.’ On t he one
hand, he asked Muslims to organize separately, on the other
hand, he asked them to ‘prove that their patriotism is unsullied
and that their love of India and her progress is no less than that
of any other community in the country.’
Jinnah’s plan per haps was to use the Muslim League to win
enough seats to force another Lucknow Pact on the Congress. He
also assumed that by participating in the 1937 elections the
Congress was reverting to pre -Gandhia n constitutional politics.
Partially because of these assumptions and partially because the
bag of communal demands was empty — nearly all the
communal demands having been accepted by the Communal
Award .Jinnah and the League fought elections on a semi -
nationahst Congress -type of programme, the only ‘Muslim’
demands being protection and promotion of the Urdu language
and script, and adoption of measures for the amelioration of the
general conditions of Muslims.
But the poor election results showed that none of Jinnah’s
assumptions were correct. Jinnah had no w to decide what to do:
to stick to his semi - nationalist, liberal communal politics which
seemed to have exhausted its potentialities or to abandon
communal politics. Both would mean going into political
wilderness. The third alternative was to take to ma ss politics
which in view of the semi -feudal and semi -loyalist social base of
the League and his own socially, economically, and politically
conservative views could only be based on the cries of Islam in
danger and the danger of a Hindu raj. Jinnah decide d in 1937 -38
to opt for his last option. And once he took this decision he went | <s>[INST]439 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
Indian National Congress. It may be I have been wrong on some
occasions. But it has never been done in a partisan spirit. My
sole and only object has been the welfare of my country. I assure
you that India’s interest is and will be sacred to me and nothing
will make me budge an inch from that position.’ On t he one
hand, he asked Muslims to organize separately, on the other
hand, he asked them to ‘prove that their patriotism is unsullied
and that their love of India and her progress is no less than that
of any other community in the country.’
Jinnah’s plan per haps was to use the Muslim League to win
enough seats to force another Lucknow Pact on the Congress. He
also assumed that by participating in the 1937 elections the
Congress was reverting to pre -Gandhia n constitutional politics.
Partially because of these assumptions and partially because the
bag of communal demands was empty — nearly all the
communal demands having been accepted by the Communal
Award .Jinnah and the League fought elections on a semi -
nationahst Congress -type of programme, the only ‘Muslim’
demands being protection and promotion of the Urdu language
and script, and adoption of measures for the amelioration of the
general conditions of Muslims.
But the poor election results showed that none of Jinnah’s
assumptions were correct. Jinnah had no w to decide what to do:
to stick to his semi - nationalist, liberal communal politics which
seemed to have exhausted its potentialities or to abandon
communal politics. Both would mean going into political
wilderness. The third alternative was to take to ma ss politics
which in view of the semi -feudal and semi -loyalist social base of
the League and his own socially, economically, and politically
conservative views could only be based on the cries of Islam in
danger and the danger of a Hindu raj. Jinnah decide d in 1937 -38
to opt for his last option. And once he took this decision he went[/INST] |
all the way towards extreme communalism putting all the force
arid brilliance of his personality behind the new politics based on
themes of hate and fear. From now on, the enti re political
campaign among Muslims of this tallest of communal leaders
would be geared to appeal to his co -religionists’ fear and
insecurity and to drive home the theme that the Congress wanted
not independence from British imperialism but a Hindu raj in | <s>[INST]all the way towards extreme communalism putting all the force
arid brilliance of his personality behind the new politics based on
themes of hate and fear. From now on, the enti re political
campaign among Muslims of this tallest of communal leaders
would be geared to appeal to his co -religionists’ fear and
insecurity and to drive home the theme that the Congress wanted
not independence from British imperialism but a Hindu raj in[/INST] |
440 | India’s Struggle For Independence
cooperation with the British and domination over Muslims and
even their extermination as also the destruction of Islam in India.
Let us take a few examples. In his presidential address to
the League in 1938, Jinnah said: ‘The High Command of the
Congress is determined, absolutely determined to crush all other
communities and cultures in this country and establish Hindu
raj in this country.’ In March 1940, he told the students at
Aligarh: ‘Mr Gandhi’s hope is to subjugate and vassalize the
Muslims under a H indu raj.” Again at Aligarh in March 1941:
‘Pakistan is not only a practicable goal but the only goa l if you
wan to save Islam from complete annihilation in this country.” In
his presidential address on April 1941, Jinnah declared that in a
united India ‘ the Muslims will be absolutely wiped out of
existence.”° Regarding the interim government in 1946, on 18
August, Jinnah referred to ‘the caste Hindu Fascist Congress,’
which wanted to ‘dominate and rule over Mussalmans and other
minor communities of India with the aid of British bayonets.’ In
1946, asking Muslims to vote for the League he said: ‘If we fail to
realize our duty today you will be reduced to the status of Sudras
and Islam will be vanquished from India.”
If a leader of the stature of Jinnah cou ld take up politics
and agitation at this low level, it was inevitable that the average
communal propagandist would be often even worse. Men like Z.A.
Suleri and F.M. Durran i surpassed themselves in Goebbelsian
demagogy.’ Even Fazl -ul-Huq, holding a respon sible position as
the Premier of Bengal, told the 1938 session of the League: ‘In
Congress provinces, riots had laid the countryside waste. Muslim
life, limb and property have been lost and blood had freely flowed.
. . There the Muslims are leading their l ives in constant terror,
overawed and oppressed by Hindus.. . There mosques are being
defiled and the culprit never found nor is the Muslim worshipper | <s>[INST]440 | India’s Struggle For Independence
cooperation with the British and domination over Muslims and
even their extermination as also the destruction of Islam in India.
Let us take a few examples. In his presidential address to
the League in 1938, Jinnah said: ‘The High Command of the
Congress is determined, absolutely determined to crush all other
communities and cultures in this country and establish Hindu
raj in this country.’ In March 1940, he told the students at
Aligarh: ‘Mr Gandhi’s hope is to subjugate and vassalize the
Muslims under a H indu raj.” Again at Aligarh in March 1941:
‘Pakistan is not only a practicable goal but the only goa l if you
wan to save Islam from complete annihilation in this country.” In
his presidential address on April 1941, Jinnah declared that in a
united India ‘ the Muslims will be absolutely wiped out of
existence.”° Regarding the interim government in 1946, on 18
August, Jinnah referred to ‘the caste Hindu Fascist Congress,’
which wanted to ‘dominate and rule over Mussalmans and other
minor communities of India with the aid of British bayonets.’ In
1946, asking Muslims to vote for the League he said: ‘If we fail to
realize our duty today you will be reduced to the status of Sudras
and Islam will be vanquished from India.”
If a leader of the stature of Jinnah cou ld take up politics
and agitation at this low level, it was inevitable that the average
communal propagandist would be often even worse. Men like Z.A.
Suleri and F.M. Durran i surpassed themselves in Goebbelsian
demagogy.’ Even Fazl -ul-Huq, holding a respon sible position as
the Premier of Bengal, told the 1938 session of the League: ‘In
Congress provinces, riots had laid the countryside waste. Muslim
life, limb and property have been lost and blood had freely flowed.
. . There the Muslims are leading their l ives in constant terror,
overawed and oppressed by Hindus.. . There mosques are being
defiled and the culprit never found nor is the Muslim worshipper[/INST] |
unmolested.” M.H. Gazdar, a prominent League leader of Sind,
told a League meeting in Karachi in March 1941: ‘The Hindus will
have to be eradicated like the Jews in Germ any if they did not
behave properly.” Jinnah was however in no position to pull up
such people, for his own speeches often skirted the same
territory.
The Muslim communalists now launched a v icious
campaign against nationalist Muslims. Maulana Abul Kalam | <s>[INST]unmolested.” M.H. Gazdar, a prominent League leader of Sind,
told a League meeting in Karachi in March 1941: ‘The Hindus will
have to be eradicated like the Jews in Germ any if they did not
behave properly.” Jinnah was however in no position to pull up
such people, for his own speeches often skirted the same
territory.
The Muslim communalists now launched a v icious
campaign against nationalist Muslims. Maulana Abul Kalam[/INST] |
441 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
Azad and other nationalist Muslims were branded as ‘show boys’
of the Congress, traitors to Islam and mercenary agents of the
Hindus. They were submitted, during 1945 - 47, to social terror
through appeals to religious fanaticism and even to physical
attacks. Jinnah himself in his presidential address to the League
in April 1943 described Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan as being ‘in -
charge of the Hinduizing influences and emasculation of the
martial Pat hans.”
Religion was also now brought into the forefront of
propaganda. In 1946, Muslims were asked to vote for the League
because ‘a vote for the League and Pakistan was a vote for Islam.’
League meetings were often held in the mosques after Friday
prayers . Pakistan, it was promised, would be ruled under the
Sharia. Muslims were asked to choose between a mosque and a
temple. The Quran was widely used as the League’s symbol; and
the League’s fight with the Congress was portrayed as a fight
between Islam and Kufr (infidelity).
Hindu communalism did not lag behind. Its political
trajectory was of course different. The two main liberal communal
leaders during the 1920s were Lajpat Rai and Madan Mohan
Malaviya. Lajpat Rai died in 1928 and Malaviya, finding himse lf
in 1937 in the sort of situation in which Jinnah found himself in
the same year, decided to retire from active politics, partly on
grounds of health. But Hindu communalism would also not
commit suicide; it too advanced to the extremist or the fascist
phase. The logic of communalism brought other communal
leaders to the fore. The Hindu Mahasabha made a sharp turn in
the fascist direction under V.D. Savarkar’s leadership. The RSS
(Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) had been from the very
beginning organized on f ascist lines; it now began to branch out
beyond Maharashtra.
Year after year, V.D. Savarkar warned Hindus of the
dangers of being dominated by Muslims. He said in 1937 that | <s>[INST]441 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
Azad and other nationalist Muslims were branded as ‘show boys’
of the Congress, traitors to Islam and mercenary agents of the
Hindus. They were submitted, during 1945 - 47, to social terror
through appeals to religious fanaticism and even to physical
attacks. Jinnah himself in his presidential address to the League
in April 1943 described Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan as being ‘in -
charge of the Hinduizing influences and emasculation of the
martial Pat hans.”
Religion was also now brought into the forefront of
propaganda. In 1946, Muslims were asked to vote for the League
because ‘a vote for the League and Pakistan was a vote for Islam.’
League meetings were often held in the mosques after Friday
prayers . Pakistan, it was promised, would be ruled under the
Sharia. Muslims were asked to choose between a mosque and a
temple. The Quran was widely used as the League’s symbol; and
the League’s fight with the Congress was portrayed as a fight
between Islam and Kufr (infidelity).
Hindu communalism did not lag behind. Its political
trajectory was of course different. The two main liberal communal
leaders during the 1920s were Lajpat Rai and Madan Mohan
Malaviya. Lajpat Rai died in 1928 and Malaviya, finding himse lf
in 1937 in the sort of situation in which Jinnah found himself in
the same year, decided to retire from active politics, partly on
grounds of health. But Hindu communalism would also not
commit suicide; it too advanced to the extremist or the fascist
phase. The logic of communalism brought other communal
leaders to the fore. The Hindu Mahasabha made a sharp turn in
the fascist direction under V.D. Savarkar’s leadership. The RSS
(Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) had been from the very
beginning organized on f ascist lines; it now began to branch out
beyond Maharashtra.
Year after year, V.D. Savarkar warned Hindus of the
dangers of being dominated by Muslims. He said in 1937 that[/INST] |
dangers of being dominated by Muslims. He said in 1937 that
Muslims ‘want to brand the forehead of Hindudom and other
non-Muslim sections in H industan with a stamp of self -
humiliation and Muslim domination’ and ‘to reduce the Hindus
to the position of helots in their own lands.” In 1938, he said that
‘we Hindus are (already) reduced to be veritable helots
throughout our land.’ | <s>[INST]dangers of being dominated by Muslims. He said in 1937 that
Muslims ‘want to brand the forehead of Hindudom and other
non-Muslim sections in H industan with a stamp of self -
humiliation and Muslim domination’ and ‘to reduce the Hindus
to the position of helots in their own lands.” In 1938, he said that
‘we Hindus are (already) reduced to be veritable helots
throughout our land.’[/INST] |
442 | India’s Struggle For Independence
It was, however, the RSS which became the chief ideologue
and propagator of extreme communalism. The head of the RSS,
M.S. Golwalkar, codified the RSS doctrines in his booklet, We. In
1939, he declared that if the minority demands were accepted,
‘Hindu National life runs t he risk of being shattered.”9 Above all,
the RSS attacked Muslims and the Congress leaders. Golwalkar
attacked the nationalists for ‘hugging to our bosom our most
inveterate enemies (Muslims) and thus endangering our very
existence.’20 Condemning the natio nalists for spreading the view
by which Hindus ‘began to class ourselves with our old invaders
and foes under the outlandish name — Indian,’ he wrote: ‘We
have allowed ourselves to be duped into believing our foes to be
our friends . . . That is the real d anger of the day, our self -
forgetfulness, our believing our old and bitter enemies to be our
friends.’ To Muslims and other religious minorities, Golwalkar
gave the following advice: ‘The non -Hindu peoples in Hindustan
must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn o
respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no
ideas but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e.,
they must not only give up their attitude of intolerance and
ungratefulness towards this land an d its age long traditions but
must also cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion
instead — in one word, they must cease to be foreigners, or may
stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation,
claiming nothing, deserving no privil eges, far less any preferential
treatment — not even citizen’s rights.’ Going further, he wrote:
‘We Hindus are at war at once with the Muslims on the one hand
and British on the other.’ He said that Italy and Germany were
two countries where ‘the ancient Race spirit’ had ‘re -risen.’ ‘Even
so with us: our Race spirit has once again roused itself,’ thus
giving Hindus the right of excommunicating Muslims. The RSS | <s>[INST]442 | India’s Struggle For Independence
It was, however, the RSS which became the chief ideologue
and propagator of extreme communalism. The head of the RSS,
M.S. Golwalkar, codified the RSS doctrines in his booklet, We. In
1939, he declared that if the minority demands were accepted,
‘Hindu National life runs t he risk of being shattered.”9 Above all,
the RSS attacked Muslims and the Congress leaders. Golwalkar
attacked the nationalists for ‘hugging to our bosom our most
inveterate enemies (Muslims) and thus endangering our very
existence.’20 Condemning the natio nalists for spreading the view
by which Hindus ‘began to class ourselves with our old invaders
and foes under the outlandish name — Indian,’ he wrote: ‘We
have allowed ourselves to be duped into believing our foes to be
our friends . . . That is the real d anger of the day, our self -
forgetfulness, our believing our old and bitter enemies to be our
friends.’ To Muslims and other religious minorities, Golwalkar
gave the following advice: ‘The non -Hindu peoples in Hindustan
must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn o
respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no
ideas but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e.,
they must not only give up their attitude of intolerance and
ungratefulness towards this land an d its age long traditions but
must also cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion
instead — in one word, they must cease to be foreigners, or may
stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation,
claiming nothing, deserving no privil eges, far less any preferential
treatment — not even citizen’s rights.’ Going further, he wrote:
‘We Hindus are at war at once with the Muslims on the one hand
and British on the other.’ He said that Italy and Germany were
two countries where ‘the ancient Race spirit’ had ‘re -risen.’ ‘Even
so with us: our Race spirit has once again roused itself,’ thus
giving Hindus the right of excommunicating Muslims. The RSS[/INST] |
giving Hindus the right of excommunicating Muslims. The RSS
launched an even more vicious attack on the Congress leaders
during 1946 -47. Provocatively accusi ng the Congress leaders in
the true fascist style of asking Hindus to ‘submit meekly to the
vandalism and atrocities of the Muslims’ and of telling the Hindu
‘that he was imbecile, that he had no spirit, no stamina to stand
on his own legs and fight for th e independence of his motherland
and that all this had to be injected into him in the form of Muslim
blood’, he said in 1947, pointing his finger at Gandhiji: ‘Those
who declared “No Swaraj without Hindu -Muslim unity” have thus
perpetrated the greatest treason on our society. They have
committed the most heinous sin of killing the life -spirit of a great | <s>[INST]giving Hindus the right of excommunicating Muslims. The RSS
launched an even more vicious attack on the Congress leaders
during 1946 -47. Provocatively accusi ng the Congress leaders in
the true fascist style of asking Hindus to ‘submit meekly to the
vandalism and atrocities of the Muslims’ and of telling the Hindu
‘that he was imbecile, that he had no spirit, no stamina to stand
on his own legs and fight for th e independence of his motherland
and that all this had to be injected into him in the form of Muslim
blood’, he said in 1947, pointing his finger at Gandhiji: ‘Those
who declared “No Swaraj without Hindu -Muslim unity” have thus
perpetrated the greatest treason on our society. They have
committed the most heinous sin of killing the life -spirit of a great[/INST] |
443 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
and ancient people.’ He accused Gandhiji of having declared:
‘“There is no Swaraj without Hindu -Muslim unity and the
simplest way in which this unity can be achieved is for all the
Hindus to become Muslims.”
The Hindu communalists also tried to raise the cries of
‘Hinduism in danger,’ ‘Hindu faith in danger,’ and ‘Hindu culture
or sanskriti in danger.’
The bitter harvest of this campaign of fear and hatred
carried on by the Hindu and Muslim communalists since the end
of the 19th century, and in particular after 1937, was reaped by
the people in the Calcutta killings of August 1946 in which over
5,000 lost their lives within five days, in the butchery of Hind us
at Noakhali in Bengal and of Muslims in Bihar, the carnage of the
partition riots and the assassination of Gandhiji by a communal
fanatic.
But, perhaps, the heaviest cost was paid by Muslims who
remained in or migrated to Pakistan. Once Pakistan was formed,
Jinnah hoped to go back to liberal communalism or even
secularism. Addressing the people of Pakistan, Jinnah said in his
Presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on
11 August 1947: ‘You may belong to any religion or caste or creed
— that has nothing to do with the business of the State. . . We
are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all
citizens and equal citizens of one State. . . Now, I think we should
keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in
course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims
would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because
that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political
sense as citizens of the State.’ But it was all too late. Jinnah had
cynically spawned a monster which not only divided India, but
would, in time, eat up his own concept of Pakistan and do more
harm to Muslims of Pakistan than the most secu lar of persons
could have predicted or even imagined. On the other hand, | <s>[INST]443 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
and ancient people.’ He accused Gandhiji of having declared:
‘“There is no Swaraj without Hindu -Muslim unity and the
simplest way in which this unity can be achieved is for all the
Hindus to become Muslims.”
The Hindu communalists also tried to raise the cries of
‘Hinduism in danger,’ ‘Hindu faith in danger,’ and ‘Hindu culture
or sanskriti in danger.’
The bitter harvest of this campaign of fear and hatred
carried on by the Hindu and Muslim communalists since the end
of the 19th century, and in particular after 1937, was reaped by
the people in the Calcutta killings of August 1946 in which over
5,000 lost their lives within five days, in the butchery of Hind us
at Noakhali in Bengal and of Muslims in Bihar, the carnage of the
partition riots and the assassination of Gandhiji by a communal
fanatic.
But, perhaps, the heaviest cost was paid by Muslims who
remained in or migrated to Pakistan. Once Pakistan was formed,
Jinnah hoped to go back to liberal communalism or even
secularism. Addressing the people of Pakistan, Jinnah said in his
Presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on
11 August 1947: ‘You may belong to any religion or caste or creed
— that has nothing to do with the business of the State. . . We
are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all
citizens and equal citizens of one State. . . Now, I think we should
keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in
course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims
would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because
that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political
sense as citizens of the State.’ But it was all too late. Jinnah had
cynically spawned a monster which not only divided India, but
would, in time, eat up his own concept of Pakistan and do more
harm to Muslims of Pakistan than the most secu lar of persons
could have predicted or even imagined. On the other hand,[/INST] |
could have predicted or even imagined. On the other hand,
despi te the formation of Pakistan and the bloody communal riots
of 1947, nationalist India did succeed in framing a secular
constitution and building a basically secular polity, whatever its
weaknesses in this respect may be. In other words, ideologies
have con sequences. | <s>[INST]could have predicted or even imagined. On the other hand,
despi te the formation of Pakistan and the bloody communal riots
of 1947, nationalist India did succeed in framing a secular
constitution and building a basically secular polity, whatever its
weaknesses in this respect may be. In other words, ideologies
have con sequences.[/INST] |
444 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Two major controversies have arisen in the last thirty years
or so around the communal problem. One is the view that the
communal problem would have disappeared or been solved if
Jinnah had been conciliated during 1937 -39 and, in particular, if
a coalition government with the Muslim League had been formed
in U.P. in 1937. The rebuff to Jinnah’s political ambitions, it is
said, embittered him and made him turn to separatism.
Let us first look at the general argument. It entirely ignores the
fact that before he was ‘rebuffed’ Jinnah was already a full -
fledged liberal communal 1st. Second, every effort was made by
the Congress leaders from 1937 to 1939 to negotiate with Jinnah
and to conciliate him. But Jinnah was caught in the logic of
communalism . He was left without any negotiable demands
which could be rationally put forward and argued. Consequently,
and it is very important to remember this historical fact, he
refused to tell the Congress leaders what the demands were
whose acceptance would sat isfy him and lead him to join the
Congress in facing imperialism. The impossible condition he laid
down to even start negotiations was that the Congress leadership
should first renounce its secular character and declare itself a
Hindu communal body and acc ept the Muslim League as the sole
representative of the Muslims. The Congress could not have
accepted this demand. As Rajendra Prasad put it, for the
Congress to accept that it was a Hindu body ‘would be denying
its own past, falsifying its history, and be traying its future’ — in
fact, it would be betraying the Indian people and their future. If
the Congress had accepted Jinnah’s demand and ‘conciliated’
him, we might well have been living under a Hindu replica of
Pakistan or a Hindu fascist state. So no se rious negotiations
could even begin.
Jinnah , too, all the while, was following the logic of his
ideology and politics. But this posture could also not be | <s>[INST]444 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Two major controversies have arisen in the last thirty years
or so around the communal problem. One is the view that the
communal problem would have disappeared or been solved if
Jinnah had been conciliated during 1937 -39 and, in particular, if
a coalition government with the Muslim League had been formed
in U.P. in 1937. The rebuff to Jinnah’s political ambitions, it is
said, embittered him and made him turn to separatism.
Let us first look at the general argument. It entirely ignores the
fact that before he was ‘rebuffed’ Jinnah was already a full -
fledged liberal communal 1st. Second, every effort was made by
the Congress leaders from 1937 to 1939 to negotiate with Jinnah
and to conciliate him. But Jinnah was caught in the logic of
communalism . He was left without any negotiable demands
which could be rationally put forward and argued. Consequently,
and it is very important to remember this historical fact, he
refused to tell the Congress leaders what the demands were
whose acceptance would sat isfy him and lead him to join the
Congress in facing imperialism. The impossible condition he laid
down to even start negotiations was that the Congress leadership
should first renounce its secular character and declare itself a
Hindu communal body and acc ept the Muslim League as the sole
representative of the Muslims. The Congress could not have
accepted this demand. As Rajendra Prasad put it, for the
Congress to accept that it was a Hindu body ‘would be denying
its own past, falsifying its history, and be traying its future’ — in
fact, it would be betraying the Indian people and their future. If
the Congress had accepted Jinnah’s demand and ‘conciliated’
him, we might well have been living under a Hindu replica of
Pakistan or a Hindu fascist state. So no se rious negotiations
could even begin.
Jinnah , too, all the while, was following the logic of his
ideology and politics. But this posture could also not be[/INST] |
ideology and politics. But this posture could also not be
maintained for long. The motive towards Pakistan was then
inevitable, for separatism was the only par t of the communal
ideological programme left unfulfilled. The alternative was to
abandon communal politics. And so Jinnah and the Muslim
League took the ultimate step in early 1940 and, basing
themselves on the theory that Hindus and Muslims were two
separ ate nations which must have separate homelands, put
forward the demand for Pakistan. Hindu communalism too had
moved in the same direction. Its separatism could not take the | <s>[INST]ideology and politics. But this posture could also not be
maintained for long. The motive towards Pakistan was then
inevitable, for separatism was the only par t of the communal
ideological programme left unfulfilled. The alternative was to
abandon communal politics. And so Jinnah and the Muslim
League took the ultimate step in early 1940 and, basing
themselves on the theory that Hindus and Muslims were two
separ ate nations which must have separate homelands, put
forward the demand for Pakistan. Hindu communalism too had
moved in the same direction. Its separatism could not take the[/INST] |
445 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
form of demanding a part of India as Hindustan — that would be
playing into the ha nds of Muslim communalism. It, therefore,
increasingly asserted that Hindus were the only nation living in
India and Muslims should either be expelled from India or live in
it as second -class citizens.
Something similar was involved in the U.P. decision o f 1937.
Jinnah and the League were firmly opposed to mass politics. To
have joined hands with them would have meant retreating to
constitutional politics in which people had little role to play.
Much before the ministerial negotiations occurred or broke do wn,
Jinnah had declared Muslims to be a distinct third party in India,
as distinguished from the British and Indian nationalism
represented by the Congress. As S. Gopal has put it: ‘Any
coalition with the League implied the Congress accepting a Hindu
orien tation and renouncing the right to speak for all Indians.’28
It would have also meant the betrayal of nationalist Muslims,
who had firmly taken their stand on the terrain of secular
nationalism. Furthermore, it would have meant abandonment of
the radical a grarian programme adopted at Faizpur in 1936 to
which the Congress Ministry was fully committed, for the League
was equally committed to the landlords’ interests. With their
representatives in the Government, no pro -peasant legislation
could possibly have been passed. In fact, it was the Congress
Socialists and the Communists, quite important in the U.P.
Congress at the time, who put pressure on Nehru to reject any
coalition with the League and threatened to launch a public
campaign on the issue if their de mand was rejected.
Interestingly, even before negotiations for the formation of a
Congress Ministry in U.P. had begun, the Muslim League had
raised the cry of ‘Islam in Danger’ in its campaign against
Congress candidates in the by -elections to U .P. assembl y during
May 1937. Jinnah himself had issued appeals to voters in the | <s>[INST]445 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
form of demanding a part of India as Hindustan — that would be
playing into the ha nds of Muslim communalism. It, therefore,
increasingly asserted that Hindus were the only nation living in
India and Muslims should either be expelled from India or live in
it as second -class citizens.
Something similar was involved in the U.P. decision o f 1937.
Jinnah and the League were firmly opposed to mass politics. To
have joined hands with them would have meant retreating to
constitutional politics in which people had little role to play.
Much before the ministerial negotiations occurred or broke do wn,
Jinnah had declared Muslims to be a distinct third party in India,
as distinguished from the British and Indian nationalism
represented by the Congress. As S. Gopal has put it: ‘Any
coalition with the League implied the Congress accepting a Hindu
orien tation and renouncing the right to speak for all Indians.’28
It would have also meant the betrayal of nationalist Muslims,
who had firmly taken their stand on the terrain of secular
nationalism. Furthermore, it would have meant abandonment of
the radical a grarian programme adopted at Faizpur in 1936 to
which the Congress Ministry was fully committed, for the League
was equally committed to the landlords’ interests. With their
representatives in the Government, no pro -peasant legislation
could possibly have been passed. In fact, it was the Congress
Socialists and the Communists, quite important in the U.P.
Congress at the time, who put pressure on Nehru to reject any
coalition with the League and threatened to launch a public
campaign on the issue if their de mand was rejected.
Interestingly, even before negotiations for the formation of a
Congress Ministry in U.P. had begun, the Muslim League had
raised the cry of ‘Islam in Danger’ in its campaign against
Congress candidates in the by -elections to U .P. assembl y during
May 1937. Jinnah himself had issued appeals to voters in the[/INST] |
May 1937. Jinnah himself had issued appeals to voters in the
name of Allah and the Quran.
In any case, if a leader could turn into a vicious
communalist and separatist because his party was not given two
seats in a provincial ministry, then how l ong could he have
remained conciliated? To argue in this fashion is, perhaps, to
treat history and politics as a joke or as the play of individual
whims. The fact is that communalism is basically an ideology
which could not have been, and cannot be, appeas ed; it had to be | <s>[INST]May 1937. Jinnah himself had issued appeals to voters in the
name of Allah and the Quran.
In any case, if a leader could turn into a vicious
communalist and separatist because his party was not given two
seats in a provincial ministry, then how l ong could he have
remained conciliated? To argue in this fashion is, perhaps, to
treat history and politics as a joke or as the play of individual
whims. The fact is that communalism is basically an ideology
which could not have been, and cannot be, appeas ed; it had to be[/INST] |
446 | India’s Struggle For Independence
confronted and opposed, as we have brought out earlier. The
failure to do so was the real weakness of the Congress and the
national movement. Interestingly, the Communists did try to
appease the Muslim League from 1942 to 1946, hoping to w ean
away its better elements. They not only failed but in the bargain
lost some of their best cadres to Muslim communalism. The effort
to have a coalition with it turned out to be a one way street from
which the Communists had the wisdom to withdraw in 194 6. In
fact, the negotiations by the Congress leaders as also the Left
were based on the false assumption that liberal communalists
could be conciliated and then persuaded to fight extreme
communalism which was anti -national. After 1937 it was only
the nati onalist Hindus and Muslims who firmly opposed
communalism. Liberal communalists like Malaviya, Shyama
Prasad Mukherji and N.C. Chatterjea failed to oppose Savarkar or
the RSS. Similarly, the liberal Iqbal or other liberal communal
Muslims did not have the courage to oppose the campaign of
hatred that Jinnah, Suleri, Fazl -ul-Huq and others unleashed
after 1937. At the most, they kept quiet where they did not join it.
It is also not true that the Congress failure regarding
communalism occurred in 1947 when i t accepted the partition of
the country. Perhaps, there was no other option at the time.
Communalism had already advanced too far. There was, it can be
argued, no other solution to the communal problem left, unless
the national leadership was willing to se e the nation plunged in a
civil war when the armed forces and the po1ice were under the
control of the foreign rulers and were themselves ready to join the
civil war.
The fact is that not all historical situations have an instant
solution. Certainly, no s uch solution existed in 1947. There is
never an instant solution to a socio -political problem like
communalism. Conditions and forces for a solution have to be | <s>[INST]446 | India’s Struggle For Independence
confronted and opposed, as we have brought out earlier. The
failure to do so was the real weakness of the Congress and the
national movement. Interestingly, the Communists did try to
appease the Muslim League from 1942 to 1946, hoping to w ean
away its better elements. They not only failed but in the bargain
lost some of their best cadres to Muslim communalism. The effort
to have a coalition with it turned out to be a one way street from
which the Communists had the wisdom to withdraw in 194 6. In
fact, the negotiations by the Congress leaders as also the Left
were based on the false assumption that liberal communalists
could be conciliated and then persuaded to fight extreme
communalism which was anti -national. After 1937 it was only
the nati onalist Hindus and Muslims who firmly opposed
communalism. Liberal communalists like Malaviya, Shyama
Prasad Mukherji and N.C. Chatterjea failed to oppose Savarkar or
the RSS. Similarly, the liberal Iqbal or other liberal communal
Muslims did not have the courage to oppose the campaign of
hatred that Jinnah, Suleri, Fazl -ul-Huq and others unleashed
after 1937. At the most, they kept quiet where they did not join it.
It is also not true that the Congress failure regarding
communalism occurred in 1947 when i t accepted the partition of
the country. Perhaps, there was no other option at the time.
Communalism had already advanced too far. There was, it can be
argued, no other solution to the communal problem left, unless
the national leadership was willing to se e the nation plunged in a
civil war when the armed forces and the po1ice were under the
control of the foreign rulers and were themselves ready to join the
civil war.
The fact is that not all historical situations have an instant
solution. Certainly, no s uch solution existed in 1947. There is
never an instant solution to a socio -political problem like
communalism. Conditions and forces for a solution have to be[/INST] |
communalism. Conditions and forces for a solution have to be
prepared over a number of years and even decades. This the
Congress and the national movement fa iled to do. Despite their
commitment to secularism, despite Gandhiji’s constant emphasis
on Hindu -Muslim unity and his willingness to stake his life for its
promotion, and despite Nehru’s brilliant analysis of the socio -
economic roots of communalism, the Indian nationalists failed to
wage a mass ideological -political struggle against all forms of
communalism on the basis of patient and scientific exposure of | <s>[INST]communalism. Conditions and forces for a solution have to be
prepared over a number of years and even decades. This the
Congress and the national movement fa iled to do. Despite their
commitment to secularism, despite Gandhiji’s constant emphasis
on Hindu -Muslim unity and his willingness to stake his life for its
promotion, and despite Nehru’s brilliant analysis of the socio -
economic roots of communalism, the Indian nationalists failed to
wage a mass ideological -political struggle against all forms of
communalism on the basis of patient and scientific exposure of[/INST] |
447 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
its ideological content, socio -economic roots, and political
consequences. In fact, the Congress rel ied too heavily on
negotiations with the communal leaders and failed to evolve a
viable and effective long -term strategy to combat communalism
at the political, ideological and cultural levels. The Congress and
its leadership have to be faulted on this cou nt. | <s>[INST]447 | Jinnah , Golwalkar and Extreme Communalism
its ideological content, socio -economic roots, and political
consequences. In fact, the Congress rel ied too heavily on
negotiations with the communal leaders and failed to evolve a
viable and effective long -term strategy to combat communalism
at the political, ideological and cultural levels. The Congress and
its leadership have to be faulted on this cou nt.[/INST] |
448 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 34. THE CRISIS AT TRIPURI
TO THE CRIPPS MISSION
The Congress victory in the 1937 election and the
consequent formation of popular ministries changed the balance
of power within the country vis -a-vis the colonial aut horities. The
growth of left -wing parties and ideas led to a growing militancy
within the nationalist ranks. The stage seemed to be set for
another resurgence of the nationalist movement. Just at this
time, the Congress had to undergo a crisis at the top — an
occurrence which plagued the Congress every few years.
Subhas Bose had been a unanimous choice as the President
of the Congress in 1938. In 1939, he decided to stand again —
this time as the spokesperson of militant politics and radical
groups. Puttin g forward his candidature on 21 January 1939,
Bose said that he represented the ‘new ideas, ideologies,
problems and programmes’ that had emerged with ‘the
progressive sharpening of the anti-imperialist struggle in India.’
The presidential elections, he sa id, should be fought among
different candidates ‘on the basis of definite problems and
programmes.” On 24 January, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad,
J.B. Kripalani and four other members of the Congress Working
Committee issued a counter statement, declaring that the talk of
ideologies, programmes and policies was irrelevant in the
elections of a Congress president since these were evolved by the
various Congress bodies such as the AICC and the Working
Committee, and that the position of the Congress President was
like that of a constitutional head who represented and
symbolized the unity and solidarity of the nation. With the
blessings of Gandhiji, these and other leaders put up Pattabhi
Sitaramayya as a candidate for the post. Subhas Bose was
elected on 29 January by 1580 votes against 1377. Gandhiji
declared that Sitaramayya’s defeat was ‘more mine than his.’
But the election of Bose resolved nothing, it only brought | <s>[INST]448 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 34. THE CRISIS AT TRIPURI
TO THE CRIPPS MISSION
The Congress victory in the 1937 election and the
consequent formation of popular ministries changed the balance
of power within the country vis -a-vis the colonial aut horities. The
growth of left -wing parties and ideas led to a growing militancy
within the nationalist ranks. The stage seemed to be set for
another resurgence of the nationalist movement. Just at this
time, the Congress had to undergo a crisis at the top — an
occurrence which plagued the Congress every few years.
Subhas Bose had been a unanimous choice as the President
of the Congress in 1938. In 1939, he decided to stand again —
this time as the spokesperson of militant politics and radical
groups. Puttin g forward his candidature on 21 January 1939,
Bose said that he represented the ‘new ideas, ideologies,
problems and programmes’ that had emerged with ‘the
progressive sharpening of the anti-imperialist struggle in India.’
The presidential elections, he sa id, should be fought among
different candidates ‘on the basis of definite problems and
programmes.” On 24 January, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad,
J.B. Kripalani and four other members of the Congress Working
Committee issued a counter statement, declaring that the talk of
ideologies, programmes and policies was irrelevant in the
elections of a Congress president since these were evolved by the
various Congress bodies such as the AICC and the Working
Committee, and that the position of the Congress President was
like that of a constitutional head who represented and
symbolized the unity and solidarity of the nation. With the
blessings of Gandhiji, these and other leaders put up Pattabhi
Sitaramayya as a candidate for the post. Subhas Bose was
elected on 29 January by 1580 votes against 1377. Gandhiji
declared that Sitaramayya’s defeat was ‘more mine than his.’
But the election of Bose resolved nothing, it only brought[/INST] |
But the election of Bose resolved nothing, it only brought
the brewing crisis to a head at the Tripuri session of the
Congress. There were two major re asons for the crisis. One was | <s>[INST]But the election of Bose resolved nothing, it only brought
the brewing crisis to a head at the Tripuri session of the
Congress. There were two major re asons for the crisis. One was[/INST] |
449 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
the line of propaganda adopted by Bose against Sardar Patel and
the majority of the top Congress leadership whom he branded as
rightists. He openly accused them of working for a compromise
with the Government on the question o f federation, of having
even drawn up a list of prospective central’ ministers and
therefore of not wanting a leftist as the president of the Congress
‘who may be a thorn in the way of a compromise and may put
obstacles in the path of negotiations.’ He had , therefore, appealed
to Congressmen to vote for a leftist and ‘a genuine anti -
federationist.’3 In the second part of his autobiography, Subhas
put forward his thinking of the period even more crudely: ‘As
Congress President, the writer did his best to sti ffen the
opposition of the Congress Party to any compromise with Britain
and this caused annoyance in Gandhian circles who were then
looking forward to an understanding with the British
Government.’ ‘The Gandhiists’, he wrote, ‘did not want to be
disturbed in their ministerial and parliamentary work’ and ‘were
at that time opposed to any national struggle.’
The Congress leaders, labelled as compromisers, resented
such charges and branded them as a slander. They pointed out
in a statement: ‘Subhas ___ Babu has mentioned his opposition
to the federation. This is shared by all the members of the
Working Committee. It is the Congress policy.’ After Subhas’s
election, they felt that they could not work with a president who
had publicly cast aspersions on their na tionalist bonafides.
Earlier , Gandhiji had issued a statement on 31 January saying: ‘I
rejoice in this defeat’ because ‘Subhas Babu, instead of being
President on the sufferance of those whom he calls rightists, is
now President elected in a contested elec tion. This enables him to
choose a homogeneous cabinet and enforce his programme
without let or hindrance.’
Jawaharlal Nehru did not resign along with the twelve other | <s>[INST]449 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
the line of propaganda adopted by Bose against Sardar Patel and
the majority of the top Congress leadership whom he branded as
rightists. He openly accused them of working for a compromise
with the Government on the question o f federation, of having
even drawn up a list of prospective central’ ministers and
therefore of not wanting a leftist as the president of the Congress
‘who may be a thorn in the way of a compromise and may put
obstacles in the path of negotiations.’ He had , therefore, appealed
to Congressmen to vote for a leftist and ‘a genuine anti -
federationist.’3 In the second part of his autobiography, Subhas
put forward his thinking of the period even more crudely: ‘As
Congress President, the writer did his best to sti ffen the
opposition of the Congress Party to any compromise with Britain
and this caused annoyance in Gandhian circles who were then
looking forward to an understanding with the British
Government.’ ‘The Gandhiists’, he wrote, ‘did not want to be
disturbed in their ministerial and parliamentary work’ and ‘were
at that time opposed to any national struggle.’
The Congress leaders, labelled as compromisers, resented
such charges and branded them as a slander. They pointed out
in a statement: ‘Subhas ___ Babu has mentioned his opposition
to the federation. This is shared by all the members of the
Working Committee. It is the Congress policy.’ After Subhas’s
election, they felt that they could not work with a president who
had publicly cast aspersions on their na tionalist bonafides.
Earlier , Gandhiji had issued a statement on 31 January saying: ‘I
rejoice in this defeat’ because ‘Subhas Babu, instead of being
President on the sufferance of those whom he calls rightists, is
now President elected in a contested elec tion. This enables him to
choose a homogeneous cabinet and enforce his programme
without let or hindrance.’
Jawaharlal Nehru did not resign along with the twelve other[/INST] |
Jawaharlal Nehru did not resign along with the twelve other
Working Committee members. He did not like the idea of
confronting Bose publicly. But he did not agree with Bose either.
Before the elections, he had said that in the election no principles
or programmes were at stake. He had been unhappy with Bose’s
aspersions on his colleagues. Nor did he agree that the fight was
between the Left and the Right. His letter to Subhas on 4
February 1939 would bear a long quotation: ‘I do not know who | <s>[INST]Jawaharlal Nehru did not resign along with the twelve other
Working Committee members. He did not like the idea of
confronting Bose publicly. But he did not agree with Bose either.
Before the elections, he had said that in the election no principles
or programmes were at stake. He had been unhappy with Bose’s
aspersions on his colleagues. Nor did he agree that the fight was
between the Left and the Right. His letter to Subhas on 4
February 1939 would bear a long quotation: ‘I do not know who[/INST] |
450 | India’s Struggle For Independence
you consider a leftist and who a rightist. The way these words
were used by you in your statements during the presidential
contest seemed to imply that Gandhiji and those who are
considered as his group in the Working Committee are the
rightist leaders. Their opponents, whoever they might be, are the
leftists. That seems to me an entirely wrong description. It seems
to me that many of the so-called leftists are more right than the
so-called rightists. Strong language and a capacity to criticize
and attack the old Congress leadership is not a test of leftism in
politics... I think the use of the words left and right has been
generally wholly wrong and confusing. If, instead of these words%
we ta lked about policies it would be far better. What policies do
you stand for? Anti-federation, well and good. I think that the
great majority of the members of the Working Committee stand
for that and it is not fair to hint at the ir weakness in this respect .’
However, more importantly , basic differences of policy and
tactics were involved in the underlying Bose -Gandhian debate.
They were partially based on differing perceptions of the political
reality, and differing assessments of the strength and weakness
of the Congress and the preparedness of the masses for struggle.
Differing styles regarding how to build up a mass movement were
also involved.
Subhas Bose believed that the Congress was strong enough
to bunch an immediate strug gle d that the masses were ready for
such struggle. He was convinced, as he wrote later, ‘that the
country was internally more ripe for a revolution than ever before
and that the coming international crisis would give India an
opportunity for achieving her emancipation, which is rare in
human history.’ He, therefore, argued in his presidential address
at Tripuri for a programme of immediately giving the British
Government a six -months ultimatum to grant the national | <s>[INST]450 | India’s Struggle For Independence
you consider a leftist and who a rightist. The way these words
were used by you in your statements during the presidential
contest seemed to imply that Gandhiji and those who are
considered as his group in the Working Committee are the
rightist leaders. Their opponents, whoever they might be, are the
leftists. That seems to me an entirely wrong description. It seems
to me that many of the so-called leftists are more right than the
so-called rightists. Strong language and a capacity to criticize
and attack the old Congress leadership is not a test of leftism in
politics... I think the use of the words left and right has been
generally wholly wrong and confusing. If, instead of these words%
we ta lked about policies it would be far better. What policies do
you stand for? Anti-federation, well and good. I think that the
great majority of the members of the Working Committee stand
for that and it is not fair to hint at the ir weakness in this respect .’
However, more importantly , basic differences of policy and
tactics were involved in the underlying Bose -Gandhian debate.
They were partially based on differing perceptions of the political
reality, and differing assessments of the strength and weakness
of the Congress and the preparedness of the masses for struggle.
Differing styles regarding how to build up a mass movement were
also involved.
Subhas Bose believed that the Congress was strong enough
to bunch an immediate strug gle d that the masses were ready for
such struggle. He was convinced, as he wrote later, ‘that the
country was internally more ripe for a revolution than ever before
and that the coming international crisis would give India an
opportunity for achieving her emancipation, which is rare in
human history.’ He, therefore, argued in his presidential address
at Tripuri for a programme of immediately giving the British
Government a six -months ultimatum to grant the national[/INST] |
Government a six -months ultimatum to grant the national
demand for independence and of launching a mass civil
disobedience movement if it failed to do so.’
Gandhiji’s perceptions were very different. He, too, believed
that another round for mass struggle was necessary to win
freedom, for Indians were facing ‘an impossible situation.’
Already, in the middle of July 1938, he had written: ‘The
darkness that seems to have enveloped me will disappear, and
that, whether with another battle more brilliant than the Dandi | <s>[INST]Government a six -months ultimatum to grant the national
demand for independence and of launching a mass civil
disobedience movement if it failed to do so.’
Gandhiji’s perceptions were very different. He, too, believed
that another round for mass struggle was necessary to win
freedom, for Indians were facing ‘an impossible situation.’
Already, in the middle of July 1938, he had written: ‘The
darkness that seems to have enveloped me will disappear, and
that, whether with another battle more brilliant than the Dandi[/INST] |
451 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
March or without, India will come to her own.”° But, he believed,
the time was not yet ri pe for an ultimatum because neither the
Congress nor the masses were yet ready for struggle. Indians
should first ‘put our own house in order.’ Making his position
clear in an interview on 5 May 1939, Gandhiji declared: ‘He
(Subhas Bose) holds that we poss ess enough resources for a
fight. I am totally opposed to his views. Today we possess no
resources for a fight. . . There is no limit to communal strife. . .
We do not have the same hold among the peasants of Bihar as we
used to... If today I am asked to s tart the “Dandi March,” I have
not the courage to do so. How can we do anything without the
workers and peasants? The country belongs only to them. I am
not equipped to issue an ultimatum to the Government. The
country would only be exposed to ridicule.”
Gandhiji’s views were above all based on his assessment of
the Congress organization. He was convinced that corruption and
indiscipline had vitiated its capacity to fight. As we have seen
earlier, during 1938 and early 1939, he repeatedly and publicly
raised the issues of mutual rivalries and bickerings among
Congressmen, bogus membership and impersonation at party
elections, efforts to capture Congress Committees, and the
general decline of authority in the Congress.
The internal strife reached its climax at the Tripuri session
of the Congress, held from 8 to 12 March 1939. Bose had
completely misjudged his support and the meaning of his
majority in the presidential election. Congressmen had voted for
him for diverse reasons, and above all because he stood for
militant politics, and not because they wanted to have him as the
supreme leader of the national movement. They were not willing
to reject Gandhiji’s leadership or that of other older leaders who
decided to bring this home to Subhas. Govind Ballabh Pa nt
moved a resolution at Tripuri expressing lull confidence in the old | <s>[INST]451 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
March or without, India will come to her own.”° But, he believed,
the time was not yet ri pe for an ultimatum because neither the
Congress nor the masses were yet ready for struggle. Indians
should first ‘put our own house in order.’ Making his position
clear in an interview on 5 May 1939, Gandhiji declared: ‘He
(Subhas Bose) holds that we poss ess enough resources for a
fight. I am totally opposed to his views. Today we possess no
resources for a fight. . . There is no limit to communal strife. . .
We do not have the same hold among the peasants of Bihar as we
used to... If today I am asked to s tart the “Dandi March,” I have
not the courage to do so. How can we do anything without the
workers and peasants? The country belongs only to them. I am
not equipped to issue an ultimatum to the Government. The
country would only be exposed to ridicule.”
Gandhiji’s views were above all based on his assessment of
the Congress organization. He was convinced that corruption and
indiscipline had vitiated its capacity to fight. As we have seen
earlier, during 1938 and early 1939, he repeatedly and publicly
raised the issues of mutual rivalries and bickerings among
Congressmen, bogus membership and impersonation at party
elections, efforts to capture Congress Committees, and the
general decline of authority in the Congress.
The internal strife reached its climax at the Tripuri session
of the Congress, held from 8 to 12 March 1939. Bose had
completely misjudged his support and the meaning of his
majority in the presidential election. Congressmen had voted for
him for diverse reasons, and above all because he stood for
militant politics, and not because they wanted to have him as the
supreme leader of the national movement. They were not willing
to reject Gandhiji’s leadership or that of other older leaders who
decided to bring this home to Subhas. Govind Ballabh Pa nt
moved a resolution at Tripuri expressing lull confidence in the old[/INST] |
Working Committee, reiterating full faith in Gandhiji’s leadership
of the movement and the Congress policies of the previous twenty
years, and asking Subhas to nominate his Working Comm ittee ‘in
accordance with the wishes of Gandhiji.’ The resolution was
passed by a big majority, but Gandhiji did not approve of the
resolution and refused to impose a Working Committee on | <s>[INST]Working Committee, reiterating full faith in Gandhiji’s leadership
of the movement and the Congress policies of the previous twenty
years, and asking Subhas to nominate his Working Comm ittee ‘in
accordance with the wishes of Gandhiji.’ The resolution was
passed by a big majority, but Gandhiji did not approve of the
resolution and refused to impose a Working Committee on[/INST] |
452 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Subhas. He asked him to nominate a Committee of his own
choice.
Subhas Bose refused to take up the challenge. He had
placed himself in an impossible situation. He knew that he could
not lead the organization on his own, but he was also not willing
to accept the leadership of the majority. To place the best
construction on his policy, he wanted Gandhiji to be the leader of
the coming struggle but he wanted Gandhiji to follow the strategy
and tactics laid down by him and the left -wing parties and
groups. Gandhiji, on the other hand, would either lead the
Congress on the basi s of his own strategy and style of politics or
surrender the position of the leader. As he wrote to Bose: ‘if your
prognosis is right, I am a back number and played out as the
generalissimo of Satyagraha .” In other words, as Rajendra Prasad
later wrote in his Autobiography, Gandhiji and the older leaders
would not accept a situation where the strategy and tactics were
not theirs but the responsibility for impl ementing them would be
theirs.’
Bose could see no other way out but to resign from the
presidentshi p. Nehru tried to mediate between the two sides and
persuade Bose not to resign, while asking Gandhiji and the older
leaders to be more accommodative. But Bose would not resi gn
from his position. On the one hand, he insisted that the Working
Committee shou ld be representative of the new radical trends
and groups which had elected him, on the ot her, he would not
nominate his ow n Working Committee. He preferred to press his
resignation. This led to the election of Rajendra Prasad in his
place. The Congress ha d weathered another storm.
Bose could also not get the support of the Congress
Socialists and the Communists at Tripuri or after for they were
not willing to divide the national movement and felt that its unity
must be preserved at all costs. Explaining i ts position, the CPI
declared after Tripuri that the interests of the anti -imperialist | <s>[INST]452 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Subhas. He asked him to nominate a Committee of his own
choice.
Subhas Bose refused to take up the challenge. He had
placed himself in an impossible situation. He knew that he could
not lead the organization on his own, but he was also not willing
to accept the leadership of the majority. To place the best
construction on his policy, he wanted Gandhiji to be the leader of
the coming struggle but he wanted Gandhiji to follow the strategy
and tactics laid down by him and the left -wing parties and
groups. Gandhiji, on the other hand, would either lead the
Congress on the basi s of his own strategy and style of politics or
surrender the position of the leader. As he wrote to Bose: ‘if your
prognosis is right, I am a back number and played out as the
generalissimo of Satyagraha .” In other words, as Rajendra Prasad
later wrote in his Autobiography, Gandhiji and the older leaders
would not accept a situation where the strategy and tactics were
not theirs but the responsibility for impl ementing them would be
theirs.’
Bose could see no other way out but to resign from the
presidentshi p. Nehru tried to mediate between the two sides and
persuade Bose not to resign, while asking Gandhiji and the older
leaders to be more accommodative. But Bose would not resi gn
from his position. On the one hand, he insisted that the Working
Committee shou ld be representative of the new radical trends
and groups which had elected him, on the ot her, he would not
nominate his ow n Working Committee. He preferred to press his
resignation. This led to the election of Rajendra Prasad in his
place. The Congress ha d weathered another storm.
Bose could also not get the support of the Congress
Socialists and the Communists at Tripuri or after for they were
not willing to divide the national movement and felt that its unity
must be preserved at all costs. Explaining i ts position, the CPI
declared after Tripuri that the interests of the anti -imperialist[/INST] |
struggle demanded not the exclusive leadership of one wing but a
united leadership under the guidance of Gandhiji.” P.C. Joshi,
General Secretary of the CPI, wrote in Ap ril 1939 that the
greatest class struggle today is our national struggle,’ that the
Congress was the main organ of this struggle, and that the
preservation of its unity was a primary task.’ | <s>[INST]struggle demanded not the exclusive leadership of one wing but a
united leadership under the guidance of Gandhiji.” P.C. Joshi,
General Secretary of the CPI, wrote in Ap ril 1939 that the
greatest class struggle today is our national struggle,’ that the
Congress was the main organ of this struggle, and that the
preservation of its unity was a primary task.’[/INST] |
453 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
Subsequently, in May, Subhas Bose and his followers
formed the For ward Bloc as a new party within the Congress.
And when he gave a call for an All-India protest on 9 July against
an AICC resolution, the Working Committee took disciplinary
action against him, removing him from the presidentship of the
Bengal Provincial Co ngress Committee and debarring him from
holding any Congress office for three years.
World War II broke Out On 1 September 1939 when Nazi
Germany invaded Poland. Earlier Germany had occupied Austria
in March 1938 and Czechoslovakia in 1939. Britain and Fr ance,
which had been following a policy of appeasement towards Hitler,
were now forced to go to Poland’s aid and declare war on
Germany. This they did on 3 September 1939. The Government
of India immediately declared India to be at war with Germany
without consulting the Congress or the elected members of the
central legislature.
The Congress, as we have seen earlier, was in full sympathy
with the victims of fascist aggression, and its immediate reaction
was to go to the aid of the anti -fascist forces. Gan dhiji’s reaction
was highly emotional. He told the Viceroy that the very thought of
the possible destruction of the House of Parliament and
Westminster Abbey produced a strong emotional reaction in him
and that, fully sympathizing with the Allied Cause, he was for full
and unquestioning cooperation with Britain. But a question most
of the Congress leaders asked was — how was it possible for an
enslaved nation to aid others in their fight for freedom? The
official Congress stand was adopted at a meeting of the Congress
W8rking Committee held at Wardha from 10 to 14 September to
which, in keeping with the nationalist tradition of
accommodating diversity of opinion, Subhas Bose, Acharya
Narendra Dev, and Jayaprakash Narayan ware also invited.
Sharp differences emerged in this meeting. Gandhiji was for | <s>[INST]453 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
Subsequently, in May, Subhas Bose and his followers
formed the For ward Bloc as a new party within the Congress.
And when he gave a call for an All-India protest on 9 July against
an AICC resolution, the Working Committee took disciplinary
action against him, removing him from the presidentship of the
Bengal Provincial Co ngress Committee and debarring him from
holding any Congress office for three years.
World War II broke Out On 1 September 1939 when Nazi
Germany invaded Poland. Earlier Germany had occupied Austria
in March 1938 and Czechoslovakia in 1939. Britain and Fr ance,
which had been following a policy of appeasement towards Hitler,
were now forced to go to Poland’s aid and declare war on
Germany. This they did on 3 September 1939. The Government
of India immediately declared India to be at war with Germany
without consulting the Congress or the elected members of the
central legislature.
The Congress, as we have seen earlier, was in full sympathy
with the victims of fascist aggression, and its immediate reaction
was to go to the aid of the anti -fascist forces. Gan dhiji’s reaction
was highly emotional. He told the Viceroy that the very thought of
the possible destruction of the House of Parliament and
Westminster Abbey produced a strong emotional reaction in him
and that, fully sympathizing with the Allied Cause, he was for full
and unquestioning cooperation with Britain. But a question most
of the Congress leaders asked was — how was it possible for an
enslaved nation to aid others in their fight for freedom? The
official Congress stand was adopted at a meeting of the Congress
W8rking Committee held at Wardha from 10 to 14 September to
which, in keeping with the nationalist tradition of
accommodating diversity of opinion, Subhas Bose, Acharya
Narendra Dev, and Jayaprakash Narayan ware also invited.
Sharp differences emerged in this meeting. Gandhiji was for[/INST] |
Sharp differences emerged in this meeting. Gandhiji was for
taking a sympathetic view of the Allies. He believed that there
was a clear difference between the democratic states of Western
Europe and the totalitarian Nazi state headed by Hitler. The
Socialists and Subhas Bose argued that the War was an
imperialist one since both sides were fighting for gaining or
defending colonial territories. Therefore, the question of
supporting either of the two sides did not arise. Instead the | <s>[INST]Sharp differences emerged in this meeting. Gandhiji was for
taking a sympathetic view of the Allies. He believed that there
was a clear difference between the democratic states of Western
Europe and the totalitarian Nazi state headed by Hitler. The
Socialists and Subhas Bose argued that the War was an
imperialist one since both sides were fighting for gaining or
defending colonial territories. Therefore, the question of
supporting either of the two sides did not arise. Instead the[/INST] |
454 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Congress should take advantage of the situat ion to wrest freedom
by immediately starting a civil disobedience movement.
Jawaharlal Nehru had a stand of his own. He had been for
several years warning the world against the dangers of Nazi
aggression, and he made a sharp distinction between democracy
and Fascism. He believed that justice was on the side of Britain,
France and Poland. But he was also convinced that Britain and
France were imperialist countries and that the War was the
result of the inner contradictions of capitalism’ maturing since
the end of World War I. He, therefore, argued that India should
neither join the War till she herself gained freedom nor take
advantage of Britain’s difficulties by starting an immediate
struggle. Gandhiji found that his position was not supported by
even his close followers such as Sardar Patel and Rajendra
Prasad. Consequently, he decided to support Nehru’s position
which was then adopted by the Working Committee. Its
resolution, while unequivocally condemning the Nazi attack on
Poland as well as Nazism and Fascism, declared that India could
not be party to a war which was ostensibly being fought for
democratic freedom while that freedom was being denied to her,
If Britain was fighting for democracy and freedom, she should
prove this in India. In particular, s he should declare how her war
aims would be implemented in India at the end of the War,
Indians would then gladly join other democratic nations in the
war effort to starting a mass struggle, but it warned that the
decision could not be delayed for long. As Nehru put it, the
Congress leadership wanted ‘to give every chance to the Viceroy
and the British Government.’
The British Government’s response was entirely negative.
Linlithgow, the Viceroy, in his well considered statement of 17
October 1939 harped on the differences among Indians, tried to
use the Muslim League and the Princes against the Congress, | <s>[INST]454 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Congress should take advantage of the situat ion to wrest freedom
by immediately starting a civil disobedience movement.
Jawaharlal Nehru had a stand of his own. He had been for
several years warning the world against the dangers of Nazi
aggression, and he made a sharp distinction between democracy
and Fascism. He believed that justice was on the side of Britain,
France and Poland. But he was also convinced that Britain and
France were imperialist countries and that the War was the
result of the inner contradictions of capitalism’ maturing since
the end of World War I. He, therefore, argued that India should
neither join the War till she herself gained freedom nor take
advantage of Britain’s difficulties by starting an immediate
struggle. Gandhiji found that his position was not supported by
even his close followers such as Sardar Patel and Rajendra
Prasad. Consequently, he decided to support Nehru’s position
which was then adopted by the Working Committee. Its
resolution, while unequivocally condemning the Nazi attack on
Poland as well as Nazism and Fascism, declared that India could
not be party to a war which was ostensibly being fought for
democratic freedom while that freedom was being denied to her,
If Britain was fighting for democracy and freedom, she should
prove this in India. In particular, s he should declare how her war
aims would be implemented in India at the end of the War,
Indians would then gladly join other democratic nations in the
war effort to starting a mass struggle, but it warned that the
decision could not be delayed for long. As Nehru put it, the
Congress leadership wanted ‘to give every chance to the Viceroy
and the British Government.’
The British Government’s response was entirely negative.
Linlithgow, the Viceroy, in his well considered statement of 17
October 1939 harped on the differences among Indians, tried to
use the Muslim League and the Princes against the Congress,[/INST] |
use the Muslim League and the Princes against the Congress,
and refused to define Britain’s war aims beyond stating that
Britain was resisting aggression. As an immediate measure, he
offered to set up a consultative committee whose advice might be
sought by the Government whether it felt it necessary to do so.
For the future, the promise was that at the end of the War the
British Government would enter into consultations with
representatives of several communities, p arties, and interests in
India and with the Indian princes’ as to how the Act of 1935 | <s>[INST]use the Muslim League and the Princes against the Congress,
and refused to define Britain’s war aims beyond stating that
Britain was resisting aggression. As an immediate measure, he
offered to set up a consultative committee whose advice might be
sought by the Government whether it felt it necessary to do so.
For the future, the promise was that at the end of the War the
British Government would enter into consultations with
representatives of several communities, p arties, and interests in
India and with the Indian princes’ as to how the Act of 1935[/INST] |
455 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
might be modified. In a private communication to Zetland, the
Secretary of State, Linlithgow was to remark a few months later:
‘I am not too keen to start talking about a period after which
British rule will have ceased in India. I suspect that that day is
very remote and I feel the least we say about it in all probability
the better.” On 18 October, Zetland spoke in the House of Lords
and stressed differences among Indian s, especially among
Hindus and Muslims. He branded the Congress as a purely
Hindu organization.’ It, thus, became clear that the British
Government had no intention of loosening their hold on India
during or after the War and that it was willing, if necess ary, to
treat the Congress as an enemy.
The reaction of the Indian people and the national
leadership was sharp. The angriest reaction came from Gandhiji
who had been advocating more or less unconditional support to
Britain. Pointing out that the British Government was continuing
to pursue ‘the old policy of divide and rule,’ he said: ‘The Indian
declaration (of the Viceroy) shows clearly that there is to be no
democracy for India if Britain can prevent it. . . The Congress
asked for bread and it has got a stone.’ Referring to the question
of minorities and special interests such as those of the princes,
foreign capitalists, zamindars, etc., Gandhiji remarked: ‘The
Congress will safeguard the rights of every minority so long as
they do not advance claims in consistent with India’s
independence.’ But, he added, ‘independent India will not tolerate
any interests in conflict with the true interests of the masses.’
The Working Committee, meeting on 23 October, rejected
the Viceregal statement as a reiteration of the old imperialist
policy, decided not to support the War, and called upon the
Congress ministries to resign as a protest. This they did as
disciplined soldiers of the national movement. But the Congress | <s>[INST]455 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
might be modified. In a private communication to Zetland, the
Secretary of State, Linlithgow was to remark a few months later:
‘I am not too keen to start talking about a period after which
British rule will have ceased in India. I suspect that that day is
very remote and I feel the least we say about it in all probability
the better.” On 18 October, Zetland spoke in the House of Lords
and stressed differences among Indian s, especially among
Hindus and Muslims. He branded the Congress as a purely
Hindu organization.’ It, thus, became clear that the British
Government had no intention of loosening their hold on India
during or after the War and that it was willing, if necess ary, to
treat the Congress as an enemy.
The reaction of the Indian people and the national
leadership was sharp. The angriest reaction came from Gandhiji
who had been advocating more or less unconditional support to
Britain. Pointing out that the British Government was continuing
to pursue ‘the old policy of divide and rule,’ he said: ‘The Indian
declaration (of the Viceroy) shows clearly that there is to be no
democracy for India if Britain can prevent it. . . The Congress
asked for bread and it has got a stone.’ Referring to the question
of minorities and special interests such as those of the princes,
foreign capitalists, zamindars, etc., Gandhiji remarked: ‘The
Congress will safeguard the rights of every minority so long as
they do not advance claims in consistent with India’s
independence.’ But, he added, ‘independent India will not tolerate
any interests in conflict with the true interests of the masses.’
The Working Committee, meeting on 23 October, rejected
the Viceregal statement as a reiteration of the old imperialist
policy, decided not to support the War, and called upon the
Congress ministries to resign as a protest. This they did as
disciplined soldiers of the national movement. But the Congress[/INST] |
leadership still stayed its hand and was reluctant to give a call for
an immediate and a massive anti -imperialist struggle. In fact, the
Working Committee resolution of 23 October warned
Congressmen against any hasty action.
While there was agreement among Congressmen on the
question of attitude to the W ar and the resignation of the
ministries, sharp differences developed over the question of the | <s>[INST]leadership still stayed its hand and was reluctant to give a call for
an immediate and a massive anti -imperialist struggle. In fact, the
Working Committee resolution of 23 October warned
Congressmen against any hasty action.
While there was agreement among Congressmen on the
question of attitude to the W ar and the resignation of the
ministries, sharp differences developed over the question of the[/INST] |
456 | India’s Struggle For Independence
immediate starting of a mass satyagraha. Gandhiji and the
dominant leadership advanced three broad reasons for not
initiating an immediate movement. First, they felt that since the
cause of the Allies — Britain and France — was just, they should
not be embarrassed in the prosecution of the War. Second, the
lack of Hindu - Muslim unity was a big barrier to a struggle. In
the existing atmosphere any civil disobedienc e movement could
easily degenerate into communal rioting or even civil war. Above
all, they felt that there did not exist in the country an atmosphere
for an immediate struggle. Neither the masses were ready nor
was the Congress organizationally in a posit ion to launch a
struggle. The Congress organization was weak and had been
corrupted during 1938 -39. There was indiscipline and lack of
cohesion within the Congress ranks. Under these circumstances,
a mass movement would not be able to withstand severe
repressive measures by the Government. It was, therefore,
necessary to carry on intense political work among the people, to
prepare them for struggle, to tone up the Congress organization
and purge it of weaknesses, to negotiate with authorities till all
the p ossibilities of a negotiated settlement were exhausted and
the Government was clearly seen by all to be in the wrong. The
time for launching a struggle would come when the people were
strong and ready for struggle, the Congress organization had
been put on a sound footing, and the Government took such
aggressive action that the people felt the absolute necessity of
going into mass action. This view was summed up in the
resolution placed by the Working Committee before the Ramgarh
Session of the Congress in March 1940. The resolution, after
reiterating the Congress position on the War and asserting that
‘nothing short of complete independence can be accepted by the
people,’ declared that the Congress would resort to civil | <s>[INST]456 | India’s Struggle For Independence
immediate starting of a mass satyagraha. Gandhiji and the
dominant leadership advanced three broad reasons for not
initiating an immediate movement. First, they felt that since the
cause of the Allies — Britain and France — was just, they should
not be embarrassed in the prosecution of the War. Second, the
lack of Hindu - Muslim unity was a big barrier to a struggle. In
the existing atmosphere any civil disobedienc e movement could
easily degenerate into communal rioting or even civil war. Above
all, they felt that there did not exist in the country an atmosphere
for an immediate struggle. Neither the masses were ready nor
was the Congress organizationally in a posit ion to launch a
struggle. The Congress organization was weak and had been
corrupted during 1938 -39. There was indiscipline and lack of
cohesion within the Congress ranks. Under these circumstances,
a mass movement would not be able to withstand severe
repressive measures by the Government. It was, therefore,
necessary to carry on intense political work among the people, to
prepare them for struggle, to tone up the Congress organization
and purge it of weaknesses, to negotiate with authorities till all
the p ossibilities of a negotiated settlement were exhausted and
the Government was clearly seen by all to be in the wrong. The
time for launching a struggle would come when the people were
strong and ready for struggle, the Congress organization had
been put on a sound footing, and the Government took such
aggressive action that the people felt the absolute necessity of
going into mass action. This view was summed up in the
resolution placed by the Working Committee before the Ramgarh
Session of the Congress in March 1940. The resolution, after
reiterating the Congress position on the War and asserting that
‘nothing short of complete independence can be accepted by the
people,’ declared that the Congress would resort to civil[/INST] |
people,’ declared that the Congress would resort to civil
disobedience ‘as soon as the Congress organization is considered
fit enough for the purpose, or in case circumstances so shape
themselves as to precipitate a crisis.”
An alternative to the position of the dominant leadership
came from a coalition of various left -wing groups: Subhas Bose
and h is Forward Bloc, the Congress Socialist Party, the
Communist Party, the Royists, etc. The Left characterized the
War as an imperialist war and asserted that the war -crisis
provided the opportunity to achieve freedom through an all -out
struggle against Brit ish imperialism. It was convinced that the | <s>[INST]people,’ declared that the Congress would resort to civil
disobedience ‘as soon as the Congress organization is considered
fit enough for the purpose, or in case circumstances so shape
themselves as to precipitate a crisis.”
An alternative to the position of the dominant leadership
came from a coalition of various left -wing groups: Subhas Bose
and h is Forward Bloc, the Congress Socialist Party, the
Communist Party, the Royists, etc. The Left characterized the
War as an imperialist war and asserted that the war -crisis
provided the opportunity to achieve freedom through an all -out
struggle against Brit ish imperialism. It was convinced that the[/INST] |
457 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
masses were fully ready for action and were only waiting for a call
from the leadership. They accepted that hurdles like the
communal problem and weaknesses in the Congress organization
existed; but they were conv inced that these would be easily and
automatically swept away once a mass struggle was begun.
Organizational strength, they said, was not to be built up prior to
a struggle but in the course of the struggle. Making a sharp
critique of the Congress leadersh ip’s policy of ‘wait and see,’ the
Left accused the leadership of being afraid of the masses, of
having lost zest for struggle, and consequently of trying to
bargain and compromise with imperialism for securing petty
concessions. They urged the Congress le adership to adopt
immediate measures to launch a mass struggle. While agreeing
on the need for an immediate struggle, the Left was internally
divided both in its understanding of political forces and on the
Course of political action in case the dominant l eadership of the
Congress did not accept the line of immediate struggle. Subhas
Bose wanted the Left to split the Congress if it did not launch a
struggle, to organize a parallel Congress and to start a struggle
on its own. He was convinced that the masses and the
overwhelming majority of Congress would support the Left -ted
parallel Congress and join the movement it would launch. The
CSP and CPI differed from this view. They were convinced that
Bose was grossly overestimating the influence of the Left and no
struggle could be launched without the leadership of Gandhiji
and the Congress. Therefore an attempt should be made not to
split the Congress and thus disrupt the national united fronts
but persuade and pressurize its leadership to launch a struggle.
Jawaharlal Nehru ’s was an ambivalent position. On the one
hand, he could clearly see the imperialistic character of the Allied
countries, on the other, he would do nothing that might lead to | <s>[INST]457 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
masses were fully ready for action and were only waiting for a call
from the leadership. They accepted that hurdles like the
communal problem and weaknesses in the Congress organization
existed; but they were conv inced that these would be easily and
automatically swept away once a mass struggle was begun.
Organizational strength, they said, was not to be built up prior to
a struggle but in the course of the struggle. Making a sharp
critique of the Congress leadersh ip’s policy of ‘wait and see,’ the
Left accused the leadership of being afraid of the masses, of
having lost zest for struggle, and consequently of trying to
bargain and compromise with imperialism for securing petty
concessions. They urged the Congress le adership to adopt
immediate measures to launch a mass struggle. While agreeing
on the need for an immediate struggle, the Left was internally
divided both in its understanding of political forces and on the
Course of political action in case the dominant l eadership of the
Congress did not accept the line of immediate struggle. Subhas
Bose wanted the Left to split the Congress if it did not launch a
struggle, to organize a parallel Congress and to start a struggle
on its own. He was convinced that the masses and the
overwhelming majority of Congress would support the Left -ted
parallel Congress and join the movement it would launch. The
CSP and CPI differed from this view. They were convinced that
Bose was grossly overestimating the influence of the Left and no
struggle could be launched without the leadership of Gandhiji
and the Congress. Therefore an attempt should be made not to
split the Congress and thus disrupt the national united fronts
but persuade and pressurize its leadership to launch a struggle.
Jawaharlal Nehru ’s was an ambivalent position. On the one
hand, he could clearly see the imperialistic character of the Allied
countries, on the other, he would do nothing that might lead to[/INST] |
the triumph of Hitler and the Nazis in Europe. His entire
personali ty and political thinking led to the line of an early
commencement of civil disobedience, but he would do nothing
that would imperil the anti-Nazi struggle in Europe and the
Chinese people’s struggle against Japanese aggression. In the
end, however, the di lemma was resolved by Nehru going along
with Gandhiji and the majority of the Congress leadership. | <s>[INST]the triumph of Hitler and the Nazis in Europe. His entire
personali ty and political thinking led to the line of an early
commencement of civil disobedience, but he would do nothing
that would imperil the anti-Nazi struggle in Europe and the
Chinese people’s struggle against Japanese aggression. In the
end, however, the di lemma was resolved by Nehru going along
with Gandhiji and the majority of the Congress leadership.[/INST] |
458 | India’s Struggle For Independence
But politics could not go on this placid note for too long. The
patience of both the Congress leadership and the masses was
getting exhausted. The Governmen t refused to budge and took up
the position that no constitutional advance could be made till the
Congress came to an agreement with the Muslim co mmun alists.
It kept issuing ordinance after ordinance taking away the
freedom of speech and the Press and the right to organize
associations. N ationalist workers, especially those belonging to
the left-wing, were harassed, arrested and imprisoned all over the
country. The Government wa s getting ready to crush the
Congress if it took any steps towards a mass strugg le.
In this situation, the Indians felt that the time had come to
show the British that their patience was not the result of
weakness, As Nehru put it in an article entitled ‘The Parting of
the Ways,’ the British rulers believed that ‘in this world of for ce,
of bombing aeroplanes, tanks, and armed men how weak we are!
Why trouble about us? But perhaps, ev en in this world of armed
conflict, there is such a thing as the spirit of man, and the spirit
of a nation, which is neither ignoble nor weak, and which m ay
not be ignored, save at peril.’ Near the end of 1940, the Congress
once again asked Gandhiji to take command. Gandhiji now began
to take steps which would lead to a mass struggle within his
broad strategic perspective. He decided to initiate a limited
Satyagraha on an individual basis by a few selected individuals
in every locality. The demand of a Satyagrahi would be for the
freedom of speech to preach against participation in the War. The
Satyagrahi would publicly declare: ‘It is wrong to help the Brit ish
war-effort with men or money. The only worthy effort is to resist
all war with non -violent resistance.’ The Satyagrahi would
beforehand inform the district magistrate of the time and place
where he or she was going to make the anti -war speech. The | <s>[INST]458 | India’s Struggle For Independence
But politics could not go on this placid note for too long. The
patience of both the Congress leadership and the masses was
getting exhausted. The Governmen t refused to budge and took up
the position that no constitutional advance could be made till the
Congress came to an agreement with the Muslim co mmun alists.
It kept issuing ordinance after ordinance taking away the
freedom of speech and the Press and the right to organize
associations. N ationalist workers, especially those belonging to
the left-wing, were harassed, arrested and imprisoned all over the
country. The Government wa s getting ready to crush the
Congress if it took any steps towards a mass strugg le.
In this situation, the Indians felt that the time had come to
show the British that their patience was not the result of
weakness, As Nehru put it in an article entitled ‘The Parting of
the Ways,’ the British rulers believed that ‘in this world of for ce,
of bombing aeroplanes, tanks, and armed men how weak we are!
Why trouble about us? But perhaps, ev en in this world of armed
conflict, there is such a thing as the spirit of man, and the spirit
of a nation, which is neither ignoble nor weak, and which m ay
not be ignored, save at peril.’ Near the end of 1940, the Congress
once again asked Gandhiji to take command. Gandhiji now began
to take steps which would lead to a mass struggle within his
broad strategic perspective. He decided to initiate a limited
Satyagraha on an individual basis by a few selected individuals
in every locality. The demand of a Satyagrahi would be for the
freedom of speech to preach against participation in the War. The
Satyagrahi would publicly declare: ‘It is wrong to help the Brit ish
war-effort with men or money. The only worthy effort is to resist
all war with non -violent resistance.’ The Satyagrahi would
beforehand inform the district magistrate of the time and place
where he or she was going to make the anti -war speech. The[/INST] |
where he or she was going to make the anti -war speech. The
carefully chosen Satyagrahis — Vinoba Bhave was to be the first
Satyagrahi on 17 October 1940 and Jawaharlal Nehru the second
— were surrounded by huge crowds when they appeared on the
platform, and the authorities could often arrest them only after
they had m ade their speeches. And if the Government did not
arrest a Satyagrahi, he or she would not only repeat the
performance but move into the villages and start a trek towards
Delhi, thus participating in a movement that came to be known
as the ‘Delhi Chalo’ (onwards to Delhi) movement. | <s>[INST]where he or she was going to make the anti -war speech. The
carefully chosen Satyagrahis — Vinoba Bhave was to be the first
Satyagrahi on 17 October 1940 and Jawaharlal Nehru the second
— were surrounded by huge crowds when they appeared on the
platform, and the authorities could often arrest them only after
they had m ade their speeches. And if the Government did not
arrest a Satyagrahi, he or she would not only repeat the
performance but move into the villages and start a trek towards
Delhi, thus participating in a movement that came to be known
as the ‘Delhi Chalo’ (onwards to Delhi) movement.[/INST] |
459 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
The aims of the Individual Satyagraha conducted as S.
Gopal has put it, ‘at a low temperature and in very small doses’
were explained as follows by Gandhiji in a letter to the Viceroy:
‘The Congress is as much opposed to victory for Nazism as any
Britisher can be. But their objective cannot be carried to the
extent of their participation in the war. And since you and the
Secretary of State for India have declared that the whole of India
is voluntarily helping the war effort, it becomes necessary to
make clear that the vast majority of the people of India are not
interested in it. They make no distinction between Nazism and
the double autocracy that rules India.’
Thus, the Individual Satyagraha had a dual purpose —
while giving ex pression to the Indian people’s strong political
feeling, it gave the British Government further opportunity to
peacefully accept the Indian demands. Gandhiji and the
Congress were, because of their anti -Nazi feelings, still reluctant
to take advantage of’ the British predicament and embarrass her
war effort by a mass upheaval in India. More im portantly,
Gandhiji was beginning to prepare the people for the coming
struggle. The Congress organization was being put back in shape;
opportunist elements were bein g discovered and pushed out of
the organization; and above all the people were being politically
aroused, educated and mobilized.
By 15 May 1941, more than 25,000 Satyagrahis had been
convicted for offering individual civil disobedience. Many more —
lower level political workers -— had been left free by the
Government.
Two major changes in British politics occurred during 1941.
Nazi Germany had already occupied Poland, Belgium, Holland,
Norway and France as well as most of Eastern Europe. It
attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. In the East, Japan
launched a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl
Harbour on 7 December. It quickly overran the Philippines, Indo - | <s>[INST]459 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
The aims of the Individual Satyagraha conducted as S.
Gopal has put it, ‘at a low temperature and in very small doses’
were explained as follows by Gandhiji in a letter to the Viceroy:
‘The Congress is as much opposed to victory for Nazism as any
Britisher can be. But their objective cannot be carried to the
extent of their participation in the war. And since you and the
Secretary of State for India have declared that the whole of India
is voluntarily helping the war effort, it becomes necessary to
make clear that the vast majority of the people of India are not
interested in it. They make no distinction between Nazism and
the double autocracy that rules India.’
Thus, the Individual Satyagraha had a dual purpose —
while giving ex pression to the Indian people’s strong political
feeling, it gave the British Government further opportunity to
peacefully accept the Indian demands. Gandhiji and the
Congress were, because of their anti -Nazi feelings, still reluctant
to take advantage of’ the British predicament and embarrass her
war effort by a mass upheaval in India. More im portantly,
Gandhiji was beginning to prepare the people for the coming
struggle. The Congress organization was being put back in shape;
opportunist elements were bein g discovered and pushed out of
the organization; and above all the people were being politically
aroused, educated and mobilized.
By 15 May 1941, more than 25,000 Satyagrahis had been
convicted for offering individual civil disobedience. Many more —
lower level political workers -— had been left free by the
Government.
Two major changes in British politics occurred during 1941.
Nazi Germany had already occupied Poland, Belgium, Holland,
Norway and France as well as most of Eastern Europe. It
attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. In the East, Japan
launched a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl
Harbour on 7 December. It quickly overran the Philippines, Indo -[/INST] |
China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Burma. It occupied Rangoon in
March 1942. War was brou ght to India’s doorstep. Winston
Churchill, now the British Prime Minister, told the King that
Burma, Ceylon, Calcutta and Madras might fall into enemy
hands. | <s>[INST]China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Burma. It occupied Rangoon in
March 1942. War was brou ght to India’s doorstep. Winston
Churchill, now the British Prime Minister, told the King that
Burma, Ceylon, Calcutta and Madras might fall into enemy
hands.[/INST] |
460 | India’s Struggle For Independence
The Indian leaders, released from prisons in early
December, were wo rried about the safety and d efence of India.
They also had immense concern for the Soviet Union and China.
Many felt that Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union had changed
the character of the War. Gandhiji had earlier denounced the
Japanese slogan of ‘Asia for Asiatics’ and asked the people of
India to boycott Japanese products. Anxious to defend Indian
territory and to go to the aid of the Allies, the Congress Working
Committee overrode the objections of Gandhiji and Nehru and
passed a resolution at the end of December offering to ful ly
cooperate in the defence of India and the Allies if Britain agreed
to give full independence after the War arid the substance of
power immediately. It was at this time that Gandh iji designated
Jawaharlal as his chosen successor. Speaking before the AICC on
15 January 1941, he said: ‘Somebody suggested that Pandit
Jawaha rlal and I were estranged. It will require much more than
differences of opinion to estrange us. We have had differences
from the moment we became co -workers, and yet I have said for
some years and say now that not Rajaji (C. Rajagopalacha ri) but
Jawaharlal will be my successor. He says that he does not
understand my language, and that he speaks a language foreign
to me. This may or may not be true. But language is no bar to
union of hearts . And I know that when I am gone he will speak
my language.’
As the war situation worsened, President Roosevelt of the
USA and President Chiang Ka i-Shek of China as also the Labour
Party leaders of Britain put pressure on Churchill to seek the
active coope ration of Indians in the War. To secure this
cooperation the British Government sent to India in March 1942
a mission headed by a Cabinet minister Stafford Cripps, a left -
wing Labourite who had earlier actively supported the Indian
national movement. Even though Cripps announced that the aim | <s>[INST]460 | India’s Struggle For Independence
The Indian leaders, released from prisons in early
December, were wo rried about the safety and d efence of India.
They also had immense concern for the Soviet Union and China.
Many felt that Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union had changed
the character of the War. Gandhiji had earlier denounced the
Japanese slogan of ‘Asia for Asiatics’ and asked the people of
India to boycott Japanese products. Anxious to defend Indian
territory and to go to the aid of the Allies, the Congress Working
Committee overrode the objections of Gandhiji and Nehru and
passed a resolution at the end of December offering to ful ly
cooperate in the defence of India and the Allies if Britain agreed
to give full independence after the War arid the substance of
power immediately. It was at this time that Gandh iji designated
Jawaharlal as his chosen successor. Speaking before the AICC on
15 January 1941, he said: ‘Somebody suggested that Pandit
Jawaha rlal and I were estranged. It will require much more than
differences of opinion to estrange us. We have had differences
from the moment we became co -workers, and yet I have said for
some years and say now that not Rajaji (C. Rajagopalacha ri) but
Jawaharlal will be my successor. He says that he does not
understand my language, and that he speaks a language foreign
to me. This may or may not be true. But language is no bar to
union of hearts . And I know that when I am gone he will speak
my language.’
As the war situation worsened, President Roosevelt of the
USA and President Chiang Ka i-Shek of China as also the Labour
Party leaders of Britain put pressure on Churchill to seek the
active coope ration of Indians in the War. To secure this
cooperation the British Government sent to India in March 1942
a mission headed by a Cabinet minister Stafford Cripps, a left -
wing Labourite who had earlier actively supported the Indian
national movement. Even though Cripps announced that the aim[/INST] |
national movement. Even though Cripps announced that the aim
of British policy in India was ‘the earliest possible realization of
self- government in India,’ the Draft Declaration he brought with
him was disappointing. The Declaration promised India
Dominion Status and a constitu tion-making body after the War
whose members would be elected by the provincial assemblies
and nominated by the rulers in case of the princely states. The
Pakistan demand was accommodated by the provision that any
province which was not prepared to accept the new constitution
would have the right to sign a separate agreement with Britain | <s>[INST]national movement. Even though Cripps announced that the aim
of British policy in India was ‘the earliest possible realization of
self- government in India,’ the Draft Declaration he brought with
him was disappointing. The Declaration promised India
Dominion Status and a constitu tion-making body after the War
whose members would be elected by the provincial assemblies
and nominated by the rulers in case of the princely states. The
Pakistan demand was accommodated by the provision that any
province which was not prepared to accept the new constitution
would have the right to sign a separate agreement with Britain[/INST] |
461 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
regarding its future status. For the present the British would
continue to exercise sole control over the defence of the country.
Amery, the Secretary of State, described t he Declaration as in
essence a conservative, reactionary and limited offer. Nehru, a
friend of Cripps, was to write later: When I read those proposals
for the first time I was profoundly depressed.’
Negotiations between Cripps and the Congress leaders
broke down. The Congress objected to the provision for Dominion
Status rather than full independence, the representation of the
princely states in the constituent assembly not by the people of
the states but by the nominees of the rulers, and above all by the
provision for the partition of India. The British Government also
refused to accept the demand for the immediate transfer of
effective power to the Indians and for a real share in the
responsibility for the defence of India. An important reason for
the fai lure of the negotiations was the incapacity of C ripps to
bargain and negotiate. He had been told not to go beyond the
Draft Declaration. Moreover, Churchill, the Secretary of State,
Amery, the Viceroy, Linlithgow, and the Commander -in-Chief,
Wavell, did no t want Cripps to succeed and constantly opposed
and sabotaged his efforts to a ccommodate Indian opinion.
Stafford Cripps returned home in the middle of April leaving
behind a frustrated and embittered Indian people. Though they
still sympathized with the a nti-fascist, especially the people of
China and the Soviet people, they felt that the existing situation
in the country had become intolerable. The time had come, they
felt, for a final assault on imperialism. | <s>[INST]461 | The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
regarding its future status. For the present the British would
continue to exercise sole control over the defence of the country.
Amery, the Secretary of State, described t he Declaration as in
essence a conservative, reactionary and limited offer. Nehru, a
friend of Cripps, was to write later: When I read those proposals
for the first time I was profoundly depressed.’
Negotiations between Cripps and the Congress leaders
broke down. The Congress objected to the provision for Dominion
Status rather than full independence, the representation of the
princely states in the constituent assembly not by the people of
the states but by the nominees of the rulers, and above all by the
provision for the partition of India. The British Government also
refused to accept the demand for the immediate transfer of
effective power to the Indians and for a real share in the
responsibility for the defence of India. An important reason for
the fai lure of the negotiations was the incapacity of C ripps to
bargain and negotiate. He had been told not to go beyond the
Draft Declaration. Moreover, Churchill, the Secretary of State,
Amery, the Viceroy, Linlithgow, and the Commander -in-Chief,
Wavell, did no t want Cripps to succeed and constantly opposed
and sabotaged his efforts to a ccommodate Indian opinion.
Stafford Cripps returned home in the middle of April leaving
behind a frustrated and embittered Indian people. Though they
still sympathized with the a nti-fascist, especially the people of
China and the Soviet people, they felt that the existing situation
in the country had become intolerable. The time had come, they
felt, for a final assault on imperialism.[/INST] |
462 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 35 . THE QUIT INDIA
MOVEMENT AND
THE INA
‘Quit India,’ ‘Bharat Choro’. This simple hut powerful slogan
launched “the legendary struggle which also became famous by
the name of the ‘August Revolution.’) In this struggle, the
common people of the country demonstrated an unparalleled
heroism and militancy. Moreover, the repression that they faced
was the most brutal that had ever been used against the national
movement. The circumstances in which the resistance was
offered were also the most adverse faced by the national
movement until then — using the justification of the war effort,
the Government had armed itself with draconian measures, and
suppressed even basic civil liberties. Virtually any political
activity, however peaceful and ‘legal,’ was at this time an illegal
and revolutionary activity.
Why had it become necessary to launch a movement in
these difficult conditions, when the possibility of brutal
repression was a certainty?
For one, the failure of the Cripps Mission in April 1942
made it clear that Britain was unwilling to offer an honourable
settlement and a real constitutional advance during the War, and
that she was determined to continue India’s unwilling
partnership in the War efforts . The empty gesture of the even
those Congressmen like Nehru and Gandhiji , who did not want to
do anything to hamper the anti fascist War effort (and who had
played a major role in keeping in check those who had been
spoiling for a tight since 1939), that any further silence would be
tantamount to accepting the right of the Bri tish Government to
decide India’s fate without any reference to the wishes of her
people. Gandhiji had been as clear as Nehru that he did not want
to hamper the anti-fascist struggle, especially that of the Russian
and Chinese people. But by the spring of 1942 he was becoming
increasingly convinced of the inevitability of a struggle. A | <s>[INST]462 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 35 . THE QUIT INDIA
MOVEMENT AND
THE INA
‘Quit India,’ ‘Bharat Choro’. This simple hut powerful slogan
launched “the legendary struggle which also became famous by
the name of the ‘August Revolution.’) In this struggle, the
common people of the country demonstrated an unparalleled
heroism and militancy. Moreover, the repression that they faced
was the most brutal that had ever been used against the national
movement. The circumstances in which the resistance was
offered were also the most adverse faced by the national
movement until then — using the justification of the war effort,
the Government had armed itself with draconian measures, and
suppressed even basic civil liberties. Virtually any political
activity, however peaceful and ‘legal,’ was at this time an illegal
and revolutionary activity.
Why had it become necessary to launch a movement in
these difficult conditions, when the possibility of brutal
repression was a certainty?
For one, the failure of the Cripps Mission in April 1942
made it clear that Britain was unwilling to offer an honourable
settlement and a real constitutional advance during the War, and
that she was determined to continue India’s unwilling
partnership in the War efforts . The empty gesture of the even
those Congressmen like Nehru and Gandhiji , who did not want to
do anything to hamper the anti fascist War effort (and who had
played a major role in keeping in check those who had been
spoiling for a tight since 1939), that any further silence would be
tantamount to accepting the right of the Bri tish Government to
decide India’s fate without any reference to the wishes of her
people. Gandhiji had been as clear as Nehru that he did not want
to hamper the anti-fascist struggle, especially that of the Russian
and Chinese people. But by the spring of 1942 he was becoming
increasingly convinced of the inevitability of a struggle. A[/INST] |
463 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
fortnight after Cripps’ departure, Gandhiji drafted a resolution for
the Congress Working Committee calling for Britain’s withdrawal
and the adoption of non -violent non -coope ration against any
Japanese invasion, Congress edged towards Quit India while
Britain moved towards arming herself with special powers to
meet the threat. Nehr u remained opposed to the idea of a
struggle right till August 1942 and gave way only at the very end.’
Apart from British obduracy, there were other factors that
made a struggle both inevitable and necessary. Popular
discontent, a product of rising prices and war -time shortages,
was gradually mounting. High -handed government actions such
as the comm andeering of boats in Bengal and Orissa to prevent
their being used by the Japanese had led to considerable anger
among the people.
The popular wi1ingness to give expression to this discontent
was enhanced by th e growing feeling of an imminent British
collapse. The news of Allied reverses and British withdrawals
from South -East Asia and Burma and the trains bringing
wounded soldiers from the Assam -Burma border confirmed this
feeling.
Combined with this was the impact of the manner of the
British evacuatio n from Malaya and Bu rma. It was common
knowledge that the British had evacuated, the white residents
and generally left the subject people to their fate. /Letters from
Indians in South -East Asia to their relatives in India were full of
graphic accounts of British betrayal and their being left at the
mercy of the dreaded Japanese. It not only to be expected that
they would repeat the performance in India, in the event of a
Japanese occupation? In fact, one major reason for the
leadership of the national move ment thinking it necessary to
launch a struggle was their feeling that the people were becoming
demoralized and, that in the event of a Japanese occupation,
might not resist at all, In order to build up their capacity to resist | <s>[INST]463 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
fortnight after Cripps’ departure, Gandhiji drafted a resolution for
the Congress Working Committee calling for Britain’s withdrawal
and the adoption of non -violent non -coope ration against any
Japanese invasion, Congress edged towards Quit India while
Britain moved towards arming herself with special powers to
meet the threat. Nehr u remained opposed to the idea of a
struggle right till August 1942 and gave way only at the very end.’
Apart from British obduracy, there were other factors that
made a struggle both inevitable and necessary. Popular
discontent, a product of rising prices and war -time shortages,
was gradually mounting. High -handed government actions such
as the comm andeering of boats in Bengal and Orissa to prevent
their being used by the Japanese had led to considerable anger
among the people.
The popular wi1ingness to give expression to this discontent
was enhanced by th e growing feeling of an imminent British
collapse. The news of Allied reverses and British withdrawals
from South -East Asia and Burma and the trains bringing
wounded soldiers from the Assam -Burma border confirmed this
feeling.
Combined with this was the impact of the manner of the
British evacuatio n from Malaya and Bu rma. It was common
knowledge that the British had evacuated, the white residents
and generally left the subject people to their fate. /Letters from
Indians in South -East Asia to their relatives in India were full of
graphic accounts of British betrayal and their being left at the
mercy of the dreaded Japanese. It not only to be expected that
they would repeat the performance in India, in the event of a
Japanese occupation? In fact, one major reason for the
leadership of the national move ment thinking it necessary to
launch a struggle was their feeling that the people were becoming
demoralized and, that in the event of a Japanese occupation,
might not resist at all, In order to build up their capacity to resist[/INST] |
Japanese aggression, It was necessary to draw them t of this
demoralized state of mind and convince them of their own power .
Gandhiji, as always, was particularly clear on this aspect. The
popular faith in the stability of British rule had reached such a
low that there was a run on the banks and people withdrew
deposits from post -office savings accounts and started hoarding | <s>[INST]Japanese aggression, It was necessary to draw them t of this
demoralized state of mind and convince them of their own power .
Gandhiji, as always, was particularly clear on this aspect. The
popular faith in the stability of British rule had reached such a
low that there was a run on the banks and people withdrew
deposits from post -office savings accounts and started hoarding[/INST] |
464 | India’s Struggle For Independence
gold, silver and coins. This was particularly marked in East U.P.
and Bihar, but it also took place in Madras Presidency.
So convinced was Gandhiji that the time was now ripe for
struggle that he said to Louis Fischer in an interview in the
beginning of June: ‘ I have become impatient. . . I may not be able
to convince the Congress I will go ahead nevertheless and
address myself directly to the people.’ He did not h ave to carry
out this threat and, as before, the Congress accepted the
Mahatma’s expert advice on the timing of a mass struggle.
Though Gandhiji himself had begun to talk of the coming
struggle for some time now, it was at the Working Committee
meeting at Wardha on 14 July, 1942 that the Congress first
accepted the idea of a struggle. The All -India Congress Committee
was then to meet in Bombay in August to ratify this decision.
The historic August meeting at Gowalia Tank in Bombay was
unprecedented in the popular enthusiasm it generated. Huge
crowds waited outside as the leaders deliberated on the issue.
And the feeling of anticipation and expectation ran so high that
in the open session, when the leaders made their speeches before
the many thousands who h ad collected to hear them, there was
pin-drop silence.
Gandhiji’s speech’s delivered in his usual quiet and
unrhetorical style, recount many who were in the audience, had
the most electrifying impact. He first made it clear that ‘the
actual struggle does not commence this moment. You have only
placed all your powers in my hands. I will now wait upon the
Viceroy a’ plead with him for the acceptance of the Congress
demand. That process is likely to take two or three weeks.’ But,
he added: ‘you may take it from me that I am not going to strike a
bargain with the Viceroy for ministries and the like. I am not
going to be satisfied with anything short of complete freedom.
Maybe, he will propose the abolition of salt tax, the drink evil , | <s>[INST]464 | India’s Struggle For Independence
gold, silver and coins. This was particularly marked in East U.P.
and Bihar, but it also took place in Madras Presidency.
So convinced was Gandhiji that the time was now ripe for
struggle that he said to Louis Fischer in an interview in the
beginning of June: ‘ I have become impatient. . . I may not be able
to convince the Congress I will go ahead nevertheless and
address myself directly to the people.’ He did not h ave to carry
out this threat and, as before, the Congress accepted the
Mahatma’s expert advice on the timing of a mass struggle.
Though Gandhiji himself had begun to talk of the coming
struggle for some time now, it was at the Working Committee
meeting at Wardha on 14 July, 1942 that the Congress first
accepted the idea of a struggle. The All -India Congress Committee
was then to meet in Bombay in August to ratify this decision.
The historic August meeting at Gowalia Tank in Bombay was
unprecedented in the popular enthusiasm it generated. Huge
crowds waited outside as the leaders deliberated on the issue.
And the feeling of anticipation and expectation ran so high that
in the open session, when the leaders made their speeches before
the many thousands who h ad collected to hear them, there was
pin-drop silence.
Gandhiji’s speech’s delivered in his usual quiet and
unrhetorical style, recount many who were in the audience, had
the most electrifying impact. He first made it clear that ‘the
actual struggle does not commence this moment. You have only
placed all your powers in my hands. I will now wait upon the
Viceroy a’ plead with him for the acceptance of the Congress
demand. That process is likely to take two or three weeks.’ But,
he added: ‘you may take it from me that I am not going to strike a
bargain with the Viceroy for ministries and the like. I am not
going to be satisfied with anything short of complete freedom.
Maybe, he will propose the abolition of salt tax, the drink evil ,[/INST] |
etc. But I will say: “Noth ing less than freedom.”’ He followed this
up with the now famous exhortation: ‘Do or Die.’ To quote: ‘Here
is a mant ra, a short one, that I give you. You may imprint it on
your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it.
The mantra is. “Do or Die” We shall either free India or die in the
attempt: we shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery.’ | <s>[INST]etc. But I will say: “Noth ing less than freedom.”’ He followed this
up with the now famous exhortation: ‘Do or Die.’ To quote: ‘Here
is a mant ra, a short one, that I give you. You may imprint it on
your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it.
The mantra is. “Do or Die” We shall either free India or die in the
attempt: we shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery.’[/INST] |
465 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
Gandhiji’s speech also contained specific instructions for
different sec tions of the peop1 e. Government servants would not
yet be asked to resign, but they should openl y declare their
allegiance to the Congress, soldiers were also not to leave their
posts, but they were to ‘refuse to fire on our own people . The
Princes were asked to ‘accept the sovereignty of your own people,
instead of pay ing homage to a foreign power.’ And the people of
the Princely States were asked to declare that they ‘(were) part of
the Indian nation and that they (would) accept the leadership of
the Princes, if the latter cast their lot with the People, but not
otherw ise.’ Students were to giv e up studies if th ey were sure
they could continue to remain firm independence was achieved .
On 7 August, Gandhiji had placed the instructions he had
drafted before the Waking Committee, and in th ese he h ad
proposed that peasants ‘who have the courage, and are prepared
to risk their all’ should refuse to pay the land revenue. Tenants
were told that ‘the Congress holds that the land belongs to those
who work on it and to no one else.’ Where the zamindari system
prevails . . . if the zamindar makes common cause with the ryot,
his portion of the revenue, which may be settled by mutual
agreement, should be given to him. But if a zamindar wants to
side with the Government, no tax should be paid to him.’ These
instructions were not actual ly issued because of the preventive
arrests, but they do make Gandhiji’s intentions clear.
The Government, however, was in no mood to either
negotiate with the Congress or wait for the movement to be
formally launched. In the early hours of 9 August, in a single
sweep, all the t op leaders of the congress were arrested and taken
to unknown destinations. The Government had been preparing
for the strike since the outbreak of the War itself, and since 1940
had been ready with an elaborate Revolutionary Movemen t | <s>[INST]465 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
Gandhiji’s speech also contained specific instructions for
different sec tions of the peop1 e. Government servants would not
yet be asked to resign, but they should openl y declare their
allegiance to the Congress, soldiers were also not to leave their
posts, but they were to ‘refuse to fire on our own people . The
Princes were asked to ‘accept the sovereignty of your own people,
instead of pay ing homage to a foreign power.’ And the people of
the Princely States were asked to declare that they ‘(were) part of
the Indian nation and that they (would) accept the leadership of
the Princes, if the latter cast their lot with the People, but not
otherw ise.’ Students were to giv e up studies if th ey were sure
they could continue to remain firm independence was achieved .
On 7 August, Gandhiji had placed the instructions he had
drafted before the Waking Committee, and in th ese he h ad
proposed that peasants ‘who have the courage, and are prepared
to risk their all’ should refuse to pay the land revenue. Tenants
were told that ‘the Congress holds that the land belongs to those
who work on it and to no one else.’ Where the zamindari system
prevails . . . if the zamindar makes common cause with the ryot,
his portion of the revenue, which may be settled by mutual
agreement, should be given to him. But if a zamindar wants to
side with the Government, no tax should be paid to him.’ These
instructions were not actual ly issued because of the preventive
arrests, but they do make Gandhiji’s intentions clear.
The Government, however, was in no mood to either
negotiate with the Congress or wait for the movement to be
formally launched. In the early hours of 9 August, in a single
sweep, all the t op leaders of the congress were arrested and taken
to unknown destinations. The Government had been preparing
for the strike since the outbreak of the War itself, and since 1940
had been ready with an elaborate Revolutionary Movemen t[/INST] |
had been ready with an elaborate Revolutionary Movemen t
Ordinance. On 8 August, 1940, the Viceroy, Linlithgow, in a
personal letter to the Governors made his intentions clear: ‘I feel
very strongly that the only possible answer to a ‘declaration of
war’ by any section of Congress in the present circumstances
must be a declared determination to crush the organization as a
while.’ For two years, Gandhiji had avoided walking into the trap
set for him by refusing to make a rash and premature strike and
had carefully built up the tempo through the Individual Civil
Disobedience Movement, organizational revamping and a
consistent propaganda campaign. But now, the Government was | <s>[INST]had been ready with an elaborate Revolutionary Movemen t
Ordinance. On 8 August, 1940, the Viceroy, Linlithgow, in a
personal letter to the Governors made his intentions clear: ‘I feel
very strongly that the only possible answer to a ‘declaration of
war’ by any section of Congress in the present circumstances
must be a declared determination to crush the organization as a
while.’ For two years, Gandhiji had avoided walking into the trap
set for him by refusing to make a rash and premature strike and
had carefully built up the tempo through the Individual Civil
Disobedience Movement, organizational revamping and a
consistent propaganda campaign. But now, the Government was[/INST] |
466 | India’s Struggle For Independence
unwilling to allow him any more time to pursue his strategy. In
anticipation of the A ICC’s passing the Quit India resolution,
instructions fo r arrests and suppression had gone out to the
provinces.
The sudden attack by the Government produce d an
instantaneous reaction among the people. In B ombay, as soon as
the news of arrests spread lakhs of people flocked to Gowalia
Tank where a mass meeting had been scheduled and there were
clashes with the authorities. There were similar disturbances on
9 August in Ahmedabad and Poona . On the 10th Delhi and many
towns in U.P. and Bihar, including Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi
and Patna followed suit with hartals, public demonstrations and
processions in defiance of the law. The Government responded by
gagging the press. The National Herald and Harijan ceased
publication for the entire duration of the struggle, others for
shorter periods.
Meanwhile, provincial and local level leaders who had
evaded arrest returned to their homes through devious routes
and set about organizing resistance . As the news spread further
in the rural areas, the villagers joined the townsmen in recording
their protest . For the first si x or seven weeks after 9 August,
there was a tremendous’ mass upsurge all over the country.
People devised a variety of ways of expressing their anger. In
some places, huge crowds attacked police stations, post offices,
kutcheries (courts ), railway station s and other symbols of
Government authority. National flags were forcibly hoisted on
public buildings in defi ance of the police. At other places, groups
of Satyagrahis offered arrest in tehsil or district headquarters.
Crowds of villagers, often numbering a few hundreds or even a
couple of thousand, physically removed railway tracks.
Elsewhere, small groups of individuals blew up bridges and
removed tracks, and cut telephone and telegraph wires. Students
went on strike in schools and colleges all over the c ountry and | <s>[INST]466 | India’s Struggle For Independence
unwilling to allow him any more time to pursue his strategy. In
anticipation of the A ICC’s passing the Quit India resolution,
instructions fo r arrests and suppression had gone out to the
provinces.
The sudden attack by the Government produce d an
instantaneous reaction among the people. In B ombay, as soon as
the news of arrests spread lakhs of people flocked to Gowalia
Tank where a mass meeting had been scheduled and there were
clashes with the authorities. There were similar disturbances on
9 August in Ahmedabad and Poona . On the 10th Delhi and many
towns in U.P. and Bihar, including Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi
and Patna followed suit with hartals, public demonstrations and
processions in defiance of the law. The Government responded by
gagging the press. The National Herald and Harijan ceased
publication for the entire duration of the struggle, others for
shorter periods.
Meanwhile, provincial and local level leaders who had
evaded arrest returned to their homes through devious routes
and set about organizing resistance . As the news spread further
in the rural areas, the villagers joined the townsmen in recording
their protest . For the first si x or seven weeks after 9 August,
there was a tremendous’ mass upsurge all over the country.
People devised a variety of ways of expressing their anger. In
some places, huge crowds attacked police stations, post offices,
kutcheries (courts ), railway station s and other symbols of
Government authority. National flags were forcibly hoisted on
public buildings in defi ance of the police. At other places, groups
of Satyagrahis offered arrest in tehsil or district headquarters.
Crowds of villagers, often numbering a few hundreds or even a
couple of thousand, physically removed railway tracks.
Elsewhere, small groups of individuals blew up bridges and
removed tracks, and cut telephone and telegraph wires. Students
went on strike in schools and colleges all over the c ountry and[/INST] |
busied themselves taking processions , writing and distributing
illegal news -sheets: hundreds of these patrikas’ came our all over
the country. They also became couriers for the emerging
underground networks’ Workers too stuck work: in Ahmedabad,
the mills were closed for three and a half months, workers in
Bombay stayed away from work for over a week following the 9
August arrests, in Jamshedpur there was a strike for thirteen | <s>[INST]busied themselves taking processions , writing and distributing
illegal news -sheets: hundreds of these patrikas’ came our all over
the country. They also became couriers for the emerging
underground networks’ Workers too stuck work: in Ahmedabad,
the mills were closed for three and a half months, workers in
Bombay stayed away from work for over a week following the 9
August arrests, in Jamshedpur there was a strike for thirteen[/INST] |
467 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
days and workers in Ahmed nagar and Poona were active for
several month s.
The reaction to the arrests was most intense in Bihar and
Eastern U P, where the movement attained the proportions of a
rebellion. From about the middle of August, the news reached the
rural areas through students and other political activists who
fanned out from the towns. Students of the Banaras Hindu
University decided to go to the villages to spread the message of
Quit India. They raised slogans of ‘Thana jalao’ (Burn police
station), ‘Station phoonk do’ (Burn the railw ay stations) ‘Angez
Bhag Gaya’ (Englishmen have fled). They hijacked trains and
draped them in national flags. In rural areas, the pattern was of
large crowds of peasants descending on the nearest tehsil or
district town and attacking all symbols of government authority.
There was gover nment fiññg and repression, but the rebellion
only gathered in momentum. For two weeks, Tirhut division in
Bihar was totally cut off from the rest of the country and no
Government authority existed. Control was lost over Patna for
two days after firing at the Secretariat. Eighty percent of the
police stations were captured or temporarily evacuated in ten
districts of North and Central Bihar. There were also physical
attacks on Europeans. At Fatwa, near Patna, two R.A.F. officers
were killed by a crowd at th e railway station and their bodies
paraded through the town. In Monghyr, the crews of two R.A.F.
planes that crashed at Pasraha on 18 August and Rulhar on 30
August were killed by villagers. Particularly important centres of
resistance in this phase were A zamgarh, Ballia and Gorakhpur in
East U.P. and Gaya, Bhagalpur, Saran, Purnea, Shahabad,
Muzaffarpur and Champaran in Bihar.
According to official estimates, in the first week after the
arrests of the leaders, 250 railway stations were damaged or
destroye d, and over 500 post offices and 150 police stations were | <s>[INST]467 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
days and workers in Ahmed nagar and Poona were active for
several month s.
The reaction to the arrests was most intense in Bihar and
Eastern U P, where the movement attained the proportions of a
rebellion. From about the middle of August, the news reached the
rural areas through students and other political activists who
fanned out from the towns. Students of the Banaras Hindu
University decided to go to the villages to spread the message of
Quit India. They raised slogans of ‘Thana jalao’ (Burn police
station), ‘Station phoonk do’ (Burn the railw ay stations) ‘Angez
Bhag Gaya’ (Englishmen have fled). They hijacked trains and
draped them in national flags. In rural areas, the pattern was of
large crowds of peasants descending on the nearest tehsil or
district town and attacking all symbols of government authority.
There was gover nment fiññg and repression, but the rebellion
only gathered in momentum. For two weeks, Tirhut division in
Bihar was totally cut off from the rest of the country and no
Government authority existed. Control was lost over Patna for
two days after firing at the Secretariat. Eighty percent of the
police stations were captured or temporarily evacuated in ten
districts of North and Central Bihar. There were also physical
attacks on Europeans. At Fatwa, near Patna, two R.A.F. officers
were killed by a crowd at th e railway station and their bodies
paraded through the town. In Monghyr, the crews of two R.A.F.
planes that crashed at Pasraha on 18 August and Rulhar on 30
August were killed by villagers. Particularly important centres of
resistance in this phase were A zamgarh, Ballia and Gorakhpur in
East U.P. and Gaya, Bhagalpur, Saran, Purnea, Shahabad,
Muzaffarpur and Champaran in Bihar.
According to official estimates, in the first week after the
arrests of the leaders, 250 railway stations were damaged or
destroye d, and over 500 post offices and 150 police stations were[/INST] |
attacked. The movement of trains in Bihar and Eastern U .P., was
disrupted for many weeks. In Karnataka alone, there were 1600
incidents of cutting of telegraph lines, and twenty - six railway
station s and thirty -two post offices were attacked. Unarmed
crowds faced police and military firing on 538 occasions and they
were also machine -gunned by low -flying aircraft. Repression also
took the form of taking hostages from the villages, imposing
collective fines running to a total of Rs 90 lakhs (which were often | <s>[INST]attacked. The movement of trains in Bihar and Eastern U .P., was
disrupted for many weeks. In Karnataka alone, there were 1600
incidents of cutting of telegraph lines, and twenty - six railway
station s and thirty -two post offices were attacked. Unarmed
crowds faced police and military firing on 538 occasions and they
were also machine -gunned by low -flying aircraft. Repression also
took the form of taking hostages from the villages, imposing
collective fines running to a total of Rs 90 lakhs (which were often[/INST] |
468 | India’s Struggle For Independence
realized on the spot by looting the people’s belongings), whipping
of suspects and burning of entire villages whose inhabitants had
run away and could not be caught. By the end of 1942, over
60,000 persons had been arrested. Twenty -six thousand people
were convicted and 18,000 detained under the Defence of India
Rules. Martial law had not been proclaimed, but the army,
though nominally working under the orders of the civilian
authorities, often did w hat it wanted to without any reference to
the direct officers. The repression was as severe as it could have
been under martial law.
The brutal and all-out repression succeeded within a period
of six or seven weeks in bringing about a cessation of the mas s
phase of the struggle. But in the meantime, underground
networks were being consolidated in with prominent members
such as Achyut Patwardhan,, Aruna Asaf Ali, Ram Mañ ohar
Lohia, Sucheta Kr ipalani, Chootubha i Puranik, Biju Patnaik, R.P.
Goenka and later, after his escape from jail, Jayaprakash
Narayan had lo begun to emerge. This leadership saw the role of
the underground movement as being that of k eeping up popular
morale by continuing to a line of command and a source of
guidan ce and lea dership to activi sts all over the country. They
also collected and distributed money as well as material like
bombs, arms, and dynamite to underground groups all over the
country. They, however, did see their role a s that of directing the
exact pattern of activities at the local level. Here, local groups
retained the initiative. Among the places in which local
underground organizations were active were Bombay, Poona,
Satara, Baroda and other parts of Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala,
Andhra, U P, Bihar and Delhi . Congress Sociali sts were generally
in the lead, but also active were Gandhian ashramites, Forward
Bloc members and revolutionary terrorists, as well as other
Congressmen.
Those actually involved in the underground activity may | <s>[INST]468 | India’s Struggle For Independence
realized on the spot by looting the people’s belongings), whipping
of suspects and burning of entire villages whose inhabitants had
run away and could not be caught. By the end of 1942, over
60,000 persons had been arrested. Twenty -six thousand people
were convicted and 18,000 detained under the Defence of India
Rules. Martial law had not been proclaimed, but the army,
though nominally working under the orders of the civilian
authorities, often did w hat it wanted to without any reference to
the direct officers. The repression was as severe as it could have
been under martial law.
The brutal and all-out repression succeeded within a period
of six or seven weeks in bringing about a cessation of the mas s
phase of the struggle. But in the meantime, underground
networks were being consolidated in with prominent members
such as Achyut Patwardhan,, Aruna Asaf Ali, Ram Mañ ohar
Lohia, Sucheta Kr ipalani, Chootubha i Puranik, Biju Patnaik, R.P.
Goenka and later, after his escape from jail, Jayaprakash
Narayan had lo begun to emerge. This leadership saw the role of
the underground movement as being that of k eeping up popular
morale by continuing to a line of command and a source of
guidan ce and lea dership to activi sts all over the country. They
also collected and distributed money as well as material like
bombs, arms, and dynamite to underground groups all over the
country. They, however, did see their role a s that of directing the
exact pattern of activities at the local level. Here, local groups
retained the initiative. Among the places in which local
underground organizations were active were Bombay, Poona,
Satara, Baroda and other parts of Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala,
Andhra, U P, Bihar and Delhi . Congress Sociali sts were generally
in the lead, but also active were Gandhian ashramites, Forward
Bloc members and revolutionary terrorists, as well as other
Congressmen.
Those actually involved in the underground activity may[/INST] |
Those actually involved in the underground activity may
have been few , but they received all manner of support from a
large variety of people. Businessmen donated gener ously. Sumati
Morarjee, who later became India’s leading woman industrialist,
for example, helped Achyut Patwardhan to evade detection by
providing, him with a different car every day borrowed from her
unsuspecting wealthy friends. Others provided hideouts for the
underground leaders and activists. Students acted as couriers. | <s>[INST]Those actually involved in the underground activity may
have been few , but they received all manner of support from a
large variety of people. Businessmen donated gener ously. Sumati
Morarjee, who later became India’s leading woman industrialist,
for example, helped Achyut Patwardhan to evade detection by
providing, him with a different car every day borrowed from her
unsuspecting wealthy friends. Others provided hideouts for the
underground leaders and activists. Students acted as couriers.[/INST] |
469 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
Simple villagers helped by refusing information to the police.
Pilots and train drivers delivered bombs and other ma terial
across the country. Government officials, including those in the
police, passed on crucial informa tion about impending arrests.
Achyut Patwardhan testifies that one member of the three -man
high level official committee formed to track down the Congr ess
underground regularly informed him of the goings on
that committee.
The pattern of activity of the underground movement was
generally that of organizing the disruption of communications by
blowing up b ridges, cutt ing tele graph and telephone wires and
derailing trains There were also a few attacks on government and
police officials and police informers. Their success in actually
disrupting communications may not have been more than that of
having nuisance value, but they did succeed in keeping up the
spirit of the people in a situation when open mass activity was
impossible because of the superior armed might of the state.
Dissemination of news was a very important part of the activity,
and considerable success was achieved on this score, the most
dramat ic being the Congress Radio operated clandestinely from
different locations in Bombay city, whose broadcast could be
heard a far as Madras. Ram Manohar Lohia regularly broadcast
on this radio, and the radio continued till November 1942 when it
was discover ed and confiscated by the police.
In February 1943, a striking new development provided a
new burst of political activity. Gandhiji commenced a fast on’ 10
February in jail. He declared the fast would last for twenty -one
days. This was his answer to die Government which had been
constantly exhorting him to condemn the violence of the people
in the Quit India Movement. Gandhiji not only refused to
condemn the people’s resort to violence but unequivocally held
the Government responsible for it. It was the ‘leonine violence’ of | <s>[INST]469 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
Simple villagers helped by refusing information to the police.
Pilots and train drivers delivered bombs and other ma terial
across the country. Government officials, including those in the
police, passed on crucial informa tion about impending arrests.
Achyut Patwardhan testifies that one member of the three -man
high level official committee formed to track down the Congr ess
underground regularly informed him of the goings on
that committee.
The pattern of activity of the underground movement was
generally that of organizing the disruption of communications by
blowing up b ridges, cutt ing tele graph and telephone wires and
derailing trains There were also a few attacks on government and
police officials and police informers. Their success in actually
disrupting communications may not have been more than that of
having nuisance value, but they did succeed in keeping up the
spirit of the people in a situation when open mass activity was
impossible because of the superior armed might of the state.
Dissemination of news was a very important part of the activity,
and considerable success was achieved on this score, the most
dramat ic being the Congress Radio operated clandestinely from
different locations in Bombay city, whose broadcast could be
heard a far as Madras. Ram Manohar Lohia regularly broadcast
on this radio, and the radio continued till November 1942 when it
was discover ed and confiscated by the police.
In February 1943, a striking new development provided a
new burst of political activity. Gandhiji commenced a fast on’ 10
February in jail. He declared the fast would last for twenty -one
days. This was his answer to die Government which had been
constantly exhorting him to condemn the violence of the people
in the Quit India Movement. Gandhiji not only refused to
condemn the people’s resort to violence but unequivocally held
the Government responsible for it. It was the ‘leonine violence’ of[/INST] |
the state which had provoked the people, he said. And it was
against this violence of the state, which included the
unwarranted detention of thousands of Congressmen that
Gandhiji vowed to register his protest, in the only way open to
him when in jail, by fasting.
The popular response to the news of the fast was immediate
and overwhelming.’ All over the country, there were hartals, | <s>[INST]the state which had provoked the people, he said. And it was
against this violence of the state, which included the
unwarranted detention of thousands of Congressmen that
Gandhiji vowed to register his protest, in the only way open to
him when in jail, by fasting.
The popular response to the news of the fast was immediate
and overwhelming.’ All over the country, there were hartals,[/INST] |
470 | India’s Struggle For Independence
demonstrations and strikes. Calcutta and Ahmedabad were
particularly active. Prisoners in jails and those o utside went on
sympathetic fasts. Groups of people secretly reached Poona t o
offer Satyagraha outside the A ga Khan Palace where Gandhiji
was being held in detention. Public meetings demanded his
release and the Government was bombarded with thousands of
letters and te legrams from people from all walks of life —
students and youth, men trade and commerce, lawyers, ordinary
citizens, and labour organizations. From across the seas, the
demand for his release was made by newspapers such as the
Manchester Guardi an, New Statesmen, Nation, News Chronicle,
Chicago Sun, as well as by the British Communist Party, the
citizens of London and Manchester, the Women’s International
League, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Ceylon
State Council. The U.S. Govern ment, too, brought pressure to
bear.
A Leaders’ Conference was held in Delhi on 19 -20 February
and was attended by prominent men, politicians and public
figures. They all demanded Gandhiji’s release. Many of those
otherwise unsympathetic to the Congress f elt that the
Government was going too far in its obduracy. The severest blow
to the prestige of the Government was the resignation of the three
Indian members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, M.S. Aney,
N.R. Sarkar and H.P. Mody, who had supported the G overnment
in its suppression of the 1942 movement, but were in no mood to
be a party to Gandhiji’s death.
But the Viceroy and his officials remained unmoved. Guided
by Winston Churchill’s statement to his Cabinet that ‘this our
hour of triumph everywhere in the world was not the time to
crawl before a miserable old man who had always been our
enemy,”° they arrogantly refused to show any concern for Indian
feeling. The Viceroy contemptuously dismissed the consequences
of Gandhiji’s possible death: ‘Six mont hs unpleasantness, | <s>[INST]470 | India’s Struggle For Independence
demonstrations and strikes. Calcutta and Ahmedabad were
particularly active. Prisoners in jails and those o utside went on
sympathetic fasts. Groups of people secretly reached Poona t o
offer Satyagraha outside the A ga Khan Palace where Gandhiji
was being held in detention. Public meetings demanded his
release and the Government was bombarded with thousands of
letters and te legrams from people from all walks of life —
students and youth, men trade and commerce, lawyers, ordinary
citizens, and labour organizations. From across the seas, the
demand for his release was made by newspapers such as the
Manchester Guardi an, New Statesmen, Nation, News Chronicle,
Chicago Sun, as well as by the British Communist Party, the
citizens of London and Manchester, the Women’s International
League, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Ceylon
State Council. The U.S. Govern ment, too, brought pressure to
bear.
A Leaders’ Conference was held in Delhi on 19 -20 February
and was attended by prominent men, politicians and public
figures. They all demanded Gandhiji’s release. Many of those
otherwise unsympathetic to the Congress f elt that the
Government was going too far in its obduracy. The severest blow
to the prestige of the Government was the resignation of the three
Indian members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, M.S. Aney,
N.R. Sarkar and H.P. Mody, who had supported the G overnment
in its suppression of the 1942 movement, but were in no mood to
be a party to Gandhiji’s death.
But the Viceroy and his officials remained unmoved. Guided
by Winston Churchill’s statement to his Cabinet that ‘this our
hour of triumph everywhere in the world was not the time to
crawl before a miserable old man who had always been our
enemy,”° they arrogantly refused to show any concern for Indian
feeling. The Viceroy contemptuously dismissed the consequences
of Gandhiji’s possible death: ‘Six mont hs unpleasantness,[/INST] |
of Gandhiji’s possible death: ‘Six mont hs unpleasantness,
steadily declining in volume, little or nothing at the end of it.’ He
even made it sound as if he welcomed the possibility: ‘India
would be far more reliable as a base for operations. Moreover, the
prospect of a settlement will be greatl y enhanced by the
disappearance of Gandhi, who had for years torpedoed every
attempt at a settlement.” | <s>[INST]of Gandhiji’s possible death: ‘Six mont hs unpleasantness,
steadily declining in volume, little or nothing at the end of it.’ He
even made it sound as if he welcomed the possibility: ‘India
would be far more reliable as a base for operations. Moreover, the
prospect of a settlement will be greatl y enhanced by the
disappearance of Gandhi, who had for years torpedoed every
attempt at a settlement.”[/INST] |
471 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
‘While an anxious nation appealed for his life, the
Government went ahead with finalizing arran gements for his
funeral. Military troops were asked to st and by for any
emergency. ‘Generous’ provision was made for a plane to carry
his ashes and for a public funeral and a half -day holiday in
offices.’ But Gandhiji, a s always, got the better of his opponents,
and refused to obl ige by dying.
The fast had done exact ly what it had been intended to do.
The public mo rale was raised, the anti -British feeling heightened,
and an opportunity for political activity provided. A symbolic
gesture of resistance had sparked off widespread resistance and
exposed the Governmen t’s high -handedness to the whole world.’
The moral justification that the Government had been trying to
provide for its b rutal suppression of 1942 was denied to it and it
was placed clearly in the wrong.
A significant feature of the Quit India Movement wa s the
emergence of what came to be known as parallel governments in
some parts of the country . The first one was proclaimed in Ba llia,
in East U P, in August 1942 under the leader ship of Chittu
Pande, who called himself a Gandhian . Though it succeeded in
getting the Collector to hand over power and release all the
arrested Congress leaders, it could not survive for long and when
the soldiers marched in, a week after the parallel government was
formed, they found that the leaders had fled.’
In Tamluk in the Midnapur district of Bengal, the Jatiya
Sarkar came into e xistence on 17 December, 1942 and lasted till
September 1944. Tamluk was an area where Gandhian
constructive work had made considerable headway and it was
also the scene of earlier mass struggles.
The Jatiya Sarkar undertook cyclone relief work, gave grants to
schools and organized an armed Vidyut Vahini . It also set up
arbitration courts and distributed the surplus paddy of the well - | <s>[INST]471 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
‘While an anxious nation appealed for his life, the
Government went ahead with finalizing arran gements for his
funeral. Military troops were asked to st and by for any
emergency. ‘Generous’ provision was made for a plane to carry
his ashes and for a public funeral and a half -day holiday in
offices.’ But Gandhiji, a s always, got the better of his opponents,
and refused to obl ige by dying.
The fast had done exact ly what it had been intended to do.
The public mo rale was raised, the anti -British feeling heightened,
and an opportunity for political activity provided. A symbolic
gesture of resistance had sparked off widespread resistance and
exposed the Governmen t’s high -handedness to the whole world.’
The moral justification that the Government had been trying to
provide for its b rutal suppression of 1942 was denied to it and it
was placed clearly in the wrong.
A significant feature of the Quit India Movement wa s the
emergence of what came to be known as parallel governments in
some parts of the country . The first one was proclaimed in Ba llia,
in East U P, in August 1942 under the leader ship of Chittu
Pande, who called himself a Gandhian . Though it succeeded in
getting the Collector to hand over power and release all the
arrested Congress leaders, it could not survive for long and when
the soldiers marched in, a week after the parallel government was
formed, they found that the leaders had fled.’
In Tamluk in the Midnapur district of Bengal, the Jatiya
Sarkar came into e xistence on 17 December, 1942 and lasted till
September 1944. Tamluk was an area where Gandhian
constructive work had made considerable headway and it was
also the scene of earlier mass struggles.
The Jatiya Sarkar undertook cyclone relief work, gave grants to
schools and organized an armed Vidyut Vahini . It also set up
arbitration courts and distributed the surplus paddy of the well -[/INST] |
to-do to the poor. Being located in a relatively remote area, it
could continue its a ctivities with comparative ease.
Satara, in Maharashtra, emerged as the base of the longest -
lasting and effective p arallel government. From the very | <s>[INST]to-do to the poor. Being located in a relatively remote area, it
could continue its a ctivities with comparative ease.
Satara, in Maharashtra, emerged as the base of the longest -
lasting and effective p arallel government. From the very[/INST] |
472 | India’s Struggle For Independence
beginning of the Quit India Movement, the region played an
active role. In the first ph ase from August 1942, there were
marches on local government headquarters the ones on Karad,
Tasgaon and Islampur involving thousands. This was followed by
sabotage, attacks on post offices, the looting of banks and the
cutting of telegraph wires. Y.B. Cha van, had c ontacts with
Achyut Patwardhan and other underg round leaders, was the
most important leader. But by the end of 1942, this phase came
to an end with the arrest of about two thousand people. From the
very beginning of 1943, the underground activist s began to
regroup, and by the middle of the year, succeeded in
consolidating the organization. A parallel government or Prati
Sarkar was set up and Nani Patil was its most important leader.
This phase was marked by attacks on Government collaborators,
informers and talatis or lower -level officials and Robin Hood -style
robberies. Nyayadan Mandals or people’s courts were set up and
justice dispensed. Prohibition was enforced, and ‘Gandhi
marriages’ celebrated to which untouchables were invited and at
which n o ostentation was allowed. Village libraries were set up
and education encouraged. The native state of Aundh, whose
ruler was pro -nationalist and had got the constitution of his state
drafted by Gandhiji, provided invaluable support by offering
refuge and shelter to the Prati Sarkar activists. The Prati Sarkar
continued to function till 1945.’
The Quit India Movement marked a new high in terms of
popular part icipation in the national move ment and sympathy
with the national cause in earlier mass struggles, the youth were
in the forefront of the struggle. Students from colleges and even
schools were the most visible element, espe ecia1ly in the early
days of August (probably the average age
of participants in the 1942 struggle was even lower than that in
earlier movements). Women especia lly coll ege an school girls, | <s>[INST]472 | India’s Struggle For Independence
beginning of the Quit India Movement, the region played an
active role. In the first ph ase from August 1942, there were
marches on local government headquarters the ones on Karad,
Tasgaon and Islampur involving thousands. This was followed by
sabotage, attacks on post offices, the looting of banks and the
cutting of telegraph wires. Y.B. Cha van, had c ontacts with
Achyut Patwardhan and other underg round leaders, was the
most important leader. But by the end of 1942, this phase came
to an end with the arrest of about two thousand people. From the
very beginning of 1943, the underground activist s began to
regroup, and by the middle of the year, succeeded in
consolidating the organization. A parallel government or Prati
Sarkar was set up and Nani Patil was its most important leader.
This phase was marked by attacks on Government collaborators,
informers and talatis or lower -level officials and Robin Hood -style
robberies. Nyayadan Mandals or people’s courts were set up and
justice dispensed. Prohibition was enforced, and ‘Gandhi
marriages’ celebrated to which untouchables were invited and at
which n o ostentation was allowed. Village libraries were set up
and education encouraged. The native state of Aundh, whose
ruler was pro -nationalist and had got the constitution of his state
drafted by Gandhiji, provided invaluable support by offering
refuge and shelter to the Prati Sarkar activists. The Prati Sarkar
continued to function till 1945.’
The Quit India Movement marked a new high in terms of
popular part icipation in the national move ment and sympathy
with the national cause in earlier mass struggles, the youth were
in the forefront of the struggle. Students from colleges and even
schools were the most visible element, espe ecia1ly in the early
days of August (probably the average age
of participants in the 1942 struggle was even lower than that in
earlier movements). Women especia lly coll ege an school girls,[/INST] |
played a very important role. Aruna Asaf A li and Sucheta
Kripalani were two major women organizers of the underground,
and Usha Mehta an important member of the small group that
ran the Congress Rad io. Workers were pr ominent as well, and
made considerable sacrifice by enduring long strikes and braving
police repression in the streets.
Peasants of all strata, well -to-do as well as poor, were the
heart of the movement especially in East U.P. and Bihar , | <s>[INST]played a very important role. Aruna Asaf A li and Sucheta
Kripalani were two major women organizers of the underground,
and Usha Mehta an important member of the small group that
ran the Congress Rad io. Workers were pr ominent as well, and
made considerable sacrifice by enduring long strikes and braving
police repression in the streets.
Peasants of all strata, well -to-do as well as poor, were the
heart of the movement especially in East U.P. and Bihar ,[/INST] |
473 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
Midnapur in Bengal, Satara in Maharashtra, but also in other
parts including Andhra, Gujarat and ‘ Kerala. Many small
zamindars also participated especially in U.P. and Bihar. Even
the big zamindars maintained a stance of neutrality and to assist
the British in crushing the rebellion. The most spectacular was
the Raja of Darbhanga , one of the biggest zamindars , who
refused to let his armed retainers to be used by the Government
and even instructed his managers to assist the tenants who had
been arrested. A significan t feature of the pattern of peasant
activity was its total concentration on attacking symbols of
British authority and a total lack of any incidents of anti -
zamindar violence, even when, as in Bihar, East U P. Satara, and
Midnapur, t he breakdow n of Government authority for long
periods of time provided the opportunity.bb Government officials,
especially those at the lower levels of the police and the
administration, were generous in their assistance to the
movement. They gave shelter, provided i nformation and helped
monetarily. In fact, the erosion of loyalty to the British
Government of its own officers was one of the most striking
aspects of Quit India struggle. Jail officials tended to be much
kinder to prisoners than n earlier years, and often openly
expressed their sympathy.
While it is true that Muslim mass participation in the Quit
India movement was not high, yet it is also true that even Muslim
League supporters not act as informers. Also, there was a total
absence of any communal clashe s, a sure sign that though the
movement may not have aroused much support from among the
majority of the Muslim masses, it did not arouse their hostility
either.
The powerful attraction of the Quit India Movement and its
elemental quality is also demonstr ated by the fact that hundre ds
of Communists at the local and village levels participated in the
movement despite the official po sition taken by the Communist | <s>[INST]473 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
Midnapur in Bengal, Satara in Maharashtra, but also in other
parts including Andhra, Gujarat and ‘ Kerala. Many small
zamindars also participated especially in U.P. and Bihar. Even
the big zamindars maintained a stance of neutrality and to assist
the British in crushing the rebellion. The most spectacular was
the Raja of Darbhanga , one of the biggest zamindars , who
refused to let his armed retainers to be used by the Government
and even instructed his managers to assist the tenants who had
been arrested. A significan t feature of the pattern of peasant
activity was its total concentration on attacking symbols of
British authority and a total lack of any incidents of anti -
zamindar violence, even when, as in Bihar, East U P. Satara, and
Midnapur, t he breakdow n of Government authority for long
periods of time provided the opportunity.bb Government officials,
especially those at the lower levels of the police and the
administration, were generous in their assistance to the
movement. They gave shelter, provided i nformation and helped
monetarily. In fact, the erosion of loyalty to the British
Government of its own officers was one of the most striking
aspects of Quit India struggle. Jail officials tended to be much
kinder to prisoners than n earlier years, and often openly
expressed their sympathy.
While it is true that Muslim mass participation in the Quit
India movement was not high, yet it is also true that even Muslim
League supporters not act as informers. Also, there was a total
absence of any communal clashe s, a sure sign that though the
movement may not have aroused much support from among the
majority of the Muslim masses, it did not arouse their hostility
either.
The powerful attraction of the Quit India Movement and its
elemental quality is also demonstr ated by the fact that hundre ds
of Communists at the local and village levels participated in the
movement despite the official po sition taken by the Communist[/INST] |
movement despite the official po sition taken by the Communist
Party . Though they sympathized wi th the strong anti -fascist
sentiments of their leaders, yet they felt the irresistible pull of the
movement and, for at least a few days or weeks, joined in it along
with the rest of the Indian people.
The debate on the Quit India Movement has cantered
particularly on two issues. First, was the movement a | <s>[INST]movement despite the official po sition taken by the Communist
Party . Though they sympathized wi th the strong anti -fascist
sentiments of their leaders, yet they felt the irresistible pull of the
movement and, for at least a few days or weeks, joined in it along
with the rest of the Indian people.
The debate on the Quit India Movement has cantered
particularly on two issues. First, was the movement a[/INST] |
474 | India’s Struggle For Independence
spontaneous outburst, or an org anized rebellion . Second, how
did the use of violence by the people in this struggle square with
the overall Congress policy of no n-violent struggle?
First, the element of spontaneity o f 1942 was certainly
larger than in the earlier move ments, though even in 1919 -22, as
well as in 1930 -31 and 1932, the Congress l eadership allowed
considerable room for an initiative and spontaneity. In fact, the
whole pattern of the Gandhian mass movements was that the
leadership chalked out a broad progra mme of action and left its
implementation at the local level to the initiative of the local and
grass roots level political activists and the masse . Even in the
Civil Disobedi ence Move ment of 1930, perhaps the most
organized of the Gandhian mass movements, Gandhiji signalled
the launching of the struggle by the Dandi March and the
breaking of the salt law, the leaders and the people at the local
levels decided whether they were going to stop payment of land
revenue and rent, or offer Satyagrah i against forest Laws, or
picket liquor shops, or follow any of the other ite ms of the
programme. Of course, in 1942, even the broad programme had
not yet been spelt out clearly since the leadership was yet to
formally launch the movement. But, in a way, the degree of
spontaneity and popular initiative that was actually exercised
had sanctioned by the leadership itself. The resolution passed by
the AICC on 8 August 1942 clearly stated: ‘A time may come
when it may not be possible to issue instruction or for
instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress
committees can function. When this happens, every man and
woman who is participating in this movement must function for
himself or herself within the four corners of the general
instructions issued. Every Indian wh o desires freedom and
strives for it must be his own guide.”
Apart from this, the Congress had been ideologically, | <s>[INST]474 | India’s Struggle For Independence
spontaneous outburst, or an org anized rebellion . Second, how
did the use of violence by the people in this struggle square with
the overall Congress policy of no n-violent struggle?
First, the element of spontaneity o f 1942 was certainly
larger than in the earlier move ments, though even in 1919 -22, as
well as in 1930 -31 and 1932, the Congress l eadership allowed
considerable room for an initiative and spontaneity. In fact, the
whole pattern of the Gandhian mass movements was that the
leadership chalked out a broad progra mme of action and left its
implementation at the local level to the initiative of the local and
grass roots level political activists and the masse . Even in the
Civil Disobedi ence Move ment of 1930, perhaps the most
organized of the Gandhian mass movements, Gandhiji signalled
the launching of the struggle by the Dandi March and the
breaking of the salt law, the leaders and the people at the local
levels decided whether they were going to stop payment of land
revenue and rent, or offer Satyagrah i against forest Laws, or
picket liquor shops, or follow any of the other ite ms of the
programme. Of course, in 1942, even the broad programme had
not yet been spelt out clearly since the leadership was yet to
formally launch the movement. But, in a way, the degree of
spontaneity and popular initiative that was actually exercised
had sanctioned by the leadership itself. The resolution passed by
the AICC on 8 August 1942 clearly stated: ‘A time may come
when it may not be possible to issue instruction or for
instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress
committees can function. When this happens, every man and
woman who is participating in this movement must function for
himself or herself within the four corners of the general
instructions issued. Every Indian wh o desires freedom and
strives for it must be his own guide.”
Apart from this, the Congress had been ideologically,[/INST] |
Apart from this, the Congress had been ideologically,
politically and organizationally preparing for the struggle for a
long time. From 1937 the onwards, the o rganization had been
revamped to un do the damage suffered during the repression of
1932 -34. In political and ideological terms as well, the Ministries
had added considerably to Congress support and prestige. In
East U.P. and B ihar, the areas of the most intense activity in
1942 were precise ly the ones in which considerable mobilization
and organizational work had been carried out from 1937 | <s>[INST]Apart from this, the Congress had been ideologically,
politically and organizationally preparing for the struggle for a
long time. From 1937 the onwards, the o rganization had been
revamped to un do the damage suffered during the repression of
1932 -34. In political and ideological terms as well, the Ministries
had added considerably to Congress support and prestige. In
East U.P. and B ihar, the areas of the most intense activity in
1942 were precise ly the ones in which considerable mobilization
and organizational work had been carried out from 1937[/INST] |
475 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
onwards.’ In Gujarat, Sardar Patel had been tourin g Bardoli and
other areas since June 1942 warnin g the people of an impend ing
struggle and suggesting that no- revenue campaigns could well
be part of it. Congress Socialists in Poona had been holding
training camps for volunteers since June 1942) Gandhiji himself,
through the Individual Civil Disobedience campaign in 1940-41,
and more directly since early 19 42, had prepared the people for
the coming battle,, which he said would be ‘short and swift.’
In any case , in a primarily hegemonic struggle as the Indian
national movement was, pr epare dness for struggle cannot be
measured b y the volume of immediate organi zational activity but
by the degre e of hegemonic influence the movement bas acquired
over the people .
How did the use of violence in 1942 square with the
Congress policy of non-violence . For one, there were many who
refused to use or sanction violent mean s and confined themselves
to the traditional weaponry of the Congress. But many of those,
including many staunch Gandhians, who used ‘violent means’ in
1942 felt that the peculiar circumstances warranted their use.
Many maintained that the cutting of teleg raph wires and the
blowing up of bridges was all right as long as human life was not
taken. Others frankly admitted that they could not square the
violence they used, or connived at with their belief in non -
violence, but that they did it all the same. Gand hiji refused to
condemn the violence of the people because he saw it as a
reaction to the much bigger violence of the state . In Francis
Hutchins’ view, Gandhiji’s major objection to violence was that its
use prevented mass participation in a movement, but that, in
1942, Gandhiji had come round to the view that mass
participa tion would not be restri cted as a resul t of violence.
The great significance of this historic movement was that it
placed the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of | <s>[INST]475 | The Quit India Movement and the INA
onwards.’ In Gujarat, Sardar Patel had been tourin g Bardoli and
other areas since June 1942 warnin g the people of an impend ing
struggle and suggesting that no- revenue campaigns could well
be part of it. Congress Socialists in Poona had been holding
training camps for volunteers since June 1942) Gandhiji himself,
through the Individual Civil Disobedience campaign in 1940-41,
and more directly since early 19 42, had prepared the people for
the coming battle,, which he said would be ‘short and swift.’
In any case , in a primarily hegemonic struggle as the Indian
national movement was, pr epare dness for struggle cannot be
measured b y the volume of immediate organi zational activity but
by the degre e of hegemonic influence the movement bas acquired
over the people .
How did the use of violence in 1942 square with the
Congress policy of non-violence . For one, there were many who
refused to use or sanction violent mean s and confined themselves
to the traditional weaponry of the Congress. But many of those,
including many staunch Gandhians, who used ‘violent means’ in
1942 felt that the peculiar circumstances warranted their use.
Many maintained that the cutting of teleg raph wires and the
blowing up of bridges was all right as long as human life was not
taken. Others frankly admitted that they could not square the
violence they used, or connived at with their belief in non -
violence, but that they did it all the same. Gand hiji refused to
condemn the violence of the people because he saw it as a
reaction to the much bigger violence of the state . In Francis
Hutchins’ view, Gandhiji’s major objection to violence was that its
use prevented mass participation in a movement, but that, in
1942, Gandhiji had come round to the view that mass
participa tion would not be restri cted as a resul t of violence.
The great significance of this historic movement was that it
placed the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of[/INST] |
placed the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of
the natio nal movement. A fter Quit India there cou1d be no
retreat. Any future negotiations with the British Government
could only be on the manner of the transfer of power.
Independence was no longer a matter of bargain. And this
became amply clear after the War. | <s>[INST]placed the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of
the natio nal movement. A fter Quit India there cou1d be no
retreat. Any future negotiations with the British Government
could only be on the manner of the transfer of power.
Independence was no longer a matter of bargain. And this
became amply clear after the War.[/INST] |
476 | India’s Struggle For Independence
With Gand hiji’s release on 6 May 1944, on medical grounds,
political activity regained momentum. Constructive work became
the main form of Congress activity, with a spec ial emphasis on
the reorganization of the Congress m achine ry. Congress
committees were revived under different names — Congress
Workers Assemblies or Representative Assemblies of
Congressmen — rendering the ban on Congress committees
ineffective. The task of training workers, membership drives and
fund collection was taken up. This reorganiz ation of the Co ngress
under the ‘cover’ of the constructive programme was viewed with
serious misgivings by the G overnment which saw it as an attempt
to rebuild Congress influence and organization in the villages in
preparation for the next round of strugg le? A strict watch was
kept on these developments, but no repressive action was
contemplated and the Viceroy’s energies were directed towards
formulating an offer (known as the Wavell Offer or the Simla
Conference) which would pre -empt a struggle by effect ing an
agreement with the Congres s before the War with Japan ended.
The Congress leaders were released to participate in the Simla
Conference in June 1945. That marked w end of the phase of
confrontation that had existed since August 1942.
Before we end t his chapter, a brief look at the Indian
National Army is essential. The idea of the INA was first
conceived in Malaya by Mohan Singh, an Indian officer of the
British Indian Army, when he decided not to join the retreating
British army and instead went to the Japanese for help. The
Japanese had till then only encouraged civilian Indians to form
anti-British organizations, but had no conception of forming a
military wing consisting of Indians.
Indian prisoners of war were handed over by the Japanese
to Moha n Singh who then tried to recruit them into an Indian
National Army. The fall of Singapore was crucial, for this brought | <s>[INST]476 | India’s Struggle For Independence
With Gand hiji’s release on 6 May 1944, on medical grounds,
political activity regained momentum. Constructive work became
the main form of Congress activity, with a spec ial emphasis on
the reorganization of the Congress m achine ry. Congress
committees were revived under different names — Congress
Workers Assemblies or Representative Assemblies of
Congressmen — rendering the ban on Congress committees
ineffective. The task of training workers, membership drives and
fund collection was taken up. This reorganiz ation of the Co ngress
under the ‘cover’ of the constructive programme was viewed with
serious misgivings by the G overnment which saw it as an attempt
to rebuild Congress influence and organization in the villages in
preparation for the next round of strugg le? A strict watch was
kept on these developments, but no repressive action was
contemplated and the Viceroy’s energies were directed towards
formulating an offer (known as the Wavell Offer or the Simla
Conference) which would pre -empt a struggle by effect ing an
agreement with the Congres s before the War with Japan ended.
The Congress leaders were released to participate in the Simla
Conference in June 1945. That marked w end of the phase of
confrontation that had existed since August 1942.
Before we end t his chapter, a brief look at the Indian
National Army is essential. The idea of the INA was first
conceived in Malaya by Mohan Singh, an Indian officer of the
British Indian Army, when he decided not to join the retreating
British army and instead went to the Japanese for help. The
Japanese had till then only encouraged civilian Indians to form
anti-British organizations, but had no conception of forming a
military wing consisting of Indians.
Indian prisoners of war were handed over by the Japanese
to Moha n Singh who then tried to recruit them into an Indian
National Army. The fall of Singapore was crucial, for this brought[/INST] |