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372 | India’s Struggle For Independence
received tremendous support. With this new confidence, they
began to take a bold stand against the Nizam’s moves.
The decision to launch the final struggle was taken by the
leaders of the State Congress in consultation with the national
leaders in Delhi. As recorded by Swami Ramanand Tirtha in his
Memoirs of Hyderabad Freedom Struggle: ‘That (the) final phase of
the freedom struggle in Hyderabad would have to be a clash of
arms with the Indian Union, was what we were more than ever
convinced of. It would have to be preceded by a Satyagraha
movement on a mass scale’.
After the preliminary tas ks of setting up the Committee of
Action under the Chairmanship of D.G. Bindu (which would
operate from outside the State to avoid arrest), the establishment
of offices in Sholapur, Vijayawada, Gadag and a central office at
Bombay, mobilization ‘f funds in which Jayaprakash Narayan
played a critical role, the struggle was formally launched on 7
August which was to be celebrated as ‘Join Indian Union Day’.
The response was terrific, and meetings to defy the bans were
held in towns and villages all over the S tate. Workers and
students went on strike, including 12,000 Hyderabadi workers in
Bombay . Beatings and arrests were comm on. On 13 August, the
Nizam banned the ceremonial hoisting of the national flag.
Swamiji gave the call: ‘This order is a challenge to th e people of
Hyderabad and I hope they will accept it’. Swamiji and his
colleagues were arrested in the early hours of 15 August, 1947,
soon after the dawn of Indian Independence. But, despite tight
security arrangements, 100 students rushed out of the
Hyde rabad Students’ union office and hoisted the flag in Sultan
Bazaar as scheduled. in subsequent days, the hoisting of the
Indian national flag became the major form of defiance and
ingenious methods were evolved. Trains decorated with national
flags would s team into Hyderabad territory from neighbouring | <s>[INST]372 | India’s Struggle For Independence
received tremendous support. With this new confidence, they
began to take a bold stand against the Nizam’s moves.
The decision to launch the final struggle was taken by the
leaders of the State Congress in consultation with the national
leaders in Delhi. As recorded by Swami Ramanand Tirtha in his
Memoirs of Hyderabad Freedom Struggle: ‘That (the) final phase of
the freedom struggle in Hyderabad would have to be a clash of
arms with the Indian Union, was what we were more than ever
convinced of. It would have to be preceded by a Satyagraha
movement on a mass scale’.
After the preliminary tas ks of setting up the Committee of
Action under the Chairmanship of D.G. Bindu (which would
operate from outside the State to avoid arrest), the establishment
of offices in Sholapur, Vijayawada, Gadag and a central office at
Bombay, mobilization ‘f funds in which Jayaprakash Narayan
played a critical role, the struggle was formally launched on 7
August which was to be celebrated as ‘Join Indian Union Day’.
The response was terrific, and meetings to defy the bans were
held in towns and villages all over the S tate. Workers and
students went on strike, including 12,000 Hyderabadi workers in
Bombay . Beatings and arrests were comm on. On 13 August, the
Nizam banned the ceremonial hoisting of the national flag.
Swamiji gave the call: ‘This order is a challenge to th e people of
Hyderabad and I hope they will accept it’. Swamiji and his
colleagues were arrested in the early hours of 15 August, 1947,
soon after the dawn of Indian Independence. But, despite tight
security arrangements, 100 students rushed out of the
Hyde rabad Students’ union office and hoisted the flag in Sultan
Bazaar as scheduled. in subsequent days, the hoisting of the
Indian national flag became the major form of defiance and
ingenious methods were evolved. Trains decorated with national
flags would s team into Hyderabad territory from neighbouring[/INST] |
flags would s team into Hyderabad territory from neighbouring
Indian territory. Students continued to play a leading role in the
movement, and were soon joined by women in large numbers,
prominent among them being Brij Rani and Yashoda Ben.
As the movement gathered for ce and gained momentum, the
Nizam and his dministration cracked down on it. But the most
ominous development was the encouragement given to the storm
troopers of the Ittihad ul Muslimin, the Razakars, by the State to | <s>[INST]flags would s team into Hyderabad territory from neighbouring
Indian territory. Students continued to play a leading role in the
movement, and were soon joined by women in large numbers,
prominent among them being Brij Rani and Yashoda Ben.
As the movement gathered for ce and gained momentum, the
Nizam and his dministration cracked down on it. But the most
ominous development was the encouragement given to the storm
troopers of the Ittihad ul Muslimin, the Razakars, by the State to[/INST] |
373 | The Freedom Struggle in Princely India
act as a paramilitary force to attack t he peoples’ struggle.
Razakars were issued arms and let loose on protesting crowds;
they set up camps near rebellious villages and carried out armed
raids.
On 29 November 1947, the Nizam signed a Standstill
Agreement with the Indian Government, but simult aneously the
repression was intensified, and the Razakar menace became even
more acute. Many thousands of people who could afford to do so
fled the State and were housed in camps in neighbouring Indian
territory. The people increasingly took to self -defenc e and
protected themselves with whatever was available. In organizing
the defence against the Razakars and attacks on Razakar camps,
the Communists played a very important role, especially in the
areas of Nalgonda, Warangal and Khammam that were their
strongholds. Peasants were organized into dalams, given training
in arms, and mobilized for the anti -Nizam struggle. In these
areas, the movement also took an anti -landlord stance and many
cruel landlords were attacked, some even killed, and illegally
occupied land was returned to the original owners. Virtually all
the big landlords had run away, and their land was distributed to
and cultivated by those with small holdings or no land.
The State Congress, too, organized armed resistance from
camps on the State’ s borders. Raids were made on customs’
outposts, police Stations and Razaicar camps. Outside the
Communist strongh%olds in the Telengana areas, it was the
State Congress that was the main vehicle for organizing popular
resistance. Over 20,000 Satyagrahis were in jail and many more
were participating in the movement outside.
By September 1948, it became clear that all negotiations to
make the Nizam accede to the Union had failed. On 13
September, 1948, the Indian Army moved in and on 18
September the Nizam surrendered. The process of the integration
of the Indian Union was finally complete. The people welcomed | <s>[INST]373 | The Freedom Struggle in Princely India
act as a paramilitary force to attack t he peoples’ struggle.
Razakars were issued arms and let loose on protesting crowds;
they set up camps near rebellious villages and carried out armed
raids.
On 29 November 1947, the Nizam signed a Standstill
Agreement with the Indian Government, but simult aneously the
repression was intensified, and the Razakar menace became even
more acute. Many thousands of people who could afford to do so
fled the State and were housed in camps in neighbouring Indian
territory. The people increasingly took to self -defenc e and
protected themselves with whatever was available. In organizing
the defence against the Razakars and attacks on Razakar camps,
the Communists played a very important role, especially in the
areas of Nalgonda, Warangal and Khammam that were their
strongholds. Peasants were organized into dalams, given training
in arms, and mobilized for the anti -Nizam struggle. In these
areas, the movement also took an anti -landlord stance and many
cruel landlords were attacked, some even killed, and illegally
occupied land was returned to the original owners. Virtually all
the big landlords had run away, and their land was distributed to
and cultivated by those with small holdings or no land.
The State Congress, too, organized armed resistance from
camps on the State’ s borders. Raids were made on customs’
outposts, police Stations and Razaicar camps. Outside the
Communist strongh%olds in the Telengana areas, it was the
State Congress that was the main vehicle for organizing popular
resistance. Over 20,000 Satyagrahis were in jail and many more
were participating in the movement outside.
By September 1948, it became clear that all negotiations to
make the Nizam accede to the Union had failed. On 13
September, 1948, the Indian Army moved in and on 18
September the Nizam surrendered. The process of the integration
of the Indian Union was finally complete. The people welcomed[/INST] |
of the Indian Union was finally complete. The people welcomed
the Indian Army as an army of liberation, an army that ended the
oppression of the Nizam and the Razakar s. Scenes of jubilation
were evident all over, and the national flag was hoisted. The
celebration was, however, marred by the decision of the
Communists to refuse to lay down arms and continue the | <s>[INST]of the Indian Union was finally complete. The people welcomed
the Indian Army as an army of liberation, an army that ended the
oppression of the Nizam and the Razakar s. Scenes of jubilation
were evident all over, and the national flag was hoisted. The
celebration was, however, marred by the decision of the
Communists to refuse to lay down arms and continue the[/INST] |
374 | India’s Struggle For Independence
struggle against the Indian Union, but that is another long story
that falls outside the scope of our pre sent concerns.
*
The cases of Hyderabad, and that of Rajkot, are good
examples of how methods of struggle evolved to suit the
conditions in British India, such as non -violent mass civil
disobedience or Satyagraha, did not have the same viability or
effect iveness in the India States. The lack of civil liberties, and of
representative institutions, meant that the political space for
hegemonic politics was very small, even when compared to the
conditions prevailing under the semi -hegemonic and semi -
repressive colonial state in British India. The ultimate protection
provided by the British enabled the rulers of the States to
withstand popular pressure to a considerable degree, as
happened in Rajkot. As a result, there was a much greater
tendency in these States for the movements to resort to violent
methods of agitation — this happened not only in Hyderabad, but
also in Travancore, Patiala, and the Orissa States among others.
In Hyderabad, for example, even the State Congress ultimately
resorted to violent metho ds of attack, and, in the final count, the
Nizam could only be brought into line by the Indian Army.
This also meant that those such as the Communists and
other Left groups, who had less hesitation than the Congress in
resorting to violent forms of strugg le, were placed in a more
favourable situation in these States and were able to grow as a
political force in these areas. Here, too, the examples of
Hyderabad, Travancore, Patiala and the Orissa States were quite
striking.
The differences between the poli tical conditions in the
States and British India also go a long way in explaining the
hesitation of the Congress to merge the movements in the States
with those in British India. The movement in British India
adopted forms of struggle and a strategy that was specifically | <s>[INST]374 | India’s Struggle For Independence
struggle against the Indian Union, but that is another long story
that falls outside the scope of our pre sent concerns.
*
The cases of Hyderabad, and that of Rajkot, are good
examples of how methods of struggle evolved to suit the
conditions in British India, such as non -violent mass civil
disobedience or Satyagraha, did not have the same viability or
effect iveness in the India States. The lack of civil liberties, and of
representative institutions, meant that the political space for
hegemonic politics was very small, even when compared to the
conditions prevailing under the semi -hegemonic and semi -
repressive colonial state in British India. The ultimate protection
provided by the British enabled the rulers of the States to
withstand popular pressure to a considerable degree, as
happened in Rajkot. As a result, there was a much greater
tendency in these States for the movements to resort to violent
methods of agitation — this happened not only in Hyderabad, but
also in Travancore, Patiala, and the Orissa States among others.
In Hyderabad, for example, even the State Congress ultimately
resorted to violent metho ds of attack, and, in the final count, the
Nizam could only be brought into line by the Indian Army.
This also meant that those such as the Communists and
other Left groups, who had less hesitation than the Congress in
resorting to violent forms of strugg le, were placed in a more
favourable situation in these States and were able to grow as a
political force in these areas. Here, too, the examples of
Hyderabad, Travancore, Patiala and the Orissa States were quite
striking.
The differences between the poli tical conditions in the
States and British India also go a long way in explaining the
hesitation of the Congress to merge the movements in the States
with those in British India. The movement in British India
adopted forms of struggle and a strategy that was specifically[/INST] |
suited to the political context. Also, political sagacity dictated
that the Princes should not be unnecessarily pushed into taking
hard positions against Indian nationalism, at least till such time | <s>[INST]suited to the political context. Also, political sagacity dictated
that the Princes should not be unnecessarily pushed into taking
hard positions against Indian nationalism, at least till such time[/INST] |
375 | The Freedom Struggle in Princely India
as this could be counter -balanced by the political weight of the
people of the state. | <s>[INST]375 | The Freedom Struggle in Princely India
as this could be counter -balanced by the political weight of the
people of the state.[/INST] |
376 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 29. INDIAN CAPITALISTS
AND THE NATIONAL
MOVEMENT
Among the various groups that participated in the national
movement were several individual capitalists who joined the
Cong ress. They fully identified with the movement, went to jails
and accepted the hardships that were the lot of Congressmen in
the colonial period. The names of Jamnalal Bajaj, Vadilal
Lallubhai Mehta, Samuel Aaron, Lala Shankar Lal, and others
are well known in this regard. There were other individual
capitalists who did not join the Congress but readily gave
financial and other help to the movement. People like G.D. Birla,
Ambalal Sarabhai and Waichand Hirachand, fall into this
category. There were also a la rge number of smaller traders and
merchants who at various points came out in active support of
the national movement. On the other hand, there were several
individual capitalists or sections of the class who either remained
neutral towards the Congress an d the national movement or even
actively opposed it.
In this chapter, we shall examine the overall strategy of the
Indian capitalist class, as a class, towards the national
movement, rather than highlight the role of various individuals or
sections within the class who did not necessarily represent the
class as a whole, or even its dominant section.
*
At the outset it must be said that the economic development
of the Indian capitalist class in the colonial period was
substantial and in many ways the natur e of its growth was quite
different from the usual experience in other colonial countries.
This had important implications regarding the class’s position
vis-a-vis imperialism. First, the Indian capitalist class grew from
about the mid 19th century with la rgely an independent capital
base and not as junior partners of foreign capital or as
compradors. Second, the capitalist class on the whole was not | <s>[INST]376 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 29. INDIAN CAPITALISTS
AND THE NATIONAL
MOVEMENT
Among the various groups that participated in the national
movement were several individual capitalists who joined the
Cong ress. They fully identified with the movement, went to jails
and accepted the hardships that were the lot of Congressmen in
the colonial period. The names of Jamnalal Bajaj, Vadilal
Lallubhai Mehta, Samuel Aaron, Lala Shankar Lal, and others
are well known in this regard. There were other individual
capitalists who did not join the Congress but readily gave
financial and other help to the movement. People like G.D. Birla,
Ambalal Sarabhai and Waichand Hirachand, fall into this
category. There were also a la rge number of smaller traders and
merchants who at various points came out in active support of
the national movement. On the other hand, there were several
individual capitalists or sections of the class who either remained
neutral towards the Congress an d the national movement or even
actively opposed it.
In this chapter, we shall examine the overall strategy of the
Indian capitalist class, as a class, towards the national
movement, rather than highlight the role of various individuals or
sections within the class who did not necessarily represent the
class as a whole, or even its dominant section.
*
At the outset it must be said that the economic development
of the Indian capitalist class in the colonial period was
substantial and in many ways the natur e of its growth was quite
different from the usual experience in other colonial countries.
This had important implications regarding the class’s position
vis-a-vis imperialism. First, the Indian capitalist class grew from
about the mid 19th century with la rgely an independent capital
base and not as junior partners of foreign capital or as
compradors. Second, the capitalist class on the whole was not[/INST] |
377 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
tied up in a subservient position with pro-imperialist feudal
interests either economically or politically. In fact, a wide cross
section of the leaders of the capitalist class actually argued, m
1944 -45, in their famous Bombay plan (the signatories to which
were Purshottamdas Thakurdas, J.R.D. Tata, G.D. Birla,
Ardeshir Dalal, Sri Ram, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, A.D. Shroff and
John Mathai) for comprehensive land reform, including
cooperativization of production, finance and marketing.’
Third, in the period 1914 -1947, the capitalist class grew
rapidly, increasing its strength and self-confidence. This was
achieved pri marily through import substitution; by edging out or
encroaching upon areas of European domination, and by
establishing almost exclusive control over new areas thus
accounting for the bulk of the new investments made since the
1920s. Close to independence, indigenous enterprise had already
cornered seventy two to seventy three per cent of the domestic
market and over eighty per cent of the deposits in the organized
banking sector.
However, this growth, unusual for a colonial capitalist class,
did not occur, as is often argued, as a result or by -product of
colonialism or because of a policy of decolonization. On the
contrary it was achieved in spite of and in opposition to
colonialism — by waging a constant struggle against colonialism
and colonial interests, i.e., by wrenching space from colonialism
itself.
There was, thus, nothing in the class position or the
economic interest of the Indian capitalists which, contrary to
what is so often argued,4 inhibited its opposition to imperialism.
In fact, by the mid 1 920s, Indian capitalists began to correctly
perceive their long-term class interest and felt strong enough to
take a consistent and openly anti-imperialist position. The
hesitation that the class demonstrated was not in its opposition
to ampenalism but in the choice of the specific path to fight | <s>[INST]377 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
tied up in a subservient position with pro-imperialist feudal
interests either economically or politically. In fact, a wide cross
section of the leaders of the capitalist class actually argued, m
1944 -45, in their famous Bombay plan (the signatories to which
were Purshottamdas Thakurdas, J.R.D. Tata, G.D. Birla,
Ardeshir Dalal, Sri Ram, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, A.D. Shroff and
John Mathai) for comprehensive land reform, including
cooperativization of production, finance and marketing.’
Third, in the period 1914 -1947, the capitalist class grew
rapidly, increasing its strength and self-confidence. This was
achieved pri marily through import substitution; by edging out or
encroaching upon areas of European domination, and by
establishing almost exclusive control over new areas thus
accounting for the bulk of the new investments made since the
1920s. Close to independence, indigenous enterprise had already
cornered seventy two to seventy three per cent of the domestic
market and over eighty per cent of the deposits in the organized
banking sector.
However, this growth, unusual for a colonial capitalist class,
did not occur, as is often argued, as a result or by -product of
colonialism or because of a policy of decolonization. On the
contrary it was achieved in spite of and in opposition to
colonialism — by waging a constant struggle against colonialism
and colonial interests, i.e., by wrenching space from colonialism
itself.
There was, thus, nothing in the class position or the
economic interest of the Indian capitalists which, contrary to
what is so often argued,4 inhibited its opposition to imperialism.
In fact, by the mid 1 920s, Indian capitalists began to correctly
perceive their long-term class interest and felt strong enough to
take a consistent and openly anti-imperialist position. The
hesitation that the class demonstrated was not in its opposition
to ampenalism but in the choice of the specific path to fight[/INST] |
to ampenalism but in the choice of the specific path to fight
imperialism. It was apprehensive that the path chosen should not
be one which, while opposing imperialism, would threaten its
own existence, i.e., undermine capitalism itself.
* | <s>[INST]to ampenalism but in the choice of the specific path to fight
imperialism. It was apprehensive that the path chosen should not
be one which, while opposing imperialism, would threaten its
own existence, i.e., undermine capitalism itself.
*[/INST] |
378 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Before we go on to discuss the capit alist class’s position vis-
a-vis imperialism and vis-a-vis the course of the anti -imperialist
movement, we should look at the emergence of the class as a
political entity — a ‘class for itself.’
Since the early 1920s, efforts were being made by various
capitalists like G.D. Birla and Purshottamdas Thakurdas to
establish a national level organization of Indian commercial,
industrial and financial interests (as opposed to the already
relatively more organized European interests in India) to be able
to effec tively lobby with the colonial government. This effort
culminated in the formation of the Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) in 1927, with a
large and rapidly increasing representation from all parts of
India. The FICCI was soon recognized by the British government
as well as the Indian public in general, as representing the
dominant opinion as well as the overall consensus within the
Indian capitalist class.
The leaders of the capitalist class also clearly saw the role of
the F ICCI as being that of ‘national guardians of trade, commerce
and industry,’ performing in the economic sphere in colonial
India the functions of a national government.5 In the process,
Indian capitalists, with some of the most astute minds of the
period in their ranks, developed a fairly comprehensive economic
critique of imperialism in all its manifestations, whether it be
direct appropriation through -home charges or exploitation
through trade, finance, currency manipulation or foreign
investments, includi ng in their sweep the now fashionable
concept of unequal exchange occurring in trade between
countries with widely divergent productivity levels. (G.D. Birla
and S.P. Jam were talking of unequal exchange as early as the
1930s).6 The Congress leaders quite often saw their assistance as
invaluable and treated their opinions and expertise on many
national economic issues with respect. | <s>[INST]378 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Before we go on to discuss the capit alist class’s position vis-
a-vis imperialism and vis-a-vis the course of the anti -imperialist
movement, we should look at the emergence of the class as a
political entity — a ‘class for itself.’
Since the early 1920s, efforts were being made by various
capitalists like G.D. Birla and Purshottamdas Thakurdas to
establish a national level organization of Indian commercial,
industrial and financial interests (as opposed to the already
relatively more organized European interests in India) to be able
to effec tively lobby with the colonial government. This effort
culminated in the formation of the Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) in 1927, with a
large and rapidly increasing representation from all parts of
India. The FICCI was soon recognized by the British government
as well as the Indian public in general, as representing the
dominant opinion as well as the overall consensus within the
Indian capitalist class.
The leaders of the capitalist class also clearly saw the role of
the F ICCI as being that of ‘national guardians of trade, commerce
and industry,’ performing in the economic sphere in colonial
India the functions of a national government.5 In the process,
Indian capitalists, with some of the most astute minds of the
period in their ranks, developed a fairly comprehensive economic
critique of imperialism in all its manifestations, whether it be
direct appropriation through -home charges or exploitation
through trade, finance, currency manipulation or foreign
investments, includi ng in their sweep the now fashionable
concept of unequal exchange occurring in trade between
countries with widely divergent productivity levels. (G.D. Birla
and S.P. Jam were talking of unequal exchange as early as the
1930s).6 The Congress leaders quite often saw their assistance as
invaluable and treated their opinions and expertise on many
national economic issues with respect.[/INST] |
national economic issues with respect.
The FICCI was, however, not to remain merely a sort of
trade union organization of the capitalist class fighting for its own
economic demands and those of the nation. The leaders of the
capitalist class now clearly saw the necessity of, and felt strong
enough for, the class to effectively intervene in politics. As Sir
Purshottamdas, President of FICCI, declared at its second annu al | <s>[INST]national economic issues with respect.
The FICCI was, however, not to remain merely a sort of
trade union organization of the capitalist class fighting for its own
economic demands and those of the nation. The leaders of the
capitalist class now clearly saw the necessity of, and felt strong
enough for, the class to effectively intervene in politics. As Sir
Purshottamdas, President of FICCI, declared at its second annu al[/INST] |
379 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
session in 1928: ‘We can no more separate our politics from our
economics.’ Further involvement of the class in politics meant
doing so on the side of Indian nationalism. ‘Indian commerce and
industry are intimately associated with and are, indeed, an
integral part of the national movement — growing with its growth
and strengthening with its strength.’ Similarly G.D. Birla was to
declare a little later in 1930: ‘It is impossible in the present . . .
political condition of our country to convert the gover nment to
our views. . . the only solution. . . lies in every Indian
businessman strengthening the hands of those who are fighting
for the freedom of our country.’
*
However, as mentioned earlier, the Indian capitalist class
had its own notions of how the a nti-imperialist struggle ought to
be waged. It was always in favour of not completely abandoning
the constitutional path and the negotiating table and generally
preferred to put its weight behind constitutional forms of struggle
as opposed to mass civil di sobedience. This was due to several
reasons.
First, there was the fear that mass civil disobedience,
especially if it was prolonged, would unleash forces which could
turn the movement revolutionary in a social sense (i.e., threaten
capitalism itself). As Laiji Naranji wrote to Purshottamdas in
March 1930, ‘private property,’ itself could be threatened and the
‘disregard for authority’ created could have
‘disastrous after effects’ even for the ‘future government of
Swaraj.’ Whenever the movement was seen t o be getting too
dangerous in this sense, the capitalists tried their best to bring
the movement back to a phase of constitutional opposition.
Second, the capitalists were unwilling to support a
prolonged all -out hostility to the government of the day as it
prevented the continuing of day -to-day business and threatened
the very existence of the class.
Further, the Indian capitalists’ support to constitutional | <s>[INST]379 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
session in 1928: ‘We can no more separate our politics from our
economics.’ Further involvement of the class in politics meant
doing so on the side of Indian nationalism. ‘Indian commerce and
industry are intimately associated with and are, indeed, an
integral part of the national movement — growing with its growth
and strengthening with its strength.’ Similarly G.D. Birla was to
declare a little later in 1930: ‘It is impossible in the present . . .
political condition of our country to convert the gover nment to
our views. . . the only solution. . . lies in every Indian
businessman strengthening the hands of those who are fighting
for the freedom of our country.’
*
However, as mentioned earlier, the Indian capitalist class
had its own notions of how the a nti-imperialist struggle ought to
be waged. It was always in favour of not completely abandoning
the constitutional path and the negotiating table and generally
preferred to put its weight behind constitutional forms of struggle
as opposed to mass civil di sobedience. This was due to several
reasons.
First, there was the fear that mass civil disobedience,
especially if it was prolonged, would unleash forces which could
turn the movement revolutionary in a social sense (i.e., threaten
capitalism itself). As Laiji Naranji wrote to Purshottamdas in
March 1930, ‘private property,’ itself could be threatened and the
‘disregard for authority’ created could have
‘disastrous after effects’ even for the ‘future government of
Swaraj.’ Whenever the movement was seen t o be getting too
dangerous in this sense, the capitalists tried their best to bring
the movement back to a phase of constitutional opposition.
Second, the capitalists were unwilling to support a
prolonged all -out hostility to the government of the day as it
prevented the continuing of day -to-day business and threatened
the very existence of the class.
Further, the Indian capitalists’ support to constitutional[/INST] |
Further, the Indian capitalists’ support to constitutional
participation, whether it be in assemblies, conferences or even
joining the Viceroy’s Executive C ouncil, is not to be understood
simply as their getting co -opted into the imperial system or | <s>[INST]Further, the Indian capitalists’ support to constitutional
participation, whether it be in assemblies, conferences or even
joining the Viceroy’s Executive C ouncil, is not to be understood
simply as their getting co -opted into the imperial system or[/INST] |
380 | India’s Struggle For Independence
surrendering to it. They saw all this as a forum for maintaining
an effective opposition fearing that boycotting these forums
completely would help ‘black legs’ an d elements who did not
represent the nation to, without any opposition, easily pass
measures which could severely affect the Indian economy and the
capitalist class. However, there was no question of
unconditionally accepting reforms or participating in co nferences
or assemblies. The capitalists were to ‘participate on (their) own
terms,’ with ‘no compromise on fundamentals,’ firmly rejecting
offers of cooperation which fell below their own and the minimum
national demands.’ It was on this ground that the F ICCI in 1934
rejected the ‘Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on
Constitutional Reforms for India’ as ‘even more reactionary than
the proposals contained in the White paper.”
Further, however keen the capitalists may have been to
keep constitutio nal avenues open, they clearly recognized the
futility of entering councils, etc., ‘unless,’ as N.R. Sarkar, the
President of FICCI, noted in 1934, ‘the nation also decides to
enter tliem.” They also generally refused to negotiate with the
British Governme nt, and certainly to make any f inal
commitments, on constitutional as well as economic issues,
behind the back of the Congress, i.e., without its participation or
at least approval. In 1930, the FICCI (in sharp contrast to the
Liberals) advised its members to boycott the Round Table
Conference (RTC) stating that ‘. . . no conference . . . convened for
the purpose of discussing the problem of Indian constitutional
advance can come to a solution . . . unless such a conference is
attended by Mahatma Gandhi, as a free man, or has at least his
aproval.”3 This was partially because the capitalists did not want
India to present a divided front at the RTC and because they
knew only the Congress could actually deliver the goods. As | <s>[INST]380 | India’s Struggle For Independence
surrendering to it. They saw all this as a forum for maintaining
an effective opposition fearing that boycotting these forums
completely would help ‘black legs’ an d elements who did not
represent the nation to, without any opposition, easily pass
measures which could severely affect the Indian economy and the
capitalist class. However, there was no question of
unconditionally accepting reforms or participating in co nferences
or assemblies. The capitalists were to ‘participate on (their) own
terms,’ with ‘no compromise on fundamentals,’ firmly rejecting
offers of cooperation which fell below their own and the minimum
national demands.’ It was on this ground that the F ICCI in 1934
rejected the ‘Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on
Constitutional Reforms for India’ as ‘even more reactionary than
the proposals contained in the White paper.”
Further, however keen the capitalists may have been to
keep constitutio nal avenues open, they clearly recognized the
futility of entering councils, etc., ‘unless,’ as N.R. Sarkar, the
President of FICCI, noted in 1934, ‘the nation also decides to
enter tliem.” They also generally refused to negotiate with the
British Governme nt, and certainly to make any f inal
commitments, on constitutional as well as economic issues,
behind the back of the Congress, i.e., without its participation or
at least approval. In 1930, the FICCI (in sharp contrast to the
Liberals) advised its members to boycott the Round Table
Conference (RTC) stating that ‘. . . no conference . . . convened for
the purpose of discussing the problem of Indian constitutional
advance can come to a solution . . . unless such a conference is
attended by Mahatma Gandhi, as a free man, or has at least his
aproval.”3 This was partially because the capitalists did not want
India to present a divided front at the RTC and because they
knew only the Congress could actually deliver the goods. As[/INST] |
knew only the Congress could actually deliver the goods. As
Ambalal Sarabhai put it in November 1929, ‘Minus the support of
the Congress, the government will not listen to you.”
Finally, it must be noted that for the capitalist class
constitutionalism was not an end in itself, neither did it
subscribe to what has often been called ‘gradualism,’ in which
case it would have joined hands with the Liberals and not
supported the Congress which repeatedly went in for non -
constitutional struggle including mass civil disobedience. The
capitalist class itself did not rule out other forms of struggle, | <s>[INST]knew only the Congress could actually deliver the goods. As
Ambalal Sarabhai put it in November 1929, ‘Minus the support of
the Congress, the government will not listen to you.”
Finally, it must be noted that for the capitalist class
constitutionalism was not an end in itself, neither did it
subscribe to what has often been called ‘gradualism,’ in which
case it would have joined hands with the Liberals and not
supported the Congress which repeatedly went in for non -
constitutional struggle including mass civil disobedience. The
capitalist class itself did not rule out other forms of struggle,[/INST] |
381 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
seeing constitutional participation as only a step towards the
goal, to achieve which other steps could be necessary. For
example, GD. Birla, who had worked hard for a c ompromise
leading to the Congre ss accepting office in 1937, warned Lord
Halifax and Lord Lothi an that the ‘Congress was not coming in
just to work the constitution, but to advance towards their goal,’
and if the ‘Governors and the Services’ did not play ‘the game’ or
‘in case there was no (constitutional) advance after two or three
years, then Indi a would be compelled to take direct action,’ by
which he meant ‘non -violent mass civil disobedience.”
*
This brings us to the Indian capitalists’ attitude towards
mass civil disobedience, which was very complex. While, on the
one hand, they were afraid of protracted mass civil disobedience,
on the other hand, they clearly saw the utility, even necessity of
civil disobedience in getting crucial concessions for their class
and the nation. In January 1931, commenting on the existing
Civil Disobedience Movemen t,. G.D. Birla wrote to
Purshottamdas, ‘There could be no doubt that what we are being
offered at present is entirely due to Gandhiji. . . if we are to
achieve what we desire, the present movement shou ld not be
allowed to slacken.”
When, after the mass movement had gone on for
considerable time, the capitalists, for reasons discussed above,
sought the withdrawal of the movement and a compromise (often
mediating between the Government and Congress to secure
peace), they were quite clear that this was to be o nly after
extracting definite concessions, using the movement, or a threat
to re-launch it, to bargain. In their ‘anxiety for peace,’ they were
not to surrender or ‘reduce (their) demands.” The dual objective
of achieving conciliation without weakening the national
movement, which after all secured the concessions, was aptly
described by G.D. Birla in January 1931: ‘We should . . . have | <s>[INST]381 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
seeing constitutional participation as only a step towards the
goal, to achieve which other steps could be necessary. For
example, GD. Birla, who had worked hard for a c ompromise
leading to the Congre ss accepting office in 1937, warned Lord
Halifax and Lord Lothi an that the ‘Congress was not coming in
just to work the constitution, but to advance towards their goal,’
and if the ‘Governors and the Services’ did not play ‘the game’ or
‘in case there was no (constitutional) advance after two or three
years, then Indi a would be compelled to take direct action,’ by
which he meant ‘non -violent mass civil disobedience.”
*
This brings us to the Indian capitalists’ attitude towards
mass civil disobedience, which was very complex. While, on the
one hand, they were afraid of protracted mass civil disobedience,
on the other hand, they clearly saw the utility, even necessity of
civil disobedience in getting crucial concessions for their class
and the nation. In January 1931, commenting on the existing
Civil Disobedience Movemen t,. G.D. Birla wrote to
Purshottamdas, ‘There could be no doubt that what we are being
offered at present is entirely due to Gandhiji. . . if we are to
achieve what we desire, the present movement shou ld not be
allowed to slacken.”
When, after the mass movement had gone on for
considerable time, the capitalists, for reasons discussed above,
sought the withdrawal of the movement and a compromise (often
mediating between the Government and Congress to secure
peace), they were quite clear that this was to be o nly after
extracting definite concessions, using the movement, or a threat
to re-launch it, to bargain. In their ‘anxiety for peace,’ they were
not to surrender or ‘reduce (their) demands.” The dual objective
of achieving conciliation without weakening the national
movement, which after all secured the concessions, was aptly
described by G.D. Birla in January 1931: ‘We should . . . have[/INST] |
described by G.D. Birla in January 1931: ‘We should . . . have
two objects in view: one is that we should jump in at the most
opportune time to try for a conciliation and the other is that we
should not do anything which might weaken the hands of those
through whose efforts we have arrived at this stage.” | <s>[INST]described by G.D. Birla in January 1931: ‘We should . . . have
two objects in view: one is that we should jump in at the most
opportune time to try for a conciliation and the other is that we
should not do anything which might weaken the hands of those
through whose efforts we have arrived at this stage.”[/INST] |
382 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Further, however opposed the capitalist class may have
been at a point of time to mass civil disobedience, it never
supported the colo nial Government in repressing it. In fact, the
capitalists throughout pressurized the Government to stop
repression, remove the ban on the Congress and the press,
release political prisoners and stop arbitrary rule with ordinances
as a first step to any se ttlement, even when the Congress was at
the pitch of its non-constitutional mass phase. The fear of
Congress militancy or radicalization did not push the capitalists
(especially after the late 1920s) to either supporting imperialism
in repressing it or eve n openly condemning or dissociating
themselves from the Congress.
The Indian capitalists’ attitude had undergone significant
changes on this issue over time. During the Swadeshi Movement
(1905 -08), the capitalists remained opposed to the boycott
agitation . Even during the Non-Cooperation Movement of the
early ‘20s, a small section of the capitalists, including
Purshottamdas, openly declared themselves enemies of the Non -
Cooperation Movement. However, during the I 930s’ Civil
Disobedience Movement, the capi talists largely supported the
movement and refused to respond to the Viceroy’s exhortations
(in September 1930) to publicly repudiate the Congress stand
and his offer of full guarantee of government protection against
any harassment for doing so.’9 In Sept ember 1940,
Purshottamdas felt that, given the political stance of the British,
the Congress was ‘left with no other alternative than to launch
non-cooperation.’20 On 5 August 1942, four days before the
launching of the Quit India Movement, Purshottamdas, J.R.D.
Tata and G.D. Birla wrote to the Viceroy that the only solution to
the present crisis, the successful execution of the war and the
prevention of another civil disobedience movement was ‘granting
political freedom to the country. . . even during the midst of war.’
* | <s>[INST]382 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Further, however opposed the capitalist class may have
been at a point of time to mass civil disobedience, it never
supported the colo nial Government in repressing it. In fact, the
capitalists throughout pressurized the Government to stop
repression, remove the ban on the Congress and the press,
release political prisoners and stop arbitrary rule with ordinances
as a first step to any se ttlement, even when the Congress was at
the pitch of its non-constitutional mass phase. The fear of
Congress militancy or radicalization did not push the capitalists
(especially after the late 1920s) to either supporting imperialism
in repressing it or eve n openly condemning or dissociating
themselves from the Congress.
The Indian capitalists’ attitude had undergone significant
changes on this issue over time. During the Swadeshi Movement
(1905 -08), the capitalists remained opposed to the boycott
agitation . Even during the Non-Cooperation Movement of the
early ‘20s, a small section of the capitalists, including
Purshottamdas, openly declared themselves enemies of the Non -
Cooperation Movement. However, during the I 930s’ Civil
Disobedience Movement, the capi talists largely supported the
movement and refused to respond to the Viceroy’s exhortations
(in September 1930) to publicly repudiate the Congress stand
and his offer of full guarantee of government protection against
any harassment for doing so.’9 In Sept ember 1940,
Purshottamdas felt that, given the political stance of the British,
the Congress was ‘left with no other alternative than to launch
non-cooperation.’20 On 5 August 1942, four days before the
launching of the Quit India Movement, Purshottamdas, J.R.D.
Tata and G.D. Birla wrote to the Viceroy that the only solution to
the present crisis, the successful execution of the war and the
prevention of another civil disobedience movement was ‘granting
political freedom to the country. . . even during the midst of war.’
*[/INST] |
*
It must be emphasized at this stage that though, by the late
1920s, the dominant section of the Indian capitalist class began
to support the Congress, the Indian national movement was not
created, led or in any decisive way influenced by t his class, nor
was it in any sense crucially dependent on its support. In fact, it | <s>[INST]*
It must be emphasized at this stage that though, by the late
1920s, the dominant section of the Indian capitalist class began
to support the Congress, the Indian national movement was not
created, led or in any decisive way influenced by t his class, nor
was it in any sense crucially dependent on its support. In fact, it[/INST] |
383 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
was the capitalist class which reacted to the existing autonomous
national movement by constantly trying to evolve a strategy
towards it. Further, while the capitalist class on the whole stayed
within the nationalist camp (as opposed to lining up with the
loyalists), it did so on the most conservative end of the nationalist
spectrum, which certainly did not call the shots of the national
movement at any stage.
However, the r elative autonomy of the Indian national
movement has been repeatedly not recognized, and it has been
argued that the capitalists, mainly by using the funds at their
command, were able to pressurize the Congress into making
demands such as a lower Rupee -Sterling ratio, tariff protection,
reduction in military expenditure, etc., which allegedly suited
only their class? Further, it is argued that the capitalists were
able to exercise a decisive influence over the political course
followed by the Congress, even to the extent of deciding whether
a movement was to be launched, continued or withdrawn. The
examples quoted are of the withdrawal of civil disobedience in
1931 with the Gandhi -Irwin Pact and the non -launching of
another movement between 1945-47.
These fo rmulations do not reflect the reality and this for
several reasons. First, a programme of economic nationalism vis -
a-vis imperialism, with demands for protection, fiscal and
monetary autonomy, and the like, did not represent the interest
of the capitalist class alone, it represented the demands of the
entire nation which was subject to imperialist exploitation. Even
the leftists — Nehru, Socialists, and Communists — in their
struggle against imperialism had to and did fight for these
demands.
Second, the d etailed working out of the doctrine of economic
nationalism was done by the early nationalism nearly haifa
century before the Indian capitalists got constituted as a class
and entered the political arena and began fighting for these | <s>[INST]383 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
was the capitalist class which reacted to the existing autonomous
national movement by constantly trying to evolve a strategy
towards it. Further, while the capitalist class on the whole stayed
within the nationalist camp (as opposed to lining up with the
loyalists), it did so on the most conservative end of the nationalist
spectrum, which certainly did not call the shots of the national
movement at any stage.
However, the r elative autonomy of the Indian national
movement has been repeatedly not recognized, and it has been
argued that the capitalists, mainly by using the funds at their
command, were able to pressurize the Congress into making
demands such as a lower Rupee -Sterling ratio, tariff protection,
reduction in military expenditure, etc., which allegedly suited
only their class? Further, it is argued that the capitalists were
able to exercise a decisive influence over the political course
followed by the Congress, even to the extent of deciding whether
a movement was to be launched, continued or withdrawn. The
examples quoted are of the withdrawal of civil disobedience in
1931 with the Gandhi -Irwin Pact and the non -launching of
another movement between 1945-47.
These fo rmulations do not reflect the reality and this for
several reasons. First, a programme of economic nationalism vis -
a-vis imperialism, with demands for protection, fiscal and
monetary autonomy, and the like, did not represent the interest
of the capitalist class alone, it represented the demands of the
entire nation which was subject to imperialist exploitation. Even
the leftists — Nehru, Socialists, and Communists — in their
struggle against imperialism had to and did fight for these
demands.
Second, the d etailed working out of the doctrine of economic
nationalism was done by the early nationalism nearly haifa
century before the Indian capitalists got constituted as a class
and entered the political arena and began fighting for these[/INST] |
and entered the political arena and began fighting for these
demands. So there was n o question of the Congress being
bought, manipulated or pressurized into these positions by the
capitalist class.
Third, while it is true that the Congress needed and
accepted funds from the business community, especially during
constitutional (election) phases. there is no evidence to suggest | <s>[INST]and entered the political arena and began fighting for these
demands. So there was n o question of the Congress being
bought, manipulated or pressurized into these positions by the
capitalist class.
Third, while it is true that the Congress needed and
accepted funds from the business community, especially during
constitutional (election) phases. there is no evidence to suggest[/INST] |
384 | India’s Struggle For Independence
that through these funds the businessmen were able to, in any
basic way, influence the party’s policy and ideology along lines
which were not acceptable to it independently. Even the Congress
dependence on funds (in the days when it was a popular
movement) has been grossly exaggerated. The Director of the
Intelligence Bureau, in reply to a query from the Viceroy, noted in
March 1939, ‘Congress has also very important substitutes for
regular f inance. The “appeal to pat riotism” saves a lot of cash
expenditures. . . Both for normal Congress activities and for
election purposes, the moneybags (capitalists) are less important
than the Gandhian superstition . . . local Congress organizations
can command so much support from the public
that they are in a position to fight elections without needing
much money. ‘In non -election phases, an overwhelming majority
of Congress cadres maintained themselves on their own and
carried on day -to-day agitations with funds raised through
membership fees and small donations.
Gandhiji’s position on capitalist support is very revealing in
this context. As early as 1922, while welcoming and even
appealing for support from merchants and mill owners; he
simultaneously maintained that, ‘whether th ey do so or not, the
country’s march to freedom cannot be made to depend on any
corporation or groups of men. This is a mass manifestation. The
masses are moving rapidly towards deliverance and they must
move whether with the aid of the organized capital o r without.
This must therefore be a movement independent of capital and
yet not antagonistic to it. Only if capital came to the aid of the
masses, it would redound to the credit of the capitalists and
hasten the advent of the happy day.’2S (Gandhiji’s atti tude
towards the capitalists was to harden further over time,
especially during World War II when a large number of them were
busy profiteering while the national movement was facing untold | <s>[INST]384 | India’s Struggle For Independence
that through these funds the businessmen were able to, in any
basic way, influence the party’s policy and ideology along lines
which were not acceptable to it independently. Even the Congress
dependence on funds (in the days when it was a popular
movement) has been grossly exaggerated. The Director of the
Intelligence Bureau, in reply to a query from the Viceroy, noted in
March 1939, ‘Congress has also very important substitutes for
regular f inance. The “appeal to pat riotism” saves a lot of cash
expenditures. . . Both for normal Congress activities and for
election purposes, the moneybags (capitalists) are less important
than the Gandhian superstition . . . local Congress organizations
can command so much support from the public
that they are in a position to fight elections without needing
much money. ‘In non -election phases, an overwhelming majority
of Congress cadres maintained themselves on their own and
carried on day -to-day agitations with funds raised through
membership fees and small donations.
Gandhiji’s position on capitalist support is very revealing in
this context. As early as 1922, while welcoming and even
appealing for support from merchants and mill owners; he
simultaneously maintained that, ‘whether th ey do so or not, the
country’s march to freedom cannot be made to depend on any
corporation or groups of men. This is a mass manifestation. The
masses are moving rapidly towards deliverance and they must
move whether with the aid of the organized capital o r without.
This must therefore be a movement independent of capital and
yet not antagonistic to it. Only if capital came to the aid of the
masses, it would redound to the credit of the capitalists and
hasten the advent of the happy day.’2S (Gandhiji’s atti tude
towards the capitalists was to harden further over time,
especially during World War II when a large number of them were
busy profiteering while the national movement was facing untold[/INST] |
repression and the people shortages and famines).
Lastly, as for the capitalists’ determining the course of the
Congress - led movements (many of them in specific areas led or
supported by socialists and Communists), again there is little
evidence to support this view. The Congress launched or
withdrew movements based on its own strategic perceptions
arising out of its understanding of the nature of the colonial state
and its current postures, the organizational, political and | <s>[INST]repression and the people shortages and famines).
Lastly, as for the capitalists’ determining the course of the
Congress - led movements (many of them in specific areas led or
supported by socialists and Communists), again there is little
evidence to support this view. The Congress launched or
withdrew movements based on its own strategic perceptions
arising out of its understanding of the nature of the colonial state
and its current postures, the organizational, political and[/INST] |
385 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
ideological preparedness of the people, the staying power of the
masses, especially when faced w ith repression, and so on. It did
not do so at the behest, and not even on behalf of the capitalist
class. In fact, almost each time the Congress launched mass
movements, e.g., in 1905 -08, 1920 -22, 1930, 1932 and 1942, it
did so without the approval of eit her the capitalist class as a
whole or a significant section of it. However, once the movements
were launched, the capitalist class reacted to it in a complex and
progressively changing fashion, as discussed above.
Quite significantly, the Indian capitali sts never saw the
Congress as their class party or even as a party susceptible only
to their influence. On the contrary, they saw the Congress as an
open-ended organization, heading a popular movement, and in
the words of J.K. Mehta, Secretary, Indian Merc hants’ Chamber,
with ‘room in it for men of all shades of politic al opinion and
economic views,’ and therefore, open to be transformed in either
the Left or the Right direction.
*
In fact, it was precisely the increasing radicalization of the
Congress in the Left direction in the 1930s, with the growing
influence of Nehru, and the Socialists and Communists within
the Congress, which spurred the capitalists into becoming more
active in the political field. The fear of radicalization of the
national movemen t, however, did not push the capitalists into the
‘lap of imperialism,’ as predicted by contemporary radicals and as
actually happened in some other colonial and semi-colonial
countries. Instead, the Indian capitalists evolved a subtle, many -
sided strategy to cont ain the Left, no part of which in volved a
sell-out to imperialism or imperial interests.
For example, when in 1929 certain capitalists, to meet the
high pitch of Communist activity among the trade unions,
attempted to form a class party, where European and Indian | <s>[INST]385 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
ideological preparedness of the people, the staying power of the
masses, especially when faced w ith repression, and so on. It did
not do so at the behest, and not even on behalf of the capitalist
class. In fact, almost each time the Congress launched mass
movements, e.g., in 1905 -08, 1920 -22, 1930, 1932 and 1942, it
did so without the approval of eit her the capitalist class as a
whole or a significant section of it. However, once the movements
were launched, the capitalist class reacted to it in a complex and
progressively changing fashion, as discussed above.
Quite significantly, the Indian capitali sts never saw the
Congress as their class party or even as a party susceptible only
to their influence. On the contrary, they saw the Congress as an
open-ended organization, heading a popular movement, and in
the words of J.K. Mehta, Secretary, Indian Merc hants’ Chamber,
with ‘room in it for men of all shades of politic al opinion and
economic views,’ and therefore, open to be transformed in either
the Left or the Right direction.
*
In fact, it was precisely the increasing radicalization of the
Congress in the Left direction in the 1930s, with the growing
influence of Nehru, and the Socialists and Communists within
the Congress, which spurred the capitalists into becoming more
active in the political field. The fear of radicalization of the
national movemen t, however, did not push the capitalists into the
‘lap of imperialism,’ as predicted by contemporary radicals and as
actually happened in some other colonial and semi-colonial
countries. Instead, the Indian capitalists evolved a subtle, many -
sided strategy to cont ain the Left, no part of which in volved a
sell-out to imperialism or imperial interests.
For example, when in 1929 certain capitalists, to meet the
high pitch of Communist activity among the trade unions,
attempted to form a class party, where European and Indian[/INST] |
attempted to form a class party, where European and Indian
capitalists would combine, the leaders of the capitalist class
firmly quashed such a move. As G.D. Birla put it, The salvation of
the capitalists does not lie in joining hands with reactionary
elements’ (i.e., pro -imperialist European inte rests in India) but in
‘cooperating with those who through constitutional means want | <s>[INST]attempted to form a class party, where European and Indian
capitalists would combine, the leaders of the capitalist class
firmly quashed such a move. As G.D. Birla put it, The salvation of
the capitalists does not lie in joining hands with reactionary
elements’ (i.e., pro -imperialist European inte rests in India) but in
‘cooperating with those who through constitutional means want[/INST] |
386 | India’s Struggle For Independence
to change the government for a national one’ (i.e. conservative
nationalists). Similarly, in 1928, the capitalists refused to
support the Government in introducing the Pub lic Safety Bill,
which was intended to contain the Communists, on the ground
that such a provision would be used to attack the national
movement.
Further, the capitalists were not to attempt to ‘kill
Bolshevism and Communism with such frail weapons’ as
frontally attacking the Left with their class organizations which
would carry no weight with ‘the masses’ or even the ‘middle
classes.’ As Birla explained, ‘I have not the least doubt in my
mind that a purely capitalist organization is the last body to put
up an effective fight against communism.’ A much superior
method, he argued later (in 1936), when Nehru’s leftist attitude
was seen as posing a danger, was to ‘let those who have given up
property say what you want to say.’ The strategy was to
‘strengthen t he han ds’ of those nationalists who, in their’
ideology, did not transcend the parameters of capitalism or,
preferably, even opposed socialism.
The capitalists also realized, as G.L. Mehta, the president of
FICCI, argued in 1943, that ‘A consistent . . . programme of
reforms’ was the most effective remedy against social upheavals.’
It was with this reform perspective that the ‘Post War Economic
Development Committee,’ set up by the capitalists in 1942, which
eventually drafted the Bombay Plan, was to functi on. Its attempt
was to incorporate ‘whatever is sound and feasible in the socialist
movement’ and see ‘how far socialist demands could be
accommodated without capitalism surrendering any of its
essential features.’ The Bombay Plan, therefore, seriously too k up
the question of rapid economic growth and equitable distribution,
even arguing for the necessity of partial nationalization, the
public sector, land reform and a series of workers’ welfare
schemes. One may add that the basic assumption made by the | <s>[INST]386 | India’s Struggle For Independence
to change the government for a national one’ (i.e. conservative
nationalists). Similarly, in 1928, the capitalists refused to
support the Government in introducing the Pub lic Safety Bill,
which was intended to contain the Communists, on the ground
that such a provision would be used to attack the national
movement.
Further, the capitalists were not to attempt to ‘kill
Bolshevism and Communism with such frail weapons’ as
frontally attacking the Left with their class organizations which
would carry no weight with ‘the masses’ or even the ‘middle
classes.’ As Birla explained, ‘I have not the least doubt in my
mind that a purely capitalist organization is the last body to put
up an effective fight against communism.’ A much superior
method, he argued later (in 1936), when Nehru’s leftist attitude
was seen as posing a danger, was to ‘let those who have given up
property say what you want to say.’ The strategy was to
‘strengthen t he han ds’ of those nationalists who, in their’
ideology, did not transcend the parameters of capitalism or,
preferably, even opposed socialism.
The capitalists also realized, as G.L. Mehta, the president of
FICCI, argued in 1943, that ‘A consistent . . . programme of
reforms’ was the most effective remedy against social upheavals.’
It was with this reform perspective that the ‘Post War Economic
Development Committee,’ set up by the capitalists in 1942, which
eventually drafted the Bombay Plan, was to functi on. Its attempt
was to incorporate ‘whatever is sound and feasible in the socialist
movement’ and see ‘how far socialist demands could be
accommodated without capitalism surrendering any of its
essential features.’ The Bombay Plan, therefore, seriously too k up
the question of rapid economic growth and equitable distribution,
even arguing for the necessity of partial nationalization, the
public sector, land reform and a series of workers’ welfare
schemes. One may add that the basic assumption made by the[/INST] |
schemes. One may add that the basic assumption made by the
Bombay planners was that the plan could be implemented only
by an independent national Governm ent.
Clearly the Indian capitalist class was anti -socialist and
bourgeois but it was not pro -imperialist The maturity of the
Indian capitalist class in identifying its long term interests,
correctly understan ding the nature of the Congress and its | <s>[INST]schemes. One may add that the basic assumption made by the
Bombay planners was that the plan could be implemented only
by an independent national Governm ent.
Clearly the Indian capitalist class was anti -socialist and
bourgeois but it was not pro -imperialist The maturity of the
Indian capitalist class in identifying its long term interests,
correctly understan ding the nature of the Congress and its[/INST] |
387 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
relationship with the different Classes in Indian society, its
refusal to abandon the side of Indian nationalism even when
threatened by the Left or tempted by imperialism, its ability to
project its own class interests as societal interests, are some of
the reasons (apart from the failure of the Left in several of the
above directions) which explains why, on the whole, the Indian
national movement remained, till independenc e under bourgeois
ideological hegemony, despite strong contending trends within it. | <s>[INST]387 | Indian Capitalists and the National Movement
relationship with the different Classes in Indian society, its
refusal to abandon the side of Indian nationalism even when
threatened by the Left or tempted by imperialism, its ability to
project its own class interests as societal interests, are some of
the reasons (apart from the failure of the Left in several of the
above directions) which explains why, on the whole, the Indian
national movement remained, till independenc e under bourgeois
ideological hegemony, despite strong contending trends within it.[/INST] |
388 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 30. THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A NATIONALIST
FOREIGN POLICY
In the course of their own anti -imperialist struggle, the
Indian people evolved a policy of opposition to imperialism as also
the expression and establishment of solidarity with anti -
imperialist movements in other parts of the world. From the
beginning, the Indian nationalists opposed the British policy of
interf ering in the internal affairs of other countries and the use of
the Indian army and India’s resources to promote, extend and
defend British imperialism in Africa and Asia.
*
The broad basis for the nationalist foreign policy was laid in
the initial years of the national movement, which coincided with
a particularly active phase of British imperial expansionism.
From 1878 onwards, the Government of India undertook a
number of large -scale military expeditions outside India’s
frontiers and its armed forces we re used in some of the wars
waged by the British Government in Asia and Africa. These wars
and expeditions were a major source of the rapid and massive
increase in India’s military expenditure. The early Indian national
leaders condemned India’s involvemen t in each of these wars and
expeditions because of the financial burden of the Indian people,
and on grounds of political morality, and also on the basis that
these involved not Indian interests and purposes but British
imperialist schemes of territorial a nd commercial expansion.
They invariably demanded that the British Government should
hear their entire cost. They also argued that India’s interests
would be best secured by a policy of peace. The Second Afghan
War was waged in 1878 -80. Voicing the Indian opinion,
Surendranath Banerjea publicly branded the war as an act of
sheer aggression and ‘as one of the most unrighteous wars that
have blackened the pages of history.” The Indians demanded that
since the unjust war was waged in pursuance of Imperial aims | <s>[INST]388 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 30. THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A NATIONALIST
FOREIGN POLICY
In the course of their own anti -imperialist struggle, the
Indian people evolved a policy of opposition to imperialism as also
the expression and establishment of solidarity with anti -
imperialist movements in other parts of the world. From the
beginning, the Indian nationalists opposed the British policy of
interf ering in the internal affairs of other countries and the use of
the Indian army and India’s resources to promote, extend and
defend British imperialism in Africa and Asia.
*
The broad basis for the nationalist foreign policy was laid in
the initial years of the national movement, which coincided with
a particularly active phase of British imperial expansionism.
From 1878 onwards, the Government of India undertook a
number of large -scale military expeditions outside India’s
frontiers and its armed forces we re used in some of the wars
waged by the British Government in Asia and Africa. These wars
and expeditions were a major source of the rapid and massive
increase in India’s military expenditure. The early Indian national
leaders condemned India’s involvemen t in each of these wars and
expeditions because of the financial burden of the Indian people,
and on grounds of political morality, and also on the basis that
these involved not Indian interests and purposes but British
imperialist schemes of territorial a nd commercial expansion.
They invariably demanded that the British Government should
hear their entire cost. They also argued that India’s interests
would be best secured by a policy of peace. The Second Afghan
War was waged in 1878 -80. Voicing the Indian opinion,
Surendranath Banerjea publicly branded the war as an act of
sheer aggression and ‘as one of the most unrighteous wars that
have blackened the pages of history.” The Indians demanded that
since the unjust war was waged in pursuance of Imperial aims[/INST] |
since the unjust war was waged in pursuance of Imperial aims
and policies, Britain should meet the entire cost of the war. The | <s>[INST]since the unjust war was waged in pursuance of Imperial aims
and policies, Britain should meet the entire cost of the war. The[/INST] |
389 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
Amrita Bazar Patrika of 19 March 1880 wrote in its usual vein of
irony: ‘Nothing throws an Englishman into a passion as when his
pocket is touched and nothing pleases him more than when he
can serve his own interests at the expense of others.’
In 1882, the Government of India participated in the
expedition sent by England to Egypt to put down the nationalist
revolt led by Colonel Arabi. Condemning the ‘aggressive’ and
‘immoral’ British poli cy in Egypt, the Indian nationalists said that
the war in Egypt was being waged to protect the interests of
British capitalists, merchants and bond -holders.
At the end of 1885, the Government of India attacked and
annexed Burma. With one voice the Indian nationalists
condemned the war upon the Burmese people as being immoral,
unwarranted, unjust, arbitrary and an act of uncalled for
aggression. The motive force behind the policy was once again
seen to be the promotion of British commercial interests in
Burma and its northern neighbor , China. The nationalists
opposed the annexation of Burma and praised the guerrilla fight
put up by the Burmese people in the succeeding years.
In 1903, Lord Curzon launched an attack upon Tibet. The
nationalist attitude was be st summarized by R.C. Dutt’s
denunciation of the ‘needless, cruel, and useless war in Tibet,’
once again motivated by commercial greed and territorial
aggrandizement.
Above all, it was the expansionist, ‘forward’ policy followed
by the Government during th e 1890s on India’s north -western
frontier that aroused the Indians’ ire. Claiming to safeguard India
against Russian designs, the Government of India got involved,
year after year, i n costly expeditions leading to the deployment of
over 60,000 troops again st rebellious tribesmen which led to the
annexation of more and more new territory and, at the same
time, to the continuous draining of the Indian treasury The | <s>[INST]389 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
Amrita Bazar Patrika of 19 March 1880 wrote in its usual vein of
irony: ‘Nothing throws an Englishman into a passion as when his
pocket is touched and nothing pleases him more than when he
can serve his own interests at the expense of others.’
In 1882, the Government of India participated in the
expedition sent by England to Egypt to put down the nationalist
revolt led by Colonel Arabi. Condemning the ‘aggressive’ and
‘immoral’ British poli cy in Egypt, the Indian nationalists said that
the war in Egypt was being waged to protect the interests of
British capitalists, merchants and bond -holders.
At the end of 1885, the Government of India attacked and
annexed Burma. With one voice the Indian nationalists
condemned the war upon the Burmese people as being immoral,
unwarranted, unjust, arbitrary and an act of uncalled for
aggression. The motive force behind the policy was once again
seen to be the promotion of British commercial interests in
Burma and its northern neighbor , China. The nationalists
opposed the annexation of Burma and praised the guerrilla fight
put up by the Burmese people in the succeeding years.
In 1903, Lord Curzon launched an attack upon Tibet. The
nationalist attitude was be st summarized by R.C. Dutt’s
denunciation of the ‘needless, cruel, and useless war in Tibet,’
once again motivated by commercial greed and territorial
aggrandizement.
Above all, it was the expansionist, ‘forward’ policy followed
by the Government during th e 1890s on India’s north -western
frontier that aroused the Indians’ ire. Claiming to safeguard India
against Russian designs, the Government of India got involved,
year after year, i n costly expeditions leading to the deployment of
over 60,000 troops again st rebellious tribesmen which led to the
annexation of more and more new territory and, at the same
time, to the continuous draining of the Indian treasury The[/INST] |
time, to the continuous draining of the Indian treasury The
Indians claimed, on the one hand, that Anglo -Russian rivalry was
the result of the clash of inte rests of the two imperialisms in
Europe and Asia, and, on the other hand, that Russian
aggression was a bogey, ‘a monstrous bugbear,’ raised to justify’
imperialist expansion. The nationalists justified the resistance
put up by the frontier tribes in defen ding their independence.
Refusing to accept the official propaganda that the Government’s | <s>[INST]time, to the continuous draining of the Indian treasury The
Indians claimed, on the one hand, that Anglo -Russian rivalry was
the result of the clash of inte rests of the two imperialisms in
Europe and Asia, and, on the other hand, that Russian
aggression was a bogey, ‘a monstrous bugbear,’ raised to justify’
imperialist expansion. The nationalists justified the resistance
put up by the frontier tribes in defen ding their independence.
Refusing to accept the official propaganda that the Government’s[/INST] |
390 | India’s Struggle For Independence
armed actions were provided by the lawlessness and blood -
thirstiness of the frontier tribesmen, they condemned the
Government for its savage measures in putting down the tribal
uprisings. They were quite caustic about the claim of the British
Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury that the frontier wars were ‘but
the surf that marks the edge and the advance of the wave of
civilization.’ ‘Philanthropy, it is said,’ quipped Tila k’s Mahra tta on
17 October 1897, ‘is the last resort of the scoundrel and the
statesman It is the straw at which they will catch when reason is
exhausted and sophistry is exposed.’
The Indian leaders argued that the expansionist policy of
the Government o f India’s frontiers, a product of Britain’s world -
wide imperialist policy, was the most important cause of the
maintenance of a large standing army, the increase in Indian
military expenditure, the deplorable financial position of the
Government, and the c onsequent increase of taxation in India
after 1815. The Indians advocated, instead, a policy of peace, the
demand for which was made by C. Sankaran Nair, the Congress
President. in 1897 in words that have a remarkably modern and
familiar ring: ‘Our true po licy is a peaceful policy . . . With such
capacity for internal development as our country possesses, with
such crying need to carry out the reforms absolutely necessary
for our well -being, we want a period of prolonged peace.’3
Three other major themes i n the area of nationalist foreign policy
emerged during the period 1880 -1914. One was that of sympathy
and support for people fighting for their independence and
liberation. Thus, sentiments of solidarity with the people of
Ireland, Russia, Turkey, Burma , Afghanistan, Egypt and Sudan,
Ethiopia and other people of Africa were vigorously expressed and
popularized through the Press. Foreign intervention in China
during the I Ho -Tuan (Boxer) Uprising was vigorously opposed | <s>[INST]390 | India’s Struggle For Independence
armed actions were provided by the lawlessness and blood -
thirstiness of the frontier tribesmen, they condemned the
Government for its savage measures in putting down the tribal
uprisings. They were quite caustic about the claim of the British
Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury that the frontier wars were ‘but
the surf that marks the edge and the advance of the wave of
civilization.’ ‘Philanthropy, it is said,’ quipped Tila k’s Mahra tta on
17 October 1897, ‘is the last resort of the scoundrel and the
statesman It is the straw at which they will catch when reason is
exhausted and sophistry is exposed.’
The Indian leaders argued that the expansionist policy of
the Government o f India’s frontiers, a product of Britain’s world -
wide imperialist policy, was the most important cause of the
maintenance of a large standing army, the increase in Indian
military expenditure, the deplorable financial position of the
Government, and the c onsequent increase of taxation in India
after 1815. The Indians advocated, instead, a policy of peace, the
demand for which was made by C. Sankaran Nair, the Congress
President. in 1897 in words that have a remarkably modern and
familiar ring: ‘Our true po licy is a peaceful policy . . . With such
capacity for internal development as our country possesses, with
such crying need to carry out the reforms absolutely necessary
for our well -being, we want a period of prolonged peace.’3
Three other major themes i n the area of nationalist foreign policy
emerged during the period 1880 -1914. One was that of sympathy
and support for people fighting for their independence and
liberation. Thus, sentiments of solidarity with the people of
Ireland, Russia, Turkey, Burma , Afghanistan, Egypt and Sudan,
Ethiopia and other people of Africa were vigorously expressed and
popularized through the Press. Foreign intervention in China
during the I Ho -Tuan (Boxer) Uprising was vigorously opposed[/INST] |
during the I Ho -Tuan (Boxer) Uprising was vigorously opposed
and the despatch of Indian troops to C hina condemned.
The second theme was that of Asia -consciousness. It was during
their opposition to the Burma war in 1885 that consciousness of
an Asian identity emerged, perha ps for the first time. Some of the
nationalist newspapers bemoaned the disappear ance of an
independent, fellow Asian country. The rise of modern Japan as
an industrial power after 1868 was hailed by Indians as proof of
the fact that a backward Asian country could develop itself within
Western control. .But despite their admiration for Japan, the
nationalist newspapers criticized it for attacking China in 1895 | <s>[INST]during the I Ho -Tuan (Boxer) Uprising was vigorously opposed
and the despatch of Indian troops to C hina condemned.
The second theme was that of Asia -consciousness. It was during
their opposition to the Burma war in 1885 that consciousness of
an Asian identity emerged, perha ps for the first time. Some of the
nationalist newspapers bemoaned the disappear ance of an
independent, fellow Asian country. The rise of modern Japan as
an industrial power after 1868 was hailed by Indians as proof of
the fact that a backward Asian country could develop itself within
Western control. .But despite their admiration for Japan, the
nationalist newspapers criticized it for attacking China in 1895[/INST] |
391 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
and for participating in the international suppression of the I Ho -
Tuan uprising. The imperialist effort to partition China was
condemned because its success would lead to the dis appearance
of a major independent Asian power. The defeat of Czarist Russia
by Japan further exploded the myth of European solidarity and
led to the resurgence of a pan -Asian feeling.
Indians also began to understand and expound the
economic rationale, in cluding the role of foreign capital exports,
behind the resurgence of imperialism in the last quarter of the
19th century. Thus, commenting on the reasons behind the
attack upon Burma, the Mahra tta of 15 November 1885, edited at
the time of Tilak and Agark ar, wrote: The truth was ‘that England
with its superfluous human energy and overflowing capital
cannot but adhere to the principle of political conduct — might is
right — for centuries to come in order to find food for her
superfluous population and marke ts for her manufacturers.’
Similarly, the Hindu of 23 September 1889 remarked: ‘Where
foreign capital has been sunk in a country, the administration of
that country becomes at once the concern of the bond -holders.
*
World War I broke out in June 1914. The Indian nationalist
leaders, including Lokamanya Tilak, decided to support the war
effort of the Government. Sentiments of loyalty to the empire and
of the desire to defend it were loudly and widely expressed. But,
as Jawaharlal Nehru has pointed out in hi s Autobiography: ‘There
was little sympathy with the British in spite of loud professions of
loyalty. Moderate and Extremist alike learnt with satisfaction of
German victories. There was no love for Germany, of course, only
the desire to see our own rulers humbled.’4 The hope was that a
grateful Britain would repay India’s loyalty with economic and
political concessions enabling India to take a long step towards
self-government, that Britain would apply to India the principles | <s>[INST]391 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
and for participating in the international suppression of the I Ho -
Tuan uprising. The imperialist effort to partition China was
condemned because its success would lead to the dis appearance
of a major independent Asian power. The defeat of Czarist Russia
by Japan further exploded the myth of European solidarity and
led to the resurgence of a pan -Asian feeling.
Indians also began to understand and expound the
economic rationale, in cluding the role of foreign capital exports,
behind the resurgence of imperialism in the last quarter of the
19th century. Thus, commenting on the reasons behind the
attack upon Burma, the Mahra tta of 15 November 1885, edited at
the time of Tilak and Agark ar, wrote: The truth was ‘that England
with its superfluous human energy and overflowing capital
cannot but adhere to the principle of political conduct — might is
right — for centuries to come in order to find food for her
superfluous population and marke ts for her manufacturers.’
Similarly, the Hindu of 23 September 1889 remarked: ‘Where
foreign capital has been sunk in a country, the administration of
that country becomes at once the concern of the bond -holders.
*
World War I broke out in June 1914. The Indian nationalist
leaders, including Lokamanya Tilak, decided to support the war
effort of the Government. Sentiments of loyalty to the empire and
of the desire to defend it were loudly and widely expressed. But,
as Jawaharlal Nehru has pointed out in hi s Autobiography: ‘There
was little sympathy with the British in spite of loud professions of
loyalty. Moderate and Extremist alike learnt with satisfaction of
German victories. There was no love for Germany, of course, only
the desire to see our own rulers humbled.’4 The hope was that a
grateful Britain would repay India’s loyalty with economic and
political concessions enabling India to take a long step towards
self-government, that Britain would apply to India the principles[/INST] |
of democracy for which she and the Allies were claiming to be
fighting the War.
After the War, the nationalists further developed their
foreign policy in the direction of opposition to political and
economic imperialism and Co opera tion of all nations in the cause | <s>[INST]of democracy for which she and the Allies were claiming to be
fighting the War.
After the War, the nationalists further developed their
foreign policy in the direction of opposition to political and
economic imperialism and Co opera tion of all nations in the cause[/INST] |
392 | India’s Struggle For Independence
of world peace . As part of this Policy, at its Delhi session in 1919,
the Congress demanded India’s representation at the Peace
Conference through its elected representatives.
Indians also continued to voice their sympathy for the
freedom fight of other countries. The Irish and Egyptian people
and the Government of Turkey were extended active support. At
its Calcutta session in 1920 , the Congress asked the people not
to join the army to fight in West Asia. In May 1921, Gandhiji
declared that the Indian people would oppose any attack on
Afghanistan. The Congress branded the Mandate system of the
League of Nations as a cover for imperialist greed. In 1921, the
Congress congratulated the Burmese people on their struggle for
freedom. Burma was at that time a part of India, but the
Congress announced that free India favoured Burma’s
independence from India. Gandhiji wrote in this context in 1922:
‘1 have never been able to take pride in the fact that Burma has
been made part of British India. It never was and never should
be. The Bu rmese have a civilization o f their own.’ In 1924, the
Congress asked the Indian settlers in Burma to demand no
separate rights at the cost of the Burmese people.
In 1925, the Northern March of the Chinese Nationalist
army began under Sun Yat-Sen’s leaders hip and the foreign
powers got ready to intervene. The Congress immediately
expressed a strong bond of sympathy with the Chinese people in
their struggle for national unity and against the common enemy
arid protested against the dispatch of Indian troops t o China. In
1925, Gandhiji described the use of Indian soldiers to shoot the
innocent Chinese students as a ‘humiliating and degrading
spectacle.’ ‘It demonstrates also most forcibly that India is being
kept under subjection, not merely for the exploitatio n of India
herself, but that it enables Great Britain to exploit the great and
ancient Chinese nation.’
In January 1927, S. Srinavasa Iyengar moved an | <s>[INST]392 | India’s Struggle For Independence
of world peace . As part of this Policy, at its Delhi session in 1919,
the Congress demanded India’s representation at the Peace
Conference through its elected representatives.
Indians also continued to voice their sympathy for the
freedom fight of other countries. The Irish and Egyptian people
and the Government of Turkey were extended active support. At
its Calcutta session in 1920 , the Congress asked the people not
to join the army to fight in West Asia. In May 1921, Gandhiji
declared that the Indian people would oppose any attack on
Afghanistan. The Congress branded the Mandate system of the
League of Nations as a cover for imperialist greed. In 1921, the
Congress congratulated the Burmese people on their struggle for
freedom. Burma was at that time a part of India, but the
Congress announced that free India favoured Burma’s
independence from India. Gandhiji wrote in this context in 1922:
‘1 have never been able to take pride in the fact that Burma has
been made part of British India. It never was and never should
be. The Bu rmese have a civilization o f their own.’ In 1924, the
Congress asked the Indian settlers in Burma to demand no
separate rights at the cost of the Burmese people.
In 1925, the Northern March of the Chinese Nationalist
army began under Sun Yat-Sen’s leaders hip and the foreign
powers got ready to intervene. The Congress immediately
expressed a strong bond of sympathy with the Chinese people in
their struggle for national unity and against the common enemy
arid protested against the dispatch of Indian troops t o China. In
1925, Gandhiji described the use of Indian soldiers to shoot the
innocent Chinese students as a ‘humiliating and degrading
spectacle.’ ‘It demonstrates also most forcibly that India is being
kept under subjection, not merely for the exploitatio n of India
herself, but that it enables Great Britain to exploit the great and
ancient Chinese nation.’
In January 1927, S. Srinavasa Iyengar moved an[/INST] |
In January 1927, S. Srinavasa Iyengar moved an
adjournment motion in the Central Legislative Assembly to
protest against Indian troops being used to suppress the Chinese
people. The strong Indian feelings on the question were
repeatedly expressed by the Congress during 1927 (including it
Its Madras session). The Madras Congress advised Indians not to
go to China to fight or work against the Chinese people who were | <s>[INST]In January 1927, S. Srinavasa Iyengar moved an
adjournment motion in the Central Legislative Assembly to
protest against Indian troops being used to suppress the Chinese
people. The strong Indian feelings on the question were
repeatedly expressed by the Congress during 1927 (including it
Its Madras session). The Madras Congress advised Indians not to
go to China to fight or work against the Chinese people who were[/INST] |
393 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
fellow fighters in the struggle against imperialism. It also asked
for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Mesopotamia and Iran
and all other foreign counties. In 1928, the Congress assured the
people of Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghan istan of its full
support in their national liberation s truggles.
Sentimerns of the solidarity of the Indian people with the
colonial people and the awareness of India’s role as the gendarme
of British imperialism the world over were summed up by Dr. MA.
Ansari in his presidential address at the Congress session of
1927: ‘The history of this philanthropic burglary on the part of
Europe is written in blood and suffering from Congo to Canton. .
. Once India is free the whole edifice (of imperialism) will coll apse
as she is the key -stone of the arch of Imperialism.’
*
In 1926 -27, Jawaharlal Nehru travelled to Europe and came into
contact with left -wing European political workers and thinkers.
This had an abiding impact on his political development,
including i n the field of foreign affairs. This was, of course, not
the first time that major Indian political leaders had made an
effort to establish links with, and get the support of, the anti-
imperialist sections of British and European public opinion.
Dadabhai N aoroji was a close friend of the socialist H.M.
Hyndman. He attended the Hague session of the International
Socialist Congress in August 1904 and after describing
imperialism as a species of barbarism declared, that the Indian
people had lost all faith in British political parties’ and
parliament and looked for cooperation only to the British working
class. Lajpat Rai also established close relations with American
socialists during his stay in the US from 1914 -18. In 1917, he
opposed US participation in the World War because of the War’s
imperialistic character. Gandhiji also developed close relations
with outstanding European figures such as Tolstoy and Romain | <s>[INST]393 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
fellow fighters in the struggle against imperialism. It also asked
for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Mesopotamia and Iran
and all other foreign counties. In 1928, the Congress assured the
people of Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghan istan of its full
support in their national liberation s truggles.
Sentimerns of the solidarity of the Indian people with the
colonial people and the awareness of India’s role as the gendarme
of British imperialism the world over were summed up by Dr. MA.
Ansari in his presidential address at the Congress session of
1927: ‘The history of this philanthropic burglary on the part of
Europe is written in blood and suffering from Congo to Canton. .
. Once India is free the whole edifice (of imperialism) will coll apse
as she is the key -stone of the arch of Imperialism.’
*
In 1926 -27, Jawaharlal Nehru travelled to Europe and came into
contact with left -wing European political workers and thinkers.
This had an abiding impact on his political development,
including i n the field of foreign affairs. This was, of course, not
the first time that major Indian political leaders had made an
effort to establish links with, and get the support of, the anti-
imperialist sections of British and European public opinion.
Dadabhai N aoroji was a close friend of the socialist H.M.
Hyndman. He attended the Hague session of the International
Socialist Congress in August 1904 and after describing
imperialism as a species of barbarism declared, that the Indian
people had lost all faith in British political parties’ and
parliament and looked for cooperation only to the British working
class. Lajpat Rai also established close relations with American
socialists during his stay in the US from 1914 -18. In 1917, he
opposed US participation in the World War because of the War’s
imperialistic character. Gandhiji also developed close relations
with outstanding European figures such as Tolstoy and Romain[/INST] |
with outstanding European figures such as Tolstoy and Romain
Rolland.
The highlight of Jawaharlal’s European visit was his
participation as a representative o f the Congress in the
International Congress against colonial Oppression and | <s>[INST]with outstanding European figures such as Tolstoy and Romain
Rolland.
The highlight of Jawaharlal’s European visit was his
participation as a representative o f the Congress in the
International Congress against colonial Oppression and[/INST] |
394 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Imperialism held in Brussels in February 1927. The basic
objective of the Conference was to bring together the colonial
people of Africa, Asia and Latin America struggling against
imperialism and the working people of the capitalist countries
fighting against capitalism. Nehru was elected one of the
honorary presidents of the Conference along with Albert Einstein,
Romain Rolland, Madame Sun Yat -Sen and George Lansbury. In
his speec hes and statements at the Conferences, Nehru
emphasized the close connection between colonialism and
capitalism and the deep commitment of Indian nationalism to
internationalism and to anti -colonial struggles the world over. A
major point of departure from previous Indian approaches was
his understanding of the significance of US imperialism as a
result of his discussions with Latin American delegates. In this
confidential report on the Conference to the Congress Working
Committee, he wrote: ‘Most of us, sp ecially from Asia, were
wholly ignorant of the problems of South America, and of how the
rising imperialism of the United States, with its tremendous
resources and its immunity from outside attack, is gradually
taking a stranglehold of Central and South Am erica. But we are
not likely to remain ignorant much longer for the great problem
of the near future will be American imperialism, even more than
British imperialism.’
The Brussels Conference decided to found the League
Against Imperialism and for National Independence. Nehru was
elected to the Executive Council of the League. The Congress also
affiliated to the League as an associated member. At its Calcutta
session, the Congress declared that the Indian struggle was a
part of the worldwide struggle agains t imperialism. It also decided
to open a Foreign Department to develop contacts with other
peoples and movements fighting against imperialism. Nor was
this understanding confmed to Nehru and other leftists. | <s>[INST]394 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Imperialism held in Brussels in February 1927. The basic
objective of the Conference was to bring together the colonial
people of Africa, Asia and Latin America struggling against
imperialism and the working people of the capitalist countries
fighting against capitalism. Nehru was elected one of the
honorary presidents of the Conference along with Albert Einstein,
Romain Rolland, Madame Sun Yat -Sen and George Lansbury. In
his speec hes and statements at the Conferences, Nehru
emphasized the close connection between colonialism and
capitalism and the deep commitment of Indian nationalism to
internationalism and to anti -colonial struggles the world over. A
major point of departure from previous Indian approaches was
his understanding of the significance of US imperialism as a
result of his discussions with Latin American delegates. In this
confidential report on the Conference to the Congress Working
Committee, he wrote: ‘Most of us, sp ecially from Asia, were
wholly ignorant of the problems of South America, and of how the
rising imperialism of the United States, with its tremendous
resources and its immunity from outside attack, is gradually
taking a stranglehold of Central and South Am erica. But we are
not likely to remain ignorant much longer for the great problem
of the near future will be American imperialism, even more than
British imperialism.’
The Brussels Conference decided to found the League
Against Imperialism and for National Independence. Nehru was
elected to the Executive Council of the League. The Congress also
affiliated to the League as an associated member. At its Calcutta
session, the Congress declared that the Indian struggle was a
part of the worldwide struggle agains t imperialism. It also decided
to open a Foreign Department to develop contacts with other
peoples and movements fighting against imperialism. Nor was
this understanding confmed to Nehru and other leftists.[/INST] |
this understanding confmed to Nehru and other leftists.
Gandhiji, for example, wrote to Nehru in Septembe r 1933: ‘We
must recognize that our nationalism must not be inconsistent
with progressive internationalism.. . I can, therefore, go the whole
length with you and say that “we should range ourselves with the
progressive forces of the world. ’
* | <s>[INST]this understanding confmed to Nehru and other leftists.
Gandhiji, for example, wrote to Nehru in Septembe r 1933: ‘We
must recognize that our nationalism must not be inconsistent
with progressive internationalism.. . I can, therefore, go the whole
length with you and say that “we should range ourselves with the
progressive forces of the world. ’
*[/INST] |
395 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
A very active phase of nationalist foreign policy began in
1936. From then onwards, there was hardly an important event
in the world to which the Congress and its leaders did not react.
Fascism had already triumphed in Italy, Germany and Japan and
was raising its ugly head in other parts of the capitalist world.
The Congress condemned it as the most extreme form of
imperialism and racialism. It fully recognized that the future of
India was closely interlinked with the coming struggle between
Fascism and the forces of freedom, socialism and democracy. It
extended full support to the people of Ethiopia, Spain, China and
Czechoslovakia in their struggle against fascist aggression.
The nationalist approach to world problems was clearly
enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru, the ch ief Congress
spokesperson on world affairs, in his presidential address to the
Lucknow Congress in 1936. Nehru analysed the world situation
in detail and focused on the Indian struggle in the context of the
coming world struggle against Fascism. ‘Our strug gle was but
part of a far wider struggle for freedom, and the forces that
moved us were moving people all over the world into action. . .
Capitalism, in its difficulties, took to fascism . . . what its
imperialist counterpart had long been in the subject c olonial
countries. Fascism and imperialism thus stood out as the two
faces of the now decaying capitalism.’ And again: ‘Thus we see
the world divided up into two vast groups today — the imperialist
and fascist on one side, the socialist and nationalist on the other.
Inevitably we take our stand with the progressive forces of the
world which are ranged against fascism and imperialism.” Nehru
went back to these themes again and again in the later years.
‘The frontiers of our struggle lie not only in our own country but
in Spain and China also,’ he wrote in January l939.
Gandhiji, too, gave expression to strong anti-fascist feelings. | <s>[INST]395 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
A very active phase of nationalist foreign policy began in
1936. From then onwards, there was hardly an important event
in the world to which the Congress and its leaders did not react.
Fascism had already triumphed in Italy, Germany and Japan and
was raising its ugly head in other parts of the capitalist world.
The Congress condemned it as the most extreme form of
imperialism and racialism. It fully recognized that the future of
India was closely interlinked with the coming struggle between
Fascism and the forces of freedom, socialism and democracy. It
extended full support to the people of Ethiopia, Spain, China and
Czechoslovakia in their struggle against fascist aggression.
The nationalist approach to world problems was clearly
enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru, the ch ief Congress
spokesperson on world affairs, in his presidential address to the
Lucknow Congress in 1936. Nehru analysed the world situation
in detail and focused on the Indian struggle in the context of the
coming world struggle against Fascism. ‘Our strug gle was but
part of a far wider struggle for freedom, and the forces that
moved us were moving people all over the world into action. . .
Capitalism, in its difficulties, took to fascism . . . what its
imperialist counterpart had long been in the subject c olonial
countries. Fascism and imperialism thus stood out as the two
faces of the now decaying capitalism.’ And again: ‘Thus we see
the world divided up into two vast groups today — the imperialist
and fascist on one side, the socialist and nationalist on the other.
Inevitably we take our stand with the progressive forces of the
world which are ranged against fascism and imperialism.” Nehru
went back to these themes again and again in the later years.
‘The frontiers of our struggle lie not only in our own country but
in Spain and China also,’ he wrote in January l939.
Gandhiji, too, gave expression to strong anti-fascist feelings.[/INST] |
He condemned Hitler for the genocide of the Jews and for
‘propounding a new religion of exclusive and militant nationalism
in the name of which any inhumanity becomes an act of
humanity.’ ‘If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of
and for humanity,’ he wrote, ‘a war against Germany, to prevent
the wanton persecution of a whole race, would be completely
justified.” | <s>[INST]He condemned Hitler for the genocide of the Jews and for
‘propounding a new religion of exclusive and militant nationalism
in the name of which any inhumanity becomes an act of
humanity.’ ‘If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of
and for humanity,’ he wrote, ‘a war against Germany, to prevent
the wanton persecution of a whole race, would be completely
justified.”[/INST] |
396 | India’s Struggle For Independence
When Ethiopia was attacked by fascist Italy in early 1936,
the Congress declared the Ethiopian people’s struggle to be part
of all exploited people’s struggle for freedom. The Congress
declared 9 May to be Ethiopia Day on which demonstrations and
meetings were held all over India expressing sympathy and
solidarity with the Ethiopians. On his way back from Europe,
Jawaharlal refused to meet Mussolini, despite his repeated
invitations, lest the meeting was used for fascist propaganda.
The Congress expressed stro ng support for Spanish
Republicans engaged in a life and death struggle with fascist
Franco in the Spanish Civil War. In his presidential address to
the Faizpur Congress in December 1936, Nehru emphasized that
the struggle going on in Spain was not merely between
Republicans and Franco or even Fascism and democracy but
between forces of progress and reaction throughout the world. ‘In
Spain today,’ he declared, ‘our battles are being fought and we
watch this struggle not merely with the sympathy of friendly
outsiders, but with the painful anxiety of those who are
themselves involved in it.” In June 1938, he visited Spain
accompanied by Krishna Menon, visited the battlefront and spent
five days in Barcelona which was under constant bombardment ,
on 13 October 1 938, Gandhiji sent a message to Juan Negr in.
Prime Minister of Spain: ‘My whole heart goes out to you in
sympathy. May true freedom be the outcome of your agony.”
In late 1938, Hitler began his diplomatic and political
aggression against Czechoslovakia lea ding to its betrayal by
Britain and France at Munich. The Congress Working Committee,
meeting in Nehru’s absence, passed a resolution viewing ‘with
grave concern the unabashed attempt that is being made by
Germany to depri ve Czechoslovakia of its independe nce or to
reduce it to impotence,’ and sending its ‘profound sympathy to
the b rave people of Czechoslovakia.” Gandhiji wrote in the | <s>[INST]396 | India’s Struggle For Independence
When Ethiopia was attacked by fascist Italy in early 1936,
the Congress declared the Ethiopian people’s struggle to be part
of all exploited people’s struggle for freedom. The Congress
declared 9 May to be Ethiopia Day on which demonstrations and
meetings were held all over India expressing sympathy and
solidarity with the Ethiopians. On his way back from Europe,
Jawaharlal refused to meet Mussolini, despite his repeated
invitations, lest the meeting was used for fascist propaganda.
The Congress expressed stro ng support for Spanish
Republicans engaged in a life and death struggle with fascist
Franco in the Spanish Civil War. In his presidential address to
the Faizpur Congress in December 1936, Nehru emphasized that
the struggle going on in Spain was not merely between
Republicans and Franco or even Fascism and democracy but
between forces of progress and reaction throughout the world. ‘In
Spain today,’ he declared, ‘our battles are being fought and we
watch this struggle not merely with the sympathy of friendly
outsiders, but with the painful anxiety of those who are
themselves involved in it.” In June 1938, he visited Spain
accompanied by Krishna Menon, visited the battlefront and spent
five days in Barcelona which was under constant bombardment ,
on 13 October 1 938, Gandhiji sent a message to Juan Negr in.
Prime Minister of Spain: ‘My whole heart goes out to you in
sympathy. May true freedom be the outcome of your agony.”
In late 1938, Hitler began his diplomatic and political
aggression against Czechoslovakia lea ding to its betrayal by
Britain and France at Munich. The Congress Working Committee,
meeting in Nehru’s absence, passed a resolution viewing ‘with
grave concern the unabashed attempt that is being made by
Germany to depri ve Czechoslovakia of its independe nce or to
reduce it to impotence,’ and sending its ‘profound sympathy to
the b rave people of Czechoslovakia.” Gandhiji wrote in the[/INST] |
the b rave people of Czechoslovakia.” Gandhiji wrote in the
Harijan: ‘Let the Czechs know that the Working Committee wrung
itself with pain while their doom was being decided.’ Speakin g for
himself, Gandhiji wrote that the plight of the Czechs ‘moved me
to the point of physical and mental distress.”6 Nehru, then in
Europe, refused to visit Germany as a state guest and went to
Prague instead. He was angry with the British Government for
encouraging Germany. In a letter to the Manchester Guardian he
wrote: ‘Recent developments in Czechoslovakia and the way the | <s>[INST]the b rave people of Czechoslovakia.” Gandhiji wrote in the
Harijan: ‘Let the Czechs know that the Working Committee wrung
itself with pain while their doom was being decided.’ Speakin g for
himself, Gandhiji wrote that the plight of the Czechs ‘moved me
to the point of physical and mental distress.”6 Nehru, then in
Europe, refused to visit Germany as a state guest and went to
Prague instead. He was angry with the British Government for
encouraging Germany. In a letter to the Manchester Guardian he
wrote: ‘Recent developments in Czechoslovakia and the way the[/INST] |
397 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
British Government, directly and through its mediators, had
baulked and threatened the Czech Gov ernment at every turn has
produced a feeling of nausea in me.” He was disgusted with the
Munich Agreement and in an article in the National Herald of 5
October 1938, he described it as ‘the rape of Czechoslovakia by
Germany with England and France holding her forcibly down!”
His interpretat ion of this betrayal of Czechoslovakia was that
Britain and France wanted to isolate the Soviet Union and
maintain Fascism in Europe as a counterpoise to it. At Tripuri, in
early 1939, the Congress passed a resolution dissociating itself
‘entirely from the British foreign policy, which has consistently
aided the fascist Powers and helped the destruction of the
democratic countries.’
In 1937, Japan launched an attack on China. The Congress
passed a resolution condemning Japan and calling upon the
Indian peo ple to boycott Japanese goods as a mark of their
sympathy with the Chinese people. At its Haripura session in
early 1938, the Congress reiterated this call while condemning
‘the aggression of a brutal imperialism in China and horrors and
frightfulness that have accompanied it.’ It warned that the
invasion of China was ‘fraught with the gravest consequences for
the future of the world peace and of freedom in Asia.’ As an
expression of its solidarity with the Chinese people, 12 June was
celebrated throughout India as China Day. The Congress also
sent a medical mission, headed by Dr. M. Atal, to work with the
Chinese armed forces. One of its members, Dr. Kotnis, was to lay
down his life working with the Eighth Route Army under Mao Ze -
Dong’s com mand.
The comple xity, the humanist approach, and anti -
imperialist content of the Indian nationalist foreign policy were
brought out in the approach to the problem of Palestine. While
Arabs were fighting against British imperialism in Palestine, | <s>[INST]397 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
British Government, directly and through its mediators, had
baulked and threatened the Czech Gov ernment at every turn has
produced a feeling of nausea in me.” He was disgusted with the
Munich Agreement and in an article in the National Herald of 5
October 1938, he described it as ‘the rape of Czechoslovakia by
Germany with England and France holding her forcibly down!”
His interpretat ion of this betrayal of Czechoslovakia was that
Britain and France wanted to isolate the Soviet Union and
maintain Fascism in Europe as a counterpoise to it. At Tripuri, in
early 1939, the Congress passed a resolution dissociating itself
‘entirely from the British foreign policy, which has consistently
aided the fascist Powers and helped the destruction of the
democratic countries.’
In 1937, Japan launched an attack on China. The Congress
passed a resolution condemning Japan and calling upon the
Indian peo ple to boycott Japanese goods as a mark of their
sympathy with the Chinese people. At its Haripura session in
early 1938, the Congress reiterated this call while condemning
‘the aggression of a brutal imperialism in China and horrors and
frightfulness that have accompanied it.’ It warned that the
invasion of China was ‘fraught with the gravest consequences for
the future of the world peace and of freedom in Asia.’ As an
expression of its solidarity with the Chinese people, 12 June was
celebrated throughout India as China Day. The Congress also
sent a medical mission, headed by Dr. M. Atal, to work with the
Chinese armed forces. One of its members, Dr. Kotnis, was to lay
down his life working with the Eighth Route Army under Mao Ze -
Dong’s com mand.
The comple xity, the humanist approach, and anti -
imperialist content of the Indian nationalist foreign policy were
brought out in the approach to the problem of Palestine. While
Arabs were fighting against British imperialism in Palestine,[/INST] |
Arabs were fighting against British imperialism in Palestine,
many of the Jews, hunted an d killed in Nazi Germany and
discriminated against and oppressed all over Europe. were trying
to carve out under Zionist leadership a homeland in Palestine
with British support. Indians sympathized with the persecuted
Jews, victims of Nazi genocide, but th ey criticized their efforts to
deprive the Arabs of their due. They supported the Arabs and
urged the Jews to reach an agreement with the Arabs directly.
The Congress observed 27 September 1936 as Palestine Day. In | <s>[INST]Arabs were fighting against British imperialism in Palestine,
many of the Jews, hunted an d killed in Nazi Germany and
discriminated against and oppressed all over Europe. were trying
to carve out under Zionist leadership a homeland in Palestine
with British support. Indians sympathized with the persecuted
Jews, victims of Nazi genocide, but th ey criticized their efforts to
deprive the Arabs of their due. They supported the Arabs and
urged the Jews to reach an agreement with the Arabs directly.
The Congress observed 27 September 1936 as Palestine Day. In[/INST] |
398 | India’s Struggle For Independence
October 1937, the Congress protested agai nst the reign of terror
in Palestine and the proposal to partition it and assured the
Arabs of the solidarity of the Indian people. In September 1938, it
again condemned the partition decision, urged the British to
‘leave the Jews and Arabs to amicably set tle the issues between
them,’ and appealed to the Jews ‘not to take shelter behind
British imperialism.’ Gandhiji reiterated all these views in
December 1938 in an important editorial in the Harij an on the
plight of the Jews in Europe. ‘My sympathies are a ll with the
Jews,’ he wrote. But it would also be ‘wrong and inhuman to
impose the Jews on the Arabs. . - It would be crime against
humanity to reduce the proud Arabs.’ Appealing to the Jews to
reason with the Arabs and ‘discard the help of the British
bayonet,’ he pointed out that ‘as it is, they are co -sharers with
the British in despoiling a people who have done no wrong to
them.” Nehru gave expression to similar views on the Palestinian
question from 1936 to 1939.
A major aspect of the nationalists’ wo rld outlook, especially
of the y outh, was the admiration and imm ense goodwill for the
Soviet Union. Nearly all the major Indian political leaders of the
time — for example, Lokamanya Tilak, Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra
Pal — had reacted favourably to the Russ ian Revolution during
1917 -18, seeing in it the success of an oppressed people. During
the 1920s, the rising socialist and communist groups and young
intellectuals were attracted by the Soviet Union, its
egalitarianism, socialist idealism, anti -imperialism , and the Five
Year Plan and were full of admiration for the socialist homeland.
In November 1927, Jawaharlal and Motilal visited the Soviet
Union. On his return, Jawaharlal wrote a series of articles for the
Hindu which were also published in book form. H is reaction was
very positive and idealistic and was reflected in the lines he put | <s>[INST]398 | India’s Struggle For Independence
October 1937, the Congress protested agai nst the reign of terror
in Palestine and the proposal to partition it and assured the
Arabs of the solidarity of the Indian people. In September 1938, it
again condemned the partition decision, urged the British to
‘leave the Jews and Arabs to amicably set tle the issues between
them,’ and appealed to the Jews ‘not to take shelter behind
British imperialism.’ Gandhiji reiterated all these views in
December 1938 in an important editorial in the Harij an on the
plight of the Jews in Europe. ‘My sympathies are a ll with the
Jews,’ he wrote. But it would also be ‘wrong and inhuman to
impose the Jews on the Arabs. . - It would be crime against
humanity to reduce the proud Arabs.’ Appealing to the Jews to
reason with the Arabs and ‘discard the help of the British
bayonet,’ he pointed out that ‘as it is, they are co -sharers with
the British in despoiling a people who have done no wrong to
them.” Nehru gave expression to similar views on the Palestinian
question from 1936 to 1939.
A major aspect of the nationalists’ wo rld outlook, especially
of the y outh, was the admiration and imm ense goodwill for the
Soviet Union. Nearly all the major Indian political leaders of the
time — for example, Lokamanya Tilak, Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra
Pal — had reacted favourably to the Russ ian Revolution during
1917 -18, seeing in it the success of an oppressed people. During
the 1920s, the rising socialist and communist groups and young
intellectuals were attracted by the Soviet Union, its
egalitarianism, socialist idealism, anti -imperialism , and the Five
Year Plan and were full of admiration for the socialist homeland.
In November 1927, Jawaharlal and Motilal visited the Soviet
Union. On his return, Jawaharlal wrote a series of articles for the
Hindu which were also published in book form. H is reaction was
very positive and idealistic and was reflected in the lines he put[/INST] |
on the title page of the book: ‘Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
but to be young was very heaven.’ In 1928 and after Nehru
9 repeatedly praised the Soviet Union ‘as t he greatest opponent of
imperialism,’ this admiration for the Soviet Union was to deepen
as he came more and more under the influence of Marxism. At
Lucknow, in 1936 , he said that though he was pained and
disagreed with much that was happening in the Sovie t Union, he
looked upon ‘that great and fascinating unfolding of a new order
and a new civilization as the most promising feature of our
dismal age.’ In fact, ‘if the future is full of hope it is largely | <s>[INST]on the title page of the book: ‘Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
but to be young was very heaven.’ In 1928 and after Nehru
9 repeatedly praised the Soviet Union ‘as t he greatest opponent of
imperialism,’ this admiration for the Soviet Union was to deepen
as he came more and more under the influence of Marxism. At
Lucknow, in 1936 , he said that though he was pained and
disagreed with much that was happening in the Sovie t Union, he
looked upon ‘that great and fascinating unfolding of a new order
and a new civilization as the most promising feature of our
dismal age.’ In fact, ‘if the future is full of hope it is largely[/INST] |
399 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
because of Soviet Russia.’ The mass trials and purge s of Stalin’s
opponents in the 1930s repelled him, but he still retained his
faith in the Soviet regime, especially as, in his view, it ‘stood as
the one real effective bulwark against fascism in Europe and
Asia.’
Other Congress leaders, for example, C.R. Das and Gandhiji
were also friendly to the Soviet Union but were put off by what
they believed to be the Communist emphasis on the role of
violence. This was: particularly true of Gandhiji. But he, too,
gradually began to change his appraisal. In a discuss ion with
students of Gujarat Vidyapith in late 1928, Gandhiji, on one
hand, praised the Bolshevik ideal of the abolition of the
‘institution of private property’ and, on the other, condemned the
Bolsheviks for accomplishing it through violence. While
predi cting the downfall of the Bolshevik regime, he said: ‘If it
continued to base itself on violence, there is no questioning the
fact that the Bolshevik ideal has behind it the purest sacrifice of
countless men and women who have given up their all for its
sake, and an ideal that is sanctified by the sacrifices of such
master spirits as Lenin cannot go in vain; the noble example of
their renunciation will be emblazoned for ever and quicken and
purify the ideal as time passes. ’
Goodwill, admiration and support for the Soviet Union were
to acquire major proportions during the I 930s as the Communist
Party, the Congress Socialist Party, the kisan sabhas, and trade
unions developed and in their propaganda and agitation cited the
Soviet Union as an example of what workers’ and peasants’
power could achieve.
*
War clouds had begun to gather again around the world
since the late 1920s. The Congress had declared at its Madras
session in 1927 that India could not be a party to an imperialist
war and in no case should I ndia be made to join a war without
the consent of its people. This declaration was to become one of | <s>[INST]399 | The Developme nt of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
because of Soviet Russia.’ The mass trials and purge s of Stalin’s
opponents in the 1930s repelled him, but he still retained his
faith in the Soviet regime, especially as, in his view, it ‘stood as
the one real effective bulwark against fascism in Europe and
Asia.’
Other Congress leaders, for example, C.R. Das and Gandhiji
were also friendly to the Soviet Union but were put off by what
they believed to be the Communist emphasis on the role of
violence. This was: particularly true of Gandhiji. But he, too,
gradually began to change his appraisal. In a discuss ion with
students of Gujarat Vidyapith in late 1928, Gandhiji, on one
hand, praised the Bolshevik ideal of the abolition of the
‘institution of private property’ and, on the other, condemned the
Bolsheviks for accomplishing it through violence. While
predi cting the downfall of the Bolshevik regime, he said: ‘If it
continued to base itself on violence, there is no questioning the
fact that the Bolshevik ideal has behind it the purest sacrifice of
countless men and women who have given up their all for its
sake, and an ideal that is sanctified by the sacrifices of such
master spirits as Lenin cannot go in vain; the noble example of
their renunciation will be emblazoned for ever and quicken and
purify the ideal as time passes. ’
Goodwill, admiration and support for the Soviet Union were
to acquire major proportions during the I 930s as the Communist
Party, the Congress Socialist Party, the kisan sabhas, and trade
unions developed and in their propaganda and agitation cited the
Soviet Union as an example of what workers’ and peasants’
power could achieve.
*
War clouds had begun to gather again around the world
since the late 1920s. The Congress had declared at its Madras
session in 1927 that India could not be a party to an imperialist
war and in no case should I ndia be made to join a war without
the consent of its people. This declaration was to become one of[/INST] |
the foundations of nationalist foreign policy in the later years and
was repeated time and again. The rise of Fascism and the threat
it posed to peace, democracy and socialism and to the | <s>[INST]the foundations of nationalist foreign policy in the later years and
was repeated time and again. The rise of Fascism and the threat
it posed to peace, democracy and socialism and to the[/INST] |
400 | India’s Struggle For Independence
independence of nations transformed the situation to a certain
extent. As pointed out earlier, the Indian national leadership was
firmly opposed to Fascism and the fascist drive towards war and
conquest. At the same time, it was afraid that Britain would go to
war, when it did, not in defence of peace and democracy but to
protect its imperialist interests. Indian could not support an
imperialist war. Moreover, imperialism itself was a major cause of
war. Imperialism must disap pear if the fascist threat was to be
successfully met; and lasting peace could be established only if
the domination and exploitation of one nation by another was
ended. The character of the war in which Britain participated
would be determined by its atti tude towards India’s freedom. For
enslaved India could not fight for the freedom of others. India
could, and would, actively support an anti -fascist war provided
its independence was immediately recognized. On the other hand,
the Congress repeatedly declar ed, during 1936 -39, it would resist
every effort to use Indian men, money and resources in a war to ,
serve British imperialism. Summing up the nationalist position,
Nehru wrote on 18 April 1939: ‘For us in India our path is clear.
It is one of complete opp osition to the fascists; it is also one of
opposition to imperialism. We are not going to line up under
Chamberlainism; we are not going to throw our resources in
defence of empire. But we would gladly offer those very resources
for the defence of democrac y, the democracy of a free India lined
up w ith other free countries.’ This position was reiterated by the
Congress Working Committee meeting in the second week of
August 1939, virtually on the eve of war. Because of this
commitment to non -violence, Gandhij i had a basic difference with
this approach. But he agreed to go along. The Congress position
was to be sorely tested in the coming three years. | <s>[INST]400 | India’s Struggle For Independence
independence of nations transformed the situation to a certain
extent. As pointed out earlier, the Indian national leadership was
firmly opposed to Fascism and the fascist drive towards war and
conquest. At the same time, it was afraid that Britain would go to
war, when it did, not in defence of peace and democracy but to
protect its imperialist interests. Indian could not support an
imperialist war. Moreover, imperialism itself was a major cause of
war. Imperialism must disap pear if the fascist threat was to be
successfully met; and lasting peace could be established only if
the domination and exploitation of one nation by another was
ended. The character of the war in which Britain participated
would be determined by its atti tude towards India’s freedom. For
enslaved India could not fight for the freedom of others. India
could, and would, actively support an anti -fascist war provided
its independence was immediately recognized. On the other hand,
the Congress repeatedly declar ed, during 1936 -39, it would resist
every effort to use Indian men, money and resources in a war to ,
serve British imperialism. Summing up the nationalist position,
Nehru wrote on 18 April 1939: ‘For us in India our path is clear.
It is one of complete opp osition to the fascists; it is also one of
opposition to imperialism. We are not going to line up under
Chamberlainism; we are not going to throw our resources in
defence of empire. But we would gladly offer those very resources
for the defence of democrac y, the democracy of a free India lined
up w ith other free countries.’ This position was reiterated by the
Congress Working Committee meeting in the second week of
August 1939, virtually on the eve of war. Because of this
commitment to non -violence, Gandhij i had a basic difference with
this approach. But he agreed to go along. The Congress position
was to be sorely tested in the coming three years.[/INST] |
401 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
CHAPTER 31. THE RISE AND GROWTH
OF COMMUNALISM
Before we discuss the growth of comm unalism in modern
India, it is perhaps useful to define the term and point to certain
basic fallacies reg arding it. Communalism is basically an ideology
with which we have lived so long that it appears to be a simple,
easily understood notion. But this is, perhaps, not so.
Communalism or communal ideology consists of three basic
elements or st ages, one following the other. First, it is the belief
that people who follow the same religion have common secular
interests, that is, common po litical, economic, so cial and cultural
interests. This is the first bedrock of communal ideology. From
this arises the notion of socio -political communities based on
religion. It is these religion -based communities, and not classes ,
nationalities, linguistic -cultural groups, n ations or such politico -
territorial units as provinces or states that are seen as the
fundamental units of Ind ian society. The Indian people, it is
believed, can act socially aid po litically and protect their collective
or corporate or non -individual interests only as members of these
religion -based communities. These different comm unities are
alleged to have their own leaders. Those who t.al of being
national, regional, or class leaders are merely masquerading;
beneath the mask they are only leaders of the ir own
communities. The best they can do is to unite as communal
leaders and then serve the wider category of the nation or
country.
The second clement of communal ideology rests on the
notion that in mu lti-religious society like India , the secular
intere sts, that is the social, cultural , economic and political
interests, of the followers of one religion are dissimilar and
divergen t from the interests of the followers of another .
The third stage of communalism is reached when the | <s>[INST]401 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
CHAPTER 31. THE RISE AND GROWTH
OF COMMUNALISM
Before we discuss the growth of comm unalism in modern
India, it is perhaps useful to define the term and point to certain
basic fallacies reg arding it. Communalism is basically an ideology
with which we have lived so long that it appears to be a simple,
easily understood notion. But this is, perhaps, not so.
Communalism or communal ideology consists of three basic
elements or st ages, one following the other. First, it is the belief
that people who follow the same religion have common secular
interests, that is, common po litical, economic, so cial and cultural
interests. This is the first bedrock of communal ideology. From
this arises the notion of socio -political communities based on
religion. It is these religion -based communities, and not classes ,
nationalities, linguistic -cultural groups, n ations or such politico -
territorial units as provinces or states that are seen as the
fundamental units of Ind ian society. The Indian people, it is
believed, can act socially aid po litically and protect their collective
or corporate or non -individual interests only as members of these
religion -based communities. These different comm unities are
alleged to have their own leaders. Those who t.al of being
national, regional, or class leaders are merely masquerading;
beneath the mask they are only leaders of the ir own
communities. The best they can do is to unite as communal
leaders and then serve the wider category of the nation or
country.
The second clement of communal ideology rests on the
notion that in mu lti-religious society like India , the secular
intere sts, that is the social, cultural , economic and political
interests, of the followers of one religion are dissimilar and
divergen t from the interests of the followers of another .
The third stage of communalism is reached when the[/INST] |
The third stage of communalism is reached when the
interests of the follower s of different religions or of different
‘communities’ are seen to be mutually incompatible, antagonistic | <s>[INST]The third stage of communalism is reached when the
interests of the follower s of different religions or of different
‘communities’ are seen to be mutually incompatible, antagonistic[/INST] |
402 | India’s Struggle For Independence
and hostile. Thus, the communalist asserts this stage that
Hindus and Muslims cannot have common secular interests, that
their secular interests are b ound to be opposed to each other.
Communalism is, therefore, basically and above all an
ideology on which communal politics is based. Communal
violence is a conjunctural consequence of communal ideology.
Similarly, Hind u, Muslim, Sikh or Christian com muna lisms are
not very different from each other; they belong to a single species;
they are varieties of the same communal ideology.
Communal ideology in a person, party or movement starts
with the first stage. Many nationalists fell prey to it or thought
within its digits even while rejecting the two other elements of
communalism, that is, the notion of the mutual divergence or
hostility of the interests of different religion - based communities.
These were the persons who saw themselves as Nationalist
Hindus, Nationalist Muslims, Nationalist Sikhs, etc., and not as
simple nationalists.
The second stage of communalism may be described as
liberal communalism or, in the words of some, moderate
communalism. The liberal commu nalist was basically a believer
in and practitioner of communal politics; but he still upheld
certain liberal, democratic, humanist and nationalist values.
Even while holding that India consisted of distinct religion -based
communities, with their own separate and special interests which
sometim es came into confli ct with each other, he continued to
believe and profess publicly that these different communal
interests could be gradually accommodated and brought into
harmony within the overall, developing national interests, and
India built as a nat ion. Most of the communalists before 1937 —
the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League, the All Brothers after
1925, M.A. Jinnah, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, and N.C.
Kelka r after 1922 — functioned within a liberal communal
framework. | <s>[INST]402 | India’s Struggle For Independence
and hostile. Thus, the communalist asserts this stage that
Hindus and Muslims cannot have common secular interests, that
their secular interests are b ound to be opposed to each other.
Communalism is, therefore, basically and above all an
ideology on which communal politics is based. Communal
violence is a conjunctural consequence of communal ideology.
Similarly, Hind u, Muslim, Sikh or Christian com muna lisms are
not very different from each other; they belong to a single species;
they are varieties of the same communal ideology.
Communal ideology in a person, party or movement starts
with the first stage. Many nationalists fell prey to it or thought
within its digits even while rejecting the two other elements of
communalism, that is, the notion of the mutual divergence or
hostility of the interests of different religion - based communities.
These were the persons who saw themselves as Nationalist
Hindus, Nationalist Muslims, Nationalist Sikhs, etc., and not as
simple nationalists.
The second stage of communalism may be described as
liberal communalism or, in the words of some, moderate
communalism. The liberal commu nalist was basically a believer
in and practitioner of communal politics; but he still upheld
certain liberal, democratic, humanist and nationalist values.
Even while holding that India consisted of distinct religion -based
communities, with their own separate and special interests which
sometim es came into confli ct with each other, he continued to
believe and profess publicly that these different communal
interests could be gradually accommodated and brought into
harmony within the overall, developing national interests, and
India built as a nat ion. Most of the communalists before 1937 —
the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League, the All Brothers after
1925, M.A. Jinnah, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, and N.C.
Kelka r after 1922 — functioned within a liberal communal
framework.[/INST] |
framework.
Extreme communalis m, or communalism functioning
broadly within a fascist syndrome, formed the third or last stage
of communalism. Extreme communalism was based on fear and
hatred, and had a tendency to use violence of language, deed or
behaviour, the language of war and enm ity against political
opponents. It was at this stage that the communalists declared | <s>[INST]framework.
Extreme communalis m, or communalism functioning
broadly within a fascist syndrome, formed the third or last stage
of communalism. Extreme communalism was based on fear and
hatred, and had a tendency to use violence of language, deed or
behaviour, the language of war and enm ity against political
opponents. It was at this stage that the communalists declared[/INST] |
403 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
that Muslims, ‘Muslim culture’ and Islam and Hindus, ‘Hindu
culture, and Hinduism were in danger of being suppressed and
exterminated. It was also at this stage that both the Muslim and
Hindu comm unalists put forward the theory that Muslims and
Hindus constituted separate nations whose mutual antagonism
was permanent and irresolvable. The Muslim League and the
Hindu Mahasabha after 1937 and the Rasht riya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) increasingly veered towards extreme or fascistic
communalism.
Though the three stages of communalism were different
from one another , they also interacted and provided a certain
continuum. Its first ele ment or stage fed liberal and extreme
communalis m and made it difficult to carry on a struggle against
them. Similarly, the liberal communalist found it difficult to
prevent the ideological transition to extreme communalism.
We may take note of several other connected aspects. While
a communalist talke d of, or believed in, defending his
‘community’s’ interests , in real life no such interests existed
outside the field of religion. The economic and political interests
of Hindus, Muslims, and others were the same. In that sense
they did not even constitute separate communities. As Hindus or
Muslims they did not have a separate political -economic life or
interests on an all -India or even regional basis. They were divided
from fellow Hindus or Muslims by region, language, culture,
class, caste, social status, social practices, food and dress habits,
etc., and united on these aspects with follower of other religions.
An upper class Muslim had far mc in common , even culturally,
with an upper class Hindu than with a ka class Muslim.
Similarly, a Punjabi Hindu sto od closer culturally to a Punjabi
Muslim than to a Bengali Hindu; and, of course, the same was
true of a Bengali Muslim in relation to a Bengali Hindu and a
Punjabi Muslim. The unreal communal division, thus, obscured | <s>[INST]403 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
that Muslims, ‘Muslim culture’ and Islam and Hindus, ‘Hindu
culture, and Hinduism were in danger of being suppressed and
exterminated. It was also at this stage that both the Muslim and
Hindu comm unalists put forward the theory that Muslims and
Hindus constituted separate nations whose mutual antagonism
was permanent and irresolvable. The Muslim League and the
Hindu Mahasabha after 1937 and the Rasht riya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) increasingly veered towards extreme or fascistic
communalism.
Though the three stages of communalism were different
from one another , they also interacted and provided a certain
continuum. Its first ele ment or stage fed liberal and extreme
communalis m and made it difficult to carry on a struggle against
them. Similarly, the liberal communalist found it difficult to
prevent the ideological transition to extreme communalism.
We may take note of several other connected aspects. While
a communalist talke d of, or believed in, defending his
‘community’s’ interests , in real life no such interests existed
outside the field of religion. The economic and political interests
of Hindus, Muslims, and others were the same. In that sense
they did not even constitute separate communities. As Hindus or
Muslims they did not have a separate political -economic life or
interests on an all -India or even regional basis. They were divided
from fellow Hindus or Muslims by region, language, culture,
class, caste, social status, social practices, food and dress habits,
etc., and united on these aspects with follower of other religions.
An upper class Muslim had far mc in common , even culturally,
with an upper class Hindu than with a ka class Muslim.
Similarly, a Punjabi Hindu sto od closer culturally to a Punjabi
Muslim than to a Bengali Hindu; and, of course, the same was
true of a Bengali Muslim in relation to a Bengali Hindu and a
Punjabi Muslim. The unreal communal division, thus, obscured[/INST] |
Punjabi Muslim. The unreal communal division, thus, obscured
the real division of the Indian people into linguistic -cultural
regions and social classes as well as their real, emerging and
growing unity into a nation.
If communal interests did not exist, then communalism was
not a pa rtial or one -sided or sectional view of the social reality; it
was its wrong & unscientific view. It has been suggested, on
occasions, that a communalist being narrow -minded, looks after | <s>[INST]Punjabi Muslim. The unreal communal division, thus, obscured
the real division of the Indian people into linguistic -cultural
regions and social classes as well as their real, emerging and
growing unity into a nation.
If communal interests did not exist, then communalism was
not a pa rtial or one -sided or sectional view of the social reality; it
was its wrong & unscientific view. It has been suggested, on
occasions, that a communalist being narrow -minded, looks after[/INST] |
404 | India’s Struggle For Independence
his own community’s interests. But if no such interests existed ,
then he could not be serving his ‘community’s’ or co-religionists
interests either. He could not be the ‘representative’ of his
community. In the name of serving his community’s interests, he
served knowingly or unknowingly some other interests. He,
therefore, either deceived others or unconsciously deceived
himself. Thus, commun al assumptions, communal logic and
communal answers were wrong. What the communalist projected
as problems were not the real problems, and what the
commun alist said was the answer was not the real answer.
Sometimes, communalism is seen as something that h as
survived from the past, as something that the medieval period
has bequeathed to the present or at least as having roots in the
medieval period. But while communalism uses, and is based on,
many elements of ancient and medieval ideologies, basically it i s
a modern technology and political trend that expresses the social
urges and serves the political needs of modem social groups,
classes and forces. Its social roots as also its social, political and
economic objectives lie very much in the modem period of Indian
history. It was brought into existence and sustained by
contemporary socio -economic structure.
Communalism emerged as a consequence of the emergence
of modern politics which marked a sharp break with the politics
of the ancient or medieval or pr e-1857 periods. Communalism, as
also other modem views such as nationalism and socialism,
could emerge as politics and as ideology only after politics based
on the people, politics of popular participation and mobilization,
politics based on the creation a nd mobilization of public opinion
had come into existence. In pre -modern politics, people were
either ignored in upper -class based politics or were compelled to
rebel outside the political system and, in case of success, their
leaders incorporated into the old ruling classes. This was | <s>[INST]404 | India’s Struggle For Independence
his own community’s interests. But if no such interests existed ,
then he could not be serving his ‘community’s’ or co-religionists
interests either. He could not be the ‘representative’ of his
community. In the name of serving his community’s interests, he
served knowingly or unknowingly some other interests. He,
therefore, either deceived others or unconsciously deceived
himself. Thus, commun al assumptions, communal logic and
communal answers were wrong. What the communalist projected
as problems were not the real problems, and what the
commun alist said was the answer was not the real answer.
Sometimes, communalism is seen as something that h as
survived from the past, as something that the medieval period
has bequeathed to the present or at least as having roots in the
medieval period. But while communalism uses, and is based on,
many elements of ancient and medieval ideologies, basically it i s
a modern technology and political trend that expresses the social
urges and serves the political needs of modem social groups,
classes and forces. Its social roots as also its social, political and
economic objectives lie very much in the modem period of Indian
history. It was brought into existence and sustained by
contemporary socio -economic structure.
Communalism emerged as a consequence of the emergence
of modern politics which marked a sharp break with the politics
of the ancient or medieval or pr e-1857 periods. Communalism, as
also other modem views such as nationalism and socialism,
could emerge as politics and as ideology only after politics based
on the people, politics of popular participation and mobilization,
politics based on the creation a nd mobilization of public opinion
had come into existence. In pre -modern politics, people were
either ignored in upper -class based politics or were compelled to
rebel outside the political system and, in case of success, their
leaders incorporated into the old ruling classes. This was[/INST] |
leaders incorporated into the old ruling classes. This was
recognized by many perceptive Indians. Jawaharlal Nehru, for
example, noted in 1936: ‘One must never forget that
communalism in India is a latte r-day phenomenon which has
grown up before our eyes.” Nor was there anything uniqu e about
communalism in the Indian context. It was not an inevitable or
inherent product of India’s peculiar historical and social
development. It was the result of conditions which have in other
societies produced similar phenomena and ideologies such as | <s>[INST]leaders incorporated into the old ruling classes. This was
recognized by many perceptive Indians. Jawaharlal Nehru, for
example, noted in 1936: ‘One must never forget that
communalism in India is a latte r-day phenomenon which has
grown up before our eyes.” Nor was there anything uniqu e about
communalism in the Indian context. It was not an inevitable or
inherent product of India’s peculiar historical and social
development. It was the result of conditions which have in other
societies produced similar phenomena and ideologies such as[/INST] |
405 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
Fascism, anti -Semitism, racism, Catholic -Protestant conflict in
Northern Ireland, or Christian - Muslim conflict in Lebanon.
The communal consciousness arose as a result of the
transformation of Indian society under the impact of colonialism
and the need to struggle against it. The growing economic,
political and administrative unification of regions and the
country, the process of making India into a nation, the
developing contradiction between colonialism and the Indian
people and the formation of modem so cial classes and strata
called for new ways of seeing one’s common interests. They made
it necessary to have wider links and loyalties among the people
and to form new identities. This also followed from the birth of
new politics during the last half of th e 19th c entury. The new
politics was based on the politicization and mobilization of an
ever increasing number of the Indian people.
The process of grasping the new, emerging political reality
and social relations and the adoption of new uniting principle s,
new social and political identities with the aid of new ideas and
concepts was bound to be a difficult and gradual process. The
process required the spread of modem ideas of nationalism,
cultural -linguistic development and class struggle. But wherever
their growth was slow and partial, people inevitably used the old,
familiar pre -modern categories of self -identity such as caste,
locality, region, race, religion, sect and occupation to grasp the
new rea lity, to make wider connections and to evolve new
identities and ideologies. Similar developments have occurred all
over the world in similar circumstances. But often such old,
inadequate and false ideas and identities gradually give wa y to
the new, historically necessary ideas and identities of nation,
nationality and class. This also occurred on a large scale in India,
but not uniformly among all the Indian people , in particular, | <s>[INST]405 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
Fascism, anti -Semitism, racism, Catholic -Protestant conflict in
Northern Ireland, or Christian - Muslim conflict in Lebanon.
The communal consciousness arose as a result of the
transformation of Indian society under the impact of colonialism
and the need to struggle against it. The growing economic,
political and administrative unification of regions and the
country, the process of making India into a nation, the
developing contradiction between colonialism and the Indian
people and the formation of modem so cial classes and strata
called for new ways of seeing one’s common interests. They made
it necessary to have wider links and loyalties among the people
and to form new identities. This also followed from the birth of
new politics during the last half of th e 19th c entury. The new
politics was based on the politicization and mobilization of an
ever increasing number of the Indian people.
The process of grasping the new, emerging political reality
and social relations and the adoption of new uniting principle s,
new social and political identities with the aid of new ideas and
concepts was bound to be a difficult and gradual process. The
process required the spread of modem ideas of nationalism,
cultural -linguistic development and class struggle. But wherever
their growth was slow and partial, people inevitably used the old,
familiar pre -modern categories of self -identity such as caste,
locality, region, race, religion, sect and occupation to grasp the
new rea lity, to make wider connections and to evolve new
identities and ideologies. Similar developments have occurred all
over the world in similar circumstances. But often such old,
inadequate and false ideas and identities gradually give wa y to
the new, historically necessary ideas and identities of nation,
nationality and class. This also occurred on a large scale in India,
but not uniformly among all the Indian people , in particular,[/INST] |
but not uniformly among all the Indian people , in particular,
religious consciousness was transformed into communal
consciousness in some parts of the country and among some
sections of the p eople. This as because there were some factors in
the Indian situation which fa voured its growth; it served the
needs of certain sections of society and certain social and
political forces. The question is why did communalism succeed in
growing during the 20th century? What aspects of the Indian
situation fa voured this process? Which social classes and
political forces did it serve? Why did it become such a pervasive | <s>[INST]but not uniformly among all the Indian people , in particular,
religious consciousness was transformed into communal
consciousness in some parts of the country and among some
sections of the p eople. This as because there were some factors in
the Indian situation which fa voured its growth; it served the
needs of certain sections of society and certain social and
political forces. The question is why did communalism succeed in
growing during the 20th century? What aspects of the Indian
situation fa voured this process? Which social classes and
political forces did it serve? Why did it become such a pervasive[/INST] |
406 | India’s Struggle For Independence
pan of Indian reality? Though it as n inherent or inevitable in the
situation, it was not a mere conspiracy of power -hungry
politicians and crafty administrators either. It had soc io-
econo mic and political roots. There was a social situation which
was funnelling it and without which it could not have survived for
long.
*
Above all, communalism was one of the by -products of the
colonial character of Indian economy, of colonial
underdevelopment, of the incapacity of colonialism to develop the
Indian economy. The resulting economic stagnation and its
impact on the lives of the Indian people, especi ally the middle
classes, produced conditions which were conducive to division
and antagonism within Indian society as also to its radical
transformation.
Throughout the 20th century, in the absence of modem
industrial development and the development of ed ucation, health
and other social and cultural Services, unemployment was an
acute problem in India, especially for the educated middle and
lower middle classes who could not fall back on land and whose
socio -economic conditions suffered constant deteriorat ion. These
economic opportunities declined further during the Great
Depression after 1928 when large scale unemployment prevailed.
In this social situation, the nationalist and other popular
movements worked for the long -term solution to the people’s
problems by fighting for the overthrow of colonialism and radical
social transformation. In fact, the middle classes formed the
backbone both of the militant national movement from 1905 to
1947 and the left -wing parties and groups since the 1920s.
Unfortunatel y there were some who lacked a wider social vision
and political understanding and looked to their narrow
immediate interests and short -term solutions to their personal or
sectional problems such as communal, caste, or provincial
reservation in jobs or in municipal committees, legislatures, and
so on. | <s>[INST]406 | India’s Struggle For Independence
pan of Indian reality? Though it as n inherent or inevitable in the
situation, it was not a mere conspiracy of power -hungry
politicians and crafty administrators either. It had soc io-
econo mic and political roots. There was a social situation which
was funnelling it and without which it could not have survived for
long.
*
Above all, communalism was one of the by -products of the
colonial character of Indian economy, of colonial
underdevelopment, of the incapacity of colonialism to develop the
Indian economy. The resulting economic stagnation and its
impact on the lives of the Indian people, especi ally the middle
classes, produced conditions which were conducive to division
and antagonism within Indian society as also to its radical
transformation.
Throughout the 20th century, in the absence of modem
industrial development and the development of ed ucation, health
and other social and cultural Services, unemployment was an
acute problem in India, especially for the educated middle and
lower middle classes who could not fall back on land and whose
socio -economic conditions suffered constant deteriorat ion. These
economic opportunities declined further during the Great
Depression after 1928 when large scale unemployment prevailed.
In this social situation, the nationalist and other popular
movements worked for the long -term solution to the people’s
problems by fighting for the overthrow of colonialism and radical
social transformation. In fact, the middle classes formed the
backbone both of the militant national movement from 1905 to
1947 and the left -wing parties and groups since the 1920s.
Unfortunatel y there were some who lacked a wider social vision
and political understanding and looked to their narrow
immediate interests and short -term solutions to their personal or
sectional problems such as communal, caste, or provincial
reservation in jobs or in municipal committees, legislatures, and
so on.[/INST] |
so on.
Because of economic stagnation, there was intense
competition among individuals for government jobs, in | <s>[INST]so on.
Because of economic stagnation, there was intense
competition among individuals for government jobs, in[/INST] |
407 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
profess ions like law and medicine, and in business for customers
and markets. In an attempt t o get a lar ger share of existing
economic opportunities, middle class individuals freely used all
the means at their disposal — educational qualifications,
personal merit as also nepotism, bribery, and so on. At the same
time, to give their struggle a wider base, the y also used other
group identities such as caste, province and religion to enhance
their capacity to compete. Thus, some individuals from the
middle classes could, and did, benefit, in the short run, from
communalism, especially in the field of government employment.
This gave a certain aura of validity to communal politics. The
communalist could impose his interpretation of reality on middle
class’ individuals because it did have a basis, however partial,
perverted and short-term, in the social existence a nd social
experience of the middle classes .
Gradually, the spread of education to well -off peasants and
small landlords extended the boundaries of the job -seeking
middle class to the rural areas . The newly educated rural youth
could not be sustained by lan d whether as land lords or
peasants, especia lly as agriculture was totally st agnant b ecause
of the colonial impact. They flocked on the towns and cities for
opening in government jobs and professions and tried to save
themselves by fighting for jobs throu gh the system of communal
reserv ations and nominations. This development gradually
widened the social base of communalism to cover the rural upper
strata of peasants and landlords.
Thus, the crisis of the colonial economy constantly
generated two opposing sets of ideologies and political tendencies
among the middle classes. When anti -imperialist revolution and
social change appeared on the agenda, the middle classes
enthusiastically joined the national and other popular
movements. They then readily advocate d the cause and demands | <s>[INST]407 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
profess ions like law and medicine, and in business for customers
and markets. In an attempt t o get a lar ger share of existing
economic opportunities, middle class individuals freely used all
the means at their disposal — educational qualifications,
personal merit as also nepotism, bribery, and so on. At the same
time, to give their struggle a wider base, the y also used other
group identities such as caste, province and religion to enhance
their capacity to compete. Thus, some individuals from the
middle classes could, and did, benefit, in the short run, from
communalism, especially in the field of government employment.
This gave a certain aura of validity to communal politics. The
communalist could impose his interpretation of reality on middle
class’ individuals because it did have a basis, however partial,
perverted and short-term, in the social existence a nd social
experience of the middle classes .
Gradually, the spread of education to well -off peasants and
small landlords extended the boundaries of the job -seeking
middle class to the rural areas . The newly educated rural youth
could not be sustained by lan d whether as land lords or
peasants, especia lly as agriculture was totally st agnant b ecause
of the colonial impact. They flocked on the towns and cities for
opening in government jobs and professions and tried to save
themselves by fighting for jobs throu gh the system of communal
reserv ations and nominations. This development gradually
widened the social base of communalism to cover the rural upper
strata of peasants and landlords.
Thus, the crisis of the colonial economy constantly
generated two opposing sets of ideologies and political tendencies
among the middle classes. When anti -imperialist revolution and
social change appeared on the agenda, the middle classes
enthusiastically joined the national and other popular
movements. They then readily advocate d the cause and demands[/INST] |
movements. They then readily advocate d the cause and demands
of the entire society from the capitalists to the peasants and
workers. Individual ambitions were then sunk in the wider social
vision . But, when prospects of revolutionary change receded,
when the anti -imperialist struggle entered a more passive phase ,
many belonging to the middle classes shifted to short -term
solutions of their personal problems, to politics based on
communalism and other similar ideologies. Thus with the same
social causation, large sections of the middle classes in several | <s>[INST]movements. They then readily advocate d the cause and demands
of the entire society from the capitalists to the peasants and
workers. Individual ambitions were then sunk in the wider social
vision . But, when prospects of revolutionary change receded,
when the anti -imperialist struggle entered a more passive phase ,
many belonging to the middle classes shifted to short -term
solutions of their personal problems, to politics based on
communalism and other similar ideologies. Thus with the same
social causation, large sections of the middle classes in several[/INST] |
408 | India’s Struggle For Independence
parts of the country constantly oscillated between anti -
imperialism and communalism or communal -type politics. But ,
there was a crucial different in the two cases. In the first case,
their own social interests merged with interests of genera l social
development and their politics formed a part of the broader anti -
imperialist struggle. In the second case, they functioned
as a narrow and selfish interest group, accepted the soc io-
political status and objectively served colonialism.
To sum up this aspect: communalism was deeply rooted in
and was an expression of the interests and aspirations of the
middle classes in a social situation in which opportunities for
them were grossly inadequate. The communal question was,
therefore a middle class questi on par excellence. The main appeal
of communalism and its main social base also lay among the
middle classes. I t is, however, important to remember that a large
number of middle class individuals remained, on the whole, free
of communalism even in the l930 s and 1940s. This was, in
particular, true of most of the intellectuals, whether Hindu,
Muslim or Sikh. In fact, the typical Indian intellectual of the
l930s tended to be both secular and broadly left -wing.
*
There was another aspect of the colonial econo my that
favoured communal politics. In the absence of openings in
industry, commerce, education and other social services, and the
cultural and entertainment fields, the Government service was
the main avenue of employment for the middle classes. Much of
the employment for teachers, doctors and engineers was also
under government control. As late as 1951, while 1.2 million
persons were covered by the Factory Acts, 3.3 millions got
employment in government service. And communal politics could
be used to put pressure on the Government to reserve and
allocate its jobs as also seats in professional colleges on
communal and caste lines. Consequently, communal politics till | <s>[INST]408 | India’s Struggle For Independence
parts of the country constantly oscillated between anti -
imperialism and communalism or communal -type politics. But ,
there was a crucial different in the two cases. In the first case,
their own social interests merged with interests of genera l social
development and their politics formed a part of the broader anti -
imperialist struggle. In the second case, they functioned
as a narrow and selfish interest group, accepted the soc io-
political status and objectively served colonialism.
To sum up this aspect: communalism was deeply rooted in
and was an expression of the interests and aspirations of the
middle classes in a social situation in which opportunities for
them were grossly inadequate. The communal question was,
therefore a middle class questi on par excellence. The main appeal
of communalism and its main social base also lay among the
middle classes. I t is, however, important to remember that a large
number of middle class individuals remained, on the whole, free
of communalism even in the l930 s and 1940s. This was, in
particular, true of most of the intellectuals, whether Hindu,
Muslim or Sikh. In fact, the typical Indian intellectual of the
l930s tended to be both secular and broadly left -wing.
*
There was another aspect of the colonial econo my that
favoured communal politics. In the absence of openings in
industry, commerce, education and other social services, and the
cultural and entertainment fields, the Government service was
the main avenue of employment for the middle classes. Much of
the employment for teachers, doctors and engineers was also
under government control. As late as 1951, while 1.2 million
persons were covered by the Factory Acts, 3.3 millions got
employment in government service. And communal politics could
be used to put pressure on the Government to reserve and
allocate its jobs as also seats in professional colleges on
communal and caste lines. Consequently, communal politics till[/INST] |
communal and caste lines. Consequently, communal politics till
1937 was organized around government jobs, educational
concessions, and the like as also po litical positions — seats in
legislative councils, municipal bodies, etc. — which enabled
control over these and other economic opportunities. It may also
be noted that though the communalists spoke in the name of | <s>[INST]communal and caste lines. Consequently, communal politics till
1937 was organized around government jobs, educational
concessions, and the like as also po litical positions — seats in
legislative councils, municipal bodies, etc. — which enabled
control over these and other economic opportunities. It may also
be noted that though the communalists spoke in the name of[/INST] |
409 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
their ‘communities,’ the reservations, gua rantees and other
‘rights’ they demanded were virtually confined to these two
aspects. They did not take up any issues which were of interest
to the masses.
*
At another plane, communalism often distorted or
misinterpreted social tension and class conflic t between the
exploiters and the exploited belonging to different religions as
communal conflict. While the discontent and clash of interests
was real and was due to non -religious or non - communal factors,
because of backward political consciousness it fou nd a distorted
expression in communal conflict. As C.G. Shah has put it: ‘Under
the pressure of communal propaganda, the masses are unable to
locate the real causes of their exploitation, oppression, and
suffering and imagine a fictitious communal source o f their
origin. ’
What made such communal (and later casteist) d istortion
possible specific feature of Indian social development — in
several parts of the country the religious distinction coincided
with social, and class distinctions . Here most often the e xploiting
sections — landlords, merchants and moneylenders, were upper
caste Hindus while the poor and exploited were Muslims or lower
caste Hindus. Consequently, propaganda by the Muslim
communalists that Hindus were exploiting Muslims or by the
Hindu communalists that Muslims were threatening Hindu
property or economic interests could succeed even while wholly
incorrect. Thus, for example, the struggle between tenant and
landlord in East Bengal and Malabar and the peasant -debtor and
the merchant -moneylend er in Punjab could be portrayed by the
communalists as a struggle between Muslims and Hindus.
Similarly, the landlord -moneylender oppression was represented
as the oppression of Muslims by Hindus, and the attack by the
rural poor on the rural rich as an attack by Muslims on Hindus.
For example, one aspect of the growth of communalism in Punjab | <s>[INST]409 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
their ‘communities,’ the reservations, gua rantees and other
‘rights’ they demanded were virtually confined to these two
aspects. They did not take up any issues which were of interest
to the masses.
*
At another plane, communalism often distorted or
misinterpreted social tension and class conflic t between the
exploiters and the exploited belonging to different religions as
communal conflict. While the discontent and clash of interests
was real and was due to non -religious or non - communal factors,
because of backward political consciousness it fou nd a distorted
expression in communal conflict. As C.G. Shah has put it: ‘Under
the pressure of communal propaganda, the masses are unable to
locate the real causes of their exploitation, oppression, and
suffering and imagine a fictitious communal source o f their
origin. ’
What made such communal (and later casteist) d istortion
possible specific feature of Indian social development — in
several parts of the country the religious distinction coincided
with social, and class distinctions . Here most often the e xploiting
sections — landlords, merchants and moneylenders, were upper
caste Hindus while the poor and exploited were Muslims or lower
caste Hindus. Consequently, propaganda by the Muslim
communalists that Hindus were exploiting Muslims or by the
Hindu communalists that Muslims were threatening Hindu
property or economic interests could succeed even while wholly
incorrect. Thus, for example, the struggle between tenant and
landlord in East Bengal and Malabar and the peasant -debtor and
the merchant -moneylend er in Punjab could be portrayed by the
communalists as a struggle between Muslims and Hindus.
Similarly, the landlord -moneylender oppression was represented
as the oppression of Muslims by Hindus, and the attack by the
rural poor on the rural rich as an attack by Muslims on Hindus.
For example, one aspect of the growth of communalism in Punjab[/INST] |
For example, one aspect of the growth of communalism in Punjab
was the effort of the big Muslim landlords to protect their
economic and social position by using communalism to turn the
anger of their Muslim tenants against Hindu traders and
moneylenders, and the use of communalism by the latter to | <s>[INST]For example, one aspect of the growth of communalism in Punjab
was the effort of the big Muslim landlords to protect their
economic and social position by using communalism to turn the
anger of their Muslim tenants against Hindu traders and
moneylenders, and the use of communalism by the latter to[/INST] |
410 | India’s Struggle For Independence
protect their threatened class interests by raising the cry of
Hindu interests in danger. In reality, the struggle of the peasants
for their emancipation was inevitable. The question was what
type of ideological - political content it would acquire. Both the
communalists and the colonial administrators stressed the
communal as against the class aspects of agrarian exploitation
and oppression. Thus, they held that the Muslim peasants and
debtors were being exploited not as peasants and debtors but
because they were Muslims.
In many cases , a communal form is given to the social
conflict not b the participants but by the observer, the official,
the journalist, the politician, and, finally, th e historian, all of
whom provide a post -facto communal explanation for the conflict
because of their own conscious or uncon scious outlook. It is also
important to note that agrarian conflicts did not assume a
communal colour until the 20th century and the rise of
communalism and that too not in most cases , in the Pabna
agrarian riots of 18 73, both Hindu and Muslim tenants fought
zamindars together. Similarly, as brought out in earlier chapters,
most of the agrarian struggles in 1919 stayed clear of communal
channels. The peasants ’ and workers ’— the radial intelligentsia
succeeded in creating powerful secular wit arid %ken movements
and organizations which became important constituents of the
anti-imperialist struggle.
It is important to note in this context that Hindu zamindars
in Bengal had acquired control over land not because they were
Hindus but as a result of the historical process of the spread of
Islamic religion in Bengal among the lower castes and classes.
Hindu zamindars and businessmen acquired e conomic
dominance over landed capital in Bengal at the beginning of the
18th century during the rule of Murshid Quli Khan, religiously
the most devout of Aurangzeb’s officials and followers. Under his | <s>[INST]410 | India’s Struggle For Independence
protect their threatened class interests by raising the cry of
Hindu interests in danger. In reality, the struggle of the peasants
for their emancipation was inevitable. The question was what
type of ideological - political content it would acquire. Both the
communalists and the colonial administrators stressed the
communal as against the class aspects of agrarian exploitation
and oppression. Thus, they held that the Muslim peasants and
debtors were being exploited not as peasants and debtors but
because they were Muslims.
In many cases , a communal form is given to the social
conflict not b the participants but by the observer, the official,
the journalist, the politician, and, finally, th e historian, all of
whom provide a post -facto communal explanation for the conflict
because of their own conscious or uncon scious outlook. It is also
important to note that agrarian conflicts did not assume a
communal colour until the 20th century and the rise of
communalism and that too not in most cases , in the Pabna
agrarian riots of 18 73, both Hindu and Muslim tenants fought
zamindars together. Similarly, as brought out in earlier chapters,
most of the agrarian struggles in 1919 stayed clear of communal
channels. The peasants ’ and workers ’— the radial intelligentsia
succeeded in creating powerful secular wit arid %ken movements
and organizations which became important constituents of the
anti-imperialist struggle.
It is important to note in this context that Hindu zamindars
in Bengal had acquired control over land not because they were
Hindus but as a result of the historical process of the spread of
Islamic religion in Bengal among the lower castes and classes.
Hindu zamindars and businessmen acquired e conomic
dominance over landed capital in Bengal at the beginning of the
18th century during the rule of Murshid Quli Khan, religiously
the most devout of Aurangzeb’s officials and followers. Under his[/INST] |
rule, more than seventy -five per cent of the zamindars and most
of the taluqdars were Hindus. The Permanent Settlement of 1793
further strengthened the trend by eliminating on a large scale
both the old Hindu and Muslim zamindar families and replacing
them with new men of commerce who were Hindus. Similarly, t he
predominance of Hindus among bankers, traders and
moneylenders in northern India dated to the medieval period. The
dominance these strata acquired over rural society under British | <s>[INST]rule, more than seventy -five per cent of the zamindars and most
of the taluqdars were Hindus. The Permanent Settlement of 1793
further strengthened the trend by eliminating on a large scale
both the old Hindu and Muslim zamindar families and replacing
them with new men of commerce who were Hindus. Similarly, t he
predominance of Hindus among bankers, traders and
moneylenders in northern India dated to the medieval period. The
dominance these strata acquired over rural society under British[/INST] |
411 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
rule was the result not of their being Hindu but of the important
economi c role they acquired in the colonial system of
exploitation. In other words, colonial history guaranteed the
growth and economic domination of merchant -moneylenders;
medieval history had guaranteed that they would be mostly
Hindus.
Communalism represented , at another level, a struggle
between two upper classes or strata for power, privileges and
economic gains. Belonging to different religions (or castes) these
classes or strata used communalism to mobilize the popular
support of their co -religionists in t heir mutual struggles. This
was, for example, the case in Western Punjab where the Muslim
landlords opposed the Hindu moneylenders and in East Bengal
where the Muslim jotedars (small landlords) opposed the Hindu
zamindars.
*
Above all, communalism develop ed as a weapon of
economically and politically reactionary social classes and
political forces — and semi- feudal landlords and ex-bureaucrats
(whom Dr. K.M. Ashraf has called the jagirdari classes)
merchants and moneylenders and the colonial state. Commun al
leaders and parties were, in general, allied with these classes and
forces. The social, economic and political vested interests
deliberately encouraged or unconsciously adopted communalism
because of its capacity to distort and divert popular struggles, to
prevent the masses from understanding the soc io-economic arid
political forces responsible for their soci al condition, to prevent
unity on national and class lines, and to turn them away from
their real national and socio -economic interests and issues and
mass movements around them. Communalism also enabled the
upper classes and the colonial rulers to unite with sections of the
middle (lasses and to utilize the latter’s politics t serve their own
ends.
* | <s>[INST]411 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
rule was the result not of their being Hindu but of the important
economi c role they acquired in the colonial system of
exploitation. In other words, colonial history guaranteed the
growth and economic domination of merchant -moneylenders;
medieval history had guaranteed that they would be mostly
Hindus.
Communalism represented , at another level, a struggle
between two upper classes or strata for power, privileges and
economic gains. Belonging to different religions (or castes) these
classes or strata used communalism to mobilize the popular
support of their co -religionists in t heir mutual struggles. This
was, for example, the case in Western Punjab where the Muslim
landlords opposed the Hindu moneylenders and in East Bengal
where the Muslim jotedars (small landlords) opposed the Hindu
zamindars.
*
Above all, communalism develop ed as a weapon of
economically and politically reactionary social classes and
political forces — and semi- feudal landlords and ex-bureaucrats
(whom Dr. K.M. Ashraf has called the jagirdari classes)
merchants and moneylenders and the colonial state. Commun al
leaders and parties were, in general, allied with these classes and
forces. The social, economic and political vested interests
deliberately encouraged or unconsciously adopted communalism
because of its capacity to distort and divert popular struggles, to
prevent the masses from understanding the soc io-economic arid
political forces responsible for their soci al condition, to prevent
unity on national and class lines, and to turn them away from
their real national and socio -economic interests and issues and
mass movements around them. Communalism also enabled the
upper classes and the colonial rulers to unite with sections of the
middle (lasses and to utilize the latter’s politics t serve their own
ends.
*[/INST] |
412 | India’s Struggle For Independence
British rule and its policy of Divide and Rule b ore special
responsibility for the growth communalism in modem India,
though it is also true that it could succeed only because of
internal social and political conditions. The f act was that the
state, with its immense power, could promote either national
integration or all kinds of divisive forces. The colonial state chose
the latter course. It used communalism to counter and weaken
the growing national movement and the welding of the Indian
people into a nation , communalism was presented by the colonial
rulers as the proble m of the defenc e of minorities. Hindu -Muslim
disunity — and the need to protect minorities from domination
and suppression by the majority — was increasingly offered as
the main justification for the maintenance of British rule,
especial ly as theories of civilizing mission, white man’s burden,
welfare of the ruled, etc., got increasingly discredited.
Communalism was, of course, not the only constituent of
the policy of Divide and Rule. Every existing division of Indian
society was encour aged to prevent the emerging unity of the
Indian people. An effort was made to set region agains t, region,
province against province, caste agains t caste, language against
language, reformers against the orthodox, the moderate against
the militant, leftist against rightist, and even class against class.
It was, of course, the communal division which survived to the
end and proved the most serviceable. In fact, near the end, it was
to become the main prop of colonialism, and colonial authorities
were to stak e their all on it. On the other hand, communalism
could not have developed to such an extent as to divide th e
country, if it did not have the powerful support of the colonial
state. In this sense, communalism may be described as the
channel through which the politics of the middle classes were
placed at the service of coloniali sm and the jagirdari classes. In | <s>[INST]412 | India’s Struggle For Independence
British rule and its policy of Divide and Rule b ore special
responsibility for the growth communalism in modem India,
though it is also true that it could succeed only because of
internal social and political conditions. The f act was that the
state, with its immense power, could promote either national
integration or all kinds of divisive forces. The colonial state chose
the latter course. It used communalism to counter and weaken
the growing national movement and the welding of the Indian
people into a nation , communalism was presented by the colonial
rulers as the proble m of the defenc e of minorities. Hindu -Muslim
disunity — and the need to protect minorities from domination
and suppression by the majority — was increasingly offered as
the main justification for the maintenance of British rule,
especial ly as theories of civilizing mission, white man’s burden,
welfare of the ruled, etc., got increasingly discredited.
Communalism was, of course, not the only constituent of
the policy of Divide and Rule. Every existing division of Indian
society was encour aged to prevent the emerging unity of the
Indian people. An effort was made to set region agains t, region,
province against province, caste agains t caste, language against
language, reformers against the orthodox, the moderate against
the militant, leftist against rightist, and even class against class.
It was, of course, the communal division which survived to the
end and proved the most serviceable. In fact, near the end, it was
to become the main prop of colonialism, and colonial authorities
were to stak e their all on it. On the other hand, communalism
could not have developed to such an extent as to divide th e
country, if it did not have the powerful support of the colonial
state. In this sense, communalism may be described as the
channel through which the politics of the middle classes were
placed at the service of coloniali sm and the jagirdari classes. In[/INST] |
fact, communalism was the route through which colonialism was
able to extend its narrow social base to sections of workers,
peasants, the middle class es and the bourgeoisie whose interests
were otherwise in contradiction with colonialism.
What were the different ways and policies, or acts of
omission and commission, through which the British encouraged
and nurtured communal ism? First, by consistently t reating
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs as separate communities and soc io-
political entities which had little in common. India, it was said, | <s>[INST]fact, communalism was the route through which colonialism was
able to extend its narrow social base to sections of workers,
peasants, the middle class es and the bourgeoisie whose interests
were otherwise in contradiction with colonialism.
What were the different ways and policies, or acts of
omission and commission, through which the British encouraged
and nurtured communal ism? First, by consistently t reating
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs as separate communities and soc io-
political entities which had little in common. India, it was said,[/INST] |
413 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
was neither a nation or a nation -in-the- making, nor did it
consist of nationalities or local societies, but consisted of
structured, mutually exclusive and antagonistic religion -based
communities. Second, official favour and patronage were
extended to the co mmunalists. Third, the communal Press and
persons and agitations were shown extraordinary to lerance.
Fourth, communa l demands were readily accepted, th us
politically stren gthening communal organizations and their hold
over the people. For example, while the Congress could get no ne
of its demands accepted from 1885 -1905, the Muslim communal
demands w ere accepted in 1906 as soon as they were presented
to the Viceroy. Similarly, in 1932, the Communal Award accepted
all the major communal demands of the time. During World War
II, the Muslim communalists ere given a complete veto on any
political advance. Fifth, the British rea dily accepted communal
organizations and leaders as the real spokesperson for their
‘communities,’ while the nationalist leaders were treated as
representing a microscopic minority — the elite. S ixth, separate
electorates served as an important instrument for the
development of communal politics . Lastly, the colonial
government encouraged co mmunalis m through a policy of non -
action against it. Certain positive measures which the state alone
could undertake were needed to check the growth of
communalism. The failure to undertake them served as an
indirect encouragement to communalism. The Government
refused to take action against the propagation of ‘virulent
communal ideas and communal hatred through the Press,
pamphlets, leaflets, literature, public platform and rumours. This
was in sharp contrast with the frequent suppression of the
nationalist Press, literature, civil servants, propaganda, and so
on. On the contrary, the Government freely rewarded communal
leaders, intellectuals and government servants with titles, | <s>[INST]413 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
was neither a nation or a nation -in-the- making, nor did it
consist of nationalities or local societies, but consisted of
structured, mutually exclusive and antagonistic religion -based
communities. Second, official favour and patronage were
extended to the co mmunalists. Third, the communal Press and
persons and agitations were shown extraordinary to lerance.
Fourth, communa l demands were readily accepted, th us
politically stren gthening communal organizations and their hold
over the people. For example, while the Congress could get no ne
of its demands accepted from 1885 -1905, the Muslim communal
demands w ere accepted in 1906 as soon as they were presented
to the Viceroy. Similarly, in 1932, the Communal Award accepted
all the major communal demands of the time. During World War
II, the Muslim communalists ere given a complete veto on any
political advance. Fifth, the British rea dily accepted communal
organizations and leaders as the real spokesperson for their
‘communities,’ while the nationalist leaders were treated as
representing a microscopic minority — the elite. S ixth, separate
electorates served as an important instrument for the
development of communal politics . Lastly, the colonial
government encouraged co mmunalis m through a policy of non -
action against it. Certain positive measures which the state alone
could undertake were needed to check the growth of
communalism. The failure to undertake them served as an
indirect encouragement to communalism. The Government
refused to take action against the propagation of ‘virulent
communal ideas and communal hatred through the Press,
pamphlets, leaflets, literature, public platform and rumours. This
was in sharp contrast with the frequent suppression of the
nationalist Press, literature, civil servants, propaganda, and so
on. On the contrary, the Government freely rewarded communal
leaders, intellectuals and government servants with titles,[/INST] |
leaders, intellectuals and government servants with titles,
positions of profit, high salaries, and so on. The British
administrators also followed a policy of relative inactivity and
irresponsibility in dealing with communal riots . When they
occurred, they were not crushed energetically. The
administrat ion also seldom made proper preparations or took
preventive measures to meet situations of communal tension, as
they did in case of nationalist and other popular protest
movements. | <s>[INST]leaders, intellectuals and government servants with titles,
positions of profit, high salaries, and so on. The British
administrators also followed a policy of relative inactivity and
irresponsibility in dealing with communal riots . When they
occurred, they were not crushed energetically. The
administrat ion also seldom made proper preparations or took
preventive measures to meet situations of communal tension, as
they did in case of nationalist and other popular protest
movements.[/INST] |
414 | India’s Struggle For Independence
To sum up: So long as the colonial state supported
communalism, a solution to the communal problem was not
easily possible while the colonial state remained; though, of
course, the overthrow of the colonial state was only the necessary
but not a sufficient condition for a successful struggle against
communalism.
*
A strong contrib utory factor in the growth of communalism
was the pronounced Hindu tinge in much of nationalist thought
and propaganda in the beginning of the 20th century.
Many of the Extremists introduced a strong Hindu religious
element in nationalist thought and propa ganda. They tended to
emphasize ancient Indian culture to the exclusion of medieval
Indian culture. They tried to provide a Hindu ideological
underpinning to Indian nationalism or at least a Hindu idiom to
its day-to-day political agitation. Thus, Tilak us ed the Ganesh
Puja and the Shivaji Festival to propagate nationalism; and the
anti-partition of Bengal agitation was initiated with dips in the
Ganges. What was much worse, Bankim Chandra Chatterjea and
many other writers in Bengali, Hindi, Urdu and other languages
often referred to Muslims as foreigners in their novels, plays,
poems, and stories, and tended to identify nationalism with
Hindus. This type of literature, in which Muslim ru lers and
officials were often portrayed as tyrants, tended to produce
resentment among literate Muslims and alienate them from the
emerging national movement. Moreover, a vague Hindu aura
pervaded much of the nationalist agitation because of the use of
Hindu symbols, idioms, and myths.
Of course, the nationalist movement rem ained, on the
whole, basically secular in its approach and ideology, and young
nationalist Muslims like M.A. Jinnah and Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad had little difficulty in accepting it as such and in joining it.
This secularism became sturdier when leaders li ke Gandhi, C .R.
Das, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, Dr. M.A. | <s>[INST]414 | India’s Struggle For Independence
To sum up: So long as the colonial state supported
communalism, a solution to the communal problem was not
easily possible while the colonial state remained; though, of
course, the overthrow of the colonial state was only the necessary
but not a sufficient condition for a successful struggle against
communalism.
*
A strong contrib utory factor in the growth of communalism
was the pronounced Hindu tinge in much of nationalist thought
and propaganda in the beginning of the 20th century.
Many of the Extremists introduced a strong Hindu religious
element in nationalist thought and propa ganda. They tended to
emphasize ancient Indian culture to the exclusion of medieval
Indian culture. They tried to provide a Hindu ideological
underpinning to Indian nationalism or at least a Hindu idiom to
its day-to-day political agitation. Thus, Tilak us ed the Ganesh
Puja and the Shivaji Festival to propagate nationalism; and the
anti-partition of Bengal agitation was initiated with dips in the
Ganges. What was much worse, Bankim Chandra Chatterjea and
many other writers in Bengali, Hindi, Urdu and other languages
often referred to Muslims as foreigners in their novels, plays,
poems, and stories, and tended to identify nationalism with
Hindus. This type of literature, in which Muslim ru lers and
officials were often portrayed as tyrants, tended to produce
resentment among literate Muslims and alienate them from the
emerging national movement. Moreover, a vague Hindu aura
pervaded much of the nationalist agitation because of the use of
Hindu symbols, idioms, and myths.
Of course, the nationalist movement rem ained, on the
whole, basically secular in its approach and ideology, and young
nationalist Muslims like M.A. Jinnah and Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad had little difficulty in accepting it as such and in joining it.
This secularism became sturdier when leaders li ke Gandhi, C .R.
Das, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, Dr. M.A.[/INST] |
Das, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, Dr. M.A.
Ansari, Subhas Bose, Sardar Patel and Rajendra Pra sad came to
the helm. The Hindu tinge was not so much a cause of
communalism as a cause of the nationalist failure to check the
growth. It made it slightly more difficult to win over Muslims to | <s>[INST]Das, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, Dr. M.A.
Ansari, Subhas Bose, Sardar Patel and Rajendra Pra sad came to
the helm. The Hindu tinge was not so much a cause of
communalism as a cause of the nationalist failure to check the
growth. It made it slightly more difficult to win over Muslims to[/INST] |
415 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
the national movement. It enabled the Government and Muslim
communalists to use it to keep large sections of Muslims away
from the nationalist movement and to instil among them the
feeling t hat the success of the movement would mean ‘Hindu
supremacy’ in the country.
This Hindu tinge also created ideological openings for Hindu
communalism and made it difficult for the nationalist movement
to eliminate Hindu communal political and ideological elements
within its own ranks. It also helped the spread of a Muslim tinge
among Muslim nationalists.
*
A communal and distorted unscientific view of Indian
history, especially of its ancient and medieval periods, was a
major instrument for the spread of communal consciousness as
also a basic constituent of communal ideology. The teaching of
Indian history in schools and colleges from a basically communal
point of view made a major contribution to the rise and growth of
communalism. For generations, almost from the beginning of the
modern school system, communal interpretations of history of
varying degrees of virulence were propagated, first by imperialist
writers and then by others. So deep and widespread was the
penetration of the communal view of histor y that even sturdy
nationalists accepted, however unconsciously, some of its basic
digits. All this was seen by many contemporary observers.
Gandhiji, for example, wrote: ‘Communal harmony could not be
perm anently established in our country so long as high ly
distorted versions of history were being taught in her schools and
colleges, through the history textbooks.’ Over and above the
textbooks, the communal view of history was spread widely
through poetry, drama, historical novels and short stories,
newspap ers and popular magazines, pamphlets, and above all,
orally through the public platform, classroom teaching,
socialization through the family, and private discussion and
conversation. | <s>[INST]415 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
the national movement. It enabled the Government and Muslim
communalists to use it to keep large sections of Muslims away
from the nationalist movement and to instil among them the
feeling t hat the success of the movement would mean ‘Hindu
supremacy’ in the country.
This Hindu tinge also created ideological openings for Hindu
communalism and made it difficult for the nationalist movement
to eliminate Hindu communal political and ideological elements
within its own ranks. It also helped the spread of a Muslim tinge
among Muslim nationalists.
*
A communal and distorted unscientific view of Indian
history, especially of its ancient and medieval periods, was a
major instrument for the spread of communal consciousness as
also a basic constituent of communal ideology. The teaching of
Indian history in schools and colleges from a basically communal
point of view made a major contribution to the rise and growth of
communalism. For generations, almost from the beginning of the
modern school system, communal interpretations of history of
varying degrees of virulence were propagated, first by imperialist
writers and then by others. So deep and widespread was the
penetration of the communal view of histor y that even sturdy
nationalists accepted, however unconsciously, some of its basic
digits. All this was seen by many contemporary observers.
Gandhiji, for example, wrote: ‘Communal harmony could not be
perm anently established in our country so long as high ly
distorted versions of history were being taught in her schools and
colleges, through the history textbooks.’ Over and above the
textbooks, the communal view of history was spread widely
through poetry, drama, historical novels and short stories,
newspap ers and popular magazines, pamphlets, and above all,
orally through the public platform, classroom teaching,
socialization through the family, and private discussion and
conversation.[/INST] |
conversation.
A beginning was made in the early 19th century by the
British historian , James Mill, who described the ancient period of
Indian history as the Hindu period and the medieval period as | <s>[INST]conversation.
A beginning was made in the early 19th century by the
British historian , James Mill, who described the ancient period of
Indian history as the Hindu period and the medieval period as[/INST] |
416 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the Muslim period. (Though he failed to characterize the modern
period as the Christian period!). Other British and Indian
historians followed h im in this respect. Furthermore, though the
Muslim masses were as poor, exploited and oppressed as the
Hindu masses, and there were Hindu zamindars, nobles and
rulers alon g with Muslim ones, these writers declared that all
Muslims were rulers in medieval I ndia and all Hindus were the
ruled. Thus, the basic character of a polity in India was identified
with the religion of the ruler Later the culture and society of
various periods were also declared to be either Hindu or Muslim
in character.
The Hindu commu nalist readily adopted the imperialist view
that medieval rulers in India were anti -Hindu, tyrannized Hindus
and converted them forcibly. All communalist, as also imperialist,
historians saw medieval history as one long story of Hindu -
Muslim conflict and b elieved that throughout the medieval period
there existed distinct and separate Hindu and Muslim cultures.
The Hindu communalists described the rule of medieval Muslim
rulers as foreign rule because of their religion. The talk of ‘a
thousand years of slave ry’ and ‘foreign rule’ was common
rhetoric, sometimes even used by nationalists. Above all, the
Hindu communal view of history relied on the myth that Indian
society and culture had reached great, ideal heights in the
ancient period from which they fell in to permanent and
continuous decay during the medieval period because of ‘Muslim’
rule and domination. The basic contribution of the medieval
period to the development of the Indian economy and technology,
religion and philosophy, arts and literature, and c ulture and
society was denied.
In turn the Muslim communalists harked back to the
‘Golden Age of Islamic achievement’ in West Asia and appealed to
its heroes, myths and cultural traditions. They propagated the
notion that all Muslims were the rulers in me dieval India or at | <s>[INST]416 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the Muslim period. (Though he failed to characterize the modern
period as the Christian period!). Other British and Indian
historians followed h im in this respect. Furthermore, though the
Muslim masses were as poor, exploited and oppressed as the
Hindu masses, and there were Hindu zamindars, nobles and
rulers alon g with Muslim ones, these writers declared that all
Muslims were rulers in medieval I ndia and all Hindus were the
ruled. Thus, the basic character of a polity in India was identified
with the religion of the ruler Later the culture and society of
various periods were also declared to be either Hindu or Muslim
in character.
The Hindu commu nalist readily adopted the imperialist view
that medieval rulers in India were anti -Hindu, tyrannized Hindus
and converted them forcibly. All communalist, as also imperialist,
historians saw medieval history as one long story of Hindu -
Muslim conflict and b elieved that throughout the medieval period
there existed distinct and separate Hindu and Muslim cultures.
The Hindu communalists described the rule of medieval Muslim
rulers as foreign rule because of their religion. The talk of ‘a
thousand years of slave ry’ and ‘foreign rule’ was common
rhetoric, sometimes even used by nationalists. Above all, the
Hindu communal view of history relied on the myth that Indian
society and culture had reached great, ideal heights in the
ancient period from which they fell in to permanent and
continuous decay during the medieval period because of ‘Muslim’
rule and domination. The basic contribution of the medieval
period to the development of the Indian economy and technology,
religion and philosophy, arts and literature, and c ulture and
society was denied.
In turn the Muslim communalists harked back to the
‘Golden Age of Islamic achievement’ in West Asia and appealed to
its heroes, myths and cultural traditions. They propagated the
notion that all Muslims were the rulers in me dieval India or at[/INST] |
least the beneficiaries of the so -called Muslim rule. They tended
to defend and glorify all Muslim rulers, including religious bigots
like Aurangzeb. They also evolved their own version of the ‘fall’
theory. While Hindus were allegedly i n the ascendant d uring the
19th century, Muslims, it was said, ‘fell’ or declined as a
‘community’ throughout the 19th century after ‘they’ lost political
power. | <s>[INST]least the beneficiaries of the so -called Muslim rule. They tended
to defend and glorify all Muslim rulers, including religious bigots
like Aurangzeb. They also evolved their own version of the ‘fall’
theory. While Hindus were allegedly i n the ascendant d uring the
19th century, Muslims, it was said, ‘fell’ or declined as a
‘community’ throughout the 19th century after ‘they’ lost political
power.[/INST] |
417 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
*
A major factor in the growth of communalism according to
some authors was the religious plu ralism or the existence of
several religions in India. This is not so. It is not true that
communalism must arise inevitably in a multi -religious society.
Religion was not an underlying or basic cause of communalism,
whose removal was basic to tackling or solving the communal
problem. Here we must distinguish between religion as a belief
system, which people follow as part of their personal belief, and
the ideology of a religion -based socio -political identity, that is,
communalism. In other words, religion is not the ‘cause’ of
communalism, even though communal cleavage is based by the
communalist on differences in religion — this difference is then
used to mask or disguise the social needs, aspirations, conflicts,
arising in non -religious fields. Religion c omes into communalism
to the extent that it serves politics arising in spheres other than
religion. K.M. Ashraf put this aspect in an appropriate phrase
when he described communalism as ‘Mazhab ki siyasi du kadari’
(political trade in religion). Communalism was not inspired by
religion, nor was religion the object of communal politics — it was
only its vehicle.
Religion was, however, used as a mobilizing factor by the
communalists. Communalism could become a popular movement
after 1939, and in particular du ring 1945 -47, only when it
adopted the inflammable cry of religion in danger. Moreover,
differing religious practices were the immediate cause of
situations of communal tension and riots. We may also note that
while religion was not responsible for communa lism, religiosity
was a major contributory factor. (Religiosity may be defined as
intense emotional commitment to matters of religion and the
tendency to let religion and religious emotions intrude into non -
religious or non -spiritual areas of life and beyo nd the individual’s | <s>[INST]417 | The Rise And Growth of Communalism
*
A major factor in the growth of communalism according to
some authors was the religious plu ralism or the existence of
several religions in India. This is not so. It is not true that
communalism must arise inevitably in a multi -religious society.
Religion was not an underlying or basic cause of communalism,
whose removal was basic to tackling or solving the communal
problem. Here we must distinguish between religion as a belief
system, which people follow as part of their personal belief, and
the ideology of a religion -based socio -political identity, that is,
communalism. In other words, religion is not the ‘cause’ of
communalism, even though communal cleavage is based by the
communalist on differences in religion — this difference is then
used to mask or disguise the social needs, aspirations, conflicts,
arising in non -religious fields. Religion c omes into communalism
to the extent that it serves politics arising in spheres other than
religion. K.M. Ashraf put this aspect in an appropriate phrase
when he described communalism as ‘Mazhab ki siyasi du kadari’
(political trade in religion). Communalism was not inspired by
religion, nor was religion the object of communal politics — it was
only its vehicle.
Religion was, however, used as a mobilizing factor by the
communalists. Communalism could become a popular movement
after 1939, and in particular du ring 1945 -47, only when it
adopted the inflammable cry of religion in danger. Moreover,
differing religious practices were the immediate cause of
situations of communal tension and riots. We may also note that
while religion was not responsible for communa lism, religiosity
was a major contributory factor. (Religiosity may be defined as
intense emotional commitment to matters of religion and the
tendency to let religion and religious emotions intrude into non -
religious or non -spiritual areas of life and beyo nd the individual’s[/INST] |
private and moral world.) Religiosity was not communalism but it
opened a person to the appeal of communalism in the name of
religion. Secularization did not, therefore, mean removing religion
but it did mean reducing religiosity or inc reasingly narrowing
down the sphere of religion to the private life of the individual. | <s>[INST]private and moral world.) Religiosity was not communalism but it
opened a person to the appeal of communalism in the name of
religion. Secularization did not, therefore, mean removing religion
but it did mean reducing religiosity or inc reasingly narrowing
down the sphere of religion to the private life of the individual.[/INST] |
418 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 32. COMMUNALISM —
THE LIBERAL PHASE
There was hardly any communalism in India before the last
quarter of the 19th century. As is well -known, Hindus and
Muslims had fought shoulder to shoulder in the Revolt of 1857.
The notion of Hindu -Muslim distinction at the non -religious
plane, not to speak of the clash of interests of Hindus and
Muslims was by and large non-existent in the Press during the
1860s. The identity that the North Indian newspapers
emphasised was that of the Hindustanis, especially vis -a-vis
European or British rulers
Even when some Muslim intellectuals began to notice that
Muslims in some parts of the country were tagging b ehind
Hindus in modern education and in government jobs, they
blamed not Hindus but the Government’s anti-Muslim policy and
the neglect of modem education by upper class Muslims. Syed
Ahmed Khan, undoubtedly one of the outstanding Indians of the
l9thiitury , began his educational activities without any
communal bias. The numerous scientific societies he founded in
1860s involved both Hindus and Muslims. The Aligarh College he
specially founded to fight the bias against mode rn education
among Muslims, receive d financial support from moneyed
Hindus; and its faculty and students had a large Hindu
component Syed Ahmed loudly preached the commonness of
Hindus and Muslims till the founding of the Congress in 1885.
Thus, for example, he said in 1884: ‘Do you not inhabit this
land? Are you not buried in it or cremated on it? Surely you live
and die on the same land. Remember that Hindus and Muslims
are religious terms. Otherwise Hindus, Muslims and Christians
who live in this country are by virtue of this fact one qawm’
(nation or community).
Ironically, communalism in India got its initial start in the 1
880s when Syed Ahmed Khan counterposed it to the national
movement initiated by the National Congress. In 1887, Dufferin , | <s>[INST]418 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 32. COMMUNALISM —
THE LIBERAL PHASE
There was hardly any communalism in India before the last
quarter of the 19th century. As is well -known, Hindus and
Muslims had fought shoulder to shoulder in the Revolt of 1857.
The notion of Hindu -Muslim distinction at the non -religious
plane, not to speak of the clash of interests of Hindus and
Muslims was by and large non-existent in the Press during the
1860s. The identity that the North Indian newspapers
emphasised was that of the Hindustanis, especially vis -a-vis
European or British rulers
Even when some Muslim intellectuals began to notice that
Muslims in some parts of the country were tagging b ehind
Hindus in modern education and in government jobs, they
blamed not Hindus but the Government’s anti-Muslim policy and
the neglect of modem education by upper class Muslims. Syed
Ahmed Khan, undoubtedly one of the outstanding Indians of the
l9thiitury , began his educational activities without any
communal bias. The numerous scientific societies he founded in
1860s involved both Hindus and Muslims. The Aligarh College he
specially founded to fight the bias against mode rn education
among Muslims, receive d financial support from moneyed
Hindus; and its faculty and students had a large Hindu
component Syed Ahmed loudly preached the commonness of
Hindus and Muslims till the founding of the Congress in 1885.
Thus, for example, he said in 1884: ‘Do you not inhabit this
land? Are you not buried in it or cremated on it? Surely you live
and die on the same land. Remember that Hindus and Muslims
are religious terms. Otherwise Hindus, Muslims and Christians
who live in this country are by virtue of this fact one qawm’
(nation or community).
Ironically, communalism in India got its initial start in the 1
880s when Syed Ahmed Khan counterposed it to the national
movement initiated by the National Congress. In 1887, Dufferin ,[/INST] |
the Viceroy, and A. Colvin the Lieutenant -Govern or of U.P.,
launched a frontal public attack on the National Congress, once | <s>[INST]the Viceroy, and A. Colvin the Lieutenant -Govern or of U.P.,
launched a frontal public attack on the National Congress, once[/INST] |
419 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
its anti -imperialist edge became clear. Syed Ahmed, believing that
the Muslims’ share in administrative posts and in profession
could be increased only by professing and provi ng loyalty to the
colonial rulers, decided to join in the attack. Furthermore, he felt
that he needed the active support of big zamindars and the
British officials for the Aligarh College. Initially he made an
attempt with the help of Shiva Prasad, Raja of Bhinga, and others
to organize along caste, birth, class and status lines the feudal
(jagirdari) and bureaucratic elements in opposition to the rising
democratic national movement. However, this attempt failed to
get off the ground.
Syed Ahmed now set out to organize the jagirdari elements
among Muslims as Muslims or the Muslim qawm (community).
He and his fo1lowrs gradually laid down the foundation of all the
basic themes of the communal ideology as it was to be
propagated in the first half of the 20th c entury. A basic theme
was that Hindus, because they were a majority, would dominate
Muslims and ‘totally override the interests of the smaller
community’ if representative, democratic government was
introduced or if British rule ended and power was transfe rred to
Indians. The British were needed to safeguard Muslims as a
minority. In the Indian context, said Syed Ahm ed, they were the
best guardians of Muslim interests. Muslims must, therefore,
remain loyal and oppose the National Congress. The theme of a
permanent clash of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ interests was also
brought forth. Giving up his earlier views, he now said that India
could not be considered a nation. He declared that the Congress
was a Hindu body whose major objectives were ‘against Muslim
interes t.’ Simultaneously, he criticized the Congress for basing
itself on the principle of social equality among the ‘lowly’ and the
‘highly’ born. Objecting to the Congress demand for democratic
elections, Syed Ahmed said that this would ‘mean that Muslims | <s>[INST]419 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
its anti -imperialist edge became clear. Syed Ahmed, believing that
the Muslims’ share in administrative posts and in profession
could be increased only by professing and provi ng loyalty to the
colonial rulers, decided to join in the attack. Furthermore, he felt
that he needed the active support of big zamindars and the
British officials for the Aligarh College. Initially he made an
attempt with the help of Shiva Prasad, Raja of Bhinga, and others
to organize along caste, birth, class and status lines the feudal
(jagirdari) and bureaucratic elements in opposition to the rising
democratic national movement. However, this attempt failed to
get off the ground.
Syed Ahmed now set out to organize the jagirdari elements
among Muslims as Muslims or the Muslim qawm (community).
He and his fo1lowrs gradually laid down the foundation of all the
basic themes of the communal ideology as it was to be
propagated in the first half of the 20th c entury. A basic theme
was that Hindus, because they were a majority, would dominate
Muslims and ‘totally override the interests of the smaller
community’ if representative, democratic government was
introduced or if British rule ended and power was transfe rred to
Indians. The British were needed to safeguard Muslims as a
minority. In the Indian context, said Syed Ahm ed, they were the
best guardians of Muslim interests. Muslims must, therefore,
remain loyal and oppose the National Congress. The theme of a
permanent clash of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ interests was also
brought forth. Giving up his earlier views, he now said that India
could not be considered a nation. He declared that the Congress
was a Hindu body whose major objectives were ‘against Muslim
interes t.’ Simultaneously, he criticized the Congress for basing
itself on the principle of social equality among the ‘lowly’ and the
‘highly’ born. Objecting to the Congress demand for democratic
elections, Syed Ahmed said that this would ‘mean that Muslims[/INST] |
elections, Syed Ahmed said that this would ‘mean that Muslims
would not be able to guard their interests, for 9t would be like a
game of dice in which one man had four dice and the other o nly
one.’ Any system of elections, he said, would put power into the
hands of ‘Bengalis or of Hindus of the Bengali type’ which would
lead to Muslims falling into ‘a condition of utmost degradation’
and ‘the ring of slavery’ being put on them by Hindus. Syed
Ahmed and his co -workers also demanded safeguards for
Muslims in Government jobs, legislative councils, and district
boards and recognition of the historical role and political | <s>[INST]elections, Syed Ahmed said that this would ‘mean that Muslims
would not be able to guard their interests, for 9t would be like a
game of dice in which one man had four dice and the other o nly
one.’ Any system of elections, he said, would put power into the
hands of ‘Bengalis or of Hindus of the Bengali type’ which would
lead to Muslims falling into ‘a condition of utmost degradation’
and ‘the ring of slavery’ being put on them by Hindus. Syed
Ahmed and his co -workers also demanded safeguards for
Muslims in Government jobs, legislative councils, and district
boards and recognition of the historical role and political[/INST] |
420 | India’s Struggle For Independence
importance of Muslims so that their role in legislative councils
should not be less than that of Hindus. At the same time, Syed
Ahmed and his followers did not create a counter command
political organization, b ecause the British authorities at the time
frowned upon any politicization of the Indian people. Syed Ahmed
held that any agitational politics would tend to become anti-
government and seditious and to create suspicion d isloya lty
among the rulers. He, there fore, asked Muslims to shun all
polities and remain politically passive, i.e., non -agitational, in
their approach. The co1onial rulers were quick to see the
inherent logic or communalism and the theory of the official
protection of the minorities and from the beginning actively
promoted and supported communalism.
The Muslim communalists continued to follow the politics of
loyalty after Syed Ahmed’s death. They openly sided with the
Government during the Swadeshi Movement in Bengal during
1905 -6 and condemn ed the Muslim supporters of the movement
as ‘vile traitors’ to Islam and as ‘Congress touts.’
But the attempt to keep the growing Muslim intelligentsia
politically passie or loyalist was not wholly successful. Badruddin
Tyabji presided over the Congress s ession in 1887, and the
number of Muslim delegates to the Congress increased in the
succeeding years. R.M. Sayani, A. Bhimji, Mir Musharaff
Hussain, Hamid Ali Khan and numerous other Muslim
intellectuals from Bombay, Bengal and Northern India joined the
Congress. They pointed out that not even one of the Congress
demands was communal or for Hindus only. The nationalist
trend continued to spread among Muslims all over the country
till the end of the 19th century. Abdul Rasul and a large number
of other Benga li Muslim intellectuals gave active support to the
Swadeshi agitation against the partition of Bengal. In fact, the
nationalist trend remained dominant among Muslims in Bengal
till the late 1920s. | <s>[INST]420 | India’s Struggle For Independence
importance of Muslims so that their role in legislative councils
should not be less than that of Hindus. At the same time, Syed
Ahmed and his followers did not create a counter command
political organization, b ecause the British authorities at the time
frowned upon any politicization of the Indian people. Syed Ahmed
held that any agitational politics would tend to become anti-
government and seditious and to create suspicion d isloya lty
among the rulers. He, there fore, asked Muslims to shun all
polities and remain politically passive, i.e., non -agitational, in
their approach. The co1onial rulers were quick to see the
inherent logic or communalism and the theory of the official
protection of the minorities and from the beginning actively
promoted and supported communalism.
The Muslim communalists continued to follow the politics of
loyalty after Syed Ahmed’s death. They openly sided with the
Government during the Swadeshi Movement in Bengal during
1905 -6 and condemn ed the Muslim supporters of the movement
as ‘vile traitors’ to Islam and as ‘Congress touts.’
But the attempt to keep the growing Muslim intelligentsia
politically passie or loyalist was not wholly successful. Badruddin
Tyabji presided over the Congress s ession in 1887, and the
number of Muslim delegates to the Congress increased in the
succeeding years. R.M. Sayani, A. Bhimji, Mir Musharaff
Hussain, Hamid Ali Khan and numerous other Muslim
intellectuals from Bombay, Bengal and Northern India joined the
Congress. They pointed out that not even one of the Congress
demands was communal or for Hindus only. The nationalist
trend continued to spread among Muslims all over the country
till the end of the 19th century. Abdul Rasul and a large number
of other Benga li Muslim intellectuals gave active support to the
Swadeshi agitation against the partition of Bengal. In fact, the
nationalist trend remained dominant among Muslims in Bengal
till the late 1920s.[/INST] |
till the late 1920s.
Once the Swadeshi Movement brought mass politics to
India, a large section of the Muslim intelligentsia could not be
kept away from the Congress; the British Government felt
compelled to difer some constitutional concessions, and it
became impossible to continue to follow the policy of political
passivity. The communalists, as also their official supporters, felt
that they had to enter the political arena. At the end of 1907 the | <s>[INST]till the late 1920s.
Once the Swadeshi Movement brought mass politics to
India, a large section of the Muslim intelligentsia could not be
kept away from the Congress; the British Government felt
compelled to difer some constitutional concessions, and it
became impossible to continue to follow the policy of political
passivity. The communalists, as also their official supporters, felt
that they had to enter the political arena. At the end of 1907 the[/INST] |
421 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
All India Muslim League was founded by a group of big
zamindars ex-bureaucrats and other upper class Muslims like
the Aga Khan, the Nawab of Dacca and Nawab Mohsin -uI-Muk.
Founded as a loyalist, communal and conservative political
organization, the League supported the partition of Bengal, raised
the slogan of separate Muslim interests, demanded separate
electorates and safeguards for Musli ms in government services,
and reiterated all the major themes of communal politics and
ideology enunciated earlier by Syed Ahmed and his followers.
Viqar -ul-Mulk for example, said: ‘God forbid, if the British rule
disappears from India, Hindus will lord o ver it; and we will be in
constant danger of our life, property and honour. The only way
for the Muslims to escape this danger is to help in the
continuance of the British rule.’9 He also expressed the fear ‘of
the minority losing its identity.’ One of the major objectives of the
Muslim League was to keep the emerging intelligentsia among
Muslims from joining the Congress. Its activities were directed
against the National Congress and Hindus and not against the
colonial regime.
Simultaneously, Hindu commun alism, was also being born.
From the 1870s, a section of Hindu zamindars, moneylenders
and middle class professionals began to arouse anti -Muslim
sentiments. Fully accepting the colonial view of Indian history,
they talked of the ‘tyrannical’ Muslim rule i n the medieval period
and the ‘liberating’ role of the British in ‘saving’ Hindus from
‘Muslim oppression.’ In U.P. and Bihar, they took up the question
of Hindi and gave it a communal twist, declaring that Urdu was
the language of Muslims and Hindi of Hin dus. All over India,
anti-cow slaughter propaganda was undertaken in the early
1890s, the campaign being primarily directed not against the
British but against Muslims; the British cantonments, for
example, were left free to carry on cow slaughter on a lar ge scale. | <s>[INST]421 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
All India Muslim League was founded by a group of big
zamindars ex-bureaucrats and other upper class Muslims like
the Aga Khan, the Nawab of Dacca and Nawab Mohsin -uI-Muk.
Founded as a loyalist, communal and conservative political
organization, the League supported the partition of Bengal, raised
the slogan of separate Muslim interests, demanded separate
electorates and safeguards for Musli ms in government services,
and reiterated all the major themes of communal politics and
ideology enunciated earlier by Syed Ahmed and his followers.
Viqar -ul-Mulk for example, said: ‘God forbid, if the British rule
disappears from India, Hindus will lord o ver it; and we will be in
constant danger of our life, property and honour. The only way
for the Muslims to escape this danger is to help in the
continuance of the British rule.’9 He also expressed the fear ‘of
the minority losing its identity.’ One of the major objectives of the
Muslim League was to keep the emerging intelligentsia among
Muslims from joining the Congress. Its activities were directed
against the National Congress and Hindus and not against the
colonial regime.
Simultaneously, Hindu commun alism, was also being born.
From the 1870s, a section of Hindu zamindars, moneylenders
and middle class professionals began to arouse anti -Muslim
sentiments. Fully accepting the colonial view of Indian history,
they talked of the ‘tyrannical’ Muslim rule i n the medieval period
and the ‘liberating’ role of the British in ‘saving’ Hindus from
‘Muslim oppression.’ In U.P. and Bihar, they took up the question
of Hindi and gave it a communal twist, declaring that Urdu was
the language of Muslims and Hindi of Hin dus. All over India,
anti-cow slaughter propaganda was undertaken in the early
1890s, the campaign being primarily directed not against the
British but against Muslims; the British cantonments, for
example, were left free to carry on cow slaughter on a lar ge scale.[/INST] |
Consequently, this agitation invariably took a communal turn,
often resulting in communal riots. The anti -cow slaughter
agitation died down by 1896, to be revived again in a more
virulent form in the second decade of the 20th century. The
Hindu c ommunalists also carried on a regular agitation for a
‘Hindu’ share of seats in legislatures and in government services.
The Punjab Hindu Sabha was founded in 1909. Its leaders,
U.N. Mukherji and Lal Chand, were to lay down the foundations | <s>[INST]Consequently, this agitation invariably took a communal turn,
often resulting in communal riots. The anti -cow slaughter
agitation died down by 1896, to be revived again in a more
virulent form in the second decade of the 20th century. The
Hindu c ommunalists also carried on a regular agitation for a
‘Hindu’ share of seats in legislatures and in government services.
The Punjab Hindu Sabha was founded in 1909. Its leaders,
U.N. Mukherji and Lal Chand, were to lay down the foundations[/INST] |
422 | India’s Struggle For Independence
of Hindu commun al ideology and politics. They directed their
anger primarily against the National Congress for trying to unite
Indians into a single nation and for ‘sacrificing Hindu interests’ to
appease Muslims. In his booklet , Self-Abnegation in Politics, Lal
Chand de scribed the Congress as the ‘self -inflicted misfortune’ of
Hindus. Hindus, he wrote, were moving towards extinction
because of ‘the poison imbibed for the last 25 years.’ They could
be saved only if they were willing to ‘purge’ the poison and get rid
of th e ‘evil.’ He accused the Congress of making ‘impossible’
demands on the Government, leading to its justifiable anger
against the Congress and Hindus. Instead Hindus should try to
neutralize the third party, the Government, in their fight against
Muslims. I t was also essential that Hindus abandon and ‘end’ the
Congress. ‘A Hindu,’ La l Chand declared , ‘should not only believe
but make it a part and parcel of his organism, of his life and of
his conduct, that he is a Hindu first and an Indian after.”
The first session of the All -India Hindu Mahasabha was held
in April 1915 under the presidentship of the Maharaja of Kasim
Bazar. But it remained for many years a rather sickly child
compared to the Muslim League. This was for several reasons.
The broader social re ason was the greater and even dominant
role of the zamindars, aristocrats and ex-bureaucrats among
Muslims in general and even among the Muslim middle classes.
While among Parsis and Hindus, increasingly, it was the modern
intelligentsia, with its emphasis on science, democracy and
nationalism, and the bourgeois elements in general, which
rapidly acquired intellectual, social, economic and political
influence and hegemony, among Muslims the reactionary
landlords and mullahs continued to exercise dominant in fluence
or hegemony. Landlords and traditional religious priests, whether
Hindu or Muslim, were conservative and supporters of | <s>[INST]422 | India’s Struggle For Independence
of Hindu commun al ideology and politics. They directed their
anger primarily against the National Congress for trying to unite
Indians into a single nation and for ‘sacrificing Hindu interests’ to
appease Muslims. In his booklet , Self-Abnegation in Politics, Lal
Chand de scribed the Congress as the ‘self -inflicted misfortune’ of
Hindus. Hindus, he wrote, were moving towards extinction
because of ‘the poison imbibed for the last 25 years.’ They could
be saved only if they were willing to ‘purge’ the poison and get rid
of th e ‘evil.’ He accused the Congress of making ‘impossible’
demands on the Government, leading to its justifiable anger
against the Congress and Hindus. Instead Hindus should try to
neutralize the third party, the Government, in their fight against
Muslims. I t was also essential that Hindus abandon and ‘end’ the
Congress. ‘A Hindu,’ La l Chand declared , ‘should not only believe
but make it a part and parcel of his organism, of his life and of
his conduct, that he is a Hindu first and an Indian after.”
The first session of the All -India Hindu Mahasabha was held
in April 1915 under the presidentship of the Maharaja of Kasim
Bazar. But it remained for many years a rather sickly child
compared to the Muslim League. This was for several reasons.
The broader social re ason was the greater and even dominant
role of the zamindars, aristocrats and ex-bureaucrats among
Muslims in general and even among the Muslim middle classes.
While among Parsis and Hindus, increasingly, it was the modern
intelligentsia, with its emphasis on science, democracy and
nationalism, and the bourgeois elements in general, which
rapidly acquired intellectual, social, economic and political
influence and hegemony, among Muslims the reactionary
landlords and mullahs continued to exercise dominant in fluence
or hegemony. Landlords and traditional religious priests, whether
Hindu or Muslim, were conservative and supporters of[/INST] |
Hindu or Muslim, were conservative and supporters of
established, colonial authority. But while among Hindus, they
were gradually losing positions of leadership, they continued to
dominate among Muslims. In this sense the weak position of the
middle class among Muslims and its social and ideological
backwardness contributed to the growth of Muslim
communalism.
There were other reasons for the relative weakness of Hindu
communalism. T he colonial Government gave Hindu
communalism few concessions and little support, for it banked | <s>[INST]Hindu or Muslim, were conservative and supporters of
established, colonial authority. But while among Hindus, they
were gradually losing positions of leadership, they continued to
dominate among Muslims. In this sense the weak position of the
middle class among Muslims and its social and ideological
backwardness contributed to the growth of Muslim
communalism.
There were other reasons for the relative weakness of Hindu
communalism. T he colonial Government gave Hindu
communalism few concessions and little support, for it banked[/INST] |
423 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
heavily on Muslim communalism and could not easily
simultaneously placate both communal isms.
The colonial authorities and the communalists together evolved
another powerful instrument for the spread and consolidation of
communalism in se parate electorates w hich were introduced in
the Morley -M into Reforms of 1907. Under this system, Muslim
voters (and later Sikhs and others) were put in separate
constituencies f rom which only Muslims could stand as
candidates and for which only Muslims could vote. Separate
electorates turned elections and legislative councils into arenas
for communal conflicts. Since the voters were exclusively the
followers of one religion, the candidates did not have to appeal to
voters belonging to other religions. They could, therefore, make
blatantly communal appeals and voters and others who listened
to these appeals were gradually trained to think and vote
communally and in general to think in terms of ‘communal’
power and progress and to express their socio -economic
grievances in communal te rms. The system of reservation of seats
and weightage in legislatures, government services, educational
institutions etc., also had the same consequence s.
A slight detour at this stage is perhaps necessary. When
discussing the history of the origins and growth of communalism
and communal organizations, one particular error is to be
avoided. Often a communalist ascribed — or even now ascribes in
historica l writings — the origins of one communalism to the
existence of and as a reaction to the other communalism. Thus,
by assigning the ‘original’ blame to the other communalism a sort
of backdoor justification for one’s own communalism is (or was)
provided. Th us the Hindu, Muslim or Sikh communa lists
justified their own communalism by arguing that they were
reacting to the communalism initiated by others. In fact, to
decide which communalism came first is like answering the | <s>[INST]423 | Communalism — The Liberal Phase
heavily on Muslim communalism and could not easily
simultaneously placate both communal isms.
The colonial authorities and the communalists together evolved
another powerful instrument for the spread and consolidation of
communalism in se parate electorates w hich were introduced in
the Morley -M into Reforms of 1907. Under this system, Muslim
voters (and later Sikhs and others) were put in separate
constituencies f rom which only Muslims could stand as
candidates and for which only Muslims could vote. Separate
electorates turned elections and legislative councils into arenas
for communal conflicts. Since the voters were exclusively the
followers of one religion, the candidates did not have to appeal to
voters belonging to other religions. They could, therefore, make
blatantly communal appeals and voters and others who listened
to these appeals were gradually trained to think and vote
communally and in general to think in terms of ‘communal’
power and progress and to express their socio -economic
grievances in communal te rms. The system of reservation of seats
and weightage in legislatures, government services, educational
institutions etc., also had the same consequence s.
A slight detour at this stage is perhaps necessary. When
discussing the history of the origins and growth of communalism
and communal organizations, one particular error is to be
avoided. Often a communalist ascribed — or even now ascribes in
historica l writings — the origins of one communalism to the
existence of and as a reaction to the other communalism. Thus,
by assigning the ‘original’ blame to the other communalism a sort
of backdoor justification for one’s own communalism is (or was)
provided. Th us the Hindu, Muslim or Sikh communa lists
justified their own communalism by arguing that they were
reacting to the communalism initiated by others. In fact, to
decide which communalism came first is like answering the[/INST] |
decide which communalism came first is like answering the
question: which came first, the chick en or the egg? Once
communalism arose and developed, its different variants fed and
fattened on each other.
The younger Muslim intellectuals were soon dissatisfied
with the loyalist , anti-Hindu and slavish mentality of the upper
class leadership of the Muslim League. They were increasingly | <s>[INST]decide which communalism came first is like answering the
question: which came first, the chick en or the egg? Once
communalism arose and developed, its different variants fed and
fattened on each other.
The younger Muslim intellectuals were soon dissatisfied
with the loyalist , anti-Hindu and slavish mentality of the upper
class leadership of the Muslim League. They were increasingly[/INST] |
424 | India’s Struggle For Independence
drawn to modern and radical nationalist ideas. The militantly
nationalist Ahrar movement was founded a this time under the
leadership of Maulana Mohammed Au, Hakim Ajmal Khan,
Hasan Imam, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, and Mazh ar-uI-Haq. In
their efforts , they got support from a section of orthodox uiwna
scholars) especially those belonging to the Deoband school.
Another orthodox scholar to be attracted to the national
movement was the young Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was
educated at the famous Al Azhar University at Cairo and who
propagated his rationalist and nationalist ideas in his newspaper
Al Hilal which he brought out in 1912 at the age of twenty -four
After an intense struggle, the nationalist young Muslims came to
the fore in the Muslim League. They also became active in the
Congress. In 1912, the brilliant Congress leader, M.A. Jinnah,
was invited to join the League which adopted self -government as
one of its objectives , in the same year, the Aga Khan resigned as
the Pr esident of the League.
From 1912 to 1924, the young nationalists began to
overshadow the loyalists in the League which began to move
nearer to the policies of the Congress. Unfortunately, their
nationalism was flawed in so far as it was not fully secular
(except with rare exceptions like Jinnah). It had a strong religious
and pan-Islamic tinge. Instead of understanding and opposing
the economic and political consequences of modern imperialism
they fought it on the ground that it threatened the Caliph
(khal ifa) and the holy places. Quite often their appeal was to
religious sentiments. This religious tinge or approach did not
immediately clash with nationalism. Rather, it made as
adherents anti -imperialist; and it encouraged the nationalist
trend among urban Muslims. But in the long run it proved
harmful as it inculcated arid encouraged the habit of looking at
political questions from a religious point of view. | <s>[INST]424 | India’s Struggle For Independence
drawn to modern and radical nationalist ideas. The militantly
nationalist Ahrar movement was founded a this time under the
leadership of Maulana Mohammed Au, Hakim Ajmal Khan,
Hasan Imam, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, and Mazh ar-uI-Haq. In
their efforts , they got support from a section of orthodox uiwna
scholars) especially those belonging to the Deoband school.
Another orthodox scholar to be attracted to the national
movement was the young Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was
educated at the famous Al Azhar University at Cairo and who
propagated his rationalist and nationalist ideas in his newspaper
Al Hilal which he brought out in 1912 at the age of twenty -four
After an intense struggle, the nationalist young Muslims came to
the fore in the Muslim League. They also became active in the
Congress. In 1912, the brilliant Congress leader, M.A. Jinnah,
was invited to join the League which adopted self -government as
one of its objectives , in the same year, the Aga Khan resigned as
the Pr esident of the League.
From 1912 to 1924, the young nationalists began to
overshadow the loyalists in the League which began to move
nearer to the policies of the Congress. Unfortunately, their
nationalism was flawed in so far as it was not fully secular
(except with rare exceptions like Jinnah). It had a strong religious
and pan-Islamic tinge. Instead of understanding and opposing
the economic and political consequences of modern imperialism
they fought it on the ground that it threatened the Caliph
(khal ifa) and the holy places. Quite often their appeal was to
religious sentiments. This religious tinge or approach did not
immediately clash with nationalism. Rather, it made as
adherents anti -imperialist; and it encouraged the nationalist
trend among urban Muslims. But in the long run it proved
harmful as it inculcated arid encouraged the habit of looking at
political questions from a religious point of view.[/INST] |