instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 386
112k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 15
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: image_transform_png_set_scale_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_scale_16(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 18,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void gdImageGifCtx(gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtxPtr out)
{
gdImagePtr pim = 0, tim = im;
int interlace, BitsPerPixel;
interlace = im->interlace;
if (im->trueColor) {
/* Expensive, but the only way that produces an
acceptable result: mix down to a palette
based temporary image. */
pim = gdImageCreatePaletteFromTrueColor(im, 1, 256);
if (!pim) {
return;
}
tim = pim;
}
BitsPerPixel = colorstobpp(tim->colorsTotal);
/* All set, let's do it. */
GIFEncode(
out, tim->sx, tim->sy, tim->interlace, 0, tim->transparent, BitsPerPixel,
tim->red, tim->green, tim->blue, tim);
if (pim) {
/* Destroy palette based temporary image. */
gdImageDestroy( pim);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The GD Graphics Library (aka LibGD) 2.2.5 has a double free in the gdImage*Ptr() functions in gd_gif_out.c, gd_jpeg.c, and gd_wbmp.c. NOTE: PHP is unaffected.
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here. | High | 21,574 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l(c,c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper(c));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LocaleLowercase in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.8-32 allows out-of-bounds access, leading to a SIGSEGV.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 23,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ID3::Iterator::getstring(String8 *id, bool otherdata) const {
id->setTo("");
const uint8_t *frameData = mFrameData;
if (frameData == NULL) {
return;
}
uint8_t encoding = *frameData;
if (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1 || mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1_1) {
if (mOffset == 126 || mOffset == 127) {
char tmp[16];
sprintf(tmp, "%d", (int)*frameData);
id->setTo(tmp);
return;
}
id->setTo((const char*)frameData, mFrameSize);
return;
}
if (mFrameSize < getHeaderLength() + 1) {
return;
}
size_t n = mFrameSize - getHeaderLength() - 1;
if (otherdata) {
frameData += 4;
int32_t i = n - 4;
while(--i >= 0 && *++frameData != 0) ;
int skipped = (frameData - mFrameData);
if (skipped >= (int)n) {
return;
}
n -= skipped;
}
if (encoding == 0x00) {
id->setTo((const char*)frameData + 1, n);
} else if (encoding == 0x03) {
id->setTo((const char *)(frameData + 1), n);
} else if (encoding == 0x02) {
int len = n / 2;
const char16_t *framedata = (const char16_t *) (frameData + 1);
char16_t *framedatacopy = NULL;
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
framedatacopy = new char16_t[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
framedatacopy[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
framedata = framedatacopy;
#endif
id->setTo(framedata, len);
if (framedatacopy != NULL) {
delete[] framedatacopy;
}
} else if (encoding == 0x01) {
int len = n / 2;
const char16_t *framedata = (const char16_t *) (frameData + 1);
char16_t *framedatacopy = NULL;
if (*framedata == 0xfffe) {
framedatacopy = new char16_t[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
framedatacopy[i] = bswap_16(framedata[i]);
}
framedata = framedatacopy;
}
if (*framedata == 0xfeff) {
framedata++;
len--;
}
bool eightBit = true;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (framedata[i] > 0xff) {
eightBit = false;
break;
}
}
if (eightBit) {
char *frame8 = new char[len];
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
frame8[i] = framedata[i];
}
id->setTo(frame8, len);
delete [] frame8;
} else {
id->setTo(framedata, len);
}
if (framedatacopy != NULL) {
delete[] framedatacopy;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: id3/ID3.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 30744884.
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
| High | 12,793 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: QString IRCView::openTags(TextHtmlData* data, int from)
{
QString ret, tag;
int i = from;
for ( ; i < data->openHtmlTags.count(); ++i)
{
tag = data->openHtmlTags.at(i);
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(Preferences::self()->color(Preferences::TextViewBackground).name());
}
else
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(data->lastFgColor);
}
}
else if (tag == QLatin1String("span"))
{
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->defaultColor);
}
else
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->lastBgColor);
}
}
else
{
ret += QLatin1Char('<') + tag + QLatin1Char('>');
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Konversation 1.4.x, 1.5.x, 1.6.x, and 1.7.x before 1.7.3 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via vectors related to parsing of IRC color formatting codes.
Commit Message: | Medium | 12,909 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int get_exif_tag_int_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
unsigned int *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
field_type = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+2],e->endian);
value_count = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+4],e->endian);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type==3) { // SHORT (uint16)
*pv = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
else if(field_type==4) { // LONG (uint32)
*pv = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The iw_get_ui16be function in imagew-util.c:422:24 in libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted image, related to imagew-jpeg.c.
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25 | Medium | 20,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
ENTITY *entity;
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE;
entity = openEntity->entity;
textStart = ((char *)entity->textPtr) + entity->processed;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, openEntity->startTagLevel,
parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next,
XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (textEnd != next
&& parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - (char *)entity->textPtr);
return result;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok;
parser->m_processor = prologProcessor;
tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
{
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
/* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */
return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding,
s, end, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-611
Summary: In libexpat before 2.2.8, crafted XML input could fool the parser into changing from DTD parsing to document parsing too early; a consecutive call to XML_GetCurrentLineNumber (or XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber) then resulted in a heap-based buffer over-read.
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype | Medium | 5,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ParseCaffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
uint32_t chan_chunk = 0, channel_layout = 0, bcount;
unsigned char *channel_identities = NULL;
unsigned char *channel_reorder = NULL;
int64_t total_samples = 0, infilesize;
CAFFileHeader caf_file_header;
CAFChunkHeader caf_chunk_header;
CAFAudioFormat caf_audio_format;
int i;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&caf_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &caf_file_header) + 4, sizeof (CAFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (CAFFileHeader) - 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_file_header, sizeof (CAFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_file_header, CAFFileHeaderFormat);
if (caf_file_header.mFileVersion != 1) {
error_line ("%s: can't handle version %d .CAF files!", infilename, caf_file_header.mFileVersion);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &caf_chunk_header, sizeof (CAFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (CAFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_chunk_header, sizeof (CAFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_chunk_header, CAFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "desc", 4)) {
int supported = TRUE;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize != sizeof (CAFAudioFormat) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &caf_audio_format, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_audio_format, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_audio_format, CAFAudioFormatFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode) {
char formatstr [5];
memcpy (formatstr, caf_audio_format.mFormatID, 4);
formatstr [4] = 0;
error_line ("format = %s, flags = %x, sampling rate = %g",
formatstr, caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags, caf_audio_format.mSampleRate);
error_line ("packet = %d bytes and %d frames",
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket, caf_audio_format.mFramesPerPacket);
error_line ("channels per frame = %d, bits per channel = %d",
caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame, caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel);
}
if (strncmp (caf_audio_format.mFormatID, "lpcm", 4) || (caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & ~3))
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mSampleRate < 1.0 || caf_audio_format.mSampleRate > 16777215.0 ||
caf_audio_format.mSampleRate != floor (caf_audio_format.mSampleRate))
supported = FALSE;
else if (!caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame || caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame > 256)
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel < 1 || caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel > 32 ||
((caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_FLOAT) && caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel != 32))
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mFramesPerPacket != 1 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame < (caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel + 7) / 8 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame > 4 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket % caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame)
supported = FALSE;
if (!supported) {
error_line ("%s is an unsupported .CAF format!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
config->bytes_per_sample = caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame;
config->float_norm_exp = (caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_FLOAT) ? 127 : 0;
config->bits_per_sample = caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel;
config->num_channels = caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame;
config->sample_rate = (int) caf_audio_format.mSampleRate;
if (!(caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && config->bytes_per_sample > 1)
config->qmode |= QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN;
if (config->bytes_per_sample == 1)
config->qmode |= QMODE_SIGNED_BYTES;
if (debug_logging_mode) {
if (config->float_norm_exp == 127)
error_line ("data format: 32-bit %s-endian floating point", (config->qmode & QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN) ? "big" : "little");
else
error_line ("data format: %d-bit %s-endian integers stored in %d byte(s)",
config->bits_per_sample, (config->qmode & QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN) ? "big" : "little", config->bytes_per_sample);
}
}
else if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "chan", 4)) {
CAFChannelLayout *caf_channel_layout = malloc ((size_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize);
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize < sizeof (CAFChannelLayout) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, caf_channel_layout, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, caf_channel_layout, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (caf_channel_layout, CAFChannelLayoutFormat);
chan_chunk = 1;
if (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED)) {
error_line ("this CAF file already has channel order information!");
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
switch (caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag) {
case kCAFChannelLayoutTag_UseChannelDescriptions:
{
CAFChannelDescription *descriptions = (CAFChannelDescription *) (caf_channel_layout + 1);
int num_descriptions = caf_channel_layout->mNumberChannelDescriptions;
int label, cindex = 0, idents = 0;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize != sizeof (CAFChannelLayout) + sizeof (CAFChannelDescription) * num_descriptions ||
num_descriptions != config->num_channels) {
error_line ("channel descriptions in 'chan' chunk are the wrong size!");
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (num_descriptions >= 256) {
error_line ("%d channel descriptions is more than we can handle...ignoring!");
break;
}
channel_reorder = malloc (num_descriptions);
memset (channel_reorder, -1, num_descriptions);
channel_identities = malloc (num_descriptions+1);
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i) {
WavpackBigEndianToNative (descriptions + i, CAFChannelDescriptionFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chan %d --> %d", i + 1, descriptions [i].mChannelLabel);
}
for (label = 1; label <= 18; ++label)
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (descriptions [i].mChannelLabel == label) {
config->channel_mask |= 1 << (label - 1);
channel_reorder [i] = cindex++;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (channel_reorder [i] == (unsigned char) -1) {
uint32_t clabel = descriptions [i].mChannelLabel;
if (clabel == 0 || clabel == 0xffffffff || clabel == 100)
channel_identities [idents++] = 0xff;
else if ((clabel >= 33 && clabel <= 44) || (clabel >= 200 && clabel <= 207) || (clabel >= 301 && clabel <= 305))
channel_identities [idents++] = clabel >= 301 ? clabel - 80 : clabel;
else {
error_line ("warning: unknown channel descriptions label: %d", clabel);
channel_identities [idents++] = 0xff;
}
channel_reorder [i] = cindex++;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (channel_reorder [i] != i)
break;
if (i == num_descriptions) {
free (channel_reorder); // no reordering required, so don't
channel_reorder = NULL;
}
else {
config->qmode |= QMODE_REORDERED_CHANS; // reordering required, put channel count into layout
channel_layout = num_descriptions;
}
if (!idents) { // if no non-MS channels, free the identities string
free (channel_identities);
channel_identities = NULL;
}
else
channel_identities [idents] = 0; // otherwise NULL terminate it
if (debug_logging_mode) {
error_line ("layout_tag = 0x%08x, so generated bitmap of 0x%08x from %d descriptions, %d non-MS",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag, config->channel_mask,
caf_channel_layout->mNumberChannelDescriptions, idents);
if (channel_reorder && num_descriptions <= 8) {
char reorder_string [] = "12345678";
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
reorder_string [i] = channel_reorder [i] + '1';
reorder_string [i] = 0;
error_line ("reordering string = \"%s\"\n", reorder_string);
}
}
}
break;
case kCAFChannelLayoutTag_UseChannelBitmap:
config->channel_mask = caf_channel_layout->mChannelBitmap;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag = 0x%08x, so using supplied bitmap of 0x%08x",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag, caf_channel_layout->mChannelBitmap);
break;
default:
for (i = 0; i < NUM_LAYOUTS; ++i)
if (caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag == layouts [i].mChannelLayoutTag) {
config->channel_mask = layouts [i].mChannelBitmap;
channel_layout = layouts [i].mChannelLayoutTag;
if (layouts [i].mChannelReorder) {
channel_reorder = (unsigned char *) strdup (layouts [i].mChannelReorder);
config->qmode |= QMODE_REORDERED_CHANS;
}
if (layouts [i].mChannelIdentities)
channel_identities = (unsigned char *) strdup (layouts [i].mChannelIdentities);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag 0x%08x found in table, bitmap = 0x%08x, reorder = %s, identities = %s",
channel_layout, config->channel_mask, channel_reorder ? "yes" : "no", channel_identities ? "yes" : "no");
break;
}
if (i == NUM_LAYOUTS && debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag 0x%08x not found in table...all channels unassigned",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag);
break;
}
free (caf_channel_layout);
}
else if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "data", 4)) { // on the data chunk, get size and exit loop
uint32_t mEditCount;
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &mEditCount, sizeof (mEditCount), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (mEditCount)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &mEditCount, sizeof (mEditCount))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if ((config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) || caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize == -1) {
config->qmode |= QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH;
if (infilesize && DoGetFilePosition (infile) != -1)
total_samples = (infilesize - DoGetFilePosition (infile)) / caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket;
else
total_samples = -1;
}
else {
if (infilesize && infilesize - caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize > 16777216) {
error_line (".CAF file %s has over 16 MB of extra CAFF data, probably is corrupt!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if ((caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize - 4) % caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket) {
error_line (".CAF file %s has an invalid data chunk size, probably is corrupt!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
total_samples = (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize - 4) / caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket;
if (!total_samples) {
error_line ("this .CAF file has no audio samples, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (total_samples > MAX_WAVPACK_SAMPLES) {
error_line ("%s has too many samples for WavPack!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize;
char *buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [0], caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [1], caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [2],
caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [3], caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (!chan_chunk && !config->channel_mask && config->num_channels <= 2 && !(config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))
config->channel_mask = 0x5 - config->num_channels;
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, channel_identities)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (channel_identities)
free (channel_identities);
if (channel_layout || channel_reorder) {
if (!WavpackSetChannelLayout (wpc, channel_layout, channel_reorder)) {
error_line ("problem with setting channel layout (should not happen)");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (channel_reorder)
free (channel_reorder);
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ParseCaffHeaderConfig function of the cli/caff.c file of WavPack 5.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service (global buffer over-read), or possibly trigger a buffer overflow or incorrect memory allocation, via a maliciously crafted CAF file.
Commit Message: issue #28, fix buffer overflows and bad allocs on corrupt CAF files | Medium | 23,882 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: context_length_arg (char const *str, int *out)
{
uintmax_t value;
if (! (xstrtoumax (str, 0, 10, &value, "") == LONGINT_OK
&& 0 <= (*out = value)
&& *out == value))
{
error (EXIT_TROUBLE, 0, "%s: %s", str,
_("invalid context length argument"));
}
page size, unless a read yields a partial page. */
static char *buffer; /* Base of buffer. */
static size_t bufalloc; /* Allocated buffer size, counting slop. */
#define INITIAL_BUFSIZE 32768 /* Initial buffer size, not counting slop. */
static int bufdesc; /* File descriptor. */
static char *bufbeg; /* Beginning of user-visible stuff. */
static char *buflim; /* Limit of user-visible stuff. */
static size_t pagesize; /* alignment of memory pages */
static off_t bufoffset; /* Read offset; defined on regular files. */
static off_t after_last_match; /* Pointer after last matching line that
would have been output if we were
outputting characters. */
/* Return VAL aligned to the next multiple of ALIGNMENT. VAL can be
an integer or a pointer. Both args must be free of side effects. */
#define ALIGN_TO(val, alignment) \
((size_t) (val) % (alignment) == 0 \
? (val) \
: (val) + ((alignment) - (size_t) (val) % (alignment)))
/* Reset the buffer for a new file, returning zero if we should skip it.
Initialize on the first time through. */
static int
reset (int fd, char const *file, struct stats *stats)
{
if (! pagesize)
{
pagesize = getpagesize ();
if (pagesize == 0 || 2 * pagesize + 1 <= pagesize)
abort ();
bufalloc = ALIGN_TO (INITIAL_BUFSIZE, pagesize) + pagesize + 1;
buffer = xmalloc (bufalloc);
}
bufbeg = buflim = ALIGN_TO (buffer + 1, pagesize);
bufbeg[-1] = eolbyte;
bufdesc = fd;
if (S_ISREG (stats->stat.st_mode))
{
if (file)
bufoffset = 0;
else
{
bufoffset = lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_CUR);
if (bufoffset < 0)
{
suppressible_error (_("lseek failed"), errno);
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
/* Read new stuff into the buffer, saving the specified
amount of old stuff. When we're done, 'bufbeg' points
to the beginning of the buffer contents, and 'buflim'
points just after the end. Return zero if there's an error. */
static int
fillbuf (size_t save, struct stats const *stats)
{
size_t fillsize = 0;
int cc = 1;
char *readbuf;
size_t readsize;
/* Offset from start of buffer to start of old stuff
that we want to save. */
size_t saved_offset = buflim - save - buffer;
if (pagesize <= buffer + bufalloc - buflim)
{
readbuf = buflim;
bufbeg = buflim - save;
}
else
{
size_t minsize = save + pagesize;
size_t newsize;
size_t newalloc;
char *newbuf;
/* Grow newsize until it is at least as great as minsize. */
for (newsize = bufalloc - pagesize - 1; newsize < minsize; newsize *= 2)
if (newsize * 2 < newsize || newsize * 2 + pagesize + 1 < newsize * 2)
xalloc_die ();
/* Try not to allocate more memory than the file size indicates,
as that might cause unnecessary memory exhaustion if the file
is large. However, do not use the original file size as a
heuristic if we've already read past the file end, as most
likely the file is growing. */
if (S_ISREG (stats->stat.st_mode))
{
off_t to_be_read = stats->stat.st_size - bufoffset;
off_t maxsize_off = save + to_be_read;
if (0 <= to_be_read && to_be_read <= maxsize_off
&& maxsize_off == (size_t) maxsize_off
&& minsize <= (size_t) maxsize_off
&& (size_t) maxsize_off < newsize)
newsize = maxsize_off;
}
/* Add enough room so that the buffer is aligned and has room
for byte sentinels fore and aft. */
newalloc = newsize + pagesize + 1;
newbuf = bufalloc < newalloc ? xmalloc (bufalloc = newalloc) : buffer;
readbuf = ALIGN_TO (newbuf + 1 + save, pagesize);
bufbeg = readbuf - save;
memmove (bufbeg, buffer + saved_offset, save);
bufbeg[-1] = eolbyte;
if (newbuf != buffer)
{
free (buffer);
buffer = newbuf;
}
}
readsize = buffer + bufalloc - readbuf;
readsize -= readsize % pagesize;
if (! fillsize)
{
ssize_t bytesread;
while ((bytesread = read (bufdesc, readbuf, readsize)) < 0
&& errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (bytesread < 0)
cc = 0;
else
fillsize = bytesread;
}
bufoffset += fillsize;
#if defined HAVE_DOS_FILE_CONTENTS
if (fillsize)
fillsize = undossify_input (readbuf, fillsize);
#endif
buflim = readbuf + fillsize;
return cc;
}
/* Flags controlling the style of output. */
static enum
{
BINARY_BINARY_FILES,
TEXT_BINARY_FILES,
WITHOUT_MATCH_BINARY_FILES
} binary_files; /* How to handle binary files. */
static int filename_mask; /* If zero, output nulls after filenames. */
static int out_quiet; /* Suppress all normal output. */
static int out_invert; /* Print nonmatching stuff. */
static int out_file; /* Print filenames. */
static int out_line; /* Print line numbers. */
static int out_byte; /* Print byte offsets. */
static int out_before; /* Lines of leading context. */
static int out_after; /* Lines of trailing context. */
static int out_file; /* Print filenames. */
static int out_line; /* Print line numbers. */
static int out_byte; /* Print byte offsets. */
static int out_before; /* Lines of leading context. */
static int out_after; /* Lines of trailing context. */
static int count_matches; /* Count matching lines. */
static int list_files; /* List matching files. */
static int no_filenames; /* Suppress file names. */
static off_t max_count; /* Stop after outputting this many
lines from an input file. */
static int line_buffered; /* If nonzero, use line buffering, i.e.
fflush everyline out. */
static char const *lastnl; /* Pointer after last newline counted. */
static char const *lastout; /* Pointer after last character output;
NULL if no character has been output
or if it's conceptually before bufbeg. */
static uintmax_t totalnl; /* Total newline count before lastnl. */
static off_t outleft; /* Maximum number of lines to be output. */
static int pending; /* Pending lines of output.
NULL if no character has been output
or if it's conceptually before bufbeg. */
static uintmax_t totalnl; /* Total newline count before lastnl. */
static off_t outleft; /* Maximum number of lines to be output. */
static int pending; /* Pending lines of output.
Always kept 0 if out_quiet is true. */
static int done_on_match; /* Stop scanning file on first match. */
static int exit_on_match; /* Exit on first match. */
/* Add two numbers that count input bytes or lines, and report an
error if the addition overflows. */
static uintmax_t
add_count (uintmax_t a, uintmax_t b)
{
uintmax_t sum = a + b;
if (sum < a)
error (EXIT_TROUBLE, 0, _("input is too large to count"));
return sum;
}
static void
nlscan (char const *lim)
{
size_t newlines = 0;
char const *beg;
for (beg = lastnl; beg < lim; beg++)
{
beg = memchr (beg, eolbyte, lim - beg);
if (!beg)
break;
newlines++;
}
totalnl = add_count (totalnl, newlines);
lastnl = lim;
}
/* Print the current filename. */
static void
print_filename (void)
{
pr_sgr_start_if (filename_color);
fputs (filename, stdout);
pr_sgr_end_if (filename_color);
}
/* Print a character separator. */
static void
print_sep (char sep)
{
pr_sgr_start_if (sep_color);
fputc (sep, stdout);
pr_sgr_end_if (sep_color);
}
/* Print a line number or a byte offset. */
static void
print_offset (uintmax_t pos, int min_width, const char *color)
{
/* Do not rely on printf to print pos, since uintmax_t may be longer
than long, and long long is not portable. */
char buf[sizeof pos * CHAR_BIT];
char *p = buf + sizeof buf;
do
{
*--p = '0' + pos % 10;
--min_width;
}
while ((pos /= 10) != 0);
/* Do this to maximize the probability of alignment across lines. */
if (align_tabs)
while (--min_width >= 0)
*--p = ' ';
pr_sgr_start_if (color);
fwrite (p, 1, buf + sizeof buf - p, stdout);
pr_sgr_end_if (color);
}
/* Print a whole line head (filename, line, byte). */
static void
print_line_head (char const *beg, char const *lim, int sep)
{
int pending_sep = 0;
if (out_file)
{
print_filename ();
if (filename_mask)
pending_sep = 1;
else
fputc (0, stdout);
}
if (out_line)
{
if (lastnl < lim)
{
nlscan (beg);
totalnl = add_count (totalnl, 1);
lastnl = lim;
}
if (pending_sep)
print_sep (sep);
print_offset (totalnl, 4, line_num_color);
pending_sep = 1;
}
if (out_byte)
{
uintmax_t pos = add_count (totalcc, beg - bufbeg);
#if defined HAVE_DOS_FILE_CONTENTS
pos = dossified_pos (pos);
#endif
if (pending_sep)
print_sep (sep);
print_offset (pos, 6, byte_num_color);
pending_sep = 1;
}
if (pending_sep)
{
/* This assumes sep is one column wide.
Try doing this any other way with Unicode
(and its combining and wide characters)
filenames and you're wasting your efforts. */
if (align_tabs)
fputs ("\t\b", stdout);
print_sep (sep);
}
}
static const char *
print_line_middle (const char *beg, const char *lim,
const char *line_color, const char *match_color)
{
size_t match_size;
size_t match_offset;
const char *cur = beg;
const char *mid = NULL;
while (cur < lim
&& ((match_offset = execute (beg, lim - beg, &match_size,
beg + (cur - beg))) != (size_t) -1))
{
char const *b = beg + match_offset;
/* Avoid matching the empty line at the end of the buffer. */
if (b == lim)
break;
/* Avoid hanging on grep --color "" foo */
if (match_size == 0)
{
/* Make minimal progress; there may be further non-empty matches. */
/* XXX - Could really advance by one whole multi-octet character. */
match_size = 1;
if (!mid)
mid = cur;
}
else
{
/* This function is called on a matching line only,
but is it selected or rejected/context? */
if (only_matching)
print_line_head (b, lim, (out_invert ? SEP_CHAR_REJECTED
: SEP_CHAR_SELECTED));
else
{
pr_sgr_start (line_color);
if (mid)
{
cur = mid;
mid = NULL;
}
fwrite (cur, sizeof (char), b - cur, stdout);
}
pr_sgr_start_if (match_color);
fwrite (b, sizeof (char), match_size, stdout);
pr_sgr_end_if (match_color);
if (only_matching)
fputs ("\n", stdout);
}
cur = b + match_size;
}
if (only_matching)
cur = lim;
else if (mid)
cur = mid;
return cur;
}
static const char *
print_line_tail (const char *beg, const char *lim, const char *line_color)
{
size_t eol_size;
size_t tail_size;
eol_size = (lim > beg && lim[-1] == eolbyte);
eol_size += (lim - eol_size > beg && lim[-(1 + eol_size)] == '\r');
tail_size = lim - eol_size - beg;
if (tail_size > 0)
{
pr_sgr_start (line_color);
fwrite (beg, 1, tail_size, stdout);
beg += tail_size;
pr_sgr_end (line_color);
}
return beg;
}
static void
prline (char const *beg, char const *lim, int sep)
{
int matching;
const char *line_color;
const char *match_color;
if (!only_matching)
print_line_head (beg, lim, sep);
matching = (sep == SEP_CHAR_SELECTED) ^ !!out_invert;
if (color_option)
{
line_color = (((sep == SEP_CHAR_SELECTED)
^ (out_invert && (color_option < 0)))
? selected_line_color : context_line_color);
match_color = (sep == SEP_CHAR_SELECTED
? selected_match_color : context_match_color);
}
else
line_color = match_color = NULL; /* Shouldn't be used. */
if ((only_matching && matching)
|| (color_option && (*line_color || *match_color)))
{
/* We already know that non-matching lines have no match (to colorize). */
if (matching && (only_matching || *match_color))
beg = print_line_middle (beg, lim, line_color, match_color);
/* FIXME: this test may be removable. */
if (!only_matching && *line_color)
beg = print_line_tail (beg, lim, line_color);
}
if (!only_matching && lim > beg)
fwrite (beg, 1, lim - beg, stdout);
if (ferror (stdout))
{
write_error_seen = 1;
error (EXIT_TROUBLE, 0, _("write error"));
}
lastout = lim;
if (line_buffered)
fflush (stdout);
}
/* Print pending lines of trailing context prior to LIM. Trailing context ends
at the next matching line when OUTLEFT is 0. */
static void
prpending (char const *lim)
{
if (!lastout)
lastout = bufbeg;
while (pending > 0 && lastout < lim)
{
char const *nl = memchr (lastout, eolbyte, lim - lastout);
size_t match_size;
--pending;
if (outleft
|| ((execute (lastout, nl + 1 - lastout,
&match_size, NULL) == (size_t) -1)
== !out_invert))
prline (lastout, nl + 1, SEP_CHAR_REJECTED);
else
pending = 0;
}
}
/* Print the lines between BEG and LIM. Deal with context crap.
If NLINESP is non-null, store a count of lines between BEG and LIM. */
static void
prtext (char const *beg, char const *lim, int *nlinesp)
{
/* Print the lines between BEG and LIM. Deal with context crap.
If NLINESP is non-null, store a count of lines between BEG and LIM. */
static void
prtext (char const *beg, char const *lim, int *nlinesp)
{
static int used; /* avoid printing SEP_STR_GROUP before any output */
char const *bp, *p;
char eol = eolbyte;
int i, n;
if (!out_quiet && pending > 0)
prpending (beg);
/* Deal with leading context crap. */
bp = lastout ? lastout : bufbeg;
for (i = 0; i < out_before; ++i)
if (p > bp)
do
--p;
while (p[-1] != eol);
/* We print the SEP_STR_GROUP separator only if our output is
discontiguous from the last output in the file. */
if ((out_before || out_after) && used && p != lastout && group_separator)
{
pr_sgr_start_if (sep_color);
fputs (group_separator, stdout);
pr_sgr_end_if (sep_color);
fputc ('\n', stdout);
}
while (p < beg)
{
char const *nl = memchr (p, eol, beg - p);
nl++;
prline (p, nl, SEP_CHAR_REJECTED);
p = nl;
}
}
if (nlinesp)
{
/* Caller wants a line count. */
for (n = 0; p < lim && n < outleft; n++)
{
char const *nl = memchr (p, eol, lim - p);
nl++;
if (!out_quiet)
prline (p, nl, SEP_CHAR_SELECTED);
p = nl;
}
*nlinesp = n;
/* relying on it that this function is never called when outleft = 0. */
after_last_match = bufoffset - (buflim - p);
}
else if (!out_quiet)
prline (beg, lim, SEP_CHAR_SELECTED);
pending = out_quiet ? 0 : out_after;
used = 1;
}
static size_t
do_execute (char const *buf, size_t size, size_t *match_size, char const *start_ptr)
{
size_t result;
const char *line_next;
/* With the current implementation, using --ignore-case with a multi-byte
character set is very inefficient when applied to a large buffer
containing many matches. We can avoid much of the wasted effort
by matching line-by-line.
FIXME: this is just an ugly workaround, and it doesn't really
belong here. Also, PCRE is always using this same per-line
matching algorithm. Either we fix -i, or we should refactor
this code---for example, we could add another function pointer
to struct matcher to split the buffer passed to execute. It would
perform the memchr if line-by-line matching is necessary, or just
return buf + size otherwise. */
if (MB_CUR_MAX == 1 || !match_icase)
return execute (buf, size, match_size, start_ptr);
for (line_next = buf; line_next < buf + size; )
{
const char *line_buf = line_next;
const char *line_end = memchr (line_buf, eolbyte, (buf + size) - line_buf);
if (line_end == NULL)
line_next = line_end = buf + size;
else
line_next = line_end + 1;
if (start_ptr && start_ptr >= line_end)
continue;
result = execute (line_buf, line_next - line_buf, match_size, start_ptr);
if (result != (size_t) -1)
return (line_buf - buf) + result;
}
return (size_t) -1;
}
/* Scan the specified portion of the buffer, matching lines (or
between matching lines if OUT_INVERT is true). Return a count of
lines printed. */
static int
grepbuf (char const *beg, char const *lim)
/* Scan the specified portion of the buffer, matching lines (or
between matching lines if OUT_INVERT is true). Return a count of
lines printed. */
static int
grepbuf (char const *beg, char const *lim)
{
int nlines, n;
char const *p;
size_t match_offset;
size_t match_size;
{
char const *b = p + match_offset;
char const *endp = b + match_size;
/* Avoid matching the empty line at the end of the buffer. */
if (b == lim)
break;
if (!out_invert)
{
prtext (b, endp, (int *) 0);
nlines++;
break;
if (!out_invert)
{
prtext (b, endp, (int *) 0);
nlines++;
outleft--;
if (!outleft || done_on_match)
}
}
else if (p < b)
{
prtext (p, b, &n);
nlines += n;
outleft -= n;
if (!outleft)
return nlines;
}
p = endp;
}
if (out_invert && p < lim)
{
prtext (p, lim, &n);
nlines += n;
outleft -= n;
}
return nlines;
}
/* Search a given file. Normally, return a count of lines printed;
but if the file is a directory and we search it recursively, then
return -2 if there was a match, and -1 otherwise. */
static int
grep (int fd, char const *file, struct stats *stats)
/* Search a given file. Normally, return a count of lines printed;
but if the file is a directory and we search it recursively, then
return -2 if there was a match, and -1 otherwise. */
static int
grep (int fd, char const *file, struct stats *stats)
{
int nlines, i;
int not_text;
size_t residue, save;
char oldc;
return 0;
if (file && directories == RECURSE_DIRECTORIES
&& S_ISDIR (stats->stat.st_mode))
{
/* Close fd now, so that we don't open a lot of file descriptors
when we recurse deeply. */
if (close (fd) != 0)
suppressible_error (file, errno);
return grepdir (file, stats) - 2;
}
totalcc = 0;
lastout = 0;
totalnl = 0;
outleft = max_count;
after_last_match = 0;
pending = 0;
nlines = 0;
residue = 0;
save = 0;
if (! fillbuf (save, stats))
{
suppressible_error (filename, errno);
return 0;
}
not_text = (((binary_files == BINARY_BINARY_FILES && !out_quiet)
|| binary_files == WITHOUT_MATCH_BINARY_FILES)
&& memchr (bufbeg, eol ? '\0' : '\200', buflim - bufbeg));
if (not_text && binary_files == WITHOUT_MATCH_BINARY_FILES)
return 0;
done_on_match += not_text;
out_quiet += not_text;
for (;;)
{
lastnl = bufbeg;
if (lastout)
lastout = bufbeg;
beg = bufbeg + save;
/* no more data to scan (eof) except for maybe a residue -> break */
if (beg == buflim)
break;
/* Determine new residue (the length of an incomplete line at the end of
the buffer, 0 means there is no incomplete last line). */
oldc = beg[-1];
beg[-1] = eol;
for (lim = buflim; lim[-1] != eol; lim--)
continue;
beg[-1] = oldc;
if (lim == beg)
lim = beg - residue;
beg -= residue;
residue = buflim - lim;
if (beg < lim)
{
if (outleft)
nlines += grepbuf (beg, lim);
if (pending)
prpending (lim);
if ((!outleft && !pending) || (nlines && done_on_match && !out_invert))
goto finish_grep;
}
/* The last OUT_BEFORE lines at the end of the buffer will be needed as
leading context if there is a matching line at the begin of the
next data. Make beg point to their begin. */
i = 0;
beg = lim;
while (i < out_before && beg > bufbeg && beg != lastout)
{
++i;
do
--beg;
while (beg[-1] != eol);
}
/* detect if leading context is discontinuous from last printed line. */
if (beg != lastout)
lastout = 0;
/* Handle some details and read more data to scan. */
save = residue + lim - beg;
if (out_byte)
totalcc = add_count (totalcc, buflim - bufbeg - save);
if (out_line)
nlscan (beg);
if (! fillbuf (save, stats))
{
suppressible_error (filename, errno);
goto finish_grep;
}
}
if (residue)
{
*buflim++ = eol;
if (outleft)
nlines += grepbuf (bufbeg + save - residue, buflim);
if (pending)
prpending (buflim);
}
finish_grep:
done_on_match -= not_text;
out_quiet -= not_text;
if ((not_text & ~out_quiet) && nlines != 0)
printf (_("Binary file %s matches\n"), filename);
return nlines;
}
static int
grepfile (char const *file, struct stats *stats)
{
int desc;
int count;
int status;
grepfile (char const *file, struct stats *stats)
{
int desc;
int count;
int status;
filename = (file ? file : label ? label : _("(standard input)"));
/* Don't open yet, since that might have side effects on a device. */
desc = -1;
}
else
{
/* When skipping directories, don't worry about directories
that can't be opened. */
desc = open (file, O_RDONLY);
if (desc < 0 && directories != SKIP_DIRECTORIES)
{
suppressible_error (file, errno);
return 1;
}
}
if (desc < 0
? stat (file, &stats->stat) != 0
: fstat (desc, &stats->stat) != 0)
{
suppressible_error (filename, errno);
if (file)
close (desc);
return 1;
}
if ((directories == SKIP_DIRECTORIES && S_ISDIR (stats->stat.st_mode))
|| (devices == SKIP_DEVICES && (S_ISCHR (stats->stat.st_mode)
|| S_ISBLK (stats->stat.st_mode)
|| S_ISSOCK (stats->stat.st_mode)
|| S_ISFIFO (stats->stat.st_mode))))
{
if (file)
close (desc);
return 1;
}
/* If there is a regular file on stdout and the current file refers
to the same i-node, we have to report the problem and skip it.
Otherwise when matching lines from some other input reach the
disk before we open this file, we can end up reading and matching
those lines and appending them to the file from which we're reading.
Then we'd have what appears to be an infinite loop that'd terminate
only upon filling the output file system or reaching a quota.
However, there is no risk of an infinite loop if grep is generating
no output, i.e., with --silent, --quiet, -q.
Similarly, with any of these:
--max-count=N (-m) (for N >= 2)
--files-with-matches (-l)
--files-without-match (-L)
there is no risk of trouble.
For --max-count=1, grep stops after printing the first match,
so there is no risk of malfunction. But even --max-count=2, with
input==output, while there is no risk of infloop, there is a race
condition that could result in "alternate" output. */
if (!out_quiet && list_files == 0 && 1 < max_count
&& S_ISREG (out_stat.st_mode) && out_stat.st_ino
&& SAME_INODE (stats->stat, out_stat))
{
if (! suppress_errors)
error (0, 0, _("input file %s is also the output"), quote (filename));
errseen = 1;
if (file)
close (desc);
return 1;
}
if (desc < 0)
{
desc = open (file, O_RDONLY);
if (desc < 0)
{
suppressible_error (file, errno);
return 1;
}
}
#if defined SET_BINARY
/* Set input to binary mode. Pipes are simulated with files
on DOS, so this includes the case of "foo | grep bar". */
if (!isatty (desc))
SET_BINARY (desc);
#endif
count = grep (desc, file, stats);
if (count < 0)
status = count + 2;
else
{
if (count_matches)
{
if (out_file)
{
print_filename ();
if (filename_mask)
print_sep (SEP_CHAR_SELECTED);
else
fputc (0, stdout);
}
printf ("%d\n", count);
}
else
fputc (0, stdout);
}
printf ("%d\n", count);
}
status = !count;
if (! file)
{
off_t required_offset = outleft ? bufoffset : after_last_match;
if (required_offset != bufoffset
&& lseek (desc, required_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0
&& S_ISREG (stats->stat.st_mode))
suppressible_error (filename, errno);
}
else
while (close (desc) != 0)
if (errno != EINTR)
{
suppressible_error (file, errno);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in GNU Grep before 2.11 might allow context-dependent attackers to execute arbitrary code via vectors involving a long input line that triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: | Medium | 9,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: unsigned long long Track::GetDefaultDuration() const
{
return m_info.defaultDuration;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 2,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleReadPixels(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::ReadPixels& c) {
GLint x = c.x;
GLint y = c.y;
GLsizei width = c.width;
GLsizei height = c.height;
GLenum format = c.format;
GLenum type = c.type;
if (width < 0 || height < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
typedef gles2::ReadPixels::Result Result;
uint32 pixels_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, height, format, type, pack_alignment_, &pixels_size, NULL, NULL)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
void* pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<void*>(
c.pixels_shm_id, c.pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!pixels || !result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (!validators_->read_pixel_format.IsValid(format)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glReadPixels", format, "format");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->pixel_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glReadPixels", type, "type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (width == 0 || height == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
gfx::Size max_size = GetBoundReadFrameBufferSize();
GLint max_x;
GLint max_y;
if (!SafeAdd(x, width, &max_x) || !SafeAdd(y, height, &max_y)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckBoundFramebuffersValid("glReadPixels")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, false, true);
if (x < 0 || y < 0 || max_x > max_size.width() || max_y > max_size.height()) {
uint32 temp_size;
uint32 unpadded_row_size;
uint32 padded_row_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, 2, format, type, pack_alignment_, &temp_size,
&unpadded_row_size, &padded_row_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint dest_x_offset = std::max(-x, 0);
uint32 dest_row_offset;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
dest_x_offset, 1, format, type, pack_alignment_, &dest_row_offset, NULL,
NULL)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
int8* dst = static_cast<int8*>(pixels);
GLint read_x = std::max(0, x);
GLint read_end_x = std::max(0, std::min(max_size.width(), max_x));
GLint read_width = read_end_x - read_x;
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
GLint ry = y + yy;
memset(dst, 0, unpadded_row_size);
if (ry >= 0 && ry < max_size.height() && read_width > 0) {
glReadPixels(
read_x, ry, read_width, 1, format, type, dst + dest_row_offset);
}
dst += padded_row_size;
}
} else {
glReadPixels(x, y, width, height, format, type, pixels);
}
GLenum error = PeekGLError();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
*result = true;
GLenum read_format = GetBoundReadFrameBufferInternalFormat();
uint32 channels_exist = GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(read_format);
if ((channels_exist & 0x0008) == 0 &&
!feature_info_->feature_flags().disable_workarounds) {
uint32 temp_size;
uint32 unpadded_row_size;
uint32 padded_row_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, 2, format, type, pack_alignment_, &temp_size,
&unpadded_row_size, &padded_row_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (type != GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glReadPixels",
"unsupported readPixel format");
return error::kNoError;
}
switch (format) {
case GL_RGBA:
case GL_BGRA_EXT:
case GL_ALPHA: {
int offset = (format == GL_ALPHA) ? 0 : 3;
int step = (format == GL_ALPHA) ? 1 : 4;
uint8* dst = static_cast<uint8*>(pixels) + offset;
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
uint8* end = dst + unpadded_row_size;
for (uint8* d = dst; d < end; d += step) {
*d = 255;
}
dst += padded_row_size;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 on Mac OS X allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 17,829 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int Chapters::GetEditionCount() const
{
return m_editions_count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 10,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: vbf_stp_error(struct worker *wrk, struct busyobj *bo)
{
ssize_t l, ll, o;
double now;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct vsb *synth_body;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(wrk, WORKER_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo, BUSYOBJ_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo->fetch_objcore, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
AN(bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_BUSY);
assert(bo->director_state == DIR_S_NULL);
wrk->stats->fetch_failed++;
now = W_TIM_real(wrk);
VSLb_ts_busyobj(bo, "Error", now);
if (bo->fetch_objcore->stobj->stevedore != NULL)
ObjFreeObj(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
HTTP_Setup(bo->beresp, bo->ws, bo->vsl, SLT_BerespMethod);
http_PutResponse(bo->beresp, "HTTP/1.1", 503, "Backend fetch failed");
http_TimeHeader(bo->beresp, "Date: ", now);
http_SetHeader(bo->beresp, "Server: Varnish");
bo->fetch_objcore->t_origin = now;
if (!VTAILQ_EMPTY(&bo->fetch_objcore->objhead->waitinglist)) {
/*
* If there is a waitinglist, it means that there is no
* grace-able object, so cache the error return for a
* short time, so the waiting list can drain, rather than
* each objcore on the waiting list sequentially attempt
* to fetch from the backend.
*/
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 1;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 5;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 5;
} else {
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 0;
}
synth_body = VSB_new_auto();
AN(synth_body);
VCL_backend_error_method(bo->vcl, wrk, NULL, bo, synth_body);
AZ(VSB_finish(synth_body));
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_ABANDON || wrk->handling == VCL_RET_FAIL) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_RETRY) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
if (bo->retries++ < cache_param->max_retries)
return (F_STP_RETRY);
VSLb(bo->vsl, SLT_VCL_Error, "Too many retries, failing");
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
assert(wrk->handling == VCL_RET_DELIVER);
bo->vfc->bo = bo;
bo->vfc->wrk = bo->wrk;
bo->vfc->oc = bo->fetch_objcore;
bo->vfc->http = bo->beresp;
bo->vfc->esi_req = bo->bereq;
if (vbf_beresp2obj(bo)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Could not get storage");
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
ll = VSB_len(synth_body);
o = 0;
while (ll > 0) {
l = ll;
if (VFP_GetStorage(bo->vfc, &l, &ptr) != VFP_OK)
break;
memcpy(ptr, VSB_data(synth_body) + o, l);
VFP_Extend(bo->vfc, l);
ll -= l;
o += l;
}
AZ(ObjSetU64(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OA_LEN, o));
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
HSH_Unbusy(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_FINISHED);
return (F_STP_DONE);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: vbf_stp_error in bin/varnishd/cache/cache_fetch.c in Varnish HTTP Cache 4.1.x before 4.1.9 and 5.x before 5.2.1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory because a VFP_GetStorage buffer is larger than intended in certain circumstances involving -sfile Stevedore transient objects.
Commit Message: Avoid buffer read overflow on vcl_error and -sfile
The file stevedore may return a buffer larger than asked for when
requesting storage. Due to lack of check for this condition, the code
to copy the synthetic error memory buffer from vcl_error would overrun
the buffer.
Patch by @shamger
Fixes: #2429 | Medium | 10,510 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::DidFinishPrinting(PrintingResult result) {
bool store_print_pages_params = true;
if (result == FAIL_PRINT) {
DisplayPrintJobError();
if (notify_browser_of_print_failure_ && print_pages_params_.get()) {
int cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintingFailed(routing_id(), cookie));
}
} else if (result == FAIL_PREVIEW) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
store_print_pages_params = false;
int cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
if (notify_browser_of_print_failure_)
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewFailed(routing_id(), cookie));
else
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewCancelled(routing_id(), cookie));
print_preview_context_.Failed(notify_browser_of_print_failure_);
}
if (print_web_view_) {
print_web_view_->close();
print_web_view_ = NULL;
}
if (store_print_pages_params) {
old_print_pages_params_.reset(print_pages_params_.release());
} else {
print_pages_params_.reset();
old_print_pages_params_.reset();
}
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 9,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static uint32_t color_string_to_rgba(const char *p, int len)
{
uint32_t ret = 0xFF000000;
const ColorEntry *entry;
char color_name[100];
if (*p == '#') {
p++;
len--;
if (len == 3) {
ret |= (hex_char_to_number(p[2]) << 4) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[1]) << 12) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[0]) << 20);
} else if (len == 4) {
ret = (hex_char_to_number(p[3]) << 4) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[2]) << 12) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[1]) << 20) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[0]) << 28);
} else if (len == 6) {
ret |= hex_char_to_number(p[5]) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[4]) << 4) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[3]) << 8) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[2]) << 12) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[1]) << 16) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[0]) << 20);
} else if (len == 8) {
ret = hex_char_to_number(p[7]) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[6]) << 4) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[5]) << 8) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[4]) << 12) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[3]) << 16) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[2]) << 20) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[1]) << 24) |
(hex_char_to_number(p[0]) << 28);
}
} else {
strncpy(color_name, p, len);
color_name[len] = '\0';
entry = bsearch(color_name,
color_table,
FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(color_table),
sizeof(ColorEntry),
color_table_compare);
if (!entry)
return ret;
ret = entry->rgb_color;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the color_string_to_rgba function in libavcodec/xpmdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3 before 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 850 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ContentEncoding::ContentCompression::~ContentCompression() {
delete [] settings;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 27,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void patch_instruction(VAPICROMState *s, X86CPU *cpu, target_ulong ip)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
VAPICHandlers *handlers;
uint8_t opcode[2];
uint32_t imm32;
target_ulong current_pc = 0;
target_ulong current_cs_base = 0;
uint32_t current_flags = 0;
if (smp_cpus == 1) {
handlers = &s->rom_state.up;
} else {
handlers = &s->rom_state.mp;
}
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
cpu_get_tb_cpu_state(env, ¤t_pc, ¤t_cs_base,
¤t_flags);
}
pause_all_vcpus();
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip, opcode, sizeof(opcode), 0);
switch (opcode[0]) {
case 0x89: /* mov r32 to r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50 + modrm_reg(opcode[1])); /* push reg */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0x8b: /* mov r/m32 to r32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x90);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr[modrm_reg(opcode[1])]);
break;
case 0xa1: /* mov abs to eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->get_tpr[0]);
break;
case 0xa3: /* mov eax to abs */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip, handlers->set_tpr_eax);
break;
case 0xc7: /* mov imm32, r/m32 (c7/0) */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x68); /* push imm32 */
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 6, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 0);
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + 1, (void *)&imm32, sizeof(imm32), 1);
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 5, handlers->set_tpr);
break;
case 0xff: /* push r/m32 */
patch_byte(cpu, ip, 0x50); /* push eax */
patch_call(s, cpu, ip + 1, handlers->get_tpr_stack);
break;
default:
abort();
}
resume_all_vcpus();
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
tb_gen_code(cs, current_pc, current_cs_base, current_flags, 1);
cpu_resume_from_signal(cs, NULL);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The patch_instruction function in hw/i386/kvmvapic.c in QEMU does not initialize the imm32 variable, which allows local guest OS administrators to obtain sensitive information from host stack memory by accessing the Task Priority Register (TPR).
Commit Message: | Low | 29,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int __net_init sit_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct sit_net *sitn = net_generic(net, sit_net_id);
struct ip_tunnel *t;
int err;
sitn->tunnels[0] = sitn->tunnels_wc;
sitn->tunnels[1] = sitn->tunnels_l;
sitn->tunnels[2] = sitn->tunnels_r;
sitn->tunnels[3] = sitn->tunnels_r_l;
if (!net_has_fallback_tunnels(net))
return 0;
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct ip_tunnel), "sit0",
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
ipip6_tunnel_setup);
if (!sitn->fb_tunnel_dev) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_alloc_dev;
}
dev_net_set(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, net);
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &sit_link_ops;
/* FB netdevice is special: we have one, and only one per netns.
* Allowing to move it to another netns is clearly unsafe.
*/
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->features |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
err = register_netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
if (err)
goto err_reg_dev;
ipip6_tunnel_clone_6rd(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, sitn);
ipip6_fb_tunnel_init(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
t = netdev_priv(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
strcpy(t->parms.name, sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->name);
return 0;
err_reg_dev:
ipip6_dev_free(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
err_alloc_dev:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.0, a memory leak exists in sit_init_net() in net/ipv6/sit.c when register_netdev() fails to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, which may cause denial of service, aka CID-07f12b26e21a.
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 25,201 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_clearflag(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error;
#ifdef DEBUG
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
xfs_attr_leaf_name_local_t *name_loc;
int namelen;
char *name;
#endif /* DEBUG */
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_clearflag(args);
/*
* Set up the operation.
*/
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, args->dp, args->blkno, -1, &bp);
if (error)
return(error);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
entry = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf)[args->index];
ASSERT(entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE);
#ifdef DEBUG
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(args->index < ichdr.count);
ASSERT(args->index >= 0);
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, args->index);
namelen = name_loc->namelen;
name = (char *)name_loc->nameval;
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
namelen = name_rmt->namelen;
name = (char *)name_rmt->name;
}
ASSERT(be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) == args->hashval);
ASSERT(namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(name, args->name, namelen) == 0);
#endif /* DEBUG */
entry->flags &= ~XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, entry, sizeof(*entry)));
if (args->rmtblkno) {
ASSERT((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0);
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
name_rmt->valueblk = cpu_to_be32(args->rmtblkno);
name_rmt->valuelen = cpu_to_be32(args->valuelen);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, name_rmt, sizeof(*name_rmt)));
}
/*
* Commit the flag value change and start the next trans in series.
*/
return xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, args->dp);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The XFS implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.15 improperly uses an old size value during remote attribute replacement, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (transaction overrun and data corruption) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging XFS filesystem access.
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> | High | 6,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_accept_from_http)
{
UEnumeration *available;
char *http_accept = NULL;
int http_accept_len;
UErrorCode status = 0;
int len;
char resultLocale[INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN+1];
UAcceptResult outResult;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &http_accept, &http_accept_len) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_accept_from_http: unable to parse input parameters", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
available = ures_openAvailableLocales(NULL, &status);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to retrieve locale list");
len = uloc_acceptLanguageFromHTTP(resultLocale, INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN,
&outResult, http_accept, available, &status);
uenum_close(available);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to find acceptable locale");
if (len < 0 || outResult == ULOC_ACCEPT_FAILED) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(resultLocale, len, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 25,285 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static zend_bool add_post_var(zval *arr, post_var_data_t *var, zend_bool eof)
{
char *ksep, *vsep, *val;
size_t klen, vlen;
size_t new_vlen;
if (var->ptr >= var->end) {
return 0;
}
vsep = memchr(var->ptr, '&', var->end - var->ptr);
if (!vsep) {
if (!eof) {
return 0;
} else {
vsep = var->end;
}
}
ksep = memchr(var->ptr, '=', vsep - var->ptr);
if (ksep) {
*ksep = '\0';
/* "foo=bar&" or "foo=&" */
klen = ksep - var->ptr;
vlen = vsep - ++ksep;
} else {
ksep = "";
/* "foo&" */
klen = vsep - var->ptr;
vlen = 0;
}
php_url_decode(var->ptr, klen);
val = estrndup(ksep, vlen);
if (vlen) {
vlen = php_url_decode(val, vlen);
}
if (sapi_module.input_filter(PARSE_POST, var->ptr, &val, vlen, &new_vlen)) {
php_register_variable_safe(var->ptr, val, new_vlen, arr);
}
efree(val);
var->ptr = vsep + (vsep != var->end);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In PHP before 5.6.31, 7.x before 7.0.17, and 7.1.x before 7.1.3, remote attackers could cause a CPU consumption denial of service attack by injecting long form variables, related to main/php_variables.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807 | High | 22,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
WORK_STATE ret;
ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
#endif
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
* in case there are any unexpected retransmits
*/
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
} else {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
}
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 does not properly restrict the lifetime of queue entries associated with unused out-of-order messages, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by maintaining many crafted DTLS sessions simultaneously, related to d1_lib.c, statem_dtls.c, statem_lib.c, and statem_srvr.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 24,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int recv_msg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t buf_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
struct sk_buff *buf;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
long timeout;
unsigned int sz;
u32 err;
int res;
/* Catch invalid receive requests */
if (unlikely(!buf_len))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(sock->state == SS_UNCONNECTED)) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
/* Look for a message in receive queue; wait if necessary */
while (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
if (sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
if (timeout <= 0L) {
res = timeout ? timeout : -EWOULDBLOCK;
goto exit;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeout = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
tipc_rx_ready(sock),
timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
}
/* Look at first message in receive queue */
buf = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
msg = buf_msg(buf);
sz = msg_data_sz(msg);
err = msg_errcode(msg);
/* Discard an empty non-errored message & try again */
if ((!sz) && (!err)) {
advance_rx_queue(sk);
goto restart;
}
/* Capture sender's address (optional) */
set_orig_addr(m, msg);
/* Capture ancillary data (optional) */
res = anc_data_recv(m, msg, tport);
if (res)
goto exit;
/* Capture message data (if valid) & compute return value (always) */
if (!err) {
if (unlikely(buf_len < sz)) {
sz = buf_len;
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
res = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(buf, msg_hdr_sz(msg),
m->msg_iov, sz);
if (res)
goto exit;
res = sz;
} else {
if ((sock->state == SS_READY) ||
((err == TIPC_CONN_SHUTDOWN) || m->msg_control))
res = 0;
else
res = -ECONNRESET;
}
/* Consume received message (optional) */
if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
if ((sock->state != SS_READY) &&
(++tport->conn_unacked >= TIPC_FLOW_CONTROL_WIN))
tipc_acknowledge(tport->ref, tport->conn_unacked);
advance_rx_queue(sk);
}
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/tipc/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure and a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Cc: Allan Stephens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 22,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 17,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (!group) return;
if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_finish(group);
EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);
if (group->generator != NULL)
EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);
if (group->generator != NULL)
EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
BN_clear_free(&group->order);
OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof *group);
OPENSSL_free(group);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-320
Summary: A timing attack flaw was found in OpenSSL 1.0.1u and before that could allow a malicious user with local access to recover ECDSA P-256 private keys.
Commit Message: | Low | 26,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void perf_event_for_each(struct perf_event *event,
void (*func)(struct perf_event *))
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *sibling;
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
event = event->group_leader;
perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &event->sibling_list, group_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(sibling, func);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 14,357 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static ssize_t exitcode_proc_write(struct file *file,
const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
char *end, buf[sizeof("nnnnn\0")];
int tmp;
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))
return -EFAULT;
tmp = simple_strtol(buf, &end, 0);
if ((*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end))
return -EINVAL;
uml_exitcode = tmp;
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the exitcode_proc_write function in arch/um/kernel/exitcode.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging root privileges for a write operation.
Commit Message: uml: check length in exitcode_proc_write()
We don't cap the size of buffer from the user so we could write past the
end of the array here. Only root can write to this file.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 19,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: midi_synth_load_patch(int dev, int format, const char __user *addr,
int offs, int count, int pmgr_flag)
{
int orig_dev = synth_devs[dev]->midi_dev;
struct sysex_info sysex;
int i;
unsigned long left, src_offs, eox_seen = 0;
int first_byte = 1;
int hdr_size = (unsigned long) &sysex.data[0] - (unsigned long) &sysex;
leave_sysex(dev);
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, 0xf0))
return 0;
if (format != SYSEX_PATCH)
{
/* printk("MIDI Error: Invalid patch format (key) 0x%x\n", format);*/
return -EINVAL;
}
if (count < hdr_size)
{
/* printk("MIDI Error: Patch header too short\n");*/
return -EINVAL;
}
count -= hdr_size;
/*
* Copy the header from user space but ignore the first bytes which have
* been transferred already.
*/
if(copy_from_user(&((char *) &sysex)[offs], &(addr)[offs], hdr_size - offs))
return -EFAULT;
if (count < sysex.len)
{
/* printk(KERN_WARNING "MIDI Warning: Sysex record too short (%d<%d)\n", count, (int) sysex.len);*/
sysex.len = count;
}
left = sysex.len;
src_offs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < left && !signal_pending(current); i++)
{
unsigned char data;
if (get_user(data,
(unsigned char __user *)(addr + hdr_size + i)))
return -EFAULT;
eox_seen = (i > 0 && data & 0x80); /* End of sysex */
if (eox_seen && data != 0xf7)
data = 0xf7;
if (i == 0)
{
if (data != 0xf0)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "midi_synth: Sysex start missing\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
while (!midi_devs[orig_dev]->outputc(orig_dev, (unsigned char) (data & 0xff)) &&
!signal_pending(current))
schedule();
if (!first_byte && data & 0x80)
return 0;
first_byte = 0;
}
if (!eox_seen)
midi_outc(orig_dev, 0xf7);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer underflow in the Open Sound System (OSS) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 on unspecified non-x86 platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging write access to /dev/sequencer.
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 4,574 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static MagickPixelPacket **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *images)
{
const Image
*next;
MagickPixelPacket
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
size_t
columns,
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(MagickPixelPacket **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (MagickPixelPacket **) NULL)
return((MagickPixelPacket **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
columns=images->columns;
for (next=images; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next->next)
columns=MagickMax(next->columns,columns);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
pixels[i]=(MagickPixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (MagickPixelPacket *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) columns; j++)
GetMagickPixelPacket(images,&pixels[i][j]);
}
return(pixels);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow at MagickCore/statistic.c in EvaluateImages because of mishandling rows.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615 | Medium | 6,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::StopWorker() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (launch_success_timer_->IsRunning()) {
launch_success_timer_->Stop();
launch_backoff_.InformOfRequest(false);
}
self_ = this;
ipc_enabled_ = false;
if (process_watcher_.GetWatchedObject() != NULL) {
launcher_delegate_->KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return;
}
DCHECK(process_watcher_.GetWatchedObject() == NULL);
ipc_error_timer_->Stop();
process_exit_event_.Close();
if (stopping_) {
ipc_error_timer_.reset();
launch_timer_.reset();
self_ = NULL;
return;
}
self_ = NULL;
DWORD exit_code = launcher_delegate_->GetExitCode();
if (kMinPermanentErrorExitCode <= exit_code &&
exit_code <= kMaxPermanentErrorExitCode) {
worker_delegate_->OnPermanentError();
return;
}
launch_timer_->Start(FROM_HERE, launch_backoff_.GetTimeUntilRelease(),
this, &Core::LaunchWorker);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 3,185 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int Equalizer_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
int32_t param2;
char *name;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 3 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 5 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
if (*pValueSize < (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
*(int16_t *)pValue = -1500;
*((int16_t *)pValue + 1) = 1500;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32438598");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
*(int16_t *)pValue = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32436341");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
*(int32_t *)pValue = EqualizerGetCentreFrequency(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32247948");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
EqualizerGetBandFreqRange(pContext, param2, (uint32_t *)pValue, ((uint32_t *)pValue + 1));
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetBand(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetNumPresets();
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
name = (char *)pValue;
strncpy(name, EqualizerGetPresetName(param2), *pValueSize - 1);
name[*pValueSize - 1] = 0;
*pValueSize = strlen(name) + 1;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
ALOGV("\tEqualizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES");
p[0] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
p[1] = (int16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
p[2 + i] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, i);
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_getParameter */
int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
int Volume_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;;
char *name;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize != sizeof(int16_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
status = VolumeGetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t *)(pValue));
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
*(int16_t *)pValue = 0;
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
VolumeGetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
status = VolumeGetMute(pContext, (uint32_t *)pValue);
ALOGV("\tVolume_getParameter() VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE Value is %d",
*(uint32_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
*(int32_t *)pValue = pContext->pBundledContext->bStereoPositionEnabled;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_getParameter */
int Volume_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int16_t level;
int16_t position;
uint32_t mute;
uint32_t positionEnabled;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
level = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t)level);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
mute = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetMute(pContext, mute);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
positionEnabled = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeEnableStereoPosition(pContext, positionEnabled);
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, pContext->pBundledContext->positionSaved);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
position = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t)position);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_setParameter */
/****************************************************************************************
* Name : LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16()
* Input : Signed 32-bit integer
* Output : Signed 16-bit integer
* MSB (16) = sign bit
* (15->05) = integer part
* (04->01) = decimal part
* Returns : Db value with respect to full scale
* Description :
* Remarks :
****************************************************************************************/
LVM_INT16 LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(LVM_INT32 Lin_fix)
{
LVM_INT16 db_fix;
LVM_INT16 Shift;
LVM_INT16 SmallRemainder;
LVM_UINT32 Remainder = (LVM_UINT32)Lin_fix;
/* Count leading bits, 1 cycle in assembly*/
for (Shift = 0; Shift<32; Shift++)
{
if ((Remainder & 0x80000000U)!=0)
{
break;
}
Remainder = Remainder << 1;
}
/*
* Based on the approximation equation (for Q11.4 format):
*
* dB = -96 * Shift + 16 * (8 * Remainder - 2 * Remainder^2)
*/
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(-96 * Shift); /* Six dB steps in Q11.4 format*/
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)((Remainder & 0x7fffffff) >> 24);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix + SmallRemainder );
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)(SmallRemainder * SmallRemainder);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - (LVM_INT16)((LVM_UINT16)SmallRemainder >> 9));
/* Correct for small offset */
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - 5);
return db_fix;
}
int Effect_setEnabled(EffectContext *pContext, bool enabled)
{
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() type %d, enabled %d", pContext->EffectType, enabled);
if (enabled) {
bool tempDisabled = false;
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bBassTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!tempDisabled) {
LvmEffect_enable(pContext);
}
} else {
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
LvmEffect_disable(pContext);
}
return 0;
}
int16_t LVC_Convert_VolToDb(uint32_t vol){
int16_t dB;
dB = LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(vol <<7);
dB = (dB +8)>>4;
dB = (dB <-96) ? -96 : dB ;
return dB;
}
} // namespace
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in lvm/wrapper/Bundle/EffectBundle.cpp in libeffects in the Qualcomm audio post processor could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32588016.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Effect command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32448258
Bug: 32095626
Test: Use POC bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I69f24eac5866f8d9090fc4c0ebe58c2c297b63df
(cherry picked from commit 01183402d757f0c28bfd5e3b127b3809dfd67459)
| Medium | 27,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> CloneVideoFrameWithLayout(
const VideoFrame* const src_frame,
const VideoFrameLayout& dst_layout) {
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->IsMappable());
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->format() == dst_layout.format());
auto dst_frame = VideoFrame::CreateFrameWithLayout(
dst_layout, src_frame->visible_rect(), src_frame->natural_size(),
src_frame->timestamp(), false /* zero_initialize_memory*/);
if (!dst_frame) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create VideoFrame";
return nullptr;
}
const size_t num_planes = VideoFrame::NumPlanes(dst_layout.format());
LOG_ASSERT(dst_layout.planes().size() == num_planes);
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->layout().planes().size() == num_planes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; ++i) {
libyuv::CopyPlane(
src_frame->data(i), src_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
dst_frame->data(i), dst_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
VideoFrame::Columns(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().width()),
VideoFrame::Rows(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().height()));
}
return dst_frame;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An insufficient watchdog timer in navigation in Google Chrome prior to 58.0.3029.81 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117} | Medium | 23,194 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void NormalPageArena::promptlyFreeObject(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(!getThreadState()->sweepForbidden());
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
Address address = reinterpret_cast<Address>(header);
Address payload = header->payload();
size_t size = header->size();
size_t payloadSize = header->payloadSize();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(pageFromObject(address) == findPageFromAddress(address));
{
ThreadState::SweepForbiddenScope forbiddenScope(getThreadState());
header->finalize(payload, payloadSize);
if (address + size == m_currentAllocationPoint) {
m_currentAllocationPoint = address;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + size);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(address, size);
return;
}
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(payload, payloadSize);
header->markPromptlyFreed();
}
m_promptlyFreedSize += size;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489} | Medium | 10,129 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = state->au_state;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, state->server,
state->auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
/* If we didn't find a client long-term key and no preauth mechanism
* replaced the reply key, error out now. */
if (state->client_keyblock.enctype == ENCTYPE_NULL) {
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
NULL,
state->local_tgt,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
state->auth_indicators,
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &state->ticket_reply,
&au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state->rstate))
state->reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
if (state->client_key != NULL)
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = state->client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client, state->cname,
state->server, state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0)
assert (state->status != 0);
au_state->status = state->status;
au_state->reply = &state->reply;
kau_as_req(kdc_context,
(errcode || state->preauth_err) ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->local_addr, state->remote_addr,
state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
state->local_tgt, errcode,
state->e_data, state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->local_tgt_storage);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(state->auth_indicators);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause a KDC assertion failure by sending invalid S4U2Self or S4U2Proxy requests.
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | Medium | 2,507 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlParseDocument(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
xmlInitParser();
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->input == NULL))
return(-1);
GROW;
/*
* SAX: detecting the level.
*/
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
/*
* SAX: beginning of the document processing.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData, &xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
if ((ctxt->encoding == (const xmlChar *)XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) &&
((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) >= 4)) {
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines.
*/
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(&start[0], 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
}
if (CUR == 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
}
/*
* Check for the XMLDecl in the Prolog.
* do not GROW here to avoid the detected encoder to decode more
* than just the first line, unless the amount of data is really
* too small to hold "<?xml version="1.0" encoding="foo"
*/
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) < 35) {
GROW;
}
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) && (IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
/*
* Note that we will switch encoding on the fly.
*/
xmlParseXMLDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return(-1);
}
ctxt->standalone = ctxt->input->standalone;
SKIP_BLANKS;
} else {
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
}
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) && (!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
/*
* The Misc part of the Prolog
*/
GROW;
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
/*
* Then possibly doc type declaration(s) and more Misc
* (doctypedecl Misc*)?
*/
GROW;
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', 'D', 'O', 'C', 'T', 'Y', 'P', 'E')) {
ctxt->inSubset = 1;
xmlParseDocTypeDecl(ctxt);
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
xmlParseInternalSubset(ctxt);
}
/*
* Create and update the external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData, ctxt->intSubName,
ctxt->extSubSystem, ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
}
/*
* Time to start parsing the tree itself
*/
GROW;
if (RAW != '<') {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY,
"Start tag expected, '<' not found\n");
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
xmlParseElement(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
/*
* The Misc part at the end
*/
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
if (RAW != 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
}
/*
* SAX: end of the document processing.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
/*
* Remove locally kept entity definitions if the tree was not built
*/
if ((ctxt->myDoc != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE))) {
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
if ((ctxt->wellFormed) && (ctxt->myDoc != NULL)) {
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_WELLFORMED;
if (ctxt->valid)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_DTDVALID;
if (ctxt->nsWellFormed)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_NSVALID;
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_OLD10;
}
if (! ctxt->wellFormed) {
ctxt->valid = 0;
return(-1);
}
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 19,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (!mTimeToSample.empty() || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if ((uint64_t)mTimeToSampleCount >
(uint64_t)UINT32_MAX / (2 * sizeof(uint32_t))) {
ALOGE(" Error: Time-to-sample table size too large.");
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
if (!mDataSource->getVector(data_offset + 8, &mTimeToSample,
mTimeToSampleCount * 2)) {
ALOGE(" Error: Incomplete data read for time-to-sample table.");
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSample.size(); ++i) {
mTimeToSample.editItemAt(i) = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28076789.
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
| High | 11,521 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long video_ioctl2(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
char sbuf[128];
void *mbuf = NULL;
void *parg = (void *)arg;
long err = -EINVAL;
bool has_array_args;
size_t array_size = 0;
void __user *user_ptr = NULL;
void **kernel_ptr = NULL;
/* Copy arguments into temp kernel buffer */
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) != _IOC_NONE) {
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) <= sizeof(sbuf)) {
parg = sbuf;
} else {
/* too big to allocate from stack */
mbuf = kmalloc(_IOC_SIZE(cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == mbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
parg = mbuf;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
unsigned long n = cmd_input_size(cmd);
if (copy_from_user(parg, (void __user *)arg, n))
goto out;
/* zero out anything we don't copy from userspace */
if (n < _IOC_SIZE(cmd))
memset((u8 *)parg + n, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd) - n);
} else {
/* read-only ioctl */
memset(parg, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
}
}
err = check_array_args(cmd, parg, &array_size, &user_ptr, &kernel_ptr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
has_array_args = err;
if (has_array_args) {
/*
* When adding new types of array args, make sure that the
* parent argument to ioctl (which contains the pointer to the
* array) fits into sbuf (so that mbuf will still remain
* unused up to here).
*/
mbuf = kmalloc(array_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (NULL == mbuf)
goto out_array_args;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(mbuf, user_ptr, array_size))
goto out_array_args;
*kernel_ptr = mbuf;
}
/* Handles IOCTL */
err = __video_do_ioctl(file, cmd, parg);
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = -EINVAL;
if (has_array_args) {
*kernel_ptr = user_ptr;
if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, mbuf, array_size))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_array_args;
}
if (err < 0)
goto out;
out_array_args:
/* Copy results into user buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_READ:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, parg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
out:
kfree(mbuf);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The video_usercopy function in drivers/media/video/v4l2-ioctl.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 relies on the count value of a v4l2_ext_controls data structure to determine a kmalloc size, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a large value.
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | Medium | 5,039 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::FlipVertically(
uint8* framebuffer,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height) {
uint8* scanline = scanline_.get();
if (!scanline)
return;
unsigned int row_bytes = width * 4;
unsigned int count = height / 2;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
uint8* row_a = framebuffer + i * row_bytes;
uint8* row_b = framebuffer + (height - i - 1) * row_bytes;
memcpy(scanline, row_b, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_b, row_a, row_bytes);
memcpy(row_a, scanline, row_bytes);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not properly handle CANVAS elements, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 3,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: LONG ValidateSignature(HWND hDlg, const char* path)
{
LONG r;
WINTRUST_DATA trust_data = { 0 };
WINTRUST_FILE_INFO trust_file = { 0 };
GUID guid_generic_verify = // WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2
{ 0xaac56b, 0xcd44, 0x11d0,{ 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x0, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xc2, 0x95, 0xee } };
char *signature_name;
size_t i, len;
signature_name = GetSignatureName(path);
if (signature_name == NULL) {
uprintf("PKI: Could not get signature name");
MessageBoxExU(hDlg, lmprintf(MSG_284), lmprintf(MSG_283), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR | MB_IS_RTL, selected_langid);
return TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE(cert_name); i++) {
len = strlen(cert_name[i]);
if (strncmp(signature_name, cert_name[i], len) == 0) {
if ((len >= strlen(signature_name)) || isspace(signature_name[len]))
break;
}
}
if (i >= ARRAYSIZE(cert_name)) {
uprintf("PKI: Signature '%s' is unexpected...", signature_name);
if (MessageBoxExU(hDlg, lmprintf(MSG_285, signature_name), lmprintf(MSG_283),
MB_YESNO | MB_ICONWARNING | MB_IS_RTL, selected_langid) != IDYES)
return TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST;
}
trust_file.cbStruct = sizeof(trust_file);
trust_file.pcwszFilePath = utf8_to_wchar(path);
if (trust_file.pcwszFilePath == NULL) {
uprintf("PKI: Unable to convert '%s' to UTF16", path);
return ERROR_SEVERITY_ERROR | FAC(FACILITY_CERT) | ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
}
trust_data.cbStruct = sizeof(trust_data);
trust_data.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_ALL;
trust_data.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_WHOLECHAIN;
trust_data.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN | 0x400;
trust_data.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
trust_data.pFile = &trust_file;
r = WinVerifyTrust(NULL, &guid_generic_verify, &trust_data);
safe_free(trust_file.pcwszFilePath);
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-494
Summary: Akeo Consulting Rufus prior to version 2.17.1187 does not adequately validate the integrity of updates downloaded over HTTP, allowing an attacker to easily convince a user to execute arbitrary code
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately. | Medium | 23,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: icmp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int plen, const u_char *bp2,
int fragmented)
{
char *cp;
const struct icmp *dp;
const struct icmp_ext_t *ext_dp;
const struct ip *ip;
const char *str, *fmt;
const struct ip *oip;
const struct udphdr *ouh;
const uint8_t *obj_tptr;
uint32_t raw_label;
const u_char *snapend_save;
const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *icmp_mpls_ext_object_header;
u_int hlen, dport, mtu, obj_tlen, obj_class_num, obj_ctype;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
dp = (const struct icmp *)bp;
ext_dp = (const struct icmp_ext_t *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
str = buf;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_code);
switch (dp->icmp_type) {
case ICMP_ECHO:
case ICMP_ECHOREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "echo %s, id %u, seq %u",
dp->icmp_type == ICMP_ECHO ?
"request" : "reply",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_UNREACH_PROTOCOL:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %d unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_PORT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
oip = &dp->icmp_ip;
hlen = IP_HL(oip) * 4;
ouh = (const struct udphdr *)(((const u_char *)oip) + hlen);
ND_TCHECK(ouh->uh_dport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport);
switch (oip->ip_p) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s tcp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s udp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
udpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %d port %d unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
oip->ip_p, dport);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_NEEDFRAG:
{
register const struct mtu_discovery *mp;
mp = (const struct mtu_discovery *)(const u_char *)&dp->icmp_void;
mtu = EXTRACT_16BITS(&mp->nexthopmtu);
if (mtu) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag (mtu %d)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst), mtu);
} else {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
}
}
break;
default:
fmt = tok2str(unreach2str, "#%d %%s unreachable",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_REDIRECT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
fmt = tok2str(type2str, "redirect-#%d %%s to net %%s",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_gwaddr));
break;
case ICMP_ROUTERADVERT:
{
register const struct ih_rdiscovery *ihp;
register const struct id_rdiscovery *idp;
u_int lifetime, num, size;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "router advertisement");
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
ihp = (const struct ih_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_void;
ND_TCHECK(*ihp);
(void)strncpy(cp, " lifetime ", sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
lifetime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ihp->ird_lifetime);
if (lifetime < 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u",
lifetime);
} else if (lifetime < 60 * 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u:%02u",
lifetime / 60, lifetime % 60);
} else {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
"%u:%02u:%02u",
lifetime / 3600,
(lifetime % 3600) / 60,
lifetime % 60);
}
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
num = ihp->ird_addrnum;
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " %d:", num);
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
size = ihp->ird_addrsiz;
if (size != 2) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
" [size %d]", size);
break;
}
idp = (const struct id_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_data;
while (num-- > 0) {
ND_TCHECK(*idp);
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " {%s %u}",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &idp->ird_addr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&idp->ird_pref));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
++idp;
}
}
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_INTRANS:
str = "time exceeded in-transit";
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_REASS:
str = "ip reassembly time exceeded";
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "time exceeded-#%d",
dp->icmp_code);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_PARAMPROB:
if (dp->icmp_code)
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - code %d", dp->icmp_code);
else {
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_pptr);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - octet %d", dp->icmp_pptr);
}
break;
case ICMP_MASKREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_mask);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "address mask is 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_mask));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMP:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp query id %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMPREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ttime);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp reply id %u seq %u: org %s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq),
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_otime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", recv %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_rtime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", xmit %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_ttime)));
break;
default:
str = tok2str(icmp2str, "type-#%d", dp->icmp_type);
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ICMP %s, length %u", str, plen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) { /* don't attempt checksumming if this is a frag */
uint16_t sum, icmp_sum;
if (ND_TTEST2(*bp, plen)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)dp;
vec[0].len = plen;
sum = in_cksum(vec, 1);
if (sum != 0) {
icmp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_cksum);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (wrong icmp cksum %x (->%x)!)",
icmp_sum,
in_cksum_shouldbe(icmp_sum, sum)));
}
}
}
/*
* print the remnants of the IP packet.
* save the snaplength as this may get overidden in the IP printer.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && ICMP_ERRTYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
bp += 8;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
snapend_save = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ip_print(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip->ip_len));
ndo->ndo_snapend = snapend_save;
}
/*
* Attempt to decode the MPLS extensions only for some ICMP types.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && plen > ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN && ICMP_MPLS_EXT_TYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext_dp);
/*
* Check first if the mpls extension header shows a non-zero length.
* If the length field is not set then silently verify the checksum
* to check if an extension header is present. This is expedient,
* however not all implementations set the length field proper.
*/
if (!ext_dp->icmp_length &&
ND_TTEST2(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res, plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1)) {
return;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tMPLS extension v%u",
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res))));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res)) !=
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " packet not supported"));
return;
}
hlen = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (ND_TTEST2(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res, hlen)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = hlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", checksum 0x%04x (%scorrect), length %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ext_dp->icmp_ext_checksum),
in_cksum(vec, 1) ? "in" : "",
hlen));
}
hlen -= 4; /* subtract common header size */
obj_tptr = (const uint8_t *)ext_dp->icmp_ext_data;
while (hlen > sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t)) {
icmp_mpls_ext_object_header = (const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *)obj_tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*icmp_mpls_ext_object_header);
obj_tlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->length);
obj_class_num = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->class_num;
obj_ctype = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->ctype;
obj_tptr += sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (%u), Class-Type: %u, length %u",
tok2str(icmp_mpls_ext_obj_values,"unknown",obj_class_num),
obj_class_num,
obj_ctype,
obj_tlen));
hlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t); /* length field includes tlv header */
/* infinite loop protection */
if ((obj_class_num == 0) ||
(obj_tlen < sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t))) {
return;
}
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
switch (obj_class_num) {
case 1:
switch(obj_ctype) {
case 1:
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 4);
raw_label = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t label %u, exp %u", MPLS_LABEL(raw_label), MPLS_EXP(raw_label)));
if (MPLS_STACK(raw_label))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [S]"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ttl %u", MPLS_TTL(raw_label)));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined objects that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case 2:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
break;
}
if (hlen < obj_tlen)
break;
hlen -= obj_tlen;
obj_tptr += obj_tlen;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp.c:icmp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13012/ICMP: Add a missing bounds check.
Check before fetching the length from the included packet's IPv4 header.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | High | 1,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderLinux::CreateSensorAndNotify(
mojom::SensorType type,
SensorInfoLinux* sensor_device) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
scoped_refptr<PlatformSensorLinux> sensor;
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping = MapSharedBufferForType(type);
if (sensor_device && mapping && StartPollingThread()) {
sensor =
new PlatformSensorLinux(type, std::move(mapping), this, sensor_device,
polling_thread_->task_runner());
}
NotifySensorCreated(type, sensor);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 16,957 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void phar_add_virtual_dirs(phar_archive_data *phar, char *filename, int filename_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *s;
while ((s = zend_memrchr(filename, '/', filename_len))) {
filename_len = s - filename;
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_add_empty_element(&phar->virtual_dirs, filename, filename_len)) {
break;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Off-by-one error in the phar_parse_zipfile function in ext/phar/zip.c in PHP before 5.5.30 and 5.6.x before 5.6.14 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized pointer dereference and application crash) by including the / filename in a .zip PHAR archive.
Commit Message: | Medium | 4,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: DataReductionProxySettings::DataReductionProxySettings()
: unreachable_(false),
deferred_initialization_(false),
prefs_(nullptr),
config_(nullptr),
clock_(base::DefaultClock::GetInstance()) {}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948} | Medium | 543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void copyIPv6IfDifferent(void * dest, const void * src)
{
if(dest != src) {
memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A Denial Of Service vulnerability in MiniUPnP MiniUPnPd through 2.1 exists due to a NULL pointer dereference in copyIPv6IfDifferent in pcpserver.c.
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument | Medium | 24,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannel(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,LayerInfo* layer_info,
const size_t channel,const PSDCompressionType compression,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*channel_image,
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
channel_image=image;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type < -1) &&
(layer_info->mask.page.width > 0) && (layer_info->mask.page.height > 0))
{
const char
*option;
/*
Ignore mask that is not a user supplied layer mask, if the mask is
disabled or if the flags have unsupported values.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:preserve-opacity-mask");
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type != -2) ||
(layer_info->mask.flags > 2) || ((layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02) &&
(IsStringTrue(option) == MagickFalse)))
{
SeekBlob(image,layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_CUR);
return(MagickTrue);
}
mask=CloneImage(image,layer_info->mask.page.width,
layer_info->mask.page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
SetImageType(mask,GrayscaleType,exception);
channel_image=mask;
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
status=MagickFalse;
switch(compression)
{
case Raw:
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(channel_image,psd_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,exception);
break;
case RLE:
{
MagickOffsetType
*sizes;
sizes=ReadPSDRLESizes(channel_image,psd_info,channel_image->rows);
if (sizes == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(channel_image,psd_info,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,sizes,exception);
sizes=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sizes);
}
break;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
status=ReadPSDChannelZip(channel_image,layer_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,compression,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,exception);
#else
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateWarning,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn",
"'%s' (ZLIB)",image->filename);
#endif
break;
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
break;
}
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
DestroyImage(mask);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage",
image->filename);
}
layer_info->mask.image=mask;
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In coders/psd.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-0 Q16, a DoS in ReadPSDLayersInternal() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted PSD file, which claims a large *length* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over *length* would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: Slightly different fix for #714 | High | 2,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const char *type,
const char *description,
const void *payload,
size_t plen,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct keyring_index_key index_key = {
.description = description,
};
struct key_preparsed_payload prep;
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
* types */
index_key.type = key_type_lookup(type);
if (IS_ERR(index_key.type)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
goto error;
}
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!index_key.type->match || !index_key.type->instantiate ||
(!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse))
goto error_put_type;
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
key_check(keyring);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
goto error_put_type;
memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep));
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (index_key.type->preparse) {
ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_free_prep;
}
if (!index_key.description)
index_key.description = prep.description;
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!index_key.description)
goto error_free_prep;
}
index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags))
goto error_free_prep;
flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0;
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_free_prep;
}
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
* to modify the keyring */
ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_link_end;
}
/* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing
* key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and
* update that instead if possible
*/
if (index_key.type->update) {
key_ref = find_key_to_update(keyring_ref, &index_key);
if (key_ref)
goto found_matching_key;
}
/* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */
if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) {
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
if (index_key.type->read)
perm |= KEY_POS_READ;
if (index_key.type == &key_type_keyring ||
index_key.type->update)
perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE;
}
/* allocate a new key */
key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error_link_end;
}
/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &edit);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_link_end;
}
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
error_link_end:
__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
error_free_prep:
if (index_key.type->preparse)
index_key.type->free_preparse(&prep);
error_put_type:
key_type_put(index_key.type);
error:
return key_ref;
found_matching_key:
/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
* - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
*/
__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
goto error_free_prep;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via vectors involving a NULL value for a certain match field, related to the keyring_search_iterator function in keyring.c.
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> | High | 5,042 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlParseElementContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *name,
xmlElementContentPtr *result) {
xmlElementContentPtr tree = NULL;
int inputid = ctxt->input->id;
int res;
*result = NULL;
if (RAW != '(') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED,
"xmlParseElementContentDecl : %s '(' expected\n", name);
return(-1);
}
NEXT;
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
tree = xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(ctxt, inputid);
res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_MIXED;
} else {
tree = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid, 1);
res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_ELEMENT;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
*result = tree;
return(res);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 10,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item) {
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
*/
return 1;
}
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
return (0);
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <
0)
return -1;
}
}
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/
s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
return (1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Anti-Replay feature in the DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 mishandles early use of a new epoch number in conjunction with a large sequence number, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (false-positive packet drops) via spoofed DTLS records, related to rec_layer_d1.c and ssl3_record.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 27,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int phar_verify_signature(php_stream *fp, size_t end_of_phar, php_uint32 sig_type, char *sig, int sig_len, char *fname, char **signature, int *signature_len, char **error) /* {{{ */
{
int read_size, len;
zend_off_t read_len;
unsigned char buf[1024];
php_stream_rewind(fp);
switch (sig_type) {
case PHAR_SIG_OPENSSL: {
#ifdef PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
BIO *in;
EVP_PKEY *key;
EVP_MD *mdtype = (EVP_MD *) EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
#else
int tempsig;
#endif
zend_string *pubkey = NULL;
char *pfile;
php_stream *pfp;
#ifndef PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
if (!zend_hash_str_exists(&module_registry, "openssl", sizeof("openssl")-1)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl not loaded");
}
return FAILURE;
}
#endif
/* use __FILE__ . '.pubkey' for public key file */
spprintf(&pfile, 0, "%s.pubkey", fname);
pfp = php_stream_open_wrapper(pfile, "rb", 0, NULL);
efree(pfile);
if (!pfp || !(pubkey = php_stream_copy_to_mem(pfp, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 0)) || !ZSTR_LEN(pubkey)) {
if (pfp) {
php_stream_close(pfp);
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl public key could not be read");
}
return FAILURE;
}
php_stream_close(pfp);
#ifndef PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
tempsig = sig_len;
if (FAILURE == phar_call_openssl_signverify(0, fp, end_of_phar, pubkey ? ZSTR_VAL(pubkey) : NULL, pubkey ? ZSTR_LEN(pubkey) : 0, &sig, &tempsig)) {
if (pubkey) {
zend_string_release(pubkey);
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl signature could not be verified");
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (pubkey) {
zend_string_release(pubkey);
}
sig_len = tempsig;
#else
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(pubkey ? ZSTR_VAL(pubkey) : NULL, pubkey ? ZSTR_LEN(pubkey) : 0);
if (NULL == in) {
zend_string_release(pubkey);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl signature could not be processed");
}
return FAILURE;
}
key = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(in, NULL,NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(in);
zend_string_release(pubkey);
if (NULL == key) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl signature could not be processed");
}
return FAILURE;
}
EVP_VerifyInit(&md_ctx, mdtype);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
while (read_size && (len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
EVP_VerifyUpdate (&md_ctx, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, (unsigned char *)sig, sig_len, key) != 1) {
/* 1: signature verified, 0: signature does not match, -1: failed signature operation */
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken openssl signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
#endif
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)sig, sig_len, signature);
}
break;
#ifdef PHAR_HASH_OK
case PHAR_SIG_SHA512: {
unsigned char digest[64];
PHP_SHA512_CTX context;
PHP_SHA512Init(&context);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
while ((len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
PHP_SHA512Update(&context, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
PHP_SHA512Final(digest, &context);
if (memcmp(digest, sig, sizeof(digest))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)digest, sizeof(digest), signature);
break;
}
case PHAR_SIG_SHA256: {
unsigned char digest[32];
PHP_SHA256_CTX context;
PHP_SHA256Init(&context);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
while ((len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
PHP_SHA256Update(&context, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
PHP_SHA256Final(digest, &context);
if (memcmp(digest, sig, sizeof(digest))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)digest, sizeof(digest), signature);
break;
}
#else
case PHAR_SIG_SHA512:
case PHAR_SIG_SHA256:
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unsupported signature");
}
return FAILURE;
#endif
case PHAR_SIG_SHA1: {
unsigned char digest[20];
PHP_SHA1_CTX context;
PHP_SHA1Init(&context);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
while ((len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
PHP_SHA1Update(&context, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
PHP_SHA1Final(digest, &context);
if (memcmp(digest, sig, sizeof(digest))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)digest, sizeof(digest), signature);
break;
}
case PHAR_SIG_MD5: {
unsigned char digest[16];
PHP_MD5_CTX context;
PHP_MD5Init(&context);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
while ((len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
PHP_MD5Update(&context, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
PHP_MD5Final(digest, &context);
if (memcmp(digest, sig, sizeof(digest))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)digest, sizeof(digest), signature);
break;
}
default:
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken or unsupported signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ZIP signature-verification feature in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 does not ensure that the uncompressed_filesize field is large enough, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PHAR archive, related to ext/phar/util.c and ext/phar/zip.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2) | High | 10,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: BOOL license_read_scope_list(wStream* s, SCOPE_LIST* scopeList)
{
UINT32 i;
UINT32 scopeCount;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, scopeCount); /* ScopeCount (4 bytes) */
scopeList->count = scopeCount;
scopeList->array = (LICENSE_BLOB*) malloc(sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) * scopeCount);
/* ScopeArray */
for (i = 0; i < scopeCount; i++)
{
scopeList->array[i].type = BB_SCOPE_BLOB;
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, &scopeList->array[i]))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the license_read_scope_list function in libfreerdp/core/license.c in FreeRDP through 1.0.2 allows remote RDP servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large ScopeCount value in a Scope List in a Server License Request packet.
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list() | Medium | 5,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BiquadDSPKernel::process(const float* source, float* destination, size_t framesToProcess)
{
ASSERT(source && destination && biquadProcessor());
updateCoefficientsIfNecessary(true, false);
m_biquad.process(source, destination, framesToProcess);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: modules/webaudio/BiquadDSPKernel.cpp in the Web Audio API implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, does not properly consider concurrent threads during attempts to update biquad filter coefficients, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (read of uninitialized memory) via crafted API calls.
Commit Message: Initialize value since calculateFinalValues may fail to do so.
Fix threading issue where updateCoefficientsIfNecessary was not always
called from the audio thread. This causes the value not to be
initialized.
Thus,
o Initialize the variable to some value, just in case.
o Split updateCoefficientsIfNecessary into two functions with the code
that sets the coefficients pulled out in to the new function
updateCoefficients.
o Simplify updateCoefficientsIfNecessary since useSmoothing was always
true, and forceUpdate is not longer needed.
o Add process lock to prevent the audio thread from updating the
coefficients while they are being read in the main thread. The audio
thread will update them the next time around.
o Make getFrequencyResponse set the lock while reading the
coefficients of the biquad in preparation for computing the
frequency response.
BUG=389219
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/354213002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@177250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 4,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetFirst() const {
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return NULL;
if (m_count == 0)
return NULL;
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //init cues
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
if (count == 0) //weird
return NULL;
#endif
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[0];
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
return pCP;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 27,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: isofs_export_encode_fh(struct inode *inode,
__u32 *fh32,
int *max_len,
struct inode *parent)
{
struct iso_inode_info * ei = ISOFS_I(inode);
int len = *max_len;
int type = 1;
__u16 *fh16 = (__u16*)fh32;
/*
* WARNING: max_len is 5 for NFSv2. Because of this
* limitation, we use the lower 16 bits of fh32[1] to hold the
* offset of the inode and the upper 16 bits of fh32[1] to
* hold the offset of the parent.
*/
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*max_len = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*max_len = 3;
return 255;
}
len = 3;
fh32[0] = ei->i_iget5_block;
fh16[2] = (__u16)ei->i_iget5_offset; /* fh16 [sic] */
fh32[2] = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
struct iso_inode_info *eparent;
eparent = ISOFS_I(parent);
fh32[3] = eparent->i_iget5_block;
fh16[3] = (__u16)eparent->i_iget5_offset; /* fh16 [sic] */
fh32[4] = parent->i_generation;
len = 5;
type = 2;
}
*max_len = len;
return type;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The isofs_export_encode_fh function in fs/isofs/export.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: isofs: avoid info leak on export
For type 1 the parent_offset member in struct isofs_fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | Low | 27,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetLast() const
{
if ((m_clusters == NULL) || (m_clusterCount <= 0))
return &m_eos;
const long idx = m_clusterCount - 1;
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 29,788 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
uint64_t allocSize = (uint64_t)mTimeToSampleCount * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > UINT32_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTimeToSample = new (std::nothrow) uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
if (!mTimeToSample)
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28076789.
Commit Message: Resolve merge conflict when cp'ing ag/931301 to mnc-mr1-release
Change-Id: I079d1db2d30d126f8aed348bd62451acf741037d
| High | 27,170 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_real_synth_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD32 num_columns, FLOAT32 qmf_buf_real[][64],
FLOAT32 qmf_buf_imag[][64]) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l, idx;
FLOAT32 g[640];
FLOAT32 w[640];
FLOAT32 synth_out[128];
FLOAT32 accu_r;
WORD32 synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf =
(FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_cos_table_trans_qmf[0][0] +
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start * 32;
FLOAT32 *buffer = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf;
for (idx = 0; idx < num_columns; idx++) {
FLOAT32 loc_qmf_buf[64];
FLOAT32 *synth_buf_r = loc_qmf_buf;
FLOAT32 *out_buf = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
(idx + 1) * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *synth_cos_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) return -1;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
WORD32 ki = ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + k;
synth_buf_r[k] = (FLOAT32)(
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 0] * qmf_buf_real[idx][ki] +
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 1] * qmf_buf_imag[idx][ki]);
synth_buf_r[k + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size] = 0;
}
for (l = (20 * synth_size - 1); l >= 2 * synth_size; l--) {
buffer[l] = buffer[l - 2 * synth_size];
}
if (synth_size == 20) {
FLOAT32 *psynth_cos_tab = synth_cos_tab;
for (l = 0; l < (synth_size + 1); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[synth_size - l] = accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
for (l = (synth_size + 1); l < (2 * synth_size - synth_size / 2); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[3 * synth_size - l] = -accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[3 * synth_size >> 1] = accu_r;
} else {
FLOAT32 tmp;
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = synth_out;
WORD32 kmax = (synth_size >> 1);
FLOAT32 *syn_buf = &buffer[kmax];
kmax += synth_size;
if (ixheaacd_real_synth_fft != NULL)
(*ixheaacd_real_synth_fft)(synth_buf_r, synth_out, synth_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
syn_buf = &buffer[0];
kmax -= synth_size;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 0) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 0) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 1) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 3) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
}
for (k = 0; k < 10 * synth_size; k++) {
w[k] = g[k] * interp_window_coeff[k];
}
for (i = 0; i < synth_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + w[synth_size * j + i];
}
out_buf[i] = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3 of ixheaacd_esbr_fft.c there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110769924
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
| High | 3,549 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void StorageHandler::ClearDataForOrigin(
const std::string& origin,
const std::string& storage_types,
std::unique_ptr<ClearDataForOriginCallback> callback) {
if (!process_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
StoragePartition* partition = process_->GetStoragePartition();
std::vector<std::string> types = base::SplitString(
storage_types, ",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY);
std::unordered_set<std::string> set(types.begin(), types.end());
uint32_t remove_mask = 0;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Appcache))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_APPCACHE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cookies))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_COOKIES;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::File_systems))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_FILE_SYSTEMS;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Indexeddb))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_INDEXEDDB;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Local_storage))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_LOCAL_STORAGE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Shader_cache))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_SHADER_CACHE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Websql))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_WEBSQL;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Service_workers))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_SERVICE_WORKERS;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cache_storage))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_CACHE_STORAGE;
if (set.count(Storage::StorageTypeEnum::All))
remove_mask |= StoragePartition::REMOVE_DATA_MASK_ALL;
if (!remove_mask) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::InvalidParams("No valid storage type specified"));
}
partition->ClearData(remove_mask,
StoragePartition::QUOTA_MANAGED_STORAGE_MASK_ALL,
GURL(origin), StoragePartition::OriginMatcherFunction(),
base::Time(), base::Time::Max(),
base::BindOnce(&ClearDataForOriginCallback::sendSuccess,
std::move(callback)));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 23,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void sample_to_timespec(const clockid_t which_clock,
union cpu_time_count cpu,
struct timespec *tp)
{
if (CPUCLOCK_WHICH(which_clock) == CPUCLOCK_SCHED) {
tp->tv_sec = div_long_long_rem(cpu.sched,
NSEC_PER_SEC, &tp->tv_nsec);
} else {
cputime_to_timespec(cpu.cpu, tp);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The div_long_long_rem implementation in include/asm-x86/div64.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 on the x86 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (Divide Error Fault and panic) via a clock_gettime system call.
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 19,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: sp<MediaSource> OMXCodec::Create(
const sp<IOMX> &omx,
const sp<MetaData> &meta, bool createEncoder,
const sp<MediaSource> &source,
const char *matchComponentName,
uint32_t flags,
const sp<ANativeWindow> &nativeWindow) {
int32_t requiresSecureBuffers;
if (source->getFormat()->findInt32(
kKeyRequiresSecureBuffers,
&requiresSecureBuffers)
&& requiresSecureBuffers) {
flags |= kIgnoreCodecSpecificData;
flags |= kUseSecureInputBuffers;
}
const char *mime;
bool success = meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime);
CHECK(success);
Vector<CodecNameAndQuirks> matchingCodecs;
findMatchingCodecs(
mime, createEncoder, matchComponentName, flags, &matchingCodecs);
if (matchingCodecs.isEmpty()) {
ALOGV("No matching codecs! (mime: %s, createEncoder: %s, "
"matchComponentName: %s, flags: 0x%x)",
mime, createEncoder ? "true" : "false", matchComponentName, flags);
return NULL;
}
sp<OMXCodecObserver> observer = new OMXCodecObserver;
IOMX::node_id node = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < matchingCodecs.size(); ++i) {
const char *componentNameBase = matchingCodecs[i].mName.string();
uint32_t quirks = matchingCodecs[i].mQuirks;
const char *componentName = componentNameBase;
AString tmp;
if (flags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
tmp = componentNameBase;
tmp.append(".secure");
componentName = tmp.c_str();
}
if (createEncoder) {
sp<MediaSource> softwareCodec =
InstantiateSoftwareEncoder(componentName, source, meta);
if (softwareCodec != NULL) {
ALOGV("Successfully allocated software codec '%s'", componentName);
return softwareCodec;
}
}
ALOGV("Attempting to allocate OMX node '%s'", componentName);
if (!createEncoder
&& (quirks & kOutputBuffersAreUnreadable)
&& (flags & kClientNeedsFramebuffer)) {
if (strncmp(componentName, "OMX.SEC.", 8)) {
ALOGW("Component '%s' does not give the client access to "
"the framebuffer contents. Skipping.",
componentName);
continue;
}
}
status_t err = omx->allocateNode(componentName, observer, &node);
if (err == OK) {
ALOGV("Successfully allocated OMX node '%s'", componentName);
sp<OMXCodec> codec = new OMXCodec(
omx, node, quirks, flags,
createEncoder, mime, componentName,
source, nativeWindow);
observer->setCodec(codec);
err = codec->configureCodec(meta);
if (err == OK) {
return codec;
}
ALOGV("Failed to configure codec '%s'", componentName);
}
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
| High | 15,154 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool Cues::Find(
long long time_ns,
const Track* pTrack,
const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const
{
assert(time_ns >= 0);
assert(pTrack);
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //establish invariant
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count > 0);
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(pReader);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#else
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return false;
if (m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#endif
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 27,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, count)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message: | High | 25,566 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: jas_image_t *bmp_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_t *image;
bmp_hdr_t hdr;
bmp_info_t *info;
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
jas_image_cmptparm_t cmptparms[3];
jas_image_cmptparm_t *cmptparm;
uint_fast16_t numcmpts;
long n;
if (optstr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring BMP decoder options\n");
}
jas_eprintf(
"THE BMP FORMAT IS NOT FULLY SUPPORTED!\n"
"THAT IS, THE JASPER SOFTWARE CANNOT DECODE ALL TYPES OF BMP DATA.\n"
"IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS, PLEASE TRY CONVERTING YOUR IMAGE DATA\n"
"TO THE PNM FORMAT, AND USING THIS FORMAT INSTEAD.\n"
);
/* Read the bitmap header. */
if (bmp_gethdr(in, &hdr)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get header\n");
return 0;
}
/* Read the bitmap information. */
if (!(info = bmp_getinfo(in))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get info\n");
return 0;
}
/* Ensure that we support this type of BMP file. */
if (!bmp_issupported(&hdr, info)) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported BMP encoding\n");
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
/* Skip over any useless data between the end of the palette
and start of the bitmap data. */
if ((n = hdr.off - (BMP_HDRLEN + BMP_INFOLEN + BMP_PALLEN(info))) < 0) {
jas_eprintf("error: possibly bad bitmap offset?\n");
return 0;
}
if (n > 0) {
jas_eprintf("skipping unknown data in BMP file\n");
if (bmp_gobble(in, n)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
}
/* Get the number of components. */
numcmpts = bmp_numcmpts(info);
for (cmptno = 0, cmptparm = cmptparms; cmptno < numcmpts; ++cmptno,
++cmptparm) {
cmptparm->tlx = 0;
cmptparm->tly = 0;
cmptparm->hstep = 1;
cmptparm->vstep = 1;
cmptparm->width = info->width;
cmptparm->height = info->height;
cmptparm->prec = 8;
cmptparm->sgnd = false;
}
/* Create image object. */
if (!(image = jas_image_create(numcmpts, cmptparms,
JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN))) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
if (numcmpts == 3) {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_R));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 1,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_G));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 2,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_B));
} else {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_GRAY_Y));
}
/* Read the bitmap data. */
if (bmp_getdata(in, info, image)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
jas_image_destroy(image);
return 0;
}
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The bmp_getdata function in libjasper/bmp/bmp_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted BMP image in an imginfo command.
Commit Message: Fixed a sanitizer failure in the BMP codec.
Also, added a --debug-level command line option to the imginfo command
for debugging purposes. | Medium | 8,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static u32 svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey(struct rpcrdma_msg *rdma_argp,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *wr_ary,
struct rpcrdma_write_array *rp_ary)
{
struct rpcrdma_read_chunk *rd_ary;
struct rpcrdma_segment *arg_ch;
rd_ary = (struct rpcrdma_read_chunk *)&rdma_argp->rm_body.rm_chunks[0];
if (rd_ary->rc_discrim != xdr_zero)
return be32_to_cpu(rd_ary->rc_target.rs_handle);
if (wr_ary && be32_to_cpu(wr_ary->wc_nchunks)) {
arg_ch = &wr_ary->wc_array[0].wc_target;
return be32_to_cpu(arg_ch->rs_handle);
}
if (rp_ary && be32_to_cpu(rp_ary->wc_nchunks)) {
arg_ch = &rp_ary->wc_array[0].wc_target;
return be32_to_cpu(arg_ch->rs_handle);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Medium | 4,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: aspath_put (struct stream *s, struct aspath *as, int use32bit )
{
struct assegment *seg = as->segments;
size_t bytes = 0;
if (!seg || seg->length == 0)
return 0;
if (seg)
{
/*
* Hey, what do we do when we have > STREAM_WRITABLE(s) here?
* At the moment, we would write out a partial aspath, and our peer
* will complain and drop the session :-/
*
* The general assumption here is that many things tested will
* never happen. And, in real live, up to now, they have not.
*/
while (seg && (ASSEGMENT_LEN(seg, use32bit) <= STREAM_WRITEABLE(s)))
{
struct assegment *next = seg->next;
int written = 0;
int asns_packed = 0;
size_t lenp;
/* Overlength segments have to be split up */
while ( (seg->length - written) > AS_SEGMENT_MAX)
{
assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, AS_SEGMENT_MAX);
assegment_data_put (s, seg->as, AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
written += AS_SEGMENT_MAX;
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (written, use32bit);
}
/* write the final segment, probably is also the first */
lenp = assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, seg->length - written);
assegment_data_put (s, (seg->as + written), seg->length - written,
use32bit);
/* Sequence-type segments can be 'packed' together
* Case of a segment which was overlength and split up
* will be missed here, but that doesn't matter.
*/
while (next && ASSEGMENTS_PACKABLE (seg, next))
{
/* NB: We should never normally get here given we
* normalise aspath data when parse them. However, better
* safe than sorry. We potentially could call
* assegment_normalise here instead, but it's cheaper and
* easier to do it on the fly here rather than go through
* the segment list twice every time we write out
* aspath's.
*/
/* Next segment's data can fit in this one */
assegment_data_put (s, next->as, next->length, use32bit);
/* update the length of the segment header */
stream_putc_at (s, lenp, seg->length - written + next->length);
asns_packed += next->length;
next = next->next;
}
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (seg->length - written + asns_packed,
use32bit);
seg = next;
}
}
return bytes;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The aspath_put function in bgpd/bgp_aspath.c in Quagga before 1.2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (session drop) via BGP UPDATE messages, because AS_PATH size calculation for long paths counts certain bytes twice and consequently constructs an invalid message.
Commit Message: | Medium | 17,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void TestPlaybackRate(double playback_rate,
int buffer_size_in_frames,
int total_frames_requested) {
int initial_bytes_enqueued = bytes_enqueued_;
int initial_bytes_buffered = algorithm_.bytes_buffered();
algorithm_.SetPlaybackRate(static_cast<float>(playback_rate));
scoped_array<uint8> buffer(
new uint8[buffer_size_in_frames * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame()]);
if (playback_rate == 0.0) {
int frames_written =
algorithm_.FillBuffer(buffer.get(), buffer_size_in_frames);
EXPECT_EQ(0, frames_written);
return;
}
int frames_remaining = total_frames_requested;
while (frames_remaining > 0) {
int frames_requested = std::min(buffer_size_in_frames, frames_remaining);
int frames_written =
algorithm_.FillBuffer(buffer.get(), frames_requested);
CHECK_GT(frames_written, 0);
CheckFakeData(buffer.get(), frames_written, playback_rate);
frames_remaining -= frames_written;
}
int bytes_requested = total_frames_requested * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame();
int bytes_consumed = ComputeConsumedBytes(initial_bytes_enqueued,
initial_bytes_buffered);
if (playback_rate == 1.0) {
EXPECT_EQ(bytes_requested, bytes_consumed);
return;
}
static const double kMaxAcceptableDelta = 0.01;
double actual_playback_rate = 1.0 * bytes_consumed / bytes_requested;
double delta = std::abs(1.0 - (actual_playback_rate / playback_rate));
EXPECT_LE(delta, kMaxAcceptableDelta);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors involving seek operations on video data.
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 23,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int fault;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
if (unlikely(!vma))
goto out;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr))
goto check_stack;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
* it.
*/
good_area:
/*
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
* occurred.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
goto out;
}
return handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, mm_flags);
check_stack:
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
goto good_area;
out:
return fault;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h in the Linux kernel before 3.15-rc5-next-20140519, as used in Android before 2016-07-05 on Nexus 5X and 6P devices, mishandles execute-only pages, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 28557020.
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> | High | 19,546 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void sas_revalidate_domain(struct work_struct *work)
{
int res = 0;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = port->ha;
struct domain_device *ddev = port->port_dev;
/* prevent revalidation from finding sata links in recovery */
mutex_lock(&ha->disco_mutex);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_ATA_EH_ACTIVE, &ha->state)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATION DEFERRED on port %d, pid:%d\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current));
goto out;
}
clear_bit(DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN, &port->disc.pending);
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d\n", port->id,
task_pid_nr(current));
if (ddev && (ddev->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
ddev->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE))
res = sas_ex_revalidate_domain(ddev);
SAS_DPRINTK("done REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d, res 0x%x\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current), res);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ha->disco_mutex);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.15.9 mishandles a mutex within libsas, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) by triggering certain error-handling code.
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Low | 10,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int mach, int strtab)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
size_t nbadcap = 0;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off + size * strtab) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if (pread(fd, name, sizeof(name), name_off + xsh_name) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (nbadcap > 5)
break;
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
if (nbadcap++ > 2)
coff = xsh_size;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: readelf.c in file before 5.22, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5, does not consider that pread calls sometimes read only a subset of the available data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov | High | 29,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadPIXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
Quantum
blue,
green,
red;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
height,
length,
width;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read PIX image.
*/
width=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
height=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); /* x-offset */
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); /* y-offset */
bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((width == 0UL) || (height == 0UL) || ((bits_per_pixel != 8) &&
(bits_per_pixel != 24)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,256) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Convert PIX raster image to pixel packets.
*/
red=(Quantum) 0;
green=(Quantum) 0;
blue=(Quantum) 0;
index=(IndexPacket) 0;
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (length == 0)
{
length=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
index=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
else
{
blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelBlue(q,blue);
SetPixelGreen(q,green);
SetPixelRed(q,red);
length--;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
status=(width != 0UL) && (height == 0UL) && ((bits_per_pixel == 8) ||
(bits_per_pixel == 24)) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 7,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void *jas_malloc(size_t size)
{
void *result;
JAS_DBGLOG(101, ("jas_malloc called with %zu\n", size));
result = malloc(size);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_malloc(%zu) -> %p\n", size, result));
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the jpc_dec_tiledecode function in jpc_dec.c in JasPer before 1.900.12 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted image file, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem. | Medium | 14,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::GetExitCode() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DWORD exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(worker_process_, &exit_code)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(INFO)
<< "Failed to query the exit code of the worker process";
exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
}
}
return exit_code;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 7,823 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::InsertCache(const CacheRecord* record) {
if (!LazyOpen(kCreateIfNeeded))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"INSERT INTO Caches (cache_id, group_id, online_wildcard,"
" update_time, cache_size)"
" VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?)";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, record->cache_id);
statement.BindInt64(1, record->group_id);
statement.BindBool(2, record->online_wildcard);
statement.BindInt64(3, record->update_time.ToInternalValue());
statement.BindInt64(4, record->cache_size);
return statement.Run();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 11,596 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didTimeout()
{
RefPtr<XMLHttpRequest> protect(this);
internalAbort();
clearResponse();
clearRequest();
m_error = true;
m_exceptionCode = TimeoutError;
if (!m_async) {
m_state = DONE;
m_exceptionCode = TimeoutError;
return;
}
changeState(DONE);
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().timeoutEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().timeoutEvent));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/xml/XMLHttpRequest.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger multiple conflicting uses of the same XMLHttpRequest object.
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 13,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool semaphore_try_wait(semaphore_t *semaphore) {
assert(semaphore != NULL);
assert(semaphore->fd != INVALID_FD);
int flags = fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to get flags for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return false;
}
if (fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to set O_NONBLOCK for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return false;
}
eventfd_t value;
if (eventfd_read(semaphore->fd, &value) == -1)
return false;
if (fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to resetore flags for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 1,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool SerializeNotificationDatabaseData(const NotificationDatabaseData& input,
std::string* output) {
DCHECK(output);
scoped_ptr<NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData> payload(
new NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData());
const PlatformNotificationData& notification_data = input.notification_data;
payload->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.title));
switch (notification_data.direction) {
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO);
break;
}
payload->set_lang(notification_data.lang);
payload->set_body(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.body));
payload->set_tag(notification_data.tag);
payload->set_icon(notification_data.icon.spec());
for (size_t i = 0; i < notification_data.vibration_pattern.size(); ++i)
payload->add_vibration_pattern(notification_data.vibration_pattern[i]);
payload->set_timestamp(notification_data.timestamp.ToInternalValue());
payload->set_silent(notification_data.silent);
payload->set_require_interaction(notification_data.require_interaction);
if (notification_data.data.size()) {
payload->set_data(¬ification_data.data.front(),
notification_data.data.size());
}
for (const PlatformNotificationAction& action : notification_data.actions) {
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationAction* payload_action =
payload->add_actions();
payload_action->set_action(action.action);
payload_action->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(action.title));
}
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
message.set_notification_id(input.notification_id);
message.set_origin(input.origin.spec());
message.set_service_worker_registration_id(
input.service_worker_registration_id);
message.set_allocated_notification_data(payload.release());
return message.SerializeToString(output);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649} | High | 17,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PP_Bool StartPpapiProxy(PP_Instance instance) {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableNaClIPCProxy)) {
ChannelHandleMap& map = g_channel_handle_map.Get();
ChannelHandleMap::iterator it = map.find(instance);
if (it == map.end())
return PP_FALSE;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle = it->second;
map.erase(it);
webkit::ppapi::PluginInstance* plugin_instance =
content::GetHostGlobals()->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return PP_FALSE;
WebView* web_view =
plugin_instance->container()->element().document().frame()->view();
RenderView* render_view = content::RenderView::FromWebView(web_view);
webkit::ppapi::PluginModule* plugin_module = plugin_instance->module();
scoped_refptr<SyncMessageStatusReceiver>
status_receiver(new SyncMessageStatusReceiver());
scoped_ptr<OutOfProcessProxy> out_of_process_proxy(new OutOfProcessProxy);
if (out_of_process_proxy->Init(
channel_handle,
plugin_module->pp_module(),
webkit::ppapi::PluginModule::GetLocalGetInterfaceFunc(),
ppapi::Preferences(render_view->GetWebkitPreferences()),
status_receiver.get())) {
plugin_module->InitAsProxiedNaCl(
out_of_process_proxy.PassAs<PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy>(),
instance);
return PP_TRUE;
}
}
return PP_FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 26,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int gtco_probe(struct usb_interface *usbinterface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct gtco *gtco;
struct input_dev *input_dev;
struct hid_descriptor *hid_desc;
char *report;
int result = 0, retry;
int error;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
/* Allocate memory for device structure */
gtco = kzalloc(sizeof(struct gtco), GFP_KERNEL);
input_dev = input_allocate_device();
if (!gtco || !input_dev) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_devs;
}
/* Set pointer to the input device */
gtco->inputdevice = input_dev;
/* Save interface information */
gtco->usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbinterface);
gtco->intf = usbinterface;
/* Allocate some data for incoming reports */
gtco->buffer = usb_alloc_coherent(gtco->usbdev, REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
GFP_KERNEL, >co->buf_dma);
if (!gtco->buffer) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory for us buffers\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_devs;
}
/* Allocate URB for reports */
gtco->urbinfo = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gtco->urbinfo) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "Failed to allocate URB\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_buf;
}
/*
* The endpoint is always altsetting 0, we know this since we know
* this device only has one interrupt endpoint
*/
endpoint = &usbinterface->altsetting[0].endpoint[0].desc;
/* Some debug */
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "gtco # interfaces: %d\n", usbinterface->num_altsetting);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "num endpoints: %d\n", usbinterface->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "interface class: %d\n", usbinterface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceClass);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint: attribute:0x%x type:0x%x\n", endpoint->bmAttributes, endpoint->bDescriptorType);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(endpoint))
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint: we have interrupt endpoint\n");
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint extra len:%d\n", usbinterface->altsetting[0].extralen);
/*
* Find the HID descriptor so we can find out the size of the
* HID report descriptor
*/
if (usb_get_extra_descriptor(usbinterface->cur_altsetting,
HID_DEVICE_TYPE, &hid_desc) != 0){
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev,
"Can't retrieve exta USB descriptor to get hid report descriptor length\n");
error = -EIO;
goto err_free_urb;
}
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev,
"Extra descriptor success: type:%d len:%d\n",
hid_desc->bDescriptorType, hid_desc->wDescriptorLength);
report = kzalloc(le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!report) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory for report\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_urb;
}
/* Couple of tries to get reply */
for (retry = 0; retry < 3; retry++) {
result = usb_control_msg(gtco->usbdev,
usb_rcvctrlpipe(gtco->usbdev, 0),
USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR,
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_DIR_IN,
REPORT_DEVICE_TYPE << 8,
0, /* interface */
report,
le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength),
5000); /* 5 secs */
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "usb_control_msg result: %d\n", result);
if (result == le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength)) {
parse_hid_report_descriptor(gtco, report, result);
break;
}
}
kfree(report);
/* If we didn't get the report, fail */
if (result != le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength)) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev,
"Failed to get HID Report Descriptor of size: %d\n",
hid_desc->wDescriptorLength);
error = -EIO;
goto err_free_urb;
}
/* Create a device file node */
usb_make_path(gtco->usbdev, gtco->usbpath, sizeof(gtco->usbpath));
strlcat(gtco->usbpath, "/input0", sizeof(gtco->usbpath));
/* Set Input device functions */
input_dev->open = gtco_input_open;
input_dev->close = gtco_input_close;
/* Set input device information */
input_dev->name = "GTCO_CalComp";
input_dev->phys = gtco->usbpath;
input_set_drvdata(input_dev, gtco);
/* Now set up all the input device capabilities */
gtco_setup_caps(input_dev);
/* Set input device required ID information */
usb_to_input_id(gtco->usbdev, &input_dev->id);
input_dev->dev.parent = &usbinterface->dev;
/* Setup the URB, it will be posted later on open of input device */
endpoint = &usbinterface->altsetting[0].endpoint[0].desc;
usb_fill_int_urb(gtco->urbinfo,
gtco->usbdev,
usb_rcvintpipe(gtco->usbdev,
endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
gtco->buffer,
REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
gtco_urb_callback,
gtco,
endpoint->bInterval);
gtco->urbinfo->transfer_dma = gtco->buf_dma;
gtco->urbinfo->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* Save gtco pointer in USB interface gtco */
usb_set_intfdata(usbinterface, gtco);
/* All done, now register the input device */
error = input_register_device(input_dev);
if (error)
goto err_free_urb;
return 0;
err_free_urb:
usb_free_urb(gtco->urbinfo);
err_free_buf:
usb_free_coherent(gtco->usbdev, REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
gtco->buffer, gtco->buf_dma);
err_free_devs:
input_free_device(input_dev);
kfree(gtco);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The gtco_probe function in drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The gtco driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious
descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in
the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface
before using it.
Also let's fix a minor coding style issue.
The full correct report of this issue can be found in the public
Red Hat Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283385
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> | Medium | 12,388 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: __imlib_MergeUpdate(ImlibUpdate * u, int w, int h, int hgapmax)
{
ImlibUpdate *nu = NULL, *uu;
struct _tile *t;
int tw, th, x, y, i;
int *gaps = NULL;
/* if theres no rects to process.. return NULL */
if (!u)
return NULL;
tw = w >> TB;
if (w & TM)
tw++;
th = h >> TB;
if (h & TM)
th++;
t = malloc(tw * th * sizeof(struct _tile));
/* fill in tiles to be all not used */
for (i = 0, y = 0; y < th; y++)
{
for (x = 0; x < tw; x++)
t[i++].used = T_UNUSED;
}
/* fill in all tiles */
for (uu = u; uu; uu = uu->next)
{
CLIP(uu->x, uu->y, uu->w, uu->h, 0, 0, w, h);
for (y = uu->y >> TB; y <= ((uu->y + uu->h - 1) >> TB); y++)
{
for (x = uu->x >> TB; x <= ((uu->x + uu->w - 1) >> TB); x++)
T(x, y).used = T_USED;
}
}
/* scan each line - if > hgapmax gaps between tiles, then fill smallest */
gaps = malloc(tw * sizeof(int));
for (y = 0; y < th; y++)
{
int hgaps = 0, start = -1, min;
char have = 1, gap = 0;
for (x = 0; x < tw; x++)
gaps[x] = 0;
for (x = 0; x < tw; x++)
{
if ((have) && (T(x, y).used == T_UNUSED))
{
start = x;
gap = 1;
have = 0;
}
else if ((!have) && (gap) && (T(x, y).used & T_USED))
{
gap = 0;
hgaps++;
have = 1;
gaps[start] = x - start;
}
else if (T(x, y).used & T_USED)
have = 1;
}
while (hgaps > hgapmax)
{
start = -1;
min = tw;
for (x = 0; x < tw; x++)
{
if ((gaps[x] > 0) && (gaps[x] < min))
{
start = x;
min = gaps[x];
}
}
if (start >= 0)
{
gaps[start] = 0;
for (x = start;
T(x, y).used == T_UNUSED; T(x++, y).used = T_USED);
hgaps--;
}
}
}
free(gaps);
/* coalesce tiles into larger blocks and make new rect list */
for (y = 0; y < th; y++)
{
for (x = 0; x < tw; x++)
{
if (T(x, y).used & T_USED)
{
int xx, yy, ww, hh, ok, xww;
for (xx = x + 1, ww = 1;
(T(xx, y).used & T_USED) && (xx < tw); xx++, ww++);
xww = x + ww;
for (yy = y + 1, hh = 1, ok = 1;
(yy < th) && (ok); yy++, hh++)
{
for (xx = x; xx < xww; xx++)
{
if (!(T(xx, yy).used & T_USED))
{
ok = 0;
hh--;
break;
}
}
}
for (yy = y; yy < (y + hh); yy++)
{
for (xx = x; xx < xww; xx++)
T(xx, yy).used = T_UNUSED;
}
nu = __imlib_AddUpdate(nu, (x << TB), (y << TB),
(ww << TB), (hh << TB));
}
}
}
free(t);
__imlib_FreeUpdates(u);
return nu;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Off-by-one error in the __imlib_MergeUpdate function in lib/updates.c in imlib2 before 1.4.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via crafted coordinates.
Commit Message: | Medium | 6,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WebPluginProxy::CreateCanvasFromHandle(
const TransportDIB::Handle& dib_handle,
const gfx::Rect& window_rect,
scoped_ptr<skia::PlatformCanvas>* canvas_out) {
HANDLE section;
DuplicateHandle(channel_->renderer_handle(), dib_handle, GetCurrentProcess(),
§ion,
STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED | FILE_MAP_READ | FILE_MAP_WRITE,
FALSE, 0);
scoped_ptr<skia::PlatformCanvas> canvas(new skia::PlatformCanvas);
if (!canvas->initialize(
window_rect.width(),
window_rect.height(),
true,
section)) {
canvas_out->reset();
}
canvas_out->reset(canvas.release());
CloseHandle(section);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 15,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
int force)
{
char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
struct context context;
int rc = 0;
if (!ss_initialized) {
int i;
for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
*sid = i;
return 0;
}
}
*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
return 0;
}
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
if (!scontext2)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
if (force) {
/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
rc = -ENOMEM;
str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
if (!str)
goto out;
}
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
context.str = str;
context.len = scontext_len;
str = NULL;
} else if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
context_destroy(&context);
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
out:
kfree(scontext2);
kfree(str);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The security_context_to_sid_core function in security/selinux/ss/services.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging the CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability to set a zero-length security context.
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> | Medium | 25,945 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void UpdateProperty(IBusProperty* ibus_prop) {
DLOG(INFO) << "UpdateProperty";
DCHECK(ibus_prop);
ImePropertyList prop_list; // our representation.
if (!FlattenProperty(ibus_prop, &prop_list)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Malformed properties are detected";
return;
}
if (!prop_list.empty()) {
update_ime_property_(language_library_, prop_list);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 26,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void CopyFromOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
sp<ABuffer> codec = getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, true /* limit */);
memcpy((OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset, codec->data(), codec->size());
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 25,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void UtilityServiceFactory::RegisterServices(ServiceMap* services) {
GetContentClient()->utility()->RegisterServices(services);
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo video_capture_info;
video_capture_info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateVideoCaptureService);
services->insert(
std::make_pair(video_capture::mojom::kServiceName, video_capture_info));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PEPPER_CDMS)
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo info;
info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateMediaService);
services->insert(std::make_pair(media::mojom::kMediaServiceName, info));
#endif
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo shape_detection_info;
shape_detection_info.factory =
base::Bind(&shape_detection::ShapeDetectionService::Create);
services->insert(std::make_pair(shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
shape_detection_info));
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo data_decoder_info;
data_decoder_info.factory = base::Bind(&CreateDataDecoderService);
services->insert(
std::make_pair(data_decoder::mojom::kServiceName, data_decoder_info));
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService)) {
GetContentClient()->utility()->RegisterNetworkBinders(
network_registry_.get());
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo network_info;
network_info.factory = base::Bind(
&UtilityServiceFactory::CreateNetworkService, base::Unretained(this));
network_info.task_runner = ChildProcess::current()->io_task_runner();
services->insert(
std::make_pair(content::mojom::kNetworkServiceName, network_info));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: SkPictureShader.cpp in Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging access to a renderer process and providing crafted serialized data.
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947} | High | 960 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void *skcipher_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
return crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, type, mask);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: crypto/algif_skcipher.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.2 does not verify that a setkey operation has been performed on an AF_ALG socket before an accept system call is processed, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted application that does not supply a key, related to the lrw_crypt function in crypto/lrw.c.
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> | Medium | 23,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int vt_reset_keyboard(int fd) {
int kb;
/* If we can't read the default, then default to unicode. It's 2017 after all. */
kb = vt_default_utf8() != 0 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE;
if (ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, kb) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-255
Summary: systemd 242 changes the VT1 mode upon a logout, which allows attackers to read cleartext passwords in certain circumstances, such as watching a shutdown, or using Ctrl-Alt-F1 and Ctrl-Alt-F2. This occurs because the KDGKBMODE (aka current keyboard mode) check is mishandled.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check | Medium | 20,841 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long jpc_bitstream_getbits(jpc_bitstream_t *bitstream, int n)
{
long v;
int u;
/* We can reliably get at most 31 bits since ISO/IEC 9899 only
guarantees that a long can represent values up to 2^31-1. */
assert(n >= 0 && n < 32);
/* Get the number of bits requested from the specified bit stream. */
v = 0;
while (--n >= 0) {
if ((u = jpc_bitstream_getbit(bitstream)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
v = (v << 1) | u;
}
return v;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The jpc_bitstream_getbits function in jpc_bs.c in JasPer before 2.0.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure) via a very large integer.
Commit Message: Changed the JPC bitstream code to more gracefully handle a request
for a larger sized integer than what can be handled (i.e., return
with an error instead of failing an assert). | Medium | 7,560 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void readpng2_warning_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp msg)
{
fprintf(stderr, "readpng2 libpng warning: %s\n", msg);
fflush(stderr);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 24,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int mount_proc_if_needed(const char *rootfs)
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
char link[20];
int linklen, ret;
int mypid;
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/proc/self", rootfs);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN) {
SYSERROR("proc path name too long");
return -1;
}
memset(link, 0, 20);
linklen = readlink(path, link, 20);
mypid = (int)getpid();
INFO("I am %d, /proc/self points to '%s'", mypid, link);
ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/proc", rootfs);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN) {
SYSERROR("proc path name too long");
return -1;
}
if (linklen < 0) /* /proc not mounted */
goto domount;
if (atoi(link) != mypid) {
/* wrong /procs mounted */
umount2(path, MNT_DETACH); /* ignore failure */
goto domount;
}
/* the right proc is already mounted */
return 0;
domount:
if (mount("proc", path, "proc", 0, NULL))
return -1;
INFO("Mounted /proc in container for security transition");
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | High | 13,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool isNodeAriaVisible(Node* node) {
if (!node)
return false;
if (!node->isElementNode())
return false;
return equalIgnoringCase(toElement(node)->getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr),
"false");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 17,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() :
BlockEntry(NULL, LONG_MIN)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 16,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long SimpleBlock::Parse()
{
return m_block.Parse(m_pCluster);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 15,861 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON_AddItemToObject( object, string, create_reference( item ) );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 18,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline LineContribType * _gdContributionsAlloc(unsigned int line_length, unsigned int windows_size)
{
unsigned int u = 0;
LineContribType *res;
int overflow_error = 0;
res = (LineContribType *) gdMalloc(sizeof(LineContribType));
if (!res) {
return NULL;
}
res->WindowSize = windows_size;
res->LineLength = line_length;
if (overflow2(line_length, sizeof(ContributionType))) {
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
res->ContribRow = (ContributionType *) gdMalloc(line_length * sizeof(ContributionType));
if (res->ContribRow == NULL) {
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
for (u = 0 ; u < line_length ; u++) {
if (overflow2(windows_size, sizeof(double))) {
overflow_error = 1;
} else {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights = (double *) gdMalloc(windows_size * sizeof(double));
}
if (overflow_error == 1 || res->ContribRow[u].Weights == NULL) {
unsigned int i;
u--;
for (i=0;i<=u;i++) {
gdFree(res->ContribRow[i].Weights);
}
gdFree(res->ContribRow);
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
}
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-191
Summary: Integer underflow in the _gdContributionsAlloc function in gd_interpolation.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.2.4 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to decrementing the u variable.
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to [email protected]. | High | 19,858 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline char *parse_ip_address_ex(const char *str, size_t str_len, int *portno, int get_err, zend_string **err)
{
char *colon;
char *host = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
char *p;
if (*(str) == '[' && str_len > 1) {
/* IPV6 notation to specify raw address with port (i.e. [fe80::1]:80) */
p = memchr(str + 1, ']', str_len - 2);
if (!p || *(p + 1) != ':') {
if (get_err) {
*err = strpprintf(0, "Failed to parse IPv6 address \"%s\"", str);
}
return NULL;
}
*portno = atoi(p + 2);
return estrndup(str + 1, p - str - 1);
}
#endif
if (str_len) {
colon = memchr(str, ':', str_len - 1);
} else {
colon = NULL;
}
if (colon) {
*portno = atoi(colon + 1);
host = estrndup(str, colon - str);
} else {
if (get_err) {
*err = strpprintf(0, "Failed to parse address \"%s\"", str);
}
return NULL;
}
return host;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-918
Summary: PHP through 7.1.11 enables potential SSRF in applications that accept an fsockopen or pfsockopen hostname argument with an expectation that the port number is constrained. Because a :port syntax is recognized, fsockopen will use the port number that is specified in the hostname argument, instead of the port number in the second argument of the function.
Commit Message: Detect invalid port in xp_socket parse ip address
For historical reasons, fsockopen() accepts the port and hostname
separately: fsockopen('127.0.0.1', 80)
However, with the introdcution of stream transports in PHP 4.3,
it became possible to include the port in the hostname specifier:
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80')
Or more formally: fsockopen('tcp://127.0.0.1:80')
Confusing results when these two forms are combined, however.
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80', 443) results in fsockopen() attempting
to connect to '127.0.0.1:80:443' which any reasonable stack would
consider invalid.
Unfortunately, PHP parses the address looking for the first colon
(with special handling for IPv6, don't worry) and calls atoi()
from there. atoi() in turn, simply stops parsing at the first
non-numeric character and returns the value so far.
The end result is that the explicitly supplied port is treated
as ignored garbage, rather than producing an error.
This diff replaces atoi() with strtol() and inspects the
stop character. If additional "garbage" of any kind is found,
it fails and returns an error. | Medium | 24,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit(Sdb *s, const ut8 *obuf,
RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu, const RBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da,
size_t offset, const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf, *buf_end = obuf + (cu->hdr.length - 7);
ut64 abbr_code;
size_t i;
if (cu->hdr.length > debug_str_len) {
return NULL;
}
while (buf && buf < buf_end && buf >= obuf) {
if (cu->length && cu->capacity == cu->length) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu (cu);
}
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &abbr_code);
if (abbr_code > da->length || !buf) {
return NULL;
}
r_bin_dwarf_init_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
if (!abbr_code) {
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = 0;
cu->length++;
buf++;
continue;
}
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = abbr_code;
cu->dies[cu->length].tag = da->decls[abbr_code - 1].tag;
abbr_code += offset;
if (da->capacity < abbr_code) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->decls[abbr_code - 1].length; i++) {
if (cu->dies[cu->length].length == cu->dies[cu->length].capacity) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
}
if (i >= cu->dies[cu->length].capacity || i >= da->decls[abbr_code - 1].capacity) {
eprintf ("Warning: malformed dwarf attribute capacity doesn't match length\n");
break;
}
memset (&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i], 0, sizeof
(cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i]));
buf = r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value (buf, buf_end - buf,
&da->decls[abbr_code - 1].specs[i],
&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i],
&cu->hdr, debug_str, debug_str_len);
if (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].name == DW_AT_comp_dir) {
const char *name = cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].encoding.str_struct.string;
sdb_set (s, "DW_AT_comp_dir", name, 0);
}
cu->dies[cu->length].length++;
}
cu->length++;
}
return buf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 2.0.1, libr/bin/dwarf.c allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file, related to r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit in dwarf.c and sdb_set_internal in shlr/sdb/src/sdb.c.
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser | Medium | 333 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidFocus() {
WebFrame* main_frame = webview() ? webview()->MainFrame() : nullptr;
bool is_processing_user_gesture =
WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(
main_frame && main_frame->IsWebLocalFrame()
? main_frame->ToWebLocalFrame()
: nullptr);
if (is_processing_user_gesture &&
!RenderThreadImpl::current()->layout_test_mode()) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_Focus(GetRoutingID()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A JavaScript focused window could overlap the fullscreen notification in Fullscreen in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | Low | 4,913 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp;
int i, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fp != NULL) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The check_acl function in pam_xauth.c in the pam_xauth module in Linux-PAM (aka pam) 1.1.2 and earlier does not verify that a certain ACL file is a regular file, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) via a special file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 22,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
xmlDocPtr doc;
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj;
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
/*
* Okay this is ugly but should work, use the NodePtr address
* to forge the ID
*/
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
doc = cur->doc;
else {
xmlNsPtr ns = (xmlNsPtr) cur;
if (ns->context != NULL)
doc = ns->context;
else
doc = ctxt->context->doc;
}
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)doc);
if (val >= 0) {
sprintf((char *)str, "idp%ld", val);
} else {
sprintf((char *)str, "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: libxslt 1.1.26 and earlier, as used in Google Chrome before 21.0.1180.89, does not properly manage memory, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted XSLT expression that is not properly identified during XPath navigation, related to (1) the xsltCompileLocationPathPattern function in libxslt/pattern.c and (2) the xsltGenerateIdFunction function in libxslt/functions.c.
Commit Message: Fix harmless memory error in generate-id.
BUG=140368
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10823168
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@149998 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 7,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ParseCaffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
uint32_t chan_chunk = 0, channel_layout = 0, bcount;
unsigned char *channel_identities = NULL;
unsigned char *channel_reorder = NULL;
int64_t total_samples = 0, infilesize;
CAFFileHeader caf_file_header;
CAFChunkHeader caf_chunk_header;
CAFAudioFormat caf_audio_format;
int i;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&caf_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &caf_file_header) + 4, sizeof (CAFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (CAFFileHeader) - 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_file_header, sizeof (CAFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_file_header, CAFFileHeaderFormat);
if (caf_file_header.mFileVersion != 1) {
error_line ("%s: can't handle version %d .CAF files!", infilename, caf_file_header.mFileVersion);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &caf_chunk_header, sizeof (CAFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (CAFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_chunk_header, sizeof (CAFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_chunk_header, CAFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "desc", 4)) {
int supported = TRUE;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize != sizeof (CAFAudioFormat) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &caf_audio_format, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_audio_format, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_audio_format, CAFAudioFormatFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode) {
char formatstr [5];
memcpy (formatstr, caf_audio_format.mFormatID, 4);
formatstr [4] = 0;
error_line ("format = %s, flags = %x, sampling rate = %g",
formatstr, caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags, caf_audio_format.mSampleRate);
error_line ("packet = %d bytes and %d frames",
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket, caf_audio_format.mFramesPerPacket);
error_line ("channels per frame = %d, bits per channel = %d",
caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame, caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel);
}
if (strncmp (caf_audio_format.mFormatID, "lpcm", 4) || (caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & ~3))
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mSampleRate < 1.0 || caf_audio_format.mSampleRate > 16777215.0 ||
caf_audio_format.mSampleRate != floor (caf_audio_format.mSampleRate))
supported = FALSE;
else if (!caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame || caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame > 256)
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel < 1 || caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel > 32 ||
((caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_FLOAT) && caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel != 32))
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mFramesPerPacket != 1 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame < (caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel + 7) / 8 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame > 4 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket % caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame)
supported = FALSE;
if (!supported) {
error_line ("%s is an unsupported .CAF format!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
config->bytes_per_sample = caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame;
config->float_norm_exp = (caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_FLOAT) ? 127 : 0;
config->bits_per_sample = caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel;
config->num_channels = caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame;
config->sample_rate = (int) caf_audio_format.mSampleRate;
if (!(caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && config->bytes_per_sample > 1)
config->qmode |= QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN;
if (config->bytes_per_sample == 1)
config->qmode |= QMODE_SIGNED_BYTES;
if (debug_logging_mode) {
if (config->float_norm_exp == 127)
error_line ("data format: 32-bit %s-endian floating point", (config->qmode & QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN) ? "big" : "little");
else
error_line ("data format: %d-bit %s-endian integers stored in %d byte(s)",
config->bits_per_sample, (config->qmode & QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN) ? "big" : "little", config->bytes_per_sample);
}
}
else if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "chan", 4)) {
CAFChannelLayout *caf_channel_layout;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize < 0 || caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize > 1024 ||
caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize < sizeof (CAFChannelLayout)) {
error_line ("this .CAF file has an invalid 'chan' chunk!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("'chan' chunk is %d bytes", (int) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize);
caf_channel_layout = malloc ((size_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, caf_channel_layout, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, caf_channel_layout, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (caf_channel_layout, CAFChannelLayoutFormat);
chan_chunk = 1;
if (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED)) {
error_line ("this CAF file already has channel order information!");
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
switch (caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag) {
case kCAFChannelLayoutTag_UseChannelDescriptions:
{
CAFChannelDescription *descriptions = (CAFChannelDescription *) (caf_channel_layout + 1);
int num_descriptions = caf_channel_layout->mNumberChannelDescriptions;
int label, cindex = 0, idents = 0;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize != sizeof (CAFChannelLayout) + sizeof (CAFChannelDescription) * num_descriptions ||
num_descriptions != config->num_channels) {
error_line ("channel descriptions in 'chan' chunk are the wrong size!");
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (num_descriptions >= 256) {
error_line ("%d channel descriptions is more than we can handle...ignoring!");
break;
}
channel_reorder = malloc (num_descriptions);
memset (channel_reorder, -1, num_descriptions);
channel_identities = malloc (num_descriptions+1);
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i) {
WavpackBigEndianToNative (descriptions + i, CAFChannelDescriptionFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chan %d --> %d", i + 1, descriptions [i].mChannelLabel);
}
for (label = 1; label <= 18; ++label)
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (descriptions [i].mChannelLabel == label) {
config->channel_mask |= 1 << (label - 1);
channel_reorder [i] = cindex++;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (channel_reorder [i] == (unsigned char) -1) {
uint32_t clabel = descriptions [i].mChannelLabel;
if (clabel == 0 || clabel == 0xffffffff || clabel == 100)
channel_identities [idents++] = 0xff;
else if ((clabel >= 33 && clabel <= 44) || (clabel >= 200 && clabel <= 207) || (clabel >= 301 && clabel <= 305))
channel_identities [idents++] = clabel >= 301 ? clabel - 80 : clabel;
else {
error_line ("warning: unknown channel descriptions label: %d", clabel);
channel_identities [idents++] = 0xff;
}
channel_reorder [i] = cindex++;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (channel_reorder [i] != i)
break;
if (i == num_descriptions) {
free (channel_reorder); // no reordering required, so don't
channel_reorder = NULL;
}
else {
config->qmode |= QMODE_REORDERED_CHANS; // reordering required, put channel count into layout
channel_layout = num_descriptions;
}
if (!idents) { // if no non-MS channels, free the identities string
free (channel_identities);
channel_identities = NULL;
}
else
channel_identities [idents] = 0; // otherwise NULL terminate it
if (debug_logging_mode) {
error_line ("layout_tag = 0x%08x, so generated bitmap of 0x%08x from %d descriptions, %d non-MS",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag, config->channel_mask,
caf_channel_layout->mNumberChannelDescriptions, idents);
if (channel_reorder && num_descriptions <= 8) {
char reorder_string [] = "12345678";
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
reorder_string [i] = channel_reorder [i] + '1';
reorder_string [i] = 0;
error_line ("reordering string = \"%s\"\n", reorder_string);
}
}
}
break;
case kCAFChannelLayoutTag_UseChannelBitmap:
config->channel_mask = caf_channel_layout->mChannelBitmap;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag = 0x%08x, so using supplied bitmap of 0x%08x",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag, caf_channel_layout->mChannelBitmap);
break;
default:
for (i = 0; i < NUM_LAYOUTS; ++i)
if (caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag == layouts [i].mChannelLayoutTag) {
config->channel_mask = layouts [i].mChannelBitmap;
channel_layout = layouts [i].mChannelLayoutTag;
if (layouts [i].mChannelReorder) {
channel_reorder = (unsigned char *) strdup (layouts [i].mChannelReorder);
config->qmode |= QMODE_REORDERED_CHANS;
}
if (layouts [i].mChannelIdentities)
channel_identities = (unsigned char *) strdup (layouts [i].mChannelIdentities);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag 0x%08x found in table, bitmap = 0x%08x, reorder = %s, identities = %s",
channel_layout, config->channel_mask, channel_reorder ? "yes" : "no", channel_identities ? "yes" : "no");
break;
}
if (i == NUM_LAYOUTS && debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag 0x%08x not found in table...all channels unassigned",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag);
break;
}
free (caf_channel_layout);
}
else if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "data", 4)) { // on the data chunk, get size and exit loop
uint32_t mEditCount;
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &mEditCount, sizeof (mEditCount), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (mEditCount)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &mEditCount, sizeof (mEditCount))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if ((config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) || caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize == -1) {
config->qmode |= QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH;
if (infilesize && DoGetFilePosition (infile) != -1)
total_samples = (infilesize - DoGetFilePosition (infile)) / caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket;
else
total_samples = -1;
}
else {
if (infilesize && infilesize - caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize > 16777216) {
error_line (".CAF file %s has over 16 MB of extra CAFF data, probably is corrupt!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if ((caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize - 4) % caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket) {
error_line (".CAF file %s has an invalid data chunk size, probably is corrupt!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
total_samples = (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize - 4) / caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket;
if (!total_samples) {
error_line ("this .CAF file has no audio samples, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (total_samples > MAX_WAVPACK_SAMPLES) {
error_line ("%s has too many samples for WavPack!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
uint32_t bytes_to_copy = (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize;
char *buff;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize < 0 || caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize > 1048576) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [0], caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [1], caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [2],
caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [3], caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (!chan_chunk && !config->channel_mask && config->num_channels <= 2 && !(config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))
config->channel_mask = 0x5 - config->num_channels;
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, channel_identities)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (channel_identities)
free (channel_identities);
if (channel_layout || channel_reorder) {
if (!WavpackSetChannelLayout (wpc, channel_layout, channel_reorder)) {
error_line ("problem with setting channel layout (should not happen)");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (channel_reorder)
free (channel_reorder);
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-665
Summary: WavPack 5.1.0 and earlier is affected by: CWE-457: Use of Uninitialized Variable. The impact is: Unexpected control flow, crashes, and segfaults. The component is: ParseCaffHeaderConfig (caff.c:486). The attack vector is: Maliciously crafted .wav file. The fixed version is: After commit https://github.com/dbry/WavPack/commit/f68a9555b548306c5b1ee45199ccdc4a16a6101b.
Commit Message: issue #66: make sure CAF files have a "desc" chunk | Medium | 18,801 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long Segment::DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(m_pos < 0);
assert(m_pUnknownSize);
#if 0
assert(m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize() < 0); //TODO: verify this
const long long element_start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
pos = -m_pos;
assert(pos > element_start);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long element_size = -1;
for (;;) //determine cluster size
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
element_size = total - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
element_size = segment_stop - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) //Cluster ID or Cues ID
{
element_size = pos - element_start;
assert(element_size > 0);
break;
}
#ifdef _DEBUG
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
#endif
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
assert(element_size >= 0);
m_pos = element_start + element_size;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#else
const long status = m_pUnknownSize->Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error or underflow
return status;
if (status == 0) //parsed a block
return 2; //continue parsing
assert(status > 0); //nothing left to parse of this cluster
const long long start = m_pUnknownSize->m_element_start;
const long long size = m_pUnknownSize->GetElementSize();
assert(size >= 0);
pos = start + size;
m_pos = pos;
m_pUnknownSize = 0;
return 2; //continue parsing
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 9,560 |