instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 386
112k
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stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 15
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 19,342 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
{
struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
goto error;
if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
goto error;
ret = 0;
if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
goto error_put;
/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
* than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
goto error_put;
}
/* change the UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!newowner)
goto error_put;
/* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
newowner->qnbytes)
goto quota_overrun;
newowner->qnkeys++;
newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
}
zapowner = key->user;
key->user = newowner;
key->uid = uid;
}
/* change the GID */
if (group != (gid_t) -1)
key->gid = gid;
ret = 0;
error_put:
up_write(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
if (zapowner)
key_user_put(zapowner);
error:
return ret;
quota_overrun:
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
zapowner = newowner;
ret = -EDQUOT;
goto error_put;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> | High | 3,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *snapshot_id,
const char *name,
Error **errp)
{
int i, snapshot_index;
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int new_l1_bytes;
int ret;
assert(bs->read_only);
/* Search the snapshot */
snapshot_index = find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(bs, snapshot_id, name);
if (snapshot_index < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"Can't find snapshot");
return -ENOENT;
}
sn = &s->snapshots[snapshot_index];
/* Allocate and read in the snapshot's L1 table */
new_l1_bytes = s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t);
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_bytes, 512));
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, sn->l1_table_offset, new_l1_table, new_l1_bytes);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Failed to read l1 table for snapshot");
g_free(new_l1_table);
return ret;
}
/* Switch the L1 table */
g_free(s->l1_table);
s->l1_size = sn->l1_size;
s->l1_table_offset = sn->l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table = new_l1_table;
for(i = 0;i < s->l1_size; i++) {
be64_to_cpus(&s->l1_table[i]);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in QEMU before 1.7.2 and 2.x before 2.0.0, allow local users to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a large (1) L1 table in the qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp in the QCOW 2 block driver (block/qcow2-snapshot.c) or (2) uncompressed chunk, (3) chunk length, or (4) number of sectors in the DMG block driver (block/dmg.c).
Commit Message: | Medium | 18,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: horAcc8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
assert((cc%stride)==0);
if (cc > stride) {
/*
* Pipeline the most common cases.
*/
if (stride == 3) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cc -= 3;
cp += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
unsigned int cr = cp[0];
unsigned int cg = cp[1];
unsigned int cb = cp[2];
unsigned int ca = cp[3];
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
while (cc>0) {
cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
cp[3] = (unsigned char) ((ca += cp[3]) & 0xff);
cc -= 4;
cp += 4;
}
} else {
cc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + *cp) & 0xff); cp++)
cc -= stride;
} while (cc>0);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 29,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AddExpectationsForSimulatedAttrib0(
GLsizei num_vertices, GLuint buffer_id) {
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, kServiceAttrib0BufferId))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER,
num_vertices * sizeof(GLfloat) * 4,
_, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BufferSubData(
GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, num_vertices * sizeof(GLfloat) * 4, _))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, VertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, VertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(*gl_, BindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, buffer_id))
.Times(1)
.RetiresOnSaturation();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle triangle arrays, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 13,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool CSPSourceList::matches(const KURL& url, ContentSecurityPolicy::RedirectStatus redirectStatus) const
{
if (m_allowStar)
return true;
KURL effectiveURL = m_policy->selfMatchesInnerURL() && SecurityOrigin::shouldUseInnerURL(url) ? SecurityOrigin::extractInnerURL(url) : url;
if (m_allowSelf && m_policy->urlMatchesSelf(effectiveURL))
return true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_list.size(); ++i) {
if (m_list[i].matches(effectiveURL, redirectStatus))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The CSPSourceList::matches function in WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/CSPSourceList.cpp in the Content Security Policy (CSP) implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 accepts a blob:, data:, or filesystem: URL as a match for a * pattern, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended scheme restrictions in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging a policy that relies on this pattern.
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950} | Medium | 2,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> UnpackPermissionSet(
const Permissions& permissions, std::string* error) {
APIPermissionSet apis;
std::vector<std::string>* permissions_list = permissions.permissions.get();
if (permissions_list) {
PermissionsInfo* info = PermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions_list->begin();
it != permissions_list->end(); ++it) {
if (it->find(kDelimiter) != std::string::npos) {
size_t delimiter = it->find(kDelimiter);
std::string permission_name = it->substr(0, delimiter);
std::string permission_arg = it->substr(delimiter + 1);
scoped_ptr<base::Value> permission_json(
base::JSONReader::Read(permission_arg));
if (!permission_json.get()) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
APIPermission* permission = NULL;
const APIPermissionInfo* bluetooth_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice);
const APIPermissionInfo* usb_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kUsbDevice);
if (permission_name == bluetooth_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new BluetoothDevicePermission(
bluetooth_device_permission_info);
} else if (permission_name == usb_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new UsbDevicePermission(usb_device_permission_info);
} else {
*error = kUnsupportedPermissionId;
return NULL;
}
CHECK(permission);
if (!permission->FromValue(permission_json.get())) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission);
} else {
const APIPermissionInfo* permission_info = info->GetByName(*it);
if (!permission_info) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kUnknownPermissionError, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission_info->id());
}
}
}
URLPatternSet origins;
if (permissions.origins.get()) {
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions.origins->begin();
it != permissions.origins->end(); ++it) {
URLPattern origin(Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = origin.Parse(*it);
if (URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin,
*it,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return NULL;
}
origins.AddPattern(origin);
}
}
return scoped_refptr<PermissionSet>(
new PermissionSet(apis, origins, URLPatternSet()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The extension functionality in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not verify that use of the permissions API is consistent with file permissions, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 19,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetDocumentEntry(const FilePath& cache_file_path,
const GetFileFromCacheParams& params,
GDataErrorCode status,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> data) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
scoped_ptr<GDataEntry> fresh_entry;
if (error == GDATA_FILE_OK) {
scoped_ptr<DocumentEntry> doc_entry(DocumentEntry::ExtractAndParse(*data));
if (doc_entry.get()) {
fresh_entry.reset(
GDataEntry::FromDocumentEntry(NULL, doc_entry.get(),
directory_service_.get()));
}
if (!fresh_entry.get() || !fresh_entry->AsGDataFile()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Got invalid entry from server for " << params.resource_id;
error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED;
}
}
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!params.get_file_callback.is_null()) {
params.get_file_callback.Run(error,
cache_file_path,
params.mime_type,
REGULAR_FILE);
}
return;
}
GURL content_url = fresh_entry->content_url();
int64 file_size = fresh_entry->file_info().size;
DCHECK_EQ(params.resource_id, fresh_entry->resource_id());
scoped_ptr<GDataFile> fresh_entry_as_file(
fresh_entry.release()->AsGDataFile());
directory_service_->RefreshFile(fresh_entry_as_file.Pass());
bool* has_enough_space = new bool(false);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::FreeDiskSpaceIfNeededFor,
base::Unretained(cache_),
file_size,
has_enough_space),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::StartDownloadFileIfEnoughSpace,
ui_weak_ptr_,
params,
content_url,
cache_file_path,
base::Owned(has_enough_space)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 7,326 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int sr_do_ioctl(Scsi_CD *cd, struct packet_command *cgc)
{
struct scsi_device *SDev;
struct scsi_sense_hdr sshdr;
int result, err = 0, retries = 0;
SDev = cd->device;
retry:
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(SDev)) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
result = scsi_execute(SDev, cgc->cmd, cgc->data_direction,
cgc->buffer, cgc->buflen,
(unsigned char *)cgc->sense, &sshdr,
cgc->timeout, IOCTL_RETRIES, 0, 0, NULL);
/* Minimal error checking. Ignore cases we know about, and report the rest. */
if (driver_byte(result) != 0) {
switch (sshdr.sense_key) {
case UNIT_ATTENTION:
SDev->changed = 1;
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"disc change detected.\n");
if (retries++ < 10)
goto retry;
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
case NOT_READY: /* This happens if there is no disc in drive */
if (sshdr.asc == 0x04 &&
sshdr.ascq == 0x01) {
/* sense: Logical unit is in process of becoming ready */
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM not ready yet.\n");
if (retries++ < 10) {
/* sleep 2 sec and try again */
ssleep(2);
goto retry;
} else {
/* 20 secs are enough? */
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
}
}
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM not ready. Make sure there "
"is a disc in the drive.\n");
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
case ILLEGAL_REQUEST:
err = -EIO;
if (sshdr.asc == 0x20 &&
sshdr.ascq == 0x00)
/* sense: Invalid command operation code */
err = -EDRIVE_CANT_DO_THIS;
break;
default:
err = -EIO;
}
}
/* Wake up a process waiting for device */
out:
cgc->stat = err;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sr_do_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/sr_ioctl.c in the Linux kernel through 4.16.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact because sense buffers have different sizes at the CDROM layer and the SCSI layer, as demonstrated by a CDROMREADMODE2 ioctl call.
Commit Message: sr: pass down correctly sized SCSI sense buffer
We're casting the CDROM layer request_sense to the SCSI sense
buffer, but the former is 64 bytes and the latter is 96 bytes.
As we generally allocate these on the stack, we end up blowing
up the stack.
Fix this by wrapping the scsi_execute() call with a properly
sized sense buffer, and copying back the bits for the CDROM
layer.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Piotr Gabriel Kosinski <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Fixes: 82ed4db499b8 ("block: split scsi_request out of struct request")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | High | 21,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: BlockEntry::Kind BlockGroup::GetKind() const
{
return kBlockGroup;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 16,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: get_page_image(LoadContext *lc, ddjvu_page_t *page, int x, int y, int w, int h, const ImageInfo *image_info ) {
ddjvu_format_t
*format;
ddjvu_page_type_t
type;
Image
*image;
int
ret,
stride;
unsigned char
*q;
ddjvu_rect_t rect;
rect.x = x;
rect.y = y;
rect.w = (unsigned int) w; /* /10 */
rect.h = (unsigned int) h; /* /10 */
image = lc->image;
type = ddjvu_page_get_type(lc->page);
/* stride of this temporary buffer: */
stride = (type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL)?
(image->columns + 7)/8 : image->columns *3;
q = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->rows,stride);
if (q == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return;
format = ddjvu_format_create(
(type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL)?DDJVU_FORMAT_LSBTOMSB : DDJVU_FORMAT_RGB24,
/* DDJVU_FORMAT_RGB24
* DDJVU_FORMAT_RGBMASK32*/
/* DDJVU_FORMAT_RGBMASK32 */
0, NULL);
#if 0
/* fixme: ThrowReaderException is a macro, which uses `exception' variable */
if (format == NULL)
{
abort();
/* ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed"); */
}
#endif
ddjvu_format_set_row_order(format, 1);
ddjvu_format_set_y_direction(format, 1);
ret = ddjvu_page_render(page,
DDJVU_RENDER_COLOR, /* ddjvu_render_mode_t */
&rect,
&rect, /* mmc: ?? */
format,
stride, /* ?? */
(char*)q);
(void) ret;
ddjvu_format_release(format);
if (type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL) {
/* */
#if DEBUG
printf("%s: expanding BITONAL page/image\n", __FUNCTION__);
#endif
register IndexPacket *indexes;
size_t bit, byte;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
PixelPacket * o = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (o == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
/* fixme: the non-aligned, last =<7 bits ! that's ok!!!*/
for (x= 0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0) byte= (size_t) q[(y * stride) + (x / 8)];
if (indexes != (IndexPacket *) NULL)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(IndexPacket) (((byte & 0x01) != 0) ? 0x00 : 0x01));
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
byte>>=1;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (!image->ping)
SyncImage(image);
} else {
#if DEBUG
printf("%s: expanding PHOTO page/image\n", __FUNCTION__);
#endif
/* now transfer line-wise: */
ssize_t i;
#if 0
/* old: */
char* r;
#else
register PixelPacket *r;
unsigned char *s;
#endif
s=q;
for (i = 0;i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
#if DEBUG
if (i % 1000 == 0) printf("%d\n",i);
#endif
r = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (r == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(r,ScaleCharToQuantum(*s++));
SetPixelGreen(r,ScaleCharToQuantum(*s++));
SetPixelBlue(r,ScaleCharToQuantum(*s++));
r++;
}
(void) SyncAuthenticPixels(image,&image->exception);
}
}
q=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(q);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 16,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int crypto_rng_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_rng *rng = __crypto_rng_cast(tfm);
struct rng_alg *alg = crypto_rng_alg(rng);
struct old_rng_alg *oalg = crypto_old_rng_alg(rng);
if (oalg->rng_make_random) {
rng->generate = generate;
rng->seed = rngapi_reset;
rng->seedsize = oalg->seedsize;
return 0;
}
rng->generate = alg->generate;
rng->seed = alg->seed;
rng->seedsize = alg->seedsize;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The rngapi_reset function in crypto/rng.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference).
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> | Medium | 5,550 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: IndexedDBDispatcher* IndexedDBDispatcher::ThreadSpecificInstance() {
if (g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Get())
return g_idb_dispatcher_tls.Pointer()->Get();
IndexedDBDispatcher* dispatcher = new IndexedDBDispatcher;
if (WorkerTaskRunner::Instance()->CurrentWorkerId())
webkit_glue::WorkerTaskRunner::Instance()->AddStopObserver(dispatcher);
return dispatcher;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the IndexedDB implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 1,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RemoteFrame::Navigate(const FrameLoadRequest& passed_request) {
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(passed_request);
FrameLoader::SetReferrerForFrameRequest(frame_request);
FrameLoader::UpgradeInsecureRequest(frame_request.GetResourceRequest(),
frame_request.OriginDocument());
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation(this));
Client()->Navigate(frame_request.GetResourceRequest(),
frame_request.ReplacesCurrentItem());
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An integer overflow leading to an incorrect capacity of a buffer in JavaScript in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728} | Medium | 7,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WT_VoiceGain (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
EAS_PCM *pInputBuffer;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
EAS_I32 gainLeft, gainRight;
#endif
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
pInputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->frame.gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
gainLeft = pWTVoice->gainLeft;
gainRight = pWTVoice->gainRight;
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* incremental gain step to prevent zipper noise */
tmp0 = *pInputBuffer++;
gain += gainIncrement;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = gain >> 16;
/* scale sample by gain */
tmp2 *= tmp0;
/* stereo output */
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> 14;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* left channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainLeft;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* right channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainRight;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* mono output */
#else
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> (NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS - 1);
tmp1 += tmp2;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
#endif
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
| High | 15,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ikev1_sig_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IKEv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 23,397 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: pimv2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len, const u_char *bp2)
{
register const u_char *ep;
register const struct pim *pim = (const struct pim *)bp;
int advance;
enum checksum_status cksum_status;
ep = (const u_char *)ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (bp >= ep)
return;
if (ep > bp + len)
ep = bp + len;
ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_rsv);
pimv2_addr_len = pim->pim_rsv;
if (pimv2_addr_len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RFC2117-encoding"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cksum 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum) == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
} else {
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) == PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER) {
/*
* The checksum only covers the packet header,
* not the encapsulated packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, 8);
if (cksum_status == INCORRECT) {
/*
* To quote RFC 4601, "For interoperability
* reasons, a message carrying a checksum
* calculated over the entire PIM Register
* message should also be accepted."
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
} else {
/*
* The checksum covers the entire packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
switch (cksum_status) {
case CORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(correct)"));
break;
case INCORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(incorrect)"));
break;
case UNVERIFIED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
break;
}
}
switch (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)) {
case PIMV2_TYPE_HELLO:
{
uint16_t otype, olen;
bp += 4;
while (bp < ep) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
otype = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
olen = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4 + olen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (%u), length %u, Value: ",
tok2str(pimv2_hello_option_values, "Unknown", otype),
otype,
olen));
bp += 4;
switch (otype) {
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_HOLDTIME:
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_LANPRUNEDELAY:
if (olen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
} else {
char t_bit;
uint16_t lan_delay, override_interval;
lan_delay = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
override_interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2);
t_bit = (lan_delay & 0x8000)? 1 : 0;
lan_delay &= ~0x8000;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T-bit=%d, LAN delay %dms, Override interval %dms",
t_bit, lan_delay, override_interval));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY:
switch (olen) {
case 0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bi-Directional Capability (Old)"));
break;
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
break;
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_GENID:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_REFRESH_CAP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "v%d", *bp));
if (*(bp+1) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", interval "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, *(bp+1));
}
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?0x%04x?", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2)));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_BIDIR_CAP:
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const u_char *ptr = bp;
while (ptr < (bp+olen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, ptr, pimv2_unicast, 0);
if (advance < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
ptr += advance;
}
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
bp += olen;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER:
{
const struct ip *ip;
ND_TCHECK2(*(bp + 4), PIMV2_REGISTER_FLAG_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [ %s ]\n\t",
tok2str(pimv2_register_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(bp+4))));
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/* encapsulated multicast packet */
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
switch (IP_V(ip)) {
case 0: /* Null header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP-Null-header %s > %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
break;
case 4: /* IPv4 */
ip_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case 6: /* IPv6 */
ip6_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP ver %d", IP_V(ip)));
break;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER_STOP:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " source="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_JOIN_PRUNE:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT_ACK:
/*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |PIM Ver| Type | Addr length | Checksum |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Unicast-Upstream Neighbor Address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Reserved | Num groups | Holdtime |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Number of Joined Sources | Number of Pruned Sources |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
{
uint8_t ngroup;
uint16_t holdtime;
uint16_t njoin;
uint16_t nprune;
int i, j;
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", upstream-neighbor: "));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
if (bp + 4 > ep)
break;
ngroup = bp[1];
holdtime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u group(s)", ngroup));
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", holdtime: "));
if (holdtime == 0xffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "infinite"));
else
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, holdtime);
}
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (i = 0; i < ngroup; i++) {
if (bp >= ep)
goto jp_done;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t group #%u: ", i+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 4 > ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
njoin = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
nprune = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", joined sources: %u, pruned sources: %u", njoin, nprune));
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (j = 0; j < njoin; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t joined source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
for (j = 0; j < nprune; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t pruned source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
}
jp_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_BOOTSTRAP:
{
int i, j, frpcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Fragment Tag, Hash Mask len, and BSR-priority */
if (bp + sizeof(uint16_t) >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tag=%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hashmlen=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSRprio=%d", bp[1]));
bp += 2;
/* Encoded-Unicast-BSR-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSR="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
for (i = 0; bp < ep; i++) {
/* Encoded-Group Address */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (group%d: ", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
/* RP-Count, Frag RP-Cnt, and rsvd */
if (bp >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPcnt=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRPcnt=%d", frpcnt = bp[1]));
bp += 4;
for (j = 0; j < frpcnt && bp < ep; j++) {
/* each RP info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP%d=", j));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp,
pimv2_unicast,
0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
if (bp + 2 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",prio=%d", bp[2]));
bp += 4;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
bs_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_ASSERT:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 8 > ep)
break;
if (bp[0] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPT"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pref=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[0]) & 0x7fffffff));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " metric=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[4])));
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_CANDIDATE_RP:
{
int i, pfxcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Prefix-Cnt, Priority, and Holdtime */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prefix-cnt=%d", bp[0]));
pfxcnt = bp[0];
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prio=%d", bp[1]));
if (bp + 3 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
bp += 4;
/* Encoded-Unicast-RP-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
/* Encoded-Group Addresses */
for (i = 0; i < pfxcnt && bp < ep; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Group%d=", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_PRUNE_REFRESH:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " grp="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " forwarder="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TUNR "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [type %d]", PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pim]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PIMv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c:pimv2_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12996/PIMv2: Make sure PIM TLVs have the right length.
We do bounds checks based on the TLV length, so if the TLV's length is
too short, and we don't check for that, we could end up fetching data
past the end of the TLV - including past the length of the captured data
in the packet.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 5,034 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: generate_palette(png_colorp palette, png_bytep trans, int bit_depth,
png_const_bytep gamma_table, unsigned int *colors)
{
/*
* 1-bit: entry 0 is transparent-red, entry 1 is opaque-white
* 2-bit: entry 0: transparent-green
* entry 1: 40%-red
* entry 2: 80%-blue
* entry 3: opaque-white
* 4-bit: the 16 combinations of the 2-bit case
* 8-bit: the 256 combinations of the 4-bit case
*/
switch (colors[0])
{
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng: --colors=...: invalid count %u\n",
colors[0]);
exit(1);
case 1:
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, colors[1], colors[1], colors[1], 255,
gamma_table);
return 1;
case 2:
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, colors[1], colors[1], colors[1],
colors[2], gamma_table);
return 1;
case 3:
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, colors[1], colors[2], colors[3], 255,
gamma_table);
return 1;
case 4:
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, colors[1], colors[2], colors[3],
colors[4], gamma_table);
return 1;
case 0:
if (bit_depth == 1)
{
set_color(palette+0, trans+0, 255, 0, 0, 0, gamma_table);
set_color(palette+1, trans+1, 255, 255, 255, 255, gamma_table);
return 2;
}
else
{
unsigned int size = 1U << (bit_depth/2); /* 2, 4 or 16 */
unsigned int x, y, ip;
for (x=0; x<size; ++x) for (y=0; y<size; ++y)
{
ip = x + (size * y);
/* size is at most 16, so the scaled value below fits in 16 bits
*/
# define interp(pos, c1, c2) ((pos * c1) + ((size-pos) * c2))
# define xyinterp(x, y, c1, c2, c3, c4) (((size * size / 2) +\
(interp(x, c1, c2) * y + (size-y) * interp(x, c3, c4))) /\
(size*size))
set_color(palette+ip, trans+ip,
/* color: green, red,blue,white */
xyinterp(x, y, 0, 255, 0, 255),
xyinterp(x, y, 255, 0, 0, 255),
xyinterp(x, y, 0, 0, 255, 255),
/* alpha: 0, 102, 204, 255) */
xyinterp(x, y, 0, 102, 204, 255),
gamma_table);
}
return ip+1;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 29,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int re_yyget_column (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER)
return 0;
return yycolumn;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libyara/lexer.l in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yy_get_next_buffer function.
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c | Medium | 13,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::OnJobNotification(DWORD message,
DWORD pid) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
switch (message) {
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_ACTIVE_PROCESS_ZERO:
CHECK(SetEvent(process_exit_event_));
break;
case JOB_OBJECT_MSG_NEW_PROCESS:
worker_process_.Set(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 11,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderWin::SensorReaderCreated(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback,
std::unique_ptr<PlatformSensorReaderWin> sensor_reader) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!sensor_reader) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<PlatformSensor> sensor = new PlatformSensorWin(
type, std::move(mapping), this, sensor_thread_->task_runner(),
std::move(sensor_reader));
callback.Run(sensor);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 7,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void GraphicsContext::addInnerRoundedRectClip(const IntRect& rect, int thickness)
{
notImplemented();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving floating styles.
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 10,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DownloadCoreServiceImpl::SetDownloadManagerDelegateForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate> new_delegate) {
manager_delegate_.swap(new_delegate);
DownloadManager* dm = BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(profile_);
dm->SetDelegate(manager_delegate_.get());
manager_delegate_->SetDownloadManager(dm);
if (new_delegate)
new_delegate->Shutdown();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Bad cast in DevTools in Google Chrome on Win, Linux, Mac, Chrome OS prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515} | Medium | 4,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int rxrpc_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
struct rxrpc_call *call = NULL, *continue_call = NULL;
struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sock->sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
int copy, ret, ullen, offset, copied = 0;
u32 abort_code;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
_enter(",,,%zu,%d", len, flags);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB | MSG_TRUNC))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ullen = msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT ? 4 : sizeof(unsigned long);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(&rx->sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_MORE;
lock_sock(&rx->sk);
for (;;) {
/* return immediately if a client socket has no outstanding
* calls */
if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&rx->calls)) {
if (copied)
goto out;
if (rx->sk.sk_state != RXRPC_SERVER_LISTENING) {
release_sock(&rx->sk);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
return -ENODATA;
}
}
/* get the next message on the Rx queue */
skb = skb_peek(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue);
if (!skb) {
/* nothing remains on the queue */
if (copied &&
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PEEK || timeo == 0))
goto out;
/* wait for a message to turn up */
release_sock(&rx->sk);
prepare_to_wait_exclusive(sk_sleep(&rx->sk), &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
ret = sock_error(&rx->sk);
if (ret)
goto wait_error;
if (skb_queue_empty(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue)) {
if (signal_pending(current))
goto wait_interrupted;
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(&rx->sk), &wait);
lock_sock(&rx->sk);
continue;
}
peek_next_packet:
sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
call = sp->call;
ASSERT(call != NULL);
_debug("next pkt %s", rxrpc_pkts[sp->hdr.type]);
/* make sure we wait for the state to be updated in this call */
spin_lock_bh(&call->lock);
spin_unlock_bh(&call->lock);
if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASED, &call->flags)) {
_debug("packet from released call");
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) != skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
continue;
}
/* determine whether to continue last data receive */
if (continue_call) {
_debug("maybe cont");
if (call != continue_call ||
skb->mark != RXRPC_SKB_MARK_DATA) {
release_sock(&rx->sk);
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
_leave(" = %d [noncont]", copied);
return copied;
}
}
rxrpc_get_call(call);
/* copy the peer address and timestamp */
if (!continue_call) {
if (msg->msg_name && msg->msg_namelen > 0)
memcpy(msg->msg_name,
&call->conn->trans->peer->srx,
sizeof(call->conn->trans->peer->srx));
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, &rx->sk, skb);
}
/* receive the message */
if (skb->mark != RXRPC_SKB_MARK_DATA)
goto receive_non_data_message;
_debug("recvmsg DATA #%u { %d, %d }",
ntohl(sp->hdr.seq), skb->len, sp->offset);
if (!continue_call) {
/* only set the control data once per recvmsg() */
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID,
ullen, &call->user_call_ID);
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
ASSERT(test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags));
}
ASSERTCMP(ntohl(sp->hdr.seq), >=, call->rx_data_recv);
ASSERTCMP(ntohl(sp->hdr.seq), <=, call->rx_data_recv + 1);
call->rx_data_recv = ntohl(sp->hdr.seq);
ASSERTCMP(ntohl(sp->hdr.seq), >, call->rx_data_eaten);
offset = sp->offset;
copy = skb->len - offset;
if (copy > len - copied)
copy = len - copied;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) {
ret = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, offset,
msg->msg_iov, copy);
} else {
ret = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, offset,
msg->msg_iov);
if (ret == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_error;
}
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
/* handle piecemeal consumption of data packets */
_debug("copied %d+%d", copy, copied);
offset += copy;
copied += copy;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
sp->offset = offset;
if (sp->offset < skb->len) {
_debug("buffer full");
ASSERTCMP(copied, ==, len);
break;
}
/* we transferred the whole data packet */
if (sp->hdr.flags & RXRPC_LAST_PACKET) {
_debug("last");
if (call->conn->out_clientflag) {
/* last byte of reply received */
ret = copied;
goto terminal_message;
}
/* last bit of request received */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
_debug("eat packet");
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) !=
skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
}
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_MORE;
break;
}
/* move on to the next data message */
_debug("next");
if (!continue_call)
continue_call = sp->call;
else
rxrpc_put_call(call);
call = NULL;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
_debug("peek next");
skb = skb->next;
if (skb == (struct sk_buff *) &rx->sk.sk_receive_queue)
break;
goto peek_next_packet;
}
_debug("eat packet");
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) != skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
}
/* end of non-terminal data packet reception for the moment */
_debug("end rcv data");
out:
release_sock(&rx->sk);
if (call)
rxrpc_put_call(call);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
_leave(" = %d [data]", copied);
return copied;
/* handle non-DATA messages such as aborts, incoming connections and
* final ACKs */
receive_non_data_message:
_debug("non-data");
if (skb->mark == RXRPC_SKB_MARK_NEW_CALL) {
_debug("RECV NEW CALL");
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_NEW_CALL, 0, &abort_code);
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) != skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
}
goto out;
}
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID,
ullen, &call->user_call_ID);
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
ASSERT(test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags));
switch (skb->mark) {
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_DATA:
BUG();
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_FINAL_ACK:
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_ACK, 0, &abort_code);
break;
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_BUSY:
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_BUSY, 0, &abort_code);
break;
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_REMOTE_ABORT:
abort_code = call->abort_code;
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_ABORT, 4, &abort_code);
break;
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_NET_ERROR:
_debug("RECV NET ERROR %d", sp->error);
abort_code = sp->error;
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_NET_ERROR, 4, &abort_code);
break;
case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_LOCAL_ERROR:
_debug("RECV LOCAL ERROR %d", sp->error);
abort_code = sp->error;
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_LOCAL_ERROR, 4,
&abort_code);
break;
default:
BUG();
break;
}
if (ret < 0)
goto copy_error;
terminal_message:
_debug("terminal");
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_MORE;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
_net("free terminal skb %p", skb);
if (skb_dequeue(&rx->sk.sk_receive_queue) != skb)
BUG();
rxrpc_free_skb(skb);
rxrpc_remove_user_ID(rx, call);
}
release_sock(&rx->sk);
rxrpc_put_call(call);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
copy_error:
_debug("copy error");
release_sock(&rx->sk);
rxrpc_put_call(call);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
csum_copy_error:
_debug("csum error");
release_sock(&rx->sk);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
rxrpc_kill_skb(skb);
skb_kill_datagram(&rx->sk, skb, flags);
rxrpc_put_call(call);
return -EAGAIN;
wait_interrupted:
ret = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
wait_error:
finish_wait(sk_sleep(&rx->sk), &wait);
if (continue_call)
rxrpc_put_call(continue_call);
if (copied)
copied = ret;
_leave(" = %d [waitfail %d]", copied, ret);
return copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 25,516 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long long Cluster::GetPosition() const
{
const long long pos = m_element_start - m_pSegment->m_start;
assert(pos >= 0);
return pos;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 4,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int perf_event_read_group(struct perf_event *event,
u64 read_format, char __user *buf)
{
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader, *sub;
int n = 0, size = 0, ret = -EFAULT;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = leader->ctx;
u64 values[5];
u64 count, enabled, running;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
count = perf_event_read_value(leader, &enabled, &running);
values[n++] = 1 + leader->nr_siblings;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED)
values[n++] = enabled;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING)
values[n++] = running;
values[n++] = count;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
values[n++] = primary_event_id(leader);
size = n * sizeof(u64);
if (copy_to_user(buf, values, size))
goto unlock;
ret = size;
list_for_each_entry(sub, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) {
n = 0;
values[n++] = perf_event_read_value(sub, &enabled, &running);
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
values[n++] = primary_event_id(sub);
size = n * sizeof(u64);
if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, values, size)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto unlock;
}
ret += size;
}
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 4,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: std::vector<FilePath> GDataCache::GetCachePaths(
const FilePath& cache_root_path) {
std::vector<FilePath> cache_paths;
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheMetaDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCachePinnedDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheOutgoingDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCachePersistentDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDownloadsDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDocumentsDir));
return cache_paths;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 8,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long long Block::GetTime(const Cluster* pCluster) const
{
assert(pCluster);
const long long tc = GetTimeCode(pCluster);
const Segment* const pSegment = pCluster->m_pSegment;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long ns = tc * scale;
return ns;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 16,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
{
int avail, index, boundary;
index = s->curpag << 8;
boundary = s->boundary << 8;
if (index < boundary)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ne2000_receive function in the NE2000 NIC emulation support (hw/net/ne2000.c) in QEMU before 2.5.1 allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and QEMU process crash) via crafted values for the PSTART and PSTOP registers, involving ring buffer control.
Commit Message: | Low | 13,101 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MojoResult Core::WrapPlatformSharedBufferHandle(
const MojoPlatformHandle* platform_handle,
size_t size,
const MojoSharedBufferGuid* guid,
MojoPlatformSharedBufferHandleFlags flags,
MojoHandle* mojo_handle) {
DCHECK(size);
ScopedPlatformHandle handle;
MojoResult result =
MojoPlatformHandleToScopedPlatformHandle(platform_handle, &handle);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return result;
base::UnguessableToken token =
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(guid->high, guid->low);
bool read_only = flags & MOJO_PLATFORM_SHARED_BUFFER_HANDLE_FLAG_READ_ONLY;
scoped_refptr<PlatformSharedBuffer> platform_buffer =
PlatformSharedBuffer::CreateFromPlatformHandle(size, read_only, token,
std::move(handle));
if (!platform_buffer)
return MOJO_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
scoped_refptr<SharedBufferDispatcher> dispatcher;
result = SharedBufferDispatcher::CreateFromPlatformSharedBuffer(
platform_buffer, &dispatcher);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return result;
MojoHandle h = AddDispatcher(dispatcher);
if (h == MOJO_HANDLE_INVALID) {
dispatcher->Close();
return MOJO_RESULT_RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED;
}
*mojo_handle = h;
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 1,865 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: foreach_nfs_shareopt(const char *shareopts,
nfs_shareopt_callback_t callback, void *cookie)
{
char *shareopts_dup, *opt, *cur, *value;
int was_nul, rc;
if (shareopts == NULL)
return (SA_OK);
shareopts_dup = strdup(shareopts);
if (shareopts_dup == NULL)
return (SA_NO_MEMORY);
opt = shareopts_dup;
was_nul = 0;
while (1) {
cur = opt;
while (*cur != ',' && *cur != '\0')
cur++;
if (*cur == '\0')
was_nul = 1;
*cur = '\0';
if (cur > opt) {
value = strchr(opt, '=');
if (value != NULL) {
*value = '\0';
value++;
}
rc = callback(opt, value, cookie);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(shareopts_dup);
return (rc);
}
}
opt = cur + 1;
if (was_nul)
break;
}
free(shareopts_dup);
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: sharenfs 0.6.4, when built with commits bcdd594 and 7d08880 from the zfs repository, provides world readable access to the shared zfs file system, which might allow remote authenticated users to obtain sensitive information by reading shared files.
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare. | Low | 17,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void SoftMPEG2::setDecodeArgs(
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader,
size_t timeStampIx) {
size_t sizeY = outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight();
size_t sizeUV;
uint8_t *pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_ip->e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_DECODE;
/* When in flush and after EOS with zero byte input,
* inHeader is set to zero. Hence check for non-null */
if (inHeader) {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = timeStampIx;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = inHeader->pBuffer
+ inHeader->nOffset;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = 0;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = NULL;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = 0;
}
if (outHeader) {
pBuf = outHeader->pBuffer;
} else {
pBuf = mFlushOutBuffer;
}
sizeUV = sizeY / 4;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[0] = sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[1] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[2] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0] = pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1] = pBuf + sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2] = pBuf + sizeY + sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs = 3;
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27833616.
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
| High | 19,268 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::NetworkThrottleManagerImpl()
: lifetime_median_estimate_(PercentileEstimator::kMedianPercentile,
kInitialMedianInMs),
outstanding_recomputation_timer_(
base::MakeUnique<base::Timer>(false /* retain_user_task */,
false /* is_repeating */)),
tick_clock_(new base::DefaultTickClock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in ChromeVox in Google Chrome OS prior to 62.0.3202.74 allowed a remote attacker in a privileged network position to observe or tamper with certain cleartext HTTP requests by leveraging that position.
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123} | Medium | 28,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mNumSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new uint32_t[mNumSyncSamples];
size_t size = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (mDataSource->readAt(mSyncSampleOffset + 8, mSyncSamples, size)
!= (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumSyncSamples; ++i) {
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I does not properly consider integer promotion, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (integer overflow and memory corruption) via crafted atoms in MP4 data, aka internal bug 20139950, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-1538. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-7915, CVE-2014-7916, and/or CVE-2014-7917.
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
| High | 25,601 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: std::string SanitizeFrontendPath(const std::string& path) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < path.length(); i++) {
if (path[i] != '/' && path[i] != '-' && path[i] != '_'
&& path[i] != '.' && path[i] != '@'
&& !(path[i] >= '0' && path[i] <= '9')
&& !(path[i] >= 'a' && path[i] <= 'z')
&& !(path[i] >= 'A' && path[i] <= 'Z')) {
return std::string();
}
}
return path;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Windows insufficiently sanitized DevTools URLs, which allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read filesystem contents via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926} | Medium | 25,249 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_word_rgb_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading raw-word-format PPM files with any maxval */
{
ppm_source_ptr source = (ppm_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPROW ptr;
register U_CHAR *bufferptr;
register JSAMPLE *rescale = source->rescale;
JDIMENSION col;
unsigned int maxval = source->maxval;
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->buffer_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
ptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
bufferptr = source->iobuffer;
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
register unsigned int temp;
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: get_8bit_row in rdbmp.c in libjpeg-turbo through 1.5.90 and MozJPEG through 3.3.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted 8-bit BMP in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the number of palette entries.
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258 | Medium | 16,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AppCacheHost::SelectCacheForWorker(int parent_process_id,
int parent_host_id) {
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending() && !was_select_cache_called_);
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
parent_process_id_ = parent_process_id;
parent_host_id_ = parent_host_id;
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers with renderer access to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect AppCacheUpdateJob behavior associated with duplicate cache selection.
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815} | High | 11,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnUpdatePrintSettings(
int document_cookie,
const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* params) {
std::string dummy_string;
int margins_type = 0;
if (!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, &dummy_string) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr, &dummy_string) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingMarginsType, &margins_type)) {
return;
}
if (printer_.get()) {
const ListValue* page_range_array;
printing::PageRanges new_ranges;
if (job_settings.GetList(printing::kSettingPageRange, &page_range_array)) {
for (size_t index = 0; index < page_range_array->GetSize(); ++index) {
const base::DictionaryValue* dict;
if (!page_range_array->GetDictionary(index, &dict))
continue;
printing::PageRange range;
if (!dict->GetInteger(printing::kSettingPageRangeFrom, &range.from) ||
!dict->GetInteger(printing::kSettingPageRangeTo, &range.to)) {
continue;
}
range.from--;
range.to--;
new_ranges.push_back(range);
}
}
std::vector<int> pages(printing::PageRange::GetPages(new_ranges));
printer_->UpdateSettings(document_cookie, params, pages, margins_type);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 18,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL;
guint32 mode;
GFileType type;
guint64 size;
filename = g_strdup (data);
if (filename == NULL ||
*filename == '\0') {
g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL);
dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path);
if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) &&
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) {
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message);
return;
}
goto icon_saved;
}
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE,
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory Traversal with ../ sequences occurs in AccountsService before 0.6.50 because of an insufficient path check in user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb() in user.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 22,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Log(const SkBitmap& p, std::string* l) {
l->append("<SkBitmap>");
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Incorrect IPC serialization in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562} | Medium | 15,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::startAnimations()
{
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> > timeContainers;
timeContainers.appendRange(m_timeContainers.begin(), m_timeContainers.end());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator itr = timeContainers.begin(); itr != end; ++itr)
(*itr)->timeContainer()->begin();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper caching associated with animation.
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 24,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers(struct VmxnetTxPkt *pkt)
{
struct iovec *l2_hdr, *l3_hdr;
size_t bytes_read;
size_t full_ip6hdr_len;
uint16_t l3_proto;
assert(pkt);
l2_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG];
l3_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG];
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, 0, l2_hdr->iov_base,
ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN);
if (bytes_read < ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN) {
l2_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l2_hdr->iov_len = eth_get_l2_hdr_length(l2_hdr->iov_base);
}
l3_proto = eth_get_l3_proto(l2_hdr->iov_base, l2_hdr->iov_len);
l3_hdr->iov_len = IP_HDR_GET_LEN(l3_hdr->iov_base);
pkt->l4proto = ((struct ip_header *) l3_hdr->iov_base)->ip_p;
/* copy optional IPv4 header data */
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags,
l2_hdr->iov_len + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_base + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header));
if (bytes_read < l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
break;
case ETH_P_IPV6:
if (!eth_parse_ipv6_hdr(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
&pkt->l4proto, &full_ip6hdr_len)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_hdr->iov_base = g_malloc(full_ip6hdr_len);
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
l3_hdr->iov_base, full_ip6hdr_len);
if (bytes_read < full_ip6hdr_len) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l3_hdr->iov_len = full_ip6hdr_len;
}
break;
default:
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
break;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) built with a VMWARE VMXNET3 paravirtual NIC emulator support is vulnerable to crash issue. It occurs when a guest sends a Layer-2 packet smaller than 22 bytes. A privileged (CAP_SYS_RAWIO) guest user could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process instance resulting in DoS.
Commit Message: | Low | 2,562 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: std::string MakeMediaAccessRequest(int index) {
const int render_process_id = 1;
const int render_frame_id = 1;
const int page_request_id = 1;
const url::Origin security_origin;
MediaStreamManager::MediaAccessRequestCallback callback =
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManagerTest::ResponseCallback,
base::Unretained(this), index);
StreamControls controls(true, true);
return media_stream_manager_->MakeMediaAccessRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id, controls,
security_origin, std::move(callback));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength(size_t index, int64 result) {
if (error_)
return;
if (result == net::ERR_UPLOAD_FILE_CHANGED) {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
return;
} else if (result < 0) {
NotifyFailure(result);
return;
}
DCHECK_LT(index, blob_data_->items().size());
const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(index);
DCHECK(IsFileType(item.type()));
int64 item_length = static_cast<int64>(item.length());
if (item_length == -1)
item_length = result - item.offset();
DCHECK_LT(index, item_length_list_.size());
item_length_list_[index] = item_length;
total_size_ += item_length;
if (--pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0)
DidCountSize(net::OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a blob.
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 21,276 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return (value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
value.string_list_value.size() == 1 &&
chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(
value.string_list_value[0]));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 23,855 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AutoFillMetrics::Log(QualityMetric metric) const {
DCHECK(metric < NUM_QUALITY_METRICS);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("AutoFill.Quality", metric,
NUM_QUALITY_METRICS);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the frame-loader implementation in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 9,493 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished() {
if (!should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_)
return;
CheckForCompletedRasterTasks();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 14,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int cdxl_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame * const p = data;
int ret, w, h, encoding, aligned_width, buf_size = pkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf = pkt->data;
if (buf_size < 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
encoding = buf[1] & 7;
c->format = buf[1] & 0xE0;
w = AV_RB16(&buf[14]);
h = AV_RB16(&buf[16]);
c->bpp = buf[19];
c->palette_size = AV_RB16(&buf[20]);
c->palette = buf + 32;
c->video = c->palette + c->palette_size;
c->video_size = buf_size - c->palette_size - 32;
if (c->palette_size > 512)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (buf_size < c->palette_size + 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->bpp < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->format != BIT_PLANAR && c->format != BIT_LINE && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Pixel format 0x%0x", c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, w, h)) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->format == CHUNKY)
aligned_width = avctx->width;
else
aligned_width = FFALIGN(c->avctx->width, 16);
c->padded_bits = aligned_width - c->avctx->width;
if (c->video_size < aligned_width * avctx->height * (int64_t)c->bpp / 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!encoding && c->palette_size && c->bpp <= 8) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
} else if (encoding == 1 && (c->bpp == 6 || c->bpp == 8)) {
if (c->palette_size != (1 << (c->bpp - 1)))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (!encoding && c->bpp == 24 && c->format == CHUNKY &&
!c->palette_size) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Encoding %d, bpp %d and format 0x%x",
encoding, c->bpp, c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (encoding) {
av_fast_padded_malloc(&c->new_video, &c->new_video_size,
h * w + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!c->new_video)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (c->bpp == 8)
cdxl_decode_ham8(c, p);
else
cdxl_decode_ham6(c, p);
} else if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
cdxl_decode_rgb(c, p);
} else {
cdxl_decode_raw(c, p);
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdxl_decode_frame function in libavcodec/cdxl.c in FFmpeg 2.8.x before 2.8.12, 3.0.x before 3.0.8, 3.1.x before 3.1.8, 3.2.x before 3.2.5, and 3.3.x before 3.3.1 does not exclude the CHUNKY format, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/cdxl: Check format parameter
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1378/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5715088008806400
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 22,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool NavigationController::RendererDidNavigate(
const ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params& params,
int extra_invalidate_flags,
LoadCommittedDetails* details) {
if (GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
details->previous_url = GetLastCommittedEntry()->url();
details->previous_entry_index = last_committed_entry_index();
} else {
details->previous_url = GURL();
details->previous_entry_index = -1;
}
if (pending_entry_index_ >= 0 && !pending_entry_->site_instance()) {
DCHECK(pending_entry_->restore_type() != NavigationEntry::RESTORE_NONE);
pending_entry_->set_site_instance(tab_contents_->GetSiteInstance());
pending_entry_->set_restore_type(NavigationEntry::RESTORE_NONE);
}
details->is_in_page = IsURLInPageNavigation(params.url);
details->type = ClassifyNavigation(params);
switch (details->type) {
case NavigationType::NEW_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(params, &(details->did_replace_entry));
break;
case NavigationType::EXISTING_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(params);
break;
case NavigationType::SAME_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(params);
break;
case NavigationType::IN_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateInPage(params, &(details->did_replace_entry));
break;
case NavigationType::NEW_SUBFRAME:
RendererDidNavigateNewSubframe(params);
break;
case NavigationType::AUTO_SUBFRAME:
if (!RendererDidNavigateAutoSubframe(params))
return false;
break;
case NavigationType::NAV_IGNORE:
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
DCHECK(!params.content_state.empty());
NavigationEntry* active_entry = GetActiveEntry();
active_entry->set_content_state(params.content_state);
DCHECK(active_entry->site_instance() == tab_contents_->GetSiteInstance());
details->is_auto = (PageTransition::IsRedirect(params.transition) &&
!pending_entry()) ||
params.gesture == NavigationGestureAuto;
details->entry = active_entry;
details->is_main_frame = PageTransition::IsMainFrame(params.transition);
details->serialized_security_info = params.security_info;
details->http_status_code = params.http_status_code;
NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(details, extra_invalidate_flags);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The drag-and-drop implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 on Linux does not properly enforce permissions for files, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 3,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ip6_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
register int advance;
u_int len;
const u_char *ipend;
register const u_char *cp;
register u_int payload_len;
int nh;
int fragmented = 0;
u_int flow;
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ip6);
if (length < sizeof (struct ip6_hdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-ip6 %u", length));
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP6 "));
if (IP6_VERSION(ip6) != 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"version error: %u != 6", IP6_VERSION(ip6)));
return;
}
payload_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip6->ip6_plen);
len = payload_len + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
if (length < len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-ip6 - %u bytes missing!",
len - length));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
flow = EXTRACT_32BITS(&ip6->ip6_flow);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "("));
#if 0
/* rfc1883 */
if (flow & 0x0f000000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "pri 0x%02x, ", (flow & 0x0f000000) >> 24));
if (flow & 0x00ffffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "flowlabel 0x%06x, ", flow & 0x00ffffff));
#else
/* RFC 2460 */
if (flow & 0x0ff00000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "class 0x%02x, ", (flow & 0x0ff00000) >> 20));
if (flow & 0x000fffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "flowlabel 0x%05x, ", flow & 0x000fffff));
#endif
ND_PRINT((ndo, "hlim %u, next-header %s (%u) payload length: %u) ",
ip6->ip6_hlim,
tok2str(ipproto_values,"unknown",ip6->ip6_nxt),
ip6->ip6_nxt,
payload_len));
}
/*
* Cut off the snapshot length to the end of the IP payload.
*/
ipend = bp + len;
if (ipend < ndo->ndo_snapend)
ndo->ndo_snapend = ipend;
cp = (const u_char *)ip6;
advance = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
nh = ip6->ip6_nxt;
while (cp < ndo->ndo_snapend && advance > 0) {
cp += advance;
len -= advance;
if (cp == (const u_char *)(ip6 + 1) &&
nh != IPPROTO_TCP && nh != IPPROTO_UDP &&
nh != IPPROTO_DCCP && nh != IPPROTO_SCTP) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ", ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst)));
}
switch (nh) {
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
advance = hbhopt_print(ndo, cp);
if (advance < 0)
return;
nh = *cp;
break;
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
advance = dstopt_print(ndo, cp);
if (advance < 0)
return;
nh = *cp;
break;
case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT:
advance = frag6_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6);
if (advance < 0 || ndo->ndo_snapend <= cp + advance)
return;
nh = *cp;
fragmented = 1;
break;
case IPPROTO_MOBILITY_OLD:
case IPPROTO_MOBILITY:
/*
* XXX - we don't use "advance"; RFC 3775 says that
* the next header field in a mobility header
* should be IPPROTO_NONE, but speaks of
* the possiblity of a future extension in
* which payload can be piggybacked atop a
* mobility header.
*/
advance = mobility_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6);
nh = *cp;
return;
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
advance = rt6_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6);
nh = *cp;
break;
case IPPROTO_SCTP:
sctp_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_DCCP:
dccp_print(ndo, cp, (const u_char *)ip6, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_TCP:
tcp_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6, fragmented);
return;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
udp_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6, fragmented);
return;
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
icmp6_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6, fragmented);
return;
case IPPROTO_AH:
advance = ah_print(ndo, cp);
nh = *cp;
break;
case IPPROTO_ESP:
{
int enh, padlen;
advance = esp_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6, &enh, &padlen);
nh = enh & 0xff;
len -= padlen;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_IPCOMP:
{
ipcomp_print(ndo, cp);
/*
* Either this has decompressed the payload and
* printed it, in which case there's nothing more
* to do, or it hasn't, in which case there's
* nothing more to do.
*/
advance = -1;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_PIM:
pim_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6);
return;
case IPPROTO_OSPF:
ospf6_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_PGM:
pgm_print(ndo, cp, len, (const u_char *)ip6);
return;
case IPPROTO_GRE:
gre_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_RSVP:
rsvp_print(ndo, cp, len);
return;
case IPPROTO_NONE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no next header"));
return;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ip-proto-%d %d", nh, len));
return;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ip6]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip6.c:ip6_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12985/IPv6: Check for print routines returning -1 when running past the end.
rt6_print(), ah_print(), and esp_print() return -1 if they run up
against the end of the packet while dissecting; if that happens, stop
dissecting, don't try to fetch the next header value, because 1) *it*
might be past the end of the packet and 2) we won't be using it in any
case, as we'll be exiting the loop.
Also, change mobility_print() to return -1 if it runs up against the
end of the packet, and stop dissecting if it does so.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 5,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep)) {
return (-1);
}
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (const struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (const struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((const u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The White Board protocol parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-wb.c:wb_prep(), several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13014/White Board: Do more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, print a truncation error if the packets are
truncated, rather than just, in effect, ignoring the result of the
routines that print particular packet types. | High | 7,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BufferQueueConsumer::dump(String8& result, const char* prefix) const {
const IPCThreadState* ipc = IPCThreadState::self();
const pid_t pid = ipc->getCallingPid();
const uid_t uid = ipc->getCallingUid();
if ((uid != AID_SHELL)
&& !PermissionCache::checkPermission(String16(
"android.permission.DUMP"), pid, uid)) {
result.appendFormat("Permission Denial: can't dump BufferQueueConsumer "
"from pid=%d, uid=%d\n", pid, uid);
} else {
mCore->dump(result, prefix);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libs/gui/BufferQueueConsumer.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for the android.permission.DUMP permission, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information, and consequently bypass an unspecified protection mechanism, via a dump request, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27046057.
Commit Message: Add SN logging
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Iede7c92e59e60795df1ec7768ebafd6b090f1c27
| High | 27,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
struct iowarrior *dev = NULL;
struct usb_host_interface *iface_desc;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
int i;
int retval = -ENOMEM;
/* allocate memory for our device state and initialize it */
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iowarrior), GFP_KERNEL);
if (dev == NULL) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Out of memory\n");
return retval;
}
mutex_init(&dev->mutex);
atomic_set(&dev->intr_idx, 0);
atomic_set(&dev->read_idx, 0);
spin_lock_init(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
atomic_set(&dev->overflow_flag, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->read_wait);
atomic_set(&dev->write_busy, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->write_wait);
dev->udev = udev;
dev->interface = interface;
iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting;
dev->product_id = le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct);
/* set up the endpoint information */
for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
if (usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
dev->int_in_endpoint = endpoint;
if (usb_endpoint_is_int_out(endpoint))
/* this one will match for the IOWarrior56 only */
dev->int_out_endpoint = endpoint;
}
/* we have to check the report_size often, so remember it in the endianness suitable for our machine */
dev->report_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(dev->int_in_endpoint);
if ((dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) &&
(dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56))
/* IOWarrior56 has wMaxPacketSize different from report size */
dev->report_size = 7;
/* create the urb and buffer for reading */
dev->int_in_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->int_in_urb) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate interrupt_in_urb\n");
goto error;
}
dev->int_in_buffer = kmalloc(dev->report_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->int_in_buffer) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate int_in_buffer\n");
goto error;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(dev->int_in_urb, dev->udev,
usb_rcvintpipe(dev->udev,
dev->int_in_endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
dev->int_in_buffer, dev->report_size,
iowarrior_callback, dev,
dev->int_in_endpoint->bInterval);
/* create an internal buffer for interrupt data from the device */
dev->read_queue =
kmalloc(((dev->report_size + 1) * MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->read_queue) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate read_queue\n");
goto error;
}
/* Get the serial-number of the chip */
memset(dev->chip_serial, 0x00, sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
usb_string(udev, udev->descriptor.iSerialNumber, dev->chip_serial,
sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
if (strlen(dev->chip_serial) != 8)
memset(dev->chip_serial, 0x00, sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
/* Set the idle timeout to 0, if this is interface 0 */
if (dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) {
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0A,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE, 0,
0, NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
}
/* allow device read and ioctl */
dev->present = 1;
/* we can register the device now, as it is ready */
usb_set_intfdata(interface, dev);
retval = usb_register_dev(interface, &iowarrior_class);
if (retval) {
/* something prevented us from registering this driver */
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Not able to get a minor for this device.\n");
usb_set_intfdata(interface, NULL);
goto error;
}
dev->minor = interface->minor;
/* let the user know what node this device is now attached to */
dev_info(&interface->dev, "IOWarrior product=0x%x, serial=%s interface=%d "
"now attached to iowarrior%d\n", dev->product_id, dev->chip_serial,
iface_desc->desc.bInterfaceNumber, dev->minor - IOWARRIOR_MINOR_BASE);
return retval;
error:
iowarrior_delete(dev);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The iowarrior_probe function in drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.
Commit Message: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 8,153 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport Image *CloneImage(const Image *image,const size_t columns,
const size_t rows,const MagickBooleanType detach,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*clone_image;
double
scale;
size_t
length;
/*
Clone the image.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"NegativeOrZeroImageSize","`%s'",image->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
clone_image=(Image *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*clone_image));
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(clone_image,0,sizeof(*clone_image));
clone_image->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_image->storage_class=image->storage_class;
clone_image->number_channels=image->number_channels;
clone_image->number_meta_channels=image->number_meta_channels;
clone_image->metacontent_extent=image->metacontent_extent;
clone_image->colorspace=image->colorspace;
clone_image->read_mask=image->read_mask;
clone_image->write_mask=image->write_mask;
clone_image->alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
clone_image->columns=image->columns;
clone_image->rows=image->rows;
clone_image->dither=image->dither;
if (image->colormap != (PixelInfo *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate and copy the image colormap.
*/
clone_image->colors=image->colors;
length=(size_t) image->colors;
clone_image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
if (clone_image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL)
ThrowImageException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickMemory(clone_image->colormap,image->colormap,length*
sizeof(*clone_image->colormap));
}
clone_image->image_info=CloneImageInfo(image->image_info);
(void) CloneImageProfiles(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageProperties(clone_image,image);
(void) CloneImageArtifacts(clone_image,image);
GetTimerInfo(&clone_image->timer);
if (image->ascii85 != (void *) NULL)
Ascii85Initialize(clone_image);
clone_image->magick_columns=image->magick_columns;
clone_image->magick_rows=image->magick_rows;
clone_image->type=image->type;
clone_image->channel_mask=image->channel_mask;
clone_image->channel_map=ClonePixelChannelMap(image->channel_map);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->magick,image->magick,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_image->filename,image->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
clone_image->progress_monitor=image->progress_monitor;
clone_image->client_data=image->client_data;
clone_image->reference_count=1;
clone_image->next=image->next;
clone_image->previous=image->previous;
clone_image->list=NewImageList();
if (detach == MagickFalse)
clone_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
else
{
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->blob=CloneBlobInfo((BlobInfo *) NULL);
}
clone_image->ping=image->ping;
clone_image->debug=IsEventLogging();
clone_image->semaphore=AcquireSemaphoreInfo();
if ((columns == 0) || (rows == 0))
{
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->montage,image->montage);
if (image->directory != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&clone_image->directory,image->directory);
clone_image->cache=ReferencePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
scale=1.0;
if (image->columns != 0)
scale=(double) columns/(double) image->columns;
clone_image->page.width=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.width+0.5);
clone_image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.x-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.x=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.x-0.5);
scale=1.0;
if (image->rows != 0)
scale=(double) rows/(double) image->rows;
clone_image->page.height=(size_t) floor(scale*image->page.height+0.5);
clone_image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->page.y-0.5);
clone_image->tile_offset.y=(ssize_t) ceil(scale*image->tile_offset.y-0.5);
clone_image->columns=columns;
clone_image->rows=rows;
clone_image->cache=ClonePixelCache(image->cache);
return(clone_image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WPG parser in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-4 and 7.x before 7.0.1-5, when a memory limit is set, allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to the SetImageExtent return-value check, which trigger (1) a heap-based buffer overflow in the SetPixelIndex function or an invalid write operation in the (2) ScaleCharToQuantum or (3) SetPixelIndex functions.
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded | Medium | 88 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool NuMediaExtractor::getTotalBitrate(int64_t *bitrate) const {
if (mTotalBitrate >= 0) {
*bitrate = mTotalBitrate;
return true;
}
off64_t size;
if (mDurationUs >= 0 && mDataSource->getSize(&size) == OK) {
*bitrate = size * 8000000ll / mDurationUs; // in bits/sec
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: A denial of service vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as Moderate because it requires an uncommon device configuration. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-35763994.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
| Medium | 19,339 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask;
fz_rect mask_bbox;
fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm;
fz_matrix mask_matrix;
fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace;
save->softmask = softmask;
if (softmask == NULL)
return gstate;
save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources;
save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
save_ctm = gstate->ctm;
pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox);
pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix);
pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
if (gstate->luminosity)
mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect;
else
{
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix);
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm);
}
gstate->softmask = NULL;
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask);
if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace)
mask_colorspace = fz_device_gray(ctx);
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1);
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from
* here the clip stack would be messed up. */
/* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */
}
fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev);
pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->ctm = save_ctm;
return gstate;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 6,956 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: htmlInitParserCtxt(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
htmlSAXHandler *sax;
if (ctxt == NULL) return(-1);
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(htmlParserCtxt));
ctxt->dict = xmlDictCreate();
if (ctxt->dict == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
sax = (htmlSAXHandler *) xmlMalloc(sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
if (sax == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
else
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
/* Allocate the Input stack */
ctxt->inputTab = (htmlParserInputPtr *)
xmlMalloc(5 * sizeof(htmlParserInputPtr));
if (ctxt->inputTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 5;
ctxt->input = NULL;
ctxt->version = NULL;
ctxt->encoding = NULL;
ctxt->standalone = -1;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START;
/* Allocate the Node stack */
ctxt->nodeTab = (htmlNodePtr *) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(htmlNodePtr));
if (ctxt->nodeTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 10;
ctxt->node = NULL;
/* Allocate the Name stack */
ctxt->nameTab = (const xmlChar **) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->nameTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 0;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 10;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoTab = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeInfoMax = 0;
if (sax == NULL) ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &htmlDefaultSAXHandler;
else {
ctxt->sax = sax;
memcpy(sax, &htmlDefaultSAXHandler, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
}
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
ctxt->wellFormed = 1;
ctxt->replaceEntities = 0;
ctxt->linenumbers = xmlLineNumbersDefaultValue;
ctxt->html = 1;
ctxt->vctxt.finishDtd = XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_0;
ctxt->vctxt.userData = ctxt;
ctxt->vctxt.error = xmlParserValidityError;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = xmlParserValidityWarning;
ctxt->record_info = 0;
ctxt->validate = 0;
ctxt->nbChars = 0;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->catalogs = NULL;
xmlInitNodeInfoSeq(&ctxt->node_seq);
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An integer overflow in xmlmemory.c in libxml2 before 2.9.5, as used in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.62 and other products, allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted XML file.
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755} | Medium | 7,999 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0, key_size = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, hex_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL;
xmlChar *bin = NULL, *hex = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
key_size = xmlUTF8Strsize (key, key_len);
if ((key_size > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_size < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_size);
/* encrypt it */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlStrdup (str);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_ENCRYPT (ctxt, padkey, str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* encode it */
hex_len = str_len * 2 + 1;
hex = xmlMallocAtomic (hex_len);
if (hex == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
exsltCryptoBin2Hex (bin, str_len, hex, hex_len);
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, hex);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 14,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
MATLAB_KO: ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = DecompressBlock(image,MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the CalcMinMax function in coders/mat.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted mat file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/131 | Medium | 8,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ShellWindowFrameView::ShellWindowFrameView()
: frame_(NULL),
close_button_(NULL) {
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via vectors involving frames, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 3,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper::PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper(
ppapi::host::ResourceHost* resource_host,
Delegate* delegate,
PP_DeviceType_Dev device_type,
const GURL& document_url)
: resource_host_(resource_host),
delegate_(delegate),
device_type_(device_type),
document_url_(document_url) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897} | High | 5,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::DeviceStopAutoRetry() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.get())
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_->StopAutoRetry();
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.202 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the Google V8 bindings.
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 16,709 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask(int32_t unused) {
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
} else {
PP_NOTREACHED();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun function in content/renderer/pepper/ppb_flash_message_loop_impl.cc in the Pepper plugin in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 mishandles nested message loops, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529} | Medium | 3,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static ext3_fsblk_t get_sb_block(void **data, struct super_block *sb)
{
ext3_fsblk_t sb_block;
char *options = (char *) *data;
if (!options || strncmp(options, "sb=", 3) != 0)
return 1; /* Default location */
options += 3;
/*todo: use simple_strtoll with >32bit ext3 */
sb_block = simple_strtoul(options, &options, 0);
if (*options && *options != ',') {
ext3_msg(sb, "error: invalid sb specification: %s",
(char *) *data);
return 1;
}
if (*options == ',')
options++;
*data = (void *) options;
return sb_block;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: fs/ext3/super.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 uses incorrect arguments to functions in certain circumstances related to printk input, which allows local users to conduct format-string attacks and possibly gain privileges via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | Medium | 5,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: char *M_fs_path_tmpdir(M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
char *d = NULL;
char *out = NULL;
M_fs_error_t res;
#ifdef _WIN32
size_t len = M_fs_path_get_path_max(M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS)+1;
d = M_malloc_zero(len);
/* Return is length without NULL. */
if (GetTempPath((DWORD)len, d) >= len) {
M_free(d);
d = NULL;
}
#elif defined(__APPLE__)
d = M_fs_path_mac_tmpdir();
#else
const char *const_temp;
/* Try Unix env var. */
# ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
const_temp = secure_getenv("TMPDIR");
# else
const_temp = getenv("TMPDIR");
# endif
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
/* Fallback to some "standard" system paths. */
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/var/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
#endif
if (d != NULL) {
res = M_fs_path_norm(&out, d, M_FS_PATH_NORM_ABSOLUTE, sys_type);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
out = NULL;
}
}
M_free(d);
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: mstdlib (aka the M Standard Library for C) 1.2.0 has incorrect file access control in situations where M_fs_perms_can_access attempts to delete an existing file (that lacks public read/write access) during a copy operation, related to fs/m_fs.c and fs/m_fs_path.c. An attacker could create the file and then would have access to the data.
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data. | High | 28,592 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xps_parse_path(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm, char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict, fz_xml *root)
{
fz_xml *node;
char *fill_uri;
char *stroke_uri;
char *opacity_mask_uri;
char *transform_att;
char *clip_att;
char *data_att;
char *fill_att;
char *stroke_att;
char *opacity_att;
char *opacity_mask_att;
fz_xml *transform_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *clip_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *data_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *fill_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *stroke_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
char *fill_opacity_att = NULL;
char *stroke_opacity_att = NULL;
char *stroke_dash_array_att;
char *stroke_dash_cap_att;
char *stroke_dash_offset_att;
char *stroke_end_line_cap_att;
char *stroke_start_line_cap_att;
char *stroke_line_join_att;
char *stroke_miter_limit_att;
char *stroke_thickness_att;
char *navigate_uri_att;
fz_stroke_state *stroke = NULL;
fz_matrix transform;
float samples[32];
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
fz_path *path = NULL;
fz_path *stroke_path = NULL;
fz_rect area;
int fill_rule;
int dash_len = 0;
fz_matrix local_ctm;
/*
* Extract attributes and extended attributes.
*/
transform_att = fz_xml_att(root, "RenderTransform");
clip_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Clip");
data_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Data");
fill_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Fill");
stroke_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Stroke");
opacity_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Opacity");
opacity_mask_att = fz_xml_att(root, "OpacityMask");
stroke_dash_array_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeDashArray");
stroke_dash_cap_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeDashCap");
stroke_dash_offset_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeDashOffset");
stroke_end_line_cap_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeEndLineCap");
stroke_start_line_cap_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeStartLineCap");
stroke_line_join_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeLineJoin");
stroke_miter_limit_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeMiterLimit");
stroke_thickness_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StrokeThickness");
navigate_uri_att = fz_xml_att(root, "FixedPage.NavigateUri");
for (node = fz_xml_down(root); node; node = fz_xml_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.RenderTransform"))
transform_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.OpacityMask"))
opacity_mask_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.Clip"))
clip_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.Fill"))
fill_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.Stroke"))
stroke_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Path.Data"))
data_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
}
fill_uri = base_uri;
stroke_uri = base_uri;
opacity_mask_uri = base_uri;
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &data_att, &data_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &clip_att, &clip_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &transform_att, &transform_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &fill_att, &fill_tag, &fill_uri);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &stroke_att, &stroke_tag, &stroke_uri);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &opacity_mask_att, &opacity_mask_tag, &opacity_mask_uri);
/*
* Act on the information we have gathered:
*/
if (!data_att && !data_tag)
return;
if (fill_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(fill_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
fill_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(fill_tag, "Opacity");
fill_att = fz_xml_att(fill_tag, "Color");
fill_tag = NULL;
}
if (stroke_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(stroke_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
stroke_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(stroke_tag, "Opacity");
stroke_att = fz_xml_att(stroke_tag, "Color");
stroke_tag = NULL;
}
if (stroke_att || stroke_tag)
{
if (stroke_dash_array_att)
{
char *s = stroke_dash_array_att;
while (*s)
{
while (*s == ' ')
s++;
if (*s) /* needed in case of a space before the last quote */
dash_len++;
while (*s && *s != ' ')
s++;
}
}
stroke = fz_new_stroke_state_with_dash_len(doc->ctx, dash_len);
stroke->start_cap = xps_parse_line_cap(stroke_start_line_cap_att);
stroke->dash_cap = xps_parse_line_cap(stroke_dash_cap_att);
stroke->end_cap = xps_parse_line_cap(stroke_end_line_cap_att);
stroke->linejoin = FZ_LINEJOIN_MITER_XPS;
if (stroke_line_join_att)
{
if (!strcmp(stroke_line_join_att, "Miter")) stroke->linejoin = FZ_LINEJOIN_MITER_XPS;
if (!strcmp(stroke_line_join_att, "Round")) stroke->linejoin = FZ_LINEJOIN_ROUND;
if (!strcmp(stroke_line_join_att, "Bevel")) stroke->linejoin = FZ_LINEJOIN_BEVEL;
}
stroke->miterlimit = 10;
if (stroke_miter_limit_att)
stroke->miterlimit = fz_atof(stroke_miter_limit_att);
stroke->linewidth = 1;
if (stroke_thickness_att)
stroke->linewidth = fz_atof(stroke_thickness_att);
stroke->dash_phase = 0;
stroke->dash_len = 0;
if (stroke_dash_array_att)
{
char *s = stroke_dash_array_att;
if (stroke_dash_offset_att)
stroke->dash_phase = fz_atof(stroke_dash_offset_att) * stroke->linewidth;
while (*s)
{
while (*s == ' ')
s++;
if (*s) /* needed in case of a space before the last quote */
stroke->dash_list[stroke->dash_len++] = fz_atof(s) * stroke->linewidth;
while (*s && *s != ' ')
s++;
}
stroke->dash_len = dash_len;
}
}
transform = fz_identity;
if (transform_att)
xps_parse_render_transform(doc, transform_att, &transform);
if (transform_tag)
xps_parse_matrix_transform(doc, transform_tag, &transform);
fz_concat(&local_ctm, &transform, ctm);
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
xps_clip(doc, &local_ctm, dict, clip_att, clip_tag);
fill_rule = 0;
if (data_att)
path = xps_parse_abbreviated_geometry(doc, data_att, &fill_rule);
else if (data_tag)
{
path = xps_parse_path_geometry(doc, dict, data_tag, 0, &fill_rule);
if (stroke_att || stroke_tag)
stroke_path = xps_parse_path_geometry(doc, dict, data_tag, 1, &fill_rule);
}
if (!stroke_path)
stroke_path = path;
if (stroke_att || stroke_tag)
{
fz_bound_path(doc->ctx, stroke_path, stroke, &local_ctm, &area);
if (stroke_path != path && (fill_att || fill_tag)) {
fz_rect bounds;
fz_bound_path(doc->ctx, path, NULL, &local_ctm, &bounds);
fz_union_rect(&area, &bounds);
}
}
else
fz_bound_path(doc->ctx, path, NULL, &local_ctm, &area);
if (navigate_uri_att)
xps_add_link(doc, &area, base_uri, navigate_uri_att);
xps_begin_opacity(doc, &local_ctm, &area, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
if (fill_att)
{
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, fill_att, &colorspace, samples);
if (fill_opacity_att)
samples[0] *= fz_atof(fill_opacity_att);
xps_set_color(doc, colorspace, samples);
fz_fill_path(doc->dev, path, fill_rule == 0, &local_ctm,
doc->colorspace, doc->color, doc->alpha);
}
if (fill_tag)
{
fz_clip_path(doc->dev, path, &area, fill_rule == 0, &local_ctm);
xps_parse_brush(doc, &local_ctm, &area, fill_uri, dict, fill_tag);
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
}
if (stroke_att)
{
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, stroke_att, &colorspace, samples);
if (stroke_opacity_att)
samples[0] *= fz_atof(stroke_opacity_att);
xps_set_color(doc, colorspace, samples);
fz_stroke_path(doc->dev, stroke_path, stroke, &local_ctm,
doc->colorspace, doc->color, doc->alpha);
}
if (stroke_tag)
{
fz_clip_stroke_path(doc->dev, stroke_path, &area, stroke, &local_ctm);
xps_parse_brush(doc, &local_ctm, &area, stroke_uri, dict, stroke_tag);
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
}
xps_end_opacity(doc, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
if (stroke_path != path)
fz_free_path(doc->ctx, stroke_path);
fz_free_path(doc->ctx, path);
path = NULL;
fz_drop_stroke_state(doc->ctx, stroke);
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the xps_parse_color function in xps/xps-common.c in MuPDF 1.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large number of entries in the ContextColor value of the Fill attribute in a Path element.
Commit Message: | High | 25,153 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ext4_punch_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t first_block, stop_block;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
loff_t first_block_offset, last_block_offset;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
int ret = 0;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, length, 0);
/*
* Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions
* Then release them.
*/
if (mapping->nrpages && mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) {
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset,
offset + length - 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* No need to punch hole beyond i_size */
if (offset >= inode->i_size)
goto out_mutex;
/*
* If the hole extends beyond i_size, set the hole
* to end after the page that contains i_size
*/
if (offset + length > inode->i_size) {
length = inode->i_size +
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - (inode->i_size & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1)) -
offset;
}
if (offset & (sb->s_blocksize - 1) ||
(offset + length) & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) {
/*
* Attach jinode to inode for jbd2 if we do any zeroing of
* partial block
*/
ret = ext4_inode_attach_jinode(inode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_mutex;
}
first_block_offset = round_up(offset, sb->s_blocksize);
last_block_offset = round_down((offset + length), sb->s_blocksize) - 1;
/* Now release the pages and zero block aligned part of pages*/
if (last_block_offset > first_block_offset)
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, first_block_offset,
last_block_offset);
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
else
credits = ext4_blocks_for_truncate(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_std_error(sb, ret);
goto out_dio;
}
ret = ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle, inode, offset,
length);
if (ret)
goto out_stop;
first_block = (offset + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
stop_block = (offset + length) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* If there are no blocks to remove, return now */
if (first_block >= stop_block)
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, first_block,
stop_block - first_block);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, first_block,
stop_block - 1);
else
ret = ext4_ind_remove_space(handle, inode, first_block,
stop_block);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
/* Now release the pages again to reduce race window */
if (last_block_offset > first_block_offset)
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, first_block_offset,
last_block_offset);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 27,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int use_conf(char *test_path)
{
int ret;
size_t flags = 0;
char filename[1024], errstr[1024];
char *buffer;
FILE *infile, *conffile;
json_t *json;
json_error_t error;
sprintf(filename, "%s%cinput", test_path, dir_sep);
if (!(infile = fopen(filename, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open \"%s\"\n", filename);
return 2;
}
sprintf(filename, "%s%cenv", test_path, dir_sep);
conffile = fopen(filename, "rb");
if (conffile) {
read_conf(conffile);
fclose(conffile);
}
if (conf.indent < 0 || conf.indent > 255) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid value for JSON_INDENT: %d\n", conf.indent);
return 2;
}
if (conf.indent)
flags |= JSON_INDENT(conf.indent);
if (conf.compact)
flags |= JSON_COMPACT;
if (conf.ensure_ascii)
flags |= JSON_ENSURE_ASCII;
if (conf.preserve_order)
flags |= JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER;
if (conf.sort_keys)
flags |= JSON_SORT_KEYS;
if (conf.strip) {
/* Load to memory, strip leading and trailing whitespace */
buffer = loadfile(infile);
json = json_loads(strip(buffer), 0, &error);
free(buffer);
}
else
json = json_loadf(infile, 0, &error);
fclose(infile);
if (!json) {
sprintf(errstr, "%d %d %d\n%s\n",
error.line, error.column, error.position,
error.text);
ret = cmpfile(errstr, test_path, "error");
return ret;
}
buffer = json_dumps(json, flags);
ret = cmpfile(buffer, test_path, "output");
free(buffer);
json_decref(json);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Jansson, possibly 2.4 and earlier, does not restrict the ability to trigger hash collisions predictably, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted JSON document.
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing. | Medium | 28,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int GetAvailableDraftPageCount() {
int page_data_map_size = page_data_map_.size();
if (page_data_map_.find(printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX) !=
page_data_map_.end()) {
page_data_map_size--;
}
return page_data_map_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 10,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many)
{
int current;
cmap_splay *tree;
if (low > high)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name);
return;
}
tree = cmap->tree;
if (cmap->tlen)
{
unsigned int move = cmap->ttop;
unsigned int gt = EMPTY;
unsigned int lt = EMPTY;
if (check_for_overlap)
{
/* Check for collision with the current node */
do
{
current = move;
/* Cases we might meet:
* tree[i]: <----->
* case 0: <->
* case 1: <------->
* case 2: <------------->
* case 3: <->
* case 4: <------->
* case 5: <->
*/
if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high)
{
/* case 1, reduces to case 0 */
/* or case 2, deleting the node */
tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low;
tree[current].low = high + 1;
if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high)
{
move = delete_node(cmap, current);
current = EMPTY;
continue;
}
}
else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high)
{
/* case 4, reduces to case 5 */
tree[current].high = low - 1;
assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high);
}
else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high)
{
/* case 3, reduces to case 5 */
int new_high = tree[current].high;
tree[current].high = low-1;
add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, many);
}
/* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */
if (tree[current].low > high) {
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
}
while (move != EMPTY);
}
else
{
do
{
current = move;
if (tree[current].low > high)
{
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
} while (move != EMPTY);
}
/* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */
/* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */
/* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */
if (!many)
{
/* Check for the 'merge' cases. */
if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = high;
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high;
delete_node(cmap, gt);
}
goto exit;
}
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[gt].low = low;
tree[gt].out = out;
goto exit;
}
}
}
else
current = EMPTY;
if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap)
{
int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256;
tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree);
cmap->tcap = new_cap;
}
tree[cmap->tlen].low = low;
tree[cmap->tlen].high = high;
tree[cmap->tlen].out = out;
tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current;
tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].many = many;
cmap->tlen++;
if (current == EMPTY)
cmap->ttop = 0;
else if (tree[current].low > high)
tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1;
else
{
assert(tree[current].high < low);
tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1;
}
move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1);
cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1;
exit:
{}
#ifdef CHECK_SPLAY
check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0);
#endif
#ifdef DUMP_SPLAY
dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, "");
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 1,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
bool *outname_needs_removal, FILE *ofp)
{
static char const editor_program[] = EDITOR_PROGRAM;
file_offset beginning_of_this_line;
size_t chars_read;
FILE *tmpfp = 0;
char const *tmpname;
int tmpfd;
pid_t pid;
if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch)
{
/* Write ed script to a temporary file. This causes ed to abort on
invalid commands such as when line numbers or ranges exceed the
number of available lines. When ed reads from a pipe, it rejects
invalid commands and treats the next line as a new command, which
can lead to arbitrary command execution. */
tmpfd = make_tempfile (&tmpname, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
if (tmpfd == -1)
pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
tmpfp = fdopen (tmpfd, "w+b");
if (! tmpfp)
pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
}
for (;;) {
char ed_command_letter;
beginning_of_this_line = file_tell (pfp);
chars_read = get_line ();
if (! chars_read) {
next_intuit_at(beginning_of_this_line,p_input_line);
break;
}
ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (buf);
if (ed_command_letter) {
if (tmpfp)
if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
write_fatal ();
if (ed_command_letter != 'd' && ed_command_letter != 's') {
p_pass_comments_through = true;
while ((chars_read = get_line ()) != 0) {
if (tmpfp)
if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
write_fatal ();
if (chars_read == 2 && strEQ (buf, ".\n"))
break;
}
p_pass_comments_through = false;
}
}
else {
next_intuit_at(beginning_of_this_line,p_input_line);
break;
}
}
if (!tmpfp)
return;
if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, tmpfp) == 0
|| fflush (tmpfp) != 0)
write_fatal ();
if (lseek (tmpfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
*outname_needs_removal = true;
if (inerrno != ENOENT)
{
*outname_needs_removal = true;
copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
}
sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
outname);
fflush (stdout);
pid = fork();
fflush (stdout);
else if (pid == 0)
{
dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
_exit (2);
}
else
}
else
{
int wstatus;
if (waitpid (pid, &wstatus, 0) == -1
|| ! WIFEXITED (wstatus)
|| WEXITSTATUS (wstatus) != 0)
fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-78
Summary: GNU patch through 2.7.6 is vulnerable to OS shell command injection that can be exploited by opening a crafted patch file that contains an ed style diff payload with shell metacharacters. The ed editor does not need to be present on the vulnerable system. This is different from CVE-2018-1000156.
Commit Message: | High | 444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_read_line(zval * this_ptr, spl_filesystem_object *intern, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
while (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY) && ret == SUCCESS && spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(intern TSRMLS_CC)) {
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read_line_ex(this_ptr, intern, silent TSRMLS_CC);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | High | 9,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static char* getPreferredTag(const char* gf_tag)
{
char* result = NULL;
int grOffset = 0;
grOffset = findOffset( LOC_GRANDFATHERED ,gf_tag);
if(grOffset < 0) {
return NULL;
}
if( grOffset < LOC_PREFERRED_GRANDFATHERED_LEN ){
/* return preferred tag */
result = estrdup( LOC_PREFERRED_GRANDFATHERED[grOffset] );
} else {
/* Return correct grandfathered language tag */
result = estrdup( LOC_GRANDFATHERED[grOffset] );
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The get_icu_value_internal function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.36, 5.6.x before 5.6.22, and 7.x before 7.0.7 does not ensure the presence of a '0' character, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted locale_get_primary_language call.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read | High | 2,285 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: eigrp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
const struct eigrp_common_header *eigrp_com_header;
const struct eigrp_tlv_header *eigrp_tlv_header;
const u_char *tptr,*tlv_tptr;
u_int tlen,eigrp_tlv_len,eigrp_tlv_type,tlv_tlen, byte_length, bit_length;
uint8_t prefix[4];
union {
const struct eigrp_tlv_general_parm_t *eigrp_tlv_general_parm;
const struct eigrp_tlv_sw_version_t *eigrp_tlv_sw_version;
const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_int_t *eigrp_tlv_ip_int;
const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_ext_t *eigrp_tlv_ip_ext;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup_t *eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_int_t *eigrp_tlv_at_int;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_ext_t *eigrp_tlv_at_ext;
} tlv_ptr;
tptr=pptr;
eigrp_com_header = (const struct eigrp_common_header *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*eigrp_com_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (eigrp_com_header->version != EIGRP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "EIGRP version %u packet not supported",eigrp_com_header->version));
return;
}
/* in non-verbose mode just lets print the basic Message Type*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "EIGRP %s, length: %u",
tok2str(eigrp_opcode_values, "unknown (%u)",eigrp_com_header->opcode),
len));
return;
}
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
tlen=len-sizeof(struct eigrp_common_header);
/* FIXME print other header info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tEIGRP v%u, opcode: %s (%u), chksum: 0x%04x, Flags: [%s]\n\tseq: 0x%08x, ack: 0x%08x, AS: %u, length: %u",
eigrp_com_header->version,
tok2str(eigrp_opcode_values, "unknown, type: %u",eigrp_com_header->opcode),
eigrp_com_header->opcode,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_com_header->checksum),
tok2str(eigrp_common_header_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->flags)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->seq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->ack),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->asn),
tlen));
tptr+=sizeof(const struct eigrp_common_header);
while(tlen>0) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header));
eigrp_tlv_header = (const struct eigrp_tlv_header *)tptr;
eigrp_tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_tlv_header->length);
eigrp_tlv_type=EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_tlv_header->type);
if (eigrp_tlv_len < sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header) ||
eigrp_tlv_len > tlen) {
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header),"\n\t ",tlen);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (0x%04x), length: %u",
tok2str(eigrp_tlv_values,
"Unknown",
eigrp_tlv_type),
eigrp_tlv_type,
eigrp_tlv_len));
tlv_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header);
tlv_tlen=eigrp_tlv_len-sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header);
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, eigrp_tlv_len);
switch(eigrp_tlv_type) {
case EIGRP_TLV_GENERAL_PARM:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm = (const struct eigrp_tlv_general_parm_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t holdtime: %us, k1 %u, k2 %u, k3 %u, k4 %u, k5 %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->holdtime),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k1,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k2,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k3,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k4,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k5));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_SW_VERSION:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version = (const struct eigrp_tlv_sw_version_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IOS version: %u.%u, EIGRP version %u.%u",
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->ios_major,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->ios_minor,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->eigrp_major,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->eigrp_minor));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_IP_INT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int = (const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_int_t *)tlv_tptr;
bit_length = tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->plen;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t illegal prefix length %u",bit_length));
break;
}
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* variable length encoding */
memset(prefix, 0, 4);
memcpy(prefix,&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->destination,byte_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 prefix: %15s/%u, nexthop: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, &tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->nexthop)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_IP_EXT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext = (const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_ext_t *)tlv_tptr;
bit_length = tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->plen;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t illegal prefix length %u",bit_length));
break;
}
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* variable length encoding */
memset(prefix, 0, 4);
memcpy(prefix,&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->destination,byte_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 prefix: %15s/%u, nexthop: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, &tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->nexthop)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t origin-router %s, origin-as %u, origin-proto %s, flags [0x%02x], tag 0x%08x, metric %u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->origin_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->origin_as),
tok2str(eigrp_ext_proto_id_values,"unknown",tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->proto_id),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->flags,
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->tag),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->metric)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_CABLE_SETUP:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-range: %u-%u, Router-ID %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->cable_end),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->router_id)));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_INT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_int_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-Range: %u-%u, nexthop: ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->cable_end)));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop[2])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_EXT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_ext_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-Range: %u-%u, nexthop: ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->cable_end)));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop[2])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t origin-router %u, origin-as %u, origin-proto %s, flags [0x%02x], tag 0x%08x, metric %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->origin_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->origin_as),
tok2str(eigrp_ext_proto_id_values,"unknown",tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->proto_id),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->flags,
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->tag),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->metric)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->load));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case EIGRP_TLV_AUTH:
case EIGRP_TLV_SEQ:
case EIGRP_TLV_MCAST_SEQ:
case EIGRP_TLV_IPX_INT:
case EIGRP_TLV_IPX_EXT:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tlv_tptr,"\n\t ",tlv_tlen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header),"\n\t ",
eigrp_tlv_len-sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header));
tptr+=eigrp_tlv_len;
tlen-=eigrp_tlv_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The EIGRP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-eigrp.c:eigrp_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12901/EIGRP: Do more length checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 28,118 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void TextTrackCue::setStartTime(double value) {
if (start_time_ == value || value < 0)
return;
CueWillChange();
start_time_ = value;
CueDidChange(kCueMutationAffectsOrder);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fpdfsdk/src/jsapi/fxjs_v8.cpp in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, does not use signatures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012} | High | 2,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: content::WebUIDataSource* CreateOobeUIDataSource(
const base::DictionaryValue& localized_strings,
const std::string& display_type) {
content::WebUIDataSource* source =
content::WebUIDataSource::Create(chrome::kChromeUIOobeHost);
source->AddLocalizedStrings(localized_strings);
source->SetJsonPath(kStringsJSPath);
if (display_type == OobeUI::kOobeDisplay) {
source->SetDefaultResource(IDR_OOBE_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kOobeJSPath, IDR_OOBE_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsHTMLPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_OOBE_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsJSPath, IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_OOBE_JS);
} else {
source->SetDefaultResource(IDR_LOGIN_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kLoginJSPath, IDR_LOGIN_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsHTMLPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_LOGIN_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsJSPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_LOGIN_JS);
}
source->AddResourcePath(kPolymerConfigJSPath, IDR_POLYMER_CONFIG_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kKeyboardUtilsJSPath, IDR_KEYBOARD_UTILS_JS);
source->OverrideContentSecurityPolicyFrameSrc(
base::StringPrintf(
"frame-src chrome://terms/ %s/;",
extensions::kGaiaAuthExtensionOrigin));
source->OverrideContentSecurityPolicyObjectSrc("object-src *;");
bool is_webview_signin_enabled = StartupUtils::IsWebviewSigninEnabled();
source->AddResourcePath("gaia_auth_host.js", is_webview_signin_enabled ?
IDR_GAIA_AUTH_AUTHENTICATOR_JS : IDR_GAIA_AUTH_HOST_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentHTMLPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_HTML
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentCSSPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_CSS
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_CSS);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentJSPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_JS
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_JS);
if (display_type == OobeUI::kOobeDisplay) {
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Thin.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_THIN);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Light.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_LIGHT);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Regular.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_REGULAR);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Medium.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_MEDIUM);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Bold.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_BOLD);
}
return source;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the SVGImage::setContainerSize function in core/svg/graphics/SVGImage.cpp in the SVG implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.146, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the resizing of a view.
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882} | High | 9,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageImpl(
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
Image* image,
WebGLImageConversion::ImageHtmlDomSource dom_source,
bool flip_y,
bool premultiply_alpha,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (type == GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV) {
type = GL_FLOAT;
}
Vector<uint8_t> data;
IntRect sub_rect = source_image_rect;
if (sub_rect == SentinelEmptyRect()) {
sub_rect = SafeGetImageSize(image);
}
bool selecting_sub_rectangle = false;
if (!ValidateTexImageSubRectangle(func_name, function_id, image, sub_rect,
depth, unpack_image_height,
&selecting_sub_rectangle)) {
return;
}
IntRect adjusted_source_image_rect = sub_rect;
if (flip_y) {
adjusted_source_image_rect.SetY(image->height() -
adjusted_source_image_rect.MaxY());
}
WebGLImageConversion::ImageExtractor image_extractor(
image, dom_source, premultiply_alpha,
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE);
if (!image_extractor.ImagePixelData()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "bad image data");
return;
}
WebGLImageConversion::DataFormat source_data_format =
image_extractor.ImageSourceFormat();
WebGLImageConversion::AlphaOp alpha_op = image_extractor.ImageAlphaOp();
const void* image_pixel_data = image_extractor.ImagePixelData();
bool need_conversion = true;
if (type == GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE &&
source_data_format == WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8 &&
format == GL_RGBA && alpha_op == WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing &&
!flip_y && !selecting_sub_rectangle && depth == 1) {
need_conversion = false;
} else {
if (!WebGLImageConversion::PackImageData(
image, image_pixel_data, format, type, flip_y, alpha_op,
source_data_format, image_extractor.ImageWidth(),
image_extractor.ImageHeight(), adjusted_source_image_rect, depth,
image_extractor.ImageSourceUnpackAlignment(), unpack_image_height,
data)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "packImage error");
return;
}
}
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore temporary_reset_unpack(this);
if (function_id == kTexImage2D) {
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat,
adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), 0, format, type,
need_conversion ? data.data() : image_pixel_data);
} else if (function_id == kTexSubImage2D) {
ContextGL()->TexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), format, type,
need_conversion ? data.data() : image_pixel_data);
} else {
if (function_id == kTexImage3D) {
ContextGL()->TexImage3D(
target, level, internalformat, adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), depth, 0, format, type,
need_conversion ? data.data() : image_pixel_data);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(function_id, kTexSubImage3D);
ContextGL()->TexSubImage3D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset,
adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), depth, format, type,
need_conversion ? data.data() : image_pixel_data);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213} | Medium | 16,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size,
size_t minimum)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
ssize_t bytes_avail;
if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) {
/* Copy mode. */
/*
* Note: '1' here is a performance optimization.
* Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of
* available bytes; asking for more than that forces the
* decompressor to combine reads by copying data.
*/
*buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
if (bytes_avail <= 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated 7-Zip file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((size_t)bytes_avail >
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining;
if ((size_t)bytes_avail > size)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)size;
zip->pack_stream_bytes_unconsumed = bytes_avail;
} else if (zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer == NULL) {
/* Decompression has failed. */
archive_set_error(&(a->archive),
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC, "Damaged 7-Zip archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
} else {
/* Packed mode. */
if (minimum > zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining) {
/*
* If remaining uncompressed data size is less than
* the minimum size, fill the buffer up to the
* minimum size.
*/
if (extract_pack_stream(a, minimum) < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (size > zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining;
else
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)size;
*buff = zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer;
zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer += bytes_avail;
}
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining -= bytes_avail;
return (bytes_avail);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libarchive version commit bf9aec176c6748f0ee7a678c5f9f9555b9a757c1 onwards (release v3.0.2 onwards) contains a CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in 7zip decompression, archive_read_support_format_7zip.c, header_bytes() that can result in a crash (denial of service). This attack appears to be exploitable via the victim opening a specially crafted 7zip file.
Commit Message: 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives
Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data()
would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause
the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory.
A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash.
An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented
binary will also crash.
==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0)
==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c)
#1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb)
#2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156)
#3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134)
#4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690)
#5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7)
#6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63)
#7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd)
#8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f)
#9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be)
#10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb)
#11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
#12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09)
This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries
may have been generated by qsym. | Medium | 651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int peer_recv_callback(rdpTransport* transport, wStream* s, void* extra)
{
freerdp_peer* client = (freerdp_peer*) extra;
rdpRdp* rdp = client->context->rdp;
switch (rdp->state)
{
case CONNECTION_STATE_INITIAL:
if (!rdp_server_accept_nego(rdp, s))
return -1;
if (rdp->nego->selected_protocol & PROTOCOL_NLA)
{
sspi_CopyAuthIdentity(&client->identity, &(rdp->nego->transport->credssp->identity));
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, TRUE);
credssp_free(rdp->nego->transport->credssp);
}
else
{
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, FALSE);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_NEGO:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_connect_initial(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CONNECT:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_erect_domain_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ERECT_DOMAIN:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_attach_user_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ATTACH_USER:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_channel_join_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CHANNEL_JOIN:
if (rdp->settings->DisableEncryption)
{
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_keys(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
}
rdp->state = CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS:
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_info(rdp, s))
return -1;
IFCALL(client->Capabilities, client);
if (!rdp_send_demand_active(rdp))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_LICENSE:
if (!rdp_server_accept_confirm_active(rdp, s))
{
/**
* During reactivation sequence the client might sent some input or channel data
* before receiving the Deactivate All PDU. We need to process them as usual.
*/
Stream_SetPosition(s, 0);
return peer_recv_pdu(client, s);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_ACTIVE:
if (peer_recv_pdu(client, s) < 0)
return -1;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid state %d\n", rdp->state);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: FreeRDP before 1.1.0-beta+2013071101 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by disconnecting before authentication has finished.
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished. | Medium | 7,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ExtensionNavigationThrottle::WillStartOrRedirectRequest() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
content::WebContents* web_contents = navigation_handle()->GetWebContents();
ExtensionRegistry* registry =
ExtensionRegistry::Get(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
const GURL& url = navigation_handle()->GetURL();
bool url_has_extension_scheme = url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme);
url::Origin target_origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
const Extension* target_extension = nullptr;
if (url_has_extension_scheme) {
target_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
} else if (target_origin.scheme() == kExtensionScheme) {
DCHECK(url.SchemeIsFileSystem() || url.SchemeIsBlob());
target_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(target_origin.host());
} else {
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
if (!target_extension) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
if (target_extension->is_hosted_app()) {
base::StringPiece resource_root_relative_path =
url.path_piece().empty() ? base::StringPiece()
: url.path_piece().substr(1);
if (!IconsInfo::GetIcons(target_extension)
.ContainsPath(resource_root_relative_path)) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
}
if (navigation_handle()->IsInMainFrame()) {
bool current_frame_is_extension_process =
!!registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
navigation_handle()->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
if (!url_has_extension_scheme && !current_frame_is_extension_process) {
if (target_origin.scheme() == kExtensionScheme &&
navigation_handle()->GetSuggestedFilename().has_value()) {
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
bool has_webview_permission =
target_extension->permissions_data()->HasAPIPermission(
APIPermission::kWebView);
if (!has_webview_permission)
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
}
guest_view::GuestViewBase* guest =
guest_view::GuestViewBase::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (url_has_extension_scheme && guest) {
const std::string& owner_extension_id = guest->owner_host();
const Extension* owner_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(owner_extension_id);
std::string partition_domain;
std::string partition_id;
bool in_memory = false;
bool is_guest = WebViewGuest::GetGuestPartitionConfigForSite(
navigation_handle()->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL(),
&partition_domain, &partition_id, &in_memory);
bool allowed = true;
url_request_util::AllowCrossRendererResourceLoadHelper(
is_guest, target_extension, owner_extension, partition_id, url.path(),
navigation_handle()->GetPageTransition(), &allowed);
if (!allowed)
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
content::RenderFrameHost* parent = navigation_handle()->GetParentFrame();
bool external_ancestor = false;
for (auto* ancestor = parent; ancestor; ancestor = ancestor->GetParent()) {
if (ancestor->GetLastCommittedOrigin() == target_origin)
continue;
if (url::Origin::Create(ancestor->GetLastCommittedURL()) == target_origin)
continue;
if (ancestor->GetLastCommittedURL().SchemeIs(
content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
continue;
external_ancestor = true;
break;
}
if (external_ancestor) {
if (!url_has_extension_scheme)
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
if (!WebAccessibleResourcesInfo::IsResourceWebAccessible(target_extension,
url.path()))
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
if (target_extension->is_platform_app())
return content::NavigationThrottle::CANCEL;
const Extension* parent_extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
parent->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL());
if (parent_extension && parent_extension->is_platform_app())
return content::NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST;
}
return content::NavigationThrottle::PROCEED;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of input in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.170 allowed a remote attacker to perform privilege escalation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867} | Medium | 2,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
int family = sk->sk_family;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
if (family == AF_INET) {
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
return pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#endif
}
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
/* Don't bother checking the checksum */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address and add cmsg data. */
if (family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = 0 /* skb->h.uh->source */;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
if (isk->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 =
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)msg->msg_name;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (np->sndflow)
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
if (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all)
pingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
#endif
} else {
BUG();
}
err = copied;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg -> %d\n", err);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ping_recvmsg function in net/ipv4/ping.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 does not properly interact with read system calls on ping sockets, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by leveraging unspecified privileges to execute a crafted application.
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 17,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void RegisterPropertiesHandler(
void* object, const ImePropertyList& prop_list) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->RegisterProperties(prop_list);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 12,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int journal_unmap_buffer(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
transaction_t *transaction;
struct journal_head *jh;
int may_free = 1;
int ret;
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "entry");
/*
* It is safe to proceed here without the j_list_lock because the
* buffers cannot be stolen by try_to_free_buffers as long as we are
* holding the page lock. --sct
*/
if (!buffer_jbd(bh))
goto zap_buffer_unlocked;
/* OK, we have data buffer in journaled mode */
write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
jbd_lock_bh_state(bh);
spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jh = jbd2_journal_grab_journal_head(bh);
if (!jh)
goto zap_buffer_no_jh;
/*
* We cannot remove the buffer from checkpoint lists until the
* transaction adding inode to orphan list (let's call it T)
* is committed. Otherwise if the transaction changing the
* buffer would be cleaned from the journal before T is
* committed, a crash will cause that the correct contents of
* the buffer will be lost. On the other hand we have to
* clear the buffer dirty bit at latest at the moment when the
* transaction marking the buffer as freed in the filesystem
* structures is committed because from that moment on the
* buffer can be reallocated and used by a different page.
* Since the block hasn't been freed yet but the inode has
* already been added to orphan list, it is safe for us to add
* the buffer to BJ_Forget list of the newest transaction.
*/
transaction = jh->b_transaction;
if (transaction == NULL) {
/* First case: not on any transaction. If it
* has no checkpoint link, then we can zap it:
* it's a writeback-mode buffer so we don't care
* if it hits disk safely. */
if (!jh->b_cp_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "not on any transaction: zap");
goto zap_buffer;
}
if (!buffer_dirty(bh)) {
/* bdflush has written it. We can drop it now */
goto zap_buffer;
}
/* OK, it must be in the journal but still not
* written fully to disk: it's metadata or
* journaled data... */
if (journal->j_running_transaction) {
/* ... and once the current transaction has
* committed, the buffer won't be needed any
* longer. */
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "checkpointed: add to BJ_Forget");
ret = __dispose_buffer(jh,
journal->j_running_transaction);
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return ret;
} else {
/* There is no currently-running transaction. So the
* orphan record which we wrote for this file must have
* passed into commit. We must attach this buffer to
* the committing transaction, if it exists. */
if (journal->j_committing_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "give to committing trans");
ret = __dispose_buffer(jh,
journal->j_committing_transaction);
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return ret;
} else {
/* The orphan record's transaction has
* committed. We can cleanse this buffer */
clear_buffer_jbddirty(bh);
goto zap_buffer;
}
}
} else if (transaction == journal->j_committing_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "on committing transaction");
/*
* The buffer is committing, we simply cannot touch
* it. So we just set j_next_transaction to the
* running transaction (if there is one) and mark
* buffer as freed so that commit code knows it should
* clear dirty bits when it is done with the buffer.
*/
set_buffer_freed(bh);
if (journal->j_running_transaction && buffer_jbddirty(bh))
jh->b_next_transaction = journal->j_running_transaction;
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return 0;
} else {
/* Good, the buffer belongs to the running transaction.
* We are writing our own transaction's data, not any
* previous one's, so it is safe to throw it away
* (remember that we expect the filesystem to have set
* i_size already for this truncate so recovery will not
* expose the disk blocks we are discarding here.) */
J_ASSERT_JH(jh, transaction == journal->j_running_transaction);
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "on running transaction");
may_free = __dispose_buffer(jh, transaction);
}
zap_buffer:
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
zap_buffer_no_jh:
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
zap_buffer_unlocked:
clear_buffer_dirty(bh);
J_ASSERT_BH(bh, !buffer_jbddirty(bh));
clear_buffer_mapped(bh);
clear_buffer_req(bh);
clear_buffer_new(bh);
bh->b_bdev = NULL;
return may_free;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The journal_unmap_buffer function in fs/jbd2/transaction.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.1 does not properly handle the _Delay and _Unwritten buffer head states, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging the presence of an ext4 filesystem that was mounted with a journal.
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | Medium | 19,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int parse_report(transport_smart *transport, git_push *push)
{
git_pkt *pkt = NULL;
const char *line_end = NULL;
gitno_buffer *buf = &transport->buffer;
int error, recvd;
git_buf data_pkt_buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
for (;;) {
if (buf->offset > 0)
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, buf->data,
&line_end, buf->offset);
else
error = GIT_EBUFS;
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_EBUFS) {
error = -1;
goto done;
}
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
if ((recvd = gitno_recv(buf)) < 0) {
error = recvd;
goto done;
}
if (recvd == 0) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "early EOF");
error = GIT_EEOF;
goto done;
}
continue;
}
gitno_consume(buf, line_end);
error = 0;
if (pkt == NULL)
continue;
switch (pkt->type) {
case GIT_PKT_DATA:
/* This is a sideband packet which contains other packets */
error = add_push_report_sideband_pkt(push, (git_pkt_data *)pkt, &data_pkt_buf);
break;
case GIT_PKT_ERR:
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "report-status: Error reported: %s",
((git_pkt_err *)pkt)->error);
error = -1;
break;
case GIT_PKT_PROGRESS:
if (transport->progress_cb) {
git_pkt_progress *p = (git_pkt_progress *) pkt;
error = transport->progress_cb(p->data, p->len, transport->message_cb_payload);
}
break;
default:
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
break;
}
git_pkt_free(pkt);
/* add_push_report_pkt returns GIT_ITEROVER when it receives a flush */
if (error == GIT_ITEROVER) {
error = 0;
if (data_pkt_buf.size > 0) {
/* If there was data remaining in the pack data buffer,
* then the server sent a partial pkt-line */
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "Incomplete pack data pkt-line");
error = GIT_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
if (error < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
done:
git_buf_free(&data_pkt_buf);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Git Smart Protocol support in libgit2 before 0.24.6 and 0.25.x before 0.25.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via an empty packet line.
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do. | Medium | 3,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const
{
if (str == static_cast<char* Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) //should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len+1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 10,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int snd_timer_start_slave(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags);
timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
if (timeri->master)
list_add_tail(&timeri->active_list,
&timeri->master->slave_active_head);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
return 1; /* delayed start */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 retains certain linked lists after a close or stop action, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call, related to the (1) snd_timer_close and (2) _snd_timer_stop functions.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 11,197 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getSupportedCompression)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (PHAR_G(has_zlib)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "GZ", 2, 1);
}
if (PHAR_G(has_bz2)) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, "BZIP2", 5, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message: | High | 9,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long hstart, hend;
if (!vma->anon_vma)
/*
* Not yet faulted in so we will register later in the
* page fault if needed.
*/
return 0;
if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_ops)
/* khugepaged not yet working on file or special mappings */
return 0;
VM_BUG_ON(is_linear_pfn_mapping(vma) || is_pfn_mapping(vma));
hstart = (vma->vm_start + ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK) & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
hend = vma->vm_end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
if (hstart < hend)
return khugepaged_enter(vma);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly create transparent huge pages in response to a MAP_PRIVATE mmap system call on /dev/zero, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 3,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker(ExecState* exec)
{
JSWorkerConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSWorkerConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (!exec->argumentCount())
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
UString scriptURL = exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec);
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
DOMWindow* window = asJSDOMWindow(exec->lexicalGlobalObject())->impl();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<Worker> worker = Worker::create(window->document(), ustringToString(scriptURL), ec);
if (ec) {
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
}
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), worker.release())));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 15,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message &msg) {
if (!render_frame_created_)
return false;
ScopedActiveURL scoped_active_url(this);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone, OnRenderProcessGone)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
if (delegate_->OnMessageReceived(this, msg))
return true;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (proxy && proxy->cross_process_frame_connector() &&
proxy->cross_process_frame_connector()->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole,
OnDidAddMessageToConsole)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_Detach, OnDetach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameFocused, OnFrameFocused)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStartProvisionalLoad,
OnDidStartProvisionalLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError,
OnDidFailProvisionalLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError,
OnDidFailLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateState, OnUpdateState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_OpenURL, OnOpenURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DocumentOnLoadCompleted,
OnDocumentOnLoadCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BeforeUnload_ACK, OnBeforeUnloadACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK, OnSwapOutACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu, OnContextMenu)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_JavaScriptExecuteResponse,
OnJavaScriptExecuteResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_VisualStateResponse,
OnVisualStateResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunJavaScriptDialog,
OnRunJavaScriptDialog)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunBeforeUnloadConfirm,
OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RunFileChooser, OnRunFileChooser)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAccessInitialDocument,
OnDidAccessInitialDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeOpener, OnDidChangeOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddContentSecurityPolicies,
OnDidAddContentSecurityPolicies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFramePolicy,
OnDidChangeFramePolicy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFrameOwnerProperties,
OnDidChangeFrameOwnerProperties)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateTitle, OnUpdateTitle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidBlockFramebust, OnDidBlockFramebust)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_AbortNavigation, OnAbortNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad, OnDispatchLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent,
OnForwardResourceTimingToParent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionResponse,
OnTextSurroundingSelectionResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_Events, OnAccessibilityEvents)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChanges,
OnAccessibilityLocationChanges)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_FindInPageResult,
OnAccessibilityFindInPageResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_ChildFrameHitTestResult,
OnAccessibilityChildFrameHitTestResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_SnapshotResponse,
OnAccessibilitySnapshotResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ToggleFullscreen, OnToggleFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SuddenTerminationDisablerChanged,
OnSuddenTerminationDisablerChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStartLoading, OnDidStartLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading, OnDidStopLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeLoadProgress,
OnDidChangeLoadProgress)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SerializeAsMHTMLResponse,
OnSerializeAsMHTMLResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SelectionChanged, OnSelectionChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FocusedNodeChanged, OnFocusedNodeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGesture,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGesture)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame,
OnScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame)
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_EXTERNAL_POPUP_MENU)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowPopup, OnShowPopup)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_HidePopup, OnHidePopup)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
OnRequestOverlayRoutingToken)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowCreatedWindow, OnShowCreatedWindow)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_StreamHandleConsumed,
OnStreamHandleConsumed)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A JavaScript focused window could overlap the fullscreen notification in Fullscreen in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | Low | 20,950 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
phys_addr_t p = *ppos;
ssize_t read, sz;
void *ptr;
if (p != *ppos)
return 0;
if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
return -EFAULT;
read = 0;
#ifdef __ARCH_HAS_NO_PAGE_ZERO_MAPPED
/* we don't have page 0 mapped on sparc and m68k.. */
if (p < PAGE_SIZE) {
sz = size_inside_page(p, count);
if (sz > 0) {
if (clear_user(buf, sz))
return -EFAULT;
buf += sz;
p += sz;
count -= sz;
read += sz;
}
}
#endif
while (count > 0) {
unsigned long remaining;
sz = size_inside_page(p, count);
if (!range_is_allowed(p >> PAGE_SHIFT, count))
return -EPERM;
/*
* On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as uncached, then
* it must also be accessed uncached by the kernel or data
* corruption may occur.
*/
ptr = xlate_dev_mem_ptr(p);
if (!ptr)
return -EFAULT;
remaining = copy_to_user(buf, ptr, sz);
unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(p, ptr);
if (remaining)
return -EFAULT;
buf += sz;
p += sz;
count -= sz;
read += sz;
}
*ppos += read;
return read;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: The mm subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.10.10 does not properly enforce the CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM protection mechanism, which allows local users to read or write to kernel memory locations in the first megabyte (and bypass slab-allocation access restrictions) via an application that opens the /dev/mem file, related to arch/x86/mm/init.c and drivers/char/mem.c.
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> | High | 1,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int expandRegular(rpmfi fi, const char *dest, rpmpsm psm, int nodigest, int nocontent)
{
FD_t wfd = NULL;
int rc = 0;
/* Create the file with 0200 permissions (write by owner). */
{
mode_t old_umask = umask(0577);
wfd = Fopen(dest, "w.ufdio");
umask(old_umask);
}
if (Ferror(wfd)) {
rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
if (!nocontent)
rc = rpmfiArchiveReadToFilePsm(fi, wfd, nodigest, psm);
exit:
if (wfd) {
int myerrno = errno;
Fclose(wfd);
errno = myerrno;
}
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: It was found that versions of rpm before 4.13.0.2 use temporary files with predictable names when installing an RPM. An attacker with ability to write in a directory where files will be installed could create symbolic links to an arbitrary location and modify content, and possibly permissions to arbitrary files, which could be used for denial of service or possibly privilege escalation.
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi. | Medium | 9,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_DetachItemFromObject( cJSON *object, const char *string )
{
int i = 0;
cJSON *c = object->child;
while ( c && cJSON_strcasecmp( c->string, string ) ) {
++i;
c = c->next;
}
if ( c )
return cJSON_DetachItemFromArray( object, i );
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 15,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc txcq_descr;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
/* Flush changes in TX descriptor before changing the counter value */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_inc_tx_completion_counter(s, qidx);
vmxnet3_trigger_interrupt(s, s->txq_descr[qidx].intr_idx);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The vmxnet3_complete_packet function in hw/net/vmxnet3.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to obtain sensitive host memory information by leveraging failure to initialize the txcq_descr object.
Commit Message: | Low | 29,516 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xsltForEach(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemForEachPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemForEachPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
int i;
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
xmlNodePtr cur, curInst;
xmlNodeSetPtr list = NULL;
xmlNodeSetPtr oldList;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize;
xmlNodePtr oldContextNode;
xsltTemplatePtr oldCurTemplRule;
xmlDocPtr oldXPDoc;
xsltDocumentPtr oldDocInfo;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (contextNode == NULL) || (inst == NULL)) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsltForEach(): Bad arguments.\n");
return;
}
if (comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltForEach(): "
"The XSLT 'for-each' instruction was not compiled.\n");
return;
}
if ((comp->select == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltForEach(): "
"The selecting expression of the XSLT 'for-each' "
"instruction was not compiled correctly.\n");
return;
}
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_FOR_EACH,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltForEach: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
/*
* Save context states.
*/
oldDocInfo = ctxt->document;
oldList = ctxt->nodeList;
oldContextNode = ctxt->node;
/*
* The "current template rule" is cleared for the instantiation of
* xsl:for-each.
*/
oldCurTemplRule = ctxt->currentTemplateRule;
ctxt->currentTemplateRule = NULL;
oldXPDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
/*
* Set up XPath.
*/
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
/*
* Evaluate the 'select' expression.
*/
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp->comp, ctxt->xpathCtxt);
if (res != NULL) {
if (res->type == XPATH_NODESET)
list = res->nodesetval;
else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"The 'select' expression does not evaluate to a node set.\n");
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_FOR_EACH,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltForEach: select didn't evaluate to a node list\n"));
#endif
goto error;
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Failed to evaluate the 'select' expression.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
if ((list == NULL) || (list->nodeNr <= 0))
goto exit;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_FOR_EACH,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltForEach: select evaluates to %d nodes\n", list->nodeNr));
#endif
/*
* Restore XPath states for the "current node".
*/
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
/*
* Set the list; this has to be done already here for xsltDoSortFunction().
*/
ctxt->nodeList = list;
/*
* Handle xsl:sort instructions and skip them for further processing.
* BUG TODO: We are not using namespaced potentially defined on the
* xsl:sort element; XPath expression might fail.
*/
curInst = inst->children;
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(curInst) && IS_XSLT_NAME(curInst, "sort")) {
int nbsorts = 0;
xmlNodePtr sorts[XSLT_MAX_SORT];
sorts[nbsorts++] = curInst;
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (xslDebugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE)
xslHandleDebugger(curInst, contextNode, NULL, ctxt);
#endif
curInst = curInst->next;
while (IS_XSLT_ELEM(curInst) && IS_XSLT_NAME(curInst, "sort")) {
if (nbsorts >= XSLT_MAX_SORT) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, curInst,
"The number of xsl:sort instructions exceeds the "
"maximum (%d) allowed by this processor.\n",
XSLT_MAX_SORT);
goto error;
} else {
sorts[nbsorts++] = curInst;
}
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (xslDebugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE)
xslHandleDebugger(curInst, contextNode, NULL, ctxt);
#endif
curInst = curInst->next;
}
xsltDoSortFunction(ctxt, sorts, nbsorts);
}
xpctxt->contextSize = list->nodeNr;
/*
* Instantiate the sequence constructor for each selected node.
*/
for (i = 0; i < list->nodeNr; i++) {
cur = list->nodeTab[i];
/*
* The selected node becomes the "current node".
*/
ctxt->node = cur;
/*
* An xsl:for-each can change the current context doc.
* OPTIMIZE TODO: Get rid of the need to set the context doc.
*/
if ((cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) && (cur->doc != NULL))
xpctxt->doc = cur->doc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = i + 1;
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, cur, curInst, NULL);
}
exit:
error:
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
/*
* Restore old states.
*/
ctxt->document = oldDocInfo;
ctxt->nodeList = oldList;
ctxt->node = oldContextNode;
ctxt->currentTemplateRule = oldCurTemplRule;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPDoc;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 23,809 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PeopleHandler::HandleSignout(const base::ListValue* args) {
bool delete_profile = false;
args->GetBoolean(0, &delete_profile);
if (!signin_util::IsUserSignoutAllowedForProfile(profile_)) {
DCHECK(delete_profile);
} else {
SigninManager* signin_manager =
SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (signin_manager->IsAuthenticated()) {
if (GetSyncService())
ProfileSyncService::SyncEvent(ProfileSyncService::STOP_FROM_OPTIONS);
signin_metrics::SignoutDelete delete_metric =
delete_profile ? signin_metrics::SignoutDelete::DELETED
: signin_metrics::SignoutDelete::KEEPING;
signin_manager->SignOutAndRemoveAllAccounts(
signin_metrics::USER_CLICKED_SIGNOUT_SETTINGS, delete_metric);
} else {
DCHECK(!delete_profile)
<< "Deleting the profile should only be offered the user is syncing.";
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)
->RevokeAllCredentials();
}
}
if (delete_profile) {
webui::DeleteProfileAtPath(profile_->GetPath(),
ProfileMetrics::DELETE_PROFILE_SETTINGS);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The JSGenericLowering class in compiler/js-generic-lowering.cc in Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles comparison operators, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code.
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181} | Medium | 29,597 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void close_all_sockets(atransport* t) {
asocket* s;
/* this is a little gross, but since s->close() *will* modify
** the list out from under you, your options are limited.
*/
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
restart:
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->transport == t || (s->peer && s->peer->transport == t)) {
local_socket_close_locked(s);
goto restart;
}
}
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842.
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
| High | 28,289 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PageInfo::OnChangePasswordButtonPressed(
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
DCHECK(password_protection_service_);
DCHECK(safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE ||
safe_browsing_status_ ==
SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD_REUSE);
password_protection_service_->OnUserAction(
web_contents,
safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE
? PasswordReuseEvent::SIGN_IN_PASSWORD
: PasswordReuseEvent::ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD,
safe_browsing::WarningUIType::PAGE_INFO,
safe_browsing::WarningAction::CHANGE_PASSWORD);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Summary: Cast in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android sent cookies to sites discovered via SSDP, which allowed an attacker on the local network segment to initiate connections to arbitrary URLs and observe any plaintext cookies sent.
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932} | Low | 8,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock,
int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*lsa);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (lsa) {
lsa->l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
lsa->l2tp_unused = 0;
lsa->l2tp_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = 0;
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = 0;
if (ipv6_addr_type(&lsa->l2tp_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = IP6CB(skb)->iif;
}
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err ? err : copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The l2tp_ip6_recvmsg function in net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_conn_id member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and therefore leaks four bytes kernel stack
in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() in case msg_name is set.
Initialize l2tp_conn_id with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 20,859 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int semid,
struct oabi_sembuf __user *tsops,
unsigned nsops,
const struct timespec __user *timeout)
{
struct sembuf *sops;
struct timespec local_timeout;
long err;
int i;
if (nsops < 1)
return -EINVAL;
sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops) * nsops, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sops)
return -ENOMEM;
err = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nsops; i++) {
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_num, &tsops->sem_num, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_op, &tsops->sem_op, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_flg, &tsops->sem_flg, err);
tsops++;
}
if (timeout) {
/* copy this as well before changing domain protection */
err |= copy_from_user(&local_timeout, timeout, sizeof(*timeout));
timeout = &local_timeout;
}
if (err) {
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sys_semtimedop(semid, sops, nsops, timeout);
set_fs(fs);
}
kfree(sops);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the sys_oabi_semtimedop function in arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 on the ARM platform, when CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is enabled, allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) by providing a crafted argument and leveraging a race condition.
Commit Message: ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> | Medium | 15,573 |