instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 386
112k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 15
30k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: selaGetCombName(SELA *sela,
l_int32 size,
l_int32 direction)
{
char *selname;
char combname[L_BUF_SIZE];
l_int32 i, nsels, sx, sy, found;
SEL *sel;
PROCNAME("selaGetCombName");
if (!sela)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if (direction != L_HORIZ && direction != L_VERT)
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("invalid direction", procName, NULL);
/* Derive the comb name we're looking for */
if (direction == L_HORIZ)
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dh", size);
else /* direction == L_VERT */
snprintf(combname, L_BUF_SIZE, "sel_comb_%dv", size);
found = FALSE;
nsels = selaGetCount(sela);
for (i = 0; i < nsels; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selGetParameters(sel, &sy, &sx, NULL, NULL);
if (sy != 1 && sx != 1) /* 2-D; not a comb */
continue;
selname = selGetName(sel);
if (!strcmp(selname, combname)) {
found = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found)
return stringNew(selname);
else
return (char *)ERROR_PTR("sel not found", procName, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Leptonica before 1.75.3 does not limit the number of characters in a %s format argument to fscanf or sscanf, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long string, as demonstrated by the gplotRead and ptaReadStream functions.
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf(). | High | 23,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_un *, sunaddr, msg->msg_name);
struct sock *other = NULL;
int namelen = 0; /* fake GCC */
int err;
unsigned int hash;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
struct scm_cookie scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, &scm, false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, msg->msg_namelen, &hash);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
namelen = err;
} else {
sunaddr = NULL;
err = -ENOTCONN;
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (!other)
goto out;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) && !u->addr
&& (err = unix_autobind(sock)) != 0)
goto out;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
if (len > SKB_MAX_ALLOC) {
data_len = min_t(size_t,
len - SKB_MAX_ALLOC,
MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE);
data_len = PAGE_ALIGN(data_len);
BUILD_BUG_ON(SKB_MAX_ALLOC < PAGE_SIZE);
}
skb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, len - data_len, data_len,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err,
PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
err = unix_scm_to_skb(&scm, skb, true);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
max_level = err + 1;
skb_put(skb, len - data_len);
skb->data_len = data_len;
skb->len = len;
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
if (!other) {
err = -ECONNRESET;
if (sunaddr == NULL)
goto out_free;
other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, namelen, sk->sk_type,
hash, &err);
if (other == NULL)
goto out_free;
}
if (sk_filter(other, skb) < 0) {
/* Toss the packet but do not return any error to the sender */
err = len;
goto out_free;
}
unix_state_lock(other);
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
*/
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
err = 0;
unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
sock_put(other);
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
} else {
unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
other = NULL;
if (err)
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
err = -EPIPE;
if (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto out_unlock;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
if (!timeo) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
unix_state_unlock(other);
other->sk_data_ready(other);
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(&scm);
return len;
out_unlock:
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
if (other)
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(&scm);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in net/unix/af_unix.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to bypass intended AF_UNIX socket permissions or cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted epoll_ctl calls.
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 24,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCacheForSharedWorker(
int host_id, int64 appcache_id) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host || host->was_select_cache_called())
return false;
host->SelectCacheForSharedWorker(appcache_id);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers with renderer access to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect AppCacheUpdateJob behavior associated with duplicate cache selection.
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815} | High | 9,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: BOOL region16_intersect_rect(REGION16* dst, const REGION16* src, const RECTANGLE_16* rect)
{
REGION16_DATA* newItems;
const RECTANGLE_16* srcPtr, *endPtr, *srcExtents;
RECTANGLE_16* dstPtr;
UINT32 nbRects, usedRects;
RECTANGLE_16 common, newExtents;
assert(src);
assert(src->data);
srcPtr = region16_rects(src, &nbRects);
if (!nbRects)
{
region16_clear(dst);
return TRUE;
}
srcExtents = region16_extents(src);
if (nbRects == 1)
{
BOOL intersects = rectangles_intersection(srcExtents, rect, &common);
region16_clear(dst);
if (intersects)
return region16_union_rect(dst, dst, &common);
return TRUE;
}
newItems = allocateRegion(nbRects);
if (!newItems)
return FALSE;
dstPtr = (RECTANGLE_16*)(&newItems[1]);
usedRects = 0;
ZeroMemory(&newExtents, sizeof(newExtents));
/* accumulate intersecting rectangles, the final region16_simplify_bands() will
* do all the bad job to recreate correct rectangles
*/
for (endPtr = srcPtr + nbRects; (srcPtr < endPtr) && (rect->bottom > srcPtr->top); srcPtr++)
{
if (rectangles_intersection(srcPtr, rect, &common))
{
*dstPtr = common;
usedRects++;
dstPtr++;
if (rectangle_is_empty(&newExtents))
{
/* Check if the existing newExtents is empty. If it is empty, use
* new common directly. We do not need to check common rectangle
* because the rectangles_intersection() ensures that it is not empty.
*/
newExtents = common;
}
else
{
newExtents.top = MIN(common.top, newExtents.top);
newExtents.left = MIN(common.left, newExtents.left);
newExtents.bottom = MAX(common.bottom, newExtents.bottom);
newExtents.right = MAX(common.right, newExtents.right);
}
}
}
newItems->nbRects = usedRects;
newItems->size = sizeof(REGION16_DATA) + (usedRects * sizeof(RECTANGLE_16));
if ((dst->data->size > 0) && (dst->data != &empty_region))
free(dst->data);
dst->data = realloc(newItems, newItems->size);
if (!dst->data)
{
free(newItems);
return FALSE;
}
dst->extents = newExtents;
return region16_simplify_bands(dst);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: HuffmanTree_makeFromFrequencies in lodepng.c in LodePNG through 2019-09-28, as used in WinPR in FreeRDP and other products, has a memory leak because a supplied realloc pointer (i.e., the first argument to realloc) is also used for a realloc return value.
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling | Medium | 14,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: TestWCDelegateForDialogsAndFullscreen()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A JavaScript focused window could overlap the fullscreen notification in Fullscreen in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to obscure the full screen warning via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | Low | 7,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingDidCommit(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT) {
can_lock_compositor_ = YES;
for (ResizeLockList::iterator it = resize_locks_.begin();
it != resize_locks_.end(); ++it)
if ((*it)->GrabDeferredLock())
can_lock_compositor_ = YES_DID_LOCK;
}
RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(compositor);
locks_pending_commit_.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 4,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void CairoOutputDev::drawMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref,
Stream *str, int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr, int maskWidth,
int maskHeight, GBool maskInvert)
{
ImageStream *maskImgStr;
maskImgStr = new ImageStream(maskStr, maskWidth, 1, 1);
maskImgStr->reset();
int row_stride = (maskWidth + 3) & ~3;
unsigned char *maskBuffer;
maskBuffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (row_stride * maskHeight);
unsigned char *maskDest;
cairo_surface_t *maskImage;
cairo_pattern_t *maskPattern;
Guchar *pix;
int x, y;
int invert_bit;
invert_bit = maskInvert ? 1 : 0;
for (y = 0; y < maskHeight; y++) {
pix = maskImgStr->getLine();
maskDest = maskBuffer + y * row_stride;
for (x = 0; x < maskWidth; x++) {
if (pix[x] ^ invert_bit)
*maskDest++ = 0;
else
*maskDest++ = 255;
}
}
maskImage = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (maskBuffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_A8,
maskWidth, maskHeight, row_stride);
delete maskImgStr;
maskStr->close();
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int *dest;
cairo_surface_t *image;
cairo_pattern_t *pattern;
ImageStream *imgStr;
cairo_matrix_t matrix;
int is_identity_transform;
buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4);
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgStr->reset();
/* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction
* so check its underlying color space as well */
is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB ||
(colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased &&
((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB);
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
}
image = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (buffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_RGB24,
width, height, width * 4);
if (image == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
pattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (image);
maskPattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (maskImage);
if (pattern == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
LOG (printf ("drawMaskedImage %dx%d\n", width, height));
cairo_matrix_init_translate (&matrix, 0, height);
cairo_matrix_scale (&matrix, width, -height);
/* scale the mask to the size of the image unlike softMask */
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (pattern, &matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (maskPattern, &matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_filter (pattern, CAIRO_FILTER_BILINEAR);
cairo_set_source (cairo, pattern);
cairo_mask (cairo, maskPattern);
if (cairo_shape) {
#if 0
cairo_rectangle (cairo_shape, 0., 0., width, height);
cairo_fill (cairo_shape);
#else
cairo_save (cairo_shape);
/* this should draw a rectangle the size of the image
* we use this instead of rect,fill because of the lack
* of EXTEND_PAD */
/* NOTE: this will multiply the edges of the image twice */
cairo_set_source (cairo_shape, pattern);
cairo_mask (cairo_shape, pattern);
cairo_restore (cairo_shape);
#endif
}
cairo_pattern_destroy (maskPattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (maskImage);
cairo_pattern_destroy (pattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (image);
free (buffer);
free (maskBuffer);
delete imgStr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message: | Medium | 22,592 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool SubsetterImpl::ResolveCompositeGlyphs(const unsigned int* glyph_ids,
size_t glyph_count,
IntegerSet* glyph_id_processed) {
if (glyph_ids == NULL || glyph_count == 0 || glyph_id_processed == NULL) {
return false;
}
GlyphTablePtr glyph_table =
down_cast<GlyphTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::glyf));
LocaTablePtr loca_table = down_cast<LocaTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::loca));
if (glyph_table == NULL || loca_table == NULL) {
return false;
}
IntegerSet glyph_id_remaining;
glyph_id_remaining.insert(0); // Always include glyph id 0.
for (size_t i = 0; i < glyph_count; ++i) {
glyph_id_remaining.insert(glyph_ids[i]);
}
while (!glyph_id_remaining.empty()) {
IntegerSet comp_glyph_id;
for (IntegerSet::iterator i = glyph_id_remaining.begin(),
e = glyph_id_remaining.end(); i != e; ++i) {
if (*i < 0 || *i >= loca_table->NumGlyphs()) {
continue;
}
int32_t length = loca_table->GlyphLength(*i);
if (length == 0) {
continue;
}
int32_t offset = loca_table->GlyphOffset(*i);
GlyphPtr glyph;
glyph.Attach(glyph_table->GetGlyph(offset, length));
if (glyph == NULL) {
continue;
}
if (glyph->GlyphType() == GlyphType::kComposite) {
Ptr<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph> comp_glyph =
down_cast<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph*>(glyph.p_);
for (int32_t j = 0; j < comp_glyph->NumGlyphs(); ++j) {
int32_t glyph_id = comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j);
if (glyph_id_processed->find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_processed->end() &&
glyph_id_remaining.find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_remaining.end()) {
comp_glyph_id.insert(comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j));
}
}
}
glyph_id_processed->insert(*i);
}
glyph_id_remaining.clear();
glyph_id_remaining = comp_glyph_id;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle Tibetan characters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix compile warning.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 15,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::styleDidChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle* oldStyle)
{
RenderBlock::styleDidChange(diff, oldStyle);
bool canPropagateFloatIntoSibling = !isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned() && !avoidsFloats();
if (diff == StyleDifferenceLayout && s_canPropagateFloatIntoSibling && !canPropagateFloatIntoSibling && hasOverhangingFloats()) {
RenderBlockFlow* parentBlockFlow = this;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (RenderObject* curr = parent(); curr && !curr->isRenderView(); curr = curr->parent()) {
if (curr->isRenderBlockFlow()) {
RenderBlockFlow* currBlock = toRenderBlockFlow(curr);
if (currBlock->hasOverhangingFloats()) {
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
RenderBox* renderer = (*it)->renderer();
if (currBlock->hasOverhangingFloat(renderer)) {
parentBlockFlow = currBlock;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
parentBlockFlow->markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout();
parentBlockFlow->markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout();
}
if (diff == StyleDifferenceLayout || !oldStyle)
createOrDestroyMultiColumnFlowThreadIfNeeded();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Web Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 6,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreateSnapshotFile(
int request_id, const GURL& blob_url, const GURL& path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
FileSystemURL url(path);
base::Callback<void(const FilePath&)> register_file_callback =
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob,
this, blob_url, url.path());
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->CreateSnapshotFile(
url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCreateSnapshot,
this, request_id, register_file_callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly maintain database metadata, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended file-access restrictions via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 21,854 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: transform_enable(PNG_CONST char *name)
{
/* Everything starts out enabled, so if we see an 'enable' disabled
* everything else the first time round.
*/
static int all_disabled = 0;
int found_it = 0;
image_transform *list = image_transform_first;
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if (strcmp(list->name, name) == 0)
{
list->enable = 1;
found_it = 1;
}
else if (!all_disabled)
list->enable = 0;
list = list->list;
}
all_disabled = 1;
if (!found_it)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: --transform-enable=%s: unknown transform\n",
name);
exit(99);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 12,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void read_boot(DOS_FS * fs)
{
struct boot_sector b;
unsigned total_sectors;
unsigned short logical_sector_size, sectors;
unsigned fat_length;
unsigned total_fat_entries;
off_t data_size;
fs_read(0, sizeof(b), &b);
logical_sector_size = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b.sector_size);
if (!logical_sector_size)
die("Logical sector size is zero.");
/* This was moved up because it's the first thing that will fail */
/* if the platform needs special handling of unaligned multibyte accesses */
/* but such handling isn't being provided. See GET_UNALIGNED_W() above. */
if (logical_sector_size & (SECTOR_SIZE - 1))
die("Logical sector size (%d bytes) is not a multiple of the physical "
"sector size.", logical_sector_size);
fs->cluster_size = b.cluster_size * logical_sector_size;
if (!fs->cluster_size)
die("Cluster size is zero.");
if (b.fats != 2 && b.fats != 1)
die("Currently, only 1 or 2 FATs are supported, not %d.\n", b.fats);
fs->nfats = b.fats;
sectors = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b.sectors);
total_sectors = sectors ? sectors : le32toh(b.total_sect);
if (verbose)
printf("Checking we can access the last sector of the filesystem\n");
/* Can't access last odd sector anyway, so round down */
fs_test((off_t)((total_sectors & ~1) - 1) * logical_sector_size,
logical_sector_size);
fat_length = le16toh(b.fat_length) ?
le16toh(b.fat_length) : le32toh(b.fat32_length);
fs->fat_start = (off_t)le16toh(b.reserved) * logical_sector_size;
fs->root_start = ((off_t)le16toh(b.reserved) + b.fats * fat_length) *
logical_sector_size;
fs->root_entries = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b.dir_entries);
fs->data_start = fs->root_start + ROUND_TO_MULTIPLE(fs->root_entries <<
MSDOS_DIR_BITS,
logical_sector_size);
data_size = (off_t)total_sectors * logical_sector_size - fs->data_start;
fs->data_clusters = data_size / fs->cluster_size;
fs->root_cluster = 0; /* indicates standard, pre-FAT32 root dir */
fs->fsinfo_start = 0; /* no FSINFO structure */
fs->free_clusters = -1; /* unknown */
if (!b.fat_length && b.fat32_length) {
fs->fat_bits = 32;
fs->root_cluster = le32toh(b.root_cluster);
if (!fs->root_cluster && fs->root_entries)
/* M$ hasn't specified this, but it looks reasonable: If
* root_cluster is 0 but there is a separate root dir
* (root_entries != 0), we handle the root dir the old way. Give a
* warning, but convertig to a root dir in a cluster chain seems
* to complex for now... */
printf("Warning: FAT32 root dir not in cluster chain! "
"Compatibility mode...\n");
else if (!fs->root_cluster && !fs->root_entries)
die("No root directory!");
else if (fs->root_cluster && fs->root_entries)
printf("Warning: FAT32 root dir is in a cluster chain, but "
"a separate root dir\n"
" area is defined. Cannot fix this easily.\n");
if (fs->data_clusters < FAT16_THRESHOLD)
printf("Warning: Filesystem is FAT32 according to fat_length "
"and fat32_length fields,\n"
" but has only %lu clusters, less than the required "
"minimum of %d.\n"
" This may lead to problems on some systems.\n",
(unsigned long)fs->data_clusters, FAT16_THRESHOLD);
check_fat_state_bit(fs, &b);
fs->backupboot_start = le16toh(b.backup_boot) * logical_sector_size;
check_backup_boot(fs, &b, logical_sector_size);
read_fsinfo(fs, &b, logical_sector_size);
} else if (!atari_format) {
/* On real MS-DOS, a 16 bit FAT is used whenever there would be too
* much clusers otherwise. */
fs->fat_bits = (fs->data_clusters >= FAT12_THRESHOLD) ? 16 : 12;
if (fs->data_clusters >= FAT16_THRESHOLD)
die("Too many clusters (%lu) for FAT16 filesystem.", fs->data_clusters);
check_fat_state_bit(fs, &b);
} else {
/* On Atari, things are more difficult: GEMDOS always uses 12bit FATs
* on floppies, and always 16 bit on harddisks. */
fs->fat_bits = 16; /* assume 16 bit FAT for now */
/* If more clusters than fat entries in 16-bit fat, we assume
* it's a real MSDOS FS with 12-bit fat. */
if (fs->data_clusters + 2 > fat_length * logical_sector_size * 8 / 16 ||
/* if it has one of the usual floppy sizes -> 12bit FAT */
(total_sectors == 720 || total_sectors == 1440 ||
total_sectors == 2880))
fs->fat_bits = 12;
}
/* On FAT32, the high 4 bits of a FAT entry are reserved */
fs->eff_fat_bits = (fs->fat_bits == 32) ? 28 : fs->fat_bits;
fs->fat_size = fat_length * logical_sector_size;
fs->label = calloc(12, sizeof(uint8_t));
if (fs->fat_bits == 12 || fs->fat_bits == 16) {
struct boot_sector_16 *b16 = (struct boot_sector_16 *)&b;
if (b16->extended_sig == 0x29)
memmove(fs->label, b16->label, 11);
else
fs->label = NULL;
} else if (fs->fat_bits == 32) {
if (b.extended_sig == 0x29)
memmove(fs->label, &b.label, 11);
else
fs->label = NULL;
}
total_fat_entries = (uint64_t)fs->fat_size * 8 / fs->fat_bits;
if (fs->data_clusters > total_fat_entries - 2)
die("Filesystem has %u clusters but only space for %u FAT entries.",
fs->data_clusters, total_fat_entries - 2);
if (!fs->root_entries && !fs->root_cluster)
die("Root directory has zero size.");
if (fs->root_entries & (MSDOS_DPS - 1))
die("Root directory (%d entries) doesn't span an integral number of "
"sectors.", fs->root_entries);
if (logical_sector_size & (SECTOR_SIZE - 1))
die("Logical sector size (%d bytes) is not a multiple of the physical "
"sector size.", logical_sector_size);
#if 0 /* linux kernel doesn't check that either */
/* ++roman: On Atari, these two fields are often left uninitialized */
if (!atari_format && (!b.secs_track || !b.heads))
die("Invalid disk format in boot sector.");
#endif
if (verbose)
dump_boot(fs, &b, logical_sector_size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The read_boot function in boot.c in dosfstools before 4.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted filesystem, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow in the (1) read_fat function or an out-of-bounds heap read in (2) get_fat function.
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <[email protected]> | Low | 14,515 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
{
struct key *keyring;
int bucket;
if (!name)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bucket = keyring_hash(name);
read_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
if (keyring_name_hash[bucket].next) {
/* search this hash bucket for a keyring with a matching name
* that's readable and that hasn't been revoked */
list_for_each_entry(keyring,
&keyring_name_hash[bucket],
name_link
) {
if (!kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), keyring->user->uid))
continue;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
continue;
if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
continue;
if (!skip_perm_check &&
key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
* key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'
* (ie. it has a zero usage count) */
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage))
continue;
keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
goto out;
}
}
keyring = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
out:
read_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
return keyring;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 4.13.5, a local user could create keyrings for other users via keyctl commands, setting unwanted defaults or causing a denial of service.
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <[email protected]> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> | Low | 9,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void __init trap_init(void)
{
int i;
#ifdef CONFIG_EISA
void __iomem *p = early_ioremap(0x0FFFD9, 4);
if (readl(p) == 'E' + ('I'<<8) + ('S'<<16) + ('A'<<24))
EISA_bus = 1;
early_iounmap(p, 4);
#endif
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_DE, divide_error);
set_intr_gate_ist(X86_TRAP_NMI, &nmi, NMI_STACK);
/* int4 can be called from all */
set_system_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_OF, &overflow);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_BR, bounds);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_UD, invalid_op);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_NM, device_not_available);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
set_task_gate(X86_TRAP_DF, GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS);
#else
set_intr_gate_ist(X86_TRAP_DF, &double_fault, DOUBLEFAULT_STACK);
#endif
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_OLD_MF, coprocessor_segment_overrun);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_TS, invalid_TSS);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_NP, segment_not_present);
set_intr_gate_ist(X86_TRAP_SS, &stack_segment, STACKFAULT_STACK);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_GP, general_protection);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_SPURIOUS, spurious_interrupt_bug);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_MF, coprocessor_error);
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_AC, alignment_check);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
set_intr_gate_ist(X86_TRAP_MC, &machine_check, MCE_STACK);
#endif
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_XF, simd_coprocessor_error);
/* Reserve all the builtin and the syscall vector: */
for (i = 0; i < FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR; i++)
set_bit(i, used_vectors);
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
set_system_intr_gate(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, ia32_syscall);
set_bit(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, used_vectors);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
set_system_trap_gate(SYSCALL_VECTOR, &system_call);
set_bit(SYSCALL_VECTOR, used_vectors);
#endif
/*
* Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
* "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
* to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
* It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
__set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);
/*
* Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
*/
cpu_init();
x86_init.irqs.trap_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
memcpy(&debug_idt_table, &idt_table, IDT_ENTRIES * 16);
set_nmi_gate(X86_TRAP_DB, &debug);
set_nmi_gate(X86_TRAP_BP, &int3);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S in the Linux kernel before 3.17.5 does not properly handle faults associated with the Stack Segment (SS) segment register, which allows local users to gain privileges by triggering an IRET instruction that leads to access to a GS Base address from the wrong space.
Commit Message: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 1,863 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::requestFileSystem(ExecutionContext* context, FileSystemType type, long long size, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
RefPtr<CallbackWrapper> wrapper = adoptRef(new CallbackWrapper(callbacks));
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, type, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The URL loader in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 21,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
opusParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
opusParams->nSampleRate = kRate;
opusParams->nBitRate = 0;
if (!isConfigured()) {
opusParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
opusParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kRate;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| High | 14,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DevToolsSession::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_ = process_host;
host_ = frame_host;
for (auto& pair : handlers_)
pair.second->SetRenderer(process_, host_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 5,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void cs_cmd_flags(sourceinfo_t *si, int parc, char *parv[])
{
chanacs_t *ca;
mowgli_node_t *n;
char *channel = parv[0];
char *target = sstrdup(parv[1]);
char *flagstr = parv[2];
const char *str1;
unsigned int addflags, removeflags, restrictflags;
hook_channel_acl_req_t req;
mychan_t *mc;
if (parc < 1)
{
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, STR_INSUFFICIENT_PARAMS, "FLAGS");
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, _("Syntax: FLAGS <channel> [target] [flags]"));
return;
}
mc = mychan_find(channel);
if (!mc)
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("Channel \2%s\2 is not registered."), channel);
return;
}
if (metadata_find(mc, "private:close:closer") && (target || !has_priv(si, PRIV_CHAN_AUSPEX)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("\2%s\2 is closed."), channel);
return;
}
if (!target || (target && target[0] == '+' && flagstr == NULL))
{
unsigned int flags = (target != NULL) ? flags_to_bitmask(target, 0) : 0;
do_list(si, mc, flags);
return;
}
/*
* following conditions are for compatibility with Anope just to avoid a whole clusterfuck
* of confused users caused by their 'innovation.' yeah, that's a word for it alright.
*
* anope 1.9's shiny new FLAGS command has:
*
* FLAGS #channel LIST
* FLAGS #channel MODIFY user flagspec
* FLAGS #channel CLEAR
*
* obviously they do not support the atheme syntax, because lets face it, they like to
* 'innovate.' this is, of course, hilarious for obvious reasons. never mind that we
* *invented* the FLAGS system for channel ACLs, so you would think they would find it
* worthwhile to be compatible here. i guess that would have been too obvious or something
* about their whole 'stealing our design' thing that they have been doing in 1.9 since the
* beginning... or do i mean 'innovating?'
*
* anyway we rewrite the commands as appropriate in the two if blocks below so that they
* are processed by the flags code as the user would intend. obviously, we're not really
* capable of handling the anope flag model (which makes honestly zero sense to me, and is
* extremely complex which kind of misses the entire point of the flags UI design...) so if
* some user tries passing anope flags, it will probably be hilarious. the good news is
* most of the anope flags tie up to atheme flags in some weird way anyway (probably because,
* i don't know, they copied the entire design and then fucked it up? yeah. probably that.)
*
* --nenolod
*/
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "LIST") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
do_list(si, mc, 0);
free(target);
return;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "CLEAR") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
free(target);
if (!chanacs_source_has_flag(mc, si, CA_FOUNDER))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, "You are not authorized to perform this operation.");
return;
}
mowgli_node_t *tn;
MOWGLI_ITER_FOREACH_SAFE(n, tn, mc->chanacs.head)
{
ca = n->data;
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER)
continue;
object_unref(ca);
}
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_DO, "CLEAR:FLAGS: \2%s\2", mc->name);
command_success_nodata(si, _("Cleared flags in \2%s\2."), mc->name);
return;
}
else if (!strcasecmp(target, "MODIFY") && myentity_find_ext(target) == NULL)
{
free(target);
if (parc < 3)
{
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, STR_INSUFFICIENT_PARAMS, "FLAGS");
command_fail(si, fault_needmoreparams, _("Syntax: FLAGS <#channel> MODIFY [target] <flags>"));
return;
}
flagstr = strchr(parv[2], ' ');
if (flagstr)
*flagstr++ = '\0';
target = strdup(parv[2]);
}
{
myentity_t *mt;
if (!si->smu)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not logged in."));
return;
}
if (!flagstr)
{
if (!(mc->flags & MC_PUBACL) && !chanacs_source_has_flag(mc, si, CA_ACLVIEW))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not authorized to execute this command."));
return;
}
if (validhostmask(target))
ca = chanacs_find_host_literal(mc, target, 0);
else
{
if (!(mt = myentity_find_ext(target)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("\2%s\2 is not registered."), target);
return;
}
free(target);
target = sstrdup(mt->name);
ca = chanacs_find_literal(mc, mt, 0);
}
if (ca != NULL)
{
str1 = bitmask_to_flags2(ca->level, 0);
command_success_string(si, str1, _("Flags for \2%s\2 in \2%s\2 are \2%s\2."),
target, channel,
str1);
}
else
command_success_string(si, "", _("No flags for \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."),
target, channel);
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_GET, "FLAGS: \2%s\2 on \2%s\2", mc->name, target);
return;
}
/* founder may always set flags -- jilles */
restrictflags = chanacs_source_flags(mc, si);
if (restrictflags & CA_FOUNDER)
restrictflags = ca_all;
else
{
if (!(restrictflags & CA_FLAGS))
{
/* allow a user to remove their own access
* even without +f */
if (restrictflags & CA_AKICK ||
si->smu == NULL ||
irccasecmp(target, entity(si->smu)->name) ||
strcmp(flagstr, "-*"))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not authorized to execute this command."));
return;
}
}
if (irccasecmp(target, entity(si->smu)->name))
restrictflags = allow_flags(mc, restrictflags);
else
restrictflags |= allow_flags(mc, restrictflags);
}
if (*flagstr == '+' || *flagstr == '-' || *flagstr == '=')
{
flags_make_bitmasks(flagstr, &addflags, &removeflags);
if (addflags == 0 && removeflags == 0)
{
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("No valid flags given, use /%s%s HELP FLAGS for a list"), ircd->uses_rcommand ? "" : "msg ", chansvs.me->disp);
return;
}
}
else
{
addflags = get_template_flags(mc, flagstr);
if (addflags == 0)
{
/* Hack -- jilles */
if (*target == '+' || *target == '-' || *target == '=')
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("Usage: FLAGS %s [target] [flags]"), mc->name);
else
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("Invalid template name given, use /%s%s TEMPLATE %s for a list"), ircd->uses_rcommand ? "" : "msg ", chansvs.me->disp, mc->name);
return;
}
removeflags = ca_all & ~addflags;
}
if (!validhostmask(target))
{
if (!(mt = myentity_find_ext(target)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_nosuch_target, _("\2%s\2 is not registered."), target);
return;
}
free(target);
target = sstrdup(mt->name);
ca = chanacs_open(mc, mt, NULL, true, entity(si->smu));
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER && removeflags & CA_FLAGS && !(removeflags & CA_FOUNDER))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You may not remove a founder's +f access."));
return;
}
if (ca->level & CA_FOUNDER && removeflags & CA_FOUNDER && mychan_num_founders(mc) == 1)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You may not remove the last founder."));
return;
}
if (!(ca->level & CA_FOUNDER) && addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
{
if (mychan_num_founders(mc) >= chansvs.maxfounders)
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("Only %d founders allowed per channel."), chansvs.maxfounders);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (!myentity_can_register_channel(mt))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("\2%s\2 has too many channels registered."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (!myentity_allow_foundership(mt))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("\2%s\2 cannot take foundership of a channel."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
}
if (addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
addflags |= CA_FLAGS, removeflags &= ~CA_FLAGS;
/* If NEVEROP is set, don't allow adding new entries
* except sole +b. Adding flags if the current level
* is +b counts as adding an entry.
* -- jilles */
/* XXX: not all entities are users */
if (isuser(mt) && (MU_NEVEROP & user(mt)->flags && addflags != CA_AKICK && addflags != 0 && (ca->level == 0 || ca->level == CA_AKICK)))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("\2%s\2 does not wish to be added to channel access lists (NEVEROP set)."), mt->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
if (ca->level == 0 && chanacs_is_table_full(ca))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("Channel %s access list is full."), mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.ca = ca;
req.oldlevel = ca->level;
if (!chanacs_modify(ca, &addflags, &removeflags, restrictflags))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not allowed to set \2%s\2 on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags), mt->name, mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.newlevel = ca->level;
hook_call_channel_acl_change(&req);
chanacs_close(ca);
}
else
{
if (addflags & CA_FOUNDER)
{
command_fail(si, fault_badparams, _("You may not set founder status on a hostmask."));
return;
}
ca = chanacs_open(mc, NULL, target, true, entity(si->smu));
if (ca->level == 0 && chanacs_is_table_full(ca))
{
command_fail(si, fault_toomany, _("Channel %s access list is full."), mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.ca = ca;
req.oldlevel = ca->level;
if (!chanacs_modify(ca, &addflags, &removeflags, restrictflags))
{
command_fail(si, fault_noprivs, _("You are not allowed to set \2%s\2 on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags), target, mc->name);
chanacs_close(ca);
return;
}
req.newlevel = ca->level;
hook_call_channel_acl_change(&req);
chanacs_close(ca);
}
if ((addflags | removeflags) == 0)
{
command_fail(si, fault_nochange, _("Channel access to \2%s\2 for \2%s\2 unchanged."), channel, target);
return;
}
flagstr = bitmask_to_flags2(addflags, removeflags);
command_success_nodata(si, _("Flags \2%s\2 were set on \2%s\2 in \2%s\2."), flagstr, target, channel);
logcommand(si, CMDLOG_SET, "FLAGS: \2%s\2 \2%s\2 \2%s\2", mc->name, target, flagstr);
verbose(mc, "\2%s\2 set flags \2%s\2 on \2%s\2", get_source_name(si), flagstr, target);
}
free(target);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: modules/chanserv/flags.c in Atheme before 7.2.7 allows remote attackers to modify the Anope FLAGS behavior by registering and dropping the (1) LIST, (2) CLEAR, or (3) MODIFY keyword nicks.
Commit Message: chanserv/flags: make Anope FLAGS compatibility an option
Previously, ChanServ FLAGS behavior could be modified by registering or
dropping the keyword nicks "LIST", "CLEAR", and "MODIFY".
Now, a configuration option is available that when turned on (default),
disables registration of these keyword nicks and enables this
compatibility feature. When turned off, registration of these keyword
nicks is possible, and compatibility to Anope's FLAGS command is
disabled.
Fixes atheme/atheme#397 | Medium | 4,788 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int atusb_get_and_show_revision(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
unsigned char buffer[3];
int ret;
/* Get a couple of the ATMega Firmware values */
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_ID, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
buffer, 3, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
atusb->fw_ver_maj = buffer[0];
atusb->fw_ver_min = buffer[1];
atusb->fw_hw_type = buffer[2];
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware: major: %u, minor: %u, hardware type: %u\n",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min, atusb->fw_hw_type);
}
if (atusb->fw_ver_maj == 0 && atusb->fw_ver_min < 2) {
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware version (%u.%u) predates our first public release.",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min);
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Please update to version 0.2 or newer");
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/ieee802154/atusb.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> | High | 29,791 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: IntRect PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect(int targetControlHeight, const IntPoint& popupInitialCoordinate)
{
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(kMaxHeight);
m_listBox->setMaxWidth(std::numeric_limits<int>::max());
int rtlOffset = layoutAndGetRTLOffset();
bool isRTL = this->isRTL();
int rightOffset = isRTL ? rtlOffset : 0;
IntSize targetSize(m_listBox->width() + kBorderSize * 2,
m_listBox->height() + kBorderSize * 2);
IntRect widgetRect;
ChromeClientChromium* chromeClient = chromeClientChromium();
if (chromeClient) {
FloatRect screen = screenAvailableRect(m_frameView.get());
widgetRect = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(IntRect(popupInitialCoordinate.x() + rightOffset, popupInitialCoordinate.y(), targetSize.width(), targetSize.height()));
FloatRect windowRect = chromeClient->windowRect();
if (windowRect.x() >= screen.x() && windowRect.maxX() <= screen.maxX() && (widgetRect.x() < screen.x() || widgetRect.maxX() > screen.maxX())) {
IntRect inverseWidgetRect = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(IntRect(popupInitialCoordinate.x() + (isRTL ? 0 : rtlOffset), popupInitialCoordinate.y(), targetSize.width(), targetSize.height()));
IntRect enclosingScreen = enclosingIntRect(screen);
unsigned originalCutoff = max(enclosingScreen.x() - widgetRect.x(), 0) + max(widgetRect.maxX() - enclosingScreen.maxX(), 0);
unsigned inverseCutoff = max(enclosingScreen.x() - inverseWidgetRect.x(), 0) + max(inverseWidgetRect.maxX() - enclosingScreen.maxX(), 0);
if (inverseCutoff < originalCutoff)
widgetRect = inverseWidgetRect;
if (widgetRect.x() < screen.x()) {
unsigned widgetRight = widgetRect.maxX();
widgetRect.setWidth(widgetRect.maxX() - screen.x());
widgetRect.setX(widgetRight - widgetRect.width());
listBox()->setMaxWidthAndLayout(max(widgetRect.width() - kBorderSize * 2, 0));
} else if (widgetRect.maxX() > screen.maxX()) {
widgetRect.setWidth(screen.maxX() - widgetRect.x());
listBox()->setMaxWidthAndLayout(max(widgetRect.width() - kBorderSize * 2, 0));
}
}
if (widgetRect.maxY() > static_cast<int>(screen.maxY())) {
if (widgetRect.y() - widgetRect.height() - targetControlHeight > 0) {
widgetRect.move(0, -(widgetRect.height() + targetControlHeight));
} else {
int spaceAbove = widgetRect.y() - targetControlHeight;
int spaceBelow = screen.maxY() - widgetRect.y();
if (spaceAbove > spaceBelow)
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(spaceAbove);
else
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(spaceBelow);
layoutAndGetRTLOffset();
IntRect frameInScreen = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(frameRect());
widgetRect.setY(frameInScreen.y());
widgetRect.setHeight(frameInScreen.height());
if (spaceAbove > spaceBelow)
widgetRect.move(0, -(widgetRect.height() + targetControlHeight));
}
}
}
return widgetRect;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Autofill feature in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly restrict field values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (UI corruption) and possibly conduct spoofing attacks via vectors involving long values.
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 25,197 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
u16 *buflen,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
*buflen = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
} else {
/*
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
}
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
} else {
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
}
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Linux kernel before version 4.11 is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference in fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c:setup_ntlmv2_rsp() that allows an attacker controlling a CIFS server to kernel panic a client that has this server mounted, because an empty TargetInfo field in an NTLMSSP setup negotiation response is mishandled during session recovery.
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]> | High | 12,599 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ip, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV4, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementation in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that leads to crossing a ruleset blob boundary.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | Medium | 8,826 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int php_stream_temp_cast(php_stream *stream, int castas, void **ret TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
php_stream *file;
size_t memsize;
char *membuf;
off_t pos;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (php_stream_is(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_IS_STDIO)) {
return php_stream_cast(ts->innerstream, castas, ret, 0);
}
/* we are still using a memory based backing. If they are if we can be
* a FILE*, say yes because we can perform the conversion.
* If they actually want to perform the conversion, we need to switch
* the memory stream to a tmpfile stream */
if (ret == NULL && castas == PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO) {
return SUCCESS;
}
/* say "no" to other stream forms */
if (ret == NULL) {
return FAILURE;
}
/* perform the conversion and then pass the request on to the innerstream */
membuf = php_stream_memory_get_buffer(ts->innerstream, &memsize);
file = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
php_stream_write(file, membuf, memsize);
pos = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
php_stream_free_enclosed(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE);
ts->innerstream = file;
php_stream_encloses(stream, ts->innerstream);
php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, pos, SEEK_SET);
return php_stream_cast(ts->innerstream, castas, ret, 1);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In PHP before 5.5.32, 5.6.x before 5.6.18, and 7.x before 7.0.3, all of the return values of stream_get_meta_data can be controlled if the input can be controlled (e.g., during file uploads). For example, a "$uri = stream_get_meta_data(fopen($file, "r"))['uri']" call mishandles the case where $file is data:text/plain;uri=eviluri, -- in other words, metadata can be set by an attacker.
Commit Message: | Medium | 597 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int free_query_string = 0;
int exit_status = SUCCESS;
int cgi = 0, c, i, len;
zend_file_handle file_handle;
char *s;
/* temporary locals */
int behavior = PHP_MODE_STANDARD;
int no_headers = 0;
int orig_optind = php_optind;
char *orig_optarg = php_optarg;
char *script_file = NULL;
int ini_entries_len = 0;
/* end of temporary locals */
#ifdef ZTS
void ***tsrm_ls;
#endif
int max_requests = 500;
int requests = 0;
int fastcgi;
char *bindpath = NULL;
int fcgi_fd = 0;
fcgi_request *request = NULL;
int repeats = 1;
int benchmark = 0;
#if HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
struct timeval start, end;
#else
time_t start, end;
#endif
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
int status = 0;
#endif
char *query_string;
char *decoded_query_string;
int skip_getopt = 0;
#if 0 && defined(PHP_DEBUG)
/* IIS is always making things more difficult. This allows
* us to stop PHP and attach a debugger before much gets started */
{
char szMessage [256];
wsprintf (szMessage, "Please attach a debugger to the process 0x%X [%d] (%s) and click OK", GetCurrentProcessId(), GetCurrentProcessId(), argv[0]);
MessageBox(NULL, szMessage, "CGI Debug Time!", MB_OK|MB_SERVICE_NOTIFICATION);
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H
#if defined(SIGPIPE) && defined(SIG_IGN)
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE in standalone mode so
that sockets created via fsockopen()
don't kill PHP if the remote site
closes it. in apache|apxs mode apache
does that for us! [email protected]
20000419 */
#endif
#endif
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_startup(1, 1, 0, NULL);
tsrm_ls = ts_resource(0);
#endif
sapi_startup(&cgi_sapi_module);
fastcgi = fcgi_is_fastcgi();
cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override = NULL;
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
_fmode = _O_BINARY; /* sets default for file streams to binary */
setmode(_fileno(stdin), O_BINARY); /* make the stdio mode be binary */
setmode(_fileno(stdout), O_BINARY); /* make the stdio mode be binary */
setmode(_fileno(stderr), O_BINARY); /* make the stdio mode be binary */
#endif
if (!fastcgi) {
/* Make sure we detect we are a cgi - a bit redundancy here,
* but the default case is that we have to check only the first one. */
if (getenv("SERVER_SOFTWARE") ||
getenv("SERVER_NAME") ||
getenv("GATEWAY_INTERFACE") ||
getenv("REQUEST_METHOD")
) {
cgi = 1;
}
}
if((query_string = getenv("QUERY_STRING")) != NULL && strchr(query_string, '=') == NULL) {
/* we've got query string that has no = - apache CGI will pass it to command line */
unsigned char *p;
decoded_query_string = strdup(query_string);
php_url_decode(decoded_query_string, strlen(decoded_query_string));
for (p = decoded_query_string; *p && *p <= ' '; p++) {
/* skip all leading spaces */
}
if(*p == '-') {
skip_getopt = 1;
}
free(decoded_query_string);
}
while (!skip_getopt && (c = php_getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS, &php_optarg, &php_optind, 0, 2)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'c':
if (cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override) {
free(cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override);
}
cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override = strdup(php_optarg);
break;
case 'n':
cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_ignore = 1;
break;
case 'd': {
/* define ini entries on command line */
int len = strlen(php_optarg);
char *val;
if ((val = strchr(php_optarg, '='))) {
val++;
if (!isalnum(*val) && *val != '"' && *val != '\'' && *val != '\0') {
cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries = realloc(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries, ini_entries_len + len + sizeof("\"\"\n\0"));
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, php_optarg, (val - php_optarg));
ini_entries_len += (val - php_optarg);
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, "\"", 1);
ini_entries_len++;
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, val, len - (val - php_optarg));
ini_entries_len += len - (val - php_optarg);
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, "\"\n\0", sizeof("\"\n\0"));
ini_entries_len += sizeof("\n\0\"") - 2;
} else {
cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries = realloc(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries, ini_entries_len + len + sizeof("\n\0"));
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, php_optarg, len);
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len + len, "\n\0", sizeof("\n\0"));
ini_entries_len += len + sizeof("\n\0") - 2;
}
} else {
cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries = realloc(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries, ini_entries_len + len + sizeof("=1\n\0"));
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, php_optarg, len);
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len + len, "=1\n\0", sizeof("=1\n\0"));
ini_entries_len += len + sizeof("=1\n\0") - 2;
}
break;
}
/* if we're started on command line, check to see if
* we are being started as an 'external' fastcgi
* server by accepting a bindpath parameter. */
case 'b':
if (!fastcgi) {
bindpath = strdup(php_optarg);
}
break;
case 's': /* generate highlighted HTML from source */
behavior = PHP_MODE_HIGHLIGHT;
break;
}
}
php_optind = orig_optind;
php_optarg = orig_optarg;
if (fastcgi || bindpath) {
/* Override SAPI callbacks */
cgi_sapi_module.ub_write = sapi_fcgi_ub_write;
cgi_sapi_module.flush = sapi_fcgi_flush;
cgi_sapi_module.read_post = sapi_fcgi_read_post;
cgi_sapi_module.getenv = sapi_fcgi_getenv;
cgi_sapi_module.read_cookies = sapi_fcgi_read_cookies;
}
#ifdef ZTS
SG(request_info).path_translated = NULL;
#endif
cgi_sapi_module.executable_location = argv[0];
if (!cgi && !fastcgi && !bindpath) {
cgi_sapi_module.additional_functions = additional_functions;
}
/* startup after we get the above ini override se we get things right */
if (cgi_sapi_module.startup(&cgi_sapi_module) == FAILURE) {
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
return FAILURE;
}
/* check force_cgi after startup, so we have proper output */
if (cgi && CGIG(force_redirect)) {
/* Apache will generate REDIRECT_STATUS,
* Netscape and redirect.so will generate HTTP_REDIRECT_STATUS.
* redirect.so and installation instructions available from
* http://www.koehntopp.de/php.
* -- [email protected]
*/
if (!getenv("REDIRECT_STATUS") &&
!getenv ("HTTP_REDIRECT_STATUS") &&
/* this is to allow a different env var to be configured
* in case some server does something different than above */
(!CGIG(redirect_status_env) || !getenv(CGIG(redirect_status_env)))
) {
zend_try {
SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 400;
PUTS("<b>Security Alert!</b> The PHP CGI cannot be accessed directly.\n\n\
<p>This PHP CGI binary was compiled with force-cgi-redirect enabled. This\n\
means that a page will only be served up if the REDIRECT_STATUS CGI variable is\n\
set, e.g. via an Apache Action directive.</p>\n\
<p>For more information as to <i>why</i> this behaviour exists, see the <a href=\"http://php.net/security.cgi-bin\">\
manual page for CGI security</a>.</p>\n\
<p>For more information about changing this behaviour or re-enabling this webserver,\n\
consult the installation file that came with this distribution, or visit \n\
<a href=\"http://php.net/install.windows\">the manual page</a>.</p>\n");
} zend_catch {
} zend_end_try();
#if defined(ZTS) && !defined(PHP_DEBUG)
/* XXX we're crashing here in msvc6 debug builds at
* php_message_handler_for_zend:839 because
* SG(request_info).path_translated is an invalid pointer.
* It still happens even though I set it to null, so something
* weird is going on.
*/
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (bindpath) {
fcgi_fd = fcgi_listen(bindpath, 128);
if (fcgi_fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't create FastCGI listen socket on port %s\n", bindpath);
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
return FAILURE;
}
fastcgi = fcgi_is_fastcgi();
}
if (fastcgi) {
/* How many times to run PHP scripts before dying */
if (getenv("PHP_FCGI_MAX_REQUESTS")) {
max_requests = atoi(getenv("PHP_FCGI_MAX_REQUESTS"));
if (max_requests < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "PHP_FCGI_MAX_REQUESTS is not valid\n");
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* make php call us to get _ENV vars */
php_php_import_environment_variables = php_import_environment_variables;
php_import_environment_variables = cgi_php_import_environment_variables;
/* library is already initialized, now init our request */
request = fcgi_init_request(fcgi_fd);
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
/* Pre-fork, if required */
if (getenv("PHP_FCGI_CHILDREN")) {
char * children_str = getenv("PHP_FCGI_CHILDREN");
children = atoi(children_str);
if (children < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "PHP_FCGI_CHILDREN is not valid\n");
return FAILURE;
}
fcgi_set_mgmt_var("FCGI_MAX_CONNS", sizeof("FCGI_MAX_CONNS")-1, children_str, strlen(children_str));
/* This is the number of concurrent requests, equals FCGI_MAX_CONNS */
fcgi_set_mgmt_var("FCGI_MAX_REQS", sizeof("FCGI_MAX_REQS")-1, children_str, strlen(children_str));
} else {
fcgi_set_mgmt_var("FCGI_MAX_CONNS", sizeof("FCGI_MAX_CONNS")-1, "1", sizeof("1")-1);
fcgi_set_mgmt_var("FCGI_MAX_REQS", sizeof("FCGI_MAX_REQS")-1, "1", sizeof("1")-1);
}
if (children) {
int running = 0;
pid_t pid;
/* Create a process group for ourself & children */
setsid();
pgroup = getpgrp();
#ifdef DEBUG_FASTCGI
fprintf(stderr, "Process group %d\n", pgroup);
#endif
/* Set up handler to kill children upon exit */
act.sa_flags = 0;
act.sa_handler = fastcgi_cleanup;
if (sigaction(SIGTERM, &act, &old_term) ||
sigaction(SIGINT, &act, &old_int) ||
sigaction(SIGQUIT, &act, &old_quit)
) {
perror("Can't set signals");
exit(1);
}
if (fcgi_in_shutdown()) {
goto parent_out;
}
while (parent) {
do {
#ifdef DEBUG_FASTCGI
fprintf(stderr, "Forking, %d running\n", running);
#endif
pid = fork();
switch (pid) {
case 0:
/* One of the children.
* Make sure we don't go round the
* fork loop any more
*/
parent = 0;
/* don't catch our signals */
sigaction(SIGTERM, &old_term, 0);
sigaction(SIGQUIT, &old_quit, 0);
sigaction(SIGINT, &old_int, 0);
break;
case -1:
perror("php (pre-forking)");
exit(1);
break;
default:
/* Fine */
running++;
break;
}
} while (parent && (running < children));
if (parent) {
#ifdef DEBUG_FASTCGI
fprintf(stderr, "Wait for kids, pid %d\n", getpid());
#endif
parent_waiting = 1;
while (1) {
if (wait(&status) >= 0) {
running--;
break;
} else if (exit_signal) {
break;
}
}
if (exit_signal) {
#if 0
while (running > 0) {
while (wait(&status) < 0) {
}
running--;
}
#endif
goto parent_out;
}
}
}
} else {
parent = 0;
}
#endif /* WIN32 */
}
zend_first_try {
while (!skip_getopt && (c = php_getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS, &php_optarg, &php_optind, 1, 2)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'T':
benchmark = 1;
repeats = atoi(php_optarg);
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
#else
time(&start);
#endif
break;
case 'h':
case '?':
if (request) {
fcgi_destroy_request(request);
}
fcgi_shutdown();
no_headers = 1;
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
php_cgi_usage(argv[0]);
php_output_end_all(TSRMLS_C);
exit_status = 0;
goto out;
}
}
php_optind = orig_optind;
php_optarg = orig_optarg;
/* start of FAST CGI loop */
/* Initialise FastCGI request structure */
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* attempt to set security impersonation for fastcgi
* will only happen on NT based OS, others will ignore it. */
if (fastcgi && CGIG(impersonate)) {
fcgi_impersonate();
}
#endif
while (!fastcgi || fcgi_accept_request(request) >= 0) {
SG(server_context) = fastcgi ? (void *) request : (void *) 1;
init_request_info(request TSRMLS_CC);
CG(interactive) = 0;
if (!cgi && !fastcgi) {
while ((c = php_getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS, &php_optarg, &php_optind, 0, 2)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'a': /* interactive mode */
printf("Interactive mode enabled\n\n");
CG(interactive) = 1;
break;
case 'C': /* don't chdir to the script directory */
SG(options) |= SAPI_OPTION_NO_CHDIR;
break;
case 'e': /* enable extended info output */
CG(compiler_options) |= ZEND_COMPILE_EXTENDED_INFO;
break;
case 'f': /* parse file */
if (script_file) {
efree(script_file);
}
script_file = estrdup(php_optarg);
no_headers = 1;
break;
case 'i': /* php info & quit */
if (script_file) {
efree(script_file);
}
if (php_request_startup(TSRMLS_C) == FAILURE) {
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
return FAILURE;
}
if (no_headers) {
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 1;
}
php_print_info(0xFFFFFFFF TSRMLS_CC);
php_request_shutdown((void *) 0);
fcgi_shutdown();
exit_status = 0;
goto out;
case 'l': /* syntax check mode */
no_headers = 1;
behavior = PHP_MODE_LINT;
break;
case 'm': /* list compiled in modules */
if (script_file) {
efree(script_file);
}
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
php_printf("[PHP Modules]\n");
print_modules(TSRMLS_C);
php_printf("\n[Zend Modules]\n");
print_extensions(TSRMLS_C);
php_printf("\n");
php_output_end_all(TSRMLS_C);
fcgi_shutdown();
exit_status = 0;
goto out;
#if 0 /* not yet operational, see also below ... */
case '': /* generate indented source mode*/
behavior=PHP_MODE_INDENT;
break;
#endif
case 'q': /* do not generate HTTP headers */
no_headers = 1;
break;
case 'v': /* show php version & quit */
if (script_file) {
efree(script_file);
}
no_headers = 1;
if (php_request_startup(TSRMLS_C) == FAILURE) {
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
return FAILURE;
}
if (no_headers) {
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 1;
}
#if ZEND_DEBUG
php_printf("PHP %s (%s) (built: %s %s) (DEBUG)\nCopyright (c) 1997-2014 The PHP Group\n%s", PHP_VERSION, sapi_module.name, __DATE__, __TIME__, get_zend_version());
#else
php_printf("PHP %s (%s) (built: %s %s)\nCopyright (c) 1997-2014 The PHP Group\n%s", PHP_VERSION, sapi_module.name, __DATE__, __TIME__, get_zend_version());
#endif
php_request_shutdown((void *) 0);
fcgi_shutdown();
exit_status = 0;
goto out;
case 'w':
behavior = PHP_MODE_STRIP;
break;
case 'z': /* load extension file */
zend_load_extension(php_optarg);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (script_file) {
/* override path_translated if -f on command line */
STR_FREE(SG(request_info).path_translated);
SG(request_info).path_translated = script_file;
/* before registering argv to module exchange the *new* argv[0] */
/* we can achieve this without allocating more memory */
SG(request_info).argc = argc - (php_optind - 1);
SG(request_info).argv = &argv[php_optind - 1];
SG(request_info).argv[0] = script_file;
} else if (argc > php_optind) {
/* file is on command line, but not in -f opt */
STR_FREE(SG(request_info).path_translated);
SG(request_info).path_translated = estrdup(argv[php_optind]);
/* arguments after the file are considered script args */
SG(request_info).argc = argc - php_optind;
SG(request_info).argv = &argv[php_optind];
}
if (no_headers) {
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 1;
}
/* all remaining arguments are part of the query string
* this section of code concatenates all remaining arguments
* into a single string, seperating args with a &
* this allows command lines like:
*
* test.php v1=test v2=hello+world!
* test.php "v1=test&v2=hello world!"
* test.php v1=test "v2=hello world!"
*/
if (!SG(request_info).query_string && argc > php_optind) {
int slen = strlen(PG(arg_separator).input);
len = 0;
for (i = php_optind; i < argc; i++) {
if (i < (argc - 1)) {
len += strlen(argv[i]) + slen;
} else {
len += strlen(argv[i]);
}
}
len += 2;
s = malloc(len);
*s = '\0'; /* we are pretending it came from the environment */
for (i = php_optind; i < argc; i++) {
strlcat(s, argv[i], len);
if (i < (argc - 1)) {
strlcat(s, PG(arg_separator).input, len);
}
}
SG(request_info).query_string = s;
free_query_string = 1;
}
} /* end !cgi && !fastcgi */
/*
we never take stdin if we're (f)cgi, always
rely on the web server giving us the info
we need in the environment.
*/
if (SG(request_info).path_translated || cgi || fastcgi) {
file_handle.type = ZEND_HANDLE_FILENAME;
file_handle.filename = SG(request_info).path_translated;
file_handle.handle.fp = NULL;
} else {
file_handle.filename = "-";
file_handle.type = ZEND_HANDLE_FP;
file_handle.handle.fp = stdin;
}
file_handle.opened_path = NULL;
file_handle.free_filename = 0;
/* request startup only after we've done all we can to
* get path_translated */
if (php_request_startup(TSRMLS_C) == FAILURE) {
if (fastcgi) {
fcgi_finish_request(request, 1);
}
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
return FAILURE;
}
if (no_headers) {
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 1;
}
/*
at this point path_translated will be set if:
1. we are running from shell and got filename was there
2. we are running as cgi or fastcgi
*/
if (cgi || fastcgi || SG(request_info).path_translated) {
if (php_fopen_primary_script(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_try {
if (errno == EACCES) {
SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 403;
PUTS("Access denied.\n");
} else {
SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 404;
PUTS("No input file specified.\n");
}
} zend_catch {
} zend_end_try();
/* we want to serve more requests if this is fastcgi
* so cleanup and continue, request shutdown is
* handled later */
if (fastcgi) {
goto fastcgi_request_done;
}
STR_FREE(SG(request_info).path_translated);
if (free_query_string && SG(request_info).query_string) {
free(SG(request_info).query_string);
SG(request_info).query_string = NULL;
}
php_request_shutdown((void *) 0);
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
sapi_shutdown();
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (CGIG(check_shebang_line)) {
/* #!php support */
switch (file_handle.type) {
case ZEND_HANDLE_FD:
if (file_handle.handle.fd < 0) {
break;
}
file_handle.type = ZEND_HANDLE_FP;
file_handle.handle.fp = fdopen(file_handle.handle.fd, "rb");
/* break missing intentionally */
case ZEND_HANDLE_FP:
if (!file_handle.handle.fp ||
(file_handle.handle.fp == stdin)) {
break;
}
c = fgetc(file_handle.handle.fp);
if (c == '#') {
while (c != '\n' && c != '\r' && c != EOF) {
c = fgetc(file_handle.handle.fp); /* skip to end of line */
}
/* handle situations where line is terminated by \r\n */
if (c == '\r') {
if (fgetc(file_handle.handle.fp) != '\n') {
long pos = ftell(file_handle.handle.fp);
fseek(file_handle.handle.fp, pos - 1, SEEK_SET);
}
}
CG(start_lineno) = 2;
} else {
rewind(file_handle.handle.fp);
}
break;
case ZEND_HANDLE_STREAM:
c = php_stream_getc((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle);
if (c == '#') {
while (c != '\n' && c != '\r' && c != EOF) {
c = php_stream_getc((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle); /* skip to end of line */
}
/* handle situations where line is terminated by \r\n */
if (c == '\r') {
if (php_stream_getc((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle) != '\n') {
long pos = php_stream_tell((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle);
php_stream_seek((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle, pos - 1, SEEK_SET);
}
}
CG(start_lineno) = 2;
} else {
php_stream_rewind((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle);
}
break;
case ZEND_HANDLE_MAPPED:
if (file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf[0] == '#') {
int i = 1;
c = file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf[i++];
while (c != '\n' && c != '\r' && c != EOF) {
c = file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf[i++];
}
if (c == '\r') {
if (file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf[i] == '\n') {
i++;
}
}
file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf += i;
file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.len -= i;
}
}
}
switch (behavior) {
case PHP_MODE_STANDARD:
php_execute_script(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case PHP_MODE_LINT:
PG(during_request_startup) = 0;
exit_status = php_lint_script(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
if (exit_status == SUCCESS) {
zend_printf("No syntax errors detected in %s\n", file_handle.filename);
} else {
zend_printf("Errors parsing %s\n", file_handle.filename);
}
break;
case PHP_MODE_STRIP:
if (open_file_for_scanning(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
zend_strip(TSRMLS_C);
zend_file_handle_dtor(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_teardown();
}
return SUCCESS;
break;
case PHP_MODE_HIGHLIGHT:
{
zend_syntax_highlighter_ini syntax_highlighter_ini;
if (open_file_for_scanning(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
php_get_highlight_struct(&syntax_highlighter_ini);
zend_highlight(&syntax_highlighter_ini TSRMLS_CC);
if (fastcgi) {
goto fastcgi_request_done;
}
zend_file_handle_dtor(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_teardown();
}
return SUCCESS;
}
break;
#if 0
/* Zeev might want to do something with this one day */
case PHP_MODE_INDENT:
open_file_for_scanning(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
zend_indent();
zend_file_handle_dtor(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_teardown();
return SUCCESS;
break;
#endif
}
fastcgi_request_done:
{
STR_FREE(SG(request_info).path_translated);
php_request_shutdown((void *) 0);
if (exit_status == 0) {
exit_status = EG(exit_status);
}
if (free_query_string && SG(request_info).query_string) {
free(SG(request_info).query_string);
SG(request_info).query_string = NULL;
}
}
if (!fastcgi) {
if (benchmark) {
repeats--;
if (repeats > 0) {
script_file = NULL;
php_optind = orig_optind;
php_optarg = orig_optarg;
continue;
}
}
break;
}
/* only fastcgi will get here */
requests++;
if (max_requests && (requests == max_requests)) {
fcgi_finish_request(request, 1);
if (bindpath) {
free(bindpath);
}
if (max_requests != 1) {
/* no need to return exit_status of the last request */
exit_status = 0;
}
break;
}
/* end of fastcgi loop */
}
if (request) {
fcgi_destroy_request(request);
}
fcgi_shutdown();
if (cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override) {
free(cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override);
}
if (cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries) {
free(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries);
}
} zend_catch {
exit_status = 255;
} zend_end_try();
out:
if (benchmark) {
int sec;
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
int usec;
gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
sec = (int)(end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec);
if (end.tv_usec >= start.tv_usec) {
usec = (int)(end.tv_usec - start.tv_usec);
} else {
sec -= 1;
usec = (int)(end.tv_usec + 1000000 - start.tv_usec);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\nElapsed time: %d.%06d sec\n", sec, usec);
#else
time(&end);
sec = (int)(end - start);
fprintf(stderr, "\nElapsed time: %d sec\n", sec);
#endif
}
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
parent_out:
#endif
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
sapi_shutdown();
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) && ZEND_DEBUG && 0
_CrtDumpMemoryLeaks();
#endif
return exit_status;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c in the CGI component in PHP through 5.4.36, 5.5.x through 5.5.20, and 5.6.x through 5.6.4, when mmap is used to read a .php file, does not properly consider the mapping's length during processing of an invalid file that begins with a # character and lacks a newline character, which causes an out-of-bounds read and might (1) allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from php-cgi process memory by leveraging the ability to upload a .php file or (2) trigger unexpected code execution if a valid PHP script is present in memory locations adjacent to the mapping.
Commit Message: | High | 23,814 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
struct ucounts *ucounts;
int ret;
ucounts = inc_mnt_namespaces(user_ns);
if (!ucounts)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
new_ns = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mnt_namespace), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_ns) {
dec_mnt_namespaces(ucounts);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
ret = ns_alloc_inum(&new_ns->ns);
if (ret) {
kfree(new_ns);
dec_mnt_namespaces(ucounts);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
new_ns->ns.ops = &mntns_operations;
new_ns->seq = atomic64_add_return(1, &mnt_ns_seq);
atomic_set(&new_ns->count, 1);
new_ns->root = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_ns->list);
init_waitqueue_head(&new_ns->poll);
new_ns->event = 0;
new_ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
new_ns->ucounts = ucounts;
return new_ns;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9 does not restrict how many mounts may exist in a mount namespace, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and deadlock) via MS_BIND mount system calls, as demonstrated by a loop that triggers exponential growth in the number of mounts.
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <[email protected]> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <[email protected]> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 27,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void fslib_copy_libs(const char *full_path) {
assert(full_path);
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" fslib_copy_libs %s\n", full_path);
if (access(full_path, R_OK)) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf("cannot find %s for private-lib, skipping...\n", full_path);
return;
}
unlink(RUN_LIB_FILE); // in case is there
create_empty_file_as_root(RUN_LIB_FILE, 0644);
if (chown(RUN_LIB_FILE, getuid(), getgid()))
errExit("chown");
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" running fldd %s\n", full_path);
sbox_run(SBOX_USER | SBOX_SECCOMP | SBOX_CAPS_NONE, 3, PATH_FLDD, full_path, RUN_LIB_FILE);
FILE *fp = fopen(RUN_LIB_FILE, "r");
if (!fp)
errExit("fopen");
char buf[MAXBUF];
while (fgets(buf, MAXBUF, fp)) {
char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (ptr)
*ptr = '\0';
fslib_duplicate(buf);
}
fclose(fp);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: In Firejail before 0.9.60, seccomp filters are writable inside the jail, leading to a lack of intended seccomp restrictions for a process that is joined to the jail after a filter has been modified by an attacker.
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more | Medium | 25,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient* client)
: m_client(client)
{
ASSERT_UNUSED(m_client, m_client);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 6,985 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
history::URLRow* url_row) {
DCHECK(url_row);
HistoryService* history_service =
profile->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
return url_db && (url_db->GetRowForURL(match.destination_url, url_row) != 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 does not properly implement SVG filters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 29,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders(const SpdyHeaderBlock& headers) {
SpdyHeaderBlock::const_iterator it = headers.find(kHttp2MethodHeader);
DCHECK(it != headers.end());
if (!(it->second == "GET" || it->second == "HEAD")) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Promise for stream " << id_ << " has invalid method "
<< it->second;
Reset(QUIC_INVALID_PROMISE_METHOD);
return;
}
if (!SpdyUtils::UrlIsValid(headers)) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Promise for stream " << id_ << " has invalid URL "
<< url_;
Reset(QUIC_INVALID_PROMISE_URL);
return;
}
if (!session_->IsAuthorized(SpdyUtils::GetHostNameFromHeaderBlock(headers))) {
Reset(QUIC_UNAUTHORIZED_PROMISE_URL);
return;
}
request_headers_.reset(new SpdyHeaderBlock(headers.Clone()));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A stack buffer overflow in the QUIC networking stack in Google Chrome prior to 62.0.3202.89 allowed a remote attacker to gain code execution via a malicious server.
Commit Message: Fix Stack Buffer Overflow in QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders
BUG=777728
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I6a80db88aafdf20c7abd3847404b818565681310
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748425
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513105} | High | 27,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0;
else
outpkt.priority = -1;
memcpy(outpkt.data, buffer, len);
receive_packet(c->node, &outpkt);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the receive_tcppacket function in net_packet.c in tinc before 1.0.21 and 1.1 before 1.1pre7 allows remote authenticated peers to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a large TCP packet.
Commit Message: Drop packets forwarded via TCP if they are too big (CVE-2013-1428).
Normally all requests sent via the meta connections are checked so that they
cannot be larger than the input buffer. However, when packets are forwarded via
meta connections, they are copied into a packet buffer without checking whether
it fits into it. Since the packet buffer is allocated on the stack, this in
effect allows an authenticated remote node to cause a stack overflow.
This issue was found by Martin Schobert. | Medium | 20,153 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Draw(cc::PaintCanvas* canvas,
const cc::PaintFlags& flags,
const FloatRect& dst_rect,
const FloatRect& src_rect,
RespectImageOrientationEnum,
ImageClampingMode clamp_mode,
ImageDecodingMode) {
StaticBitmapImage::DrawHelper(canvas, flags, dst_rect, src_rect, clamp_mode,
PaintImageForCurrentFrame());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 21,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Release() {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Release";
pincode_callback_.Reset();
passkey_callback_.Reset();
confirmation_callback_.Reset();
UnregisterAgent();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 16,425 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int _make_decode_table(codebook *s,char *lengthlist,long quantvals,
oggpack_buffer *opb,int maptype){
int i;
ogg_uint32_t *work;
if (!lengthlist) return 1;
if(s->dec_nodeb==4){
/* Over-allocate by using s->entries instead of used_entries.
* This means that we can use s->entries to enforce size in
* _make_words without messing up length list looping.
* This probably wastes a bit of space, but it shouldn't
* impact behavior or size too much.
*/
s->dec_table=_ogg_malloc((s->entries*2+1)*sizeof(*work));
if (!s->dec_table) return 1;
/* +1 (rather than -2) is to accommodate 0 and 1 sized books,
which are specialcased to nodeb==4 */
if(_make_words(lengthlist,s->entries,
s->dec_table,quantvals,s,opb,maptype))return 1;
return 0;
}
if (s->used_entries > INT_MAX/2 ||
s->used_entries*2 > INT_MAX/((long) sizeof(*work)) - 1) return 1;
/* Overallocate as above */
work=calloc((s->entries*2+1),sizeof(*work));
if (!work) return 1;
if(_make_words(lengthlist,s->entries,work,quantvals,s,opb,maptype)) goto error_out;
if (s->used_entries > INT_MAX/(s->dec_leafw+1)) goto error_out;
if (s->dec_nodeb && s->used_entries * (s->dec_leafw+1) > INT_MAX/s->dec_nodeb) goto error_out;
s->dec_table=_ogg_malloc((s->used_entries*(s->dec_leafw+1)-2)*
s->dec_nodeb);
if (!s->dec_table) goto error_out;
if(s->dec_leafw==1){
switch(s->dec_nodeb){
case 1:
for(i=0;i<s->used_entries*2-2;i++)
((unsigned char *)s->dec_table)[i]=(unsigned char)
(((work[i] & 0x80000000UL) >> 24) | work[i]);
break;
case 2:
for(i=0;i<s->used_entries*2-2;i++)
((ogg_uint16_t *)s->dec_table)[i]=(ogg_uint16_t)
(((work[i] & 0x80000000UL) >> 16) | work[i]);
break;
}
}else{
/* more complex; we have to do a two-pass repack that updates the
node indexing. */
long top=s->used_entries*3-2;
if(s->dec_nodeb==1){
unsigned char *out=(unsigned char *)s->dec_table;
for(i=s->used_entries*2-4;i>=0;i-=2){
if(work[i]&0x80000000UL){
if(work[i+1]&0x80000000UL){
top-=4;
out[top]=(work[i]>>8 & 0x7f)|0x80;
out[top+1]=(work[i+1]>>8 & 0x7f)|0x80;
out[top+2]=work[i] & 0xff;
out[top+3]=work[i+1] & 0xff;
}else{
top-=3;
out[top]=(work[i]>>8 & 0x7f)|0x80;
out[top+1]=work[work[i+1]*2];
out[top+2]=work[i] & 0xff;
}
}else{
if(work[i+1]&0x80000000UL){
top-=3;
out[top]=work[work[i]*2];
out[top+1]=(work[i+1]>>8 & 0x7f)|0x80;
out[top+2]=work[i+1] & 0xff;
}else{
top-=2;
out[top]=work[work[i]*2];
out[top+1]=work[work[i+1]*2];
}
}
work[i]=top;
}
}else{
ogg_uint16_t *out=(ogg_uint16_t *)s->dec_table;
for(i=s->used_entries*2-4;i>=0;i-=2){
if(work[i]&0x80000000UL){
if(work[i+1]&0x80000000UL){
top-=4;
out[top]=(work[i]>>16 & 0x7fff)|0x8000;
out[top+1]=(work[i+1]>>16 & 0x7fff)|0x8000;
out[top+2]=work[i] & 0xffff;
out[top+3]=work[i+1] & 0xffff;
}else{
top-=3;
out[top]=(work[i]>>16 & 0x7fff)|0x8000;
out[top+1]=work[work[i+1]*2];
out[top+2]=work[i] & 0xffff;
}
}else{
if(work[i+1]&0x80000000UL){
top-=3;
out[top]=work[work[i]*2];
out[top+1]=(work[i+1]>>16 & 0x7fff)|0x8000;
out[top+2]=work[i+1] & 0xffff;
}else{
top-=2;
out[top]=work[work[i]*2];
out[top+1]=work[work[i+1]*2];
}
}
work[i]=top;
}
}
}
free(work);
return 0;
error_out:
free(work);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62800140.
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
| High | 21,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: gss_process_context_token (minor_status,
context_handle,
token_buffer)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
if (token_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
if (GSS_EMPTY_BUFFER(token_buffer))
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_process_context_token) {
status = mech->gss_process_context_token(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
token_buffer);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | High | 5,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> PrivateScriptRunner::runDOMAttributeGetter(ScriptState* scriptState, ScriptState* scriptStateInUserScript, const char* className, const char* attributeName, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject = classObjectOfPrivateScript(scriptState, className);
v8::Local<v8::Value> descriptor;
if (!classObject->GetOwnPropertyDescriptor(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, attributeName)).ToLocal(&descriptor) || !descriptor->IsObject()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute getter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> getter;
if (!v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(descriptor)->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "get")).ToLocal(&getter) || !getter->IsFunction()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute getter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
initializeHolderIfNeeded(scriptState, classObject, holder);
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(getter), scriptState->getExecutionContext(), holder, 0, 0, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
rethrowExceptionInPrivateScript(isolate, block, scriptStateInUserScript, ExceptionState::GetterContext, attributeName, className);
block.ReThrow();
return v8::Local<v8::Value>();
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android permitted execution of v8 microtasks while the DOM was in an inconsistent state, which allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: Blink-in-JS should not run micro tasks
If Blink-in-JS runs micro tasks, there's a risk of causing a UXSS bug
(see 645211 for concrete steps).
This CL makes Blink-in-JS use callInternalFunction (instead of callFunction)
to avoid running micro tasks after Blink-in-JS' callbacks.
BUG=645211
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2330843002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#417874} | Medium | 22,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WT_Interpolate (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
const EAS_SAMPLE *loopEnd;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
loopEnd = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
/*lint -e{713} truncation is OK */
phaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* check for loop end */
acc0 = (EAS_I32) (pSamples - loopEnd);
if (acc0 >= 0)
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->loopStart + acc0;
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Sonivox in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 does not check for a negative number of samples, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtengine.c and arm-wt-22k/lib_src/eas_wtsynth.c, aka internal bug 26366256.
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
| High | 16,536 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
digit = *p - '0';
else
break;
p++;
l <<= 3;
l |= digit;
}
return (l);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libarchive 3.3.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (xml_data heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted xar archive, related to the mishandling of empty strings in the atol8 function in archive_read_support_format_xar.c.
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy. | Medium | 22,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int retval;
/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;
}
/* Set-gid? */
/*
* If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;
}
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the prepare_binprm function in fs/exec.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19.6 allows local users to gain privileges by executing a setuid program at a time instant when a chown to root is in progress, and the ownership is changed but the setuid bit is not yet stripped.
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 9,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void GfxImageColorMap::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getRGBLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getRGBLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message: | Medium | 10,645 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int l2tp_ip_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin->sin_port = 0;
memset(&sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err ? err : copied;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The dgram_recvmsg function in net/ieee802154/dgram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 24,797 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
list[i] = NULL;
}
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
} else
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c is vulnerable to an off-by-one error caused by malicious server responses, leading to DoS or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: | High | 20,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::DestroySharedSurfaceHandle(
const gfx::GLSurfaceHandle& handle) {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return;
}
context_->deleteTexture(handle.parent_texture_id[0]);
context_->deleteTexture(handle.parent_texture_id[1]);
context_->finish();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 24,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void SavePackage::OnReceivedSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(
const std::vector<GURL>& resources_list,
const std::vector<Referrer>& referrers_list,
const std::vector<GURL>& frames_list) {
if (wait_state_ != RESOURCES_LIST)
return;
DCHECK(resources_list.size() == referrers_list.size());
all_save_items_count_ = static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()) +
static_cast<int>(frames_list.size());
if (download_ && download_->IsInProgress())
download_->SetTotalBytes(all_save_items_count_);
if (all_save_items_count_) {
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = resources_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = u.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(u, referrers_list[i],
this, save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(frames_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = frames_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(
u, Referrer(), this, SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_DOM);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
DoSavingProcess();
} else {
Cancel(true);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the IPC layer in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: image_transform_png_set_@_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport Image *EnhanceImage(const Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define EnhanceImageTag "Enhance/Image"
#define EnhancePixel(weight) \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelRed(image,r)+pixel.red)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelRed(image,r)-pixel.red); \
distance_squared=(4.0+mean)*distance*distance; \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelGreen(image,r)+pixel.green)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelGreen(image,r)-pixel.green); \
distance_squared+=(7.0-mean)*distance*distance; \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelBlue(image,r)+pixel.blue)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelBlue(image,r)-pixel.blue); \
distance_squared+=(5.0-mean)*distance*distance; \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelBlack(image,r)+pixel.black)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelBlack(image,r)-pixel.black); \
distance_squared+=(5.0-mean)*distance*distance; \
mean=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelAlpha(image,r)+pixel.alpha)/2.0; \
distance=QuantumScale*((double) GetPixelAlpha(image,r)-pixel.alpha); \
distance_squared+=(5.0-mean)*distance*distance; \
if (distance_squared < 0.069) \
{ \
aggregate.red+=(weight)*GetPixelRed(image,r); \
aggregate.green+=(weight)*GetPixelGreen(image,r); \
aggregate.blue+=(weight)*GetPixelBlue(image,r); \
aggregate.black+=(weight)*GetPixelBlack(image,r); \
aggregate.alpha+=(weight)*GetPixelAlpha(image,r); \
total_weight+=(weight); \
} \
r+=GetPixelChannels(image);
CacheView
*enhance_view,
*image_view;
Image
*enhance_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Initialize enhanced image attributes.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
enhance_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,
exception);
if (enhance_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(enhance_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
enhance_image=DestroyImage(enhance_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Enhance image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
enhance_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(enhance_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,enhance_image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
center;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,-2,y-2,image->columns+4,5,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(enhance_view,0,y,enhance_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
center=(ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image)*(2*(image->columns+4)+2);
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
distance,
distance_squared,
mean,
total_weight;
PixelInfo
aggregate;
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict r;
GetPixelInfo(image,&aggregate);
total_weight=0.0;
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p+center,&pixel);
r=p;
EnhancePixel(5.0); EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(10.0);
EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(5.0);
r=p+GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+4);
EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(20.0); EnhancePixel(40.0);
EnhancePixel(20.0); EnhancePixel(8.0);
r=p+2*GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+4);
EnhancePixel(10.0); EnhancePixel(40.0); EnhancePixel(80.0);
EnhancePixel(40.0); EnhancePixel(10.0);
r=p+3*GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+4);
EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(20.0); EnhancePixel(40.0);
EnhancePixel(20.0); EnhancePixel(8.0);
r=p+4*GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+4);
EnhancePixel(5.0); EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(10.0);
EnhancePixel(8.0); EnhancePixel(5.0);
if (total_weight > MagickEpsilon)
{
pixel.red=((aggregate.red+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
pixel.green=((aggregate.green+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
pixel.blue=((aggregate.blue+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
pixel.black=((aggregate.black+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
pixel.alpha=((aggregate.alpha+total_weight/2.0)/total_weight);
}
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(enhance_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(enhance_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,EnhanceImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
enhance_view=DestroyCacheView(enhance_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
enhance_image=DestroyImage(enhance_image);
return(enhance_image);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow at MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h in SetPixelViaPixelInfo because of a MagickCore/enhance.c error.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1611 | Medium | 10,412 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadPSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
has_merged_image,
skip_layers;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
length;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->endian=MSBEndian;
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) psd_info.signature);
psd_info.version=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(psd_info.signature,"8BPS",4) != 0) ||
((psd_info.version != 1) && (psd_info.version != 2)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) ReadBlob(image,6,psd_info.reserved);
psd_info.channels=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (psd_info.channels > MaxPSDChannels)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded");
psd_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
psd_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if ((psd_info.version == 1) && ((psd_info.rows > 30000) ||
(psd_info.columns > 30000)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((psd_info.depth != 1) && (psd_info.depth != 8) && (psd_info.depth != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.mode=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image is %.20g x %.20g with channels=%.20g, depth=%.20g, mode=%s",
(double) psd_info.columns,(double) psd_info.rows,(double)
psd_info.channels,(double) psd_info.depth,ModeToString((PSDImageType)
psd_info.mode));
/*
Initialize image.
*/
image->depth=psd_info.depth;
image->columns=psd_info.columns;
image->rows=psd_info.rows;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (psd_info.mode == LabMode)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
if (psd_info.mode == CMYKMode)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
else if ((psd_info.mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info.mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode))
{
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,psd_info.depth != 16 ? 256 : 65536,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image colormap allocated");
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 1 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
else
image->alpha_trait=psd_info.channels > 3 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap only present for indexed and duotone images.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading colormap");
if (psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode)
{
/*
Duotone image data; the format of this data is undocumented.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,data);
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
}
else
{
size_t
number_colors;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap.
*/
number_colors=length/3;
if (number_colors > 65536)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,number_colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
}
if ((image->depth == 1) && (image->storage_class != PseudoClass))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImproperImageHeader");
has_merged_image=MagickTrue;
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
unsigned char
*blocks;
/*
Image resources block.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading image resource blocks - %.20g bytes",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
blocks=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*blocks));
if (blocks == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,blocks);
if ((count != (ssize_t) length) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) blocks,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
ParseImageResourceBlocks(image,blocks,(size_t) length,&has_merged_image,
exception);
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
}
/*
Layer and mask block.
*/
length=GetPSDSize(&psd_info,image);
if (length == 8)
{
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
skip_layers=MagickFalse;
if ((image_info->number_scenes == 1) && (image_info->scene == 0) &&
(has_merged_image != MagickFalse))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read composite only");
skip_layers=MagickTrue;
}
if (length == 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has no layers");
}
else
{
if (ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,skip_layers,exception) !=
MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Skip the rest of the layer and mask information.
*/
SeekBlob(image,offset+length,SEEK_SET);
}
/*
If we are only "pinging" the image, then we're done - so return.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read the precombined layer, present for PSD < 4 compatibility.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading the precombined layer");
if ((has_merged_image != MagickFalse) || (GetImageListLength(image) == 1))
has_merged_image=(MagickBooleanType) ReadPSDMergedImage(image_info,image,
&psd_info,exception);
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) == 1) &&
(length != 0))
{
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
status=ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,MagickFalse,exception);
if (status != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
}
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) > 1))
{
Image
*merged;
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,TransparentAlphaChannel,exception);
image->background_color.alpha=TransparentAlpha;
image->background_color.alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
merged=MergeImageLayers(image,FlattenLayer,exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,merged);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ReadPSDImage function in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PSD file.
Commit Message: Added extra check to fix https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/93 | Medium | 17,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RunCompositingDidCommitCallbacks(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
for (std::vector< base::Callback<void(ui::Compositor*)> >::const_iterator
it = on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.begin();
it != on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.end(); ++it) {
it->Run(compositor);
}
on_compositing_did_commit_callbacks_.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 15,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::Mount(const std::string& source_path,
const std::string& source_format,
const std::string& mount_label,
const std::vector<std::string>& mount_options,
MountAccessMode access_mode,
RemountOption remount,
VoidDBusMethodCallback callback) {
MountType type =
source_format.empty() ? MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE : MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE;
if (GURL(source_path).is_valid())
type = MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE;
base::FilePath mounted_path;
switch (type) {
case MOUNT_TYPE_ARCHIVE:
mounted_path = GetArchiveMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_DEVICE:
mounted_path = GetRemovableDiskMountPoint().Append(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(mount_label));
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE:
if (custom_mount_point_callback_) {
mounted_path =
custom_mount_point_callback_.Run(source_path, mount_options);
}
break;
case MOUNT_TYPE_INVALID:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
mounted_paths_.insert(mounted_path);
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE,
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::BindOnce(&PerformFakeMount, source_path, mounted_path),
base::BindOnce(&FakeCrosDisksClient::DidMount,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), source_path, type,
mounted_path, std::move(callback)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.80 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513} | High | 12,567 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: virtual scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> CreateTransportClient(
const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
uint64 transport_handle) {
if (!shared_context_.get())
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<ImageTransportClientTexture> image(
new ImageTransportClientTexture(shared_context_.get(),
size, device_scale_factor,
transport_handle));
return image;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 9,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 29,294 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static ssize_t userfaultfd_ctx_read(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, int no_wait,
struct uffd_msg *msg)
{
ssize_t ret;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue *uwq;
/*
* Handling fork event requires sleeping operations, so
* we drop the event_wqh lock, then do these ops, then
* lock it back and wake up the waiter. While the lock is
* dropped the ewq may go away so we keep track of it
* carefully.
*/
LIST_HEAD(fork_event);
struct userfaultfd_ctx *fork_nctx = NULL;
/* always take the fd_wqh lock before the fault_pending_wqh lock */
spin_lock(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->fd_wqh, &wait);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
uwq = find_userfault(ctx);
if (uwq) {
/*
* Use a seqcount to repeat the lockless check
* in wake_userfault() to avoid missing
* wakeups because during the refile both
* waitqueue could become empty if this is the
* only userfault.
*/
write_seqcount_begin(&ctx->refile_seq);
/*
* The fault_pending_wqh.lock prevents the uwq
* to disappear from under us.
*
* Refile this userfault from
* fault_pending_wqh to fault_wqh, it's not
* pending anymore after we read it.
*
* Use list_del() by hand (as
* userfaultfd_wake_function also uses
* list_del_init() by hand) to be sure nobody
* changes __remove_wait_queue() to use
* list_del_init() in turn breaking the
* !list_empty_careful() check in
* handle_userfault(). The uwq->wq.head list
* must never be empty at any time during the
* refile, or the waitqueue could disappear
* from under us. The "wait_queue_head_t"
* parameter of __remove_wait_queue() is unused
* anyway.
*/
list_del(&uwq->wq.entry);
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->fault_wqh, &uwq->wq);
write_seqcount_end(&ctx->refile_seq);
/* careful to always initialize msg if ret == 0 */
*msg = uwq->msg;
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
uwq = find_userfault_evt(ctx);
if (uwq) {
*msg = uwq->msg;
if (uwq->msg.event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) {
fork_nctx = (struct userfaultfd_ctx *)
(unsigned long)
uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1;
list_move(&uwq->wq.entry, &fork_event);
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
userfaultfd_event_complete(ctx, uwq);
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (no_wait) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
schedule();
spin_lock(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
}
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->fd_wqh, &wait);
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
spin_unlock(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
if (!ret && msg->event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) {
ret = resolve_userfault_fork(ctx, fork_nctx, msg);
if (!ret) {
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
if (!list_empty(&fork_event)) {
uwq = list_first_entry(&fork_event,
typeof(*uwq),
wq.entry);
list_del(&uwq->wq.entry);
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &uwq->wq);
userfaultfd_event_complete(ctx, uwq);
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
}
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use-after-free flaw was found in fs/userfaultfd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.6. The issue is related to the handling of fork failure when dealing with event messages. Failure to fork correctly can lead to a situation where a fork event will be removed from an already freed list of events with userfaultfd_ctx_put().
Commit Message: userfaultfd: non-cooperative: fix fork use after free
When reading the event from the uffd, we put it on a temporary
fork_event list to detect if we can still access it after releasing and
retaking the event_wqh.lock.
If fork aborts and removes the event from the fork_event all is fine as
long as we're still in the userfault read context and fork_event head is
still alive.
We've to put the event allocated in the fork kernel stack, back from
fork_event list-head to the event_wqh head, before returning from
userfaultfd_ctx_read, because the fork_event head lifetime is limited to
the userfaultfd_ctx_read stack lifetime.
Forgetting to move the event back to its event_wqh place then results in
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq); in
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion to remove it from a head that has been
already freed from the reader stack.
This could only happen if resolve_userfault_fork failed (for example if
there are no file descriptors available to allocate the fork uffd). If
it succeeded it was put back correctly.
Furthermore, after find_userfault_evt receives a fork event, the forked
userfault context in fork_nctx and uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1 can
be released by the fork thread as soon as the event_wqh.lock is
released. Taking a reference on the fork_nctx before dropping the lock
prevents an use after free in resolve_userfault_fork().
If the fork side aborted and it already released everything, we still
try to succeed resolve_userfault_fork(), if possible.
Fixes: 893e26e61d04eac9 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 8,843 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: s_aes_process(stream_state * ss, stream_cursor_read * pr,
stream_cursor_write * pw, bool last)
{
stream_aes_state *const state = (stream_aes_state *) ss;
const unsigned char *limit;
const long in_size = pr->limit - pr->ptr;
const long out_size = pw->limit - pw->ptr;
unsigned char temp[16];
int status = 0;
/* figure out if we're going to run out of space */
if (in_size > out_size) {
limit = pr->ptr + out_size;
status = 1; /* need more output space */
} else {
limit = pr->limit;
status = last ? EOFC : 0; /* need more input */
}
/* set up state and context */
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
/* allocate the aes context. this is a public struct but it
contains internal pointers, so we need to store it separately
in immovable memory like any opaque structure. */
state->ctx = (aes_context *)gs_alloc_bytes_immovable(state->memory,
sizeof(aes_context), "aes context structure");
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "could not allocate aes context");
return ERRC;
}
if (state->keylength < 1 || state->keylength > SAES_MAX_KEYLENGTH) {
gs_throw1(gs_error_rangecheck, "invalid aes key length (%d bytes)",
state->keylength);
}
aes_setkey_dec(state->ctx, state->key, state->keylength * 8);
}
if (!state->initialized) {
/* read the initialization vector from the first 16 bytes */
if (in_size < 16) return 0; /* get more data */
memcpy(state->iv, pr->ptr + 1, 16);
state->initialized = 1;
pr->ptr += 16;
}
/* decrypt available blocks */
while (pr->ptr + 16 <= limit) {
aes_crypt_cbc(state->ctx, AES_DECRYPT, 16, state->iv,
pr->ptr + 1, temp);
pr->ptr += 16;
if (last && pr->ptr == pr->limit) {
/* we're on the last block; unpad if necessary */
int pad;
if (state->use_padding) {
/* we are using RFC 1423-style padding, so the last byte of the
plaintext gives the number of bytes to discard */
pad = temp[15];
if (pad < 1 || pad > 16) {
/* Bug 692343 - don't error here, just warn. Take padding to be
* zero. This may give us a stream that's too long - preferable
* to the alternatives. */
gs_warn1("invalid aes padding byte (0x%02x)",
(unsigned char)pad);
pad = 0;
}
} else {
/* not using padding */
pad = 0;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16 - pad);
pw->ptr += 16 - pad;
return EOFC;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16);
pw->ptr += 16;
}
/* if we got to the end of the file without triggering the padding
check, the input must not have been a multiple of 16 bytes long.
complain. */
if (status == EOFC) {
gs_throw(gs_error_rangecheck, "aes stream isn't a multiple of 16 bytes");
return 0;
}
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In Artifex Ghostscript 9.23 before 2018-08-24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript could use uninitialized memory access in the aesdecode operator to crash the interpreter or potentially execute code.
Commit Message: | Medium | 3,762 |
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