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CoAStaL NLP Group 28

[ "recognizing that a jury reasonably could find based on an employees complaints to a superior that the employee perceived her environment as hostile", "holding that ajlthough a continuing pattern of hostile or abusive behavior is ordinarily required to establish a hostile environment a single instance can suffice when it is sufficiently egregious and holding that the plaintiff established that she suffered a sexually hostile working environment where she alleged she was raped by a male coworker", "holding that plaintiffs allegation that her professor gave her a brief bear hug was insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment", "holding that plaintiffs allegations of loosely related actions that she perceived to be hostile to her based on her race are insufficient to meet the heavy burden required to prove hostile environment", "holding that a plaintiffs psychological distress was not vicarious in a hostile work environment case where she experienced her workplace as hostile by reason of the alleged harassment of other women out of her presence" ]

[ "holding that an slc members status as a defendant does not create a lack of independence", "holding that an illegal immigrants status as a nonresident does not create an exemption allowing him to drive without a valid georgia license", "holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause", "holding mere status as a director does not create liability where the actions complained of were taken by individual managerial employees of a corporate entity", "holding that filing an answer does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit" ]

[ "holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review", "holding that an alien parent may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the aliens united states citizen child in the event of the aliens deportation", "holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding", "holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel", "holding that the crime of bringing aliens to the united states is complete when the initial transporter who brings the aliens to the united states ceases to transport them" ]

[ "holding that while some courts have adopted the intent to silence requirement we see no reason why the forfeiture doctrine should be limited to such cases", "holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct", "holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under 981 the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to 2461c and 853p", "holding that a single implicit reference to the email in which the complaint makes no explicit reference to nor does it quote at all from is insufficient to establish that the email was incorporated by reference into the complaint", "holding that since the reference in 2461c to the procedures of 853 includes the latter statutes implicit authorization of in personam money judgments we see no reason why this reference should not also include the forfeiture of substitute assets" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was properly a statutory claim under the personnel management act", "holding that notice of claim against police dispatch and emergency transport personnel that failed to include names of specific dispatchers substantially complied", "holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after", "holding that records regarding complaints against state police officers which would be exempt from disclosure when unredacted where no longer exempt after the names of state police troopers the names of complainants and all identifying information were redacted", "recognizing emergency exception" ]

[ "holding an informants tip can establish reasonable suspicion without investigative confirmation if the tip is credible", "holding corroboration of named informants statements some of which included suspects hearsay enhanced informants reliability", "recognizing that although not a key detail corroboration of defendants name residence and make of vehicle lent credence to informants tip", "holding corroboration is not a necessity where confidential informants reliability was well established and his tip was based on direct personal observation of criminal activity", "holding an informants tip if questionable can be corroborated by the observation of lawful conduct" ]

[ "holding it well settled that a final eis or the record of decision issued thereon constitute final agency action ", "holding that the final renewable agency action was taken when appropriate administrator signed the final rulemaking document designated in the federal register", "holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence", "holding a rod to be final agency action", "holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action" ]

[ "holding that where the alj had already obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability", "holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs", "holding that the alj failed to analyze the effect of cfs on a claimants ability to do work meaningfully when he rejected cfs as a diagnosis for want of a definite test or specific laboratory findings to support the diagnosis", "holding that the alj properly relied on the assessments of a nonexamining physician and not claimants treating physicians in determining the rfc at step four", "holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record" ]

[ "holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage", "holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition", "holding that a party invoking a 547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received", "holding that patronizing a prostituted child requires some record evidence that the defendant attempted to give anything of value in exchange for sex", "holding that under 11 usc 547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer" ]

[ "holding un constitutional a requirement that a legislative committee sit with the governor in decisions regarding spending of money on state buildings see separate opinion of justice crane", "holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others", "holding that a federal court does not sit as a superpersonnel department to review the prudence of employment decisions", "holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a mandamus action against the governor and the department of transportation to compel their performanee in accordance with constitutional and legislative mandates", "holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes" ]

[ "recognizing that a metes and bounds partition when land contains oil and gas results in a serious loss to a coowner who receives a lot without oil or gas under the surface with the loss due solely to the division of the land", "holding provision in oil and gas lease authorizing lessor to use gas for agricultural purposes contained no geographical limitations", "recognizing oil gas and coal are minerals and holding if oil gas and minerals are reserved from the grant of the surface of several tracts of unseated land they can be taxed as an estate in land", "holding that allegations that states lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation", "holding assignment of oil and gas lease is subject to business and commerce code section 2601" ]

[ "holding that commerce has no obligation to notify the parties beforehand that commerce had chosen a surrogate country different from that designated in the initial determination", "holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce", "holding that nothing in the statute prohibits commerce from valuing the fop as it did because commerce does not have to duplicate the exact production experience of an nme manufacturer at the expense of choosing a surrogate that most accurately represents the fmv of the surrogate in the hypothetically created marketeconomy version of the nme", "holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act", "holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause" ]

[ "holding that the 2005 amendment was a substantive change", "recognizing that four reasons for granting a rule 59e motion are manifest errors of law or fact newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence manifest injustice and an intervening change in controlling law", "holding that change in state substantive case law does not constitute the removal of an impediment", "holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances", "holding that congress had the power to amend an obligation but any intent to change substantive law in a subsequent appropriation must be clearly manifest" ]

[ "holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate", "holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation", "holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils", "holding that obligation to pay mortgage on home was satisfied by payment of fire insurance proceeds where husband maintained fire insurance policy", "holding that when the house is destroyed by fire and there exists thereon a policy by insurance the money arising therefrom stands in the place instead of such house the proceeds of the policy therefore take the place of the property loss" ]

[ "holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee", "holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage", "holding any doubts concerning scope of arbitrable issues resolved in favor of arbitration", "holding that statutes and ordinances are presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of constitutionality", "holding that disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in state law must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party" ]

[ "holding that a determination of whether the defendants actions constituted a taking under the louisiana constitution does not implicate any issues of federal law and thus does not provides a basis for a federal district court to exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction", "holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute", "holding under the circumstances that a criminal proceeding does not qualify as an alternate remedy under the federal fca", "holding that application of federal arson statute to a private home would federalize a typically state crime and thereby significantly change the federalstate balance in the prosecution of crimes", "holding that arson of an owneroccupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property used in commerce and is not subject to federal prosecution under federal arson statute" ]

[ "holding that a mere failure to accord procedural protection called for by state law or regulation does not of itself amount to a denial of due process", "holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege", "recognizing that absolute judicial immunity is not grounded in any special esteem for those who perform judicial functions and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office but because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself", "recognizing as a matter of law executive privilege for governor", "holding that rule 609 shows a desire to accord a controlling consideration to rehabilitation as opposed to executive grace or judicial invalidation" ]

[ "holding that insured could recover the costs of defending a declaratory judgment action brought by the injured party to compel the insurer to defend but could not recover the costs associated with prosecuting crossclaims against the insurer", "holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand", "holding that government was entitled to recover costs for removal of shoal in navigable channel", "holding party not entitled to recover attorneys fees without also recoveringdamages for breach of contract in part because attorney fees are in the nature of costs not damages", "holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal" ]

[ "holding a party cannot be joined to prevent removal where no cause of action can be brought against that party", "holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal", "recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action", "holding that a person who requests public records is a necessary party and must be joined in any action brought under rcw 4256540", "holding that municipal court records were admissible under official records or public documents exception" ]

[ "holding that emergency medical technicians and paramedics were not entitled to official immunity for their actions related to the treatment of patients in nonemergency situations", "holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not addressing the merits", "holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity", "holding that patients who were denied medical treatment on nonemergency basis had standing to bring antitrust action against medical center", "holding nurses were not entitled to official immunity where it was alleged that they failed to follow orders for a patients care given to them by a doctor" ]

[ "holding that an insurer may assert as defenses the nonnegligence of the uninsured the contributory negligence of the insured and the lack of resulting damage all being matters of substantive law and legal defenses of the uninsured but it does not succeed to the rights of the uninsured motorist to interpose the latters procedural defense of statute of limitations", "holding that a hit and run or unknown driver is deemed to be uninsured for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute", "holding that the rejection was made a part of the policy because the declarations pages included the statements uninsured motorist covs rejected and uninsured motorists coverages have been rejected", "holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy", "holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid" ]

[ "recognizing that family court may under special circumstances require a supporting spouse to secure an alimony obligation with a life insurance policy", "recognizing that even though a spouse is already employed or employable an award of rehabilitative alimony may also be justified as a bridgethegap measure to aid the recipient in making the transition from a married to a single state", "holding that an obligation is in the nature of alimony when it is intended to provide support for the spouse rather than an equalization of property rights", "holding that property transferred by a spouse to avoid support obligation may be considered on the issue of property distribution as well as alimony", "holding that an award of temporary or rehabilitative alimony may not be made unless the recipient spouse is not selfsupporting and citing hull v hull 83 mdapp 218 220221 574 a2d 20 1990" ]

[ "holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien", "holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default", "holding that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale quiets title in the purchaser", "holding that a wouldbe bona fide purchaser could not simply ignore the recorded notices of an impending nonjudicial foreclosure sale and fail to make inquiry as to whether the announced sale had occurred", "holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser" ]

[ "recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client", "holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved", "holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one", "holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client", "holding that the substantial relationship test embodies a broader concept than the rule of confidentiality that of continuing fidelity to a former client a duty of loyalty" ]

[ "holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known", "holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer", "holding an attorney is released from those obligations of secrecy which the law places upon him whenever the disclosure of a communication otherwise privileged becomes necessary to the protection of the attorneys own rights", "holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client", "holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense" ]

[ "recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear", "holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint", "holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful", "holding that pursuant to 28 usc 2254d1 if the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry", "holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end" ]

[ "holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds", "holding that the prosecution cannot divide a single crime into multiple units to avoid double jeopardy", "holding that multiple convictions under 924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution", "holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver", "holding the first question for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis is whether congress expressed its intent concerning multiple convictions at a single trial for different statutory violations arising from the same act or transaction" ]

[ "holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay", "holding that rule 606b contains no exception for racially biased statements made during jury deliberations and expressing skepticism about whether constitutional concerns can ever override the rule", "holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors", "recognizing rule", "holding that the arkansas counterpart to cre 606b applies whether a verdict is reached or a mistrial declared and under the extraneous information exception allows jurors to testify about statements made during deliberations" ]

[ "holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims", "holding that because plaintiffs claims did not challenge the handling administration or payment of his flood claim or compliance with the act or the regulations the state law claims for breach of contract and tort are not preempted by the nfia", "holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute", "holding that claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the texas department of insurance because they concern the claims handling process", "holding that the dwc has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim for misrepresentation of an insurance policy when the misrepresentation occurs within the claimsettlement process also holding that the plaintiffs claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional dis tress arose out of the carriers investigation handling and settling of a workers compensation claim" ]

[ "holding that remand was necessary when the alj failed to adhere to 4041527d2s procedural requirements and noting that a de minimis violation of those procedural requirements may qualify as harmless error", "holding that court had no obligation to inform pro se litigant of procedural requirements due to clear evidence in record including inter alia defendants mention of requirements in summary judgment motion that litigant knew requirements", "holding that court may not impose procedural requirements on agency decisionmaking that go beyond those of the administrative procedure act", "holding that courts must strictly adhere to title viis procedural requirements and stating that these requirements are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants", "holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion" ]

[ "holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech", "holding that a police officer speaking to a public official about his concerns over public safety issues is speaking in his capacity as a police officer and not as a citizen", "holding that a police officers deposition in a fellow officers 1983 action alleging unlawful retaliation was protected speech", "holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect", "holding that police officers criticism of his departments handling of a sniper incident was protected speech because the officer spoke in his capacity as police union president" ]

[ "recognizing that copyright offices interpretation of copyright act should ordinarily receive deference", "holding that declaratory judgment and unjust enrichment claims were preempted notwithstanding that plaintiff did not assert a copyright claim", "holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement", "holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession", "holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement" ]

[ "holding danger was not so obvious to invitee as to relieve defendant of liability as a matter of law", "holding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine", "holding that jjust as the mere receipt of director fees does not constitute a disqualifying interest as a matter of law so too are crossdirectorships insufficient to create interests", "holding that the mere failure to investigate does not constitute suppression of the evidence", "holding that a negative performance evaluation on its own is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law" ]

[ "holding that the first element of mail fraud knowing participation in a scheme to defraud can extend beyond the specific mailing and that the loss calculation for a mail fraud conviction may include any loss from the fraudulent scheme that the mailing furthered", "recognizing that where the relationship to the mailing and the alleged fraudulent scheme is at best highly attenuated a rico claim based thereupon will be dismissed", "holding that mailing of titleregistration forms satisfied mailing requirement because they contributed to success of the scheme", "holding that a rico plaintiff must allege at a minimum the time place and content of the alleged misrepresentations on which he or she relied the fraudulent scheme the fraudulent intent of the defendants and the injury resulting from the fraud", "recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud" ]

[ "holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time", "holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment", "holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background", "holding that section 102 of the civil rights act of 1991 does not apply to preenactment conduct", "holding that the 1981 amendments contained in 101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively" ]

[ "holding that an environmental group established constitutional standing where its members lived near a landfill into which an epa regulation allegedly would permit certain hazardous wastes to be deposited", "holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did", "recognizing standing for an environmental group based on the adverse effect of an international commerce commission decision on its members", "holding that industry groups and various agencies conclusions that certain cyanidecontaining wastes were hazardous provided fair notice to support criminal conviction under rcra despite the defendants claim that the regulation required a specific standardsbased test", "holding that an organization lacked standing to challenge allegedly lax epa regulations of hazardous waste because its members did not have to follow the lax procedures" ]

[ "holding that prosecutors statements regarding his opinion as to the truthfulness of a defense witness considering the evidence against the defendant did not reach the level of the grossly improper statements which would require the trial court to correct them ex mero motu", "holding that where a defendant expressly manifested his belief in the truth of the statements contained in the motion to dismiss thereby adopting those statements as his own such statements are admissible against the defendant in the states case in chief", "holding that statements to the jury made by the prosecutor asserting that a defense witness was lying was improper but considering all the facts and circumstances revealed in the record which showed overwhelming evidence against the defendant such statements did not constitute a prejudicial error", "holding that the prosecutors argument attacking the integrity of defense counsel was of such gross impropriety as to justify ex mero mo tu correction however in light of the strong and convincing case against the defendant we could not hold that the prosecutrixs improper comments were sufficiently prejudicial as to require a new trial", "holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony" ]

[ "holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed", "holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment", "holding a certificate of presentation appearing on the last page of appellants motion for new trial did not establish presentment", "holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment", "holding a certification of service and presentment was insufficient to establish the trial court received actual notice of the defendants motion for new trial" ]

[ "holding that buckhannon applies to the attorneys fees provision of the idea", "holding buckhannon applicable to the fair credit reporting act 15 usc 1681 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties", "holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc 2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties", "holding buckhannon applicable to the freedom of information act 5 usc 552 et seq which provides attorneys fees for complainants who have substantially prevailed", "holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc 1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal" ]

[ "holding that even if a thirdparty administrator is not a fiduciary under erisa such an administrator still has standing pursuant to 1331", "holding that payment made in reasonable belief that it was required by an insurance contract was involuntary", "recognizing that the administrator was amply protected if it made a distribution but nonetheless was entitled to exact releases upon payment of distributions", "recognizing that an employer had a dual role as administrator of plan and as employer and only the role of administrator was held to a fiduciary standard", "holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim" ]

[ "holding that the bankruptcy court plainly had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior orders", "holding a bankruptcy court is empowered to reopen a bankruptcy case on its own motion under 11 usc 105a", "holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court", "holding that a motion to enforce bankruptcy sale order is a core proceeding and citing 11 usc 105a as the section which gives the bankruptcy court the power and the jurisdiction to enforce its valid orders ", "holding that bankruptcy court has discretionary power pursuant to 11 usc 105a to order preconfirmation plan payments in a chapter 12 proceeding" ]

[ "holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable", "holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release", "holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release", "holding that terms identifying persons in a manner that the parties to the release would know who was to be benefitted sufficient under specific identity rule", "holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release" ]

[ "recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule", "holding that extraordinary factors justified invocation of the good cause exception under 553", "recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception", "holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause", "recognizing exception" ]

[ "holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance", "holding that an indictment under 922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient", "holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely", "holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense", "holding that an indictment phrased in the statutory language was sufficient to satisfy ors 1325507" ]

[ "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001", "holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries", "holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children", "holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule", "holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children" ]

[ "recognizing that outside of the employment context speech that would chill a person of ordinary firmness is actionable", "holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable", "recognizing that code is speech", "holding that speech must be a threat or coercion to be actionable", "holding that statute reaching beyond purely commercial speech to chill fully protected speech can merit application of the overbreadth doctrine" ]

[ "recognizing that the statute of limitations provision of the aedpa is an affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional", "holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact", "holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel", "holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment", "holding that despite defendants willingness to abandon statute of limitations defenses the plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to address the question of whether foreign courts would accept such a waiver" ]

[ "holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured", "holding that if counsel retained by an insurer acts as an investigator and not as an attorney then the communications between the insured and insurer are not privileged", "holding in the context of an attorney malpractice suit an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the acts of the attorney it selects to defend the insured while the insurer selected the attorney to defend the insureds and controlled the ultimate decision to settle or defend under the policy there is nothing in the record to indicate the insurer had any control over the details of the litigation as it was being conducted by the the attorney", "holding that where the insurer retains an attorney to represent the insured pursuant to an insurance policy the attorney acts in the capacity of an independent contractor for the insured", "holding that an insurance policy providing that the insurance company would pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at our request emphasis omitted did not establish an agreement that the insurer would cover attorney fees and costs to the insured in a declaratory action" ]

[ "holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property", "holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content", "holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property", "holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence", "holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted" ]

[ "holding that a dog sniff of a federal express package was a search", "holding that a dog sniff search of a safe taken by a burglar from the defendants home was a search", "holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest", "holding a dog sniff outside the defendants front door was not a fourth amendment search", "holding that dog sniff of dryer vent of house was not a search" ]

[ "holding that covenants prohibition on the employeedoctor from practicing health care of every nature and kind was unreasonable where the doctor had been employed to practice in the specialty of ophthalmology", "holding that the debtors false statements about the location of assets of the estate were material to the proceedings", "holdingthat the language of an arbitration clause applying to all claims demands disputes or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise concerning the vehicle was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue", "holding that validity of sale would be affected where settlement was approved and the debtors assets were transferred free and clear of all liens", "holding description all of the debtors properties assets and rights of every kind and nature wherever located sufficient to cover equipment" ]

[ "holding that the conviction should be affirmed despite the existence of two conspiracies where the indictment charged only one because this variance did not prejudice the defendant", "holding that the conviction should be upheld because there was no prejudice to the defendant even though the defendant had been charged with one conspiracy and the proof at trial showed two separate conspiracies", "holding that the jury would have no problem separating the actions of the individual defendants where there were only four defendants and two separate conspiracies", "holding that there was no prejudice when evidence complained of would have been admissible against defendant in separate trial", "holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication" ]

[ "holding that parental rights may be terminated based on the egregious abuse of a sibling without a showing of a nexus but providing that the parent should be afforded the opportunity to show a lack of a nexus", "holding that in order to support a termination of parental rights based on prospective abuse it is necessary to show that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parents control likely to continue and placed the child at risk and citing as an example the parents mental illness", "holding the parental rights of a child may not be terminated unless that parent has been represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings", "recognizing that a court is not limited in what it may consider in determining whether parental rights should be terminated", "recognizing petitioners must be afforded the opportunity to show good cause for filing a longer petition" ]

[ "holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive 2255 motion", "holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court citations omitted", "holding that while a district court lacks jurisdiction to deny a 60b motion while an appeal is pending it can certify that it will grant a 60b motion if the court of appeals remands the case for that purpose", "holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc 3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp", "holding that fedrcivp 60b motion premised on fraud on the court is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice" ]

[ "holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made", "holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint", "holding that ijlater applications cannot amend an application and restore its entitlement to priority", "holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so", "holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court" ]

[ "holding that failure to prove an essential element of an offense does not constitute fundamental error which may be raised for the first time on appeal", "holding that in the absence of a government crossappeal an appellate court may not sua sponte correct a district court error if the correction would be to the defendants detriment", "holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming", "holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error", "holding that the failure to charge an essential element of a crime in the indictment is an error which should be noted by an appellate court sua sponte as plain error" ]

[ "recognizing this method of submission", "holding it is within the trial courts discretion to choose on a casebycase basis the method although expressly rejecting the reserved jurisdiction method", "recognizing this rule", "recognizing this presumption", "recognizing offset method" ]

[ "holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment", "holding that offer of judgment statute does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and costs unless dismissal is with prejudice", "holding that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants seeking attorney fees are to be treated alike", "holding a prevailing consumers attorneyfee award under the magnusonmoss act at the trial level should not be dissipated by uncompensated costs expenses and attorney fees in successfully defending a judgment on appeal", "holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party" ]

[ "recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to 1983 claims", "holding that state statutes which merely establish procedures and do not mandate any particular substantive result do not give rise to a statecreated liberty interest", "holding that texas parole statutes do not create a protected liberty interest under an older statutory scheme", "recognizing that nevada statutes do not confer a legitimate expectation of parole release and therefore do not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process", "holding that a prison grievance procedure is not a substantive right and does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment" ]

[ "holding that the admission of a certified document stating that defendants license was suspended was nontestimonial", "holding that a certified abstract of a defendants driving record was nontestimonial", "holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant", "holding that a certified letter verifying that a defendant did not have a valid drivers license was nontestimonial and that washington courts have long recognized the inherent reliability and admissibility of driving records", "holding that driving records were nontestimonial" ]

[ "holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendants collection and publication of highly sensitive personal information including credit card numbers social security numbers financial account numbers and information regarding plaintiffs personal issues including sexuality mental illness alcoholism incest rape and domestic violence", "holding that the amount of loss should include sales tax and shipping costs on computer equipment bought by stolen credit card numbers", "holding that although the social security number in the information and the social security numbers in the previous convictions did not match the rest of the identifying information the first and last name and date of birth did match and was sufficient to establish the defendants identity particularly in light of the fact that the defendant did not claim he was not the individual named in the previous convictions", "holding that plaintiffs alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data which included their names addresses and social security numbers", "holding that plaintiffs social security numbers are not relevant to determining liability for unpaid wages in a suit under the flsa and state law" ]

[ "holding that the state court unreasonably credited the officer when the petitioners attorney provided accurate corroboration of the petitioners version of the postarrest interview", "holding habeas petitioners may show cause for such default in specific circumstances in states that require petitioners to raise iatc claims in initial state habeas proceedings rather than on direct appeal", "holding that the state supreme courts summary adjudication of habeas petitioners claims left intact the reasoning of the lower court and that the state is accordingly entitled to the benefit of the more thorough treatment of petitioners strickland claims in that court", "holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court", "holding that where the state court denies petitioners requests for discovery investigatory funds and a hearing the court cannot find that petitioner failed adequately to develop the facts of his claims in state court" ]

[ "holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home the resulting injury was more than de minimis", "holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him", "holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury", "holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody", "holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave" ]

[ "holding that it is not", "holding that a district court can cure the effect of an improper prosecutorial comment with a jury instruction", "holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in light of the prosecutors argument and the entire record and if a review of the record convinces the court that the jury would have convicted defendant even if it were not exposed to the alleged improper prosecutorial comments then no actual prejudice occurred", "holding that prosecutorial denigration of a defendants mitigation by suggesting it is phantom is improper", "holding failure to turn over brady material after prosecutorial phase of case had begun was covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity" ]

[ "holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it", "holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal", "holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion", "holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact" ]

[ "holding that state could be liable under ada for inaccessibility of company it contracted with to provide state inmates with jobs", "holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability", "recognizing that under california state law only ceremonial marriages can be contracted", "holding that a physician under contract with north carolina to provide medical services to prison inmates was a state actor for purposes of 1983", "holding that the plain text of title ii of the ada unambiguously extends to state prison inmates" ]

[ "holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies unless judgment is entered on the basis of documentary evidence alone", "holding that a court would abuse its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence", "holding that the factfinders choice between two views of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous", "holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard", "holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous" ]

[ "holding that exclusiveremedy provision applied to both temporary staffing company and client company", "holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company", "holding that trial court erred in granting ex parte temporary injunction prohibiting marketing activities of defendant company because there had been no showing that plaintiff company would likely suffer irreparable harm or lacked an adequate remedy at law", "holding that plaintiffs failure to mention vice president of thirdparty company in initial disclosures was harmless because plaintiffs mentioned president of company and defendants conducted no discovery of company", "holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen" ]

[ "holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion", "holding that recusal is not required when judge has minimal alumni contacts with a defendant university", "holding that party who had sought disqualification of the judge who heard his cause only from the assignment judge and not the judge himself could not appropriately raise recusal issue on appeal", "holding that recusal was required based on newspaper report of interview with trial judge", "holding recusal not required" ]

[ "recognizing privilege under federal rules", "recognizing privilege", "holding privilege was waived only as to matters specifically at issue in court action", "recognizing application of federal deliberative process privilege to internal state communications", "recognizing federal common law privilege for psychotherapistpatient communications but holding that litigant waived privilege by raising issue as to her psychological state" ]

[ "holding testimonial statements to include those involving a declarants knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative environment", "holding witnesss formal signed written statement given at the police station one hour after the crime following structured police questioning was testimonial", "holding victims statement testimonial where it was elicited in response to structured police questioning pursuant to a police investigation", "holding antiassignment clause in structured settlement is enforceable", "holding that postmmmda statement knowingly given in response to structured police questioning was testimonial" ]

[ "holding that the eleventh amendment applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought", "holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "holding that prospective relief made in the absence of the required findings is immediately terminable regardless of when ordered", "holding exhaustion is required regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures", "holding that a proper determination of the questions of law cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings" ]

[ "holding that a shortened statute of limitations should not be applied retroactively as to bar otherwise valid civil claims", "holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void", "holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case", "holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired", "holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases" ]

[ "holding that new york law applies to this matter", "recognizing the rule and surveying new york law", "recognizing the time honored practice of applying new york city rates in calculating attorneys fees throughout the southern district of new york including in counties north of the city", "recognizing a split of authority regarding whether the nyhrl like the new york city human rights law includes an instate impact requirement and holding that it does", "holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued" ]

[ "holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under 1981", "holding claim is not cognizable", "holding claim is cognizable", "holding that retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 usc 1981", "holding that plaintiffs claim of reduction in work hours in retaliation for her filing of eeoc charge states a cause of action under 1981" ]

[ "holding that maryland law controls the operation of a group health insurance policy that covers employees who live and work in maryland notwithstanding the fact that the policy was executed in rhode island and contained a provision that the law of rhode island would control the operation and effect of the policy", "holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth", "holding fact that prototype group disability policy submitted to insurance department for approval contained blanks and that therefore policy actually issued with blanks filled in may have been unapproved in violation of insurance statutes did not warrant voiding of nonduplication of benefits clause in group disability policy", "recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing", "holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy" ]

[ "holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court", "holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion", "holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crimes will be charged and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion", "holding that a sentencing determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the district court", "holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion" ]

[ "holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact", "holding that the reasonableness of a defendants efforts in discharging a duty of care is a question for the trier of fact when the record does not permit summary judgment", "holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review", "holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage", "holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them" ]

[ "holding that the discovery relating to the rates charged to conocel or the procedure or methodology for applying the rates to be charged are plainly relevant to the foreign proceedings as they formed the basis of conocels defense", "holding extraneous acts relevant to show intent in charged offense", "holding that fedrevid 404b does not restrict evidence of crimes that arose out of the same series of transactions as the charged offense or that are necessary to complete the story of the charged crime", "holding but offering no authority for the position that the defense counsel could neither argue nor receive an instruction distinguishing the crime charged from a lesserunincluded offense not charged", "holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt" ]

[ "holding evidence of nonuse of seat belts irrelevant to the liability issues involving the plaintiffs alleged contributory negligence", "holding that contributory negligence in the sense of mere carelessness or inadvertence is not a defense in strict liability cases", "recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims", "holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence", "recognizing nonuse of seat belt may constitute such negligence as will permit apportionment of damages under comparative negligence" ]

[ "recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver", "holding that the faas alleged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the course of certificating a specific aircraft as part of a spotcheck program involved calculated risks but fell squarely within the discretionary function exception", "holding that actions against the faa for its alleged negligence in certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary function exception of the federal tort claims act id at 821 104 sct 2755 because the faas decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations is plainly a discretionary activity id at 819 21 104 sct 2755", "holding that the faas application of a spotcheck system to a particular aircraft was a discretionary function", "holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision " ]

[ "holding that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of stored email", "holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells", "holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party", "holding that users have reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages despite advance warning that the messages could be read", "holding appellant failed to show any expectation of privacy in files stored on the computer system in his office was one that society accepts as objectively reasonable" ]

[ "holding an officers reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed was sufficient justification for seizure of suspects makeup bag and exigent circumstances justified the subsequent warrantless search of the closed bag", "holding that the owner of a shoulder bag located on the front seat of his girlfriends car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents", "holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone", "holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment", "holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole" ]

[ "holding that an error was not harmless when the district court chose the lowest end of the improper sentencing range after stating that even if the court isnt correct the court believes it is necessary to sentence at this very high range", "holding that no notice is necessary when a court exceeds a range recommended by chapter 7", "holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7", "holding that only general rather than specific reasons must be stated when a court strays from the chapter 7 range", "holding that the district court did not err by failing to specify a final adjusted sentencing range because we apply a presumption of reasonableness only to sentences falling within the initial sentencing range recommended under the guidelines and there is no intrinsic need to specify an adjusted sentencing range to aid our appellate review" ]

[ "holding that sale of accounts receivable under section 363 was not free and clear of defenses such as recoupment but was free and clear of setoff rights unless the setoff was actually taken prepetition", "holding that section 363 governs the sales of executory contracts here section 365 provides some limitations and conditions to assignments none of which negates the applicability of section 363 to the sale at auction of an executory contract", "holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable", "holding that the secured partys contract and quasicontract claims fail as a matter of law because they are subject to the buyers ucc defenses and its right to recoupment and setoff under the agreements between the buyer and the debtor", "holding that sale under section 363 eliminates unexercised setoff rights but not recoupment defense" ]

[ "holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend", "holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention", "recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court", "holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint", "holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case" ]

[ "holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid", "holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous", "holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan", "holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs", "holding that expenses refers to costs" ]

[ "holding that montana law cannot require special notice provisions in arbitration contracts", "holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract", "holding that proposed invalidation of the entire arbitration agreement even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff could not afford to pay for the arbitration proceedings was unnecessarily radical because the court could instead simply nullify the fee provisions of the arbitration agreement and force the defendant employer to bear the expense of arbitration", "holding that montana law requiring all arbitration provisions to be typed in underlined capital letters was preempted because congress precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status", "holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable" ]

[ "holding that the rule applies regardless of the comparative fault of the employer versus the employee", "holding that the donovan rule applies regardless of whether the injunction is issued before or after the federal court filing", "holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor", "holding that with respect to noneconomic damages section 768813 requires that an employers comparative fault must be considered by the jury in a negligence suit by an employee against a manufacturer even though the employer is immune from liability under the workers compensation law", "holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct" ]

[ "holding that isolated criminal acts by unknown assailants resulting in theft of personal property and minor injury were not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution", "holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants against ethnic chinese indonesians which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution", "holding that petitioner an ethnic chinese christian from indonesia did not establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution in indonesia because she failed to demonstrate that she would be individually targeted for persecution and country reports indicate that religious discrimination and harassment of ethnic chinese have declined in previous years", "holding that isolated physical violence and unfulfilled threats perpetrated by serbian citizens against an ethnic albanian in kosovo constituted harassment not persecution", "holding that two isolated criminal acts perpetrated by unknown assailants are not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution" ]

[ "holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous", "holding that trial courts determination of whether defendant accepted responsibility should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation", "holding that a trial courts findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction", "holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous", "holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed" ]

[ "holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants", "holding that because respondents challenged a contract broadly without challenging the arbitration clause specifically challenge must be considered by an arbitrator", "holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause", "recognizing exception to general rule that disputes arising under contract with valid arbitration clause are referred to arbitrator", "holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator" ]

[ "holding that a samesex partner could not recover loss of consortium damages under a massachusetts statute for injuries suffered by her partner even though samesex marriage was unlawful at the time the underlying tort occurred", "recognizing that laws prohibiting samesex marriage humiliate tens of thousands of children now being raised by samesex couples", "holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother", "holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional", "holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children" ]

[ "holding that the threat of injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under the challenged statute", "holding that fear of prosecution was not imaginary or speculative even though the challenged criminal penalty provision had never been applied to plaintiffs proposed conduct where statute on its face proscribed the proposed conduct and where the state has not disavowed any intention of invoking the criminal penalty provision", "holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct", "holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable", "holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired" ]

[ "holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence", "holding of crawford applies only to testimonial hearsay", "holding testimonial evidence implicates the sixth amendment which demands unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination but the admission of nontestimonial hearsay evidence remains the province of each states development of hearsay law", "holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay", "holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion" ]

[ "holding that there was no record of a hearing about settlement objections", "holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable", "holding that the commissions approval of a nonunanimous settlement agreement did not violate intervenors due process rights because the record shows that the appellant presented arguments in opposition to the settlement during the agenda conference in which the appellant was allowed thirty minutes to present its views in opposition to the settlement agreement", "holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations", "holding that an injunction was inappropriate because this was not an mdl case discovery was not complete no class settlement was imminent in fact as far as the record shows no serious settlement progress had been made" ]

[ "holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties", "holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party", "holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment", "holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement", "holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim" ]

[ "holding that junior creditor entitled to adequate protection from interest accruing on senior claim", "holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor", "holding that codebtor relief should be granted to collect accruing unpaid interest", "holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date", "holding that gross income can include interest or dividends accruing to fathers ira" ]

[ "holding flsa enforcement scheme preempted contract negligence and fraud claims", "holding that even a state law regulating insurance will be preempted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of or in addition to erisas remedial scheme", "holding claims under the kentucky act were preempted because they conflicted with erisas civil enforcement scheme", "holding that a proper waiver of interest by a nonpartieipant in a plan is not preempted by erisas antialienation provisions", "holding claim providing additional remedies conflicts with erisas remedial scheme and is preempted" ]

[ "recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit", "holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "recognizing that an entitlement not to stand trial or face other burdens of litigation is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability", "holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today", "holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional" ]