Datasets:

coastalcph

/

lex_glue

like 50

Follow

CoAStaL NLP Group 28

[ "holding that a writ of execution under new jersey law is not an action against the consumer", "holding that the new jersey blue sky law simply allows the bureau to regulate its half of the transaction the offer that occurs entirely within the state of new jersey", "recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller", "recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey", "holding purposeful and deliberate omission on enactment of new jersey sales and use tax of exemption found in new york counterpart act which served as the model for new jersey act" ]

[ "holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service", "recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act", "holding that if service done by certified mail action commenced upon receipt of summons and complaint", "holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail", "holding that service of a subpoena via certified mail is sufficient under rule 45 particularly when defendant does not deny actual receipt" ]

[ "holding a limitation on damages arising out of bodily injury to one person involved in an accident applies to all claims arising from the death of that person", "holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured", "holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled", "holding that the policys exclusion of coverage for any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of such bodily injury operates where the genesis of the action is an employees workrelated bodily injury quoting national union fire ins co 906 f2d at 200", "holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party" ]

[ "holding that police did not enjoy qualified immunity for a period where they acknowledged that plaintiff had to be released but nevertheless kept him handcuffed", "holding that couple held themselves out as married when they had reputation in community for being married even though they had kept marriage secret from a few family members", "holding that the defendants statement in an application for citizenship that he had only been married once was false even if the second marriage had been a nullity because it was bigamous", "holding victims statements to coworkers admissible to rebut defendants claim that they had a good marriage", "holding that samesex partners who would have chosen to marry before a childs birth had they been permitted to are entitled to a statutory presumption of parentage that otherwise conferred benefits only upon a married spouse" ]

[ "holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable", "holding that there can be only one final appealable order", "holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable", "holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action", "holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable" ]

[ "holding that appellant who filed a 2255 motion but produced no affidavit from the witness in question or any other independent support for his claim failed to show prejudice because he offered only speculation that he was prejudiced by his counsels failure to interview the witness which was not enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial as required by strickland", "holding that closure was limited not only because it lasted only for the testimony of one witness but also because there was no limitation at all on the right of the public or the press to examine the transcript of the officers testimony", "holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case", "holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness", "holding that not only the employees testimony at the grievance hearing but also the affidavit that he filed and his agreement to be listed as a potential witness were entitled to protection" ]

[ "recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo", "holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard", "recognizing abuse of discretion rather than de novo standard of review", "holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion", "holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo" ]

[ "holding that request for historical csli information was not a search", "holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense", "holding that request from inmate to county jail chaplain to pass information to coeonspir ator was not privileged because the aid requested was not religious and because the request was not intended to be confidential", "holding that plaintiffs request that inquiry be made of the jury about its intent behind the verdict was not a request to poll the jury", "holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential" ]

[ "holding that the new jersey statute of limitations applicable to 1983 actions is njsa 2a142", "holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy", "holding that public defender did not face conflict requiring withdrawal when bringing collateral attack of a defendants conviction public defender was required to attack competence of previous public defender and stating that automatic disqualification would hamper the ability of public defenders offices to represent indigents in criminal cases", "holding that claims based on asserted violations of the lad and 1983 are not subject to the new jersey tort claims act", "holding designated counsel acting on behalf of the office of public defender in law guardian program to be public employees for purpose of the new jersey tort claims act njsa 5911 to 123 and therefore entitled to indemnification by the state" ]

[ "holding that title ix subjects state athletic association to suit under the theory that association controls athletic programs receiving federal aid", "holding that the ncaa did not exercise controlling authority over school athletic programs", "holding that federal wage controls applied to state employees too", "holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state", "holding in part that the ncaa was subject to title vi because it exercised controlling authority over athletic programs receiving federal financial assistance" ]

[ "holding that blood alcohol dissipation was not sufficient by itself to create an exigent circumstances exception to virginia statutory requirement that the driver be arrested within three hours of the offense", "holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation", "holding that the dissipation of alcohol from a persons blood stream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw", "holding that in drunkdriving investigations the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant", "holding existence of arrest warrant compelling case for finding dissipation" ]

[ "recognizing a finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed", "holding that the court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence and may only set aside the finding if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust", "holding that error is harmless if there is substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction", "holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge", "holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction" ]

[ "holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort", "recognizing tort of wrongful discharge", "holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim", "recognizing tort of negligence by words", "holding tort of negligence must be based upon duty other that one imposed by contract" ]

[ "holding that because counsels lumping of fees was not considered in calculating the revised lodestar amount it could serve as a basis for adjusting the fee award", "holding that in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees under federal fee shifting statutes courts may not enhance the fee award above the lodestar amount to compensate attorneys for assuming the risk of receiving no payment for their services if the lawsuit failed", "holding that the court has discretion to double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation", "holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied", "holding that a fee substantially less than the lodestar amount is permissible" ]

[ "holding appellate counsel was not ineffective for forgoing a claim disputing the admission of victim impact evidence because it had no merit", "holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel", "holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim", "holding that appellate counsel could not be found to have rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise issues that are without merit", "holding that letters from the victims family constituted improper victim impact statements but appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim because the jury never saw the letters and thus the claim was without merit" ]

[ "holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car", "holding a police officer who was pursuing a fleeing suspect was immune from his torts when he ran a red light and collided with plaintiffs vehicle", "holding that accelerating a car so that it screeched and fishtailed a bit was sufficient for offense", "holding that accelerating a car so that its tires spun when a light turned from red to green was sufficient", "holding that accelerating a car so that it threw gravel on police car was enough to satisfy exhibition of speed violation" ]

[ "holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error", "holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law", "holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error", "holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment", "holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless" ]

[ "holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution", "holding that suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request by the defense violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irre spective of the good faith of the prosecution", "holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution", "holding burden of proof must be on prosecution to prove that particular home school curriculum was not adequate to avoid exposing parents to the risk of criminal prosecution should their suppositions of the adequacy of the home curriculum be mistaken however in good faith thus indicating mental state is relevant to guilt", "holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution" ]

[ "holding that a class could not be certified because the definition made class members impossible to identify prior to individualized factfinding and litigation and thereby failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action under rule 23", "holding that when defendant failed to appear at scheduled suppression hearing the court could have decided the motion in defendants absence but it did not have the authority to refuse to consider it", "holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute", "holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error", "holding that plaintiffs had failed to identify a class where the proposed boundaries did not appear to relatte to the defendants activities but were instead arbitrarily drawn lines on a map" ]

[ "holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest", "holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest", "holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity", "holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a 1983 claim alleging false arrest", "recognizing first amendment retaliation right" ]

[ "holding res judicata applied to unappealed division of military retirement benefits when that division was not preempted at time of divorce but would have been preempted by later federal act had that act applied retroactively which it did not", "holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce", "holding that a transfer was a demotion where there was testimony that few people transferred voluntarily from jobs in the plaintiffs prior division to jobs in the plaintiffs new division everybody viewed a transfer from the plaintiffs new division to the prior division as a promotion and the two departments had different seniority systems", "holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division", "holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement" ]

[ "recognizing significant differences in text of state and federal equal protection clauses", "holding that a forumselection clause may be enforced under rule 12b3 as a motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue", "holding that forumselection clauses are generally enforceable and a party attempting to show that such a clause should not be enforced bears a heavy burden", "holding that consideration of forumselection clauses under rule 12b6 does not present significant doctrinal error", "holding that motions to dismiss based on forumselection clause should be analyzed under rule 12b3" ]

[ "holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants", "holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty", "holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing", "holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error", "holding that resentencing is required" ]

[ "holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority", "holding that after stem bankruptcy judges have the authority to enter interlocutory orders in noncore proceedings and in core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy court may not enter final orders or judgment consistent with article iii absent consent", "holding that a lawsuit alleging malpractice by an accountant in a bankruptcy case was a core matter within a bankruptcy courts jurisdiction", "holding that stem does not change bankruptcy courts authority to decide fundamental core procedures of bankruptcy court", "holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court" ]

[ "holding plaintiff bears the burden of showing that delay was due to oversight inadvertence or excusable neglect", "holding that the states failure to object to a late petition for appeal of a termination order granted by the trial court on the basis of excusable neglect constituted a waiver of the states right to contest excusable neglect on appeal to the court of appeals", "holding that failure to accurately calculate the thirtyday appeal period is not excusable neglect", "holding that the circuit judge did not have the authority to extend the thirtyday time limit for filing a notice of appeal", "holding that the concept of excusable neglect could not be invoked to gloss over a failure to take minimum safeguards for determining that action is being taken" ]

[ "holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion", "holding that a state has subject matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce if one of the spouses is domiciled in the state", "holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion", "holding that a report relied upon by agency in determining whether or not to award a grant had not been adopted as there is no indication in the record that in funding the grant the agency expressly adopted the reasoning of the report", "holding in reference to an eleven mile grant of the foreshore that neither the king nor the state could grant away for private purposes so much of the publics rights in the lands under water" ]

[ "holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action", "holding the same for the other separate rate plaintiffs in this action", "holding that although money had and received and unjust enrichment were pled as separate causes of action they are really the same cause of action", "holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries", "recognizing separate causes of action for injuries to plaintiffs land caused by occasional flooding" ]

[ "holding that son who lived on land entirely by virtue of his mothers consent owned no estate to which the homestead right could attach and that the homestead right cannot be based on so precarious a tenure as the sons occupancy at the will of his mother", "holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title", "holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property", "holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future", "holding that son had no homestead interest in property even though he resided upon it with his fathers consent because son had neither title nor a present right to possess land nor right to demand partition from father who was his cotenant" ]

[ "holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors is without merit when the goal is to be able to conduct fishing expedition interviews with jurors after they return a guilty verdict", "holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias", "holding that one jurors exposure to extraneous information concerning prior criminal acts of the defendant which she did not disclose to the other jurors before they rendered a verdict did not merit a new trial", "holding that the defendant was not prejudiced when the jurors saw him being searched where the jurors themselves had been frisked", "holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors was procedurally barred because the claim should and could have been raised on direct appeal" ]

[ "holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by 301", "holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim", "holding that a bad faith claim is a tort", "holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith", "holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted" ]

[ "holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party", "holding that absence from prior state was temporary during the time it was contemplated that the parent and child would return to the other state", "holding that spouse was not required to return to work immediately upon divorce to avoid judicial imputation of income", "holding that calling in sick during an absence and providing hospital forms describing the illness upon return to work is sufficient notice", "holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights" ]

[ "holding special master did not err in rejecting a theory of causation where there was no evidence in the record suggesting that the proposed mechanism was at work in the petitioners case", "holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process", "holding that in the postaward context a disappointed bidder lacked standing to bring a protest action when its submission was nonresponsive to the solicitation", "holding that defense of fraud was waived where no special issue was submitted and there was disputed evidence", "holding an ordinance regulating doortodoor solicitation unconstitutional in part because there was no evidence of a special crime problem related to doortodoor solicitation in the record" ]

[ "holding that chapter 610 rsmo which requires public governmental bodies to open their meetings to the public when conducting the peoples business does not violate the home rule law because it does not regulate powers duties or compensation", "holding texas open meeting act prohibiting governmental body from conducting closed meetings during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control is discussed to be contentneutral because closed meetings 1 prevent transparency 2 encourage fraud and corruption and 3 foster mistrust in government", "recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way", "holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy", "holding while florida courts have recognized that notice of public meetings is mandatory the preparation of an agenda that reflects every issue that may come up at a properly noticed meeting is not and notice need not be given of every potential deviation from a previously announced agenda the public has the right to attend open meetings but no authority to interfere with the decisionmaking process" ]

[ "holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii", "holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii", "holding that location of relevant employment records should be given significance because it was expressly stated in the title vii venue provision", "holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc 1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii", "recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap" ]

[ "recognizing the public interest exception", "holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling", "holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court", "recognizing the compelling interest in highway safety", "holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest" ]

[ "holding that the objector must not only show that the facts do not support the exemption but must also prove that the debtor knowingly deceived the trustee and the creditors at the time the exemption was made", "holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party", "holding that the trustee objector cannot escape the burden of proof assigned to an objecting party under rule 4003c because the exemption claim relates to a settlement agreement which fails to allocate damages into specif ic categories of recovery", "holding that the burden of proof is initially placed upon the objector with respect to any objections he files and this burden does not shift to the debtor merely upon a showing that the debtor has failed to allocate the personal injury settlement into its various component parts", "holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt" ]

[ "holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal", "holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief", "holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief", "holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief", "holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief" ]

[ "holding the defendant waived any claim of error by both failing to object at trial and affirmatively agreeing to a limited closure", "holding that statutory grounds for recusal can be waived both by failing to object and by failing to assert error on appeal", "holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court", "holding that government waived right to challenge alleged error of district court in failing to impose statutory minimum sentence under 841b1b by failing to object to sentence announced by district court", "holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal" ]

[ "holding that an indictment was sufficient where it failed to specify which subsection of sorna defendants conviction allegedly meets", "holding that an indictment under 922g1 was not required to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce an indictment which tracked the statutory language was sufficient", "holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense", "holding that evidence of an eighteenyearold conviction was admissible to show intent because that conviction involved exactly the same crime as was charged in the indictment", "holding that an indictment which cites the pertinent statute and uses its language will be sufficient to support a conviction" ]

[ "recognizing an attorneys right to conduct the clients case with a certain degree of privacy", "holding that the right to associate with others as a military company is not a privilege of citizens of the united states", "recognizing congresss ability to choose the degree of culpability associate with particular factually distinct conduct", "recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another", "recognizing authority of legislature to choose officers of municipal corporations" ]

[ "holding that it was unreasonable for officers to break down doors that they already knew were open", "holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him", "holding that no closure occurred where judge locked doors to ensure jury would not be distracted", "holding that it would not be unreasonable to find condition in hotel lunchroom unsafe because invitee would be distracted", "holding that no closure occurred when judge did not allow anyone to enter or leave courtroom during jury instructions" ]

[ "holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review", "holding the trial court was without authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review", "holding that an appellate court may not review errors that have not been assigned by a party or a point of error", "holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority", "holding that an appellate court is not required to review an appellants point relied on which appears without citation of applicable or relevant authority" ]

[ "recognizing a subset of the common interest privilege as parents and schools have a corresponding interest in the free flow of information about administrators and faculty members", "recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection", "recognizing privilege", "holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard", "recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children" ]

[ "holding that restitution is proper under 2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses", "holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted", "holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc 3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction", "holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses ", "holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum" ]

[ "holding that under 28 usc 1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case", "holding that although a state may be free to develop its own laws of search and seizure to meet law enforcement needs such laws may not authorize police conduct which trenches upon fourth amendment rights regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct", "recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice", "holding that there was no justiciable controversy and that while many laws may be easily subject to challenge we may only review such matters in a proper law suit", "holding that the summoned party may in an enforcement proceeding challenge the 7609f2 determination that there is a reasonable basis for believing there may be a violation of a revenue law" ]

[ "holding officer was performing discretionary act in deciding when and how to arrest suspect", "holding testimony of officer explaining how officer came to suspect appellant was not objectionable as hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to show why the officer got an arrest warrant for and arrested appellant", "holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act", "holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest", "holding that there was no arrest when suspect was moved from his own truck to a police car" ]

[ "recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state", "holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment", "holding that under the old state employment merit system all employees of the state are deemed classified unless they have been specifically exempted form that category", "holding that the statute plainly exempted all employees who were covered by the flsa before january 1 2007", "holding that antecedent debts will not be deemed within a dragnet clause unless they are specifically identified in the instrument" ]

[ "holding 1130 to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff", "holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied", "holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants", "holding that the defendant could not be sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute if his offense occurred before the statute became effective", "holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause" ]

[ "holding that a court may not enter an injunction freezing assets in action for damages where there is no equitable interest in frozen assets", "holding assets in escrow", "holding that a limited partner does not have an interest right or title in the assets of the partnership", "holding that the receiver of assets not the subsequent purchaser of the assets retained all liabilities not specifically enumerated in a similar purchase and assumption agreement", "holding that insurance premiums deducted from employees paychecks and commingled with corporate assets were plan assets in accordance with department of labor regulations see 29 cfr 25103102a and therefore that president of employer corporation acted as a fiduciary when he failed to separate those assets for payment to the funds and instead used them to pay company creditors" ]

[ "holding that severance pay received postseparation was not marital property as the condition to receive the pay was related to the sale of the corporation not to husbands work during his marriage", "holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee", "holding that a plan providing severance pay for reduction in work force simply did not contemplate the effect of a sale of a business on the availability of severance pay", "holding calculating severance benefits based upon age years of service and pay required no discretion", "holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract" ]

[ "holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable", "holding that permit fee assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code", "holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes", "holding that taxes are not private property that can be physically taken by the government", "holding that background check assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code" ]

[ "holding that prolonged sexual abuse of neighboring adolescent girls by defendants husband with known proclivity for such behavior not a superseding cause of wifes negligent failure to warn victims or take other reasonable steps to prevent harm to them", "holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims", "holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person", "holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn", "holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse" ]

[ "holding that pain and suffering does not survive the death of the injured", "holding that beyond evidence of inhumane prison conditions a cat claimant must provide some evidence that the authorities act with the specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering on those detained", "recognizing as an element of pain and suffering", "holding that detention in squalid overcrowded cells without adequate food water sanitation exercise or medical treatment in haitian prisons does not constitute torture under cat because there is no evidence that haitian authorities have the specific intent to inflict pain or suffering", "recognizing as separate from pain and suffering" ]

[ "holding that officers knocking the plaintiff to the ground rolling him over and pinning him with their knees on his neck back and legs so he could be handcuffed did not constitute excessive force and noting that the plaintiffs offer to return to custody after his escape attempt did not eliminate the need for force", "holding that purposely tripping the plaintiff while he was being escorted in handcuffs causing him to fall to the floor and cut his face could be excessive force", "holding that where an officer grabbed plaintiffs arm twisted it around plaintiffs back jerking it up high to the shoulder and then handcuffing the plaintiff as plaintiff fell to his knees screaming did not constitute excessive force", "holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim", "holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable" ]

[ "recognizing but finding inapplicable pure question of law exception to doctrine of exhaustion", "recognizing the futility exception to the tribal exhaustion rule", "recognizing doctrine", "recognizing exception to the exhaustion doctrine where the states highest court has explicitly and recently addressed the precise issue advanced by the petitioner", "holding that presentation of an untimely petition to the states highest court satisfied the exhaustion requirement" ]

[ "holding that attorneyclient privilege could apply to communications of legal advice between nonlawyer members of management and human resources department if the communication was made in confidence for the primary purpose of obtaining legal advice", "holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client", "holding that retention of an attorney to investigate an insurance claim and make a coverage determination under a policy is a classic example of a client seeking legal advice from an attorney", "holding that if documents are privileged in the hands of the client they retain that privilege when given to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice", "holding that discussions between management personnel concerning legal advice given by attorney is privileged even when attorney is not physically present" ]

[ "holding that requiring the utility to relocate its pipes at its own expense did not constitute a legal injury", "holding that an order requiring the agency to search the records did not constitute courtordered change in the relationship of the parties", "holding that agency order requiring utility to meet certain evidentiary requirements in future proceedings did not establish imminent or sufficiently likely enforcement", "holding that a landlords alleged threats that tenants who did not sign a lease would have to pay their own utility bills and be subject to future rent increases did not constitute a wrongful use of force or fear", "recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings" ]

[ "holding the argument that the state and federal constitutions required appointed counsel in adoption proceeding was not preserved", "holding that defamation action is not a proceeding arising in a bankruptcy case", "holding no state court jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding", "holding that parties not related to the child could not file an adoption petition and later prove the unfitness of the natural parents because the child was not available for adoption as defined in the adoption act parents had to be found unfit before petition could be filed", "holding that indians could be denied access to state courts in connection with an adoption proceeding arising on a reservation" ]

[ "holding that plaintiffs statistics did not shed any light on the legally relevant issue because they did not indicate the group of applicants who were interviewed or even the group of applicants found qualified or the group of all applicants", "holding supplemental eis not necessary for sitespecific timber sale where programmatic eis considered effects of both clearcutting and group selection and sitespecific project authorized group selection", "holding that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case need show only that he is a member of a protected group and whites are a protected group under title vii", "recognizing women as a distinct group", "holding that the forum selection clause at issue encompassed both contract and tort claims" ]

[ "holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed", "holding evidence of apparent authority insufficient where patient sought services of particular doctor rather than services of hospital generally", "holding that child who received services that school deemed 504 accommodations was ideaeligible because services rose to the level of specially designed instruction without analysis of need", "holding that plaintiff who provided similar services which were arguably attendant care services under state law fell within the exemption", "recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case" ]

[ "holding that the decoration contractor freeman was not subject to premises liability because it did not occupy own control or make special use of the premises at the javits center", "holding that defendant properly established that it did not owe premises liability duty because it did not own occupy or control premises where injury occurred but that defendant was not entitled to traditional summary judgment because it failed to address duty arising out of alleged creation of dangerous condition", "holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises", "holding that the policy insured property but failure to occupy premises negated coverage", "holding that a contractor had no duty of care to a third party under a premises liability theory because the contractor was not a landowner or occupier but expressing no opinion as to whether the contractor owed a duty to the third party under general negligence principles because the third partys legal theory was restricted to premises liability" ]

[ "holding that a 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action ", "holding that 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury", "holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss", "holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury", "holding that a loss occurs and has its inception whether or not the insured knows of it" ]

[ "holding that appellate court can uphold a trial courts ruling on any ground appearing in the record whether urged in the trial court or not", "holding court of appeals was to review facts in light most favorable to trial courts ruling even when no witnesses testified and all evidence was submitted in written affidavits", "holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion", "holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record", "holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant" ]

[ "holding that the agency cannot use insufficient evidence as a basis for finding no adverse impact", "holding that adverse inference rule is permissive", "holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment", "holding that there was no basis for adverse inference instruction for failure to produce emails until five days before trial", "holding that committing prisoner to administrative segregation for five days was adverse" ]

[ "recognizing exception", "recognizing a childabuse exception to marital communications privilege", "recognizing that a partys prior consent to the recording or monitoring of communications constitutes an exception to the abuse of privacy act", "recognizing the prior conviction exception of almendareztorres", "recognizing such an exception" ]

[ "holding an excludable period under 2912074a commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendants pretrial motion", "holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under 3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under 3161h7a", "holding that the 120day period commences when the applicant appears in person for the interview", "holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer", "holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act" ]

[ "holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued", "holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed", "holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage", "holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment", "holding that random spot checks were not narrowly tailored to the purpose of ensuring an adequate amount of insurance coverage" ]

[ "holding partner owes fiduciary duty in dealings effecting the winding up of the partnership and the proper preservation of partnership assets during that time", "holding that a retiring partner or the representative of a deceased partner is a creditor of the partnership in the amount of the retiring or deceased partners partnership interest", "holding only a party to the partnership agreement can breach it and be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty relating to partnership obligations", "holding that under the texas uniform partnership act the government was entitled to collect the tax liability indisputably a partnership debt from any one of the general partners", "holding that under texas law limited partner could not bring breach of fiduciary duty claims without the partnership because the partners claims would be indirect and duplicative of the partnerships claims" ]

[ "holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts", "holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined", "holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings", "holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings", "holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties" ]

[ "recognizing the public interest exception", "recognizing a traditional distinction between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other", "recognizing distinctions between public and private areas", "recognizing private right of action", "holding that land dedicated for a public street may not be leased to a private entity for private use" ]

[ "holding that the act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a victim veto that precludes application of the act as well as holding that the act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment", "holding that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense that is waived if not raised in the trial court", "holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial", "holding that in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages not only for his unlawful arrest and imprisonment but also for expenses of his defense", "holding that the vagueness of brady handgun act not ripe for adjudication in suit for injunction but could be raised as a defense in the case of an unlikely criminal prosecution of law enforcement agents" ]

[ "holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for district court to allow a mechanical engineer to give expert testimony about a machine with which the engineer had no design experience", "holding that drivers and witnesses testimony about car steering malfunction could be proof of defect without establishing the mechanical cause of the malfunction", "holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial", "holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony", "holding that a cause of action does not arise in negligence when a product malfunctions or is defective and the malfunction or defect results in damage only to the product itself and produces only economic loss" ]

[ "holding that verbal threats such as we going to get you you better drop the suit do not rise to the level of adverse action", "holding the statement shouldnt i have an attorney so you dont ask me any illegal questions as an equivocal request for counsel", "holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute", "holding that the statement i guess you better get me a lawyer then was not an unequivocal invocation of the right to an attorney because the phrase i guess was equivocal", "holding that an unequivocal invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel must be presented in a manner that a reasonable police officer under similar circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for the presence of an attorney" ]

[ "holding that although congress has never enacted a comprehensive maritime code federal courts may not award loss of society damages under general maritime law because the death on the high seas act expressly prohibits recovery of such damages", "holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law", "recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law", "holding that general maritime law preempts state law", "holding punitive damages not recoverable for retaliatory discharge claim under general maritime law" ]

[ "holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed", "holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient", "holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea", "holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction", "holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea" ]

[ "holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted", "holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial", "holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm", "holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim", "holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" ]

[ "holding that gilmer plainly indicates that an arbitral cost allocation scheme may not be used to prevent effective vindication of federal statutory claims", "holding the plain language of 1325b2 unambiguously indicates that prospective not historical expenses are to be used to calculate disposable income", "holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state", "holding that the quantity of drugs may not be used to support a departure", "holding that igras specific grant of federal jurisdiction for certain actions indicates congress intended to limit federal jurisdiction to those instances" ]

[ "holding that the sue or be sued clause in corporate charter served as a waiver because the clause had no restrictions or limitations and was a clear explicit and unambiguous waiver", "holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous", "holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal", "holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver", "holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal" ]

[ "recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination", "holding violation of right to testify could not be harmless", "holding that right to be heard in article i section 11 incorporates framers contemporaneous understanding which did not recognize criminal defendants right to testify", "recognizing that a defendants right to be heard in criminal proceedings prior to sentencing is constitutionally protected", "holding right to testify was federal constitutional right" ]

[ "recognizing that pursuant to the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine corporate form may be disregarded when the corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person", "holding that the us attorneys office is the alter ego of the united states exercising its sovereign power of prosecution", "holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation", "holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law", "holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud" ]

[ "holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence", "holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence", "holding that the search of purses could not be justified as a protective search for weapons when police had control of the purses", "holding warrantless search of motel room after occupant was arrested outside room for drug possession could not be justified as search incident to arrest absent other exigent circumstances", "recognizing that a protective search of a residence may be justified when the defendant is arrested outside of the home" ]

[ "holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant", "holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report", "holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search", "holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records", "holding that policy requiring police officers to discontinue vehicular pursuit if they could establish offenders identity imposed a ministerial duty and that officers did not have discretion to ignore the policy" ]

[ "holding in an obscenity case it was not error to fail to require expert affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene", "holding that disclosure of grand jury materials to parole commission was harmless error", "recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case", "holding that expert testimony is unnecessary where the case is not a case in which lay jurors would be unable to grasp the issues without expert assistance", "holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible" ]

[ "holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in 1983 as any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it because njeither the supreme court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association", "holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act", "recognizing this rule", "holding that only deliberate executive conduct gives rise to a familial association violation and explicitly noting that this rule applies to both minor and adult children", "holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action" ]

[ "holding that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial", "holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial", "holding defendant waived right to contest lawfulness of search on appeal after he had admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial", "holding that a showing of actual prejudice was required where the defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial", "holding evidence admissible in punishment phase of trial because evidence had bearing on appellants personal responsibility and moral guilt" ]

[ "holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued", "holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer", "holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination", "holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy", "holding that an insurance company may limit coverage only if the limitation does not contravene public policy" ]

[ "holding that back pay awards are not excludable from gross income under 26 usc 104a2 1988 because the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that an award of back pay under title vii does not constitute the legal remedy of damages", "holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment", "holding that an arbitral award of back pay that continued beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was perfectly appropriate because the agreement contained no provision restricting back pay to the term of the agreement", "holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement", "holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court" ]

[ "holding that minor defendant was not entitled to a writ of prohibition directing the trial court to dismiss his capitalmurder indictments where he argued that only statutorily authorized sentences of death and life imprisonment without parole had been declared unconstitutional but the florida courts had established a valid sentencing option under miller", "holding that sentence was erroneous but not void where sentence of life imprisonment without parole was imposed for first degree murder under unconstitutional penalty statute", "holding that because minor defendant was mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and because his case was still pending on direct appeal when miller was released the minor defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing", "holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity", "recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences" ]

[ "holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm", "holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief", "holding that a drug manufacturer failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because its claim that it will suffer a loss of sales should an anda be approved and drug product marketed before this case is disposed of on the merits is pure speculation as it had failed to provide any proof of economic loss and merely states that it would probably lose 20 to 30 percent of its market during the first year", "holding that the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm because there is nothing before the court which would lead it to conclude that the competing drug will cause any harmful health effects", "holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss" ]

[ "recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights", "holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith", "recognizing that a court is not limited in what it may consider in determining whether parental rights should be terminated", "holding that due process allows parental rights to be terminated only upon clear and convincing evidence of unfitness", "holding the parental rights of a child may not be terminated unless that parent has been represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings" ]

[ "holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict", "holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict", "holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative", "holding that when a jury finds section 1988 liability but fails to award damages nominal damages are available to plaintiff", "holding that the first amendment right to free speech is absolute and an award of nominal damages is required even if the defendant fails to object to the nominal damages instruction" ]

[ "holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement", "holding that appellate court is not bound by the agencys interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue", "holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending", "holding itself not bound by the opinion of another division of its own appellate district", "holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues" ]

[ "holding that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes violation of code", "holding that creditors of a trust beneficiary were prohibited from intervening in an action involving a dispute between the trustee and a beneficiary concerning distribution of the trust corpus", "holding that a nonattorney trustee who represents the trust in court is representing and affecting the interest of the beneficiary and is thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of law", "holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust", "holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction" ]

[ "holding that when a plaintiff seeking an injunction raises a genuine issue of fact material to the defendant governments claim regarding its justification for a policy summary judgment is inappropriate", "holding that the original pto declarations create a genuine issue of material fact", "holding the conflict in expert declarations created a genuine issue of materi al fact that made summary judgment inappropriate", "holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment", "holding summary judgment inappropriate to resolve an essentially procedural conflict" ]

[ "holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights", "recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify", "holding in the private sector context that flsa rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived and stating that in any event congressionally granted flsa rights take precedence over conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained compensation arrangement", "holding that constitutional rights in extradition take precedence over treaty terms", "recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights" ]

[ "holding that when terminating nonprobationary employee employer is bound by policies established in personnel policy guide that control the employeremployee relationship", "holding that an employee could not be bound to an arbitration agreement that had been mailed to him by his employer acceptance of which was indicated by employees continued tenure with the company where there was no evidence in the record that the employee had received read or understood the document", "holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga 349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action", "holding handbook binding on employment relationship where employee had not been issued a copy but employee helped draft the guide a copy was available in the department where she worked employees could review guide on request and it was published to employees in sense of having been made generally known to them and proclaimed officially by employer", "holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury" ]

[ "holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion", "holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court", "holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction", "holding that due process required disqualification of a state supreme court justice from an appeal where the appellants chairman and president contributed 8 million to that supreme court justices election campaign after a 50 million verdiet was entered in the trial court", "holding that the question of recusal of a supreme court justice is to be left to the individual justice" ]

[ "holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins", "holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 16", "holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime", "holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction", "holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime" ]

[ "holding that in the event that parties are from different states and the subject matter is national in scope and where the contract states it shall be deemed to be made under the laws of the state of new york and for all purposes construed in accordance with laws of said state new york law applies as the parties choice of law", "holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under 1983", "holding that the sentence in article ii section 16 constitution of montana that guarantees an employee the right of full legal redress against third parties is mandatory and self executing and leaves no room for erosion based on what federal courts or the courts of other states would do pursuant to federal laws or the laws of other states", "holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution", "holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution" ]

[ "holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute", "holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law not arizona law should be applied", "holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in houston texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute for plaintiffs claims of various forms of fraud and negligent misrepresentation", "recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas", "holding nonresidents statement that he had committed no torts in texas was properly excluded as conclusory" ]