context
stringlengths
5
855
endings
sequence
label
class label
5 classes
petition if this Court eventually affirmed the grant of visitation rights to Vest, I find the quoted passage to be possible support for granting Vest visitation rights, rather than for denying them. 2 . My preference would be to remand to the children’s court for further findings on the issue of visitation. See State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't v. Coleman, 104 N.M. 500, 505, 723 P.2d 971, 976 (Ct.App.1986). As already noted, the children’s court's inquiry into this issue was too limited in scope. Additionally, there has been a significant lapse of time since the children’s court’s determination. This appellate delay may have had a crucial effect on the issues before the children’s court. See generally State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. Geist, 310 Or. 176, 796 P.2d 1193, 1200-01 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Because the paramount concern here is the
[ "recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights", "holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest", "recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights", "recognizing that protracted litigation regarding parental rights is detrimental to children", "holding that evidence did not support termination of parental rights to two children despite mothers prior conviction for killing her stepchild" ]
33
among the nation’s veterans is not uncommon. VA statistics show that, as of January 2011, “there were 67,495 homeless Veterans[, a]nd an estimated 144,842 Veterans spent at least one night in an emergency shelter or transitional housing program in a recent year.” http:// www.va.gov/HOMELESS/about_the_ initiative.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). The Secretary asserts that it is due to the pervasive nature of the problem that he concedes that homelessness may be an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See Secretary’s Response at 2. Despite our recognition of the problem of homelessness among veterans, we are not bound by the Secretary’s concession when considering whether Ms. Checo’s homelessness is an extraordinary circumstance. See Bove, 25 Vet.App. at 140-41 (<HOLDING>); see also McCreary, 19 Vet.App. at 332
[ "holding that the 120day judicial appeal period is not subject to waiver or forfeiture by the secretary", "holding that issue of whether the 120day judicialappeal period prescribed by 38 usc 7266a for seeking judicial review of a board decision is subject to equitable tolling is a legal question", "holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver", "holding that the right to support is not subject to waiver by either parent", "holding that due process right to present a defense is subject to forfeiture if not properly asserted in the trial court" ]
00
from New York’s surcharge program and was not preempted. The prevailing wage law merely “alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans,” Id. at 334, 117 S.Ct. 832, and thus is “no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate.” Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668, 115 S.Ct. 1671. More recently, in De 6th Cir.1995) (ERISA preempted claim for the refusal to authorize inpatient treatment for a mental health patient); Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir.1993) (ERISA preempts malpractice claim against an HMO for denying precertification for heart surgery); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d
[ "holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans", "holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute", "holding that erisa preempts wrongful death and state common law actions when plaintiff asserts insurers delay in authorization of procedure caused the patients death", "holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother", "recognizing cause of action for wrongful death" ]
22
trial court as a prerequisite to appellate review are rooted in the well-established principle that appellate courts are courts of review, and that trial judges should be given an opportunity to correct any errors occurring in trial proceedings before complaint is taken to a higher court. Application of those rules makes perfect sense in normal instances of trial error; however, the instant issue presents a rare example of an issue where fundamental fairness requires an exception to the rule. The view that a defendant’s failure to object to denial of the right against self-incrimination does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the right to assert such error on appeal was supported inferentially in O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 93, 87 S.Ct. 252, 253-54, 17 L.Ed.2d 189, 191 (1966) (<HOLDING>), and expressly in Walker v. United States, 404
[ "holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination", "holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific", "holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from asserting an indemnity claim against a state", "recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination", "holding state procedural rule requiring trial objections could not bar an appellant from asserting a violation of his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination" ]
44
A.2d 22, 25 (1984). Accordingly, “the privilege extends not only to communications made in open court, but also encompasses pleadings and even less formal communications such as preliminary conferences and correspondence between counsel in furtherance of a client’s interest.” Pawlowski v. Smorto, 403 Pa.Super. 71, 588 A.2d 36, 41 (1991) (citations omitted). In fact, the absolute privilege has been extended to statements made by private parties to law enforcement officials for the purpose of initiating the prosecution of criminal charges, see id. at 42, as well as to statements made to mental health officials for the purpose of initiating involuntary commitment proceedings, Marino v. Fava, 915 A.2d 121, 124 (Pa. Super. 2006). Cf. Schanne v. Addis, 632 Pa. 545, 121 A.3d 942, 952 (2015) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Our
[ "holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding", "holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school", "holding that the judicial privilege does not apply to an allegation concerning a school teacher made by an adult former student before commencement of any quasijudicial proceeding and without an intent that it lead to a quasijudicial proceeding", "holding that a statutory basis is necessary for an administrative body to initiate reconsideration of its prior final quasijudicial decisions", "holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding" ]
22
§ 158 cmt. m (“An unprivileged remaining on land in another’s possession is a continuing trespass for the entire time during which the actor wrongfully remains.”). The continuing presence of MCI’s fiber optic cables on Browning’s land therefore could give rise to a claim of continuing trespass, assuming that the original installation of the cables was tor-tious (which MCI denies). Nevertheless, even assuming that MCI committed a continuing trespass, any such claim was discharged by confirmation of MCI’s plan of reorganization, due to the expansive scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “claim” and Browning’s failure to allege any relevant post-confirmation conduct or unforeseeable damages. It is well-established under Kansas law Co., 64 Kan. 403, 403, 67 P. 831, 833 (Kan.1902) (<HOLDING>). Whether Browning would have been required
[ "recognizing fundamental principle that utility rates are set for the future and not the past", "recognizing that when a defendants negligence causes bodily injury the plaintiff can recover damages for past present and future medical expenses bodily injury and emotional distress", "holding plaintiff must move before public interests are involved to bring suit for ejectment but allowing single action for past present and future damages", "holding that prejudgment interest may properly be added to damage awards for past lost wages medical expenses that have been incurred and past pain and suffering but not future loss of earnings future medical expenses andor future pain and suffering", "holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs" ]
22
three additional bases for equitably tolling § 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period: (1) "his lack of access to legal resources,” (2) "his lack of legal knowledge,” and (3) his "medical disability” (depression). R. at 64. In his filings with this court, however, Mr. Sandoval does not renew these claims. Instead, he simply states that he "explained the circumstances beyond [his] control” during "habeas review.” Aplt. Opening Br. for Appl. for COA at 2. Insofar as this could be read as an attempt to incorporate the three arguments by reference, this practice is generally disfavored in this circuit. See 10th Cir. R. 28.4 (“Incorporating by reference portions of lower court or agency briefs or pleadings is disapproved.”); see also Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 963-64 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160
[ "holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance", "holding that courts must construe pro se filings liberally", "holding that the appellant could not incorporate district court filings into his appellate brief by reference and that his pro se status did not except him from such established rules", "holding that nonlawyer proceeding pro se could not represent his children", "holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them" ]
22
offense, and the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses. Defendant argues that the Career Offend er Guideline should not have been applied to him, because the instant offense was not a crime of violence. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 582 (9th Cir.2004). Defendant is correct with respect to the counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). “‘Crime of violence’ does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.... ” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n. 1; see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45-47, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, Defendant is incorrect with respect
[ "holding that commentary in the guidelines manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline", "holding a sentence is not based on the guidelines unless the plea agreement itself expressly uses a guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment", "recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative", "holding that commentary in sentencing guidelines that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline it interprets", "holding that sentencing guidelines commentary must be given controlling weight unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is plainly inconsistent with the guidelines itself" ]
44
to adjudicate Mr. DeBatto’s claims. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4. The government initially contested this court’s jurisdiction over those claims, Def.’s Mot. at 7, referring to plaintiffs failure to cite the fact that his claims for disability retirement benefits fall within the ambit of 10 U.S.C. § 1201. Section 1201 provides that if the Secretary concludes that a service member is “unfit to perform the duties of the member’s office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical disability incurred while entitled to basic pay ... the Secretary may retire the member.” 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that Section 1201 is money-mandating. See Chambers, 417 F.3d at 1223-24 (citing Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1174-75); Sawyer v. United States, 930 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Based upon Section 1201, Mr. DeBatto can
[ "recognizing that although provision of municipal service is not fundamental right inequitable provision of that service is subject to equal protection analysis", "holding that an attempted service on the partys counsel was insufficient without proof of the counsels actual authority to receive service", "holding that fdcpa statutory damages did not predominate over the requested equitable relief because given the defendants net worth and the number of class members each class member would be entitled to receive only 025 in statutory damages", "holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision", "holding that section 1201 is moneymandating and that when the terms of the statutory provision are met the service member is entitled to receive compensation" ]
44
loss as of that date. Blackmon further argues that the net operating loss of $5,657,287 in 1999 was not indicative of the loss Nexity might incur in the future because he understood from one and omissions regarding Nexity’s financial performance in the year 2000 were immaterial as a matter of law. ii. June 15, 2000, Closing Blackmon argues that the Nexity defendants misrepresented the closing date of the offering as June 15, 2000, because Nexity actually allowed investors to purchase stock even after August 2000. Blackmon bases this argument on the new factual allegation in the stricken amended complaint. Because we hold that the amended complaint was properly disallowed, the trial court was correct in not addressing this argument. See Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>). Therefore, we do not consider this argument.
[ "holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints", "holding that the trial court properly refused to consider allegations in the disallowed amended complaints", "holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action", "holding leave to amend was properly denied where the relator had previously filed two amended complaints", "holding that the trial court properly refused defendants instruction because it invaded the province of the jury" ]
11
substantially outweighed by the dangers listed in Rule 403. Rule 404(c)(l)(C)-(D); State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 49 ¶ 30, 97 P.3d 865, 874 (2004). Benson argues the trial court erred by making this finding because the attack on Yolanda was dissimilar to and remote in time from the other crimes. See Rule 404(e)(l)(C)(i)-(ii) (listing dissimilarity and remoteness as factors to consider). ¶ 14 The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Although the attack on Yolanda differed in some ways from the attacks on the other victims (for example, it involved a second assailant and the use of a chemical to render her unconscious), the attacks did not have to precisely align for the evidence to be cross-admissible. See State v. Lehr (Lehr III), 227 Ariz. 140, 147 ¶ 21, 254 P.3d 379, 386 (2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Rule 404 emt. to 1997 amendment
[ "holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment", "recognizing that jurors have the right to reject that part of the evidence believed by them to be untrue and to accept that found by them to be true", "holding death sentence need not be pending in order for this court to engage in review of issues on appeal", "holding that ajets need not be perfectly similar in order for evidence of them to be admitted under rule 404", "holding that the 1979 policy interpretation need not be approved by the president in order to become effective as it is not a rule regulation or order" ]
33
township in the RLCWA’s district took on a different status simply by virtue of its annexation by another township in the RLCWA’s district. Second, the federal anti-curtailment statute specifically anticipates that a city will use its annexation of property located within the service area of a rural water association as a basis to provide service to that property, and expressly prohibits such provision of service while the water district is indebted to the federal government. See 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). Third, case law shows that a municipality’s annexation of property located within a rural water association does not, of itself, remove it from the water district for § 1926(b) purposes. See, e.g., Glenpool Util. Serv. Auth. v. Creek County Rural Water Disk, 861 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Bell Arthur Water Corp. v. Greenville Util.
[ "holding that article x 2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially", "holding that 1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents", "holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of 1926b", "holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district", "holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted" ]
11
this Court will not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla.1999). The referee’s findings of fact demonstrate that Mirk misappropriated $31,487.50 in client funds held in his trust account. This Court has long held that attorney misconduct involving the misuse or misappropriation of client funds is unquestionably one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit. See Fla. Bar. v. Martinez-Genova, 959 So.2d 241, 246 (Fla.2007). Indeed, disbarment is presumed the appropriate discipline when an attorney engages in this type of misconduct. Id.; see also Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So.2d 333, 338 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>). We have also emphasized that the presumption
[ "holding that disbarment is the presumptively appropriate sanction under both the florida standards for imposing lawyer sanctions and case law when a lawyer misappropriates trust funds", "holding that a finding of bad faith on the part of the offending lawyer is a prerequisite for imposing sanctions under 1927", "holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person", "holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorneys repeated material misrepresentations", "holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction where an attorney misappropriated funds from his real estate partners" ]
00
119 (1996); Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344, 346 (8th Cir.1974) (officers are not required to “conduct a mini trial” before making an arrest). Probable cause is to be determined upon the objective facts available to the officers at the time of the arrest. See id. At the time of appellees’ arrest in this case, the officers had, at least, arguable probable cause to conclude that Smithson and his son Ryan had committed an assault. Even if this were a mistaken belief the officers would still be entitled to a qualified immunity defense. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096. Accordingly, we conclude that Stanley and Aldrich are entitled to qualified immunity on appellees’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. See Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). B. Due Process Appellants Stanley and Aldrich
[ "holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim", "recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in 1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest", "holding that in a 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury", "recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to 1983 claims", "holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause" ]
33
Brown’s argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on “any person”). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown’s conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no
[ "holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel", "holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen", "holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law", "holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct", "holding police officer is a public official" ]
33
denial of the conversation with Fultz appears for the first time in the form of an affidavit, completed one day before her response to Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment and four months after the deposition. In evaluating whether an employee has been disciplined or terminated “because of’ a protected trait, we must “look at the facts as. they appear to the person making the decision.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer’s] proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [the employer] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”); see also McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Before issuing the reprimand, Dixon informed
[ "holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false", "holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations", "holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment", "holding that a plaintiff failed to state a claim based on conclusory allegations that a locality failed to adequately supervise officers in the proper use of force where the complaint provided no factual allegations of known widespread conduct by the localitys employees comparable to that alleged as to the plaintiff", "holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant" ]
00
and tie up our water resources in this state to the detriment of our true appropriators. Hearing on S.B. 481 Before the House Agriculture Committee, 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg.Sess. (hearing tape MIT-79 38A, May 7, 1979, at 10:15 a.m.). 9 . In Florence, we held that an applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the "can and will" statute has been satisfied. Florence, 688 P.2d at 718, 718 n. 7; accord In re Gibbs, 856 P.2d 798, 802-03 (Colo. 1993); FWS, 795 P.2d at 840-41; see Public Serv. Co. v. Board of Water Works, 831 P.2d 470,- 478 (Colo.1992); City of Thornton, v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 926 (Colo. 1992); Fox v. Division Eng'r, 810 P.2d 644, 646 (Colo.1991). We have applied this requirement in several contexts. See FWS, 795 P.2d at 840 (<HOLDING>); Fox, 810 P.2d at 646 (holding that an
[ "holding that unsuccessful job applicant for governmental employment had due process right to meaningful administrative appeal of rejection when regulations established right to such appeal", "recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings", "holding that an applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal", "holding that a plaintiff has no absolute unconditional right of access to the courts and no constitutional right of access to prosecute frivolous or malicious actions", "holding that the applicant failed to satisfy the statute because the applicant did not have an ownership right or access right to the reservoir site" ]
44
506 F.3d 1211, 1237 (10th Cir.2007) (“[Defendant] has cited to no United States Supreme Court decisions, and our own independent research has failed to produce any, holding that a state court’s erroneous application of state criminal law can result in a violation of a criminal defendant’s equal protection rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2943, 171 L.Ed.2d 872 (2008). And any argument that the OCCA’s application of the Spuehler standard was an ex post facto violation, thereby implicating his due process rights, is unavailing. The decision in Easlick did not alter the definition of criminal conduct or change the punishment for any offenses. Thus, its application did not constitute an ex post facto violation. See Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1228 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, Mr. Bates argues that the evidence
[ "holding that the ex post facto clause has no application to deportation", "holding that application of a judicial decision was not an ex post facto violation when the decision did not redefine any crimes defenses or punishments", "holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law", "holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause", "holding application of successor statute regarding registration of sexual predator was regulatory and not an ex post facto violation" ]
11
communications in those proceedings, free of the threat of legal actions predicated upon those communications, that is the heart of the rule. The nature of the underlying dispute simply does not matter.” Echevarria, 950 So.2d at 384. Because it is undisputed that the acts complained of here occurred during and were related to the judicial proceedings, we agree with the trial court that the litigation privilege applies to LatAm’s cause of action against Holland & Knight for abuse of process. See also Am. Nat’l Title & Escrow of Fla. v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 748 So.2d 1054, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (affirming the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the law firm in an action for abuse of process on the basis of a ., 935 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). The Florida Supreme Court has also
[ "holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the allegations of the initial complaint did not allege facts which would bring the case within the coverage of the title insurance policy", "holding that the litigation privilege did not prohibit the plaintiffs false imprisonment claim because the confinement did not occur during the course of the judicial proceedings nor in an effort to prosecute or defend the lawsuit", "holding in the context of an attorney malpractice suit an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the acts of the attorney it selects to defend the insured while the insurer selected the attorney to defend the insureds and controlled the ultimate decision to settle or defend under the policy there is nothing in the record to indicate the insurer had any control over the details of the litigation as it was being conducted by the the attorney", "holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law", "holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act" ]
11
is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. The word in ordinary usage means “must” and is inconsistent with a concept of discretion. Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed.1990). The Supreme Court has also recognized that use of the word “shall” is “language of an ‘unmistakably mandatory character.’ ” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989) (“Congress could not have chosen stronger words[, that is, ‘shall order,’] to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied....”); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 223-27, 107 S.Ct. 2802, 97 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377,
[ "holding that the use of the word shall in the extradition clause and the extradition act creates a mandatory duty", "holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons", "holding that the word may in the declaratory judgment act does not mean shall ", "holding that the use of the word shall in 1285a of subchapter ii of the act imposes a mandatory duty on the administrator to allot all the amounts authorized to be appropriated", "holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language" ]
00
clause is limited to legal impossibility because “Florida law construes force majeure clauses to exclude only those delays that are excusable under the doctrine of impossibility.” To support that contention, Paradigm cites Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671, 675 (1944), but that decision does not shoulder the proposition. In Florida Power the delay was caused by a hurricane — an act of God. Id. The court was concerned with only that kind of delay. That does not mean the court was narrowing the force majeure clause at issue (and all force majeure clauses in all Florida contracts) to cover only acts of God. It appears to us that force majeure clauses broader than the scope of impossibility are enforceable under Florida law. See Devco, 518 So.2d at 923 (<HOLDING>); St. Joe Paper Co. v. State Dep’t of Envtl.
[ "holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim", "holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims", "holding that the use of excessive force does not constitute a prison condition in the ordinary sense of the term", "holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment", "holding that excessive rain excused delay under the contracts force majeure clause as a condition outside of the sellers control" ]
44
in which ease imputing the subsidiaries’ jurisdictional contacts to the parent would be improper. Id. at 1085 (citing Bellomo, 488 F.Supp. at 746). Similarly, the New York district court in Bellomo held that: [wjhere a holding company is nothing more than an investment mechanism[, i.e.,] a device for diversifying risk through corporate acquisitions^] the subsidiaries conduct business not as its agents but as its investments. The business of the parent is the business of investment, and that business is carried out entirely at the parent level. Where, on the other hand, the subsidiaries are created by the parent, for tax or corporate finance purposes, there is no basis for distinguishing between the business of the parent and the business of the subsidiaries. 488 F.Supp. at 746 (<HOLDING>); but see Arch v. American Tobacco Co., Inc.,
[ "holding foreign insurance company was supercorporation engaged in underwriting and selling insurance policies through its subsidiaries", "holding that subcontractors primary and excess insurance policies must pay first and before contractors own insurance", "holding that notice and a hearing were required before the commissioner of insurance could require an insurance company to change its definition of at fault in order to secure approval of an increase in insurance rates", "holding claims for negligent procurement of insurance accrued on date the insured purchased the insurance policies", "holding negligent failure to notify regulatory body of lapse of insurance policy did not arise out of underwriting of insurance" ]
00
concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) does not permit an award of money damages against the IRS for violating the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the court examines 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) and (b) for authority to support the judgment of the bankruptcy court. Section 106(a) and (b) addresses to what extent the government is deemed to have waived its sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings when it pursues a claim against a debtor. Subsection (a) “provides for ‘affirmative recovery/ including money judgments,” but only in limited circumstances. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of Income Maintenance (In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc.), 850 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir.1988), aff'd, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S.Ct. 2818, 106 L.Ed.2d 76 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Inslaw, 113 B.R. at 812-13 (<HOLDING>). The waiver of sovereign immunity under this
[ "holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate the payment of money by the united states", "holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply", "holding that the united states department of justice waived its immunity from money damages under subsection a", "holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief", "holding a claim for injunction but not money damages against a state officer for a violation of the age discrimination in employment act enacted under article i section 8 of the united states constitution was not barred by sovereign immunity under the ex parte young exception" ]
22
11 U.S.C. § 303(i). When a court dismisses an involuntary petition, § 3 Focus’ appeal as equitably moot. Appellees have not demonstrated that this case “present[s] transactions that are so complex or difficult to unwind that the doctrine of equitable mootness would apply.” Lowenschuss v. Selnick (In re Lowenschuss), 170 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir.1999). Because Focus seeks an exit instead of a do-over — i.e., the termination of bankruptcy proceedings and the dismissal of the trustee, rather than a complex corporate restructuring — the requested relief is not only possible but decidedly more practicable than the relief sought in other bankruptcy appeals we have dismissed as moot. See Baker & Drake, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (In re Baker & Drake, Inc.), 35 F.3d 1348, 1351-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); cf. Mann v. Alexander Dawson Inc. (In re
[ "recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined", "holding that a plaintiff must allege either an interference with specific third parties or an identifiable class of third persons", "holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party", "holding appeal not moot where bankruptcy proceedings involved third parties but unlike robehs farms and rochman v northeast utils serv group in re pub serv co 963 f2d 469 1st cir1992 the reorganization plan is not a complex billiondollar affair that has affected innumerable third parties", "holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties" ]
33
search a premises, Weston, 67 M.J. at 393 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988), I do not believe that case to be controlling. Matlock was arrested on the front lawn of the house, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988, and placed in a nearby police car. Id. at 179, 94 S.Ct. 988 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The arresting officers subsequently approached the house, spoke with a resident who shared a bedroom with Matlock, and received permission to search that bedroom. Id. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988. The police did not ask Matlock for his consent to search the bedroom, nor did he offer it. Id. The Supreme Court recognized the consent of the cotenant may be valid against a eotenant who has not objected. Id. at 170, 94 S.Ct. 988; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-80, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (<HOLDING>). This case differs from Matlock and Rodriguez
[ "holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises", "holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez", "holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises", "holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises", "holding that there is no violation of the fourth amendment when the government reasonably believed that the individual giving consent to the search had authority to do so" ]
00
the defendant’s only link to the crime is eyewitness identification. Subsequent to our decisions in Davis and Randle, studies have shown the primary cause for the conviction of innocent people in our criminal justice system is mistaken eyewitness identification. Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, 29 Champion 12 (2005). DNA exoneration ca subsequently litigate whether an identification made as part of such a deposition should be admitted because it was reliable, as required by the second part of the test set forth in Neil. Judicial resources can be preserved by avoiding a situation that will likely create an impermissibly suggestive procedure and result in an inadmissible identification. See United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Rule 2.13(1) was implemented to protect a
[ "holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial", "holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial", "holding an incourt identification made with the defendant sitting next to his attorney at the counsels table is so clearly suggestive as to be impermissible", "holding when the defendant timely objected to an incourt identification by an eyewitness the trial judge should have directed the government to provide an outofcourt lineup or other protective procedure to avoid an impermissibly suggestive incourt identification", "holding that witness had an independent basis to support incourt identification where the description made prior to any pretrial identification was substantially an accurate description of the defendant" ]
33
these allegations and materials are sufficient to plausibly allege ACI and Adderley are an integrated enterprise under the FLSA. See Perez v. Westchester Foreign Autos, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6091(ER), 2013 WL 749497, at **7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013). Plaintiffs also allege that the proposed individual defendants were owners and corporate officers of Adderley and ACI, and had authority over matters including payroll, personnel, and the supervision and hiring and firing of employees of both companies. (PAC ¶¶ 43-130.) Discovery allegedly supports the assertion that Messers. Presser, Misseri, and Cestaro are the sole shareholders of both Adderley and ACI. (Kessler Decl. ¶ 8). Under the FLSA, these allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege employer status. See Irizarry, 722 F.3d at 116 (<HOLDING>); Perez, 2013 WL 749497, at *8. The NYLL
[ "holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company", "holding owner of limited liability company may be personally liable to third party if owner acts as agent for company and fails to disclose existence and identity of principal", "holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa", "holding that the responsibility of another did not absolve the plaintiff of his own responsibility where the plaintiff helped incorporate the company served as vice president and president owned varying levels of stock and possessed authority to hire and fire", "holding in context of control person analysis that because defendant founded the company and was its largest shareholder he may be able to influence the company" ]
00
(citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul’s store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation’s borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held
[ "holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction", "recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians", "holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation", "holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians", "holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization" ]
22
practice and protocol. We do not question that Amanda’s proof is sufficient for a negligence claim against Nissan. Our review, however, extends to the enhanced culpability required for punitive damages. Proving Gross Negligence Successful completion of regulatory product testing weighs against a finding of gross negligence.' Accordingly, exceeding mandatory requirements by successfully completing more rigorous testing strongly weighs against such a finding. The logic is clear. Meeting and then exceeding base safety requirements is, at the- very least, facial evidence of exercising slight care. Federal courts applying Kentucky law have correctly- observed this standard. E.g,, Cameron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. Civ.A.5:04-CV-24, 2005 WL 2674990, at *9 (E.D.Ky. Oct. 20, 2005) (<HOLDING>). This approach has also been adopted by
[ "holding that the undisputed fact that manufacturer complied with federal safety standards weighed against punitive damages", "holding that a reduction in punitive damages to comply with the due process clause is a federal constitutional issue not a fact issue requiring jury consideration", "holding that indemnification by excess liability insurer for punitive damages imposed on drug manufacturer contrary to public policy", "holding a court may not award punitive damages", "holding that punitive damages could not be granted because punitive damages are a matter of substantive law and substantive state law must yield to federal limitations" ]
00
where the suit is brought; that is, in Ecuador. First, as Gallo points out, Ecuador’s repeal of Decree 1038-A is a strong indication that the portion of that decree that invalidates forum selection and choice of law clauses does not constitute strong public policy. Second, to the extent Decree 1038-A may have expressed a public policy against forum selection clauses, the strength or extent of that policy is not sufficient to justify the non-enforcement of the forum selection and choice of law provisions of the contract. Public policy against a forum selection clause will not prevent enforcement of the clauses where the contract implicates international trade and where the complaining party’s substantive rights are not subverted by the choice of law or forum. See Bonny, 3 F.3d at 162 (<HOLDING>). While Andina argues that Bonny, and
[ "holding antiwaiver provision of securities laws does not prevent enforcement of contract provision choosing english forum", "holding federal law does not prevent a state from choosing between prospective operation of its decision and that of relation backward", "holding that puffery is not actionable under the securities laws", "holding that in interpreting a contract we look to the conflict of laws rules of the forum state to determine which states laws will be controlling", "holding that provision of securities exchange act allowing injunction against one who is violating or will violate securities laws does not confer subject matter jurisdiction over dispute with individual not accused of such violations" ]
00
testimony. Moreover, we find that the written order excluding the victim’s statements to Marvin Bynum states, “The proffered statements do not possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as required by Rule 804(B)(4) [sic] of the Rules of Evidence.” The better practice would have been for the trial court to specify in the other orders that the evidence was admissible under Rule 804(b)(5). However, from the transcript and the nearly identical findings and conclusions in all the written orders in the record, it is clear that the hearsay testimony admitted by the court was admitted pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5). Therefore, omission of the rule number from the orders admitting the testimony was harmless. Cf. State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 97, 337 S.E.2d 833, 847 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Defendant argues further that there was
[ "holding that it is incumbent upon the trial court to enter into the record findings of fact and conclusions that the manner of payment is reasonable and one which defendant can afford", "holding that before admitting rule 80324 hearsay statements the trial court must enter in the record appropriate statements rationale or findings of fact and conclusions of law", "holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law", "holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact", "holding court must conduct new trial absent parties consent where deceased judge had not issued findings of fact and conclusions of law before death" ]
11
Court accepts as true all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Finally, “the court neither weighs the evidence, nor determines the credibility or reliability of the witnesses.” State v. Daleske, 866 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Mo.App.1993) (citing State v. Middleton, 854 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo.App.1993)). The appellant concedes in his brief that our appellate courts have routinely recognized the fact that a fingerprint at the scene of the crime may in and of itself be sufficient to convict. See State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 413 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Bland, 757 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Mo.App.1988) (citing State v. Thomas, 452 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo.1970)) (<HOLDING>). However, he contends that “a partial palm
[ "holding that information of criminal activity given by a known reliable informant is enough to sustain a terry stop", "holding that evidence was sufficiently reliable because there was corroboration", "holding that due to the reliable and unique quality of an individuals fingerprint fingerprint evidence by itself is enough to support a criminal conviction", "holding that it was sufficient that the government submitted unchallenged certified records of conviction and other clearly reliable evidence", "holding that a judicial confession in a guilty plea is itself sufficient evidence to support the crime charged" ]
22
“writing and uploading reports.” (FAC ¶ 58.) The Court finds that these facts alone are insufficient to state a claim that the time is compensable because the FAC contains no facts indicating whether it was necessary for Wolman or Iwasiuk to complete these tasks outside of their scheduled shifts. With respect to Lundy, the FAC states that he arrived thirty minutes early to each shift to be updated by the nurse working the prior shift and he stayed thirty minutes after each shift to finish charting and update the nurse working the following shift. (FAC ¶ 60.) The Court finds that these facts state a plausible claim that his off-shift work was necessary for the proper and efficient performance of his job. See Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 718 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). in. Training Programs “Time spent attending
[ "holding that a radiological technologist was entitled to compensation for the fifteen minutes spent before her shift each day turning on the xray processing machine letting it warm up and performing tests on the machine because the proper performance of her job required this preparatory work to be completed when the first walkin patient could potentially arrive", "holding the government proved the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the minor when among other things he spent twenty minutes taking pictures of her for her backpage ad", "holding that it was proper for the medical examiner to estimate the victims time of death based on the results of her investigators lividity test as it was standard procedure for her to rely on tests performed by members of her office", "holding that the something more requirement was met when after a factory worker complained to her supervisor that her machine was not operating properly the workers supervisor told her to go back to work quit whining and just deal with it", "holding that an applicant who convincingly demonstrated that she could not rely on the authorities to protect her from her fathers abuse and that by turning to governmental authorities for help her circumstances may well have worsened was not required to report private persecution to government authorities to qualify for asylum" ]
00
rise to a duty of reasonable care to third parties. Shepard, 390 N.W.2d at 241. Thus, the physician’s special relationship to Eric’s mother gave rise to a duty that also extended to Eric, who was, “[a]s plaintiffs son and a member of her household,” a “foreseeable potential victim of [the physician’s] conduct.” Id. Similarly, in Welke, the court concluded that a duty existed for the benefit of a third party where a physician injected his patient with an unknown substance, let the patient drive his vehicle, and the patient subsequently killed another individual while driving. 375 N.W.2d at 406. The third party, the court held, was “an innocent driver within the scope of foreseeable risk” by virtue of the physician’s relationship with his patient. Id.; see also Duvall, 362 N.W.2d at 279 (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich.App. 291, 335 N.W.2d
[ "holding that a psychiatrist owed a duty to a person foreseeably injured by his patient", "holding that psychiatrist has duty to third parties to exercise due care in treatment and release of committed patients", "holding that when a psychiatrist determines or should determine that a patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third party the psychiatrist has a duty of reasonable care to that party", "holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave", "holding that psychiatrist had duty to protect individuals endangered by his epileptic patient" ]
44
in your office as a patient, he came in with his contact lenses in, he had a prior history of refractions that you believe indicated stability, you still would have remeasured him prior to surgery; correct? A. That's just my habit. Q. And your habits are the ones that you believe are what a prudent ophthalmologist should observe? A. As stated in the context of my deposition. Q. Do you know what the standard of care is in Arizona, Doctor? A. No. 7 . See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34, 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49, 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339, 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Peacock v. Samaritan Health Serv., 159 Ariz.
[ "holding that a manufacturers insert in and of itself may not establish the relevant standard of care in a medical negligence action but may be considered by the fact finder along with expert testimony to define the standard of care", "holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard", "holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally accepted standard of care", "recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care", "holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider" ]
33
of record rather than the alien. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also favor notice of counsel of record rather than actual notice of the client. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) (stating that “whenever service under these rules is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court”). Case precedent also indicates that actual notice of an alien is not required under the INA. See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 669 n. 6 (3d Cir.1990) (noting in dicta that notice to attorney comprised actual notice to alien); Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 502-3 (D.C.Cir.1989) (finding actual knowledge of attorney constitutes reasonable notice); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193, 1194 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Anin received notice as required by the INA.
[ "holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city", "holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner", "holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice", "holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice", "holding that notice to original attorney not formally withdrawn comprised proper notice" ]
44
by Kratzer’s testimony, not wife’s. As such, it is admissible béeause it is the admission of one co-conspirator uttered in the furtherance of a conspiracy. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 489 Pa. 85, 413 A.2d 1025 (1980). If any portion of the transcript should have been redacted to exclude wife’s conversation, such an omission was harmless error, since appellant’s participation in the conspiracy was established beyond a reasonable doubt through the conversations with Kratzer. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 540 Pa. 442, 446-447, 658 A.2d 746, 749 (1995) (stating that error is harmless when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error insignificant so that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict); see also Evans at 92-94, 413 A.2d at 1029 (<HOLDING>). In sum, it was not an abuse of discretion for
[ "holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy", "holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy", "holding that admission of evidence of activity not done in furtherance of the conspiracy was harmless error where defendants participation was fully established by the testimony of another coconspirator", "holding that proof of overt act is not required to support admission of evidence of statement of coconspirator during course of conspiracy", "holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt" ]
22
believed the victims and that the defendant was not being truthful. Id. at 325-26. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to redact those statements as impermissible comments on credibility. Id. at 327. On review before the Supreme Court, the issue was how the vouching rule, which developed as a principle applicable to in-court testimony, applies to a witness’s out-of-court comments on credibility. Id. at 331. To answer that question, the court was required to reconcile the apparent tension between its decisions in State v. Odoms, 313 Or 76, 83, 829 P2d 690 (1992) (explaining that “a relevant out-of-court statement, recounted at trial, generally may not be excluded merely because it is phrased in the form of an opinion”), and State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 48, 913 P2d 308 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Chandler, 360 Or at 333 (“Whereas Charboneau
[ "holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error", "holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility", "holding that hospitalization of witnesss wife and his desire to be by her side was not a substantial basis for admitting witnesss testimony from first trial", "holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay", "holding that it was not erroneous for committing court to refuse to admit an affidavit from a private investigator that provided evidence of a witnesss lack of credibility when the affidavit would not have explained away the witnesss testimony but only challenged its credibility" ]
11
is reasonable only if the notice includes the date on which and the county in which the alleged crime or bad act occurred and the name of the alleged victim of the crime or bad act.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 3(g). The record reflects that the State provided notice to appellant of its intention to use evidence of prior convictions and extraneous offenses, and it supplemented its notice. The notices included the information required by Article 37.07, Section 3(g). Additionally, appellan im.App.1998) (analyzing former appellate rule and holding review not preserved unless defendant brings matters to trial court’s attention in a motion for new trial and trial court rules on the motion); Longoria v. State, 154 S.W.3d 747, 762 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.2004, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). Thus, appellant has waived his contention
[ "holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal", "holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal", "holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court", "holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial", "holding where record fails to establish whether and how appellant presented motion for new trial to the trial court it was not timely presented" ]
44
speculate as to whether the operator had sufficient time to stop the machine safely even if he had been watching a CCTV screen. Beauregard’s argument therefore reduces to the possibility that a CCTV system would have captured Bourgeois’s image in time for the operator to stop the machine safely and that the operator would have been paying attention and done so. Drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in Beauregard’s favor, a jury could conclude only that a CCTV system possibly, but not probably, would have prevented the accident that killed Bourgeois. Causation framed in terms of possibilities does not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a design defect that caused an injuiy. See Goffredo v. Mercedes-Benz Truck Co., 402 Mass. 97, 102-03 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Sweeting v. Cairns & Brother, Inc., 32
[ "holding that trial court properly granted directed verdict when plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to state cause of action under the dtp a", "holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury", "recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party", "holding that a directed verdict in defendants favor was appropriate where plaintiff s expert was able to state his opinion regarding the cause of plaintiffs injuries only in terms of possibility but not of probability", "holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict" ]
33
County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Ban zure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete’s Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is “[s]o obvious ... that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity.” Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533(<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the
[ "holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional", "holding that doctrine does not violate due process", "holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists", "holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies", "holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy" ]
22
ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111
[ "holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent", "holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required", "holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search", "holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search", "holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car" ]
11
and would prevent law enforcement from getting inside without same). 38 United States v. Santos, 403 F3d 1120, 1132 (II) (B) (2) (e) (10th Cir. 2005); see Brown v. State, 269 Ga. 830, 832-33 (2), n. 2 (504 SE2d 443) (1998) (listing as “reasonably-founded suspicious factors” the following: “an officer’s knowledge of past criminal involvement by individuals inside the stopped vehicle', irregularities in licensing and insurance documentation or the driver’s authority to be operating the stopped vehicle; and the location where the stop occurred” (emphasis supplied)); Giles v. State, 284 Ga. App. 1, 4 (1) (642 SE2d 921) (2007) (considering prior arrest history as a relevant factor in totality of circumstances analysis). Cf. Martin v. State, 316 Ga. App. 220, 226 (2) (729 SE2d 437) (2012) (<HOLDING>). 39 Evans v. State, 262 Ga. App. 712, 716 (1)
[ "holding that possession of more than seven tons of marijuana justified the district courts refusal to provide a simple possession instruction", "holding that a past arrest for possession without more is simply not enough to provide reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is currently in possession", "holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession", "recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession", "holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct" ]
11
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). District courts within the Fifth Circuit have divided as to whether Woodfield’s fair-notice standard continues to apply to pleading affirmative defenses and counterclaims, or whether Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility standard applies. Compare, e.g., Vargas v. HWC Gen. Maintenance, LLC, 2012 WL 948892, at *2 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 20, 2012) (<HOLDING>); with Floridia v. DLT 3 Girls, Inc., 2012 WL
[ "holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions", "holding that where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendants liability it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief ", "holding that twombly and iqbals plausibility standard applies", "holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to 523 claims", "recognizing the circuit split and applying the subjective standard as more stringent without deciding which standard applies" ]
22
“dismiss the charges in Perry County.” This court has held that a “petition for postconviction relief attacking a judgment, regardless of the label placed on it by the petitioner, is considered pursuant to our postconviction rule, Criminal Procedure Rule 37.” Bailey v. State, 312 Ark. 180, 182, 848 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1993) (per curiam) (citing Williams v. State, 291 Ark. 244, 724 S.W.2d 158 (1987)). However, Rule 37 is “applicable only to such persons who are in custody.” Bohanan v. State, 336 Ark. 367, 370, 985 S.W.2d 708, 709 (1999) (emphasis added) (rejecting argument that a person on parole was “in custody” of the Department of Correction and holding that a petitioner must be incarcerated to be entitled to Rule 37 relief). Compare State v. Herred, 332 Ark. 241, 964 S.W.2d 391 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, at the time Wilmoth filed his petition
[ "holding that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over all subsequent custody orders once the trial court acquired jurisdiction", "holding that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant rule 37 relief where petitioner herred was in custody at the time the court ruled on his motion", "holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions is dispositive", "recognizing for the first time that the habeas court had the power to retain the petitioner in conditional custody before granting relief", "holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date" ]
11
canons of interpretation. Lockhart, 126 S.Ct. at 703-04. In this case, for example, Section 408 exists to protect the United States’ obligations under NAFTA. Indeed, powerful canons do exist to protect such interests. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963) (overturning the NLRB’s construction of a statute because Congress did not clearly state that it intended to violate the law of nations); FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142, 80 S.Ct. 543, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960) (Black, J. dissenting) (“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.”); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 237-38 (D.C.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, because Section 408 is
[ "holding jones act insufficiently clear to abrogate immunity", "holding that congress could abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to the commerce clause", "holding that in an earlier version of 11 u s c 106 congress had failed to make sufficiently clear its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity", "holding that congress must speak with a clear statement if it intends to abrogate an international agreement", "holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity" ]
33
the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin’s trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this
[ "holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line", "holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial", "holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment", "holding such agreements to be per se illegal", "holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable" ]
00
into Execution ... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” Although other circuits have held that the combined effect of these provisions does not permit Congress to regulate “pure” state or local elections, see Bowman, 636 F.2d at 1011, elections in which federal and state candidates are on the same ballot are properly subject to federal regulation. Ibid, (observing that “Congress may regulate any activity which exposes the federal aspects of the election to the possibility of corruption, whether or not the actual corruption takes place and whether or not the persons participating in such activity had a specific intent to expose the federal election to such corruption or possibility of corruption”); see also McCranie, 169 F.3d at 727 (<HOLDING>). Under the Elections Clause, Congress is
[ "holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government", "holding no violation of federal establishment clause", "holding that elections clause and the necessary and proper clause combine to provide congress with the power to regulate mixed federal and state elections even when federal candidates are running unopposed", "holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state", "holding that the power to regulate the business of another and especially of a competitor is a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause" ]
22
needlessly leave out of our decisions an important source of information about the child, and in the end, it is the dependent child who suffers. After all, the children count here, not the agency. I believe that we gain nothing, and lose precious information by refusing foster parents standing. Standing to sue simply ensures that a particular party has a sufficient stake in a controversy before the court to obtain a judicial resolution. It should not be a doctrine to close the court house doors on parties who have a real interest in the matter at hand. I believe that the Juvenile Act confers “standing,” subject to traditional jurisprudential limits, for the agency, the grandparent, and the foster parents to file these petitions. See also Silfies v. Webster, 713 A.2d 639 (Pa.Super.1998)(<HOLDING>); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1567
[ "holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child", "holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter", "holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal", "holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody", "holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation" ]
00
ask us to review the Board’s decision denying their motion to reopen. A denial of a motion to reopen is a final order that may be appealed to this court. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (10th Cir.2004). In their petition for review filed with us on January 22, 2013, petitioners did request review of the denial of their motion to reopen as well as their motion for reconsideration. But this request came too late to obtain judicial review of the motion-to-reopen decision, which had been entered August 31, 2012. Petitioners failed to file a separate petition for review from the motion-to-reopen decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (establishing 30-day time period for filing petition for review); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394-406, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (<HOLDING>). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider
[ "holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order", "holding for the same reason that motion for appointment of counsel does not toll the period for filing a federal habeas petition", "holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal", "holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional", "holding filing of motion for reconsideration does not toll the 30day deadline for filing petition for review" ]
44
or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.” Id. at 835. The dispositive issue in the instant case is whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient allegations to show that drag racing is a “dangerous condition” as that term is used in § 537.600.1(2). See Johnson v. City of Springfield, 817 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo.App.1991). In Missouri, three major lines of case authority define the term “dangerous condition” as found in § 537.600.1(2). See parallel discussions in Johnson, supra. In the first line of case authority, “dangerous condition” has a narrow meaning and refers to defects in the physical condition of a public entity’s property. Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 835; Chase v. City of St. Louis, 781 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo.App.1989) (<HOLDING>); Zubcic v. Mo. Portland Cement Co., 710 S.W.2d
[ "holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire", "holding that the land contract vendor was entitled to fire insurance benefits when the fire occurred after a judgment for possession was obtained by the vendor pursuant to summary forfeiture proceedings", "holding that petition failed to allege fire hydrants were physically defective where fire hydrants did not work and plaintiffs decedent was killed in fire", "holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable", "holding where the defendants conduct in setting a fire was a proximate cause of a fire fighters death the death occurred in course of and in furtherance of the arson" ]
22
between cases brought under the federal law and those brought under Maine law. While the First Circuit does make a distinction, it ultimately holds that the negligence per se doctrine of Pratico is strictly limited to cases brought under FELA, and it strongly implies that the doctrine will not be expanded. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998). 4 . Castine argues that the trooper testified at trial to matters that he had not previously indicated he would address, and therefore, it was unfairly surprised at trial. Generally, a continuance is the appropriate remedy when a party seeks to admit “surprise" evidence at trial. Because Castine did not seek a continuance, however, it may not now claim unfair surprise. See Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because violation of a safety regulation
[ "holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion", "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify", "holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion", "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify", "holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance" ]
44
evidence which demonstrates the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact to be resolved at trial. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir.2013) (citation omitted). A fact is “material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwoo be considered when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1314 (10th Cir.2005) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>); World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co.,
[ "holding that hearsay evidence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion", "holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion", "holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment", "holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion", "holding that hearsay ev idence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion" ]
44
If a statement does not contain any expressly exculpatory material, the Government need not produce that statement to the defense. To hold otherwise would impose an insuperable burden on the Government to determine what facially non-exculpatory evidence might possibly be favorable to the accused by inferential reasoning. We are confident that the Supreme Court did not intend the Brady holding to sweep so broadly. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1988); see also Harris v. Kuba, 486 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir.2007) {“Brady does not require that police officers or prosecutors explore multiple potential inferences to discern whether evidence that is not favorable to a defendant could become favorable.”); United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that just such inferential
[ "holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under rule 38b", "holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights", "holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence", "holding that brady does not place any burden upon the government to conduct a defendants investigation or assist in the presentation of the defenses case" ]
44
CURIAM: Carlo Junior Seneeharles appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He raises three issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm Sen-echarles’s con earm and ammunition had traveled through interstate commerce before the offense was committed, the Government established a minimal nexus between Senecharles’s firearm and ammunition and interstate commerce, and the statute was constitutional as-applied to him. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). B. Armed Career Criminal Act Senecharles also
[ "holding 922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce", "recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce", "holding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a crime when the firearm was kept in a car across the street from where the defendant was selling drugs", "holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time", "holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense" ]
00
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Cabrera contends that the district court did not adequately explain the reaso tantively unreasonable. We review for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169. L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The district1 court did not abuse its discretion. The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including not only Cabrera’s state prison sentence and efforts towards rehabilitation, but also his rejection of the fast-track plea agreement and his criminal history, which is entirely distinct from the offense at issue here. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; cf. United States v. Defterios, 343 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not
[ "recognizing that delay in indictment may sometimes be a basis for a sentencing departure but holding that district court erred when it decreased sentence based on a delay in an indictment where the offenses were separate crimes distinct in time place and victims", "holding trial court erred in denying defendants motion for arrest of judgment where indictment was insufficient", "holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence", "recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part", "holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense" ]
00
begins to run at the time of the alleged breach and not after the conclusion of the appeals. Allison, 209 F.Supp.2d at 60. In Allison, a law student at Howard University brought a breach of contract claim related to his expulsion. After learning of his expulsion on May 22, 1996, the student filed multiple appeals and made numerous requests for readmission but did not file his lawsuit until June 17, 1999. Id. The Court held that the statute of limitations began to run at the time the expulsion decision was “made and communicated” to the student and that the “pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review, does not toll the running of the limitations period.” Id., citing Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff argues that defendants are relying
[ "holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run", "holding that the statute of limitations for an employment discrimination lawsuit by a college professor who did not receive tenure began when the college made the tenure decision and communicated that decision to the plaintiff", "holding that the only alleged discrimination occurred and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced at the time the adverse employment action was made and communicated to the plaintiff", "holding that the limitations period for a discrimination charge based on tenure denial begins when aggrieved person receives notice of denial not on the last day of employment", "holding that the statute teacher tenure act does not allow termination on the basis of a regulation which neither forbids nor commands action" ]
11
and admitted evidence in deciding whether the district court abused its discretion in precluding an -alternative perpetrator defense). a. S.H. Trial testimony reveals S.H. visited the home Meisel shared with Thomas, Thomas regularly slept during the day, and Meisel left his computer on with a slots program running. Given this extremely limited evidence, we have no doubt the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence for the purpose of arguing S.H. is the person who committed the child pornography crimes set out in the indictment. If mere proximity and potential access were sufficient to argue an alternative perpetrator committed the crime, this court can hardly envision a criminal trial that would not involve such a defense. But see id. at 1220-22 (<HOLDING>). b. W.R. Evidence implicating W.R. as the
[ "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony", "holding that the trial court must apply the provisions of the statute and specifically determine whether the perpetrator of domestic abuse had rebutted the presumption against an award of joint custody", "holding unconstitutional a state evidentiary rule automatically excluding alternative perpetrator evidence when the prosecution case was strong", "holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting alternative perpetrator evidence where the record demonstrated the supposed alternative perpetrator was near the victim no more than ten minutes before the crime", "holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment" ]
33
since she testified live at trial. See CP at 778. The city also argues this case is analogous to Noltie, where we held gruesome photographs were properly admitted so long as they were relevant and accurate. Noltie, 116 Wn.2d at 852. We do not see the comparison, since in this case, the city admits the most gruesome and repetitive aspect of the 911 tape was not accurate. See Revised Opening Br. of Resp’t/Cross-Appellant at 44. ¶20 The use of the caller’s assertion, repeated no less than five times during the call, that someone had been decapitated appears calculated to inflame the passions of the jury, especially since it was conceded to be untrue. CP at 782-84; Revised Opening Br. of Resp’t/Cross-Appellant at 44; see also State v. Pendergrass, 179 Mont. 106, 111-12, 586 P.2d 691 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Although the city claims the 911 tape could
[ "holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact", "holding trial court abused its discretion in admitting rape victims 911 call because the emotional and nearly incoherent outpourings of the victim in the immediate aftermath of a violent crime necessarily induced a feeling of outrage against the defendant", "holding admissible testimony of the victims daughter regarding a telephone call from the defendant to the victim hours before the victims death and the victims emotions following the telephone call where defendant claimed accident", "holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body", "holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial" ]
11
parties to the charge indicating the finding. The Commission's letter of determination shall be the final determination of the Commission.” 2 . The Florida Omnibus Aids Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.50, prohibits employers from discharging an employee or otherwise discriminating against any employee on the basis of knowledge or a belief that the employee has HIV. 3 . The Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq., prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee with a "handicap” because of the employee’s "handicap.” 4 . We reject BT Foods’ position that Byrd failed to preserve this issue by later stipulating to admission of the entire EEOC file, including the determination letters. See Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So.2d 197 (Fla. 2001) (<HOLDING>). However, because the trial court's ruling was
[ "holding that once a trial court makes an unequivocal ruling admitting evidence over a movants motion in limine the movants subsequent introduction of that evidence does not constitute a waiver of the error for appellate review", "holding grant or denial of motion in limine is preliminary ruling and normally preserves nothing for appellate review", "holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial", "holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered", "holding that a definitive ruling in limine preserves an issue for appellate review without the need for later objection" ]
00
product as a treatment for depression; Unigen and Univera further point out that Univera is in fact prohibited from doing so by FDA regulation. The question is, then, does Univera infringe Claim 16 of the '308 patent by marketing and selling, products containing 6-MBOA as a treatment for stress? In other words, is treating “stress” the same as treating “depression” as used in Claim 16? The answer depends on how the court construes the term “depression” as used in Claim 16. Several considerations are important in addressing this question. First, on a motion for a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement dispute, a court is not required to engage in a comprehensive and final claim construction See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Further, when construing a claim term: ... a
[ "holding that courts interpret indemnity provisions same as written contracts", "holding a state court has an inescapable obligation to interpret and apply the federal statute", "holding that trial courts have no obligation to conclusively and finally interpret claims when considering a preliminary injunction", "recognizing that the rules of statutory construction apply when we interpret constitutional provisions", "holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation" ]
22
Peay, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 473 (1967); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Rice, n rule, stating the rule was limited to criminal cases. After the court’s ruling, Goodman used his three peremptory challenges to strike two black jurors and one white. A third black juror was seated to hear the case. It appears that after the conclusion of the case and before submission (there having been seated thirteen jurors), the single black juror was removed from the panel by lot, thus leaving the decision in the hands of twelve white jurors. To create the issue presented for our conside 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (19716) (recognizing prospective application of a new rule where, inter alia, inequities might arise from retroactive application); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct.
[ "holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule", "holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials", "holding a court may apply a new rule in the criminal case before it but return to the old rule as to all other cases arising on facts predating the pronouncement", "holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past", "holding that when the supreme court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule" ]
22
Certification Regarding requirements for certification, a settlement class must meet the re quirements for certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Thus, the named plaintiffs must meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 423 (4th Cir.2003). The practice in this circuit is “to give Rule 23 a liberal rather than a restrictive construction, adopting a standard of flexibility in application [that] will in the particular case best serve the ends of justice for affected parties and promote judicial efficiencies.” Id. at 424 (quoting In re A.H. Robins, Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>)). In the instant case, plaintiffs seek
[ "holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification", "holding that while it is not appropriate to consider the merits in determining certification the admissibility of all evidence which has relevance to the merits is not barred if it is relevant to the purpose of refuting or supporting the existence of a class", "holding that rule 54b certification order should contain specific findings setting forth reasons for certification", "holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services", "holding need certification filed after information returned was timely because the statute includes no deadline for filing a certification and no court has imposed one" ]
33
has not undertaken any consumer surveys and the record contains no sworn consumer testimony. Similarly, with respect to trade dress infringement, the evidence presented by Hi-Tech does not clearly demonstrate that its trade dresses are distinctive or have acquired secondary meaning. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1540 (11th Cir.1986) (recognizing that extensive sales and advertising alone do not necessarily establish secondary meaning). B. Irreparable Harm Even assuming that Hi-Tech had established a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims, the Court nevertheless concludes that Hi-Tech is not entitled to a preliminary injunction because it has not demonstrated a substantial threat of irreparable harm. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). In its brief, Hi-Tech argued that irreparable
[ "holding that evidence of specific competitive injury establishes irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief", "holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest", "holding that injunctive relief may be warranted where there is a particularly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of irreparable injury", "holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction", "holding that even when likelihood of success has been established the absence of irreparable injury standing alone makes preliminary injunctive relief improper" ]
44
by § 1681a(r)(5), and there was no “credit transaction” within the meaning of § 1681b(a)(3)(A). PCA, therefore, had no purpose specified as permissible under the statute to obtain Pintos’s credit report. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court relied on our decision in Has-bun. Hasbun presented the question of whether a government agency looking to enforce a child support judgment could obtain a credit report on a judgment debt- or under § 1681b(a)(3)(A). 323 F.3d at 802-03. The court determined that debt collection was generally a permissible purpose for obtaining credit reports under § 1681b(a)(3)(A), and that the government, which stood in the shoes of the judgment creditor, could, like any other creditor, obtain credit reports for debt collection. Id. at 803-04, 805 (<HOLDING>). Relying on Hasbun, the district court
[ "holding that 1681ba3a applies only if the con sumer initiates a credit transaction", "holding that amtrak is an agency of the government for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government", "holding that the government agency was engaged in the collection of an account under 15 usc 1681ba3a and therefore had a permissible purpose for obtaining the credit report", "holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency", "holding in the context of a fcra violation that a jury could find that a consumers credit score was negatively influenced by the failure to list a debt as disputed because evidence was presented that when a credit reporting agency received notice of a dispute it records the dispute in the credit report and does not include the derogatory information in assessing the credit score" ]
22
over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.” Id. at 1518. The Court, however, also held that, as between a wife’s consent to a search of the family residence and her husband’s refusal to consent, "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.” Id. at 1519. Comments, Model Civ. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. 9.13 (2007). 13 . See also Cal. Penal Code § 3067(d) (in the context of parole searches, noting "[i]t is not the intent of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment.”). 14 . But see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-52, 657, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, Nev., 290
[ "holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity", "holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional", "recognizing a claim for civil liability against municipalities under 1983", "holding individual officers entitlement to qualified immunity does not immunize municipalities from monell liability", "holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit" ]
33
Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”) (emphasis added). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, whether they can prove membership in a specially protected class or not. The Court does not, in so holding, suggest that membership in a particular class of persons is irrelevant to a determination of whether a constitutional violation has occurred. Courts must evaluate discrimination based on membership in an identified suspect class such as race, alien-age, or national origin, with the most strict scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has held that
[ "holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling", "holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest", "recognizing the compelling interest in highway safety", "holding that such classifications are permissible only when suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest", "holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest" ]
33
not find that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of any material issue of fact with regard to Defendants’ safety reasons for the denial of Mr. Satawa’s permit application such that the safety reasons given by Mr. Hoepfner should be discredited. “As a general matter, it is clear that a State’s interest in protecting the ‘safety and convenience’ of persons using a public forum is a valid governmental objective.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2565, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376, 117 S.Ct. 855, 866, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1569, 176 L.Ed.2d 110 (2010) (<HOLDING>). As this Court previously observed, “even
[ "holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state", "recognizing the public interest exception", "holding pennsylvania statute regulating subrogation is a law regulating insurance", "recognizing a somewhat greater governmental interest in regulating expressive activity on city streets because of the public safety concerns raised by vehicular traffic", "recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation" ]
33
Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 303 F.3d 419, 424 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Continental Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 80 N.Y.2d 640, 648, 593 N.Y.S.2d 966, 609 N.E.2d 506 (1993)). Accord Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Cook, 7 N.Y.3d 131, 137, 818 N.Y.S.2d 176, 850 N.E.2d 1152(2006). 94 . Maryland Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 332 F.3d 145, 160 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Continental, 80 N.Y.2d at 648, 593 N.Y.S.2d 966, 609 N.E.2d 506). Accord Feldman Law Grp. P.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 819 F.Supp.2d 247, 256-57 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (noting that New York law permits consideration of facts extrinsic to the four comers of the complaint in determining a duty to defend); Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 67, 571 N.Y.S.2d 672, 575 N.E.2d 90 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 95 . See Auriemma v. Biltmore Theatre, LLC,
[ "holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage", "holding that once a plaintiff has pled facts in the complaint indicating that the statute of limitations is a complete or partial bar to an action it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead either in the complaint or in amendments to it facts establishing an exception to the affirmative defense", "holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the allegations of the initial complaint did not allege facts which would bring the case within the coverage of the title insurance policy", "holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage", "holding that rather than mechanically applying only the four corners of the complaint rule the sounder approach is to require the insurer to provide a defense when it has actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage" ]
44
impact’ upon the duration of his custody.” Bourke v. Hawk-Sawyer, 269 F.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Razzoli v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.2000)) (“habeas is indeed exclusive even when a non-habeas claim would have a merely probabilistic impact on the duration of custody.”). In Razzoli, the Circuit Court held that a prisoner could not assert a claim under the Privacy Act because his only recourse was to seek relief through a habeas petition. 230 F.3d at 376. As in this case, the prisoner’s Privacy Act claim in Razzoli alleged that the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission had “violated 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) by maintaining in their files and using a false record, [a] report of [a] drug possession incident, even though the .C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). In this case, as in Razzoli and Bourke,
[ "holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release", "holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible", "holding that federal prisoners claim was properly filed as an action for habeas although he was not laying claim to an immediate release or release in the near future he is however maintaining that he is being deprived of the chance to secure his release by unlawfully being declared ineligible for parole consideration", "holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole", "holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release" ]
22
Suggesting an Initial Written Warning." At the end of that list, Policy 210 warns, "Repeated violations of any of the above examples or other more serious offenses will result in more extreme disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment." Policy 210 then provides thirteen "Examples of Misconduct Suggesting Termination." The misconduct section of Policy 210 states, "Misconduct, depending on its seriousness, will generally be addressed by means of written warning ... or other discipline up to and including termination." Thus, the misconduct provisions of Policy 210 indicate that NCR retains some discretion as to when and whether to provide a written warning before terminating an employee. See Sanderson v. First See. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 308, 306 (Utah 1992) (<HOLDING>). €89 With respect to performance issues,
[ "holding failure to follow progressive discipline policy does not constitute pretext when employer reserves right to fire atwill employees without notice", "holding that the statement in the employers progressive discipline policy that in situations where employee behavior warrants immediate termination the stages of this process do not need to be followed granted the employer unbounded discretion to discharge employees without following the guidelines", "holding no pretext for not following progressive discipline where policy contemplated immediate termination for certain offenses", "holding the employer breached the duty owed to its employee by erroneously advising the employee he would continue to have coverage for 30 days following his termination of employment under the employers group policy", "holding failure to follow progressive discipline does not demonstrate pretext when use of the policy is entirely discretionary" ]
11
exchange or giving away of [controlled substances] ... ****** (b) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any law enforcement officer upon process issued by any district court having jurisdiction over the property. Seizure by a law enforcement officer may be made without process if: ****** (3) there is probable cause to believe that the property was used in violation of this act K.S.A. 65-4135(a)(4) and (b)(3). Once property is seized pursuant to subsection (b)(3), proceedings pursuant to K.S.A. 65-4171 must be implemented promptly. K.S.A. 65-4135(c). The court notes that K.S.A. 65-4135 is virtually identical to the federal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881. See State ex rel. Love v. One 1967 Chevrolet El Camino, 247 Kan. 469, 473, 799 P.2d 1043 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the federal statute, courts have
[ "recognizing that the two statutes are nearly identical", "holding that trial judge is legally correct in dismissing declaratory action when two actions are substantially the same issues were identical and the identical action was still pending", "holding that though mississippi law governs the amount of the fee award here because the factors considered under state and federal law are nearly identical both state and federal cases are instructive", "holding these two statutes are not criminal offenses and only affect sentencing", "holding that substantive aspects of claims under federal discrimination statutes and fcra are identical" ]
00
other than article 42.12, section 5 of the same code. Therein, the legislature stated that matters involving conviction and punishment had to be appealed immediately after the defendant was placed on probation. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 23(b) (Vernon Supp.1999). Once probation is revoked, however, the complainant “may appeal the revocation.” Id. From this it follows that when the legislature said the accused “may appeal the revocation” it meant that he can only appeal matters relating to the revocation itself. See, e.g., Keith v. State, 916 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1996, no pet.) (concluding that the time to appeal the conditions of one’s probation is at the time the complainant is granted probation); Standley v. State, 517 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (<HOLDING>). And, whether one was granted an opportunity
[ "holding where party fails to challenge specificity of pleading it waives right to claim that pleading fails to meet legal requirements", "holding right to be fundamental", "holding that a defendant who fails to object to trial error forfeits his right to appellate review unless he can establish fundamental error", "holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court", "holding that absent fundamental error one who fails to appeal when placed on probation waives his right to review" ]
44
United States, 780 F.2d 198, 199 & n. 2 (2d Cir.1985). While civilians were also allowed in the club, this did not vitiate the benefit provided to appellant through the club by virtue of his military service. Appellant was subject to military discipline and control while at the club. As the district court noted, the uncontradict-ed evidence in this case shows that the club is under the operational control of the Fort Riley base commander. The commander has the authority to suspend, ter- mínate or deny privileges of servicemen to participate in such activities if he deems it in the best interests of the activity, the installation, or the Army. Numerous Army regulations govern the establishment and operation of nonappropriated fund instru-mentalities such as the club. See also id. at 199 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that this case more closely
[ "holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations", "holding that a conviction for receiving stolen property based on possession must be vacated because it involved the same act constituting theft based on retaining property", "holding that courts must defer to executive branch regulations implementing statutes so long as agencys regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute", "holding based on army regulations that club constituting nonappropriated fund instrumentality was under military regulation and control", "holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended" ]
33
regulatory and dictionary definitions of “nominal”). The plaintiff asserts that the Secretary’s approval of the Maine HMP exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority in violation of the APA. See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 59. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the Secretary abused his discretion in approving “nominal” copayments that exceed the Secretary’s own regulatory definition of what constitutes a “nominal” copayment. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C); Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, 23, 55-58; PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 28. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that it was an abuse of discretion for the Secretary to approve the HMP because it includes unlawfully high copayments. See PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 28 (quoting Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 711 F.2d 370, 381 (D.C.Cir.1983)) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the defendants argue that the
[ "recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language", "holding that when an agencys interpretation of its own rules flies in the face of the language of the rules themselves it is owed no deference", "holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation", "holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law", "holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference" ]
11
and Defendants, therefore, terminated her employment without notice and an opportunity to be heard. A § 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process has three elements: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003). Thus, the Due Process Clause protects one’s job only where one has a property right in that job. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was a non-probationary employee in Alabama’s classified service and, therefore, had a property interest in her position. See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1133-35 (Ala.2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
[ "recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution", "holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state", "holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor", "holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law", "holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment" ]
44
the guerillas knocked on the door of the house that Mendez was staying in. He escaped out a back window and ran away. As he ran, they shot him. Fortunately, his wound was a nonfatal one to his left arm. Mendez fled El Salvador for the United States to avoid being killed. 2. Despite concluding that Mendez was credible and had “articulated a social group which is visible within Salvadoran society as affiliation with the army during the civil war period,” the Board concluded that Mendez’s description of these events were “too vague” to establish that he was “individually targeted.” This conclusion is not backed by “substantial evidence,” because no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Mendez was not individually targeted. Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1155, 1159-61 (9th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable fact-finder would have to
[ "holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment", "holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions", "holding that fourth element of a prima facie case is satisfied when the employees who were more favorably treated were situated similarly to the plaintiff", "holding that a similarly situated petitioner was perse cuted when he was repeatedly threatened with death and hunted down albeit unsuccessfully by men with pistols who were out to harm him", "holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated" ]
33
of the Forfeiture Action The first question presented on this appeal is whether administrative forfeiture actions brought within the 120-day time period sufficiently comply with the letter of the law, as provided in § 924(d)(1), when the judicial proceedings are not brought also within the permissible 120 days. Section 924(d)(1) provides, in part: “Any action or proceeding for the forfeiture of firearms or ammunition shall be commenced within one hundred a 738, 741 (S.D.Tex.1998), aff'd, 54 Fed. Appx. 405, 2002 WL 31688616, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct.28, 2002) (concluding that the statute required “either an administrative forfeiture proceeding or a judicial forfeiture action within 120 days of a seizure”); United States v. Fourteen Various Firearms, 889 F.Supp. 875, 877 (E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Twelve Miscellaneous
[ "holding in pertinent part that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal", "holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial", "holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because both the administrative and the judicial forfeiture actions were not commenced within the 120day timeframe", "holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings", "holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because it was filed without proper authority" ]
22
and not to whether one or more conspiracies existed.” Broce, 781 F.2d at 796 (citing Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.1978)). 9 . We emphasize, however, that none of our cases interpreting Menna has been faced with the question of whether, consistent with Menna, a double jeopardy claim may be waived by the kind of deliberate relinquishment of a known right which the Supreme Court first described in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). See United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 802 (10th Cir.1986) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that a "deliberate decision to relinquish a legal claim" within the meaning of Johnson v. Zerbst should constitute a waiver of a double jeopardy claim); Launius, 575 F.2d at 772 (<HOLDING>). For example, we have never been faced with a
[ "holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal", "holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver", "holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy may be waived pursuant to a bargainedfor plea", "holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver", "holding that when the court in menna suggested that a double jeopardy claim may be waived it is clear that the court was referring not to waiver conclusively presumed from a guilty plea but to waiver as defined in johnson v zerbst" ]
44
commentary to section 4A1.2 defines “prior sentence” as “a sentence imposed pri- or to sentencing on the instant offense, other than a sentence for conduct that is part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.l). Here, Appellant’s state court sentence was imposed in April of 1993, prior to his August 30, 1993, sentencing on the instant offense. Whether his conduct in selling cocaine qualifies as conduct that was part of the instant offense presents an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts of appeal that have considered the issue have decided the appropriate inquiry is whether the “prior sentence” and the instant offense involve conduct that is severable into two distinct offenses. See, e.g., U.S. v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1338-39 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349 (10th
[ "recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico", "recognizing that deadly weapon finding may be made even when weapon used is unknown", "holding that venue did not he in virginia for money laundering that occurred in florida de spite the fact that the money was embezzled in virginia", "holding that defendants state conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was not part of the instant federal money laundering offense even though the concealed weapon was found at the time of defendants arrest for attempting to carry out money laundering scheme", "holding that rule 3702d12 does not apply to convictions for possession of firearm and carrying concealed weapon when unrelated to commission of any additional substantive offenses" ]
33
pill bottles, and that drug users “usually” buy one piece of crack cocaine, rather than more than one “individual sale-type pieces.” The investigator’s testimony, however, was an insufficient basis upon which to predicate Hicks’s conviction. Storing drugs in a pill bottle for quick disposal, and possessing an unidentified number of sales-size pieces of the drug, without more, equally supports the hypothesis that the person found with the drugs was a user rather than a dealer. See, e.g., Bethea v. State, 220 Ga. App. 800, 801-802 (1) (470 SE2d 328) (1996) (possession of rocks of cocaine, without more, was insufficient to support inference that defendant intended to distribute the cocaine); Anderson v. State, 215 Ga. App. 426, 427-428 (1) (451 SE2d 103) (1994) (physical precedent only) (<HOLDING>). Decided October 6, 2008. Ronald R. Parker,
[ "holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute", "holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks", "holding there was insufficient evidence to prove intent to distribute where the defendant dropped a plastic bag containing loose white rocks of cocaine and there was no other indicia of the defendants intent such as the drugs being packaged in smaller baggies", "holding that defendants collective possession of plastic baggies beepers and scales in conjunction with other evasive action was sufficient evidence for jury to find conspiracy to distribute and possess cocaine beyond reasonable doubt", "holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine" ]
22
De Santamaria v. United States Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1008-10 (11th Cir.2008) (finding persecution where alien received numerous death threats, was dragged by her hair out of her vehicle, and was later kidnapped and beaten); Delgado v. United States Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 859-61 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (finding persecution based on cumulative effect of two beatings, continued threatening phone calls, and two instances of the alien’s car being vandalized with political graffiti); Niftaliev v. United States Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.2007) (finding that the cumulative effect of numerous beatings, arrests, searches, and interrogations, culminating in a fifteen-day, food-deprived detention compelled a finding of past persecution). Notwithstanding the (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th
[ "holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution", "holding that two beatings which were four years apart lasted only a few hours each and did not result in serious injury did not constitute persecution", "holding that court was not compelled to find past persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution where the petitioner was arrested detained for four hours and experienced some physical mistreatment", "holding that a chiropractor was not in custody for miranda purposes despite an ensuing interview which lasted nearly seven hours", "holding that two arrests and repeated beatings constituted persecution" ]
11
residents in ICF/MR units to receive “active treatment,” as is required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(d)(2) and 42 C.F.R. § 483.440. Moreover, neither the Complaint nor the Consent Decree sought to require STS to consider all residents for community placement. Finally, neither the Complaint nor the Consent Decree sought to enjoin STS from issuing DNR orders. Each of the above remedies is sought by plaintiffs in the instant case. Thus, in the instant case there is manifest evidence that the statutory structure of CRI-PA prevented the Justice Department from pursuing all of the causes of action and types of relief which are available to the plaintiffs. For this reason, plaintiffs’ claims are not barred under res judicata. See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 32 F.3d 654, 658 (2nd Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Absence of Privity Literal privity need
[ "holding that res judicata is not applicable to a claim for relief that was unavailable in the earlier action", "holding that res judicata does not bar those claims that arose after the original pleading is filed in the earlier proceeding", "holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings", "holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action", "holding that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to defenses that could have been raised in a prior action" ]
00
620, 622 (La.App.1967) (same). Takings of temporary easements are measured differently. A landowner must be compensated for the loss of use of property taken by a temporary easement and any impairment of access to the property during the period of construction. Miczek v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.App. Ct. 105, 108, 586 N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (1992) (involving temporary slope easement). Some courts have held that the damages are equal to the rental value of the property for the period of occupation. 4 Nichols at § 12E.01. This is commonly measured by the rental value of the property as a whole. See Paddock v. Town of Durham, 110 N.H. 106, 108, 261 A.2d 438, 441 (1970); 4A Nichols at § 14.2462. Cf. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 8, 69 S.Ct. 1434, 1439, 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949) (<HOLDING>). E. Miscellaneous Damages are to be measured
[ "holding that the proper measure of compensation in a temporary taking is the rental value that probably could have been obtained", "holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market", "holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure", "holding that the proper measure of damages to repair defects for a building contract that has not been substantially performed is the contractually agreed upon measure of damages", "holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed" ]
00
are also supported by the evidence. The witness paid elose attention to the burglar. She was not frightened by him, but instead focused upon his face in an attempt to determine who he was. Cf. State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. 214, 220, 385 A.2d 831, 834 (1978) (implying that the fact that the witness was “scared” and acted “like he was in shock” at the time of the robbery would have lessened the degree of attention he paid to the features of the suspect). Her identification of the defendant should not be discounted simply because she is not a police officer specially trained to observe details. Further, her description of the burglar, although lacking in some details, substantially agreed with the defendant’s appearance. See State v. Heald, 120 N.H. 319, 323, 414 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Allard, 123 N.H. 209, 214,
[ "holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts", "holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial", "holding that the government had established necessity for wiretaps despite its use of three cooperating witnesses because those witnesses were able to give agents only limited information not including the names of all members of the conspiracy", "holding that the descriptions given by three witnesses were sufficiently accurate despite the fact that they varied in detail", "holding where the plaintiff presented evidence which demonstrates that the terms alleged by the defendants to be indefinite were in fact sufficiently well delineated to all parties the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants was inappropriate despite the fact that the defendants contested the plaintiffs evidence concerning the manner in which the relevant contractual language should be construed" ]
33
could be reached was made. A juror responded, “No, sir, we haven’t been able so far. Judge, we stand 11 to 1.” Gidley, supra, at 114, 95 So. 330. With this knowledge the judge proceeded to give a modified “Allen charge” which contained patently coercive language. At one point the judge stated, “The business of the courts cannot be disposed of by mistrials.” Gidley, supra at 114, 95 So. 330. In the case at bar, the court gave no “Allen charge” and did not admonish the jury to reach a verdict. The judge’s inquiry in this case was made for the purpose of determining the practicability of allowing the jury, which had requested a review of some of the testimony, more time for deliberation. We find no reversible error here. See also, Orr v. State, 269 Ala. 176, 111 So.2d 639 (Ala.1959) (<HOLDING>); Ex Parte Morris, 465 So.2d 1180, 1183-84
[ "holding that party who noted issue and made several broad conclusory statements on appeal waived argument for failure to develop", "holding that several coercive statements made in combination required reversal", "holding that a statement that the jurors were not required to reach a verdict but should try to do so was not coercive", "holding that allen charge given by court was coercive and required a new trial", "holding that failure to give explanation of allegations required reversal" ]
11
944, 565 N.E.2d 215, 218-19 (1990). As the Court already has discussed, none of Cottrell’s diverse co-Defendants in this case have been fraudulently joined to defeat diversity. To the extent there is any question about the citizenship of the Allen Cassens Trust, the Albert Cassens Trust, Albert Cassens, Mark Shashek, Marysville Releasing, Inc., Bankhead Transportation Equipment Company, and Bankhead Enterprises, Inc., for diversity purposes, it would have been apparent to Cottrell upon service of the Younts’ operative complaint that those Defendants were due to be dismissed from the case under the “seller’s exception” to 735 ILCS 5/2-621, at least with respect to the Younts’ products liability claims. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F.Supp.2d 659, 684-85 (N.D.Ill.2005) (<HOLDING>); Link v. Venture Stores, Inc., 286 Ill.App.3d
[ "holding that section 2621 does not apply to claims for breach of warranty", "holding that warranty claim accrued at tender where 180 day warranty on computer not a warranty for future performance as it involved a remedy only", "holding that fifra preempts breach of warranty claims based on labeling", "holding that passenger cannot maintain action for breach of implied warranty to provide safe passage", "holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty" ]
00
“insurer” technically is considered part of the “business of insurance” is not material. Barnett Bank, at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1111 (“The word 'relates’ is highly general, and this Court has interpreted it broadly in other pre-emption contexts.”). Thus, for example, the Internal Revenue Service is not part of the “business of insurance,” and yet we have held that a Treasury Regulation, which resulted in a tax on insurance companies, rendered the MeCarran-Ferguson Act “inapplicable by its own terms.” See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 1211, 1219 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 229, 62 L.Ed.2d 169 (1979); see also Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1414-15 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035, 109 S.Ct. 1932, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore we conclude that Congress expressly
[ "holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period", "holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule", "holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act", "holding that the longshore and harbor workers compensation act specifically relates to business of insurance", "holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act" ]
33
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and learned that the federal license "will not change upon renewal." 4 . The position statement included an Administrator's Memorandum, dated June 19, 1986, indicating how regional offices should handle approval of permits for hydropower purposes. The memorandum indicates that when dealing with a hydropower application coming within FERC jurisdiction, departmental staff need to be aware of FERC licensing conditions for the facility in question. An attachment to the memorandum shows standard conditions of approval for a state water rights permit and the language of one of such conditions is that which was incorporated into the license at issue in this case. The memorandum notes that an applicant "can request Department action on 0-41 (1969) (<HOLDING>). 7 . It was also after the enactment of I.C. §
[ "holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use", "holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate", "holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use", "holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested", "recognizing the right to use water to generate power" ]
33
8117 (one year); Ga.Code.Ann. § 9-2-61 (six months); 735 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/13-217 (one year); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.19 (one year); Tenn.Code.Ann. § 28-1-105 (one year); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 205(a) (McKinney 1990) (six months); W.Va.Code § 55-2-18 (one year). A plaintiff should not be permitted to extend the re-filing period beyond the limitations period fixed by section 16.064 by filing one or more discretionary appeals which are later dismissed. Therefore, if presented with the facts of this case, it is likely that the Texas Court of Appeals would hold that a dismissal becomes “final” after it is affirmed on appeal, not after discretionary appeals, such as petitions for rehearing or a writ of certiorari, are denied. Cf. Click v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 397 F.2d 590, 594 (8th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); Lehman Bros. v. Hughes Hubbard & Reed,
[ "holding that filing of petition for writ of certiorari did not prevent judgment from becoming final for purposes of limitations period of missouri savings statute which provided that plaintiff who suffers nonsuit in wrongful death action may commence new action within one year thereafter", "holding new mexico statute of limitations for filing a 1983 action is three years", "holding it is settled that the supreme court may consider questions raised on the first appeal after which the court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari as well as those that were before the court of appeals upon the second appeal after which the court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari internal quotation marks omitted", "recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review", "holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired" ]
00
“[t]he inquiry [whether a duty of care exists] involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). We have also made clear that, [i]n most eases, the justice of imposing such a duty [of care] is so clear that the cause of action in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the basis of the actor’s creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm resulting in injury. In fact, however, more is needed, “more” being the value judgment, based on an analysis of public policy, that the actor owed the injured party a duty of reasonable care. [Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied) (<HOLDING>).] It is beyond question that “[a] cause of
[ "holding that provisions in a subcontract incorporating a prime contract for a limited purpose are limited only to those that are applicable", "holding that the tort threshold requirement njsa 39670n is not applicable if the injury to a qualified claimant is caused by a hit and run motorist", "holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration", "holding limited by njsa 2a1557", "holding a writ was appropriate when the authorization was not limited as to time and not limited to specific healthcare providers" ]
33
of his mental illness. Both the ADA and the appellant’s counsel spent considerable time discussing insanity and mental illness. During voir dire, the ADA admitted the appellant was mentally ill. The record reflects that the appellant’s only-defense to the State’s murder allegation was the insanity defense. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to question the veni-re on how they might give effect to mitigating evidence of insanity, mental illness, mental defect, and other elements of the anticipated defense. See Shipley v. State, 790 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The appellant should have been allowed to question the prospective jurors about their feelings on punishment and whether they could consider probation. See Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). Although the majority acknowledges that
[ "holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question to prospective jurors on their feelings against recommending probation as punishment in a murder case", "holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question seeking to determine bias or prejudice in favor of the victim because she was a nun", "holding trial judge was at the very limit of his discretion in refusing to remove prospective jurors for cause", "holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow questions regarding victims status as a child", "holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion" ]
00
6 . 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b). 7 . 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341-42, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003) (defining elements required to satisfy the clause). 8 . Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 875-76 (9th Cir.2004). We review the district court’s choice of the standard of review de novo. Id. To the extent the plaintiffs question the district court’s ability to renew Reliance’s summary judgment motion, we note that the plaintiffs faced the complete dismissal of their complaint when Reliance first made its motion and briefed all relevant issues. In these circumstances, renewal of the motion was not inappropriate. 9 . See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Sandy v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
[ "holding that an agreement may provide elements of a plan by setting out rules under which beneficiaries will be entitled to care", "holding that nonsignatory settlor and trust beneficiaries could be compelled to arbitrate under account agreement between trustee and merrill lynch which contained an arbitration clause because agreement was the underlying basis for all the claims of the beneficiaries and there would have been no claims without the agreement", "holding that the proceeds of a pension plan could be garnished after they had been paid out to the beneficiaries", "holding that beneficiaries of an alleged will may recover reasonable expenses and attorneys fees when defending a will in good faith", "recognizing that there may be multiple beneficiaries of federal programs" ]
00
Statement. They were, however, obtained prior to this Court’s actual approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement, which occurred on December 19, 2008 (i.e. at the joint hearing on approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement and the Amended Plan). Although typically a disclosure statement should be approved before the proponent solicits votes for the plan, here the premature solicitation was harmless and, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a harmless failure to comply with § 1125’s solicitation requirements “is not necessarily fatal to the success of a Chapter 11 reorganization.” In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.D.Ga.1980); see also First Am. Bank of N.Y. v. Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274, 278-80 (D.Del.1988) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(2)(B)(vi),
[ "holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case", "holding such agreements to be per se illegal", "holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment", "holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process", "holding that a plan proponents failure to obtain court approval of solicitation materials is not per se fatal to the confirmation process" ]
44
his failure to appear personally at the hearing. This distinguishes this case from cases where a party never appears in an action, and a default judgment is granted at trial. See, e.g., Ladson v. BPM Corp., 2004 S.D. 74, ¶¶ 22-25, 681 N.W.2d 863, 869 (upholding a default judgment granted to the plaintiff at trial where the defendant corporation never answered the complaint or otherwise appeared in the action by counsel as required by law and as repeatedly instructed by the circuit court). 6 . Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412, 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio
[ "holding that despite failure to appear for trial default could not be entered without notice to defendant", "holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact", "holding that default judgment was not warranted where the defendant answered late but answered", "holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment", "holding 1 that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial a plaintiffs only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial 2 that entry of default is not authorized and 3 that the hearing held under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguished from a default hearing 1 quoting warden v lamb 98 calapp 738 277 p 867 868 1929" ]
44
its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be injured, or its morals likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both. The 1993 version did not contain subsection (2), which was part of the statute in effect in 1996 at the time of petitioner's crime. See Note 1, supra. To the extent that the Connecticut Supreme Court found the 1993 version of § 53-21 to have two distinct purposes, that finding would be even more pronounced under the 1996 version, which added the second subsection involving contact with the intimate parts of a child under the age of sixteen. 15 . See also State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 163, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 16 . In State v. Smith, 73 Conn.App. 809,
[ "holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force", "holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the physical endangerment portion of the statute when the defendant was charged only with the risk of injury to a child by doing an act likely to impair the morals of a child under the age of sixteen", "holding that where defendant charged with wilfully or unlawfully committing certain acts likely to impair the morals of a minor child contrary to general statutes 5321 specific intent is not an element of the crime defined", "holding that the deliberate touching of the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner was conduct proscribed by the second prong of subsection 1", "holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child" ]
11
the litigation in the form cast or in the plaintiffs chosen forum”). [¶ 9] If this Court were to retain jurisdiction only over those claims which arguably are barred by the relevant statutes of limitations and dismiss the remaining causes of action, this would force Sander-son to proceed in a manner akin to an improper splitting of his cause of action. See Freed v. Unruh, 1998 ND 34, ¶ 10, 575 N.W.2d 433 (allowing plaintiff to proceed with lawsuit would be analogous to an improper splitting of cause of action); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Arlt, 61 N.W.2d 429, 434 (N.D.1953) (stating when there is a single cause of action, although there may be different kinds of damages, only one suit can be brought); Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n, 73 N.D. 108, 11 N.W.2d 442 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Choice Fin. Group v. Schellpfeffer, 2005
[ "holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent", "holding a person who has availed himself of part of single claim or obligation in action or defense is thereafter estopped from enforcing the remainder of it", "holding that a motion to intervene is not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party", "holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class", "holding that the rule of splitting of causes of action as related to res judicata does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action and that all damages from a single wrongful act must be claimed in one action" ]
11
the magistrate may not have had the authority to enter the order under Ind.Code § 33-24-5-8, Father does not argue on appeal that the order was defective because it contained the signature of the magistrate only and the record does not indicate that either party argued below that die order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication the order was approved by the trial court. Accordingly, the parties have waived any challenge to the validity of the appealed order by failing to make any objection or call the court’s attention to the issue. See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind.2001) (noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his c ; see also Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Father cites to “Ind.Code § 35-16-15-7.”
[ "holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of hearing by failing to object", "holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court", "holding appellant waived argument by failing to assert it at suppression hearing", "holding that appellant by failing to object to commissioners authority before or at the administrative hearing waived any challenge", "holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial" ]
33
applied in employment discrimination cases, although the burden of production shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff makes out a pri-ma facie case, the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact ... remains at all times with the plaintiff”). 21 . Cf. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Ont. (Human Rights Comm’n), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321, ¶ 119 (Can.) (referring to "the rule of evidence that the burden of proof should lie on the person most likely to be in possession of the relevant facts”); McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, ¶ 30 (Can.) ("The burden of proof should fall on the party who is in the best position to obtain the facts.”). 22 . See Schaible Elec. Ltd. v. Melloul-Blamey Constr., Inc., [2004] 35 C.L.R. (3d) 141, ¶¶ 105-26 (Ont.) (standing merely for R. 653, 655-56 (Ont.) (<HOLDING>). 23 . In oral argument before this Court,
[ "holding that seller was entitled to recover contract price of goods where buyer failed to make effective rejection under the ucc", "holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue", "holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to 672606", "holding that title revested in seller under california law when buyer revoked his acceptance of goods", "holding merely that to the extent a breaching buyer wishes to invoke the presumption that a nonbreaching seller will resell the contractedfor goods in the open market it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for those goods" ]
44
to the County. 2. Plaintiffs’ substantive due process challenge also fails. When, as here, plaintiffs “rely on substantive due process to challenge governmental action that does not impinge on fundamental rights,” courts “merely look to see whether the government could have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did.” Halverson, 42 F.3d at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted). The County has put forward a rational justification for the retroactive nature of the Ordinance—ensuring compliance with Clark County Code § 8.04.040(B)(3)’s requirement that the gambling permitted by Class A Slot Machine Licenses remains merely “incidental” to the licensee’s primary business purpose. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 3. The Ordinance does not violate the Equal
[ "holding that the act is retroactive", "holding retroactive application", "holding that retroactive aspects of legislation must satisfy due process a burden met simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose", "holding no retroactive application", "recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation" ]
22