sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
|---|---|
kā śaktis tatra dadhyādi yadi dṛśyeta dugdhavat // | now what is this ‘potency’? if it is the same as the curd and other effects, then this also would be perceived like the milk itself. |
[p.34] kāraṇe kāryamastīti yaducyate bhavadbhis tatra ko 'rtho 'bhipretaḥ / kiṃ vyaktirūpeṇa / tan na / | It is asserted (by the Sāṅkhya) that the Effect subsists in the Cause; what do you really mean by this? Do you mean that the Effect exists there in the actually manifested form? If so, then that cannot be; |
kṣīrādyavasthāyām api dadhyādīnāṃ paścādvadupalabdhiprasaṅgāt / | for if it were so, then while the Milk is still in the form of Milk, the Curd would be perceived, just as it is after the production of the Curd. |
atha śaktirūpeṇa / tathāpi yattachaktirūpaṃ dadhyādeḥ kāryarūpādupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptādanyat āhosvit tadeva / yadi tadeva tadā pūrvavadupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ // anyaccetkatham anyasya bhāve 'bhaktyānyaducyate / | Or, is it meant that it subsists there in the form of Latent Potency? Is this ‘Potency’ something different from the Curd and other Effects as manifested in the perceptible form? Or is it the same as these? If it is the same, then, as before, it should be perceptible (which it is not). If it is something different (from the effect), then the existence of one thing cannot be spoken of as that of another, except figuratively. |
nahi sattvasya sadbhāvaḥ sadbhāvo duḥkhamohayoḥ // | (for example) the existence of the (attribute of) ‘harmony’ is not spoken of as the existence of ‘pain’ and ‘delusion (35) |
athānyaditi pakṣaḥ tadā kāraṇātmani kāryam astīti pakṣasyakto bhavet / | that the ‘Potency’ is something different from the ‘Effect’, then the view that ‘the Effect subsists in the form of the Cause’ becomes abandoned; |
kāryavyatiriktasya śakyākhyasya padārthāntarasya bhāvābhyupagamāt / tathā hi yadevāvirbhūtaṃ viśiṣṭarasavīryavipākādiguṇopetaṃ rūpaṃ tadeva dadhyādikaṃ kāryamucyate / | because you admit the existence of an entity different from the Effect, in the shape of ‘Potency’, For instance, when something becomes manifested in a form endowed with particular qualities resulting from the development of the particular taste and potency, then it is called an ‘Effect’, like the Curd for instance; |
tac ca kṣīrāvasthāyam upalambhayogyasyānupalabdher asadvyavahāraviṣayaḥ / | and this Curd-effect is spoken of as ‘non-existent’ in the state of Milk, because it is not capable of being perceived. |
yac cānyad asti śaktirūpaṃ tat kāryam eva na bhavati / | As regards ‘Potency’, which (you say) is something different from this ‘Effect’, it cannot thus be an ‘Effect’; |
na cānyasya bhāve 'nyadastyatiprasaṅgāt / | for the simple reason that the existence of one thing (Potency) cannot mean the existence of another (Effect); |
nanu cāyur ghṛtaṃ naḍvalodakaṃ pādaroga ityanyasya sadbhāve 'nyaducyamānaṃ dṛṣṭam evetyāha abhaktyeti / | “But we have such expressions as Butter is longevity, where Butter is found to be spoken of as longevity, which is a totally different thing, and Damp Reed is foot-disease, where Damp Reed is spoken of as foot-disease, a totally different thing.” |
abhaktyā anupacāreṇetyarthaḥ / | In answer to this, the Text has added the phrase ‘except figuratively’; |
kāraṇe hi kāryopacārād āyurghṛtam ity ucyate / | Longevity is spoken of as Butter only figuratively, through attributing the character of the Effect (Longevity) to its Cause (Butter); |
na mukhyataḥ / | and such expressions are not possible in their literal sense. |
yadi tu bhavatāpyupacārāt kāraṇe kāryamastītyucyate tadā na kaścid virodhaḥ / | If, when you say that ‘the Effect is existent in the Cause’, you are using only figurative language, then there is no difference between our views; |
etad eva dṛṣṭāntenopapādayannāha nahītyādi / | This is what the Text shows by means of an example The existence of Harmony, etc. |
nahi yadeva satvarūpaṃ tadeva duḥkhamohayor bhavadbhir vyavasthāpyate ' ' teṣāṃ parasparaṃ bhinnalakṣaṇavyavasthānāt // | Even you (Sāṃkhya) do not hold that the form of ‘Pain’ (Rajas-Attribute) and ‘Delusion’, (Tamas-Attribute) is the same as that of ‘Harmony’ (Sattva-Attribute); as each one of these has been held to have a distinct character of its own. |
sattvādyanugataṃ vyaktaṃ na siddhaṃ naḥ kathañcana / | The ‘manifest’ is not admitted by us in any way whatsoever as homogeneous with (made up of) pleasure and the rest; |
āntaratvātsukhādīnāṃ vyaktatvāt tatsvasaṃvidaḥ // | because pleasure and the rest are ‘internal’, ‘subjective’; and that these are so is manifest from their own clear cognition. |
śabdādilakṣaṇaṃ vyaktam sukhādirūpaṃ" naḥ asmākam asiddhaṃ / | That the ‘Manifest’, in the shape of Sound and other things, is ‘homogeneous’ with of the same form as, Pleasure (Pain and Delusion), is not admitted by us in any way; |
kasmāt / sukhādīnām āntaratvāt saṃvidrūpatvāt / | why? because Pleasure and the rest are ‘internal’, i.e. subjective, of the nature of consciousness (feeling); |
śabdādīnāṃ cācetanatvāt katham ete sukhādyanvitā bhaveyuḥ / prayogaḥ ye saṃvidrūparahitāś ca śabdādaya iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /yathaparaḥ upagtaḥ āchetanaḥ purushaḥ smhidruparahitāsca shabdhadaya itivyapacanupalabdhiḥ syad etat saṃvidrūpatvena sukhādimayatvasya yadā vyāptiḥ siddhā bhavet tadā tannivartamānaṃ śabdādiṣu sukhādimayatvaṃ nivartayedyāvatā saiva na siddhā puruṣasyaiva saṃvidrūpatveneṣṭatvādityata āha vyaktyatvāt tatsvasaṃvidaiti / | and Sound and other things being insentient, how could they be homogeneous with Pleasure, etc.? The argument may be formulated as follows: Things that are not of the nature of Consciousness cannot consist of Pleasure and the rest e.g. the Spirit postulated by the other party; and Sound and other things are devoid of the nature of Consciousness; hence the more extensive character is found absent in them (which excludes the presence of the less extensive character, that of consisting of Pleasure, etc.). The following argument might be urged: “it is only after the invariable concomitance of the character of being of the nature of Consciousness with the character of consisting of Pleasure, etc. has been established that the absence of the former might exclude the character of earning Pleasure from Sound and the rest; |
tat saṃvidrūpatvaṃ sudkhādīnāṃ siddhaṃ kasmāt / [p.35] sukhādīnāṃ svasaṃvida svasaṃvedanasya vyaktatvāt / | In answer to this, the Text adds That these are so is manifest from their own cognition« That is, the fact of Pleasure, etc. being of the nature of Consciousness is well established, how? from the cognition of Pleasure, etc. themselves; |
atispaṣṭeyaṃ sukhaprītitāpādirūpeṇa satyasati vā śabdādiviṣayasannidhāne prakāśāntaranirapekṣā svayamprakāśātmalakṣaṇā svasaṃvittiḥ / | in the form of the Feelings of Satisfaction and the rest, following upon the presence or absence of Sound and other things, is self-luminous by its very nature and does not depend upon anything else to illumine (manifest) it; |
yadeva hi prakāśāntaranirapekṣaṃ sātādirūpataḥ svayaṃ siddhaṃ taccaitanyaṃ sukhaṃ saṃvedanaṃ jñānamityādibhiḥ paryāyaiḥ kathyate / | and whatever is independent of other things to manifest it, and is self-illumined in the form of Satisfaction, etc., is spoken of by such terms as ‘Consciousness’, ‘Pleasure’, ‘Feeling’, ‘Cognition’, all which are synonymous. |
yadi ca sukhādīnām anyena saṃvedanenānubhavād anubhavakhyātiḥ syāt tadā teṣāṃ saṃvedanamasātādirūpaṃ syāt svayam atadātmakatvāt / | If the experiencing of Pleasure, etc. were due to some other feeling, then the feeling of Pleasure, etc. would be of the nature of something other than Satisfaction and the rest; because it itself would not be of the nature of that; |
yathā yogino 'numātuś ca parakīyaṃ sukhādi samvedayataḥ / | as is the case with the Yogin, or the Person making inferences, cognising the Pleasure, etc. as felt by other persons. |
anyathā te 'pi yogyādayaḥ sākṣāt sukhādyanubhāvina ivāturādayaḥ syuḥ / | If this were not so, then these persons Yogin, etc. also would be themselves actually feeling the Pleasure, etc. as present in others, and (hence) being distressed and so forth (on account of those feelings). |
yogyādivadvānyeṣām apyanugrahopaghātau na syātāmaviśeṣāt / saṃvedanasya ca sātādirūpatve 'bhyupagamyamāne siddhaṃ sukhādeḥ saṃviddhrūpatvaṃ / | Or (conversely), as in the case of the Yogin., so in all cases, the feelings of being kindly or unkindly treated would be absent, as the circumstances would be the same in both cases.' If then, the Feeling is admitted to be of the nature of Satisfaction and the rest, it becomes established that Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of Consciousness. |
idam eva hi naḥ sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ ca yatsātamasātaṃ ca saṃvedanaṃ / | Because our Pleasure is nothing more than the feeling of Satisfaction, and Pain is nothing more than the feeling of Dissatisfaction. |
tasmānnānaikāntikatā hetor nāpyasiddhatā / | From all this it follows that the Reason put forward in the Text is not Inconclusive nor Inadmissible. |
bāhyārthavādināṃ sarveṣām eva śabdādiṣu saṃvidrūparahitatvasya siddhatvāt / | Specially among people who (like the Sāṃkhya) believe in the Reality of the External World, it is an admitted fact that Sound and other things (which are external, objective) are devoid of the nature of Consciousness. |
anyathā vijñānavādimatamevāṅgīkṛtaṃ syāt / | If it were not so, then they would have accepted the doctrine of the Idealist; |
tacceṣṭam eva / | and this would be what we most desire. |
nāpi viruddhatā hetoḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt // | Nor can our Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’, as it is found present in every case where the Probandum is known to be present. |
syād etat yathā bahiravasthitanīlādisannidhānād anīlādirūpam api saṃvedanaṃ nīlādirūpanirbhāsaṃ bhavati tathā bāhyasukhādyupadhānavaśād asātādirūpam api sātādirūpamiva lakṣyate tena saṃvedanasya sātādirūpatve 'pi na sukhādīnāṃ saṃvidrūpatvaṃ sidhyatyato naikāntikatā maulasya hetor ityāśaṅkyāha ekatretyādi / | The following argument might be urged (by the Sāṃkhya): “As a matter of fact, though Consciousness (or Cognition) by itself is devoid of the Blue or any other colour, yet it appears to be of that colour, by reason of the proximity of the Blue Object outside; and in the same manner, the Consciousness, which by itself is devoid of the form of Happiness and the rest, appears in these forms by reason of the imposition of the external Happiness, etc. upon it; so that, even though the Feeling is of the nature of Happiness, etc., these latter cannot be regarded as constituting Consciousness; and thus our principal Reason is not ‘too wide’ or Inconclusive.” |
ekatraiva ca śabdādau bhāvanājātibhedataḥ / | The answer to this is provided by the following: [see verse 37 above] |
bhāvanājātibhedata iti / | ‘Bhāvanājātibhedataḥ’; ‘Bhāvanā’ stands for Habit; |
bhāvanāḥ abhyāsāḥ jātis tu nijā prakṛtiḥ tayor bhedo viśeṣaḥ / | ‘jāti’, ‘nature’, for one’s own character; on account of the diversity peculiarity of these two; attachment and the rest; |
saṅgādaya iti / | ‘attachment’ stands for Longing; |
saṅgo 'bhilāṣaḥ ādiśabdena prītyādayo dveṣodvegādayo dainyāvaraṇādayaś catraiguṇyakāryagaṇā gṛhyante / | the phrase ‘and the rest’ includes such feelings as Love and the like, due to the Harmony–Attribute, Hate, Agitation, etc. due to the Energy–Attribute, and Dejection, Illusion, etc. due to the Inertia–Attribute; |
niyatā iti caikākārāḥ / | thus the effects of all the Three Attributes become included all these are found to be restricted, i.e. of one form; |
tathā hi bhāvanāviśeṣān madyāṅganādiṣu bhāvitaśubhāśubhādinimittānāṃ kāmukādīnāṃ jātiviśeṣāc ca kuraṅgakarabhādīnāṃ keṣāñcideva pratiniyatāḥ prītyādayaḥ sambhavanti / | for instance, on account of their peculiar habits, the Lover and other persons have one or the other of the said feelings in regard to Wine, Woman and other things, according as they have been found to be conducive to good or evil; similarly on account of the peculiar nature, one or the other of the said feelings appear in some of the animals, like the Deer (who are attracted by Sound), the Elephant (who are attracted by Odour) and the like. |
na sarveṣāṃ etac ca śabdādīnāṃ sukhādirūpatve sati na yuktaṃ // | This would not be right if Sound and other objects were of the nature of (consisted of) Pleasure and the rest. |
kasmād ity āha ekavastvanupātitva ityādi / | Question “Why?” The answer is given in the following: |
ekavastvanupātitve citrā saṃvitprasajyata / | Being in keeping with one and the same object, the consciousness would be variegated in character. |
adṛṣṭādivaśānnno cen na syād vastvanuyāyinī // | if it be urged that “it is not so because of destiny and such other forces”, then the consciousness would not be in keeping with the object at all. |
[p.36] sarveṣām eva hi teṣām abhinnavastuviṣayatvānnīlādiviṣayasaṃvedanavatpratyekaṃ citrā saṃvitprasajyeta / | All the said Feelings being in keeping with one and the same object, the Consciousness of each person would be variegated in character, just like the cognition of such objects as the Blue and the like. |
syād etadyadyapi tryātmakaṃ vastu tathāpy adṛṣṭāder dharmādilakṣaṇasya sahakāriṇo vaśena kasyacit kiñcid eva rūpaṃ pratibhāsate na sarvaṃ sarvasyeti / | It might be urged that “Even though every Object is tripartite in character (as made up of the Three Attributes), yet under the influence of such auxiliary unseen forces as those of Destiny and the like, in the form of Merit and Demerit, it is only some aspect of it that figures in the consciousness of any one person, and not all its aspects to all persons. |
ādiśabdena bhāvanājātibhedajighṛkṣādīnāṃ grahaṇaṃ / | The term ‘ādi’, ‘such other forces’, includes Habit, Nature, Desire to hold and the like.” |
yadyevaṃ na syād vastvanuyāyinī vastālambanā sā saṃvin na prāpnoti tadākāraśūnyatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | If that were so, then the Consciousness would, not be in keeping with the object; i.e. such Consciousness would not rest upon the object; as it would be devoid of the form of the Object itself. |
tryākāraṃ vastuno rūpam ekākārāś ca tadvidaḥ / | The form of the object itself is three-formed, and the cognitions (of men) are one-formed; |
tāḥ kathaṃ tatra yujyante bhāvinyastadvilakṣaṇāḥ // | how can these latter be really possible with reference to the object, being entirely different from it in character? (39) |
sattvarajastamasāṃ rūpaṃ / | The form of the Object consists of the Three Attributes of Sattva (Harmony), Rajas (Energy) and Tamas (Inertia). |
ekākārāś ca tadvida iti / | The Cognitions of men are one-formed; |
teṣām puruṣāṇāṃ vidaḥ saṃvittayaḥ pratyekamabhiṣvaṅgādimātraikarūpaniyamādekākārāḥ saṃvedyanta ity arthaḥ / | the term ‘tat’ stands for Men, Spirits; what is meant is that the Cognitions that men have are all found to be of one form, having their form determined solely by each one of the numerous circumstances of ‘Attachment’ and the like. |
tā iti saṃvidaḥ tatreti śabdādau ' bhāvinya iti pāramārthikya ity arthaḥ / kasmān na yujyanta ity āha tadvilakṣaṇā iti / | How can these latter, i.e. the Cognitions in reference to the Object Sound and the rest, really truly, be possible? “Why cannot these be possible?” Because they are different from, it in character; |
tadālambanavastuvilakṣaṇā ity arthaḥ / | i.e. quite different in character from the object on which they are based. |
prayogaḥ yadyadākārasaṃvedanaṃ na bhavati na tat tadviṣayaṃ yathā cakṣurjñānaṃ na śabdaviṣayaṃ / | The argument is to be formulated in the following form: When a Cognition does not apprehend the form of a particular object, it cannot have this object for its objective basis; e.g. Visual Cognition cannot have Sound for its objective basis; |
tryātmakavastvākāraśūnyāś ca yathoktāḥ saṃvida iti vyākānupalabdhir atiprasaṅgāpattiviparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ / | the Cognitions in question are devoid of the form of the three-formed object; hence the conclusion of the Opponent would be opposed to the wider Premiss, and there is reason for denying it also, in the shape of likely incongruities. |
syād tad yathā pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīto 'pi sarvātmanā śabdādike vastuni bhāvanādivaśena kvacid eva kṣaṇikatvādau niścayotpattir bhavati na sarvatra tadvad adṛṣṭādivaśenaikākārā saṃvidbhaviṣyatīti / | The following might be urged (by the Sāṃkhya): “Even though what is actually apprehended by Perception is the Object, Sound and the rest, in its entire aspect, yet, on account of predisposition and other circumstances, the definite cognition that actually appears (according to the Buddhist) is only in reference to certain aspects of it, such as its momentary character and not in reference to all its aspects; |
tadetad asamyak / | This cannot be right. |
na hi kṣaṇikādivikalpasyādi{lpaspade}paramārthato vastuviṣayatvamasmākam iṣṭaṃ / | According to us, such conceptions as those of ‘momentary character’ and the like do not in reality have any Entity for their objective; |
sarvavikalpātītatvād vastunaḥ / | because (according to us) the ‘Entity’ is beyond all conception. |
pāramparyeṇa tu vastuni pratibandhāt tathāvidhavastuprāptihetutayā tasya prāmāṇyaṃ / | It is only indirectly that conceptions (and Cognitions) are connected with the Entity, and thereby becoming the means of apprehending that Entity, they come to be recognised as the Pramāṇa (Proof, Evidence, Means of Cognition) for that Entity. |
prītyādīnāṃ tu parair vastuviṣayatvam eva paramārthata iṣṭaṃ / | As for Love and the rest on the other hand, they are actually admitted by the other party to have objects as their real objective; |
anyathā hi nirālambanatve sati sukhādyātmanāṃ śabdādīnām anubhavat sukhādyanubhavakhyātirityetan na syāt / teṣāṃ ca prītyādīnāṃ savikalpakatvād aniścitaṃ na kiñcid rūpam astīti sarvātmanānubhavakhyātiḥ syāt / | if that were not so, then the said Love, etc. would have no basis (or substratum), and it would (thus) be not true to say that ‘the Cognition of the feelings of Pleasure, etc. follows from the Cognition of Sound and other objects which are of the nature of Pleasure, etc.’ Further, inasmuch as the feelings of Love, etc. are definitely determinate in their character, there is no uncertainty or indefiniteness attaching to their character, and as a result of this, the Cognition of the feeling of these would be always in their entire form. |
iyam eva hi niścayānāṃ svārthapratipattir yattāścayanaṃ nāma // | In fact it is this cognition of the object of all definite Cognitions that constitutes their definiteness. |
prasādodvegavaraṇānyekasmin puṃsi yogināṃ / | For the followers of yoga, ‘satisfaction’, ‘dissatisfaction’ and ‘delusion’ are produced in the same spirit; |
jāyante na ca tadrūpaḥ pumān abhimataḥ paraiḥ // | and yet the other party do not hold the spirit to be of the essence of those. |
[p.37] tathā hi kāpilayogināṃ puruṣaṃ prakṛtivibhaktaṃ bhāvayatāṃ puruṣamālambyasvabhyastayogānāṃ prasādo bhavati prītiś ca / ajitayogānāṃ kṣiprataramapaśyatāṃ udvegaḥ ye ca prakṛtyā jaḍamatayasteṣāṃ varaṇamupajāyate / | Those followers of Yoga who accept the teachings of Kapila, when meditating upon the Spirit as distinguished from Primordial Matter, derive Satisfaction and Happiness, after having practised meditation of the Spirit in the right manner; but those who do not succeed in the practice of Meditation, and hence do not perceive the Spirit quickly enough, become beset with Dissatisfaction; while those who are, by their very nature, of dull intelligence, become beset with Delusion; |
na cāsau puruṣas tadrūpastriguṇātmako 'bhīṣṭaḥ paraiḥ / | and yet the other Party do not regard the Spirit to be of the essence of these i.e. to consist of the Three Attributes. |
tasmāt prasādatāpadainyādikāryopalabdher ityanaikāntikametat / | From this it follows that the premiss stated in the form ‘Because of the apprehension of such Effects as Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction and Dejection’ is Inconclusive, ‘too wide’. |
saṅkalpāt tāni prītyādīni bhavanti na puruṣāditi cet / | “As a matter of fact, however, Pleasure, etc. proceed from Volition (Determination, the function of Cosmic Intelligence), not from the Spirit.” |
etacchabdādiṣvapi samānaṃ / | The same might be said of Sound and the rest also; |
tataś ca saṅkalpamātrabhāvitve bāhyāḥ sukhadayo na sidhyanti / | and in that case, as all these objects (Sound, etc.) would be products of mere Volition, there could be no such things as External Pleasure, etc.; |
saṅkalpasya saṃvidrūpatvāt / | because ‘Volition’ is of the nature of Consciousness, purely subjective. |
ata eva ca bāhyasukhādyupadhānavaśāt saṃvedanasya sātādirūpatvamityetad api vyabhicāri / antareṇāpi bāhyaviṣayopadhānaṃ puruṣālambanena prītyādīnām utpattidarśanāt / | For the same reason the proposition that “Cognition or Experience is of the nature of Satisfaction (Dissatisfaction and Dejection), through the influence of such impositions as those of external Pleasure, etc.” also becomes rejected. Specially because, even without the imposition of such external things, Happiness, etc. are actually found to appear entirely on the substratum of the Spirit itself. |
yacceṣṭāniṣṭhavikalpād anapekṣitabāhyaviṣayasannidhānaṃ sukhādisaṃvedanaṃ prasiddhaṃ tat kathaṃ paropadhānāt syāt / | How too could the imposition of something else bring about the well-known feeling of Pleasure, etc. which appears independently of the proximity of external things, from the mere contemplation of what is agreeable and disagreeable? |
mano 'pi siddham ityādinā saṃvidrūpatvasya pratipāditatvāt / | It might be said that “the Mind also (wherein this Contemplation takes place) would be made up of the Three Attributes through the imposition of the same |
tasmāt samanvayādityasiddho hetuḥ // idānīṃ hetusiddhim abhyupagamyānaikāntikatvaṃ pratipādayann āha siddhe 'pītyādi / | From all this it follows that the reason put forward (by the Sāṃkhya) “Because of homogeneity” is ‘Inadmissible’, ‘unproven’, (40) |
siddhe 'pi triguṇe vyakte na pradhānaṃ prasidhyati / ekaṃ tat kāraṇaṃ nityaṃ naikajātyanvitaṃ hi tat // | Even though the ‘manifest’ be accepted as ‘consisting of three attributes’, primordial matter does not become established as the one eternal cause of that (manifest); because that ‘manifest’ is not imbued with any single generic character. |
yadi nāma vyaktam triguṇātmakaṃ siddhaṃ tathāpi tasya yattadabhīṣṭaṃ kāraṇaṃ pradhānākhyaṃ tan na sidhyati / | Even if it be taken as proved that the ‘Manifest’ consists of the ‘Three Attributes’, yet that does not prove what the Sāṃkhya wishes viz. that the Cause of that ‘Manifest’ is that which is called ‘Primordial Matter’; |
tathābhūtena kāraṇena kvacid api hetor anvayāsiddher iti bhāvaḥ / | that is to say, because the reason that has been put forward has not been found to be concomitant with a Cause of that kind. |
tathā hi triguṇātmakamevaṃ nityaṃ vyāpi ca tasya kāraṇaṃ sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ / | For instance, what the Sāṃkhya desires to prove is that the Cause of the ‘Manifest’ is one, consisting of the Three Attributes, eternal and all-pervading; |
na caivambhūtena kāraṇena kvaciddhetoḥ pratibandhaḥ siddhaḥ / nāpi yadātmakaṃ kāryam upalabhyate kāraṇenāvaśyaṃ tadātmanā bhavitavyaṃ / | as a matter of fact, with such a Cause, the invariable concomitance of the Reason has nowhere been perceived; nor is it necessary that the Cause must be of the same nature as the Effect is found to be; |
kāryakāraṇayor bhedāt / | because there is a clear difference between the Cause and its Effect. |
tathā hi hetumattvānityatvāvyapitādibhir dharmaiḥ samanvite vyaktākhyaṃ kāryamiṣyate bhavadbhiḥ naca tatkāraṇasya tādrūpyamiṣṭaṃ tasmād anaikāntiko hetuḥ / | You hold that the Effect in the shape of the ‘Manifest’ is that which has such characteristics as ‘having a Cause’, ‘being non-eternal’, ‘non-pervasive’ and so forth; and yet you do not hold the Cause (of this Manifest) to have these characteristics. Hence your Reason (Premiss) is ‘too wide’, ‘inconclusive’, |
dharmaviśeṣaviparītabhāvanād viruddho 'pīti darśayannāha ekaṃ tat kāraṇamityādi / | The Text next proceeds to show that the Reason put forward (by the Sāṃkhya) is ‘contradictory’ also, inasmuch it entails the conception contrary to the nature of the particular Entity: As the one eternal Came, etc.; |
eko nityastriguṇātmakaḥ kāraṇabhūto dharmaḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ sa ca tathābhūto na sidhyati kiṃ tarhi viparīta iti bhāvaḥ / | that is to say, what is meant to be proved is the existence of an Entity, which is one, eternal and made up of the Three Attributes, as the Cause (of the ‘Manifest’); and no such entity is established by the Reason put forward; |
kasmādityāha naikajātyanvitaṃ hi taditi / | in fact, what is established is something quite contrary to it, “How so?” Because that is not endowed, etc. |
hi śabdo hetau / | The particle ‘hi’ stands for ‘because’; |
tasmāt tadvyaktākhyaṃ kāryaṃ naikayā triguṇātmakayā svātmabhūtayā jātyā samanvitaṃ siddhaṃ / kiṃ tarhi anekatvānityatvādidharmānvitamevopalabhyate / | hence the meaning is that the Effect in the shape of the ‘Manifest’ is not recognised to be imbued with any such single generic character as consists of the Three Attributes and which forms the very essence of the ‘Manifest’, “What is it then that is recognised?” The ‘Manifest’ is actually cognised as endowed with such qualities as multiplicity, non-eternality and so forth. |
yadi hi vyaktam ekayā yathoktyā jātyā samanvitaṃ bhavet tadā tat kāraṇam api yathoktadharmaviśiṣṭaṃ sidhyet / | If the ‘Manifest’ were really imbued with any such generic character as that postulated by the other party, then the Cause also of that ‘Manifest’ would have to be recognised as possessed of that character. |
[p.38] yāvatā kāryasyānityatvānekatvadharmānvayadarśanāt tatkāraṇam api tathaivānumīyate / | Inasmuch as, however, the Effect (in the shape of the ‘Manifest’) is actually found to be imbued with such qualities as ‘non-eternality’, ‘multiplicity’ and the like its Cause also has to be inferred as possessed of these same qualities. |
nityasya kramākramābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt / | Specially because in the case of a Cause that is eternal, the idea of its fruitful operations being both sequential and simultaneous would involve self-contradiction; |
kāraṇabhedakṛtatvāc ca kāryavaicitryasya / | and because diversity in the Effect can be only due to diversity in the Cause; |
anyathā nirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt / | otherwise the diversity in the Effect would be without any Cause (baseless). |
tasmān na nityaikarūpapradhānasiddhiḥ / | From all this it follows that any such single eternal Entity as Primordial Matter cannot be recognised. |
yadi punar anityānekarūpa eva kāraṇaṃ pradhānam iti saṃjñā kriyeta tadā nāsti vivāda iti bhāvaḥ // | If the name ‘Primordial Matter’ is given to a Cause that is non-eternal and many, then there we have no quarrel with you. |