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tasmān na tatkṣayo yuktaḥ / | From all this it follows that there can be no ‘removal’ of the Obstruction (of Apprehension). |
athavā nityatvādīt tadviṣayāyāḥ saṃvitter nityatvannāvaraṇaṃ sambhavati tadasambhavān na kṣayo yukta ity arthaḥ / | Or the term ‘nityatvāt’, ‘because of its being constant’ (in the Text), may be taken to mean that, bemuse the Cognition of the Effect is constant (eternal), there can be no ‘obstruction’ of it; and because such obstruction is impossible, there can be no ‘obstruction’ of it. |
na cāpyāvaraṇakṣayaḥ kenacit kriyate / tasya niḥsvabhāvatvāt / | Nor again can the ‘removal of the obstruction’ be brought about by anything, because it is characterless (being a negative entity, it has no positive character). |
na kevalaṃ satkāryavādapakṣe sādhanaprayogavaiyarthyaṃ bandhamokṣābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ sarvalokavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgācānivāryaḥ / | Under the doctrine of the ‘Existent Effect’, the futility of the causal operation is not the only incongruity; the impossibility of Bondage and Liberation is another incongruity; in fact, the most undesirable contingency of the cessation of all worldly activity cannot be avoided. |
tathā hi pradhānapuruṣayoḥ kaivalyopalambhalakṣaṇasya tattvajñānasyotpattausatyāṃ mokṣo bhavadbhiriṣyate / | For instance, you hold the doctrine that ‘Liberation’ follows on the appearance of True Knowledge, in the shape of real discrimination between Matter and Spirit; |
tac ca tattvajñānaṃ sarvadāvasthitameveti muktāḥ sarva eva dehinaḥ syuḥ ato na bandhaḥ / | now as this True Knowledge is always constantly present, all embodied beings would be always ‘liberated’; hence there could be no ‘Bondage’. |
mithyājñānavaśāc ca bandha iṣyate tasya ca sarvadāvasthitatvena sarvadā sarveṣāṃ baddhatvāt kuto mokṣaḥ lokaś ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārārthaṃ pravartate / | Conversely, ‘Bondage’ also has been held to be due to Wrong Notion (Misconception, Illusion); and as this Illusion also would be a constant factor, all beings would be always ‘under bondage’; and under the circumstances, how could there be any ‘Liberation’? Then again, whenever people have recourse to any activity, it is either for securing what is beneficial or for getting rid of what is harmful. |
[p.30] satkāryavādapakṣe ca na kiñcid aprāpyamaheyaṃ vāstīti nirīham eva jagatsyāt / | Under the theory of the ‘Existent Effect’ however, there can be nothing that cannot be secured, nor anything that cannot be got rid of; hence the whole world would be without desire for anything; |
antatas sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgaḥ // | so that ultimately there would be total cessation of all worldly activities. |
evaṃ tāvat satkāryavādaṃ nirākṛtyāsatkāryavādapakṣabhāvino doṣān parihartumāha traiguṇyasyetyādi // traiguṇyasyāvibhede 'pi na sarvaṃ sarvakārakaṃ / yadvattadvadasattve 'pi na sarvaṃ sarvakārakaṃ // | Just as (under the sāṃkhya theory), even though, on the ground of all things being constituted by the Three Attributes, there is no differentiation among them, and yet everything (Cause) does not produce everything (Effect), in the same manner, even though the Effect is non-existent (before the Causal Operation), everything cannot produce everything. Having thus refuted the doctrine of the ‘Effect being existent (even prior to the operation of its Cause),’ the Author proceeds to refute the objections likely to be urged against the doctrine that ‘the Effect is nonexistent (prior to the operation of its Cause)’: [see verse 28 above] |
satkāryaniṣedhādeva sāmarthyād asatkāryam iti siddham eva sadasatoranyonyaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvena prakārāntarāsambhavāt / | The very denial of the theory of the ‘Existent Effect’ has, by implication, proved that the Effect is ‘non-existent’; as ‘existent’ ‘and non-existent’ are contradictory terms; and hence no third alternative is possible. |
tathāpi paropanyas tasya dūṣaṇasya dūṣaṇābhāsatāpratipādanāyocyate / | Even so, the Author now proceeds to show the futility of the objections that the Opponent has urged (against the Buddhist theory of the ‘non-existent Effect |
tatra yattāvaduktaṃ kartuṃ tannaiva śakyeta nairūpyād iti / | The objection has been urged (by the Sāṃkhya, under Text 8, above) that “if the Effect were non-existent, it could not be produced, bemuse it would have no form at all”, |
tadasiddhaṃ vastusvabhāvasyaiva kriyamāṇatvābhyupagamāt / tasya ca vastusvabhāvasya nīrūpatvāsiddheḥ / prāgutpattes tanniḥsvabhāvameveti cen na / | because the theory is that it is the nature or character itself (of the Effect) that is produced (by the Cause), and this nature or character of the thing is not ‘known’ (admitted) to be ‘formless’, It might be urged that “before its production, it is certainly characterless”. |
nahi svabhāva eva niḥsvabhāvo yuktaḥ vastusvabhāvapratiṣedhalakṣaṇatvānniḥsvabhāvatvasya / | as it is not possible for it to be ‘characterless it cannot be right to regard the character itself as characterless; because when something is said to be ‘characterless’ what is meant is that U has no character; |
nacāpyutpādātprāk tadasti / | and this certainly is not there, even before the production of the thing; |
kriyamāṇaṃ vastu yena tadeva niḥsvabhāvaṃ siddhyet / atha vastuvirahalakṣaṇameva nīrūpaṃ dharmiṇaṃ pakṣīkṛtya nairūpyāditi hetuḥkriyate tadā siddhasādhyatā / | in fact, (under the argument of the Opponent) that itself would come to be characterless by which the Effect is produced. If the Reason ‘because it would have no form’ be held to have been put forward with reference to the ‘formless entity’ in the shape of the ‘negation of the thing’, then the reasoning would be futile (proving what is already proved or admitted); |
nahi vastuvirahaḥ kenacit kriyamāṇatayābhyupagataḥ / api ca anikāntiko 'pi hetuḥ / | as the ‘negation of the thing’ has not been regarded by any one as ‘something produced’, Further, the Reason is invalid also as being ‘Inconclusive’; |
vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt / | as no reason has been put forward for sublating the contrary; |
yataḥ kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamātkiñcidevāsatkriyate yasyotpādakaṃ kāraṇamasti yasya tu viyadabjāder nāsti kāraṇaṃ tan na kriyata ityanekānta eva / | inasmuch as the potency of the Gause is always restricted, it is only some non-existent thing that is produced, only that for the production of which the Cause is there; that thing, for producing which there is no Cause such for instance as the ‘Sky-lotus’, is never, produced. |
nahi sarvaṃ sarvasya kāraṇamiṣṭaṃ / | Hence the Reason put forward (by the Sāṅkhya) is ‘too wide, Inconclusive’, Everything cannot be regarded as the Cause of everything; |
nāpi yadyadasattat tatkriyata eveti vyāptiriṣṭā / | nor is any such universal proposition accepted as that ‘whatever is non-existent must be produced’; |
kiṃtarhi yatkriyate tatprāgutpatter asadeveti / | what is accepted is the proposition that ‘whatever is produced was non-existent before its production’. |
syād etat tulyepyasatkāritve kāraṇānāṃ kimiti sarvaṃ sarvasyāsataḥ kāraṇaṃ na bhavatīti / | The following might be urged (by the Sāṃkhya) “All Causes being equally productive of what has been non-existent, why is it that all Causes are not productive of all non-existent effects?” |
tadetadbhavato 'pi samānam codyaṃ tulye hi satkāritve kimiti sarvam sarvasya sataḥ kāraṇaṃ na bhavatīti / na ca bhavatāṃ matena kiñcid asadasti yena tan na kriyeta / | This criticism can be urged with equal force against you also: All Causes being equally productive of what has been existent, how is it that all Causes are not productive of all effects? According to your view, there is nothing that is non-existent, which, on account of its non-existence, could not be produced. |
kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamāt sadapi śaśaviṣāṇādi na kriyata iti cet / | “It is because the potency of Causes is restricted that, though things like the Hare’s Horn are existent, they are not produced.” |
taditaratrāpi samānaṃ / | The same is equally true for the other theory also. |
api ca yathā bhavatāṃ traiguṇyasya sarvatrāviśeṣe 'pi na sarvaṃ sarvakārakaṃ bhavati śaktipratiniyamāt / | Then again, just as for you, even though all things are equally constituted by the Three Attributes, yet everything is not productive of everything, because the potency (of things) is restricted; |
sarvasya kārakaṃ sarvaṃ vā kārakamasyeti vigrahaḥ / | the compound ‘Sarvakāraka’ may be explained as ‘productive of everything’ or as ‘that which has everything for its producer’; |
tadvad asatvepi kāryasyānvayino vā kasyacid rūpasya na sarvaṃ sarvakārakaṃ bhaviṣyati / | in the same manner (under our view also), even though all things (Effects) are equally non-existent, yet everything will not be productive of everything. |
etaccābhyupagamyoktaṃ yadvat tadvaditi / | In fact, what has been asserted in the Text ‘As in your case, so in mine also’ has been said after having admitted the Opponent’s contention, for the sake of argument; |
na punaḥ sāmyam iti / | in reality, there is no ‘equality’ between the two theories. |
tathā hi satyapi bhede kasyacit kaścideva hetur bhavati / | Because (under our view) even though there is diversity among things, yet, some one effect is produced by some one Cause only; |
svahetuparamparāsamāyātatvāt tathābhūtasvabhāvabhedapratiniyamasyetyaviruddhaṃ / [p.31] abhede tv ekasyaikasminn eva kāle hetutvam ahetutvaṃ ca parasparaviruddhaṃ kathaṃ sambhāvyate / | If, on the other hand, there is ‘non-differentiation’ (between Cause and Effect), how could it be possible to conceive of such an incongruity as that involved in one and the same thing being both ‘cause’ and ‘non-cause’ at the same time? Specially as distinction (differentiation) among things is always based upon contrary properties being attributed to them. |
tathācāha bhede hi kāraṇaṃ kiñcit vastudharmatayā bhavet / | This has been thus declared ‘For all differentiation there must be some ground or basis in the nature of the things concerned; |
abhede tu nirudhyete tasyaikasya kriyākriye // % QUOTE Pramāṇavārttika 1:174 | if there were non-differentiation, then, all being one and the same, its activity as well as inactivity would both be rendered impossible’, (28) |
avadhīnām aniṣpatter niyatās te na śaktayaḥ / | “Inasmuch as the presence of limits would re impossible for you, the potencies cannot be restricted. |
satve tu niyamas tāsāṃ {yuktaḥ}sāvadhiko na tu // | on the view of their being existent, on the other hand, their restriction would be right and proper as pertaining to the limits.” (29) |
ta iti tava bauddhasyāsatkāryavādinaḥ na kāraṇānāṃ niyatāḥ śaktayo ghaṭante / | For you i.e. for the Buddhist who holds the Effect to he non-existent. it is not possible for the (causal) Potencies to be restricted. |
kasmāt / avadhīnāṃ kāryabhūtānām aniṣpatteḥ / | Why? Because the presence of limits, in the shape of Effects would be impossible; |
nahyavadhimantareṇāvadhimato 'sti sadbhāvaḥ prayogaḥ / | for the simple reason, that when the limit is non-existent, that which is limited cannot be there. |
ye sadbhūtakāryāvadhiśūnyā na te niyataśaktayo yathā śaśaviṣāṇādayaḥ sadbhūtakāryāvadhiśūnyāś ca śālibījādayo bhāvā iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: Tilings devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects cannot have their potencies restricted, e.g. such things as Hare’s Horns, and (according to you) things like the Paddy-seed are devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects; |
svapakṣasya sausthityaṃ darśayannāha satva iti / | hence they do not fall within range of the Major term [i.e. they cannot have their Potencies restricted]’, With a view to show the soundness of his own view, the Sāṃkhya adds On the view of their being existent, etc. |
kāryāṇāṃ sadbhāve satītyarthaḥ / | i.e. if Effects are held to be existent; |
tāsām iti śaktīnāṃ // | ‘their’ i.e. of the Potencies. |
naivam ityādinā hetor anaikāntikatām āha naivaṃ teṣām aniṣpattyā mābhūcchabdas tathāparaṃ / | It is not so; it may be that, on account of the absence of ‘limits’, there can be no such subsequent assertion as held by us. |
sarvopādhiviviktasya vasturūpasya na kṣatiḥ // | but there is no harm done to the nature of the thing itself which is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts. |
tathā hi teṣām avadhīnām aniṣpattau yadi paraṃ kṣīrasya dadhyutpādane śaktirityeṣa vyapadeśo mābhūt yatpunas tathāvidhaṃ sarvopādhiśūnyamadhyāropitaṃ vastu yadanantaram adṛṣṭapūrvaṃ vastvantaramudeti tasyāpratiṣedha eva // | [It cannot be as urged by the Opponent] because, on account of the absence of ‘Limits’, it may be that there can be no such subsequent assertion as that ‘the potency to produce Curd is present in the Milk’; that may be so; but there is that Entity which is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts which is not a mere imposition (or assumption), subsequent to which there appears another Entity, which has not been previously perceived; |
syād etadyatra śabdavikalpānām apravṛttis tatra vastusvabhāve 'pi nivartata evetyāha na nāmarūpamityādi / na nāma rūpaṃ vastūnāṃ vikalpā vācakāś ca yat / | and there can be no denial of such an Entity (as of the former one). The name of things is not their ‘essence’ (nature, form); because all kinds of ‘conception’ and ‘verbal expression’ proceed through habit, with reference to the undifferentiated (immaculate) entity. The Sāṃkhya may urge the following “Where, with regard to anything, there is absolute cessation of all verbal and conceptual content there the very nature of the thing must cease |
viśvakalpāḥ pravartante yathābhyāsamabhedini // svabhāva eva hi vyāpako nivartamānaḥ svaṃ vyāpyaṃ nivartayati kāraṇaṃ vā kāryaṃ pratibandhasadbhāvāt / | The ‘Nature’ of a thing is what has the widest extension (range); it is only when that is excluded that it sets aside its less extensive concomitants, be it Cause or Effect, because there is invariable concomitance between the two (the more extensive ‘Nature’ and the less extensive Cause or Effect); |
natvanyo 'tiprasaṅgāt / | nothing else sets aside this; |
naca kṣīrasya dadhni śaktirityevamādināmavyapadeśo vastūnāṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo bhavati / | Such ‘verbal expression’ as that ‘Milk has the potency to produce Curd’, does not constitute the ‘Essence’ Nature of things; |
yena tannivartamānaṃ tathāvidhaṃ vastu nivartayet / | if it were so, then alone could ‘the verbal expression’, on being excluded, exclude the relevant thing also. |
nāmagrahaṇamupalakṣaṇaṃ / | ‘Verbal Expression’ is mentioned only by way of illustration; |
vikalpo 'pi tatsaṃsṛṣṭo gṛhyate / | ‘Conception’ (Fanciful Assumption) also as related to the Thing in question is meant to be included. |
[p.32] {karanaṃgruhyate}kāraṇam api vastūnāṃ nāma na bhavatyeva tadantareṇāpi vastusambhavāt / | ‘Essence’ also is mentioned only by way of illustration; it includes the ‘Cause’ also; so that the ‘Name’ of a thing is not its ‘Cause’; because the thing can be produced without the Name. |
atra kāraṇam āha vikalpā ityādi / yat yasmāt nāmasaṃsargabhājo vikalpā vācakāś ca śabdā viśvakalpāḥ nānāprakārāḥ abhedini niraṃśaikasvabhāvavastuni yathābhyāsaṃ vartante / | The Author states the reason for the assertion just made Because all kinds of ‘Conception’, etc. etc. Because, inasmuch as, all ‘Conceptions’, which are connected with Names, as also all ‘Verbal Expressions’ expressive words, both of which are of all kinds of various kinds, proceed, become applicable, through habit, with reference to the undifferentiated (Immaculate) Entity i.e. the Entity which has no component parts and which is of one constant uniform nature. |
tathā hi eka eva śabdādir bhāvo nityādirūpeṇa bhinnasamayasthāyibhiḥ pravādibhir vikalpyate vyapadiśyate ca / | That is to say, there is a single Entity, in the shape of ‘Word-Sound’ for instance, which, being constant, is ‘conceived’ and ‘spoken of’ by speakers existing at varying times. |
teṣāṃ ca śabdavikalpānāṃ tādātmye tadviṣayatve vā vastunaścitratvaṃ prāpnoti / vastusvarūpavadeva vā śabdavikalpānama ekarūpatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | It is only when these ‘Word-conceptions’ become identified with, and have for their objective, the said constant Entity, that this latter becomes diversified; or (conversely), like the Essence of the Entity itself, the Conceptions themselves become unified in essence; |
nahyekaṃ citram iti yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | any such idea would lead to absurdity. |
tasmācchaktipratiniyamāt kiñcidevāsatkriyate na sarvamityato nairūpyanaikāntiko 'pi hetuḥ / | Hence what happens is that the potency of the Cause being restricted, it is only some non-existent thing that is produced, not all. |
ata evopādānagrahaṇādityādikriyate hetucatuṣṭayasyānaikāntikatvaṃ / | For the same reasons, the other reasons also (propounded by the Sāṃkhya in support of the ‘Existence of the Effect’ under Sāṃkhyakārikā, 9) such as ‘because the particular Cause is secured’, and the rest, become invalid. |
tathā hi yadi kāryasattākṛtameva pratiniyatopādānagrahaṇaṃ kvacit siddhaṃ syāt tadaitat syāt / | Because, what is said regarding the ‘Securing of the particular Cause’ would be true if the said ‘Securing of the particular Cause’ were found anywhere to have been due to the presence (therein) of the Effect; |
yāvatā kāraṇaśaktiniyamakṛtam api niyatopādānagrahaṇaṃ yujyata eva / | specially as it is quite possible for the said securing of the particular Cause to be due to the restricted character of the Potency of the Cause itself. |
kāraṇaśaktipratiniyamādeva ca na sarvasya sarvasmāt sambhavaḥ sarvasya sarvārthakriyākāritvasvabhāvāsambhavāt / | That ‘everything cannot be produced from everything’ is also due to the restricted character of the Causal Potency itself; as it is impossible for everything to be, by its very nature, capable of producing allngs. |
yatpunaruktamakāryātiśayaṃ yattvityādi tadapyabhiprāyāparijñānād uktaṃ / | As for the argument set forth (by the Sāṃkhya) above, under Text 12 “that to which no peculiarity can be attributed, which is formless and unmodifiable, how could such a thing be produced by Causes?” that also has been urged without understanding the real sense of our theory. |
nahyasmābhirabhāvaḥ kriyata ityabhidhīyate / | We do not say that a Non-entity is produced; |
yena vikṛtau satyāṃ tasya svabhāvahāniprasaṅgaḥ syāt / | if we had said that then alone could it be urged against us that any modification of it would involve loss of its very essence. |
kiṃtu vastveva kriyata iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditaṃ / | We have however already explained that what is produced is a Thing itself (not a mere non-entity); |
tac ca vastu upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher niṣpannasya ca kāryatvānupapatteḥ prāgutpādād asadity ucyate yasya ca kāraṇasya sannidhānamātreṇa tattathābhūtamudeti tena tatkriyata iti vyapadiśyate natu vyāpārasamāveśāt kenacitkiñcit kriyate nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇāṃ / | all that we say is that the thing was non-existent before its production, a conclusion deduced from the fact that (prior to production) it is not found to fulfil the conditions of Cognisability and that which is already a full-fledged entity cannot be an Effect, something to be produced; and that it is spoken of as ‘produced’ by that Cause on whose mere proximity it springs into existence. Nothing is produced by the entering into it of any operations (of the Cause), because all things are, by their very nature, devoid of operative activity. |
nāpyasannāma kiñcid asti yadvikriyate na vā vastusvabhāvaḥ pratiṣedhamātralakṣaṇatvād asattvasya / | Then again, there is nothing that can be called a ‘non-entity’, which could be modified (as urged by the Sāṃkhya); nor can ‘non-existence’ constitute the ‘Essence’ of anything; because ‘non-existence’ is a mere negation. |
apica yadyakāryātiśayatvād asanna kriyata ityabhidhīyate / sadapi ca svabhāvaniṣpatter akāryātiśatameveti tat kathaṃ kriyate / | Then again, if it be asserted that “What is non-existent cannot, be produced, because no peculiarities of the product could be attributed to it”, then how could the Existent also be produced, since its essential features are already accomplished, and no further peculiarities could be attributed to it? For these reasons, the reasoning that “Because what is efficient can produce only that which can be produced by it” is invalid. |
tasmācchaktasya śakyakāraṇādityeṣonaikāntaḥ / asatkāryavāde ca kāraṇābhāvasya yujyamānatvāt kāraṇabhāvādityayamapyanaikāntikaḥ / yadvā pūrvaṃ sataḥ kāryatvāsambhavasya pratipāditatvāt asatkāryavāda eva copādānagrahaṇādiniyamasya yujyamānatvāt upādānagrahaṇād ityāder hetucatuṣṭayasya viruddhatā sādhyaviparyayasādhanāt // | Further, inasmuch as under the theory of the ‘Non-existent Effect’, it is possible for things to be ‘Causes’, the final (Sāṃkhya) argument also “Because the Effect is of the essence of the Cause” is invalid, ‘too wide and Inconclusive’, Or, inasmuch as the fact of the Existentng being an ‘Effect’ has been already shown to be impossible, and as all the facts that have been urged, in the shape of the arguments (in Sāṃkhyakārikā, 9) “because the particular Cause is secured” and so forth, are explicable only under the theory of the Effect being non-existent, all these four arguments are ‘contradictory’ (as urged in support of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the ‘Existent Effect’,, because they actually prove what is contrary to the conclusion desired (by the Sāṃkhya) (31) |
nanu yadyasadevotpadyata iti bhavatāṃ mataṃ tat kathaṃ sūtre sadasator utpādaḥpratiṣiddhaḥ / | [Says the Sāṃkhya] “If it is your view that what is produced has been non-existent, then how is it that in the Sutra (of the Buddhists), the production of both, the Existent as well as the Non-existent, has been denied? |
yathoktam anutpannā mahāmate sarvadharmāḥ sadasator anutpannatvāt iti atrāha utpāda ityādi / utpādo vastubhāvastu so 'satā na satā tathā / | This is the declaration ‘O high-minded one, all Things are un-produced, as neither the Existent nor the Non-existent is ever produced The answer to this is provided by the following: [see verse 32 above] |
[p.33] tuśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ / | The particle ‘tu’ (in reality) serves to emphasise what is going to be said. |
vastūnāṃ pūrvāparakoṭiśūnyakṣaṇamātrāvasthāyī svabhāva evotpāda ity ucyate / bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ / | When we come to examine in what manner a particular thing may be distinguished from other things, we find that what is called the ‘production’ (appearance, coming into existence, of a Thing) is only its own Essence, becoming itself, which exists merely for a moment, free from all connection with all elements of the Past and the Future. |
natu vaibhāṣikavikalpitā jātiḥ samskṛtalakṣaṇaṃ / | It is not a ‘Universal’ with particular features, as assumed by the Vaibhāṣika; |
tasyāḥ pratiṣetsyamānatvāt / | such a ‘Universal’ is going to be refuted (under Chapter 13). |
nāpi vaiśeṣikaparikalpitaḥ sattāsamavāyaḥ svakāraṇasamavāyo vā tayor api niṣetsyamānatvāt / | Nor does it consist in ‘inherence in Being’ or ‘inherence in its own Cause’, as postulated by the Vaiśeṣika; as both these also are going to be refuted (under Chapter 13); |
paramatena ca tayor nityatvāt / nityasya ca janmānupapatteḥ / | and because, under the theory of the other party (the Vaiśeṣika), both these (Inherences) are constant, and what is already constant cannot be produced. |
sattāsvakāraṇāśleṣakaraṇāt kāraṇaṃ kila / | the Cause is a cause by virtue of producing the Effect; |
sā sattā sa ca sambandho nityau kāryamatheha kiṃ // | the Being and the Contact both being constant, what is there that could be produced?’ |
sa evam ātmaka utpādo nāsatā tādātmyena sambadhyate / | This the said Production cannot be related to what is non-existent, by the relation of ‘co-essentiality’ (being of the same essence); |
sadasator virodhāt / na hy asad bhavati / | as ‘existent’ and ‘non-existent’ are mutually contradictory, what is nonexistent cannot come about. |
nāpi satā pūrvabhāvinā sambadhyate / | Nor can the ‘production’ be related to what is existent already from before; |
tasya pūrvamasattvāt / | because before Production, the existent cannot be there. |
katham idānīm asatkāryavādino yūyam ity āha kalpikayetyādi / | Question “Then how is it that you (Buddhists) are upholders of the doctrine that ‘the Effect is non-existent’?” |
kalpikayā dhiyā kartṛbhūtayā karaṇabhūtayā vā kevalamasatā kartrā sambadhyate sambandhamupanīyata ity arthaḥ / | Answer Only to a conceptual idea, etc.; it is only to a conceptual idea, which is of the nature of either the Active Agent or the Instrument, (Cause) it is led into relationship. |
nahyasannāma kiñcid asti yadutpattimāviśet kiṃ tu kalpaniko 'yaṃ vyavahāro yadasadutpadyata iti yāvat // | As a matter of fact, there is nothing called ‘non-existent’ which could enter into ‘production’; the idea therefore that ‘the non-existent is produced’ is purely conceptual. |
yadidaṃ vastuno rūpam ekānantaramīkṣyate / | The basis (of the said conception) lies in the fact that the form of a thing perceived in immediate sequence to another thing did not exist before. |
prāg āsīn neti tadbījaṃ prāgbhūtaṃ tv idamasti na // | if the said thing had existed previously, then this basis would not be there (for the said assumption). |
yadetadekasya pratiniyataysa kasyacitpadārthasyānantaramadṛṣṭapūrvaṃ vasturūpamupalabhyate tanmadhyāvasthātaḥ prāṅnāsīt upalabdhikṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ / | When the previously unperceived form of a particularng is perceived in immediate sequence to another thing, the said form is one that did not exist before i.e. prior to its own ‘middlemost state’[1] for the simple reason that it is not apprehended as fulfilling the conditions of being perceived. |
tasmād idaṃ prāgasatsamutpadyata ityasyāḥ kalpanāyā bījaṃ / | Hence this forms the basis for the conception that the thing that is produced is one that did not exist before. |
kasmād ity āha prāgbhūta ityādi / | “How so?” If the said thing, etc.; |
madhyavasthātaḥ prāk madhyāvasthātadbhūte vidyamāne sati vasturūpe nāstīdaṃ kalpanānibandhanam utpadyata iti / tathā hi utpadyata ityanena madhyāvasthabhāvyena pratiniyataṃ svarūpamucyate / | i.e. prior to its ‘middlemost state’, if the form of the thing, this middlemost state, had existed, there could be no room for the said ‘basis’ of the Conception that ‘what was non-existent has become produced Because the term ‘becomes produced’ connotes that particular state of the thing which appears in its ‘middlemost state’; |
yadica yasya prāgapi bhāvaḥ syāt tadā tasya madhyāvasthabhāvyeveti yadetanniyatam svarūpaṃ tasya hāniḥ syāt / | and if this were present even previously (to that state), then this would set aside the notion that the ‘form’ of the thing consists in that particular form of it which appears during the ‘middlemost state’ only. |
ākāśavat sarvadāvasthitasya pūrvāparamadhyāvasthābhāvāt / | As (ex hypothesi), it would be as all-pervading as Ākāśa, and as such it could not have any ‘previous’ or ‘middlemost’ or ‘subsequent’ states at all. |
tataś ca sarvadā sarvamutpadyata ityevaṃ vyapadiśyeta viśeṣābhāvāt // | Under the circumstances, it would be possible to assert that ‘allngs are produced at all times’, as there would be no grounds for differentiation. |
kṣīrādiṣu ca dadhyādi śaktirūpeṇa yanmataṃ / | It has been held that the curd and other effects subsist in the milk and other causes, in the form of latent potency; |