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Dharmamitra 43

yadi dugdhādyātmasu kṣīrādīnāṃ svabhāveṣu dadhyādilakṣaṇāni kāryāṇi sarvathā sarvātmanā viśeṣarasavīryavipākādinā vibhaktena rūpeṇa madhyāvasthāvatsanti tadā teṣāṃ satāṃ kimutpādyaṃ rūpam asti yena te kāraṇair dugdhādibhir janyāḥ syuḥ /

If the Effects (Products) in the shape of Curd and the rest exist wholly in their entirety i.e. in their mature and properly differentiated character, regarding their specific taste, potency and consequences, in the essence of their Causes. Milk and the rest, then, as they would be already existent, what of their form would be there that would have to be produced, i.e. for the purpose whereof they would have to be produced by such causes as Milk and the rest? The compound ‘hetvādisadṛśātmanām’ is to be analysed as ‘those whose essence is exactly like the Cause, etc.’;

hetvādisadṛśa ātmā yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ /

the ‘Cause’ here stands for the Primordial Matter; the ‘etc.’ stands for the Sentience;

etena kāryakāraṇabhāvaprasaṅgasādhanaṃ pramāṇadvayaṃ sūcitaṃ // sāmprataṃ spuṭameva pramānayannāha hetujanyam ityādi /

and certainly the fully matured Effects being thus circumstanced, what is meant is the fully developed form of the Effects, which, thus, cannot be produced again. This indicates the two Reasonings that go to demolish any such permanent relation as that between Cause and Effect.

hetujanyaṃ na tatkāryaṃ sattāto hetuvittivat / ato nābhimato heturasādhyatvāt parātmavat //

(A) The said effect cannot be produced by the cause, because it already exists, like the cause and the spirit. (B) Thus also what is postulated cannot be the cause, because there is nothing that can be brought about by it, just like the other thing.

hetuḥ pradhānaṃ lokaprasiddhaṃ ca kṣīrādi /

‘Hetu’, ‘Cause’, stands for Primordial Matter, and also the common things, Milk and the like;

tat kāryam iti / mahadādi lokaprasiddhaṃ ca dadhyādi /

‘Tat kāryam’, ‘the said effect’, stands for the Cosmic Intelligence, etc. (products, according to the Sāṃkhya, of Primordial Matter), as also the common things, Curd and the like;

sattāta iti / sattvāt /

‘Sattātaḥ’, means ‘became it already exists’;

hetuvittivad iti / hetuḥ pradhānaṃ lokaprasiddhaṃ ca kṣīrādi /

‘hetu-vitti-vat’, ‘like the Cause and the Spirit’, ‘Cause’ stands for Primordial Matter and also for the common things, Milk and the like;

vittiḥ caitanyaṃ /

‘vitti’, ‘Spirit’, stands for the Sentient Faculty;

tābhyāṃ tulyaṃ vartata iti hetuvittivat / prayogaḥ yat sarvākāreṇa san na tat kenacij janyaṃ yathā prakṛtiś caitanyaṃ vā /

and what is like these two is ‘like the Cause and the Spirit The argument may be thus formulated That which is existent in its entirety cannot be produced by anything, as, for instance, Primordial Matter and Spirit.;

sad eva ca kāryaṃ madhyāvasthāyāṃ / sac ca sarvātmanā paramatena dadhyādīti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ /

and the Effect in its mature state is already existent (ex hypothesi), according to the opinion of our Opponent the Curd and the Products are already existent; hence (if these were held as to be produced) it would involve the contingency of going against a universal law.

na vānaikāntikatāhetoḥ /

Nor can the reason (probans) here put forward be regarded as not true, inadmissible;

anutpādyātiśayasyāpi janyatve sarveṣāṃ janyatvaprasaṅgo 'navasthāprasaṅgaśca bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ /

because, if what cannot be produced in any form were regarded as producible, then all things would have to be regarded as producible, and this would lead to a regressus ad infinitum, which would nullify the Opponent’s proposition;

janitasyāpi punar janyatvaprasaṅgāt /

and it would also involve the further absurdity of the producibility of what has already been produced.

evaṃ tāvat kāryatvābhimatānām akāryatvaprasaṅgāpādanaṃ kṛtaṃ / idānīṃ kāraṇābhimatānām akāraṇatvaprasaṅgāpādanaṃ kurvannāha ato nābhimata ityādi /

So far the Author has shown that what are regarded (by the Sāṃkhya) as ‘Effects’ cannot really be ‘Effects’ or ‘Products’; now he proceeds to show that what are regarded as ‘Causes’ cannot really be ‘Causes’ ‘Thus also what is postulated, etc? ‘Postulated’, i.e. the Entity posited.

tenāyam artho bhavati / mūlaprakṛtyādir bījadugdhādiścābhimataḥ padārtho vivakṣitasya mahadāder dadhyādeś ca na hetuḥ /

What is meant is as follows: Primordial Matter, and also the Seed, Milk and other common things, which have been postulated as the ‘Cause’ of such intended effects as Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, as also Curd and other common products, cannot be the cause of these latter, that is, it is not capable of being treated as the producer;

janakavyavahārayogyo na prāpnotītyāthaḥ /

as a matter of fact, there is nothing that can be brought about by the said entity;

asādhyatvāt nāsya sādhyamastītyasādhyas tadbhāvas tatvaṃ / etaccānantaroktāt kāryatvapratiṣedhāt siddhaṃ /

and as the said entity has this character, it cannot be regarded as the ‘Cause’, That this is so follows from what has been said (in the first half of the Text), regarding the effects in question being not effects at all;

ata evāta ityuktaṃ /

it is for this reason that the Text has used the term ‘ataḥ’, ‘thus’.

parātmavad iti / anyasvabhāvavat / akāraṇābhimatapadārthasvabhāvavad ity arthaḥ /

‘Parātmavat’, ‘Just like the other things’, i.e. like the thing with a different character, i.e. like the entity which has not been posited as a Cause;

na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣa iti vacanāt / prayogaḥ yadavidyamānasādhyaṃ na tat kāraṇaṃ yathā caitanyaṃ / [p.26] avidyamānasādhyaścābhimataḥ padārtha iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /

the entity that has not been posited as the Cause is the Spirit, as declared (in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, 3) ‘The Spirit is neither productive nor product This argument may be formulated as follows: That for which there is nothing to be brought about cannot be a Cause, e.g. the Spirit; the entity postulated (as Cause) is one for which there is nothing to be brought about;

etac ca dvayam api prasaṅgasādhanamato nobhayasiddhodāharaṇena kiñcit /

hence there is no need for putting forward only such corroborative examples as are accepted by both parties.

yastu manyate sāṅkyaḥ puruṣasyāpi pratibimbodayānyāyena bhogaṃ prati kartṛtvam astīti /

There is a party among Sāṃkhyas who hold the view that “The Spirit also is also a doer (a Cause) in regard to his own experiences, on the analogy of the Reflection [which, though not of the Reflecting Substance, is yet attributed to it;

taṃ pratyevaṃ vyākhyā / paraścāsāvātmā ca mukta ity arthaḥ /

As against this party, the explanation of the Text would be as follows: The term ‘parātma’ stands for the ‘Para-ātmā’, the Liberated Spirit;

tasya hi muktatvād bhogaṃ pratyapi kartṛtvaṃ nāstīti nodāharaṇāsiddhiḥ //

as such a Spirit would be liberated, he could not be the doer (Cause) in regard to Experience. Hence (even so) there is nothing wrong with the corroborative instance cited in the Text.

athetyādinā paramate hetvorasiddhimāśaṅkate athāstyatiśayaḥ kaścid abhivyaktyādilakṣaṇaḥ / yaṃ hetavaḥ prakurvāṇā na yānti vacanaīyatāṃ //

It might be urged that “there is some peculiar feature, something in the shape of manifestation and the like, by producing which, causes might cease to be defamed (as futile)”. The Author, in the following text, indicates (on behalf of the Sāṃkhya) the fallacy of ‘Inadmissibility’ in the argument just put up by himself [see verse 19 above]

tatra yadi prathamo hetuḥ sarvātmanābhivyaktyādirūpeṇāpi sattvāditi sarviśeṣaṇaḥ kriyate tadā na siddhyati / nahyasmābhirabhivyaktyādirūpeṇāpi sattvamiṣyate kāryasya /

[The Sāṃkhya may argue as follows: ] “If, in your first argument, you mean your premiss to be in the fully qualified form ‘because it already exists in its entirety, even along with such features as being manifest and the rest’, then the premiss is ‘Untrue’, ‘Inadmissible’; because we do not regard the Effect as existing along with all such features as being manifested and the like;

kiṃ tarhi śaktirūpeṇa /

we regard it as existing only in the form of a potency (in the Cause).

atha sāmānyena nirviśeṣaṇas tadānaikāntikaḥ yasmād abhivyaktyādilakṣaṇasyātiśayasyotpadyamānatvāt na sarvasya kāryatvaprasaṅgo bhaviṣyati /

If, on the other hand, you mean your premiss to be in general form, without the said qualification, then it is ‘Inconclusive’; because such peculiar features as manifestation and the like are actually produced (even under our theory). Nor does our theory involve the absurdity of all things being Effects (produced).

ata eva dvitīyo 'pi hetur asiddhaḥ sādhyasya vidyamānatvāt /

For the same reason, the second reason put forward by you is also ‘not true’, ‘Inadmissible’, as there is something to be brought about, produced.

abhivyaktyādilakṣaṇa iti / ādiśabdenodrekādyavasthāviśeṣaparigrahaḥ /

This is what is meant by the phrase ‘Something in the shape of Manifestation and the like’; the expression ‘and the like’ is meant to include such peculiar conditions as Growth, etc.

yamiti atiśayaṃ / vacanīyatām iti vācyatāṃ /

‘Which’ (in the Text) stands for the ‘peculiar feature’, ‘To be defamed’, blamed.

nābhimato hetur asādhyatvādityādir doṣo na bhavatīti yāvat //

if, however, it did not exist previously, then, being- non-existent, how could it be produced out of the causes? (20)

prāgāsīdityādinā pratividhatte

The Author answers the above arguments in the following [see verse 20 above]

tatra vikalpadvayaṃ kadācidasāvatiśayo 'bhivyaktyādyavasthātaḥ prāk prakṛtyavasthāyām apyāsīd vā na vā yadyāsīt tadā bhavadbhir dvayor api hetvor na kiñcidasiddhatvādikamuktamuttaraṃ no cetprāgāsīdevam api so 'tiśayaḥ kathaṃtebhyo hetubhyaḥ prādurbhāvamaśnuvīta asadakāraṇāditi bhavatāṃ nyāyān nayukta etadityabhiprāyaḥ //

There can be only two alternatives: (1) This ‘peculiar feature’ that has been spoken of, existed already, in its pristine state of Primordial Matter, prior to the condition of ‘manifestation’ and the rest, or (2) it did not so exist. If it did exist, then you have not succeeded in showing the invalidity (inadmissibility) of the two Reasons put forward by us, and thus answering them. If, on the other hand, it did not exist previously, then, even so, how could that ‘peculiar feature secure its production from the said ‘Causes’? As your argument is that what is non-existent cannot be produced, such production cannot be right;

evaṃ tāvat sadakaraṇādityayaṃ hetuḥ samarthitaḥ /

such is the sense of the Text.

nātaḥ sādhyaṃ samastīti nopādānaparigrahaḥ / niyatādapi no janma na ca śaktir na ca kriyā //

For the same reason, if there is nothing to be produced, there would be no ‘recourse to the cause’, nor would there be any production out of even a specific cause, nor would there be any ‘efficiency’, nor any ‘operation’ (of the cause).

yathoktyā nītyā sādhyasyābhāvād upādānaparigraho na prāpnoti tat sādhyaphalavāñchāyaiva teṣāṃ prekṣāvadbhiḥ parigrahāt / [p.27] niyatādeva kṣīrāder dadhyādīnāṃ janmetyetadapi na prāpnoti sādhyasyāsambhavād eva /

As in accordance with the said reasoning, the Effect to be brought about would (according to the Sāṃhhya) be already in existence [read ‘Sādhyasya bhāvāt’], ‘recourse to Cause’ would not be possible; as intelligent persons have recourse to a cause only for the purpose of something that could be brought about by that Cause. Nor would it be necessary that particular Effects, like Curd and the rest, must proceed only from particular causes;

etacca sarvasambhavābhāvādityetasya samarthanaṃ / tathā hi sarvasmāt sambhavābhāva eva niyatājjanmetyucyate tac ca satkāryavādapakṣe sādhyābhāvān na yujyate /

This supports the (parodied) argument ‘Because all things are not possible’, What is meant is that when the Sāṅkhya asserts that ‘an Effect cannot be produced from all causes’, what he means is that ‘a particular Effect can be produced only from a particular Cause This is not possible under the Sāṃkhya theory of the Effect being already existent;

tathā śaktasyeti śakyakaraṇam ityetad api dvayaṃ na yujyate /

as, under this theory, there would be nothing to be produced, Similarly as regards the argument that ‘an efficient Cause can produce only that for which it is effiicent’, neither ‘efficiency’ nor ‘the production of that for which it is efficient’ is possible under the Sāṃkhya theory;

sādhyasyābhāvādeva /

for the very same reason that there is nothing to be produced (under the theory).

yadi hi kenacitkiñcidabhinirvartyeta tadā nirvartakasya śaktir vyavasthāpyate / nivartyasya ca karaṇaṃ sidhyet /

If anything were produced by another thing, then alone could one admit the ‘efficiency’ of the latterng, which could then be accepted as the ‘Cause’ of that which would be produced;

nānyathā taddarśayati na ca śaktir na ca kriyeti // kāraṇābhāvo 'pi padārthānāṃ na yuktaḥ sādhyābhāvād eva /

not otherwise. This is what is meant by the words Nor would there be ‘efficiency’, nor any ‘operation of the Cause’, (21)

sarvātmanā ca niṣpatter na kāryamiha kiñcana /

Inasmuch as every effect, is already there in its entirety, there can be nothing ‘to be produced’ (an effect);

kāraṇavyapadeśo 'pi tasmānnaivopapadyate //

consequently, the very name ‘cause’ cannot be logical.

etac ca kāraṇābhāvād ityetasya hetoḥ samarthanaṃ /

This is said in support of the argument (the last one in the parodied Sāṃkhyakārikā) ‘Because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause’.

nacaivaṃ bhavati tasmān na satkāryamiti sarvahetuṣu prasaṅgapratyayo yojyaḥ // bhūyaḥ prakārāntareṇa satkāryavādaṃ dūṣayannāha sarvaṃ cetyādi /

But it is not (i.e. the name ‘Cause’ is not illogical). Hence the Effect cannot be regarded as existent; this conclusion has to be construed with all the (five) arguments set forth above.

sarvaṃ ca sādhanaṃ vṛttaṃ viparyāsanivartakaṃ / niścayotpādakaṃ cedaṃ na tathā yuktisaṅgataṃ //

All Means (of Cognition), when operative, serve to set aside Wrong Cognition and to produce Definitely Certain Cognition; this would not be compatible with reason (under the Sāṃkhya theory).

vṛttam iti /

‘Operative’ active.

viparyāsagrahaṇena saṃśayo 'pi gṛhyate tasyobhayāṃśāvalmbenāropakatvasambhavāt /

‘Wrong Cognition’ includes also Doubtful Cognition, as it partakes of both the contraries (affirmation and denial), and hence is as much an ‘imposition’ (as Wrong Cognition).

sarvam eva svaviṣayaṃ pravṛttaṃ dvayaṃ karoti / prameyārthaviṣaye pravṛttau saṃśayaviparyāsau nivartayati niścayaṃ ca tadviṣayamutpādayati /

As a matter of fact, every Means (of Cognition), when operating on its objective, does two things: it sets aside Misconception and Doubt relating to the object of Cognition, and produces a definitely Certain Cognition relating to it.

tadetat satkāryavāde yuktyā na saṅgacchate //

This fact cannot be compatible with reason, under the Sāṃkhya theory of the ‘Existent Effect’.

na sandehaviparyāso nivarttyau sarvadā sthiteḥ /

The doubt and the misconception cannot be set aside, as they would be always there.

nāpi niścayajanmāsti tata eva vṛthākhilaṃ //

nor is the producing op definitely certain cognition possible, for the very same reason.

tathā hi sandehaviparyāsau bhavatāṃ matena caitanyātmakau vā syātāṃ buddhimanaḥsvabhāvau vā /

[It is not compatible] because, as regards Misconception and Doubt, both of these, under your theory, would be of the nature of either Sentience (Consciousness, Spirit) or Cosmic Intelligence and Mind;

pakṣadvaye 'pi na tayor nivṛttiḥ sambhavati / caitanyabuddhimanasāṃ nityatvena tayor api nityatvāt /

in either case any setting aside of these would be impossible, because Spirit, Cosmic Intelligence and Mind, all these being eternal (constant), Misconception and Doubt also would be constant.

nāpi niścayotpattiḥ sādhanāt sambhavati /

Nor would the production of Definitely Certain Cognition be possible through any Means;

tata eva sarvadā sthiteḥ kāraṇāt /

for the same reason, i.e. because it is always there (ex hypothesi).

tasmād yadetatsādhanamuktam bhavatā tadakhilaṃ sarvam eva vṛthā /

From all this it follows that all that you have said in support of your doctrine is entirely futile.

etena svacanavirodha udbhāvito bhavati /

What tins hints at is that the Sāṃkhya -doctrine involves self-contradiction;

tathā hi niścayotpādanāya sādhanaṃ bruvatā niścayasyāsata utpattiraṅgīkṛtā bhavet /

for instance, when the Sāṃkhya speaks of the means of producing a definitely Certain Cognition, it implies the producing of the Definite Cognition which has not been there;

[p.28] satkāryamiti ca pratijñayā sā niṣiddheti svacanavyāghātaḥ //

and this is contrary to the assertion that ‘the Effect is existent’; so there is clear self-contradiction.

athāpi niścayo 'bhūtassamutpadyeta sādhanāt / nanu tenaiva sarve 'mī bhaveyur vyabhicāriṇaḥ //

If, on the other hand, (it be held that) the definite cognition that would be produced would be one that has not been there, then, this one instance (of the effect being non-existent) would invalidate all those reasons (that have been set forth by the sāṃkhya).

atha mābhūt sādhanaprayogavaiyarthyam iti / niścayo 'bhūto 'sanneva sādhanād utpadyata ityaṅgīkriyate /

If, in order to avoid the futility of the reasons, it be admitted that the Definite Cognition that is produced from the Means is one that did not exist before, then, in that case, the entire set of reasonings ‘Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. etc.’ (Sāṃkhyakārikā, 9), becomes invalidated;

evaṃ tarhi asadakaraṇādityāder hetuguṇasya samastasyaivānaikāntikatā prāpnoti niścayavadasato 'pyutpattyavirodhāt / tataś ca yathā niścayasyāsato 'pi karaṇaṃ tanniṣpattaye ca yathā viśiṣṭasādhanaparigrahaḥ yathā ca tasya na sarvasmāt sādhanābhāsādeḥ sambhavaḥ yathā cāsāvasannapi śaktair hetubhiḥ kriyate tatra ca yathā hetūnāṃ kāraṇabhāvo 'sti tathānyatrāpi bhaviṣyati // avyakto vyaktibhāktebhya iti cedvyaktirasya kā /

similarly, just as there is production of the non-existent Definite Cognition, and the securing of the particular Means for the said production, and as there is no possibility of the said Definite Cognition being produced from all sorts of Means (Wrong, Doubtful and the like), and as even though non-existent, the Definite Cognition is brought about by only such means as are efficient for that purpose, and just as these Means have the nature of the ‘Cause’, so exactly could it be also in every other case [and the Premiss of the Sāṃkhya would thus become annulled]. If it be held that “the effect, which has been unmanifested (latent, in the cause), acquires manifestation through the causes”, then (the question is) what is this manifestation of the effect? it cannot consist in'the appearance (production) of a peculiarity in its nature;

na rūpātiśayotpattir avibhāgād asaṅgateḥ //

because of non-differentiation and non-connection.

athāpi syādyadyapi prāksādhanaprayogāt sanneva niścayaḥ tathāpi na sādhanavaiyarthyaṃ yataḥ prāganabhivyakto 'sau paścātebhyaḥ sādhanebhyo 'bhivyaktimāsādayati /

The Sāṃkhya may argue thus “Though, even prior to the operation of its Means, the Definite Cognition is already in existence, yet the Means (Cause) is not futile; because prior to the operation of the Cause, the Cognition was unmanifested (lying latent in the Cause), and subsequently (to the operation), it acquires mamfestation through that cause;

tasmād abhivyaktyarthaṃ sādhanāni vyāpriyanta iti nānarthakyameṣām iti /

hence what the Cause operates for is the manifestation (of the latent Effect); and so there is no futility.”

tadetad ayuktaṃ /

This however cannot be right;

vyakter asiddhatvāt tathā hi vyaktiḥ svabhāvātiśayotpattir vā bhavet yad vā tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tadupalambhāvaraṇāpagamo vā /

because there can be no such ‘manifestation’, This ‘manifestation’ consists either (a) in the appearance of some peculiarity in the nature of the Effect, or (b) in the apprehension of the peculiarity, or (c) in the disappearance of what has been obstructing the apprehension of the peculiarity.

tatra tāvat svabhāvātiśayotpattiḥ /

It cannot consist in the appearance of some peculiarity in its nature;

tathā hi asau svabhāvātiśayo niścayasvarūpādapṛthagbhūto vā pṛghagbhūtovā / yadyapṛthagbhūtas tadā tasya niścayādavibhāgād apṛthaktvānniścayasvarūpavat sarvadaivāvasthiter notpattir yuktā /

because would this ‘peculiarity in its nature’ be non-distinct from the Effect [Definite Cognition in the case in question], or distinct from it? If it were non-distinct, then, inasmuch as there would be non-differentiation from the Definite Cognition (Effect), it would be as constant as the form of the Definite Cognition itself;

atha pṛthagbhūtaḥ evam api tasyāsāvitī sambandhānupapattiḥ / tathā hi ādhārādheyalakṣaṇo vā sambandho bhavet janyajanakabhāvalakṣaṇo vā /

If, on the other hand, the ‘peculiarity’ is something distinct from the Effect (Definite Cognition) itself, even so, there could be no such connection (or relationship) as ‘this is a peculiarity of that’, Because any such connection (between the Effect and its Peculiarity) could only be either one of ‘container and contained’ or of ‘Cause and Effect’ (Producer and Product).

na tāvadādyāḥ parasparānupakāryopakārakayos tadasambhavāt / upakāre vā tasyāpyupakārasya vyatirekitve sambandhāsiddher anavasthāprasaṅgāt /

because the two factors concerned not rendering any help to one another, the said relation of ‘Container and Contained’ is not possible; even if there were any help rendered, if that Help were something distinct from the two factors, then the Connection itself could not be there;

avyatirekitve ca sādhanaprayogavaiyarthyaṃ /

so that there would be an infinite regress.

niścayād evopakārāvyatiriktasyātiśayasyotpatteḥ /

as the Definite Cognition (Effect) itself would have brought about the ‘Peculiarity’, which, ex hypothesis is not-distinct from the said Help.

amūrtatvāccātiśayasyādhaḥprasarpaṇāsambhavān na tasya kaścid ādhāro yuktaḥ adhogatipratibandhakatvenādhārasya vyavasthānāt /

Then again, the ‘Peculiarity’ being something incorporeal, it would not be possible for it to fall downwards, and as such, it would not need a ‘container’ (or receptacle, support), because a ‘receptacle’ can only serve the purpose of preventing this downward fall (due to gravity).

nāpi janyajanakabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sarvadaiva niścayākhyasya kāraṇasya sannihitatvān nityam atiśayotpattiprasaṅgāt /

Nor is the relation of ‘Cause and Effect’ possible (between the Effect and its ‘Peculiarity’); because the Cause in the shape of the Definite Cognition being always there, it would be possible for the peculiarity to be produced always, which is absurd.

na ca sādhanaprayogāpekṣayā niścayātiśayotpādakatvaṃ yuktaṃ /

Nor would it be right to hold that the production of the Peculiarity by the Definite Cognition would be dependent upon the actual operation of the Cause.

anupakāriṇyapekṣānupapatteḥ /

Because there can be no dependence upon what renders no help;

[p.29] upakāritve vā pūrvavaddoṣo 'navasthā ca /

and if there is help rendered, then the theory becomes open to the objection and infinite regress urged above.

apica yo 'sāvatiśayaḥ pṛthagbhūtaḥ kriyate sa kimasannāhosvitsannti vikalpadvayamatrāpyavataratyeva /

Further, this Peculiarity that is held to be produced as something distinct, is it existent or non-existent (prior to the operation of the Cause)? These two horns of the dilemma present themselves here also.

tatrāsatve pūrvavat sādhanānām anaikāntikatāpattiḥ /

If the Peculiarity is something non-existent, then, as urged above, all the reasons (put forward by the Sāṃkhya) become invalidated.

satve ca sādhanavaiyarthyaṃ /

If, on the other hand, it has been existent, then there is no use for the Cause.

tatrāpyabhivyaktāviṣyamāṇāyāṃ keyam abhivyaktirityanavasthāprasaṅgo durnirvāraḥ /

If in regard to the Manifestation also, a further ‘manifestation’ were postulated, there would be nothing to prevent the infinite regress as to what this further ‘manifestation’ is and so forth.

tasmād vyatirekapakṣe 'pyasaṅgater asambandhān na rūpātiśayotpattir yujyate //

Thus, even on the alternative of the two being distinct, there would be ‘non-connection’; and as there would be no connection (relationship), any production of ‘peculiarity’ in the nature of the Effect would not be possible.

na tadviṣayasaṃvittir nopalambhāvṛtikṣayaḥ /

The ‘Manifestation’ of the Effect cannot consist in its Apprehension; nor in the removal of what was obstructing its Apprehension;

nityatvād upalambhasya dvitīyasyāpyasambhavāt //

because the Apprehension is a constant factor, and also because there is no possibility of a second (Apprehension).

nāpi tadviṣayajñānotpattilakṣaṇābhivyaktir yuktā nityatvāt tadviṣayāyāḥ saṃvitteḥ /

It cannot be right to regard the ‘manifestation’ (of the Effect) as consisting in the appearance of the cognition of the Effect; because the Cognition of the Effect is a constant factor.

tathā hi yāsau tadviṣayā saṃvittiḥ sā bhavataḥ satkāryavādino matena nityaiveti kiṃ tasya utpādyaṃ syāt / dvitīyasyopalambhasyāsambhavācca na tadviṣayajñānotpattilakṣaṇābhivyaktiryuktā /

For instance, this cognition of the Effect must, under the theory of the upholder of the theory of the Effect being existent, be something eternal; under the circumstance what of it would be there which would be produced? Also because no second apprehension is possible, the Manifestation of the Effect cannot consist in the appearance of the Cognition of that Effect.

apiśabdaḥ samuccaye bhinnakramaś ca asambhavād ityasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ /

and it has to be construed apart from its place in the text; it should be taken as after the word ‘asambhavāt’, (i.e. at the end of the sentence).

tenaitad uktaṃ bhavati / ekaiva bhavatāṃ matena saṃvit āsargapralayādekā buddhir iti siddhāntāt saiva ca niścayaḥ tatra ko 'paras tadupalambho 'bhivyāktyākhyo 'sti yaḥ sādhanaiḥ kriyeta /

So that the sense comes to be as follows: According to your view, Cognition (Consciousness) is one only, your doctrine being that from Creation down to Dissolution, there is only one Consciousness; and it is this same Consciousness that constitutes Definite Cognition; apart from this then, what other ‘apprehension’ is there which would be styled ‘manifestation’, and which would be produced by Causes?

syād etat na buddhisvabhāvā tadviṣayasaṃvittiḥ kiṃ tarhi / manaḥsvabhāveti /

The following might be urged here (by the Sāṃkhya) “The Apprehension of an object is not of the nature of ‘Buddhi’ (Consciousness), it is of the nature of ‘Manas’, ‘Mind’”.

tadasamyak buddhirupalabdhir adhyavasāyo manaḥsaṃvittir ityādīnām arthāntaratvāt /

because all these terms ‘Buddhi’ (Intelligence), ‘Upalabdhi’ (Apprehension), ‘Adhyavasāya’ (Determinate Cognition), ‘Manas’ (Mind), ‘Saṃvitti’ (Knowledge) and so forth, are synonymous.

etac ca paścānnivedayiṣyate /

This is going to be explained later on.

nāpi tadviṣayopalambhāvaraṇakṣayalakṣaṇābhivyaktiḥ ata eva kāraṇadvayāt /

Nor can ‘Manifestation’ of the Effect consist in the ‘removal of what has been obstructing its apprehension’; for the same two reasons.

tathā hi yattadupalambhāvaraṇaṃ tasya nityatvān na kṣayaḥ sambhavati /

For instance, ‘that which has been obstructing its apprehension’ being something eternal (ex hypoihesi), no ‘removal’ of it is possible.

nāpi tirobhāvalakṣaṇaḥ yuktaḥ atyaktapūrvarūpasya tirobhāvāsambhavāt /

It is not possible for this ‘removal’ to be in the nature of ‘disappearance’; because until the thing has renounced its previous form, it cannot ‘disappear

dvitīyasya copalambhasyāsambhavānnopalambhāvaraṇam asti /

Further, ‘because there is no possibility of a second apprehension’, there can be no obstacle to apprehension;

nahyasata āvaraṇam yuktaṃ vastusadviṣayatvāt tasya /

as there can be no obstruction (concealment) of what is non-existent, because what is ‘obstructed’ is always something that is existent.