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cs	other	N/A	Svaz uspěl s návrhem na zvýšení pokut za přestupky proti občanskému soužití [Svaz měst a obcí České republiky] Svaz uspěl s návrhem na zvýšení pokut za přestupky proti občanskému soužití Svaz měst a obcí České republiky oslovil poslance a poslankyně Ústavně právního výboru Poslanecké sněmovny projednávající novelu nového trestního kodexu a souvisejících zákonů s návrhem na zvýšení sankcí za přestupky proti občanskému soužití. Důvodem bylo sladění koncepčního přístupu k ochraně priorit jako život, zdraví a osobní integrita v přestupkovém zákoně s novým trestním zákonem, který tyto hodnoty staví do popředí. V zákoně o přestupcích byly tyto hodnoty opomíjeny, když pokuty za nejčastěji projednávané přestupky dle § 49 odst. 1 písm. c) zákona o přestupcích činily od data schválení zákona v roce 1990 až doposud maximálně 3.000 Kč, jakkoliv je zmíněným ustanovením chráněno např. zdraví, osobní svoboda nebo soukromí občanů. Podle návrhu Svazu by pokuta měla nadále činit až 20.000 Kč. Návrh Svazu si osvojila poslankyně a místopředsedkyně výboru JUDr. Eva Dundáčková a podpořil jej i předseda výboru Marek Benda, výbor pak návrh jednomyslně schválil a zařadil jej do komplexního pozměňovacího návrhu, kterým výbor napravil legislativně-technické nedostatky původního návrhu novely trestního kodexu. Bude-li novela ve znění komplexního pozměňovacího návrhu schválena Poslaneckou sněmovnou a následně i Senátem, bude již od 1. ledna 2010 možné sankcionovat pachatele přestupků proti občanskému soužití adekvátnějšími pokutami, než tomu bylo doposud. U přestupků proti občanskému soužití spáchaných formou urážky nebo uvedením v posměch dle § 49 odst. 1 písm. a) zákona o přestupcích, které se projednávají pouze na návrh postižené osoby (nikoliv z moci úřední), se sankce zvyšuje z 1.000 Kč na 5.000 Kč. U přestupků dle § 49 odst. 1 písm. b) zákona o přestupcích (ublížení na zdraví z nedbalosti) a přestupků dle § 49 odst. 1 písm. c) zákona o přestupcích (hrubá jednání, mj. drobné ublížení na zdraví) se jedná o zvýšení z 3.000 Kč na 20.000 Kč. U „diskriminačních“ deliktů dle § 49 odst. 1 písm. d) zákona o přestupcích (omezování výkonu práv příslušníků národnostních menšin) a § 49 odst. 1 písm. e) zákona o přestupcích (působení újmy pro příslušnost k menšině, stavu, názoru, vyznání apod.) jde o zvýšení z 5.000 Kč opět na 20.000 Kč. Výše sankcí byla projednána s Ministerstvem vnitra ČR jako gestorem zákona o přestupcích; podrobné zdůvodnění změn naleznete v obecné a zvláštní části odůvodnění svazového pozměňovacího návrhu zde. Podstatné je především zvýšení sankcí dle § 49 odst. 1 písm. c) zákona o přestupcích, dle kterého jsou postihovány i různé formy ublížení na zdraví nebo vyhrožování, vydírání, domácí násilí a řada deliktů hraničících svou závažností s trestnými činy, tedy nikoliv pouze sousedské naschvály a jiné bagatelní přestupky. Nadále by již sankce za vážné delikty neměly být pouze symbolické, ale sankční rozmezí by mělo umožnit přiměřeně postihovat i vážná porušení zákona, aby jejich oběti neměly pocit, že kvalifikací protiprávního jednání za přestupek pachatel postihu de facto unikl.
de	caselaw	Switzerland	Bundesgericht Tribunal fédéral Tribunale federale Tribunal federal {T 0/2} 9C_521/2012 Urteil vom 17. Januar 2013 II. sozialrechtliche Abteilung Besetzung Bundesrichter Kernen, Präsident, Bundesrichter Meyer, Bundesrichterin Glanzmann, Gerichtsschreiberin Dormann. Verfahrensbeteiligte IV-Stelle des Kantons St. Gallen, Brauerstrasse 54, 9016 St. Gallen, Beschwerdeführerin, gegen H._, vertreten durch Rechtsanwalt Robert Baumann, Beschwerdegegnerin. Gegenstand Invalidenversicherung (Invalidenrente), Beschwerde gegen den Entscheid des Versicherungsgerichts des Kantons St. Gallen vom 11. Juni 2012. Sachverhalt: A. Die 1960 geborene H._ meldete sich im März 2001 bei der Invalidenversicherung zum Leistungsbezug an. Mit Verfügungen vom 15. Juni 2007 sprach ihr die IV-Stelle des Kantons St. Gallen eine halbe Invalidenrente ab 1. Februar 2005 zu. Nach einem ersten Beschwerdeverfahren, weiteren Abklärungen und Durchführung des Vorbescheidverfahrens ermittelte sie einen Invaliditätsgrad von 53 % und bestätigte mit Verfügung vom 26. Juli 2010 den Anspruch auf eine halbe Invalidenrente ab 1. Februar 2005. B. Mit Beschwerde beantragte H._ spätestens ab 1. September 2000 eine ganze Invalidenrente; die IV-Stelle ersuchte um Feststellung, dass die Versicherte keinen Rentenanspruch habe. In teilweiser Gutheissung des Rechtsmittels sprach das Versicherungsgericht des Kantons St. Gallen der Versicherten mit Entscheid vom 11. Juni 2012 eine halbe Invalidenrente ab 1. Februar 2004 zu. C. Die IV-Stelle führt Beschwerde in öffentlich-rechtlichen Angelegenheiten mit dem Antrag, in Aufhebung des Entscheides vom 11. Juni 2012 sei festzustellen, dass die Versicherte keinen Rentenanspruch habe. H._ lässt auf Abweisung der Beschwerde schliessen. Das kantonale Gericht und das Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen verzichten auf eine Stellungnahme. Erwägungen: 1. 1.1 Die IV-Stelle ist zur Beschwerde legitimiert, auch wenn sie mit der Verfügung vom 26. Juli 2010 den Anspruch auf eine (Teil-)Rente noch bejahte (BGE 138 V 339 E. 2 S. 340 ff.). 1.2 Mit der Beschwerde in öffentlich-rechtlichen Angelegenheiten kann unter anderem die Verletzung von Bundesrecht gerügt werden (Art. 95 lit. a BGG). Die Feststellung des Sachverhalts kann nur gerügt werden, wenn sie offensichtlich unrichtig ist oder auf einer Rechtsverletzung im Sinne von Artikel 95 beruht und wenn die Behebung des Mangels für den Ausgang des Verfahrens entscheidend sein kann (Art. 97 Abs. 1 BGG). Das Bundesgericht legt seinem Urteil den Sachverhalt zu Grunde, den die Vorinstanz festgestellt hat (Art. 105 Abs. 1 BGG). Es kann die Sachverhaltsfeststellung der Vorinstanz von Amtes wegen berichtigen oder ergänzen, wenn sie offensichtlich unrichtig ist oder auf einer Rechtsverletzung im Sinne von Artikel 95 beruht (Art. 105 Abs. 2 BGG). 2. Die Vorinstanz hat dem Gutachten der MEDAS vom 20. November 2009 in Bezug auf sowohl den medizinischen Sachverhalt als auch die Arbeitsfähigkeitsschätzung Beweiskraft beigemessen. Gestützt darauf hat sie festgestellt, mit dem "Dazukommen des psychiatrischen Leidens" im Februar 2004 habe sich eine Einschränkung der Arbeitsfähigkeit für eine adaptierte Tätigkeit von 50 % ergeben. Dies führte nach ihrer Auffassung zu einer Erwerbsunfähigkeit im Umfang von 55 resp. 57,5 % und folglich zum Anspruch auf eine halbe Invalidenrente. Den Rentenbeginn hat sie auf den gleichen Zeitpunkt gelegt, weil die Versicherte während des Wartejahres (Art. 29 Abs. 1 lit. b IVG in der bis 31. Dezember 2007 geltenden resp. Art. 28 Abs. 1 lit. b IVG in der seither geltenden Fassung) in der angestammten Tätigkeit vollständig arbeitsunfähig gewesen sei. Streitig und zu prüfen ist lediglich die (Rechts-)Frage, ob das psychische Leiden der Beschwerdegegnerin mit Blick auf die Rechtsprechung von BGE 130 V 352 eine auch rechtlich relevante Einschränkung der Arbeitsfähigkeit bewirkt (zur Abgrenzung von Tat- und Rechtsfragen BGE 137 V 64 E. 1.2 S. 65 f.). 3.1 3.1.1 Somatoforme Schmerzstörungen und ähnliche aetiologisch-pathogenetisch unerklärliche syndromale Leidenszustände vermögen in der Regel keine lang dauernde, zu einer Invalidität im Sinne von Art. 4 Abs. 1 IVG führende Einschränkung der Arbeitsfähigkeit zu bewirken (BGE 136 V 279 E. 3 S. 280 ff.; 130 V 352 E. 2.2.2 und 2.2.3 S. 353 f.; 132 V 65; 131 V 49; 130 V 396). Die - nur in Ausnahmefällen anzunehmende - Unzumutbarkeit eines Wiedereinstiegs in den Arbeitsprozess setzt das Vorliegen einer mitwirkenden, psychisch ausgewiesenen Komorbidität von erheblicher Schwere, Intensität, Ausprägung und Dauer oder aber das Vorhandensein anderer qualifizierter, mit gewisser Intensität und Konstanz erfüllter Kriterien wie chronische körperliche Begleiterkrankungen und mehrjähriger Krankheitsverlauf bei unveränderter oder progredienter Symptomatik ohne längerfristige Remission, ein ausgewiesener sozialer Rückzug in allen Belangen des Lebens, ein verfestigter, therapeutisch nicht mehr angehbarer innerseelischer Verlauf einer an sich missglückten, psychisch aber entlastenden Konfliktbewältigung (primärer Krankheitsgewinn) oder schliesslich unbefriedigende Behandlungsergebnisse trotz konsequent durchgeführter Behandlungsbemühungen (auch mit unterschiedlichem therapeutischem Ansatz) und gescheiterte Rehabilitationsmassnahmen bei vorhandener Motivation und Eigenanstrengung der versicherten Person voraus (BGE 130 V 352 E. 2.2.3 S. 354 f.). Je mehr dieser Kriterien zutreffen und je ausgeprägter sich die entsprechenden Befunde darstellen, desto eher sind die Voraussetzungen für eine zumutbare Willensanstrengung zu verneinen (BGE 137 V 64 E. 4.1 S. 67 f.; 131 V 49 E. 1.2 S. 50 f. mit Hinweisen). 3.1.2 Auch wenn eine invalidisierende Wirkung einer mittelschweren depressiven Störung nicht von vornherein auszuschliessen ist, bedingt deren Annahme jedenfalls, dass es sich dabei nicht bloss um die Begleiterscheinung einer Schmerzkrankheit handelt (vgl. in Bezug auf mittelgradige depressive Episoden Urteil 9C_736/2011 vom 7. Februar 2012 E.4.2.2.1 mit Hinweisen), sondern um ein selbstständiges, vom psychogenen Schmerzsyndrom losgelöstes depressives Leiden (Urteil 9C_869/2011 vom 18. April 2012 E. 4.5; SVR 2008 IV Nr. 1 S. 1, I 176/06 E. 5.2). Fehlt es daran, ist nach der Rechtsprechung in der Regel keine invalidisierende Wirkung des Gesundheitsschadens anzunehmen (BGE 137 V 64; 130 V 352). 3.1.2 Auch wenn eine invalidisierende Wirkung einer mittelschweren depressiven Störung nicht von vornherein auszuschliessen ist, bedingt deren Annahme jedenfalls, dass es sich dabei nicht bloss um die Begleiterscheinung einer Schmerzkrankheit handelt (vgl. in Bezug auf mittelgradige depressive Episoden Urteil 9C_736/2011 vom 7. Februar 2012 E.4.2.2.1 mit Hinweisen), sondern um ein selbstständiges, vom psychogenen Schmerzsyndrom losgelöstes depressives Leiden (Urteil 9C_869/2011 vom 18. April 2012 E. 4.5; SVR 2008 IV Nr. 1 S. 1, I 176/06 E. 5.2). Fehlt es daran, ist nach der Rechtsprechung in der Regel keine invalidisierende Wirkung des Gesundheitsschadens anzunehmen (BGE 137 V 64; 130 V 352). 3.2 3.2.1 Für die Beurteilung der Arbeits(un)fähigkeit stützt sich die Verwaltung und im Beschwerdefall das Gericht auf Unterlagen, die von ärztlichen und gegebenenfalls auch anderen Fachleuten zur Verfügung zu stellen sind. Aufgabe des Arztes oder der Ärztin ist es, den Gesundheitszustand zu beurteilen und dazu Stellung zu nehmen, in welchem Umfang und bezüglich welcher Tätigkeiten die versicherte Person arbeitsunfähig ist. Hinsichtlich des Beweiswertes eines Arztberichtes ist entscheidend, ob dieser für die streitigen Belange umfassend ist, auf allseitigen Untersuchungen beruht, auch die geklagten Beschwerden berücksichtigt, in Kenntnis der Vorakten (Anamnese) abgegeben worden ist, in der Beurteilung der medizinischen Zusammenhänge sowie der medizinischen Situation einleuchtet und ob die Schlussfolgerungen der Experten begründet sind (BGE 134 V 231 E. 5.1 S. 232; 125 V 351 E. 3a S. 352 mit Hinweis). 3.2.2 Im Rahmen der freien Beweiswürdigung (Art. 61 lit. c ATSG [SR 830.1]) darf sich die Verwaltung - und im Streitfall das Gericht - weder über die (den beweisrechtlichen Anforderungen genügenden) medizinischen Tatsachenfeststellungen hinwegsetzen noch sich die ärztlichen Einschätzungen und Schlussfolgerungen zur (Rest-)Arbeitsfähigkeit unbesehen ihrer konkreten sozialversicherungsrechtlichen Relevanz und Tragweite zu eigen machen. Die rechtsanwendenden Behörden haben diesfalls mit besonderer Sorgfalt zu prüfen, ob die ärztliche Einschätzung der Arbeitsunfähigkeit auch invaliditätsfremde Gesichtspunkte (insbesondere psychosoziale und soziokulturelle Belastungsfaktoren) mitberücksichtigt, die vom sozialversicherungsrechtlichen Standpunkt aus unbeachtlich sind (vgl. BGE 130 V 352 E. 2.2.5 S. 355 f.; 127 V 294 E. 5a S. 299; SVR 2012 IV Nr. 22 S. 95, 8C_302/2011 E. 2.5.1). Wo psychosoziale Einflüsse das Bild prägen, ist bei der Annahme einer rentenbegründenden Invalidität Zurückhaltung geboten (vgl. BGE 127 V 294 E. 5a S. 299; Urteile 9C_2010/2012 vom 9. Juli 2012 E. 3.3.2; 9C_1041/2010 vom 30. März 2011 E. 5.1). 4. 4.1 Im Gutachten der MEDAS vom 20. November 2009 wurden folgende Diagnosen mit Einfluss auf die Arbeitsfähigkeit gestellt: "- Mittelgradige depressive Störung mit somatischem Syndrom bei verschiedenen psychosozialen Belastungen - Chronisches cervicocephales Syndrom mit vielen vegetativen Begleitbeschwerden - Funktionelle Beschwerden an beiden Armen und Händen mit Schwächegefühlen und Hyposensibilitätsgefühl im linken Arm - Status nach handchirurgischem Eingriff wegen Tenovaginitis der Daumenbeugersehne 05/00 und der Zeigefingerbeugersehne 03/01 sowie erneut 04/02 mit subjektiver Krafteinbusse, objektiv normale Beweglichkeit der genannten Finger". Das kantonale Gericht hat dementsprechend zutreffend (E. 1) festgestellt, dass im massgeblichen Zeitraum psychische Faktoren im Vordergrund gestanden hätten. Ebenso trifft der vorinstanzliche Hinweis, eine depressive Störung stelle "indessen keinen pathogenetisch (ätiologisch) unklaren syndromalen Zustand dar, bei welchem die Rechtsprechung zu den somatoformen Schmerzstörungen zur Anwendung gelangen würde", im Grundsatz zu (SVR 2012 IV Nr. 22 S. 95, 8C_302/2011 E. 2.4). Die Vorinstanz hat aber nicht festgestellt, dass die von den MEDAS-Experten attestierte Arbeitsunfähigkeit im Wesentlichen lediglich auf dem depressiven Leiden beruhen soll, und eine solche Feststellung wäre auch nicht haltbar (E. 1.2), zumal dies in klarem Widerspruch zur oben erwähnten Diagnoseliste stände (vgl. dazu auch E. 4.2). Soweit das kantonale Gericht angenommen zu haben scheint, die Anwendbarkeit der Rechtsprechung gemäss E. 3.1.1 sei aufgrund der diagnostizierten Depression von vornherein ausgeschlossen, kann ihm nicht beigepflichtet werden. 4.2 Aus den medizinischen Unterlagen, insbesondere dem MEDAS-Gutachten vom 20. November 2009, geht hervor, dass die gesundheitlichen Probleme der Versicherten in erheblichem Ausmass mit Eintritt des Handleidens im September 1999 ihren Anfang nahmen. Nachdem zwischen Mai 2000 und April 2002 handchirurgische Eingriffe erfolgten, verblieben ihr an Armen und Händen funktionelle Beschwerden und reaktive Schmerzen, für die kein somatisches Korrelat vorliegt. Die als cervicocephales Syndrom diagnostizierten Kopf- und Nackenschmerzen sind gemäss Angaben der Versicherten - allerdings vorerst ohne nachhaltigen Einfluss auf die Arbeitsfähigkeit - bereits seit ca. 1981 vorhanden und scheinen sich ab Ende 2003 verstärkt zu haben; auch sie liessen sich indessen - trotz diesbezüglich gezielter Untersuchungen - nicht durch entsprechende Befunde objektivieren. Unter diesen Umständen ist klar von einem psychischen, syndromalen (Schmerz-)Leiden auszugehen, welches an den Vorgaben gemäss E. 3.1.1 zu messen ist (BGE 137 V 64 E. 4.3 S. 69). 4.3 Infolge einer beruflichen Abklärung wurde für angepasste Tätigkeiten - d.h. "bei körperlich und die Hände nur leichter belastenden" Arbeiten - eine uneingeschränkte Arbeitsfähigkeit attestiert (Schlussbericht BEFAS vom 7. Oktober 2002). Ab Februar 2004 begab sich die Versicherte in psychiatrische Behandlung, wo erstmals eine depressive Störung festgestellt wurde. Zur Frage, ob es sich bei dieser um einen Begleitumstand des syndromalen (Schmerz-)Leidens oder um eine davon losgelöste, selbstständige depressive Beeinträchtigung handelt (E. 3.1.2), äusserten sich die MEDAS-Experten in den Gutachten vom 13. April 2006 und vom 20. November 2009 weder explizit noch indirekt. Aus dem Umstand, dass die MEDAS-Gutachter 2006 eine depressive Störung ohne, 2009 hingegen mit somatischem Syndrom diagnostizierten, lässt sich nichts ableiten, lag doch laut verbindlicher (E. 1.2) vorinstanzlicher Feststellung bei der zweiten Untersuchung ein weitgehend unveränderter Zustand vor. In den medizinischen Unterlagen finden sich indessen klare Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass die Diagnosen in engem Zusammenhang stehen: Symptome einer Depression wurden erstmals mit dem Bericht der behandelnden Psychiaterin vom 19. Februar 2004 aktenkundig, nachdem das Verfahren bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt ausschliesslich von der Handproblematik geprägt war, obwohl die Versicherte nach eigenen Angaben bereits seit Jahren unter Kopfschmerzen gelitten hatte. Deren Verschlimmerung scheint gleichzeitig mit der depressiven Entwicklung eingesetzt zu haben. Zudem scheinen sowohl die Depression als auch die weiteren psychiatrischen Diagnosen weitgehend auf sozialen Problemen und somit grundsätzlich invaliditätsfremden Faktoren zu beruhen: So liess die Versicherte im Schreiben an die IV-Stelle vom 19. Februar 2004 darauf hinweisen, dass zur gesundheitlichen Verschlechterung "insbesondere auch die sehr schwierige finanzielle Situation beigetragen" habe, was die behandelnde Psychiaterin im Bericht vom 6. Juni 2004 bestätigte. Diese verwies zudem auf die Überforderung der alleinerziehenden Mutter durch die Erziehung des Sohnes und dessen schulische Probleme (Berichte vom 8. September 2007 und 4. September 2009). Der psychiatrische MEDAS-Experte nannte Aspekte wie "intellektuelle Leistungsfähigkeit, Schulbildung, Scheidung, schwieriges Einzelkind, Rolle der alleinerziehenden Mutter, wenig integriert, kulturelle Eigenschaften"; in Bezug auf die Prognose hielten die Gutachter Faktoren wie "Emigrationsproblematik, bescheidene Deutsch- und Schulkenntnisse, vieljährige Arbeitsabstinenz, starke Selbstlimitierung, schwierige soziale Verhältnisse und subjektive Krankheitsüberzeugung" für bedeutsam. Unter diesen Umständen wäre selbst dann, wenn ein selbstständiges depressives Leiden vorläge, dafür im konkreten Fall nicht von einer sozialversicherungsrechtlich relevanten Einschränkung der Arbeitsfähigkeit auszugehen (Urteil 9C_210/2012 vom 9. Juli 2012 E. 4.2 mit Hinweisen), zumal in den MEDAS-Gutachten auch nicht ansatzweise dargelegt wurde und auch sonst nicht nachvollziehbar ist (vgl. E. 3.2.1), weshalb trotz Ausklammerung der genannten Gegebenheiten eine Arbeitsunfähigkeit von 50 % resultieren sollte. 4.4 Was die Morbiditätskriterien gemäss E. 3.1.1 anbelangt, lassen sich die fehlenden vorinstanzlichen Feststellungen ergänzen (E. 1.2). Die Depression als allfällige psychische Komorbidität bewirkt nach dem Gesagten keine relevante Einschränkung der Arbeitsfähigkeit. Es liegt auch keine erhebliche körperliche Begleiterkrankung vor, zumal es an einem somatischen Korrelat für das syndromale Leiden fehlt (vgl. Urteile 9C_540/2012 vom 17. Dezember 2012 E. 3.3.2; 9C_709/2009 vom 14. Dezember 2009 E. 4.1). Gemäss MEDAS-Gutachten vom 20. November 2009 berichtete die Versicherte von regelmässigen Kontakten mit der Schwester und deren Familie sowie mit einer Nachbarsfamilie; ein sozialer Rückzug in allen Belangen ist daher auszuschliessen. Laut psychiatrischem Gutachten fand die Beschwerdegegnerin durch ihre Krankheit "eine Rolle im Helfernetz". Damit ist klar ein rechtlich unbeachtlicher sekundärer Krankheitsgewinn (BGE 130 V 352 E. 3.3.2 S. 359) erstellt. Zwar liegt ein mehrjähriger Krankheitsverlauf mit unbefriedigenden Behandlungsergebnissen vor, aber immerhin empfahlen die Gutachter die Fortführung der psychiatrischen Behandlung. Bei der erforderlichen Gesamtbetrachtung dieser Tatsachen gibt es keine hinreichenden Gründe, dem syndromalen psychischen Leiden ausnahmsweise invalidisierende Wirkung beizumessen. Die Beschwerde ist begründet. 5. Mit diesem Ergebnis wird die Beschwerdegegnerin schlechter gestellt als mit der Verfügung vom 26. Juli 2010. Ein Verfahren nach Art. 61 lit. d Satz 2 ATSG ist nicht aktenkundig. Die Sache ist daher zu dessen Durchführung an die Vorinstanz zurückzuweisen (BGE 138 V 339 E. 2.3.2.2 und E. 6 S. 343). 6. Dem Ausgang des Verfahrens entsprechend hat die Beschwerdegegnerin die Gerichtskosten zu tragen (Art. 66 Abs. 1 BGG). Demnach erkennt das Bundesgericht: 1. Die Beschwerde wird im Sinne der Erwägungen gutgeheissen. Der Entscheid des Versicherungsgerichts des Kantons St. Gallen vom 11. Juni 2012 wird aufgehoben und die Sache an die Vorinstanz zurückgewiesen, damit sie im Sinne von E. 5 verfahre. 2. Die Gerichtskosten von Fr. 500.- werden der Beschwerdegegnerin auferlegt. 3. Dieses Urteil wird den Parteien, dem Versicherungsgericht des Kantons St. Gallen und dem Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen schriftlich mitgeteilt. Luzern, 17. Januar 2013 Im Namen der II. sozialrechtlichen Abteilung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts Der Präsident: Kernen Die Gerichtsschreiberin: Dormann
el	legislation	EU	Επίσημη Εφημερίδα τών Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων 83 377R2058 'Αριθ . N 239/ 16 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα τών Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων 17.9.77 ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 2058/77 ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ τής 16ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1977 περί τών λεπτομερειών έφαρμογής τοϋ κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 1621 /77 «περί τής μεταφο ράς στόν ιταλικό όργανισμό παρεμβάσεως αποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος εις κόνιν άπό τούς όργανισμούς παρεμβάσεως άλλων Κρατών μελών» H ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΩΝ, ποποιήθηκε τελευταία άπό τόν κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 1 825/77 (5) καί τοΰ κανονισμοΰ (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 443/77 τής Έχοντας υπόψη : Έπιτροπής τής 2ας Μαρτίου 1977 περί τής πωλήσεως σέ ορισμένη τιμή άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν τή συνθήκη περί ίδρύσεως τής Εύρωπαϊκής Οικονομι πού προορίζεται γιά τή διατροφή χοίρων καί πουλερι κής Κοινότητος, κών καί περί τροποποιήσεως τών κανονισμών (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 1687/76 καί (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 368/77 (6)· τόν κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 804/68 τοΰ Συμβουλίου τής 27ης 'Ιουνίου 1968 περί κοινής όργανώσεως άγοράς ότι ό ιταλικός οργανισμός παρεμβάσεως πρέπει νά στόν τομέα τοΰ γάλακτος καί τών γαλακτοκομικών πληροφορείται ταχύτατα τή γεωγραφική θέση καί τίς προϊόντων ί1), όπως τροποποιήθηκε τελευταία άπό τόν διαθέσιμες ποσότητες τοΰ έν λόγω προϊόντος· δτι αύτές κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 559/76 (2), καί ιδίως τό άρθρο 7 οί ίδιες πληροφορίες, δπως καί αύτές πού άφοροΰν τή παράγραφος 5, τό άρθρο 10 παράγραφος 3 καί τό άρθρο γεωγραφική θέση τών τόπων άποθηκεύσεως στήν ' Ιτα 28 , λία , πρέπει νά διαβιβάζονται στήν Έπιτροπή , ίδίως γιά νά τής επιτρέψουν νά έκτιμήσει τίς οικονομικές έπι τόν κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 1621 / 77 τοΰ Συμβουλίου πτώσεις αύτής τής διαβιβάσεως· τής 18ης 'Ιουλίου 1977 περί τής μεταφοράς στόν ιτα λικό οργανισμό παρεμβάσεως άποκορυφωμένου γάλα δτι , γιά τήν άναζήτηση τών πλέον οίκονομικών μέσων κτος εις κόνιν άπό τούς οργανισμούς παρεμβάσεως άλ γιά τήν πραγματοποίηση αύτής τής πράξεως, ένδείκνυ λων Κρατών μελών (3), καί ιδίως τό άρθρο 1 παράγρα ται ή προσφυγή σέ διαδικασία δημοπρασίας γιά τή φος 2, μεταφορά τοΰ άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος εις κόνιν στήν 'Ιταλία· Εκτιμώντας: ότι λόγω τοΰ είδικοΰ σκοποΰ αύτής τής μεταφοράς ότι , σύμφωνα μέ τόν κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 1621 /77, άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν , πρέπει νά έξαι έτέθησαν στή διάθεση τοΰ ίταλικοΰ όργανισμοΰ πα ρεθει ή πώλησή του άπό τήν έφαρμογή τοΰ κανονισμοΰ ρεμβάσεως 20000 τόννοι άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 2054/ 76 τής Έπιτροπής τής 19ης Αύγου είς κόνιν, τό όποιο κατεϊχον οί όργανισμοί παρεμβά στου 1976 περί τής πωλήσεως γιά έξαγωγή στίς τρίτες σεως τών άλλων Κρατών μελών δτι πρέπει νά καθο χώρες άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν άπό τούς ρισθοΰν οί λεπτομέρειες τής έφαρμογής αύτοΰ τοΰ οργανισμούς παρεμβάσεως πού προορίζεται γιά τή δια μέτρου· τροφή ζώων (7), όπως τροποποιήθηκε τελευταία άπό τόν κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 1 724/77 (®)* δτι, γιά τούς δτι πρέπει νά όρισθοΰν οί όργανισμοί παρεμβάσεως ίδιους λόγους, πρέπει νά προβλεφθούν οί είδικοί όροι πού είναι έπιφορτισμένοι μέ τή διάθεση τοΰ άποκορυ γιά τήν έφαρμογή τοΰ κανονισμοΰ (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 2213/76 φωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν σέ συνάρτηση μέ τίς δια τής Έπιτροπής τής 10ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1976 περί τής θεσιμότητές τους· δτι ό γαλλικός- οργανισμός παρεμ πωλήσεως άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν δημο βάσεως διαθέτει άποθέματα πού πληροΰν τούς όρους σίου άποθέματος (9), όπως τροποποιήθηκε άπό τόν κα ήλικίας, οί όποιοι έπιτρέπουν τήν πώληση άπό τόν νονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 920/77 (10)· ΐταλικό όργανισμό παρεμβάσεως βάσει τοΰ κανονι σμοΰ (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 368/77 τής Έπιτροπής τής 23ης Φε δτι κανένα νομισματικό έξισωτικό ποσό δέν έφαρμόζε βρουαρίου 1977 περί τής πωλήσεως διά δημοπρασίας ται σ' αύτή τή μεταφορά, σύμφωνα μέ τό άρθρο 2 δεύ άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος εις κόνιν πού προορίζεται γιά τή διατροφή χοίρων καί πουλερικών (4), δπως τρο (5) EE άριθ. N 203 τής 9.8.1977, σ. 20 (6) ΕΕ άριθ. N 58 τής 3.3.1977, σ. 16. O ΕΕ άριθ. N 148 τής 28.6.1968, σ. 13. O ΕΕ άριθ. N 228 τής 20.8.1976, σ. 17 (2) EE άριθ. N 67 τής 15.3.1976, σ. 9. (8) ΕΕ άριθ. N 189 τής 29.7.1977, σ. 41 . (3) ΕΕ άριθ. N 181 τής 21.7.1977, σ. 6. (9) ΕΕ άριθ. N 249 τής 11.9.1976, σ. 6. (4) ΕΕ άριθ. N 52 τής 24.2.1977, σ . 19. (10) ΕΕ άριθ. N 108 τής 29.4.1977, σ. 75 ---pagebreak--- 84 ' Επίσημη ' Εφημερίδα τών Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων τερη περίπτωση τού κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 1055/77 Άρθρο 2 του Συμβουλίου τής 17ης Μαΐου 1977 περί τής άποθε ματοποιήσεως καί τών μετακινήσεων τών προϊόντων 1 . Οί σάκκοι πού περιέχουν τό άποκορυφωμένο γάλα πού άγοράσθηκαν άπό οργανισμό παρεμβάσεως ()· ότι, εις κόνιν πού διετέθη άπό τούς προμηθευτές όργανι όσον άφορα τούς τρόπους άποστολής, έφαρμόζονται τά σμούς παρεμβάσεως φέρουν, μέ γράμματα μεγέθους άρθρα 2 καί 4 τοϋ κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 1722/77 τής τουλάχιστον ένός έκατοστού, την άκόλουθη ένδειξη : ' Επιτροπής τής 28ης 'Ιουλίου 1977 περί τών κοινών λεπτομερειών έφαρμόγής του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . «Destinato ail ' alimentazione degli animali». 1055/77, περί τής άποθεματοποιήσεως καί τών μετακι νήσεων τών προϊόντων πού άγοράσθηκαν άπό οργανι 2 . O ιταλικός όργανισμός παρεμβάσεως, άφού έ σμό παρεμβάσεως (2)· ξασφαλίσει τήν ποσότητα, ποιότητα καί τή συσκευα σία τού άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν, παραδί δτι τά μέτρα πού προβλέπονται στόν παρόντα κανονι δει τό έμπόρευμα πού είναι φορτωμένο σέ μεταφορικό σμό εϊναι σύμφωνα μέ τή γνώμη τής ' Επιτροπής Δια μέσο στό σημείο φορτώσεως τής άποθήκης άναχωρή χειρίσεως Γάλακτος καί Γαλακτοκομικών Προϊόντων, σεως τού οργανισμού παρεμβάσεως καί άναλαμβάνει τήν ευθύνη άπό αύτή τή στιγμή . ΕΞΕΔΩΣΕ ΤΟΝ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟ : 3 . Κατά τήν παραλαβή , παραδίδεται στόν άντιπρό σωπο τού ιταλικού όργανισμού παρεμβάσεως πιστο "Αρθρο 1 ποιητικό πού έχει συνταχθεί άπό τόν προμηθευτή όρ γανισμό παρεμβάσεως καί βεβαιώνει τή συμφωνία τού 1 . Σύμφωνα μέ τόν κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 16ΪΙ /Π, οί προϊόντος μέ τίς προδιαγραφές τού παραρτήματος τού όργανισμοί παρεμβάσεως πού άναφέρονται άνωτέρω κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 1108/68 . θέτουν στή διάθεση τού ιταλικού όργανισμού παρεμ βάσεως τίς άκόλουθες ποσότητες άποκορυφωμένου γά 4. Οί ιταλικές άρχές άναλαμβάνουν δλα τά έξοδα πού λακτος είς κόνιν, τό όποιο άγοράσθηκε σύμφωνα μέ τό προκύπτουν άμεσα ή έμμεσα άπό ύγειονομικούς έλέγ άρθρο 7 παράγραφος 1 τού κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) χους ή ελέγχους ποιότητος, πού πραγματοποιούνται άριθ. 804/68 : άπό αύτούς ή κατόπιν αίτήσεώς τους, άπό τίς άρμόδιες α) ό γαλλικός όργανισμός παρεμβάσεως: 10 000 τόν άρχές τών προμηθευτών Κρατών μελών. νους πού εισήλθαν στά άποθέματα πρίν άπό τήν 1η 5 . ' Τά Κράτη μέλη προμηθευτές θεσπίζουν τά ά 'Ιανουαρίου 1976· ναγκαια μέτρα, ώστε νά δύνανται νά πραγματοποιη β) ό οργανισμός παρεμβάσεως τού Λουξεμβούργου: θούν οί έλεγχοι πού προβλέπονται στήν παράγραφο 4 10 000 τόννους . πρίν άπό τήν παραλαβή τού έμπορεύματος άπό τόν ιταλικό οργανισμό παρεμβάσεως . 2 . Οί όργανισμοί παρεμβάσεως πού άναφέρονται στήν παράγραφο 1 φροντίζουν ώστε οί έν λόγω ποσό τητες νά είναι διαθέσιμες τήν 1η ' Οκτωβρίου 1977 "Αρθρο 3 ' Επιλέγουν τόπους άποθηκεύσεως, κατά προτίμηση με ταξύ τών τόπων τών πλησιεστέρων στή χώρα προορι 1 . Τό ποσό τών έξόδων μεταφοράς τού έν λόγω άπο σμού, σέ όσο τό δυνατό περισσότερο περιορισμένο κορυφωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν καθορίσθηκε άπό τόν άριθμό . ίταλικό οργανισμό παρεμβάσεως, μέ διαδικασία δημο πρασίας. 'Εντός προθεσμίας δώδεκα ήμερών άπό τής ενάρξεως τής ίσχύος τού παρόντος κανονισμού, άνακοινώνουν Αυτά τά έξοδα περιλαμβάνουν: στόν ίταλικό όργανισμό παρεμβάσεως καί στήν ' Επι τροπή τόν κατάλογο τών περιοχών άποθηκεύσεως . α) τή μεταφορά (έξαιρέσει τής φορτώσεως) άπό τό ση μείο φορτώσεως ΐής άποθήκης άναχωρήσεως μέχρι ' 3 . Ό ίταλικός όργανισμός παρεμβάσεως άνακοινώνει τό σημείο φορτώσεως τής άποθήκης προορισμού- στούς άλλους ένδιαφερομένους οργανισμούς παρεμβά β) τήν έκφόρτωση καί τήν τοποθέτηση στήν άποθήκη σεως καί στήν ' Επιτροπή , έντός προθεσμίας δώδεκα ήμερών άπό τής ένάρξεως τής ίσχύος τού παρόντος γ) τά έξοδα άσφαλίσεως πού καλύπτουν τήν άξία τού κανονισμού, τόν κατάλογο τών άποθηκών όπου θά έμπορεύματος, ή όποία έχει καθορισθεί άπό τήν άποθεματοποιηθεϊ τό άποκορυφωμένο γάλα είς κόνιν. τιμή παρεμβάσεως τού άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος εις κόνιν. 4 . "Οσον άφορα τίς άποθήκες όπου θά άποθεματο ποιηθεϊ, άπό τόν ίταλικό όργανισμό παρεμβάσεως, τό 2 . Ό ίταλικός όργανισμός παρεμβάσεως καθορίζει τίς άποκορυφωμένο γάλα εις κόνιν, έφαρμόζονται οί δια ρήτρες καί τούς όρους τής δημοπρασίας σύμφωνα μέ τάξεις τού άρθρου 3 τού κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . τίς διατάξεις τού παρόντος κανονισμού. Πρέπει νά 1 108/68 . προβλέπουν ίδίως τήν παροχή άσφαλείας πού έξασφα λίζει τήν καλή περάτωση τής δημοπρασίας . Έπί πλέον, πρέπει νά έξασφαλίζουν ίσότητα προσβά O ΕΕ άριθ. N 128 τής 24.5.1977, σ. 1 . σεως καί μεταχειρίσεως σέ κάθε ένδιαφερόμενο, (2) ΕΕ άριθ . N 189 τής 29.7.1977, σ. 36. όποιος καί &ν είναι ό τόπος τής έγκαταστάσεώς του ---pagebreak--- ' Επίσημη Εφημερίδα τών Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων 85 στήν Κοινότητα . Γιά τό σκοπό αυτό, ό ιταλικός όργα α) o κανονισμός (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 2054/76 δέν έφαρμόζεταν νισμός παρεμβάσεως άνακοινώνει στούς άλλους οργα θ) 10 000 τόννοι έχουν πωληθεί βάσει τών κανονισμών νισμούς παρεμβάσεως καί στήν Επιτροπή τό κείμενο (ΕΟΚ) άριθ. 368/77 ή (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 443/77 καί 10 000 τής προκηρύξεως τής δημοπρασίας στό όποιο πρέπει τόννοι βάσει τοΟ κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 2213/76* νά εχει γίνει άναφορά σέ σημείωση πού θά έχει δημο σιευθεί στήν 'Επίσημη 'Εφημερίδα τών Ευρωπαϊκών Κοι γ) ή πώληση βάσει του κανονισμού (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . νοτήτων τουλάχιστον όκτώ ήμέρες πρίν άπό τήν 2213/76 υπόκειται στούς άκόλουθους είδικούς όριακή ήμερομηνία πού θά έχει καθορισθεί άπό τόν όρους: ιταλικό οργανισμό παρεμβάσεως γιά τήν ύποβολή τών προσφορών . — τό άποκορυφωμένο γάλα είς κόνιν προορίζεται αποκλειστικά για μετουσίωση ή μεταποίηση σέ Οί προσφορές πού έχουν κατατεθεί στόν ιταλικό όργα σύνθετες τροφές σύμφωνα μέ τόν κανονισμό νισμό παρεμβάσεως έκτελούνται καί γίνονται δεκτές σέ (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 990/72 τής Επιτροπής τής 15ης Ιταλικές λιρέττες . Μαΐου 1972 (1), όπως τροποποιήθηκε τελευταία άπό τόν κανονισμό (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 920/77, 3 . Ή δημοπρασία κατακυρώνεται σέ έκεινον ή εκεί — ή πώληση περιορίζεται στήν άνώτατη ποσότητα νους άπό τούς προσφέροντες οί όποιοι προσέφεραν τών 200 τόννων κατά άγοραστή καί κατά μήνα, τούς καλύτερους όρους . — κατά τήν καταβολή τής τιμής άγορας, αύτή Έν τούτοις, έάν οί προσφορές κατά τή δημοπρασία δέν έλαττώνεται κατά τό ποσό τής ενισχύσεως πού άντιστοιχούν στίς τιμές καί τά έξοδα πού ισχύουν κα προβλέπεται στό άρθρο 10 τού κανονισμού νονικά, ή δημοπρασία άκυρώνεται . (ΕΟΚ) άριθ . 804/68 , — πρίν άπό τήν παραλαβή , ό άγοραστής παρέχει 4. Οί ιταλικές άρχές ένημερώνουν τήν ' Επιτροπή γιά άσφάλεια 42 λογιστικών μονάδων άνά 100 χι τήν εξέλιξη τών πράξεων τής δημοπρασίας, καί τής λιόγραμμα, έξασφαλίζοντας τή χρησιμοποίηση άνακοινώνουν άμέσως τά άποτελέσματα, καθώς καί τού άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν στό τούς οργανισμούς παρεμβάσεως, θέτοντας στή διά ιταλικό έδαφος γιά τούς σκοπούς πού άναφέρ θεσή τους τίς σχετικές ποσότητες. θηκαν στήν πρώτη περίπτωση . "Αρθρο 4 Ή πώληση άποκορυφωμένου γάλακτος είς κόνιν άπό "Άρθρο 5 τόν ίταλικό όργανισμό παρεμβάσεως, τό όποιο άποτε λει τό άντικείμενο τής μεταφοράς πού άναφέρεται στόν Ό παρών κανονισμός άρχίζει νά Ισχύει τήν τρίτη παρόντα κανονισμό , πραγματοποιείται ύπό τίς άκό ήμέρα άπό τή δημοσίευσή του στήν 'Επίσημη 'Εφημε λουθες προϋποθέσεις : ρίδα τών Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων. O παρών κανονισμός είναι δεσμευτικός ώς πρός δλα τά μέρη του καί ίσχύει άμεσα σέ κάθε Κράτος μέλος. Έγινε στίς Βρυξέλλες, στίς 16 Σεπτεμβρίου 1977. Γιά τήν 'Επιτροπή Finn GUNDELACH Ά ντιπρόεδρος O ΕΕ άριθ. N 115 τής 17.5.1972, σ. 1 .
en	wikipedia	N/A	On October 1, 2022, a tractor carrying pilgrims overturned and fell into a pond near Bhadeuna village in Kanpur district in Uttar Pradesh, India. 27 people died in the accident, while 9 others were injured. Most of the victims were women and children. After the incident, the Government of Uttar Pradesh banned the use of tractor-trolleys for traveling in the state. Background According to the 2019 annual report of India's Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Kanpur is the fifth-highest road accident fatalities and the highest crash severity in India. In September 2022, ten people died as a tractor-trolley carrying 47 fell into a pond in Itaunja town of Lucknow. Accident A tractor-trolley carrying 40 or 50 passengers was on to Ghatampur after attending a Mundan ceremony at the Chandrika Devi temple in Fatehpur. The tractor-trolley overturned and fell into a pond leading to the deaths of 27 people and many injured. The accident survivors alleged that the driver was drunk and speeding. The accident occurred near Bhadeuna village, in the Kanpur district, under the Saadh police station. Response Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President of India Droupadi Murmu and Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh Yogi Adityanath have expressed grief over the incident. The Indian government has announced an ex-gratia amount of 2 lakh each to the next of kin of the deceased and 50,000 for the injured. The Uttar Pradesh Police and district administration in the state ran a ten-day special drive against traveling in tractor-trolleys and other goods carriers. The government also issued a circular mentioning penalty of 10,000 for those who found using tractor-trolleys for traveling purposes. See also Traffic collisions in India References History of Uttar Pradesh (1947–present) 2010s in Uttar Pradesh Disasters in Uttar Pradesh Kanpur Nagar district 2022 road incidents 2022 disasters in India October 2022 events in India
pt	wikipedia	N/A	Chester Ellsworth Gillette (9 de agosto de 1883 – 30 de março de 1908), foi um assassino condenado americano, tornando-se a base para o personagem fictício Clyde Griffiths no romance de Theodore Dreiser, An American Tragedy, que por sua vez foi a base do filme de 1931 e de um de 1951 vencedor de um oscar com o nome de A Place in the Sun. Antecedentes Gillette nasceu em Montana, mas passou parte de sua infância em Spokane, Washington. Seus pais eram financeiramente confortáveis, mas profundamente religiosos, e, eventualmente, renunciaram a sua riqueza material para participar do Exército da Salvação. A família viajou ao redor da Costa Oeste e do Havaí durante sua adolescência. Chester frequentou a Oberlin College com ajuda de um tio rico, mas saiu depois de dois anos, em 1903. Após deixar a escola, trabalhou em diversos empregos até 1905, quando assumiu um cargo na fábrica de saias de um tio em Cortland, Nova Iorque. Assassinato de Grace Brown Na fábrica Gillette conheceu Grace Brown, outra funcionária. Gillette e Brown logo começaram uma relação sexual, com Brown acreditando que Gillette se casaria com ela. Na primavera de 1906, Brown revelou que estava grávida. Ela continuou a pressionar Gillette para casamento, escrevendo-lhe cartas pedindo frequentemente. Brown voltou para casa de seus pais por um tempo, mas voltou a Cortland quando ela descobriu que o Gillette namorava outras meninas. Uma crença popular apresentava uma senhorita chamada Harriet Bento, um conhecida rica de Gillette que os jornais especularam mais tarde como a "outra mulher" que havia feito Chester deixar Grace. Harriet acaloradamente negou isso, ao ponto de realizar um comunicado formal à imprensa afirmando: "Eu nunca me relacionei com Chester E. Gillette... nossa amizade foi de... curta duração e nenhuma palavra foi dita sobre estarmos noivos.” Como a primavera e o verão de 1906 em avanço, avançava, outros notaram um aumento da frequência em que Gillette levantava a voz e as recorrentes lágrimas de Brown na fábrica ou em casa. Brown continuou a pressionar Gillette para tomar uma decisão, enquanto que Gillette dava desculpas sobre uma viagem iminente. Por fim, a Gillette fez arranjos para uma viagem para Adirondack Mountains em Nova Iorque. O casal parou e permaneceu por uma noite em Utica, Nova York e, em seguida, foi para Big Moose Lake no Condado de Herkimer. Em um hotel próximo, Gillette registrou sob um nome falso (embora ele tenha usado suas próprias iniciais, para coincidir com o monograma em sua mala). Ele estava carregando uma mala e uma raquete de tênis. Brown neste ponto esperava algum tipo de fuga dos dois. Na manhã de 11 de julho, Gillette levou Brown em um barco a remo em Big Moose Lake, onde ele golpeou-a com sua raquete de tênis e deixou-a a se afogar. Ele voltou sozinho e deu baixa no hotel. Mais tarde, testemunhas diriam que a Gillette parecia calmo e perfeitamente à vontade, como se nada estivesse errado. O corpo ferido e espancado de Brown foi encontrado no fundo do lago no dia seguinte. Gillette tinha feito um mau trabalho de planejamento do encobrimento e foi rapidamente detido nas proximidades de Inlet, Nova York. Julgamento e execução O julgamento ocorreu no Condado de Herkimer e rapidamente chamou a atenção de todo o país. O advogado de defesa de Gillette alegou que seu cliente era inocente, que Brown havia cometido suicídio e que Gillette era um espectador impotente ao suicídio. O júri condenou Gillette por assassinato. O Tribunal de Apelações de Nova Iorque manteve o veredicto e Governador Charles Evans Hughes se recusou a conceder clemência. Em 30 de março de 1908, Chester Gillette morreu na cadeira elétrica na prisão de Auburn, Nova York. Anos recentes A série de televisão Unsolved Mysteries levou ao ar um episódio sobre o incidente histórico de Gillette e Brown, em janeiro de 1996. Em 2007, o diário de Gillette, que ele escreveu durante os últimos sete meses que passou na prisão, foi doado para a Hamilton College pela sobrinha-neta de Gillette. Além do diário, 12 cartas escritas por Gillette durante seu tempo na prisão também foram doados. Onze das cartas foram endereçadas a Bernice Ferrin, um amigo da família que se mudou para Auburn, Nova Iorque para ficar com a irmã de Gillette. A carta XII, uma carta de despedida escrita no dia antes de sua execução, foi dirigida à irmã de Gillette. O diário e as cartas foram publicados em dezembro de 2007, quase 100 anos depois da execução de Chester Gillette. Ligações externas Mortos em 1908 Naturais de Nova Iorque (cidade) Pessoas executadas na cadeira elétrica Criminosos dos Estados Unidos
en	caselaw	US	The appellant in this case, Angela Lombardo, on the 7th day of December, 1916, leased unto the appellee, The Clifford Brothers Company, a corporation, certain leasehold property in the City of Baltimore, known as 404 Colvin Street, for the term of five years from the date of the lease, at the monthly rental of twenty dollars payable in advance, with the provision that should the rent be ten days in arrears, the lessor should have the right to re-enter and take possession of the leased premises. The lease contained the further provision that the lessee should have the privilege or option of purchasing the leased property at any time during the tenancy at and for the sum of two thousand dollars; and should it exercise such option, it was therein covenanted by the lessor that she would convey the said property to the lessee free and clear of all liens and incumbrances. On the 12th day of June, 1920, the lessee filed its bill alleging therein that it had notified the defendant, Angela Lombardo, of its intention of exercising the privilege or option of purchasing the said leased property and had done all that was required of it to be entitled to have said property conveyed to it by the lessor, but she had refused to convey the same in accordance with the provisions of the lease. The defendant answered the bill, charging the plaintiff with having repeatedly defaulted in the provision of the lease in respect to the payment of rent within the time stipulated Page 34 therein, which she claimed rendered void "the further operation of the lease, including any right or option of purchase contained in said lease," and "that finally on the 27th day of April, 1920, the monthly installment of rent, due on the 1st day of April, 1920, remaining unpaid and being twenty-seven days over-due," she availed herself of said provision of the lease and notified the lessee of her intention to re-enter and take possession of the leased property; and that it was not until such notice was given that the lessee notified her of its intention to purchase said property under the provision contained in the lease; at which time she claims the plaintiff's right to purchase the leased property no longer existed, because of its said default and the action taken thereon by her. The plaintiff's right to the relief sought in this case depends altogether upon the question whether its right to purchase the leased property at the sum named in the lease was forfeited by it because of its failure, under the facts and circumstances shown in the record, to pay the rent covenanted to be paid within the time stipulated in the lease. The plaintiff corporation is engaged in the manufacture of candy and was so engaged at the time of the execution of the above mentioned lease of 404 Colvin Street. It was then occupying and using for said business purpose both 402 and 406 Colvin Street, and it was because of its location in respect to 402 and 406 that 404 Colvin Street became especially desirable to the plaintiff. The monthly payment of rent for the property so leased was regularly made, that is, within ten days after the same became due, until April, 1918, fifteen or more months after the lease became effective (unless there was a default in the payment of the January rent, 1918, which is not clear from the record), when the payment was made on the 16th for that month. The monthly payments thereafter were all made within the stipulated period with the following exceptions: The June and November payments of the year 1918 were Page 35 made on the 11th and 14th of those months respectively; the payments for February, July, August, October and December were made on the 13th, 18th, 12th, 13th and 20th of those months respectively; and the payment for March, 1920, on the 23rd of that month. The record also discloses that for other months the rent was paid in advance of the time of payment. A part payment for April, 1918, was paid on the 15th day of March and the rent for November, 1919, was paid on the 17th of October of that year. The lease is silent as to where the rent was to be paid and upon this question there is a conflict of evidence. The defendant and her son testified that, at the time of the execution of the lease, Frank J. Clifford, president of the plaintiff corporation, the only person present other than themselves, as claimed by them, stated that the rent would be mailed to the defendant, which they say was done for a number of months thereafter, after which time, the defendant, her son or daughter, would go to the plaintiff's place of business and there collect the rent. This they say they did because of the failure of the plaintiff to mail to the defendant the rent promptly when due, but Mr. Clifford emphatically denied that he ever made the statement that the rent would be mailed to her, and stated that it was mailed to her only on occasion when he was ill and not at his place of business, when the defendant, her son or daughter, called for it. At such times, a check would be brought to his home to be signed by him and, when so signed, was mailed to her. There were probably several other occasions when they called for the rent, that he told them he would mail them a check the next day, which was invariably done. Several of the employees of the plaintiff, including the secretary of the company, whose work was in the office of the company, fully corroborated Mr. Clifford in his statement that the rent was from the beginning of the tenancy paid to the defendant or those sent by her, when she or they called Page 36 for it, except on such occasions as those mentioned by Mr. Clifford. It is conceded by the defendant that after some months the rent was collected by her or those representing her at the plaintiff's place of business, and the only conflict of evidence is as to how or where the rent for the first part of the term was collected, and this we think is not at all important in the decision of this case. For if it were the understanding, as claimed by her, that the rent was to be mailed to her and was not so mailed to her, this requirement was waived by her because of her continuous conduct thereafter in going to the plaintiff's place of business and there collecting the rent, without making the slightest complaint to the plaintiff of its failure to pay the rent promptly when due, or of its failure to mail it to her, which she states the plaintiff was to do; nor did she at any time complain of the fact that she was required, as she says, to go to the plaintiff's place of business to collect the rent. She had received the rent for March, 1920, and the only month for which she had not been paid was the month of April following, and it was because of the plaintiff's failure to pay the rent for that month, and that month alone, within the stipulated period of the lease, that she sought to re-enter and take possession of the premises, and for this month, she neither called at the plaintiff's office to collect the rent therefor, nor did she in any other way ask for its payment, before attempting to re-enter and take possession of the leased premises because of said alleged breach of the lease, when she could have gotten it at any time after the same became due, as stated by the plaintiff and its witnesses. As said by this Court, speaking through JUDGE URNER in Wylie v. Kirby, 115 Md. 286, "It is an established doctrine that equity will grant relief from a forfeiture, where such condition is provided to secure the payment of money, as in the case of a right of re-entry for the non-payment of rent at the time designated in the lease. Carpenter v. Wilson, Page 37 100 Md. 22; City Bank of Baltimore v. Smith, 3 G. J. 280;Story's Equity Jur. (13th ed.) Secs. 1314 to 1316." We further said in that case, quoting from 1 Pomeroy's Eq.Jur. Sec. 453: "Where a lease contains a condition that the lessor may re-enter and put an end to the lessee's estate, or even that the lease shall be void, upon the lessee's failure to pay the rent at the time specified, it is well settled that a court of equity will relieve the lessee and set aside a forfeiture incurred by his breach of the condition, whether the lessor has or has not entered and dispossessed the tenant. This rule is based upon the notion that such condition and forfeiture are intended merely as a security for the payment of money." There is nothing in the record even to indicate that the condition of forfeiture was intended to serve any other purpose than that of a security for the payment of the rent at the time stated therein. It is shown that all the rent accruing to April, 1920, has been paid, and that a check for that month, as well as checks for all succeeding months, have been drawn and signed ready for delivery to the defendant upon her willingness to accept the same. The conduct of the defendant in her long course of dealing with the plaintiff was, we think, sufficient to have led the plaintiff to believe that prompt payment would not be insisted upon, and that it was not her intention to enforce a forfeiture because of the alleged breach of said condition of the lease, and therefore the defendant should not be permitted, without notice of her intention to do so, to enforce a forfeiture for a breach of said condition of the lease. 16 R.C.L. 652. The decree of the court below ordering and directing the defendant to convey said property to the plaintiff upon the payment to her of the sum of two thousand dollars, and the rent stipulated in the lease from the 1st day of April, 1920, to the date of the decree, will be affirmed. Decree affirmed, with costs. *Page 38
en	other	N/A	Digital - Tutors: Creating a High-Speed Camera Effect with After Effects » GFXHome \| Best CG / VFX Resources for Artists! GFXhome » Tutorials » 3D » Digital - Tutors: Creating a High-Speed Camera Effect with After Effects Date: 8-11-2014, 22:23 Digital - Tutors: Creating a High-Speed Camera Effect with After Effects Digital - Tutors: Creating a High-Speed Camera Effect with After EffectsSoftware used: After Effects CC 2014, Photoshop CC 2014 \| Project Files: Included \| 771 MBIn this series of After Effects tutorials, we'll go through the process of creating a high-speed camera effect using still images. We'll start by using Photoshop to deconstruct our photographs.We'll use various tools to separate our action pieces from the rest of the image and we'll repair any missing information in our backgrounds. Next, we'll pull in our layered Photoshop documents into After Effects as compositions. From there, we'll create the high-speed effects by animating our layers. And finally, we'll combine our clips into one composition and add some final touches to pull our composition together.Homepage:_www.digitaltutors.com/tutorial/1845-Creating-a-High-Speed-Camera-Effect-with-After-Effects Uploaded.nethttp://ul.to/mffggfdjhttp://ul.to/q60kgbb0http://ul.to/qvpjraidRapidgator.nethttp://rapidgator.net/file/075ebd4b49b92433f6cadfce6ef56856/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part1.rar.htmlhttp://rapidgator.net/file/f0e8578f5e3ee479230d9d1e5dc18b28/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part2.rar.htmlhttp://rapidgator.net/file/d9c6fb00761432a7743081ee4d4bfd2b/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part3.rar.htmlOboom.comhttps://www.oboom.com/5UW7NQH0/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part1.rarhttps://www.oboom.com/L7I8Q9FL/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part2.rarhttps://www.oboom.com/T1LCPTE3/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part3.rarXerver.cohttp://xerver.co/vuxj4f9abma1/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part1.rarhttp://xerver.co/g8hm7s5pga19/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part2.rarhttp://xerver.co/4ne81znvi9w2/DT_Creating_a_High-Speed_Camera_Effect_with_AE.part3.rar Site BBcode/HTML Code: Creating a High-Speed Camera Effect with After Effects CCDigital - Tutors: Creating a VFX Environment in MARI and NUKEDigital Tutors - Creating Robust After Effects Compositions in Photoshop Tutorial-kEISODigital - Tutors: Creating Robust After Effects Compositions in Photoshop
en	caselaw	US	17‐1612 United States v. Robinson UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of September, two thousand eighteen. PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., DENNIS JACOBS, GUIDO CALABRESI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, ‐v.‐ 17‐1612 JAMES ROBINSON, Defendant‐Appellant, BERNARD COUCH, JR., JONATHAN ANDERSON, Defendants. ____________________________________ 1 FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: Daniel A. McGuinness, Adam D. Perlmutter, Perlmutter & McGuinness, P.C., New York, NY. FOR APPELLEE: Nathan Rehn and Sarah K. Eddy, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Scheindlin, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. James Robinson was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Scheindlin, J.) of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1349. On appeal, Robinson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as well as certain evidentiary rulings. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 1. Robinson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy. Specifically, he claims that the only direct evidence of his intent to join the conspiracy was the testimony of a cooperating witness named Kenneth Nadolny, which (Robinson argues) the jury should have rejected on credibility grounds. The argument fails easily. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails if “any rational [jury] could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore we assess the evidence put before the jury by “draw[ing] all permissible inferences in favor of the government and resolv[ing] all issues of credibility in favor of the jury[‘s] verdict.” United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 139 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphases added). Our review is thus sharply circumscribed: “It is the province of the jury[,] and not of the court[,] to determine whether a witness who may have been inaccurate, contradictory and even untruthful in some respects was nonetheless entirely credible in the essentials of his testimony.” United States v. OʹConnor, 650 F.3d 839, 2 855 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we do not second‐guess a jury’s apparent decision to credit a witness’s testimony except in extreme cases where the testimony was “incredible as a matter of law,” meaning it was “incredible on its face” or it “def[ied] physical realities.” United States v. Truman, 688 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is not an extreme case. In arguing that Nadolny’s testimony was incredible as a matter of law, Robinson relies on an alleged lack of corroboration for some of Nadolny’s central assertions, his supposedly combative demeanor on the witness stand, and a single inconsistency. “The proper place for [such run‐of‐the‐mill] challenge[s] to a witness’s credibility is in cross‐examination and in subsequent argument to the jury, not in a” request for post‐ trial relief from a verdict. Truman, 688 F.3d at 139 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). In Truman, we declined to find a witness’s testimony incredible as a matter of law, despite substantially more pervasive indicia of unreliability: the witness had been highly combative, refusing to answer any questions on a key topic; his testimony had included various “inconsistencies”; his attorney had conceded “that he had perjured himself” in a related state court trial; and the government had “effective[ly] repudiat[ed]” his testimony. Id. at 139‐40. On top of that, he had breached a cooperation agreement with prosecutors and acknowledged his history of criminal activity and substance abuse. See id. at 139. We nonetheless vacated a grant of post‐trial relief that was based on the witness’s lack of credibility. No different result is warranted here; the jury’s verdict finds sufficient support in the record. 2. Robinson argues that the district court deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present a defense by prohibiting him (on hearsay grounds) from testifying about exculpatory out‐of‐court statements purportedly made by two of his co‐ conspirators. As to testimony about co‐conspirator Kenneth Foote, Robinson’s counsel did not contemporaneously offer a non‐hearsay basis for admitting the statements, but the court identified one sua sponte after the defense had rested. The court then invited counsel to recall his client to the stand in order to elicit the previously excluded testimony; but counsel declined the offer. Even assuming that the initial hearsay ruling was erroneous, Robinson’s claim fails because the court’s curative measures permitted Robinson to present his defense free of prejudice. District courts are empowered to “correct errors made in the course 3 of trial while [they] still ha[ve] the opportunity to do so.” United States v. Burger, 739 F.2d 805, 810 (2d Cir. 1984). This authority includes the “discretion to reopen a case after the defense has rested” so that previously excluded defense testimony can be admitted. Id. at 809‐10 (rejecting as “[un]persuasive” defendant’s claim that “the belated admission of [the] evidence” would have prejudiced his case and that a mistrial was required instead). An erroneous exclusion may be deemed cured even where, as here, the defense‐‐as a matter of trial strategy‐‐declined the court’s offer to reopen. See id. “We conclude that the district court’s offer to reopen the case was sufficient to render harmless its previous error in excluding [the] evidence,” as “the belated introduction of th[e] testimony [at issue] would not have been unfairly prejudicial.” Id. at 810. Robinson cannot use an appeal “to evade the consequences of an unsuccessful tactical decision.” United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir. 1991). Robinson also challenges the court’s exclusion of out‐of‐court statements purportedly made by another co‐conspirator, Nadolny. The court did not extend an offer to Robinson to retake the stand in order to introduce the previously excluded Nadolny statements. Again, Robinson’s counsel failed to offer a non‐hearsay basis for admitting the statements, either contemporaneously or during the colloquy concerning Foote’s statements and the court’s offer to reopen. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). Accordingly, any objection to the exclusion of the Nadolny statements was forfeited and our review is only for plain error. See United States v. Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir. 1995). Robinson cannot prevail under that exacting standard. “Th[e] [plain error] standard is met when (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellantʹs substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming that the exclusion was clearly erroneous, Robinson cannot establish that it “had a substantial and injurious effect . . . on the juryʹs verdict.” United States v. Groysman, 766 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, Robinson was permitted to introduce Nadolny’s out‐of‐court statements to make substantially the same point he now claims he was not permitted to make. Robinson contends on appeal that he was prohibited from offering statements made by 4 Nadolny that would have provided the jury an “innocent explanation” for why he accepted a stolen check from Nadolny. Appellant’s Br. 25. However, Robinson did provide the jury such an explanation when he testified that Nadolny had told him that the check was repayment for a loan and that the name on the check‐‐Undertone‐‐was Nadolny’s company. Robinson fails to identify any additional information that he would have adduced from Nadolny’s out‐of‐court statements on this point‐‐much less information that would have swayed the jury‐‐and no such information is apparent in the record. Robinson therefore fails to sustain his burden of establishing substantial prejudice from the exclusion. See United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he defendant . . . bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice [on plain error review].”). Finally, Robinson cannot establish that the jury’s verdict would have been different if he had been permitted to offer further testimony about his supposedly innocent receipt of the Nadolny check. Nadolny directly testified that Robinson was a knowing participant in the conspiracy, and the jury evidently credited that testimony. Even apart from Robinson’s handling of the Nadolny check, there was damning testimonial and documentary evidence of his criminal activities. Substantial evidence showed that Robinson, inter alia, created a forged letter to induce a bank to accept for deposit stolen Undertone checks, directed an associate to deposit additional stolen checks, and had regular contact with the other conspirators during the course of the scheme. On this record, we cannot say that the introduction of arguably cumulative evidence on a narrow point would have occasioned Robinson’s acquittal. We have considered Robinson’s remaining arguments‐‐including his contention that the court committed error by directing the invitation to reopen to Robinson’s counsel rather than to Robinson himself‐‐and find them to be without merit. See Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1997). For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 5
cs	legislation	EU	1.4.2006 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie L 94/26 NAŘÍZENÍ KOMISE (ES) č. 545/2006 ze dne 31. března 2006, kterým se mění nařízení (ES) č. 1464/2004, pokud jde o podmínky pro povolení doplňkové látky „Monteban“ náležející do skupiny kokcidiostatik a jiných léčebných látek (Text s významem pro EHP) KOMISE EVROPSKÝCH SPOLEČENSTVÍ, s ohledem na Smlouvu o založení Evropského společenství, s ohledem na nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1831/2003 ze dne 22. září 2003 o doplňkových látkách používaných ve výživě zvířat (1), a zejména na čl. 13 odst. 3 uvedeného nařízení, vzhledem k těmto důvodům: (1) Doplňková látka narasin (Monteban, Monteban G 100) náležející do skupiny kokcidiostatik a jiných léčebných látek byla povolena za určitých podmínek v souladu se směrnicí Rady 70/524/EHS (2). Nařízení Komise (ES) č. 1464/2004 (3) povolilo tuto doplňkovou látku na deset let k použití pro výkrm kuřat, přičemž povolení je vázáno na osobu odpovědnou za uvedení doplňkové látky do oběhu. Doplňková látka byla oznámena jako stávající produkt podle článku 10 nařízení (ES) č. 1831/2003. Jelikož veškeré informace požadované na základě tohoto ustanovení byly předloženy, uvedená doplňková látka byla zanesena do Registru doplňkových látek v krmivech Společenství. (2) Nařízení (ES) č. 1831/2003 stanoví možnost změny povolení doplňkové látky na základě žádosti držitele povolení a vyjádření Evropského úřadu pro bezpečnost potravin (dále jen „úřad“). (3) Ve stanovisku přijatém dne 27. července 2004 úřad navrhl stanovit maximální limit reziduí ve výši 50 μg/kg pro všechny vodnaté tkáně vykrmovaných kuřat, a v důsledku toho považovat jednodenní ochrannou lhůtu za dostatečnou. Může být nezbytné přezkoumat maximální limity reziduí uvedené v příloze tohoto nařízení s ohledem na výsledky hodnocení této účinné látky Evropskou agenturou pro léčivé přípravky. (4) Držitel povolení doplňkové látky narasin (Monteban, Monteban G 100) navrhl změnit podmínky povolení a předložil Komisi žádost o zavedení maximálního limitu reziduí doporučeného úřadem. (5) Nařízení (ES) č. 1464/2004 je tedy třeba odpovídajícím způsobem změnit. (6) Opatření stanovená tímto nařízením jsou v souladu se stanoviskem Stálého výboru pro potravinový řetězec a zdraví zvířat, PŘIJALA TOTO NAŘÍZENÍ: Článek 1 Příloha nařízení (ES) č. 1464/2004 se nahrazuje přílohou tohoto nařízení. Článek 2 Toto nařízení vstupuje v platnost dvacátým dnem po vyhlášení v Úředním věstníku Evropské unie. Toto nařízení je závazné v celém rozsahu a přímo použitelné ve všech členských státech. V Bruselu dne 31. března 2006. Za Komisi Markos KYPRIANOU člen Komise (1) Úř. věst. L 268, 18.10.2003, s. 29. Nařízení ve znění nařízení Komise (ES) č. 378/2005 (Úř. věst. L 59, 5.3.2005, s. 8). (2) Úř. věst. L 270, 14.12.1970, s. 1. Směrnice zrušená nařízením (ES) č. 1831/2003. (3) Úř. věst. L 270, 18.8.2004, s. 8. PŘÍLOHA Registrační číslo doplňkové látky Jméno a registrační číslo osoby odpovědné za uvedení doplňkové látky do oběhu Doplňková látka (obchodní název) Složení, chemický vzorec, popis Druh nebo kategorie zvířat Maximální stáří Min. obsah Max. obsah Jiná ustanovení Konec období povolení Maximální limity reziduí (MLR) v příslušných potravinách živočišného původu z dotčeného druhu nebo kategorie zvířat mg účinné látky/kg kompletního krmiva Kokcidiostatika a jiné léčebné látky „E 765 Eli Lilly and Company Limited narasin 100 g/kg (Monteban, Monteban G 100) Doplňková látka: narasin: 100 g účinné látky/kg sójový nebo minerální olej: 10–30 g/kg vermikulit: 0–20 g/kg sójové nebo rýžové slupky ad 1 kg Účinná látka: narasin: C43H72O11 Číslo CAS: 55134-13-9 polyetherická monokarboxylová kyselina produkovaná kmenem Streptomyces aureofaciens (NRRL 8092), v granulích Obsah narasinu A: ≥ 90 % výkrm kuřat — 60 70 Ochranná lhůta nejméně 1 den před porážkou. V návodu k použití musí být uvedeno: ‚Nebezpečné pro koňovité, krůty a králíky.‘ ‚Toto krmivo obsahuje ionofor: podávání této látky současně s některými léčebnými látkami (např. thiamulinem) může být kontraindikováno.‘ 21.8.2014 50 μg narasinu/kg všech vodnatých tkání vykrmovaných kuřat.“
es	other	N/A	Art. 295 Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Nación CPCC Artículo 295 (CPCCN) El recurso de inconstitucionalidad podrá interponerse contra las sentencias y resoluciones a las que - Legislación Argentina 2019 Inicio > Códigos > Código Procesal Civil y Comercial > Artículo 295 CPCC Artículo 295 Nacional El recurso de inconstitucionalidad podrá interponerse contra las sentencias y resoluciones a las que hace referencia el artículo 288 en los siguientes casos: Nacional Artículo 295 CPCCN Artículo 1 ...293 294 295 296 297 ...784
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Un évêque () est le dignitaire d'une Église chrétienne particulière ou d'un diocèse. La fonction d'évêque existe dans les Églises catholique et orthodoxe, ainsi que dans la Communion anglicane et dans certaines Églises protestantes. Dans chacune de ces Églises, l'évêque est consacré par un ou plusieurs évêques issus d'une chaîne d'ordonnateurs qui, théoriquement, remonte dans le temps jusqu'à l'un des apôtres du Christ. C'est ce que l'on appelle la succession apostolique, qui est revendiquée par l'ensemble de ces Églises. Dans le protestantisme et le christianisme évangélique, le ministère d'évêque est présent dans toutes les dénominations, souvent avec d'autres noms comme président du conseil ou surveillant général. Certaines dénominations utilisent spécifiquement ce titre. Étymologie Le mot évêque vient du mot gallo-roman *EPISCU, forme raccourcie du latin episcopus, lui-même issu du grec / qui, formé à partir de la préposition ἐπί (« sur ») et du verbe σκοπέω (« observer »), signifie littéralement « surveillant » ou « superviseur », le « pilote qui contrôle la situation et dirige le navire, le berger ou le gardien qui conduit et protège le troupeau », c'est-à-dire responsable d'une organisation ou d'une communauté. Le mot est utilisé dans les Épîtres de Paul et les Actes des Apôtres, qui sont des textes parmi les plus anciens du christianisme. Avant le christianisme, le terme désignait diverses fonctions d'administrateur dans les domaines civil, financier, militaire ou judiciaire. Histoire Premiers siècles Si l’histoire de la fonction épiscopale remonte à l’époque des premiers développements de l’institution ecclésiale, ses origines et son évolution durant les premiers temps du christianisme demeurent largement conjecturales. En outre, la documentation fragmentaire a souvent laissé libre cours, dès l’Antiquité, aux surinterprétations dogmatiques ou confessionnelles dans le but de légitimer des institutions nouvelles en cherchant à les couvrir de l’autorité des Apôtres, ce qui en fait une question débattue de longue date. Ainsi, les tentatives de proposer une vision évolutive de l'épiscopat sur base des éléments lacunaires conservés des trois premiers siècles du christianisme, constitués de l'histoire discontinue de certaines Églises locales aux réalités singulières et peu interconnectées, demeure autant de gageures. On peut néanmoins dégager quelques grands traits de cette évolution : dès l’apparition des premières communautés d’adeptes de la foi chrétienne, des fonctions de services à ces communautés sont apparues, des services ou ministeria (« ministères ») qui se sont peu à peu spécialisés puis institutionnalisés, dans un processus sans uniformité répondant aux spécificités et besoins de communautés locales éparses et diversifiées avant de peu à peu converger au vers une structuration peu ou prou similaire qui caractérise certaines fonctions dans la plupart des communautés de la Grande Église, aboutissant notamment au principe d’« une communauté, un évêque ». Les temps apostoliques C'est terme grec episkopos qui donne les termes « épiscope » puis « évêque ». Durant les premiers siècles de l'ère commune, son usage au sein de communautés chrétiennes locales différentes et dispersées dessine les contours de fonctions et de prérogatives variables — d'ailleurs souvent indistinctes de celles du « presbytre » — qui ne correspond plus guère à l'usage en cours dans l'Église actuelle. Signifiant « surveillant », « gardien » ou encore « inspecteur », le terme episkopos est connu en grec classique dans le vocabulaire administratif et religieux, pour qualifier des tâches de direction plus ou moins importantes, ainsi que comme attribut divin, un usage que l'on retrouve également à deux reprises pour Dieu dans la Septante où douze autres occurrences concernent des fonctions déléguées de gardien du Temple, de cadre de l'armée ou de directeur de travaux. Absent des Évangiles, il n'apparait qu'à quatre reprises dans le Nouveau Testament pour désigner un office ecclésial qu'il est difficile de distinguer de celui du presbyteros (« ancien »). On le trouve deux fois au singulier et deux fois au pluriel, notamment dans un passage des Actes des apôtres où l'épiscope est présenté comme un berger qui « fait paître » les fidèles. On trouve également un usage du terme comme titre christologique dans la Première Épitre de Pierre. La littérature néotestamentaire atteste de l'émergence au sein des premières communautés de disciples de Jésus de Nazareth — qui professent que ce dernier est le Messie — d'une certaine diversité de ministères qui plongent leurs racines dans le judaïsme tardif, tant pour le judéo-christianisme jérusalémite que pour le pagano-christianisme hellénistique de type paulinien. Dans les différentes « assemblées » (/ekklesia) du paléochristianisme, on rencontre des ministères de type « charismatiques » généralement itinérants— apôtres, prophètes et docteurs, trois catégories bénéficiant de dons divins — aux côtés de ministères plus « institutionnels » — épiscopes, presbytres et diacres davantage liés à une communauté donnée — qui relèvent, dans des groupes organisés ne connaissant pas encore de « clergé », de la catégorie des « hommes d'Église » chargés de la gestion pratique, cultuelle, spirituelle, doctrinale... dans la vie quotidienne des fidèles. Subordonnés aux apôtres, les episkopoi et presbyteroi semblent avoir joué le rôle de proche collaborateurs de ceux-ci dont ils sont parfois les délégués dans une communauté donnée. Ils assument leur charge de l’episkopè — la « surintendance » ou la « vigilance » auprès des communautés — de manière collégiale sous l'autorité apostolique. Collégialités Avec la disparition des apôtres qui, de leur vivant, jouissent assez naturellement de la principale autorité au sein des communautés, ainsi qu'avec l'estompement consécutif des attentes eschatologiques, une crise de l'autorité se fait jour. L’autorité des charismatiques itinérants et celle des ministres locaux se trouvent bientôt en rivalité et l'on observe assez rapidement une montée en puissance des seconds qui s'affirment peu à peu face à l'autorité des premiers, même si certains des charismatiques subsistent çà et là : bien que cela suscite des résistances, les épiscopes/presbytres et diacres deviennent progressivement les détenteurs du pouvoir dans les communautés, dont ils assurent la direction spirituelle et matérielle sous une forme collégiale calquée sur la gestion des synagogues. On observe les premières aspirations à l'épiscopat d'un seul ou « mono-épiscopat » dans les écrits d'Ignace d'Antioche — dont l'activité est généralement située dans les deux premières décennies du — qui défend auprès des communautés d'Asie Mineure l'unité de l'Église par un système hiérarchique « conforme à la volonté de Dieu » où l'évêque unique est assisté d'un collège de presbytres (presbyterium) et des diacres, justifiant le primat par une approche théologique. Mais sa défense polémique du modèle atteste que celui-ci est encore loin d'être la norme dans des groupes de chrétiens toujours largement autonomes y compris au sein d'une cité comme Antioche. A contrario, la documentation qui évoque les ministères paléochrétiens contemporaine d'Ignace ignore le mono-épiscopat et atteste de diverses formes de direction collégiales : le Didachè recommande l'élection « d'évêques et de diacres », la Première épître de Clément évoque un collège de presbytres, le Pasteur d'Hermas mentionne des « ministres de l'Église », Polycarpe — lui-même qualifié de « presbytre apostolique » — atteste seulement de presbytres et de diacres tandis qu'Ignace lui-même ne fait pas état de la présence d'un modèle mono-épiscopal à Rome ni ailleurs qu'en Asie Mineure. Il faut cependant noter que les sources sont également muettes sur le fonctionnement de ces collégialités assurant l’episkopè, réduisant les chercheurs aux conjectures. En outre, les fonctions des épiscopes et des presbytres ne se distinguent toujours pas nettement, les deux termes étant même parfois appliqués aux mêmes personnes : on trouve ainsi, au tournant du , les communautés de Corinthe et de Rome dirigée par un collège de presbytres ou d'épiscopes assistés de diacres tandis que dans le dernier quart du siècle ni Irénée de Lyon ni Clément d'Alexandrie ne font encore la distinction, bien que le premier semble bien connaître une structure mono-épiscopale. Ainsi, les étapes qui mènent vers l'installation du mono-épiscopat et de l'épiscope comme chef unique d'une église locale, distinct du presbyterium, ne sont pas claires, restent débattues et ont dû différer selon les emplacements. Bien qu'elles restent là aussi conjecturales, plusieurs reconstructions ont néanmoins été proposées : l'une voit dans le phénomène l'évolution de la présidence du collège « des anciens » initialement détenue par l'un des apôtres dont l'épiscope serait le délégué puis l'héritier ; une autre envisage le besoin d'unité des églises domestiques des cités, jusque-là relativement indépendantes et dirigées par des chefs de familles ou anciens, rassemblés en conseils sous la pression de facteurs externes comme les innovations doctrinales, d'où aurait progressivement émergée la figure de l'évêque unique ; une dernière enfin, plus théologique, veut que l'Église se ressente depuis ses origines comme une communauté eucharistique rassemblée autour d'un chef de communauté devenu le « superintendant » unique pour chaque ville, selon le modèle « pas d'Église sans eucharistie et pas d'eucharistie sans évêque ». Quels qu'en soient les causes et facteurs, l'autorité de l'évêque sur les communautés locales semblent bien établie dès cette époque et il est un fait que le mono-épiscopat tend à devenir le modèle commun à partir de la seconde moitié du , même si le contrôle de clergé par l'évêque ne va pas toujours de soi et que sa prééminence en termes canoniques ne s'impose que plus tardivement. Mono-épiscopat Le christianisme apparaît dans l'Orient méditerranéen dont les cités sont l'articulation, et c'est vers la conversion des populations de celles-ci que la mission chrétienne se tourne naturellement : les communautés paléochrétiennes forment très tôt des réalités urbaines qui se définissent par leur appartenance à leur localité et se rassemblent autour d'évêques presque toujours implantés dans les villes, préfigurant l'organisation institutionnelle de l'Église autour de la cité qui, dans le contexte juridique et administratif de l'Empire, correspond à la fois à un chef-lieu et au territoire sous son autorité. Le voit ainsi l'apparition d'un modèle d'organisation de l'Église inspiré des cités qui aboutit à l'apparition d'un ordre clérical et la formation d'un clergé qui se distingue du peuple, sacralisant progressivement les fonctions hiérarchisées sur un modèle vétérotestamentaire. Depuis la seconde moitié du , le modèle mono-épiscopal s'est généralisé et l'évêque prend bientôt la tête de cette hiérarchie ecclésiastique pour devenir le dispensateur sur terre de l’auctoritas — une notion jusque-là exclusivement civile — confiée par Dieu à l'Église. On le retrouve désormais à la direction de chaque église, à la tête de laquelle il est proposé au peuple par le clergé local en collaboration avec les évêques des cités environnantes. Une fois élu par le peuple et ordonné par un collège d'évêques, il cumule tous les pouvoirs : en outre d'assurer la prédication, c'est l'évêque qui assure les fonctions liturgiques et sacrées, assurant l'administration du baptême, la célébration de l'eucharistie, la réconciliation des pénitents, la formation, l'ordination et le contrôle des clercs, la consécration des vierges et veuves ainsi que celle des édifices religieux ; il assure la direction de la communauté et administre ses ressources ainsi que ses membres — qu'il a le pouvoir d'excommunier — dont il arbitre les conflits et qu'il assiste dans les difficultés ou les épreuves, dans un rôle qui s'apparente à celui de pater familias. Cependant, l'émergence de la structure mono-épiscopale ne signifie pas pour autant la disparition de la collégialité : la charge d'évêque n'est pas concevable sans un presbyterium d'anciens qui le conseille et qui peut d'ailleurs assurer la vie de la communauté en cas d'absence de l'évêque ou de vacance du siège épiscopal ; par ailleurs les évêques eux-mêmes se considèrent entre eux comme membres d'un collège, ouvrant la voie aux pratiques synodales. C'est ainsi en collège que les évêques veillent à l'orthodoxie de la doctrine et de la manière dont elle est dispensée par les clercs. Si le mono-épiscopat implique la présence unique d'un évêque — auquel seul revient désormais l'appellation d’episkopos/episcopus — pour chaque agglomération, il existe cependant une grande disparité dans la distribution des sièges épiscopaux : quand en Afrique romaine le moindre bourg est doté d'un évêque, l'Égypte et la Gaule ne connaissent qu'un unique siège métropolitain pendant longtemps — certaines cités sans chef-lieu se voient même refuser un siège épiscopal —, favorisant alors le rôle des presbytres comme responsables pastoraux des communautés locales, préfigurant les paroisses. Pour les campagnes, particulièrement en Orient et en Égypte, on note l'apparition de chorévêques, des auxiliaires de l'évêque dotés de certaines prérogatives épiscopales mais qui sont bientôt remplacés par des périodeutes, des « visiteurs » envoyés par l'évêque, sans statut propre. Suivant le principe de stabilité épiscopale qui se développe alors, l'évêque est quant à lui désormais lié à son Église, qu'il ne peut en principe quitter pour une autre, et y reçoit parfois le titre d'affectueuse vénération de « pape » que l'on retrouve à Carthage, Alexandrie ou Rome mais aussi dans des agglomérations plus modestes. Rapidement, une hiérarchie entre les évêques finit cependant par apparaître : les évêques de villes importantes peuvent souvent se réclamer d'une origine apostolique plus directe et président aux affaires des évêques d'une région donnée. Empire chrétien Lorsque, à la fin du , Eusèbe de Césarée rédige sont Histoire de l'Église, la figure de l'évêque est devenue incontournable dans les communautés chrétiennes désormais largement répandues autour de la Méditerranée, à telle enseigne qu'ils sont particulièrement visés lors des persécutions de Valérien (257-260) puis — après une période de quiétude voire d'expansion à la suite de l'édit de tolérance promulgué en 260 par Gallien qui offre aux chrétiens une visibilité nouvelle dans les cités impériales et leur ouvre des perspectives de carrières administratives et militaires au sein de l'appareil d'État — celle de Dioclétien (303-313) qui intervient brutalement après quinze années d'un règne jusque-là marqué par une tolérance identique à ses prédécesseurs. Précision du rôle Néanmoins, malgré cette ultime vague de persécutions, lorsque Constantin s'empare de la tête de l'Empire, la physionomie de l'Église chrétienne est pour l'essentiel fixée et le modèle épiscopal de direction des communautés chrétiennes, largement établi. L'Église locale, rassemblée autour de la figure de l'évêque — idéalement natif de la ville et issu de son clergé —, constitue ainsi la cellule fondamentale de l'Église dont la structuration conduit à une progressive mais irrépressible cléricalisation. À partir du , la charge pastorale de l'évêque envers les communautés de fidèles — citadines ou rurales — qui lui sont soumises est désignée sous terme latin de , dont provient le mot « paroisse », qui prend progressivement un sens territoriale, désignant davantage le lieu où s'exerce la charge plutôt que la charge elle-même ou la communauté, préfigurant le diocèse, la « paroisse de l'évêque » ; chacun de ces termes reste toutefois longtemps polysémique et leur usage dans les acceptions actuelles ne se généralise que tardivement, attestant que « durant de longs siècles, le pouvoir de l'évêque ne se décline pas prioritairement sur un mode territorial ». Par ailleurs, les troubles causés par les différends théologiques qui se développent de manière critique et multiplient notamment les contestations d'élections épiscopales, occasionnent l'immixtion du pouvoir civil dans les affaires des communautés chrétiennes : en 325 l'empereur Constantin Ier convoque le concile de Nicée qui s'attache notamment à préciser le rôle des évêques afin d'éviter ces contestations : le concile établit notamment l'obligation du recours aux synodes épiscopaux provinciaux pour le choix des évêques, l'approbation d'un évêque métropolitain pour valider ce choix, la nécessité de la présence d'au moins trois évêques pour la consécration ou encore l'interdiction de la translation d'un évêque d'un siège à un autre. Cette dernière règle, comme d'autres, est régulièrement violée par la suite dans le cadre de l'âpre compétition qui règne particulièrement pour l'élection à la tête des grands sièges épiscopaux, voire pour de plus modestes, dans la mesure où la charge d'évêque — prestigieuse et généralement bien dotée — peut attiser une compétition animée par l'ambition ou la convoitise. Notables Constantin confère en outre aux évêques, déjà chargés d'arbitrer les conflits dans leurs communauté, une juridiction civile d'arbitrage — l’audientia episcopalis — à laquelle ont bientôt recours tant des chrétiens que des non-chrétiens, multipliant les régulations de conflits temporels, poussant les sièges importantes à engager des clercs pour épauler ces « intercesseurs particulièrement recherchés ». Le pouvoir impérial trouvant en eux des relais stables et accessibles, les évêques se voient également confier d'importantes attributions civiles et édilitaires de la cité comme l'examen des comptes, la nomination et le contrôle des fonctionnaires, l'approvisionnement, la validation des poids et mesures utilisés sur les marchés, l'entretien des édifices publics et fortifications... Enfin, les évêques reçoivent une immunité d'impôts et de charges curiales, le droit d'accorder l'asile et la capacité d'affranchir les esclaves. Le règne de Constantin a également un impact important sur le développement de la richesse d'une Église qui a déjà engrangé de très importantes ressources au cours du : l'empereur légalise les legs et donations dès 321, rémunère les clercs individuellement, dote généreusement les grands établissements de culte... inaugurant une politique de soutien qui est suivi par ses successeurs et les élites fortunées. En outre, apparues depuis le , les maisons épiscopales (domus episcopi) où réside l'évêque et où sont conservés le mobilier et les livres liturgiques quittent les périphéries pour rejoindre le cœur des cités, dans une architecture de plus en plus majestative qui fait écho aux palais de gouverneurs ou aux villas des élites. Par delà les différends christologiques qui traversent l'époque, il se forme bientôt un consensus sur le fait de considérer l'évêque en tant que « grand prêtre » de sa ville, auquel il incombe d'attirer la faveur de Dieu sur toute la communauté, notamment par la célébration de rites publics qui sanctifient la cité. Dans la salle d'audience de son palais épiscopal, il y reçoit le conseil municipal et les représentants du gouvernement impérial ainsi qu'il préside régulièrement le conseil municipal, assisté des notables locaux. L'évêque devient ainsi un personnage majeur de la cité dont le prestige est souvent augmenté par les évergésies auquel il se livre, qui, au-delà des édifices de cultes et autres établissements charitables, peuvent concerner des ouvrages d'art comme des aqueducs, des ponts ou des portiques. Ce prestige lui confère un rôle de plus en plus temporel et politique qui l'amène régulièrement à représenter ou défendre sa cité tant auprès du pouvoir impérial — auprès duquel il peut intercéder pour par exemple obtenir le pardon en cas de rébellion ou encore des exemptions d'impôts — que des chefs barbares qui s'imposent progressivement en Occident à partir du : l'évêque endosse alors régulièrement le rôle de defensor ciuitatis, tantôt en négociant avec ceux-ci, tantôt organisant la résistance ou encore obtenant des réductions d'impôts auprès des nouveaux dirigeants. Ces recours aux autorités civiles ne sont pas rares dans la mesure où, jusqu'au milieu du , l'évêque n'a généralement pas de revenus permettant l'autonomie économique de sa charge, l'obligeant à obtenir des moyens auprès du pouvoir ou de généreux donateurs. La généralisation du mono-épiscopat semble avoir pris plus de temps que cela a parfois été décrit et de nombreuses églises urbaines conservent tout au long des une direction assurée par les prêtres et les diacres plutôt que par l'évêque qui, monopolisé par ses charges ou ses devoirs de représentation, peut être souvent absent. Les enjeux financiers n'étant en outre pas minces, il n'est pas rare que ce dernier se retrouve en conflit avec son propre clergé, dans des proportions parfois terribles ainsi qu'en atteste la lutte opposant à Rome, au tournant du , les factions de Symmaque et de son concurrent à l'épiscopat, Laurentius. Néanmoins, vers la fin de l'Antiquité, l'évêque se voit réserver divers rites et sacrements dont ceux de la confirmation des baptisés, de la consécration des autels et du chrême, l'onguent sanctifié utilisé pour de nombreux sacrements. Dans l'Empire d'Orient, les prérogatives civiles de l'évêque se renforcent dans la mesure où, inamovible à la différence des autres édiles et magistrats, il participe largement de l'identité urbaine ; ainsi, c'est lui qui, à partir du règne de Justinien (527-565), préside le groupe de notables dirigeant la cité tandis qu'il obtient parfois jusqu'au droit de police sur les clercs, comme c'est le cas du patriarche d'Alexandrie au . Par ailleurs, les agglomérations de toutes tailles de y sont, au cours des , le théâtre d'une vague de constructions d'édifices religieux souvent richement ornées commanditées par les évêques et leur clergé, qui — souvent placées au centre des villes — modifient le tissu urbain des villes du Moyen-Orient. Lien entre sa ville et l'imposante administration impériale héritée de Dioclétien et Constantin, l'évêque oriental devient bientôt un rouage essentiel dans un système gouvernemental particulièrement intrusif et centralisé. L'évêque devient ainsi le véritable représentant de l'empereur au sein de sa Cité, voire son « chien de garde » : c'est souvent dans la salle d'audience épiscopale que les mandats impériaux sont désormais proclamés aux notables locaux et l'évêque a, au prétexte de sa « liberté sacerdotale », la latitude de dénoncer à l'empereur un gouverneur coupable de prévarication ou d'incompétence. Néanmoins, si l'articulation entre le pouvoir impérial et l'autorité épiscopale est le gage d'une certaine unité et de stabilité sur le plan du gouvernement de l'Empire, il n'en va pas de même pour l'unité doctrinale du christianisme et sa prétention à l'universalité peine à être atteinte. En effet, au lendemain du concile de Chalcédoine (451), les querelles christologiques se prolongent, qui divisent régulièrement le clergé sur telle ou telle confession de foi et pas plus le pouvoir impérial qu'épiscopal n'arrivent à développer une force coercitive ou une autorité morale suffisante pour imposer l'unité religieuse. Ainsi la crise monophysite qui en découle voit un grand nombre de clercs rejoindre les positions du moine Jacob Baradée qui multiplie les ordinations sacerdotales et propose un nouveau type d'organisation ecclésiale : à la verticalité de l'Église impériale où des communautés urbaines séparées s'empilent en une pyramide culminant à Constantinople, il oppose un ensemble de réseaux régionaux dans lequel cités et campagne sont égales, rassemblées par une identité religieuse commune qui dépasse bientôt les limites de l'Empire. Moyen Âge Ordre épiscopal De manière générale, au tournant vers le Haut Moyen-Âge de l'aire gréco-romaine, l'évêque est devenu « le premier des notables d'une cité qui se reconnaît en lui et recourt volontiers à lui en cas de crise ». Pour autant, et bien qu'il demeure avant tout le guide de sa communauté locale, il n'existe pas de modèle standardisé de la manière dont un évêque doit incarner sa fonction et répondre aux obligations ou défis de sa charge et chaque la situation de chaque épiscopat doit être examinée dans son contexte particulier. En outre, la situation de l'Empire byzantin centralisé contraste avec celle qui prévaut en Occident, tributaire des divisions occasionnées par la multiplication des royaumes barbares. En Occident, à partir du , que ce soit en Gaule, en Espagne, en Italie ou en Angleterre, les évêques comme les abbés se recrutent essentiellement dans les familles aristocratiques franques, burgondes, wisigothiques, lombardes ou anglo-saxonnes qui s'efforcent par ailleurs d'obtenir de hautes charges civiles des autorités royales. Néanmoins, si les souverains francs et wisigoths choisissent directement les évêques, ils ne peuvent toutefois pas les déposer après leur consécration sans le soutien d'un concile. À l'époque carolingienne, les élites laïques et ecclésiastiques se confondent largement et participent d'une même culture qui les distingue du reste de la population tandis que les souverains carolingiens, dans l'objectif de défendre la foi catholique et de réformer le clergé, se montrent interventionnistes dans le choix des évêques qu'ils n'hésitent pas à imposer. Ainsi, au , l'apparition de l'« ordre épiscopal » (ordo episcoporum) témoigne de la reconnaissance par le pouvoir carolingien de la fonction épiscopale qui gagne bientôt une place éminente dans le gouvernement de l'empire. C'est de cette époque que datent les premiers témoignages d'ordinations épiscopales spécifiques qui, se distinguant de l'ordination sacerdotale, sont célébrées par un Métropolitain accompagné d'au moins deux évêques et voient le nouvel évêque recevoir les attributs de sa charge : l'anneau qui l'unit à l'Église qu'il est amené à gouverner et la crosse symbolisant sa charge pastorale. « L'essence du pouvoir épiscopal réside [dès lors] dans le pouvoir d'ordre [qui fait] de l'évêque le « premier dispensateur du sacré »». C'est à cette époque également que prennent forme les chapitres de chanoines, héritiers du collège des clercs (clerici canonici) entourant l’évêque et chargés au sein de la cathédrale de le seconder dans l’accomplissement de la liturgie, réglementés en 816 par la Règle d'Aix et son Institutio canonicorum. La seconde moitié du siècle voit l'apparition de sacramentaires propres aux évêques et distincts des recueils liturgiques habituellement utilisés par l'ensemble des prêtres, dont le Pontifical romano-germanique constitue un aboutissement. Au tournant du , là où la royauté s'affaisse et où se développe la féodalité qui voit la montée en puissance des seigneurs qui se substituent à l'autorité royale défaillante, les évêques — responsables de terres bientôt assimilées aux fiefs — peuvent se trouver vassalisés. A contrario, dans le Saint Empire germanique des ottoniens et dans le nord de l'Italie sous son influence, le « moment carolingien » se poursuit du moins jusqu'à la fin du . De manière générale, les évêques de l'Église latine « pré-grégorienne » se présentent ainsi, jusqu'au , comme autant de chefs quasi autonomes d'Églises locales liées entre elles dans une forme de « fédération » présidée par le pape de manière honorifique. Réforme grégorienne Avec la réforme grégorienne, le statut de l'évêque connaît de profondes mutations en occident, l'épiscopat changeant à la fois de dimension et de signification : si son pouvoir pastoral se renforce, l'évêque se transforme en un rouage local au sein d’une structure ecclésiale globale et centralisée, gouvernée par la papauté, dans laquelle il est soumis à un contrôle étroit de sa hiérarchie. En effet, le pape, outre le fait qu'il intervienne de plus en plus dans les nominations, dispose progressivement de la capacité à destituer ou à transférer les prélats dont les décisions de justice sont désormais susceptibles de recours devant les tribunaux pontificaux. En outre, sur le plan civil, l’émergence de gouvernements urbains empiètent sur les attributions militaires, fiscales et judiciaires des évêques, pouvant affaiblir notablement leur pouvoir politique tandis que le siège romain, dans un processus de séparation des sphères ecclésiastique et laïque, entend soustraire la fonction épiscopale à la tutelle des puissants. Si les évêques perdent de leur autorité en matière liturgique ou doctrinale, ils doivent néanmoins veiller à la diffusion et au respect local de la législation canonique, au bon déroulement des cérémonies liturgiques et à l'orthodoxie des croyants. Et sur le plan fiscal, ils conservent l'administration de la dîme, dont ils récupèrent entre un tiers et un quart à leur profit, sommes auxquelles s'ajoutent la perception d'un cens épiscopal ainsi que diverses taxes prélevées auprès des prêtres à l'occasion des visites et synodes diocésains. À partir du , le droit romano-canonique revêt des formes de plus en plus rigoureuses et, notamment avec la publication du Décret de Gratien — compilé entre 1140 et 1160 —, la nature du pouvoir épiscopal, l'officium episcopi, est clairement définie et classée en trois catégories distinctes : ordre, juridiction et enseignement (ou magistère). Lordre confère à l'épiscopat une dignité supérieure au sein de l'ordre des prêtres, établissant l'évêque comme un successeur des apôtres du fait de sa consécration par imposition des mains qui lui transmet l’Esprit Saint et le charisme du sacerdoce : en plus de pouvoir administrer les sacrements habituellement réservés aux prêtres, l'évêque dispense la confirmation, a le pouvoir de d'ordonner prêtres et diacres mais aussi de consacrer de nouveaux évêques, de distribuer le chrême ou encore de consacrer les lieux de culte... entre autres prérogatives. L'aspect temporel de la juridiction, qui s’exerce tant sur les clercs que les laïcs et consiste initialement à la capacité de légiférer et d'arbitrer pour garantir la paix, tend à s'amenuiser au fil de l’affirmation des justices seigneuriales ou communales, pour se concentrer dans le domaine spirituel, doctrinal et ecclésiastique. Enfin, avec le magistère, il incombe à l'évêque de diffuser et de défendre l’Évangile et la morale chrétienne, d'instruire les croyants par la catéchèse et le prêche, ainsi que de veiller à la formation des clercs : la formation intellectuelle de l'évêque devient un enjeu primordial. Par ailleurs, afin de mettre un terme à l'appropriation dynastique de l'épiscopat par les familles aristocratiques, la réforme grégorienne confie le choix de l'évêque aux chapitres des chanoines — dont le Décret de Gratien fait les auxiliaires naturels du prélat et qui, selon les diocèses, peuvent être entre une vingtaine et une centaine — et son investiture à l'évêque Métropolitain. Ceci n'empêche toutefois pas l'aristocratie moyenne ou inférieure de souvent conserver son emprise sur les chapitres eux-mêmes. C'est également à cette époque que la gestion diocésaine se renforce avec le développement autour de l'évêque de fonctions confiées à certains membres du chapitre cathédral, où se recrutent archidiacres, trésoriers, chanceliers, écolâtres et autres chantres, ainsi que par la création de l'officialité épiscopale qui répond à la multiplication des affaires judiciaires soumises aux prélats, bientôt confiée à un décrétiste auxiliaire de l'évêque : l'official. Ainsi, à l'issue de la réforme grégorienne, la perte d'autonomie des évêques aux est partiellement compensée par un meilleur contrôle du diocèse par son titulaire, désormais à la tête d'une petite administration locale à la fois hiérarchique et territoriale, tandis que les évêques restent eux-mêmes souvent des hommes de cour, parfois proches des souverains ou leurs conseillers. Même si la situation est très variable selon la taille, le peuplement et les activités économiques des diocèses, la charge épiscopale reste néanmoins souvent prestigieuse — souvent occupée par des représentants de la noblesse locale mais qui sont désormais pourvus d'une solide formation théologique ou juridique — et tant les revenus que le pouvoir politique de son titulaire, qui en tant que pasteur conseille régulièrement princes ou seigneurs, restent importants. En outre, les paroisses s'intègrent progressivement dans la structure diocésaine tandis qu'aidés de leurs chapitres, les évêques s'efforcent vigoureusement de faire reconnaitre, notamment auprès des moines, leur autorité sur l'ensemble des lieux de cultes, églises ou chapelles, ainsi que sur leurs desservants présents dans des diocèses devenus au « le cadre de pratiques administratives, fiscales et pastorales territorialisées [constituant] à ce titre l'échelon clé d'une institution, l'Église, qui se pense elle-même de manière globale comme un ensemble territorialisé dominé par une papauté impériale ». La « fabrique » de l'évêque Succession apostolique L’affirmation selon laquelle les ministères de l'Église remontent aux apôtres est attestée dès les années 80 par les Épîtres pastorales et, une dizaine d'années plus tard, la Première épître de Clément affirme que les épiscopes, comme les diacres, ont été institués par les apôtres eux-mêmes, dans la première attestation connue de la chaîne de transmission de l'autorité Dieu-Christ-apôtres-épiscopes. Très tôt apparaissent des listes d'épiscopes que l'on fait remonter aux apôtres afin de démontrer l’orthodoxie d’une communauté locale dans un procédé connu dans la littérature antique qui a pour fonction de témoigner d'une ancienneté plutôt que d'une historicité : si l'on en croit Eusèbe de Césarée († 339) qui écrit au tournant du et pour lequel le sujet « tourne à l’obsession », l’utilisation des premières listes d’épiscopes d'origines apostoliques débute avec Hégésippe de Jérusalem († 180) ; elles sont développées ensuite chez Irénée de Lyon († 202) qui leur consacre le livre III de son Adversus Hæreses, chez Hippolyte de Rome († 235) ou encore Julius Africanus († 240). Vers le milieu du , dans le cadre d'un conflit d'autorité dans sa communauté, Cyprien de Carthage affirme que les évêques, institués par Jésus lui-même dans la personne des apôtres, sont supérieurs aux diacres qui ne l'ont été qu'à la Résurrection. Dès la fin , l'apparition du terme « apostolique » dans le Credo atteste de cette revendication d'une continuité de l’Église tant dans son message et dans ses institutions depuis l'époque des apôtres et, au début du , Augustin d'Hippone fixe la doctrine selon laquelle les évêques sont dépositaires de la succession de ces derniers : depuis lors, « le motif ecclésiologique qui fait des évêques les successeurs des apôtres paraît ressortir à la catégorie des invariants ». Ainsi, entre les , afin de pallier l'absence d'origines antiques, les diocèses médiévaux recourent régulièrement à la création de « romans diocésains » qui font remonter leur fondation aux temps constantiniens ou apostoliques. A clero et populo Durant la période qui s'étend du , l'évêque est régulièrement élu suivant le principe a clero et populo (« par le clergé et par le peuple ») dont la première attestation figure dans le recueil généralement daté des premières décennies du , longtemps connu sous le nom de Tradition apostolique, qui prescrit « que l’on ordonne évêque celui qui a été choisi par tout le peuple ». L'adage recouvre cependant dans les faits des pratiques fort variables et connaît modalités de réalisation fort différentes selon les lieux et les époques. Néanmoins, de manière générale, en engageant à la fois la communauté locale — peuple et clergé —, ainsi que le réseau des Églises voisines à travers la participation de leurs évêques sous la houlette de l'évêque métropolitain dont l'autorité s'affirme peu à peu, l'élection a clero et populo, entend affirmer l'unité de l'Église. Si la présence du peuple — qui doit signifier son consentement par le suffragium, une approbation enthousiaste voire une acclamation à l'élection ou à la consécration du nouvel évêque — est un facteur dans la désignation épiscopale nécessaire à la démonstration de cette unité, les modalités précises de cette participation restent indéterminées juridiquement ; de la même manière le nombre d'évêques voisins dont il faut obtenir le consensus et qui doivent procéder à l'ordination est variable. Assez rapidement, des limites apparaissent à l'autonomie des communautés, notamment occasionnées par la multiplication des sièges épiscopaux au : dès le concile de Sardique, en 343, les populations d'un village ou d'une petite ville sont invitées à se contenter d'un prêtre afin de ne pas « avilir le nom et l'autorité de l'évêque » et, vers la même époque, le pseudo-concile de Laodicée stipule qu'« il ne faut pas permettre aux foules de procéder à l’élection [des évêques] » tandis qu'en 390, un concile de Carthage interdit aux communautés de se doter de manière autonome d'un évêque, l'initiative devant en revenir à un évêque déjà en place. Néanmoins, certaines élections notables comme celles de Martin de Tours (v. 371), d'Ambroise de Milan (v. 374) ou encore de Germain à Auxerre (418) attestent de procédures électives associant le peuple, tandis que l'évêque de Rome Léon Ier écrit encore en 445 que « les vœux des citoyens, le témoignage populaire, l'avis des notables, l'élection des clercs sont requis pour l'ordination des évêques » qui doivent être « élu[s] par tous » précisant qu'il doivent l'être par « l’accord du clergé et du peuple ». L'évêque de Rome recommande par ailleurs que les candidats à l'épiscopat aient parcouru l'entièreté du cursus clérical car il n'est pas rare jusque-là que des laïcs accèdent à la fonction. De l'élection à la nomination Empire Convoqué en 325 par l'empereur Constantin Ier, le concile de Nicée s'attache à préciser le rôle des évêques — qui sont en principe élus à vie — afin d'éviter les contestations, interdisant notamment la translation d'un évêque d'un siège à un autre. Il établit dans son canon 5 du l'obligation du recours aux synodes épiscopaux provinciaux pour choisir les évêques ce qui revient, même si les communautés de fidèles peuvent toujours refuser un candidat, à remettre l'élection épiscopale dans les mains des évêques. Après Nicée, la crise arienne — une querelle dogmatique entre ariens et nicéens qui dure plusieurs décennies — divise profondément le monde chrétien et son clergé, particulièrement en Orient : des factions s'opposent parfois violemment et se disputent les sièges épiscopaux les plus prestigieux, ce qui amène le pouvoir civil à intervenir et se mêler des élections épiscopales. Si Constantin n'intervient lui-même que pour exiler quelques évêques récalcitrants, son fils Constance II est beaucoup plus interventionniste et installe d'autorité sur les sièges épiscopaux des personnalités favorables à l'approche arianisante à laquelle il souscrit, déposant et exilant les opposants à sa politique religieuse. Cette approche césaropapiste — Constance affirme « ce que je veux doit être le canon de l'Église » — est poursuivie par ses collègues ou successeurs, selon le parti qu'ils défendent. On retrouve de telles nominations par le pouvoir également dans le royaume d'Arménie voire chez les Sassanides. Tout au long des de nombreuses règles sont édictées concernant l'âge des candidats mais qui ne s'accordent entre elles que sur le fait qu'il faut un âge minimum : pour les Constitutions apostoliques, pour Justinien, suivant une décrétale du pape Sirice... Mais les dérogations semblent avoir été nombreuses et les règles peu suivies, Augustin d'Hippone faisant par exemple élire un jeune lecteur de au siège de . De par les fonctions temporelles qui incombent de plus en plus à la charge, les candidats à l'épiscopat se recrutent souvent dans les milieux aisés et cultivés du sein desquels sont déjà issus les hauts fonctionnaires de l'État, particulièrement dans la classe curiale dont les membres peuvent être dans des états de fortune très éloignés, issu de familles relativement modestes comme Augustin d'Hippone ou très fortunées comme Basile de Césarée. L'Église latine médiévale En Occident, où l'Église est moins structurée qu'en Orient byzantin, la période mérovingienne est caractérisée par une intervention croissante des autorités royales des royaumes francs dans les nominations épiscopales et si les évêques défendent une élection par « le clergé et le peuple » — le « peuple » est alors à comprendre comme les notables laïcs —, ils s'accordent bientôt sur la nécessité de l'intervention royale : le concile national d'Orléans de 549 précise ainsi explicitement qu'il faut obtenir l'« assentiment du roi » (cum volontate regis), qui ne doit toutefois pas se substituer à l'élection, le corps épiscopal et les souverains insistant chacun dans les décennies qui suivent sur leur prérogative respectives ; ils n'est d'ailleurs pas rare que ces derniers nomment des fonctionnaires laïcs issus de l'administration palatine, dont les capacités de gestion emportent l'adhésion locale, mais favorisent aussi, notamment dans les villes de moindre importance, la « vénalisation » de la charge ecclésiastique en acceptant l'argent des candidats à l'épiscopat. Ainsi, dès la seconde moitié du , les nominations d'évêques par les souverains européens se multiplient et les titulaires de la charge se recrutent de moins en moins chez les clercs ; néanmoins, souvent choisies parmi les fonctionnaires royaux, ces personnalités cultivées mettent leurs talents de gestionnaires au service de l'Église. Les carolingiens accentuent le mouvement puis, à la fin du , avec le développement de la société féodale qui voit la montée en puissance des seigneurs laïcs (optimates, nobiles, potentes) qui se substituent à l'autorité royale défaillante, les évêques — en charge de terres bientôt assimilés aux fiefs — se trouvent souvent vassalisés. Le tournant grégorien D'une manière ou d'une autre, la nomination des évêques est ainsi progressivement accaparée par le pouvoir séculier, avant que s'engage la réaction ecclésiale connue sous le nom de « Réforme grégorienne ». L'évolution de la titulature à partir du témoigne de l'émergence de l'affirmation du pouvoir papal en la matière : les charges épiscopales ne sont bientôt plus obtenues par la seule « grâce de Dieu » mais également par « [celle] du siège apostolique » et en 1047, le pape Clément II utilise pour la première fois le terme papatus (papauté) pour marquer la supériorité de l'évêque de Rome sur l’episcopatus (épiscopat). Le principe électif tombe progressivement en désuétude à partir du , réservé dans un premier temps aux seuls collèges de chanoines avant d'être remplacé au par les nominations pontificales. C'est en effet à partir du pontificat d’Innocent IV (1243-1256), une prélat versé dans le droit canon sous le règne duquel se généralise la notion de plenitudo potestatis — la « toute-puissance pontificale » déjà développée par Innocent III, (1198-1216) — que la pratique des nominations pontificales des évêques tend à devenir la règle. Sous la justification de cette plenitudine potestatis, Innocent IV se livre dès 1246 à des nominations directes connues sous le nom de « mandats de provision » et, au terme de différentes dispositions de renforcement prises par ses successeurs, la nomination papale devient quasiment la règle sous la papauté avignonnaise au point qu'Urbain V affirme en 1363 son droit de désigner tous les évêques. Les profits que la papauté tire des nominations auxquelles elle procède ne sont pas étrangers à la généralisation du système qui contraint les nouveaux prélats à s'acquitter de sommes ou bénéfices considérables en faveur du Saint-Siège qui, en plus de conforter son pouvoir, trouve là une importante source de revenus. Épiscopat dans les confessions chrétiennes Église catholique Théologie catholique de l'épiscopat La théologie de l'épiscopat distingue trois éléments constitutifs, de droit divin, tous trois également d'origine apostolique : La titulature attribuée par l'élection, ou la désignation canonique, qui investit du droit au siège ; Le pouvoir d'ordre, conféré par l'imposition des mains, ou ordination épiscopale, par un ou plusieurs évêque, qui alloue à son tour les pouvoirs sacramentels d'ordination épiscopale et sacerdotale, le pouvoir de confirmation pouvant être délégué par l'évêque dans son diocèse. La juridiction, assumée au moment de la prise de possession du siège, ou investiture, qui confère l'autorité spirituelle et administrative immédiate sur une portion donnée du peuple de Dieu, l'Église particulière : diocèse, ou éparchie, ou patriarcat (ou même l'ensemble de l'Église catholique, dans le cas précis du pontife romain, c'est-à-dire du pape, qui est évêque de Rome. Ces trois éléments, normalement unis et coordonnés l'un à l'autre, peuvent être accidentellement disjoints. La titulature et la juridiction peuvent varier, en cas de démission, ou de mutation de siège, par exemple. Le pouvoir d'ordre est donné pour toujours : sacerdos in aeternum. La titulature et la juridiction sont distinctes pour chaque évêque ; ce sont elles qui constituent la hiérarchie ecclésiastique. Le pouvoir d'ordre, quant à lui, est unique et identique pour tous les évêques. Il fonde ce qu'on appelle la collégialité épiscopale. Tous trois, titulature, pouvoir d'ordre et juridiction, sont une participation au sacerdoce du Christ, unique vrai prêtre et pasteur. Titres et fonctions Évêque diocésain et évêque titulaire On distingue entre l'évêque diocésain et l'évêque titulaire : « Sont appelés diocésains les Évêques auxquels est confiée la charge d'un diocèse; titulaires, les autres Évêques » Dans l'Église latine, l'évêque diocésain peut être : Pape, évêque de Rome, ayant juridiction sur ce diocèse mais aussi ayant une juridiction plénière complète sur toute l’Église catholique Primat, archevêque d'un diocèse le plus prestigieux et le plus ancien d'un pays (Par exemple, Lyon pour la France) et dont il a la juridiction Patriarche, archevêque ayant ce titre (dans l'Église latine seulement honorifique), comme par exemple de Lisbonne ou de Venise Archevêque, évêque investi de la charge d'un archidiocèse L'évêque titulaire peut être : au service du pape dans la curie romaine ou comme nonce apostolique etc. pour excercer une fonction sur le territoire de divers diocèses, comme directeur d'une œuvre missionnaire pontificale, assistant ecclésiastique de l'Action catholique, recteur d'université catholique etc. au service d'un diocèse particulier, comme évêque auxiliaire Les évêques titulaires mentionnés jusqu'ici reçoivent le titre d'un siège titulaire, un diocèse éteint ou supprimé. Il y a aussi des évêques titulaires sans siège titulaire : L'évêque émérite, qui, pour des raisons de santé ou pour avoir atteint la limite d'âge ou pour d'autres raisons, a présenté la démission de sa charge d'évêque diocesain, acceptée par le pape L'évêque coadjuteur destiné à être successeur de l'actuel évêque diocésain Évêques en situation irrégulière Évêque suspendu par Rome, et perdant toute juridiction, s'il en avait une, mais gardant le pouvoir plénier d'ordination qui devient illicite mais qui reste valide. Évêque excommunié latae sententiae (excommunication automatique) pour avoir consacré un nouvel évêque sans l'aval de Rome, mais conservant cependant son pouvoir plénier d'ordination, lequel devient illicite et conduit en principe à un schisme. Paramentique Un évêque catholique se reconnaît à différents attributs : Il porte une croix pectorale et un anneau pastoral (anneau épiscopal) ; Sa soutane (ou livrée) est violette, autrefois entièrement, aujourd'hui noire doublée et filetée de cramoisi, avec une ceinture large en soie, ou en moire, voire en matière soyeuse, faisant le tour de la taille et se fermant sur le côté gauche, retombant en deux pans descendant au-dessous du genou ; Une calotte violette ; Il porte une mitre lors des cérémonies liturgiques ; Il dispose d'une crosse symbole de sa fonction de pasteur ; Il se choisit une devise épiscopale ; Il a des armoiries composées d'un écu propre à chaque évêque entouré d'ornements extérieurs communs à tous les évêques : un « chapeau » : vert pour les évêques et archevêques ou les assistants au trône pontifical, rouge pour les cardinaux. Ce vert était, à l'origine, le symbole de leurs franchises et exemptions de droits ; entourant le chapeau des évêques : une cordelière d'où pendent douze voire vingt houppes vertes (ou glands appelé galero) accompagne les ornements extérieurs de l'écu. Le vert en héraldique se dit sinople. Les houppes pendant de chaque côté du chapeau et son posées 1, 2, 3, voire 1, 2, 3 et 4. Les houppes sont au nombre de trente pour les archevêques, également vertes et posées en cinq rangs de chaque côté, dans cet ordre : 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ; l'écu est posé sur une croix de procession : à une traverse pour les évêques, et plusieurs traverses pour les archevêques, primats ou cardinaux ; une devise figurant sous l'écu. L'évêque la choisit lui-même et la conserve toute sa vie, même lorsqu'il est promu cardinal par exemple ; autrefois, les insignes et rubans de décorations et médailles entouraient l'écu ; pour certains évêques et pour tous les archevêques un pallium entoure aussi parfois l'écu (mais pas toujours même pour ceux qui y ont droit, ni pour ceux de haut rang comme les primats ou les cardinaux). Le pallium s'agit d'un ornement liturgique catholique consistant en une bande d'étoffe de laine blanche. Son nom vient du latin pallium (au pluriel pallia) qui signifie manteau. Le pallium est orné de cinq croix pattées monochromes en soie symbole des plaies du Christ, une sur chaque appendice et quatre sur la partie circulaire. Les croix et les extrémités des parties pendantes du pallium noires (sauf pour le Pape où elles sont de couleur rouge). Pendant toute une partie du Moyen Âge les croix du pallium ont été de couleur rouge pour tous ; une mitre était souvent posée sur l'écu mais cet usage est maintenant prohibé depuis quelques dizaines d'années. une couronne était autrefois posée sur l'écu. Elle était soit familiale, soit représentant les titres de noblesse attachés au chef d'un évêché. Nomination et consécration Les évêques sont nommés par le pape, à partir de listes transmises à Rome par le nonce apostolique, établies par les évêques d'une même province ou même région ecclésiastique. Chaque évêque a le droit de faire des propositions. Dans le passé, la désignation des évêques a souvent donné lieu à des luttes entre les pouvoirs politiques et l'Église catholique, par exemple la querelle des Investitures, au , entre les papes et les empereurs romains germaniques. De nos jours, les évêques sont nommés par le Saint-Siège, cette règle connaissant des exceptions, comme en France pour l'évêque aux armées qui est fonctionnaire, et pour l'archevêque de Strasbourg et l'évêque de Metz, qui sont nommés formellement par le président de la République française (selon le concordat en Alsace-Moselle) mais sur proposition de Rome, et quelques diocèses de Suisse. D'autre part, dans les Églises catholiques orientales, les évêques des Églises patriarcales et archiépiscopales majeures sont désignés par le synode ou par le patriarche. Église orthodoxe Théologie orthodoxe de l'épiscopat L'évêque occupe le degré suprême de la hiérarchie ecclésiastique. Il est le successeur des apôtres qui préside à l'eucharistie. Il est l'icône du Christ et le pasteur d'une église particulière dont il porte le nom dans sa titulature. Il est le surveillant et le responsable de la doctrine et de l'enseignement de ses ouailles. Il veille à la communion à l'intérieur de son église et à la communion de son église avec les autres églises orthodoxes. Seuls les hiéromoines (moines, prêtres) accèdent à l'épiscopat. Il en découle que les évêques orthodoxes sont astreints non seulement au célibat mais aussi au monachisme, contrairement aux prêtres orthodoxes qui peuvent rester mariés s'ils l'étaient déjà avant leur ordination diaconale. L'évêque orthodoxe n'est pas selon la formule du catholicisme. Il est, par la grâce de son épiscopat et par la sainte eucharistie qu'il préside ou qui est célébrée en son nom, celui qui a le pouvoir sacramentel de transformer en Église le troupeau de fidèles qui se rassemble autour de lui. Titulature Primat, si l'évêque préside une église autocéphale ou autonome. Archevêque, s'il est primat, ou s'il préside une province. Patriarche, Catholicos ou Maphrien les plus hauts titres honorifiques de primat. Métropolite (usage russe), s'il occupe un siège à la tête d'une province importante ou s'il occupe n'importe quel siège comme titulaire (usage grec). Cathigoumène (dans les Églises orthodoxes ou catholiques orientales), s'il est supérieur d'un monastère. Auxiliaire, s'il est l'assistant d'un évêque titulaire (souvent d'un archevêque en charge donc d'un important diocèse). Chorévêque (usage chypriote), s'il est auxiliaire tout en portant comme titre le nom d'une localité du diocèse. Hiérarque Paramentique Les vêtements de l'évêque célébrant à l'autel : Le sakkos, l'ample tunique impériale garnie de grelots. Sur les icônes cependant, les évêques ne portent pas le sakkos mais la chasuble traditionnelle. Si cette chasuble est ornée de croix foncées sur fond clair, on l'appelle le polystavrio. L'omophore, grande écharpe de laine qui est pliée autour de la tête et retombe devant et derrière. Elle symbolise la brebis perdue que le Christ porte sur ses épaules. Elle est le symbole même de l'épiscopat. La Panaghia, un médaillon pectoral représentant la Mère de Dieu, du Signe. Les évêques honorés d'un titre honorifique portent en plus une croix pectorale et une aigle bicéphale. La crosse épiscopale est un bâton surmonté d'une croisette entourée de deux figures de serpents affrontés qui symbolisent la prudence et la sagesse. La mitre épiscopale est une couronne en dôme. Il est accompagné de deux sous-diacres portant chacun un chandelier, l'un à trois branches, l'autre à deux. Ce sont les symboles de la foi orthodoxe, en la Trinité et dans les deux natures du Christ. La tenue solennelle de l'évêque présidant au chœur est la mandia, traîne violette ornée de bandes rouges et blanches. Les vêtements de l'évêque en tenue de ville sont : Il est habillé en moine avec son kalimaphion surmonté d'un voile. Il porte son médaillon pectoral avec éventuellement la croix et l'aigle. Il a un bâton pastoral. Églises protestantes Églises anglicanes Théologie et discipline Chez les protestants, la succession apostolique n'est généralement pas considérée comme historique, mais comme spirituelle. Les Églises anglicanes (certaines sont appelées épiscopaliennes) ont conservé l'épiscopat, qui fait partie de leur héritage d'avant la décision de rupture d'Henri VIII. L'ordination sacramentale à vie par trois évêques, la conservation de la succession apostolique (souvent dite historique) et les devoirs et responsabilités de l'évêque suivent les grandes lignes de l'épiscopat catholique et orthodoxe. Les évêques sont soit nommés, soit élus, suivant les us et coutumes de chacune des trente-huit provinces (églises nationales) de la Communion anglicane. Ministère féminin Les femmes sont admises à l'épiscopat dans majorité des provinces anglicanes y compris l'Angleterre. La première femme à devenir évêque anglican, Barbara Harris, a été élue évêque suffragante dans le diocèse épiscopalien du Massachusetts en 1988 et consacrée le . Penny Jamieson est la première évêque anglicane diocésaine pour le diocèse de Dunedin le . Paramentique De façon courante à la ville, ils portent souvent une chemise violette, ce qui n'est jamais le cas des évêques catholiques. Les vêtements à l'autel sont semblables à ceux des évêques catholiques. Au chœur, pourtant, les évêques anglicans portent des vêtements très particuliers : La soutane violette, Le rochet, comme une aube mais avec des manches très larges resserrées aux poignets, Le chimère, une espèce de chape légère, noir ou rouge,L'écharpe ou tippet'', comme une étole noire très longue, Croix pectorale, anneau, crosse. Églises protestantes Théologie et discipline Dans le protestantisme (au sens strict, Irvingiens exceptés), seules certaines Églises luthériennes, méthodistes et quelques rares Églises réformées connaissent un ministère épiscopal personnel, qui est une fonction de l'Église et non un ordre sacramentel. Les luthériens français désignent cette fonction par le terme d'inspecteur ecclésiastique. À noter que dans les pays scandinaves et dans une partie de l'Allemagne, la succession apostolique historique a été conservée puisque les diocèses catholiques sont devenus luthériens en bloc lors de la Réforme. Dans l'Église luthérienne, on garde le souvenir de cette étymologie en nommant les évêques des inspecteurs ecclésiastiques. Ces fonctions sont électives, c'est-à-dire démocratiques ; le suffrage des fidèles s'exerçant soit directement au premier degré, soit au second degré. Dans la plupart des confessions protestantes acceptant le ministère épiscopal, la continuité apostolique est généralement entendue comme signifiant la fidélité à l'enseignement apostolique - une succession spirituelle donc, et non historique. Dans les autres Églises protestantes, au niveau de l'Église locale, le ministère épiscopal est celui des pasteurs (traditionnellement élus), et collégialement des anciens. Le consistoire, ou conseil presbytéral est élu par l'assemblée générale qui élit aussi, dans le système presbytéro-synodal, un certain nombre de délégués au synode. Au niveau d'une union nationale, le ministère d'unité est assuré par les synodes et conseils élus par eux, avec parfois une forte concentration sur la personne de leur président. À défaut, il l'est par la collégialité des pasteurs. Ministère féminin Les églises protestantes connaissent un épiscopat féminin, comme elles connaissent les ministères pastoraux féminins. En 1918, Alma Bridwell White fut consacrée évêque méthodiste par William Baxter Godbey, et fut donc la première femme évêque aux États-Unis. Christianisme évangélique Dans le christianisme évangélique, le ministère d’évêque avec des fonctions de surveillance sur un groupe de pasteurs est présent dans certaines dénominations chrétiennes évangéliques . Notes et références NotesRéférences''' Bibliographie Ouvrages spécialisés . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles spécialisés . . . . . . . . . Ouvrages généralistes Voir aussi Articles connexes Ministère Église (organisation) Service (d’église) Épiscope Patriarche Pentarchie Succession apostolique Évêque errant Siège titulaire Annuaire Pontifical, Archevêque Liens externes Titre religieux Chef religieux Organe ou ministère d'une Église protestante
en	caselaw	US	Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 1 of 100 PageID# 298 i©wak ^smasSjtSe Conjgular obtained from the originator who to intervene in this matter despite its other conducted business with an indigenous international worldly present issues. national, were not authorized by the Trustee. Tribal Juris Consultant, Rhashea Lynn Wee,the Tribal Council have resolved that: Harmon-El, who is also the Trustee to mortgage collateral held in Trust and 1) Tribal Juris Consultant Rhashea therefore owned by the Trust. These BAR Lynn Harmon-El must not be member agents, flirther have completely impeded from performing her refused and with the approval of their duties on behalf of the Guale Court's jurisdiction to Notice and Yamassee Nation, Communicate with the Trustee, as a power 2) A United States Administrative ofattorney representative ofthe Nationals, permanent Cease and Desist, and as an interested party respondent. Restraining Order, shall be Allative members of the Tribe fall under executed and sealed by the Key Tribal Trusts and are beneficiaries for their Holder or Supreme Consular Bench protection and the protection of the ofthe Guale Yamassee Courts; Tribe/Clan's assets. 3) An investigation into the Terrorist Acts Committed against our tD^ronsb) this Official International Letter Nationals, mentioned herein, and Rogatory and International Amicus CuriOy others who have been injured under Wee annul all nexus contracts stemmed similar or same circumstances shall from the 1933 bankruptcy and Wars Powers ensue; Act 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548 that were 4) Anti-Fraud and Anti-Human Rights established from the Vatican Papal Bulls at and Anti-Terrorism Courses shall the beginning as well as the Dum Diversas, be required for allative Judicial consigning Indigenous Peoples to Officers and Officials within the ^perpetual servitude' and slavery of the Philadelphia Judicial Community, colonial occupiers and ensue an Intense since this is the jurisdiction Investigation of all documents, data, and presently at issue before us, to parties who create and are involved, eliminate intentional and establish and assert unlawful contractual unintentional international human nexuses with our Nationals through Actio rights and Indigenous De DoLo MaLo and Unconscionableness. discriminatory rights violations. come in peace and as shall remain in communication 411^44international fiiends without without arms. arms, and we come for your assistance, first, although this shall remain vigilant in asserting our S matter is of imminent *National Security". rights and our national's rights as indigenous. .ee, therefore leaving us I without any other choice, do Wee, thank you in advance for your inform you that the State attention and notice ofthis Letter Rogatory Department shall be contacted Transmittal Commercial Communication. 101 P a g c Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 2 of 100 PageID# 299 AAAAAAAAAAAAAA CoMssalar Cowrt ?IHnanimoujE(lp H^ecfolbeb anb l^greeb on W^e iBtetn Jf(eur JBe ILii Cres^cent :0Hoon on tiie Has^t Bap of 3^maaban» HTune 3,2019 ISf.B. in §ear of tlie €Wm H39 jffllCg Broit. Broit. s ^nantmoutf tS^ribal Council @enc(ion S>uprenie ^ranb Council ^arie-lSfntoinette jfealljer C1 Co-S>upreme ranb Council Charlie ^o Curste C1 ^ranb Council Uamp Be l^ipor C1 ^ranb Council ^nail Biter Bep C^ranb Council iSlicIiael Be iSlngeli C1 €nb of Communication. Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 3 of 100 PageID# 300 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 4 of 100 PageID# 301 nil AU Commercial 'ihrnsaedoihs and Trade and Nouts are BuiM by hidiyetimts Specie Rhashea Lynn Haimon El Marie Poppi Whho Feather El ChiefJuris Consul First Assistant Juris Consul GUALE YAMASSEE MBC/INAAN JURIS CONSUL OFFICE [email protected] Phone/Fax: 1.833.482.5333 July 26,2019 Fixed Leo,Era ofAquarius Satum and Pluto Capricorn (Retrograde) Worcester County Superior Court Attention: Dennis McManus,Esq. d/b/a Worcester County Clerk Magistrate 225 Main Street, Room 1008 Worcester, Massachusetts Territoiy[01608] Uniform Postal Umon Treaty Effective />i\ RE; Wva(iveA«^^.178^001270 Greetings: \\„.i W-Jj '■ -.1 .J-'-' ! \ Enclosed please find an Order dated 07.09J2p]^(-fron/\the Guale Yamassee Sui Juris Consular Court regarding the above matter docketed as suc^ in your Coiih. Wee, appreciate your attention to this miatten Engaged, By:. Rhashea Lynn Harmon-El Chief Juirs Consul All Rights Reserved cc: United States Department of the Treasury United States Internal Revenue Service Guale Yamassee Compliance and Auditing lionil itH'thif - Vifhf. Coii>Tig^il©20l9 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 5 of 100 PageID# 302 tPje ®uale^ainai«c ^wi 3furi0 Consfular Coart Rhashea Lynn Harmon El,Trustee of Harris Private Foreign- International Charitable Sanctuary Trust,and EMERGENCY MOTION Harold Harris IV, Indigenous Sul Juris FOR REVIEW AND REUEF ORDER Petitioners, Summer Term Vs. Plied:01072019F The commonwealth of Massachusetts Court, Worchester County,Superior Court, And Docket:01072019F ANTHONY N.RENZI And Agents d/b/a Attorneys for allatlve Corporations known and Unknown Foreign Respondents. SPEOALORDER St/ASPOAffg AND NOW, upon REVIEW of the file presented by Plaintiffs occurring before the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, County of Worcester, Superior Court Civil Action Number: 1785CV00127D operating within the Jurisdiction of the United States of America,en North America, • AND UPON,PETITIGN and FIUN6 OF EMERGENCY MOTION,submitted on July 01,2019; AND UPON, FINDING that the Guale Yamassee Sul Juris Consular Court possesses ORIGINAL JURISDICTION over the disputed foreclosure matter; WEE,THEREFORE,GRANTthrough SUASPONTE ORDER Plaintiffs'EMERGENCY MOTION forthe following: 1) REMOVAL OF Civil Action Number:1785CVG0127D to Guale Yamassee Jurisdiction; il) INJUNCTION AGAINST FORECLOSURE; III) Permanent Restraining Order(PRO)against all parties and agents representing or appointed to represent allatlve parties listed and/or to be designated and/or appointed from further engaging in Injurious acts towards Petitioners; CopyfightO2019 All Rights Reserved /''IHI- f ".-/i't fht't't 'f! '«)/.•/■ ),■»»»!.?• •/ /.'I ' Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 6 of 100 PageID# 303 i^S— Wtft(Suale ^amasr£fe &ni STun'st Coniafular Court AND FURTHER, through 5UA 5P0NTE ORDER under Guate Yamassee Nation's ConstHutional Right Incorporating The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Human Rights laws to protect Its Nationals and this Court's Constitutional Authority to uphold the Guate Yamassee Nation's Constitution and uphold Justice through enforcement ofThe Rights ofIndigenous Peoples Individually and Collectively, WEE,the Guale Yamassee SulJuris Consular Court, AUTHORIZE Petitioners through this ORDER,to: I) File Liens In the amounts of costs presented to the Court Including Interests;and II) Attachments of derivative accounts against allative foreign agents, which Includes attomey BAR membership numbers. NOTICE of this 5UA SPONTE ORDER along with the liens filed against allative parties, entities and Individuals, shall be forwarded to allative Foreign Respondents and the United States Department of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service as per International comity by United States PostalService asthis Is an international commerce Issue and falls within the Jurisdiction of the UPU and therefore Its legal protections. THEREAFTER, within ten (10)days, an ORDER to enforce the judgments including a summary of all liens may be filed with this COURT along with proof of USPS mailings. THERE SHALL BE NO FURTHER ACTIONTO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT UNLESS AND UNTIL THE ORDER AUTHORIZING IS ISSUED. / f >^^4 GRANTED AND SE/jlEO W„ . Supreme Ju END OF ORDER Copyright&)2019 All Rights Reserved Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 7 of 100 PageID# 304 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 8 of 100 PageID# 305 •; ' -v •' - .^u: ■- ' . ■■ ■ ■ ; ;v-;. .vi'S/';- ■ Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 9 of 100 PageID# 306 o{ Sntent to tie Sertbattbe Sfctton fBaoeb on BTntftfical anb Commercial Panb Jfraob Committeb bp tbe $bfl(ibebpbia ^obemment Sctinu ao jOarltet $atticipant0 in CoHnbion biiib iiatribter "^aron" Sirentb anb Corporate Panto Cra o( 9qnarittb, &atnm in Capricorn anb $lnto,iOoon in 4Semini, of tbe 2020 Hear of fD^e 0osA Pi0b> 07 be ^anbier SUconnt: 170503410 ^Slegarbins ISboriginal Htle to 1361 46« Street, [Hbilobebpb^a,$ennbplbania iHniteb ^tateo Cerritorp, $!a[t0t43-0t0l] <$re^ngo fi^om tbe C^nale Cbief S^nrio Conscnl Office of tbe ((Mficial <@uale Hotnatoee C^obemment. As per the attached Errata which remains unrebutted by All who possess knowledge of the following facts and Conclusions of Law: Wee are the true and original Divine Living Beings who charted the Oceans and Sea prior to and subsequent to safely arriving in what Is now known as America. Our ancestors shared our knowledge and information with you as you began to learn and understand the sciences that governed our existence. You took that information and used It to divide the knowledge and information, splicing and issuing degrees in incomplete forms through Universities throughout the planet. Through the Principles established by our ancestors, governing and navigating commercial trade according to those Principles, Banking was established and provided for the unfettered engagement in trade and commerce regardless of religious beliefs. The wise King Solomon followed these very Principles. During the Revolutions (British and American) the Divine Living Beings were scribed and labeled as "Assets". Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 10 of 100 PageID# 307 These Divine Living Beings who possessed bestowed upon them of Genesis i Nobility were then stripped through perversion, of Principles their ancestors created and shared with the "strange people from afar" and therefore fraudulently and deceptively denied of their rightful titles as the true Hebrews of Nobility and Autochthonous of the Land. Being Genesis I and the chosen people of The Most High prior relationships with kingdoms and empires recognized this Truth and established Treaties and Agreements with family recognized of the 12 Tribes upon arrival. The Church through its Priest, Bishops et cetera are responsible for maintaining the organizational structure and control ofthe affairs that occur administratively for commercial trade and therefore banking (internationally) to continue. Further, the Church knows as mentioned in the attached document from the Seat of Saint Peter that, the Divine Living Being is not the alter ego created as a legal fiction with the same Appellation in all caps upon Pauper Certificates known as "Birth Certificates". From sea to shining sea subsequent 1787 and with the assistance and permission of those Hebrews who were already here upon the lands known as and called the Americas prior to even 1213 to ail intelligent Divine Living Beings,the Laws ofthe Sea were brought upon land and Banking was Incorporated into every facet of the dally regime, including the operations of the courts. The Conclusions of Law remaining unrebutted and placing ail persons and agents of persons involved in the matter(s) herein addressed are in violation of; Under United States Code Title 25 §177 Purchases or grants of lands from Indians "Indian" matters not exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts, fall under the exclusive Jurisdiction of the United States Federal Government and its territories. Aiiative Barrister "Land Barons" Agents and judge Barristers were unequivocally aware of these facts and laws and willingly and deliberately Ignored them to the detriment of the indigenous Nationals identified under the Account 170503419 as "Defendants". Wee, are a Foreign International Nation of Divine Living Beneficiaries, enjoying the same status, immunities and privileges as set^fort at the international Organizations Immunities Act (lOIA-Publlc Law 79-291 Title 1 §2,59 United States Statutes at Large 669, House Resolution 4489, enacted December 29, 1945) possessing the capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of real and personal property and to institute legal proceedings. Aiiative Persons, Barristers "Land Barons" attached, identified and named in the herein matter, primary PHELAN HALLiNAN, LLP. are private foreign agents. Guale Yamassee Nation and its Nationals are a separate Nation and comprises of indigenous(Indians)going back more than 10,000 years. Ail persons and agents of persons,therefore,are In direct violation of United States Code §288a Privileges, Exemptions, Immunities of International Organizations and numerous Jus Cogens violations. When dealing with Indigenous Nationals, all state and civilian laws are inapplicable because the states as united in 1787 became subject to the newly created and incorporated United States of America, as £ Plurlbus Unum.in this Account 170503419 all participants intentionally chose to ignore the facts and Jus Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 11 of 100 PageID# 308 cogens and Treaty laws which remain in effect and therefore any State Court decisions or State Court interference is a violation as a matter of law. The continued denial of rights to Indigenous Nations and its Nationals of any rights, including to representation of its own authority, regarding accusations of international breach of banking laws to control and monopolize the Land and Assets through legal Clvillter Mortuus scriptions is a direct violation of Guale Yamassee Constitution, 15 United States Code,and Jus Cogens. An unrebutted affidavit according to the Principles governing Banking Laws and ali other Jus Cogens Laws governing Trade and Commerce stands as Truth. Remove 1361S. 46"* Street,(PA19143-0101] as per United States Territory from the pending Sheriff Sale listed to occur January 07,2020. Done. 33£bfebi of iScarant (&bsierbeb tlTaben at: (6nale ^amaslsfee ^obernment) Cottndl of 12 tE^ J&t ^nbmitteb anb dertaeb bp: Sfttentfon: C[)tef Jarul Coit^nlt onb Cferb of Court C/® illa'at Hato & tE^e £.fQ^tK of Snbfgenotur ^eopletf 1315 IS^alnnt i^treet, i&titte 320 $l)ilabelpl\|fa, $ennirplbatita [$1319143-0101] America tEnrtle Sulonb Faxed: PHELAN HALLINAN, LLP ((215) 505-55:14, 215-574-0699) Department of Justice Hcusiiu)( 202 514 1116) Cc'd International Financial Ttmes (HongKong)et allative International and National News Media Papal Legate Charles J. Chaput Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 12 of 100 PageID# 309 Ill All Commercial Transactions and Trade and Notes are Backed hy !ndif»enons Specie FROM THE DESK OFTHE GUALE YAMASSEE TRIBUNAL *Nollce to PrincipalIs Notice to Agent, Notice to Agentis Notice to Principal** August 21,2019 GC Fixed Leo 2028'Moon Taurus,Era ofAquarius,SaCum and Pluto Rz Capricorn Rx To Whom It May Concern' This Sui Juris Judicum E/rata Corrige is presented and NOTICED to clarify the misunderstanding that has taken place for several centuries regarding us,the Indigenous People. The enactment of Colonial Laws and Acts misiabeled Indigenous People as the following; Black, Slave, Negro,Coloured,Afncan-American and a list ofother denationalizing categories. This has caused to present day,substantial injuries,commercially creating an insurmountable amount ofdebt owed the Indigenous. The Papal Bulls,Noir Codes,and Non-Intercourse Act led to a myriad ofothercodes,including Penal Codes. Resultingly, centuries of pain and suffering was inflicted upon the Indigenous who were promised and assured the protection of the united states. The Autochthonous connection to our Indigenous Land,speaks life into the truth ofour reality, reflective in our rich and diverse culture across the planet. Through our planetaiy imprint and historical records, it is further reflected in your Coat of An&Jeals, Code^^hics. Codes. Corporate Seals. Coiporate Symbols,and other Fellowships.incluBio^l^e Sui^:B^^p\|^owya6lhe Bible. The display and use of our Indigenous sytnbQ^hn4%<^^i^^ of their continued the survival ofall; this is a Commonality; air7\Sconient;,d Cohiract; a Covenant. use, is imperative for ! •« I \ This Errata Corrige is presented to comipt \|he mislnbl^nng categories. Denationalizing documcnt.<> and actions resulting therefrom, have proximnlctytMusedllTcPh{^j^ and continued human rights violations and material Agreement breaches committed ngainst-lndigenous People: thus far having a negative impact in the fomi of Commercial Civil Liter Mortus for Indigenous Peoples. 1 he Papal Bulls have expired that sparked the mislabeling lasting several centuries. Wee are not assets and the agreements remain. In aggregation with all formentioned commercial oKstnictions. there is a debt that has been created that is substantially increasing with each day of non-compensation that is owed and over due to Indigenous People. In honour of our ancestors, the opportunity for dialogue to work towards remedy has presented itself. On behall of Indigenous People, this Tribunal serx'es as Creditor and Representative to receive all remedies entitled for distribution and required for the necessaiy healing process never received, as a result of the manifest violation oftreaty,due to continuous ignored demands ofjustice,and refusal to cure and compensate through continuous displays ofhostilities upon the Indigenous. Wee remain in honour. DONE liud ofBonded Note hoeked by Indigenous Specie. 'Alt.9 For the benefit and oomfoit ofthe[Indigenous]and for the prevention oflitjuries or oppressions on the part ofthe citizens or [indigenous the United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right ofregulating the trade with the[Indigenous]and managing all their ajto in such manners as they think proper. Art.9Hopewell On the KeoWee D^nMve Hvaty. Non-yhtn.slcmthlc llontlofCnolv Yimutssvr Notum. Copyriglit®2019 An Iiucniatioiial and National Riglits Rc.scrvcd Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 13 of 100 PageID# 310 _ AiiinHiHnnfrBtfan fiwa Hie Chair ofSaint Peter Kseptrofifid EKtTMidlnsiySealofStintPotar Letters Patent ex cathedra BMBRCBNGB Qplfta Gnee eftlte One DMm Slpfrb,10til to whom timo Ptttem shallcame,Creetiaf; IhsnBaiinytqr.titeDMao^Attberate tetomad tolotvBScyl QiA4y>»20l3,ttftol)MBo8ipWlbtv8kesIiigft8ateiniateQof«imtadbdttoicaIlx»«««iUefitaatfKce iBdpn9afQfftr(to«o«eat{niontawncactithtoiUlM8gbeIa\|iiIs8Mal8totBiIniBtfnmisrioaefiIni mo rfse to JteM 4iAt fiBB^woen^ tritfwrteni oftO cWnw end tocouitti ibr theemogcwo ftoa tadstipt^ RBndnsibo DMm Etttftto vabn tad cflfattBoe. :^toroidaltad mcftfflotieatto •pbdsed'papov ofitoO{vteo6«8teb9rtelem<M«eRatIo»ortto wnMofeenteeotewbceatttliMtndntandto ftoflitda dte ceaan oftto DMnt eitfio o eifillitl iuMieitea ftrtttbettttdhUMoftfn AIL Now b dto dmo to ftiSP ftiwnd wtib d» bUStBtloa ofdM poopte o IkefihBto tte fottladoa ofdteir divbeaett nd (In Rtum oftho ftr tteb dMito efnto 01 we atsbt then b Bo-ootslas Bood ftswBrdi wlilte uoillu^t wBitdftooftwn ^wfT"fWfy\| dntfltwBfttntBnodttiiBub ntdoflMcnnitniMfliL All Doodib tttbi Bodbr Ondfictin tend ogolBit the pnpedy ofdn divhto onto tad hdd by tho bm Itetfon oodlbitotmn dteb Un rim(>0 >Bd ihiO ho teaodtedy tonsdood Bpea It htt beea dMBnobcd(tat onoa omiaildp tod coBttol ofdn ptopefQf b odvaiobfiSbc^dn dMno esttto i»d tta UvbstaneSetetodtonoL CUm en dto pnmtr Adl ho tend nd noonled hgr te Ctalr ofSifat Peterita"ilotfoe ofBKfanr dniBlos dn lebne ODd ittom ofdn pcopei^(0 d» Cbdr ofSilni Peter br fanedlBto pomxln ftr too^ Qviag tassSetay by iperiil mta.(im>"Kodeo ofBsctatf tad le&m ofthe OaidReitolbeedfndo dn diBrdi.onder • pttai ofOMoaandesdn^ itall taondte^ ssnnder d» pepaof,oad tay/Ul eoB&ol em nU prm>(y« i^ttalriQeoiditotefbcittaeebBntadfettinofdtopiopaOrtottepene^cBdoenbetofdttGtalrefStlRt Fetoft Ite OfSeo of(to Ctab ofSBlBt Peter dan prnMitm^riato deeomaatotfoa tad otoiily ank propeny at oader The ehind,eaderpabi ofesteetommtfeodeMtoli ttta isplitoed ion to d» edtienko ofdn peepto «d the legtl fietleo iWm of dn wetM of Tumnwr- The cfemcfa dall woA to came the fteodsm fte» the otdtwdtl tetded and ftclltatothe coathnnd taUltadOQ ofthe peopletoo rateofgite^ mBidancoond pmperiv Bibs dto peiftedp bveKbet Bebie dot wo BO a^tai cacmd on dettedea tad BOW ottte be lei tbta pi(tf<wttttettBwalfliiftfPaagB?ihBaidietd..«.Newtedgebiiif^dttnheoiadftfttoUOwitiU[i!ofd»whote SBditanNOTboeaipbyedftrnltlteiypoipesei.'* fiiewot Wolavo awed Oor OreitSeal ofPeter to to edibtod to dieie pieteot^ wMJWo haw tte»d wM» Oar Ptn Hi iitww inwHHtob RoyilKtad. Olveatho IS^dayoflolylnthoYe Ran' Ota SttoofStotttotervtitoiOdkeeftftoHnperoftto Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 14 of 100 PageID# 311 ^ ^ ; . - \ - •• ■ • • . ^ -. .■ ; -'v' : :r5v-:4,v; \. . . • • ■ . .. ,,, : -\ 'vW: ■ ■. ■ ./s~^.~{•■■«/---.. .;' :'j''-;.- .'v ■ ■ .■ ;•■'■«,'i - . , 0 • ■ " ■; , -^•- WXXX3Xm:mm^ ::\-:^ ' :■; ; v"' . , - ' " ■-■■ • ■^'■" ■ * ' •-, ■ ' ■ ■ - - , - P'x v rxixxjx, WXPi :g fyi''-:>','-XX'X^-. j., ¥xx"rXX.yC^::-- ?l ■ ; >1 ^ ' " ,/'■ "■^ ■;:X - 'v- i.^'':"--^ Sil ililiiiili I -/'- ■ ■, n. . ■■■-i;:7--s'V>. ,. : Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 15 of 100 PageID# 312 000. Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 16 of 100 PageID# 313 (Page 23 of 320) OrC^'CrNajf CerdfiEtrmie-Od^ Mm 9: 100159969203365484 NOTE ^f'luuty Publle ^-36-02. Vienna Virginia (Datel ICttyJ (Sate) 5981 Callie Furnace Court, Hanaosaa, VA 20112 (Ptepcfty Addna] 1. BORROWER'S PROMISE TO FAY Inreiurororaloaalhatlhavececetved,IprosiIietop^U^.$ 371,400.00 (Otbanumnl bcalled'PrindpaJ'). plus Interest, to tbectder of lira Leader.Tfte Lender b Branch Banking cuxd Trust Con9>any I will make all paymenb under(hb Note In the fonn of cash,check or nraiuy order. 1 tmdeistand that(he Lender may traosfer Ihb Note. T1» Leader or anyono who lakes Ihb Note tiy transfer and who b eoUlled to receive piymenb uoder thb Note b called (he'Note Holder.* 2. INTEREST Interest will be charged on unpaid ptlncipal until Ihd foil amount ofPrindpal has been pahL I will pay Interest at a yearly rale of 6.250%. The Inleresl rate required by Ihb Section 2 b the rate I wlU pay both before and after ai^ default described In Section 6(B) of Ihb Note. 3. PAYMENTS (A)Time and Place ofPayments ' 1 will pay principal and interest by making a prymenl every mooih. 1 will make my monthly payment on the Isc dayofeacbmonlbbe^hmlngon HavenbcT l, 2002 .IwllI make these paymenb every month until Ibave paid all of the ptiodpal and Interest and say other draiges described bdow that I may owe under ihb Note. Each monthly payment will beappll^ as ^Ib scheduled due date and will be applied to tnlcrest before PiindpoL If,on October 1, 2032 .1 Still owe amccnb under Ihb Note.IwlUp^those amounb In foO on llul dale, which b called Ike'Malurlly Date.* I wQI make my ffloiuMy paymenb at 223 Weot Noah Street, Hileon, NO 27893 or si n dlircreoi{date Ifrequired the Note Holder. (B) Antount of Monthly Paymenb My monthly paymeol wUl be In(he amount of U.S. S 2,286.77 4. BORROWER'S RICIIT TO PREPAY Have (he right to rodre paymenb ofPrtodpal at aigr time before (hty are do& A payment of Prindpal onfy b hrtown as a 'PrepaymenL* Whbi I make a Prepayment. 1 wilt tell the Note Holder In writing that I am doing sal m^ not designate a payment as a Piepaymoii If1 have not made all the monthly paymenb due under the Note. I may make a full Prepayment or partial Pr^ymcnb without p^lng a Prepayment charge. The Note Holder will use my Prepymenb (o reduce the amount ofPrt^pal that I owe under fhb Note. However,(he Note Holder m^apply my Prepaymeni to (he accrued and unpaid Interest on (be Prep^rmtnl amount, before ^lytng my Prepayment (o reduce (he Prindpal omnunt of(he Note. If I make a partial Prepayment, there be no changes In the due date or In the amount of my menlhly payment unless the Note Holder agrees In writing to tliose changes. • 000 Si51C7Sl APPb 117000131)91 LOAH fifi9aO))<S48 VIRQiNIA FIXED RATE NOTE>Slnsto Famlly-Fannlo Meo/FroddlaMoc UNIFORM INSTRUMENT (MM »«St •BN(VA)(0003) Form 3247 IMS VMP WORTOAOe rOAMS.(600)SI\|.mi Pgo 1 of 3 cj252>< lliB ftescjEBaEi!"AceejNfir Aol8RetailedfirSe^ecMQosiie Ilb W«aseBM9fl^xit»&«qof>w ^(KX:3^(bXJ) (Page 24 of Case 320) 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 17 of 100 PageID# 314 5. LOAN CHARGES If a law, which applies lo (Ids loan and which scts'niaxlntain loan diaiges, b hna]^ blopreted so that the Interest or oihtf loan diargcs coBccled or to be collected In oonnedios irilh thb loan exceed (he permitted flmlls, then:(q) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted Unili: and (b)ar^ sums abeady colleded from me which exceeded permitted limits wHI be refunded to me. The Note Holder may choose to iMs tefond hy reducing the Plrtndpal I owe under this Note or by naklng a direct paymol to m& Ifa leTund reduces PHndpal the redoctloa will be treated as a partial PtepaymenL 6. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO FAY AS REQUIRED (A)Late Charge for Overdue Payments If the Note Holder has not received the luD amount of si^ monthly payment the end of Fifteen calendar days after tlie date lib due,I will pay a late charge to the Note Holder.The amount orihacha^wm be S.OOO %or my overdue payment of prindpd and Inluest.1 wULpay thb bte charge promptly but only once on each bte payment (0)Default Ifl do not pay the full amount of each monthly payment on the date It b due,1 wUJ be lo defaolt. (C)Notice ofDefault If 1 am In default the Note Holder may send me a wiitteo notice (elliog methatlfldonatpayibe overdue amnuni by a certain dale, the Nme Holder may regulre me to pay hnmedhtdy the loll antoonl ofMndpal which bu not been paid and all ibe Interest that I owe cn that amount That date must be at feast 30 days after the date on widcb the notice b to ne or delivered byothermeans. (D)No Waiver By Note Holder Even if, at a lime when I am In (tefaull, the Note Holder does not require me to pay Immedbtely In fUU as described above, ihe Note Holder will stIH have tha right to do so If1 am In defaull at a later tbne. I (E)Pi^ent of Note Holder's Costs and Bxpcnt^ I If the Note Holder has required me to p^ Immediately to hill as described above, Ibe Note Holder wU hne tbo ifghl to be paid bach by me for all of lb cosb and expenses to enfordsg thb Note lo (he extent imt prddblted 1^ applicable taw. Those expenses Include,for example,reasonable attorneys'fees., 7. GIVING OF NOTICES Unless applicable law requires a dlffeteoi mcthod,-hi9 cotke that must be given to me under (hb Note will be given by delivering (I or ty nailing It first class mall lo me at (he Property Address above or at a dtfTercnt address If I give the Note Holder a notice ofoty different address. Any notice(bat must be given to(he Note HoUer under thb Note wOl be giveo by ddtverlng It or by mailing It Ity first dass mall to(he Note Holder at(he address staled In Section 3(A) above or at a dlffetenl address IfI am given inotlce ofthat different address. 8. OBLIGATIONS OFFELONS UNDER THIS NOTE If more than one person sign thb Note,each ptnon b fully end personally obligated to keep all of the promises made in thb Note, Including the promise to pay the full amnunt owed. Any person who b a guarantor, surety or endorser of(hb Note b also obligated to do these things, kny person svbo takes over these oblfgaticns, Indudlng the obBgallons of a guarantor, surety or endorser of Uib Note, b abo obligated to keep all of the promises made In thb Note.The Note Hdder may enforce lb rights under thb Note egalnsi each person indlvlduany or ogalnsl all of us together. Thb means Ihat aity one of us may be required to pay all of the amounb owed under thb Note. 9. WAIVERS 1 and any ether penon who has obligations under thb Note waive (be rtghb of Presentment and Notice of DtshaoGr and waive the benefit of the homestead exemption as to the Pnqtetty described in (he Security InstromcfU (as defined below). 'PtesenUntnl' means (he right (o require tl« Note Holder to dcowid payment of amounts due: 'NoUoe of Dlshcnor' means Ibe right to require(he Note Holder to give notice to other persons that amounb due have not been paid. tmc 0tsi<7S3 MPL ai^ocoissssi LOAH aicssossssse .I Form13247 3147 lAI imi <^>-SNtVA)(cao»i Pftcii Hiis Piescotaent is"Acttpfed for Value"fiont and back. ■ADd is Returned fcrStftoeat^ agent UCC 3403 (bXl) Dated: (Page 25 of Case 320) 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 18 of 100 PageID# 315 I 10. UNIFORM SECURED NOTE ' This Note is a unironn Instrament with limited vsHatlons In some JiirisdldloasL In addldca to the proledtons glvai to (be Note Holder under this Note, a Mortgage. Deed orTnist. or Security Deed (the Seciir\|^ Instrament'). dated the samo date as this Note, protects the Note Holder Iroin possible losses whlcb might result If Ido not keep the promises which Imake In this Note. That Security Instrument describes hw and under what condUlons I may be reriulied (o m^ Immediate payment In fuQ of all antounis I owe under ihts Not& Some of those coodltloQS ore doKifbcd as follows: IfalloraiQrpattofthePrepefty or aiy Interest In the Frepertybscld or transfencd (ortfBonower Iscola natural person a benefldal Interest In Borrower b sold or tranrfhrred) wfihont Leciter's prior wiitcen cQOsent. Lender may reqidn Immediate payment In full of all sums secured by thb Security InstnimccL However. Ihb option shall not be exercbed by Lender Ifsuch exerdse b prohibited by Ai^dhable Law. If Lends* exerdses Ihb option, Lends shall give Borrows notice of accderatloa The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days Kntm the date the notice b given In accordance with Section 15 within which Dcrrows must pay all sums secured by ihb Security Instrument. IfDotniws Ms to p^ these sums prim to the expiration ofthb period, Lends may Invoke any remedlu permlltcd by Ihb Security Instrument without fbrtbs notice or demand on Borrows. WITNESS THE HAND(S)AND SEALfS) OF THE UNDERSIGNED. .(5eal) Akuo Oylmah CI Sdn — .Boirowcr edlc B. Chin •Benowtr .CSeaO .(&al) 'BoRQWcr •BojiDwcr _(SmO —(Seal) •Sonmnr •Bernrarcr -(Seal) -(Seal) •tleiTOMrer •Botrowtt tS^(MgiBaJ Oafyi TlibblocertUy(liattbbbtheNoledesalbtd In and secured by a Deed ofTn on tlie Property located In Prince William My Comiutalon Enplres; NoUiyFcbUe OCC 11316793 APPl. livoooisisn ^ LOMI •■6930336510 fl^P^-SNtVAt(0001) PtsaSoil Fom 3247 1/01 Of I WAS ^ vaustc^jcs AS AMY B HUSE n^isRftlBIlcdfilfj^^tlteDwPtedCIOSQRQfi &cESCfOW. c[yoacsaiisiiL 3g^(XX:^4Q3(bXi) finite fJl -3 (Page 4 of Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 19 of 100 PageID# 316 320> ^■ ■ liiiiiiiiiiiii lMtri9e93teaiel35S44 Pai t v ts ■Prltte* UllllM Courity. VA IQ/OI/MM 2t»>e61)f1 .Asvld e. lUbU. CI«rK RcltnnTo: Mip Refereoce 9: RPC/PunxIlO#: Pupated^ > \|Sp«ce Abcrt Ibta Uoo Pftr Rccot4lag Osta] • DEED OF TRUST NQN 1003S99692033S5484 Th8foHowJn8MonB8UoD.asftrthefdeilfltdteIow.bpoWdedia8^ ThtsDecdcfXhmisglwnby Wcua Oyiaah <aiin, Benedic B. Chlix 'S'," ' »•««* «■»" 200.- Rlcteona? VA 23m" """V' »»«»«>od PATkvay, Ttailw. for (to tosat ot Mditjig. Btelnailc Reglilnllon SyaoM. fee. M hmaday. o k» 3Sa Pijf oEnNrnoNS ^53 c!t?4 Httx DOC •1534071 APn. 117000153)91 ^tNlA.SlngtaF»n,iIy4:om,.oMoo«r„^droi;»;OWro^^ "VSS? ifln <afc-6A(VA){oioa> . onn.1047 wn P.9.1ar„ ^d. vB» »«0RT0A« rwao. {eo9jMi.»»i IhB PtescBteeDt is "Acc^teiMbr Value" ftonl and bak, Aid is Retuioed an ^ UCC 3-403 (bXl) (Page 5 ot 320} Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 20 of 100 PageID# 317 Hi tnitnaosaiooioiaeete Pts«s 2 OP (9 (A)"Security ImtnimetU" meais thb document, which b dated together with all RIdets to this documenl. (B)"Borrower" b Akua Gyioah Chin, Banedic B. Chin Bonuwer b the inislor under Ihb Security losmiisenL (C)"lender" b Branch Banlelng and Trust Company Lender b a Coxporatlcn oiganized and existing under the bum of North Carolina Leader's address b 233 Nest Hash Street, Nllson, HC 27693 (D)"Trustee" b David F. SkaCf Trustee (whether one or more persons) b a Vbglob resident amVor a United Stales or Vlrglnb-duitirad corporation vdiose prtod^ ofllce - b located b Vliglnla. Trustee's addrin b 130B Devil's Reach Rd., Suite 200. Noodbridge, VA 22192 "Trustee" b Carol p. ordess Trustee (whether one or more persons) b a Vbi^hda tesbteot andfor a United Slates- ot Vliglaik-cbaiteted corpoiailon whose ptbclpa) olOoe. b located b Vbglnla. Thistee'a address b 2609 Bmerywood Parkway, Richamnd, VA 2328S (B)"MERS" bMortgage Qectronlc RegistratloaSystems, lot. MERS bai^aialecorporalloa that bfing solely as a nominee for Lender end Lcmbr's utrccssora and Bssigns. MERS b the btnefldary mder thb Security Instrmuent. MERS b organbed and ^'htlng tmdtr be laws of Bebwere, and baa an address telephone number of P.O.Box me.Flbt, MI 48501-20Z6.teL(688)679-MERS. (F)"Note" means the piombsoiy note signed by Borrowir and dated as of the date hereof The Note states tint Bonower owes Lender Three Hundred Seventy One Thousand Pour Hundred and Ho/lOO Doltan (U.S.S 371,400.00 )pita btereiLBonawer has premised to pay thb debt b regular Periodic Paymenb and to p^the debt b full not hter than October 1, 2032 .The Interest rate staled b the Note b Six and One Quarter percent( 6.2S0 %). if thb Security lastnunent b an adjustable rate mntgige loan, thb Intllal rate b subject b rfnngi' in accordance with the allacfaed AdjuslaUe Rate Rider.• (G) "Propcrljr" means (he property tial b desolbed below under the beading Ttansfer of Righb b the Property." I>0C a(534073 APPL •(700015)391 «930S3«S4e }-OA(VA)(oioz) P«g«SeltS Pom 3047 1/01 IhisFtesaitmeatis Value* &Dd aid bal, AsdisRedBQed (Cosine of(he Esoow. itotuoryoarcoQliad ageol OCX:3-403(bXI) rfafpfi- 5 (Page 6 of Case 320) 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 21 of 100 PageID# 318 ifltirtscdaiootdn P«B«i S OP 10 (H)"Loan" means Ute debt evidenced the Note, p!as Intetesl, any mepaynteni cbaiges and isle charges due under the Note,and as susu duo under(Ms Security losuumeni,plus interest (I) °RIdcn" means sli Riders (o this Seatiily loslnnnesl thai are executed by Borrower. The following RHm are to be executed by Borrower Idiecfc bm as applicable]: Hi]AiQustable Rate Rider Condomlnlom Rider Second Home Rider BaDoan RUer Planned Unit Oevetopmeu Rider MFamllyRMer IVA Rider Biweeldy Payment Rider Other($)[specify) U) "AppUcnbte Law" means oO conlrolllog applicable fcderd, stale and local statutes, legnlatlooi. ordinances and administrative rules and orders (tb^ bave the effect of law) as well as all applied final, nonoppealablejudldal opinions. (IQ "Communlfy Assodallea Docs, Fees, and Assessments" means aD dues, fees, assessments and other charges that are Imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condonttidtim assodatfam. homeovmets association or similar oiginfaallorL CL) "Elcctioidc Funds Transfer" means ar^ transfer of(hnds, other than a transaction originated by dteck, drail or similar paper Instrumsil. vddch b bdtlated ihtougb an electronic (ermfnal, telephonic Instntmenl, oofflpaler. or magnetic tape so as to order, fautiuct, or autbortaa a fbsndal Institution to debit or credit on accoiuL Sudi term indudts. but b not Halted to. pohd-of'sala (laasflas, astonuted (cOer machine transactions, transfers tttlilated fay telephone, wte transfers, and aulonuted deailngjbotise transfers. (hQ "Escrow Items" means those Items that ate described In SedloD 3. (N)"MboeQaneoos ftocccds" means atiy compensation, settlement, swaid ofdamages, or proceeds paid by at^ third patty (other than Insurance proceeds paid umtcr the coverages descrlbtd In Sedloo'5) fon (O danage to.or destructloa of,the Ropcify;(IQ condwimatlcn or other tafdng of all or ay part of the Pw^ay, 010 oonveyance In Ueu of condemnation; or Ov) mbiepreicnlxilom of. or ombsloos as to, the vahte amVbr condldon ofthe Property. (0)"Mortgage Insuranoe" means btttnante pntiectlog Lender against(he nnnpayment of,or default on,the Lo^ (P)"Periodic Faymcat" means (be regulatly sdtedoled amount due for (Q principal and InletesI under the Note, plus(U)airy amounts under Section 3oftUs Security InstiumesL «2)"RESPA" means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U5.C Section 2601 rt seq.) and lb Implemestli^ regulation. Regulation X (24 CFJL Fart 3500), as thiy might be Bmeitdtd from time to time, or ai^ additional or successor Icgblallon or r^olatlon that govens the same subject matter. As used In lUs Security Instrumenl. 'RESPA* refers to aU lequbemenis lestilciiars that are Imposed In regard to a 'federally related mortgage loan* even If the Loan does ml qualify as a "federally rdated mortgage loan" under RESPA. (R)"Successor la Interest of Borrower" means aiqr party that has tahen title to the Propafy. whether or not that party has assumed Borrower's obUgalloas under the Note aniFor lids Securtfy InstrumenL DOC iisateva APPL iiioooisisai 0i<9}0)3«9«8 (^P>8A(tfA)(oioi) Page Sorts Form 3047 1101 this PiesaiWioa is"Atceplalfor Vabe"fom skII®!! AadisR«uniedfeSell!»Bi\|«lClo!i«ofll«E^ i(bi»tcaosiira»m><9>wtoosofyoo''o<i^ ^j^^^;\|^agailU0C3-«B(bXI) {Page 7 of Case 320) 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 22 of 100 PageID# 319 ln«tri200ai09l0IZ8S48 PcBat A Of 18 TRANSFER OF lUGIITS IN THE PROPERTY Tbo becefldaiy of this Securtiy Insintmeal Is MER5 (solely bs oomlnee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the suooessocs sod assigns of MERS. This Security lasttumcat secures to Larfen Q (he r^ymwl of the Loaa» aod all renewals, cxtendons and inodmcatlons of the Note; and ^ tha performsnoe of Borrower's covenants and aaecnients onda this Seemly Intniment and the Noiie. For this porpose, Bonower bnvctably giatUs airo conveys to 1)03188. in bust, wUb power of sde. the foDovdng described property located In the County riyi^ofitcocrnliRsJailsdtctlos] of Prince Hilliast (NannofReconHfigJuHsdlctlsB]! S&L. "A"/kkcJ(£cf which currenlly has the address of '■ \| 5901 Callle Furnace Court' , ismetl Manassas ICttyA^aimt^.Virginia 301X2 CBpCodcl (Tropaty Address): TOGETHER WITH all the improvemenls now or hereallef erected on (he property, and all easematts, appurtenances, and fixtures now or ttereaRer a part of the proneity. All lephoemrols and additions shall also be covered by this Security Insbumeot. AO of the fotegolag Is referred to In this Security Instnuneot as the 'Property. Borrower unueisiands and agrees (hot MERS nolds only legal llde to the Imetesls granted by Borrower In this Security Inrtrumenl. buulf necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Leader's successors and assigns) has the rl^t: to exerdse arty or all of those Interests, tndudl^ but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell (be noperty; and to tahe any action requhed of Lender InduiBng, but cot Bmlted to, releasing and canceling (bis Security lostrumenL suttject to any encumbrances of record. THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for naUonal use and nonrunlfoim covenants wllh limited varbtlons by Jurisdiction to constltule aunlform security instiumenl covering r^ popcrty. UNIFORM COVENANTS. Bonower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 1. Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow Items, Preprtyment Charges, and Late Charges. Bonower shall p^ when due (he princ^al of. and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any ptqi^eal dei^ and late charges due under (he Note. Bonower shall also pay fimds for Escrow Items pursuant to Section 3. Payments due under the Note and (his Security Instrument shall be made In UJS. DOC OisasesA appl sizoooissasi tisnoiassAe (2&>6A(VA)(gini PasaAcfis Form 3047 1/01 AidBRelodfi»&iftiB^CkBTO ir iigSitUCCIAIBPiXI) [jiO. !£:3::2^— (Page 8 of 320) tnttri2e02IOOIOl: Pt8»i fl OP IS currency. However, ir any check or citnr lastnimest received by Lender as pqnnenl under (be Note or this Secmtiy Imtramcnt is returned to Lender unpaid. Lender may rcquiro thai aiy or OH aubsequenl paymenls due under the Note ond this SecuiUv Instrumenl be roide to one or mom ofthe following forms, as selected by Lends: (a) c»b;(b) monev order (<) oertliled check, bank check, treasurer'e check or cashier's cbech, provided aiw such ch^ is orann upim an Institution whose deposits sre Inured by a fcdenl agen^, fostnimenialliy,or entity, or(d)Electtonle FundsTtansftf. Payments are dtmed received by Lender wb» tecdved at the locadon designated in the Note or al such other lootion as may Be designated by Lender in occotdanoe wllb Che notice provisions In Section IS. Lender may return aiqr payment or partial payment Iftbepqnnent or paidalnymcots are losuindcnl to bring the Loan cnncm. Lcmler mw accept aiy paymeol or partial paymcnl faisulBdeet to bring the Loan cnntoi, without waiver of(u^ rights nereuads or prqndlODCo Us rt^ to lefitsesucbptymenl or partial payments in the future, but Lender b not ohUgsted tosppty such paymsds at the time such paymeott are acceded. Ifeach Periodic Pimnent b applied as of Its sdMuIed due data, then Lender need noi pm Interest on unapi^ed funds. Leotte may hold such unajqilled funds until Bonowcr nukes mQiment Co tnuig the Loan cuncnt. If Beirowef does noi do so wUhin a reasonabtajMiied of time, Lender smU cUhcr app^ sudi funds or return (hem to Bonower. If not ai^Qed earlier,such nicds will be applied to the oubtandlng nilndpal balance under the Note immedliiiely prior to foreclosure. No oifsct or claim wUch Bonowcr im^l taw now or In the future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making pwmenb due under Note and ihb Security Instrument or perfntmlng the covenants and sgreemenb seemed oy thb Security InstramenL Z. Application ofPaymenb or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in thb Section 2; all piymenls accepted and applied by Lmer shall be applied In tm foUowioa order of pbnlly;(g) Interest due under the Note; (b) prinapal due under (be Note;(c) amounts due under Section 3. Such payswnb sbaO be appUed to each Periodic Payment In the order in wfalicb U became due; Any icmnlnlng amnmru shall be applied (Iisi to tale charges,sec^ to any oiher amounb due under Ihb Security bistioffient, and ibtn (o ledua the prtndpil balance ofthe Note; If Lender receives a pqnnenl ftom Borrower for a dcOnguent Periodic Pivment which Includes a sudldenl amount to pay ai^ late chaine due; the payment may be applied to the deUu]ueat paymenl and (be late dttige. If mote tnan one Periodic Pmsoil b ontstandbu Lender may ajqdy a:^ piynunt receded from Bonower to the fcpqrment of the Pcriouc Paymenb If, andto the extent that, eadi payment can be paid In fulL To the extent (I^ vg excess exbb after the p^ment b applied to the Ibll piymcnt of one'or more Periodic Paymenb, such excess may be appUed to aiw late chtn^ due. VolimlBiy prqiayinenb.shall be appQed lltsi to aiqr prepayment charm and Cnen as desolbcd b the Note. Aiw appllcwon ofpaymenb, usurutce proceeds, or Mbcdlasooos Proceeds to principal due under(he Note sba)]not extend or postpone to due date,or change the amotmi,ofthe Periodic Payment 3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on lha t^y Periodic P^enb are due under to Note, until the Note b ^d In fUlI, a sum (to "runds') to provide for pament of amounb due fon (a) taxes and assessmenb and other Itenu whldi can atiiln pnoriiy over tnb Seotriiy Instrument as a lien or encumbrance on the Fropctte (b) leasehold paytonb or ground renb on the Property, If 31^ (c) premluros for ai^ and oil msuimice lequlrcd Lenda untur Section 5; and (d) Mortgage Insmance uemloms. If aiw, or any sums p^Ie by Bomwer to Lender In Ileo of to pymest of Moits^ muance ptentons In accordance wUh iha provlrions of Section 10. These items are caBed Escrow Items. At origination or al oi^ lime doting the term of the Loaa Lender may reonlie that Community Assodailon Dues, Foes, and Assessmenb,If wg, be escrowed ly Bonower, and such oacs, fees and assessmenb shall be an Escrow Item. Bonower shall pronroily limtlsh to Lender all notices of amounb to be paid under Ihb Section Bonower shaQ pay Lender the rnnds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives Bonower's obligation to pay the Funds for any or all ^crow Items. Lender may waive Bonower's obligation to py to Lender Funds lor any or all Escrow Items at any Ume. Any such waiver may oti\|y bo In writing. In (he event of such waiver, Borrower shall pay directly, when and whcro payable, to amounb due for any Escrow Items for which pymeni of Funds has been wilved by Lender and. If Lender requires, shall (farnbn to Lender recelpb evldcadng sudi payment within such time period as Lender may i^utre. Botrower's obligation to nuke sucb pymenb ain to provide rece^b shell lor alljnirposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement oontalnea in thb Security Instnim^ as to phrase covenant and agreement* b used In Section 9. If Borrower b obligated to pqy Escrow Items dtreclly, pursuant to a vwver. and Bonower faUs to the amount due for an &ctow Item, Lender may exerdse lb righb under Sedlon S.and pay sudi amount and Borrower shall then be obOgated under Section 9 to repay to Lender any suco DOC St 524075 Apn. 017000X5)391 e920)3S540 •6A(VA)(PIOl) cagvgolll Form 3047 1/01 Tbsheseotmatfis fitgn sodbsjt, )OSQ80f&9ESCRIW. orytxircoBlzact UCC34D(bXI) Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 23 of 100 PageID# 320 (Page 9 of Case 320) 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 24 of 100 PageID# 321 iniIri2e03iogti>ta68«s P>9«i e OF IB afflotmL Lender tnsjr revoke the waiver os to any or all Escrow Kenu at oiw lime by a notice given in accordance with Section IS and, upon such revcc^n. Borrower staO pty(o fender olTFunds, onala such amounts,that ate(beo required csder this SKtlon 3. Lender nay. at ai^r lime, collect and bdd Funds in an amount (o) suindent to permit Lender to sppW the Funds at the time spedfled under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed (he maxlnnRD a lender can reqidre under RESPA. Letuler sbaO wtinnte the aniount of Funds due on the (nds of current data and reasondtle estimates ofexpenditiines offiitune Ekiow Items or otherwise in ooooidance wllb Applicable L»v. The Funds shall be bdd toaatnstitutioa whroe deposhs ate Instil by a fedeid sgsay,^TOmneoiallty, or entiN (icchtding Lender, ifLender Is an insttluilflii whose deposits are so bntired) or lo ai^ Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to oay (he Escrow items no later than the time qrediled under RESPA. Leiufer shall cot ch^ Borrower ror holdhtg and applytng the Funds, annua^ a/udnhtg the escrow account, or veri^ing the Escrow Items, unless Leader p^ Borrower Interest on the Funds and AppEcable Law permiis Lender to roake such a char^ Unless an a^eemeol Is nude in writing or Appilcabte tiw requires Interest to be paid en the Funds, Lender shall not be required to pay Bonower ony tntertsi or earnings on the Ftinds. Borrower and Lender can agree in wrMfl^bowsver.dutlaletest sMI be paid co the Funds. Lender shall give to Bonower, without chain, an amtml awMtrtitfff of the Funds as required by RESPA. If these b a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as deRned under RESPA. Lender shaD account to Bonower for tbe excess limds tn accordance widi RESPA.Ifthere b a shortage ^Fusib heid In esatnv. as d^ned .-' under RESPA. Latdwtosfaali - necessary makenotlQr up dteBorrower sbortam as leqaiied 1^with ta acoodsoce RE^A. andbut RESPA, Bonower shtUtw In no moie pay 12 to Lotder the amount numihly paymenb. If there b a deOden^ of'Funds odd lo escrow, as deOned under RESPA. Lender shall uuttfy Brntmer Boitower as required by RESPA,and Borrower shall pw(0 Lrodcr Lender(he the amouiit atnoi necessary to make up tbedwidemy In accordance witb RESPA,but In no more than 12 modhly payments. poQ payment In ftill of lU sum secured by thb Security Instnnneni, Leodre shaD prompily refimd to Bcnowv apy'Fumb held ty Lender. 4. Chaigcs; Liens. Bonower shall pqr all taxes, asscstmtiib. charges. Ones, and Impositions attributable to the Property wdtlcfa can 8Uato,{martty over thb Secuiire lottiumail. leas^Id payumnb or ground lenb on(be Pnqierty. Ifaiw,and {^ontfflttnl^ Assodidcn Dues.Tecs,and Assessments,irm.To tbe eileiil(hat theseItemsam Escrow Items,Borrower soaD piy them in the maBttcr provided In Section 3/ Bonower shaQ ponmlly Asdaigs any lien widdi has ptoriiy over tus Security Instrumrot unlrn Borrower:(a) agrees m wntb^ to the payment of the cbllgaflon secured ly(be Ben In a to Leader, but only so ioqgu Borrower uperfopnlagsu^agtecmeiit;(b)oonlesUlbeUeobggodftllhby,or delends against cofoicemtQl ofthe Hen In.lega prorredlty whltfa to Lendg's oplclon operate to pmvect the enrarcemeni of tbe lien wbQe those pioceedlogf are pending, but only unUl such proaeolDgs are concluded: or (c) secures from the boldre of tlw lien on a^cemcnl salbfiictoiy lo Lender suoonBntlng the Uto to thb Security Instrument. If Lender dettsmlnes (hat any part of the fkcperty b subjed to a lien wl^ can prloriy over ibb Security bstiument. Leader may give Bonower s notice IdeallQdtig the Ilea Wliblo 10 days of the dale on wldai that nodoe b given. Borrower shall satisfy tbe Ben or take one or more of the actions set forth above In Ihb Section 4. Lender mm mqulie Bonower to pay a cne-tlme cbuge for a real estate lax veriilestiao and/or repotting service used ly Lendo to coDsedloo tHlb thb Loaa S.Propcsfy Insurance. Bonower sbaO keep the Improvemab now cxbting or hcrealUr erected oo the cry tostiea amdnst loss by Ore, faaaaids Inctuded mddn the term 'extendra coverage* and aiy other baords InduArtg. md not Umued ta earthquakes and docds. for widdi Lender reqata Insurance. Thb Insurance shall be malnlihied to the imounb Ondudtog dcdu^Ue tcvcb) and for (he periotb that I^der requites. Wbai Lender requires puisuanl lo Ihd preceding sentences can duuige during the terra of(he L^ The Insurance carrier priding the Insurance shaQ be chosen ly Borrower subject to Lender's sight to disapprove Borrower's choica which right shaO not be exercised unroemnabfy. Lender may teqture Bonower to pay. to connedloo wito thb Loaa either: (a) a ooe>ilffie charge for IIo^ none determlnalloa certlRcatioo and traddi^ services; or (b)a cne-thne dwige for R^ wtni» determination aid certification services and stibsequenl charges eyfa lime rcmqipings or rimltir changes occur which reasonabfy might affect such detciminatloa or certlCcatlcn. Borrower shall abo be responrible for ihe ixx: fts}4e7s APPL SiTOOOlSlSSl •i69a033SS<e (^^■OAfVA) (omi Ptgoaortl Fcnn3047 ttOI 'ntsFt8sentmeQtis''Ac Vstdg* fioot fiid bsckt AcdisRetarMdfjs ClosQRoftbeEscniv. Idol agent UCC 3-403 (bXl) Dated: (Page 10 of 320} Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 25 of 100 PageID# 322 tnitriSOQlieSiOiaSMt P«eai 7 Cf «B payment of any fees Imposed by (he Federal Emeraesn Manasefflefll Agency In connection with the review ofany flood zone detenalnatlon FesuIUog from an objection by Sorrower. If Borrower Eiils (o malnialn aiqr of the coverages desaibed above. Lender may obtain Insurance covera^ at Lender's option end Borrower's erqiense. Lender b uiukr no obligation to purchase any panlcalar type or emottnt of coverage. Therefore such coverage shall cover Lender, but ml^ or might not protect Bonower, Borrower's equity b the Fnaeily, or the contents of the ProiHen^, a^dnst any tbh, nauard or llabiliw and mlghl provide greater or terser covoeffi than was prevtoosfy b effect Borrower adsnmrie^a Oat Ite cost of die bnoanoe ooven^ so obtained aOda sIgnlDcaolIy esioeed the cost of Insurance thai Borrower could have obtained. Atw amounb dlibuised ^ mder thb Section S sfaaB become addUbnal debt of Borrower seemed by Im Security losliuntenL These amounb shall bear Merest at the Note rate from the dale ofdisbursement and shall be payable, wllh such Interest upon noSoe Cram Lender to Borrower requesdngjpayment AU bsutance pwcles required Lender and tenewab of such policies shall be sul^ect to Lender's right to dbapprove such poUdes, shall Include a standard moiteage daose, and shall naine Lender as moitsegee a^or as an oddlUonal toss piyea. Lender shall h«ve ihe right to hold the mlldes and renewal ceitltbales. If Lender icqultes. Borrower shaQ prompt^ give to Lender all iccelpb of paid premiums and ttnewal notices, if Borrower obtains aay fonn ofInsur:^ coverage, not othowbe requbed by Ladtr,for > nrampl notice to tlte insurance canter and Lender. Lender may mah'e proof of loss if riot made prompl^ by Bonower. Unless Lender and Bonower otherwbe agree b writing any bsuiance proceeds, wfaethtf or rot the underlying bniance was rc^iited ty Lender,s^ be applira to testotallon or repair of the Pirtycriy, If ihe rcstoratloo or b econom&lly feasible and Lender's security fo not lessened. Daring repair and restoratloa period, f.end^'r shall have the right to hold such bsunnoc proceeds unfil Leader has bad aa opportunity to bq^ such Frap^ to ensun(he work has been completed to Lender's saiblisciloo, provided that sudt Inspktbn shall be undertaken Dtompt^. Lmtder nay dobutse proceeds for the repaln and cestoiallofl b a sin^e pwment or b aserles or progress p^d otd of(be bsunutce proceeds am shall M the sole cbllgalhin of Borrow.Ifthe restoration or tqalr b not economically feasible or Lender's secoiUy wotdd be lessened, the Insurence picroeds shall be ap^ed to the sums seooed by thb Seccriiy lasttumeat whether ornoi then due, with the excess. If any. paid to Bonower.Such Insurance proceeds shall be appQed b the order provided for b Section 2. If Bonower abandons the Properly, Lmer mw file, negotiate and settle any ava^te bsuiance ond (dated malters. If Bonower does not respond wiihb 30 aiyi to a notice from Leader that the tasurance canter has offered to settle a chlm, dies Lender tasy nrootbte and settle the claim. The SOnby period will begin when the notice b gtvea In eUber event, or If Lender acquires dm Property under ^^n 22 or othefwlse, Bonower herdy assigns to Lender (d Borrower's rigbs to ary Insurance proceeds to an amount not to exceed the amounb unpaid under(be Note or ibb Security Instromeni. and flijaiy other ofBonower's ti^b (other than Ibe il^ to aiy tefimd of aneamed premfuna paid ly Bonowj under an bsuiance policies co^g (be Property, bsofar as sudi il^ are apdlcahle to the coverage of(he Property. Leodv may nse the Insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the Property or to py amounts cnjidd under the Note or thb Security Itstiument whether or rot duo due. 6. Occopanqr. Bonower shall occupy,establish, and use the Property as Bonowcr's principal residence orilhb 60 d^ after the execution of thb Security lutrament and sIuO ooalbue to occupy the Praperty as Borrower's principal residence for al feast one year after the dale of occtqnnty, unlm Lender otoerwlse agrees In willbg. which consetd shall not be uoieasonably vrithhdd, or unless circumstances which ore bqyond Borrower's oontroL 7. Preservation, Mabtcnance and Protection of the Property; Itispcctloiu. Bonower shall not destroy, damage or Impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on Propoty. VVfaet&r or not Borrower b residing b the Property. Borrow shall tla Property b oida'to prevenl the Prapetto from iMciionttng or dMseaslng b vd^ due to lb condltloa Uiticss It b determined juiniant to SecUon 5 mat rqialr orrestoiiilon b not economically feasflrie. Borrow shaft pnmytly repair the if damaged to rcvntd ftuther delerioratlon or damage:. If Insmanoe or co^enma^ proceeds are paid b DOC e1534677 APVb 117000153391 6930J36S4S t^^-OAfVA)(0101) Poa7of IS Form 3047 IfOI IliB Prescntmeift is"Accqited^ Vahie'fon!aiKl ba^ Asd is Rettmid for .agent UCC 3-403(bXD Dated: — <Pago 11 of 320) Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 26 of 100 PageID# 323 lliili ln«tr 13atntCS10a«MA P«g«i 6 Of' 16 consecUon wltb dannge (o, or tho laldng of, chs Piopcity, Borrower shall be respoosible Tor re\|nlrlng or restoitng the Prapetty cidy If Under has released prooMds for such ptopoies. Lrader may dlsbtt^ proceeds for the repairs and restonitton In a slqgle paym^ or to a series of process payments as the work Is completed. If the Instoance or condennalloo proceeds aie not sufildenl to totslr or restore the Property, 'Borrower Is not rdleved ofBorrower's obllgiitlffn for the oompleilQa sath repm or restoration. Under or its agent may make reasoaahle entries upon and Inspections of the Property^ If it has reasonable cause. Under mw Inspect the Interior of the Improvements on the Property. Lender sbaO give Borrower notice at the time ofor prior to such an Interlof InmecSton spedQrh^g jmrh rmotHble criire. 8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be udeBoiIt if. during ilm Loan oppllCBthm piocess. Borrower or ai^ penons or ^Ues acting at the dhectloa of Borrower or with Borrower's knowledge or consent gave material^ ^c. mlslcadl^ or tnaccniate Information or statements to Lender (or felled to provide Lender with material InfonnaUi^ In connection with the Loaa Material representations Include, but sxe not limited to, tepitsenlalloos conoenihtg Borrower's occupajtcy of the Property as Bonower's prtndpa] residence. 9. Protection of Lender's inlcrett In the Property and Rights Under this Security InstrantenL If (a) Borrower lalls to perform the covenants and sgreonenb contained In t^Security Instromeot,(b)thm b a legal proceeding tra might rignlRcant^ affect Undtf's Interest In the PSqictiy and/or righb this Secv^ Instrument (sudi as a procecdlag In baakrapt^, proteie, for condemnation or foifeltuie, for enforcement of a tlea which may attain priority ever tlA Security Instrument or to enforce laws or ic^ilailans). or (c) Bonower has abandon^ the Prqxsty, then Under may do and pay for whatever b reasonable or appropriate to protect Under's Interest In the Property and righb under Ihb Security Instrument. Indudtng protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing ondfor repairing (he Property. Lender s actions can Include, but are not limited to:(a)Pwtg any sums secured by a Uen whta has prMy over tUs Security Instiumeal; appearing In couri; and reasonable attoroeys' feesto protect lb Interest to the PKperty andfor ilj^ under Inb Security bstnnneet. Ir'ffgd'pfl lb secured itfwmnn b a bankiuptiy protcedlng. Seostng (hel^ietty lochtdes. but b not limited to, entering the Property to make lepalis, donge lods, tefdace or boanf up doms aid windows, dmb water frora pipes, building or other ode violations ox dangodus amdlilons, and have tuffltTiw torned on or oft Although Under may take acdon under tUs Section 9, Under does not have to do so and b not any. duty « olillgadon to do sa It h agreed that lendff bents no DabUlty for not taking soy ot aD actions authorized undatfab Section 9. Any amounb dlsbmsed fay Lender under thb Sccdon 9 shaQ become addlttonal ddri of Bonower seemed fay Ihb Security lostnunenL These amounb shall bear Interest at the Note rate Ihnn (he date of disbursema)! and shall be payable, with sudi tnterest, upon noUca Bom Lender to Borrower rcguestlng payment If thb Security Instnnnent b on a leasdiold. Borrower shall com^ with all(he provisions of the lease. If Boirowcr acqulra fee title to the Property,(he (easeindd and them title shall not mefge unless Under agrees to(he merger In writing. 1(L Mortgage Imurante. If Lender required Moxtoage as a condition of nwVtng the Loan, Borrower shall pay (he premiums required to maXnt^^n tbeMorigage TnBifimr In effect if, for soy reason, the Mortage Insurance covm^ required fay Leoder to beavtilabk Bom the nantga® tosurer that previous^ provided such Instnaooe and Bonower was reci^ to make s^arately designated ptymenb toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Bonower shall pay the pxemlunn required to coverage substantially equivalent to the Mortgage Insinenco previously la effect at a cost substantially equivalent to (he cost to Borrower of the Mortgage Insurance previously In effect from an alteintte mnrtgage Insurer sdected ly Lenda. If substantially e^valeol-Mortgage losurance covetnge b not avallabte, Bonower shall continue to pay to Leoder the amount of(he separaidy designated paymenb (btl were due when dm Insuianoe covtrnge cos^ to be in effect Lender wfll accept ose and reteb these (Hmnaib as a non-refundable loss reserve In lien of Mortgage Insurance. Such toss reserve sban be oaa-reBmdaue. notwlthstandlog the Bet that the Loan b uUlicaidy paid b fuU,and Under shall not be required to pay Borrower siiy Interest or eoinlngi on sudi toss reserve: Under can no longer require toss reserve psymtiib If Mciitge« Insurance coverage^ the amount and for the period that Under requlies) provided by an tosurer seleded^ faecmses svaibUe, bobtained,and Lender reqidressqaialdy derignaltd paymenb toward thepremhimsfo 1 Insurance. If Under required Mortgage Insurance as acondltioa of making the tmd Dcirower was DOC StsaaaTe M>n> 11700015)191 6920))6S«S <^^<^(VA)<oioa} PagaOaf It FCfm3047 Itot ThisFieseatmatis Vahie'fioBlaodback, AodisR^BQGd&r ClostBe oftbe Escrow, Ido ofyoorcodzail BXiJ ggeolUCC 3-403(bXl) Dated: (Page 12 of Case 320) 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 27 of 100 PageID# 324 pw. n? w fcgulied to make scpaniely designated pqfmenls lowtid (ha pmnlums for Moitgam Insmanoe, Bomnver sh^ pay(he prcmlUBS te<^red to malnlaJa Mottgaga lasurance la effect a to provlm a Roa-reTuodable loss reseive. tmlll Leader's requlranent for Molgago Insuraoce ends in sccordacoe with zty wittten apeemeflt between Borrower and Lender provldisg for (emlnatlon or ontl](efnlnatloa Is lerpdred by Applicable Law.Nothing In(his Section 10 affects Bonowtr's obligation lo pay Interest at(be tale novlded In(be Note. Mortgage Insurance relmbtmes Lender (or any wty(bat psxtbases the Note) for certain losses It may Inair IfBorrower does not repay tbe Loan as agreed. Botiow b rot a pat^ to(1« Mntgage Insurance: Mortgage Insurers evaluate tbeir total r& on all sudi losuiance In force fiom time to time; and ttay ester into agreentenb with other parties that share or modify Ihtir risk,or reduce losses. These agreemeob ate on (enns aid conditions (hat are satisfactory lo Iho mortgage losoicr and the other party (or pvUcs) lo these agreements. These agreements may teqaire the morigigB bvurer to make peynteitb using atiy source of Binds (bal the mortgage Insurer may tu^ available (which miy Include (kinds cbialotd from Mortgage Itmuance premium^. As 0 result of(bese agreements, Lender, oay purcbaser of the Note, another Insurer, ai^y retosurer, ai^ other entity, or any ainilate of oiy of the foregoing may receive (directly or Indirectly amounb (hat derive (ram (or might be cbaiacteitred as) a portion of Borrower's pqnoenb for Miongage lasurance. In exdiange for sharing or modifying tha moitga^ Insurer's tbk. or redtmlsg losses. Ifsuch agreement provtdn that en affiliate en Lender Idtes a share of ibe Insurer's risk la exchange (or a share of the premiums paid to the Insurer, theairangemenl b oiten termed "captive iGlosurartte." Fkutbei: (a) Arty such agrecmeab wIQ not a(lkct lha amounb (hat Bomnver has agreed to pay for Mortgage Insurance, or any other (ertns of the Loan. Such agreentenb wIQ not inmase the omount Borrower will owefor Mcrtgoge Insurance;and th^ wHI not entitle Borrower to nny icfmuL (b) Any suds agtccmenb vdO not affect the r^hb Borrower has•If any • vrilh respect to the Mot^ge Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of19S8 or any other law.These rights may Indttde the right to receive certain dbdotuies, to request and obtain cancellation of the Mortgage Insarance; to have the Mortgage Insuxanoe termlaated automatfcalfy, andAir(o receive a rtfttad ofany Mortgage Iruiiranoe prtmlums that were unkataed at the time ofsucn canceQation or tcrmlnatbp. 11. Asslgnxncnt of MbocQantcos Proceeds; Forfeiture. All Mlscdhneoas Proceeds are hereby assigned to and shall he paid to Loider. If(be Property is damag^ su^ Mbcrilaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair ofthe Pioperty, If the restoration or repair b eooiumtlcally feasible and Lendw's securly b mn (»«>«>«( During such re^and restorallon pttm Lender sliiiB have the right (o hold such Mbcelhiteous Proceeds mail Lender ha had an opportunity to Inspect such Property to ensure (be wi^ bu been completed (o Lender's satisfaction, proWded that sudi Inspection ahaH be umlcrtaken promptly. Leader may p^ for ihs repairs and restoration lo a single disbaisement or in a scries of progress paymeob as the work b completed. Unless an agreement b made In wrillng or AppUcabla Law requites loteresi lo he paid on sudi Mbcelbneous Proceeds. Lender shall not be required to fay Bcirower any Interest or earnings on sudi Mbcelbneous Proceeds. If tin restoration or repair b not econo^caDy fcasIUe or Lender's security would he lenesed, the Mlscdlaneous Proceeds shall be applied to(he sums secwed by ihb Security Instmniait. wbe^ or not then due. wtih (he excess. If any, paid to Borroww. Sudi MbccHancons Procttds shall be applied b the order provided for b SecttonZ. In the event of a total taking, daltuction, or loss b value of the Pioperty. the Mlscdlaneous Proceeds shall be applied (o(ha sums secured by ihb Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with (he If any.paid b Bonower. b the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss b value of(be Property b which the fair market value of the Properfy Immedlaidy before the partial taking, destruction, or loss b value b equal to or greater (ban the amount of the sums secured by tw Seoirily Instrument Immediately before il» partial '"Wng. desiittdloD, or loss b value, unless Borrower and Lender otbcrwlia ^rte b writing,the sums secured by thb Security Insirumeot shall be reduced by the amount of (he Mlscdlaneous Proceeds multiplied the following rraction:(a) the total amount ofthe sumssecured Immedlalefy before the partial takbg,destruction, or loss b value divided by (b) the fair nurhet value of the Property Immediately before the partial taklog. destruction, or loss b value. Aify balance shall be paid to Bcfnwer. DOC etsaieis M>PL liroooisssss liQAN iissaossesfe •flA(VA)(Oioii P«gOelS Form 3047 1/01 Ibis Fkeseotmentis"Aco^fxVabib fiod aodbadi, And is RetiHoetlfor %eiUUCX:3^(bXl) (Page 13 of 320) InslfilSOSISatOISSaAS p<ei to c t9 In Iho event of a partial taldng, destruction, or loss In value of the huperty In which the fair market value of the Proper^ immedlatefy before the partial taUng, destrudlon, or loss In value b less (be omount of (he sums secured inunedlstely before the partial taking, destruction, cr loss b) valuer Borrower and Lender otherwise agree In wiUlng, the Miscellaneous Iboceeds shall be applied to the «"«« secured (hb Sccurt^ Instrument whether or not the sums are then due. IfIM Proper^ b abandoned by Borrower, or If, after notice by Lender to Borrower (hat tho Opposing Fatly (as deftned In(be next sentence) oners to make an award to settle a dalm for Borrower falb to rapond to Lender within 30 d^ after (he date the notice b ^ven. Lender b aotilmted to collect and apply lite Mbcdlaneous Proceeds either to restoration or rinalr ofthe Property or to(he sums secured by(hb SMutfty Instrument, whether or not therr due.'Opposing Party' means the third par^ (bat owes Boirowct wusceltoeous Proceeds or the party against whom Borrower has a right of acdon in regard to Mbcelloneous Proceeds Borrower shall be in default If aiiy action or proceeding, wbether dvil or criminal, b twym (bat in Lenito's Judgment, could result In forfeiture ofthe Property or other material impairment ofLender's Interest In the Proper^ or ilghb undtf tfab Security Instrument Bonower can cure surA a default and,If acceterailon has occurred, reinstate as provided In Section 19. by causing the action or pnceedlog to be wUh a ru^g Ibat In Lender's Judgment precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material inpainneitl of Under's tntcrest In the Property cr r^hb under ihb Security lostramenL The proceeds ofany award or rf'im for damages that are atlribulable to the Impairment of Lena's Interest In the Property are hereby and shalllb paid to Lender. All Mbcellaneeus Proceeds that are not applied to tesiotatloo or repair of the ftaperty shall besnnUed in the order provided for In Scdlon 2. 12. BoiTDWcr Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not aWalver. Extensloa of(be time for pqrment or modlOallon of amortbatloo of the stuns secured by(hb Secntliy inttmmpnt granted by to Borrower or or^ Successor In Merest of Borrower shall oot openle toieleaso the UabUJty of Borrower or any Soocesscrs In Interest of Borrower. Lender sbaD not be required to comntenoe proceedings agtilnst oiiy Successor to Interest of Bonower or to refuse to extend time for payment cr otherwise modify of the sums secured by thb Securtfy Instrument by teasoo ofany tmit# by(M orlglaal Borrower or any SUooesson in Interest of Bonower. Any ftnbeaiacos by Lender In orntrififig gay itgbi or Veoreify Indudlng, wtdioul limitation, Leodre's aoceplattoe of piymenb from Ihltd persons. esUties or Successors In Interest of Bonower or In amounts less thu (he amount then dne, shall not Ire a waiver of or preclude the exerebe ofai^ right or remedy. 13.Joint sod Several I^blQty: Coslgnm; Suctcsren and Aislgna Bound. Bonower coveoanb and agrees (hat Bonower't obligations and Uablllty shall be Joint and severeL However, ai^ Bonower who eo-slgos(bb Security InsirumesI bul does not execute the Note (a 'co<algoer'0:(a) b co-slgi^g 1^Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and coov^ the co-signer's interest In the Prqretty under Ite terms of(hb Security Instrument;(b) b cot personally obligated to pay the sums secured by thb Security Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lmides and my other Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbm or make any accommodations with regard to (he terms of thb Security Instnunent or the Note ^thoui the co-signer's consent. Sub)ecl to the provisions ofSection 18^ any Successor In Interest of Borrower who assumes Borrower's obligations under thb Security Instrument In writing,' and b approved by Lender, sltall obtain all of Dotrowcr's tidus and beneftb under thb SecutUy Instrument. Borrower sh^ nm be released from Borrower's obligations and liability under thb Security Inslniment unless Lender agrees (o sudi release In wtillng. The covenanU and agreemenb of thb'Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided.In Secdon 20)and beneflt the successon and assigns of Lender. 14. Loon Charges, lender may charge Bonower fees for services performed In connection with Borrower's default, for (he purpose of protecting Lender's Interest In the Property and tighb under thb SecutUy Instrumeni, including Ml not litnlled to, attoriKys' fees, property Inspe^n aitd val^oa fees. In re^id to any other fees, the absence of express audioiUy in lids Security Instrument to charge a spe^c fee to Borrower shall not be construed as a prohlbUIon on die dtaigiog ofsuch fee. Lender may not charge fees thai are expressly prohibited by thb Security Instrument or by Applicable Law. DOC Oi5340SO kPPL SiTOOOlSSaSl a!«930336S4e (^&-eA(VA)(oiou Pgtaotll Form 3047 1/01 ItiB Presentment is OoaHeofteEseaw. ofyoaroosdisct ijenlUCC34(>3(bXl) Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 28 of 100 PageID# 325 (Page 14 of 320> ln«tr!2C02ie0t013aM0 Pts«: tt or 19 If(be Loan Is subject to a law which sets nuudmum loan chaiges, aiul (hat law b floally Intopreted so that the tmerest or ciha loan charm coQeded or to be cdlected In cooncctton with the Inan emed the permitted UffllJs. then: CO aity such loan charge Shan be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce(he charge to the permitted limit; and Cb) any sums alrkdy oollecled from Borrower which exceeded permitted limlb win be refunded to Bocrewo'. Leraer imy cbotM(o mike Ibb rehmd by leduriQg the prtni^ owed unto the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower. If a leiued reduces ptIndpaL (he r^tolro will be treated as a partial preprymenl wUhout any prepayment charge (whether or net a prepryment charge b provided for unto the N(^.Borrower's acce^ance ofany such tefimd matte l^dbed payment to Borrower wQi constitute a waiver ofatgr dgbt ofaction Bonrwer ml^ have orbing out ofsuch ovetdiatge. 15. Notices. AO notices ^ven Borrower or Lento in connedloo with thb Seoirfty Instrument must be In wihlsg. Any notice to Btarowcr In conncdlon with thb Security Instiumeat shall te deemed to have been given to Borrower wdien mailed by first dass mall or when aduilly dellveted to Borrower's notice address If sent by other mcsns. Notice to aty one Borrower shaD coastltule notice to all Boirowen unless Applicable Law expressly teguhes otbm^ The notice address shall be the Proper^ Address unless Borrower has designated asubstltute notice address by notice to Lender. Borrower shaD pirm^tly notify Lento of Borrower's change of address. IfLender qiedifles a procedure for repotting Bonowd's ^ge of oddren. then Borrmver shall onfy report a change of address through that specUIed procedure. Ihere may be only one designated notice address t^er(Us SeotrUy Instrument al any one time. Aiy notice to Lento shall be given by delivering It or by mailing II by first class mail to Lender's address slatra hoein unless Lento has designated another address by notice to Btvtowef. Any notice In connccUcn tWtb ihb Security Instrument shall not ba deemed to have been given to Leader until edually received by Lento. Ifaqy notice required by thb Security Instrument b also r^ulicd unto Appltcable Law.(be Appl^Ie Law requirement wtil satisfy the coneqwndlng requirement unto ihb Securlfy lostrttmcnL 16. Govemlng Law; SeverabOlfy; Rules of Coastructloa. Thb Stcuri\|y testiumeot shall be governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction In wlilcb the Pbvetfy b located. All ifghb and obllgaUons contained In thb Security Instrument are subject to any icqulrantnb and Untitalloas of AppIhaUe Law. Applicable Law migbl cxpUdtly or Implldlly bllow the patties(o a^ by contract or U be rijeol. but sudi silence sbaO not be cooMiued as qndb^oa ^rimt agreemcot by conttacL In the evail tiat any provision cr dausa ofthb Security Instremest or tie Note coofilds wUb Actable Law.sodi cosffid sbaO not olTect other provisions of thb Security Instrument or the Note which can be givea effi^ withoal the conlDctlog provision. As u^ In thb Security Instrument: words of (he masculine gender shaD mean and Indude corresponding neuter words or words of the feminine gendo; (b) words In the singular ihaU mean and include (he plural and vice versa; and(d the word 'may gives st^ dbcreUon wKfaout ai^ obligation to take any action. 17. Borrower's Copy. Bonower shall be ^veo one copy ofthe Note and of thb Secuiify InstrumcnL 16. Transfer of (he Properfy or a Beneficial Intimt in Borrower. As used in Ihb Sedbn 18. 'Interest In the Properfy" means aify legal or btneBdal tnlerest to iha Propcriy. Indntog, but not limiled ta those benefidal Inlensb traosfetted to a bond for tod.cono&ct for deed.Ins^menl sales(xmii^ orescrow agreement,the intent ofwhich b(be transfer oftlfle by Borrower at a fiiture date to a purdiasei. If all or aify part of the Praperfy or any Interest in the Ptoperfy b sold or transferred (or If Borrower b net a lulora] person and a beneficial Interest In Bonower b sold or transferred) wUhout Lento's prior written consent. Lender may reoulre Immediate payment In full of all sums secured Ify Ibb Security InstntmcoL However.Ihb option shall not be exetcbed by Lender Ifsuch cxcrdse b prohibited by Applicable Law. If Lender exercbes (1^ option. Lender 'sbaQ gtvo Bonower nctloe of accdttatton. The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the dale the notice b given In accordance with Section IS within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by thb Secmify Instrument If Borrower faib to pay these sums prior to the expiration of thb period. Lender miy Invoke any remedies permitted by tbb Seoirify imtrumenl without further notice or demand on Bonower. 19. Borrower's Right to Reinstate After AccdenitloiL If Bonower meeb certain coodltions. Borrower shall have the right to have enfcrcemcnl of Ihb Security Instrument dbcontinued at any time prior to the eaiiiesi of: (a) five digs before sale of tin Ptoperfy pursuant to any power of sale contained in tltis poc itsaeasi APPL itveooissssi 693eS)SS48 •6A(VA)(0101} P«g»tlari3 FormSIMT 1/01 TUsPieseotmentis fioidaiKlback, OosnRoftiieEsaov. AodisRetunKdffiS lofyoorooB&aGt life UCC 3-403(bXl) Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 29 of 100 PageID# 326 (Page 15 of Case 320) 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 30 of 100 PageID# 327 ln>lri2eO>tOOIO pu«) ta OF to Secutlly liutnuneot;(b)such oilier period as Applicable Law tnlghl specify for(he lenolnatloa of Donower's right to rdnsisle; or (c) entiv of a Judgmeot euordaa (Iris Scourity Instiuffleiil. nmse coodlllons ore (hat Bomwen (a) pays L^er oil sums udilch then would ra due under (his Security bBtrunteot and (he Note as If BO acceleration bad occurred; (b) cures am (Mbult of 319 otter covenants or agreements; <c) pays ail expenses tncuned in eBforditg this Securify uatrumenl, Including, but not limited to. reasonable aUomm' fees, property tospectlon aim valuation fees, and other fees Incurred for tte purpose of nrotecUng Leader's Interest (n Ite Broperty and rights under this Security Instrument; and (d) tarn sura action as Lender reasonably require to assure that Lender's Interest In Ite Ptope^ and rights undo- this Security Instrusienl. and Borrower's obligation to p^ tte sums secured by this Se^fy Instrumenl. shall comlnue undianged. Lender may rcoulre &t Borrower pay sudi reinstatement sums and ermenses In one or more of tte following fcnns, as sefected by LendBi cash; (b) money order; (<) oerti^ check, bank chedt. treasurer's check or cashier's ^edi. provided a^ such ^eck b drawn u^ an Institutibn whose dibits are Insured by a federal agency, instromentally or entity; or (d) Elecirenic Foods Transfer. Upon remstatement by Bortowo. ihb souilty Jastrument and cbilgallons secured hereby shall teoalii luUy efiective as If no accdemttoo had occurred. However, lUs tfgb to reinstate shaU not a^ify in tte case of accdetallon under Section 18. 20. Sale of Note; Chanm of Loon Servlcer; Notice of Grievance. Tte Note or a partial Interest In tte Note (togetherwiihlhisSecuniylastrumenO can be sold ffite or more limes without prior notice to Borrower. A sale mighl result In a diaitge'In Ite entity Qmown as tte'Loon Servlcei) that oouecis Periodic Payments due under the Note and this Secuii^ Instrument and performs other mortgage loan servicing obligations under Ite Note, this Security Instrumenl. and'Aiqillcable Law. There also might be one or more changes of the Loan Servkerunrdxled to a sale of the Note. If there b a darme of(he Loan Servlcer. Borowcr will be given written notice of tte change which will slate the name and address of the new Loan Servlcer. the address to widcb payments ihoula be made end ai^ other Inforaatlon RESPA requires In comcctlon vrilh a notice oftnnsfer of sctvidog. If tte Note b sold am ihoeaRcr Ite Lon is serviced by a Loan Sovtcer otter than (he purchaser of the Note; tte mortgage loan scrvirieg diU^oas to Borrower will remain wUb ite Loan Sei^cer or be transferred to a sirccessor Loan Servlcer and are not assumed by tte Note purdiaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser. I Neither Bomnver i»r Lender roay conmiecc^ j<rin. or be Joined to eny Jndidsl action (as cither an indivfdnal Bt^ganl or(he member ofa c&s)that arises Bum the o&r party's actlcos pursuanl to(hb Serarify Instrument or(hat alleges thai the olber party has breadad aiiy proton of. or any duly owed 1^ reason of. (hb Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender las noli^(he otho- raity(with sudi notice given In cofflpllance with the lequlxemenb of Section llQ ofsuch alleged hieadi and airotm tte other party tereto a reasonable period aller the giving ofsuch notice to take corrective action. If Appltcahle Law ptovfdes a time ^od widra must elapse before certain action can be takea that lime period will be deemed to be reasonable lorpuxposcs ofthb pangmph. Tte notice of accderatlon end opportunity to cure Given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and ine notice of aoceleratlon given to Borrower pursuant (0 Section 18 shall be deemed to saUsfy(he notice and opportunity(0 late corrective action provblons ofIhb Section 20. 21. Huardous Subsloncca. As used In thb Section 21: (a) 'Hazardous Substances" are those substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances, poOuianb. or wastes by Envtronmental Law and (be foUowIrtg substances: oasollse. kerosene, other Oam^Ie or(oidc petroleum products, toxic pesticides herblddes, volatlla sorvenb, nntalab contahiheg asbestos or formalddiyde. and radioactive (b) "Emdronmental Law" means federal laws and lam of^jurisdiction wbm the Propetfy b located (hat relate to health, safety or envboiunenlal protection; (<0 'Environmental Cleanup" Indudes ai^ response action, remedial adion, or removal acdoo. as defined In EnvtoniMnlal Law and w an 'Environmental Condition" means a condition that con muse,contribute(0.or otherwbe trigger an Kwlronmental Cleanup. Borrower shall not cause or petntU (he presence, use. dl^osal storago. or release of any Hazardous Sobstonces, or (hieatea to release any Hazardous Substances, on or In tte Properfy. Borrower shall not do, Ror allow anyone dsa to do; anything aJTectlng the fyoperty (a) thai b In vldatton of any Environmental Law. (b) which creates on Eovlronmental Condition, or (c) whh^ due to tte presence, use. or rdease of a Hazardous Substance, aeates a condition that adve^y aflecb the value of the Property. The piecc^g two sentences shall not spply to the presence, use. or storage on the Property of smdl quantities of Hazardous Substances (hat ore geoaralfy recognized to be apjiroi^te (0 normal residential uses and to iT^ttu^»iianfft» of the Property(bidudl^ but not limited to, basstxdotis substances In consumer producb). DOC 0l924a03 jwpL ot-rooosssssi ■ssaossssra (ffit-eA(VA)totoii ..j56£ajS" p9ucns Fonn3047 1/01 TtusPBstatawiiis Yah# sidbski CtefflgofflieEsaow. ldOJ8t agent UCC 3-403 (bXD Dated: i-' (Page 16 of Case 320} 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 31 of 100 PageID# 328 In«triaeo3i69toi3eo4a PtB«: la OP 10 Botrowet aliall promptly give Lender written notice of(a) any laveatlgiilon. claim, denand, lavodt or other ectlcn by any govemnuntal or legulatoiy agency or private patty Involving (he Profieity and aigr Hazardous Sidntance or Envbonmcntal taw vritlcb Bonowcr has sctoal knowledge; (b) aigr Envtroomental OmMioa, Indudlr^ but not limited to, any spSIIitg, leaking, dtscbaxgOi release or ihiest of release of any Hazardous Substance, and (c) any csndltloa caused ly (he presence, use or rdease of a Hazardous Substance wblcb adversely afleds the value of the Proper^. If Booower bams,orb notUIed ly any govcnunoiial or regulator authorl^. or any pilvale party,(hat aiiy removal or other lemedlalton ofany Hazardous Substance affedlng the Ftopeity b necessary. Borrower sbaB promptly take aD necessary remedial actions in accordance wlifa Envbonmenti] Law. Nothing bereia dull create any obUgatloQ on Le^ for an Envtroomental Cleanup. NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS, Borrower and Lender firrther covenant and agree as follows: 22. Accdcfutlon; Remedies. Lender ihaQ give nellee to Borrower prior to accrferotton foUowing Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement In thb Security Instnment Qrut not prior to accdcrotlon under Section 18 unless AppBcable Law provides otbenvbe). The rrotice zhaO specify; (a)' the default; (b) the action tvquiicd to one the defotdt;(c)a date^ rwt tm than 30 ditys fyom the date the notice b ^vest to Borrower, by wfaldi the default n^ be aired; and (d) that fallim to cure the defoult ojt or before the dale spedSed In the notice mc(y result to occdcratloa of the sums secured by (hb Security Instrument and sale of the Property. The notice shall further Inform Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the to btlitg a couil action to assert the non-cxbteace ofa default or oity other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sole. If the defoult b not cured on or before the date spedfltd In the notice; Lender at lb option may require Immediate payment la full of all sums secured by thb Security lostroment wUhout further dcm^ and may invoke the power of sole and any other remedies permitted bv A\|qillcahle Low. Lender shaO be entitled to coBcct aQ Incurred In puisuli^ the remedies provided In tlds Section 22,Indudlng, hot not Dmlted to, reasoaahle attorn^'fees and Gostt oftitle cvldcate. If Lender Invokes the power of sale, Lender or Tnistce shall give to Borrower, the owner of the Property, and all other pcnons. notice ofsale as required by AppU^le Law.Trustee sfaoQ give pabBc notice ofsole by advertising. In accordance With AppIIcaUe Low,once a week for two ntcoesslye weeks In a nevnpaptr having general drcubUon In the county or dty In widdi any part of the Property b located, and by such addUlonal or any dlffckeiU form of advcrtbemenl the Tnotco deems advisable. T^tee mays^ the Prepcrfy on(he cl^tb day after tbe Bret advertbemeot or any day thereafter, but not btcr than 30 days fcUov^(he lost advertbcmmt Thtstce, withotit demand on Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to the hlghttt Udder at the tfane and place and under the terms designated In the Rodoe of tale in one or more parcds and in aqy order Trustee drtrrmlnts. Thistee may postpone tale of aQ or any pared of the Proptrfy by advcrlblng In accordance with Applicable Law.Lento or lb deslgnee may purcbase the ^perfy at aqy sale; Trustee slinll dcBvcr to the purcbaser T^tee's deed convcylflg the Property with special warranty of title. The redtab to (he Trustee's deed ihaQ be prima fode cvldeace of the truth of the statemenb made thcrdn. Trustee sbaQ apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order: (n) to dbcharge the expenses of execotlng the trait. Including a reasonable commbslon to Trustee; (b) to dbduuge all tax^ levies, and assessment, with cosb and Interest If these cosb have priority over the lien of thb Security Instrument, Including the due pro rata thereof for the current year; (c) to dbcharge In the order of theb priority. If any, the renatnlng debb und obligations secured by thb Security Instrument, and aity Qens of record tnTctlor to thb Security Instrument under wbkh sale b made, with lavritd Interest; and, (d) the residue of the proceeds shaQ be paid to Borrower or Borrower's asrigns. Trustee shaQ sot he lequbcd to take possession of the Property prior to the sale tkcrcofor to ddlver possesrion ofthe Property to the purchaser at the sale. COC 0153480) APFL •>10e01S))91 ^. LOAM •iS930))<S4e .UAtyA)(OtOO l>«o»11of II Fonn3047 1/01 IbisFiesGatnKBtis 'ahig'fioQlaQdbakt CtesmeofdieEsaow. ItioQSofyoarcos&SEt ag^UCC 3-403(bXJ) Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 32 of 100 PageID# 329 CERTIFICATION REGARDING CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS FOR FOREIGN BANKS The information contained in this Certification is given pursuant to Sections 3318(j)ond 5318(k)ofTitle 31 ofthe United Stales Code, as added by sections 313 and 319(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107- 56). The undersigned financial institution. Branch Banking and Trust Company on behalfofitsforeign branchy(the "Foreign Bank")hereby certifies as follows: A.Correspondent Accounts Covered by this Certification This Certification applies to all correspondent accounts established for the Foreign Bank by Covered Financial Institutions. B.Physical Presence/Regulated Affiliate Status The Foreign Bank maintains a physical presence in the Cayman Islands. This means that the Foreign Bank: • Has a business address of, Branch Banking and Trust Company, c/o Intertrust Bank, 190 Elgin Avenue, Grand Cayman KYI-9005, Cayman Isl^ds where it employs one or more individuals on a full-time basis and maintains operating records related to its banking activities. • Is authorized to conduct banking activities in the country where its place of business is located. •Is subject to inspection by the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority,the FDIC and the NC Commissioner ofBanks that licensed the particular Foreign Bank to conduct banking activities. C.Indirect Use of Correspondent Accounts No Correspondent Account maintained by a Covered Financial Institution may be used to indirectly provide banking services to certain foreign banks. Foreign Bank hereby certifies that it does not use any Correspondent Account with a Covered Financial Institution to indirectly provide banking services to any foreign bank that does not maintain a physical presence in any country and that is not a regulated affiliate. D.Ownership Information The Foreign Bank is wholly owned by BB&T Corporation whose shares are publicly traded. Publicly traded means that the shares are traded on an exchange or an organized over-the-counter market that is regulated by a foreign securities authority as defined in section 3(a)(50) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(50)). Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 33 of 100 PageID# 330 E.Process Agent CT Corporation is a resident of the United States at the following street address: 225 Hilisborough Street, Raleigh, NO 27603, and is authorized to accept service of legal process on behalf of the Foreign Bank from the Secretary of the Treasury or the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Section 5318(k) of title 31, United States Code. F. General The Foreign Bank hereby agrees to notify in writing each Covered Financial Institution at which it maintains any Correspondent Account of any change in facts or circumstances reported in this Certification, Notification shall be given within 30 calendar days of such change. The Foreign Bank will make such notification by publication on the BBandT.com website. Any Covered Financial Institution using this certification should check the BBT.com web site periodically to obtain updated certified information. Foreign Bank does not undertake to otherwise give notice to any Covered Financial Institution ofany change in the Foreign Bank's certification. The Foreign Bank understands that each Covered Financial Institution at which it maintains a Correspondent Account may provide a copy of this Certification to the Secretary ofthe Treasury and the Attorney General ofthe United States. The Foreign Bank further understands that the statements contained in this Certification may be transmitted to one or more departments or agencies of the United States of America for the purpose offulfilling such departments' and agencies* governmental functions. I, Ranea P. Sanders, certify that I have read and understand this Certification, that the statements made in this Certification are complete and correct, and that I am authorized to execute this Certification on behalfofthe Foreign Bank. Executed on this day of 0 iT 2013. lea P. Sanders, Senior Vice President BSA/AML Group Operations Manager Branch Banking and Trust Company Received and reviewed by: Name: Title; For: [Name ofCovered Financial Institution] Date: Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 34 of 100 PageID# 331 MIN: 1002711-0000014787-4 Loan Number: W265949MA InterestOiJly ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE (Six-Month LIBOR Index (As Published in The Wall Street Journal)- Rate Caps) THIS NOTE CONTAINS PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR CHANGES IN WIY INTEREST RATE AND MY MONTHLY PAYMENT. THIS NOTE LIMITS THE AMOUNT MY ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE CAN CHANGE AT ANY ONE TIME AND THE MAXIMUM RATE I MUST PAY. JXJLY 15, 2005 Massachusetts ID.VC] lC«ty] isuwi 50 LOVELL ROAD, HOLDEN , MASSACHUSETTS 01520 [Piroper^ A4dms\| 1. BORROWER'S PROMISE TO PAY ^ In return fox a loan that I have received. T promise to pay U.S. $ 248,000.00 (this amo^t Is "Principal"), plnsintcrest. to the order of Lender. Lender is HOMBBRIDGE MORTGAGE CORP, A NEW YORK CORPORATION 1 will make all payments under this Note in the form of cash, check or money order. ^ ^. I uttdetstand that I-ender may transfer this Note. Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is enhded to receive payments under this Note is called the "Note Holder." 2 INTT.REST Interest will be charged on unpaid principal until the ftdl amount of Principal been ^ interest at a yearly rate of 6.200 %. The inlexest rate 1 will pay naay change in accordance with Section 4 of mis Note. The interest rate required by this Section 2 and Section 4 of this Note is the rate I will pay both before and after any default described in Section 7(B) of this Note. 3. PAYMENTS ^the iBt day Of every month, beginning on SEPTEMBER 1, 2005 . Before the First Principal and Interest Payment Due Date as described in Section 4 of this Note, my payr^t will consist only ^^foL^rduf^n"^^ princi^alance of this Note. Thereafter. I will pay principal and inicmst by making a wm^ my and interest beginning on the First Principal and Interest Paym^t Due Dale as described in Section 4 of this Note. I will make these payments cveiy month until I have paid all of the p^clpal md interest and any other charges described below that I may owe undex this Note. Bach monthly poy^nt will be ap^led" scheduled due date, and if the payincni includes both principal and interest, it will ho applied on AUGUST 1, 2035 .1 still owe amounts under this Note, I will pay those amounts m fiiU on that date, which OAK DRXVE, SYOSSET, NEW YORK 11704 or at a different place if required by the Note Holder. (B) Amount of My Initial Monthly Payments oo-i i-r before the First Principal and My initial monihly payment will be in the amount of U.S. 3X,26X33 ^ ^ . . ,. Tntere^t Pavmcni Due Date thereafter it will be in an amount sufficient to repay the piincip^ and in^st at t^ rate deiennined as described in Section 4 of Not© in substamially equal installments by the Maturity Date. The Note Holder will notify me prior to the date of change in monthly payment. Smm to m^moSy^^t wUl reflect changes in the impdd principal of my toan ai^ in the ' must^The No» Holder will determine my new inrerest rate and the changed amount of my monthly payment in accordance with Section 4 of this Note. 4. ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES interest rate I will pay will change to an adjwtable on which my 2008 .and the adjustable interest rate I will pay may change on that day every sixth could initial fixed interest rate changes to an adjustable interest rate, and each date on which my jus change, is called a "Change Date." CONV 9 OC.ARM InrarsnOnly Notn pngo 1 of 3 PG-477e I0<»10> Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 35 of 100 PageID# 332 (B)The Index . , Begummg with the first Change DaCe» my interest rate will be based on an Index. The "Index" is the average of inierbank offered rales for six month U.S. dollar-denominated deposits in the London market ("LIBOR"), as polished in The Wall Street JoumaL The most recent Index figoxe available as of the date 45 days before the Change Date is called the "Current Index." . ^ .r . If the Index is no longer available, the Note Holder will choose a new index that Is based upon comparable mfonuauon. The Note Holder will give me notice of this choice. <C) Calculation of Changes Before each Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate my new interest rate by adding SIX AND 200/1000 percentage points( 6.200 %)tothc Current Index. The Note Holder will thra round the result of this addition to the nearest one^ighth of one percentage point (0.125%). Subject to the limits stated in Section 4(D)below, this rounded ■will be my new interest rate undl the next Change Date. The Note Holder will then determine the amount of the monthly paymeiU that would be sufficient to repay the unpaid principal that I am expected to owe at the Change Date in fiill on the Maturity Date at my new interest rate in substantially equal payments. The result of this calculation will be the new amount of my monthly payment. (D) Limits on Interest Rato (Hianges • .i. Thc interest rato 1 am required to pay at the first Change Date will not he greater than 9 < 200 % or less tban 6.200 %. Thereafter, my interest rate will never be increased or decreased on any single Change Date by mom th^ ONE AND 000/lOOO percentage point(s) ( 1.000 %) from the rate of interest 1 have bwn paying for the preceding six months. My interest rate will never be greater than 12.200 %or less than 6.200 %. (E) Bffectiye Date of Changes , My new interest rate will become effective on each Change Date. I will pay the amount of my new iranthly pa^nt beginni^ on the first monthly payment date after the Change Date until the amount of my monthly payment changes again. tite efltefiw^te of any change in my interest rate and/or monthly payment, the Note Holder wll to me a notice of such change. The notice will include information required by law to ^ given to mc and also the ncle and telephone number of a person who will answer any question I may have regarding the notice. and OB OUs Not. (Ux. "P^t Princip., and So««a. Payment Due Date") shall be the first monthly payment date after AUGUST 1, 2008 Th^toTright^to^I^^paym^o^ at any time before they otti J"®-^ is known as a "Full prepayment." A prepayment oneoforonly partofofmythemonthly more unpaid principal payments,is my known due ^date a wParti^be ^ «« more than same os^ Prepayment.atI any amount. I may make a Pull or a Partial Px^ayment musttto. sdU make each later ^ payment as it becomes due and in the P«p.yn«n. P«>a..y Addondnn, penalty. will be treated as a partial Prepayment. 7. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED 3 .ooHtf w P'V—' in««, only. of principal and lni«ea. I will pay this late charge promptly but only once on each late payment. ® Iho Ml amount of «dx monthly payment ott the date it is due. I wiU he in default. ^Ird^'ftSlt'Sfc Note Holder may send tne.a ^-n^^ certain date, the Note Holder may at Ic^i 30 days after the date on which the notice is mailed to me or the interest that 1 owe on that amount. That date must be at leasi ju uays aiwi delivered by other means. deM.lt. the Note Holder does oot ne^m ^ to pay immediatriy in Ml as described above, the Note Holder will still have the right to do so If I am in default at a later time. V 'VWM IntcmwiOnlY Not" „ « .« >9^io> t»wa««3 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 36 of 100 PageID# 333 (E) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and Expenses If the Note Holder has Tequired me to pay immediately in lull as descatbed above, the Note Holder will have the light to be paid back by me foi all of Its costs and expenses in enfoidng this Note to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. Those expenses include, for example, reasonable attoxneys* fees. 8. GIVING OF NOTICES Unless applicable law requires a different method, any notice that must be given to me under this Note will be given by delivering it or by mniimj h by first class mail to me at the Property Address above or at a different address if 1 give the Note Holder a notice of my different address. Unless the Note Holder requires a differeni method, any notice that mnst be given to the Note Holder under this Note will be given by mailing it by first class tnaii to the Note Holder at the address stated in Section 3(A) above or at a diffbtent address if I am given a notice of that different address. 9. OBLIGATIONS OFPERSONS UNDER THIS NOTE If more one person signs this Note, each person is fully and personally obligated to keep all of the promises made in this Note, fTMrhtrting the promise to pay the full amount owed. Any person who is a guarantor, surety or e^orsei of this Note is also obligated to do these things. Any person who takes over these obligadons, including the obligations of a guarantor, surety ox endorser of this Note, is also obligated to keep ah of the promises made in this Note. The Note Holder may enforce its rights under this Note against each person individually or against all of us together. This means that any one of us may be required to pay all of the amotmts owed under this Note. 10. WAIVERS ^ ^ V, . ^ u I and any other peison who has obligations under this Note waive the lights of Presentment and Notice of Dishonor. -Presentment" the right to require the Note Holder to demand payment of amounts due. "Notice of Dishonor" means the right to require the Note Holder to give notice to other persons that amounts due have not been paid. 11 SECURED NOTE In addition to the protecdons given to the Note Holder under this Note, a Mortgage, Drod of Trust, or S^rity D^d (the "Security Insbtument"), dated the same date as this Note, protects the Note Holder from posrible losses tbaiim^t result if I do not keep the promises that I make in this Note. That Security Instrument describes how and und« what conthdons 1 n»y be required to make immediate payment in full of all amounts I owe under this Note. Some of those conditions read as follows: If all or any part Of the Property or any Jnteresi in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) mt^t lender s prior wntten consent, immediate payment in fiiU of aU sums secured by th^s bounty Instrument. However, this opdon not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable t^w. « If Lento exerciiBS <Us option. Lender shaU give Borrower nonro of neriod of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given m accorda^e with Secuon 15 wid^ whi^ slower most oav all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums^or to the any rLedics pemdttcd by this Security Instrument wrthout fimhcr nodce or demand on Borrower. WITNESS THE HAND(S)AND SBAL(S)OP THE IH^fDHRSIGNED. (Seal) t -Borrower HTVROIiD Xj - HARRIS IV (Seal) ^unu>wtdri^evttSiJo«Sy&^ee8,AtrivJiloiionYeasuiy -Borrower WITHOUT RECOURSE HOMEBRIDOEtllORTOA^E COl (Seal) -Bortowef [EN. TREASURER (Seal) pyny Tpyyig OP PAYTOTHE ORIiERr^F ■" -Borrower COUNmVWIDE HOME LOANS INC. WtTKOUT recourse COUNTwJwDB Orig/mif On/yJ COUNT^VjsionOFTTUEASURY BANK.NA lavMASpocW CONV BY_ 9 BC.AAM intof«MOrtiY Not* Mana^ngDhectoe Onga 3 of 3 Pe-a270 (04101 VICE PRESIDENT HOMEBRIOGE MORTGAGE BANKERS Uniform Residential Loan Application EJ tfie mma <a ntots ef Booowo'* spsuto wlU not b» oitd oi o boiis(or ton qiuSnestnn, but hit orhor nsUfintstnust bo coaiWorod MUio Uw^rrowtr ra^du n a ooimnunlly prepetty atals, iho eeeuitty(voperty b locoiod In a community propsrty auto, of the Borrower is roiyiBB on oaief pmpuly loeaiad bi a cotmminlty propony oiato as a bitts for ropaymont of tha ioaa ~ I. TYPE OF MOBTTSAGE AMD TERMS OF LOAN KOMtoo (_t\|VA ^nConvemional 1 tOlhait Acooey Caso Mumber Umlsr Caso Numtier Appferfon Ql FHA '^USOAmutol waasftoMA Arasum imcpestRaie ^na^tenr IPhodlUto Otlur(axplalnl: 6JU)0 % 380 He 1 Sublactnopefty Address btf«et.city.natt&2IP\| - - Kd.of Units 50 LOVEU RD.HOLOEN,WORCESTER MA 01520 1 Lcesi Dasenpaen of sutatot Prapflity (eusch daaenpton If nateseMyl Yesr Beat SECTiON-BLOCK-LOT: 1948 Furpbiq of wnil^^Parehaso 1"'loanstnietlcn l_\|Diiior(oxptmn): nopsny wlu bt; IXltteflnanea 1 . iCanilruaiBn-Permannni tioa areettstnteaothpamaaentloan. ad Antoitnt&tabftsUeAS jiall'retentValaeeflnl I(b)Cost of Imprewamcnts iTotal (a + U J S Is _ Ls_ Cion9>/ete tUs Una U thb Is a reRasace loan. Yosf anginal Coat I Amount Existing(Jans Ptapoio of Raflnaneo Oaiolbatmpmvomsnta \| frmda \| jtobaroaJo ApiyTVud 11 2004 S 271000.00 Is 2B9470.00 Cash'Out/Dobt Conso CatliS ivtsniior m wtdcti Itlta vrto fia ItsM tetatowbibelnldtn: HAROLD HARRIS & SHAUNA HARRIS iJGINTLY r \|FeegmpIa Souco of Oewn Payment^etOamam Qiarsoo and/orSubonllnata ^inanang(axpiam) r~lIx9J8ho!d 'l>rw npwefta dc«) Borcower HI. BORROWER IWFORMATIOM CaBorrow&r Botrewsf's ttania(biehtds Jr.or Sr.U appBcsliIo} CO'Bcnawor'a Mama (tnetuda Jr. orSr.If eppileaiia) HAROLD HARRIS SHAUNA HARRIS 1 Seifel StstfOyCrMbv 1 HanrMMfMl «i«a cMi) aseiHMissmnnr) Ttt.Sdi«ei tailiiSta>9(T<MrMtr hOM now(Ml.»«M«0 Dai(MkV9orrrTT} VivSdioal 010688692 j 50B-829^499 02/08/1985 529.732670 S08'82d.a489 08/0S/1O7S 1 Otpafcai(001tsMOf0»aanMB\| 0«K84«ttewllOtd by BaROwn) m. 0 \|«0» Ugenua •a Q ]«sc Presont Address(tbcel. dty< ototo,2iP) \| fj^Sex N».iat; aftatentAddn8ss<stroot,dty,atalOiZIPl T !"*** — 31 50LOVQJ.ro 50LOVELLRD HOLOEN,MA 01520 HOLOEN,O/IA 01520 MaiBng Addnsst,If ifiilotent from Prasant Addrcsa MaSIng Addtass.I)dilfsronl from Present Address 60LOVELLRO 60LOVELLRD Hottton.MA 01520 Holdan.MA 01520 If nsiding atpnsant addressfwrless than two yoara, eompUtto tfte foBowut^ PaflBerAddrossUtreat,ctly,state.2IP\| HhVts Fanner Addrasafstraat.cay.otata.ZP) Irnm «».«« N&ma & Address of Empfeyar \| \|Self Emptayad Vll.atfis\|9b Hama&AddwttolEmplaynrl jSotf Employed VM.nc!iilM> 0Y5M 2Y11M JOS A.BANKS tta.mtrtrtS bilM»Om BJ'S WHOLESALE Ym tuoliytab <M Bi* 500 HANOVER PIKE etwrniybn'MiBa 2088 Bay St elwnlwnraMii HOLOEN,MA 01S20 5 TAUNTON,MA02780 5 PesluaiVftUe/rvpe ofSusinsas aisneineMaxd.mcMdi) PosliiaiVTliterrypa of Businass Btthw fNtti STORE MANAGER 508051^702 PAYROLLASSISTANT S0a5516g05 //aapbyadla current posUlM torless tften iwo years erffcuaentlf em/r/ayerfisinsre(fton aneposltleo,eoivplete the feUovnt^ Wama& Address of Emptayarp"!Self EmpteYod fillet fltmo & Address of Emplayor \| \| Self Emplayod OtUStImB\| 03/0210/04 TARGET STORES HcMMfbtcstre MvMrtxare PAYROLL DEPT S S 330 TURNPIKE RD WESTBOPOUOH.MA 01B81 Potitconnitfenvpe of Butmasa B»«n RareiMlfu CMi) PoiltianrnuD/fVpe a\|Susmess Bonai anon* Snd.M«t mM MANAGER 5083661426 Nama & Address of Employer p~]Self Emplsyed Name & Address of Einpfayor p~\|Self Employed Odottbon.lt] MmWybon, MtaOlyliaaiB, S t PostttGiyntian'ypo of Buitness BtfiMMA flfiAs tihdL a«8ccdd Poaltba/ntfa/TVPa of ewnuns RantencS uM ftMStttNibnaes am 1 1 J ./ rre«ici4 rtuMMMforDtan CIA4 tsnboi mm 1 ^jjj 1 r»iitoebyTbtta>«iu<naegwp»iri>.i«fc-»»»«»»<rtmi«.fi'wi h Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 37 of 100 PageID# 334 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 38 of 100 PageID# 335 HOMEBRIOGE MORTGAGE BANKERS 1 1 ,— Bmi Micilirir tneni Beiiemr Celewwd ntd etttbdMeiiaitr Pimai hipiNd ((•diindth^ti OntnifJ.tHsni » 3760.00 S 2739^)0 « 6469.00 (CiM » 1 Qgtnwi 1BS3.19 * 1281.33 t>»iiii» OdwrnuKaiig 9An 623.17 tewmaw* 56.42 EB>12 BMUndOMtllU anlXiuiTim 213.66 9»fl2 NnSiMillacatH ktatsm bMom OtherIbdm tioctehtta Mam-awAwn Bm e»oitcuM.Mad Oho: Tdd t 3750.00 9 2739.00 ■ 8469.00 tfdd 9 1823.29 9 2183.74 Die SmrihiOlhtilamw Hw)wtAeiiMT<dd«qB«t.«tM»iim!tB>1«ifti«teBfwtndtab»imdi<gtld 9Mtmdta)uCl«iew(BfdiaMlihoml»h«»»BcaatWti«lfwm>ltittMt(iih MonMrAimnt t aaUeuxwgAOfUtfbMrpnMnudeaceatEteacdtmsettaMCMiM^UttilMiouMlSifctldititttavacd. K(Me»8«cia»tffit9nwiceatldi4itaBU9«n«e«»Smtisaa«sd «c$poiQhi nail btcaaffaM ibout CwitpKM llna CBo^M I^JcMly QfMicslV UietSlindRAidAti«tt. Ui\|l&cr«dlii1lfait«dttu>i(tf«<ta<al«M:d(/lQid«dltdAedita.ratMh3 ASSETS Xtititai teas motma iteio maa/ui. Nd nwi lem. i&im. ctAS Mfpeil. ttodi cMto. tte> ttei eencBBtmiMeiLUocctnaKk hdb>t«Wnt>»t«MiHluiUdi«ll6idWMcoadKt»d»i)(Mrtie«Mdo Cik<iyiitewed pmhnehrtlttx; dMtdhewpadOodShiiiioiHy. UAmifllES Ssgfamei owiaei.... tKM ad•Mm«ICit«air IPifoiitlMeasCtt Urtchaektao «nd «>vt»>qt »ecacni» httcw N«m Md titteu or OMk.8U,w fteit Ueoe WEUSPAROO 70.00 14941.00 213 I"-"* asiiBfsa itnwd odiim olCewptnr iPiyeidiMaiui AtaMk Tl Nnm lid idltee d OWb Ult» Oe^ than CHASE •259.01) •6760.00 26 10228017S91S09 tiatftdoMtudCOBt^ IfOIRtdAltKM SOVERBONBK Mbm irdiditt»e> BCA.OSL or OidtItMm 234.00 5921.00 25 teVB. aiT4DB7657Sa0271 tenKdi^midCBinpuT' f PtlRidfMMM DMCOB •73.00 2897.00 Kmad eMose «l «tt.«tedl UeoA 40 Woo. fl45800087aC9 xim wd Mam d COKfaer tfttnooHMinci* SALUEMAESROPTYLSC 25.00 2625J)0 Sml58c(diiCoovmr oiatJtKtfiOa 105 hdewipaid mSBBBBMBiP ttnowdMaiuotcaniyiey tdkinKdMenM aAUIBMAE3R0PTYLSC 24.00 2620.00 UUtisiavuoit oiAMbi 10S fiooMcaie 1 10Se8S92t02F Stdststal U^tdi Ais«U aueeadMOmdCeayier I FOieoiWeeo (kd tttdend hour eteUlnkw Sm Sch Of UofcUiUas fiea ntMMoflid tilaaonedl 311100.00 2613.10 294076.76 VimdhMieieMtwwt hrd IM modid bwtttiullt)ewwid UmmM ifueMnV tttninlOOiii^intpmtoMtlatauM* rMAtAtiOiMdiu rttiM«$ftea«<H4(etti Mlttie) leMUitdC«pctiM((Md«in,ooua dm.iiel OAcrKiMMeuniti) Totd fldonthlv PAVmeta 3230.19 TottiActoU. S 311100.00 -16648.76 Totd tUbiOllBS b. 5 329748.76 ffddiKMdS «1/o« rit«aoi4 iMMfdseiMSou tosam oun Milid Br^loM HKda(bntaMiI.Ue.- WNWd'iiiMeian) HAROLD '' CNw/wct Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 39 of 100 PageID# 336 □□□□iraD □□ooan s s ?i\|il ®\|i\|0 aggang □ gy gj t; □□□orijiD □□□000 0 011 III! P iiii p II B ^Isll ?S e«f iMi m siisaH (D \Ui UJ S If " ' llfl tii» \|3\| c I ? I3\|l4 II llillllllillit o s lU (9 !,i He o A i ii d 3 ta ui s a if I il id III iD 'I* ^f II jIxS iaflis HIj If Ml \|ii-T- IIooan Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 40 of 100 PageID# 337 Continuation Sheet/Residential Loan Application »3WWIP AtmyCtMKvoStn Vtt(kh ooeeeuewi Ckm D foa otal(Mc* ■MM to ttovicti ift* ItnUcaitil leM HAROLD BARRZ8 Hdk D tti BGasRtr «' O (ar CMtinKnR toMcrClMinnam c»Bs>r>Kx. SHADUA BARRXa W265949UA LZASZLZSZBS ADlffifiTCOM Creditor's ictanta Account Htanber Payment Konths Le£t Balance Addreas/City/State/Zlpcode Xo Pay CARHCDT/GBHa 6019180337287078 61.00 33 2040.00 SH SBRVZCXHa 52973a676101F SO.00 32 1600.00 DBLL PIHAHCZAL SVCS/CX 7945012902658699 34.00 32 1102.00 H8BC m 330008906356 47.00 20 942.00 HSBC tlV 975001047342 21.00 35 730.00 CBDBA8BARS 35940403 33.00 20 674.00 B8BC trr 010018026449 15.00 38 563.00 Xna-SARGBX 928730117690 25.00 10 246.00 XAN8 SKimS 163268937360972 10.00 17 171.00 BFC - USA. 4200103921 141.00 57 8066.00 P8T PREMIER 4610078705979144 24.00 32 770.00 R.B. Leant ACCREDZXED HOME LB21DBR 406189437 1553.19 220083.87 R.B. Leant MORTQAOS LEEIDERS HBXNORX, U 9000056457 599.00 57088.89 i«.rfg:i5!n...wa_ QWabOrk ntoto mm csrwtel tor ca. at I . at toSv to tonwwg^ inda Mr bcu Ittuotou oatciRoa icy al M ttoM BO. » totiButto mkt tto .« 1»ia.Vas>iSwaCM^S »■ / 1 . - 1^ H ItdcK fewoMtoNiiifieO# biKI nt>i>4liyTIt»KiaatokoalP.Mihto«.-«iOTit.i3«.M.><>i Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 41 of 100 PageID# 338 Continuation Sheet/Residential Loan Application ftc^swca AgrsevCrnKjoOoi Um ifeli<iiQtak(auit>«aiayMii(tdin»t ««u U <ac^M (tntecUU Uu BaROZiD HARBX6 Afpfcuath MM ft la Bngnw or C far coOmvoiti toCawwcr. SBAUNa BAimZS W265949ua. tCCABZZiXSXBS JUDDEtlSUM Creditor's Uamo Account Nuoiber Faynont Uonths Le£t Balance Address/city/State/Zipeodo To Pay TOTAL t 2S13.19 29407ff.76 .n «««• Mir idiknu: erMoUowpeliftiVifar Ow or »OF»«Mnl,W WlNte la»inre«l» «» MwUtirool* eooorwig err «#»•««»• tttiswcDlceir aiMtte rtoiwc»«nami fuwuA iwaBa tapt. Otatai/l': o»fa I » QaOtmaa^i^man .f "" / / I 1 l&h^ rawmUuraJi> to« Oift« fahteibr Um RnAf taiCSi Mm.)«.•WMwAlfantMMi Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 42 of 100 PageID# 339 CONTINUATION SHEET/RESIDENTIAL LOAN APPLICATION Use this continuatioa sheet if you Borrower: Ageiu:y Case Number: need more ^ace to con^lete the HAROIrD L. HARRIS IV Residential Loan Application. Mark B for Borrower or C for Co- Co-Bonower: Leader Case Number: Borrower. SHAUNA HARRIS W26S949MA Under Massachusetts statute, Mass GEN L C3i 184, Section 17B you, the Borrower, are entitled to know the following: 1. The responsabili^ of the attorney for the Lender is to protect the interest of the Lender. 2. Yon, the Borrower, may at your own expense, engage an attorney of your own selection to represent your interests in this transaction. The approximate expiration date of the Note is AUGUST 3., 2035 The rate ofinterest charged is 6.200 %, Please be aware that as of the expiration date of the Note, we, the Lender, may demand payment ofsaid Note, may rewrite the Note by agreement at a greater or lesser rate of interest, or may, by agreement, allow payments to be made on said Note at the same, or a lesser or greater rate of interest. l/We ftilly uoderstasil ttut H l» a Federal crime punbltoble by flne or IroprUonmeni. or boU), to knowingly moke any Iblse ■tatements concerning any ofthe otiove facta a» applicable under the provbtona of Title 18. United States Code. Section 1001, et »eq. Borrow* ro Stgna Data . » er's Signature n//w&Sr MASSACHUSeTTS CONTINUATION SHEET/RESIDENTIAL LOAN APPLICATION DocMogto&iaas^ aoo^aa-iaaa FANNIE MAE FORM lOOS/FREODIE MAC FORM 6S www, doomoglo. eom O1/O1/04 Macs.sBe.l.tan Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 43 of 100 PageID# 340 BK:40344 Pg:2S - IC 3 ^ 2^2.-277'^^ ' i Doc ID# 000tO3222734MN3S Bk:40344 Rg:26 Doe: ASM .« Psj^rfatt ii&i4/20M^iPM »2fi ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE Mortgago Beclronic Regisiration Systems,Inc. acOng solely as nominee for Homettifdge Mortgage Corp holder ote real estate mortgage From: Harold L Harris IV and Shauna Hants Ta' Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,Inc. acting solely as nomineefor Komebridge Mortgage Cdfp Dated: July 15.2005 Recorded with the Worcester County CWcrcesler Disliicl) Regtslry of Deeds In Book 36B30Pago 275 • property at: 50 Loveil Street, Koldert, MA 01520 for value receh/ed ertd other good and vatuattle consideration paid assigns said mortgage and the note and claim secured thereby to: Bank of NewYork'as Trustee forthe CertWcate.hoIders CWABSi Inc^Asset-Backed Certificates. Series 2005-AB4 whose address Is 101 Barclay Street, New York, NY 10286 In wftriesa whereof,the said Moitgege Electronic ReglslraUon'Syslems,Inc. acting solely as nominee for Homebridge Mortgage Corp, has caused Its seal to be hereto affixed end these presents to I)© stgned, acknowledged and delivered In Its name and'hahatf bv mguywcwe,iBTViC6P^^>ff,its isrvtccpREBwgwr .hereto duly authorized,effective the dav cf.^^5^j ,2006 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,Ina acting soteV for Homebtidgo Mortgage BleV as nomineefw Mortgage Corp By: ■ ■. mmutmofSB,tsrvtCEFRESOENr STATE OF \ COUNTY COLUN • .2008 Then psisonatly appeared the above named M.HEuywCrtE isryipgPHiJ^Pir ..r •Registration S^tems,Inc.acting solely as nominee for Homabndge Mortga^ Instrument to tio his free acland deed In swch capacity and the free aet and deed of Mortgago Etsctmnle Registration Systems.Inc. actog solaly as nominee for Komobrldgo liitortgage Cot.hafore me «n£SI:WOIiC.Antony J.VigHoW. Hesbter ^ o'^" mil 610 103222734 D8 001 001 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 44 of 100 PageID# 341 ri-vl t ^ ^ »''" ) I •-. . . ''"s- ''','• If'" y I' \' ■ •■ KilBiMj^illi Wi i r-, %' S-' ~i» '"'C^V' ^ '•Iv .V . '. ■^f;:--'»"tf-g-'-i %« ;?S"Sv • . .'■ '-' ' "' \- • . 'T-; = ■'' ,.; - /.* ' ",■•'■■ .• •■ : .. -."s-iX' X . ??Si? ,'5?? Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 45 of 100 PageID# 342 WORCESTERDISTRICP After Recording Return To: registry ofdeeds HOMEBRIDGE MORTGAGE CORP RECEIVED&Rj^ORD:lED torth n<^ I 60 OAK DRIVE iPiS SYOSSBT, NEW YORK 11704 Loan Number: W265949MA DATB_ m? ANTHONY J>V1GLI6TTI» REGISTER IIME STAMP ISpaoa Above This lino For Recording O MORTGAGE MlNi1002711-0000014787-4 610 1032^ 02 001 0TM DEFINITIONS Words used in multiple sections of tbls document are defined below and otlier words are defined in Sections 3,11, 13,18,20and21. Certain rales regarding the usage ofwoidsused in this document are also provided in Section 16. (A) "Security Instrument" means tliis document, which is dated JULY 15, 2005 ,together with all Rideis to this document. <B) "Borrower"is HAROLD L. HARRIS IV AND SHAUNA HARRIS Borrower is tlie mortgagor under tills Security Instrument. (Q "MERS"is Mortgage Hectconic Registration Systems, Inc. MBRS is a separate coipoiatioa that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is tlie mortgagee under this Security Instrument. MERS is organized and existing under the laws ofDelaware, and has an address and telephone number ofP.O.60X2026,Flint, MI 48S01-2026.(el.(888)679-MERS. (D) "Lender" is HOMEBRIDGE MORTGAGE CORP Lender is a organized and existing under dte laws of NEW YORK Under'saddress is 60 OAK DRIVE, SYOSSET, NEW YORK 11704 (E) "Note" means Uie promissory note signed by Borrower and dated JULY 15, 2005 The Note states dial Borrower owes Lender TWO HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND AND 00/100 Dollars(U.S.$ 248,000.00 )plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not later than AUGUST 1, 2035 (F) "Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer ofRights in tlie Property." (GO "Loan"meanstlie debtevidenced by the Note,plusinterest,any prepaymentcharges and late charges due under (lie Note, and all sums due under tliis Securi^ Instrument, plus interest. Borrower Initials: MASSACHUSETTS-Singta Family-Pannlo Maa/Freddls Mac UMIFORM INSTRUMENT - MERS DocMaglc^SiBsaBSO eoo-e43'i382 Form 3022 01/01 Page 1 of 13 www,doemagh.eom Maioq mui l.utn Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 46 of 100 PageID# 343 (B) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument(hat are executed by Borrower. The following Riders are to be executed by Borrower (check box as applicable]: SI Adjustable Rate Rider Q Condominium Rider [H Second Home Rider n Balloon Rider D Planned Unit Development Rider S OUier(s)[specify] n 1-4 Family Rider Q Biweekly Payment Rider Exhibit "A" (I) "ApplicableLaw"means ail controlling applicable federal,state and local statutes,regulations,ordinancesand administrative rules and orders(that have die effect of law) as well as all applicable final, non-appealable judicial opinions. <i) "Community Association Dues,Fees,and Assessments" means all dues,fees,assessments and other charges tliat are imposed on Borrower or tlie Property by a condominium association, homeowners association or similar organization. (K) ''Electronic Ftinds Transfer" meansany transfer offunds,other than a transaction originated by check,draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated (btough an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, computer, or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial insdtulion to debit or credit an account. Such term includes, but is not limited to, polnt-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions, transfers initiated by telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transfers. (L) "Escrow Items" means(hose items tliat are described in Section 3. ^ "Miscellnncons Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damdges, or proceeds paid by any tiiird party (otlier tlian insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Section 5)for: (i) damage to, or destruction of, tlie Property; 00 condemnation or other taking of all or any part of the Property;(n\)conveyance in lieu of condemnation; or(iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the value and/or condition of the Property. "MortgageInsurance" meansinsurance protecting Lender against the nonpaymentof,or defaulton,die Loan. (O) "Periodic Payment" means tlie regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under (he Note, plus (ii) auy amounts under Section 3 of this Secority Instrument. (?) "RESPA" means die Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act(12 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.) and its implementing leguladon,Reguladon X(24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as Ihey might be amended fix)m time to dme, or any additional or successor legislation or reguladon diat governs the same subject matter. As used in this Security Instrument, "RESPA"refers to all requirements and restricdons diat are imposed inregard to a "federally related mortgage loan" even if die Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage loan" under RESPA. (Q) "Successor in Interest of Borrower" means any party that has taken title to(be Property, whether or not diat party has assumed Borrower's obligadons under die Note and/or diis Security Instrument. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY This Security Instrument secures to Lender; (i) die repayment of the Loan, and ail renewals, extensions and modifications of die Note; and 0i) die performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and die Note. For this purpose, Borrower does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to MERS(solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns)and to the successors and assigns of MERS,with power of sale, the following described property located in the COUNTY of WORCESTER (Type ofRecording Jurisdiclion] IName ofRecording lurisdicHonl Boirower Initials MASSACHUSETTS-SIngIa Famlly-Fannio Mae/Freddio Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT - MERS DocMaglceo^sasaao 800-649-1362 Form 302201/01 Pago 2 of 13 wwvi/.doomagiG.com Ma3032 BBiiia.ltm Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 47 of 100 PageID# 344 SEE LEGAL DESCRIPTION ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART HEREOF AS EXHIBIT "A". which currently has the addcess of 50 LOVELL ROAD [StTMll HOLDEN .Massachusetts 01520 ("Property Address"): [(^ty) (Sp Code] TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements pud additions shall also be covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in tliis Security Instrument as the "Property." Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to tlie interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply witli law or custom, MERS(as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns)has the right: to exercise any or all ofthose interests, including,but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take'any action required ofLender including, but notlimited to, releasing and canceling tins Security Instrument BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of tlie estate hereby conveyed and lias the right to mortgage, grant and convey tlie Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. Borrower warrants and will defend generally the tide to tlie Property against all claims and demands,subject to any encumbrances ofrecord. THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uuifoxm covenants wlUi limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform securi^ instrument covering real property. UNIFORM COVENANTS. Bonower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: I. Payment of PrlnclpaU Interest, Escrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges. Borrower shall pay wiien due the principal of, and interest on, die debt evidenced by(he Note and any prepayment ciiarges and late ciiarges due under die Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items pursuant to Section 3. Payments due under die Note and diis Security Instrument shall be made in U.S. currency. However, if any check or other instrument received by Lender as payment under the Note or this Security Instrument is returned to Lender unpaid, Xxnder may require tliat any or all subsequent payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument be made in one or more ofthe following forms,as selected by Lender:(a)cash;(b) money order,(c)cerdfied clieck, bank check, treasurer's check or cashier's check,provided anysuch check is drawn upon aninsdtution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or endty; or(d)Electronic Funds Transfer. Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at such other locadon as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the nodce provisions in Secdon 15. Lender may return any paymentor pardal xiayment ifthe payment or partial payments are insufficient to bring the Loan current. Lender may accept any payment or pardal payment insufficient to bring the Loan current, without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in (be future, but Lender is not obligated to apply such payments at tlie time such payments are accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of its scheduled due date, dien Lender need not pay interest on unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unapplied funds undl Bonower makes payment to bring (he Loan current. If Borrower does not do so within a reasonable period of dnie, Lender shall either apply such funds or return diem to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds will be applied to the outstanding principal balance under the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offiseC or claim Borrower loIUals MASSACHUSETTS-Slngle Pamlly-Fannla Mae/Freddte t^ao UNIFORM INSTRUMENT • MERS DocMagks&rmsos 800-S49'i3B7 Form 3022 01/01 Page 3 of 13 www.doemagh.eom M«3022.man.3 tea Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 48 of 100 PageID# 345 which Borrower might have now or in tlie future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments due under tlie Note and diis Security Instrument or performing (lie covenants and agreements secured by this Security Instniment. 2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as oUterwise described in tliis Section 2, all payments accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in tite following order of priority:(a) interest due under the Note; (b)principal due under the Note;(c)amounts due under Sections. Such payments shall be applied to each Periodic Payment in tlie order in which it became due. Any remainiug amounts shall be applied first to late charges, second to any otlier amounts due under this Security Instrument, and tiien to reduce the principal balance of the Note. If Lender receives a payment from Botiower for a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a sufficient amount to pay any late charge due, tlie payment may be applied to tlie delinquent payment and the late charge. If more Uian one Periodic Payment is outstanding. Lender may apply any payment received from Borrower to (lie repayment of tlie Periodic Payments if, and to tlie extent that, each payment can be paid in fiiil. To the extent tliat any excessexists after the payment is applied to the full payment ofone or more Periodic Payments,such excess may be applied to any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall be applied first to any prepaymentcharges and then as described in the Note. Any application ofpayments,insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under the Note shall not extend or postpone tlie due date, or cliange tlie amount, of(he Periodic Payments. 3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments arc due under(he Note, until the Note is paid In full, a sum (tlie "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due for:(a)(axes and assessments and otlier items which can attain priority over tliis Security Instromeni as a lien or encumbrance on(he Property;(b)leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any;(c) premiums for any and all insurance requited by Lenderunder Section 5;and(d)Mortgage Insurance premiums,ifany, or any sumspayable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of(lie payment of Mortgage Insurance premiums in accordance with the provisions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow Items." At origination or atany time during the term of(be Loan,Lender may require Uiat Community Association Dues,Pees, and Assessments,ifany,be escrowed by Borrower,and such dues,fees aud assessments shall be an Escrow Item. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this Section. Borrower shall pay Leader the Funds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives Borrower's obligation to pay tlie Funds for any or all Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any orall Escrow Items at any time. Any such waiver may only beIn writing. In die event ofsuch waiver. Borrower sliall pay directly, when and where payable, tlie amounts due for any Escrow Items for which payment of Funds lias been waived by Lender and,if Lender requires, shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payment widiin such time period as Lender may requite. Bonower'sobligation to makesuch payments and to provide receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement contained In this Security Instrument, as die phrase "covenant and agreement" is used in Section 9. IfBorrower is obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, piirsuaut to a waiver,and Borrower fails to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 and pay such amount and Borrower shall then be obligated under Section 9 to repay to Lender any such amount. Lender may revoke the waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by a notice given in accordance with Section 15 and,upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to Lender all Funds, aud in such amounts, diat are dien required under diis Section 3. Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount (a) sufficient (o permit Lender to apply the Funds at (lie time specified under BESPA,and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can require under BESPA. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due on (he basis of current data and reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otlierwise in accordance with Applicable Law. The Funds shall be held in an Institution wbo^ deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity Oncluding Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so Insured) or in any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply (lie Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later than the time specified under RBSPA. Lender shall not charge Bonower for holding jand applying die Funds, annually analyzing the escrow account, or verifying (lie Escrow ItemSt unless Lender pays Bonower interest on(he Funds and Applicable Law pennits Lender to make such a diarge. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on tlie Funds, Lender shall notbe required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on(he Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree Borrower Initials MASSACHUSETTS-Sinoto Femtly-Fannie Mae/Freddie Mae UNIFORM INSTRUMENT• MERS DocMaglc^OisaBDoa aoo-e49't367 Form 3022 01/01 Page 4 of 13 www.docmoglo.eom Ma3Q]2.inuD4.(cni Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 49 of 100 PageID# 346 in writing, liowevcr, that interest shall be paid on tlje Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of tlte Funds as required by lUBSPA. If lliere is a surplus ofFunds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender riiall account to Borrower for tlie excess funds in accordance witli RBSPA. ITthere is a shortage ofFunds held in escrow, as defined under RBSPA, Lender sliall notify Borrower as required by RESPA,and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up tite shortage in accordance wltli RESPA,but in no more than 12 monthly paymmts. If there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA,Lender sliall notify Borrower as required by RESPA,and Bonower shall pay to Lender tIte amount necessary to make up the deficiency in accordance with RESPA,but in no more tlian 12 montlily payments. Upon payment in iiill of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund to Borrower any Funds held by Lender. 4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions attributable to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Instroment, leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any, and Cbmmunity Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any. To llie extent that these items are Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay Ihem in the manner provided in Section 3. Bonower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Securi^ Instrument unless Borrower: (a)agrees in writing to Ute payment of die obligation secured by die lien in a manner acceptable to Lender, but only so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) contests die lien in good faiUi by, or defends against enfbrcement ofthe lien in,legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to prevent the enforcement of die lion while diDse proceedings are pending, but only until such proceedings are concluded; or(c)secures from die holder of the lien an agreement sadsfactoiy to Lender subordinadng the lien to this Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of die Property is subject to a lien which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying die Jten. Within 10 days of die date on which that notice is given, Borrower shall satisfy die lien or take one or more of die actions set forth above in this Section 4. Lender may require Borrower to pay a onetime charge for a real estate tax verification and/or reporting service used by Lender in connection with this Loan. 5. Property Insurance. Borrower sliall keep die improvemenls now existing or hereafter erected on die Properfy insured against loss by fire, hazards included within(he term "extended coverage," and any other hazards including,but not limited to, eardiquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts including deductible levels) and for the periods diat Lender requires. What Lender requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during die term ofthe Loan. The insurance carrier providing die insurance shall be cliosenby Borrowersubject to Lender's right to disapprove Borrower'schoice, which rightshall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower to pay,in connection with diis Loan,either:(a)a one- dme charge for flood zone deteroiination, certificaUon and tracking services; or(b)a one-time charge for flood zone determinadonand cerUfication services and subsequent charges each time remappings or similar dianges occur which reasonably might affect such determination or certification. Bonower diall also be re^onsible for the payment of any fees imposed by die Federal Emergency Management Agency in conuecdon widi the review of any flood zone determination resuldng from an objection by Bonower. IfBorrower fails to maintain any of die coverages described above. Lender may obtain insurance coverage, at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligaUon to purchase any particular type or amount of coverage. TJierefoie, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect Borrower, Borrower's equity in die Property,or the contents of the Property,against any risk,liazard or liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage dian was previously in effect. Borrower acknowledges (hat the cost of the insurance coverage so obtained might signlficandy exceed the cost ofinsurance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed by Lender under diis Secdon 5 shall become additional debt ofBorrower secured by diis Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at die Note rate from the date of disbursement and sliall be payable, widi such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment. All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's right to disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee. Lender shall have the right to hold die policies and renewal certificates. If Lender requires. Borrower shall prompdy give to Lender all receipts ofpaid premiums and renewal notices. IfBorrower obtains any Borrower Initials MASSACHUSETTS-Stnolo Family-Fannio Moe/Froddia Mao UNIFORM INSTRUMENT - MERS DocMogtceffimiaB Boo^49.t382 Form 3022 01/01 .Pane 5 of 13 www.doemagh.eom Ma3(az.nBmS tciA Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 50 of 100 PageID# 347 foim of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to» or destruction of, die Property, sucii policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee. In Ute event ofloss.Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otiierwise agree in writing, any insurance proceeds, whether oi not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be applied to restoration or repair of lite Property,if Oie restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lenders security is not lessened. During such repair and restoration period. Lender shall have (lie right to hold such insurance proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Properly to ensure (he work has been completed to Lender's satistaction, provided dial such inspection sliall be undertaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments as die work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such insurance proceeds. Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest orearnings on such proceeds. Pees for public adjusters, or otlier tliird parties, retained by Borrower shall not be paid out of the insaraiice proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If(lie restoration oriepairis noteconomically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, theinsurance proceeds shall be applied to die sums secured by(his Security Instrument, wJieUier or not then due, with the excess,ifany, paid to Borrower. Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in die order provided for in Section 2. If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available iusurance claim and related matters. IfBorrower does notre^ond witliin 30 days to a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has offered to settle a claim, dien Lender may negotiate and settle the claim. The 30^y period will begin when die notice is given. In either event, or ifLender acquires the Property under Section 22 or otherwise. Borrower hereby assigns to Lender(a) Borrower's rights to any insurance proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts unpaid under the Note or diis Security Instrument, and(b)any other ofBorrower's rights(other than die right to any refund of uneained premiums paid by Borrower)under all insurance policies cpvering (he Property, insofar as such rights aie applicable to die coverage ofthe Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore die Property or to pay amounts unpaid under die Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not(hen due. 6 Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use die Property as Borrower's principal residence widiiii60 days after the execution ofthis Security Instrumentand sliall continue to occqpy the Property as Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date ofoccupancy, unless Lender otherwise agrees in writing, which consent sliall notbe unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are beyond Borrower's control. 7. PrcservntioD, Mnintennnce and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Borrower shall not destroy, damage or impair die Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Properly. Whether or not Borrower is residing in die Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in order to prevent the Property from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is determined pursuant to Section5 dial repair or restoration is not economically feasible. Borrower shall prompdy repair the Property if damaged to avoid further deterioration or damage. Ifinsurance or condemnation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or the taking of, die Property, Borrower shall be responsible for repairing or restoring the Property only if Lender has released proceeds for such putposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for(he repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series ofprogress payments as die work is completed. If(he insurance or condemnation proceeds are not sufficient to repair or restore die Properly, Borrower is not relieved ofBorrower's obligation for die completion ofsuch repair or restoration. Lender or Its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has reasonable cause. Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on die Property. Lender shall give Borrower notice at tlie time ofor prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause. 8. Borrower's Loon Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during (he Loan application process. Borrower or any personsor entities acting at the direction ofBorrower or witii Borrower's knowledge or consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender widi material information) In connection with the Loan. Material representations include, but are not limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of die Property as Borrower's principal residence. Borrower Initials; MASSACHUSETTS-Slngle Famity-^Fannls Mae/Froddio Moo UNIFORM INSTRUMENT - MERS DocMagtceff^mm 80O^49.tS67 Form 3022 01/01 Pooo6of13 wvfW.docm9gfG,com MaSOtS mmiSIon Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 51 of 100 PageID# 348 9. Protection of Lender's Interest in tbe Property and Rights Under tliis Security Instrument If(a) Borrower fails to perform Uie coveiiants and agreements contained in tliis Security Inslmment,(b) diere is a legal proceeding tliat mightsignificantly affect Lender'sinterestintheProperty and/orrightsnnder diis Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate,for condemnation or forfeiture, for enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or leguladons), or(c) Borrower has abandoned the Properly, dien Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's interest in the Property and rights uirder diis Security Instrument, including protecdng and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property. Lender's actions can include, but are not limited to:(a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument;(b)appearing in court; and (c) paying reasonable attorneys' fees to protect its Interestin die Property and/or rights under diis Security Instrument,including its secured position in a ban^ptcy proceeding. Securing die Property includes, but is not limited to,entering the Property to make repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows, drain water firom pipes, eliminate building or oiher code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned on or off. Aldiough Lender may take action under tbis Section 9,Lender does not have to do so and is not under any duly or obligation to do so. It is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all actions authorized under tins Section 9. Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by tills Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from (lie date ofdisbursement and shall be payable, with sucli interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment. If tills Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Bonower shall comply with all tlie provisions of tiie lease. If Borrower acquires fee title to the Property,(lie leasehold and (lie fee title shall not merge unless Lender agrees to the merger in writing. 10. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan, Bonower shall pay tiie premiums required to maintain tbe Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any reason, the Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available firom the mortgage insurer tiiat previously provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance,Borrower shall pay tbe premiums required to obtain coverage substantially equivalent to(he Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to (be cost to Borrower of(be Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer selected by Lender. If substantially equivalent Mortgage Insurance coverageis not available. Borrower shall continue to pay to Lender tbe amount of tbe separately designated payments that were due when the insurance coverage ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and retain Uiese payments as a non-iefiiiidable loss reserve in lieu ofMortgageInsurance. Such loss reserve sliall be non- refundable, notwithstanding tiie fact tiiat (lie Loan is ultimately paid in full, and Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss reserve payments if Mortgage Insurance coverage(in the amount and for(lie period that Lender requires) provided by an insurer selected by Lender again becomes available, is obtained, and Lender requires separately designated payments toward tiie preniioms for Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward ilie premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay die premiums required to maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refuiidable loss reserve, until Lender's requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement betw^n Borrower and Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable Law. Nodiing In this Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in tiie Note. Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender(or any entity that purchases tiie Note)for certain losses it may incur IfBorrower does not repay tiie Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a party to the Mortgage Insurance. Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time,and may enter into agreements witii otlier parties that share or modify their risk, or reduce losses. Tliese agreements are on terms and conditions(hat are satisfaciocy to tlie mortgage insurer and the other parly (or parties) to these agreements. These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source offunds dint tiie mortgage insurer may liave available (which may include funds obtained from Mortgage Insurance premiums). As a result of Uiese agreements. Lender, any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, any reinsurer, any other entity,or any affiliate ofany of tlie foregoing, may receive(directly or indirectly) amounts that derive from(or might be characterized as)a portion ofBorrower's payments for Mortgage Insurance,in exchange for sharing or modifying Borrower Initials JL' Form 3022 01/01 Femily-Fannle Mae/Freddie Mao PageUNIFORM 7 of 13 INSTRUMENT - MERS DocMagfe£8^saaaa Boo-e4S-t362 www.</oemagh.com MiSOnjnni.?im Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 52 of 100 PageID# 349 Uie mortgage insurer's risk, or reducing losses. If suck agieemeni provides that an affiliate of Lender takes a share of Uie insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the premiums paid to the insurer, the anangement is often termed "captive reinsurance." Further: (a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower has agreetl to pay for Mortgage Insurancei or any otlier terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not Increase the amount Borrower will owe for Mortgage Insurance, and tliey will not entitle Borrower to any refund. 00 Any such agreements will not aB'ect the rights Borrower has- if any - with respect to the Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of1998 or any other law. These rigiits may include the right to receive certain disclosures, to request and obtain cancellation of the Mortgage Insurance, to have the Mortgagelnsurance terminated automatically,and/or to receive a refund ofany MortgageInsurance premiums tliat were unearned at the time ofsuch cancellation or termination. 11. AssignmentofMiscellaneousProceeds; Forfeiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds are hereby assigned to and shall be paid to Lender. If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of tlie Property,iftlie restoration orlepairiseconomically feasible and Lender's security is notlessened. During such repair and restoration period. Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure tlie work has been completed to Lender's satisfection, provided tliat such inspection sliall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for tlie repairs and restoration in a single disbursement or in a series of progress payments as tlie work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such Miscellaneous Proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such Miscellaneous Proceeds. If tlie restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, tlie MiscellaneousProceedsshall be applied to tlie sums secured by this Security Instiumeut, whether or not then due, witli tlie excess, ifany, paid to Borrower. Such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied in die order provided for in Section 2. In the event of a (oiat taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property,(lie Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to die sums secured by diis Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess,if any, paid to Borrower. In die event ofa partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of(lie Property in which (be fair market value of (lie Property immediately before die partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is equal to or greater than tlie amount of die sums secured by (bis Security Instrument immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, die sumssecured by(bisSecurity Instrumentshall be reduced by die amount of die Miscellaneous Proceeds multiplied by tlie following ftaclion:(a) the total amount of the sums secured immediately before the partial taking,destruction, or loss in value divided by(b)the feir market value of the Piopeity immediately before die partial taking,destruction, or loss in value. Any balance shall be paid to Borrower. In tiie event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value ofthe Property in which the fair market value of tiie Property immediately before (lie partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than die amount of tlie sums secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, die Miscellaneous Proceeds diall be applied to die sums secured by diis Security Instrument whether or not(he sums are then due. If the Property is abandoned by Bonower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower(hat(he Opposing Party (as defined in (he next sentence) offers to make an award to setUe a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to Lender witiiin 30 days after die date the notice is given. Lender is authorized to collect and apply(he Miscellaneous Proceeds eidier to restoradon or repair of die Property or to the sums secured by this Security lostniment, whether or not then due. "Opposing Party" means the third party that owes Bonower Miscellaneous Proceeds or die party against whom Borrower has a right of action in regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds. Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whetiier civil or criminal, is begun tiiat, in Lender's judgment,could result In forfeiture ofthe Property or other material impairment of Lender's interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. Bonower can cure sucli a default and,if acceleiatioo has occurred, reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing die action or proceeding to be dismissed with a ruling tlial, in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of die Property or other material irapaiiment of Lender's interest in the Property or Borrower Iniiiols; HlllW MASSACHUSETTS-Singlo Famlty-Fannie Mao/Freddlo Mao UNIFORM INSTRUMENT • MERS OocA/fe^te^IRascsso 800-M$'i3e2 Form 3022 01/01 Page 8 of 13 www.docmaglG.com Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 53 of 100 PageID# 350 rights under this Security Instniment. Tiie proceeds of any award or claim for damages tliat are attributable to Uie impairment of Lender's interest In the Property are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender. All Miscellaneous Proceeds tliat are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be applied in tlie order provided for in Section 2. 12. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of tiie titne for payment or modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instniment granted by Lender to Borrower or any Successor in Interest ofBorrower shall not operate to release the liability of Bonower or any Saccessors in Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any Successor in Interest of Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of tiie sums secured by tills Security Instrument by reason ofany demand made by tlie original Bonower or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including, witliout limitation. Lender's acceptance of payments from tliird persons, entities or Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the amount tlien doe,shall not be a waiver of-or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy. 13. JointancISeveralLiability;Co-signers;Successorsand Assigns Bound. Borrowercovenantsand agrees QtatBorrower'sobligations and liability shall bejointand several. However,any Borrower who co-signs this Security Instniment but does not execute tlie Note(a "co-signer"):(a)is co-signing tliis Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is not personally obligated to pay die sums secured by diis Security Instrument; and (c) agrees diat Lender and any other Borrower can agree to extend, modil^,forbear or make any accommodadons with regard to the terms ofthis Security Instrument or die Note without die co-signer's consent. Subject to the provisions of Section 18, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes Borrower's obligationsunderdiisSecurity Instrumentinwrlting,and is approved by Lender,shall obtain all ofBorrower'srights and benefits under dils Security Instniment. Borrower shall notbe released fix>m Borrower's obligations and liability under this Security Instrument unless Ijender agrees to such releasein writing. The covenants and agreements ofthis Security Instrument shall hind (except as provided in Secdon 20) and beuefit the successors and assigns of Lender. 14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connecdon widi Borrower's default, for die purpose of piotecdng Lender's interest in the Property and rights under diis Security Instrument, Including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspecdonand valuadon fees. In regard to any other fees, the absence ofexpress authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific fee to Borrower shall not be constiuedi as a prohibidon on die charging ofsuch fee. Lender may not cliarge fees that are expressly prohibited by this Security Instniment or by Applicable Law. If the Loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges,and that law is finally interpreted so that die interest or other loan diarges collected or to be collected in connection'widi die Loan exceed the pernutted limits, dien:(a)any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce die charge to die permitted limit; and(b)any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to Bonower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principalowed under the Note or by making a direct payment (0 Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any prepayment charge(whether or not a prepayment charge is provided for under the Note). Borrower's acceptance of any such refund made by direct payment to Borrower will constitute a waiver of any right of action Borrower might have arising out ofsuch overcharge. 15. Notices, All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with tiiis Security Instrument must be in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been,given to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower's notice address if sent by other means. Notice to any one Bonower shall constitute notice to all Borrowers unless Applicable Law expressly requires oUierwJse. The notice address shall be the Property Address unless Borrower has designated a substitute notice address by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly notify Lender of Borrower's change of address. If Lender specifies a procedurefor reporting Borrower'schauge ofaddress, tlien Bonower shall only report a change ofaddress tiirough tiiat ^ecified procedure. There may be only one designated notice address under diis Security Instrument at any one time. Any notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to Lender's address stated liereinunless Lenderhas designated anotlier address by notice to Bonower. Any notice In coimection willi tills Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually received by Lender. Borrower Initials: MASSACHUSETTS-Slnole Famny-Fannio Mao/Freddie Mao UNIFORM INSTRUMENT - MERS DocMoglee(Fmsas eoo-649.t363 Form 3022 01/01 Pago 9 of 13 www.doemagk.com Mt30Z2jianL9.tan Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 54 of 100 PageID# 351 If any notice requited by tills Security Instrument is also required under Applicable Law, the Applicable Law requirement will satisfy tlie corresponding requirement under tliis Security Instrument. 16. Goventing Lawj Severability; Rules of Construction. Tills Security Instniment shall be governed by federal law and the law of tlie jurisdiction in which the Properly is located. All tights and obligations contained in tills Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of Applicable Law. Applicable Law might explicitly or implicitly allow tlie parties to agree by contract or it might be silent, but such silence shall not be construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. In tlie event that any provision or clause of tins Security Instroment or Uie Note coDflicls witli Applicable Law,such conflict shall not ariect other provisions of this Security Instniment or t)ie Note which can be given effect without(he conflicting provision. As used in tills Security Instrument:(a) words of the masculine gender shall mean and include corresponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender;(b) words in tlie singular shall mean and include the plural and vice versa; and (c) Uie word "may" gives sole discretion witliout any obligation to take any action. 17. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument. 18. Transfer of tlie Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18,"Interest in the Property" means any legal or beneflclal interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, tliose beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed,installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the Intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser. If alt or any part of the Property or any Interest in (lie Properly is sold or transferred (or ifBonower is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may require immediate paymentin full ofall sums secured by tliis Security Instrument. However, tliis option sliall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law. If Lender exercises(his option. Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from tlie date the notice is given in accordance witli Section IS within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by Utis Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to die expiration of tills period. Lender may Invoke any remedies permitted by tills Security Instrument witliout further notice or demand on Borrower. 19. Borrower'sRigbtto Reinstate After Accderaflon. IfBoirowermeets certain conditions,Borrower shall have(he right to Jiave enforcementofthis Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to the earliest of:(a)five days befere sale of(lie Property pursuant to any power ofsale contained In this Security Instrument;(b)such other period as Applicable Law mightspecify for the teimination ofBonower's right to reinstate;or(c)entry ofajudgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those conditions are (liat Borrower:(a)pays Lender all sums which tlien would be due under Uiis Security Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred;(b)cures any default of any other covenants or agreements;(c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing tiiis Security Instrument, Including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees, and other fees incurred for the pu^ose ofprotecting Lender's interest In tlie Property and rightsunder tliis Security Instrument; and(d)takes such action asLender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in the Property and rightsunder this Security Instrument,and Borrower's obligation to pay the sumssecured by tiiis Security Instrument,shall continue unchanged. Lender may require that Borrower pay such reinstatement sums and eiqienses in one or more oftiie following fbiros, as selected by Lender:(a)cash;fl))money order;(c)certified check, bank check, treasurer's check or cashier's check, provided any such checkis drawn uponaninstitution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency,instrumentality oreotify;or(d)Electronic Funds Transfer. Uponreinstateraentby Bonower,this Security Instrument and obligations secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred. However, tliis right to reinstate shall not apply In the case of acceleration under Section 18. 20. Sale ofNote;Change of Loan Servicer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partialinterestIn the Note (togetiier wiUi tliis Security Instrument)can be sold one or more times witlioutprior notice to Borrower. A sale might result in a cliange in (lie entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects Periodic Payments due under the Note and tiiis Security Instrument and perfonns other mortgage loan servicing obligations under the Note, tiiis Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be one or more changes of(he Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of(lie Note. Iftiiere is a cliange of(lie Loan Servicer,Borrower will be given written notice of Uie change which will state the name and address of tlie new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments should be made and any otlier information RESPA requires in connection with a notice of transfer ofservicing. If the Note is sold and thereafter :jMVV Borrower Initials MASSACHUSETT8~6lnola FamOy-pannie Mae/Freddie Mao UNIFORM INSTRUMENT - MERS DocMaghs&isaisaBi aoows-waa Form 3022 01/01 Pago 10 of 13 " www.dpcmaglG.eom M«3ai2.iium to ten Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 55 of 100 PageID# 352 die Loaii is serviced by a Loan Seivicer other than Uie purchaser of(he Note, the mortgage Joan servicing obligations to Borrower will remain with die Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are not assumed by the Note purchaser unless odierwise provided by die Note purchaser. Neidier Borrower nor Lender may commence,join, or bejoined to any judicial action(as eidier an individual lidgantor(lie member ofa class)(hatarises itom the odier party's actions pursuant to this Security Instrument or diat alleges diat die other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this Security Instrument, until such Borrower orLenderhasnotified the odier parly(withsuchnodce given in compliance with the requirements ofSecdon 15)ofsuch alleged breach and afforded (he odier party hereto a reasonable period after the giving ofsuch notice to take correcdve acdon. If Applicable Law provides a time period which must elapse before certain action can be taken, diat time period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes of this paragraph. The notice of acceleradon and opportunity to cure given to Borrower pursuant to Secdon 22 and the nodce of acceleration given to Borrower pursuant to Secdon 18 shall be deemed to satisfy die nodce and opportunity to take correcdve action provisions of diis Section 20. 21. Bnzardoiis Substances. As used in Oils Secdon 21:(a) "Hazardous Substances" are those substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances, pollutants, or wastes by EnvironmentalLaw and the following substances: gasoline, kerosene, odier flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials;(b)"Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws ofdiejurisdiction where die Property islocated(hatrelate to healdi,safety orenvironmental protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response acdon, remedial acdon, or removal action, as defined in Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental Condition" means a condition that can cause, contribute to, or odierwise trigger an Environmental Qeanup. Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence,use,disposal,storage,orrelease ofany Hazardous Substances, or direaten to release any Hazardous Substances, on orin die Property. Borrower shall not do, nor allow anyone else to do, anydiliig affecting die Property (a) Uiat is In violation of any Environmental Law, (b) which creates an Environmental Condition, or(c) which, due to die presence, use, or release of a Hazardous Substance, creates a condition diat adversely affects (he value of die Properly. The preceding two sentences shall not apply to die presence,use, or storage on die Property ofsmall quantities ofHazardous Substances diat are generally recognized to be appropriate to normal readential uses and to maintenance of the Property Oncluding, but not limited to, Iiazardous substances in consumer products). Borrower shall promptly give Lender written notice of(a) any investigation, claim, demand,lawsuit or odier action by any governmental or regulatory ogency or private party involving the Property and any HazardousSubstance or Environmental Law ofwhicli Borrower has actual knowledge,(b)any Environmental Condition,including but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of release of any Hazardous Substance, and (c) any condition caused by the presence, use or release of a Hazardous Substance which adversely affects die value of the Properly. If Borrower learns, oris notified by any governmental or regulatory authority, or any private party, tliat any removal or odier remediation of any Hazardons Substance affecting tlie Property is necessary, Borrower shall piompdy take all necessary remedial actionsin accordance widi Environmental Law. NoUiing herein shall create any obligation on Lender for an Environmental Cleanup. NON-UNiFORh/) COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower'sbreacli ofany covenantor agreementin this Security Instrument(butnot prior to acceleration under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). Tiie notice sliall specify:(a) the default; <b) the action required to cure the default;(c) a date, not less than 30 days from tlie date the notice is given to Borrower, by which tlie default must be cured; and (d)tliat failure to cure the default on or before tlie date specified in the notice may resultin acceleration ofthesumssecured by this Security Instrument and sale of(lie l^operty. The notice shall Purtiier Inform Borrower of(he right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any otiier defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the default is not cured on or before the date specified in tlie notice. Lender at its option may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and may Invoke the statutory POWER OF SALE and any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law. Lender shall be Borrower Tnitials: iais: MASSACHUSETTS-Slngle Famiiy-Fannto Mao/Froddle Mao UNIFORM INSTRUMENT • MERS DocMsgfe^fftumoo eoo-g^s./jas Form 3022 01/01 Page 11 of 13 wiviv.i/oem»fffc.eom MbSQ2iuitlII tcm Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 56 of 100 PageID# 353 entitled to collect all expenses inctirred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22,including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs qf title evidence. If Lender invoices the STATUTORY POWER OPSALE,Lender shall mail a copy of a notice ofsale to Borro^ver, and to other persons prescribed by Applicable Law, in the manner provided by Applicable Law. Lenda:shall publish the notice ofsale, and the Property shall be sold in the manner prescribed by Applicable Law. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale. The proceeds of the sale shall be applied in tlie following order:(a)to all expenses of tliesale, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees; (b)to all sumssecured by this Security Instrument;and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally entitled to it. 23. Release. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall discbarge this Security Instrument. Borrower shall pay any recordation costs. Lender may charge Bonower a fee for releasing this Security Instrument, but only if die fee is paid to a third party for services rendered and the charging of die fee is permitted under Applicable Law. 24. Waivers. Borrower waives all rights ofhomestead exemption in die Property and relinquislies all rights ofcurtesy and dower in the Property. BY SIGNING-BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to die terms and covenants contained in diis Security Instrument and in any Rider executed by Borrower and recorded widi it. .(SeaO _ (Seal) HAROLD LL^HARRIS IV -Borrower SHAUNA HARRIS -Borrower _ (Seal) (Seal) -Borrower -Borrower (Seal) (Seal) -Borrower -Borrower Witness: Witness: MASSACHUSETTS-SIngte Family-Fannie \|y/lae/Fredd]e Mao UNIFORM INSTRUMENT • MERS DocMagteeff^ooBBO eoo^4S-fS02 Foim 3022 01/01 Page 12 of 13 www.doemagh.eotn Man32.iaBa 12(on Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 57 of 100 PageID# 354 CommonwealUi of Massachusetts County of WORCESTER On (bis 15th day of July, 2005 ,before me,(he undersigned notary public, personally appeared HAROIiD L. HARRIS IV, SHAUNA HARRIS proved to me through satisfactory evidence of identification, which were ^^ f to be(he person whose name issigned on Uiepreceding or attached document,and acknowledged to me that(he)(slie) signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose. □ (as partner for a corporation) □ (as for , a corporation) □ (as attorney in fact for die principal) □ (as for . (a) (the) ) J0HNW.KY6ER Nataiy Public CcmmonwealQi of btasaactiusetts MifComnfissionB(piesJul12,2007 Notary Public (Printed Name) (Seal) My commission expires: MASSACHUSETTS-^ingla Family-Pannia Mae/Fraddio Moo UNIFORM INSTRUMENIT - MERS OocMag/b^tRBinsca Form 3022 01/01 Pago 13 of 13 ■ tvivtv.docma^/o.com MOnil nna.» ittu Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 58 of 100 PageID# 355 Exhibit A Properly Address: 50 Lovell Road,Holden, Massachusetts 01520 The land with the buildings and improvements thereon on the southeasterly side of Lovell Road, Holden, Worcester County, Massachusetts, at a comer of the land now or formerly of Raddin and at the westerly comer ofthe premises; Thence N.33 degrees E.by Lovell Road seventy-three(73)feel to the land formerly ofFowler; Thence S.48 degrees by said Fowler land eighty-five(85)feet, more or less, to land formerly ofDavis; Thence S.33 1/4 degrees W. by said Davis land seventy-tliree(73)feet to said Raddin land; Thence N. 48 degrees W. by said Raddin land eighty-five (85) feet, more or less, to the place of beginning. Excepted fiom the above premises is the portion thereofconsisting of approximately four hundred forty- eight and five tenths(448.5)square feet conveyed by B.B. Wilbur to Herbert V. Lindsay Jr. and June M. Lindsay by a deed dated April 15,1974, and recorded with the Worcester District Registry of Deeds in Book 5539,Page 187(See Plan Book 399,Plan 108). Being the same premises conveyed to the herein named mortgagor(s)by deed recorded with Worcester South Registry ofDeeds in Book 34211,Page 294. Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 59 of 100 PageID# 356 After Recording Return To: HOMEBRIDGE MORTGAGE CORP 60 OAK DRIVE SYOSSET, NEW YORK 11704 Loan Number: W265949MA MIN; 1002711-0000014787-4 Prepared By: (Space Above This Lino Por Recording Data) DOC ID If: InterestOnly ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER (Six-Month LIBOR Index (As Published In The Wall Street Journall - Rate Caps) THIS InterestOnly ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER is made this 15th day of JULY 2005 , and is Incorporated Into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed of Trust, or Deed to Secure Debt (the "Security Instrument") of the same date given by the undersigned (the "Borrower") to secure Borrower's Note to HOMEBRIDGE MORTGAGE CORP, A NEW YORK CORPORATION (the "Lender") of the same date and covering the property described In the Security instrument and located at: 50 LOVELL ROAD, HOLDEN , MASSACHUSETTS 01520 (Property Address) THE NOTE CONTAINS PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR CHANGES IN MY INTEREST RATE AND MY MONTHLY PAYMENT. THIS NOTE LIMITS THE AMOUNT MY ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE CAN CHANGE AT ANY ONE TIME AND THE MAXIMUM RATE I MUST PAY. CONV •BC-ARM Rider . FE-4279 (0410) Page 1 of 4 iwmi.cw Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 60 of 100 PageID# 357 ADDITIONAL COVENANTS. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the Security Instrument, Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: A.INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES The Note provides for an initial Interest rate of 6.200 %,The Note provides for changes in the interest rate and the monthly payments, as follows: 4. ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES lA) Change Dates The interest rate I will pay will change on the 1st day of AUGUST, 2008 , and on that day every sixth month thereafter. Each date on which my interest rate could change is called a "Change Date." (B)The Index Beginning with the first Change Date, my interest rate will be based on an Index. The "Index" is the average of interbank offered rates for six month U.S. dollar-denominated deposits in the London market ("LIBOR"), as published in The Wall Street Journal. The most recent Index figure available as of the date 45 days before the Change Date is called the "Current Index." if the Index is no longer available, the Note Holder will choose a new index that Is based upon comparable information. The Note Holder will give me notice of this choice. (C\| Calculation of Changes Before each Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate my new interest rate by adding SIX AND 200/1000 percentage points( 6.200 %) to the Current Index. The Note Holder will then round the result of this addition to the nearest one-eighth of one percentage point (0.125%). Subject to the limits stated in Section 4(D} below, this rounded amount will be my new interest rate until the next Change Date. The Note Holder will then determine the amount of the monthly payment-that would be sufficient to repay the unpaid principal that I am expected to owe at the Change Date In full on the Maturity Date at my new interest rate In substantially equal payments. The result of this calculation will be the new amount of my monthly payment. CONV •BC-ARM Rider Initials: FE-4279(0410) Page 2 of 4 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 61 of 100 PageID# 358 (D) Limits on Interest Rate Changes The Interest rate I am required to pay at the first Change Date will not be greater than 9.200 % or less than6.200 %. Thereafter, my interest rate wHI never be increased or decreased on any single Change Date by more than ONE AND 000/1000 percentage point(s)( 1.000 %)from the rate of interest i have been paying for the preceding six months. My interest rate will never be greater than 12.200 % or less than 6.200 %. (E) Effective Date of Changes My new interest rate will become effective on each Change Date. I wit! pay the amount of my new monthly payment beginning on the first monthly payment date after the Change Date until the amount of my monthly payment changes again. (F) Notice of Changes Before the effective date of any change in my interest rate and/or monthly payment, the Note Holder will deliver or mail to me a notice of such change. The notice will include information required by law to be given to me and also the title and telephone number of a person who will answer any question I may have regarding the notice. IG) Date of First Principal and Interest Payment The date of my first payment consisting of both principal and interest on this Note Ithe "First Principal and interest Payment Due Date") shall be the first monthty payment date after AUGUST, 2008 B. TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY OR A BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN BORROWER Uniform Covenant 18 of the Security Instrument is amended to read as foDows: Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used In this Section 18, "Interest In the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser. If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or If a Borrower Is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower Is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written consent. Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law. If Lender exercises the option to require immediate payment in full. Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within CONV •BC-ARM Rider Initials: FE-4279 (0410) Page 3 of 4 Ui427Slcw Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 62 of 100 PageID# 359 .r t which Borrower must pay alt sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower falls to pay these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoice any remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower. limAM (Seal) HAROLD IV borrower (Seal) SHAUNA HARRIS - Borrower _ (Seal) Borrower _ (Seal) Borrower CONV •BC-ARM Rider FE-4279(0410) Page 4 of 4 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 63 of 100 PageID# 360 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 64 of 100 PageID# 361 4; ' 4 '■'■ ' . •■■'- . ' ■• , ■., ■- -V 4 ' - iipi®iiii#\|fe#s "c. '• >-S-.k. ^;p?-iASilSSA 1.i: A 4A - ; ,,A- .. ■ ";' A; ■;:'>A' .r~ -' ' ' a" ' '"v . A-. t;' ' '' V , i SSStel #i5 alfc<®''s > '.>' . - A' 5 v^5i,. ASl' . .4 ;#A VI VBCD LOW I SOIIOaOTf MXfli tee8S25se}im9«os NOTE WML 14, 2011 vbiladolphta, ianrunuiM \|Oato\| (Oity) i0Uta\| IMl • 44X8 0y, POILWSLPaXA, fk Ifl42-S221 \|P«op«ny MdioMi 1. BORRowErrspnoMiseiopAY hiet8me9relo4iiOtsllhowieook«d.lpi8mli»topeyU8. \|TO,ooo.oo CMiomooRttieaMnMP4n< ptu»l(ittfest.(oih«eRltre((h«Landar.TlwUn0wb mmru swi, n», h ynsMiw ouumnw mVlflOi MM. I vA imfca si pajiinaiti tsatottdi Note In Oittorn olcastL check er monoycmitr. lvB(ftnttntfSialC»LKitfirm^triRiflrMtlCo(a.1lwtmtftr4ronyem«(iotsk«o0ilsNatoby(raii3tiir«nd«itio b snoasd(0reesira payiMRts uatftrflds NetIs csSmI dtt KoMsr* 2. INTGRBSr tatsmstwO bduugsd en unpaid pdndpilimtt Ot(UOsffiount o(RfeMtpsI hM fasen poU.t wQ pay Mtnst1 y«nVntiv( 9.299%. j IheiRlereitntBiequlrMibyOilsSacdonabfliaFstalwOiMybalhbefmsndefterQnydeiBuKdtsedbedlnSoefoi 8(B)efatI»Neti X PAYMaCTS (A}Ibntnd PItM of Piymofita lvflpypttec^4ndlt!lwBtbyiosldBgp«yinaiitowyBwnai. liRflmstenvBtonBtfypiynnnieaflt* ur tf^feCeashmoo&iboQkiAioen Mn i, 2011. l«(fliMkstftMpynNntetMfycRenOiunfltfi»op^iBo>Oipitnc4MJeMlfittnoitRtffqfe9»rcti<igt»(tacAo(l bsfawomtwycwunderone Not.Cm>moaa^pymaiwg booppcedaicftetchiftlocldttttfcao end wBb* sppg8d6atitts<saibeftj;WnctpsiH.on KMT 1, 2041, l«aiommflunto«wfflftWtNoto.t%»ffl pay thoso iinounii biftiOen OMt<W.vMeh b oiltd th"Mttittty out.* loOinaifBiyraoBatlypaymentiot 9191 cowowm nt 9K0I, M 40090-2091 or1laserent piooo tf nqplrtd by th* Not* Heidor. ^AraoimlefItotiMy Poyment* MyresnO^paymentviObotnttioameuntefUA ftll.oo. 4. mRHOviEirsinaKrTOPiiERAV asaftopaymontVVhsntm«ko«Pirtpoyment.lwOtsfth«NoteHoidsrInMntSnglfistlcmdoinglalmaynatdsalsnste 0 paymtnteo Rspoymsat Vtfiav not owd* olttw mofiOily pmrneots duundertbo Nelo. I may moke a bi9fteptymenict panUfbspoymtflti wtSttutpoyingPnp^dnmtditiB.1h» Net HoUor wd iiainyn«p^rmanbtsrMliio9MameufttofmMfp8iOatlewuidere)fsNet.Kei«vBr,0iNeiHe)d8fm^r«Ppijr myfbepormoRt toStooonitd and unpaid tntamlen iho fbopqansA emeont. btfofo flpplyino niy FYep^fmsnl to rMhiee8i9MRc^meunieftbNst.nimahapiifiBlftB\|HqinMnLthef«iflbiioclMn^lneiduodatoerin 9wmcgntcfnyinqn0iiyps\|m<nltfldwothNetHeMofywlnwiWnfltoCwioctw^. 0. tOANOHAROfiS n• (nr.vMch eppte to Mslean end wMetisets mtidhnan tern ehnv«s,is(btiSy bilsmntid sothatQi0Meieot ofethsftoaid>si8eaeegsclsdortobctilactodInccnnaetoniahBtfsleanaKeaadlhp8nriBodl»Bl».eiBn;(e)any eveh teen oiMisshsB bo mduood by Otsmounlnsmsafy to radue(hcherQo to dw petmOtod BmR:and(Ueity folUolat fi klCU^ laaimAtzraimMiBHOTLfibdstasiy^nrtsUMffnesisiiMUieieitiiotoiituaiiNr rtensawtiet "' eies»eotoO(OwOenm<ikha, Peg 1 el 9 FtoeoNOT eiei D4«iS«201i l#iOO J503182676 CRlSn^L N01E-1 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 65 of 100 PageID# 362 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 66 of 100 PageID# 363 pi: U ;ii S Pi li -3 =3 III III III If 11 ir II II If i!? Ill ''If? II I Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 67 of 100 PageID# 364 VI NBCD IM0 I 90StSt67< BamM«rffiuitp«ytBtun»tccurt<Sbytttl98MuiMytRs6uniQnlHBo<iowerbbtBpsy9ttc«sum»ptior(o0w ea\|»liiBoftdteportotf.Undtrra^tiwto>ny(twt<Bttpifna8tdbyftl»8oan6ytn»ttuin>ntV(B>ic«lftathtf imOov or damoAtf en Bofrewtr. VnmeBd Tie HAta>\|9)AND8£AL(8)OF1HE UWSnatONED. Mur B. 'PAYTOTHEOROa^O^ lyBMjAMrfiEAL VICEPRESOENT (BtgnOifdnd Only] IIUUiaroiEWCTB»TCHOT6<>i»ffiggy»««>tVl«f^tWI»WlCWIBPOWiPWflWl>igff ffORaawoim •teOMeavOrtwOKamntikbHL fftfl 9 ot 5 RtMMOT OTM Q«i9-aeii i«iB« 503182676 0RI6INRL NOTE-I VI WGO uns I M>U2<TC mat leoosissosmCTMS NOTE JVMt 14, SMI »Ul«dolphla, PtOmnVMISA \|Oato\| ICttyl fSUtal isft 0 4€ra oTi musnyazik, pa mas-snr tPcoparty AdtooM) 1. BonmwrEfrsraoMisETOPAV In(«(umferabanOi«tlhmaraeelMd.lpfQiniiotopayU8. $10,060.00 ^mountbeiMM»(p<r), pf(i»bHemllothtord«roriteLimftr.11wUoOorb PtAOonut OMOt, m, A PSomuA CBMBnao OAVSVOO IMS. IvAI mako cQ poymonts URdor tMi NoteIn Ow Conn olenh.Ohock or iROiwy ORtr. luntfHitindeulthaUtiOtriMytransttfadiNotaDttlRitferoraAyntotKhotikioMtNotobybvnteoitdwIto II EllwW w rOCOWW pijFHWro WiCli Uw Iww D ClBSe iw •ww rWOpT 2. naamt Intofofl vfO bo chaiBOd on vnqMiO pdnel^ unH Itio(u9fmottnlointic^ ha» boon pM.I«ta pay bitomi«t0 youtynttoot 92901. IbotnbrostrRtoroqutrodbyOUoSocilonStetharatolwSlpcybothboforaandoftefcnytfaftutltftMftbodinSoction 0(6}of M» Note, 2, PAVMENTB <A)Hmoand Plcco OfPaymoato I viO pay ptfROl^ and tntnoit by RUktRg0poymont owfy moMh. ivamtkomyotetAtlypoyiooRioaOto iot tfqfoliadifMnOiboglmlngoa Jtaai t, 2011. IwfiaioikotbotopaynwntiowiyowilhuiiBtiHBiopoMtfoftbopilBt^MiindtiiifMtowlotyoCwfchiigoocteqtbod btioiaromt RuyoMtmdir MsNote.EsKhmontMy paymtntwabofp^bdaotlb ochoduMdOttfdoandivB bo eppled(oftitumboCBf»Rtecb<lHlcn lour 1, 2041, l8t9owtamountiimtf«rOdiNetB.I%iiO pay Oiostamounts India on Otatdcto.wti)d)tsecBadOtoMctuitly Date.' I wS make my monthly poymaati ot 9191 OORPOmB DA SllOf, m 4iOM>24>t or ata dSbrant ptseo IflaoHlmf by Ow Neto Kottfer. (B)AmottM et SSoRthiyPayoNnta MyiRflnSiIyp^fiDantisabatnftaamoimiefULS. $M5.94. 4. BORROWEfraRIOHrtOPREPAY lln«aOio(lgl)teeRi8l(apaymaRtsofmrte(pOlataiiyanobffmthoyafadua.ApoymintcfMic<palot4ylstotown eaoPrepaymenlWheniiMtoaRepaymtttt.la(fB(rithal{QtoHoMarCn«nt&t8th8tlamdefeTosaliiiaynaldaitBnoto I apaymenlaial^epeqffnmtVihavaratmadtanihomoftth^paymantaduaunderOteNoto. I I may make0fuO Frepayntemor peitol Rrepaymaitb wllheut payOiO•fifopoynwAchatge.Hui Noto KeMar wQ usomyfYapaymtntstoniduoaOtoamountof Mtdpa)that1 mm undorCMsNats.KowowtthsNoteKotdor mayappty ftiyftopayment10the acetvad and unpaid tatofoat en tho RropiVinenlamount, bafOro app^flng ray PmpqnnntIb fodttoalhaftIneIpalaffleum6fthaNQla.tflmBkoapaftliinrapa)iRienl.ttntowObano€haR$8alnlhodiMtfitaortn Otaamountof my fficnihiy paymant untaaa Ow Nota Kctderestaa* faisnttrtB 10 Qteso tfunsaa. 0. LOANCHARQES tfataa,artdeft a^Costo this toon and aMelitats maibiiiim loan chafgoa.isfnaoyintatpralad M thatthe bdafoal ofoqtafloancftiiyaootlactidoftobacotectedlnoonitactlonaiimtWsloanoKetadthapamtlBadfcidb.BitmWwy such loan ohsfga stitO bo laducad by Om amoitid neeesaaiy le raduea0» charga toOta poimttad 6ri% ad^any Soialalat WaTOTATgWXttOtUTg rtn^iRJSfKnjafNttSMttOtCTCRMItCSTWaiDfT PKnaCNUOl ^ otiaoMoaO(ftwOac«iaieo.inc. POga 1 of 1 fasoaNOT otbi ea-u-aoii loloo J503182676 0RI6IKRL NOTE-1 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 68 of 100 PageID# 365 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 69 of 100 PageID# 366 h 111 m ill £}\| ir III ei II BS aJ II I II I !Hffil g i I II §i i«l I lil mi II I i§ i Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 70 of 100 PageID# 367 n MBCD UNW • S09ie2S7< DonTwmfmatp«y«l«amwcuridby{hi«8»Qaftytft<trwaatnitfBcntwtrtti^tep«yth«f«um»{MtortoO)t e»ybrttoclftbpttlodLLBiawwaylnvote6nyi«BqdIe»p«iBat«lbytWi6ganftytititntm«vl%>W)outfWhtf neOM er tfimantf on Bcmwtr. VmNE88 WE HM(D(8)AND OPIHE U»ffiERS»NB>. KMT 8. PAYTOTHEOROatOF WnHOUT RECOURSE FIA6STAR6ANICFS8 MELEIDAMcNEAL VICE PRESIDENT t8te»0itsb«l0nly\| iWttiCTfltBWCPiiMgtBWMhtffcriiiiiriiiiiftiiiiiTw^nriMUwrwiMPWHtaimT Nmsmtm PmMesrOnABvtoaangnliklaa PSng* ' Cf S PKOCNOT OWl M-is-aoii Mioe J503182676 ORIGZhCRL NOTE-JL Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 71 of 100 PageID# 368 After lleeerdiBg Rotern 9oi flAOSSAR BMm 5t91 GOBPOmSB DRZVB tBOt, MX 48098 FXBAL DOCIIMBBSB, NAIL STOP «r-$31-l Km it 273163800 APV It -(OpacAbevtThisttoa Fm lUeotdlno Oatal < VI NBCD LOMI • 503182676 MORTQAGE IMIM: 100088B8031826760S OERNmONS Words iisedin muRljptosefitiens otOib dooutnonloredofinsdbdowond other woida ore defined In Sections 8,11,18,18,20end 21.Certain rules rsoardlRgOie usage ofwords used In this doeument are also provided In Seotta)10« (A)%aetifl^lnatrumeiit"meaR9 this document,whioh is dated april 14# 20ii, together urith all RIdeis to this document (0)''Botfowof"Is May B, KoCloud and Vara L, JoaoD, Borrower ts the mortgagor under this Becuii^ Instmment (C)WBt8Is Mortgage Bectimie Regbtralnn Byetems,Inc. MER8Isaeepaiate corporation thatIs aeOng sotsVasandmneefor Usnderand Lender^tuccessersend assigns. MBIStstitenioitgagso imdarthlaBsaudty Inotiumsnt MGRS Isorganbed and erdsttngimderthelawsofDelaware,and has a ma^address at P.CX Bex 2026,Rinl, Ml 48S01-2020\|and a street address of 1801 & Voorhses StiBSl, Buita C,OarwDIe,IL 81834.The M6R8 telephone number Is (868)678MERS. (D)'iAndoi"la PLAOSzaR rrhr# psb. Initialst P6M4mVAIOA-e]n9t»F«ndy^ann1eWH/FmddlsMMUNll9RMll(8TRU!IBIirRrfn80S81/D1 ^ OnlBoOoeunwnttvtftfc Page 1 of 13 PARDBBb PAEO^Tl tOH 0413-20il 14i00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 72 of 100 PageID# 369 VI MBCD LOIM I S0318267e Undor It a pbosralut cbmobrsd fiavxBOS BJun orgontiod and osdttfng under the laws of UBX3BD 8ZAZBS OF tonssach. Lmdei't addratt b SiSl COJtPORASS OR, «ROl, MX e8098-363e, CE)'Ifote" means the pfombsoiy notes^ned by Borrows and dated aprzi* 14, 20ll. 'T?ieMGte9tatetthalBoiiowerowetUfider*******«*68VE»rx isovsiUR) ahd ro/IOO kDotbn (U.8. $98,000.00 ) In full not later than Miur 1, 2041. (F)"Propertymeansthe propertythatb desorlbed betowunderthe heading ItransferofRlghtt bithe Property/ (Q)"Loan** means the debt^Adeneed by the Note, plus biterest,any prepayment charges and tate charges due under the Note,and all sums due under thb SeouiSy Instnonent, plus InteretL (M "RIderaP meansall Riderstothb SecurityInstrumintthatareoxseutsd try Borrower.IhofoOowIng Riders are to be executed by Bofrower teheek boxasappScablet: CZSAdjuttable Rate Raer CIDCondomlnlum Rider CUSecond Home Rider I^BaQoon Rider OPlanned Unit Development Rider CI30ther(s)(speeliy] B14 Pbffilly Rder OBIwesldy Payment fwer VA Rider 5) "Applteablo Law"means an cotttroSInoappIlceblefederel,state and beat statiilas,i8gutatlQn8, onnnarm and admlrdstradvarulesandordereflhathavotheeffectoflaw)aswb9asallappDrabtefinBl, non^poilsble Judicial opfnbns. (J) Community Aeaodttlen Duee,Pteib and Aeseaementa means all dues.fees, essesemento end other ohsigss that ere tmposed on Borrower or the Property by a condomlniuin ossodbtton, homeownere assootafion or etmnar organlxatlen. (K)"BeotrontoPUndaltanafeynMans any transfer offund8,oth6rthanatnui8aotlon originated by chedr, draft, or slmOar paper bstrument, which b InNated fhrm^ en eleetronlo terminal tetephonio InsSnimont,computer,or magnetto tape ao as to order,Instrud or authoitze afinendal msStutlon to debit Of crediten eocouniSuch term Inctudes,but b notDmfted to,polnt-oPsala transfsia,automated t6!l8rmachlnetran8aetIons,tran8fBr8tnttbted bytebphone,WlrotrBn8iUis,andeiitDmetedcleaitnShous6 tranefiam. (L)"Eaoiow ItemaF* means those Items that are described In Section S. fM)"UlsoQllansouaPrecoedB^mesnsanycompensation,settlement,award ofdamages,orproeseds paM byany third party(otherthan Insumnce proceedsj^d underthecousragee descilbedin Section 6)fon(0 damage to,ordestniotlon of,the Property; AO condemnation orcther taking ofaQ or any part of the Property;(^oonvmmncaIn Ibu ofcendemnaton;or0^ ml8rN>'8sentBttons ,oromteslons as to, the vanie end/or condmn of the Property. (N>"Mottgage InsuraneeP meansInsufanceproleotbg lenderagalnstthe nonpaymentof.or default on,the Loan. g))''PeilodlePBymenlfmeanstheiegularfytchedutodamountduefor0)prbdpaland tnterestunder e Note,phis(R)any omounte under Sectfen 3ofthb Sectnfty(nstniment (P)"RESPA* means the Real Estate Settbmenl Proeedurss Aot(12 U.$.C. 92601 et seq.) and fb Implementtng ragutaSon. Regulation X(24 C.F.R.Part3600),as they might be amended from time to time,or any addionalorsuccessor tegielatbn orregutailon thotgovems thesame subjeot matter.As used In this Seeurlhrlnstniment,REBPA refers to aOrequIrBmenb end lestrbtlonslhaUre tmposed In regard tea tsda^rebtod mortgageloon* even ifthe Loan doss not quafdy asa federal^ratotsd mortage loan* under RESPA. <0)"Sueoeaeortn Intereatef Borrower"meansany parb that hastakenliiletothe Property,whether or net that party hssassumed Borrowai's obOgatlons under the Notesnd/cr thb Security InstmmenL XDltiolat PafOiSn.VANUUSbtdvPanilH'ttRfltoMM/PieddlOilMUNlRriUIUfSTRUMEIfrRormSSSSiroi 10.' OnBfi0\|}oeumsnti.lnB. Page 2 of 12 PABD58L toil ' 04-13-2011 14t00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 73 of 100 PageID# 370 VI MBCD MAS 9 90}1$2(76 TRANSFER OF ffiOHTS IN THE PnOPERW ThbSteurily(nstnimfntsaoima toUndtn(I)thoifipaymenioftholoan,aKlUr«iiowBte,ejdenslora and ^TA litA mf AfV#l linWAFlHIft 000^19 Wl mMVV l#\|0 »WWTUWMMWM nyp9tfRMeafiRO'fuiMlcaoa)of PBZZiADBtTOSA 8SB Tzns APS It 272163600 whiohoimeni^haa Old atfdrew ol 1S61 s 46x» sr# pbzuid8lp8IA# \|Stro«t)(Ctlyl Ponnaylvanta 19163-3827 CPropeity Address^: IZlpCodN TOQETHS)WITH an thelinpioveinonts now or hereafter erectnlon tha prepnty,and eOeasamonto. appurtenaneeai and(Wuret new ar hereafter o partd tha proper^.AS reptsoamenli and addKtona ehaO eliobaeereredbythlsSeeitittylnatrufflenLAUdlhaforasolngbrelefiadtolnthlaSacuH^lnetnimaniae tha'Prepart/'BeiroweriindenlandaandaflreeathatMBtS hddeenlylesaltniotothatnteresb granted byBonowartnlhb Seeurftytnetiumen!,but,Dnaeaeeaiytocon^wfthtaworcuttom,MBtS(atnomlneo for lender and Lendei'e eueeessoiB and aeftgns) has Ore r^hb to exereiee any or aS of Otoaa Intereaie, Incktding,buinotOmlted to,the righttofoadoeoand eeD Ore Pioperty;and totakoany action required of Under tnduding,butnet Gnrited h,ideating end cancenng Oib Saeuifty Inatnanenl BORRCTWER COVENANTSthatBonoww^b tawfUIVfielted ofOre estate hvefcyconveyed end has Ota rightto mertgaga,grantend eonvey Ore Property and flial Ore nnpperty b unencumbered,exoept (orencimibrencaaefrecoid.BonowerwanantsandwindefendgenereliyOre OtfetoOrel^w^agalnst oO oialma and demands,eubfeetto any encumbrences ofrecord. THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT comblnee unfform covononb for naOonal use and nonmntform covenants with limited varfattone byfuibdlctlon to coneOtutaaunlfoimaeouiOybietnimeAloovBitng real property. UNIFORM COVENANTS.Bomwer and Under oovreiant and agree aafoBowe: 1. Piwmenl of Principal,Interest Eeerowltemo^PrejMymreilCiuigea,and tote Charges. BonowerensD pay when due Ore princtyalof,and bitereeton,Ore debtevtdenced byOta Note and eny prepaymentchargesand late chargee duo under Ore Note. Bonower ehaO abo payftmds for Escrow hema pursuantto SeettonS.Paymenb due underOre Noteand Oib Seouitty InstnnnenieheO be made In U.S.eunenoy.However.Ifanycheek oroOrertnetrumoO received by Underas payment under Ote Note or thb Security Instrument b returned to Under unpaid, Lretder may require Oral any or aQ subsequentpaymenb dueisuler Oio Noteand thb Security tnsliument bemadeIn cneor more ofthe fbSowmg forms,as aelected by Under:(a)cash;(b) moirey order;(c^ ceitBed check,Irenk check, treesurm check or cashlo'e check; prorided any eueh check b drawn upon an bntiiutbn whose deposHs ere Insured by a federal ageri^,Instramentalfty,or enftty;or(tQ Electronb Fun^ TVMsfer. zaltialai PEiirrevLVAiOA-8tnobFefniv-f^Mieffto(MbMMUtaRriiM(N8TRuafQ«rpwiReoeii/ei OnawDocuiMnI«,(AO. Pogc 3 of 13 PAOIEOL tctt Oe-13-2011 14too Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 74 of 100 PageID# 371 VI MBCD LOAB I S0)ie267< Pftynwnb are deemod rocetvad by Underwhen received atthe tocellon designated In the htota or at such other location as may be desfgnated by Under bi accordance with the nottea provbtons(n Section 19.tjender may return any paymentor paitblpaymentRthe paymentOf partbl payments are Iniufflelentto bring the Uan ourreni lender mayaec^t any pi^entor paitia)paymmt insufltetent to bring the UanouirenlitMthoutwaiverofenyfi^hereunoeror prejutScetoftsilgnta torahiaeauch paymmt or partial payments Infhefiituro,butlonderb not obllQQted toapidy such payments at the dme such payments are acoepted. Ifeach Periodic Paymentis apj^ed as of Bescheduled due date, then Under need net pay Interest en tmappBedftmde. Under may hoM such unappOedhmdeuntQ eonowar makes paymmtto bring the loan ouivmtL If Borrower does not do so within a reasonable period oftime,Undar shsl either applysuch hinds or return thorn to Borrower. If not mpDed eatfler. euch hmds w81 be appQed to the ovtetai^bg prtodpal balance under the Note trnmaoatety prior to foredoBure. No dbet or dalm which Bonewer mlgnt have now or In the future against Uitder shall redevB BorrovrerfrofflmaklngpaymentsdueundertheNotsand thb BeourhyInstrummttor perfbrmtng the covenants and agremtents secured liy this Beourfty Instniment 2. Applleatton of Paymente or Prooeeda. Buept ae otherwise deocrlbed(n this Section 2,el) payments acceptsd and applied by UndsrehaO beappiled In Aefollowing orderof priority:(a)Interest dueunderthaNote:(b)prndpalduoundertha Nete:{q amountsduo underGeeUnS.Such payments shaO be appBad toeach Pericm PaymentbitheOlderIn which It becamedue.Any remaining amounts shanbeappBedfirttto late ohaiges,second to anyotheremounb dueunderthb Security Instrument, and then to reduce(he principal babnceof the Note. II Under receives a paymentfrmn Borrowerfor a deBnquent Psriodlc Payment which Includes a sufficient amount to pay any (ate charge due, the payment may be appOed to Ote defoquent paymortand thelatecharge.Hmorethanone PeriodicPaymmitb oubtand^,Under mayapply any payment receivedfrom Borrower tothe repayment ofthe Periodic Paymenb R,and to the extantthat, each paymentcan be paM In hiO.To the ejdontthatany erooese QXbb after the paymantb appBad to thefull paymentofone or more Peitodlo Paymenb,such exosse may be eppBed toany(ate charges due.Votuntaiy propaymenb ehafl be appOed first to any prepayment charges and(hen aa described In the Note. AnyappBcaHon ofpaymenb,Insurance proceeds,or MIsetilanoous Preoeedstoprlnclpaldueundw the Note shell notextend oroosfoone(he duedeto,orchange the amount,of the Patlodio Payments. 3. Fundsfor Escrow ttome.BorrowershaQpay to UmteronthsdayPsriodloPaymsnbaredus underthe Note.untBtheNote b paid In toll,aaum me"Funds')topro^sforpaymentofamounbdua for.(a)taxes end assessmenb and other hems which can atlm (ulorily over thb GecuiHyInstniment 88 a Qen or encumbrance on the fYoperty:(b)leasehold paymoib or ground rente on the Proparqf,If any:(c) premkime tbr any and aO Inwranee required by Under under Beotfon 5;and (d) Mortgage tnsuranee premiums, R any, or any sums payable by Borrowsr to Under In Beu of the payment of Mortgage Insurance premiumsIn accordance with theprmbbnsofSection 10.Thesettema arecalled "Esbw Rents." At ori^c^n or at any time during mo term ol the Uan,Under may require that CommuMty Association Dues, FSes,and Assessments,R any, ba escrowed by Borrower,end eueh dues,fess and assessmento shall be an Escrow Item* Borrower shaO promp^fUmbh to Under an notices ofamounto tobepiBd underlhbSe^n.Bcnowershall payUndertheFundsfsr Escrow Items unless UnderwalVes Boirowere oblbaSon to pay the PUndsfor any or ell Escrow items. Under may waJve Bonowar's obfigatton to paytoLsndar Fimdsforem oraO Emtqw items elany time.Anysuch waiver mayonly bein writing.In theeventofsuch waiver,Boirowarshall pay direetly,when and where payable,Iheamountedueforany EscrowItemsforwhbh paymentofFunde basbeenwaived by Under and,RUndarrequires,shaOfUimshtoUnderreoelpteovtdenoing such paymentwHhbiauoh tlnreperiod Bs Under mayrequire. Bonowof's ottSgaRon to maxssuch paymentsand to prerideiBoelpte shill(or oQ puiposesbedeemed toheaoovenantandagreementcontamedInIhb Security(nstrument,asthephraso "covenant and agreeinenir b used b Section 9. R Bcfrewer b obBgated to pey Escrow Kwns <sioc%, mnsuanttoavvalver,e^ BcROwerbbtopaythe amountduefUran Escrow R^Lender nt^exerebe ns righb underSecfion9and pay euCh amountand BonawerehaQ then be obBgatad under Seolion8to repayto Underanysuchemounl Under maylevckethewaiveras toenyor^ PaiN8VLVANIA.8beUFeiieKfiiml»filMri^rad«eMMlll(iraRMU(81RUMflNTFeim90Sei/^ OiilntDo«tm8nti.lfle. Page 4 of 19 P/flsOfiOl toil 04-13-2011 14I00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 75 of 100 PageID# 372 VI MBCD LOMI f B09182676 by anotfoeolvon In oeoonlancawfttiSactfon 15and,upon such rovooatlon,SofioworshaQ payto Lander sQ Rinds,end bi suoh emounis.thatam then required under this Section s. Lender may,atonytime,ooQootandhold RindsIn en amount(a)suffiolentlopefmltLendertoapply theFunds atthodmaspacfflfid underRE8PA.and(htnottoexoeodthemaxiRHimamoimtaleAdftroan require underR68PA.LendershallesflmateOre amountofFundsdueon the basb ofcunentdata and reasonable estfmatse of eupendituies of future Gktow Items or othenwtso In accordance with AppBcabte Law The Funds slwU be hetd in en inatSuOon vtihose deposits are Insured by a foderel agency, (nstrumentatfly,or entity dneiudtng Lsnder.lfLenderIsen bretltutlon whose depositsaresoInsured)or In any FsdetaiKome Uan Bank,under ahoBappty the Funds to pay the Escrow tlams no tilerthan the tlmospsoHled underRE8PA.Lendershsllnetoharoe Boirowerferholdingend applying the Rinds, aiuuiany an^/dng ttte escrow aecount,or veiifylno Escrow Itemti, unless Lenaer pays Borrower InterestcnfteRymdaandAppBcableLawpermllsLenderto makesuehachsfge.Unlessan agrewnent is made In wiiOng or Appwebte law requires Interest to be paid on the FUnds.Uuidef shell not be required to pay Boiicwer any Interest m eamlnge on tire Rinds. Borrower and Lender can agree(n writing,however,thmintereslshaBbepaMonBhe^de.twedershallglvetoBoirtwer,Wtthouictwrga. an annual aeoounUiM ofthe Funds as required by REBPA. IftheretsaiuiBkisolRmdshiMtnescrow,88tt6l^undQrREBPA.Underah8aacceunttoBorrower futIreexeetsfUnas bi eoBoidancaw^ RE8PA.trthereisashoftegeolf^mds hM In escrow,esdcAted imder R^PA,Lender ihaB ncABy Bonower asrequired by REBPA,and BoficwershaBpaytoLenderthe amountneceseeiyto make up theehortega bioeocidanoe wBh RG8PA.butb)no more tnanl2 moiihly pammmts.tf therels a debeli^dRmds hetd bi escrow,as dsQnad under RSBPA,Lntder etreB no% Boftoweraslequbed by RESPA,and RoiiowershallpaytoLendertheamountneeessaiyto make up the deBdenoytnacooniencewlihREBPAibutlnnomoremanlBmonihlypeyments. ^ ^ ^ Upon psymentbifUOofaQeume secured bythis Beeurftylnstniment,LendsrshaQ promptly reftind to Borrower any Funds held by Lender. 4. Charges;liana.Borrower shall pay an taxes, eseesements,charges,fines,and bnpesmons attrilMitablato the Property which can attain priorityoverthis BscurityInstniment,leasehold payments or ground rents on the Praperty,if any,and CommunBy Association Dues.Peas,and Aesesements,If ai^^theextentthatthesehemsareEscrow items.BorrowereheSpaythem In the marmer prmridod Bomrw^shaO promptly dischameany[Ion which has priority overthis Security Instrument unless Bmraww:(a) agrees bi writing to m pe^menl of the oDlIfiatlon secured by the Sen In a manner acraptabteId Lender,btdonV oolong asBonowerls perfom^suehagraemenl:(b)conteatetheBen In good fSsSh by,or defends againstenforoemenl of tire Qen In,fsgat proceedings which In Under's opbi^ operate to preventthe enforcementof the Hen white those proceedings are pending,butonly until eif^ procoedtngs are concluded; or (c) seourse firom the holder of the Den an agreemerit satisfaotoiy to Lender subotdbrettng the Rento this Beeuritytnetrument II Under detarmtnes that any paitclthaPnyerWIssubJeottoaUenwhtehcan attain piforttyovarttileBeeurttyInstrument,Lendermay give ^inwer a notice tdentil^g tire Sen.Wititin 10 days of the date on wiileh tiiat notice Is gWen, BorrowershaQ sai^the Qmi ortake ens or more of the amions setfOith above bi this Beeflsn 4. lender may require Borrower to pay a ene4Ime mtatge lOr a real estate tax vertfleatton and/or reporting ser^ used by Lendw In connection wltfi thie Loan. 8. PropeiVtiieurenoe.Borrewereha9KeeplheImprevBmanlsnowa)69t!ngorh9eflftereieotedon thoRropeiWtniured agalRstlGsa l]^fire,hazBrds Included wQhln the tenn"extended oovsrageband any other hazards Including,but notlimited to,earthquakesand tiocds,for which Letdar requires(nsuiance. Thte boufarree shaO bo malntateed tn tire emouitts Bnetudtng tiedireSblefevele)and for tire iMBfods that Lenderrequ^Vtttat Underremdias puiBuentto tire preee^sentenceseen ohange dumg theterro oftheLDan.ThabisuianoeceirierprDvkftRgthalnsuranoashaBbechosenbyBoiiowersttirjsetieLettdw's i^httodbappfoveBoncwerlechoIoe,whichiteht^notbe6X8rBi56dtmr8asonabhr.LntdermByreqi^ Borrcwar topsy,te oonneotlon wfth ttito Loan,eOhen(a)aone^bna tfieige forflood zone detemunationi ceitllleal^end tracing servlees;or(b)a onetime chargeforflood zensdetornAurt^ar^^g^gflw P6NN9YUVAfAA-8b)gtoRuney-fttntfoafMt/Proddh Mm UNIFORM ClISVIIUUEtirPOnnSOCsirei OaSn9Doam»nt,lna Page 8 Of 13 WEDBDL 1011 04-13-3011 14I00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 76 of 100 PageID# 373 VI ffBGO IMS 9 503ie2<7« soivteodeiKieubsequonlchaiQdseBohtlinorefflapptnsftorilmn&rchQRgosoecurvMMeh ivasoniblymishi 0tfedt tuehdetamftlnafioooroartifioation. BoirawsrahaQ also boresftonstblotor ttia paymofttofanyfees Imposed byIhoFsdeialEmaiQancy M8na0fifn«UAsan^&icoimeetton wUh010rsMtawofanyfioM 2ono (ffitarmlnaDon rasutfng from an objection by Bofiowar. tf BorrowerfeBs to maintain any ofthe covereoeedoooifbed above,Lender may obtain Insurance oovefage,atLendero option and BoirowerlBexpoise.Lendertaimd^noobOgattontopurdiasaaiiy paittcttsarQlpo oramountofcovemga.lherefsro,such coverageehaS cover Lerid<7,butm^htormlgm nolpfotoetBcnewar,Bonower%oqtdtyinlhal^operty,orthaeontsnttofthe Prop8riy,8ffitotanyittk, haiard orQabliatfand mightprovMegraotmor(essercoveragethan wasprevtoualyIn efteet Boirowar acfcnowledgeelnaltheeotlofthotnittmnceooveiBstaoobtabied inlSht^nlilcantty exceed the cost oftneuranee thatBoirowaroould have obtained.Anyamounts disbursed by Lender underthlaBoctlen 5shall become additional debt of Bonowereecured by this Beourlty Instniment Iheee amounts shall bear Interest at(ho Note ratafrom the date of dfsbummentand shaO be payable,with euch Interest, upon notice from lisnder to Boirower requesting payment All(nsuiancepoQclOsrequired by Lenderand renewalsofsudipoSoIesshallbeaubjeotto Lendei'e rightto disapproveeuch poBcles,ehaO include astandard moftgage clause,and shall nameLenderae mortgagee enrVor as an eddWenaf toea payee. Lender shall have the rfght to hold the policies end renewal cartSicates. If Lender reqidrea, Borrowar ahall prompUy give to Lendtr afl receipts of paid premlume end renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any form on Insuranee covamge, not otherwise required by Londar.(ordamage to,ordestraotlon of,thehoperty,sueh poOoyshalltnoiudeastandard mortgage cleuse and Shan name Lender as moitgagae eno/br as an additloial toss payee. Inlheevantofloss.BowowsrshsOglvepRHnptnotlcetotheineuraaeeeanlar and Lender.Lender may mekeproofof(oselfnotmadepfomptfy byBeimwv.Unlese Lendmrand Borrowerothsiwlseagree In writing,any Insurance prTOeGd8,whedterornotthe underMng Insurance was required Iw Lender, shaObeimpBedtofestorellonorrepaIrofthePropeity,ffthereetorBtfonorrepmrbeconomioawfsas9>le and Lender'ssecurity Is notlessoned.During euotirepairand restoration irarlod,LenderehaOhavathe lightto hold sudiInsurance proceeds until LenderhMtuuSanoppoitunmtolnspecttuahPropeiW to ensure the work has been comptstsd to Lender's sattsfbotlon, provided Oiatauoh fnspeotlon Shan be ondeitaken promptly.LsndermaycQsburseproceedsforthorepalraand rssioiafionInastnglepayment or hi aserlas of progress paymentsas the workbcompletad.Unless an agreementis madeIn wrklno orAppSeableLawrequlreslnteresttobepaldcnsuohinsuraneepioceedSiLonderehallnotberequired 10 p^ Borrower any Interest or earning on such proceeds. Pees for pubSo adjustrae,or other third partto, retained by Bonower shall notbepaM outofthe fosioanoe proceeds and shaO be the sole obllgaAion offorrower.KtherestoranonoriepalrIs noteoonomloiilyfeaslblecr Lendei'eeeourity would beleesenad,the btturanoe proceeds shsQ beapplied tothesumseecured bythb Securitytnstniment, Whether or notthen due,wBh theexceea,tfany,paid to Borrower.Bueh Insursnceprocaidt shall ba eppBed In the order provided for In Becifon 2. ., If Borrower abandons the Proper^,Lender mayfile, negotiate and smtio any a(vailabie Insurance claim end related mattere.dBorrowerdooenotiespondwHhlndOdaystoonotieofrom LmdOT^foo Insurance carrier has offered to eetffe a claim, then Lender may negoffate and eettle the datm. ihe dO^ayperiod wDlbeoInwhenthenotloebglven.In efthmrevenliOrlfLonderacqulreethePirQpaftyunder Section 22 or otherwise, Boirowar hereto aedgns to Lender <a) Bonowerb rights to any(nwianco proceeds in an amountnotto exceed the amounts uripald underthe Note orthis Becuiity liwtnimeiit, and 0>)any other of Bofrowei's rtghb (other than the rightto any refund of uneein^ premkinra paid by Bcfrowerjunder allfosurinoe pottoto ooverfng Ihe ^perqf,tnecfer as eudi rights areappHea^ to thecoveiage ofthe Property.Lender may usethe Insuianoe proceeds oWierto repalrof wlorsina propertycrto payameuntounpski underdie Note or(WsBeourltyInstrumentwhefoerornrttliwi^e. S. OMUpanoy.Borrower ehailoccupy,eeteb&h,and use the Propaity as Borrower^ principal reskfence within 60 days a^the execution ofOds Beeurtty Instrumentand shall continue to e^py the Property as Borrower's prfaidpel reeldsneefor atleastone yosraflw the dateof wupmoy,uraees Lender otherwise agrees n wii&ig, wWch consent ehaO net lie unreMonably withheld, or uraesi extenuBltng droumstances eidst which are boyond^nower'soontroL PENNSVLVAIIIA-SbtBfo PafdSy-FtnRto MtWFiroddto Mae VKtPORM INSTRUtlBNT SOSi1/Dt CfianeOeoumente,lna Page 6 of IS 04-13-3011 14too Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 77 of 100 PageID# 374 VI mCD LOAN I B03182676 7. Pi«8Qivatfon,MalntinanoeftmlProteolIonoflh0Pioptiiy:trap9ot(onaBarower8lieanol (lootroy.<tama8d orImpalrUte nepmty.aBowthoProperlytodeterfoialoorcommitwaotaon the Ropeity. WhetocniotBoimwarbiaskliRolnmePropeitytBoirowBrehaOm^ti^nthePrepeitylncRlertopfovsnt thoFtaportyficmcteterioiatinocrdocPBftelnglnvBluecliiototteoomjSlofLUAleseEtbdstfflmlnedpurBuafrt toSee^SlhatrBpalroriMtorafionfefioteeonomleaByfBBslbteb BonowershaOpromptlyrepofinhai^aty ITdamsaedtoavmftiithefdeteitomlloncrdamm. BtneurBnoeoroondannaOcnprooeedaeiopBldtn coimeeSon wKh denage(Ob or(he taMrig dt,the mpeity,BoirGWor shall be leeponslbto for repanng or restoring the FVoperty only if Lender haa retaased proceeds for such purposes. Lender may dbbureo proooedsforthorepataondiestofattontnoelnglepaymemor&ftaeeilesofpiooiesepaymentsaslhework »oonipt8tod.(f(he(R8umnoeoroondenmaiIonprocoedsamnotttr6ic{enttorepalrorre8toiofheRmpef^, Bonower b itotreieved of Boiraww's obCgadofi tordie compfstfoit ofsuch or restoraSon. Lender or £b agent may make reasonable entdes upon and (nspecttons of the Aoparty. If ft haa reasonable cause,UndwmayInspeelfho Inteitoreftheimpiovemenb en the Roperty.LenderthaSgive Bonower noSoe at(ho time of or prior tosuch an fntolorInspeetten spediytRg auoireasonabto cause. 6, Borrower'o Loan Ai^neatfon. Boirawer shall l»e In default IL dutfng the loan epplloatlon rocesa, Borrower or any persons or enthtos acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrow^a pro Imcowbttoo w- consent gave materially false, mlslsedlng, or Inaccurate Intormatlon or etatemonta to Lender (or faBad to pno^ Lander malerlal Infofmalton) In connection with the Ijoan. Matwfal I raprasentatlonslnc{ude,hutaieneiMad to,representBtlonsconoemlne Borrower'a occupancyofthe Property aa Borrower'a prln^pd rostdenoo. 9 Prolecttoiiof Lendar'otntereattn the Propertyand RIghte UnderthioSecurity InetmmenL If(e)BorrowarfaSa to peitoimlheoovenanta andagrasmenta containedIn thbBeeurlt/lnatniment,(b) i therebalegBlprooe^gthatmlghtdgnllbantlyeftootLfindertolnterestlntheRop^and/ortiehts I under thb Security Inatniment(such aa a prooeeding fn bankniptey, pnrirate,for eondamnallon or forfbhuro,forentoreementota Ben which may attain pMtyoverthb Seeurity Instrumentorto enforce • lawe or regutalfona)i or(c) Borrowerhos ebandonad the Ropery,then Lender mi^ do and pay fOr I whatever b reasonableorappropriate to protect Lander^ Interesth the Roperty and rtghts underIhb ' SecurBy tnitrument, bictudlng protecting and/or asiesilng the value of die Propatly, and securing ancyor repidringdiePrMerty.Lender'a actions can Inolttdei butare netSmited to:(a)paying anyauma secured byaOenwhtchnBspftorttyoverthb Securiiylnstnimentifb)appearingIn court;and(c)paying reasonable attorneys'fees to protect Ra interest n the Rop^r enw rfghta under dib Semirity Inatniment.including llsaecured posRIon in aimnktuptcy proceeding.Bocuring the Propeitylneludaa, butbnotttmfledto,enteringthePrepmtyto makor8\|^re,changeto«(8,reptaeeorboaTd updoorsand windows,dram waterfirom pipes,eliminate buQdIng or othereode vfotatlena ordangerous conditions, andhavButBKIa8tum8denoroff.Althou^ Lender may take action under this Section 9,lender does i not have todo so and b net under any dutyor obligavon to do so.ft b ogread that Lender Inours no RabGhy for not taking any or all aotlona authoitoad under thb Seotton 9. Anyemounb cfisbursad by Lmuferunder thb Section0ahaB become additional debtof Berrewer aeoured bythb Seeurity Inalrument Ihese amounb ehaO bearInterestat the Note ratefrom the date of dbbufsement and shall bo payabb, with euch Interest, upon nolioe ftom Lander to Borrower reguesdnp paymenL If Ihb SecurBy fnstrumentb on a laaaahold, Bmrawer ehaD comply wBh ell the provblona ofthe tease.BorrcwefehannotBurrenderthaleasehddeataiaandlntereatahcreln conveyed ortefmlnate or cancel the ground tease. Borrower ahafl not, without the ergnese written rrenaent of Lender, altar or amend the ground lease. If Borrower acqukm fee tUe to Iho Property,theleasehold and the foe tBIe shall not mtigo unless Lender agrees to the merger In writing. 10. Mortgage tnauranea. If Lender regulred Mortgage Insurance aa a eondlUon of making the Loan.BonowwahatlpaytheprsmHima requrodlomalntam the MortgagetnsuraneaIn efiem.N,forony reason,thoMoitgagelnsuraneocoveragefeouIred byLanderceasestobaavanebtefromthemortgage Insurer that prevkwsly provided audi Insurance and Boinwar waa required to make aeparatety \| dealanatod paymentstoviyardthe premlumator MortgageInduranoe,Boncwarehall paythe ptemluma requuad to obtain coverage aubsiantltlty equlvatentto the Mortgage insurance prevtoi^ I XnltialBii PENNSVLVAKUr-Sbt^Fan^imUe MM/FrotfdWMfieUNtTOR^ INSITRUMeiir PermSOSa imi OiUhaDeeuii)gnto,ti)a Page 7 Of 13 PAgoaSL lOtI 04-13-2011 14I00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 78 of 100 PageID# 375 VI LOU I S0S182676 a costsubflantlBlly oqulvsten)to tho costto eoffower otthe Moftgage Insurance pf0vtou8^ bi effeol fftman aftefiuue moftB80OInsurertalocted by Lender.Itsubstan^equWaloUMoftsasalttsuranoo coverage b not aveOabtOi Benower thsO continue to pay to Lender ihe amount of Im tspsrotely designated paymmts that were due when the bmiranee coverage cttsed to be h eftoot Lendervra eoeept,useand retain these paymenb asa non>reftmdAbte tosslesenreIn OeuofMortageinsurance. Such loss reserveehaU be non-ietUndabtei notMtihstBndlng thefaa thattheloan b ultimetety tn ttiD, and Lender ehaO not be required to pay Bonewerany(nteresi or earnings on such toss reserve. Lenderoannotongerr * "" - ^ torthepertod thatLenderrequires)provided byen Insurorseleoted byLenda'agaln becomesavaOabte, b oblamed,and Lender requlros separatelydeslgnatod paymento toward the premiumstor Mortgage lAsuranoo.IfLsnderrequired Mortgage Inaureneeaa aconolttondmaklngtho Loanand Boirowerwas requlrad to make aepaialaly dealgnaied payments toward the premiums for Mertgage Insurance, Bonewer ahaO pay the premlumi required to maintain Mortgage Insurance In eftocL or to provide a non-refundstola toss reserve,until Lender's requfrementtor Mmtgage tnsuranee ends In accordonca with any wrtttm agreement berareen Borrower and Lender prmlMg tor euch teimtoation or until * neqifiedby^pllcabler " . It the rate eforasd In thi enter Into agreemento with other parties that share or modliy their ibk, or reduce tosees. These sgreemenisareonteimsandcondltlonsthBtareeBttstaotoiytothemettgagetosttFerendthQOtherpaily (or parttos) to these agreements. These agreements may require the mortgage Insurw to make payments using anyeouiceofhinds thatthe mortgageInsurer may haveavaOable(whbh mayInclude hinds obtalneadrem Mortgage tnsuranee premiums). Asa resultofthese agreements.Lender,any purdiasarofthe Note,anetherlnsuror,anyreinsurer, any otherenti^ioranyemilateofany oftheroregcbg,mayreceive(directiy crindlrcctly)amounts that derive from (or might be oharaoted^ as)aportton of Bonower's paymentotor tdortgage tneurenee, In exohangeforsharingor mcdlt^g thernoftgage tosurer'd risk,orredueing tosses.Ifsuch agreement provides that an atititote of Lender takes a share o1 the Insurer's rbk In mochangetor a ehara ofthe premiums paid to the Insurer,the arrangement to often tarmed 'captivelelnsuianee.* Further: (a) Any auoh agracffienta wtQ not aftoot tho emountothal Borrower haa agreed to pay fbr Mof^agoInauiance,oraiqr othertermaoftho Uan.Such agrasmentawiS nollReieaaeiheamount Borrower wotowefor Mortage bwirance,andihoywSI notenfltte Borrowerto any reftmd. <b) Any auoh agreomsnla wQl neteffoetthe righta Borrower haa-Ifany-wfth laapeetfo tha MoitgagotnsuraneoundorthoHomeowneraPiotoetionAetof1998oranyothorlaw.Thes8i(ghta may bieludo the right to reosfve ositain dJioloourea^ to request and obtain oanodjatlen offoe Moitgagatntttrane8,(ohavethe Moitgagatnanrfmoeterminated autom8tieany,an<VortorocOtve arefundofanyMoi^galniUfancepremlumalhatwereiineamedatthetlmeofaucheenoallatten ortonnlnattoii. 11. A«dgnmentofMIaetlloiicoueProceoda;Fbitolhire.ABMbce8anoqu8Pmce8d8are hereby asalgnedteandehaQbepaMtoLefider. ^ , nthe Property to damaged,sudi ^cellaneousPreceedsshafl be appfied to restoration oriepalr ofihePfop^.IftheroatoiattonorrepalrtoeeoflemtoillyfCasIMeandLendef'eaocuihybnottossened. O^ng such repair and restorirtton ireilod, Ldtder enaD tiave the rl^t to hold su^ Mfscetlaneous Proceeds unta Under has had an opportunity tetnspeclaufih Piop^to ensuretoo woik hw hew comptotsdtoLmdei'seatisftetion.provMedtoateuohlfwpeetionshiabeundeit^ promptly.Lendv to bo paid misuch Umwwwwww.. -w., r-t . or oamtngscn such MboeOsneousProceeds.Iftherestoration orrepalrbnoteconemlesllytoastoteor Lender'sseouritywoutdbelessened.theMisoeaaneousProceodsshaObeapplledtotoenmstMj^ laifeialai'SeSeSK Onan«Oeeumtnts.(na Page 8 of 15 toil oa-n^aoii utoo Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 79 of 100 PageID# 376 Vi IfBCO LOAS ^ S03162676 by this Security Instniment,Whether or notthen dua,w{th(he oxMts,If aiy. peldtoBofrower. Such MIscelleneous Proceede ehall be oppBed(n the order prodded tor(n Section 2. Infhoeventofatota!taking,deBtruetlon,crlo8eIn valuaollhaRoperty.theMiscellaneoueProeeede shaft be applM to the sums secured by this Security Instniment,wheither or not then due,whh the excese,If any,paid to Borrower. In the eventofa partialtaking,destruoUon,or toes In vatueolthe Propertyto which thefair market value ofthe nrq»ftyImmediate^ betore the paidaltaktog^i deetnietlon,or toss in value le equalto or groaterttianfheemountofdiosumseecured^tMeSeoumylnetnimentlmmecSatelybetorethe partial taking,deetniotlon.orlose In valuo,tmleee Bonowerand lenderotherwise agreeIn wrhtog,thesums secured by this Seourtte(netiumentthaQ be reduced by the amount of the MboeOaneoue Preceede muttlptlod by thetollowtoghaotlon:(a)the total amountofthe eume seoured bnmedlately before the partial tektog, destructton, or toss to value dMded by (b) the fair, market value of tne Property (mmedlateiy before the paittol taking, deetniotlon, or bra to vahia Any balance ehaO be paid to Bonower. Intheeventota peidsltaking,destruction, tose to value ofthe Property In which thefalrinaiket value ofthe Property hnmerBateV before the partialtaking,dratniodon,or tora to vahie to lose Otan the amountofdieeume eooured tmrnedlateV before the patUai taking,destruction,or toas to value,unleee Borrower and Under otheiwiee agree to writing, the MlsoeHaneoin Roceedsshaflbe appltodtothe sums secured by thia Seourity Instniment whether or notthe eume ere then due. IfthePrweitytoabandoned by Borrower,ortf,after notloo byIjenderto BoirawerthattheOpposing Party(asdeflned to the nextsentence)cftois tomakean awardtosetUoa dabnfor damages,Doirower fSllatorespond to UnderwithinSOdaysafterthedata the notfoetoglveniUnderleauthorised toeoUset and epp^the Mtocellaneoue Rroceeds either to restoration or repair of the Rropeily or to the sums secured bythlsSecuiftyfnetrumentiWhetherornotlhen due."Opposing Petty* means the third party timtcwes Borrower Mtoeeltoneeue Proceeds or the party egetoetwhcm Borrowerhasa righlofaction In regard to MtoceQaneous Pioceeds. Borrowershall be to dsfieuiltifany aetton orprraeeiflng, whdher olvQ orcftmlnal,to begun that, to Under's(udgment,could result to forfeiture ofthe Property or oth«'matertal Impairment of Under'e totsresttothe Prepeity orfishta underttili Sectofiy tnstrument Borrowercan cuteouch a defaultand, tf eoeeleralion haa oceuiied.letoetate as provtdeo to Seotton 19,by causing the eollan or proceeding to be dismissed with a mSng that,In l^der's(ttdgment,pieotudra forfeiture of the Prep^or other material tmpatonent of Urumre Interest to the Prqserty or rights under this Bseuifty Instniment The proceedsofanyaward ordalm for damagestoatareattrlbutablotelhoimpairmentofUndm'e Interest to the ^operty are hare^ aeelgnod and shell be paid to Ijender. AD MIseeQaneoue Rroceede that are not appDed to restoration or repair ofthe Ropeity shall be applied to the order provided(or to Section 2. 12 Botiowor Not Reteaaed:Porbeamneo By Under Net a Watuer.Bftsnslon of the time(or payment or modlDoetion of amoruratton oftho sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Underto Bonowerorany Sucoeeeorin Interest of Bonower eheO notoperate to ralease the tlabOity of Bonower or any Sucesseoie to toterest of Borrower. Under shall net be lequtred to eommenee proceedingsagalnelanySuccessor In tnterestolBonower or toiefUsetomtend ftmefor payment or otheiwtoemot^amordiatlonoftheeumeeeouredbyihleSecurBylnstiumentbyteasonofanydmnBnd madeIty the orfotoal Borrower orany Sueoessore to Interest of Bonower.Anyforbearance by Under Inexerarfnganyifghtcrremectytocludtng,wfthoutSmllafion, Underto acce^oacf peymenteltom third persons,entifes orSuccetsoiiIn tnlereel of Bonoweror In amountston than the amount then due,ehaO not be a waiver of preclude the oxeiotoe ofany right or remedy. 13. Jotot«nd$everalLlablllty;Co-elsner8;8ucoeeeoreiindAsNgn8Bound.Bcnrowercovenants and agrees that Borrowei'e obltoatlons and OabStyshall Ire Jointand eoveraL However,any Bonower coignstl^ Security Instrumentbutdoes notexecute tho Note(a'oo-flsn^:(a)to coining this Secu^ Instfument only to mortgage^ grantand convay the cootoner'a toterest to the Property underthe termsofthto Secimtytoelnimeni;i>)to not porsonaDydiBgated to payIheeumesecured by this Socurtty Instrument;and (c) agrees thai Under and any other Borrower can agr-' initlalei PGNNSvLVANiA-etnetoPomBy^Rio MtwvirodStoeiM UMFORMirmmuMeNrPerm asm 1/01 ORlMDeeiinwnaitAa. Page 9 of 13 PAfl^EOL lOll 00-13-2011 14I00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 80 of 100 PageID# 377 VI MBCO liOMI • 50S182676 modliyfbibsar or mako any teeommodoOent wttti regBrd to iho tenns of this Soourity tnstnimentor tho Noto without the co-slsnar'a coment. Sub^t to tho provislono of Section 16, any Suooeseor In biterest of Boirowsr who aisumos Borrower'sobltgattons tmdorthisSocurfVhistnimeiitbiwriting,and to approvodbyUnder,ohaOobtatn aQofBonower'a rfghtsendbenefito underthlsSeourityInstrument BorrowershoHnotbe refeesodftom Boirowm'eobllpawmsand Dabity underthtoSecurity(nstrumentimlsssUnderesreeetoeuchrefotte biwriting.Ihocovenants and agieemento ofthisSecurity Instrumentahall bind(oxeeptas provided In Beellon 20)and benefit the euocoaeors and assigns of Under. 14» Loan Chargoa. Undar may charge Berrcwer feesfor eervtoes parformed In oonneotlon with Borrower'sd8feult,mrIho purpoeoof proteetlng Underto interesttn the mpertyand rights underthis SacurilyInslrument,lncludlno,butnotamlted to,attomoy8feet,propertyInspedlonandvituatlonfees. In regard to any otherfees, the obsenoe of express authority In thfa Becuniy tnstrumanttochargea speoltofeetoeonowershallnotbeconstrued aaaprehMSonon thechaiging ofsuchfse.Undermay netchargefees that are ortpress^ prohibited by this Becuri^ tnstnunentor by AppSoablo Uw. tfthe Uan to airi^ecitea taw which sete maumum loancteuges,and thattowto finelVinterpreted80 thattho tntaiestor edwloan chargeecoQsM orto be coUscled teconnecttonwfih the Loan exceed the pennitted Bmlls,then:to)anysuch toan charge ahafl be rethiced by the amount necessary to reducethe chargetothepetmltted Gmll:and(p)anyauma alreadycottectedfrom BcncwerwhtohCEKceedod permitted Bm&iwQIberefUnded to Boivowar.Unaormswehobseto makethtorefUnd byreducing thepi(ne\|palowod under fiteNoteortiy making adiredpaymem to Borrower.Ifa rdUnd reduces principal,thereduction wOl bo treated asa parttol prepaymentwtthoutenypiapaymantchargo(nhether orncia prepaymentdmige to protMed for uftdw the Note). Boirowarto acceptance of ai^su^ refund made ly dlrad payment to BorrowerwaconstltiitaawaiverofaiwitghtofoellonBorrcwermlghthavoaiisteooutdeuQhovdoharga. 16. Kotfcoe.AD noSoes given by Bdrower or Lsndertocormececn wftb thisSeeurl^tostrumantmust be to wifitog.Any nodoo to Borrowerto connection wtih this Security tnstnimentshaD bodeemed to have addressIfsent byotoer means.Notice toenyotteBorrowershaDconsttoftendlceto aDScfrcwere unlesa AppDoable Law erqirasSly rsqulras dheiwlie.Ihe noUea address shaD be the Rfopaity Addfeia unleas Borrower has des^nated aiubstltuta noDce address by ncficeto Under.Borrowerst^promptly UnderofBcncwdtochangeofaddiQsa.IfUnderspodSosaprocadureforreporting Bonmvef^ohango ofaddrasa,then BonowershaOonlyreport achango ofaddressthrough(hat apacUed proeedure.lhare mayboonVonedosffftatsdndtoe address underthb SecmlVtostotmentat any onetime.Any noticeto Underahafl be dvsn by dsBveitog ftor by maStog k by first ctosa maS to Undertoaddress stated hereto untese Undo'haedmlgnatadanottterBffilteea l» n^to Boirower.Ai^ncdce to oonnectton wSh Ihto Security tostnimentahaO not be de«ned to hava been given to Under untilacteaiy received by Under, denynotloarequkadbydiisSecurity toitnimemtoetoo required underAppflcabto Uw,theAppBcableUw 16. Qovemlng Law; SevemblRty; nulte of Conetnioltoa Ihb Security toetrument ehaO be governed by federal law and the toMrof tho{uil8dtotion to wMch the ^oparty to tooated.AH rights and obligations contained to this Security Instrument are eubjeol to any requirements and Omitattona of AppDoable Uw.AppDeable UwmtonfeoDcntyortmpDcIDy aSow the parlies to agree by contractor tt mtghtbo sUoit butauoh sDeneeahallnotbocontlnied as aprehlbltion againstagreementbyoontraot In meoventthatany provision ordausa ofthis Securite Instrumentorthe NcteconlBots with Appltoabto l.aw,such eonfilctehatt no!aftoetother provtolons ofthle Security Instrumentorthe Note which can be given effect without the confitettog piovltlen. As used to this Security Inatniment:(a) words of the masoutine gender ahall mean and todude Gorrespondtog neuter worda orworde ofthefsmlntoe gender;(b)words to thesingulareheil mean end todude the plural and vice versa:and (c)the word "may"ghnssde discretion wTtliout any obSgallon to take any action. 17. Eoimwsr'eCopy.BofrowershBBbagtvBnoneoopydtheNoteandefihls Securitytostnimofit 19. Tranefsr of the Prepsity or o Bonondal tntsreatbi Boirewer.As used In thte Sootton 16, "InterestIn the Property meansanytagelor banefidaltnterestIn the Rnoperty,Including, Xaitialsi^ PeWteVWMOA-StngSsFftffiSH'efmto 6ttdRstfdI»(ttM UWF^ mamUMEffr Form SQSf 1/01 OitBRaDocunNnU^bic Page • 10 Of 16 Rf^EOL 1011 04-13-2011 14iOD Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 81 of 100 PageID# 378 _ . .. VI KBCD LOAH f 803182676 to,tho89b6n6flelalfnt8r99tftreui8f8frecllnabondfor<fQ«d,contr8etforcleod,In$tBl&nentMte8G«itrBct orescrowB9reemont.tftotntentofwhteht8tl)otrBn8fBroflHlobyBoiroworatoftftyfedatetoopur6ha8ef. tfoBoroqfpaflofttianopoityorarvintarafittnUionopeitybeoMortiaiwfenedCQrtfBoirmmrtonot a Rotuml pofBon and a benofieial{nterestIn Bonnowar b add ortramtomQ wilhQid Undsi^ pjkH-vn&tsn consont Lender may leqtAe hmiodiate pavrnentm ftiQ deleume leeured Iwthb SeeutOy Inetniment Houmver,ttds cplon dto)nm be exudsedby Lander tteuch Qocsrelse b praholted byApiSeaUelaw. If Lander exerebee thb optfdh,Lender eriell^ Borrower notice oracoeleiatton* The nollce abaD pro\^de a period d notleae(ban 30dayefrom the date the notice li given In accordance with Beetlon ISvdthlnwtiich Borrower muetpayeSeumsaeeuntd by thtaSecurityInetnimeni tl BenowerfBaeto pay theae sums prior to the exptrailon d thb period, Lender may Invoke any femedtea permitted by ibia Seourfty Instrument udthoutfurther notice or demand on Borrows. 10. Borrowtr'o Right to Rebistate Alter Aoceteration. if Borrower meeta oertaln oondBlona, Borrowershall have the r^httoItave enltaroementd this Beourity Inainimentdboonttnued atanyttmo idortothe earliestd:(^fivedi^befiaresaledtheFToper^pursuantta any powardtalecattalned In this Security Inalmment;(b)etidi other peibid as Applloable Law mightepeettyiorthoteimlnatton d Borrower^ rlgtit to rdnstale;or(o)entry d a Judgment enforefng ftm Bocuilty Instiumentllmee cotKSttons are that Borrower:(a)paw Lander etfeuma whieh then would be due under thie Seeurlty InstrumentandtheNoleaeHnoaccelerallonhad oocurred;(b)curesanydefeultdanyothercovenanto 07agreements;(o)payseB expensestneuffed in entoretng tWsSecuittyInsbument,InOludlng,butnot Bmlted to,reasonable attomeyetees,pipperlylnspootion and vatuatlenfeee,and otherfeesincurrod (brthepuiBose ofprotectlf^ tender'a hitarostbi ttro Propertyand rights underthisSocurlbflrtttrumeitt; and (d)takes such action as Lender may reasonably requhe to assure ttiat Undvb {merest hi the Piropmty and rlghla undertdsSecurityInstrument,and Botrower'a obBgatien topaytheeumaeecurad by this Seanfly InstiumenL shaQ continue unchanged Lender may requirattat Borrower pweudi relnstatementeumeaRdergrensaslnonaormoredmofoltowIngfeimSiaaeeteetedlrylendat^toash: (b) moneyorden (o)certKled check,bank check,tieaaurmla check or caahter'a oheek, provided any suehchocklsdrawnuponan Irtstttuttonwhoeo deposftsorelnsuredtoafSdetalagency,tnstrumsntaSty or enttty;or(d)Beotrenle Funds Transfer,Upon reinstatement by Bsrrewer,this Socurliy Instnrmcnt endcWgattenstocured herebythaMremiUnluI^tlftctlveeeWnoaccderatten had occurred.However, thb rightto retnatate ahaB not appty In the case of aeceleratton under Sectten 18, Sd Seleef NotoiCluMeofLoanSeivleer:NeUe9orCli1evance.TheNotaoroparttallntmat In the Note Ao^^wlth this SecurityInatrumonQ can beaeld one ormore Urnea without prior notiM to Borrower.A sate mfghlresultIn achange In the entily gmown asthe"Loan Servlcer^ thatcolteols FerlodtoPa^sntsdueundertheNoteandfhisSecurltylnBtnimentandperfonnsothefmoitgBgelpm aervldno ob^atlona imderthe ttete,this SaourityInstrument,and AppUeabla Law.There also might bo one or more changea ofthe Loan Servlcer urirelated to a sale of the Note,If there la a oltange w the Loan Seivlcsr, Borrower will be given written notfoe ofthe ohange whtoh wDI strta the namynd address of the new Loan Servteer, ttie address to whioh paymsnts should be made and any othw Iiitormatlon RESPA leciulresIn connertion with anotee oftransfer ofaeivfe^.H^Notelss^end thereaftertto Li^Is senriced bya Loan Servloerotherthan the purdtaser ofthe Note,the mortgage (ean servicing oW^ons to Borrcwer wBI lenwln with the Loan Servteer or be fransfen^ to e suocesaor Loan Seivtesr and are notassumed by the Note purchtter unless othawtsa provided by the Itote purdtaser. Neither Borrower nor Lander maycommence,loin,orho telhed toanyJudM acltoi(as ejttw^ Indhftdud Btlgantcr the memtrerda dasa)thetaibesfrom lha other pa^a ectfons pursuant to this SecurityInstiumsntor thatallogesthalihe other paityhas breach^ ^tK byreason d.this Security Instrument untHsuch Borroweror Under has notlflcd thootttorp^fwan such notteo glvwi to ccmpBance with the requirements d Seotten IQ dtuch oBog^ breach md altofded the ether party h»eto a leasonabte period after the SMng eotton.IfAppDcaWe Low providesalime period which mustelapse betere certain aol^^botoKen. that time period wtB be deemed to bo reaeoneble for purposes d paiagaph.Jmo notteo of eceet^tton end opporturdqi to cure given to Bcircwer pursuant to Seotton «2 andttan^g^" InitialsI4 PENMSTLVAMA-anria FSnffly-PlliRloIteWRodCtoIteo tJNIFCliM IHSIRUIIBMTPCf« aowi/OI OnSRPOocuiQtlitBbtROi ^ PsgO » 11 Of 19 PABJBJL 04-13-2011 1011 14i00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 82 of 100 PageID# 379 VX HBCD LQAS f 603182676 aetaferatton Qlven to Boiiower punuant to Seofloa 18 ahaU bo doamed to aatia^ the nottoe and opportunity to take eorroettve aetton pravtetom of this Geotion 20. 21. Hoardouo Subolaneea.As used In this 8ootIcn2f: 'Hazardous Stibstanoea are those subatanoes dsfinad as todo or hazaidoia substances, poOutants, or wastes by Envbonmental Uw and the(oaowlng substances:gasoline,keioseno,otharnammable ortttde petrolaitm products,toxic pesticides and herbicides, volalSe solvents, matsitals contalnktg asbestos or fofmaMehyde, and radloaotive matsifals:(b)'Ehvlioninental Law* meansfederallaws and bwsofthejurtsdiotion where the Property b located (hat relate to health, tmfety or environmental protection;(c)"Bivironmrntal Cleamip^lneludeBanyrespenseaol!on,remedbtaetlon,orremovalactfon,asdefined In Eh^ronmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental Condition" means a oondttlon that oan cause, contrlbiite to, or otheiwlso trigger an Ehvirenmental Cleanup. Borrower shall not cause or permit the pressnoe, use, dlaposBl, storage, or releasa of any Hazardous Substances, or threaten to roleaae any Huardous mbstances,on or In the Property. BorrowershaB notdo,noraHow anyoneelse todo,anything afteettng theProp^(a)that b In violation of any Envlronmental law.(bl whfeh creates en Environmental Condltfon, or(q whteb, due to the praaence,uie,orre!easeoforazaidou88ub8tanoe,erBatesacondltlofithaladveredya(liecbthevaIue ofthePiopef^.The preceding two eentencee aheil not apply to the presenee,use^ or etoragoonthe Property ofsmallquantltfae ofHazaidouaBubstancea Ihatamgmwallyieceiipdtedto be appropriate lonoimalresIdentlelusesandtomelntenanoooftheRpoperty pdudlng,but notOmlted to, hazardous substances In consumer produote). BorrowerehaD promptly give tinderwritten notice of(c)anyInvestigation,cbbn.demand,lawsuit or other action by any governmental or regulateiy agency or private party tevoMng the Prop^and any Hazardous substance or Envfroransntal Law of which Borrower has actual knowfedge,(blany Environmental Condition,Including butnotQmtted to,anyramng.leaking,(Sschaige,release m threat ofrelease ofany Hazardous Bubstenee,and(q anyconidlBon caused bythe presence,use or reloaso of a Hazardous Substance which advereely ofteoto the value ofthe l^^eity.If Borrowor(earns,or to notftied by any fiovemmental or regutotory aulhorily, or any private party, that any removal or other remediation ofany HazardousSubstance affecting the Propertyto necessary. Borrowershall promptly take oQ necessaryremedialaetfona In aceordanoewith EhwonmentatLow. Nothing herein shellcreate any obtoatlon en Lenderfor an EInvtronmental Cleanup. NOIwNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lenderfurther covenant and amea as Idlows: 22. Aoeeteratlon; Remedied. Lender ehall give notice to Borrower pifor to acceleration following Bonrower'e breach of any covenant oragreomeiitIn tide Seouri^(namimont(but net priorto acceleration under Section18itnteea Aj^Teabla Law provldea othoiwlae). Under ahall notify BoiroweroriamongotherlhlngmCqthodefattll;(b)thoaeUon requiredtocurethedefautt; <o)when the default muathe cured;and(d)thatfailure tocurethedofaulleaeseelRod mayresult tnaeoatorattonoftheoumaaeeuredbylhteSoourltylntbumenLforaelesufebylttdtelalproeeedtng and aate of the Property. Lender sindl furtlter Inform Borrower of the riglit to retnatate after eaotletation ondlhe rightto aaaarltn thefbreolcaureproeaedlng the non^tatenee of edafoult orany other defenae of Borrower to aoeeteratlon and fforeoloiure.If the default Is notcured oa apedlfled^ Lendar atfie option moyiiqutreImmediate paymentInfun ofen attmeaecured bythla Beeuflty Instrament wtlhout further demind end may lOiocloao thte Seeurtty fnatrumant by ludlola] proeeedlim. Under ehall be entilted to oolteel all expenaea Inourred In pursuing the remedlesprevtdedlntlils8eotten22,tneludlng,butnotllmltedto,attomey»feseandeoeteottitto evtdcnca to the extent permitted by AppSeatrie Uw. 88. Release. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Beeurily Instrument thto Security Instrument end the eetate oonvqred shaB tennlnate and become void.After auch ocourrenea.Under shea dtochargaand eatfsiy this SecurityInstrument Borrower ehaQ pay any reccrdafion costs. Under for services rendered and the charglrig ofthe fSe to pemtitted under Appllcabte Law. 24 Walvfiie. Borrower,to theextent permitted by AppUoabto Law,waives and releasesany error or defseb In proceedings to enforce thto Security Instrument and hereby waives the f zoitlaisi PBHKBVLVANVWatnsts RunlV-FciuittMsiri^rtMe M«e UNIFORM(NBTRUMENr FeroSOSSIfot OnIb«OaetmMcdo,lno. Page 13 Of 13 PAfiJEDL lOii 04-13-2011 14i00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 83 of 100 PageID# 380 Vl HBCD LOAS 0 909182676 proMnterftitura taws providing for stay of exocution, oxfonslon of dme,mmptton from attadimenti fovy end o^,and homeotead oxemptlon. 28. Rofn8Uitoiii9iilPoilod.Bonow8r^tfm9toreInffotopfOM(dodbiSoetloiilOi}iaae9dendfoonohoitr prforfothaoommoncefiMcfbtdcRnooSdoharifrdOfifocrotheroalopuisuanttothloSeeuittytRstninwit 28. Purehtso Momy Moftgogo.If any oftho debtoeeurod thb Secuitty Instiumem b fontfo BorrowoffoaequlrodtlototbePicportyithfodeourBylnstiiimontehaRb&apurdiasomonoyinoitssgo. 27. tntereatflito AfterJudgmenL Bonoweragreee thatlholnteroBtmtopayabtoalteraiiidgmftnt benteredcnfitoNotoerlnanoolIoncfmortgagoforMfosiiieshalbelheratepeiyabfoffomtlniiolodrne under tee Koto. 8Y teQNINQ BHLOW.Bciroweraocepte ond agrees to the teime and covefwnb contelned In thb Seeuiity tnelnimont and In any Rldtf exeouted by Borrower end leeordad wtth ft. (Seal) tax 8 ooa&oBMeaitik oi vsoaswnmh county oi PBXtAOHLPRKA On tbia« tbe IH « day ofi i^f I AsjI Mid ti&doraJlra befoea me, uadorelgBad officer, paraonaliy ajppeared MA{f: w.iTor^ known to mo (or eatiefaotevily pvovoo) to be the poraoa wbOBe nosMfe) ia/avo eobaevibed to the within inetrunont and aoknowlodged that ho/eho/tboy exaootad the name for the yucpesoe thoeein eontaiMd. Xn witneaa wfteveef X hereunto aet my hand and o£fioial^\|ed^« My ogmniflsion expireai \lckv)\i ti N0TAIUAL86M. VELERASNiaUR ttotwyMUto UHNte HPRaiKSIWR.KOHISOHfRY C0UH1Y C6fdfiGalg^i\|il^an( do hereby eert^ utai tee coneetandreu oi wtthiwiamedMortaaaeelt sisi congORAaw Dk* TO«r. MI 488ge«263e WRneeo my hand tele .day of rgsrr nNi«n.v«NiMt«.rmiy^.iiiii.MMn.M.MuUMfeRMiNMRiuiafrMaiMati/n Onan»OoeuRi«iit«.lne. Page 13 of 19 PAfiO^ ton 06.19-2011 14i00 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 84 of 100 PageID# 381 '. '. >',r' l!^il: ^ t. ^ " fStSMS .- - V--'' :iaE' ^ /M - •: ;■■.■?;' • •' ■■" „■::• ■/ • ,- < ■ :4t^ ^ ' I' /- * '"f -"■ r - -' •.' •? j • ' • .i,- -• - . ■ ~''' Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 85 of 100 PageID# 382 imoliial Claim IBeeb PREPARED BY AND RETURN TO: RLH MA'AT LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE C/0 AGENT/ATTORNEY"^RHASHEA LYNN HARMON® THE PHILADELPHIA BUILDING 1315 WALNUT STREET,SUITE 320 PHILADELPHIA,PENNSYLVANIA 19107 267.312.7322 ®\|\|te Sulientliro made the 13^ day ofJuly In the year ofThe Most High tStOO tCj^OIURltllir SSlltb Aixteen(20t6), -JBetttieeti- Vsxa IL 3fim^ jOcClotth Cffiotl^er) (Hereinafter,called("^rantortf")),ofthe original in Fee, tS^e He iLinli & tHnifieli 3tiW0enontf Hribate foreign tCrilial J^omCfp tCrtua Cfumav^rvissOf (Hereinafter,called "#rantee(g)''),of the other part,in Fee on behalf of allatlve Trustees. 19NtnejlCeQ, that the said Arantonl, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE SILVER DOLLAR COIN(United States FIAT Value $25.00),lawful money and legal tender of the United States of America (USA), unto them well and truly paid by the said 6ranteeg/®nuttee$l In good faith, at and before the sealing and delivery of these presents, the receipt whereof it Is hereby acknowledged. Grantor, hath or have remised,released and quit- claimed; 9nb Hpf these presents,^rantor^, doth or do remise, release, and forever quit-claim, unto the 6rsntrr(st)/®mgtre(g),his helrs/asslgns/agents/beneficlaries,all the rights,titles.Interests, property,claims,and demands whatsoever, both In law,domestically and internationally,and in equity, in or to the lands or premises released, or Intended so to be, so that neither the Grantor or #rantot(0), nor his or their personal representatives, nor his or their heirs, nor his or their assigns(including agents/beneficiaries),nor his or their third party capacitors,shall Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 86 of 100 PageID# 383 ^nobtal(^it Claim Beeb at any time thereafter^ have, claim, challenge, or demand the said lands and premises and buildings or any part thereof.In any manner whatever;and ^erebp,6ratttot(0),grant,conveys,bargains,sells,aliens,enfeoffs,releases and quit-claims SQoMal l&ltft dsittt 3&{0{\|t!Sl, and ConUnn unto the said Grantees,their heirs, and Assigns; and 9nsHb0, rights, titles. Interests, claims. In the below described real property known In the United States as real estate; and iSQl CEtteltl, lot or piece of ground with the messuage or tenement thereon erected; and ftttttStdl, on the Northern easterly side of 46^ Street at the distance of 478 feet, 4 Inches Southeastward from theSoutheastside of WoolUlstlb iSbtttttE tt^t tPOEtltp (27^) Wat\l of tie Cftp of defacto;and CotlteitlftlB,in frontor In breadth on the said 46^ Street,14feet,four(4)Inches and extending of that width In length or depth Northeastward 80feet to a certain alley three(3)feet wide. BefngiUiolimSte: 13618.46** street TAX ID#:27-2-1658-00 the same premises title which,3^0\|^ IS* iHottfO,Executor by Deed dated December 1,1982and recorded December 9,1982in Coittftp]defacto. In Deed Book EFP 615 page 436 granted and conveyed unto Zootl IS* li^Otnod^ and fftSlStlt Wimuuil), his wife In fee, iSnb the same premises title which,lootl 9* Wouifltlb and JfoOOCo Executors by Fee Simple Deed dated March 18, 1996 and RECORDED June 28, 1996 In [$8Ctob646f8 Cotltltp] defacto, granted and conveyed unto jKop C* ^lltCIOub and Vsxa 3L S^OtlEO In Allodial Fee Simple as jSfoillt UtenantS tlCfie Slisllt In Deed Book Number and/or Instrument Number JTD 27 Page 480. herein 91lbbtaf l&ltlt Claim Be^Is a conveyance from Mother and Daughter as Joint Tenants with the Right of Survivorship,to JRt llinb Ss fBnifieb Snbigenoutf foreign Cdbol jfamOp Cnurt in 9nobial^EE ftisiplE. Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 87 of 100 PageID# 384 (0uit Claim Beeb t!]^Og0tl[)0t, with all and singular buildings, improvements, ways, streets, alleys, passages, waters, water courses, rights, liberties, privileges, hereditaments and appurtenances, whatsoever thereupon belonging or in any wise appertaining, including but not limited to any and ail reversions and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof and all the estate, right, title. Interest, property,claim and demand whatsoever of the said 4ltantor(sl),in law,equity, or otherwise, howsoever,of, in and to the same and every part thereof. iStfb %ti ^olb,the said lot or piece of ground,real property,estate above described along with the buildings and improvements thereon erected, hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and all the estate, premises hereby granted or mentioned and intended so to be, with all appurtenances, unto the said and the survivor of them, and their heirs, and their assigns, in perpetuity, of such survivors to and for the only proper use and behoof of the said Grantees/Trustess,and their survivors. Sub,the iStantOtiel for themselves, their heirs and their assigns, their Heirs, their Executors, and their Administrators, So,hereby,these ^vtsizntst Cotlbop, (Staift all rights,titles, interests liens,equity,and claim whatsoever for the first party, either in law or equity, to their their their (CxemtOtO, and their SllnnCniOtratom, et cetera to their benefit and behoof. In Support of th^above said Witnesses are the following: O 2: 3n WittttSiSi said parties of the first part of these presents have hereunto set-^ y theirhandrandseals: , gnature tee's Signature ^ Z-AZ. Vcra L. Jones and May McCIoud Grantor(s) 's(Trustee's) Name /.y/C S'Lft/c.32.0 Grantor's Address, Residence Grantee's Address Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 88 of 100 PageID# 385 illlloltial Claim Beeb City, State & Zip City, State, & Zip ^tate (0f: ^emtfiipttiania ) Cotintp(9!$(flalielpf)ia ) On this 25th day ofNovember in the^ar of T\ lousand and Eighteen(2018), before me,the undersigned Notary Pubiic Officer/^ m hereby certifythat personaiiy appeared, /hose names are signed to the foregoing instrument, titied dbiAL'QUIT CLAiM D^D, and who is Known to me (or satisfactoriiy proven)and acknowiedged to be the person(s) whose name(s)subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that they executed the same, voluntarily on the day the same bears dated. l^f)tXtOt, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal on this day of month In the year of20f(. -and- ^ipature o!JBtotarp (Officer: My Commission Expires COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA j ifOTARfAL SfAL i HEIL VAY, Notary Piibtk '.itynf Pivia^'i-ripMia, Pbila. County Vv ;n.n.-.sK.n r;:o=r>^3 March 5. 2U21 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 89 of 100 PageID# 386 BOOK NO. PAGE NO PHILADELPHIA REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX CERTIFICATION DATE RECORDED CITY TAX PA© 1 Complete each section and file In duplicate with Recorder of Deeds when(1)the full conslderalionyvalue is/is not set forth In the deed,(2)when the deed is with consideration, or by gift, or(3)a tax exemption is claimed. If more space Is needed, attach additional sheet(s). A. CORRESPONDENT — All Inquiries may bo directed to the foUowIng person: NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER; Rhashea Lynn Harmon El, Esquire AREA CODE ,26i 312-7322 STREET ADDRESS crrY STATE ZIP CODE 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 320 Philadelphia PA 19107 B. TRANSFER DATA DATE OF ACCEPTANCE OF DOCUAffiNT: GRANTOR(SVLESSOR(S) GRANTEE(SVIESSEE(S) Vera L. Jones and May E. McCloud STREET ADDRESS STREET ADDRESS 1361 S. 46th Street 1361 S. 46th Street CITY STATE ZIP CODE CITY STATE ZIP CODE Philadelphia PA 19143 [Philadelphia PA 19143 C. PROPERTY LOCATION STREET ADDRESS cnv.TOWNSHg>.BOROUGH 1361 S. 46th Street [Philadelphia IHMBL SCHQCkQlSIBIC.!. \|[A&£a8ca. Philadelphia Philadelphia 27-2-1658-00 D. VALUATION DATA 1. ACTUAL CASH CONSIDERATION 2. OTHER CONSIDERATION 3. TOTAL CONSIDERATION + 4. COUNTY ASSESSED VALUE S. COMMON LEVEL RATIO FACTOR 6. FAIR MARKET VALUE $78,500.00 X mi □ E. EXEMPTION DATA 1A. PERCINIAOJLOiJEXSMEIlQtJ. IB. PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST CONVEYED 2. Check Appropriate Box Below for Exemption Claimed I—I Will or intestate succession iSASie OF DECFMFSn (ESTATE FILE SVMBERl r~1 Transfer to Industrial Development Agency. I—I Transfer to agent or straw party. (Attach copy of agency/straw party agreement). r~l Transfer between principal and agent. (Attach copy of agency/straw trust agreement). Tax paid prior deed SI 1 Transfers to the Commonwealth, the United States, and Instrumentalities by gift, dedication, condemnation or in lieu of condemnation. (Attach copy of resolution). I—I Transfer from mortgagor to a holder of a mortgage in default. Mortgage Book Number L J, Page Number. Mortgagee (grantor) sold property to Mortgagor (grantee) (Attach copy of prior deed). r~i Corrective deed (Attach copy of the prior deed). fin Other (Please explain exemption claimed, if other than listed above.) jTransfer from Mother and Daughter to Vndcr penallies ofhw or ordinance, I declare dial / have examined this Slafeinenf. including accompanying infonnation. and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is tme. correct prtd/omplete. viafon SIGNATURE Of O SPONOENT OR RESPONSI DATE 82-12W(Rov. 6(93) (SKI- RHVKRSK) Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 90 of 100 PageID# 387 INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING PHILADELPHIA REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX CERTIFICATION Section A Correspondent: Enter the name, address and telephone number of party completing this form. Section B Transfer Data: Enter the date on which the deed or other document was accepted by the Party(ies). Enter the name and address of the Grantor(s)/Lessor(s) and Grantee(s)/Lessee(s). You must list all names. Attach additional sheet(s) with full name and address of parties involved. If necessary. Section C Property Location: This section deals with the property being transferred; complete fully. Include the tax parcel number w^ere applicable and the county where the Statement Is being filed. Section D Valuation Data: Complete for all transactions. 1. Actual Cash Consideration - Enter that amount. 2. Other Consideration - Enter the total amount of non-cash consideration such as property and securities. Include mortgages and liens existing before the transfer and not removed thereby, and the agreed consideration for the construction of Improvements. 3. Total Consideration - Indicate on line 3 the total of lines 1 and 2. This will be the total consideration for the purchase of the property. 4. -.County Assessed Value - Enter the actual assessed value of the property as per records of the county assessment office. 5. Common Level Ration Factor - Enter the county common level ratio factor applicable for the county in which the property is located. An explanation of this factor is provided below. 6. Fair Market Value - Multiply the county assessed value (4)and the county common level ratio factor (5)and enter the result In block 6. Section E Exemption Data: Complete only for transactions where an exemption is claimed, la. Percentage of Exemption - Enter the percentage of the total consideration claimed as exempt. lb. Percentage of Interest Conveyed - Enter percentage of Interest conveyed. 2. Check Appropriate Box for Exemption Claimed - Boxes are provided for the most often used Pennsylvania real^ exemptions. Each is explained In order of appearance on the Realty Transfer Statement of Value form. "Will or Intestate Succession"- A transfer by Will for no or nominal consideration, or under the Intestate succession laws is exempt fr^om tax. Provide the name of the decedent and estate file number in the space provided. Transfer To or From Agent or Straw Party"•A transfer to or from an agent Is exempt from tax if a transfer to or from the agent's principal by the third party would be exempt from tax. Attach a copy of the agency/straw party agreement and a statement explaining the exemption claimed. Transfer Between Principal and Agent" - A transfer between an agent or principal for no or nominal consideration is exempt. Attach a copy of the agency/straw trust agreement Enter the tax paid on the prior deed in the space prodded. Transfer to the Commonwealth,the United States and Instrumentalities by Gift, Dedication, Con demnation or In lieu of Condemnation." -(Attach a copy of resolution) Transfer from Mortgagor to Holder of a Mortgage In Default" - A transfer from a mortgagor to a holder of a mortgage In default, whether pursuant to a foreclosure or In lieu, thereof. Is exempt. Provide the mortgage book number and page number where mortgage Is recorded, and property was transferred directly from the Mortgage to the Mortgagor. "Corrective Deed" - A deed for no or nominal consideration which corrects a deed that was previously recorded but does not extend or limit the title or interest under the prior deed is exempt from tax.(Attach copy of the prior deed). "OTHER"(PLEASE EXPLAIN EXEMPTION CLAIMED IF OTHER THAN THOSE LISTED ABOVE.) -When claiming an exemption other than those listed, you must specify which exemption Is claimed. When possible, provide the applicable statutory citation. Attach additional pages, If necessary. COMMON LEVEL RATIO FACTOR This is a property valuation factor provided by-the* Department of Revenue by which the county assessed value Is multiplied to determine the taxable value of real estate for all non-arm's length transactions, leases and acquired companies. The factor Is base on the common level ratio established by the State Tax Equalization Board. The common level ration is a ratio of assessed values to current fair market values as reflected by actual sales of real estate in each county. A statewide list of the factors is available at the Recorder of Deeds' office In each county. THIS STATEMENT MUST BE SIGNED BY A REASONABLE PERSON CONNECTED WITH THE TRANSACTION. 82-127 (Reverse) (Rev.6/93) Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 91 of 100 PageID# 388 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 92 of 100 PageID# 389 ^. , V s^'- * , - < - " •« 'a^"' -a i ■ ), "^ \''^rK \ "^ .i' 'K ^ >■ f '"■' r 5- .V , , < ^/>' .• ,~\-v .« 'r\ ' T '•» •,/ SS,,^ A!.' ' » V isiissia&i-vi >>"" . ''>;- -5..' >'' '< TiU'ornciAi.couKT Muiui narcclan Clan-(iualc/Yiimasscc-Ituligciuuis Native Anterican Ass(»ciaii()n of Nations: Qriuinal Gualc. Yamassec, Mcciiica. Citerokce. Scniinolc. Creek. Wasliita ^pccinl ^olucr ©f 9ttontcp ©f j!Blnnb JSavccfnn Clnn, ©unlc ^nmn£f£»cr: :^era-IL. :3Ionc^: itlarcli 13. 2018 "NOTICE" 'lUlE PURPOSE OF THIS POWHR OF AT!T)RNi£Y IS TO CONVEY AUTHORITY TO THE INDIVIDUAL YOU DESIGNATE (YOUR "AGENTr'REPRESENTATIVE") SPECIFIC POWERS TO HANDLE ANY SUITS IN LAW OR OTHER CAPACITIES THAT ARE BROUGHT AGAINST YOU. CONCERNING YOUR BI-INCi, AND ANY RIIAI. AND/OR PI-RSONAL. PR0IM:RIT. which also includes the FULL POWERS TO NiXiO I IATI-: AND ANSWER IN YOUR STEAD WITHOUT ADVANCE NOTICE TO YOU OR APPROVAL BY YOU. THIS SPECIAL POWER OF AT'FORNIiY IMPOSES A DUTY ON N OUR ACiENT OR REPRESENTATIVE TO EXERCISE THE SPECIFIED GRAN ri:D POWERS. AND WHEN THE POWERS VESTED ARE I:XI-RCISED, YOUR AGENT/REPRESENTATIVE SIlAI.I. USE DUE CARE TO ACT FOR AND IN ^'OUR BENIii rr AND IN ACX'ORDANCE; WITH THE POWERS VESTED WITHIN THIS POWER OF AITORNEY AS LONG AS THOSE POWERS DO NOT CONFLICT WITH OR VIOLATE THE MUND BAREEFAN CONSTITUTION YOUR ACiENT /REPRSE:NTArivi- HAS riii- AUTiioRrrv Eo i;xi;rcise; the POWERS GIVEN HERE AND COMPLIANT WITH THE GUALE YAMASSEE CONSTITUTION THROUGHOUT THE DURATION OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE CREATION OF THIS SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY. ONCI- YOl 1 1 IAVE: DE.CIDI'D TO RI-VOKI- THIS SPI-CIAl. POWEIR Ol- A TI()RNi;V. AND CAN TI-ND TO YOR OWN AI-I-AIRS SURR()UNDIN(i THE SPIX lAI. circiimsiance:s which prompti-d the; ne:e:d for hie: crilai ion oi- niis SPECIAL power of ArroRNE:Y. rill- powi:rs. hi:re:in vi-:.si i:d shall IMMEDIATI:LY CI-ASE to 0PE:RATE by OPEIRAEION oi- law. UNI.IISS YOU expre:s.sly indica ee: oehe:rwise: weehin i ie:re:in. 1 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 93 of 100 PageID# 390 w THIIOi-l'IClALCOUKT F-niRTIIKK. H\i IT IINDI{KST()()1) •i llAT AS A YAMASSi-l: (illALI{ TRIITM. Mi£MBIiR TliA'r ITIl- I)0(TRIN1£ 0\|- ••Ri:nj£Ci lVl£ HUMANISM" APRLITS IN ALL Si rUATIONS. IN ri IIS Sl'LCIAL POWLR OR A I TORNEY. FURTMKK. AS WITH ALLA IMVL: POWERS OF A'l TORNIiY CONVLIYINO AUTI IORI TY TO ANO TI IIiR. TI M-: OUALI-: YAMASSP:!- COUR T MAY RI£V()KE I I ll- POWERS OF YOUR ACiENT/REPRESEN FA FIVP: II- THE COURT DETERMINES ri lA'F YOUR ACJI-N'F IS ACTING IN CONTRAVENTION OR IN VIOLATION OF THE DUTIES BESTOWED AND ENTRUSTED. SPECIFICALLY RELATING TO NOT ACTING IN YOUR BEST INTEREST AND/OR IS CARELESSLY AND/OR RECKLESSLY ACTING AGAINST THE DUTIES SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED WITHIN THIS SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY OR THAT VIOLATE FIDUCIARY AND LEGAL DUTIES AS PER THE RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED BY THIS SPECIAL POWER OF A'R'ORNEY OR REQUIRED BY THE GUALE YAMASSEE CONSTITUTION CONCERNING INDIGENOUS AGENTS/REPRESENTATIVES AS WELL AS VIOLATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF "REFLECTIVE HUMANISM". FURTHER, tup: POWERS AND DUTIES Ol- AN INDIGF.NOUS AOENT/RI-PRI-SENTATIVE UNDE.R A POWER OI-ATrORNEY ARp; EXPLAINED MORE FULLY AS SETFORTM THROUGH THE RELATIONSHIP OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING UNIVERSAL AGENT/FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE GUALE Y.A.MASSEE CONSTITUTION Wl IICII IS THE PRIMARN'SOURCI- AND SUPREME LAW OVER ALL OTHERS concp:rning riii- ai-fairs oi- guale yamassfp: tribal members. IF THERE IS ANYTHING ABOUT THIS SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY THAT YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND. YOU SHOULD SEEK COUNCIL FROM THE YAMASSEE CHIEF OR CHIEF LEGAL COUNCIL TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU. HAVE READ OR HAD EXPLAINED TO ME THIS NOTICE AN D UNDI£RS ■N I S AND purpose: DATE: \ \UTOGRAPH OF:- Vcra-L.: Jones: (PRINCIPAL) Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 94 of 100 PageID# 391 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 95 of 100 PageID# 392 y) Ill; OI-I-IC IAI. COUK I ^pedal $otoer anb S[ntI)ott>at(on of jSlstcdgitniBnt(^f \l CVCi UO .on IR bap of tAcjircJn month, in 2^0 near of t^z €IoT)ipm. ASSIGNMENT:, I, l^^vi do hereby appoint and assign CHIEF LEGAL COUNSEL OF GUALE YAMASSEE COURT. my true ami lawful Altomcy- In-Faci ("ATTORNEY-IN-FACt" or "MY ATTORNEY") and as my agent("AGENT"/"REPRESENTATIVE) with full power ofsubstitution, proxy, for me and in name and stead, to transact all my business concerning any suits concerning Foreign Court matters brought against me and any individuals for whom I am the Legal Guardian, and to manage and/or to appoint and assign another Guale-Yamassee Tribal Member or Tribal Counsel to manage all my legal affairs as completely as I might do if personally present or personally dealing with the matter. FURTHER,these appointment and assignments include and are not limited to remaining in full elTect through exercising the authorized powers set-forth herein below in the event that I become incapacitated, di.sabled. or mentally impaired. FTOTHe., n CHlEP LECAI, AGENT/REPRESENTATIVE) OF RLH MA'AT l.AW & THE RIGHT.S OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TRU.ST. BRICK & MORfAR. \}\5 WALNUT STREET. SUITE ."^20. PHILADELPHIA HOMERULE CHARTER.PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH.[19107] /)/; FACTO and P.O. BOX 7446. PHILADELPHIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19101. becomes Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 96 of 100 PageID# 393 incapncitnlcil or can no longer sen'c us my agenl/Rcprcsenlativc. anollicr GIJALI: YAMASSEE MEMBER WHO IS COMPETETENT IN THE GUALE YAMASSEE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS AND LAWS OP NATIONS, INTERNATIONALLY AND CUSTOMARILY shall sci FURTHER, I, revoke any and all prior General and/or Special Powers of Altorncy(s) that I have heretofore knowingly or unknowingly given to any foreign person{s) or individiial(s). including entities prior to this herein said SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY. FURTHER, this SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY may be voluntarily revoked only by me at any time by my written revocation entered and fi led of public record, in thejuri.sdiction in which I have been hailed to as a "Respondent" or "Defendant' in accordance and in operation with all rights provided through the DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, which is operable and enforceable through the GUALE YAMASSEE CONSTITUTION. Therefore, any publication, not merely within the counties or municipalities, e.g. the deed of records of PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE CHARTER. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA. PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTI I. HO.ME RULE CHARTER shall be sufHcient. provided said publication is alTi.xed with my validly executed autograph and SEAL explicitly indicating revocation along with notarized and delivered to my CMIEI- LF:GAL COUNSEL and appointed ATfORNEY IN l-ACf. ^•'"'Rhashea Lynn Hannon-EI'U, Esq. SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: This power of attorney shall continue in force and may be accepted and relied upon by anyone to whom it is pre.sented despite my Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 97 of 100 PageID# 394 >0 rill-Ol-l-ICIAI COUK I purported rcvocnlion ol'ii or my death. UNTIL the actual WKITinN NOTICl:ol'such revocation is received by such pcrson(s) or contacted by and inromied by my Cl-IIEF LEGAL COUNSEL and appointed ATTORNEY,"'"■'^'Rhashea Lynn Harmon-El©. Esq. FURTHER, this power of attorney .shall become immediately elTective upon the e.xecution of my autograph and SEAL. All acts done by my AGENT/REPRESENATIVE and CHIEF LEGAL COUNSEL and appointed ATT'ORNEV, ''"'^^Rhashea Lynn Haimon-EI©. Esq.. pursuant to this special power during any period of this suit in law. shall have the .same elTect to my benefit and bind me and my succe.ssors in interest as if I were the individual directly addressed. Included in these powers, and not limited by .same arc the powers as are customar>' within the GUALE YAMASSEE CLAN and outlined in the GUALE YAMASSEE CONSTITUTION and Yamassee Codes as follows: (I) "To serve as my power of attorney or representative in Yama.s.see or foreign suits or any formal, including busine.ss and governmental affairs" (2) "To create a trust for my benefit." (3) "To make di.scu.ss any amendments to an existing tni.st for my benefit with the Trustee." (4) "To di.sclaim any interest in property." (5) "To renounce fiduciar>' positions." (6) "To negotiate and make or receive payments" (7) "To answer questions in my stead." (S) " To engage in real property tran.sactions ( Trade and Commerce)." (9) "To engage in tangible personal properly transactions (Trade and Commerce)." (It)) "To engage in stock, bond and other securities tran.sactions." Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 98 of 100 PageID# 395 Till: OI'I ICIAI CODK I (1 1)"To engage in eommodily and opiinn Iransaclions." (12)"To engage in banking and financial transactions." (13)"To enter safe depo.sit boxes." (Id)"To engage/inquire in insurance transactions." (15)"To engage/inquire in retirement plan transactions." (16)"To engage/inquire in Loan transactions." (17)"To handle interests in estates and trusts." (18)"To pursue public and private claims and litigation." (19)"To receive government (Tribal or Foreign) benefits." (20)"To pursue any and all finance/economic matters." A. FIPUCTARY RELATIONSHIP; An agent or representative acting under a power of attorney has a fiduciary relationship with the principal. In the absence of a specific provision to the contrary in the power of attorney, the fiduciary relationship includes the duty to: (1) Exercise the powers for the benefit of the principal. (2) Keep separate the assets ofthe principal from those of an agent. (3) Exercise reasonable caution and pnidence. (4) Keep a full and accurate record of all transactions, receipts and di.sbursements on behalf of the principal. B. ADDITIONAL POWERS: In addition to but not by way of limitation. I al.so include other powers as follows: Contracts: To enter into, perfomi. modify, extend, cancel, compromise, enforce, negotiate or otherwise act with re.spect to any contract of any sort whatsoever. Contracts includes the law suits of any kind which require an agreement Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 99 of 100 PageID# 396 I IIIOM ICIAI COUKI or waiver orjiirisdiclion or autliority U)sue or dclcnd any forced suits and forced claims ol jurisdiction over my being, my property (real and personal), my estate, my trusts ct cetera. (2)JMnll: fo receive all mail addressed to me from the United Stales Postal Sen'ice and any private carrier and to forward my mail to any address my CHIEF'COUNSEL and appointed ATTORNEY. ■'"•^^Rliashea Lynn Hamion-El©, Esq., may designate. (3) Einnlov Profc.ssionnis: To employ lawyers, investment counsel, accountants, physicians, other professionals and other persons or entities to render services for or to me and to treat, engage, or finance for such services. My only requirement is that those individuals employed as professionals be Indigenous and that they adhere to and honor the Gualc Vamassec Constitution. (4) Annointment as Gnnrdinn. In the event a guardian of my Estate is ever appointed !)>' Yamassee Court. I nominate my Attorney-in-fact as guardian of my estate and in the event my ATTORNEY IN FACT OR AGENT becomes incapacitated or is no longer living then as mentioned above I assign/appoint someone who possesses the legal competence, knowledge and experti.se as Guale Yamassee Legal Chief Coumsel in the primary AGENT'S/REPRESENTA TIVE'S stead and revocation. Thereafter. Guale Yamassee Court has the authority to appoint someone in accordance with the Constitution of Guale Yamassee Clan. This clau.se has no effect upon the wishes and statements regarding the assigned executor of my estate upon my death. My Trustee in law and in Fact, is the executrix of my estate as per the bylaws of the Clan Trust. This herein "Guardianship Clause" is solely applicable wherein I have become incapacitated, sulTered from loss ofsound mind, become mentally impaired or mentally disabled during my life and such Guardian.ship is nccessar>'. reasonable and appropriate for the benefit of my care during my life. Should I regain full capacity and full competence, then by operation of Divine law this Guardianship Clause will of course return to its hibernated passive stauj^^^^ag^gjaiatlers herein addressed shall resume as specified herein, Ppt A5C C. GENERAL GRANT OF POWF.RS: IN TO THE POWERS AND DISCRETION HEREIN, SPECIFICALLY GIVEN AND CONFERRED UPON MY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT and AGENT/REPRESENTATIVE, AND NOTWITHSTANDING ANY USAGE OR CUSTOMS DECLARATIONS OR LAWS. AS PROVIDED IN THE DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TO THE CONTRARY. MY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CHIEF LEGALL COUNSEL AND APPOINTED ATTORNEY. T.MRhashea Lynn Marmon-EI©. Esq.. (PRIMARY AGENT- REPRESENTATIVE), SHALL HAVE THE FULL POWER.RIGHT AND AUTHORITY. TO DO. PERFORM AND TO CAUSE TO BE DONE AND PERFORMED ALL SUCH TRANSACTIONS, ACTS.DEEDS AND MATTERS IN CONNECTION WITH ANY SUIT BY FOREIGN COURTS, MY PROPERTY AND ESTA'fE AS MY A'ITORNF:Y-IN-FAC'f AND .AT MY ATTORNEY IN FACTS SOLE DISCRETION. WHICH SHALL BE DEEMED REASONABLE. NECESSARY. DESIRABLE AND PROPER. AS FULI.Y. EFFECTUALLY AND ABSOLUTE AS IF MY ATTORNEY-IN-FAd WIlRIi THE ABSOLUTE OWNER AND POSSESSOR AND TITLE IN FEE AS PRINCIPAL THEREOF. A. Reliance on Powers Granted: This powers authorized and granted herein. ma> be 8 Case 3:21-cv-00006-MHL Document 3-6 Filed 01/06/21 Page 100 of 100 PageID# 397
it	other	N/A	Cass. 5540/2011: Investimento pedone e concorso di colpa. Cass. 5540/2011: Investimento pedone e concorso di colpa. Martedì 29 Marzo 2011 21:00 Francesco Annunziata a) Allorquando siano accertate la pericolosità e l'imprudenza della condotta del pedone, la colpa di questo concorre, ai sensi dell'articolo 1227, comma primo, cod. civ., con quella presunta del conducente. b) La mera circostanza che il pedone abbia attraversato la strada, sulle strisce pedonali, frettolosamente e senza guardare non costituisce da sola presupposto per l'applicabilità dell'art. 1227, comma 1, cod. civ., occorrendo invece, a tal fine, che la condotta del pedone sia stata del tutto straordinaria ed imprevedibile (Cassazione, sez. III, 9 marzo 2011, n. 5540) Cassazione, sez. III, 9 marzo 2011, n. 5540 (Pres. Petti – Rel.D’Amico) M..T. conveniva in giudizio, dinanzi al Tribunale di Pesaro, G..D.M. , C..G. , P..D.M. , D.M.S. e M..D.M. , nella loro qualità di eredi di D.M.F. , nonché la s.p.a. Allianz Subalpina Assicurazioni, quale compagnia assicuratrice per la r.c.a. di quest'ultima, per sentirli condannare, in solido, al risarcimento dei danni da essa subiti a seguito di un incidente stradale. Deduceva l'attrice che, mentre camminava sul margine destro di una strada provinciale era investita dall'auto condotta da D.M.F. riportando gravissime lesioni personali. La s.p.a. Allianz Subalpina Assicurazioni si costituiva contestando la domanda attrice, sia in relazione all'an che in relazione al quantum. Il Tribunale concedeva due provvisionali. Con sentenza del 30.8-2.9.2002 il Tribunale dichiarava che l'incidente per cui è causa si era verificato per colpa concorrente di F..D.M. e M..T. , rispettivamente nella misura dell'80% e del 20% e condannava i convenuti, in solido fra loro, al pagamento della somma di Euro 65.587,24 già detratto quanto corrisposto dalla s.p.a. Allianz Subalpina in corso di causa, oltre accessori. Proponeva appello M..T. deducendo che il Tribunale aveva erroneamente ritenuto l'esistenza di un suo concorso di colpa. Contestava la determinazione del danno biologico, del danno morale, delle spese medico assistenziali e di quelle future. La Allianz Subalpina sosteneva la totale infondatezza del proposto gravame di cui chiedeva il rigetto, con integrale conferma della sentenza impugnata. La Corte d'Appello di Ancona respingeva l'appello e confermava la sentenza impugnata. Proponeva ricorso per cassazione M..T. con 10 motivi. Resistevano con separati controricorsi la Allianz s.p.a. (già R.A.S. s.p.a. conferitaria dell'azienda di Allianz Subalpina s.p.a.) e G..D.M. . Le parti presentavano memorie. Con il primo mezzo d'impugnazione M..T. denuncia: “Violazione e falsa applicazione degli artt. 1227 c.c. - 2043 c.c. - 2054 c.c. - 2697 c.c. - 115 c.p.c. - 116 c.p.c. - 190 C.d.s. introdotto dal D.Lgs.vo n. 30.4.1992, n. 285 -/Art. 360, 1 comma, n. 3 c.p.c. - Art. 366 1 co. n. 4 c.p.c.”. Sostiene parte ricorrente che la Corte territoriale non ha correttamente utilizzato le suddette norme in relazione alla fattispecie de qua in quanto ha confermato il concorso di colpa del pedone nella misura del 20% e quella del conducente in misura dell'80%. La Corte ha in particolare errato, secondo M..T. , per aver affermato il concorso di colpa sostenendo che la mera violazione dell'art. 190 del Codice della strada ha determinato il concorso di colpa affermato dal giudice di primo grado, senza neppure svolgere alcun rilievo circa l'elemento causale riferibile al pedone. In tema di investimento stradale, anche se il conducente del veicolo non abbia fornito la prova idonea a vincere la presunzione di colpa che l'articolo 2054, primo comma, cod. civ., pone nei suoi confronti, non è preclusa l'indagine, da parte del giudice di merito, in ordine al concorso di colpa del pedone investito, con la conseguenza che, allorquando siano accertate la pericolosità e l'imprudenza della condotta del pedone stesso, la colpa di questo concorre, ai sensi dell'articolo 1227, comma primo, cod. civ., con quella presunta del conducente (Cass., 22.5.2007, n. 11873). D'altra parte il pedone che si accinge ad attraversare la strada sulle strisce pedonali non è tenuto, alla stregua dell'ordinaria diligenza, a verificare se i conducenti in transito mostrino o meno l'intenzione di rallentare e lasciarlo attraversare, potendo egli fare ragionevole affidamento sugli obblighi di cautela gravanti sui conducenti. Ne consegue che la mera circostanza che il pedone abbia attraversato la strada, sulle strisce pedonali, frettolosamente e senza guardare non costituisce da sola presupposto per l'applicabilità dell'art. 1227, comma 1, cod. civ., occorrendo invece, a tal fine, che la condotta del pedone sia stata del tutto straordinaria ed imprevedibile (Cass., 30.9.2009, n. 20949). Nella specie l'impugnata sentenza ha accertato che la condotta della conducente del veicolo ha concorso in maniera rilevante alla produzione dell'evento, pur non rappresentandone la causa unica: l'appellante infatti risulta aver contravvenuto ad un preciso obbligo imposto dall'art. 190 del codice stradale procedendo su un lato diverso da quello prescritto da quest'ultima norma (Cass., 30.10.1998, n. 902). Con il secondo motivo si denuncia: “Omessa e/o insufficiente e/o contraddittoria motivazione su un fatto controverso essenziale per la decisione art. 360 1 co. n. 5 c.p.c. e 366 bis c.p.c.”. Parte ricorrente ritiene insufficiente e contraddittoria la motivazione: con la quale l’impugnata sentenza ha determinato il concorso di colpa della conducente dell'autovettura investitrice nella misura dell'80% della e della pedone investita nella misura del 20% senza motivazione e/o con motivazione insufficiente e contraddittoria. Ritiene parte ricorrente che, nella specie, il rapporto eziologico necessario a determinare l'imputabilità concorsuale del comportamento della pedone non sussiste e l'investimento è derivato solo dallo sbandamento dell'auto che ha attinto la pedone. l motivo è infondato. Come sostiene l'impugnata sentenza la T. procedeva infatti a piedi lungo la strada, nella stessa direzione dell'auto investitrice, sul margine destro della carreggiata, contravvenendo al disposto dell'art. 190, 1 comma C.d.s. Dal rapporto degli agenti di polizia intervenuti sul luogo dell'incidente si evidenzia inoltre la presenza di una banchina erbosa della quale il pedone avrebbe prudentemente potuto avvalersi, almeno in parte, anziché ingombrare detto margine stradale. Alla luce di tali elementi deve ritenersi che il comportamento della T. non è stato privo di efficienza causale rispetto all'evento dannoso e che la motivazione sul punto è senz'altro congrua. Con il terzo mezzo d'impugnazione parte ricorrente denuncia “Violazione e/o falsa applicazione dell'art. 2056 c.c. Art. 360, 1 comma, n. 3 c.p.c. - Art. 366 1 co. n. 4 c.p.c.”. Sostiene M..T. che la Corte d'appello di Ancona non ha correttamente applicato le suddette norme in relazione alla. determinazione, sotto il profilo del quantum debeatur, del danno biologico da lei stessa subito. Secondo la ricorrente la sentenza di secondo grado ha errato in particolare per avere applicato le "tabelle" del Tribunale di Milano cronologicamente corrispondenti al momento dell'incidente e non quelle pubblicate al tempo della decisione e per non avere operato alcuna integrazione in aumento in relazione alla peculiare gravità del danno da macro-permanente da essa stessa subito. In caso di lesioni gravissime con perdita della salute e con perdita totale della capacità lavorativa sia generica che specifica, il danno biologico deve essere necessariamente personalizzato calcolando anche la componente della capacità lavorativa e del danno psichico sicché, ai valori tabellari della stima statica della gravità del danno, devono aggiungersi in aumento le altre componenti, secondo un prudente apprezzamento che tenga conto del tempo della liquidazione e dell'eventuale probabile aggravamento verificatosi successivamente, ove documentato e scientificamente provato (Cass., 12.12.2008, n. 29191). Nella specie la Corte d'Appello, in presenza di lesioni gravissime, non ha provveduto alla personalizzazione del danno, limitandosi all'adozione di criteri predeterminati. Con il quarto mezzo parte ricorrente denuncia “Violazione e/o falsa applicazione degli artt. 2056 e 2059 c.c. - Art. 360, 1 comma, n. 3 c.p.c. - Art. 366 1 co. n. 4 c.p.c.”. Sostiene parte ricorrente che la Corte d'Appello di Ancona non ha correttamente applicato le norme in epigrafe in relazione alla determinazione del danno morale accertato alla ricorrente a seguito delle lesioni riportate nell'incidente per cui è causa. Nella liquidazione del danno non patrimoniale derivante da fatto illecito, il giudice di merito deve infatti tener conto delle effettive sofferenze patite dall'offeso, della gravità dell'illecito di rilievo penale e di tutti gli elementi della fattispecie, in modo da rendere la somma liquidata adeguata al caso concreto. Il ricorso da parte dei giudici di merito al criterio di determinazione della somma dovuta a titolo di risarcimento del danno morale in una frazione dell'importo riconosciuto per il risarcimento del danno biologico, è legittimo, purché il giudice abbia tenuto conto delle peculiarità del caso concreto, effettuando la necessaria personalizzazione d:. detto criterio alla fattispecie e dando atto di non aver applicato i valori tabellari con mero automatismo (Cass., 9.11.2006, n. 23918). Nella specie M..T. ha subito un danno gravissimo e l’impugnata sentenza non ha provveduto a personalizzare il suddetto criterio. Con il quinto motivo si denuncia “Violazione e/o falsa applicazione degli artt. 2056 e 2059 c.c. - Art. 360, 1 comma, n. 3 c.p.c. - Art. 366 1 co. n. 4 c.p.c.”. Sostiene parte ricorrente che la Corte territoriale non ha correttamente applicato le norme in epigrafe in relazione alla determinazione dell'intero danno "non patrimoniale" nella concezione da ultimo proposta da questa Corte a Sezioni Unite con la sentenza dell'11.11.2008, n. 26972. La decisione della Corte d'Appello di Ancona, si afferma, pur riconoscendo la necessità che il danno sia risarcito integralmente in relazione alla concretezza del caso singolo, si è limitata ad applicare le tabelle pubblicate dal Tribunale di Milano che sono invece preordinate a criteri standardizzati e quindi prive di autonoma valutazione della fattispecie concreta. Il danno non patrimoniale da lesione della salute costituisce infatti una categoria ampia ed onnicomprensiva nella cui liquidazione il giudice deve tener conto di tutti i pregiudizi concretamente patiti dalla vittima (Cass., S.U., 11.11.2008, n. 26972). Nel caso di specie risulta dalla C.t.u. che il soggetto era gravemente menomato nella sua integrità psicofisica, che a causa della tracheotomia e dell'impedimento fonetico aveva difficoltà a verbalizzare la propria pur limitata produzione ideativa. Con il sesto, settimo e ottavo motivo che per la loro stretta connessione devono essere congiuntamente esaminati, si denuncia rispettivamente: 6) “Violazione e/o falsa applicazione degli artt. 2056 e 1223 c.c. e 115 c.p.c. - Art. 360, 1 comma, n. 3 c.p.c. - Art. 366 1 co. n. 4 c.p.c.”; 7) “Violazione e/o falsa applicazione degli artt. 2056 e 1223 c.c. - 115 c.p.c. - 112 cpc - Art. 360, 1 comma, n. 3 c.p.c. - Art. 366 1 co. n. 4 c.p.c. –“; 8) “Omessa e/o insufficiente e/o contraddittoria motivazione su un fatto controverso essenziale per la decisione - art. 360 1 co. n. 5 c.p.c., e 366 bis c.p.c.”. Si afferma con tali motivi che la Corte territoriale non ha fatto buon uso delle norme in epigrafe in ordine alla valutazione e quantificazione del danno emergente costituito dalle spese sostenute sino alla decisione e di quelle da affrontare in futuro. Sostiene in particolare M..T. che in ordine a talune spese sostenute e provate la Corte d'Appello ha violato le norme in epigrafe (art. 2056 c.c., 1223 c.c. e 115 c.p.c.) le quali assicurano il diritto del danneggiato ad essere risarcito delle spese che provi di aver sostenuto a causa dell'incidente. In tal senso, secondo parte ricorrente, la Corte territoriale non ha fatto buon governo dell'art. 112 c.p.c. secondo il quale il giudice deve pronunciare su tutta la domanda. Infatti in ordine al capo della domanda avente ad oggetto le "spese sostenute da M..T. a causa dell'incidente nel periodo dal 16.12.97 alla decisione, la Corte d'Appello di Ancona ha omesso la pronuncia con riferimento a talune spese quali quelle per ticket per medicinali, visite specialistiche trasporti in ambulanza, diritti di copia di cartelle cliniche, esami di laboratorio, assistenza. La Corte d'appello ha infatti correttamente osservato che, riguardo alle spese future, il giudice deve accertare che le stesse saranno sostenute secondo una ragionevole e fondata attendibilità e che nella specie dalla Ctu non risulta l'esigenza di una assistenza di tipo infermieristico mentre per la manutenzione della protesi è previsto il ricovero ospedaliero a carico del servizio sanitario nazionale così come a carico di tale servizio è la terapia riabilitativa. Quanto alle spese sostenute dal di dell'incidente a quello della pronuncia la Corte territoriale le ha ritenute dovute in misura ridotta adottando il criterio della liquidazione forfettaria. Con il nono motivo di ricorso si denuncia “Violazione e falsa applicazione degli artt. 2056 e 1223 c.c. - Art. 360 1 co n. 3 c.p.c. art. 366 1 co. n. 4 cpc”. Secondo il ricorrente la Corte territoriale non ha correttamente applicato le suddette disposizioni in ordine alla qualificazione della natura del danno da incidente stradale e correlata applicazione della rivalutazione monetaria e degli interessi. Secondo l'impugnata sentenza l'importo determinato in valori monetari correnti all'epoca della sentenza di primo grado, costituiscono debito di valuta in conseguenza della liquidazione operata e sono suscettibili di incremento sulla base degli interessi legali fino al saldo, senza operare ulteriore valutazione, in applicazione della sentenza di questa Corte (Cass., S.U., 17.2.1995, n. 1712). Con il decimo ed ultimo motivo si denuncia “Violazione e falsa applicazione degli artt. 2056 e 1223 c.c. - Art. 112 - 115 c.p.c. Art. 360 1 co n. 3 c.p.c. art. 366 1 co. n. 4 c.p.c.”. Sostiene parte ricorrente che la. Corte territoriale non ha fatto corretta applicazione delle facoltà che il nostro ordinamento offre al giudice per decidere correttamente. Basti ricordare che nella fattispecie de qua la Corte territoriale non ha vagliato nel complesso le prove della parte, e soprattutto non ha neppure preso in esame i titoli e tantomeno adempiuto l'obbligo di motivazione. La valutazione delle prove rientra infatti nella discrezionalità del giudice di merito che, ai fini della decisione, non è tenuto a valutare analiticamente tutte le risultanze processuali, né a confutare singolarmente le argomentazioni prospettate dalle parti, essendo sufficiente che egli, dopo averle vagliate, nel loro complesso, indichi gli elementi si quali intende fondare il suo convincimento e l'iter seguito nella valutazione degli stessi e per le proprie conclusioni, implicitamente disattendendo quelli logicamente incompatibili con la decisione adottata. In conclusione, devono essere accolti il terzo, quarto e quinto motivo del ricorso e rigettati gli altri. L'impugnata sentenza va cassata con rinvio alla Corte d'Appello di Ancona in diversa composizione. La Corte accoglie il terzo, quarto e quinto motivo del ricorso; rigetta gli altri. Cassa in relazione e rinvia alla Corte d'Appello di Ancona in diversa composizione. 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La notifica si perfeziona, per il notificante, con la consegna dell'atto all'ufficiale giudiziario. Saggio interesse legale 2015
de	other	N/A	LSG Berlin-Brandenburg, L 1 SF 101/06: LSG Berlin und Brandenburg: materielles recht, mangelnde sorgfalt, rechtliches gehör, befangenheit, voreingenommenheit, akteneinsicht, zivilprozessordnung, anzeichen, auskunft, auflage Urteil des LSG Berlin-Brandenburg vom 26.07.2006, L 1 SF 101/06 L 1 SF 101/06 LSG Berlin und Brandenburg: materielles recht, mangelnde sorgfalt, rechtliches gehör, befangenheit, voreingenommenheit, akteneinsicht, zivilprozessordnung, anzeichen, auskunft, auflage Materielles recht, Mangelnde sorgfalt, Rechtliches gehör, Befangenheit, Voreingenommenheit, Akteneinsicht, Zivilprozessordnung, Anzeichen, Auskunft, Auflage Landessozialgericht Berlin-Brandenburg L 1 SF 101/06 Das Gesuch des Antragstellers, die Richterin wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit abzulehnen, wird zurückgewiesen. Das Befangenheitsgesuch ist zulässig, insbesondere prozessual noch nicht überholt. Die abgelehnte Richterin hat über das Rechtschutzbegehren des Antragstellers zwar bereits entschieden. Gleichwohl ist das erstinstanzliche Eilverfahren noch nicht endgültig abge-schlossen. Die Richterin kann noch mit dem Rechtschutzbegehren befasst sein. Denn der Antragsteller hat Beschwerde eingelegt, auf die hin das Sozialgericht zunächst zu entscheiden hat, ob es ihr abhilft oder nicht (§ 174 Sozialgerichtsgesetz [SGG]). Das Ablehnungsgesuch ist jedoch unbegründet. Gemäß § 60 SGG i.V.m. § 42 Abs. 1 und 2 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) findet die Ablehnung einer Richterin wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit statt, wenn ein Grund vorliegt, der geeignet ist, Misstrauen gegen ihre Unparteilichkeit zu rechtfertigen. Dies ist der Fall, wenn ein am Verfahren Beteiligter von seinem Standpunkt aus bei objektiver und vernünftiger Betrachtung davon ausgehen darf, dass die Richterin nicht unvoreingenommen entscheiden werde. Die nur subjektive Besorgnis, für die bei Würdigung der Tatsachen vernünftigerweise kein Grund ersichtlich ist, ist dagegen nicht Maßstab der Prüfung. Tatsächliche Befangenheit oder Voreingenommenheit ist also nicht erforderlich; es genügt schon der "böse Schein" der Parteilichkeit, d.h. der mögliche Eindruck mangelnder Objektivität. Insbesondere kann das Verhalten des Richters im Prozess die Besorgnis der Befangenheit begründen. Je nach den Umständen reicht gegebenenfalls schon das Übergehen eines bestimmten Vortrags oder Antrags eines Beteiligten oder die fehlende Bereitschaft, das Vorbringen einer Partei vollständig zur Kenntnis zu nehmen und zu würdigen. Solche Gründe liegen hier nicht vor: Der Antragsteller sieht Anlass für die Besorgnis einer Voreingenommenheit, weil die Richterin durch ihr Verhalten gegen das "prozessuale Gleichbehandlungsverbot" verstoßen und ihn in seinem Recht auf Gehör verletzt habe. Zum einen sei ihm der Schriftsatz des Antragsgegners erst am Tage der gerichtlichen Entscheidung per normaler Post zugänglich gemacht worden. Zum anderen sei entschieden worden, bevor ihm Gelegenheit zu rechtlichem Gehör geboten worden sei. Er habe ausdrücklich aber vergeblich um rechtliches Gehör zu Mitteilungen des Antragsgegners zum Ergebnis des Hausbesuches bei ihm oder für den Fall der Übersendung des entsprechenden Berichts erbeten. Aus der gebotenen objektivierten Sicht ergeben sich hieraus keine Indizien, welche auf etwaige Befangenheit hindeuten: Ein Ablehnungsgesuch kann grundsätzlich nicht darauf gestützt werden, dass von einem Richter unrichtige Entscheidungen in materieller oder in verfahrensrechtlicher Hinsicht ge- troffen worden seien. Behauptete Rechtsverstöße können eine Besorgnis der Befangenheit vielmehr nur dann rechtfertigen, wenn Gründe dargetan werden, die dafür sprechen, dass die mögliche Fehlerhaftigkeit auf einer unsachlichen Einstellung des Richters gegenüber dem ihn ablehnenden Beteiligten oder auf Willkür beruht. Dies kann eine unsachgemäße Verfahrens-leitung sowie evident mangelnde Sorgfalt sein. Davon ist auszugehen, wenn sich das pro-zessuale Vorgehen des Richters so sehr von dem normalerweise geübten Verfahren entfernt, dass sich für die dadurch betroffene Partei der Eindruck einer sachwidrigen, auf Vorein-genommenheit beruhenden Benachteiligung aufdrängt (vgl. OLG Oldenburg FamRZ 1992, 192 f. mit weiteren Nachweisen) Das Institut der Richterablehnung ist hingegen kein geeignetes Mittel, sich gegen unrichtige oder für unrichtig gehaltene Rechtsauffassungen eines Richters zu wehren, gleichgültig ob diese Ansichten formelles oder materielles Recht betreffen. Hierfür steht dem Antragsteller ein Rechtsmittelverfahren zu, nicht jedoch das Ablehnungsverfahren. Hier ist eine Verletzung des Rechtes auf Gehör (Art. 103 Abs. 1 Grundgesetz [GG], § 62 SGG) nicht ersichtlich. Der Antragsteller hatte Gelegenheit, sich zum maßgeblichen Prozessstoff zu äußern. Der Antragsteller ist insbesondere nicht gehindert gewesen, zu seinen Wohnumständen vorzutragen und den im Eilverfahren geeigneten Beweis anzubieten. Dies ist ihm nämlich unabhängig vom etwaigen Inhalt der Antragserwiderungsschrift und von der Kenntnis des Berichts vom Hausbesuch möglich gewesen. Die Vorsitzende hat das Vorbringen ausweislich der Begründung des Beschlusses vom 28. Juni 2006 auch zur Kenntnis genommen und gewürdigt. Es ist aus demselben Grunde auch nicht ersichtlich, dass der Antragsteller gegenüber dem Antragsgegner in seiner Verfahrensstellung benachteiligt worden sein könnte. Dass die Richterin der Bitte des Antragstellers, ihm eine Stellungnahme zur Ansicht des Antragsgegners zu seiner häuslichen Situation zu ermöglichen, nicht entsprochen und sogleich in der Sache entschieden hat, beruht auch nicht auf einer vom üblichen Verfahren ungewöhnlich abweichenden Verhalten oder sonst unsachlichen Gesichtspunkten. Der Antragsteller verkennt, dass Verfahren des einstweiligen Rechtschutzes Eilverfahren sind. Diese Verfahren verlangen grundsätzlich eine kurzfristige Entscheidung. Eine zügige Entscheidung ohne Eingehen auf diese Bitte mag hier nicht unbedingt nötig gewesen sein. Sie ist jedoch keinesfalls Ausdruck einer unsachgemäßen Vorgehensweise, zumal die Anträge nach Auffassung der Vorsitzenden bereits aus einem anderen Grund als der hier zwischen den Beteiligten streitigen häuslichen Situation des Antragsstellers sowie deren rechtlicher Relevanz und Folgen - nämlich wegen mangelnder Eilbedürftigkeit - zurückzuweisen gewesen sei. Insofern ist auch eine Missachtung des § 128 Abs. 2 SGG nicht ersichtlich. Auch soweit die Richterin gegen die Verfahrensvorschrift des § 107 SGG verstoßen haben könnte, indem sie vor der Entscheidung dem Antragsteller nicht das Ergebnis der von ihr bei der Meldebehörde eingeholten Auskunft (§ 106 Abs. 3 Nr. 3 SGG) mitgeteilt hat, hat ihre Verfahrensweise jedenfalls diesen sachlichen Hintergrund und lässt nicht im Ansatz auf Voreingenommenheit oder Parteilichkeit gegenüber dem Antragsteller schließen. Entsprechendes gälte auch bei einer Verletzung des § 128 Abs. 2 SGG. Nicht nachvollziehbar ist das Vorbringen des Antragsstellers, die Richterin habe bloß behauptetes, noch nicht bestehendes, materielles Recht angewendet. Die von ihr im Rahmen der zusätzlichen Begründung der Abweisung herangezogenen §§ 41 und 36 Sozialgesetzbuch Zwölftes Buch (SGB XII) sind jedoch geltendes Recht, unabhängig von einem Gesetzes-entwurf zur Änderung unter anderem des § 20 SGB XII. Soweit der Antragsteller der Richterin vorwirft, aufs gröbste ihre Pflicht aus § 106 Abs. 1 SGG verletzt zu haben, eine Berichtigung des Sachantrages zu 2.) –Verpflichtung zur Herausgabe des Berichtes über den Hausbesuch- zu ermöglichen, entbehrt dies einer Grundlage. Es kann dem Beschluss nämlich nicht entnommen werden, dass die Richterin die Ablehnung dieses Antrages auch auf eine Falschbezeichnung gestützt hat. Der Sache nach ist vielmehr -zusätzlich zur fehlenden Eilbedürftigkeit - ein eigenständiger Anspruch gegen den Antrags-gegner mit dem Hinweis auf die mögliche Akteneinsicht abgelehnt worden. Dieser Hinweis im Beschluss kann aus objektiver Sicht nicht als Verhöhnung aufgefasst werden, weil er zutreffend ist. Daran ändert auch der Umstand nichts, dass die Weigerung des Antragsgegners, Akteneinsicht zu gewähren, wohl rechtswidrig gewesen ist. Es ist bereits nach Aktenlage rein tatsächlich falsch, dass es sich bei dem Bericht um einen Entwurf im Sinne des § 25 Abs. 1 Satz 2 Sozialgesetzbuch Zehntes Buch gehandelt hat. Eine Besorgnis der Befangenheit folgt zuletzt auch nicht aus der dienstlichen Stellungnahme der Richterin. Sinn einer solchen dienstlichen Äußerung ist die Klärung des Sach-verhalts (vgl. Heinrich in Musielak, Zivilprozessordnung, 4. Auflage 2005, § 44 RdNr. 9). Aus der Stellungnahme hier folgt, dass die Richterin den zugrunde liegenden Tatsachen, die sich aus den Akten ergeben, nichts hinzuzufügen hat. Anzeichen für Voreingenommenheit sind deshalb nicht ersichtlich. Die Bewilligung von Prozesskostenhilfe isoliert für das Ablehnungsverfahren scheidet aus (ebenso: Zöller-Phillipi, ZPO, § 119 Rdnr. 2). Dieses ist als Zwischenverfahren Teil des erstinstanzlichen Rechtszuges im Sinne der §§ 73a SGG, 119 Abs. 1 ZPO.
de	other	N/A	4A_103/2010 16.03.2010 4A_103/2010 Arbeitsvertrag; Unterfrachtvertrag, B.________ (Beschwerdegegner) ist Inhaber der Einzelfirma BX.________, die im Auftrag der Y.________ AG den Transport und die Zustellung von Paketen in der Region Bern übernimmt. Mit einem am 10. Mai 2004 auf unbegrenzte Zeit abgeschlossenen "Unterfrachtvertrag" übertrug er A.________ (Beschwerdeführer) das nicht ausschliessliche Recht, Pakete, Briefe, Produkte und andere Dienstleistungen zu übernehmen, zu transportieren und zuzustellen. Der Wortlaut der Vereinbarung entsprach einem zuvor geltenden Vertrag zwischen dem Beschwerdegegner und einer Kollektivgesellschaft, bestehend aus dem Beschwerdeführer und einem weiteren Gesellschafter. Am 22. Oktober 2004 trafen sich die Parteien in einem Restaurant in Bern zu einem Gespräch. In dessen Nachgang verfasste der Beschwerdegegner eine Vereinbarung betreffend die sofortige Vertragsauflösung mit Saldoklausel, auf welche sich die Parteien seiner Meinung nach mündlich geeinigt hatten. Er händigte das Schriftstück dem Beschwerdeführer aus, der es aber nicht unterzeichnete. Einig sind sich die Parteien immerhin darüber, dass der "Unterfrachtvertrag" aufgehoben worden ist. Umstritten ist dagegen dessen Rechtsnatur (Arbeitsvertrag oder Transportvertrag [spezieller Auftrag]), die Art der Auflösung (contrarius actus oder Kündigung) und deren finanzielle Folgen (Lohnansprüche und Fahrzeugkosten). Der Beschwerdeführer belangte den Beschwerdegegner vor dem Gerichtskreis IX Schwarzenburg - Seftigen auf Zahlung von Fr. 42'029.20 aus Arbeitsvertrag, eventuell auf Fr. 28'822.25 aus Frachtvertrag, je nebst Zins. Ferner sei der Beschwerdegegner zu verpflichten, die gerichtlich zugesprochenen Lohnanteile mit der Sozialversicherung abzurechnen. Der Gerichtspräsident 2 wies die Klage am 13. März 2009 ab. Gleich entschied das Obergericht des Kantons Bern am 13. Oktober 2009 auf Appellation des Beschwerdeführers. Der Beschwerdeführer hat das Urteil des Obergerichts mit Beschwerde in Zivilsachen angefochten, mit welcher er seine im kantonalen Verfahren gestellten Anträge erneuert. Mit gleicher Post reichte er ein Gesuch um unentgeltliche Rechtspflege im Sinne von Art. 64 Abs. 1 und 2 BGG ein. Vernehmlassungen wurden nicht eingeholt. Die Vorinstanz kam zum Ergebnis, das umstrittene Vertragsverhältnis sei nicht als Arbeitsvertrag, sondern als Frachtvertrag zu qualifizieren, der durch die Aufhebungsvereinbarung vom 22. Oktober 2004 aufgelöst worden sei. In einer Alternativbegründung hielt die Vorinstanz sodann dafür, selbst wenn die Schutzbestimmungen des Arbeitsrechts auf das Vertragsverhältnis unter den Parteien anwendbar sein sollten, wäre die per Saldo aller Ansprüche abgeschlossene Aufhebungsvereinbarung gültig zustande gekommen. 1.1 Die Vorinstanz ging in Übereinstimmung mit dem erstinstanzlichen Gericht, auf dessen Feststellungen sie verwies, vom Sachverhalt aus, wie ihn der Beschwerdegegner ihrer Ansicht nach glaubwürdig geschildert hatte. Dieser hatte ausgeführt, die Beschaffung eines Fahrzeugs sei vertragsgemäss Pflicht des Beschwerdeführers gewesen. Dennoch habe er - der Beschwerdegegner - dem Beschwerdeführer immer wieder ausgeholfen und ihm im November 2003 auf Abzahlung einen Citroën verkauft. Nachdem dieser nur zwei Monate später aufgrund eines Ölmangels einen Motorschaden erlitten habe, habe er dem Beschwerdeführer einen alten Lieferwagen geschenkt, den Beschwerdeführer aber auf die Abzahlungsschuld für den Citroën hingewiesen. Im September 2004 habe auch der geschenkte Wagen wegen Ölmangels einen Motorschaden erlitten, worauf er dem Beschwerdeführer ein weiteres Fahrzeug zum Gebrauch überlassen habe. Zwei Wochen später sei auch bei diesem Wagen ein Motorschaden aufgetreten, diesmal weil zu viel Öl eingefüllt worden sei. Der Beschwerdegegner habe alsdann dem Beschwerdeführer für kurze Zeit ein weiteres Fahrzeug zum Gebrauch überlassen. Anlässlich des Treffens im Restaurant habe er dem Beschwerdeführer erklärt, er sei nicht mehr bereit, ihm weitere Lieferwagen zur Verfügung zu stellen. Der Beschwerdeführer habe erwidert, er könne sich kein eigenes Fahrzeug leisten und wolle daher aus dem Vertrag aussteigen. Hierauf hätten sie sich mündlich geeinigt und den Vergleich per Handschlag besiegelt. Demgegenüber hat sich der Beschwerdeführer nach Auffassung der Vorinstanz widersprüchlich geäussert, und zwar wie folgt: "Ich habe einer sofortigen Vertragsauflösung am 22.10.2004 im C.________ mündlich nicht zugestimmt. Ich habe zuerst schon zugestimmt gehabt, wenn ich diese 3 Monate Kündigungsfrist mit Lohnentlöhnung (sic) erhalten hätte. Der Variante von Herrn B.________, in welcher ich drei Monate frei hätte arbeiten sollen, habe ich nicht zugestimmt. Ich habe per Handschlag zugestimmt, war aber voll nicht einverstanden. Ich habe gesagt, dass ich nicht einverstanden war. Ich habe nicht zugestimmt. Ich habe nicht gesagt, dass ich einverstanden bin. Ich habe abgemacht, dass ich nicht mehr arbeiten komme (...). Ab diesem Tag war ich sicher, dass ich nicht mehr bei Herrn B.________ arbeiten würde. Ich ging mit dem Gedanken weg, dass ich nichts mehr erhalte und dass ich nicht mehr arbeiten gehe." Weiter gab der Beschwerdeführer an, der Beschwerdegegner habe ihm insgesamt vier verschiedene Wagen zur Verfügung gestellt, zu denen er immer gut geschaut habe und für welche er die Garagenrechnungen selbst bezahlt habe. Er habe zwar einen Motorschaden gehabt, anerkenne aber nicht, die vom Beschwerdegegner geltend gemachten Schäden verursacht zu haben. 1.2 Der Beschwerdeführer rügt, die Vorinstanz habe den Sachverhalt offensichtlich unrichtig festgestellt. Über den Grundsatz der Aufhebung des Vertrages sei nie ein Konsens zustande gekommen. Zur Begründung beruft sich der Beschwerdeführer einzig auf seine Aussage, wonach er "voll nicht einverstanden" gewesen sei und darauf, dass er unerfahren, der Beschwerdegegner aber erfahren gewesen sei und die zeitlichen und örtlichen Umstände des Treffens diktiert habe. Er legt aber nicht dar, weshalb die Vorinstanz in Willkür verfallen sein soll, wenn sie auf jene Aussage des Beschwerdeführers abstellte, wonach er mit dem Gedanken weggegangen sei, nicht mehr beim Beschwerdegegner zu arbeiten und nichts mehr von diesem zu erhalten. Die Beschwerde erweist sich in diesem Punkte als offensichtlich unbegründet. Somit bleibt es dabei, dass ein tatsächlicher Konsens in dem Sinne zustande gekommen ist, dass die Parteien den Vertrag per sofort auflösen und per Saldo aller Ansprüche auseinandergesetzt sind. Zu prüfen bleibt, ob der mündliche Aufhebungsvertrag rechtlich zulässig war oder ob ihm arbeitsrechtliche Schutzbestimmungen zu Gunsten des Arbeitnehmers (namentlich Art. 341 Abs. 1 OR) beziehungsweise ein vertraglicher Formvorbehalt entgegenstanden. 2.1 Gegen die Qualifikation der von den Parteien mit "Unterfrachtvertrag" betitelten Vereinbarung als Arbeitsvertrag spricht die Tatsache, dass der Beschwerdeführer vor Abschluss der Vereinbarung im Rahmen der Kollektivgesellschaft unter einem Vertrag mit gleichem Wortlaut für den Beschwerdegegner tätig war. Beim Vertrag mit der Kollektivgesellschaft konnte es sich nicht um einen Arbeitsvertrag handeln. Hinzu kommt, dass es im Betrieb des Beschwerdegegners zwei Arten von Beschäftigten gab, nämlich "Subunternehmer" und "Angestellte", wobei diese einen festen Lohn erhielten und die Auslagen nicht selbst zu tragen hatten. Es erscheint inkonsequent, den Vertrag gemäss dem Subunternehmermodell zu unterzeichnen und darauf die arbeitsrechtlichen Bestimmungen anwenden zu wollen, nach welchen das andere Modell konzipiert ist. Selbst bei einer Qualifikation der Vereinbarung als Arbeitsvertrag, ist indessen, wie zu zeigen sein wird, nicht zwingend auf die Unzulässigkeit des Aufhebungsvertrages zu schliessen. 2.2 Ein Vertrag über die Aufhebung eines Arbeitsverhältnisses kann zulässig sein, sofern er nicht zu einer klaren Umgehung des zwingenden gesetzlichen Kündigungsschutzes führt (BGE 119 II 449 E. 2a S. 450; 118 II 58 E. 2a S. 60 mit Hinweisen). Eine solche Vereinbarung unterliegt ungeachtet der im Vertrag für Ergänzungen und Abänderungen verlangten Schriftform keinerlei Formvorschriften (Art. 115 OR; Urteil 4C.61/2006 vom 24. Mai 2006 E. 3.1). Wird der Vertrag vom Arbeitgeber aufgesetzt, muss dem Arbeitnehmer aber eine genügende Überlegungsfrist zur Verfügung stehen (Urteil 4C.51/1999 vom 20. Juli 1999 E. 3c). Ist ein übereinstimmender Wille, das Arbeitsverhältnis zu beenden, erstellt, ist für die Gültigkeit einer derartigen Vereinbarung, soweit sie einen Verzicht auf Ansprüche aus zwingendem Recht bedeutet, zusätzlich vorausgesetzt, dass der Aufhebungsvertrag einen echten Vergleich darstellt, bei welchem beide Parteien Konzessionen machen (BGE 118 II 58 E. 2b S. 61 mit Hinweisen). 2.3 Der Beschwerdeführer bestreitet, dass die Gegenpartei Konzessionen gemacht habe. Angesichts der kurzfristig anberaumten Besprechung vom 22. Oktober 2004 habe er keine Zeit zum Überlegen gehabt. Vielmehr sei er überrumpelt worden. 2.3.1 Die Vorinstanz hielt fest, es habe dem Beschwerdeführer bereits seit mehr als einem Tag vor dem Treffen bekannt sein müssen, dass der Beschwerdegegner beabsichtigte, ihn für die defekten Fahrzeuge - zu Recht oder zu Unrecht - haftbar zu machen. Seit längerer Zeit sei er auch über die Darlehensforderung des Beschwerdegegners im Bilde gewesen. Angesichts dieser Umstände gelangte die Vorinstanz zur Überzeugung, dass der Beschwerdeführer am Abschluss der Saldovereinbarung ein vernünftiges Interesse gehabt und ihm dafür eine hinreichende Überlegungsfrist zu Verfügung gestanden habe. 2.3.2 Mit der blossen Behauptung, er sei anlässlich des Treffens im Restaurant überrumpelt worden, vermag der Beschwerdeführer die Feststellung, er habe schon vor der Besprechung um die Ansprüche, die der Beschwerdegegner geltend machte, gewusst, nicht als willkürlich auszuweisen. Da der Beschwerdeführer selbst keinen Transporter stellen konnte, musste er sich bewusst sein, dass diesbezüglich eine Lösung gesucht werden musste, um eine Weiterarbeit zu ermöglichen. Von einer Überrumpelung kann keine Rede sein. 2.3.3 Ob ein Verzicht des Arbeitgebers auf Ansprüche gegenüber dem Arbeitnehmer einen echten Vergleich im Sinn der bundesgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung (BGE 118 II 58 E 2b S. 61) darstellt, beurteilt sich im Zeitpunkt des Vergleichsschlusses (Urteil 4C.27/2002 vom 19. April 2002 E. 3c, publ. in SJ 2003 I S. 220 ff. S. 223) nach den Prozessaussichten des Arbeitgebers. Dieser muss zwar nicht strikt nachweisen, dass und in welchem Umfang die Ansprüche tatsächlich bestanden, denn die Unsicherheit über Bestand und Umfang der gegenseitigen Forderungen soll durch den Abschluss eines Vergleichs gerade aus der Welt geschaffen werden. Von einer Konzession des Arbeitgebers kann aber nur gesprochen werden, wenn er auf ernsthafte Ansprüche mit greifbaren Erfolgsaussichten verzichtet. 2.3.4 Nach den Feststellungen der Vorinstanz traten bei den vier dem Beschwerdeführer zur Verfügung gestellten Transportern Defekte auf. Als Grund für die Motorenschäden gab der Beschwerdegegner an, zweimal sei zu wenig Öl verwendet worden und einmal zu viel. Schäden, die durch Ölmangel oder das Einfüllen von zu viel Öl entstehen, können in der Regel bereits mit minimaler Vorsicht ausgeschlossen werden. Da derartige Probleme wiederholt auftraten und der Beschwerdeführer dem betreffenden Vorwurf nichts Substantielles entgegenzuhalten vermochte, erscheint nicht unwahrscheinlich, dass sich Schadenersatzansprüche wegen grobfahrlässigen Verhaltens des Beschwerdeführers hätten durchsetzen lassen, so dass im Verzicht auf die Ansprüche eine echte Konzession des Beschwerdegegners liegt. 2.3.5 Bezüglich der Darlehensforderung macht der Beschwerdeführer zwar geltend, sie habe nicht bestehen können, da der Beschwerdegegner aus Arbeitsvertrag verpflichtet gewesen sei, ihm seine Auslagen zu ersetzen und das notwendige Material für die Ausführung der Arbeiten zur Verfügung zu stellen. Ob ein Arbeitsvertrag vorliegt, ist aber zweifelhaft (vgl. E. 2.1 hiervor) und war zwischen den Parteien umstritten. Mit der Unterzeichnung der Saldoklausel war der Beschwerdeführer von der Pflicht zur Rückzahlung der Darlehensforderung auch für den Fall befreit, dass der "Unterfrachtvertrag" nicht als Arbeitsvertrag zu qualifizieren sein sollte. Dass insoweit für den Standpunkt des Beschwerdegegners reale Prozesschancen bestanden, dokumentieren die Entscheide der beiden kantonalen Instanzen, die dessen Auffassung gefolgt sind. Inwieweit die im "Unterfrachtvertrag" bezüglich der Fahrzeuge getroffene Regelung bei Anwendbarkeit der Bestimmungen über den Arbeitsvertrag (vgl. Art. 327b Abs. 1 OR) zulässig wäre, braucht daher nicht vertieft behandelt zu werden. Der Verzicht stellt jedenfalls ein echtes Entgegenkommen des Beschwerdegegners dar. 2.4 Es ist mithin nicht zu beanstanden, dass die Vorinstanz annahm, der mit der vereinbarten Saldoklausel verbundene Erlass der restlichen Forderung aus dem Abzahlungsvertrag und der Verzicht auf allfällige Schadenersatzforderungen habe den Interessen des Beschwerdeführers gedient. Damit konnte sie den Aufhebungsvertrag bundesrechtskonform als gültig erachten. 2.5 Da der angefochtene Entscheid mit der Eventualbegründung vor Bundesrecht standhält, ist nicht rechtserheblich, ob die Vorinstanz das ursprüngliche Vertragsverhältnis zutreffend als Frachtvertrag nach Art. 440 ff. OR qualifizierte, zumal auch dieser formlos durch gegenseitige Übereinkunft aufgehoben werden kann. Auf die betreffenden Ausführungen in der Beschwerde ist daher nicht einzutreten. Nach dem Gesagten erweist sich die Beschwerde zwar als unbegründet und ist abzuweisen. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass ihr die Erfolgsaussichten zum vornherein abgesprochen werden konnten, stellten sich doch heikle Fragen der Abgrenzung zwischen Auftrag und Arbeitsvertrag und liess die Vorinstanz in ihrer Eventualbegründung bundesrechtswidrig ausser Acht, dass dem Arbeitnehmer nach Art. 327b Abs. 1 OR die üblichen Aufwendungen für den Betrieb und Unterhalt eines vom Arbeitnehmer gestellten Motorfahrzeugs zwingend zu vergüten sind. Da auch die Bedürftigkeit des Beschwerdeführers als gegeben erachtet werden kann, ist seinem Gesuch um unentgeltliche Rechtspflege unter Beigabe eines unentgeltlichen Rechtsbeistandes in der Person seines Rechtsvertreters zu entsprechen. Da keine Vernehmlassungen eingeholt wurden, ist keine Parteientschädigung geschuldet. Das Gesuch des Beschwerdeführers um Gewährung unentgeltlicher Rechtspflege für das Verfahren vor Bundesgericht wird gutgeheissen. Dem Anwalt des Beschwerdeführers, Rechtsanwalt Jörg Zumstein, wird aus der Bundesgerichtskasse ein Honorar von Fr. 2'500.-- ausgezahlt.
fr	other	N/A	ÉQUIPEMENT, TRANSPORTS, AMÉNAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE, TOURISME et MER PAR M. JEAN-YVES BESSELAT, Voir le numéro : 1863 (annexe 22) L'article 49 de la loi organique du 1er août 2001 fixe comme date butoir, pour le retour des réponses aux questionnaires budgétaires, au plus tard huit jours francs à compter du dépôt du projet de loi de finances. Cette date était donc le 9 octobre. A cette date, la majeure partie des réponses était parvenue à votre Rapporteur. I.- UN PROJET DE BUDGET PRÉSERVÉ DANS LE CADRE DE LA MISE EN œUVRE DE LA LOI ORGANIQUE RELATIVE AUX LOIS DE FINANCES 9 A.- LA PRÉSERVATION DES CRÉDITS DESTINÉS À LA MER DANS UN CONTEXTE BUDGÉTAIRE DIFFICILE 9 1. Les augmentations sont réparties sur l'ensemble des titres budgétaires, à l'exception des subventions d'investissement 9 2. L'action sociale en faveur des marins constitue toujours le poste prépondérant du budget 10 a) L'augmentation des charges de l'ENIM 10 b) L'action sociale de l'Etat en faveur de certaines catégories de marins 12 c) La cessation anticipée d'activité des marins 13 B.- LA MISE EN œUVRE DE LA LOI ORGANIQUE RELATIVE AUX LOIS DE FINANCES NE DOIT PAS CONDUIRE À RÉDUIRE L'IMPORTANCE POLITIQUE DE LA MER 13 1. L'éclatement de la présentation des crédits de la mer à compter de 2006 13 2. La réorganisation critiquable des services du ministère 15 II.- LA SÉCURITÉ MARITIME DEMEURE UNE NÉCESSITÉ BUDGÉTAIRE À CONFORTER 16 A.- LES CATASTROPHES RÉCENTES DOIVENT ENGAGER LE GOUVERNEMENT À MOBILISER PLUS DE MOYENS EN FAVEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ MARITIME 16 1. Les moyens d'investissement des CROSS privilégiés au détriment de leurs moyens de fonctionnement 17 2. Les moyens consacrés à la signalisation maritime sont en recul 19 3. La régulation des crédits destinés au contrôle et à la surveillance des affaires maritimes 21 4. La politique de contrôle des navires nécessite d'importants moyens humains 22 B.- LES MOYENS DESTINÉS À LA FORMATION MARITIME DOIVENT BÉNÉFICIER À L'ENSEMBLE DES FILIÈRES 22 III.- LA COMPÉTITIVITÉ DES PORTS ET DE LA FLOTTE FRANÇAIS CONSTITUE UN DÉFI À RELEVER 25 A.- MODERNISER LES PORTS FRANÇAIS SANS RÉDUIRE LEUR SÛRETÉ 25 1. Eléments de comparaison internationale en matière de compétitivité des ports 25 2. L'adaptation du cadre législatif constitue la première étape de la modernisation du régime des ports 27 3. Les moyens destinés à la modernisation des ports doivent être confortés 29 4. La modernisation des installations ne saurait se traduire par une diminution de la sûreté et de la sécurité portuaires 31 B.- RENDRE À LA FLOTTE DE COMMERCE SA COMPÉTITIVITÉ 34 1. Le dispositif des allègements de charges sociales est insuffisant pour restaurer cette compétitivité 36 2. Les crédits destinés au développement du cabotage doivent être mieux utilisés 36 3. Les différents dispositifs d'allègement de charges fiscales n'apportent que des solutions partielles 37 4. La proposition de loi créant un registre international français (RIF) constitue la seule réponse globale à ce problème 40 Notre politique de la mer aurait-elle enfin pour ambition de rendre à la France son rang de grande puissance maritime ? Alors que les rapporteurs pour avis des crédits de la mer avaient pris l'habitude, sous la précédente législature, de voir les moyens destinés à cette politique stagner, tandis que certaines réformes se faisaient cruellement attendre, il n'est plus possible de douter aujourd'hui de la volonté des différents gouvernements issus de la présente majorité de faire de la politique de la mer une priorité. L'enjeu est de taille, car il faut rappeler que la France est une nation géographiquement tournée vers la mer - grâce aux départements et aux territoires d'outre-mer, elle détient le troisième domaine public maritime de l'ordre de 11 millions de kilomètres carrés - mais qu'elle est en train de passer à côté d'une opportunité de développement extrêmement importante : la croissance du transport maritime s'établit, sur les vingt dernières années, à près de 8 % par an en moyenne, et cette tendance devrait s'accentuer dans les années à venir. Pourtant, la France ne représente aujourd'hui plus que 0,8 % du tonnage mondial, et avec une flotte de commerce de l'ordre de 200 navires, elle n'est plus capable de peser dans les négociations multilatérales, par exemple au sein de l'Organisation maritime internationale. Pire, elle ne bénéficie que dans des proportions dérisoires de ce formidable accroissement du trafic maritime, dont les retombées, en termes économiques et en termes d'emploi, pourraient être beaucoup plus importantes. Pour tenter d'apporter une solution à ce problème, les différents Gouvernements ont mobilisé, depuis 2002, des moyens importants ; il s'agit en premier lieu de moyens budgétaires, car chacun pourra se féliciter de constater que les crédits de la mer ont progressé de 6 % en 2004 et de 4,4 % pour 2005, ce qui constitue, dans le contexte budgétaire actuel, un effort très important. Si le secteur maritime est largement dominé par le jeu du marché, il revient en effet à l'Etat d'assumer sans faiblir ses missions régaliennes, notamment dans le domaine de la formation maritime ou de la sécurité maritime, afin de permettre un développement équilibré de ce secteur. Après les naufrages de l'Erika et du Prestige en particulier, la France semble enfin se donner les moyens de contrôler le trafic maritime très important qui croise au large de ses côtes. En outre, l'année 2005 verra les moyens destinés à moderniser nos installations portuaires augmenter, afin que notre pays puisse constituer une escale compétitive aux yeux des armateurs du monde entier. L'efficacité des crédits ainsi affectés à la politique de la mer sera assurée, au titre de l'année 2005, par la définition claire des objectifs que le Gouvernement entend atteindre, ce qui, dans la perspective de l'entrée en vigueur de la loi organique relative aux lois de finances en 2006, mérite d'être salué. Ces objectifs ont été par ailleurs énoncés au cours de deux rendez-vous interministériels majeurs : - le comité interministériel de la mer (CIMER) du 16 février 2004, dans la continuité de celui du 29 avril 2003, a décidé que la sécurité maritime et portuaire devait rester une priorité, notamment par le biais de l'amélioration de notre couverture radar et du fonctionnement des Centres régionaux opérationnels de surveillance et de sauvetage (CROSS). Il a en outre confirmé la nécessité de soutenir notre flotte de commerce, notamment par le biais du développement des « autoroutes de la mer ». Il s'agit aussi pour le Gouvernement de soutenir la plaisance, dont les retombées économiques pour nos territoires littoraux ne doivent pas être oubliées ; - le comité interministériel de l'aménagement et du développement du territoire (CIADT) du 14 septembre 2004 a permis d'envisager les axes d'une réforme de la politique de développement économique du littoral, dans le respect du principe de développement durable de cette partie particulièrement fragile de notre territoire. Les crédits budgétaires ne sont pas le seul levier de la politique maritime de la France : il est également très important de libérer les initiatives privées dans un secteur soumis à une concurrence internationale forte, et de lever les contraintes et les pesanteurs fiscales et administratives qui pèsent sur elles. Cette politique a un coût budgétaire limité, mais une efficacité importante sur le secteur, notamment sur les investisseurs qui attendent du Gouvernement certains signaux confirmant sa volonté de soutenir l'économie maritime. De ce point de vue, l'activité des différents gouvernements qui se sont succédé depuis 2002 a été déterminante, alors que les dispositifs d'allègements de charges fiscales et sociales ont été maintenus, l'introduction d'une taxation forfaitaire autorisée par la loi de finances rectificative de 2002 a permis également de simplifier la relation entre les armateurs et l'administration fiscale. Cette mesure constitue par ailleurs un alignement du régime fiscal français sur celui de nos principaux partenaires européens dans le domaine de la mer, tels que le Royaume-Uni ou les Pays-Bas. Dans le même ordre d'idée, le Gouvernement a décidé de soutenir la création, initiée par une proposition de loi déposée au Sénat, d'un registre international français, dont l'objectif est de restaurer l'attrait de notre pavillon, notamment à l'égard des nombreux armements contrôlés par des intérêts financiers français, mais placés sous un pavillon de complaisance, en raison du coût induit par l'inscription d'un navire aux différents registres français. La Commission européenne elle-même a en effet reconnu que le registre des Terres australes et antarctiques françaises (TAAF) est l'un des moins compétitifs d'Europe. L'examen de cette proposition de loi à l'Assemblée nationale sera, à n'en pas douter, une date importante dans l'histoire de la marine de commerce, et chacun espère que ce dispositif juridique, qui a déjà fait ses preuves dans de nombreux pays européens, permettra d'enrayer le déclin inexorable de la flotte de commerce française. L'examen des crédits de la mer dans le cadre du projet de loi de finances pour 2005 s'annonce donc, selon votre rapporteur, sous de bons auspices : tout en confirmant la volonté du Gouvernement de soutenir budgétairement la France de la mer, ils s'inscrivent plus largement dans une politique volontaire et cohérente qui devrait se concrétiser en 2005 par le vote de la proposition de loi relative au registre international français. I.- UN PROJET DE BUDGET PRÉSERVÉ DANS LE CADRE DE LA MISE EN œUVRE DE LA LOI ORGANIQUE A.- LA PRÉSERVATION DES CRÉDITS DESTINÉS À LA MER DANS UN CONTEXTE BUDGÉTAIRE DIFFICILE 1. Les augmentations sont réparties sur l'ensemble des titres budgétaires, à l'exception des subventions d'investissement Les crédits inscrits, pour le budget de la mer, dans le projet de loi de finances pour 2005 s'élèvent à 1 141 millions d'euros contre 1 094 millions d'euros en 2004, ce qui représente une hausse de 4,4 %. Rappelons que cette augmentation fait suite à une augmentation importante - de l'ordre de 6 % - en 2004, ce qui conduit à une augmentation de plus de 10 % du budget de la mer en deux ans. Comme en 2004, cette hausse contraste avec l'évolution du budget global de l'équipement qui subit, à périmètre constant, une baisse de 0,9 %. Chacun des titres est en légère augmentation, à l'exception des crédits destinés aux subventions d'investissement qui enregistrent un repli de 1,6 %. On ne peut que se féliciter de cette prise en compte, au niveau du budget de l'Etat, de cette priorité que représente la mer pour la France. ÉVOLUTION DES CRÉDITS DE LA MER PRÉSENTATION PAR TITRE de loi de finances 2004 de loi de finances 2005 de finances 2005/projet de loi de finances 2004 Titre III- Moyens des services dont charges de personnels (1) Titre IV- Interventions publiques 947,27 dont ENIM Total des dépenses ordinaires (DO) 1 070,40 Titre V- Investissements exécutés par l'Etat Titre VI- Subventions d'investissement Total des crédits de paiement (CP) des dépenses en capital Total des DO et CP Source : fascicule budgétaire « Mer » (1) La baisse apparente des crédits de personnel résulte du transfert d'emplois vers le chapitre 39-01, créé pour la réalisation d'une expérimentation menée dans le cadre de la loi organique du 1er août 2001. Lorsque l'on retranche les crédits destinés à l'Etablissement national des invalides de la marine (ENIM), qui constituent cette année plus de 77 % des crédits de la mer, les dotations prévues pour 2005 atteignent 319,2 millions d'euros, et sont en hausse d'un peu moins de 1 % par rapport aux crédits inscrits au projet de loi de finances initiale pour 2004. Les dépenses ordinaires correspondantes s'établissent à 248,4 millions d'euros, soit une somme sensiblement égale aux dotations correspondantes du projet de loi de finances initiale pour 2004. D'autre part, les autorisations de programme atteindront l'année prochaine 53,5 millions d'euros, ce qui représente une baisse de 5,54 % par rapport à la dotation de 2004. Cette réduction de 3,15 millions d'euros résulte, d'une part, du transfert, sur le budget du ministère de l'intérieur, de 1,5 million d'euros correspondant au programme exceptionnel d'investissement en Corse et, d'autre part, d'une baisse des autorisations de programme de l'ensemble des chapitres du titre V. 2. L'action sociale en faveur des marins constitue toujours le poste prépondérant du budget a) L'augmentation des charges de l'ENIM Pour l'année 2005, la progression globale des crédits résulte principalement de la hausse de la subvention à l'ENIM, qui croit de 5,7 % pour s'établir à 822 millions d'euros. Rappelons en outre que les crédits destinés à l'ENIM avaient déjà augmenté de 7,66 % en 2004. Ces augmentations répétées appellent de la part de votre rapporteur une analyse de la situation financière de l'Etablissement, d'autant plus que l'exécution budgétaire de l'ENIM s'est soldée en 2003 par un excédent de 35 millions d'euros, contre un déficit de 42 millions d'euros en 2002. S'agissant des charges, les dépenses définitives pour 2005 s'établissent à 1 488 millions d'euros ; elles sont donc inférieures d'environ 0,6 % à la prévision initiale de 1 497 millions d'euros fixée dans le cadre de la loi de finances initiale pour 2003. Il convient en outre de noter que le rythme de progression des dépenses, de 0,7 %, tend à se stabiliser, alors que ce rythme était de 3,15 % en 2002. Enfin, les charges d'exploitation sont en diminution de plus de 2 %, ce qui prouve que l'Etablissement est géré avec rigueur, ce dont votre rapporteur se félicite. Les ressources se sont établies pour leur part à 1 523,25 millions d'euros en 2003. Les recettes propres se sont élevées à 212,7 millions d'euros en 2003 contre 200 millions d'euros en 2002, tandis que les transferts sociaux sont passés de 506 à 515 millions d'euros. La subvention de l'Etat à l'ENIM s'est donc élevée à 744,9 millions d'euros. S'agissant de l'année 2004, dont l'exercice n'est pas clos, les dépenses comme les ressources, telles qu'il est possible de les appréhender après un semestre d'exécution budgétaire, devraient être conformes aux prévisions, sous réserves de mesures nouvelles et imprévisibles liées aux aléas climatiques ou conjoncturels. Toutefois, l'ENIM pourrait connaître certaines difficultés de gestion liées aux incertitudes portant d'une part sur le montant des versements attendus en novembre et décembre au titre de la compensation inter-régimes pour l'assurance vieillesse, qui devrait normalement atteindre 35 millions d'euros, et d'autre part sur le remboursement par l'Etat des allègements de charges en faveur de l'emploi, qui devrait atteindre 15 millions d'euros. Sur les sept premiers mois de l'année, les compensations versées à l'Etablissement sont néanmoins comparables à celles de 2003, et le taux de consommation de la subvention de l'Etat est passé de 58 % fin juillet 2003 à 53 % fin juillet 2004. S'agissant des perspectives pour l'année 2005, le budget global de l'ENIM devrait atteindre 1 546,7 millions d'euros, ce qui représente une augmentation limitée de 1,25 %. Ces prévisions sont établies à partir des dernières hypothèses économiques et sociales élaborées par le Gouvernement. Ces hypothèses font en particulier ressortir une dégradation, lente mais constante, du ratio entre les actifs et les pensionnés, ce qui n'est pas propre au régime des marins, mais peut expliquer en partie l'augmentation de la subvention de l'Etat. Total des personnes protégées 232 049 Les prévisions de dépenses sont fondées sur les éléments suivants : - les charges de la Caisse de retraite des marins ont été évaluées à 1 052, 3 millions d'euros, contre 1 039 millions d'euros en 2004, notamment du fait de l'évolution des salaires forfaitaires ; - l'évolution des salaires forfaitaires et du nombre de prestataires de la Caisse générale de prévoyance devrait conduire à établir les dépenses au titre des risques maladie et invalidité à près de 57 millions d'euros ; - s'agissant des prestations servies par la Caisse générale de prévoyance, l'analyse des tendances générales observée en matière d'assurance maladie a conduit à évaluer les dépenses prévisibles à 345 millions d'euros, contre 332 millions d'euros en 2004, ce qui représente une augmentation assez significative. S'agissant des recettes, les estimations sont les suivantes : - les recettes propres devraient enregistrer une légère augmentation par rapport à 2004, grâce notamment au maintien du taux des cotisations et de la relative stabilité des actifs ; - le projet de budget pour 2005 prévoit des recettes au titre de la compensation inter-régimes de 380 millions d'euros contre 412 millions d'euros en 2004, ce qui représente une baisse de 7,8 %. Rappelons que la baisse avait été de 6,5 % en 2004. La dégradation de l'équilibre du régime est donc principalement due à la réduction de ce transfert entre régimes, qui appelle donc nécessairement une augmentation du budget de l'Etat. En 2005, les produits devraient donc s'élever à 724 millions d'euros, tandis que les charges devraient s'élever à 1,5 million d'euros. Par conséquent, la subvention de l'Etat destinée à équilibrer le budget pour 2005 s'établit à 822 millions d'euros, ce qui représente une augmentation de 5,7 %. Cette augmentation résulte donc principalement de la réduction progressive de la compensation inter-régime ; votre rapporteur tient à saluer ce transfert de ressources qui conduit, en définitive, à clarifier le financement de l'ENIM. b) L'action sociale de l'Etat en faveur de certaines catégories de marins L'ENIM ne constitue pas le seul levier budgétaire permettant de mener une politique sociale dans le domaine maritime. Ainsi, 62 000 euros de crédits ont été inscrits à l'article 40 du chapitre 46-32, afin de pouvoir octroyer une aide sociale d'urgence aux marins abandonnés dans les ports français. Cette dotation est en recul sensible par rapport au montant de près de 200 000 euros mobilisé en 2004. Il faut en outre rappeler que cet article avait enregistré une baisse de 30 % en 2004. Néanmoins, votre rapporteur se veut rassurant sur l'efficacité des fonds ainsi mobilisés. En effet, il faut rappeler que les navires abandonnés peuvent désormais être vendus, et abonder le fonds d'intervention d'urgence que cet article subventionne également. Il faut en outre rappeler que la France milite auprès des instances internationales, notamment l'Organisation internationale du travail et l'Organisation maritime internationale, afin de mettre en place un système d'assurance financé au niveau international. Chacun peut, enfin, se féliciter de la ratification par le Parlement de plusieurs conventions de l'Organisation internationale du travail (1), notamment la convention n° 166 prévoyant désormais clairement dans notre droit interne que le rapatriement des marins abandonnés dans les ports français sera effectué à la charge de l'armateur. Même si votre rapporteur estime qu'il ne sera pas toujours évident d'identifier clairement l'armateur - le naufrage du Prestige a en effet montré que le secteur du transport maritime repose parfois sur l'enchevêtrement de sociétés écrans - et encore moins de parvenir à lui faire supporter le coût du rapatriement, dans la mesure où l'abandon d'un navire résulte souvent de la mise en liquidation judiciaire de l'armateur, il considère que ce signal fort dans notre système législatif peut conduire à dissuader certains armateurs étrangers de comportements parfois inacceptables. c) La cessation anticipée d'activité des marins Le plan de soutien à la flotte de commerce, décidé par le comité interministériel de la mer le 1er avril 1998, prévoit la reconduction pour une durée de trois ans du système de cessation anticipée d'activité en budgétisant 150 cessations anticipées d'activité, ce qui porte le contingent à 4 100 bénéficiaires. Cette mesure devrait ainsi permettre d'atténuer les conséquences sociales des licenciements économiques. Les dotations budgétaires relatives à cette mesure, inscrites dans l'article 10 du chapitre 46-37, s'élevaient à 2 millions d'euros en 2004. Dans le projet de budget pour 2004, elles s'établissent à 1,5 million d'euros, pour s'ajuster aux besoins constatés. B.- LA MISE EN œUVRE DE LA LOI ORGANIQUE RELATIVE AUX LOIS DE FINANCES NE DOIT PAS CONDUIRE À RÉDUIRE L'IMPORTANCE POLITIQUE DE LA MER 1. L'éclatement de la présentation des crédits de la mer à compter de 2006 Comme les autres crédits du ministère de l'Equipement, le projet de budget de la mer a été, cette année, présenté par les ministres sous le signe de la loi organique n° 2001-692 du 1er août 2001 relative aux lois de finances. Votre rapporteur estime évidemment que l'entrée en vigueur de cette loi organique est une bonne chose pour l'efficacité de la dépense publique. Il regrette néanmoins qu'aucune expérience de globalisation des crédits n'ait été engagée par le ministère dans le domaine de la mer, considérant que le secteur maritime se prête particulièrement à la globalisation des crédits. Au titre de l'année 2005, le ministère de l'Equipement a prévu de mener une expérimentation sur le programme relatif à la sécurité et aux affaires maritimes dans la région Manche-Mer du Nord correspondant au champ de compétence de la quatrième direction régionale des affaires maritimes. Cette expérience de globalisation des crédits devrait concerner ceux dédiés à la sécurité et la sûreté maritimes, aux gens de mer et l'enseignement maritime, et aux activités littorales et maritimes. Cependant, les actions de signalisation maritime ont été exclues de cette expérimentation, ce qui paraît normal à votre rapporteur, tant il est vrai qu'un sujet aussi important ne doit pas faire l'objet, en priorité, d'une expérimentation. Cette expérience devrait permettre à la direction régionale de tester les possibilités offertes par la fongibilité des crédits. La seconde conséquence de l'entrée en vigueur de la loi organique relative aux lois de finances sera de réorganiser la présentation des crédits sous la forme de missions ministérielles ou interministérielles, puis de programmes et d'actions. S'agissant des crédits de la mer, cette innovation ne peut qu'être bénéfique dans la mesure où la lecture des crédits n'est pas toujours simple. Votre rapporteur s'interroge néanmoins sur l'unité de la présentation des crédits de la mer à l'issue de cette réforme. Selon les informations qui lui ont été fournies, la politique maritime du ministère, ainsi que l'ensemble des crédits correspondants, seront intégrés dans la mission « Transports », dont le champ est évidemment extrêmement vaste. Cette mission regroupe en effet la politique du ministère de l'Equipement dans le domaine des transports terrestres et aériens. Les crédits actuellement affectés à la politique maritime seront répartis entre le programme « Transports terrestres et maritimes », notamment les actions « Infrastructures fluviales et portuaires », « Régulation des services de transports fluviaux et maritimes », et le programme « Sécurité et affaires maritimes », notamment les actions « Sécurité et sûreté maritimes », « Gens de mer et enseignement maritime », « Activités littorales et maritimes », et « Actions interministérielle de la mer ». Ensuite, les crédits de l'ENIM, qui représentent 77 % de ce budget, seront rattachés à la mission interministérielle « Régimes sociaux et de retraite », intégrant l'ensemble des régimes spéciaux de retraite. Les crédits de la mer seront donc présentés au sein de missions dont l'étendue est vaste, et n'ont rien à voir avec la mer. Selon les informations fournies à votre rapporteur, le « bleu » consacré à la mer pourrait même finir par disparaître : votre rapporteur s'élève contre une telle disparition, qui n'a jamais fait l'objet d'une concertation avec les élus. L'existence d'un « bleu » spécifique à la mer, de même d'ailleurs qu'une administration spécifique, avait en effet un sens politique : affirmer l'importance de la politique de la mer, dans un pays comptant près de 5 500 kilomètres de côtes. Il est difficilement acceptable que l'entrée en vigueur de la loi organique relative aux lois de finances ait pour effet revenir sur cet acquis cher à tous les élus du littoral. 2. La réorganisation critiquable des services du ministère Votre rapporteur avoue par ailleurs avoir été très déconcerté par le projet de réorganisation des services du ministère en charge de la politique de la mer. Manifestement, un projet de regroupement de la direction des transports terrestres, de la direction des affaires maritimes et des gens de mer, de la direction du transport maritime, des ports et du littoral a été lancée en 2004. Il viserait à prendre en compte les objectifs de modernisation de l'administration, et à mieux coordonner les moyens consacrés à la sécurité et à la sûreté maritimes avec ceux mobilisés au profit des autres modes de transport. Avant même d'aborder la question de l'opportunité d'une telle réforme, votre rapporteur s'émeut de n'avoir été informé de ce projet qu'au stade de sa phase terminale, puisqu'il a entrepris d'envoyer un courrier au ministre compétent le 7 octobre, alors que le projet devrait être arrêté à la fin du mois, voire au début du mois de novembre. En outre, votre rapporteur, ainsi que de nombreux élus du littoral et des représentants du secteur maritime estiment de concert qu'un tel regroupement conduit à diluer la spécificité de la mer dans des problématiques de transport qui sont plus générales. A l'heure où le Gouvernement met en place des mesures importantes en faveur de l'activité maritime - la taxe au tonnage ou le registre international français - il paraît très important de ne pas donner un tel contre signal aux investisseurs qui voudraient s'établir en France, ainsi qu'aux salariés pour lesquels la structure administrative actuelle garantissait une politique spécifique. II.- LA SÉCURITÉ MARITIME DEMEURE UNE NÉCESSITÉ BUDGÉTAIRE À CONFORTER Du point de vue budgétaire, votre rapporteur estime que le ministère a une priorité absolue nécessitant des moyens financiers importants et constants dans le domaine maritime : prévenir autant que possible les catastrophes écologiques et économiques liées au naufrage des navires transportant des produits polluants. Au-delà des seuls aspects écologiques, les naufrages de l'Erika et du Prestige ont en effet montré qu'une telle catastrophe pouvait être dramatique pour l'économie d'une région. A.- LES CATASTROPHES RÉCENTES DOIVENT ENGAGER LE GOUVERNEMENT À MOBILISER PLUS DE MOYENS EN FAVEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ MARITIME Votre rapporteur est heureux de constater que l'effort budgétaire réalisé à la suite des catastrophes du Prestige et de l'Erika reste soutenu, et a même tendance à s'accélérer en 2005, dans le contexte budgétaire difficile que chacun connaît. Pourtant, cette évolution est contrastée suivant que l'on analyse les crédits de fonctionnement ou les crédits d'investissement. En effet, les dotations de fonctionnement destinées aux services opérationnels concourant à la sécurité de la navigation, les centres régionaux opérationnels de surveillance et de sauvetage (CROSS) ainsi que la signalisation maritime, sont fixées à 6,43 millions d'euros, contre 6,59 millions d'euros en 2004, ce qui représente une baisse de 2,4 %. En revanche, les dotations en capital inscrites en crédits de paiement au budget 2005 ont été réévaluées de 20 %, s'élevant à 16,04 millions d'euros contre 13,28 millions d'euros en 2004. S'agissant des autorisations de programme, le budget pour 2005 consacré à la signalisation maritime enregistre un repli de 17,3 millions d'euros à 13,3 millions d'euros, ce qui représente une baisse de 23 %. La réévaluation de 20 % des crédits de paiement est un point très positif, compte tenu du fait que l'amélioration de la signalisation maritime et du fonctionnement des CROSS est souvent liée à l'acquisition de matériels de haute performance dont le coût est important. ÉVOLUTION DES MOYENS DESTINÉS À LA SÉCURITÉ MARITIME Crédits d'investissement (crédits de paiement) Crédits d'investissement (autorisations de programme) Total des dépenses ordinaires et des crédits de paiement 1. Les moyens d'investissement des CROSS privilégiés au détriment de leurs moyens de fonctionnement La prévention des naufrages passe, en premier lieu, par le renforcement des moyens des sept CROSS de Gris-Nez, Jobourg, Corsen, Etel et La Garde en métropole, et de Fort de France et la Réunion en outre-mer. Ces services spécialisés des affaires maritimes ont en effet pour fonction essentielle de coordonner l'emploi des moyens navals et aériens des administrations concourant à l'action de l'Etat en mer (Marine nationale, armée de l'air, gendarmerie nationale, douanes, sécurité civile et affaires maritimes). A cette fin, ils sont chargés de l'exécution de six missions principales : la recherche et le sauvetage des personnes en détresse en mer, la surveillance de la circulation maritime (principalement pour les CROSS Gris-Nez, Jobourg et Corsen), la surveillance des pêches maritimes, la surveillance des risques de pollution maritime, la diffusion des renseignements de sécurité maritime, la réception des alertes de sûreté des navires. ÉVOLUTION DES DOTATIONS BUDGÉTAIRES DES CROSS Evolution 2005/2004 (en % ) Exploitation opérationnelle des CROSS (Chapitre 34-98 art. 40) Opérations déconcentrées (chapitre 53-32 art. 30) Opérations non-déconcentrées (chapitre 53-32 art. 40) Comme le montre le tableau ci-dessus, l'évolution de la dotation des CROSS connaît des évolutions contradictoires. Alors que leurs dotations de fonctionnement enregistrent un repli de 4 %, les dotations d'investissement enregistrent une augmentation très importante, particulièrement en crédits de paiement, ce qui devrait permettre l'accélération de la modernisation des CROSS. S'agissant du recul des moyens de fonctionnement, votre rapporteur tient à rappeler que ces crédits avaient augmenté de près de 75 % en 2004, notamment du fait de la mise en œuvre du système de surveillance des pêches par satellites radar des terres australes et antarctiques françaises, dont l'installation s'est terminée en 2004. Compte tenu de la fin de ce programme, les moyens de fonctionnement des CROSS connaissent donc une certaine stabilité entre 2004 et 2005. En outre, ce recul des moyens de fonctionnement n'affecte pas les moyens humains des CROSS, constitués par des personnels des affaires maritimes à statut militaire, pour la direction et l'encadrement, ou civil pour le secrétariat et la maintenance technique, et par des personnels de la marine nationale à statut militaire. La réforme du service national a impliqué le remplacement d'une centaine d'appelés du contingent qui effectuait son service dans les CROSS. En outre, la création récente de CROSS en outre-mer a rendu nécessaire un renforcement des moyens en personnels. Avec la professionnalisation des armées, l'évolution technologique importante du fonctionnement des CROSS et l'augmentation du niveau de qualification requis pour y travailler, il apparaît que les besoins en personnels ont augmenté. Pour faire face à ces nouvelles charges, le projet de budget pour 2005 prévoit d'augmenter les crédits de personnel de 630 000 euros. S'agissant ensuite des programmes d'investissement des CROSS, leurs infrastructures font l'objet d'un programme permanent de modernisation résultant d'engagements internationaux auprès de l'Organisation maritime internationale ou de l'Union européenne. Ces programmes visent à renforcer la surveillance du trafic maritime grâce au renouvellement et à l'extension de la couverture radar des trois CROSS de la Manche, et à la mise en place des stations côtières d'identification automatique des navires. Les moyens mobilisés devraient également permettre de mettre en place, en France, le système national d'information sur le trafic maritime dénommé « Trafic 2000 », ainsi que sa connexion aux systèmes européens d'information. Enfin, ce programme d'investissement devrait permettre d'améliorer la couverture radio de nos côtes. L'exécution de ce programme pluriannuel a déjà notamment permis la réalisation des opérations suivantes : - la mise en service de 2 stations Navtex (2), à Ouessant et a La Garde pour la Méditerranée ; - la première tranche de modernisation des infrastructures immobilières des CROSS ; - la mise en place de deux nouvelles stations de radio pour les zones situées au large d'Ouessant pour l'Atlantique, et de Porquerolles pour la Méditerranée ; - la mise en place d'un dispositif de surveillance du trafic maritime dans les bouches de Bonifacio ; - l'expérimentation d'un démonstrateur de gestion du trafic maritime à partir du CROSS Jobourg. En 2005, les crédits prévus en investissement par le présent projet de budget doivent permettre l'avancement des programmes suivants : - la poursuite des opérations d'amélioration de la couverture radio maritime de sécurité. En particulier, le marché visant au renforcement des radars en Manche sera lancé à la fin de l'année 2004, ce qui explique la majeure partie de l'augmentation des crédits dans le présent projet de budget ; - la sécurisation des réseaux de télécommunication des CROSS Jobourg et Gris-Nez ; - la poursuite du programme pluriannuel de réparation, d'entretien et de renouvellement des équipements techniques des CROSS, ainsi que l'entretien immobilier des centres ; - la mise en œuvre d'un nouveau plan d'équipement pour renforcer la sécurité maritime et compléter le dispositif et les moyens de prévention et d'intervention de l'Etat en mer ; - la mise en place du réseau d'information sur le trafic maritime intitulé « Trafic 2000 » en collaboration avec la marine nationale et les ports. 2. Les moyens consacrés à la signalisation maritime sont en recul Au sein des crédits destinés à assurer la sécurité maritime, ceux destinés à la signalisation maritime, dont bénéficie à titre principal le bureau des phares et balises, enregistrent un recul assez important, que ce soit en fonctionnement ou en investissement. ÉVOLUTION DES CRÉDITS DESTINÉS À LA SIGNALISATION MARITIME Evolution 2005/2004 (en %) Moyens de fonctionnement (chapitre 34-98 art. 60) Moyens d'investissement (chapitre 53-32 art. 60 et 70) Rappelons qu'un plan de modernisation de la signalisation maritime a été lancé en 1998, avec les objectifs suivants : - mettre en place des stations d'émission de corrections différentielles GPS (Global Positioning System), le plan ayant pour objectif de doubler le nombre de ces stations émettrices en France métropolitaine. Pour répondre aux exigences de l'Organisation maritime internationale, il a en outre été décidé d'implanter des stations émettrices outre-mer. Parallèlement, l'étude et le développement de nouvelles balises répondeuses radar (RACON) ont été mis en œuvre ; - installer des bouées de nouvelle génération, qui offriront une meilleure visibilité pour les usagers et remplaceront les bouées en acier inadaptées aux nouveaux baliseurs. 400 bouées sont ainsi prévues pour équiper le littoral de la Mer du Nord, de la Manche et de l'Atlantique ; - moderniser la flottille en remplaçant trois baliseurs océaniques, deux baliseurs côtiers et quatorze bateaux de travaux et vedettes est prévu. Compte tenu des contraintes budgétaires, le remplacement des baliseurs du Verdon et de Saint-Nazaire a été retardé, d'où des surcoûts générés par la nécessité de maintenir un effectif suffisant pour le fonctionnement de navires dont l'effectif est important et de maintenir en état des navires de plus de soixante ans, donc plus coûteux ; - remettre à niveau les établissements de signalisation maritime : 21 millions d'euros seront nécessaires pour achever ce programme de réfection. En effet, comme il a été reporté pour permettre la réalisation du programme des baliseurs, l'ensemble du parc de ces établissements continue à se détériorer, ce qui oblige à augmenter les estimations initiales de 28 millions d'euros. Cette estimation ne prend pas en compte la réfection du phare de Cordouan, en attente d'un financement particulier, et dont le coût de remise en état a été chiffré en 1997 à 13,7 millions d'euros. Compte tenu des prévisions d'allocation des crédits de paiement, le programme de renouvellement de la flottille devait être achevé en 2008 et celui de remise à niveau des établissements de signalisation maritime en 2009. Votre rapporteur tient à attirer l'attention du ministère sur l'importance que revêt ce genre d'équipement pour la sécurité maritime, souhaitant que ces lignes budgétaires ne fassent pas les frais de la régulation actuelle, ce qui peut être à terme très dangereux pour la sécurité de nos côtes. En effet, selon les informations fournies à votre rapporteur, les crédits déjà mobilisés ont permis de rendre opérationnel le baliseur côtier du Havre depuis le début de l'année 2002, tandis que les baliseurs océaniques de Brest et de Dunkerque ont été livrés en octobre 2002 et en mars 2003. Néanmoins, le projet de budget pour 2003 ne permettra pas de mobiliser les 7 millions d'euros nécessaires à l'acquisition d'un baliseur neuf pour le centre du Verdon. 3. La régulation des crédits destinés au contrôle et à la surveillance des affaires maritimes Le dispositif de contrôle et de surveillance des affaires maritimes comprend d'une part une flottille de vedettes régionales et un patrouilleur de haute mer et d'autre part un réseau d'unités littorales des affaires maritimes (ULAM) qui assurent des missions de surveillance et de police, de contrôle technique de certaines catégories de navires et de proximité administrative. Dans le projet de budget pour 2005, la dotation de fonctionnement du dispositif de contrôle et de surveillance s'élève à 795 200 euros, contre un peu plus d'un million en 2004, ce qui représente une baisse de 22 %. En outre, les crédits d'investissement, inscrits à l'article 10 du chapitre 53-32, passent de près de 3 millions d'euros à 700 000 euros, ce qui représente une baisse considérable, tandis que les autorisations de programme augmentent légèrement. Si la baisse des crédits d'investissement s'explique par l'achèvement du second patrouilleur de haute mer, la baisse des moyens de fonctionnement est en revanche moins compréhensible, d'autant qu'elle est importante. Votre rapporteur appelle donc le ministère à avoir une politique cohérente dans le domaine de la sécurité maritime, car un observateur avisé ne saurait comprendre que les crédits destinés aux CROSS augmentent significativement, tandis que ceux destinés à la signalisation maritime et au dispositif de surveillance et de sécurité sont redéployés. La sécurité maritime doit en effet être budgétairement pensée comme un tout cohérent. S'agissant des ULAM, le dispositif a fait l'objet d'un audit d'évaluation au début de l'année 2004, concluant à l'efficacité globale du réseau mais appelant à un redéploiement des unités sur l'ensemble du littoral. En l'état actuel, la Gironde, la Manche et la Seine maritime ne disposent pas de telles unités. En 2005, le redéploiement des effectifs des ULAM devrait permettre de créer une ULAM interdépartementale supplémentaire dans les départements du Nord, du Pas-de-Calais et de la Somme. 4. La politique de contrôle des navires nécessite d'importants moyens humains La sécurité des navires et de la navigation repose enfin sur l'activité des 15 centres de sécurité des navires qui assurent les visites des navires français et, dans le cadre du Mémorandum de Paris, le contrôle des navires étrangers en escale dans les ports français, avec pour objectif l'inspection de plus de 25 % des navires étrangers. Rappelons que cet objectif a imposé la programmation d'un doublement du nombre des inspecteurs des affaires maritimes en 2006, pour atteindre le nombre de 130. Ces inspecteurs sont chargés de la délivrance et du renouvellement des titres de sécurité des navires contrôlés, et effectuent des audits des navires soumis au code international de la gestion de la sécurité. Depuis 2001, 54 postes ont été créés pour faire face à cette obligation. Aujourd'hui, l'effectif des inspecteurs de la sécurité des navires s'élève à 125, dont 89 seulement sont habilités à effectuer les contrôles des navires étrangers. Cette limitation risque de conduire à contrôler davantage les navires français, ce qui n'est évidemment pas l'effet recherché. En outre, le taux de contrôle des navires a atteint 29 % en 2003, grâce à la mobilisation d'inspecteurs et le recrutement de vacataires chargés d'assister les inspecteurs, afin de tenir compte de la durée de formation des inspecteurs (18 mois). Votre rapporteur se félicite qu'un tel résultat ait pu être atteint, même s'il est peu probable que cette performance soit poursuivie en 2004. Le présent projet de budget ne prévoit en revanche aucune nouvelle création de poste d'inspecteur. Il pourrait être par conséquent judicieux de conforter les moyens humains destinés au contrôle des navires, ce qui permettrait aux inspecteurs de faire face aux nouvelles exigences internationales en ce domaine. En effet, un amendement à la convention internationale pour la prévention de la pollution par les navires - la convention dite « MARPOL » - par des règlements du 18 février 2002 et du 22 juillet 2003, prévoit une intensification des contrôles permettant d'éliminer progressivement les pétroliers à simple coque. B.- LES MOYENS DESTINÉS À LA FORMATION MARITIME DOIVENT BÉNÉFICIER À L'ENSEMBLE DES FILIÈRES Concourant à la sécurité et à la sûreté maritime, la formation maritime est considérée par le Gouvernement comme une priorité en matière d'insertion économique et sociale. Néanmoins, comme en 2004, les crédits consacrés à cette politique enregistrent des évolutions contrastées : rappelons que, dans le cadre du budget précédent, les moyens de fonctionnement affectés aux Ecoles nationales de la marine marchande ont été reconduits à hauteur de 1,78 million d'euros, tandis que ceux octroyés à l'enseignement maritime secondaire ont bénéficié d'une très forte progression (+ 67,28 %) résultant du passage sous statut public des personnels de l'Association de gérance des écoles de formation maritime et aquacole (AGEMA). Au titre de l'année 2005, les moyens destinés à l'enseignement maritime passeront, en crédits de paiement, de 30,8 à 32,5 millions d'euros, ce qui représente une augmentation de près de 5,5 %. Votre rapporteur ne peut que s'en féliciter, même s'il faut noter que cette augmentation est inégalement répartie entre les différents organismes de formation, comme le montre le tableau suivant : ÉVOLUTION DES CRÉDITS DESTINÉS À LA FORMATION MARITIME Écoles nationales de la marine marchande (ENMM) Lycées professionnels maritimes (LPM) Association de gérance de l'enseignement maritime et aquacole (AGEMA) Ce tableau appelle les commentaires suivants : les crédits destinés aux rémunérations enregistrent une augmentation continue, du fait de l'intégration progressive des personnels de l'AGEMA à la fonction publique. De même, l'augmentation importante des crédits destinés au fonctionnement des lycées professionnels maritimes résulte également de la suppression de l'AGEMA à compter de 2004, dans la mesure où cette association assurait le fonctionnement des lycées. Outre cette modification dans la structure de financement de l'enseignement maritime, il faut souligner que les moyens de fonctionnement de l'enseignement maritime secondaire continuent d'être confortés, puisque l'augmentation de près de 30 % des moyens de fonctionnement inscrits au chapitre 36-37 bénéficie exclusivement à l'enseignement secondaire, dont la subvention est pratiquement doublée, s'établissant en 2005 à 1,32 million d'euros. La subvention de fonctionnement des quatre établissements d'enseignement supérieur de la marine marchande reste fixée, comme en 2003 et en 2004, à 1,77 million d'euros. Votre rapporteur s'inquiète de cette simple reconduction des moyens destinés à l'enseignement supérieur maritime, qui conduit, du fait de l'inflation, à éroder progressivement leur capacité d'action. A cette érosion s'ajoute le fait qu'en 2005, leurs moyens d'équipement en autorisations de programme passeront de 0,68 million d'euros, à 0,66 million d'euro, enregistrant ainsi une baisse de près de 3 %, ce qui laisse présager d'une baisse des crédits de paiements au titre des prochains budgets. S'agissant des moyens d'investissement, ils seront reconduits en 2005, tant pour l'enseignement secondaire que supérieur ; néanmoins, chacun pourra noter le niveau très modeste des moyens destinés à l'investissement dans l'enseignement maritime, puisque les Ecoles nationales de la marine marchande bénéficieront à ce titre de 0,66 million d'euros, tandis que les lycées professionnels maritimes verront leurs moyens stabilisés à 0,24 million d'euros. Dans ce contexte, l'augmentation des crédits destinés aux bourses des élèves doit être considérée comme une bonne nouvelle, puisque ceux-ci passent de 383 000 à 391 000 euros pour l'enseignement supérieur, et de 921 000 euros à 1,134 million d'euros. En revanche, votre rapporteur ne peut que noter avec regret la réduction des moyens destinés à la formation continue, alors que leur niveau en 2004, de l'ordre de 2,2 millions d'euros, était déjà très modeste. III.- LA COMPÉTITIVITÉ DES PORTS ET DE LA FLOTTE FRANÇAIS CONSTITUE UN DÉFI À RELEVER A.- MODERNISER LES PORTS FRANÇAIS SANS RÉDUIRE LEUR SÛRETÉ En 2005 comme durant les années précédentes, les priorités du Gouvernement dans le domaine portuaire consisteront à la fois à optimiser le fonctionnement des ports, notamment en améliorant leur insertion dans un environnement très concurrentiel, mais aussi à améliorer la sûreté et la sécurité du transport maritime. Votre rapporteur se félicite de constater que le Gouvernement a déjà entrepris de mettre en œuvre ce double objectif, d'une part par le biais de la loi n° 2004-809 du 13 août 2004 relative aux libertés et responsabilités locales, notamment dans ses articles 30, 31 et 121, prévoyant une décentralisation des ports non autonomes relevant de l'Etat, mais aussi par le biais de l'ordonnance n° 2004-691 du 12 juillet 2004 portant diverses dispositions d'adaptation au droit communautaire dans le domaine des transports. Cette adaptation du cadre législatif ne saurait toutefois remplacer un véritable soutien budgétaire à la compétitivité des ports français, qui sont de plus en plus confrontés à la concurrence de grands ports internationaux très proches de la France, tels que Rotterdam ou Anvers. 1. Eléments de comparaison internationale en matière de compétitivité des ports Avant d'entamer toute analyse de la politique française dans le domaine portuaire, votre rapporteur aimerait fournir certains éléments de comparaison entre la compétitivité des ports français et des principaux ports européens. Ce rappel permettra en effet de souligner à quel point il est important, dans un marché aussi concurrentiel que le transport maritime, de soutenir l'activité portuaire française, faute de quoi celle-ci sera progressivement absorbée par les ports tout proches de Rotterdam ou d'Anvers. Evidemment, toute comparaison dans ce domaine est par nature très délicate, compte tenu de l'hétérogénéité des éléments de coûts, et des distorsions liées à la structure des tarifs. Néanmoins, l'analyse de la compétitivité des ports français à partir de la comparaison des coûts de transit des conteneurs dans les principaux ports européens permet de souligner les points suivants : - dans le domaine des grandes lignes transocéaniques Est-Ouest entre pays industrialisés, la desserte des pays du Nord de l'Europe semble se structurer autour de trois ou quatre escales maximum. Le port de Rotterdam est en position dominante, tandis que les ports de Bremerhaven ou Hambourg en Allemagne centralisent les escales de l'Europe septentrionale. Pour l'Ouest de l'Europe, le port du Havre semble disposer d'atouts intéressants ; - dans le domaine des lignes Nord-Sud, desservies par les porte-conteneurs de plus petites dimensions entre l'Europe et l'Afrique et l'Amérique Latine, les ports de Rouen et de Saint-Nazaire sont assez bien placés dans la concurrence internationale. Ces différences d'attractivité s'expliquent par l'hétérogénéité des dépenses d'escale, acquittées par l'armateur, et les dépenses de transport acquittées par le chargeur. Les dépenses d'escale acquittées par l'armateur comprennent les droits de port sur le navire, les dépenses de pilotage, de remorquage et de lamanage et les frais de manutention, auxquelles s'ajoutent les frais de navigation et de séjour du navire au port. Le tableau ci-dessous synthétise, avec comme base 100 le port de Rotterdam, les dépenses d'escale des principaux ports européens, pour les lignes conteneurisées entre l'Europe et l'Asie, pour des escales identiques. COMPARAISON DES DÉPENSES D'ESCALE DANS LES PRINCIPAUX PORTS EUROPÉENS Type de porte-conteneur (3) PC 1600 EVP PC 2750 EVP PC 3750 EVP PC 4200 EVP PC 5000 EVP PC 6200 EVP On constate donc que les ports français, et principalement le port de Fos, ont des coûts d'escale supérieurs à la moyenne européenne. Le port du Havre semble disposer d'une certaine compétitivité dans le domaine des dépenses d'escale pour les gros porte-conteneurs. Ensuite, les dépenses de passage portuaire acquittées par le chargeur entrent également en ligne de compte pour déterminer la compétitivité d'un port. Ces dépenses comprennent le taux de fret, qui couvre les dépenses maritimes de l'armateur (navires, soutes, dépenses d'escale), les frais de manutention portuaires (ou en anglais, les « terminal handling charges ») payées selon un barème forfaitaire et devant permettre à l'armateur de couvrir les frais qu'il a engagés auprès du terminal opérateur relatifs au chargement ou au déchargement du conteneur, les frais du transport terrestre nécessaire pour amener le conteneur au port ou pour le conduire jusqu'à sa destination finale, ce transport étant assuré soit par l'armateur, moyennant rétribution par le chargeur, soit par le chargeur lui-même. Le tableau ci-dessous met en évidence une certaine compétitivité des ports français dans ce domaine : COMPARAISON DES DÉPENSES DE PASSAGE PORTUAIRE DANS LES PRINCIPAUX PORTS EUROPÉENS (4) Il apparaît donc que les ports français sont dans la moyenne du marché européen, même s'ils sont légèrement plus chers dans le domaine de la manutention. Il apparaît en effet que les entreprises de manutention consacrent une partie inférieure à la moyenne européenne de leur excédent d'exploitation au développement et au renouvellement de l'outil de production. Des efforts de compétitivité sont donc indispensables dans ce domaine, de même que l'amélioration des infrastructures portuaires par l'Etat. 2. L'adaptation du cadre législatif constitue la première étape de la modernisation du régime des ports La loi n° 2004-804 du 13 août 2004 relative aux libertés et responsabilités a été l'occasion de définir les modalités de la décentralisation des ports maritimes non autonomes relevant de l'Etat, c'est-à-dire les ports d'intérêt national (5). Ces dispositions constituent le second volet de la décentralisation des grandes infrastructures de transport, initiée en 1983 avec la décentralisation des 304 ports de commerce et de pêche aux départements, des 228 ports de plaisance aux communes, mais dont le poids économique était relativement faible dans le revenu national global tiré de l'activité portuaire (environ 5 %). Cette seconde étape de la décentralisation des infrastructures de transport est donc de plus grande ampleur puisqu'elle concerne le quart du trafic portuaire de marchandises, près de la moitié du trafic de marchandises diverses, et 80 % du trafic de passagers. - les ports d'intérêt national seront décentralisés au profit des collectivités territoriales et de leurs groupements au plus tard le 1er janvier 2007. Toute collectivité ou groupement de collectivités pourra demander ce transfert avant le 1er janvier 2006 pour les ports situés dans sa zone géographique, soit en totalité soit pour une partie seulement des activités du port ; - dans le cas où il y aurait plusieurs demandes, le préfet de région organise une concertation entre les collectivités intéressées, afin de désigner une collectivité responsable de la gestion du port. En cas de désaccord persistant, le préfet de région désigne d'autorité le bénéficiaire du transfert du port avant la fin de l'année 2006 ; - le domaine public portuaire sera transféré à titre gratuit à la collectivité attributaire, contrairement à la simple mise à disposition retenue dans le cadre de la décentralisation opérée en 1983. Pour les ports ayant déjà été décentralisés en 1983, la collectivité compétente pourra demander à l'Etat de lui transférer le domaine public selon les mêmes modalités ; - pour chaque port transféré, une convention conclue entre l'Etat et la collectivité bénéficiaire, ou à défaut un arrêté du ministre chargé des ports maritimes, définira les modalités pratiques du transfert accompagné d'un diagnostic de l'état du port, fixant également la date d'entrée en vigueur de ce transfert. Cette convention doit également fixer les conditions dans lesquelles le bénéficiaire met gratuitement à la disposition de l'Etat les installations et aménagements nécessaires au fonctionnement des services chargés de la police et de la sécurité ; - le régime d'exploitation de ces ports restera le même qu'actuellement, la collectivité attributaire venant simplement se substituer à l'Etat. Durant le processus de transfert, les délégations de service public venant à échéance seront prolongées jusqu'au 31 décembre 2007, sauf opposition du délégataire ; - enfin, s'agissant du transfert de moyens financiers, le concours particulier relatif aux ports maritimes à la dotation générale de décentralisation, fixé en application de l'article L. 1614-8 du code général des collectivités territoriales, est étendu aux ports qui seront décentralisés. Un décret en Conseil d'Etat doit définir la répartition entre les collectivités qui réalisent des investissements au titre des compétences transférées. Votre rapporteur ne peut que se féliciter de ce transfert des ports d'intérêt national aux collectivités territoriales, qui pourront les gérer au mieux dans l'intérêt de la région ou du département dans lequel est implanté le port d'intérêt national. S'agissant des ports autonomes assurant plus des trois quarts du trafic portuaire de marchandises, le Gouvernement a renoncé à présenter l'avant-projet de loi de modernisation portuaire, élaboré dans le courant de l'année 2003, comportant de nombreuses mesures destinées à améliorer le fonctionnement de ces ports. En effet, compte tenu des enjeux financiers actuels dans le cadre des programmes d'investissement au Havre (Port 2000) et Marseille (Fos 2XL), le Gouvernement a préféré privilégier la stabilité institutionnelle des ports autonomes. Il se limitera donc, par voie réglementaire, à prendre certaines mesures permettant d'améliorer la compétitivité des ports autonomes, mais en écartant le projet de modification de la composition des conseils d'administration. Votre rapporteur souscrit à l'option politique du Gouvernement, estimant que la modification des organes de direction des ports autonomes n'est pas une priorité politique dans le domaine maritime, qu'elle pourrait même perturber un secteur important sans avoir d'effets réels sur l'efficacité des ports autonomes. 3. Les moyens destinés à la modernisation des ports doivent être confortés Comme le montre le tableau ci-dessous, les moyens consacrés au renforcement de la sécurité et la modernisation des ports sont en légère augmentation dans le présent projet de budget. Néanmoins, cette évolution globale dissimule certaines disparités qu'il convient d'analyser. ÉVOLUTION DES MOYENS CONSACRÉS AUX PORTS MARITIMES Projet de loi de finances 2005 Projet de loi de finances 2005/projet de loi de finances 2004 Crédits informatiques (chapitre 34-98 article 80) Entretien et exploitation des ports maritimes (chapitre 35-3) Participation aux dépenses des ports autonomes maritimes (chapitre 44-34) Transports, communications et télécommunications des ports maritimes (chapitre 53-30 art.30) Port autonome du Havre. Port 2000 Transports, communications et télécommunications des ports maritimes (chapitre 63-30 art. 10) Total des dépenses ordinaires et crédits de paiement En premier lieu, votre rapporteur est heureux de constater que les crédits informatiques, qui avaient été doublés en 2004 pour les besoins du suivi documentaire du trafic maritime (dans le cadre de la mise en place du dispositif Trafic 2000) ont été reconduits au même niveau (640 000 euros). Néanmoins, la participation de l'Etat à l'entretien des installations portuaires s'établit à 69,2 millions d'euros, ce qui représente un certain tassement par rapport à l'année 2004 pour laquelle les crédits inscrits en loi de finances initiale atteignaient 70,2 millions d'euros. Plus précisément, les moyens mobilisés en faveur des ports non autonomes sont très légèrement réévalués, à 11,6 millions d'euros, tandis que la participation de l'Etat aux dépenses d'entretien des ports autonomes, s'élevant à 57,6 millions d'euros, est réduite de près de 1,9 %. Au titre des investissements et des subventions d'investissement, les crédits consacrés à la modernisation des ports, s'élevant à 42,65 millions d'euros en crédits de paiement, progressent de 8,8 %. Ces crédits incluent 1,5 million d'euros destiné à la Corse qui seront transférés sur le budget de l'intérieur. Sur le reste du territoire, ils permettront de poursuivre la mise en œuvre des grandes opérations portuaires telles que Port 2000 au Havre ou des investissements prévus dans le cadre des contrats de plan Etat-régions. Quant aux autorisations de programme, elles restent stables, c'est-à-dire à un niveau inférieur à celui de 2003, ce qui devrait difficilement permettre l'achèvement des programmes prévus aux contrats de plan et dont la réalisation n'atteindra que 42,7 % à la fin de cette année. Etat de l'avancement du projet Port 2000 au Havre Rappelons que le projet Port 2000 a pour ambition de faire du port du Havre une plate-forme majeure à l'échelle européenne pour le trafic des conteneurs en répondant à trois impératifs principaux : - améliorer la qualité des services aux navires ; - diminuer le coût des transferts entre les navires et les transports terrestres ; - absorber la croissance du trafic maritime (6). Le projet, dont les modalités ont été fixées en décembre 1998 pour un montant de 568 millions d'euros aux conditions économiques de juin 2000, prévoyait la construction des installations suivantes : - un accès nautique sécurisé par la création d'une digue de 5 000 mètres et un nouveau chenal d'accès maritime ; - un potentiel de 12 postes à quai associés à de larges terre-pleins favorisant simultanément le service rapide aux navires et aux conteneurs et le rendement élevé des équipements ; - des transferts aisés de conteneurs entre les terminaux et les différents modes de transport terrestre par navettes routières multi-chariots circulant en site propre ; - des dessertes ferroviaires de proximité permettant la formation de trains au plus proche des quais. Les travaux portant directement sur le port sont menés dans les temps, puisque la première phase des travaux portant sur la construction de 4 postes à quai est terminée, et devrait aboutir à leur mise en exploitation dans le courant de l'année 2005. Le développement important du trafic permet en outre d'envisager la réalisation, à l'horizon de 2007 ou 2008, de deux nouveaux postes à quai sur les 6 prévus dans les enquêtes relatives à la seconde phase des travaux de Port 2000 réalisées le 6 novembre 2001. En outre, la construction d'un quai de 1400 mètres et de ses terre-pleins est bien avancée puisque la paroi moulée est terminée et l'ancrage de la paroi est en cours de finition. La digue d'accès provisoire en travers du chenal, d'une longueur de 645 mètres, est terminée depuis le 30 janvier 2004, ainsi que les digues extérieures de près de 6 kilomètres. En revanche, la réalisation des dessertes ferroviaire, routière et fluviale du port semble prendre du retard. Rappelons que le projet Port 2000 a vocation à être un exemple en termes d'intermodalité. Ainsi, la desserte ferroviaire visant à desservir les 4 postes à quai est pour l'instant suspendue à la déviation des pistes de chantier. La construction des voies ne devrait par conséquent se terminer que dans le courant de l'année 2005. S'agissant de la desserte routière, une entrée par l'ouest doit permettre de relier le port à l'autoroute A 29 en assurant le contrôle douanier des marchandises débarquées. En l'état actuel, les titulaires de l'appel d'offre communautaire lancé pour la réalisation de la première phase des travaux (terre-plein et chaussées de l'entrée Ouest, plate-forme d'assise des chaussées de desserte du terminal Ouest) n'ont pas encore été désignés. En outre, les appels d'offre pour la réalisation de la seconde phase des travaux (couches de roulement et raccords des chaussées de l'entrée Ouest, chaussée d'accès au terminal Est et à la digue) sont encore en cours de préparation. Enfin, la desserte fluviale, qui devrait faire l'objet de la création d'un terminal fluvial dédié dans le port actuel et relié par une voie routière en site propre aux terminaux de Port 2000, est toujours à l'étude par les acteurs économiques et institutionnels. Certains financements complémentaires aux projets Port 2000 et Fos 2XL seront par ailleurs mobilisés par la nouvelle Agence de financement des infrastructures de transport en France (AFITF) dont la création a été décidée par le Comité interministériel à l'aménagement et au développement du territoire (CIADT) du 18 décembre 2003. Cette agence sera financée par le produit de la redevance d'occupation du domaine public routier acquittée par l'ensemble des sociétés d'autoroutes ainsi que par le produit des dividendes des participations détenues par l'Etat et ses établissements publics dans le capital des sociétés d'autoroutes. En 2005, cette agence devrait bénéficier de 635 millions d'euros de crédits, dont 280 millions d'euros provenant des dividendes attendus de la vente des participations dans les sociétés d'autoroute, 155 millions d'euros provenant de la redevance domaniale, et 200 millions d'euros d'une dotation en capital par le budget de l'Équipement. Dans le domaine maritime et portuaire, cette agence doit, en 2005, contribuer au financement de l'écluse fluviale prévue dans le cadre du projet Port 2000 et des nouveaux terminaux à conteneurs du port de Marseille-Fos dans le cadre du projet Fos 2XL. 4. La modernisation des installations ne saurait se traduire par une diminution de la sûreté et de la sécurité portuaires Votre rapporteur est d'avis que la modernisation des ports, et les investissements destinés à accroître leur compétitivité, ne doit pas se faire au détriment de la sûreté et de la sécurité. La France constitue à cet égard une référence internationale, et doit le rester. Votre rapporteur est donc heureux de constater que le renforcement de cette politique a constitué une priorité d'action du ministère en 2004 et en 2005, tant sur le plan budgétaire que normatif. S'agissant d'abord des moyens budgétaires, le renforcement de la sécurité dans les ports maritimes se traduit, comme en 2004, par la création de 2 postes d'officiers de port et 13 postes d'officiers de port adjoint. Sur le plan législatif et réglementaire, plusieurs nouveautés méritent d'être soulignées. D'abord, la loi n° 2004-237 du 18 mars 2004 portant habilitation du Gouvernement à transposer par ordonnance des directives communautaires a permis la parution dans des délais rapides de l'ordonnance n° 2004-691 du 12 juillet 2004 portant diverses dispositions d'adaptation au droit communautaire dans le domaine des transports. Cette ordonnance contient plusieurs dispositions très importantes destinées à renforcer la sécurité et la sûreté dans les ports français : - son article premier vise à obliger les autorités portuaires à mettre à la disposition du préfet et du préfet maritime les informations et les statistiques relatives aux mouvements des navires, au trafic maritime de passagers et de marchandise, ainsi qu'aux caractéristiques des cargaisons. Cette disposition conduit à rendre obligatoire dans les ports français le système communautaire de suivi des navires découlant de la directive 2002/59/CE du 27 juin 2002 ; - son article 2 définit les pouvoirs de contrôle de l'Etat du port à l'égard des navires désirant accéder à un port français. L'autorité investie du pouvoir de police portuaire peut réaliser tous les contrôles qu'elle juge opportuns pour assurer la sûreté du port, et en refuser l'accès pour les cargaisons représentant un danger pour l'environnement ; - l'ordonnance rend en outre obligatoire dans les ports français la création d'installations de réception de déchets de navires, c'est-à-dire des déchets propres à l'exploitation des navires et les résidus de cargaison ; - l'article 5 de l'ordonnance contient par ailleurs une mesure très importante, découlant de la directive 2002/59/CE du 27 juin 2002, visant à rendre obligatoire la délimitation de lieux de refuge pour les navires en difficulté. A cet effet, le ministre chargé des ports maritimes peut enjoindre à l'autorité portuaire d'accueillir un navire en difficulté. Dans le domaine de la sûreté, l'année 2004 a été marquée par la mise en place dans les ports maritimes, au plus tard au 1er juillet 2004, du code international pour la sûreté des navires et des installations portuaires (code dit « ISPS » pour « Interface Ship/Port Security »). Suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001 et à la série d'attaques terroristes contre des navires militaires, le gouvernement américain a en effet décidé de prendre des mesures rapides destinées à sécuriser le transport maritime et les ports, tant au plan national que multilatéral. Rappelons que ce code a été adopté le 12 décembre 2002 lors de la Conférence diplomatique de l'Organisation maritime internationale, dans le cadre de la modification de la Convention internationale de 1974 pour la sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer (convention dite « SOLAS »), et prévoit que l'ensemble des ports et des navires impliqués dans le transport international de marchandises et de passagers doivent s'adapter à une série de mesures standardisées de sûreté. Ces mesures concernent l'analyse, au niveau national, des risques potentiels et des moyens d'y remédier. Le code ISPS prévoit en outre l'installation d'un système d'alerte de sûreté des navires, l'établissement de plans de sûreté dans chaque port et l'institution de certificats internationaux de sûreté des navires. Dans la continuité de l'adoption du code ISPS par l'OMI, l'Union européenne a édicté le 31 mars 2004 le règlement 725/2004 CE relatif à l'amélioration des navires et des installations portuaires, dont l'objet est de transposer au niveau européen les dispositions du code ISPS. Votre rapporteur se félicite de constater que notre pays a prévu de dépasser les standards prévus par l'OMI en étendant les prescriptions du code ISPS au trafic national de passagers se situant à plus de 20 milles des côtes à compter du 1er juillet 2005, puis à l'ensemble du trafic national au 1er juillet 2007. La directive prévoit en outre la mise en œuvre, obligatoirement pour les pays européens, de certaines recommandations émise dans le cadre du code ISPS (notamment ceux relatifs aux exercices d'entraînement et aux plans de sûreté des navires). Au niveau national, les dispositions permettant de mettre en œuvre dans les ports français les mesures prescrites par le code ISPS ont été portées à la connaissance des préfets des départements littoraux par deux circulaires du 19 décembre 2003 et du 29 mars 2004, précisant les ports soumis au dispositif ISPS, les modalités de réalisation des évaluations de sûreté et des plans de sûreté. Ces directives ont permis d'identifier 350 installations portuaires faisant l'objet du dispositif, réparties entre les 7 ports autonomes (représentant près de 50 % des installations), 20 ports d'intérêt national et 18 ports décentralisés. A ce jour, votre rapporteur se félicite de constater que la quasi-totalité des installations portuaires des ports autonomes sont dotées d'un plan de sûreté approuvé. Par ailleurs, plusieurs ports de commerce d'intérêt national sont déjà conformes aux prescriptions du code ISPS. Les efforts doivent cependant être poursuivis dans les autres ports d'importance secondaire. Il semble donc qu'une politique ambitieuse soit en train d'être mise en œuvre dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la sûreté maritimes. La seule zone d'ombre concerne la future directive communautaire sur les services portuaires : alors que le Parlement européen avait rejeté en novembre 2003 la dernière version très controversée de cette directive, la Commission a présenté un nouveau projet le 13 octobre dernier. Rappelons que cette directive vise à libéraliser l'accès aux services portuaires que sont le lamanage, le remorquage, et le pilotage, alors que la Cour de justice a reconnu, dans différents arrêts (7), que ces services constituaient des services d'intérêt économique général justifiant des dérogations à l'application des règles de concurrence prévues par l'article 90 paragraphe 2 du Traité de Rome. Votre rapporteur estime par conséquent qu'il s'agit d'une nouvelle offensive politique de la Commission qui voudrait étendre le marché intérieur des transports aux services portuaires à rythme parfois plus rapide que ne le voudraient les Parlements nationaux ainsi que le Parlement européen. Or, cette libéralisation ne constitue pas nécessairement une avancée pour les services portuaires français, dont la qualité est reconnue dans le monde entier. Chacun notera en effet qu'en l'état actuel, aucune collision entre navires ni aucune pollution accidentelle n'a été occasionnée par une erreur quelconque des services portuaires français. Dès lors, on ne peut que craindre que la directive portuaire constitue un recul par rapport à ce « sans faute » réalisé par nos services portuaires. En outre, si la directive portuaire est effectivement de nature à accroître la concurrence dans le domaine des services portuaires pour de très grands ports tels que Rotterdam ou Hambourg, ce ne sera probablement pas le cas dans les ports d'importance plus moyenne du territoire français, dans lesquels le nombre de prestataires est restreint. Votre rapporteur comprend néanmoins que l'ouverture de ce secteur à la concurrence a pour objet de contraindre les prestataires à réguler leurs tarifs. La comparaison internationale de la compétitivité des ports européens établie précédemment montre néanmoins que le monopole existant en France sur les services portuaires ne conduit pas à accroître démesurément les tarifs pratiqués par nos prestataires. En outre, votre rapporteur estime que le même résultat pourrait être atteint en soumettant chaque service - lamanage, remorquage et pilotage - à un appel d'offre tous les dix ans. B.- RENDRE À LA FLOTTE DE COMMERCE SA COMPÉTITIVITÉ Les moyens budgétaires, inscrits au chapitre 45-35, tendant à renforcer la compétitivité de la flotte de commerce française et à soutenir l'emploi maritime, sont fixés à 60,8 millions d'euros, en baisse de 2 %. Rappelons que ce chapitre permet de financer les subventions relatives au remboursement des charges patronales, les subventions pour le démarrage des lignes de transport maritime à courte distance, ainsi que le versement correspondant aux charges de retraite supportées par la Compagnie générale maritime et financière. Pour l'année 2005, cette baisse correspond principalement à la réduction de 50 % des crédits destinés à subventionner le transport maritime de courte distance. ÉVOLUTION DES CRÉDITS DESTINÉS AU SOUTIEN DE LA FLOTTE DE COMMERCE Total du chapitre 45-35 Dégrèvement TP 15,46 (1) Taxe au tonnage (9,00) (2) Allègement taux ENIM 22,50 (3) 22,95 (3) 25,25 (3) (1) : crédits inscrits sur le budget des charges communes (2) : montant correspondant à l'estimation en année pleine de la réduction de recettes fiscales qui serait induite par la mise en œuvre du dispositif de taxation forfaitaire au tonnage (3) : estimation Source : Ministère de l'équipement, des transports, du logement, du tourisme et de la mer Les crédits budgétaires et les allègements de charge sont néanmoins loin de constituer le seul levier d'aide à notre flotte de commerce. Comme dans de nombreux secteurs soumis à une forte concurrence internationale, la simplification et l'aménagement de notre système juridique permet également de soutenir les entreprises françaises de ce secteur. Votre rapporteur aimerait d'ailleurs rappeler à quel point ce soutien est aujourd'hui nécessaire. Selon les derniers chiffres de l'enquête professionnelle réalisée en 2001, le chiffre d'affaires réalisé par les armements français est estimé à 5 milliards d'euros, le transport ainsi réalisé s'élevant à 99,5 millions de tonnes. Le secteur maritime français a profité de la reprise des échanges mondiaux en 2003 et 2004, porté par la croissance chinoise. La progression du chiffre d'affaires des principaux groupes français - la Société nationale Corse-Méditerranée, le groupe BAI-Brittany ferries, Sea France, la Compagnie méridionale de navigation, la CMA-CGM, le groupe Delmas, la société Louis-Dreyfus armateurs et le groupe Bourbon - devrait pourtant rester modérée en 2004. La flotte française ne cesse en outre de se réduire, puisqu'elle comptait 215 navires en 1994, contre 207 au 1er janvier 2004, ce qui ne représente que 0,8 % de la flotte mondiale, contre, par exemple, 19,5 % pour la flotte grecque. Il existe donc un dynamisme réel dans ce secteur, et il est aujourd'hui plus que jamais nécessaire que la France ne laisse pas des pays concurrents profiter des retombées, en termes de chiffre d'affaires et d'emploi, de l'augmentation mondiale du trafic maritime. 1. Le dispositif des allègements de charges sociales est insuffisant pour restaurer cette compétitivité La part la plus significative des crédits destinés aux allègements de charge sociale est constituée par le remboursement des charges sociales patronales afférentes aux risques vieillesse, maladie et accidents du travail des personnels navigant sur les navires sous registre métropolitain ou des départements d'outre-mer. Les remboursements ont porté en 2003 sur un montant total de 38,75 millions d'euros. En 2004, la dotation s'est élevée à 44 millions d'euros, ce qui a permis de rembourser l'intégralité des charges dont étaient redevables auprès de l'ENIM et de l'URSSAF les armements éligibles. Suite aux décisions du Comité interministériel de la mer du 2 juin 2000, le dispositif a été étendu, à compter de 2002, au remboursement des charges relatives aux contributions d'allocations familiales et de chômage. Ce remboursement a été réalisé pour la première fois en 2003, mais en raison de l'insuffisance des crédits, il n'a été opéré qu'à hauteur de 80 % pour les armements à passagers (pour un montant total de près de 10 millions d'euros) et à hauteur de 60 % pour les autres armements (pour un montant total de 4,6 millions d'euros), soit au total 14,65 millions d'euros. A cet égard, le projet de loi de finances initial pour 2005 prévoit, dans son article 74, de limiter les allègements de cotisations patronales aux rémunérations inférieures à 1,6 SMIC. Cette disposition est particulièrement mal accueillie par les syndicats d'armateurs qui s'estiment victimes d'un dumping social de la part des pavillons étrangers et doivent faire face au renchérissement du pétrole. Par ailleurs, la dotation correspondant au remboursement par l'Etat à la Compagnie générale maritime et financière de certaines charges sociales a été ramenée à 15,8 millions d'euros, compte tenu d'une réduction des besoins. Rappelons que ce remboursement vise à compenser les charges liées aux personnels sédentaires de l'ancienne Compagnie générale maritime (CGM). 2. Les crédits destinés au développement du cabotage doivent être mieux utilisés La dotation destinée à financer l'aide au démarrage de lignes maritimes à courte distance sera ramenée en 2005 à son niveau initial de 1 million d'euros. Ce dispositif, créé en 2002, vise à apporter aux projets un soutien financier dégressif à hauteur de 30 % au maximum des dépenses engagées sur trois ans. Depuis l'instauration de cette aide, sur les cinq dossiers présentés la première année, un seul est parvenu au stade de la finalisation, un seul dossier a été déposé en 2004. Le cabotage représente pourtant une opportunité de développer un trafic maritime sûr et rentable ; il contribue en outre à décongestionner les routes françaises, dans une perspective écologique qui mérite d'être promue. Cette politique représente en outre une priorité tant nationale que communautaire. En effet, suite à la parution du rapport du sénateur M. Henri de Richemont intitulé « Un pavillon attractif, un cabotage crédible : deux atouts pour la France », le Gouvernement a décidé une première mesure relative au poids total roulant autorisé pour les opérations de transport combiné ports maritimes - routes, appelé communément « 44 tonnes ». En l'état actuel de la réglementation, seul le transport combiné rail-route et fluvio-route peut déroger aux règles de poids maximaux autorisés pour les véhicules de transport combiné en trafic international, cette dérogation permettant de porter cette limite de 40 à 44 tonnes, lorsque les parcours routiers initiaux et finaux ne dépassent pas 150 kilomètres à vol d'oiseau, en application de la directive 92/106/CEE du Conseil du 7 décembre 1992. Un projet de décret étendant cette dérogation au combiné maritime-route a été élaboré et a été soumis à l'avis des organes consultatifs. Il devrait être publié prochainement, ce qui constituera, sans nul doute, une incitation au transport combiné mer-route. S'agissant des autres propositions avancées par le rapport du sénateur Henri de Richemont, et notamment la mise en place de lignes maritimes d'intérêt général sur chacune des façades atlantique et méditerranéenne, le ministère chargé des transports est en train de conduire une étude approfondie sur leur faisabilité économique. On doit également signaler, au niveau communautaire, l'adoption en juillet 2003 par le Parlement européen d'un règlement relatif au programme « Marco Polo » visant à inciter les projets de transports alternatifs au mode de transport routier. Une ligne Fos-Savone a d'ailleurs suscité un certain intérêt de la part des instances communautaires, puisqu'elle a bénéficié des fonds de ce programme. Mais, comme l'a souligné auprès de votre rapporteur pour avis M. Jean-Louis Amato, président du Comité national routier, cette ligne est en pratique peu attrayante pour les transporteurs routiers : le recours au combiné nécessite en effet des rotations de navires journalières et un trafic équilibré, ce qui n'est pas le cas pour l'instant. En outre, les marchandises arrivant à Savone sont généralement destinées à être transportées jusqu'à Milan, qui se situe à 150 kilomètres. Le coût de ce transit, ajouté à celui des approches du port de Fos, est pour l'instant trop élevé : un aller-retour entre Marseille et Milan coûte actuellement près de 1 150 euros (535 euros pour acheminer des matières premières de France en Italie et 610 euros pour acheminer des produits transformés d'Italie en France). Les pouvoirs publics mènent également une réflexion pour mettre en place une ligne maritime Santander-Nantes permettant d'éviter les Pyrénées. 3. Les différents dispositifs d'allègement de charges fiscales n'apportent que des solutions partielles Outre les allègements de charges sociales, les armements de notre flotte de commerce bénéficient d'allègements de charges fiscales, concernant en premier lieu la taxe professionnelle. Jusqu'à la fin de l'année 2002, cet allègement a reposé sur un dispositif mis en place en 1988 conduisant au remboursement de la part maritime de cette taxe l'année suivant son acquittement par l'armement. Ce dispositif concernait 160 armements, mais son coût s'est révélé trop important, notamment en 2002 où les 7,4 millions d'euros votés en loi de finances initiale ont été très insuffisants pour couvrir le coût de 22,8 millions d'euros de ce dispositif. La loi de finances initiale pour 2003 a donc simplifié ce dispositif en remplaçant le remboursement par un dégrèvement de la part maritime de la taxe professionnelle, accordé sur demande des armements auprès des services des impôts. Ce dégrèvement, qui ne modifie pas le produit fiscal de la taxe professionnelle revenant aux collectivités locales et à leur groupement, reste à la charge de l'Etat et est désormais inscrit sur le budget des charges communes. Les crédits affectés à ce dispositif resteront en 2005 de 15,46 millions d'euros. Votre rapporteur regrette par ailleurs, comme chaque année, que les arriérés dus à l'insuffisance des crédits destinés, lors des années précédentes, à financer le remboursement de la taxe professionnelle s'élèvent encore à 7,2 millions d'euros. Ce passif ne peut aujourd'hui plus être apuré, l'introduction d'un dégrèvement au 1er janvier 2003 ayant conduit à ne plus doter la ligne budgétaire correspondante. Cette situation est particulièrement regrettable, et il conviendrait de trouver une solution afin d'y mettre un terme. Le second dispositif d'allègement fiscal dont bénéficie notre flotte de commerce a été créé par l'article 19 de la loi n° 2002-1576 du 30 décembre 2002 de finances rectificative pour 2002, sous la forme d'une option pour la taxation forfaitaire au tonnage, venant se substituer à l'imposition sur les sociétés normalement applicable, et dont l'objectif est de maintenir et de développer les activités maritimes dont le centre de décision effectif est situé sur le territoire français. Rappelons que ce dispositif, inspiré du droit anglais ou néerlandais, consiste en la taxation d'un bénéfice déterminé forfaitairement, par l'application d'un barème au tonnage des navires exploités par l'armement. Ce dispositif est optionnel et s'applique par période 10 ans, pour un coût total annuel de 9 millions d'euros. Le régime de la taxe au tonnage peut être choisi par les entreprises dont le chiffre d'affaires provient pour 75 % au moins de l'exploitation de navires armés au commerce et : - qui soit sont possédés en pleine propriété ou en copropriété, soit sont affrétés coque nue ou à temps ; - qui sont affectés au transport de personnes ou de biens, au remorquage en haute mer, au sauvetage ou à d'autres activités d'assistance maritime ; - qui n'ont pas été acquis, pendant la période d'application du régime de la taxe au tonnage, auprès de sociétés liées directement ou indirectement et n'ayant pas opté elles-mêmes pour ce régime. Le régime de la taxe au tonnage offre un nouveau mode de détermination du résultat imposable en appliquant à chacun des navires, par jour et par tranche de jauge nette de 100 UMS, le barème suivant : Ce barème s'applique également pendant les périodes d'indisponibilité des navires. Pour les sociétés qui sont membres d'un groupe, l'option n'est valable que si elle est exercée par l'ensemble des sociétés membres du groupe susceptibles de bénéficier de ce régime. L'option est formulée pour une période irrévocable de dix années et est renouvelable au terme de cette période. Le régime de la taxe au tonnage prend fin lorsque la société : - ne possède ou n'affrète plus aucun navire éligible ; - ne remplit plus la condition de pourcentage minimum de chiffre d'affaires provenant de l'exploitation de navires armés au commerce ; - devient membre d'un groupe dont les sociétés membres susceptibles de bénéficier de la taxe au tonnage n'ont pas exercé cette option. La mise en œuvre de ce dispositif est en bonne voie, puisque l'instruction fiscale du 12 février 2004 prévoit que les entreprises pourront opter pour ce régime en 2004 ou en 2005, et pour la première fois lors du dépôt des déclarations au 1er mai 2004 pour les entreprises clôturant leurs comptes au 31 décembre 2003. A la fin du mois de juillet 2004, l'analyse des déclarations fiscales ne permet pas de préciser le nombre d'entreprises ayant opté pour ce dispositif. Néanmoins, plusieurs des grandes compagnies françaises, telles que la compagnie Bourbon ou la Compagnie maritime nationale, ont déjà fait connaître leur intention d'opter pour ce régime fiscal. Par ailleurs, afin d'encourager les investissements maritimes, le dispositif du groupement d'intérêt économique (GIE) fiscal, faisant l'objet des articles 39 C et 39 CA du code général des impôts, a été mis en place en 1998 pour permettre aux investisseurs et à l'exploitant du navire de bénéficier d'un avantage fiscal, variable selon le type d'opération, se situant en moyenne entre 20 et 25 % du montant investi. Il permet notamment de bénéficier d'un amortissement exceptionnel ainsi que de l'absence d'imposition sur les plus-values de cession. Pour bénéficier de ce mécanisme, la revente du navire à l'utilisateur doit intervenir lorsqu'au moins les deux tiers de la durée normale d'amortissement du bien sont écoulés (soit 5 ans 1/3). Ce dispositif fiscal permet de favoriser l'investissement maritime et donc d'accroître le nombre et de moderniser les navires qui battent pavillon français. En 2002, 19 dossiers ont été déposés et 34 navires ont été agréés ou pré-agréés, tandis que sur les sept premiers mois de 2003, 16 dossiers ont été déposés et 15 ont été agréés ou pré-agréés pour 21 navires, dont un navire méthanier d'une valeur de 225 millions d'euros. BILAN DU GIE FISCAL AU 30 JUILLET 2004 A fin du mois de juillet 2003, depuis la mise en œuvre du dispositif en 1998, 140 navires avaient donc fait l'objet d'une demande d'agrément auprès du ministre de l'économie, des finances et de l'industrie. Les dossiers ayant reçu un agrément ou un pré-agrément représentaient 104 navires et un investissement de total de 3 526 millions d'euros. 4. La proposition de loi créant un registre international français (RIF) constitue la seule réponse globale à ce problème Toutes les réformes politiques menées pour rendre à la flotte française sa compétitivité ont été guidées par le même constat alarmant : le pavillon français est « en voie de disparition », pour reprendre les termes de M. Henri de Richemont dans son rapport sur la proposition de loi relative à la création du registre international français. En 1962, la flotte enregistrée sous pavillon français représentait 762 navires, pour n'en représenter plus que 207 en 2004. Cette diminution est due pour partie à l'augmentation de la taille des navires, mais aussi au manque de compétitivité du pavillon français. A titre de comparaison, la Grèce représente 1 160 navires et la Norvège 1 108, la flotte française se situant au 7ème rang de l'Union européenne, représentant environ moitié moins de navires que le Danemark qui compte 432 navires. Cette diminution est en outre d'autant plus spectaculaire que la flotte de commerce mondiale n'a cessé d'augmenter depuis 1962. Ce déclin ne représente cependant qu'une partie de la réalité. Il existe en effet de nombreux armateurs qui ont « fui » le pavillon français, jugé souvent trop cher, pour mettre leur navire sous pavillon de complaisance. On estime généralement qu'une quinzaine de navires de plus de 200 tonneaux ont quitté le pavillon français en 2003, tout en restant la propriété d'armateurs français qui ont choisi de les exploiter sous d'autres pavillons (Bahamas, Saint-Vincent ou Grenadines). Au total, la flotte contrôlée par des intérêts français battant pavillon étranger s'élève à une centaine de navires, et représente environ 40 % de la flotte française. Ce déclin a en outre des conséquences en termes d'emploi, puisque les effectifs des personnels navigants français s'élevaient à 43 550 en 1959, contre seulement 9 300 environ aujourd'hui. Cette évolution est très grave quant aux conséquences sur la vocation des jeunes à épouser la carrière maritime : on constate en effet aujourd'hui un manque de candidats aux concours de recrutement des officiers de la marine marchande ; ainsi, au concours de 2002, 15 places sont restées vacantes, soit près de 10 % des places ouvertes. Il n'y a eu, par ailleurs, aucun candidat au concours du corps technique et administratif des affaires maritimes en 2003. Ce déclin prouve en outre le manque d'efficacité du registre des Terres australes et antarctiques françaises (TAAF) en dépit de l'augmentation importante des navires qui y sont enregistrés. Rappelons qu'il existe aujourd'hui trois registres français : le registre métropolitain, régi par les dispositions de la loi n° 67-5 du 3 janvier 1967 portant statut des navires et autres bâtiments de mer, comptant actuellement 73 navires immatriculés. Le registre des TAAF a pour sa part été créé par l'article 26 de la loi n° 96-151 du 26 février 1996 relative aux transports, et compte actuellement 94 navires représentant plus de 90 % du tonnage des navires de commerce naviguant sous pavillon français. Enfin, le registre d'immatriculation des territoires d'outre-mer (Wallis et Futuna, Polynésie française, Mayotte, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon) est régi par le décret n° 60-600 du 22 juin 1960 portant règlement d'administration publique et relatif aux navires immatriculés dans les territoires d'outre-mer de la République. On compte actuellement 7 navires enregistrés en Nouvelle-Calédonie, 28 en Polynésie et 6 à Wallis et Futuna. Le registre des TAAF représente donc le principal registre bis français, mais celui-ci n'a pas permis d'enrayer le déclin de la flotte française. Il apparaît en effet de plus en plus que ce registre n'est pas compétitif, puisqu'il repose essentiellement sur le dispositif du GIE fiscal exposé précédemment. Cet état de fait a d'ailleurs été reconnu par la Commission européenne elle-même, pour qui ce registre est environ 35 % plus cher que les autres, et plus rigide que les autres en terme de législation du travail. En outre, les navires inscrits au registre des TAAF ne peuvent bénéficier des dispositions du règlement n° 3577/92 du Conseil du 7 décembre 1992 relatif à l'application du principe de libre circulation des services aux transports maritimes à l'intérieur des Etats membres. Ainsi, dans la mesure où ces navires ne sont pas reconnus comme étant immatriculés dans un Etat membre, ils n'ont pas accès au cabotage maritime sur le littoral européen. Il en résulte un préjudice important pour les navires inscrits à ce registre. La création du registre international français apparaît donc de plus en plus comme une nécessité économique. Elle conduirait en outre à aligner la France sur ses principaux partenaires européens, qui bénéficient pour certains d'entre eux d'un tel pavillon depuis longtemps. La Norvège (1987), le Danemark (1988), les Pays-Bas (1996), l'Espagne (1997), l'Italie (1998) et l'Allemagne (1999) se sont successivement dotés d'un tel outil juridique. Le Luxembourg a également ouvert un registre bis qui a rapidement attiré une grande partie de la flotte belge ; pour remédier à cette situation, la Belgique a donc été contrainte d'en créer un récemment. Ces registres ont en commun certaines dispositions juridiques destinées à renforcer l'attractivité du pavillon national ; en premier lieu, ces registres ouvrent en général la possibilité, pour les entreprises nationales, d'embaucher des salariés étrangers par l'intermédiaire de sociétés de « manning », c'est-à-dire de recrutement de main-d'œuvre, dans des proportions variables qui peuvent aller jusqu'à la totalité de l'équipage à l'exception du capitaine. Le dispositif repose en outre généralement sur une défiscalisation du revenu des personnels navigants. Enfin, il prévoit généralement l'option d'une taxation forfaitaire au tonnage, qui existe déjà en droit français. La création des registres internationaux a été un succès incontestable, puisqu'elle a entraîné une forte relance des inscriptions sous les pavillons nationaux européens. A titre l'exemple, la Belgique avait perdu la quasi-totalité de sa flotte de commerce au profit du Luxembourg ; depuis la création du registre bis belge en 2003, près de 50 navires ont été réimmatriculés en Belgique. Au Danemark, la réforme de 1988 a permis d'augmenter le tonnage national de 62 % et l'emploi du secteur de 35 %. Votre rapporteur espère avoir convaincu qu'il est aujourd'hui absolument nécessaire de créer un registre français. Cette avancée est aujourd'hui en bonne voie, puisqu'une proposition de loi a été déposée en ce sens au Sénat par MM. Henri de Richemont, Josselin de Rohan, Jacques Oudin, Patrice Gélard, Lucien Lanier et Yannick Texier. Rappel des principales dispositions de la proposition de loi initiale n° 47 relative à la création du registre international français Article 1er : Création du registre international français pour les navires armés au commerce au long cours ou au cabotage international et les navires armés à la plaisance de plus de 24 mètres hors tout. Article 2 : Fixation de la condition de nationalité française pour le capitaine et l'officier chargé de sa suppléance. Articles 3 à 13 : Dispositions relatives à la réglementation du travail applicable sur les navires inscrits au RIF. Articles 14 et 15 : Régime de protection sociale applicable aux navigants communautaires et non communautaires. Article 16 : Exonération totale d'impôt sur le revenu pour les navigants embarqués à bord des navires inscrits au RIF et qui ont leur domicile fiscal en France. Article 17 à 21 : Dispositions diverses En vue de l'examen de la proposition de loi à l'Assemblée nationale, qui devrait intervenir à la fin de l'année 2004 ou au début de l'année 2005, votre rapporteur a organisé une grande table ronde réunissant les professionnels concernés. Tout en déplorant l'absence - volontaire - des représentants des syndicats, votre rapporteur tient à se féliciter de l'ambiance constructive de cette table ronde. Les armateurs et les responsables politiques et administratifs ont compris que la perspective de la création d'un nouveau registre international peut créer des craintes du côté des syndicats de marins, ou même des responsables des écoles nationales de la marine marchande. Il est donc apparu important de rassurer les différents intervenants, en leur expliquant que la création du RIF n'est absolument pas une invention des armateurs pour pouvoir faire naviguer avec un pavillon français des navires avec des normes sociales moins élevées. Rappelons en effet que l'Etat du pavillon est tenu, en vertu des conventions internationales, de mettre en œuvre la même obligation de surveillance, de contrôle et de police de la sécurité maritime pour tous les navires, quel que soit le registre dont ils relèvent. Grâce à la médiation organisée, à la demande du ministre, par M. Bernard Scemama, syndicats et armateurs ont pu s'asseoir ensemble à la table des négociations. Il faut leur rendre hommage puisque le texte a pu être enrichi et que les points de vue sont très nettement rapprochés. Chaque partenaire a bien compris que la création du RIF présente au contraire de nombreux avantages indiscutables qui devraient mettre toutes les parties en présence d'accord sur ce projet : - le RIF devrait permettre d'accroître la compétitivité de notre pavillon ; - alors que le registre des TAAF ne bénéficie d'aucune disposition sociale clairement inscrite dans le code du travail, le projet de loi contient de nombreuses mesures protectrices concernant le contrat de travail, les congés, la durée du travail, la protection sociale pour les personnels navigants étrangers. Le maintien du statut social du personnel navigant français sera par ailleurs garanti par un accord de branche étendu ; - le registre international français devrait en outre permettre de clarifier de nombreuses situations juridiques, dans la mesure où le registre des TAAF avait été l'objet de nombreuses contestations devant le Bureau international du travail, et devant les tribunaux internes et communautaires. Le texte devrait donc permettre d'accroître la sécurité juridique des armateurs ; - le RIF devrait enfin permettre de relancer l'emploi maritime dans notre pays, à l'image des pays étrangers qui se sont munis d'un tel registre. Ainsi, de 1997 à 2002, les flottes néerlandaise et danoise, ont enregistré une augmentation respectivement de 49 et de 62 %, entraînant une augmentation de l'emploi de l'ordre de 15 %. Après l'analyse du projet de budget de la mer pour 2005, votre rapporteur pour avis doit à la fois exprimer sa satisfaction et ses attentes : - en premier lieu, sa satisfaction de voir les crédits destinés au financement de la politique maritime de la France non seulement préservés dans un contexte budgétaire difficile, mais encore augmentés pour financer de nombreuses actions prioritaires. Votre rapporteur est en particulier très satisfait de constater que les crédits destinés à la sécurité maritime et portuaire permettront d'éviter de nouvelles catastrophes économiques et écologiques tant préjudiciables pour le développement durable de nos 5 500 kilomètres de littoraux métropolitains. Le même jugement peut être globalement porté s'agissant des crédits destinés à la formation maritime, à la modernisation des ports et aux dispositifs d'allègement fiscaux et sociaux destinés à soutenir la flotte de commerce ; - en second lieu, ses attentes, car la perspective de l'examen de la proposition de loi relative au registre international français constitue la garantie que les problématiques liées à la mer seront abordées de manière approfondie dans le cadre d'un débat législatif nécessairement plus fécond qu'un débat budgétaire. L'adoption de ce texte dans le courant de l'année 2005 constituera, à n'en pas douter, une date historique dans l'histoire de la marine de commerce. Lors de sa réunion du 2 novembre 2004 (8), la Commission a entendu M. Gilles de Robien, ministre de l'équipement, des transports, de l'aménagement du territoire, du tourisme et de la mer, et M. François Goulard, secrétaire d'Etat aux transports et à la mer, sur les crédits de la mer pour 2005. M. Gilles de Robien a indiqué que le développement durable devait être intégré très en amont dans toutes les décisions de son ministère, ce qui implique une évolution au niveau local mais aussi au niveau central, et un resserrement autour de quelques grandes directions. Le ministère sera ainsi doté en 2005 d'une direction générale de la mer et des transports terrestres, qui préservera les spécificités liées aux gens de mer et à la sécurité, mais qui aura une approche réellement intégrée des infrastructures, pour développer les synergies entre le ferroviaire, le fluvial, le transport routier et nos ports. Rappelant que nos ports ont toujours souffert d'être considérés comme des équipements d'extrémité, coupés de leur hinterland, le ministre a affirmé que cette réforme les plaçait au cœur de la chaîne logistique dans un ensemble international, afin de leur offrir une desserte intérieure efficace et plus respectueuse de l'environnement qui devrait faire d'eux des portes d'entrée en Europe. Ensuite, il a montré comment la politique d'investissement du ministère était marquée par le développement durable, en présentant un plan historique d'investissement avec la création de l'Agence de financement des infrastructures de transport de France (AFITF), dont les ressources seront consacrées pour 75 % aux programmes les plus ambitieux en faveur des modes de transport ferroviaires, fluviaux et maritimes avec les autoroutes de la mer et qui bénéficiera d'un système de financement pérenne. Il a ainsi indiqué que les moyens nouveaux de l'AFITF devraient permettre de poursuivre la mise en œuvre des grands projets annoncés lors du comité interministériel à l'aménagement et au développement du territoire (CIADT) du 18 décembre dernier. Ce sont 7,5 milliards d'euros que l'agence apportera d'ici à 2012, et 20 milliards au total qui seront mobilisés grâce aux contributions des autres partenaires, privés ou publics, territoriaux ou communautaires. Ces moyens permettront la mise en œuvre du plan adopté par le Gouvernement, incluant en particulier l'avancement des projets Fos 2XL et Port 2000 et la mise en place des autoroutes de la mer. Puis, le ministre a insisté sur un autre thème central en matière de transports, la sécurité, priorité permanente, qu'il s'agisse de la lutte contre l'insécurité routière, de la sécurité des transports ferroviaires, de la sécurité de la navigation maritime ou encore de la sécurité aérienne. M. François Goulard a d'abord précisé que les aides destinées à soutenir la flotte de commerce, constituées sous la forme d'allègements de charges sociales, seraient reconduites en 2005 pour un montant égal à celui de 2004. Il a indiqué que son ministère avait désiré mettre l'accent sur la formation maritime, afin de conforter l'efficacité d'un système reconnu par tous et constituant un atout pour notre pays. Il a ensuite expliqué que la sécurité maritime serait l'une des priorités du ministère pour 2005, notamment par le biais du renforcement des moyens destinés au contrôle des navires, mais aussi de la rénovation de la couverture radar dans la Manche. S'agissant des transports terrestres et fluviaux, il a indiqué que la desserte ferroviaire des ports serait développée, rappelant en outre que la modernisation des installations portuaires mobiliserait en 2005 près de 113 millions d'euros, notamment dans le cadre du projet Port 2000 et du projet Fos 2XL. Après avoir excusé l'absence du rapporteur pour avis des crédits de la mer, M. Jean-Yves Besselat empêché, M. François-Michel Gonnot s'est félicité en son nom du fait que l'importance économique, culturelle et sociale de la mer ait enfin été reconnue au niveau budgétaire, rappelant que le présent projet de loi prévoyait d'augmenter le budget de la mer de 4,4 %. Il a indiqué que l'essentiel de cette augmentation résultait de l'accroissement des charges de l'Établissement national des invalides de la marine (ENIM), dont la dotation augmente de près de 8 % dans le présent projet de budget après avoir augmenté de 7 % dans le cadre de la loi de finances initiale pour 2004. Notant que près de 77 % des crédits de la mer sont aujourd'hui consacrés à l'ENIM, il s'est interrogé sur les efforts mis en œuvre par le ministère pour optimiser son fonctionnement, notamment sur le plan informatique, afin de dégager des moyens nécessaires pour les autres volets de la politique maritime que sont la sécurité et la formation maritime, la modernisation des ports et le renforcement de la compétitivité de la flotte de commerce française. Il a ensuite exprimé sa satisfaction de voir les moyens consacrés à la sécurité maritime augmenter en 2005, après avoir augmenté de 25 % entre 1999 et 2004, estimant que cette évolution traduisait la prise en compte, au niveau budgétaire, des nouvelles priorités politiques fixées à la suite du naufrage de l'Erika et du Prestige. Il a indiqué que ces moyens permettraient d'améliorer la couverture radar dans la Manche, et d'instaurer le système de suivi du trafic maritime nommé « Trafic 2000 ». Il s'est par ailleurs félicité du fait que le Gouvernement ait dépassé les objectifs du Mémorandum de Paris en 2003, fixant à 25 % le nombre des navires devant être contrôlés dans les ports français. Il a néanmoins précisé que ces contrôles étaient pour partie réalisés par des vacataires, dont certains ne peuvent pas contrôler les navires étrangers, et a donc interrogé le ministre sur les mesures prises pour améliorer le dispositif. S'agissant de la formation maritime, il a noté que les moyens humains consacrés à cette politique seraient stabilisés, tandis que les moyens de fonctionnement seraient augmentés de près de 30 %. Précisant néanmoins que cette augmentation bénéficierait uniquement à l'enseignement maritime secondaire, il a interrogé le ministre sur les moyens qui seraient mis en œuvre au profit de l'enseignement supérieur maritime. Rappelant enfin que le dernier volet de ce projet de budget concernait la modernisation des ports et le renforcement de la compétitivité de la flotte de commerce, il s'est félicité de l'augmentation de 11 % des investissements destinés aux ports, permettant, notamment, d'accélérer la réalisation des projets Port 2000 et Fos 2XL. Il a néanmoins interrogé le ministre sur sa position à l'égard de la directive sur la libéralisation des services portuaires adoptée récemment par la Commission européenne, et sur les effets qui en sont attendus dans le domaine de la sûreté portuaire. S'agissant enfin du soutien à la flotte de commerce, il a rappelé l'importance de plusieurs dispositifs d'allègement de charges fiscales et sociales existants, dont la dotation serait reconduite en 2005, ainsi que de dispositifs de soutien innovants tels que la taxe au tonnage, et le groupement d'intérêt économique (GIE) fiscal. Il a néanmoins précisé que l'attention de tous les parlementaires était tournée vers la création du registre international français (RIF), interrogeant le ministre sur le calendrier prévu pour l'examen de ce projet de loi très attendu. M. Daniel Fidelin, s'exprimant au nom du groupe UMP, a remarqué que le projet de budget pour 2005 témoignait du caractère prioritaire de l'objectif général d'amélioration de la sécurité dans les divers modes de transport. Ainsi, il a considéré que le budget des transports maritimes témoignait de la volonté du Gouvernement d'améliorer la sécurité, conformément aux décisions du comité interministériel de la mer (CIMER) du 16 décembre 2004 et de l'Union européenne, puisque cette politique bénéficierait en 2005 d'un budget de 44 millions d'euros, en progression de 8 % par rapport à l'année précédente. Il s'est également réjoui de l'augmentation des moyens attribués aux centres régionaux opérationnels de surveillance et de sauvetage (CROSS) ainsi qu'à la formation maritime des gens de mer. Il a noté que de nombreux projets d'équipements collectifs étaient d'ailleurs en cours de réalisation, 202 kilomètres d'autoroutes devant être mis en service en 2005 et le projet « Port 2000 » devant créer 2 000 emplois au Havre et faire de ce port le premier port français en matière de containers. Il a ensuite invité le ministère à mener une réflexion sur le développement du cabotage. Il a conclu en indiquant que les députés du groupe UMP apporteraient leur soutien à ce projet de budget. M. Maxime Bono, s'exprimant au nom du groupe socialiste, a regretté que le montant des subventions aux transports combinés soit réduit de moitié en 2005. Il a estimé que, même si les efforts consentis en matière de sécurité routière et maritime devaient être salués, le projet de budget des transports pour 2005 n'était pas à la hauteur des ambitions affichées en matière de développement durable et ne recevrait donc pas le soutien des députés du groupe socialiste. M. Jean Dionis du Séjour, s'exprimant au nom du groupe UDF, a annoncé que le groupe UDF soutiendrait avec ardeur ce budget, le jugeant à la fois courageux et innovant. En réponse aux différents intervenants, M. Gilles de Robien, ministre de l'équipement, des transports, de l'aménagement du territoire, du tourisme et de la mer, a indiqué, s'agissant de l'état d'avancement des infrastructures dont la réalisation a été décidée lors du CIADT du 18 décembre 2003, que le débat public sur le projet Fos 2XL avait abouti de manière positive et que le chantier Port 2000 au Havre avançait à grand pas ; M. François Goulard, secrétaire d'Etat aux transports et à la mer, a ensuite apporté les précisions suivantes : - des mesures d'optimisation de la gestion de l'établissement national des invalides de la marine (ENIM) seront recherchées en partenariat avec d'autres établissements de sécurité sociale ; - le système Trafic 2000 centralise par informatique les données relatives aux déplacements de navires dans les eaux européennes. Ce système met la France au premier rang européen pour la qualité du suivi des navires ; - l'objectif qui consiste à contrôler 25 % des navires dans les ports français est en voie d'être atteint. Ceci ne dépend pas du statut de la main-d'œuvre employée à ces contrôles (vacataires ou titulaires), mais de la possibilité de disposer de suffisamment de contrôleurs homologués ; - le nouvel avant-projet de directive sur les services portuaires, présenté par la Commission européenne, est étudié avec attention par le Gouvernement. Le Parlement européen en avait rejeté une première version en 2003 ; - dans le projet de loi de finances pour 2005, les crédits de soutien à la flotte sont stables ; - le dispositif du GIE fiscal fait actuellement l'objet des contrôles habituels de la Commission européenne sur les aides d'Etat ; - s'agissant du registre international français (RIF), la médiation de M. Bernard Scemama a permis aux organisations patronales et syndicales de trouver un terrain d'accord. Les deux parties sont en effet proches d'un consensus sur l'idée d'un « pavillon bis » qui comporterait des obligations en matière d'emploi maritime européen ; Puis, la Commission a examiné les crédits de la mer pour 2005. Conformément aux conclusions de M. Jean-Yves Besselat, rapporteur pour avis, la Commission a émis un avis favorable à l'adoption des crédits de la mer pour 2005. --fpfp-- N° 1865 - tome XI - Avis au nom de la commission des affaires économiques sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2005 : Mer (M. Jean-Yves Besselat) 1 () Loi n° 2004-146 du 16 février 2004 autorisant la ratification des conventions de l'Organisation internationale du travail n°163 concernant le bien être des gens de mer, en mer et dans les ports, n° 164 concernant la protection de la santé et les soins médicaux des gens de mer, n° 166 concernant le rapatriement des marins, n° 178 concernant l'inspection des conditions de travail et de vie des gens de mer, n° 179 concernant le recrutement et le placement des gens de mer, n° 180 concernant la durée du travail des gens de mer et les effectifs de navire, n° 185 concernant les pièces d'identité des gens de mer (révisée), et du protocole relatif à la convention n° 147 concernant les normes minima à observer sur les navires marchands. 2 () Le Navtex est un service international relevant du système mondial de détresse et de sécurité en mer, permettant l'émission des bulletins météorologiques, des avertissements de navigation ainsi que des messages pour les services de pilotage. 3 () Les porte-conteneurs sont différenciés suivant leur traille mesurée en « équivalent vingt-pieds » (EVP). Précisons que cette comparaison a été réalisée sur un échantillon de 500 porte-conteneurs. 4 () Comparaison effectuée par les chargeurs pour l'acheminement de conteneurs vers l'Extrême-Orient, avec pour base 100 le port de Rotterdam. 5 () Il s'agit des ports d'intérêt national et des ports maritimes contigus aux ports militaires dont la liste est fixée à l'article L. 121-7 du code des ports maritimes : soit, en métropole, Calais, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Dieppe, Caen-Ouistreham, Cherbourg, Saint-Malo, Brest, Le Fret, Roscanvel, Concarneau, Lorient, La Rochelle, La Pallice et Chef de Baie, des Minimes, Bayonne, Port-la-Nouvelle, Sète, Toulon, Nice, Ajaccio, Bastia ; en outre-mer, Fort-de-France (Martinique), Degrad-des-Cannes et Larivot (Guyane), Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (Saint-Pierre et Miquelon) et Port-Réunion (Réunion). 6 () Le port du Havre a en effet vu transiter 1,2 million de conteneurs équivalent vingt pieds (MEVP) en 1997, mais 1,72 MEVP en 2002 et 1,94 MEVP en 2003. 7 () Voir par exemple, au sujet du lamanage, l'arrêt CJCE du 10 décembre 1991 « Merzi Convenzionali Porto di Genova ». 8 () Ce compte-rendu constitue un extrait de l'audition ayant eu lieu le 2 novembre 2004, composé uniquement des interventions relatives au secteur de la mer.
es	other	N/A	Primera sentencia que inaplica el período de prueba para el contrato de apoyo a emprendedores - IURE Abogados Primera sentencia que inaplica el período de prueba para el contrato de apoyo a emprendedores El Juzgado de lo Social no 2 de Barcelona inaplica la regulación legal del período de prueba contenida en el apartado 3 del artículo 4 del Real Decreto Ley 3/2012, de 6 de julio, por contravenir una norma de rango superior, el artículo 4.4 de la Carta Social Europea de 1961, pues no fija ni plazo de preaviso ni indemnización por finalización del contrato dentro de su duración, considerándose además excesivo y carente de causa. Esta Sentencia constituye un importante precedente, al tratarse de la primera resolución judicial que declara la no validez del período de prueba de un año aplicable a esta modalidad contractual. Según consta en los hechos probados, el demandante, mayor de edad, suscribió un contrato indefinido de apoyo a los emprendedores con la empresa demandada el 30.03.2012, con una jornada semanal de 40 horas y con la categoría de peón. En la cláusula segunda del contrato se estableció un período de prueba de un año. Días antes de concluir el período de prueba, la empresa, por carta de 22.03.2013, y a efectos de esa fecha, le comunicó la finalización de su contrato por no haber superado dicho período. El trabajador reclamó en su demanda la improcedencia del despido, al considerar superado el período de prueba establecido en el Convenio colectivo que le era aplicable (2 semanas para el personal obrero, ampliable a 6 meses) y, sin que pudiera tenerse en cuenta, a tal efecto, el período de prueba de un año, por contravenir lo establecido en una norma de rango superior, el artículo 4.4 de la Carta Social Europea de 1961. Este artículo dispone que para garantizar el ejercicio efectivo del derecho a una remuneración equitativa, las Partes Contratantes se comprometen “a reconocer el derecho de todos los trabajadores a un plazo razonable de preaviso en caso de terminación del empleo”. Tal y como puede apreciarse en los fundamentos de derecho, la Juzgadora entiende que la Carta Social Europea es una norma internacional que forma parte del derecho interno y que tiene el mismo valor vinculante que los Tratados de la Unión Europea, por lo que en orden al principio de jerarquía normativa se sitúa por encima de la Ley nacional, correspondiendo a la Comisión Europea de Derechos Sociales velar por la correcta aplicación de la Carta y siendo, además, sus decisiones vinculantes para los órganos jurisdiccionales sociales. En base a lo anterior, trae a colación la Decisión tomada el 23 de mayo de 2012 por la Comisión Europea de Derechos Sociales, con ocasión de un litigio sustancialmente idéntico que se planteó sobre la normativa griega, que amplió el período de prueba en el trabajo de dos a doce meses para todos los trabajadores, sin distinción por especialización o especificaciones del trabajo para el que son contratados. En esta Decisión el Comité entiende que la citada normativa constituye una violación del artículo 4.4 de la Carta Social Europea, no pudiendo considerar en ningún caso como razonable el período de prueba de un año según lo que debe entenderse por dicho concepto. La Juzgadora, consecuente con la decisión del Comité, llega a la conclusión de que el artículo 4.3 del RD Ley 3/2012 vulnera el artículo 4.4 de la Carta pues no fija ni plazo de preaviso ni indemnización por finalización del contrato durante el período de prueba de un año, no pudiéndose entender el mismo como razonable. Además, indica que el RD Ley contraviene la legislación nacional en materia de contratación temporal; puesto que, convierte al contrato de emprendedores en un contrato temporal carente de causa, algo prohibido en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Añade a lo precedente, que lo contenido en el RD Ley no puede justificarse en el marco de una situación de crisis económica, ya que durante la misma no se puede desproteger a los trabajadores de sus derechos. Todo ello le lleva a la conclusión final de que, habiéndose finalizado el contrato fuera del período convencionalmente establecido constituye un verdadero despido carente de causa, que debe ser declarado por ello improcedente, a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 55.3 y 4 en relación con el artículo 108 LRJS, y con los efectos que disponen el artículo 56 del ET y el Artículo 110 de la LRJS.
en	other	N/A	On March 4, 2019, the petitioner, an inmate confined in the Federal Correctional Institution in Safford, AZ, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241. (Doc. 1) The petitioner claims that he was improperly sentenced as a Career Offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Mathis v. United States, __ U.S.__, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). Pending before the court is the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 11) The petition should be dismissed. A section 2241 petition cannot be used to challenge the sentencing court's guideline calculation. Smith was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and heroin among other things. United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 273 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith, 2017 WL 2837144, at 1 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal dismissed, 714 Fed.Appx. 310 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 375 (2018). He was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Id. On direct appeal, Smith argued that the jury should have been “required to make findings regarding the extent of his involvement in the conspiracy, ” and that his sentence failed to comply with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Smith, 441 F.3d at 273. Smith did not argue that his prior convictions did not qualify as predicate offenses under the career offender guidelines. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentences on March 21, 2006. Id. at 254, 274. Smith filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on July 12, 2007. Smith v. U.S., 2014 WL 12710241 (E.D.Va. 2014). A petition pursuant to section 2255 is appropriate where the petitioner seeks to vacate his conviction or sentence. The petition was dismissed on January 31, 2008. Id. Smith filed a motion to dismiss, which the sentencing court construed as a second section 2255 petition on June 18, 2012. Id. The court dismissed the petition on June 21, 2012. Id. Smith filed a third section 2255 petition on July 28, 2014. Smith v. U.S., 2014 WL 12710241 (E.D.Va. 2014). He challenged his career offender sentencing enhancement imposed pursuant to U.S.S.G. s § 4B1.1. Id. On September 16, 2014, the sentencing court dismissed the petition because the Fourth Circuit had previously denied Smith's motion for permission to file a “second or successive” section 2255 petition. Id. On June 17, 2016, the Fourth Circuit granted Smith permission to file a successive section 2255 petition in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) violates due process. United States v. Smith, 2017 WL 2837144, at 1 (E.D. Va. 2017). The petition was eventually denied, however, as controlled by Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017). Id. at *3. On March 4, 2019, Smith filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s § 2241. (Doc. 1) He claims he was illegally sentenced as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Mathis v. United States, ___ U.S.___, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). There is no limit to the number of section 2241 petitions that a prisoner may file. A second or successive section 2255 petition, however, can only be filed after receiving special permission from the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. s § 2255 (g). The respondent filed the pending motion to dismiss the petition on June 27, 2019. (Doc. 11) He argues the petition should be dismissed because a section 2241 petition cannot be used to challenge an improper sentence. Smith filed a response on July 24, 2019. (Doc. 18) The respondent filed a reply ...
es	wikipedia	N/A	El Partido Independientes de Color fue un partido político fundado en Cuba por Evaristo Estenoz el 7 de agosto de 1908. Historia Fue fundado en el número 63 de la calle Amargura en la ciudad de La Habana, teniendo como proclama principal la idea de José Martí de tener «una República con todos y para el bien de todos». Se levantó en acta formal que el presidente de la agrupación sería Esternoz y el puesto de secretario sería ocupado por Gregorio Surín, así como las causas por las cuales había sido constituida la organización. Se dirigió la solicitud de inscripción a Enoch Crowder, presidente de la Junta Electoral durante la intervención norteamericana, y la misma fue aprobada. Como primer objetivo se plantearon la participación en las elecciones del 14 de noviembre de ese año. Se creó el periódico Previsión como órgano del partido. El 15 de agosto de 1908 en La Habana tuvo lugar el primer mitin público, en la plaza del Cristo. Entre los hechos más relevantes está el Levantamiento Armado de los Independientes de Color de 1912, que supuso el inicio de un conflicto armado contra el gobierno de la época, y que acabó con la masacre de sus miembros y desaparición del partido. Ideario El programa del partido abarcaba 5 temas principales: derechos obreros, derechos ciudadanos, nacionalismo, instrucción pública, jurídica y tierra a los campesinos. Los Independientes de Color demandaban la repatriación por cuenta del Estado de todos los cubanos que quisieran regresar al país y estuvieran carentes de medios, la revisión de los expedientes de propiedad hechos efectivos durante la primera intervención norteamericana, la nacionalización del trabajo mediante ley que garantizase la admisión de cubanos con prefencia a los extranjeros, la distribución en colonias de las tierras del Estado para los que careciesen de recursos, leyes para regular el trabajo infantil, seguros contra accidentes de trabajo, enseñanza gratuita y obligatoria, incluyendo la universitaria, juicios por jurado constituidos por ciudadanos de ambas razas, así como la oposición a la pena de muerte por entender que los personas de raza negra tenían menos probabilidades de escapar a la pena que los blancos. Partidos políticos desaparecidos de Cuba Partidos políticos fundados en 1908 Partidos políticos disueltos en 1912
en	caselaw	US	This is an appeal by the Ohio State Medical Board (hereinafter the "board') from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, which court, on appeal, reversed the order of the board which suspended the license of William C. Manthey, M.D. to practice medicine and his Drug Enforcement Administration permit, and required Manthey to sit for and pass the Clinical Competency portion of the "FLEX" (Federal Licensing Examination). Dr. Manthey was served with a notice that the board intended to determine under the provisions of R.C. 4731.22 whether or not to limit, reprimand, revoke, suspend, place on probation, refuse to register, or reinstate his certificate to practice medicine or surgery. The acts set forth in the notice were alleged to be in violation of R.C. 4731.22(B)(2), (B)(3) and (B)(6). R.C. 4731.22, as effective herein (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2401, 2410-2411), provided as pertinent to this appeal as follows: "(B) The board, by a vote of not less than six members, shall, to the extent permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend a certificate, refuse to register or refuse to reinstate an applicant, or reprimand or place on probation the holder of a certificate for one or more of the following reasons: "* * * "(2) Failure to use reasonable care discrimination in the administration of drugs, or failure to employ acceptable scientific methods in the selection of drugs or other modalities for treatment of disease; "(3) Selling, prescribing, giving away, or administering drugs for other than legal and legitimate therapeutic purposes or conviction of violation of any federal or state law regulating the possession, distribution, or use of any drug; "* * * "(6) A departure from, or the failure to conform to, minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar circumstances, whether or not actual injury to a patient is established[.]" The matter was heard by a member of the board acting as hearing officer. The board subpoenaed and submitted as evidence "all patient records for the 125 patients designated by a double asterisk (*) in the * * letter issued * * ." Also presented was the testimony of Dr. Manthey and that of two expert witnesses, one called on behalf of the board and one called on behalf of Dr. Manthey. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer made his report and recommendations, finding in the report that no evidence was presented to establish a violation of R.C.4731.22(B)(3), but that there were violations of R.C.4731.22(B)(2) and (B)(6). The hearing officer's report and recommendations were amended by the board which then issued its order as follows: "1. Dr. William C. Manthey's license to practice medicine or surgery in Ohio shall be suspended for one Page 183 year. All but thirty days of the suspension shall be stayed provided that he complies with paragraph #2 of this Order. "2. Dr. William C. Manthey shall surrender his Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) permit for a period of not less than one year, after which time he must receive the Board's approval to reapply for his DEA permit. "3. Dr. William C. Manthey shall appear before the State Medical Board or its agent four months from the effective date of this Order and, thereafter, as the Board determines. "4. Dr. William C. Manthey shall sit for the Clinical Competency portion of the FLEX examination in June of 1984 or December, 1984. If he does not pass the examination, his license to practice medicine or surgery in Ohio shall be suspended until he repeats the test and passes it. "* * " The board sets forth four assignments of error in its appeal. We will consider these assignments in a different order than set forth by the board. Assignment of Error No. Two: "The lower court erred in ruling that the board could not consider patient records which had been produced in conjunction with an alleged violation of R.C. Sec. 4731.22(B)(3) when no such violation was ultimately found." Assignment of Error No. Three: "The lower court erred in concluding that the list of patients and prescriptions attached to the board's original citation letter was not admissible in toto." R.C. 4731.22(D)(1), as herein effective (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2401, 2413), provided in pertinent part: "The board shall conduct all investigations and proceedings in such a manner as to protect patient confidentiality. The board shall obtain the consent of the patient in the form of a written release signed by the patient or by an authorized representative of the patient before seeking access to medical record information concerning a patient for the purpose of any investigation or hearing, except that no such consent is required if there is reason to believe that there has been a violation of division (B)(3) of section 4731.22 of the Revised Code. * " The above language first appeared as a part of R.C. 4731.22, effective August 27, 1982 (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2401, 2410-2414). We have been referred to no cases which have interpreted that particular portion of the section nor do we find any such cases. However, a reading of the section indicates that written consent of the patient is dispensed with only where there is reason to believe that there has been a violation of R.C.4731.22(B)(3). To permit access to patients' records where there is reason to believe that R.C. 4731.22(B)(3) has been violated, but permit them to be used to prove other violations regardless of the outcome of the (B)(3) violation, would appear to violate the terms of the statute as it provides for the protection of patient confidentiality. We conclude that the seeking of access to a patient's records without his consent is limited to violations of R.C.4731.22(B)(3) and, as to all other violations of R.C. 4731.22, consent must first be obtained before access to such records can be effected. The board contends that Dr. Manthey consented to the use of the records and/or waived the right to question their use by failing to object at the hearing before the board. However, it is the patients' confidentiality that is protected and the physician can neither consent to access without consent nor waive admission at the hearing. Page 184 We find the second and third assignments of error not to be well-taken and conclude that, in the absence of the evidence obtained from the patients' records, the board's order is not supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence. The trial court's judgment of reversal must be affirmed for the above reasons. However, App. R. 12(A) mandates that we pass upon the remaining two assignments of error. Assignment of Error No. One: "The lower court erred in concluding that the hearing member and the board could not rely upon their own expertise in reaching a decision on whether appellant had violated the medical practices Act." The syllabus of Arlen v. State (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 168, 15 Ohio Op. 3d 190, 399 N.E.2d 1251, states: "Expert testimony as to a standard of practice is not mandatory in a medical disciplinary proceeding to determine whether a physician's conduct falls below a reasonable standard of medical care." At 61 Ohio St. 2d at 173-174, 15 Ohio Op. 3d at 193-194,399 N.E.2d at 1254-1255, Justice Locher, writing for a majority of four members of the court, stated: "In discussing the legislative intent for the existence of such board, this court, in Farrand v. State Medical Board (1949),151 Ohio St. 222, at page 224, stated: "`* * * The purpose of the General Assembly in providing for administrative hearings in particular fields was to facilitate such matters by placing the decision on facts with boards or commissions composed of men equipped with the necessary knowledge and experience pertaining to a particular field. * * ' "The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, in Jaffe v. StateDepartment of Health (1949), 135 Conn. 339, 64 A.2d 330, addressed the same issue as in the case at bar. In discussing the need for expert opinion for such a specialized board, such as in the instant cause, that court stated, at pages 349-350: "` * * Expert opinions of other physicians offered before it could have been disregarded by it, and from a practical standpoint would in all probability have little, if any, effect in bringing it to a decision at variance with its own conclusion upon the question whether or not the conduct of a practitioner had been compatible with professional standards or whether or not he was competent. With the facts of that conduct before it, the board was competent to determine such questions without hearing expert opinion evidence. It is true that where, in cases tried in court, an issue presented is such that its solution can only be reached upon the basis of the special knowledge of expert witnesses, such evidence must be produced. * * * That rule, however, supports rather than contravenes our conclusion in this case because it is based on the fact that such a question goes beyond the field of the ordinary knowledge and experience of judges or jurors; * * * and this is illustrated by our decisions holding that where an issue can be determined by the application of such knowledge expert testimony is not required. * * ' "Finding the above rationale proper, we determine that the State Medical Board is competent to determine whether a physician has failed to conform to a minimum standard of care. "The requirement for expert testimony in the record of a license revocation proceeding usurps the power of the State Medical Board's broad measure of discretion. The very purpose for having such a specialized technical board would be negated by mandating that expert testimony be Page 185 presented. Expert opinion testimony can be presented in a medical board proceeding, but the board is not required to reach the same conclusion as the expert witness. The weight to be given to such expert opinion testimony depends upon the board's estimate as to the propriety and reasonableness, but such testimony is not binding upon such an experienced and professional board. "* * " Thus, to the extent that the common pleas court stated that "[a] judge or hearing officer's decision should be made on the basis of the record before him and the evidence presented at the hearing on trial" and "[n]othing else should be taken into consideration in arriving at the decision," we find such to be in contravention of Arlen v. State, supra. The first assignment of error is well-taken, but in view of our conclusions reached in disposing of the second and third assignments of error, such error is not prejudicial and does not permit reversal of the lower court's judgment of reversal. Assignment of Error No. Four: "The lower court erred in analyzing the board's order in terms of a negligence medical malpractive standard and failed to recognize that the standards set forth in R.C. Sec. 4731.22(B)(2) and (B)(6) are to be construed by the board based upon its own expertise." R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) states one of the reasons for revocation or suspension of a certificate as follows: "A departure from, or the failure to conform to, minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar circumstances, whether or not actual injury to a patient is established[.]" The distinction between medical malpractice and the standard set forth in R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) concerns injury. In a negligence action for malpractice, injury is an element of the cause of action. Here the departure from the required standard is the failure to conform to minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar circumstances regardless of ensuing injury to the patient. While the common pleas court spoke as to the medical malpractice standard resulting in injury, its ultimate conclusion dealt with the differing opinions as to what constituted a failure to conform to minimal standards of care as set forth in R.C. 4731.22(B)(6). Thus, the court properly applied the standards of R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) notwithstanding that they are generally expressed in medical malpractice terms. The fourth assignment of error is not well-taken. For the reasons set forth under assignments of error two and three above, and having found no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment. Judgment affirmed. COLE, P.J., and GUERNSEY, J., concur. GUERNSEY, J., retired, of the Third Appellate District, was assigned to active duty pursuant to Section 6(C), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. Page 186
it	wikipedia	N/A	Il Brasilia Challenger 1995 è stato un torneo di tennis facente parte della categoria ATP Challenger Series nell'ambito dell'ATP Challenger Series 1995. Il torneo si è giocato a Brasilia in Brasile dal 24 luglio al 6 agosto 1995 su campi in cemento. Vincitori Singolare Leander Paes ha battuto in finale Roberto Jabali 6-1, 5-7, 6-4 Doppio Jean-Philippe Fleurian / Nicolás Pereira hanno battuto in finale Noam Behr / Lior Mor 7-6, 6-2 Collegamenti esterni
sl	wikipedia	N/A	Tone Kuntner, slovenski pesnik in gledališki igralec, * 13. maj 1943, Trate. Življenjepis Tone Kuntner se je rodil v številni kmečki družini na Tratah v Slovenskih goricah, vendar so se kasneje preselili v Bistrico ob Dravi. Po končani klasični gimnaziji v Mariboru je leta 1968 diplomiral na Akademiji za gledališče, radio, film in televizijo v Ljubljani in postal 1969 član Mestnega gledališča ljubljanskega. V oblikovanju tipiziranih likov je razvil osebnostno poudarjeno, analitično in ponotranjeno karakterno igro. V osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja je odigral več osrednjih likov v repertoarju MGL. Igra tudi v filmih in televizijskih igrah. Leta 1966 je izdal prvo pesniško zbirko (Vsakdanji kruh). Njegov pesniški svet vsebuje podobe protislovij in posebnosti vsakdanjega življenja na vasi, zlasti pa prizadevanje po prvobitnem sožitju z naravo, piše pa tudi ljubezensko liriko in veristične družbeno kritične pesmi. Leta 2014 je prejel zlatnik poezije. Je oče igralca Jerneja Kuntnerja in biologa Matjaža Kuntnerja. Pesniške zbirke Vsakdanji kruh (1966) Lesnika (1969) Mrtva zemlja, Mladinska knjiga, 1972 Trate (izbor pesmi, Cankarjeva založba, 1975 Ledene rože (1978) v lesu ogenj (1979) Slovenske gorice (1981) Koprive (1988) Moje bregače (1993) O domovina (1994) Marija Snežna (1995) Golčim besede iz srca in vesti (1995) Cmurek 1998) Moja jablana (1999) Mati Slovenija (2000) Tropine (2005) Sklici Glej tudi seznam slovenskih pesnikov seznam slovenskih igralcev Viri Janež, Stanko, Pregled Slovenske književnosti, Založba Obzorja Maribor, 1978 Veliki splošni leksikon; knjiga 6, DZS, Ljubljana, 2006 Enciklopedija Slovenije; knjiga 6, Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana, 1992 Slovenski pesniki Slovenski gledališki igralci Severjevi nagrajenci Nagrajenci Prešernovega sklada
en	caselaw	US	225 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (2002) Debra K. PIATT, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. No. 00-4113-JAR. United States District Court, D. Kansas. September 27, 2002. 1279 1280 Pantaleon Florez, Jr., Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff. David P. Murdick, K. Gary Sebelius, Wright, Henson, Somers, Sebelius, Clark & Baker, LLP, Topeka, KS, for Defendant. MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION REMANDING ROBINSON, District Judge. This is an appeal from the denial of Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits.[1] The denial was based on a finding that although Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work, and although her exertional limitations do not allow her to perform the full range of sedentary work, there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy which she could perform.[2] Procedural Background Plaintiff Debra K. Piatt applied for social security disability benefits on February 17, 1998, claiming disability beginning on June 14, 1997, from injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident on that date.[3] In the accident, Plaintiff sustained a broken right ankle, broken left femur, and crushed right heel.[4] Plaintiff claims that she is now disabled by pain and limitation in those extremities. She further claims that the accident aggravated tendinitis in her left elbow, and that she also suffers back pain, as well as tendinitis and carpal tunnel syndrome in her right arm and hand. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim originally and upon reconsideration.[5] After conducting a hearing on Plaintiff's claim on January 11, 1999, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act.[6] The Appeals Council 1281 affirmed the ALJ's decision on May 5, 2000.[7] The ALJ's decision is now the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. Plaintiff's Background Plaintiff, born on December 30, 1954, was 44 years old at the time of her administrative hearing in January 1999.[8] She completed the 11th grade and never received a GED.[9] Plaintiff is ambidextrous; she writes with her left hand but uses her right hand for everything else.[10] Plaintiff's past work history includes work as a cook, waitress and manager.[11] Plaintiff's Testimony at the January 11, 1999 hearing before the ALJ Plaintiff testified that since her June 14, 1997 car accident, she has not worked nor sought work, except she once or twice tried to work for her mother as a cook, and she once tried to help her daughter wait tables.[12] She was unable to work as a cook for longer than 2 to 21⁄2 hours because pain precluded her from standing without taking breaks as needed. She was unable to work more than an hour as a waitress because of pain.[13] Plaintiff testified that pain in her foot and legs causes her difficulty standing for more than 11⁄2 hours and difficulty walking at a normal pace for more than 30 to 45 minutes. After standing or walking for these periods of time, she must take a 10 to 15 minute break.[14] She noted that the weather and how much she has already walked, both affect her stamina, but that after 30 minutes to an hour, she needs to walk around and stretch to get relief.[15] Plaintiff walks with a limp and one of her feet turns inward causing her to trip over herself.[16] Plaintiff testified that she is unable to get down on her left knee at all, is unable to bend, and cannot climb ladders. She can walk stairs only very slowly.[17] Plaintiff describes her pain on an increasing scale of 1 to 10, as ranging from 5 to 6 for ankle pain and 6 to 7 after 45 minutes of walking.[18] She also has lower back pain when she sits, stands, sleeps or walks.[19] She can sit for 30 minutes, but then needs a stretch break to avoid pain in her back, legs and feet.[20] She noted that how long she can sit depends on whether she is sitting in a regular chair or recliner.[21] Plaintiff describes her pain on an increasing scale of 1 to 10, as ranging from 5 to 6 for back pain, but 7 if she sits too long.[22] Plaintiff testified that she has pain and limitations in her upper extremities as well. Before the accident, she had tendinitis in her left arm, which the accident aggravated, such that she continues to have pain and "tennis elbow" in her left arm.[23] She further testified that she has numbness and pain in her right hand and 1282 forearm. After driving, using a calculator, talking on the phone or laying in bed for longer than 30 minutes, she has numbness in her right hand and forearm. Her right arm goes to sleep and she has to lift her arm and shake it to relieve the numbness.[24] Plaintiff testified that she lives with her boyfriend and cares for three children, a 13 year old and seven year old twins. Every day she prepares them breakfast and supper. She spends about an hour preparing supper, but must take "a couple" of rest breaks. She finds it painful and difficult to peel potatoes, because her fingers start aching.[25] Plaintiff further testified that she does some housework: vacuuming for no more than 30 minutes at a time; two loads of laundry a day; and loading the dishwasher. On her "good days" she can do this housework for 30 minutes to an hour before stopping to rest in a recliner with her feet up. On her bad days she is unable to do even a total of two hours of housework. On her bad days she spends most of her time in her recliner with her feet propped up. She is never able to mop, clean out the refrigerator, straighten pots and pans in a low cabinet or dust in high places.[26] The ALJ's January 15, 1999 decision The ALJ found,[27]inter alia, that: The medical evidence establishes that the claimant, status post motor vehicle accident, has severe impairments consisting of a broken left femur and broken right calcaneus but that she does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. The claimant's statements regarding her impairments and their impact on her ability to work are credible to the extent that they do not exceed the limitations set forth in the residual functional capacity determination stated below. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertion requirements of sedentary work in that she is able to occasionally lift and carry up to 10 pounds and up to 10 pounds frequently; to stand and walk up to 2 hours in an 8 hour workday; and to sit for an entire 8 hour workday, 20 C.F.R. 404.1545. The claimant's residual functional capacity is reduced in that she is restricted from more than occasional bending, squatting, crawling, climbing, stooping, crouching and kneeling. The claimant must avoid exposure to unprotected heights, exposure to marked temperature changes and being around moving machinery. The claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work. . . . . The claimant has acquired work skills including involving record maintenance, ordering, supervising and planning which are transferable to work at a sedentary exertional level such as that of production clerk. 20 C.F.R. 404.1568. . . . . Although the claimant's exertional limitations do not allow her to perform the full range of sedentary work ... there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy which the [sic] she could perform. Examples of such jobs are final assembler and electronics tester. The claimant is capable of performing the entire base of unskilled, sedentary occupations and jobs. 1283 Asserted Errors Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred because he: (1) failed to give proper weight to the opinion of the treating physician and failed to affirmatively seek clarification of some inconsistencies in the treating physician's report concerning upper and lower extremity limitations; (2) failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's claims of pain and failed to properly evaluate and articulate its findings concerning Plaintiff's credibility; and (3) as a consequence of these errors, failed to propound a proper hypothetical question to the vocational expert (VE). Standard of Review On appeal, judicial review of the Commissioner's determination that claimant is not disabled is limited.[28] The Court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record and whether he applied the correct legal standards.[29] Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[30] Although the court should meticulously examine the record, it may "neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency."[31] The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process to determine if a claimant is disabled.[32] If a claimant is determined to be disabled or not disabled at any step, the evaluation process ends there.[33] The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; then it shifts to the Commissioner.[34] When a claimant has one or more severe impairments, the Commissioner must consider the combined effects of the impairments in making a disability determination.[35] A person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if her physical and mental impairments, considered in combination, preclude her from doing her previous work, and she lacks the residual functional capacity (RFC) "to perform other work in the national economy in view of [her] age, education, and work experience."[36] Discussion Impairments in Upper Extremities: Tendinitis in Left Elbow The ALJ found that Plaintiff has only two severe impairments, a broken left femur and broken right calcaneus. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's other claimed impairments were not severe. He found that while she had sustained tendinitis in her left elbow, it was not severe, as it had 1284 not been shown "to significantly impact her basic work abilities." He acknowledged, that despite finding that her left arm tendinitis was not severe, he must take it into account (at Step 5) when determining Plaintiff's RFC.[37] At Step 5, however, the ALJ found that this impairment did not affect her RFC, because the evidence, including the clinical notes of her treating physician, Dr. Stanley Jones, showed that her left arm tendinitis was mild and did not require continued treatment.[38] The ALJ's finding is based on substantial evidence. The objective medical evidence, as well as the Plaintiff's testimony, fails to establish that the left arm tendinitis was significantly painful, or impaired Plaintiff's ability to perform daily activities or to write with her left hand. Plaintiff noted no difficulty in grasping with her left hand.[39] Tendinitis in right arm and Carpal Tunnel in right arm and hand At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's alleged right arm tendinitis and carpal tunnel syndrome were not "medically determinable" from the reports of the treating physician, Dr. Jones, or the consultative physician, Dr. Thompson.[40] The ALJ noted that although Plaintiff alleged that she had little grasping ability with her right hand, and had been treated for right arm tendinitis over 20 years ago, Dr. Thompson, who examined her twice, found that her grip strength was normal, her dexterity was preserved, she had no atrophy, cyanosis, clubbing, edema or muscle wasting, and he found negative signs of carpal tunnel when he tested her in his August 1998 examination.[41] But at Step 2, the Tenth Circuit has required only a "de minimus" showing by plaintiff, that she has an impairment that would have more than a minimal effect on her ability to do basic work activities.[42] Plaintiff has made at least a de minimus showing, through her testimony about how the use of her right hand and arm is limited. Plaintiff also made a de minimus showing through the medical records of Dr. Jones, the treating physician, who in May 1998, tested Plaintiff for carpal tunnel, found "some symptomatology of carpal tunnel," and prescribed a cock-up splint for her to wear at night.[43] The ALJ erred in not giving any weight to this finding by the treating physician. The Commissioner must give substantial weight to the evidence and opinion of the claimant's treating physician, unless good cause is shown for rejecting it. If a treating physician's opinion is rejected, specific, legitimate reasons must be given.[44] Thus, the ALJ erred in finding that the right arm tendinitis and carpal tunnel were not medically determinable and thus not severe at Step 2. Despite this finding, however, at Step 5, the ALJ further discussed why these were not severe and disabling impairments. Manipulative limitations from right arm tendinitis and carpal tunnel. At Step 5, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's RFC allowed her to perform the entire range of unskilled, sedentary occupations 1285 and jobs.[45] This type of work requires the ability to use one's hands in a repetitive and manipulative fashion. Unskilled sedentary work also involves other activities, classified as "nonexertional," such as capacities for seeing, manipulation, and understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions.[46] Manipulative limitations: Most unskilled sedentary jobs require good use of both hands and the fingers; i.e., bilateral manual dexterity. Fine movements of small objects require use of the fingers; e.g., to pick or pinch. Most unskilled sedentary jobs require good use of the hands and fingers for repetitive handfinger actions.[47] The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform such work, having no manipulative limitations. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion of Dr. Jones and failing to seek clarification of an inconsistency in Dr. Jones's RFC questionnaire. In a Residual Functional Capacity questionnaire completed by Dr. Jones on December 5, 1998, he answered questions IV and V in an apparently inconsistent way. Question IV stated: "Claimant can use hands for repetitive action such as ... simple grasping, pushing & pulling, fine manipulation." Dr. Jones checked boxes indicating that Plaintiff could not perform any of these repetitive actions, with either her right or left hand. Question V asked: "Is there evidence of any disorder that would limit in any way repetitive hand action involving: simple grasping, pushing & pulling, fine manipulation." Dr. Jones checked boxes indicating that there was no evidence of any disorder that would limit any of these repetitive actions in either her right or left hand.[48] The ALJ noted that "the evaluation of manipulative function is obviously recorded incorrectly in that Dr. Jones expresses alternately that total manipulative limitation is present while indicating that there is no disorder presented that limits manipulative ability. Clearly the claimant does not present with a complete loss of manipulative ability. Thus, the ALJ concluded that there was no manipulative limitation." The ALJ erred in several respects. First, rather than seek clarification from Dr. Jones, the ALJ assumed that Dr. Jones meant to represent that Plaintiff had no manipulative limitation. Such a finding would be consistent with Dr. Thompson's observations and tests during his March 1998 and August 1998 examinations. But, the ALJ's finding ignored Dr. Jones's clinical findings in May 1998, that he tested Plaintiff for carpal tunnel and she had a "positive Tinel's" and "positive Phalen's" indicative of "some symptomatology of carpal tunnel."[49] Obviously, the ALJ's assumption and conclusion that there was no manipulative limitation excluded the possibility that there was some limitation. Generally, the ALJ is "required to give controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion about the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, and any physical or mental restrictions, if `it is well supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and if it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.'"[50] A treating physician's 1286 report can be rejected "if it is brief, conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence" or is "not supported by specific findings."[51] When a treating physician's opinion is inconsistent with other medical evidence, the ALJ should examine the reports of other physicians to determine whether they outweigh the report of the treating physician.[52] But, the ALJ gave controlling weight to the consultative physician's opinion that Plaintiff did not have carpal tunnel, noting that carpal tunnel was only "provisionally diagnosed" by Dr. Jones, whose order for nerve conduction tests was not carried out.[53] The fact that the nerve conduction tests were not performed is an insufficient reason to reject the treating physician's findings and opinion.[54] Moreover, Dr. Jones performed the same clinical tests as Dr. Thompson performed, the Tinel's and Phalen's tests.[55] Inexplicably, the ALJ accepted Dr. Thompson's negative findings as conclusive, and rejected Dr. Jones's positive findings, when their respective findings were based on the same tests. Giving Dr. Thompson's findings more weight is not justified, when other evidence in the record supports Dr. Jones's positive findings of carpal tunnel. Plaintiff recounted a history of problems with tendinitis and carpal tunnel in her right hand and arm. She was treated for the tendinitis more than 20 years ago, and the condition was aggravated by the accident. In addition, her testimony was that she has numbness and pain in her right hand and arm after using them for 30 minutes, and that peeling potatoes causes her fingers to ache.[56] The ALJ discounted this other evidence supportive of Dr. Jones's opinion, however, because the ALJ found Plaintiff's claims not credible. He noted that Plaintiff did not complain to any physician of record about her right hand or arm until her August 1998 consultative examination with Dr. Thompson.[57] That is not true. Dr. Jones's clinical notes reflect that he tested Plaintiff for carpal tunnel in May 1998; and in a Reconsideration Disability Report she filed in July 1998, Plaintiff complained of carpal tunnel and numbness in her right wrist and arm.[58] The ALJ further questioned Plaintiff's credibility by noting that she cancelled her appointment with the physician Dr. Jones referred her to and never obtained a nerve conduction test.[59] The extensiveness of a claimant's attempts to obtain medical relief, or failure to comply with a physician's directives, is one of many factors relevant in considering the credibility of the claimant's subjective complaints.[60] Although credibility determinations 1287 are peculiarly in the province of the finder of fact and not overturned when supported by substantial evidence,[61] the ALJ's findings regarding credibility must be closely and affirmatively linked and logically connected to substantial evidence.[62] While the ALJ may rely upon claimant's failure to pursue treatment or take medication for determination on credibility, the ALJ must consider whether such treatment would have restored claimant's ability to work.[63] The ALJ did not articulate how obtaining a nerve conduction test would have provided Plaintiff any further relief than the cock-up splint and pain medication prescribed by Dr. Jones. Moreover, the record shows that Plaintiff was a "self pay" patient;[64] and Plaintiff testified that she could not afford the $700 to $800 cost of the nerve conduction tests, and that Dr. Jones's office indicated that they would check to see if "disability" would pay the cost.[65] Given the differing opinions of Dr. Jones and Dr. Thompson, and the evidence supportive of Dr. Jones's opinion, even if of questionable credibility, the ALJ should have, at the very least, contacted Dr. Jones to seek clarification of his internally inconsistent statements in the RFC questionnaire. The regulations provide that the Commissioner must seek additional evidence or clarification from a medical source when the report from a medical source contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved.[66] And a Social Security Ruling provides that the Commissioner must make a reasonable effort to recontact treating sources for any needed clarification of their opinions.[67] Clarification of whether Plaintiff has manipulative limitations, and if so, to what extent, might have a significant impact on her RFC. "Any significant manipulative limitation of an individual's ability to handle and work with small objects with both hands will result in a significant erosion of the unskilled sedentary occupational base."[68] This is demonstrated by the vocational expert's response to one of the hypotheticals posed by the ALJ in this case, that assumed the limitations in Dr. Jones's RFC, except she has manipulative limitations, and is able to use her right hand for only 30 minutes at a time, necessitating a 5 to 10 minute break before resuming use of the right hand. The right hand is her dominant hand, except she does not use it for writing. The vocational expert opined that given these limitations, the sedentary base of jobs would be reduced by 90 to 95 percent.[69] Thus, the Court concludes that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that there was no manipulative limitation. The matter shall be remanded back to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Upon remand, the Commissioner shall clarify Plaintiff's manipulative limitations and the impact on her RFC. 1288 Impairments of Lower Extremities Ability to Stoop The ALJ found at Steps 2 and 5 that Plaintiff has severe impairments from a broken left femur and broken right calcaneus.[70] The ALJ concluded that these impairments allow her to have an RFC to perform the physical exertion requirements of sedentary work, lifting and carrying up to 10 pounds frequently, standing and walking up to 2 hours in an 8 hour workday and sitting for an entire 8 hour workday. The full range of sedentary work, requires the ability to lift no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally to lift or carry articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one that involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. "Occasionally" means occurring from very little up to one-third of the time, and would generally total no more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday. Sitting would generally total about 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.[71] Furthermore, in sedentary work, Postural limitations or restrictions related to such activities as climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, balancing, kneeling, crouching, or crawling would not usually erode the occupational base for a full range of unskilled sedentary work significantly because those activities are not usually required in sedentary work. An ability to stoop occasionally; i.e., from very little up to one-third of the time, is required in most unskilled sedentary occupations. A complete inability to stoop would significantly erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base and a finding that the individual is disabled would usually apply, but restriction to occasional stooping should, by itself, only minimally erode the unskilled occupational base of sedentary work.[72] The ALJ stated that Plaintiff's RFC is reduced because she can only occasionally bend, squat, crawl, climb, stoop, crouch or kneel.[73] But Plaintiff argues that there is no substantial evidence supporting his finding that she can occasionally stoop. In fact, Dr. Jones, her treating physician stated in the RFC questionnaire that Plaintiff can occasionally bend or crawl, but can never squat, climb, stoop, crouch or kneel.[74] The ALJ disregarded this finding of Dr. Jones, however, because: Dr. Jones's assessment that the claimant is capable of occasional bending must supersede the inconsistent finding in his evaluation that the claimant is incapable of stooping, crouching, kneeling and crawling. Under Social Security Ruling 85-15 these functions are defined in basic terms. Stooping, kneeling, crouching, and to some extent crawling, are described as synonymous with bending in that they are all progressive forms of bending parts of the body. Since the claimant is seen by Dr. Jones as capable of occasional bending overall, it must be concluded that she is capable of occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling.[75] However, nothing in the RFC questionnaire filled out by Dr. Jones would inform him that if he indicates that Plaintiff can bend "occasionally" he is also indicating 1289 that she can perform the other listed actions occasionally. On the contrary, the form asks for a separate evaluation of the claimant's ability to "bend, squat, crawl, climb, reach above, stoop, crouch, kneel" and the respondent is to separately check whether claimant is able to do each activity "not at all," "occasionally," "frequently," or "continuously."[76] Thus, the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Jones's assessment that Plaintiff could never squat, climb, stoop, crouch or kneel, and could only occasionally bend or crawl. In particular, by rejecting Dr. Jones's assessment that Plaintiff could never stoop, the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the vocational expert which included that Plaintiff could occasionally stoop. Stooping is necessary in sedentary work; a restriction to occasional stooping minimally erodes, and a complete inability to stoop significantly erodes, the unskilled sedentary occupational base. Thus, the ALJ's error was material to the Step 5 determination of whether there are jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. Because there is no substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff can occasionally stoop, the matter shall be remanded back to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Upon remand, the Commissioner shall include Plaintiff's complete inability to stoop in his consideration of her RFC. Ability to Sit or Stand without breaks In a sedentary position, Although sitting is involved, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.... Since being on one's feet is required "occasionally" at the sedentary level of exertion, periods of standing or walking should generally total no more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday, and sitting should generally total approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.[77] The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to stand and walk up to 2 hours in an 8 hour workday; and to sit for an entire 8 hour workday.[78] Plaintiff argues that there is no substantial evidence to support his finding; she has difficulty standing for more than 11⁄2 hours and difficulty walking at a normal pace for more than 30 to 45 minutes. After standing or walking for these periods of time, she must take a 10 to 15 minute break.[79] She noted that the weather and how much she has already walked, both affect her stamina, but that after 30 minutes to an hour, she needs to walk around and stretch to get relief.[80] Plaintiff claimed that her ability to sit, stand and walk was limited by pain in her heel, leg, and back. Having to shift positions or stand up and walk around every 30 minutes is a significant non-exertional limitation, because a normal workday permits breaks only once every 2 hours. Although some positions allow for alternate sitting and standing, particularly for unskilled occupations, most jobs have ongoing work processes which demand that a worker be in a certain place or posture for at least a certain length of time to accomplish a certain task. Unskilled types of jobs are particularly structured so that a person cannot ordinarily sit or stand at will.[81] 1290 The ALJ found Plaintiff's subjective claims of impairment, symptoms and pain in the lower extremities credible only "to the extent that they do not exceed the limitations set forth in the residual functional capacity determination." That is to say, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's subjective claims were credible only to the extent that they supported his ultimate determination[82] that she could stand or walk for 2 hours in an 8 hour workday and sit for an entire 8 hour workday. The proper analysis of evidence of alleged disabling pain was set forth by the Tenth Circuit in Luna v. Bowen.[83] This analysis requires consideration of (1) whether plaintiff established a pain-producing impairment by objective medical evidence; (2) if so, whether there is a "loose nexus" between the proven impairment and the plaintiff's subjective allegations of pain; and (3) if so, whether considering all the evidence, both objective and subjective, plaintiff's pain is in fact disabling.[84] With respect to Plaintiff's claim of back pain, the ALJ found insignificant objective evidence of a pain producing impairment; an x-ray of the lumbar spine showed only minimal end plate spurring at L3-4.[85] The ALJ did not explain how this "minimal spurring" meant there was no objective evidence of a back injury. However, Dr. Thompson's examination also suggested that Plaintiff had no significant back injury. He found that her straight leg raising was negative and there were no paraspinous muscle spasms.[86] The ALJ did acknowledge, however, that there was objective medical evidence that Plaintiff had a lower extremity pain-producing impairment in her heel and leg.[87] If a pain-producing impairment is demonstrated by objective medical evidence, the decision maker must consider the relationship between the impairment and the pain alleged. Although the ALJ found that the medical record did not reflect an impairment consistent with more than moderate right heel and left leg pain, the claimant does not have to prove by objective medical evidence that the extent of her impairment is sufficient to cause the pain alleged. She only need show a loose nexus.[88] The impairment or abnormality must be one which could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain. If an appropriate nexus does exist, the decision maker must then consider all the evidence presented to determine whether the claimant's pain is in fact disabling.[89] This is in recognition that "the severity of pain is inherently subjective."[90] Plaintiff's testimony and contemporaneous complaints to physicians provide adequate evidence that there were impairments of her lower and upper extremities that at least had a loose nexus with the pain she complains of. Therefore, at the third step of the Luna analysis, the ALJ considers a number of factors in determining whether claimant's complaints of pain are credible.[91] Those 1291 factors include: the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain relief, the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence.[92] Applying those factors, the ALJ found that: there were inconsistencies in Plaintiff's statements regarding her ability for prolonged sitting. She testified she is able to sit for no more than 30 minutes to 1 hour; but in March 1998, she told Dr. Thompson that she could sit for 3 to 4 hours.[93] While the ALJ noted that there was no evidence in the record of any worsening in her condition that would explain this inconsistency, that is not entirely accurate. Plaintiff testified, and according to his clinical notes, also related to Dr. Thompson in March 1998 and August 1998, that her ability to sit, stand and walk varied with the weather; and her ability for prolonged sitting depended in part on whether she was sitting in a chair or her recliner.[94] The ALJ also noted that based on Plaintiff's account, the range of her routine daily activities involved "caring for several small children, cooking and housework as well as some recreational activity."[95] But, the ability to perform a limited daily routine does not establish the absence of disability.[96] Therefore, an ALJ "may not rely on minimal daily activities as substantial evidence that a claimant does not suffer disabling pain."[97] Nor should the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff occasionally goes camping,[98] serve to establish the absence of disability, for sporadic diversions are not very probative of RFC, just as sporadic work is not.[99] Although Plaintiff cares for three children between the ages of 7 and 13, and cooks and performs some household tasks, she is limited by her inability to stoop or reach down; by back, leg and arm pain after a period of activity; and by her need to take 10 to 15 minute breaks while cooking and doing household tasks. And, this is on her "good days." On her bad days she is able to do much less, and is primarily limited to sitting in her recliner. Such limited and sporadic performance of daily activities does not negate the possibility of disability.[100] The ALJ also noted that the post-surgery treatment of the fractures had been relatively conservative; and that Plaintiff had been able to obtain relief from pain with over the counter medications and did not need stronger prescription medicine for pain relief more than 2-3 times a month.[101] But, the ALJ neglected to mention that Plaintiff had been plagued by 1292 continuous pain that was not always relieved by pain medication. In February 1998, Dr. Jones prescribed Voltaren for pain in Plaintiff's knee and heel, and when he saw her again in May 1998, he switched her to Daypro because she obtained no relief from the Voltaren.[102] In an undated statement, Plaintiff stated that she was taking 2 tablets of Daypro every day and 1-2 tablets of Ultram every 6 hours as needed, both prescribed by Dr. Jones. She also indicated that she takes Advil as needed for pain.[103] In March 1998, Plaintiff complained to Dr. Thompson that she was up 3-4 times a night with pain; and in August 1998 she complained to him that she was up twice a night with pain.[104] The ALJ did not mention that Dr. Thompson noted in his August 1998 examination of Plaintiff that while her reflex, sensation and motor function findings were within normal limits, Plaintiff demonstrated severe difficulty with hopping, squatting and heel-to-toe walking, and she exhibited moderate to severe difficulty with any orthopedic maneuver.[105] On the other hand, there is evidence supporting the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's claims are not entirely credible. Dr. Jones, the treating physician, had opined that Plaintiff's heel and femur fractures objectively supported no more than slight pain and that no physician had placed exertional restrictions on Plaintiff below the sedentary level. Furthermore, Dr. Jones had monitored Plaintiff for a year after her surgery; and Dr. Jones had found that she was healing satisfactorily and could increase her activities.[106] It is proper for the ALJ to consider the extent of the objective evidence in determining whether it is consistent with plaintiff's subjective evidence.[107] Although the ALJ must consider plaintiff's subjective complaints, the ALJ does not have to accept them as true.[108] A credibility determination is left to the ALJ as the trier of fact, and the ALJ's credibility findings are traditionally given particular deference.[109] The ALJ's credibility findings must be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.[110] Because there was some basis in the record for the ALJ to disbelieve Plaintiff's claims of pain, the Court defers to the ALJ's conclusion in that regard.[111] Unless there is a conspicuous absence of credible evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion, which there is not, the Court should treat the ALJ's credibility determination as binding upon review.[112] *1293 Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in concluding that Plaintiff's subjective claims of pain were not entirely credible, but credible only to the extent that her RFC allowed her to stand up to 2 hours out of an 8 hour workday and sit for the entire 8 hour workday. Conclusion Reviewing the record as a whole, the Court concludes that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that this case be reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT UPON REMAND, the Commissioner shall: (1) include Plaintiff's right arm tendinitis and carpal tunnel syndrome in his consideration of her severe impairments and RFC; and (2) include Plaintiff's manipulative limitations and complete inability to stoop in his consideration of her RFC. IT IS SO ORDERED. NOTES [1] This action is brought under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. [2] Tr. 22 [3] Tr. 66 [4] Tr. 138-139, 206 [5] Tr. 26-27 [6] Tr. 22-23 [7] Tr. 5-6 [8] Tr. 206 [9] Tr. 224, 206 [10] Tr. 224 [11] Tr. 233 [12] Tr. 213-214, 224 [13] Tr. 214 [14] Tr. 207-210 [15] Tr. 211-212 [16] Tr. 210-211 [17] Tr. 213-215 [18] Tr. 212-213 [19] Tr. 209-211 [20] Tr. 211-212 [21] Tr. 232 [22] Tr. 212-213 [23] Tr. 225-226, 215-216 [24] Tr. 215-217 [25] Tr. 219 [26] Tr. 218-222 [27] Tr 21-22 [28] Hamilton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 961 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir.1992). [29] Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.1997). [30] Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (quotations omitted). [31] Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991). [32] Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir.1988); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. [33] Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d 706, 710 (10th Cir.1989). Disability is defined as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ..." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). [34] Id. [35] Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, (10th Cir.1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). [36] Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 142, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987). [37] Tr. 15, 19 [38] Tr. 16, 18-19 [39] Tr. 227 [40] Tr. 15 [41] Tr. 15-16, 175, 192 [42] Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir.1997). [43] Tr. 145 [44] Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.1987); Turner v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 326, 329 (10th Cir.1985). [45] Tr. 22 [46] SSR 96-9p [47] Id. [48] Tr. 200-201 [49] Tr. 145 [50] Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir.1995) (quotation omitted); See also Security Ruling 96-2p (stating that where a treating physician's medical opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record, it must be given controlling weight). [51] Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 301 (10th Cir.1988); Castellano v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994). [52] Goatcher v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 52 F.3d 288, 289-90 (10th Cir.1995). [53] Tr. 17 [54] See Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir.1987). [55] Tr. 145 [56] Tr. 215-17, 219 [57] Tr. 18 [58] Tr. 145, 99 [59] Tr. 16 [60] See Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir.1995) (stating that when considering the credibility of subjective complaints, the ALJ should consider factors such as "the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain relief, the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence") (quoting Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir.1991)). [61] Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir.1990). [62] See Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391; Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1131 (10th Cir.1988). [63] See Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir.1987) [64] Tr. 145 [65] Tr. 226 [66] 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1). [67] SSR 96-5p. [68] SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185. [69] Tr. 236 [70] Tr. 15 [71] SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185. [72] Id. [73] Tr. 22 [74] Tr. 201 [75] Tr. 19 [76] Tr. 201 [77] SSR 83-10 [78] Tr. 22 [79] Tr. 207-210 [80] Tr. 211-212 [81] SSR 83-12. [82] Tr. 21 [83] 834 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir.1987). [84] See Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390 (10th Cir.1995). [85] Tr. 16, 194 [86] Tr. 175 [87] Tr. 17 [88] Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.1993). [89] Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). [90] Luna, 834 F.2d at 165. [91] Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir.1993). [92] Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir.1991)). [93] Tr. 174 [94] Tr. 174, 191, 211-212 [95] Tr. 18 [96] Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987). [97] Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir.1993). [98] Tr. 15 [99] Martin v. Bowen, 652 F. Supp. 1270 (D.Kan.1987). [100] Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 516-17 (10th Cir.1987) [101] Tr. 17-18 [102] Tr. 145-147 [103] Tr. 106 [104] Tr. 174, 191 [105] Tr. 191-94 [106] Tr. 145-147 [107] See Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir.1990) (medical records must be consistent with nonmedical testimony as to severity of pain). [108] Arensman v. Apfel, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1254 (D.Kan.1999). [109] Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 755 (10th Cir.1988) (citing Beavers v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.1978)). [110] Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534, 537 (10th Cir.1990). [111] Ward v. Apfel, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D.Kan. 1999). [112] See Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir.1992)
en	legislation	UK	Citation, commencement and interpretation 1 1 This Order may be cited as the Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme (Amendment) Order 2011 and shall come into force on 11th April 2011. 2 In this Order “the principal Scheme” means the Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme 1983 . Amendments to the principal Scheme 2 1 For Schedule 3 to the principal Scheme substitute the Schedule set out in Schedule 1 to this Order. 2 For Schedule 4 to the principal Scheme substitute the Schedule set out in Schedule 2 to this Order. Andrew Robathan Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Ministry of Defence 14th March 2011 We approve Michael Fabricant Angela Watkinson Two of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury 15th March 2011
it	other	N/A	DOMANDA DI PARTECIPAZIONE A CONCORSO PUBBLICO - PDF Download "DOMANDA DI PARTECIPAZIONE A CONCORSO PUBBLICO" 1 ALLEGATO N. 1 DOMANDA DI PARTECIPAZIONE A CONCORSO PUBBLICO AL DIRETTORE GENERALE A.S.L. N. 3 GENOVESE Il/La sottoscritto/a (Cognome) (Nome) Nato/a a (Città) (Prov) il chiede di essere ammesso al Concorso pubblico, per titoli ed esami, riservato agli aventi diritto al collocamento obbligatorio al lavoro, appartenenti alle categorie protette, ai sensi art. 18 comma 2 - della legge n. 68/1999, per la copertura a tempo indeterminato di n. 1 posto di Assistente Tecnico Geometra / Categoria C, pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale n. del. A TAL FINE, CONSAPEVOLE DELLE SANZIONI PENALI PREVISTE DALL ART. 76 D.P.R. N. 445/2000 NEI CASI DI FALSITA IN ATTI E DICHIARAZIONI MENDACI, DICHIARA SOTTO LA PROPRIA RESPONSABILITA : 1. di essere residente in (Città) (Prov) (indirizzo) n. CAP ; 2. di impegnarsi a comunicare tempestivamente eventuali variazioni di indirizzo, sollevando l Azienda da responsabilità in caso di mancata o tardiva comunicazione del cambiamento del sottoindicato domicilio eletto per ricevere ogni comunicazione relativa al presente concorso: (Città) (Prov) (indirizzo) n. CAP Telefono e mail ; 3. di essere in possesso della cittadinanza ; 4. di essere iscritto/a nelle liste elettorali del Comune di (o Stato estero) ; 5. di NON avere riportato condanne penali e di NON avere carichi pendenti; (oppure compilare il punto 6) Pag. 1 di 6 2 6. di aver riportato le seguenti condanne penali e / o carichi pendenti 1 ; 7. di essere in possesso del Diploma di Scuola Secondaria di Secondo Grado di conseguito presso di il ; 8. di essere iscritto/a negli elenchi dei disoccupati appartenenti alle categorie protette, ai sensi art. 18 comma 2 legge 68/1999, del Centro per l Impiego della Provincia di Genova 9. di trovarsi, relativamente agli obblighi di leva, nella seguente posizione: ; 10. di avere prestato servizio presso Pubbliche Amministrazioni; (oppure scegliere il punto 12) di NON avere prestato servizio presso Pubbliche Amministrazioni; 12. di scegliere, in caso di idoneità a sostenere la prova orale, la seguente lingua straniera: ; 13. di avere diritto alla riserva del posto, in caso di idoneità, in quanto: ; 14. di essere in possesso dei seguenti titoli che conferiscono diritto di preferenza a parità di punteggio: ; 15. di essere portatore di Handicap ai sensi dell art. 3 della legge 5 febbraio 1992, n. 104 e, pertanto, di avere necessità, nel corso dello svolgimento delle prove, dei seguenti tempi aggiuntivi nonché dei seguenti ausili ; (da compilare in caso di cittadinanza diversa da quella italiana, ai sensi del DPCM , n. 174) 16. di godere dei diritti civili e politici nello Stato di ; 17. di essere in possesso degli altri requisiti previsti dal bando per i cittadini della Repubblica Italiana; 18. di avere una adeguata conoscenza della lingua italiana. 1 Indicare titolo del reato e numero di iscrizione a ruolo CONDANNE E CARICHI RIPORTATI SONO DA INDICARSI COMUNQUE, anche se sia stata concessa amnistia, indulto, condono o perdono giudiziale, sospensione della pena, beneficio della non menzione, etc 2 Certificare all interno del curriculum vitae, fornendo tutti i dati necessari così come indicato al punto 7) del bando Pag. 2 di 6 3 Dichiara, infine, di essere informato/a che: in caso di assunzione in condizioni di particolare necessità e urgenza la comunicazione dell assunzione gli potrà essere data, oltre che mediante lettera raccomandata A/R, tramite messaggio di posta elettronica o altro strumento ritenuto idoneo dall Azienda. Allega: curriculum formativo e professionale datato e firmato; (vedere bando al paragrafo MODALITA GENERALI PER IL RILASCIO DI DICHIARAZIONI SOSTITUTIVE ) elenco datato e firmato dei documenti e titoli presentati, numerati progressivamente in relazione al corrispondente titolo; fotocopia fronte / retro di valido documento di identità. IL/LA SOTTOSCRITTO/A AUTORIZZA, AI SENSI DEL D.LGS. 196/2003, CODESTA AZIENDA AL TRATTAMENTO DEI PROPRI DATI PERSONALI, FINALIZZATO ALL ESPLETAMENTO DELLA PRESENTE PROCEDURA CONCORSUALE E DICHIARA DI CONOSCERE ESPLICITAMENTE TUTTE LE CLAUSOLE DEL RELATIVO BANDO. Luogo Data Firma 3 3 Ai sensi dell art. 39 del D.P.R. 445/2000, la firma non è soggetta ad autenticazione. Pag. 3 di 6 4 ALLEGATO 2 FAC-SIMILE DICHIARAZIONE SOSTITUTIVA DI CERTIFICAZIONE (Art. 46 D.P.R , n. 445) Il sottoscritto, nato a il e residente in, Via, a conoscenza delle sanzioni penali, previste dall art. 76 del D.P.R. nel bando di concorso pubblico, relativo alla procedura in argomento), , n. 445 (riportato per esteso Di essere in possesso del seguente titolo di studio: DICHIARA Sotto la propria responsabilità conseguito in data presso con la seguente votazione Di essere in possesso dell abilitazione allo svolgimento della professione di: ottenuta in data presso Di aver partecipato ai seguenti Corsi di Formazione e di Aggiornamento professionale qualificanti ed attinenti al posto da ricoprire: titolo del corso dal al presso n. ore ovvero n. giorni ovvero n. crediti ECM con superamento di esame finale punteggio /valutazione esame finale su (spazio libero per eventuali altre dichiarazioni) Genova, Firma del dichiarante Pag. 4 di 6 5 ALLEGATO 3 FAC-SIMILE DICHIARAZIONE SOSTITUTIVA DI ATTO DI NOTORIETA (Art. 47 D.P.R , n. 445) Il sottoscritto, nato a il e residente in, Via, a conoscenza delle sanzioni penali, previste dall art. 76 del D.P.R. nel bando di concorso pubblico, relativo alla procedura in argomento), , n. 445 (riportato per esteso DICHIARA Sotto la propria responsabilità Di aver prestato attività professionale con rapporto di lavoro subordinato: presso (Azienda Sanitaria Ospedaliera P.A.) di (località) (indirizzo) nel profilo professionale/mansione disciplina: dal al (indicare causa di cessazione) con rapporto di lavoro a tempo determinato/indeterminato tipologia pieno/ parziale % per ore settimanali di aver svolto le seguenti attività professionali con rapporto di lavoro diverso da quello subordinato presso (Azienda Sanitaria Ospedaliera P.A.) di (località) (indirizzo) nel profilo professionale/mansione disciplina: tipo di rapporto di lavoro (libero professionale, autonomo, collaborazione, borsa di studio, ecc.) per n. ore settimanali Di aver svolto i seguenti incarichi di insegnamento conferiti da Enti Pubblici specifici rispetto al posto da ricoprire: presso materia di insegnamento anno ore (spazio libero per eventuali altre dichiarazioni) Genova, Firma del dichiarante Pag. 5 di 6 6 ALLEGATO 4 FAC-SIMILE DICHIARAZIONE SOSTITUTIVA ATTO DI NOTORIETA (Artt. 19 e 47 D.P.R , n. 445) Il sottoscritto, nato a il e residente in, Via, a conoscenza delle sanzioni penali, previste dall art. 76 del D.P.R , n. 445 (riportato per esteso nel bando di concorso pubblico, relativo alla procedura in argomento), DICHIARA Sotto la propria responsabilità Che le fotocopie allegate alla presente domanda, numerate da n. 1 a n. sono conformi all originale in suo possesso. Genova, Firma del dichiarante Pag. 6 di 6 ---------AZIENDA SANITARIA LOCALE 3 GENOVESE STRUTTURA COMPLESSA SERVIZIO AMMINISTRAZIONE DEL PERSONALE ---------AZIENDA SANITARIA LOCALE 3 GENOVESE STRUTTURA COMPLESSA SERVIZIO AMMINISTRAZIONE DEL PERSONALE Via A. Bertani n. 4-16125 GENOVA - Tel. 010/84911 BANDO DI CONCORSO PUBBLICO, PER TITOLI ED ESAMI,
de	wikipedia	N/A	Adelaide Ferreira (eigentlich: Maria Adelaide Mengas Matafome Ferreira, * 23. September 1959 in Alcanena) ist eine portugiesische Sängerin und Schauspielerin. Erste Singles von ihr erschienen ab 1978, ein Hit in Portugal wurde die 1981er Rocksingle Baby Suicida. Sie gewann 1985 das Festival da Canção und durfte daher beim Eurovision Song Contest 1985 in Göteborg für ihr Land antreten. Mit der Ballade Penso em ti (Eu sei) gelangte sie nur auf Platz 18. Dennoch blieb sie bis heute eine populäre Sängerin in ihrer Heimat mit einer ganzen Reihe von Singles und Alben. Ab Anfang der 1980er Jahre wurde sie neben der Musik auch als Schauspielerin aktiv. Ihre wohl bedeutendste Rolle war in dem 1980er Spielfilm Kilas, o Mau da Fita. Seit Mitte der 1980er kann man sie in portugiesischen Telenovelas sehen. 2015 nahm sie mit dem Lied Paz erneut am Festival da Canção teil, schied aber bereits im Halbfinale aus. 2016 ist sie in einer der Hauptrollen im Stück Parque á vista im Teatro Maria Vitória in Lissabon zu sehen. Diskografie (Alben) 1986 – Entre Um Coco e Um Adeus 1989 – Amantes Imortais 1996 – O Realizador está Louco 1998 – Só Baladas 2000 – Sentidos 2006 – Mais Forte que a Paixão 2008 – O Melhor de Adelaide Ferreira 2011 – Colecção Grandes Êxitos 2011 – Esqueco-me de te Esquecer Weblinks Einzelnachweise Musiker (Portugal) Sänger Filmschauspieler Teilnehmer am Festival da Canção Interpret eines portugiesischen Beitrags beim Eurovision Song Contest Portugiese Geboren 1959 Frau
it	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 31997R2519 Regolamento (CE) n. 2519/97 della Commissione del 16 dicembre 1997 che stabilisce le modalità generali per la mobilitazione di prodotti da fornire a titolo del regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96 del Consiglio per l'aiuto alimentare comunitario Gazzetta ufficiale n. L 346 del 17/12/1997 pag. 0023 - 0040 REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 2519/97 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 16 dicembre 1997 che stabilisce le modalità generali per la mobilitazione di prodotti da fornire a titolo del regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96 del Consiglio per l'aiuto alimentare comunitario LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE,visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea,visto il regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96 del Consiglio, del 27 giugno 1996, relativo alla politica e alla gestione dell'aiuto alimentare e ad azioni specifiche di sostegno alla sicurezza alimentare (1), in particolare l'articolo 22,considerando che, alla luce dell'esperienza, sembra opportuno modificare il regolamento (CEE) n. 2200/87 della Commissione, dell'8 luglio 1987, che stabilisce le modalità generali per la mobilitazione, nella Comunità, di prodotti a titolo di aiuto alimentare comunitario (2), modificato dal regolamento (CEE) n. 790/91 (3); che a fini di chiarezza occorre procedere alla rifusione di detto regolamento;considerando che appare opportuno riaffermare l'importanza dell'uguaglianza dell'accesso da parte degli operatori economici alle operazioni di fornitura; che la procedura di gara assicura le stesse garanzie in materia rispetto a una procedura di aggiudicazione;considerando che occorre inserire la mobilitazione di prodotti al di fuori della Comunità in un quadro regolamentare; che visto tale inserimento è opportuno indicare che, tenuto conto degli obblighi specifici, anche derogatori alle prassi commerciali abituali, non viene fatto riferimento in generale agli Incoterms;considerando che è opportuno prevedere la possibilità di affidare l'acquisto dei prodotti da fornire, sia sul mercato comunitario che fuori della Comunità, a organismi internazionali e non governativi beneficiari essi stessi degli aiuti;considerando che è opportuno prevedere la possibilità di incaricare un'impresa o un organismo di eseguire totalmente o in parte le azioni di aiuto alimentare;considerando che occorre prevedere la possibilità di ricorrere alla trattativa privata in particolari circostanze giustificate;considerando che occorre prevedere la fornitura di prodotti reso destino via terra in considerazione dei nuovi paesi beneficiari dell'aiuto alimentare, in particolare i paesi del Caucaso e dell'Asia centrale;considerando che per alcuni organismi beneficiari dell'aiuto alimentare può essere opportuna la fornitura franco fabbrica o franco vettore;considerando che occorre rendere le procedure di mobilitazione il più possibile agili e flessibili in funzione delle diverse condizioni cui è assoggettato l'aiuto alimentare comunitario;considerando che le misure previste dal presente regolamento sono conformi al parere del comitato della sicurezza e dell'aiuto alimentare,HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO:CAPO I Disposizioni generali Articolo 1 1. Qualora, in vista dell'esecuzione di un'azione comunitaria nell'ambito delle azioni previste dal regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96, si decida di procedere ad una mobilitazione di prodotti, si applicano le modalità previste dal presente regolamento.2. Il presente regolamento si applica per forniture da effettuare:- o franco fabbrica o franco vettore,- o reso porto d'imbarco,- o reso porto di sbarco,- o reso destino.3. Qualora gli acquisti vengano effettuati negli stessi paesi beneficiari, la Commissione può adottare disposizioni particolari stabilite nel bando di gara di cui all'articolo 6, per tener conto degli usi dei paesi e dei loro operatori.Articolo 2 1. La partecipazione alle gare previste nel quadro del presente regolamento è aperta, a parità di condizioni, a tutte le persone fisiche e giuridiche, in prosieguo denominate «imprese»,- della Comunità, ai sensi dell'articolo 58 del trattato;- di uno Stato membro stabilite fuori della Comunità, o società marittime stabilite fuori della Comunità e controllate da cittadini di uno Stato membro, se le loro navi sono registrate in tale Stato membro conformemente alla sua legislazione;- di un paese beneficiario compreso nell'elenco allegato al regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96;- alle condizioni stabilite agli articoli 11 e 17 del regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96, del paese in cui sarà effettuata la mobilitazione.2. La Commissione può escludere dalla partecipazione alle gare, in via provvisoria o definitiva, le imprese che risultino aver commesso un'infrazione grave a uno degli obblighi inerenti all'esecuzione di un'azione di aiuto alimentare o di un'altra operazione finanziata dalla Comunità.Articolo 3 1. La Commissione può autorizzare le organizzazioni internazionali e non governative beneficiarie dell'aiuto comunitario ad acquistare esse stesse i prodotti da fornire a titolo di aiuto e a provvedere alla loro mobilitazione. In questo caso, la Commissione decide le modalità e le condizioni pertinenti.2. La Commissione può affidare, del tutto o in parte, la mobilitazione dei prodotti a titolo di aiuto comunitario a un'impresa o ad un organismo appositamente incaricato. In questo caso, la Commissione stabilisce le modalità e le condizioni del mandato.3. La Commissione fissa le modalità e le condizioni previste ai paragrafi 1 e 2 del presente articolo, conformemente all'articolo 22 del regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96, in applicazione delle disposizioni del presente regolamento.Articolo 4 1. Secondo le condizioni determinate per ciascuna fornitura, il prodotto da consegnare è acquistato nella Comunità, nel paese beneficiario o in un paese in via di sviluppo figurante nell'allegato del regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96, appartenente, se possibile, alla stessa regione geografica, conformemente alle disposizioni di cui all'articolo 11 del medesimo regolamento.2. In via eccezionale e secondo le modalità di cui all'articolo 11, paragrafo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96, l'acquisto può essere effettuato sul mercato di un paese diverso da quelli di cui al paragrafo 1.3. Quando l'acquisto è effettuato nella Comunità il prodotto può essere acquistato sul mercato, presso un organismo d'intervento designato nel bando di gara o fabbricato utilizzando un prodotto acquistato presso uno di tali organismi. In caso di acquisto presso un organismo d'intervento, l'acquisto è effettuato mediante vendita a prezzo fisso, secondo le disposizioni della vigente regolamentazione agricola comunitaria.4. Quando l'acquisto viene effettuato fuori della Comunità, la Commissione può indicare il paese d'origine dei prodotti da fornire per un'azione specifica.Articolo 5 Le caratteristiche dei prodotti da mobilitare e i requisiti in materia di confezionamento e di marcatura sono pubblicati nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee, serie C, salve le disposizioni speciali eventualmente adottate dalla Commissione e indicate nel bando di gara.CAPO II Procedure di aggiudicazione Articolo 6 1. La fornitura è aggiudicata mediante una delle seguenti procedure:a) gara aperta,b) gara ristretta,c) trattativa privata.2. In caso di gara aperta, viene pubblicato un bando di gara nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee conformemente all'allegato I, almeno quindici giorni prima della scadenza del termine per la presentazione delle offerte.3. In caso di gara ristretta, viene inviato un bando di gara ad almeno tre imprese mediante lettera o telecomunicazione scritta.Quando la mobilitazione si effettua nella Comunità, le imprese invitate sono scelte tra quelle che hanno partecipato alle gare di cui al paragrafo 2.Quando la mobilitazione si effettua fuori della Comunità, le imprese invitate sono quelle iscritte a tal fine presso la Commissione.Si può ricorrere alla procedura ristretta nei casi seguenti:a) mobilitazione fuori della Comunità;b) fornitura nell'ambito di una decisione di assegnazione presa a norma dell'articolo 24, paragrafo 1, lettera a) del regolamento (CE) n. 1292/96;c) fornitura decisa a seguito della risoluzione di un precedente contratto di fornitura;d) fornitura divenuta urgente dopo la decisione di assegnazione.4. In caso di trattativa privata una sola impresa è invitata a presentare un'offerta.Si può ricorrere alla trattativa privata quando le caratteristiche particolari di una fornitura lo richiedono e segnatamente quando si tratta di una fornitura effettuata a titolo sperimentale.5. La gara può comportare la fornitura di un determinato quantitativo o di un quantitativo massimo di prodotto per un dato importo.6. Una sola gara può raggruppare la fornitura di più lotti. Un lotto può essere suddiviso in più parti o riguardare diverse azioni.Articolo 7 1. Gli offerenti partecipano alla gara inviando un'offerta scritta, mediante lettera raccomandata, all'ufficio della Commissione indicato nel bando di gara, oppure consegnandola allo stesso, dietro ricevuta di ritorno. Le offerte vengono presentate in una busta recante la dicitura «Aiuto alimentare» e il numero di riferimento della gara. La busta deve essere sigillata e posta in un'altra recante l'indirizzo indicato nel bando di gara.Le offerte possono essere inviate anche mediante telecomunicazione scritta ai numeri indicati nel bando di gara. La congestione delle linee non può essere addotta quale giustificazione dell'inosservanza del termine per la presentazione delle offerte.Le offerte devono pervenire o essere consegnate integralmente entro il termine precisato nel bando di gara.2. Può essere presentata una sola offerta per ciascun lotto. L'offerta è valida soltanto se riguarda la totalità di un lotto. Quando un lotto è suddiviso in più parti, l'offerta definisce una media.Quando la gara comporta la fornitura di più lotti, viene presentata un'offerta distinta per ciascun lotto. L'offerente non è tenuto a presentare un'offerta per tutti i lotti di cui al bando di gara.Le offerte sono presentate secondo il modello figurante nell'allegato II, A e conformemente alle indicazioni fornite nell'allegato II, B.3. L'offerta indica quanto segue:a) il nome e l'indirizzo dell'offerente;b) gli estremi della gara, del lotto e il numero dell'azione;c) il peso netto del lotto o, in applicazione della lettera), l'importo stabilito, al quale l'offerta si riferisce;d) l'importo proposto, espresso in ecu per tonnellata di prodotto netta o in qualsiasi altra unità di misura precisata nel bando di gara, al quale l'offerente s'impegna ad effettuare la fornitura secondo le condizioni stabilite quando non si applichi la disposizione di cui alla lettera e);e) il quantitativo netto proposto, qualora la gara riguardi, per un determinato importo, la fornitura di un quantitativo massimo di un dato prodotto.L'offerta è formulata tenendo conto, da una parte, delle condizioni di mobilitazione di cui all'articolo 4 stabilite per la fornitura in oggetto e, dall'altra, della restituzione o della tassa applicabili all'esportazione, nonché degli altri importi compensativi fissati nella regolamentazione riguardante gli scambi di prodotti agricoli.Il bando di gara può richiedere che l'offerta includa tali importi di restituzione o altri importi.Le disposizioni del secondo e del terzo comma si applicano in quanto compatibili.4. Salvo il disposto del paragrafo 3, in caso di fornitura franco fabbrica o reso destino unicamente via terra, l'offerta indica al massimo due indirizzi di carico. In caso di fornitura franco vettore, l'indirizzo di carico è indicato nel bando di gara; la Commissione fa ricorso a questo stadio di consegna soltanto in circostanze speciali motivate.5. Salvo il disposto del paragrafo 3, in caso di fornitura reso porto di sbarco o reso destino via mare, l'offerta indica un solo porto d'imbarco. L'offerta può tuttavia indicare due porti qualora il carico non possa essere effettuato totalmente nel primo porto a causa della configurazione di quest'ultimo e debba essere completato sulla stessa nave nel secondo porto.6. Salvo il disposto del paragrafo 3, in caso di fornitura reso porto d'imbarco, l'offerta indica un solo porto accessibile alle navi d'altura che consenta di effettuare la fornitura alle condizioni stabilite. L'offerta può tuttavia indicare due porti quando il lotto sia suddiviso in più parti con luoghi di destinazione diversi.Per forniture non superiori a 3 000 t nette per lotto con una sola destinazione, il porto di carico è scelto in funzione della possibilità di un collegamento marittimo, con al massimo un trasbordo in un porto situato al di fuori della Comunità, con il paese di destinazione mediante una nave di linea o a carico parziale durante il periodo di consegna stabilito. In questo caso l'offerta è valida soltanto se è accompagnata dall'attestato di una compagnia marittima o del suo agente circa l'esistenza di tale collegamento.Per forniture di prodotti trasformati, riso compreso, in caso di mobilitazione nella Comunità, detto collegamento marittimo può comportare un trasbordo in un altro porto europeo della Comunità conforme alle condizioni fissate sopra; tale porto deve essere anch'esso indicato nell'offerta. Le spese relative al trasbordo sono a carico del fornitore.7. Quando si applica il paragrafo 3, lettera d), l'offerta è presentata nel modo seguente:a) in caso di fornitura franco fabbrica o franco vettore, l'offerente presenta un'unica offerta comprendente tutte le spese di carico e di sistemazione dei prodotti nei mezzi di trasporto messi a disposizione dal beneficiario;b) in caso di fornitura reso porto d'imbarco, l'offerente presenta un'unica offerta comprendente tutte le spese relative allo stadio di consegna indicato dal bando di gara;c) in caso di fornitura reso porto di sbarco, l'offerente indica contemporaneamente due importi:i) il primo per lo stadio di consegna previsto; l'offerta indica separatamente le singole spese corrispondenti al trasporto marittimo propriamente detto;ii) il secondo per lo stadio di consegna alternativo reso porto d'imbarco indicato nel bando di gara;d) in caso di fornitura reso destino via mare, l'offerente indica contemporaneamente due importi:i) il primo per lo stadio di consegna previsto; l'offerta indica separatamente le singole spese corrispondenti al trasporto continentale oltremare, da un lato, e al trasporto marittimo propriamente detto, dall'altro;ii) il secondo per lo stadio di consegna alternativo reso porto d'imbarco indicato nel bando di gara;e) in caso di fornitura reso destino unicamente via terra, l'offerente indica contemporaneamente due importi:i) il primo per lo stadio di consegna previsto; l'offerta indica separatamente le singole spese corrispondenti al trasporto terrestre propriamente detto;ii) il secondo per lo stadio di consegna alternativo franco fabbrica.8. Quando si applica il paragrafo 3, lettera e), il bando di gara precisa il modo di presentazione dell'offerta.9. L'offerta è valida soltanto se è accompagnata dalla prova della costituzione della garanzia di cui all'articolo 8. La garanzia viene comunicata secondo le modalità di cui al paragrafo 1 del presente articolo. Non è ammesso il semplice riferimento ad una garanzia costituita per uno stesso lotto in occasione di un'offerta precedente.10. L'offerta è valida soltanto se è presentata a norma del presente articolo e se non contiene riserve o condizioni diverse da quelle stabilite per la gara.11. A ricevimento avvenuto un'offerta non può essere né modificata né ritirata, tranne nel caso di cui all'articolo 9, paragrafo 4.Articolo 8 Per ciascun lotto intero, è costituita una garanzia d'offerta espressa in ecu. L'importo della garanzia è fissato nel bando di gara. Il periodo di validità è di almeno un mese, rinnovabile su richiesta della Commissione. La garanzia precisa che essa è costituita conformemente al presente articolo ed include le indicazioni di cui all'articolo 7, paragrafo 3, lettere a) e b). Un solo documento può riunire le garanzie relative a più lotti purché ad ogni lotto corrisponda un singolo importo.La garanzia è costituita a favore della Commissione, sotto forma di fideiussione prestata da un istituto di credito riconosciuto da uno Stato membro. In caso di mobilitazione fuori della Comunità, la garanzia può essere prestata da un istituto di credito situato fuori della Comunità e accettato dalla Commissione. La garanzia deve essere irrevocabile e poter esser fatta valere su semplice richiesta. La liberazione della garanzia può intervenire solo per iniziativa della Commissione. La garanzia è liberata o acquisita conformemente all'articolo 22. Non è prevista alcuna ricevuta.In caso di mobilitazione nel paese beneficiario dell'aiuto alimentare, la Commissione può definire nel bando di gara altre modalità per la garanzia in considerazione delle consuetudini del paese.Articolo 9 1. La fornitura è aggiudicata, entro un termine massimo di tre giorni lavorativi per gli acquisti comunitari e di quattro giorni lavorativi per gli acquisti fuori della Comunità a decorrere dalla scadenza del termine per la presentazione delle offerte, all'offerente che ha presentato l'offerta più bassa rispettando tutte le condizioni del bando di gara e in particolare le caratteristiche dei prodotti da mobilitare, in prosieguo: «il fornitore».2. Se l'offerta più bassa è presentata simultaneamente da più offerenti, la fornitura viene aggiudicata mediante estrazione a sorte.3. Nel caso di una fornitura prevista agli stadi reso porto di sbarco o reso destino si può tuttavia procedere all'aggiudicazione di una fornitura da effettuare allo stadio alternativo fissato nel bando di gara, vale a dire reso porto d'imbarco o franco fabbrica.4. Aggiudicata la fornitura, il fornitore e gli offerenti la cui offerta non è stata scelta sono informati dell'aggiudicazione mediante lettera o telecomunicazione scritta entro il termine di cui al paragrafo 1. Qualora la comunicazione dell'aggiudicazione sia inviata al fornitore dopo tale data, questi ha la facoltà di ritirare l'offerta il primo giorno lavorativo seguente.5. Ogni gara comporta due termini di presentazione distinti indicati nel bando di gara. Quando la fornitura non è aggiudicata alla scadenza del primo termine, la Commissione può rinviare l'aggiudicazione in funzione del secondo termine stabilito. Gli offerenti ne sono informati mediante lettera o telecomunicazione scritta, entro il termine di cui al paragrafo 1.II secondo termine di presentazione può eventualmente comportare nuove condizioni riguardo alla fornitura.6. La Commissione può non procedere all'aggiudicazione alla scadenza del primo o del secondo termine di presentazione, in particolare quando le offerte presentate non rientrino nella gamma dei prezzi normalmente praticati sul mercato. La Commissione non è tenuta a rendere noto il motivo della sua decisione. Gli offerenti sono informati dell'omessa aggiudicazione della fornitura mediante telecomunicazione scritta, entro il termine di cui al paragrafo 1.7. Quando la mobilitazione avviene nella Comunità, i risultati delle gare vengono pubblicati nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee, serie C.I risultati delle principali gare al di fuori della Comunità sono pubblicati periodicamente nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee, serie C.CAPO III Obblighi del fornitore e condizioni relative alla fornitura dei prodotti Articolo 10 1. Il fornitore adempie i propri obblighi in conformità delle condizioni indicate nel bando di gara e rispetta gli impegni di cui al presente regolamento, compresi quelli risultanti dalla sua offerta.Tutte le pertinenti condizioni generali e particolari si presumono conosciute e accettate dal fornitore.2. Per garantire il rispetto dei propri obblighi, il fornitore presenta, entro i dieci giorni lavorativi successivi alla comunicazione dell'aggiudicazione della fornitura, una garanzia di consegna alla Commissione. Tale garanzia, espressa in ecu, è pari al 10 % dell'importo dell'offerta per lotto. Il periodo di validità di tale garanzia deve essere di almeno un anno, rinnovabile su richiesta della Commissione. Essa è costituita conformemente alle disposizioni dell'articolo 8, secondo e terzo comma. La garanzia precisa che è costituita a norma del presente articolo ed include le indicazioni di cui all'articolo 7, paragrafo 3, lettere a) e b). Inoltre, essa indica il paese o l'organismo beneficiario dell'aiuto.3. Entro i dieci giorni lavorativi successivi alla comunicazione dell'aggiudicazione della fornitura, il fornitore comunica per iscritto all'impresa di cui all'articolo 11:a) nome e indirizzo del produttore, dell'impresa di confezionamento o dell'organismo di ammasso dei prodotti da consegnare, con le date indicative di fabbricazione o di confezionamento.In caso di fornitura di un prodotto trasformato, il fornitore comunica con almeno tre giorni lavorativi di anticipo la data d'inizio della fabbricazione o del confezionamento.b) il nome del suo rappresentante nel luogo di consegna.4. I diritti e gli obblighi derivanti dall'aggiudicazione della fornitura non sono trasferibili.Articolo 11 Aggiudicata la fornitura, la Commissione indica al fornitore l'impresa che sarà incaricata dei controlli di cui all'articolo 16, del rilascio del certificato di conformità, eventualmente del certificato di consegna e, in generale, del coordinamento di tutte le operazioni relative alla fornitura, (in prosieguo: «l'impresa incaricata del controllo»).Qualora durante l'esecuzione della fornitura sorgano divergenze tra detta impresa e il fornitore, la Commissione adotta le misure opportune.La Commissione può designare imprese diverse incaricate del controllo nelle diverse fasi della fornitura.Articolo 12 1. In caso di fornitura franco fabbrica o franco vettore si applicano le disposizioni dei paragrafi da 2 a 8. (Lo stadio di consegna è determinato dal bando di gara).2. Il fornitore concorda per iscritto con il beneficiario o con il suo rappresentante, con copia all'impresa incaricata del controllo, la data di consegna dei prodotti all'indirizzo di carico indicato nella sua offerta o nel bando di gara. L'impresa incaricata del controllo presta tutta l'assistenza necessaria al raggiungimento di tale accordo.Una consegna frazionata può essere effettuata soltanto con l'accordo del beneficiario e della Commissione. In questo caso la Commissione addebita al fornitore le spese supplementari relative al controllo.3. Il fornitore comunica quanto prima per iscritto all'impresa incaricata del controllo e alla Commissione la data e il luogo di consegna convenuti o, eventualmente, l'assenza di accordo con il beneficiario. In questo caso l'assenza di accordo viene notificata almeno dieci giorni prima della scadenza del termine del periodo di consegna fissato nel bando di gara, onde consentire alla Commissione di prendere le misure opportune.4. La fornitura viene eseguita entro il periodo fissato nel bando di gara. Qualora la fornitura non possa essere eseguita entro tale periodo, la Commissione, su domanda scritta del beneficiario debitamente giustificata, può prolungare detto periodo del numero di giorni necessario per consentire la consegna, fino a un massimo di trenta giorni. Il fornitore è tenuto ad accettare tale proroga.Se la consegna non può essere eseguita entro il termine prorogato per motivi non imputabili al fornitore, questi può essere liberato dai suoi obblighi, qualora lo richieda.5. La fornitura si ritiene effettuata quando tutti i prodotti sono stati effettivamente caricati e sistemati nei mezzi di trasporto messi a disposizione dal beneficiario.6. Il fornitore sopporta tutti i rischi, in particolare di perdita o di deterioramento dei prodotti, fino al momento in cui la fornitura sia stata eseguita e accertata dall'impresa incaricata del controllo nel certificato di conformità finale di cui all'articolo 16.7. Il fornitore espleta le formalità necessarie per l'ottenimento del certificato d'esportazione e di sdoganamento e sopporta le relative spese e tasse.8. In caso di discordanza tra le date e i quantitativi figuranti nel certificato di presa in carico di cui all'articolo 17 e quelli figuranti nel certificato di conformità finale, la Commissione può procedere a verifiche supplementari che possono implicare il rilascio di nuovi documenti.Articolo 13 1. In caso di fornitura reso porto d'imbarco si applicano le disposizioni dei paragrafi da 2 a 8. Lo stadio di consegna è specificato nel bando di gara.2. Il fornitore concorda per iscritto con il beneficiario o con il suo rappresentante, con copia all'impresa incaricata del controllo, la data di consegna dei prodotti al porto d'imbarco indicato nella sua offerta, nonché la banchina di attracco e, all'occorrenza, il ritmo di carico della nave. L'impresa incaricata del controllo presta tutta l'assistenza necessaria al raggiungimento di tale accordo. In assenza di un accordo, la Commissione prende le misure opportune in base ad un rapporto della stessa impresa.Su richiesta scritta del fornitore e d'accordo con il beneficiario, la Commissione può autorizzare un cambiamento del porto d'imbarco, purché le eventuali spese derivanti dal cambiamento siano a carico del fornitore.Una consegna frazionata può essere effettuata soltanto con il consenso del beneficiario e della Commissione. In questo caso le spese supplementari relative al controllo sono addebitate al fornitore dalla Commissione.3. Il fornitore comunica quanto prima per iscritto all'impresa incaricata del controllo e alla Commissione la data e il luogo di consegna convenuti oppure, eventualmente, l'assenza di accordo con il beneficiario. In questo caso l'assenza di accordo viene notificata almeno dieci giorni prima della scadenza del periodo di consegna fissato nel bando di gara, onde consentire alla Commissione di prendere le misure opportune.4. Se la consegna non ha potuto essere eseguita entro il termine fissato nel bando di gara a causa dell'indisponibilità di un collegamento marittimo, la Commissione prende le misure opportune in base ad un rapporto dell'impresa incaricata del controllo. In particolare essa può prolungare d'ufficio il termine di consegna, autorizzare un cambiamento di porto, risolvere il contratto di fornitura, o ancora far trasportare i prodotti da una nave proposta dal fornitore o dall'impresa incaricata del controllo, qualora il nolo e le spese di carico siano ritenuti accettabili. Le spese derivanti dalle misure prese possono essere addebitate al fornitore qualora l'attestato di cui all'articolo 7, paragrafo 6, risulti inesatto.5. Tranne che nella fattispecie di cui al paragrafo 4, la consegna viene eseguita entro il termine fissato nel bando di gara. Qualora la consegna non possa avvenire entro tale periodo, la Commissione, su richiesta scritta del beneficiario debitamente giustificata, può prorogare detto termine del numero di giorni necessario per consentire la consegna, fino ad un massimo di trenta giorni. Il fornitore è tenuto ad accettare la proroga.Se la consegna non può essere eseguita entro il termine prorogato per motivi non imputabili al fornitore, questi può essere liberato dai suoi obblighi, qualora lo richieda.6. Qualora le operazioni di carico incombano al fornitore, questi carica i prodotti a bordo della nave indicata dal beneficiario secondo i ritmi di carico della nave o, secondo il caso, degli impianti portuali e tenuto conto delle consuetudini del porto.Qualora si tratti di prodotti da consegnare allo stadio fob stivaggio incluso, tutte le operazioni di stivaggio, e di livellamento in caso di consegna alla rinfusa, incombono al fornitore.7. La fornitura si ritiene eseguita quando tutti i prodotti sono stati effettivamente consegnati allo stadio previsto nel bando di gara.8. Si applicano le disposizioni dell'articolo 12, paragrafi 6, 7 e 8.Articolo 14 1. In caso di fornitura reso porto di sbarco si applicano le disposizioni dei paragrafi da 2 a 14.Lo stadio di consegna è determinato nel bando di gara.2. Il fornitore fa eseguire a proprie spese il trasporto per la rotta che meglio consente di rispettare la scadenza di cui al paragrafo 14, dal porto d'imbarco indicato nella sua offerta fino al porto di destinazione precisato nel bando di gara.Tuttavia, su domanda scritta del fornitore, la Commissione può autorizzare un cambiamento del porto d'imbarco, purché le eventuali spese derivanti dal cambiamento siano a carico del fornitore.3. Il fornitore fa eseguire il trasporto marittimo su una nave inserita nella classe più elevata dalle società comunitarie o internazionali di classificazione e che presenta tutte le garanzie di ordine sanitario per il trasporto di prodotti alimentari. Per gli imbarchi nella Comunità, le società di classificazione rispettano le regole e le norme definite dalla direttiva 94/57/CE del Consiglio (4).Il trasporto marittimo viene eseguito conformemente alle disposizioni in materia di prevenzione della distorsione di una concorrenza libera e leale su una base commerciale, di cui ai regolamenti del Consiglio (CEE) n. 954/79 (5), (CEE) n. 4055/86 (6), (CEE) n. 4056/86 (7), (CEE) n. 4057/86 (8) e (CEE) n. 4058/86 (9), relativi alla politica comunitaria nel settore dei trasporti marittimi. Il trasporto marittimo non verrà effettuato da società le cui pratiche abbiano recato pregiudizio agli armatori comunitari, o il cui paese di stabilimento abbia limitato il libero accesso al traffico marittimo per le società marittime degli Stati membri o per le navi immatricolate in uno Stato membro in conformità della sua legislazione, segnatamente durante la validità di una decisione del Consiglio in applicazione dell'articolo 11 del regolamento (CEE) n. 4057/86 e dell'articolo 4, paragrafo 1, lettera b) del regolamento (CEE) n. 4058/86.Il fornitore trasmette all'impresa incaricata del controllo un attestato comprovante che la nave utilizzata è conforme ai requisiti sanitari e una copia dei certificati di classificazione della nave.4. Il fornitore stipula un'assicurazione marittima in suo favore o fa valere una polizza d'abbonamento. Detta polizza, stipulata almeno per l'importo dell'offerta, copre tutti i rischi connessi al trasporto e ogni altra attività del fornitore inerente alla fornitura fino allo stadio di consegna stabilito. Essa copre inoltre tutte le spese di smistamento, riconfezionamento, ripresa o distruzione dei prodotti avariati e di analisi dei prodotti che non abbiano subito avarie tali da ostacolarne l'accettazione da parte del beneficiario.L'assicurazione ha inizio nel momento in cui i prodotti assicurati lasciano i magazzini del fornitore e termina quando la fornitura è realizzata allo stadio di consegna indicato nel bando di gara e accertata nel certificato di conformità finale dall'impresa incaricata del controllo.Inoltre, la polizza menziona espressamente che la copertura è concessa conformemente al presente articolo.5. Il fornitore conferma per iscritto al beneficiario e all'impresa incaricata del controllo, non appena ne viene a conoscenza, la designazione della nave e la sua bandiera, la data di carico, la data presunta di arrivo nel porto di sbarco, nonché qualsiasi fatto verificatosi durante la spedizione.Il fornitore comunica al beneficiario e all'impresa incaricata del controllo, oppure fa loro comunicare dal capitano o dal corrispondente della compagnia marittima, la data presunta di arrivo della nave nel porto di sbarco dieci giorni, poi cinque giorni, poi tre giorni, poi quarantotto ore prima dell'arrivo previsto.6. Una consegna frazionata su più navi può essere eseguita soltanto con il consenso della Commissione. In tal caso le spese supplementari connesse al controllo sono imputate al fornitore dalla Commissione.7. Il fornitore carica a sue spese i prodotti a bordo della nave nel porto d'imbarco e sostiene le spese di nolo.Per una fornitura franco nave («ex chip»), le spese di scarico e le eventuali spese di controstallia nel porto di sbarco non sono a carico del fornitore, purché quest'ultimo non abbia ostacolato lo scarico. Il bando di gara può prevedere l'obbligo per il fornitore di pagare alla Commissione il premio di acceleramento («despatch money»). Una copia del resoconto dei fatti («statement of facts») e del conto dei giorni di stallia («laytime») viene fornita a tal fine al momento della presentazione della domanda di pagamento.Per una fornitura reso banchina («ex quai»), il fornitore sopporta le spese di scarico nel porto di sbarco, in particolare le spese di scarico sulla banchina lungo bordo e, all'occorrenza, le spese di alleggio, compresi il nolo, il rimorchio e lo scarico degli alleggi, nonché le eventuali spese di controstallia relative alla nave e, se del caso, agli alleggi.Per una fornitura reso magazzini portuali, il fornitore sopporta, oltre alle spese di cui al terzo comma, le spese di movimentazione e di trasferimento dei prodotti dalla banchina ai magazzini portuali, sistemazione inclusa.Per una consegna in «container», la fornitura è effettuata allo stadio reso terminale per «container» o allo stadio reso magazzini portuali. In questo caso il periodo di franchigia dei «container» è di almeno 15 giorni e chiaramente indicato nella polizza di carico. In caso di fornitura allo stadio reso magazzini portuali, le spese di scarico dei prodotti dai «container» e di sistemazione nei magazzini sono a carico del fornitore; qualora l'utilizzazione di «container» sia un'iniziativa del fornitore e non una condizione prevista dal bando di gara, le spese che ne derivano sono a carico del fornitore.Sono inoltre a carico del fornitore i diritti di banchina («wharfage») o spese analoghe, quando il regolamento portuale li addebiti alla nave.8. Il fornitore espleta le formalità necessarie per l'ottenimento del certificato d'esportazione e di sdoganamento e sopporta le relative spese e tasse. Le formalità per l'ottenimento della licenza d'importazione e le formalità doganali d'importazione non devono essere espletate dal fornitore, né sono a carico di quest'ultimo le spese e le relative imposte.9. Avvenuto l'imbarco, il fornitore trasmette al beneficiario, inviandone copia all'impresa incaricata del controllo, i seguenti documenti:a) una fattura «pro forma» indicante che si tratta di una consegna di aiuto comunitario a titolo gratuito;b) una copia del certificato di conformità provvisorio di cui all'articolo 16;c) qualsiasi documento necessario allo sdoganamento e alla presa in carico da parte del beneficiario;d) ogni altro documento previsto dal bando di gara.Per una fornitura franco nave, il fornitore trasmette anche i seguenti documenti:a) l'originale della polizza di carico per il porto di destinazione o qualsiasi documento equivalente che consenta lo sdoganamento e lo scarico dei prodotti da parte del beneficiario;b) eventualmente, il contratto di nolo, la «booking note» o qualsiasi documento indicante in particolare il termine di stallia;c) per i carichi completi, una nota tecnica indicante il pescaggio previsto all'arrivo in acqua salata e, per tale pescaggio, il numero di tonnellate corrispondente all'immersione di un centimetro (TPC) nonché il piano di carico.Per una fornitura reso banchina o magazzini portuali, il fornitore trasmette anche i seguenti documenti:a) una copia della polizza di carico ed eventualmente una distinta colli in caso di consegna in «container»;b) un ordine di consegna che consenta lo sdoganamento e il ritiro dei prodotti da parte del beneficiario;10. La polizza di carico indica in ogni caso il vettore e viene stilata all'ordine del rappresentante del fornitore nel porto di sbarco. Tuttavia, su domanda scritta del beneficiario, il fornitore indica il beneficiario o il suo rappresentante come consegnatario, unicamente al fine di consentire l'espletamento delle formalità doganali d'importazione.Tranne che per le forniture franco nave, la designazione del beneficiario come consegnatario non può comportare per il beneficiario l'obbligo di sostenere o prefinanziare interamente o in parte le spese di scarico. I nomi del beneficiario e dell'impresa incaricata del controllo nel porto di sbarco devono sempre figurare nella casella di notificazione, detta «notify».11. Salvo il disposto del paragrafo 14, la fornitura è realizzata, secondo il caso, quando tutti i prodotti sono stati effettivamente:a) consegnati nella stiva della nave, allo stadio franco nave di cui al paragrafo 7, secondo comma,ob) scaricati sulla banchina, allo stadio reso banchina di cui al paragrafo 7, terzo comma,oc) allogati nei magazzini portuali o nel terminale per «container», secondo le fattispecie di cui al paragrafo 7, quarto e quinto comma.12. Tutti i rischi, in particolare di perdita o di deterioramento dei prodotti, sono a carico del fornitore, fino al momento in cui la fornitura sia stata eseguita e accertata da parte dell'impresa incaricata del controllo nel certificato di conformità finale allo stadio di fornitura di cui al paragrafo 7.13. In caso di discordanza tra le date e i quantitativi figuranti nel certificato di presa in carico e quelli figuranti nel certificato di conformità finale, la Commissione può procedere a verifiche supplementari che possono implicare il rilascio di nuovi documenti.14. Tutti i prodotti devono pervenire al porto di sbarco entro il termine fissato nel bando di gara. Qualora, per uno stesso lotto, il bando di gara indichi più porti di sbarco e un solo termine di consegna, i prodotti devono pervenire ai diversi porti di sbarco prima del termine stabilito.La registrazione della nave eseguita dalle autorità portuali del porto di sbarco fa fede della data di arrivo in tale porto. Qualora fosse impossibile ottenere la prova mediante la registrazione, la data di arrivo è accertata mediante un estratto del giornale di bordo, confermato dall'impresa incaricata del controllo.Il bando di gara può prevedere, all'occorrenza, un periodo di consegna prima del quale ogni fornitura sarà considerata prematura con conseguenti sanzioni a norma dell'articolo 22, paragrafo 4, lettera c).15. Qualora la consegna non possa essere eseguita prima del periodo fissato nel bando di gara, la Commissione, su domanda scritta del beneficiario debitamente giustificata, può prorogare detto periodo del numero di giorni necessario per consentire la consegna, fino ad un massimo di trenta giorni, o risolvere il contratto. Il fornitore è tenuto ad accettare tale proroga o risoluzione.Se la consegna non può essere eseguita entro il termine prorogato per motivi non imputabili al fornitore, questi può essere liberato dai suoi obblighi, qualora lo richieda.Articolo 15 1. In caso di fornitura reso destino, via mare e via terra oppure unicamente via terra, si applicano le disposizioni dei paragrafi da 2 a 11.2. Il fornitore fa eseguire a sue spese il trasporto per la via che meglio consente di rispettare il termine di cui al paragrafo 9, dal porto d'imbarco o dalla banchina di carico indicata nella sua offerta fino al luogo finale di destinazione determinato dal bando di gara.Tuttavia, su richiesta scritta del fornitore, la Commissione può autorizzare un cambiamento del porto d'imbarco o della banchina di carico, purché le eventuali spese derivanti dal cambiamento siano a carico del fornitore.Il fornitore sopporta tutte le spese fino alla messa a disposizione dei prodotti all'entrata del deposito nel luogo di destinazione.Per una consegna prevista in «container», il fornitore sopporta tutte le spese di locazione, spedizione, messa a disposizione all'entrata del deposito e rinvio dei «container» vuoti. A meno che non abbia proceduto di sua iniziativa all'uso dei «container», non previsto nel bando di gara, il fornitore non sostiene le spese di detenzione oltre una franchigia di 15 giorni a decorrere dalla messa a disposizione all'entrata del deposito.3. Si applicano, in quanto compatibili, le disposizioni dell'articolo 14, paragrafi 3, 4, 6 e 8.4. Il bando di gara può indicare un porto di sbarco o un punto di transito, per l'inoltro della fornitura.5. Salvo il disposto del paragrafo 9, la fornitura è realizzata quando tutti i prodotti sono stati effettivamente messi a disposizione nel deposito del luogo di destinazione; lo scarico dei mezzi di trasporto non è a carico del fornitore.6. Tutti i rischi, in particolare di perdita o di deterioramento dei prodotti, sono a carico del fornitore, fino al momento in cui la consegna sia stata eseguita allo stadio di fornitura di cui al paragrafo 2 e accertata dall'impresa incaricata del controllo nel certificato di conformità finale.7. In caso di discordanza tra le date e i quantitativi figuranti nel certificato di presa in carico e quelli figuranti nel certificato di conformità finale, la Commissione può procedere a verifiche supplementari che possono implicare il rilascio di nuovi documenti.8. Il fornitore comunica quanto prima per iscritto al beneficiario e all'impresa incaricata del controllo i mezzi di trasporto utilizzati, le date di carico, la data di arrivo a destinazione presunta, nonché qualsiasi fatto verificatosi durante l'inoltro dei prodotti.Il fornitore conferma nel modo più rapido al beneficiario e all'impresa incaricata del controllo la data di arrivo a destinazione presunta, con cinque giorni di anticipo.9. Tutti i prodotti devono pervenire al luogo di destinazione entro il termine fissato nel bando di gara. Qualora, per uno stesso lotto, il bando di gara indichi più luoghi di destinazione e un solo termine di consegna, i prodotti devono pervenire in ciascun luogo entro il termine stabilito.Il bando di gara può prevedere, all'occorrenza, un periodo di consegna prima del quale ogni fornitura sarà considerata prematura con conseguenti sanzioni a norma dell'articolo 22, paragrafo 4, lettera c).10. Si applicano le disposizioni dell'articolo 14, paragrafo 15.11. Effettuate le operazioni di carico, il fornitore trasmette al beneficiario, inviandone copia all'impresa incaricata del controllo, i documenti seguenti:a) in caso di trasporto marittimo, una copia della polizza di carico, con indicazione del vettore;b) un ordine di consegna che consenta lo sdoganamento e il ritiro dei prodotti da parte del beneficiario;c) una copia del certificato di conformità provvisorio;d) una fattura «pro forma» indicante che si tratta di un aiuto comunitario a titolo gratuito;e) la distinta colli in caso di consegna in container;f) il foglio di spedizione in caso di consegna via terra;g) qualsiasi documento necessario allo sdoganamento e alla presa in carico da parte del beneficiario;h) ogni altro documento previsto dal bando di gara.Articolo 16 1. Per ogni fornitura l'impresa incaricata del controllo esegue un controllo della qualità, della quantità, del confezionamento e della marcatura dei prodotti da consegnare.Il controllo definitivo è eseguito allo stadio di consegna stabilito. In caso di fornitura reso porto di sbarco o reso destino, viene effettuato anche un controllo provvisorio al momento del carico o in fabbrica.2. Il controllo viene effettuato in un momento e in condizioni che consentono di ottenere tutti i risultati delle analisi e, eventualmente, di una controperizia, prima della messa a disposizione oppure prima che abbiano inizio le operazioni di carico. Tuttavia, in circostanze particolari, segnatamente in caso di rischio di sostituzione del prodotto nel corso della fornitura, dopo detti controlli, l'impresa può eseguire, se autorizzata dalla Commissione, un controllo supplementare e della stessa natura, durante le operazioni di carico. Tutte le conseguenze finanziarie della non conformità constatata a seguito di quest'ultimo controllo, in particolare le eventuali spese di controstallia, sono a carico del fornitore.3. Al termine del controllo definitivo, l'impresa incaricata del controllo rilascia al fornitore un certificato di conformità finale, indicante in particolare la data di esecuzione della fornitura e la quantità netta fornita, eventualmente accompagnato da riserve.4. Non appena l'impresa incaricata del controllo constata una non conformità deve informarne quanto prima il fornitore e la Commissione per iscritto. Tale comunicazione è denominata «notificazione di riserve». Il fornitore può contestare i risultati presso l'impresa e la Commissione entro i due giorni lavorativi successivi all'invio della suddetta notificazione.5. Al termine del controllo provvisorio, l'impresa incaricata del controllo rilascia al fornitore un certificato di conformità provvisorio, eventualmente accompagnato di riserve. L'impresa precisa se le riserve sono tali da rendere i prodotti non accettabili allo stadio di consegna. La Commissione può decidere, in base alle riserve formulate, di non procedere al pagamento dell'acconto di cui all'articolo 18, paragrafo 4.6. Il fornitore sopporta tutte le conseguenze finanziarie, in particolare le spese di falso nolo o di controstallia, conseguenti alle carenze qualitative dei prodotti o alla tardiva messa a disposizione di questi ultimi per le operazioni di controllo.7. I rappresentanti del fornitore e del beneficiario sono invitati dall'impresa incaricata del controllo, per iscritto, ad assistere alle operazioni di controllo, in particolare al prelievo dei campioni destinati alle analisi; il prelievo dei campioni è effettuato secondo gli usi professionali.Durante l'operazione di prelievo, l'impresa incaricata del controllo effettua due prelievi supplementari che tiene sigillati a disposizione della Commissione per consentire un eventuale secondo controllo, nonché per eventuali contestazioni da parte del beneficiario o del fornitore.Il costo dei campioni prelevati è a carico dell'aggiudicatario.8. Qualora il fornitore o il beneficiario contestino i risultati del controllo provvisorio o definitivo effettuato conformemente al paragrafo 2, l'impresa incaricata del controllo fa eseguire, se autorizzata dalla Commissione, una controperizia riguardante un secondo prelievo di campioni, una seconda analisi o un secondo controllo del peso o del condizionamento, in funzione del carattere della contestazione.La controperizia è effettuata da un servizio o da un laboratorio consensualmente designato dal fornitore, dal beneficiario e dall'impresa incaricata del controllo. In caso di mancato accordo entro i due giorni lavorativi successivi alla notificazione della contestazione, il servizio o il laboratorio viene designato d'ufficio dalla Commissione.9. Se al termine dei primi controlli o della controperizia il certificato di conformità finale non viene rilasciato, il fornitore ha l'obbligo di sostituire i prodotti.10. Le spese relative ai controlli di cui al paragrafo 2 sono a carico della Commissione.Le spese relative al controllo dei prodotti di sostituzione o delle forniture supplementari di cui rispettivamente al paragrafo 9 e all'articolo 17, paragrafo 1, sono a carico del fornitore.Le spese relative alla controperizia di cui al paragrafo 8 sono a carico della parte soccombente.11. In caso di turbative che, per motivi non imputabili al fornitore, abbiano gravi effetti su una fornitura reso porto di sbarco o reso destino, la Commissione può decidere che l'impresa incaricata del controllo rilasci, prima dell'esecuzione della fornitura, un certificato di conformità finale, previo appropriato controllo sulla quantità e la qualità dei prodotti.12. Il fornitore può chiedere all'impresa incaricata del controllo di rilasciare un certificato di conformità provvisorio o finale relativo a quantitativi parziali.Tuttavia non possono essere rilasciati più di tre certificati parziali per lotto. Ogni certificato parziale deve riguardare un quantitativo di almeno 2 500 t nette per i cereali non trasformati e 100 t nette per gli altri prodotti, salvo quando il certificato riguardi la parte residua di un lotto. In tutti questi casi, la Commissione imputa al fornitore le spese di controllo supplementari. Tuttavia, quest'ultima disposizione non viene applicata quando si tratta di un lotto suddiviso in più parti aventi destinazioni diverse.Articolo 17 1. Per una fornitura di prodotti alla rinfusa è ammessa una tolleranza di peso del 3 % al di sotto della quantità richiesta. Per una fornitura di prodotti confezionati, la tolleranza è dell'1 %. I quantitativi prelevati come campioni dall'impresa incaricata del controllo si aggiungono alle percentuali di tolleranza.Quando le soglie di tolleranza sono superate, la Commissione può esigere dal fornitore una consegna supplementare alle stesse condizioni finanziarie della fornitura iniziale, entro un secondo termine fissato dalla Commissione stessa. All'occorrenza si applica l'articolo 22, paragrafi 4, 5 e 7.2. Il certificato di assunzione a carico o il certificato di consegna determinano la quantità netta effettivamente consegnata.3. II beneficiario consegna al fornitore un certificato di assunzione a carico contenente le indicazioni di cui all'allegato III. Il certificato è rilasciato senza indugio dopo la messa a disposizione della merce allo stadio fissato per la fornitura e dopo che il fornitore ha consegnato al beneficiario l'originale del certificato di conformità finale, il certificato d'origine, la fattura «pro forma» che determina il valore del prodotto e la cessione al beneficiario a titolo gratuito e, all'occorrenza, i documenti di cui agli articoli 14 e 15.L'impresa incaricata del controllo presta tutta l'assistenza necessaria ai fini del rilascio di detto certificato.4. In caso di omesso rilascio del certificato di assunzione a carico da parte del beneficiario entro 15 giorni dalla ricezione dei documenti di cui al paragrafo 3, l'impresa incaricata del controllo rilascia al fornitore, su sua domanda scritta giustificata e d'accordo con la Commissione, entro cinque giorni lavorativi, un certificato di consegna contenente le indicazioni di cui all'allegato III.CAPO IV Condizioni di pagamento e di liberazione delle garanzie Articolo 18 1. L'importo massimo da pagare al fornitore è quello dell'offerta, all'occorrenza maggiorato delle spese di cui all'articolo 19 e diminuito degli abbuoni di cui al paragrafo 3, delle ritenute di cui all'articolo 22, paragrafo 8, delle spese supplementari di controllo di cui agli articoli da 12 a 16 o delle spese risultanti dalle misure di cui all'articolo 13, paragrafo 4.Quando la gara riguarda la fornitura di quantitativi massimi di un determinato prodotto, l'importo massimo da pagare è quello figurante nel bando di gara, salvo applicazione degli abbuoni e delle ritenute o delle spese di cui sopra o pagamento delle spese di cui all'articolo 19.2. II pagamento è effettuato per il quantitativo netto figurante nel certificato di assunzione a carico o nel certificato di consegna. Tuttavia, in caso di discordanza tra il certificato di assunzione a carico e il certificato di conformità finale, quest'ultimo prevale e serve come base per il pagamento.3. Qualora la qualità dei prodotti, il loro confezionamento o la loro marcatura constatati allo stadio di consegna previsto non corrispondano a quanto prescritto, ma non abbiano ostacolato l'assunzione a carico dei prodotti o il rilascio di un certificato di consegna, la Commissione può applicare abbuoni al momento di determinare l'importo da pagare. L'applicazione di abbuoni nei confronti di un fornitore può comportare l'applicazione dell'articolo 2, paragrafo 2.4. In caso di fornitura reso porto di sbarco o reso destino, su richiesta del fornitore può essere versato un acconto entro il limite massimo del 90 % dell'importo dell'offerta, secondo le seguenti modalità:a) proporzionalmente ai quantitativi parziali riconosciuti conformi, per i quali l'impresa incaricata del controllo ha rilasciato un certificato di conformità provvisorio,b) oppure per il quantitativo totale in relazione al quale l'impresa incaricata del controllo ha rilasciato un certificato di conformità provvisorio.Qualunque sia il numero di acconti parziali versati per un dato lotto, la Commissione paga un unico saldo per lotto, salvo in circostanze da essa riconosciute eccezionali.5. L'importo da pagare è versato su richiesta del fornitore, presentata in due esemplari.La domanda di pagamento del totale o del saldo è corredata dei seguenti documenti:a) una fattura compilata per l'importo richiesto,b) l'originale del certificato di assunzione a carico o del certificato di consegna,c) una copia del certificato di conformità finale.La domanda di pagamento di un acconto è corredata dei seguenti documenti:a) una fattura emessa per l'importo richiesto,b) una copia del certificato di conformità provvisorio,c) una copia della polizza di carico, del contratto di nolo o del foglio di spedizione,d) una copia del certificato di assicurazione.Gli acconti non possono eccedere il 90 % dell'importo dell'offerta. Essi sono concessi su presentazione di una garanzia d'acconto costituita a favore della Commissione, di importo pari all'importo dell'offerta, maggiorato del 10 %. Tale garanzia è costituita a norma dell'articolo 8, secondo e terzo comma. La sua efficacia deve avere la durata di almeno un anno, rinnovabile su domanda della Commissione.Ogni copia deve essere certificata conforme all'originale e recare la firma del fornitore.6. Le domande di pagamento del totale o del saldo sono presentate alla Commissione entro tre mesi dalla data di rilascio del certificato di assunzione a carico o del certificato di consegna. Salvo motivi di forza maggiore, una domanda presentata dopo tale termine implica una ritenuta del 10 % sul pagamento da effettuare.7. I pagamenti sono eseguiti entro sessanta giorni dalla data di ricevimento da parte della Commissione della domanda completa presentata secondo le disposizioni del paragrafo 5.Se il pagamento è eseguito dopo tale termine, non giustificato da perizie o inchieste complementari, sono dovuti interessi di mora al tasso mensile applicato dall'Istituto monetario europeo, pubblicato nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee, serie C. Il tasso da applicare è quello del mese del giorno successivo alla scadenza del termine di cui al primo comma. Per un ritardo superiore a un mese, si applica una media ponderata secondo il numero di giorni d'applicazione di ciascun tasso.Articolo 19 1. II fornitore sopporta tutte le spese derivanti dalla fornitura dei prodotti allo stadio stabilito. Tuttavia, la Commissione può rimborsare al fornitore che ne faccia richiesta scritta alcune spese supplementari calcolate in base agli opportuni documenti giustificativi, quando un certificato di assunzione a carico o di consegna sia stato rilasciato senza riserve relative alla natura delle spese in oggetto.2. Escluse tutte le spese amministrative, le spese supplementari sono quelle di magazzinaggio, assicurazione e finanziamento effettivamente sostenute dal fornitore, secondo il caso:a) a seguito di una proroga del periodo di consegna, concesso su domanda del beneficiario,b) in seguito a ritardi di oltre trenta giorni tra, da un lato, la data di consegna e, dall'altro, il rilascio del certificato di assunzione a carico o di consegna oppure del certificato di conformità finale se questo è rilasciato successivamente.3. Le spese di magazzinaggio e di assicurazione riconosciute sono rimborsate in ecu, convertendo l'importo espresso nella moneta delle spese al tasso di conversione applicato dalla Commissione.Le spese riconosciute non possono superare i seguenti massimali:- 1 ECU per tonnellata di prodotti alla rinfusa e 2 ECU per tonnellata di prodotti confezionati, per settimana, per le spese di magazzinaggio;- lo 0,75 % annuo del valore dei prodotti, per le spese di assicurazione.Le spese di finanziamento sono calcolate come segue:>NUM>A × N × I>DEN>360A = importo che rimane da pagare a norma dell'articolo 18, alla data del fatto che dà luogo al pagamento delle spese di finanziamento;N = numero di giorni di proroga consumati di cui al paragrafo 2, lettera a), o numero di giorni di ritardo di cui al paragrafo 2, lettera b);I = tasso di cui all'articolo 18, paragrafo 7.4. In casi eccezionali la Commissione può rimborsare al fornitore, che ne faccia richiesta scritta, alcune spese impreviste purché non derivino da un vizio intrinseco dei prodotti, da un confezionamento insufficiente o inadeguato, da un ritardo nell'esecuzione della fornitura imputabile al fornitore o da una situazione di congestione portuale, né siano imputabili ad un subappaltatore.5. La Commissione indennizza il fornitore, che ne faccia richiesta scritta, qualora questi sia stato liberato dai suoi obblighi in particolare a norma dell'articolo 12, paragrafo 4, dell'articolo 13, paragrafo 5, dell'articolo 14, paragrafo 15, dell'articolo 15, paragrafo 10, e dell'articolo 20, secondo comma.Escluse tutte le spese amministrative, gli indennizzi coprono da un lato le spese di magazzinaggio, assicurazione e finanziamento, calcolate a norma dei paragrafi 2 e 3 del presente articolo e, dall'altro, un indennizzo compensativo consensualmente determinato, comunque non superiore al 3 % dell'importo dell'offerta.6. Le domande di pagamento di spese supplementari e di spese impreviste devono essere distinte da quella relativa al pagamento della fornitura ed essere presentate in due esemplari entro il termine di cui all'articolo 18, paragrafo 6. Dopo la scadenza di tale termine si applica una ritenuta del 10 %.Articolo 20 Se, dopo l'aggiudicazione, la Commissione designa un indirizzo di carico, un porto d'imbarco, un porto di sbarco o un luogo di destinazione finale diversi da quelli fissati inizialmente, o un altro stadio di fornitura, il fornitore consegna i prodotti al nuovo indirizzo di carico, nel nuovo porto, nel nuovo luogo di destinazione finale o al nuovo stadio di fornitura. La Commissione concorda con il fornitore l'eventuale riduzione o aumento delle spese inizialmente previste.Tuttavia, su domanda debitamente motivata, il fornitore può essere liberato dai suoi obblighi.Articolo 21 Salvo casi di forza maggiore, se, per ragioni non imputabili al beneficiario bensì al fornitore, la fornitura non è eseguita entro i trenta giorni successivi alla scadenza del termine di consegna stabilito, tutte le conseguenze finanziarie della mancata fornitura, totale o parziale, sono a carico del fornitore. In particolare, le conseguenze finanziarie possono comprendere le spese direttamente connesse all'inesecuzione della fornitura, sostenute dal beneficiario, quali le spese di controstallia o di falso nolo relative al trasporto marittimo o continentale, le spese di locazione di magazzini o aree di deposito e le relative spese di assicurazione.Inoltre, nelle circostanze citate al primo comma, la Commissione constata l'inesecuzione della fornitura è adotta le misure opportune.Articolo 22 1. Le garanzie costituite a norma degli articoli 8, 10 paragrafo 2 e 18 paragrafo 5 sono, secondo il caso, liberate o acquisite in conformità dei paragrafi da 2 a 8.2. La garanzia di gara è liberata nei casi seguenti:a) mediante lettera o telecomunicazione scritta della Commissione, quando l'offerta non è valida o non è stata prescelta o quando la fornitura non è stata aggiudicata;b) quando l'offerente, designato fornitore, ha costituito la garanzia di consegna o ha ritirato l'offerta, a norma dell'articolo 9, paragrafo 4.La garanzia è acquisita se il fornitore non ha presentato la garanzia di consegna entro i dieci giorni lavorativi successivi all'aggiudicazione della fornitura nonché qualora l'offerente ritiri l'offerta a norma dell'articolo 7, paragrafo 11.3. La garanzia di consegna è interamente liberata mediante lettera o telecomunicazione scritta della Commissione quando il fornitore:a) ha presentato la garanzia di acconto di cui all'articolo 18, paragrafo 5, terzo comma;b) ha eseguito la fornitura conformemente a tutti i suoi obblighi;c) è stato liberato dai suoi obblighi a norma degli articoli 12, paragrafo 4, 13, paragrafo 5, 14, paragrafo 15, 15 paragrafo 10 e 20, secondo comma.d) non ha eseguito la fornitura per cause di forza maggiore riconosciute dalla Commissione.4. Salvo casi di forza maggiore, la garanzia di consegna è soggetta a ritenute parziali effettuate cumulativamente nei casi seguenti, fatta salva l'applicazione del paragrafo 8:a) del 10 % del valore dei quantitativi non consegnati, fatte salve le percentuali di tolleranza di cui all'articolo 17, paragrafo 1;b) del 20 % dell'importo globale del trasporto marittimo indicato nell'offerta, qualora la nave noleggiata dal fornitore non sia conforme alle condizioni di cui all'articolo 14, paragrafo 3;c) dello 0,2 % del valore dei quantitativi consegnati oltre la scadenza del termine, per ciascun giorno di ritardo, o eventualmente, a condizione che il bando di gara lo preveda, dello 0,1 % per ciascun giorno di consegna prematura.Le ritenute di cui alle lettere a) e c) non sono applicate quando le inadempienze constatate non sono imputabili al fornitore.5. La garanzia di acconto è interamente liberata come la garanzia di consegna nei casi di cui al paragrafo 3, lettere b) e c).Essa è oggetto di ritenute parziali a norma, mutatis mutandis, delle disposizioni di cui al paragrafo 4.6. La garanzia di consegna o di acconto è interamente acquisita quando la Commissione constata la mancata esecuzione della fornitura, in applicazione dell'articolo 21.7. La garanzia di consegna o di acconto è liberata proporzionalmente ai quantitativi per i quali è stato stabilito il diritto al pagamento del saldo. Essa è acquisita per gli altri quantitativi.8. La Commissione detrae gli importi delle ritenute da effettuare a norma dei paragrafi 4, 5 e 6 dall'importo finale da pagare. La garanzia di consegna o di acconto è liberata contemporaneamente e interamente.CAPO V Disposizioni finali Articolo 23 La Commissione valuta i casi di forza maggiore che possono essere all'origine dell'inesecuzione di una fornitura o dell'inosservanza di uno degli obblighi del fornitore.Le spese derivanti da un caso di forza maggiore riconosciuto dalla Commissione sono a carico di questa.Articolo 24 La Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee è competente a conoscere di qualsiasi controversia derivante dall'esecuzione, dall'inesecuzione o dall'interpretazione delle modalità delle forniture eseguite a norma del presente regolamento.Articolo 25 Il diritto belga si applica a qualsiasi questione non disciplinata dal presente regolamento.Articolo 26 Il regolamento (CEE) n. 2200/87 è abrogato.Tuttavia esso resta d'applicazione alle forniture per le quali la comunicazione del bando di gara è anteriore all'entrata in vigore del presente regolamento.I riferimenti al regolamento abrogato s'intendono fatti al presente regolamento.Articolo 27 II presente regolamento entra in vigore il ventesimo giorno successivo alla pubblicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee.Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri.Fatto a Bruxelles, il 16 dicembre 1997.Per la CommissioneJoão DE DEUS PINHEIROMembro della Commissione(1) GU L 166 del 5. 7. 1996, pag. 1.(2) GU L 204 del 25. 7. 1987, pag. 1.(3) GU L 81 del 28. 3. 1991, pag. 108.(4) GU L 319 del 12. 12. 1994, pag. 20.(5) GU L 121 del 17. 5. 1979, pag. 1.(6) GU L 378 del 31. 12. 1986, pag. 1.(7) GU L 378 del 31. 12. 1986, pag. 4.(8) GU L 378 del 31. 12. 1986, pag. 14.(9) GU L 378 del 31. 12. 1986, pag. 21.ALLEGATO I BANDO DI GARA 1. Azione n. (all'occorrenza, più numeri per lotto)2. Beneficiario (secondo il caso un paese o una organizzazione)3. Rappresentante del beneficiario4. Paese di destinazione5. Prodotto da mobilitare6. Quantitativo totale (tonnellate nette)7. Numero di lotti (all'occorrenza, quantitativi per lotto e/o lotto parziale)8. Caratteristiche e qualità del prodotto (secondo quanto pubblicato ai sensi dell'articolo 5)9. Condizionamento (secondo quanto pubblicato ai sensi dell'articolo 5)10. Etichettatura o marcatura (secondo quanto pubblicato ai sensi dell'articolo 5)- lingua da utilizzare per la marcatura- diciture complementari11. Modo di mobilitazione del prodotto (contratto comunitario, scorta d'intervento e, in questo caso, organismo detentore della scorta e prezzo di vendita fissato, o contratto fuori della Comunità)12. Stadio di consegna previsto13. Stadio di consegna alternativo (applicazione dell'articolo 9, paragrafo 3)14. a) Porto d'imbarco (articolo 7, paragrafi 4 e 6)b) Indirizzo di carico15. Porto di sbarco16. Luogo di destinazione (indirizzo del magazzino di deposito per lo stadio reso destino)- porto o magazzino di transito- via di trasporto terrestre (articolo 15, paragrafo 4)17. Periodo o data ultima per la consegna allo stadio previsto- 1° termine- 2° termine (articolo 9, paragrafo 5)18. Periodo o data ultima per la consegna allo stadio alternativo- 1° termine- 2° termine (articolo 9, paragrafo 5)19. Scadenza per la presentazione delle offerte (alle 12.00, ora di Bruxelles)- 1° termine- 2° termine (articolo 9, paragrafo 5)20. Importo della garanzia d'offerta21. Indirizzo cui inviare le offerte e le garanzie d'offerta22. Restituzione all'esportazioneALLEGATO II.A >INIZIO DI UN GRAFICO>MODELLO DI OFFERTA>FINE DI UN GRAFICO>ALLEGATO II.B SPESE DA INCLUDERE NELL'OFFERTA Elenco fornito soltanto a titolo indicativo A. Fornitura franco fabbrica o franco vettore1. Prezzo del prodotto e del condizionamento.2. Spese di carico e di sistemazione nei mezzi di trasporto messi a disposizione dal beneficiario.3. In caso di fornitura franco vettore, spese di trasporto fino al terminale di trasporto indicato nel bando di gara.4. Spese relative all'espletamento delle formalità doganali di esportazione.B. Fornitura reso porto d'imbarco1. Cfr. punto A.1 e A.4.2. Spese di carico e di trasporto fino al luogo di fornitura e, all'occorrenza, spese di scarico.3. In caso di fornitura in contenitori, spese di carico e di trasporto fino allo stadio terminale per container, posizione «stack».4. In caso di fornitura di cereali, le spese comprendono, all'occorrenza, le spese di entrata nel silo, di silaggio, di permanenza e uscita dal silo, di carico, di stivaggio e di livellamento. (Stadio di consegna fob - stivaggio incluso oppure fob - stivato e livellato).5. Spese di pesatura, di controllo e di analisi effettuati eventualmente su iniziativa dei fornitori (diverse da quelle risultanti dall'articolo 16).C. Fornitura reso porto di sbarco1. Cfr. punto B.2. Spese di approdo, comprese le spese di intervento dello spedizioniere e, eventualmente, le spese di carico, all'occorrenza, di stivaggio e di livellamento.3. Nolo marittimo.4. Assicurazione.5. Spese di scarico di cui all'articolo 14, paragrafo 7, se si tratta di una fornitura reso banchina.D. Fornitura reso destino via mare1. Cfr. C, comprese le spese di scarico di cui al punto C.5.2. Spese di transito doganale.3. Spese di trasferimento sui mezzi di trasporto per la rispedizione fino alla destinazione finale.4. Spese di trasporto continentale fino alla destinazione finale.5. Assicurazione.6. Spese di messa all'entrata del deposito nel luogo di destinazione. In caso di consegna in container, spese di cui all'articolo 15, paragrafo 2.E. Fornitura reso destino via terraCfr. D, escluse le spese relative al trasporto marittimo.ALLEGATO III >INIZIO DI UN GRAFICO>CERTIFICATO DI PRESA IN CARICO>FINE DI UN GRAFICO>
en	contracts	US	Exhibit 10.1 Approved 7/06 MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT This Severance Agreement, dated as of , 200 is among GTC Biotherapeutics, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation (together with its affiliates and subsidiaries, ‘GTC’) with its principal offices at 175 Crossing Blvd., Framingham, MA 01702, and (the ‘Employee) residing at . The Employee is employed by GTC as Accordingly, the parties hereto agree as follows: SECTION 1. SEVERANCE PAYMENT; BENEFITS. 1.1 Termination Events Resulting in Severance Payments. In the event of the termination of the Employee’s employment by GTC without cause, then GTC shall make a severance payment to the Employee in the amount set forth in, and payable in accordance with, Section 1.2. No severance shall be payable in the event that the Employee’s employment is terminated (a) by the Employee, (b) by GTC in the event of the Employee’s death or inability, by reason of physical or mental impairment, to perform substantially all of the Employee’s duties for a continuous period of 120 days, or (c) by GTC in the event of the Employee’s breach of any material duty or obligation to GTC, or intentional or grossly negligent conduct that is materially injurious to GTC (as reasonably determined by GTC’s Board of Directors) or willful failure to follow the reasonable directions of GTC’s executive officers. 1.2 Amount and Payment of Severance. The aggregate severance payment referred to above shall be paid in a lump sum, payable with thirty (30) days following the date of termination, in an aggregate severance amount (the “Severance Amount”) equal to (i) twelve (12) months of Base Salary in effect on the date of termination. 1.3 Benefits. The Employee’s coverage under GTC’s health and dental insurance plans will remain in effect at GTC’s normal co-pay expense, during any period over which severance payments are being made hereunder, unless the Employee notifies GTC in writing that such coverage is no longer necessary. If, because of limitations required by third parties or imposed by law, the Employee cannot be provided such benefits through GTC’s plans, then GTC will provide the Employee with substantially equivalent benefits, on an aggregate basis, at its expense, which may include paying the cost of COBRA payments to the extent available under the Company’s plans. SECTION 2. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ANT) NON-COMPETITION COVENANT. 2.1 Confidentiality and Inventions Agreement. The Employee confirms that he or she has executed, or agrees that he or she will execute, GTC’s standard confidentiality and inventions agreement pertaining to GTC’s intellectual property and confidential information. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2.2 Non-Competition Covenant. During the Employee’s employment by GTC and, subject to the terms of Section 2.3, during the period of one year after such termination, the Employee will not: (a) become or be interested in (whether as an officer, director, stockholder, partner, proprietor, associate, representative or otherwise), or directly or indirectly engage in activities or render services for or to, any contract research organization located anywhere in North America which engages in activities or services which are directly related to any specific product or services or ongoing project of GTC on which the Employee was working during the Employee’s employment; provided, however, that notwithstanding the foregoing, the Employee may own, as an inactive investor, securities of any competitor corporation, so long as the Employee’s holding in any one such corporation shall not in the aggregate constitute more than 1% of the voting stock of such corporation; or (b) recruit, entice, or induce any of GTC’s other consultants or employees to engage in any activity which, were it done by the Employee, would violate the foregoing clause (a). 2.3 Non-Competition Payments; Enforcement of Non-Competition Covenant. (a) Subject to Section 2.3(b), following the termination of the Employee’s employment with GTC, GTC may enforce its rights with respect to the Employee’s non-competition covenant set forth in Section 2.2 only if: (i) GTC makes severance payments to the Employee hereunder; or (ii) in the event that the employment of the Employee by GTC is terminated and the Employee is not entitled to severance payments under the terms of Section 1.1 or any other agreement or understanding between the parties, GTC makes payments to the Employee, biweekly in arrears for twelve (12) months commencing with the first month after termination, each in an amount equal to 100% of the Employee’s biweekly base salary at the time of such termination; or (iii) during the twelve month period commencing with the first month after termination, GTC makes severance payments under another agreement or understanding between the parties which, together with any voluntary payments by GTC, equal or exceed the amount payable under Section 2.3(a)(ii). (b) GTC’s obligations under Section 2.3 are subject to the following: (i) The aggregate payments under Section 2.3(a) may be reduced by the amount of any salary or wages earned, or expected to be earned assuming continued employment at any new employment of Employee, as a result of any new employment of the Employee during such period, provided that to the extent severance payments are due under Section 1.1 or any other agreement, in no event shall such payments be less than the amount of such required severance. (ii) In the event that Employee breaches the covenant set forth in Section 2.2, GTC may enforce such covenant without continuing payments under Section 2.3(a) after the date of such breach. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (iii) In the event that GTC commences payments under Section 2.3, GTC may only terminate such payments under subsections 2.3(a)(ii) or (iii), if applicable, prior to the end of such twelve month period in the event that GTC has provided the Employee with two months prior written notice of such termination; provided however, that this clause (iii) does not entitle GTC to terminate payments required by Section 1.1 or under any other severance agreement prior to payment in full. In the event of any such early termination of payments, GTC’s right to enforce the Employee’s non-competition covenant set forth in Section 2.2 will terminate upon the date of the last payment hereunder. SECTION 3. MISCELLANEOUS. 3.1 Assignment. This Agreement may not be assigned, in whole or in part, by either party without the prior written consent of the other party, except that GTC may, without the consent of the Employee, assign its rights and obligations under this Agreement to any corporation, firm or other business entity with or into which GTC may merge or consolidate, or to which GTC may sell or transfer all or substantially all of its assets, or of which 50% or more of the equity investment and of the voting control is owned, directly or indirectly, by, or is under common ownership with, GTC. After any such assignment by GTC, GTC shall be discharged from all further liability hereunder and such assignee shall have all the rights and obligations of GTC under this Agreement. 3.2 Notices. All notices, requests, demands and other communications to be given pursuant to this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly given if delivered by hand or mailed by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the addresses set forth at the beginning of this Agreement or such other address as a party shall have designated by notice in writing to the other party, provided that notice of any change in address must actually have been received to be effective hereunder. 3.3 Integration. This Agreement is the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes any prior agreement or understanding relating to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement may not be superseded amended, supplemented or otherwise modified except by a writing signed by the Employee and GTC. 3.4 Binding Effect. Subject to Section 3.1, this Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto and their successors, assigns, heirs and personal representatives. 3.5 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in two counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and shall together constitute one and the same instrument. 3.6 Severability. If any provision hereof shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision hereof, and this Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid or unenforceable provision had not been included herein. If any provision hereof shall for any reason be held by a court to be excessively broad as to duration, geographical scope, activity or subject matter, it shall be construed by limiting and reducing it to make it enforceable to the extent compatible with applicable law as then in effect. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3.7 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, without regard to its conflict-of-law provisions. 3.8 Termination. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to or shall modify the at-will nature of the Employee’s employment relationship with GTC. The Employee may terminate his or her employment at any time with or without notice and with or without cause and GTC may do likewise, subject only to the express provisions of this Agreement. 3.9 Survival of Obligations; Enforcement. The Employee’s duties hereunder shall survive termination of the Employee’s employment by GTC. The Employee acknowledges that a remedy at law for any breach or threatened breach by the Employee of the provisions of this Agreement may be inadequate and the Employee therefore agrees that GTC shall be entitled to injunctive relief in case of any such breach or threatened breach. 3.10 Notice to Future Employers. For the period of twelve (12) months immediately following the end of the Employee’s employment by GTC, the Employee will inform each new employer, prior to accepting employment, of the existence of this Agreement and provide such new employer with a copy of it. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have duly executed and delivered this Agreement as of the date first written above. EMPLOYEE GTC BIOTHERAPEUTICS, INC. By:
en	wikipedia	N/A	Jogja International Heritage Walk (JIHW) is an international walking event that is held annually at Yogyakarta in the island of Java, Indonesia since 2008. JIHW is usually held in November for two days at Prambanan Temple and Imogiri, covering a distance categories of 5, 10 and 20 kilometers route. Walkers passes through plantation of Karang Tengah, slope of Bantul, and tourists villages of Sleman Regency. The event is organized to promoting the historical and cultural potential of the area, as well as to attract tourist. Many international tourist take part in the event every year. The motto of JIHW walking event is to promote a healthy lifestyle, also to improve communication and interaction between communities of different religions, nationalities, languages and cultural backgrounds. The event is a member of International Marching League, and Internationaler Volkssportverband (IVV) since 2013. The event is arranged by Jogja Walking Association. Other than the walking competition the event has supporting activities such as Family Fun Walk, Coloring and Umbrella Painting competitions and an educational trip. External links References Walking events Events in Yogyakarta Annual events in Indonesia
en	caselaw	US	This is an appeal from a judgment recovered by the appellee against appellant as compensation Page 412 for certain necessities furnished appellant's decedent during her lifetime. By its motion for a new trial appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence which is to the following effect: From 1928 to 1942 appellee Louis C. Schroeder, his brother Rudolph Schroeder and their mother Mary Schroeder lived together as a family in a common household. Part of the time appellee's son and daughter also were a part of the household. The house was owned by the mother who performed the household duties during the time that she was able. Rudolph did some of the household chores when his mother was not able and also furnished coal and other necessities for the family. Appellee furnished the groceries and paid laundry bills. No one paid rent or board. The mother died in 1942. The question here presented is whether appellee is entitled to compensation from decedent's estate for the groceries furnished and the laundry bills paid by him. Where a person rendering services and the person for whom they are rendered are members of a family living together as one household, and the service appertains to such condition, 1-3. an implication of a promise on the part of the recipient to pay for the services does not arise from the mererendition and acceptance thereof. The only proper inference is that the services were rendered gratuitously. However a contract to pay for such services may be shown and such contract may be express or implied. An implied contract to pay may be inferred from facts and circumstances of the services which indicate that compensation was intended or is required by reason and justice. The question as to whether there is an express or implied contract to pay is ordinarily one for the jury Page 413 under proper instruction. Hill v. Hill (1889), 121 Ind. 255, 23 N.E. 87; McCormick, Executor v. McCormick (1891),1 Ind. App. 594, 28 N.E. 122; James, Administrator v. Gillen (1892),3 Ind. App. 472, 30 N.E. 7; Estate of Reeves v. Moore (1892),4 Ind. App. 492, 31 N.E. 44; Crampton v. Logan (1902),28 Ind. App. 405, 63 N.E. 51; Irwin v. Jones (1910),46 Ind. App. 588, 92 N.E. 787; Miller v. Miller (1911),47 Ind. App. 239, 94 N.E. 243; Kirklin v. Clark (1913), 53 Ind. App. 358, 101 N.E. 753; Wainright Trust Co., Admr. v. Kinder (1918),69 Ind. App. 88, 120 N.E. 419; Farmers Loan Trust Co., Admr. v.Mock (1936), 102 Ind. App. 270, 2 N.E.2d 235. The above rules would also logically apply to the furnishing of groceries consumed by the family or the payment of the family laundry bills. Appellee does not claim the existence of an express contract but does contend that the facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant the jury in finding an implied contract to pay. It is settled, as we have stated above, that the question as to the existence of an implied contract to pay is ordinarily one for the jury. But the jury could not find the existence of such 4. implied contract from the mere furnishing of the groceries and the payment of the laundry bills. We are unable to find any facts or circumstances whatsoever indicating in the slightest that appellee ever expected to recover compensation or that his mother ever expected to compensate him. Nor do we find any facts or circumstances indicating that compensation is required by reason and justice. We must therefore conclude that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence. Other questions presented are not likely to arise on another trial and therefore do not require consideration. *Page 414 Judgment reversed with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for a new trial and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. NOTE. — Reported in 70 N.E.2d 764.
en	caselaw	US	Case 4:17-cr-00651 Document 366 Filed in TXSD on 12/14/18 Page 1 of 3 United States District Court Southern District of Texas ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT December 14, 2018 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS David J. Bradley, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § § v. § CRIMINAL NO. H-17-651(9) § GRISEL SALAS § REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Before the court, by referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), is the matter of the re-arraignment of Grisel Salas, a defendant in this action. The court, having addressed Defendant personally in open court, now submits its Report and Recommendation. On December 13, 2018, Defendant, Grisel Salas, appeared with counsel before the undersigned magistrate judge for the purpose of entering a guilty plea to Count 18 of the Indictment charging her with conspiracy to harbor, conceal, and shield from detection certain aliens present in the United States in violation of the law, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii),(iii), 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i),(iii)(Count 18). Defendant, Grisel Salas, consented in writing to plead guilty before a United States Magistrate Judge. After conducting said proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this court makes the following findings of fact: 1. Defendant, Grisel Salas, after consultation with counsel of record and with the approval of the government, has knowingly and voluntarily consented 1 Case 4:17-cr-00651 Document 366 Filed in TXSD on 12/14/18 Page 2 of 3 to be advised of her rights and to enter a plea of guilty before a U.S. Magistrate Judge subject to final approval and imposition of sentence by United States District Judge Gray H. Miller. 2. Defendant Grisel Salas is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea. 3. Defendant Grisel Salas is aware of the nature of the charges, the maximum punishment range and other penalties that may be imposed at sentencing. She has acknowledged that she understands the Plea Agreement terms. 4. Defendant Grisel Salas understands her constitutional and statutory rights and wishes to waive those rights. 5. Defendant Grisel Salas is aware that pursuant to the Plea Agreement, she is waiving her right to appeal her conviction and sentence, both directly and collaterally. 6. Defendant Grisel Salas understands that the sentencing judge is not bound by any recommendation on sentencing made by either counsel for the government or counsel for the defendant, and that if a recommendation on sentencing is not followed by the sentencing judge, she may not withdraw her plea of guilty. 7. Defendant Grisel Salas’s plea of guilty is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the offense charged in Count 18 of the Indictment. Based upon the foregoing findings, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned that the guilty plea of Defendant Grisel Salas to Count 18 of the Indictment be ACCEPTED by the court and that Grisel Salas be adjudged guilty of the offense alleged in Count 18 of the Indictment, to wit: conspiracy to harbor, conceal, and shield from detection certain aliens present in the United States in violation of the law, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii),(iii), 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i),(iii). 2 Case 4:17-cr-00651 Document 366 Filed in TXSD on 12/14/18 Page 3 of 3 The Clerk shall send copies of this Report and Recommendation to the respective parties who have fourteen (14) days from the receipt thereof to file written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. The original of any written objections shall be filed with the United States District Clerk electronically. Copies of such objections shall be mailed to opposing parties and to the chambers of the undersigned, 515 Rusk, Suite 7019, Houston, Texas 77002. SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 14th day of December, 2018. ______________________________ U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 3
en	contracts	US	Exhibit 10.3 SEVENTH AMENDED AND RESTATED KENSEY NASH CORPORATION INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN RESTRICTED STOCK AGREEMENT THIS RESTRICTED STOCK AGREEMENT, dated as of [ ], is between KENSEY NASH CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and the employee (the “Participant”) designated on the attached Notice of Grant of Award (the “Notice”) (the Notice and this Restricted Stock Agreement hereinafter referred to as this “Agreement”) All capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Agreement shall have the meaning set forth in the Plan. WHEREAS, the Committee desires, by affording the Participant an opportunity to receive shares of the Company’s Common Stock as hereinafter provided, to carry out the purposes of the Seventh Amended and Restated Kensey Nash Corporation Employee Incentive Compensation Plan, as amended from time to time (the “Plan”); and WHEREAS, the Committee has duly made all determinations necessary or appropriate to the grants hereunder; NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth and for other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto have agreed, and do hereby agree, as follows: 1. Grant of Restricted Stock. Subject to and upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement and the Plan, the Committee granted to the Participant on [ ] (the “Grant Date”) the number of shares of Restricted Stock set forth on the Notice (the “Shares”), and the Participant hereby accepts the grant of the Shares on a restricted basis, as set forth herein. 2. Limitations on Transferability. At any time prior to vesting in accordance with Paragraph 3 or 4, the Shares, or any interest therein, cannot be directly or indirectly transferred, sold, assigned, pledged, hypothecated, encumbered or otherwise disposed. 3. Dates of Vesting. Subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Agreement, the Shares shall cease to be restricted and shall become non-forfeitable (thereafter being referred to as “Unrestricted Stock”) pursuant to the schedule set forth on the Notice. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to Paragraphs 4 and 5 below, in the event that the Participant incurs a Termination of Service prior to the end of the Restriction Period (as defined in Section 8.3(a) of the Plan), all Shares that have not previously become Unrestricted Stock shall be immediately forfeited to the Company. 4. Termination of Service. Subject to Paragraph 5 below, the provisions of this Paragraph 4 shall apply in the event the Participant incurs a Termination of Service at any time prior to the date on which the Restricted Stock shall become Unrestricted Stock as set forth in Paragraph 3: (a) If prior to the end of the Restriction Period, the Participant incurs a Termination of Service because of his or her death or Disability, all of the Shares shall become Unrestricted Stock, and the Participant shall immediately own the Shares free of all restrictions otherwise imposed by this Agreement. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (b) If, prior to the end of the Restriction Period, the Participant incurs a Termination of Service for any reason other than his or her death or Disability, then the Shares that have not previously become Unrestricted Stock shall be immediately forfeited to the Company. 5. Adjustments/Change in Control. In the event of a Change in Control or other corporate restructuring provided for in the Plan, the Participant shall have such rights, and the Committee shall take such actions, as are provided for in the Plan. 6. Stock Certificates and Escrow. The certificates for the Shares may be held in custody by the Company until, and to the extent, such Shares shall become Unrestricted Stock. The Shares and the related certificates, together with any assets or securities held in the Company’s custody, shall either be (a) surrendered to the Company for cancellation to the extent such Shares are forfeited by the Participant pursuant to the terms of the Plan or this Agreement or (b) released to the Participant to the extent such Shares become Unrestricted Stock pursuant to Paragraph 3, 4 or 5 above. 7. Requirements of Law; Registration and Transfer Requirements. The Company shall not be required to issue any Shares if the issuance of such Shares shall constitute a violation of any provision of any law or regulation of any governmental authority. This Agreement and each and every obligation of the Company hereunder are subject to the requirement that the Shares may not be issued unless and until they are listed, registered or qualified, properly marked with a legend or other notation, or otherwise restricted, as is provided for in the Plan. The inability of the Company to obtain approval from any regulatory body having authority deemed by the Company to be necessary to the lawful issuance and transfer of any Shares pursuant to this Agreement shall relieve the Company of any liability with respect to the non-issuance or transfer of the Shares as to which such approval shall not have been obtained. However, the Company shall use its best efforts to obtain all such approvals. 8. No Stockholder Rights. The Participant shall not have any voting rights or rights to receive any dividends with respect to the Shares during the Restriction Period. 9. No Employment Rights. This Agreement is not a contract of employment, and the terms of employment of the Participant or other relationship of the Participant with the Company shall not be affected in any way by this Agreement except as specifically provided herein. The execution of this Agreement shall not be construed as conferring any legal rights upon the Participant for a continuation of an employment or other relationship with the Company, nor shall it interfere with the right of the Company to discharge the Participant and to treat him or her without regard to the effect which such treatment might have upon him or her as a Participant. 10. No Disclosure Rights. Except as required by applicable law, the Company (or any of its affiliates) shall not have any duty or obligation to affirmatively disclose to a record or beneficial holder of Common Stock, Restricted Stock or Unrestricted Stock, and such holder shall have no right to be advised of, any material information regarding the Company at any time prior to, upon or in connection with receipt of the Shares. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11. Governing Law. The interpretation, performance and enforcement of this Agreement shall be governed by and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware (other than its laws respecting choice of law). 12. Compliance with Laws and Regulations. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Company shall not be obligated to cause to be issued or delivered any certificates for Shares, prior to (a) the listing of such shares on any stock exchange or NASDAQ (or other public market) on which the Common Stock may then be listed (or regularly traded), (b) the completion of any registration or qualification of such shares under federal or state law, or any ruling or regulation of any government body which the Committee determines to be necessary or advisable, and (c) the satisfaction of any applicable withholding obligation. The Committee may require the Participant to make such representations and furnish such information as it may consider appropriate in connection with the issuance or delivery of the shares of Common Stock in compliance with applicable law or otherwise. 13. Successors and Assigns. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon each successor and assign of the Company. All obligations imposed upon the Participant or a Representative, and all rights granted to the Company hereunder, shall be binding upon the Participant’s or the Representative’s heirs, legal representatives and successors. 14. No Limitation on Rights of the Company. This Agreement shall not in any way affect the right of the Company to adjust, reclassify, reorganize or otherwise make changes in its capital or business structure, or to merge, consolidate, dissolve, liquidate, sell or transfer all or any part of its business or assets. 15. Notices. Any notice that either party hereto may be required or permitted to give the other shall be in writing and may be delivered personally or by mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the Secretary of the Company, 735 Pennsylvania Drive, Exton, Pennsylvania 19341, or the Participant at his or her address as shown on the Company’s payroll records, or to such other address as the Participant, by notice to the Company, may designate in writing from time to time. Any such notice shall be deemed given when received by the intended recipient. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any notice required or permitted hereunder from the Company to the Participant may be made by electronic means, including by electronic mail to the Company-maintained electronic mailbox of the Participant, and the Participant hereby consents to receive such notice by electronic delivery. To the extent permitted in an electronically delivered notice described in the previous sentence, the Participant shall be permitted to respond to such notice or communication by way of a responsive electronic communication, including by electronic mail. 16. Construction. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, this Agreement is made and the Shares are granted pursuant to the Plan and are in all respects limited by and subject to the express provisions of the Plan, as amended from time to time. The interpretation and construction by the Committee of the Plan, this Agreement and any such rules and regulations adopted by the Committee for purposes of administering the Plan, shall be final and binding upon the Participant and all other persons. 17. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the Plan, constitute the entire obligation of the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and shall supersede any prior expressions of intent or understanding with respect to such matter. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18. Amendment. Any amendment to this Agreement shall be in writing and signed on behalf of the Company; provided, however, that no such amendment may impair the rights of the Participant without his or her consent. 19. Waiver; Cumulative Rights. The failure or delay of either party to require performance by the other party of any provision hereof shall not affect its right to require performance of such provision unless and until such performance has been waived in writing. Each and every right hereunder is cumulative and may be exercised in part or in whole from time to time. 20. Counterparts. This Agreement may be signed in two (2) counterparts, each of which shall be an original, but both of which shall constitute but one and the same instrument. 21. Headings. The headings contained in this Agreement are for reference purposes only and shall not affect the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. 22. Severability. If any provision of this Agreement shall for any reason be held to be invalid or unenforceable, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not effect any other provision hereof, and this Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid or unenforceable provision were omitted. 23. Tax Consequences. The Participant acknowledges and agrees that the Participant is responsible for all taxes and tax consequences with respect to the grant of the Shares or the lapse of restrictions otherwise imposed by this Agreement. The Participant further acknowledges that it is the Participant’s responsibility to obtain any advice that the Participant deems necessary or appropriate with respect to any and all tax matters that may exist as a result of the grant of the Shares or the lapse of restrictions otherwise imposed by this Agreement. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the Shares, together with any other assets or securities held in escrow hereunder, shall not be released to the Participant unless, as provided in Section 12.7(c) of the Plan, the Participant shall have paid to the Company, or made arrangements satisfactory to the Company regarding the payment of, any federal, state, local or foreign taxes of any kind required by law to be withheld with respect to the grant of the Shares or the lapse of restrictions otherwise imposed by this Agreement. 24. Receipt of Plan. The Participant acknowledges receipt of a copy of the Plan, and represents that the Participant is familiar with the terms and provisions thereof, and hereby accepts the Shares subject to all the terms and provisions of this Agreement and of the Plan. The Shares are granted pursuant to the terms of the Plan, the terms of which are incorporated herein by reference, and the Shares shall in all respects be interpreted in accordance with the Plan. The Committee shall interpret and construe the Plan and this Agreement, and its interpretation and determination shall be conclusive and binding upon the parties hereto and any other person claiming an interest hereunder, with respect to any issue arising hereunder or thereunder. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have acknowledged their rights and obligations under this Agreement as of the Grant Date, by signing the Notice.
en	other	N/A	ADONIS I. GOINS, Plaintiff,v.CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant Gary W. Lipkin, Esquire, of Duane Morris LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Plaintiff. Charles M. Oberly III, Esquire, United States Attorney, District of Delaware, and Dina White Griffin, Esquire, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Philadelphia Pennsylvania. Of Eric P. Kressman, Esquire, Regional Chief Counsel, Region III and Katie M. Gaughan, Esquire, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Counsel for Defendant. Adonis I. Goins (" plaintiff) appeals from a decision of Carolyn W. Colvin, the Commissioner of Social Security (" defendant" ),[1] denying his application for disability insurance benefits (" DIB" ) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 401-434. (D.I. 1) Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to award DIB or remand for further proceedings. (D.I. 10,11) Defendant has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, requesting the court to affirm her decision and enter judgment in her favor. (D.I. 13, 14) The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).[2] Plaintiff filed a protective claim for DIB on April 26, 2007, asserting disability (since the alleged onset date of October 15, 2006) due to back problems, migraines, sinusitis, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (" PTSD" ). (D.I. 8 at 233-36, 282) His claim was denied initially and after reconsideration. ( Id. at 100-104, 108-113) Administrative Law Judge Melvin D. Benitz (" ALJ" ) held a hearing on May 21, 2009. ( Id. at 60-82) In a decision dated August 3, 2009, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled. ( Id. 85-95) On August 17, 2009, plaintiff requested a review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. ( Id. at 146-47) On April 14, 2010, the Appeals Council remanded the matter, finding, in part, that Page 584 the ALJ failed to provide an adequate evaluation of the medical source opinion evidence offered by Cyndia Choi, M.D. (" Dr. Choi" ), plaintiff's treating psychiatrist. ( Id. at 98) The Appeals Council directed the ALJ to consider the detailed medical opinions offered by Dr. Choi and to assess this information against pertinent Social Security Rulings. ( Id. at 98-99) A hearing was held before the ALJ on January 4, 2011. ( Id. at 30-59) Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. ( Id. at 11) Vocational expert, Mitchell A. Schmidt (" VE" ), also testified. In a decision dated February 4, 2011, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. ( Id. at 8-29) The Appeals Council denied review. ( Id. at 1-6) Having exhausted his administrative remedies, plaintiff filed a civil action on May 5, 2012, seeking review of the final decision. (D.I. 1) 1. Plaintiff's medical history, treatment and condition. Plaintiff, born in 1970, was 36 years old at his alleged onset date. (D.I. 8 at 33, 233) Plaintiff is considered a younger individual under 20 C.F.R. 404.1563(c). He has a high school education and a vocational degree in pharmaceuticals. ( Id. at 33) Plaintiff's past relevant work was as a building maintenance manager, an air line baggage handler, park service worker, construction worker, and a dialysis technician. ( Id. at 53-54) The record medical evidence reflects that in December 1998, plaintiff commenced treatment in the emergency room at the Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center (" VAMC" ), after having sustained an injury while lifting a heavy box.[3] ( Id. at 443) Medical notes indicate that, due to a car accident in 1993, plaintiff suffered chronic low back pain, whiplash and neck pain. ( Id. at 443) As a result of the injury, he had increased pain in his back and neck. X-rays were negative. Plaintiff was advised to rest, avoid heavy lifting, and to use a heating pad. A follow-up appointment with the VAMC clinic was scheduled. ( Id. ) On February 21, 2002, plaintiff went to the Primary Care Center at the VAMC for his first appointment. ( Id. at 440) He was treated by Joan A. Gallo, CRNP (" Nurse Gallo" ). ( Id. at 441) Medical notes identify low back pain and migraines as his chief problems. ( Id. at 440) X-rays, anti-inflammatory medications and physical therapy were ordered. ( Id. at 441) On April 23, 2002, plaintiff presented to the Mental Health Outpatient Clinic (" MHC" ), stating that he was " not sleeping and was never treated for PTSD." ( Id. at 437) Progress notes indicate that plaintiff was not having suicidal or homicidal ideation or hallucinations. His thought process was goal directed and he was alert, polite, oriented and cooperative during the examination. Plaintiff reported feeling easily agitated and having sleep disruptions (including nightmares) for some time. A PTSD evaluation was scheduled. On the same day, plaintiff had an appointment with Nurse Gallo, complaining of persistent back pain. ( Id. at 438) A back x-ray revealed mild degenerative joint disease at L5-S1. ( Id. at 438, 431) Plaintiff reported that the pain medications he was taking were ineffective. ( Id. at 438) Plaintiff returned for an appointment with Nurse Gallo on July 11, 2002 for complaints of back pain, arm numbness, and insomnia. ( Id. at 435) He was encouraged Page 585 to seek an evaluation for PTSD. ( Id. at 436) On August 2, 2002, plaintiff had an evaluation with a physical therapist. ( Id. at 433) He tolerated the therapy well and was given back strengthening exercises to do at home. ( Id. at 434) During a January 23, 2003 appointment at VMAC, plaintiff complained of chronic lower back pain and frequent migraine headaches. ( Id. at 430) Plaintiff said that Excedrin helped with headaches. He was referred to physical therapy and provided with back strengthening exercises. ( Id. at 431) On July 28, 2003, plaintiff a had follow-up appointment with Nurse Gallo and complained of lower back pain and migraine headaches. ( Id. at 426) At that time, plaintiff was working for an airline performing a lot of physical labor. ( Id. at 427) Progress notes reflect that plaintiff was having difficulty coping with PTSD issues. ( Id. at 429) Nurse Gallo scheduled an appointment with the MHC. On August 12, 2003, plaintiff returned to the MHC, complaining of back pain and nightmares. ( Id. at 420) Plaintiff relieved the nightmares by consuming excessive amounts of alcohol. Psychotherapy, " given [plaintiff's] significant stressors and history of violent impulses," was recommended. ( Id. at 423) Plaintiff agreed to schedule therapy after his " alcohol consumption ceased." ( Id. ) His diagnosis was night terrors, PTSD and alcohol dependency. On September 8, 2003, plaintiff appeared for an appointment at the MHC. ( Id. at 418-419) He reported having mood swings, " frequent nightmares about combat," and feelings of isolation. Progress notes reveal that plaintiff had some symptoms of PTSD, but was able to tolerate without medication. On November 6, 2003, plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with Nurse Gallo. ( Id. at 414) He indicated that he was happy to be working as a park service employee. Plaintiff complained of lower back pain, sleep problems and migraines. ( Id. at 415) Nurse Gallo requested input from the Psychiatry Department regarding PTSD. On January 13, 2004, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Gabriel Bucurescu (" Dr. Bucurescu" ), a board certified neurologist, for migraine headaches that were occurring 5-6 days a week. ( Id. at 410) The throbbing pain plaintiff experienced was also accompanied by nausea. Dr. Bucurescu found that plaintiff was able to follow three step commands, repeat and name appropriately, and had normal writing and reading abilities. ( Id. at 411) He was prescribed Naproxen,[4] Propranolol [5] and Excedrin. ( Id. at 413) Plaintiff returned to Nurse Gallo on March 8, 2004, with complaints of lower back pain and migraine headaches. ( Id. at 406) His medications and x-rays were reviewed. ( Id. at 407) On September 13, 2004, plaintiff was assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning (" GAF [6]" ) score of 48.[7] ( Id. at 381) A diagnosis of PTSD was also noted. Plaintiff returned for follow-up care with Nurse Gallo on September 16, 2004. ( Id. at 402) His complaints were lower back pain, migraine headaches, PTSD and allergies. ( Id. at 403) Progress notes reveal that plaintiff stopped drinking alcohol in November 2003. On November 18, 2004, plaintiff had a follow-up visit with Nurse Gallo. ( Id. at 402) He complained of the same problems as outlined in the September 16th visit. Over one year later, on January 23, 2006, plaintiff returned to Nurse Gallo with complaints of severe headaches, chronic back pain, sleep disturbances, and PTSD problems (including flashbacks). ( Id. at 397) The screening for PTSD was positive. ( Id. at 398) Plaintiff was referred to the Behavioral Health Laboratory (" BHL" ). Plaintiff appeared for an appointment with BHL on January 25, 2006. ( Id. at 393) Based on the symptoms presented, plaintiff was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and PTSD. ( Id. at 393-394) With respect to PTSD, plaintiff reported having the following experiences: (1) avoidance of a traumatic event; (2) trouble with recall; (3) loss of interest; (4) feeling detached; (5) feeling numb; (6) trouble sleeping; (7) irritable; (8) difficulty concentrating; and (9) feeling nervous. ( Id. at 394) An appointment with a mental health care provider was scheduled. ( Id. at 393) On February 23, 2006, plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with Nurse Gallo. ( Id. at 391) His chief complaints were back pain, sleep problems, PTSD, headaches and depression. ( Id. at 392) Plaintiff's medications were adjusted and appointments with MHC and neurology were recommended. On March 6, 2006, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Bucurescu for migraine headaches that were occurring approximately three days a week. ( Id. at 387) The migraines were accompanied by throbbing pain, light and sound sensitivity, and nausea that lasted the entire day. He was prescribed Propranolol, Excedrin and a follow-up appointment was scheduled. On March 16, 2006, plaintiff was evaluated by board certified psychiatrist Cyndia S. Choi, M.D. (" Dr. Choi" ). ( Id. at 381) Dr. Choi found that plaintiff met the " criteria for PTSD," as he was experiencing nightmares, insomnia, hyper vigilance, and irritability. ( Id. at 381) Dr. Choi noted that plaintiff wished to avoid medication that was too sedating and was concerned about taking too much time off from work for doctor appointments. His GAF score was 48. ( Id. at 377) On May 8, 2006, Dr. Bururescu examined plaintiff for complaints of migraine headaches. ( Id. at 378) Dr. Bururescu increased plaintiff's dosage of Propranolol, recommended continuation of non-prescription pain medication, and ordered a follow-up appointment. Later that day, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Choi. The mental status examination revealed that plaintiff was irritable and anxious, his thought processes goal oriented, and his judgment was adequate. Page 587 ( Id. at 377) He had no suicidal thoughts or homicidal ideation. Dr. Choi prescribed Celexa [8] and supplied plaintiff with a letter of unemployability. ( Id. at 377-378) On June 29, 2006, plaintiff was seen by Nurse Gallo, complaining of frequent migraines, severe back pain and sleep problems related to PTSD. ( Id. at 374-75) Plaintiff said Celexa improved his mood, but caused drowsiness. Nurse Gallo recommended continued mental health treatment with Dr. Choi. On June 29, 2006, plaintiff had a follow-up mental health examination with Dr. Choi. ( Id. at 373-74) Dr. Choi found plaintiffs mood was " dysphoric due to chronic PTSD," his affect was polite and thought processes were " goal directed." There was no psychosis or suicidal or homicidal ideation. Plaintiff reported being concerned about losing his job. Dr. Choi prescribed a Seroquel [9] and discontinued Celexa. ( Id. at 374) Plaintiff's GAF score was 47. Plaintiff returned to Dr. Choi on September 8, 2006. ( Id. at 369) The mental status examination revealed that his: (1) affect was polite and appropriate; (2) thought processes were goal directed; (3) insight and judgment were adequate; and (4) thoughts were not suicidal or homicidal. ( Id. at 369-70) Dr. Choi observed that plaintiff was having " great difficulty keeping his present job due to his service connected disabilities." ( Id. at 369) She also noted that he was " despondent due to his situation" but was " coping." ( Id. at 369-70) Plaintiff's GAF score was 47. ( Id. at 359) On the same date, plaintiff was treated by Dr. Bucurescu for migraine headaches. ( Id. at 370) The mental examination revealed that he was oriented to time, place and person; his judgment was good and he could explain similarities and proverbs well. ( Id. at 371) Although Propranolol was initially effective, plaintiffs migraines had resumed in intensity and frequency. Dr. Bucurescu discontinued Propranolol and suggested using Excedrin, as needed. A four month follow-up appointment was scheduled. ( Id. at 373) On December 21, 2006, plaintiff was treated by Nurse Gallo for left hip pain. ( Id. at 366-68) He reported taking Motrin daily for relief. Progress notes indicate that his headaches were occurring daily and spontaneously. Motrin and Excedrin relieved the pain, but left plaintiff feeling dizzy. Plaintiff reported having sleep difficulties as well as nightmares. The loss of nighttime sleep made plaintiff tired and unable to work during the day. He admitted having suicidal thoughts. ( Id. at 368) Plaintiff's physical examination revealed very tense muscles and trigger points, with limited flexion of knees. He was prescribed Naproxen and told to continue Excedrin. A six-week follow-up appointment was scheduled. On February 1, 2007, plaintiff returned to Nurse Gallo, complaining of headaches and chronic lower back pain. ( Id. at 363) The migraines would start soon after he awoke at 4:00 or 4:30 a.m. and last for three to four hours. Excedrin would relieve the pain, but left plaintiff feeling hungover. On February 5, 2007, plaintiff saw Dr. Bucurescu complaining of frequent migraines. ( Id. at 360) Progress notes reflect that the headaches were without aura Page 588 and still " occurring rather frequently." ( Id. at 362) Dr. Bucurescu prescribed Zomig [10] to take at the onset of a migraine. During a February 7, 2007 appointment, Dr. Choi observed that plaintiff was alert and oriented without psychosis. ( Id. at 359) His mood was dysphoric, thought content clear, without suicidal or homicidal ideation. Plaintiff expressed concerns with his inability to maintain employment. Dr. Choi provided a letter to support plaintiff's unemployability. His GAF score was 47. ( Id. at 353) On March 7, 2007, plaintiff appeared for an appointment with a physical therapist to address his complaints of increased pain and decreased function. ( Id. at 357-59) His pain level was recorded at 7 out of 10 (highest). Instruction on exercises to relieve pain was provided. Plaintiff was scheduled for a six-week physical therapy plan. Plaintiff appeared for a follow-up mental health evaluation with Dr. Choi on March 15, 2007, where he complained of frequent nightmares. ( Id. at 353) Dr. Choi noted: [Plaintiff] continues to suffer with significant PTSD which interferes with his nightly sleep. He has frequent insomnia. He has been unable to hold a job due to his PTSD, although he would prefer to work, he has had multiple bad experiences due to PTSD . . . . [Plaintiff's] [m]ood is depressed . . . [a]ffect is restricted but polite. [His] [t]hought processes are goal directed. ( Id. at 353) Plaintiff reported using Remeron [11] and Valium,[12] but prefers using a minimal amount of medication. His GAF score was 47. ( Id. at 346) On March 15, 2007, plaintiff was examined by Nurse Gallo for complaints of back pain. ( Id. at 356) She noted that his depression remained the same with suicidal thought, but no intent. ( Id. ) Plaintiff was instructed to continue physical therapy and treatment with mental health services. Plaintiff returned to Dr. Choi on May 7, 2007. ( Id. at 346) Plaintiff was having frequent nightmares and difficulty dealing with the stresses associated with reorganizing his life following the loss of his job. The mental status examination revealed plaintiff's mood was depressed and affect " somewhat more restricted." ( Id. at 347) Dr. Choi discussed and reviewed his current medications. ( Id. at 551) He had stopped taking Remeron because it was too sedating. He reported taking Valium rarely. His GAF score was 47. ( Id. at 548) On May 7, 2007, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Bucurescu for complaints of migraine headaches, which were occurring about five times a week. ( Id. at 347-348) Progress notes indicate that Excedrin and Zomig helped relieve the headaches. ( Id. at 350) On August 23, 2007, plaintiff presented to Nurse Gallo, complaining of persistent headaches. ( Id. at 471) Progress notes state that he remained depressed with suicidal thought, but no intent. ( Id. at 472) In a letter dated September 26, 2007,[13] Dr. Choi wrote : Plaintiff is under my care at the Philadelphia VA Medical Center Mental Health Clinic for his service connected diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He is presently a total of 70% or more and he is totally disabled and unemployable due to his PTSD. He has not worked since 2006, due to his PTSD which interferes with his ability to concentrate and follow tasks. Also, due to his PTSD, he is socially isolative, irritable, impulsive, with poor social skills that interferes with his ability to maintain employment and work with others. ( Id. at 455) Plaintiff returned for a mental health appointment on September 27, 2007. ( Id. at 548) Dr. Choi observed: [Plaintiff] continues to suffer with significant PTSD which interferes with his nightly sleep. He has frequent nightmares. He has been unable to hold a job due to PTSD, although he would prefer to work. He had gotten a job as a diesel engine mechanic but he could not do it due to PTSD. He then went and received training for pharmacy tech but he could not do that either due to PTSD and physical injuries. ( Id. at 549) The mental status examination revealed that his mood was depressed and affect more restricted. Plaintiffs thought process was goal directed with no delusions or suicidal/homicidal ideation. Plaintiff's insight and judgment were deemed " adequate." Progress notes state that Dr. Choi adjusted plaintiff's medications and scheduled a follow-up appointment. ( Id. at 551) His GAF score was 47. ( Id. at 634) During a November 30, 2007 appointment, Dr. Choi found plaintiff's mood depressed, affect restricted and thought processes contained " ruminations about past trauma." ( Id. at 634) Progress notes reflect that plaintiff " admits to suicidal ideation periodically, but denies attempts or present intentions." ( Id. ) There was no finding of homicidal ideation or delusions. His insight and judgment were " poor." ( Id. ) Dr. Choi continued his course of medications, including a prescription for Diazepam.[14] ( Id. at 634-36) On the same date, Dr. Choi completed a Psychiatric/Psychological Impairment Questionnaire (" questionnaire" ). ( Id. at 501-16) Plaintiffs current GAF was listed at 41. ( Id. at 501) Dr. Choi diagnosed " PTSD due to the Persian Gulf War" and concluded that his prognosis was " poor." ( Id. at 501) She identified the following clinical findings [15] to support her diagnosis of PTSD: (1) poor memory; (2) appetite disturbance with weight change; (3) sleep disturbance; (4) mood disturbance; (5) emotional lability; (6) recurrent panic attacks; (7) anhedonia or pervasive loss of interest; (8) paranoia or inappropriate suspiciousness; (9) feelings of guilt/worthlessness; (10) difficulty thinking or concentrating; (11) suicidal ideation or attempts; (12) social withdrawal or isolation; (13) decreased energy; (14) intrusive recollections of a traumatic experience; (15) generalized persistent anxiety; and (16) hostility and irritability. ( Id. at 502) Dr. Choi listed the following laboratory and diagnostic test results to support her prognosis: " mental status exam-depressed mood, restricted affect, thought process ruminations about traumatic experience." ( Id. at 502-503) In response to a series of prompts regarding plaintiff's ability to sustain an activity during a normal workday, Dr. Choi concluded that plaintiff was " markedly limited" in the following categories: (1) understanding and memory; [16] (2) sustained concentration and persistence; [17] (3) social interactions; [18] and (4) adaption.[19] Dr. Choi added that plaintiff was unable to maintain concentration and became socially withdrawn and irritable. ( Id. at 506) She averred that plaintiff was unable to tolerate even low work stress because " he still has difficulties with PTSD without the stress of work." ( Id. at 507) Plaintiff returned to Dr. Choi for treatment on December 31, 2007. ( Id. at 626) The mental status examination revealed his mood as chronic dysphoric and affect restricted. Plaintiff had no suicidal or homicidal ideation and his insight and judgment were adequate. ( Id. at 627) Dr. Choi assessment was PTSD, chronic and severe, related to plaintiff's service in the Gulf War and a motor vehicle accident. ( Id. at 628) Plaintiff reported that Remeron helped with insomnia, but caused grogginess. Plaintiff also reported taking Valium, but had not had a refill since September 2007. ( Id. at 628) Plaintiffs GAF was 45. ( Id. at 522) On February 11, 2008, plaintiff was treated by Nurse Gallo for complaints of lower back pain and migraine headaches. ( Id. at 524) He reported that his left hip pain improved because he had stopped walking distances. At his March 10, 2008 appointment with Dr. Choi, plaintiff complained that his nightmares were becoming worse. ( Id. at 520) Dr. Choi assessed plaintiff's mood as depressed and affect appropriate. ( Id. at 616) Plaintiff had no signs of suicidal or homicidal ideation and his judgment and insights were fair. Dr. Choi prescribed Celexa and scheduled a follow-up appointment. ( Id. at 520) On April 17, 2008, plaintiff returned to Dr. Choi, complaining of insomnia. ( Id. at 613) The mental status examination revealed that plaintiff was depressed, affect restricted and thought processes were goal directed. He had no present suicidal or homicidal ideation, but had feelings of hopelessness and helplessness. ( Id. at 613) Dr. Choi continued plaintiff's medications and scheduled a three-month follow-up appointment. ( Id. at 615) Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Burcurescu for migraines on June 17, 2008. ( Id. at 603) Progress notes reflect that the headaches were occurring daily. The mental status examination revealed that plaintiff was able to: (1) follow three step commands; (2) explain proverbs well; (3) explain similarities correctly; and (4) exercise good judgment. ( Id. at Page 591 604) Dr. Bucurescu adjusted his prescriptions and ordered a six month follow-up appointment. ( Id. at 606) On July 21, 2008, State Agency Psychologist C. Tucker, Ph.D. (" Dr. Tucker" ), completed a Psychiatric Review Technique and Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. ( Id. at 558) Dr. Tucker diagnosed depression and PTSD. ( Id. at 561-562) She found that plaintiff was " not very credible" and had " compliance problems with his medications and with his exercises for his physical problems." ( Id. at 571) Dr. Tucker also surmised that plaintiff's claims of isolation were overstated since he was able to take care of his girlfriends' children, drive them to school, shop, attend appointments and had a relationship. (Id.) She concluded that plaintiff was able to handle low stress tasks. On July 24, 2008, plaintiff presented with complaints of migraines, wrist pain, hip pain and depression. ( Id. at 595) He reported having fewer nightmares and sleeping better. ( Id. at 596) Nurse Gallo noted that plaintiff was suicidal, without intent. ( Id. at 596) Progress notes reflect that plaintiff contacted Nurse Gallo on July 25, 2008, complaining of persistent pain. ( Id. at 615) The complaints were relayed to Dr. Choi, who indicated the concerns would be addressed at his next scheduled appointment (approximately two weeks later). During an August 6, 2008, appointment with Dr. Choi, plaintiff reported hip and wrist pain. ( Id. at 589) Dr. Choi concluded that plaintiff's pain was not related to depression or PTSD. The mental status examination revealed that plaintiff was depressed, affect restricted and no suicidal or homicidal ideation. ( Id. at 591) Dr. Choi recommended an examination by a rheumatologist. Plaintiff returned to Dr. Choi on November 6, 2008 complaining that he " felt like crap." ( Id. at 706) Progress notes reflect that plaintiff was depressed " over his finances due to his unemployability." ( Id. ) Dr. Choi diagnosed " PTSD with increasing depression due to stressors." ( Id. at 708) Plaintiff's affect was appropriate, his thought processes were goal oriented, and he did not have suicidal or homicidal ideation. ( Id. at 706) His GAF score was 45. ( Id. at 684) On January 13, 2009, plaintiff returned to Dr. Bucurescu with complaints of migraine headaches. ( Id. at 703) Dr. Bucurescu adjusted his medications. ( Id. at 705) On January 14, 2009, plaintiff presented to Nurse Gallo with complaints of migraine headaches that were occurring more frequently and with intensity. ( Id. at 701) He complained of ongoing hip and back pain, which improved with stretching exercises. Plaintiff also reported having trouble sleeping and snoring. Nurse Gallo referred plaintiff to the sleep clinic to " eliminate [the] component [of] sleep apnea." ( Id. at 702) On February 9, 2009, plaintiff returned to Dr. Choi for a follow-up appointment. ( Id. at 683) The mental status examination revealed that he was depressed and anxious, but was coping. Plaintiffs affect was restricted, thought processes were goal directed, and there was no presence of suicidal or homicidal ideation. ( Id. at 684) On March 11, 2009, plaintiff was evaluated by the Polytrauma Team (" the Team" ). ( Id. at 660-668) Plaintiff complained of: (1) headaches; (2) backaches; (3) poor sleep; (4) weakness in his legs; (5) difficult getting dressed; (6) coughing and choking while eating; (7) constipation; (8) frequent urination; and (9) depression. ( Id. at 663) Progress notes reveal that plaintiff stated " I should be able to go to work and do Page 592 things. This is not what I planned." ( Id. ) The Team concluded that plaintiff would benefit from participation because he suffered from " significant PTSD," headaches, pain from multiple sources, did not take medications as prescribed, and had poor nutritional habits. ( Id. at 665) On March 20, 2009, plaintiff was treated for headache pain by an acupuncture provider. ( Id. at 656) The acupuncture treatment was helpful, allowing him to do some housework and stretching exercises. Progress notes state that plaintiff was concerned about his finances and continued to reject ideas about taking jobs that would be " more in keeping with his physical issues." ( Id. ) On April 13, 2009, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Bucurescu for persistent migraine headaches. ( Id. at 832) Although Maxalt [20] was helping, plaintiff continued to have headaches about four times per week. Dr. Bucurescu adjusted the medications. ( Id. at 835) On May 11, 2009, Dr. Choi contacted plaintiff by telephone to discuss the rescheduling of his May 15, 2009 appointment. ( Id. at 824) She concluded he was " psychiatrically stable on present [prescriptions] of Valium, Ambien,[21] which he takes seldomly. [His] last refill was in February. . . he stopped most medications for a while because he was feeling sick and . . . that he was on an excessive amount of medication." ( Id. at 824) His GAF score was 45. ( Id. at 810) Dr. Choi examined plaintiff on May 20, 2009. ( Id. at 810) Plaintiff complained of depression and asked to try antidepressant medication. ( Id. at 811) The mental status examination revealed: depression, restricted affect and thought processes without suicidal or homicidal ideation. His insight and judgment were adequate. He reported increased depression, irritability, anxiety, increased thoughts of suicide and insomnia. ( Id. at 811, 814) Dr. Choi prescribed Celexa.[22] ( Id. at 813) Progress notes also reveal that plaintiff was depressed over finances due to his unemployability. (Id. at 811) In a May 20, 2009 letter,[23] Dr. Choi noted: Plaintiff suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder secondary to his involvement in the Persian Gulf War. His prognosis is poor. He suffers from poor memory, sleep disturbance, mood disturbances, emotional lability, recurrent panic attacks, anhedonia/pervasive loss of interests, paranoia/inappropriate suspiciousness, difficulty thinking/concentrating, suicidal ideation, social withdrawal/isolation, decreased energy, intrusive recollections of a traumatic experience, generalized persistent anxiety, hostility, irritability and nightmares which often involve his traumatic past . . . . Plaintiff is markedly limited in his capacity to remember locations and work-like procedures; understand and remember detailed instructions, carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; Page 593 perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary tolerance; and sustain ordinary routine without supervision. . . . Plaintiff is essentially precluded from accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors; getting along with co-workers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes . . . . Plaintiff experiences episodes of deterioration/decompensation in work/work-like settings which cause him to withdraw from the situation and/or experience an exacerbation of signs and symptoms. . . . Plaintiff is incapable of tolerating even low work stress as work stress can trigger irritability or social withdrawal. . . . If plaintiff were to attempt to return to work, I would expect him to be absent at least three days a month secondary to his impairment and treatment. . . . ( Id. at 713-14) Plaintiff returned to Dr. Bururescu on August 24, 2009 with complaints of migraine headaches that were no longer responding to medication. ( Id. at 793, 794, 796) The headaches occurred about four days a week. ( Id. at 793) The mental status examination revealed that plaintiff " could explain proverbs well" . . . " could do similarities correctly" and had " good" judgment. ( Id. at 794) On September 18, 2009, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Choi, complaining of persistent depression, severe pain, insomnia, and inability to concentrate or complete tasks. ( Id. at 787) The mental status examination revealed his mood as depressed, and his affect restricted with no presence of suicidal or homicidal ideation. Dr. Choi reviewed and adjusted his Celexa and Valium prescriptions. ( Id. at 789) His GAF was a 45. ( Id. at 870) Plaintiff returned to Dr. Choi for an appointment on December 18, 2009. ( Id. at 870) He complained of chronic pain and feelings of hopelessness. Progress notes reflect that plaintiff had relapsed with alcohol use, was depressed and angry. The mental status examination revealed that plaintiff was depressed and his affect restricted. His thought content was " passive suicidal, but with no intention or plan." ( Id. ) Plaintiffs insight and judgment were fair and his thought processes were goal-oriented. Dr. Choi directed plaintiff to continue taking Celexa for depression. ( Id. at 872) On the same date, Dr. Choi completed a new questionnaire. ( Id. at 839) His current GAF was listed at 42. In this questionnaire, Dr. Choi added " persistent irrational fears" and removed " paranoia or inappropriate suspiciousness" from the clinical findings listed to support her diagnosis. ( Id. at 840) With respect to " the ability to make simple work related decisions" and " the ability to travel to unfamiliar places or use public transportation," Dr. Choi changed the responses to " markedly limited." [24] ( Id. at 843-844) Regarding the question about episodes of deterioration in work, Dr. Choi changed her explanation to " [plaintiff] cannot tolerate any stress. [He] [b]ecomes more withdrawn . . . ." ( Id. at 844) With respect to tolerating work stress, Dr. Choi averred " [plaintiff] has poor judgment with poor social interactions. He [c]annot control [his] emotions, [has] no energy to work, [and] no tolerance for stress." ( Id. at 845) Plaintiff presented to Nurse Gallo on February 8, 2010, with continued complaints of back pain. ( Id. at 866) Progress Page 594 notes reflect that he was doing " alright," had headaches three days a week, was depressed, and had sleep problems. ( Id. at 868) He reported drinking alcohol frequently. ( Id. at 867) On July 7, 2010, plaintiff appeared for a mental status evaluation by Dr. Frederick Kozma, Ph.D., as part of his application for disability determination services. ( Id. at 847-855) Plaintiff drove himself to the appointment without difficulty. ( Id. at 847) During the clinical interview, Dr. Kozma observed that plaintiff maintained good eye contact during the examination, but had difficulty organizing his thoughts. ( Id. at 849, 853) On the mini-mental status examination, plaintiff was able to repeat and recall words, perform serial tasks, name common objects, follow three-step commands, read and follow written directives, write a sentence correctly, and copy a diagram of intersecting pentagons. Dr. Kozma found this was normal cognitive functioning. ( Id. at 850) He assessed plaintiff's GAF at 45. In response to questions regarding ability to do work-related (mental) activities, Dr. Kozma concluded that plaintiff was markedly impaired in: (1) his ability to make judgments in simple work-related decisions; (2) understanding and remembering complex instructions; (3) carrying out complex instructions; and (4) his ability to make judgments in complex work-related decisions. ( Id. at 852) Dr. Kozma found that plaintiff had no impairment in understanding and remembering simple instructions. Dr. Kozma found plaintiff was " mildly impaired" in the ability to interact with the public, coworkers and supervisors. ( Id. at 853) He determined that plaintiff's impairment would have a " moderately severe" affect on his ability to sustain work and attendance in a normal work-setting. ( Id. at 855) In summation, Dr. Kozma opined: Plaintiff suffers from major depressive disorder characterized by sad affect, feelings of helplessness, low motivation, a loss of pleasure in most activities, difficulties with attention and concentration. He has experienced suicidal ideation in the past. Plaintiff suffers from breathing related sleep disorder manifested by insomnia related to sleep apnea. Plaintiff does not appear able to manage his own funds. ( Id. at 850-851) On August 30, 2010, plaintiff returned to Nurse Gallo with complaints of back pain and chest pain at night. ( Id. at 932) Although plaintiff reported taking Celexa, there were no recent prescription orders on file. Nurse Gallo found his affect as slightly brighter and advised him to continue treatment with Dr. Choi. ( Id. at 932) On October 7, 2010, members of the Team met to discuss plaintiff's case. ( Id. at 942-43) They concluded that their services were no longer needed because he had not been in contact with nor responded to their outreach attempts. ( Id. at 943) Plaintiff's case was returned to his primary care provider, Nurse Gallo, with the option of returning to the Team as needed. (Id. at 943) Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with Nurse Gallo on November 22, 2010, complaining primarily of lower back pain. ( Id. at 940) His back pain improved with inactivity. The physical examination revealed that his affect was slightly brighter. Plaintiff reported experiencing anxiety, accompanied with diarrhea, before leaving the house. He denied taking any medication for depression or PTSD. ( Id. at 940-41) On March 14, 2011, Dr. Choi completed a third questionnaire. ( Id. at 956) Plaintiff's GAF was 45. Although similar to the Page 595 first and second questionnaires, Dr. Choi noted the presence of the following, to support her clinical findings: (1) delusion or hallucinations; (2) paranoia or inappropriate suspiciousness; (3) perceptual disturbances; and (4) blunt, flat or inappropriate affect. ( Id. at 957) She removed the " persistent irrational fears" from the listing. Dr. Choi increased her assessments from " moderately limited" to " markedly limited" with respect to: (1) ability to ask simple questions or request assistance; and (2) the ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. ( Id. at 960) Conversely, she found that plaintiffs ability to make simple work related decisions improved from " markedly limited" to " moderately limited." Dr. Choi also noted that plaintiff had " poor concentration," which limited his ability to perform basic work related activities. ( Id. at 961) Dr. Choi added that " [d]ue to depression, poor concentration, irritability, poor impulse control, [plaintiff] is totally disabled." ( Id. at 962) Plaintiff was born on May 8, 1979. ( Id. at 33) He completed high school and obtained a vocational degree in pharmaceuticals. He is unmarried and lives with his fiancé and her daughter. ( Id. at 38) Plaintiff served in the United States Army from 1989 to 1993. ( Id. at 48) He was a diesel engine mechanic. He was stationed overseas in 1990-1991, during the Gulf War. ( Id. at 50) He was " partially" in combat, stationed " above the front lines." Plaintiff declined to describe what occurred, explaining that he did not wish to relive the wartime experiences. ( Id. ) Plaintiff was diagnosed with PTSD and depression in 1992 or 1993. ( Id. at 69) In two separate slip and fall accidents in 1990 and 1992, plaintiff sustained head injuries and was hospitalized for one day at a military hospital. In 1993, while on military leave, plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was rear-ended by a tractor trailer. ( Id. at 48-49, 67) He suffered a head injury and whiplash. ( Id. at 49) Following his discharge from the Army, plaintiff worked as a custodian, park service worker, an airline baggage handler, an exercise equipment repair/maintenance person, a construction worker, and a dialysis technician. ( Id. at 53-54, 64-65) Plaintiffs last job was at a landfill where his duties included carrying and installing pipes on top of garbage. ( Id. at 64) In 2006, he stopped working, no longer able to perform the physical demands due to wrist pain, back pain, migraine headaches and high blood pressure. ( Id. at 33-34) He tried physical therapy, a TENS unit and medication to relieve symptoms. ( Id. at 35) Plaintiff experiences back pain on a daily basis. ( Id. at 36) The pain radiates down his legs if he walks too much. ( Id. at 47) Plaintiff also has pain in both wrists and wears splints to relieve the pain. He had surgery on his left wrist in 1992. He suffers from migraine headaches approximately five days a week and finds relief with Excedrin. ( Id. at 45-46) He has been treated for PTSD since March 2006. Plaintiff has nightmares twice a week due to PTSD. ( Id. at 38) He also suffers with anxiety before leaving the house and, as a result, has to use the bathroom. Plaintiff sleeps about four hours a night due to anxiety. ( Id. at 42) Although diagnosed with sleep apnea in 2009, his anxiety has prevented him from participating in an overnight sleep study. ( Id. ) Plaintiff takes naps, almost daily. ( Id. at 43) He takes pain medicine, but experiences side effects of dizziness and constipation. ( Id. at 44) He last took medication for depression in October 2010. ( Id. at 43) He testified that he did not notice any improvement in his mood with medication. Depression medication also causes side effects of dizziness, nausea and chest pains. ( Id. at 45) Plaintiff can walk for approximately 10-15 minutes before having to stop due to pain. ( Id. at 36, 51) After five minutes of resting, he can resume walking. ( Id. ) Plaintiff can sit for two hours continuously and stand in one position for approximately one hour. ( Id. at 47) Plaintiff is able to lift between 15 - 20 pounds. ( Id. at 51) He is unable to carry buckets of water or lift groceries. ( Id. at 37) Plaintiff does not shop for groceries. ( Id. at 50) His fiancé does the laundry and cooking. ( Id. at 41) Plaintiff testified that it takes three hours to get ready to leave in the morning. ( Id. at 39) He dresses himself and can review directions. ( Id. ) Plaintiff has memory trouble and problems with concentration. ( Id. at 43) He gets along with people, although has experienced anger outbursts in previous jobs. ( Id. at 39) While he does not have any friends, plaintiff is able to interact with his family at dinner or at a game. He spends a lot of time watching television and often feels depressed. ( Id. at 40) Plaintiff prefers to be left alone and has thoughts of hurting himself. He does not have any social activities. ( Id. at 39-40) He attended a church service in January 2011. ( Id. at 39, 52) Following plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ consulted VE Mitchell A. Schmidt. ( Id. at 53) The ALJ posed the following hypothetical question: I'd like for you, if you would, to assume a person's who's 36 years of age on his onset date; has a 12th grade education plus a degree in pharmaceuticals; past relevant work as indicated; right handed by nature; suffering from various impairments, including degenerative disc disease as a result of a fall and motor vehicle accident, some depression and probably some PTSD. He indicates in his testimony that he has sleep apnea, has some high blood pressure that's fairly well controlled by medication. All of these things do cause him to have some moderate depression, pain, and discomfort, and radiation of that pain on an infrequent basis; occasional headache; and infrequent flashbacks, somewhat relieved by his medications, however, without significant side effects, but he indicates dizziness from one or a combination of his meds. As a result, Mr. Schmidt, he would need to have simple, routine, unskilled jobs, probably SVP 2 in nature, and you can explain what that means. Low concentration, low memory level jobs. By that, I mean jobs that have no decision-making requirements, and no changes in the work setting, very little judgment required for the job. There's no production rate-pace work, and jobs that would have little interaction with the public, coworkers, or supervisors. He also seems to have some moderate deficiency in his ability to perform his ADL's and to interact socially; and to maintain his concentration, persistence, and pace. If I find that he can lift 10 pounds frequently, 20 on occasion; can sit for two hours, stand for an hour consistently on an alternate basis, however, eight hours a day/five days a week; would have to avoid heights and hazardous machinery due to his dizziness, stair-climbing, temperature and humidity extremes. Due to his hands, no fine manipulation or dexterity. Due to his headaches on Page 597 occasion, no bright lights. With those limitations, he would seem to be able to do some light and sedentary work activities. Can you give me jobs that exist out there in the national economy in significant numbers and with those limitations as a vocational expert? ( Id. at 54-56) The VE answered affirmatively and concluded that plaintiff could perform jobs that are quantified with specific vocational preparations at levels one or two, e.g., unskilled occupations.[25] ( Id. at 57) The VE testified that plaintiff could not perform his past work. ( Id. at 57) 2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of October 15, 2006 through his date last insured of December 31, 2010 (20 C.F.R. 404.1571 et seq.). 3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments: Degenerative disc disease, wrist pain, depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (" PTSD" )((20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c)). 5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and was further limited to simple, unskilled jobs which were SVP 2 in nature, low concentration and low memory, defined as no decision making requirements or changes in the work setting, and very little judgment required, no production or rate-paced work, little interaction with the public, coworkers, or supervisors, but was able to lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, sit for two hours, stand for one hour, consistently, on an alternate basis, eight hours per day, five days a week, had to avoid heights, hazardous machinery, and stair climbing due to dizziness, temperature or humidity extremes, as such exposure would likely aggravate his symptoms, no fine manipulation or dexterity, and no bright lights due to headaches. 7. The claimant was born on May 8, 1970 and was 40 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date last insured 20 C.F.R. 404.1563). 9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is " not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41, and 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 10. Through the date last insured, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional Page 598 capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 C.F.R. 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)). 11. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from October 15, 2006, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2010, the date last insured (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(g)). ( Id. at 13-24) The term " substantial evidence" is defined as less than a preponderance of the evidence, but more than a mere scintilla of evidence. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, substantial evidence " does not mean a large or significant amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). The Supreme Court also has embraced this standard as the appropriate standard for determining the availability of summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. This standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), " which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should not be directed." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, (1986) (internal citations omitted). Thus, in the context of judicial review under § 405(g), " [a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if [the ALJ] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence--particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)--or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion." See Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). Where, for example, the countervailing evidence consists primarily of the plaintiff's subjective complaints of disabling pain, the ALJ " must consider the subjective pain and specify his reasons for rejecting these claims and support his conclusion with medical evidence in the record." Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1990). " Despite the deference due to administrative decisions in disability benefit cases, 'appellate courts retain a responsibility to scrutinize the entire record and Page 599 to reverse or remand if the [Commissioner's] decision is not supported by substantial evidence.'" Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)). " A district court, after reviewing the decision of the [Commissioner] may, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) affirm, modify, or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision with or without a remand to the [Commissioner] for rehearing." Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984). Social Security Administration regulations incorporate a sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is under a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ first considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, then the ALJ considers in the second step whether the claimant has a " severe impairment" that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. If the claimant suffers a severe impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets the criteria of an impairment listed in the " listing of impairments," 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (1999), which result in a presumption of disability, or whether the claimant retains the capacity to work. If the impairment does not meet the criteria for a listed impairment, then the ALJ assesses in the fourth step whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. If the claimant cannot perform her past work, then step five is to determine whether there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). If the ALJ finds that a claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the sequence, review does not proceed to the next step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). It is within the ALJ's sole discretion to determine whether an individual is disabled or " unable to work" under the statutory definition. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). The ALJ is required to evaluate all of the medical findings and other evidence that supports a physician's statement that an individual is disabled. The opinion of a treating or primary physician is generally given controlling weight when evaluating the nature and severity of an individual's impairments. However, no special significance is given to the source of an opinion on other issues which are reserved to the ALJ, such as the ultimate determination of disablement. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1527(e)(2) & 404.1527(e)(3). The ALJ has the discretion to weigh any conflicting evidence in the case record and make a determination. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1527(c)(2). On appeal, plaintiff contends that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because he did not properly weigh the medical opinion of treating physician, Dr. Choi. (D.I. 11) Defendant counters that there is substantial record evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Choi's opinions did not merit controlling weight. (D.I. 14) It is well-settled that a treating physician's opinion on issues not reserved for the commissioner must be deemed " controlling" if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record. Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001). An ALJ may only outrightly reject a treating physician's assessment based on contradictory Page 600 medical evidence, not due to his or her own credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion. Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 2000). The ALJ must review all of the pertinent medical evidence and " explain" his " conciliations and rejections." Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000). Without such information, a reviewing court is unable to determine if probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored. Id. at 119; see Fargnoli, 247 F.3d 34 at 41 (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)). If a reviewing court is denied this opportunity, the claim must be remanded or reversed and all evidence must be addressed. See Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43 (3d Cir. 1994). Applying this authority to the record at bar, the court finds that the ALJ did not adequately evaluate the opinion evidence offered by plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Choi. The administrative record is over 900 pages and chronicles plaintiff's treatment at VMAC from December 1998 to 2011. (D.I. 8) From 2006 to 2010, plaintiff had at least 19 appointments with Dr. Choi.[26] Her progress notes reveal detailed information about plaintiff, including his mental health history, current complaints, examination results, diagnosis, drug history and intake, prognosis and GAF assessment. The progress notes of Nurse Gallo,[27] and to a lesser degree Dr. Bucurescu, include similar information. Similarly, following a mental status examination, Dr. Kozma found that plaintiff had a generally sad and sullen appearance, a depressed affect, sleep problems, feelings of helplessness, decreased memory and concentration, and limited insight and judgments. Dr. Kozma assessed plaintiff a GAF score of 45, the same score given by Dr. Choi in March 2011. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that Dr. Choi's opinion did not merit controlling weight because " it was not well supported by medical signs and laboratory findings and is inconsistent with the detailed treatment records from the VAMC as summarized above." [28] ( Id. at 21) The ALJ supported this conclusory determination by referencing discrepancies. First, he compares Dr. Choi's September 30, 2007 questionnaire and letter dated May 20, 2009 which list numerous symptoms,[29] with the fact that plaintiff has never been hospitalized or received emergency room treatment for those same symptoms. ( Id. ) Although the ALJ implicitly suggests that the absence of hospitalization or emergency care impugns Dr. Choi's opinions, there is no medical opinion or evidence to support this supposition. Instead, the ALJ has impermissibly substituted his own lay opinion to support his rejection of Dr. Choi's opinion. See Biller v. Acting Commissioner of Social Sec., Page 601 962 F.Supp.2d 761, 779 (W.D. Pa. 2013). Next, the ALJ cites treatment records dated November 6, 2008 and February 9, 2009 to show that Dr. Choi made only two clinical findings, depressed mood and occasional restricted affect.[30] The record, however, reflects other findings, including a diagnosis of PTSD.[31] An ALJ cannot extrapolate pieces of information from the record evidence to support his conclusion while ignoring other evidence that negates the probative value of the evidence cited. Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d at 318. Likewise, the ALJ points to an inconsistency regarding medication side effects found in Dr. Choi's narrative (side effects of sedation and poor concentration listed) and progress notes (no side effects listed). A review of progress notes, however, reveals that during a December 31, 2007 examination, Dr. Choi recorded plaintiffs statement about side effects, to wit, Remeron helped with insomnia but made him " overly groggy the next day." ( Id. at 628) Further, progress notes from March 16, 2006, reflect plaintiff's wish to avoid medication that was too sedating. ( Id. at 377) Similarly, the ALJ observes that on September 18, 2009, plaintiff told Dr. Choi that he was feeling better. The record, however, reflects that plaintiff's mood and sentiments varied, to wit: (1) on September 8, 2006 (despondent); (2) on February 7, 2007 (dysphoric); (3) on November 30, 2007 (had ruminations about past trauma); and (4) on November 6, 2008 (plaintiff said that he " felt like crap" ). The ALJ concludes with, " [m]oreover, Dr. Choi's opinion is not supported by the medical evidence or consistent with the record as a whole, including the conservative nature of his treatment and level of care, as well as [plaintiff's] self-reported daily activities." ( Id. at 21) This broad rejection of Dr. Choi's opinion (unaccompanied by citations to the record) does not afford the court the opportunity to consider whether the ALJ considered all probative evidence.[32] Relatedly, the record reflects that the ALJ failed to weigh Dr. Choi's findings under the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and § 416.927. Where an ALJ finds that a treating physician's opinion does not merit controlling weight, the ALJ must perform a specific analysis to determine how much weight to afford the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). To that end, the ALJ must consider the treatment relationship, the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion offered by the medical evidence, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the Page 602 specialization of the treating physician. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). If, on remand, the ALJ finds that Dr. Choi's opinion does not merit controlling weight, then the ALJ's decision must specifically analyze and explain how much weight to afford the opinion.[33] For the reasons discussed above, the court remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, therefore, is granted and defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied. An appropriate order shall issue. At Wilmington this 13th day of August, 2014, for the reasons stated in the memorandum opinion issued this same date; IT IS ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (D.I. 10) is granted. 2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.I. 13) is denied. 3. The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, and to remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with the memorandum opinion issued on this same day. 4. The Office of General Counsel shall forward a copy of the memorandum opinion and order to the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, Office of Appellate Operations for action by the Appeals Council.
de	wikipedia	N/A	Eugen Robert Weiss (* 26. Juni 1863 in Neu-Ulm; † 15. Januar 1933 in München) war ein deutscher Opernsänger (Bariton) und Gesangspädagoge. Leben Weiss besuchte ein Gymnasium in Augsburg und studierte dann ab Herbst 1883 an der Königlichen Musikschule in München. Seine Lehrer waren Hasselbeck und A. Schimon für Gesang, Brulliot für dramatische Darstellung, für Klavier der Gluth, Chorgesang Abel und für Komposition Rheinberger, Thuille und Gluth. 1886 schloss er sein Studium ab und ihm wurde der „Dr. Königswarter Ehrenpreis“ verliehen. Sein Debüt gab er im Jahre 1888 an der Krolloper in Berlin. In der darauf folgenden Spielzeit folgte ein Engagement am Theater Rostock. Bis 1891 war er als Opernsänger auf den Bühnen Sondershausen, Schwerin und Dortmund tätig, danach folgte bis 1893 ein Engagement am Hoftheater Weimar. Weiss wirkte ab 1894 als Konzertsänger, Stimmdiagnostiker, Stimmphysiologe und Gesangslehrer in Berlin, dann in Wiesbaden, Düsseldorf und Essen. 1900 wurde Weiss durch Friedrich, Herzog von Anhalt, zum Kammersänger ernannt und erhielt 1913 den Verdienstorden für Kunst und Wissenschaft in Gold ebenfalls vom damaligen Herzog von Anhalt. Schülerinnen und Schüler von ihm waren Sigrid Onégin, Margot Hinnenberg-Lefèbre, Marianne Mörner, Richard Tauber, Bassist Carl Braun und Kammersänger Walther Kirchhoff. Im Jahr 1917 wurde Weiss als Dozent für Solo-, Konzert- und dramatischen Gesang an die Akademie für Tonkunst nach München berufen, wo ihm im Jahr 1921 der Professorentitel verliehen wurde. Daneben erlangte er auch als Veranstalter von privaten Soireen einen guten Ruf. Im November 1928 gründeten Jörgen Forchhammer, W. Freytag, Kammersänger Rudolph und E.R. Weiss den Verein der Münchener Stimmbildner und Gesanglehrer. Er heiratete am 20. Mai 1895 Luise Dorothee Wilhelmine Gertrud Friedrich. Aus dieser Ehe ging eine gemeinsame Tochter Katharina Klara Auguste Gertrud Senta, geboren am 6. August 1896, in Berlin hervor. Diese absolvierte später eine Ausbildung zur Konzertsängerin (Alt). In zweiter Ehe war er verheiratet mit der Hofopernsängerin Marie-Louise Müller-Weiss, die damals am Wiesbadener Hoftheater engagiert war. Sie hatten einen gemeinsamen Sohn, Walter Hubert Weiss, Beruf: Jazz- und Bigbandmusiker (1910–1950). 1931 wurde Weiss in den Ruhestand versetzt. Er verstarb am 15. Januar 1933 nach einer Konzertaufführung in den Goethe-Sälen in München. Literatur Schwäbischer Schulanzeiger. 51. Jahrgang, Nr. 4, vom 15. Februar 1933, S. 44–46. Geschichte der Hochschule für Musik und Theater München. Schneider, Tutzing 2005, ISBN 3-7952-11530, S. 248f, S. 278, S. 423. Weblinks Opernsänger Bariton Kammersänger Hochschullehrer (Hochschule für Musik und Theater München) Gesangspädagoge Deutscher Geboren 1863 Gestorben 1933 Mann
en	other	N/A	Jane the Virgin S02E10 HDTV x264-FLEET & Jane the Virgin S02E10 720p HDTV x264-AVS » Leadrly.com Jane the Virgin S02E10 HDTV x264-FLEET & Jane the Virgin S02E10 720p HDTV x264-AVS Category: TV Show \| Comment: 0 Release Group: AVS (Scene)Release Name: Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.720p.HDTV.x264-AVSRelease Date: 1st February 2016Filename: Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.720p.HDTV.x264-AVSSource: HDTVSize: 355 MB & 1.30 GBGenre: Drama \| Family \| SoapsRuntime: 42 minutesSeason & Episode: Chapter Thirty-TwoRelease DescriptionIn the middle of the night, Jane gets a burst of creative energy and starts her thesis. Unfortunately, Mateo spills orange juice all over her computer causing it to crash and Jane loses all her hard work. When Jane brings her computer to be fixed, she meets Dax and with the urging of her friend Lina, Jane considers dating again. Rogelio decides to have his mother Liliana become his manager, but soon realizes that was not the best decision. When Rafael comes to after being attacked by his mother now known to be the crime lord Mutter, he goes to Michael and tells him what Mutter is looking for.TV.com - TVRage OR DOWNLOAD LINKS:(Premium Recommended)Uploaded.net:a0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.720p.HDTV.x264AVS.part1.rara0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.720p.HDTV.x264AVS.part2.rara0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.HDTV.x264FLEET.rarRapidgator.net:a0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.720p.HDTV.x264AVS.part1.rar.htmla0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.720p.HDTV.x264AVS.part2.rar.htmla0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.HDTV.x264FLEET.rar.htmlTurbobit.net:a0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.720p.HDTV.x264AVS.part1.rar.htmla0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.720p.HDTV.x264AVS.part2.rar.htmla0acg.Jane.the.Virgin.S02E10.HDTV.x264FLEET.rar.htmlAll above links are interchangable. No password Mirror LinksJane_the_Virgin_S02E10_HDTV_x264_FLEET_Jane_the_Virgin_S02E10_720p_HDTV_x264_AVS.part01.zipJane_the_Virgin_S02E10_HDTV_x264_FLEET_Jane_the_Virgin_S02E10_720p_HDTV_x264_AVS.part02.zip Tags: Virgin, Virgin Jane the Virgin S02E10 HDTV x264-FLEET & Jane the Virgin S02E10 720p HDTV x264-AVS Download via Hotfile Rapidshare Fileserve Megaupload & FileSonic, Jane the Virgin S02E10 HDTV x264-FLEET & Jane the Virgin S02E10 720p HDTV x264-AVS free torrent downloads included crack, serial, keygen.
pl	wikipedia	N/A	Timur Marsielewicz Safin (ros. Тимур Марселевич Сафин, ur. 4 sierpnia 1992) – rosyjski szermierz, florecista, dwukrotny medalista olimpijski z Rio de Janeiro. Walczy prawą ręką, treningi rozpoczął w 2001 w Ufie. Zawody w 2016 były jego pierwszymi igrzyskami olimpijskimi. Po złoty medal sięgnął w drużynowej rywalizacji florecistów, rosyjską drużynę tworzyli poza nim Artur Achmatchuzin i Aleksiej Czeriemisinow. Indywidualnie zajął trzecie miejsce. Indywidualnie był brązowym medalistą mistrzostw świata z 2013. Ma w dorobku złote medale mistrzostw Europy w 2016 (indywidualnie i w drużynie), srebrne w 2017 (indywidualnie i w drużynie) oraz brąz w drużynie (2014). Przypisy Linki zewnętrzne Profil na stronie FIE Profile na stronie EFC Rosyjscy szermierze Rosyjscy medaliści olimpijscy Medaliści Letnich Igrzysk Olimpijskich 2016 Ludzie urodzeni w Taszkencie Urodzeni w 1992
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Le Grand Prix moto de République tchèque 2010 est la dixième manche du championnat du monde de vitesse moto 2010. La compétition s'est déroulée du 13 au sur le circuit de Masaryk. C'est la du Grand Prix moto de République tchèque. Résultat des MotoGP Résultat des Moto2 Résultat des 125 cm3 Liens externes Site officiel de MotoGP Grand Prix moto de Tchéquie République Tcheque Sport en Tchéquie en 2010 Sport en août 2010
es	wikipedia	N/A	El Seven Sudamericano Masculino 2008 se jugó en Punta del Este, Uruguay. El tercer Seven de la CONSUR tuvo que reacomodar su calendario de partidos en el play-off dado que no sólo fue un Sudamericano sino también un clasificatorio que otorgaba una plaza a la Copa del Mundo de Rugby 7 de 2009 aparte del equipo argentino que estaba clasificado por su actuación en la Copa del Mundo anterior. Este cambio en el fixture determinó que se jugaran dos partidos menos en semifinales que en un campeonato tipo. Así, el equipo ubicado en la 3o posición de la serie B queda 6o en la general y Argentina no jugó partidos clasificatorios esperando en la final al ganador de la semifinal (Chile - Uruguay), este último se hizo del partido y cayó en la final frente a Los Pumas. Los 18 matchs se llevaron a cabo en el Estadio Domingo Burgueño Miguel. Equipos participantes Selección de rugby 7 de Argentina (Los Pumas) Selección de rugby 7 de Brasil (Los Vitória-régia) Selección de rugby 7 de Chile (Los Cóndores) Selección de rugby 7 de Colombia (Los Tucanes) Selección de rugby 7 de Paraguay (Los Yacarés) Selección de rugby 7 del Perú (Los Tumis) Selección de rugby 7 de Uruguay (Los Teros) Selección de rugby 7 de Venezuela (Las Orquídeas) Clasificación Grupo A Posiciones Nota: Se otorgan 3 puntos al equipo que gane un partido, 1 al que empate y 0 al que pierda Resultados Grupo B Posiciones Nota: Se otorgan 3 puntos al equipo que gane un partido, 1 al que empate y 0 al que pierda Resultados Play-off Semifinales de Oro Finales 7o puesto 4o puesto Clasificación a Dubái 2009 Final de Oro Posiciones finales Clasificación a Copa del Mundo de Rugby 7 Los Pumas ya estaban clasificados a Copa del Mundo de Rugby 7 de 2009 a desarrollarse en Dubái y el otro cupo fue disputado entre los ganadores de semifinales, Cóndores y Teros, el partido fue para los locales. Véase también Sudamericano de Rugby A 2008 Sudamericano de Rugby B 2008 Sudamericano Juvenil A de Rugby 2008 Sudamericano Juvenil B de Rugby 2008 Seven Sudamericano Femenino 2008 Referencias Enlaces externos IRB / Frankie Deges - RWC Sevens places at stake in Punta del Este (en inglés) Sports.groups.yahoo - Nota de Prensa: Resultados Sudamericano de Rugby Seven's Uruguay M2008 Competiciones de rugby de Uruguay Punta del Este Deporte en Maldonado Rugby en 2008 Deporte en Uruguay en 2008
en	caselaw	US	236 P.2d 305 (1951) GOODMAN v. GOODMAN No. 3669 Supreme Court of Nevada October 10, 1951. Springmeyer & Thompson, of Reno, for Appellant. Samuel Platt, of Reno, for Respondent. MERRILL, Justice. This is an appeal from order of the trial court denying a motion for modification of a divorce decree to provide increased support for the minor child of the parties. The question before us is whether this action by the court constituted abuse of judicial discretion. On June 24, 1948 a decree of divorce was granted to appellant, which decree granted her custody of the minor child of the parties, a boy six years of age. The decree approved an agreement between the parties under the terms of which respondent agreed to pay to appellant the sum of $25 each week for the support, maintenance and education of the child. On November 7, 1950 appellant filed notice of motion to modify said decree by increasing the amount to be so paid from $25 a week to $100 a week. The motion, generally, was made upon the grounds that the sum of $25 a week was insufficient for the purposes; that respondent was well able to pay the amount sought; that the 306 financial circumstances surrounding the child had changed for the worse and those of the respondent had improved. On November 30, 1950 the motion was presented and was denied by the trial court. This appeal was then duly taken. The court in so acting did so in exercise of discretionary powers conferred upon it by statute. Accordingly, upon this review our concern is not whether error of law in the ordinary sense was committed by the trial court, but whether its action constituted abuse of discretion. The action of the trial court with which we are here concerned, was taken pursuant to the provisions of sec. 9462, N.C.L. 1929, Supp. 1943-1949, which states: "The court, in granting a divorce, shall make such disposition of, and provision for, the children, as shall appear most expedient under all the circumstances, and most for the present comfort and future well-being of such children; * * the court may, during the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing or at any time thereafter during the minority of any of the children of the marriage, make such order for the custody, care, education, maintenance, and support of such minor children as may seem necessary or proper, and may at any time modify or vacate the same." The position of appellant is that (aside from the question of changed circumstances) the motion to modify the decree presented to the trial court one question of fact: What is a proper sum to require the father to contribute for the support of his child under existing conditions? (Which question includes the two subordinate questions: (1) What does the child reasonably require to maintain his standard of living? and (2) What can the father reasonably afford to pay?) Evidence before the trial court was confined to affidavits. The facts so established need not be discussed in detail for the purposes of this decision. It may be conceded that the evidence established that the sum of $25 a week was insufficient to maintain the child in the manner which both parties apparently were agreed he should enjoy; that the father was able to make payments for support of the child in excess of this sum and that some pertinent change of circumstances was shown both as to the child and as to the father. Appellant contends, under these circumstances, that the modification of the decree was no longer a matter of discretion but a matter of right in the child; that the court had no discretion but to grant the motion in an appropriate amount. A consideration of the nature of judicial discretion is, we feel, essential to a proper determination of the matter. Few legal terms are subject to a wider diversification of definition and construction. Bouvier has defined "discretion" in part as: "That part of the judicial function which decides questions arising in the trial of a cause, according to the particular circumstances of each case, and as to which the judgment of the court is uncontrolled by fixed rules of law. The power exercised by courts to determine questions to which no strict rule of law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of the court." Dean Pound in his "Readings On The History And System Of The Common Law" (page 19) deals with the subject in the following manner: "Four propositions may be laid down with reference to the exercise of discretion: (1) Whether or not a matter is one for law or for discretion is settled by law, and the court has no power to put it in the one category or the other at pleasure. A court has no discretion to apply the law or not as it sees fit. (2) Where discretion is conferred, it must really be exercised as such; the court cannot act oppressively or arbitrarily under pretence of exercising discretion. Such arbitrary or oppressive action under color of exercising discretion is called abuse of discretion. (3) If discretion reposed in a court or judge is in fact exercised as such, the manner of its exercise will not be reviewed. (4) But if the discretion is abused, the abuse may be reviewed and corrected by a higher tribunal." Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 307 866, 22 U.S. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204, 234, has stated: "Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." Thus, where the legislature has spoken with imperfect clarity or has failed to speak at all, it is still the function of the court not to "will" the law, but to discern it: to discern the legislative intent or, with the aid of analogy in the absence of legislative expression, to discern the course of justice; thus, to discern "the law" and relieve it of its obscurity. Clearly, then, in discretionary matters the court's exercise of discretion may not be arbitrary or capricious. Such an exercise might well constitute a "willing" of the law rather than a discernment of it. It might well become, as Lord Camden has characterized it, "the law of tyrants." While Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in his use of the word "law" has attached to it an all-inclusive meaning, Dean Pound's use of the word is in a different and far less comprehensive sense. In using the word to characterize a category of determination distinct from that of "discretion," he undoubtedly has reference to fixed and established legal principles which the court in its process of discernment is bound to follow. As was said in Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S.C. 488; 25 S.E. 797, 801: "The term `discretion' implies the absence of a hard and fast rule. The establishment of a clearly-defined rule would be the end of discretion. And yet `discretion' should not be a word for arbitrary will or unstable caprice. Nor should judicial discretion be, as Lord Coke pronounced it, `a crooked cord,' but rather, as Lord Mansfield defined it, the `exercising the best of their judgment upon the occasion that calls for it,' adding that `if this discretion be willfully abused * * it ought to be under the control of this court.' Rex v. Young, 1 Burrows, 560." Yet even within the area of discretion where the court's discernment is not to be bound by hard and fast rules, its exercise of discretion in the process of discernment may be guided by such applicable legal principles as may have become recognized as proper in determining the course of justice. A clear ignoring by the court of such established guides, without apparent justification, may constitute abuse of discretion. In Norris v. Clinkscales, supra, the court continues: "The courts and text writers all concur that by `judicial discretion' is meant sound discretion guided by fixed legal principles. It must not be arbitrary nor capricious, but must be regulated upon legal grounds, grounds that will make it judicial. It must be compelled by conscience, and not by humor. So that when a judge properly exercises his judicial discretion he will decide and act according to the rules of equity, and so as to advance the ends of justice." Under our statute as we have quoted it, the legislature in effect has stated that a child's right to support is to be established not by law (in Dean Pound's sense of that word) but by discretion; that the welfare of the minor child demands that a hard and fast rule is not to constitute the basis for action, but that such basis is rather to be the reason and conscience of the trial judge. It cannot be denied that the determinations which appellant contends must form the basis for decision are material and, indeed, essential. This does not mean, however, that they are themselves to constitute the basis for action and, as such, are to supersede the discretion which the legislature has conferred upon the trial judge. This would transform that judicial discretion into a fact-finding duty which could as well be performed by a jury. Rather, these determinations should be regarded as guides for the exercise of discretion under the circumstances of each particular case. Should it become apparent that the trial court had willfully and deliberately disregarded 308 these matters, it might be said that it had acted oppressively and arbitrarily under pretense of discretion and had thereby been guilty of abuse. In our view this cannot here be said. The evidence shows that in addition to making the payments required by court decree, respondent had voluntarily paid something in excess of $2,000 each year for the support, maintenance and education of his son. Appellant contends that these facts are beyond the proper scope of court consideration (save as demonstrating the financial abilities of respondent); that the duty of the court is to establish by its decree the extent of the father's obligation and of the child's right to support. The trial court, in denying the motion of appellant, clearly appears to have given consideration to the voluntary payments. In doing so, can it be said to have been guilty of a disregard of the essential determinations for which appellant contends? The question is as to the scope of the area within which the court's discretion may operate. Is it to be limited to those circumstances which apply to the suitability of the existing order as an isolated question in itself? The court's statutory duty is to "make such * * provision for the children as shall appear most expedient under all the circumstances," and "as may seem necessary or proper." In our view the language "all the circumstances" must be taken to mean all of the circumstances which may reasonably bear not only upon the suitability of the present order (as an isolated question in itself), but upon the necessity for or propriety of modification as well. In the light of this interpretation, we cannot agree that consideration of the matter of the voluntary payments was improper. Appellant argues that consideration of the welfare of the child demands that his rights be established by decree and that he be not left to depend upon continued generosity of the father. The point is indeed a strong and appealing one. However, to accept that an area of discretion exists, is to recognize that within that area there may be conscientious disagreement as to the best manner of its exercise. For example, the trial judge may have felt that the child might well, under the facts of this particular case, benefit more from a continuation of the voluntary basis than through an increased allowance; that in the event of such an increase, the father, regardless of generous impulsions, might feel that he could not exceed it without endangering his position in the event of further applications for increase. However, without further entering the realm of speculation, which in any consideration of discretionary action is difficult to avoid, we can with reasonable certainty state the apparent determination of the trial court: that the child was not suffering from present inadequacies of the decree; that modification was not necessary; that present conditions did not render a failure to modify improper. In our view, under all of the circumstances of the case, including those of the voluntary payments, such a determination cannot be held to constitute abuse of discretion. The order of the trial court is affirmed. Each party shall bear his own costs upon this appeal. BADT, C.J., and EATHER, J., concur.
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Les Jeunes IHEDN (anciennement l'Association nationale des Auditeurs jeunes de l'Institut des Hautes Études de Défense nationale - ANAJ-IHEDN) est une association loi de 1901. Elle regroupe les auditeurs jeunes formés par l’Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN) et s’ouvre à l’ensemble de la jeunesse. L'association se veut une plateforme d’engagement et un réservoir de réflexions, en France et à l’international, autour des questions d'Engagement, de Défense de Sécurité. Elle est placée sous le double parrainage du ministre des Armées et du chef d’état-major des armées. Histoire L'association a été fondée par Fabrice Fages en France en 1996. L’association regroupe, depuis 1996, les auditeurs jeunes formés par l’Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN), et s’ouvre à l’ensemble de la jeunesse. Plateforme d’engagement et réservoir de réflexions, l’association offre, en France et à l’international, des moyens de s’investir au profit des grands enjeux d’avenir pour la France. Elle propose à ses membres des conférences, ateliers ou visites pour mieux comprendre les différents acteurs du monde la Défense. L'association s'engage également par des actions de mémoire et de solidarité, notamment en partenariat avec le l'Œuvre nationale du Bleuet de France. Les Jeunes IHEDN sont depuis 2020, une association reconnue d’intérêt général. En 2021, l'association s'est associée avec l'Agence de l'innovation de défense et l'entreprise MTP Esport, afin de lancer le projet d'esport LNX lors du Forum d'innovation défense. Depuis 2022, l'association est présidée par Nicolas HENRY. Elle s'est vu remettre, par Le Souvenir français, l'ancien drapeau de leur antenne du 15e arrondissement de Paris, orné d'une cravate de l'association Rhin et Danube, aux couleurs de la 1re armée (France, 1944-1945), afin de matérialiser le renforcement de ses actions mémorielles. Organisation L'association est administrée par un comité directeur, de 15 membres, ayant chacun une fonction définie soit statutairement, soit par le président à la suite de son élection. Les membres du comité directeur sont élus au scrutin secret lors d’une assemblée générale ordinaire. Son renouvellement se fait annuellement par moitié. L'association est structurée thématiquement et géographiquement en trois pôles : le pôle "comités", le pôle "régions" et le pôle "international". Le Pôle comités rassemble les 14 comités d'études : Aéronautique et espace, Afrique, Armée du futur, Asie-Océanie, Cyber, Sécurité Intérieure, Cultures et Influences, Risques et Intelligence économique, Europe, Énergies et Environnement, Marine et Océans, Moyen-Orient et Monde Arabe, Industrie de Défense, Amériques. À l'échelle nationale, l'association des Jeunes IHEDN dispose de délégations sur l'ensemble du territoire national représentant l'association dans les régions françaises et outre-mer. À l'échelle internationale, l'association des Jeunes IHEDN dispose également de délégations dans de nombreux pays pour assurer la représentation de l'association à l'étranger. Références Voir aussi Articles connexes Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN) Liens externes Site des Jeunes IHEDN Site de l'IHEDN Association française fondée en 1996 Défense et sécurité en France
pl	other	N/A	Terminy w postępowaniu opartym o art. 111 Kodeksu wyborczego - Prawo wyborcze Postępowanie prowadzone w trybie przewidzianym w art. 111 Kodeksu wyborczego jest niezwykle intensywne z punktu widzenia zaangażowanych podmiotów. Niestety, brak zorientowania uczestników postępowania w tym przedmiocie często prowadzi do uchybienia terminom dokonania czynności. Co więcej, także sądom zdarza się uchybić wyznaczonym terminom. 1. Terminy dla sądu Jak wskazuje art. 111 § 2 Kodeksu wyborczego, sąd okręgowy ma 24 godziny na rozpoznanie wniosku wniesionego w oparciu o ten przepis. Termin ten należy liczyć od momentu wniesienia wniosku do sądu. Należy pamiętać, że zanim odpowiedni wniosek trafi na ręce sędziego, upływa określony czas. Niezbędne pozostaje także dokonanie odpowiednich zawiadomień uczestników postępowania. W praktyce okazuje się, że całość postępowania pierwszoinstancyjnego rozgrywa się w przeciągu kilku godzin. Ustawodawca nie zdecydował się na konkretne określenie terminu doręczenia postanowienia wydanego w sprawie wraz z uzasadnieniem. Wskazano jedynie, że doręczenie takie odbywa się „niezwłocznie”. Termin ten należy rozumieć w taki sposób, że albo postanowienie doręczane jest natychmiast po jego ogłoszeniu, albo też zaraz po jego ogłoszeniu przy pomocy służby sądowej. Jeżeli od postanowienia zostanie wniesione zażalenie, sąd apelacyjny ma 24 godziny na jego rozpoznanie. Sytuacja w ramach postępowania w drugiej instancji pozostaje więc tożsama z sytuacją właściwą dla pierwszej instancji. Sąd po raz kolejny ma 24 godziny na rozpoznanie zażalenia. Zażalenie wnosi się za pośrednictwem sądu okręgowego do sądu apelacyjnego. Termin rozpoznania sprawy powinien więc biec od momentu wniesienia zażalenia już do sądu okręgowego. W praktyce dotrzymanie terminu przez sąd apelacyjny jest więc niezwykle trudne. W zakresie terminów wyznaczonych dla sądów należy ustalić jedną kwestię – co dzieje się w razie ich przekroczenia? Jeżeli którykolwiek z sądów przekroczy wyznaczony termin rozpoznania sprawy, nie ma to żadnego wpływu na jej rozpoznanie. Oczywiście, może to stać się przyczynkiem do dochodzenia odszkodowania, domagania się wyjaśnień, itp., lecz w praktyce pozostaje poza możliwością ingerencji uczestnika postępowania. Należy podkreślić, że wyznaczone przez ustawodawcę terminy pozostają w wielu przypadkach rzeczywiście i obiektywnie niemożliwe do zachowania. Nie można jednak wykluczyć sytuacji, w której dojdzie do takiego przeciągnięcia rozpoznania sprawy, że stanie się ona bezprzedmiotowa, w związku z zakończeniem wyborów (o takiej sytuacji czytaj: tutaj i tutaj). 2. Terminy dla uczestników postępowania Sąd I instancji wydaje w sprawie wszczętej na gruncie art. 111 Kodeksu wyborczego postanowienie. Art. 111 § 3 Kodeksu wyborczego wskazuje, że termin na wniesienie zażalenia na postanowienie wynosi 24 godziny. Termin ten w praktyce budzi poważne wątpliwości. Według zasad postępowania cywilnego, termin na wniesienie zażalenia biegnie od momentu jego otrzymania wraz z uzasadnieniem. Wydaje się, że także w przedmiotowym przypadku termin 24-godzinny powinien być liczony w tożsamy sposób. Nie ma podstaw dla liczenia tego terminu od momentu ogłoszenia postanowienia, szczególnie że uczestnik postępowania nie musi być na nim obecny, a więc może nie znać jego treści. Podmiot chcący wnieść zażalenie musi pamiętać, że termin na jego wniesienie może ulec znacznemu skróceniu. Jak wskazywałem we wpisie dotyczącym upływu terminu (zobacz wpis), zgodnie z art. 9 § 3 Kodeksu wyborczego dokonanie czynności jest możliwe jedynie w godzinach urzędowania danego adresata. Jeżeli doręczenie postanowienia ma miejsce np. w godzinach wieczornych, wniesienie zażalenia w ciągu 24 godzin może być niemożliwe. Ustawodawca nie daje wskazówek, czy w takim wypadku termin wniesienia zażalenia biegnie do dnia kolejnego (do której godziny?), czy też kończy się w dniu następującym po dniu doręczenia postanowienia. W mojej opinii należałoby przyjąć, że termin ten kończy się w dniu następującym po dniu doręczenia postanowienia. Zażalenie wniesione kolejnego dnia powinno zostać uznane za wniesione po terminie. Postępowanie oparte o art. 111 Kodeksu wyborczego wzbudza jak widać wiele kontrowersji w zakresie procedury. Pozostaje ono szczególnie wymagające z punktu widzenia uczestników postępowania, chociaż także sądy muszą w sposób szczególny pozostawać przygotowane do rozpoznawania tego rodzaju spraw w trakcie kampanii wyborczej. Tagi: Tryb wyborczy, Terminy, Postępowanie, art. 111 Kodeksu wyborczego
en	caselaw	US	158 Ga. App. 556 (1981) 281 S.E.2d 265 DEPARTMENT OF BANKING & FINANCE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA v. INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS OF GEORGIA, INC. et al. 61178. Court of Appeals of Georgia. Decided May 1, 1981. Rehearing Denied May 18, 1981. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs II, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Don A. Langham, First 561 Assistant Attorney General, H. Perry Michael, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn L. Allen, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Wilbur T. Fitzgerald, Charles A. Evans, for appellees. Toby B. Prodgers, Susan B. Orsher, C. Wilson Dubose, amici curiae. CARLEY, Judge. The Citizens & Southern Bank of Cobb County (C&S) is a state bank with its principal office located in Austell, Georgia, a municipality with a population of less than 5,000 according to the 1970 census. In April of 1979 C&S applied to the Department of Banking and Finance (Department) for approval to purchase 100% of the outstanding capital stock of Pledger Insurance Agency, Inc. 557 (Pledger), a general insurance agency with its office in Austell. C&S also applied for the Department's approval to operate Pledger as a general insurance agency. In May of 1979, at the suggestion of the Department's Deputy Commissioner, C&S amended its application to request approval to operate Pledger through a wholly owned subsidiary which would purchase Pledger's assets and continue to do business under the Pledger tradename. The Department approved the amended application and authorized C&S to form a wholly owned subsidiary, Suburban Agency, Inc. (Suburban), and to operate Suburban as a general insurance agency. Suburban was formed and C&S purchased 100% of Suburban's capital stock. Suburban purchased Pledger's assets and commenced to do business as a general insurance agency selling all lines of insurance. Pursuant to Code Ann. § 41A-401 appellees filed a petition for judicial review of the Department's action with reference to the approval of the creation and operation of Suburban. The individual appellees are licensed independent insurance agents doing business in Cobb County. The corporate appellee, Independent Insurance Agents of Georgia, is a professional association of approximately 5000 licensed independent insurance agents. The appellees, alleging they were "affected" by the Department's action in approving C&S's amended application to create Suburban, sought to have that action held unlawful and set aside. The trial court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, the essence of which was as follows:". . . State banks in Georgia do not have the authority, by any competent statutory grant, to engage in business as general insurance agents, and the phrase `incidental powers necessary to carry on the banking business' appearing in Ga. Code § 41A-1202 (j), being read in proper context does not allow The Department to administratively create such a power. This ruling is dispositive of the main issue and requires the Court to conclude and hold that the final action of The Department in this case was in excess of statutory authority." Judgment was entered for the appellees and the final action of the Department approving C&S's application was set aside. The application of the Department for a discretionary appeal to this court was granted so that we might review the trial court's interpretation of the permissible scope of the statutory powers afforded state banks under the "incidental powers" provision of Code Ann. § 41A-1202. 1. For reasons similar to those expressed in Saxon v. Ga. Assn. of Independent Ins. Agents, 399 F2d 1010, 1016 (6) (5th Cir. 1968) we reject the argument that the appellees were not "affected" by the Department's action and therefore lacked "standing" under Code Ann. § 41A-401 to bring the instant special statutory proceeding. 558 2. The question presented for resolution is simply stated: Do state banks have the power to engage in the business of selling insurance? Clearly such a power is not among those specifically enumerated as either a general corporate power of a bank under Code Ann. § 41A-1201 or as an additional operational power under Code Ann. § 41A-1202. However, while there is not a specific grant of such power under either statute, Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j) does provide: "Banks and trust companies shall, in addition, have the power... to exercise all incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the banking or trust business, as the case may be, when approved by the Commissioner of Banking and Finance." Under Code Ann. § 41A-104 (a) (6) one of the underlying objectives of the "Financial Institutions Code of Georgia" is to provide for "appropriate competition among financial institutions and between them and other financial organizations including those organized under the laws of the United States, other States, and foreign Countries." Thus the question becomes whether a state bank, in the exercise of an "incidental power" and with the approval of the Commissioner, may engage in the business of selling insurance in the same manner as could a national bank under the banking laws of the United States. We conclude that Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j) establishes a legislative intent that state banks be authorized to exercise "incidental powers" and delegates the authority to approve such powers to the Commissioner, who shall be guided in this determination by the statutory objective stated in Code Ann. § 41A-104 (a) (6) of making state banks competitive with national banks. See generally Crawley v. Seignious, 213 Ga. 810 (102 SE2d 38) (1958). It is beyond dispute that under the provisions of 12 USCA §92 in order for state banks to be "competitive" with national banks they be authorized to engage in the business of insurance if "located and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants." Under this interpretation of Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j), if the Commissioner approves, it is an "incidental power" of a limited category of state banks to engage in the business of insurance. There is a second and more compelling reason for holding that Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j) evidences a legislative intent that that statute be construed so as to permit the administrative action taken by the commissioner in this case. The General Assembly has, in effect, made engaging in the business of insurance an "incidental power" of certain state banks by adopting Code Ann. § 56-322 (a) (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 1101, 1102), which provides in relevant part: "No lending institution, bank holding company or any subsidiary or affiliate of either of the foregoing, doing business in this State, or any officer or 559 employee of any of the foregoing (but not including any director) may directly or indirectly be licensed to sell insurance in any municipality within this State which has a population which exceeds 5000, according to the latest United States decennial census . . ." We disagree with the trial court's refusal to consider Code Ann. § 56-322 as authority for a certain limited category of state banks to engage in the business of insurance. Under Code Ann. § 56-322 (a), banks may not be licensed to sell insurance in any municipality with a population in excess of 5,000. Applying the underlying rationale of the maxim expressio unis est, exclusio alterius, we find that the exclusion on the licensing of banks to sell insurance does not apply to banks engaged in the business of insurance in municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants. If the General Assembly had intended that no state banks engage in the business of insurance it would not have directed the Commissioner of Insurance to deny licensing to banks to engage in that business only in municipalities of greater than 5,000 people. Thus, under Code Ann. § 56-322 banks may be licensed to engage in the selling of insurance in communities of less than 5,000 population but not in communities with larger populations. This is, in effect, the Attorney General's interpretation of former Code Ann. § 13-1802. It is true that Code Ann. § 56-322 deals with licensing by the Insurance Commissioner whereas Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j) deals with approval by the Commissioner of Banking and Finance of a state bank's "incidental powers." However, Code Ann. § 56-322 and Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j) were enacted at the same legislative session and relate to the same subject matter the permissive scope of a bank's powers and must, therefore, be construed in pari materia. Cf. Shehane v. Wimbish, 34 Ga. App. 608 (131 S.E. 104) (1925). "[O]ur system of law is not to be construed by single Code sections or single provisions of the law; the entire system must be construed as a whole to determine the intent and purpose of the law as applied to each particular case or state of facts." Lucas v. Smith, 201 Ga. 834, 837 (41 SE2d 527) (1947). "It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed in relation to other statutes of which it is a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes `in pari materia,' are construed together, and harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto." Ryan v. Commrs. of Chatham County, 203 Ga. 730, 731 (48 SE2d 86) (1948). When the statutes are read together unless the Commissioner of Banking and Finance has the authority under Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j) to approve a state bank's power to engage in the insurance business, the directive in Code Ann. § 56-322 to the Commissioner of Insurance to deny *560 licensing to banks only to engage in the exercise of that power in municipalities of greater than 5,000 persons means nothing. Obviously Code Ann. § 56-322 contemplates that the Commissioner of Banking and Finance has the concomitant authority to give his preliminary approval to engage in the business of insurance to those banks which will subsequently be licensed to do so by the Commissioner of Insurance. It is only when the statutes are read together thusly that the "entire system" of regulating the entry of banks into the business of insurance in this state can be given effect. A state bank must first seek to secure the approval of its own regulatory authority to engage in the business of insurance as an "incidental power" under Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j). The Commissioner of Banking and Finance is authorized to give his approval if the bank is located and doing business in a municipality of less than 5,000 inhabitants and would thereby be placed in "appropriate competition" with national banks. Under Code Ann. § 56-322 the Commissioner of Insurance would then be authorized to license the state bank to sell insurance within the limits of that municipality. It is clear that if C&S were a national bank it would be entitled to engage in the business of insurance in Austell under 12 USCA § 92.12 CFR § 7.7100. Therefore, in order to make C&S, a state bank, "appropriately competitive" the Commissioner of Banking and Finance was authorized under Code Ann. § 41A-1202 (j) to give his approval to C&S to engage in the business of insurance. Under such rules and regulations as have been promulgated under Code Ann. § 56-322 (b), the Commissioner of Insurance would then be authorized to issue a limited license to C&S to sell insurance within the municipality of Austell. The trial court erred in construing the legislative intent of the entire statutory system by which a state bank may engage in the limited exercise of the business of insurance in this state. The final action of the Department in giving approval to C&S to engage in that business was not unlawful for any reasons asserted by the appellee. It was, therefore, error to set aside the Department's action taken with regard to the application of C&S. Judgment reversed. Deen, P. J., and Banke, J., concur.
en	wikipedia	N/A	The Cave of Salemas is located close to the village of Lousa in the municipality of Loures in the Lisbon District of Portugal. Discovered by archaeologists during the 1950s, the cave appears to have been occupied by humans as a temporary refuge during the Upper Paleolithic and used as a tomb during the Neolithic. Located in a Cretaceous limestone outcrop, the cave is situated about 100 metres north of the Neolithic dolmen known as the Anta do Alto da Toupeira. It is a solutional cave and consists of a winding rift passage about 30 metres long and one metre wide. Although not unique in the area, it is the most developed cave, both in terms of size and depth. It was first explored in September 1959 by L. Albuquerque e Castro and then fully excavated by a team from the Geological Survey of Portugal, headed by O. de Veiga Ferreira, José Camarate Andrade França and Georges Zbyszewski, during two digs in November 1959 and in October- December 1960. The top levels excavated contained Neolithic materials, such as ceramic items, together with human bones consistent with the existence of a necropolis and the bones of small animals. The relatively few tools found suggest that the cave never served as a permanent dwelling for humans. Lower levels contained evidence of Solutrean lithic and bone tools and artefacts of the Upper Paleolithic, together with bones of various fauna. There is evidence that some of the Paleolithic levels were removed in part of the cave during the Neolithic to make way for the necropolis. Animal bones discovered included those of brown bears (Ursus arctos) and cave bears (Ursus spelaeus); leopards (Felis pardus) and Iberian lynx (Felis pardina); hyenas; wolves; and horses. Items collected are stored in Lisbon’s Geological Museum (Museu Geológico). Carbon dating puts the dates of human bones and a tooth from the Paleolithic as being from around 25,000 to 20,000 years ago. References Caves of Portugal Prehistoric sites in Portugal Upper Paleolithic sites in Europe Loures
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Vilanova del Camí (baskiska: Vilanova del Cami) är en ort i Spanien. Den ligger i provinsen Província de Barcelona och regionen Katalonien, i den östra delen av landet, km öster om huvudstaden Madrid. Vilanova del Camí ligger meter över havet och antalet invånare är . Terrängen runt Vilanova del Camí är huvudsakligen kuperad, men den allra närmaste omgivningen är platt. Vilanova del Camí ligger nere i en dal. Den högsta punkten i närheten är meter över havet, km söder om Vilanova del Camí. Runt Vilanova del Camí är det tätbefolkat, med invånare per kvadratkilometer. Närmaste större samhälle är Igualada, km nordväst om Vilanova del Camí. Trakten runt Vilanova del Camí består till största delen av jordbruksmark. Medelhavsklimat råder i trakten. Årsmedeltemperaturen i trakten är °C. Den varmaste månaden är juli, då medeltemperaturen är °C, och den kallaste är december, med °C. Genomsnittlig årsnederbörd är millimeter. Den regnigaste månaden är november, med i genomsnitt mm nederbörd, och den torraste är december, med mm nederbörd. Kommentarer Källor Orter i Katalonien
en	caselaw	US	The appeal here brings for review questions which are to all intent and purposes like those presented in the case of City of Winter Haven, et al., v. A.M. Klemm Son, a corporation, in which original opinion and judgment was filed April 5th, 1938, and in which opinion, on consideration of petition for rehearing was filed May 18th, 1938. On authority of the opinions and judgments in that case, the orders here under review are reversed and the cause remanded for further proceeding in due course of law. So ordered. Reversed and remanded. WHITFIELD, TERRELL, BROWN, BUFORD and CHAPMAN, J.J., concur. *Page 279
da	legislation	Denkmark	Den fulde tekst Skriftlig fremsættelse (17. marts 2009) Ministeren for udviklingsbistand (Søren Pind): Herved tillader jeg mig for Folketinget at fremsætte: Forslag til lov om etablering af Institut for Flerpartisamarbejde. (Lovforslag nr. L 160). Vedlagte forslag til lov om etablering af Institut for Flerpartisamarbejde skal tilvejebringe grundlaget for et nyt dansk initiativ til støtte for pluralistiske politiske systemer i udviklingslandene. Danmark kan bidrage til at styrke demokratiske processer i udviklingslandene med udgangspunkt i vores lange demokratiske tradition. Vi kan dele vores erfaringer med det danske folkestyre og dermed inspirere udviklingslandene til selv at udvikle demokratiske samfund. Igennem to årtier er en væsentlig andel af den danske udviklingsbistand blevet anvendt til at støtte demokratifremmende tiltag, herunder forfatningsudvikling, valgsystemer, parlamenter, folkelig deltagelse, ligestilling og frie medier. Støtten hertil udmøntes såvel i Danmarks multilaterale som i den bilaterale bistand. Også Folketinget, Ombudsmandsinstitutionen og en række danske NGOer er involveret i projekter, der har til formål at fremme demokrati og god regeringsførelse i udviklingslandene. Erfaringer viser imidlertid, at forankring af demokrati også kræver en styrkelse af flerpartisystemer, inden for rammerne af hvilke ansvarlige og solide politiske partier kan udfolde sig. Formålet med et nyt uafhængigt institut for flerpartisamarbejde er at styrke den danske demokratibistand, herunder særligt støtten til udvikling af politiske partier og flerpartisystemer i udviklingslandene. Instituttet vil udgøre en merværdi for den samlede danske demokratistøtte ved inddragelse af Folketingets partier i demokratisamarbejdet, dels ved etablering af direkte samarbejde mellem danske og udenlandske politikere baseret på en tvær- og flerpolitisk platform, dels ved at give de danske partier mulighed for enkeltvis at yde direkte parti-til-parti støtte (søsterpartistøtte). Instituttet vil med fokus på kapacitetsopbygning støtte politiske systemer i udviklingslandene og gennem samarbejdsaftaler med lokale partnere om konkrete aktiviteter sikre, at støtten er efterspørgselsdrevet og forankret hos lokale aktører. Instituttet for Flerpartisamarbejde vil være en selvejende institution. Instituttets bestyrelse vil bestå af 15 medlemmer, hvoraf ni medlemmer udpeges af Folketingets partier, to medlemmer udpeges af Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd, et medlem udpeges af Rektorkollegiet, et medlem udpeges af NGO Forum, et medlem udpeges af Dansk Center for Internationale Studier og Menneskerettigheder og et medlem udpeges direkte af udviklingsministeren. Idet jeg i øvrigt henviser til de bemærkninger, der ledsager forslaget, skal jeg tillade mig at anbefale det til det høje Tings velvillige behandling.
ro	wikipedia	N/A	Homo habilis este o specie disparută din genul Homo, care, potrivit fosilelor găsite până în prezent, ar fi trăit în Africa cu 2,3-1,5 milioane de ani în urmă, în timpul etapelor Gelasian și Calabrianul timpuriu din epoca geologică Pleistocen. În 1960, la Cheile Olduvai din Tanzania au fost descoperite fosile identificate ca o specie separată de Homo. Specimenul a primit numele binomial H. habilis ("Omul îndemânatic") în 1964. În aspectul și morfologia sa, H. habilis este intermediar între Australopithecus și Homo erectus, iar clasificarea sa în genul Homo a fost subiect de dezbatere controversată încă de la propunerea inițială. Un argument principal pentru clasificarea sa ca prima specie Homo ("uman") a fost folosirea uneltelor de piatră. Cu toate acestea, dovezile pentru folosirea anterioară a uneltelor de către membrii indiscutabili ai Australopithecus au fost găsite în anii 1990. Clasificarea ca Homo A existat o dezbatere academică privind plasarea sa în genul Homo, mai degrabă decât în genul Australopithecus. Dimensiunile mici și atributele mai degrabă primitive i-au determinat pe unii experți (Richard Leakey printre ei) să propună excluderea H. habilis din genul Homo și plasarea acestora în Australopithecus ca Australopithecus habilis. Louis Leakey (tatăl lui Richard Leakey), paleoantropologul britanico-kenyan care a fost primul care a sugerat existența lui H. habilis și soția sa, Mary Leakey, au găsit prima urmă a lui H. habilis în 1955: doi dinți hominin. Aceștia au fost mai târziu clasificați ca "dinți de lapte", și, prin urmare, dificil de identificat cărei specii aparține, spre deosebire de dinții permanenți. Cu toate acestea, în 1959, Mary Leakey a recuperat craniul unui adult tânăr care avea un creier mic, o față mare, canini mici și dinți masivi de mestecat (care i-au câștigat porecla "Spărgătorul de nuci"). H. habilis era mic de înălțime și avea brațe disproporționat de lungi comparativ cu oamenii moderni; totuși, avea o față mai puțin proeminentă decât australopitecinele din care se crede că a coborât. H. habilis a avut o capacitate craniană puțin mai mică decât jumătate din dimensiunea oamenilor moderni. În ciuda morfologiei tipică maimuțelor, rămășițele H. habilis sunt adesea însoțite de unelte primitive de piatră (de exemplu, Cheile Olduvai, Tanzania și Lacul Turkana, Kenya). Homo habilis a fost adesea considerat a fi strămoșul lui Homo ergaster, care, la rândul său, a dat naștere speciei Homo erectus. Dezbaterile continuă asupra faptului dacă toate fosilele cunoscute sunt atribuite în mod corespunzător speciei, iar unii paleoantropologi consideră că taxonul este invalid, alcătuit din specimene fosile de Australopithecus și Homo. Noile descoperiri din 2007 păreau să confirme punctul de vedere că H. habilis și H. erectus au coexistat, reprezentând linii separate dintr-un strămoș comun în loc de H. erectus descendent din H. habilis. O explicație alternativă ar fi că orice relație ancestrală de la H. habilis la H. erectus ar fi trebuit să fie cladogenetică mai degrabă decât anagenetică (adică dacă o un subgrup de populație izolată de H. habilis a devenit strămoșul lui H. erectus, alte subgrupuri au rămas neschimbate H. habilis până la dispariția lor ulterioară). Descoperirile de la Dmanisi din Georgia, care aveau diferite trăsături fizice și diferențe în uzul dinților, sugerează unor cercetători că toate grupurile contemporane timpurii de Homo din Africa, inclusiv Homo ergaster, Homo habilis și Homo rudolfensis sunt de aceeași specie și ar trebui să fie atribuită lui Homo erectus, cu implicația că variația dintre aceste "specii" reprezintă evoluția prelungită a unei linii, mai degrabă decât diferențele interspecifice. Morfologie Dimensiunea creierului H. habilis s-a dovedit a fi cuprinsă între 550 cm3 și 687 cm3, mai degrabă decât de la 363 cm3 până la 600 cm3 așa cum s-a crezut anterior. O reconstrucție virtuală publicată în 2015 a estimat volumul endocranial între 729 și 824 ml, mai mare decât orice valoare publicată anterior. Capacitatea creierului H. habilis de aproximativ 640 cm3 a fost în medie cu 50% mai mare decât la australopithecine, dar considerabil mai mică decât la Homo sapiens. Aceste hominine erau mai mici decât oamenii moderni, având în medie, nu mai mult de 1,3 m înălțime. Proporțiile corpului pentru H. habilis sunt conforme cu dovezile craniodentale, sugerând o asociere mai strânsă cu H. erectus. Comportament Se crede că Homo habilis a stăpânit uneltele din cultura Olduwan aparținând Paleoliticul Inferior. H. habilis a folosit aceste pietre pentru a măcelări și a lua pielea animalelor. Aceste așchii de piatră erau mai avansate decât orice unealtă folosită anterior și i-au dat lui H. habilis avantajul de a prospera în medii ostile. Dacă H. habilis a fost primul hominin care a stăpânit tehnologia uneltelor de piatră, rămâne controversat, după ce a fost descoperit Australopithecus garhi, datat acum 2,6 milioane de ani, împreună cu uneltele de piatră. Majoritatea experților presupun că inteligența și organizarea socială a H. habilis erau mai sofisticate decât la australopitecinele tipice sau la cimpanzei. H. habilis folosea unelte în primul rând pentru îndepărtarea cărnii de pe leșuri mai degrabă decât pentru vânătoare sau apărare. Cu toate acestea, în ciuda utilizării uneltelor, H. habilis nu era un excelent vânător, deoarece dovada bogată a fosilelor indică faptul că H. habilis a fost o bază în dieta animalelor de pradă mari, cum ar fi Dinofelis, o felină de dimensiunea unui jaguar. Homo habilis a coexistat cu alte primate bipede asemănătoare Homo, cum ar fi Paranthropus boisei, dintre care unele au prosperat multe milenii. Cu toate acestea, H. habilis, posibil datorită inovației uneltelor timpurii și a unei diete mai puțin specializate, a devenit precursorul unei întregi linii de specii noi, în timp ce Paranthropus boisei și rudele sale robuste au dispărut din registrul fosil. Este posibil ca H. habilis să fi coexistat cu H. erectus în Africa pentru o perioadă de 500.000 de ani. Note Mamifere descrise în 1964 Antropogeneză Antropologie Arheologie Evoluția omului Preistorie Primate Specii timpurii de Homo Tanzania preistorică
en	caselaw	US	455 Pa. 148 (1974) Slotsky, Appellant, v. Gellar et al. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued November 20, 1973. January 24, 1974. 149 Before JONES, C.J., EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. Alex Bonavitacola, with him Stephen B. Barson, and Robinson, Greenberg & Lipman, for appellant. Nathan L. Posner, with him Victor Wright, and Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, for Jack Gellar and Kate Gellar, appellees. Edward Cohen, for Penn Radio Cab, Inc., appellee. 150 OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE EAGEN, January 24, 1974: Penn Radio Cab, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the taxicab business in Philadelphia. Fifty percent of the stock issued by the corporation is owned by Morris Slotsky and the remaining fifty per cent of such stock is owned by Jack Gellar and Kate Gellar, his wife. Dissidence arose among the shareholders, and on April 2, 1969, Slotsky filed a petition under the Business Corporation Law[] requesting the Court of Common Pleas to appoint a custodian for the corporation. An extended evidentiary hearing ensued and on December 22, 1969, the trial court entered an adjudication and order granting the petition. Exceptions to this adjudication and order were subsequently dismissed by a court en banc, and the order was made final. The appointment of a custodian for the corporation then followed. No appeal was filed. On December 18, 1970, the court sur petition by Slotsky issued a rule to show cause why a liquidating receiver should not be appointed to sell the assets of the corporation. Further hearings followed before a judge other than the one who presided at the hearing on the initial petition. On March 2, 1972, the judge, after hearing oral argument from counsel, stated orally from the bench, "as a result of all that I have heard both formally and informally and everything else, I came to the very firm conclusion, I came to this ruling, I am not appointing a liquidating trustee. . . ." This adjudication or ruling was not then transcribed and filed in the prothonotary's office but nonetheless Slotsky filed an appeal in the Superior Court on March 29, 1972, from the trial court's oral pronouncement. On November 20, 1972, the trial court filed an adjudication and order in the prothonotary's office dismissing 151 the petition for the appointment of a liquidating receiver and directing that this adjudication become final unless exceptions were filed thereto within twenty days. No exceptions were filed. On March 19, 1973, the Superior Court transferred Slotsky's appeal here, presumably because the action was one in equity. While an adjudication may be made orally in open court at the end of the trial, in such an event the adjudication should forthwith be transcribed and filed in the office of the prothonotary. See Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1517(b). And the date upon which the order is docketed is the starting date for the appeal time to run. Burdett Oxygen Co. v. I.R. Wolfe & Sons, Inc., 433 Pa. 291, 249 A.2d 299 (1969). Additionally, where an action such as this is tried before the court without a jury, an appeal does not lie until a court en banc has passed on the exceptions to the trial court's adjudication or, if none are filed, until the prothonotary enters the adjudication as final. See Community Sports, Inc. v. Oakland Oaks, 429 Pa. 412, 240 A.2d 491 (1968); Meitner v. Scarborough, 321 Pa. 212, 184 A. 81 (1936); Frankel v. Reliance Mutual Life Insurance Company of Illinois, 199 Pa. Super. 295, 184 A.2d 305 (1962). Hence, the appeal in this case was premature and must be quashed. However, in the interest of justice the record will be remanded to the trial court with directions to allow Slotsky a reasonable opportunity to file exceptions to the trial court's adjudication of November 20, 1972. After a final order is entered, if either party wishes to appeal, such an appeal should be filed in the Superior Court. An action under the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law is an action at law and not one in equity. It is so ordered. NOTES [*] See Section 513.1A(2) of the Act of July 20, 1968, P.L. 459, No. 216, 15 P.S. § 1513.1.
pt	wikipedia	N/A	NGC 2979 (NGC 3050) é uma galáxia espiral (Sa) localizada na direcção da constelação de Sextans. Possui uma declinação de -10° 22' 59" e uma ascensão recta de 9 horas, 43 minutos e 08,6 segundos. A galáxia NGC 2979 foi descoberta em 25 de Março de 1786 por William Herschel. Ver também Astronomia extragaláctica Lista de galáxias Lista de objectos NGC New General Catalogue Ligações externas NGC 2979 Constelação de Sextans Galáxias espirais
es	wikipedia	N/A	Jean-Paul Adam Mokiejewski (Niza, 6 de julio de 1933-Ib., 8 de agosto de 2019), más conocido como Jean-Pierre Mocky, fue un actor, director de cine, guionista y productor de cine francés. Biografía Debuta como actor en el cine y en el teatro. Tiene un papel en la pieza de teatro Les Casse-pieds (1948) de Jean Dréville, en las películas Orphée (1950) de Jean Cocteau o Le Gorille vous salue bien (1957) de Bernard Borderie. Pero es sobre todo en Italia que alcanza la fama con su papel en Los Vencidos de Michelangelo Antonioni. Tras trabajar como becario a las órdenes de Luchino Visconti en la película Senso (1954) y de Federico Fellini en La strada (1954), escribe su primera película, La Tête contre les murs (1959) y ambiciona de filmarlo el mismo, pero el productor prefiere contratar al director Georges Franju. Mocky dirige su primera película el año siguiente con Les Dragueurs (1959). Desde entonces no paró de rodar. En los años 1960 consigue seducir al público con comedias como Un drôle de paroissien (1963) o La Grande Lessive (!) (1968). Después de Mayo 68, se interesa por el género negro y rueda Solo (1969) en el que muestra un grupo de jóvenes terroristas de extrema izquierda, y L'Albatros (1971) que muestra la corrupción de la clase política. Al principio, sus películas se dedicaron al levantamiento contra las restricciones impuestas por la sociedad. Más tarde será la farsa: en la película "Bonsoir", el indigente Alex (Michel Serrault) pretende ser un amante de la lesbiana Caroline (Claude Jade) para salvar su herencia contra sus parientes homofóbicos. En los años 1980 vuelve a encontrar el éxito con una película que denuncia las derivas violentas de ciertos aficionados del fútbol, un año antes del drama del Heysel (À mort l'arbitre, 1984), y una comedia que denuncia las hipocresías alrededor de los peregrinajes de Lourdes (Le Miraculé, 1987). En los años 1990 y 2000, sus películas tienen menos éxito pero Jean-Pierre Mocky sigue rodando con el mismo entusiasmo. Su cine, a menudo satírico y panfletario, se inspira de los sucesos sociales. Trabaja con muy pocos medios y rueda con rapidez. Dirigió a actores tan famosos como Bourvil (Un drôle de paroissien, La Cité de l'indicible peur, La Grande Lessive (!) y L'Étalon), Fernandel (La Bourse et la Vie), Michel Simon (L'Ibis rouge), Michel Serrault (doce películas entre las cuales Le Miraculé y À mort l'arbitre), Francis Blanche (cinco películas entre las cuales La Cité de l'indicible peur), Jacqueline Maillan (cinco películas), Jean Poiret (ocho films) y con las estrellas Catherine Deneuve (Agent trouble), Claude Jade (Bonsoir), Jane Birkin (Noir comme le souvenir), Jeanne Moreau (Le Miraculé) y Stéphane Audran (Les saisons du plaisir). En 2010 recibió el prix Henri-Langlois por el conjunto de su carrera y el prix Alphonse-Allais en 2013. El Festival International du film Entrevues de Belfort en 2012 y la Cinémathèque française en 2014 le dedicaron una retrospectiva integral. Referencias Directores de cine de Francia Actores de Francia Productores de cine de Francia Nacidos en Niza Fallecidos en París
fi	wikipedia	N/A	Degerforsin kunta () on Örebron läänissä sijaitseva Ruotsin kunta. Maakuntajaossa se kuuluu Värmlantiin ja Närkeen. Kunnan keskustaajama on Degerfors. Kunnan maapinta-ala on 383,95 neliökilometriä (1.1.2016) ja asukasluku 9 631 henkeä (31.12.2020). Kristillisdemokraattien entinen puheenjohtaja Göran Hägglund on kotoisin kunnasta. Vuonna 2007 kunnassa oli 26,26 km2 peltoa, joten saman ajankohdan maapinta-alaan vertaamalla saadaan peltojen osuudeksi 6,8 prosenttia kunnan maapinta-alasta. Kuntajaon kehitys Vuonna 1912 Karlskogan maalaiskuntaan perustettiin Jannelundin taajaväkinen yhdyskunta. Vuodesta 1938 lähtien sitä alettiin kutsua Degerforsiksi. Degerforsin seurakunta oli erotettu Karlskogan seurakunnasta jo vuonna 1883, mutta Degerforsin maalaiskunta erotettiin itsenäiseksi kunnaksi Karlskogan maalaiskunnasta vasta vuonna 1925. Vuonna 1943 koko maalaiskunta muutettiin Degerforsin kauppalaksi. Taajaväkinen yhdyskunta oli lakkautettu noin vuotta aikaisemmin, kun kaupunkeja koskevia määräyksiä (ruots. stadsstadgorna) oli alettu soveltaa koko maalaiskunnan alueella. Vuoden 1952 kuntauudistus ei vaikuttanut kauppalaan, mutta tuolloin muodostettiin Svartån "suurkunta" yhdistämällä aiemmat Kvistbron, Nysundin ja Skagershultin maalaiskunnat. Vuonna 1967 Svartån maalaiskunta jaettiin ja Nysundin seurakunta liitettiin Degerforsin kauppalaan. Vuonna 1971 kauppala muutettiin nykyiseksi Degerforsin kunnaksi. Väestönkehitys Kunnan väestö taustan mukaan on esitetty seuraavassa taulukossa. Hieman vanhempien vuoden 2009 lopun tietojen mukaan kunnassa asui 375 Suomessa syntynyttä, mikä vastasi 3,9 prosenttia kunnan väestöstä. Vielä vanhempien vuoden 1984 lopun tietojen mukaan 8,0 prosenttia kunnan asukkaista oli ulkomailla syntyneitä. Tuolloin kunnassa asui 548 Suomessa syntynyttä, mikä vastasi 4,6 prosenttia kunnan väestöstä. Vuoden 2010 tietojen mukaan 20 vuotta täyttäneiden kuntalaisten mediaaninettotulot olivat 174 248 kruunua. Vuodelta 2007 olevan tiedon mukaan kuntalaisten nettovarallisuuden mediaani oli 38 000 kruunua. Vuoden 2011 lopussa kunnan väestö jakautui eri ikäryhmiin seuraavasti: 0–17-vuotiaat: 17,9 % 18–64-vuotiaat: 57,3 % 65 vuotta täyttäneet: 24,7 % Elinkeinot Seuraava taulukko kuvaa työpaikkojen ja työllisten jakautumista eri elinkeinojen kesken. Luvut on laskettu kahdessa eri Statistiska centralbyrånin tilastossa ilmoitettujen perusteellisempien tietojen pohjalta. "Päiväväestö" (ruots. dagbefolkning) kertoo kunnassa sijaitsevista työpaikoista ja "yöväestö" (ruots. nattbefolkning) puolestaan kunnassa asuvien elinkeinosta. Työpaikkaomavaraisuus on laskettu päivä- ja yöväestön suhteena. Alkutuotanto tarkoittaa maa- ja metsätaloutta sekä kalastusta. Jalostuksen kohdalla on laskettu yhteen tavaranvalmistus- ja kierrätysteollisuus, energia- ja ympäristöyritykset sekä rakennusteollisuus. Muut toimialat on laskettu palveluihin lukuun ottamatta niitä, joiden elinkeino on tuntematon. Taajamat Kunnassa on 3 taajamaa, joiden osuus kunnan väestöstä vuoden 2010 lopussa oli 81,6 prosenttia. Taajamien ulkopuolella asui tuolloin 1 774 asukasta. Seuraavassa on lueteltu kunnan alueella sijaitsevat taajamat väkilukuineen: Kunnan keskustaajama on lihavoitu. Entiset taajamat Ruotsissa on tilastoitu taajamaväestö aikaisemmin myös vuosina 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 ja 2005. Jonakin tai joinakin näistä vuosista kunnassa on ollut myös seuraavan luettelon mukaiset taajamat, jotka eivät enää ole taajamia: Strömtorp Strömtorp on sittemmin kasvanut yhteen Degerforsin taajaman kanssa. Pientaajamat Yli 200 asukkaan taajamien lisäksi kunnassa on vuoden 2010 tietojen perusteella myös seuraavat 50–199 asukkaan pientaajamat: Högberg östra Högåsen* Knutsbol* Ölsboda Asteriski () tarkoittaa, että pientaajama kuuluu osittain toiseenkin kuntaan. Högåsen ja Knutsbol kuuluvat osin myös Karlskogan kuntaan. Kunnanvaltuusto Ruotsissa valitaan joka neljäs vuosi edustajat valtiopäiville, maakäräjäkuntien valtuustoihin ja kunnanvaltuustoihin. Seuraavassa taulukossa on esitetty valtiopäivillä edustettuina olevien puolueiden saamat valtuustopaikat Degerforsin kunnanvaltuustossa vuodesta 1973 lähtien. Piirit Vuodesta 2016 alkaen kunta on jaettu seuraaviin piireihin: Degerforsin piiri Nysundin piiri Seurakunnat Vuoden 2012 aluejaon mukaan kunnassa on seuraavat Ruotsin kirkon seurakunnat: Degerfors-Nysund Historialliset seurakunnat Seuraavassa luettelossa on mainittu kaikki nykyisen kunnan alueella sijainneet seurakunnat. Jos seurakunta on lakkautettu, niin sen perässä on asteriski (). Mahdolliset suluissa lukevat nimet ovat seurakunnan vaihtoehtoisia tai vanhempia nimiä. Jos nimen perässä lukee kbfd, niin kyseessä "kirkonkirjapiiri" (), joka ei ole muodostanut omaa seurakuntaa, vaikka ne seurakuntiin rinnastetaankin. Degerfors Nysund (Sund) Kirkot Lähteet Aiheesta muualla Degerforsin kunnan kotisivut Sevärda kulturmiljöer i Degerfors kommun
en	caselaw	US	542 F. Supp. 79 (1982) Paul H. NEAL, Plaintiff, v. Harold MILLER, Defendant. Civ. No. 82-4027. United States District Court, S. D. Illinois. July 7, 1982. 80 Paul H. Neal, pro se. Richard H. Lloyd, Asst. U. S. Atty., East St. Louis, Ill., for defendant. ORDER FOREMAN, Chief Judge: Before the Court is an order denying plaintiff's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) by United States Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers. Plaintiff's claim was found frivolous and clearly without merit. Plaintiff has filed with the Court numerous motions attacking the denial. Before reviewing the propriety of the denial, a discussion of the Court's jurisdiction is necessary. I. Denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis on grounds of frivolity is permissible prior to the issuance of summons. This circuit's treatment of in forma pauperis applications was reviewed in Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Division, County Court, Milwaukee County, State of Wisconsin, 510 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1975). In Wartman, the Court expressly overruled its earlier decision in United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953), which held that in determining whether to allow a complaint to be filed in forma pauperis under § 1915(a), a district court should not consider the merits of the claim, but should grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis if the affidavit of indigency is sufficient. The Radio Station WENR decision went on to hold that the question of whether the complaint presented a meritorious claim should then be examined and the action dismissed pursuant to § 1915(d) if found to be frivolous or malicious. In overruling this procedure, the Court in Wartman recognized the illogic of authorizing a dismissal on grounds of frivolity only after summons has issued pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court expressly mandated the procedure to be followed: Accordingly, in the future, a district judge should deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis if an action is frivolous or malicious. If the motion is granted and the complaint filed, the matter cannot be dismissed until summons has issued. This practice will avoid any conflict between section 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(a). Wartman, supra, 510 F.2d at 134. Although the Court was expressly authorizing a "frivolous and malicious" determination under § 1915(a), the teaching of Wartman is clear. Denying leave to proceed on grounds of frivolity, a criterion specifically within the ambit of § 1915(d), is permissible before summons is issued. While authorizing a denial on grounds of frivolity before summons is issued, the Wartman decision did not address the question of a magistrate's authority to make that determination without the district court's adoption. In the Court's opinion, the magistrate's order denying plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on grounds of frivolity, § 1915(d), should be treated as a Report and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). At issue is whether a magistrate's order under § 1915(d) falls within § 636(b)(1)(A) or (B). Section 636(b)(1)(A) authorizes a magistrate to hear and determine: any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Section 636(b)(1)(B) authorizes the district judge to designate a magistrate to hear the matters excepted in § 636(b)(1)(A). In such a case, the magistrate is to submit to the district judge a report and recommendation for final disposition. A reading of § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) clearly indicates that dispositive determinations are delegated to the district judge. 81 Dismissal on grounds of frivolity and maliciousness is by nature a dispositive ruling, falling within § 636(b)(1)(B). A determination of frivolity and maliciousness necessarily involves an analysis of the merits of the asserted claim. Such determinations are for the district judge to make, by way of initial consideration or by reviewing the magistrate's Report and Recommendation. This conclusion is buttressed by recommendations of the Federal Judicial Center's Prisoner Civil Rights Committee. In discussing the function of the magistrate in regards to a dismissal under § 1915(d) on grounds of frivolity and maliciousness, the Committee recommended: The Magistrate may submit to the Judge a report and recommendation for disposition. The original of the Magistrate's report and recommendation will be filed with the clerk and a copy mailed by the Magistrate to the plaintiff and any party who has been served, with notice that objections thereto may be filed within ten days. Upon receipt and after consideration of any exceptions or objections from the plaintiff, the Magistrate will submit to the Judge a proposed order of disposition. Recommended Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in Federal Courts 59 (1980). The Court recognizes that the Committee recommends that denials under § 1915(a) by a magistrate can be appealed, according to local rules, to the district judge. Recommended Procedures, supra, at 54. However, in making this recommendation as to the magistrate's function, the Committee viewed denials under § 1915(a) as turning solely on the economic status of the plaintiff, rather than the merits of the claim. As noted, this view of § 1915(a) was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in Wartman. But given the Committee's suggestions as to the magistrate's different roles under §§ 1915(a) and (d), it is clear that it views a dismissal on grounds of frivolity and maliciousness a dispositive ruling and subject to the procedures of § 636(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, the Court treats the magistrate's denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis as a Report and Recommendation. II. In his complaint, plaintiff, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, alleges that prison officials are violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment. He alleges that prison officials are intentionally torturing him in hopes he will commit suicide. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that wires and metal conductors, operated by remote control, have been implanted throughout his entire body. He states that defendant operates the remote control device, causing him extreme mental and physical pain. The heat from the wires allegedly have burned holes in various parts of his body, resulting in waste pouring from his intestines and stomach. Plaintiff requests injunctive relief and damages in the sum of $10,000,000. On February 8, 1982, United States Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers ordered the plaintiff to submit a detailed factual statement of what, when, where and how the acts and conduct alleged occurred, along with the named defendant's involvement. Further, plaintiff's medical records were ordered. On April 19, 1982, Magistrate Meyers denied plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As grounds, plaintiff's medical records were examined along with x-rays taken on the day the order was entered. Plaintiff was denied leave under § 1915(d) because his claim "is frivolous and clearly without any merit." After reviewing the record, the Court agrees with Magistrate Meyers' conclusion. Plaintiff's claim is wholly without merit. Plaintiff objects by stating that the x-ray examination was not performed by unbiased personnel. The Court views this objection unpersuasive. Plaintiff's contentions, if sincere, are wholly illusory. Accordingly, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
fr	caselaw	Luxembourg	Parquet Général Service de documentation Fiche JUDOC N° JUDOC : 98407362 Date de la décision : 03/04/1984 Juridiction : Tribunal d'arrondissement de Numéro de la décision : - Diekirch Chambre : Numéro de rôle : 5217; 87/84 Classements : Mots-clés : CIVIL,RESPONSABILITE CIVILE, RESPONSABILITE DELICTUELLE ET QUASI-DELICTUELLE, RESPONSABILITE DU FAIT PERSONNEL, FAUTE, CIRCULATION, DROIT DE PRIORITE N'EST PAS ABSOLU Références : L00LC10 A1382 CODE CIVIL Sommaire : La faute est, en droit positif, la première condition de la responsabilité du fait personnel. S'il n'y a pas de faute, la responsabilité des articles 1382 et 1383 ne saurait être mise en jeu. Et c'est au demandeur en indemnité à démontrer la faute. En cas de nécessité évidente pour le non-prioritaire désirant s'engager sur la route principale de s'y avancer quelque peu avec son véhicule pour avoir une visibilité, et collision immédiate, consécutivement à cette manoeuvre, avec une voiture en doublant une autre et circulant à une distance de seulement 70 - 80 cm du bord afférent de la route, il échet d'admettre que la débitrice de priorité n'a commis aucune faute, imprudence ou négligence en relation causale avec l'accident. En effet à moins de lui dénier le droit d'emprunter la route principale d'Arlon, on ne voit guère comment elle aurait pu agir différemment ni quelle mesure elle aurait dû prendre pour éviter une telle collision. Il est en outre actuellement généralement admis que le droit de priorité de passage ne présente pas un caractère absolu opposable aux autres règles du code de la route. Page 1 "
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Le château de Lion-sur-Mer est une demeure qui se dresse sur le territoire de la commune française de Lion-sur-Mer dans le département du Calvados, en région Normandie. Au la famille de Moyon y possédait un château fort. Ce bâtiment fortifié, aujourd'hui disparu, perdit son statut seigneurial au . Le château actuel bâti un peu plus loin a été édifié en partie à l'époque de la Renaissance au dessus de caves du . Le château est partiellement protégé aux monuments historiques. Localisation Le château est situé à l'ouest de la commune de Lion-sur-Mer, dans le département français du Calvados. Historique Les trois fiefs nobles de la paroisse Au la paroisse de Lion était divisée en trois fiefs nobles : le fief de la paroisse appartenait au à Guillaume de Moyon (ou Mohun). L'abbaye de Troarn s'en rend propriétaire en 1262 et le garde jusqu'au sauf de 1568 à 1613, période pendant laquelle il appartient à François Roger, bourgeois de Caen, et à ses descendants ; le « grand fief de Lion » entre, au , en possession de ce même François Roger après avoir appartenu à la famille de Meullent du milieu du et de leurs descendants au , sauf quand il lui est confisqué par les Anglais de 1418 à 1450 pendant la guerre de Cent Ans. Il est ensuite occupé par les de Folligny ; le fief de Baally aussi dit « fief du chasteau de Lyon ». Bien que simple quart de fief de chevalier contrairement au Grand Fief de Lion qui était de haubert, il était probablement le seul des trois fiefs à s'enorgueillir d'une vraie fortification. La famille Le Sens en fait l'acquisition en 1505. Robert Roger, descendant de François Roger, et André Le Sens se disputent le titre de seigneur de Lion en 1588, querelle qui n'a pas de solution immédiate satisfaisante mais se résout finalement quand les descendants des Le Sens portant le titre de marquis ou comte, achètent, en 1671, par grignotages successifs tout le grand fief de Lion. L'ensemble est partagé de nouveau au gré des successions mais le château actuel reste en possession des descendants de la famille Le Sens jusqu'en 1847 où Auguste Massieu de Clerval en fait l'acquisition. Il est encore occupé au par des descendants de cette famille. Le château actuel Au tout début du la résidence seigneuriale de Lion est encore située dans l'ancien château fortifié du fief de Baally. Le château actuel de Lion se trouve ailleurs, presque un kilomètre plus loin, sur l'emplacement d'une grande maison bourgeoise avec colombier, four, grange et jardin. Cette demeure située en terre roturière, existait déjà en 1400, héritée de ses parents par Perrette Auberée, l'épouse du premier Isaac Le Sens. Transformée et agrandie par les descendants de la famille Le Sens, détenteurs d'un ou plusieurs fiefs nobles selon les époques, elle devient tout naturellement manoir seigneurial à la fin du . Une chapelle est construite vers 1736. En 1761 un des Le Sens décide de donner un accès plus majestueux à la propriété en créant face au bâtiment d'habitation une pelouse partagée par une longue allée bordée de hauts arbres. En 1848, Auguste Massieu de Clerval établit une séparation entre l'habitation et les communs. Un logement en style néo-gothique portant les armes de la famille est construit pour le gardien en 1860. Durant la Première Guerre mondiale, le château a servi d'hôpital militaire. En 1944 des tirs d'obus ravagent le parc et les communs, la chapelle est presque entièrement détruite, le château est légèrement atteint. Tout est remis en état dans les années suivantes, avant 1959. Depuis 2012, des travaux de restauration ont été entrepris, tout d'abord pour se débarrasser de la mérule qui envahissait des parquets et ensuite pour le rafraîchissement des façades. Des fenêtres en trompe-l’œil ont été créées pour assurer la symétrie de la façade nord. Un tableau représentant le château a été exécuté par le peintre Maurice Utrillo. Après l'avoir acheté en 1969, Samuel Porter l'a prêté en 1973 à un certain Harold Von Maker qui s'est avéré être un escroc. Le tableau a disparu au Venezuela et n'a jamais refait surface. Description Le château, dont le pavillon et la tour d'angle ont été construits après 1536 par André Le Senset Philippine de Mélissent, fut agrandi et subit de nombreuses transformations au cours des siècles suivants. Il est visible du sud par une petite voie parallèle à la route côtière qui rejoint la commune de Luc-sur-Mer. Une grille en fer forgé donne l'accès à un petit pont qui enjambe le saut-de-loup creusé par Robert-Pierre le Sens dit le Marquis de Lion au . L'entrée est surveillée par une maison de gardien élevée en 1860 dans un style néo-gothique. Couronnée par des créneaux, cette maison en forme de tour porte les écus des familles Massieu de Clerval et Hue. Un canon échoué sur le rivage et offert par des pêcheurs au début du à madame de Than, née le Sens de Folleville a été posé derrière le saut de loup. Une allée droite bordée de pelouses conduit au château en passant devant la chapelle. Les autres bâtiments à l'ouest sont cachés par des rangées de hauts arbres. Le logis Il est composé de plusieurs parties différentes mais mitoyennes dont le pavillon, à l'est, est en forte avancée vers le sud formant ainsi un « L » avec le reste de l'édifice. Côté sud Le pavillon Renaissance : Construit aux environs de 1540, c'est un bâtiment carré d'un étage coiffé d'un très haut comble en fer de hache de de hauteur. Deux échauguettes en encorbellement percées de petites baies cintrées décorent les angles sud. Les cinq fenêtres de l'étage ont conservé leurs meneaux et leurs traverses. Les trois lucarnes à plein-cintre et fronton triangulaire sont ouvertes à l'aplomb des fenêtres. Deux d'entre elles, encadrées par des petits arcs-boutants, sont très semblables à la partie supérieure d'une lucarne du gros pavillon du château de Fontaine-Henry datée de 1538. Les bas-reliefs au-dessus des fenêtres, les frises des échauguettes, les moulures des ouvertures du pavillon, comme celles de la tour d'escalier indiquent une construction du début et du milieu du . Seule la porte plein-cintre ouverte dans le mur sud date du et les fenêtres du rez-de-chaussée ont été refaites au par Auguste Massieu de Clairval. La tour d'escalier: Bâtie au ou au à la même époque que le pavillon en retour d'équerre auquel elle est accolée. Elle est de forme arrondie sur ses deux niveaux inférieurs et surmontée d'une pièce carrée dont les murs droits sont rattrapés par une trompe. Une mince tourelle en surplomb couronnée d'un dôme et d'un lanternon lui est accolée. La porte plein-cintre et la fenêtre qui la surplombe ont été rajoutées au . A l'intérieur l'escalier à vis qui permettait la communication entre la partie carrée centrale et le pavillon dont les planchers n'étaient pas à la même hauteur, a disparu. Un escalier à trois volées du siècle permet de gagner les étages. La partie centrale : La partie centrale carrée de la seconde moitié du est percée de deux rangées de deux fenêtres et couverte d'un toit à quatre pans muni de hautes lucarnes à frontons triangulaires du . La partie la moins élevée à l'ouest : Rebâti au , un rez-de-chaussée percé de trois fenêtres est surmonté d'un étage aux trois lucarnes pendantes sous un toit brisé à la Mansart. Il est précédé d'un petit avant-corps et couvre une cave dont la voûte est soutenue par des arcs-doubleaux. Cette cave voûtée, partie la plus ancienne de la propriété, faisait partie du premier corps de logis du qui n'existe plus. Côté est Une tour sur trois niveaux coiffée d'une toiture conique est accolée au pavillon et au bâtiment qui contient l'escalier du . Un autre petit bâtiment rectangulaire est en saillie derrière. Côté nord Le bâtiment du milieu comporte un étage surmonté d'un toit où s'ouvrent quatre lucarnes, sa façade restaurée au est percée de deux rangées de huit baies dont certaines sont aveugles. Il est encadré par deux constructions sans étage au toit à pans coupés aux lucarnes à fenêtres pendantes, reconstruite pour l'une, celle qui se trouve à l'ouest, et rajoutée à l'est pour l'autre au avant 1720. Malgré les réaménagements et reconstructions à différentes époques l'ensemble tant du côté nord que du côté sud garde un équilibre grâce aux fenêtres toutes alignées entre elles et de mêmes dimensions sauf celles de l'étage du pavillon un peu moins hautes Une cohérence est maintenue aussi grâce au cordon qui court d'un bout à l'autre du bâtiment entre le rez-de-chaussée et le premier étage. La chapelle Élevée au début du par Robert-Pierre le sens, la chapelle est un simple bâtiment rectangulaire couvert d'une toiture à la Mansart semblable à celle de la partie ouest du logis. La façade occidentale est munie d'un fronton triangulaire orné de feuillage. les murs gouttereaux sont percés chacun de deux grandes fenêtres. À l'intérieur un bas-relief représentant la Présentation de la Vierge au Temple est le seul rappel de la vocation religieuse de cet édifice, destiné à l'origine au culte catholique, mais qui a servi un siècle plus tard, de 1863 à 1899, à la célébration de rites protestants. Les communs et bâtiments agricoles Un bâtiment qui était solidaire du logis avant les aménagements d'Auguste Massieu de Clairval au se dresse encore à l'ouest. Plus loin près du portail du s'élèvent une grange et un long bâtiment qui abritaient diverses activités agricoles dont la fabrication du cidre attestée par la présence d'un pressoir et d'une meule. Ces édifices ont été construits au ou plus vraisemblablement au . Une glacière du a été restaurée entre 2020 et 2021 Protection aux monuments historiques Au titre des monuments historiques : les façades et les toitures du pavillon carré formant l'aile droite du château ; la tourelle contiguë ; le pavillon de l'escalier sont classés par arrêté du ; la chapelle située dans le parc au sud-est du pavillon carré est inscrite par arrêté du ; les façades et les toitures et caves de l'aile ouest sont classées par arrêté du ; les façades et les toitures des bâtiments de communs, y compris la serre ; l'assiette du parc, avec ses murs de clôture et les sauts-de-loup sont inscrits par arrêté du . Notes et références Notes Références Annexes Bibliographie . . Articles connexes Liste des monuments historiques de l'arrondissement de Caen Liens externes Lion-sur-Mer Lion-sur-Mer Monument historique dans le Calvados Monument historique classé en 1926 Monument historique inscrit en 1946 Monument historique classé en 1969 Monument historique inscrit en 2007 Architecture Renaissance dans le Calvados
es	other	N/A	EUSKAL HERRIKO AUTONOMIA ERKIDEGOAREN HIZKUNTZA POLITIKA - ppt descargar EUSKAL HERRIKO AUTONOMIA ERKIDEGOAREN HIZKUNTZA POLITIKA Publicada porBerengária Lindo Modificado hace 4 años Presentación del tema: "EUSKAL HERRIKO AUTONOMIA ERKIDEGOAREN HIZKUNTZA POLITIKA"— Transcripción de la presentación: 1 EUSKAL HERRIKO AUTONOMIA ERKIDEGOAREN HIZKUNTZA POLITIKA La política lingüística de Euskadi 2 Los territorios del euskera 3 Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi, Navarra y País Vasco Norte Bizkaia Gipuzkoa Araba Álava Lapurdi Zuberoa Baja Navarra Nafarroa 4 Organización política de la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco Administración autonómica Gobierno Vasco Parlamento Vasco Administración foral (Álava, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya) Diputaciones Forales Juntas Generales Municipios-Ayuntamientos: 251 6 Instituciones comunes Gobierno y Parlamento autónomos: amplia capacidad de autogobierno Régimen especial de financiación: Concierto Económico Pacto plurianual Capacidad recaudatoria Pago de un cupo al Estado 7 Factores clave para el desarrollo de una política lingüística eficaz 8 Tres factores clave Marco legal adecuado: oficialidad Políticas públicas de promoción de la lengua: planificación y recursos Compromiso y adhesión social 9 Estatuto de Autonomía (1979) Ley de Normalizacióndel euskera (1982) 1) Marco legal Constitución (1978) Estatuto de Autonomía (1979) Ley de Normalizacióndel euskera (1982) Legislación sectorial: administración pública,educación, policía autonómica... 10 Constitución española 1. El castellano es la lengua española oficial del Estado. Todos los españoles tienen el deber de conocer el castellano y el derecho a usarlo. 2. Las demás lenguas españolas serán también oficiales en las respectivas comunidades autónomas de acuerdo con sus estatutos. 3. La riqueza de las distintas modalidades lingüísticas de España es un patrimonio cultural que será objeto de especial respeto y protección. 11 El derecho a usar el euskera Estatuto de Autonomía El derecho a usar el euskera 6.1. art: El euskera, lengua propia del pueblo vasco, tendrá como el castellano carácter de lengua oficial en Euskadi, y todos sus habitantes tienen el derecho de conocer y usar ambas lenguas. 6.2. art: Las instituciones comunes de la CAE (...) garantizarán el uso de ambas lenguas (...) y regularán las medidas necesarias para garantizar su conocimiento. 12 Ley 10/1982, de 24 de noviembre, básica de normalización del uso del euskera 13 Ley 10/82 de 24 de noviembre, Básica de Normalización del Uso del Euskera Derechos lingüísticos de la ciudadanía. Obligaciones de los poderes públicos. 14 2. Persigue la normalización del uso del euskera Ley 10/82, de 24 de noviembre, Básica de Normalización del Uso del Euskera Delimita el régimen de doble oficialidad lingüística, en desarrollo del Estatuto 2. Persigue la normalización del uso del euskera 3. Determina los derechos lingüísticos de los hablantes y las obligaciones de la administración Reconoce el derecho al uso. Garantizar la oportunidad de uso, sin imponer. Apuesta por el verdadero bilingüismo. Objetivo: cohesión social y convivencia. 15 CAPÍTULO ÚNICO (ARTÍCULO CINCO) CAPÍTULO ÚNICO (ARTÍCULO CINCO). DE LOS DERECHOS DE LOS CIUDADANOS Y DEBERES DE LOS PODERES PÚBLICOS EN MATERIA LINGÜÍSTICA Todos los ciudadanos del País Vasco tienen derecho a conocer y usar las lenguas oficiales, tanto oralmente como por escrito. Se reconocen a los ciudadanos del País Vasco los siguientes derechos lingüísticos fundamentales: Derecho a relacionarse en euskera o en castellano oralmente y/o por escrito con la Administración y con cualquier Organismo o Entidad radicado en la Comunidad Autónoma. Derecho a recibir la enseñanza en ambas lenguas oficiales. Derecho a recibir en euskera publicaciones periódicas, programaciones de radio y televisión y de otros medios de comunicación. Derecho a desarrollar actividades profesionales, laborales, políticas y sindicales en euskera. Derecho a expresarse en euskera en cualquier reunión. 3. Los poderes públicos garantizarán el ejercicio de estos derechos, en el ámbito territorial de la Comunidad Autónoma, a fin de que sean efectivos y reales. 16 CAPÍTULO I. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA DENTRO DEL ÁMBITO TERRITORIAL DE LA COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA DEL PAÍS VASCO Artículo 6. Se reconoce a todos los ciudadanos el derecho a usar tanto el euskera como el castellano en sus relaciones con la Administración Pública en el ámbito territorial de la Comunidad Autónoma, y a ser atendidos en la lengua oficial que elijan. 17 CAPÍTULO I. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA DENTRO DEL ÁMBITO TERRITORIAL DE LA COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA DEL PAÍS VASCO Artículo 8. Toda disposición normativa o resolución oficial que emane de los poderes públicos sitos en la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco, deberá estar redactada en forma bilingüe a efectos de publicidad oficial. 2. Todo acto en el que intervengan los poderes públicos sitos en la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco, así como las notificaciones y comunicaciones administrativas, deberán ir redactados en forma bilingüe, salvo que los interesados privados elijan expresamente la utilización de una de las lenguas oficiales de la Comunidad Autónoma 18 CAPÍTULO I. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA DENTRO DEL ÁMBITO TERRITORIAL DE LA COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA DEL PAÍS VASCO Artículo 9. En sus relaciones con la Administración de Justicia, todo ciudadano podrá utilizar la lengua oficial de su elección, sin que se le pueda exigir traducción alguna. 2. Los escritos y documentos presentados en euskera, así como las actuaciones judiciales, serán totalmente válidos y eficaces. El Gobierno Vasco promoverá de acuerdo con los órganos correspondientes, la normalización del uso del euskera en la Administración de Justicia en el País Vasco. 19 CAPÍTULO I. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA DENTRO DEL ÁMBITO TERRITORIAL DE LA COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA DEL PAÍS VASCO Artículo 14. A fin de hacer efectivos los derechos reconocidos en el artículo 6 de la presente Ley, los poderes públicos adoptarán las medidas tendentes a la progresiva euskaldunización del personal afecto a la Administración Pública en la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco. Los poderes públicos determinarán las plazas para las que es preceptivo el conocimiento de ambas lenguas. En las pruebas selectivas que se realicen para el acceso a las demás plazas de la Administración en el ámbito territorial de la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco, se considerará, entre otros méritos, el nivel de conocimiento de las lenguas oficiales, cuya ponderación la realizará la Administración para cada nivel profesional. 20 Uso del euskera en la enseñanza 21 CAPÍTULO II. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LA ENSEÑANZA Artículo 15. Se reconoce a todo alumno el derecho de recibir la enseñanza tanto en euskera como en castellano en los diversos niveles educativos. A tal efecto, el Parlamento y el Gobierno adoptarán las medidas oportunas tendentes a la generalización progresiva del bilingüismo en el sistema educativo de la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco. 22 CAPÍTULO II. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LA ENSEÑANZA Artículo 16. 1. En las enseñanzas que se desarrollen hasta el inicio de los estudios universitarios, será obligatoria la enseñanza de la lengua oficial que no haya sido elegida por el padre o tutor, o, en su caso, el alumno, para recibir sus enseñanzas. 2. No obstante, el Gobierno regulará los modelos lingüísticos a impartir en cada centro teniendo en cuenta la voluntad de los padres o tutores y la situación sociolingüística de la zona. 3. Los centros privados subvencionados con fondos públicos que impartan enseñanzas regladas tomando como base una lengua no oficial en la Comunidad, impartirán como asignaturas obligatorias el euskera y el castellano. 23 CAPÍTULO II. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LA ENSEÑANZA Artículo 17. El Gobierno adoptará aquellas medidas encaminadas a garantizar al alumnado la posibilidad real, en igualdad de condiciones, de poseer un conocimiento práctico suficiente de ambas lenguas oficiales al finalizar los estudios de enseñanza obligatoria y asegurará el uso ambiental del euskera, haciendo del mismo un vehículo de expresión normal, tanto en las actividades internas como externas y en las actuaciones y documentos administrativos. Artículo 19. Las Escuelas Universitarias de Formación del Profesorado, adaptarán sus planes de estudio para conseguir la total capacitación en euskera y castellano de los docentes, de acuerdo con las exigencias de su especialidad. 24 CAPÍTULO II. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LA ENSEÑANZA Artículo 20. 1. El Gobierno, a fin de hacer efectivo el derecho a la enseñanza en euskera, establecerá los medios tendentes a una progresiva euskaldunización del profesorado. (IRALE) 25 Uso del euskera en los medios de comunicación 26 CAPÍTULO III. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN SOCIAL Artículo 22. Se reconoce a todos los ciudadanos el derecho a ser informados por los medios de comunicación social tanto en euskera como en castellano. A tal efecto, el Gobierno adoptará las medidas conducentes a aumentar la presencia del euskera en los medios de comunicación social, tendiendo a la equiparación progresiva en el uso de ambas lenguas oficiales. 27 CAPÍTULO III. DEL USO DEL EUSKERA EN LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN SOCIAL Artículo 24. El Gobierno impulsará la normalización lingüística en los centros emisores de RTVE a fin de asegurar una adecuada presencia del euskera como lengua propia del País Vasco. Artículo 25. El Gobierno, a fin de garantizar de forma progresiva el derecho reconocido en el artículo 22, adoptará las medidas encaminadas a la promoción y protección del uso del euskera potenciando en todo caso su difusión y posibilidades de utilización efectiva en: - La radiodifusión. - La prensa y publicaciones. - La cinematografía. - Teatro y espectáculos. - Medios de reproducción de imagen y sonido. 28 Del uso social y otros aspectos institucionales del euskera 29 CAPÍTULO IV. DEL USO SOCIAL Y OTROS ASPECTOS INSTITUCIONALES DEL EUSKERA Artículo 26. Los poderes públicos vascos tomarán las medidas oportunas y los medios necesarios tendentes a fomentar el uso del euskera en todos los ámbitos de la vida social, a fin de posibilitar a los ciudadanos el desenvolvimiento en dicha lengua en las diversas actividades mercantiles, culturales, asociativas, deportivas, religiosas y cualesquiera otras. Artículo 27. Los poderes públicos vascos fomentarán el uso del euskera en la publicidad. 2. Asimismo, impulsarán el uso ambiental del euskera y su empleo en la rotulación de todo tipo de entidades mercantiles, recreativas, culturales y asociativas de carácter no oficial. 30 CAPÍTULO IV. DEL USO SOCIAL Y OTROS ASPECTOS INSTITUCIONALES DEL EUSKERA Artículo 28. El Gobierno promoverá la enseñanza del euskera para adultos y la alfabetización de la población vascohablante mediante la creación de un Ente Público a tal efecto. Mediante Ley del Parlamento Vasco se regulará la normativa correspondiente. Artículo 29. El Gobierno, con el fin de facilitar la tarea de normalización del uso del euskera, creará un órgano de encuentro, que tendrá por objeto estudiar, canalizar y coordinar los esfuerzos y las actividades de las diversas Instituciones, en lo referente a la aplicación y desarrollo de esta Ley. 31 2.- Ámbito de la planificación: política y recursos adecuados 32 Características del Plan General de Promoción del Uso del euskera Plan estratégico de la política de promoción de las administraciones públicas Define las líneas fundamentales de la política lingüística del Gobierno Vasco y demás administraciones públicas. Establece la colaboración entre los poderes públicos y los agentes sociales. 33 Objetivo principal: Plan General de Promoción del Uso del euskera Adoptar las medidas de política lingüística necesarias para garantizar la posibilidad de vivir en euskera a quien así lo desee. Lograr la total normalización de su uso en el ámbito personal, social y oficial. 34 Tres objetivos estratégicos: Plan General de Promoción del Uso del euskera (EBPN) Tres objetivos estratégicos: Transmisión de la lengua. Uso social: administración, ocio, deporte, ámbito laboral, tecnologías de la información y de la comunicación... Calidad de la lengua. 35 3.- Compromiso y adhesión social Consejo Asesor del Euskera Bases para la Política Lingüística de principios del siglo XXI: hacia un pacto renovado 36 Competencia lingüística. CAV, 1981-2006 (%) Bilingües pasivos ( ) Bilingües pasivos ( ) 17,3 ( ) Monolingües castellanos ( ) 45,2 37,5 Bilingües ( ) 12,2 21,9 65,9 Monolingües castellanos ( ) 1981 2006 Fuente: IV Mapa sociolingüístico 37 Competencia lingüística por grupos de edad. CAV, 1981-2006 (%) 100 80 2006 60 40 100 20 80 >=65 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 Grupos de edad 60 40 1981 20 >=65 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 Grupos de edad Competencia lingúística Bilingües Bilingües pasivos Monolingües castellanos Fuente: IV Mapa sociolingüístico 38 Evolución de los modelos lingüísticos en la enseñanza no universitaria(1): de 1983-84 a 2008-09(2) Curso académico 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 % modelo D modelo B modelos A+X (1) Excluida la EPA. (2) Los datos del curso son provisionales Fuente: Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación 39 Evolución de la euskaldunización del profesorado de enseñanza no universitaria (1994/95–2006/07) . 6,6% 1994/95 22,1% 42,6% 6,4% 71,4% 50,9% Perfil lingüístico de los profesores PL 0 PL 1 PL 2 Fuente: Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación 40 Evolución del porcentaje de alumnos matriculados en enseñanza en euskera en la Universidad (nuevas admisiones) . 60 50 40 30 20 10 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Cursos Fuente: Universidad del País Vasco 41 Eskerrik asko Muchas gracias Tres objetivos estratégicos: Plan General de Promoción del Uso del euskera (EBPN) Tres objetivos estratégicos: La transmisión de la lengua. Uso social: administración, ocio, deporte, ámbito laboral, religión, tecnologías de la información y de la comunicación... La calidad de la lengua. Eskerrik asko Muchas gracias Descargar ppt "EUSKAL HERRIKO AUTONOMIA ERKIDEGOAREN HIZKUNTZA POLITIKA"
it	wikipedia	N/A	La Regione ecclesiastica Umbria è una delle sedici regioni ecclesiastiche in cui è suddiviso il territorio della Chiesa cattolica in Italia. Il suo territorio comprende il territorio della regione amministrativa Umbria della Repubblica Italiana e alcune località nel Lazio e nelle Marche. La regione ecclesiastica oggi Statistiche Superficie in km2: 9.129 Abitanti: 843.181 Parrocchie: 591 Numero dei sacerdoti secolari: 623 Numero dei sacerdoti regolari: 428 Numero dei diaconi permanenti: 104 Suddivisione Questa regione ecclesiastica è composta da otto diocesi, così ripartite: Arcidiocesi di Perugia-Città della Pieve, metropolitana, che ha come suffraganee: Diocesi di Assisi-Nocera Umbra-Gualdo Tadino Diocesi di Città di Castello Diocesi di Foligno Diocesi di Gubbio Arcidiocesi di Spoleto-Norcia, immediatamente soggetta alla Santa Sede Diocesi di Orvieto-Todi, immediatamente soggetta alla Santa Sede Diocesi di Terni-Narni-Amelia, immediatamente soggetta alla Santa Sede Conferenza episcopale Umbra La conferenza episcopale umbra ha sede ad Assisi. Presidente: Renato Boccardo, arcivescovo di Spoleto-Norcia Vicepresidente: Ivan Maffeis, arcivescovo metropolita di Perugia-Città della Pieve Segretario: Francesco Antonio Soddu, vescovo di Terni-Narni-Amelia Diocesi umbre soppresse Diocesi di Arna Diocesi di Bettona Diocesi di Bevagna Diocesi di Foro Flaminio Diocesi di Martana Diocesi di Otricoli Diocesi di Plestia Diocesi di Spello Diocesi di Trevi Note Voci correlate Pontificio seminario regionale umbro Collegamenti esterni Regione ecclesiastica Umbria su Beweb - Beni ecclesiastici in web
en	wikipedia	N/A	Princess Alexandra Louise Marie Olga Elisabeth Therese Vera of Hanover and Cumberland (29 September 1882 – 30 August 1963) was the wife of Frederick Francis IV, Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. As such, she was the last grand duchess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin from their marriage on 7 June 1904 until the Grand Duke abdicated on 14 November 1918, following the German Revolution of 1918. Alexandra was the daughter of Ernest Augustus, Crown Prince of Hanover, and Princess Thyra of Denmark. Family Alexandra was the second eldest daughter and third child of Ernest Augustus, Crown Prince of Hanover (1845–1923) and Princess Thyra of Denmark (1853–1933), the youngest daughter of Christian IX of Denmark (1818–1906) and Louise of Hesse-Kassel (1817–1898). Alexandra was a great-great-granddaughter of George III of the United Kingdom (1738–1820) and Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz (1744–1818). Marriage and issue Alexandra married on 7 June 1904 in Gmunden, Austria-Hungary to Frederick Francis IV, Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (1882–1945), son of Frederick Francis III, Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and his wife Grand Duchess Anastasia Mikhailovna of Russia. The bridegroom gave Alexandra a diamond and aquamarine tiara by Faberge. Alexandra and Frederick Francis had five children: Friedrich Franz, Hereditary Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (22 April 1910 – 31 July 2001). Married Karin Elisabeth von Schaper, daughter of Walter von Schaper and his wife Baroness Louise von Münchhausen. The couple had no issue. Duke Christian Louis of Mecklenburg (29 September 1912– 18 July 1996). Married Princess Barbara of Prussia, daughter of Prince Sigismund of Prussia and Princess Charlotte of Saxe-Altenburg. The couple had issue. Duchess Olga of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (1916–1917). Duchess Thyra of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (18 June 1919 – 27 September 1981). Duchess Anastasia of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (11 November 1923 – 25 January 1979). Married Prince Friedrich Ferdinand of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, son of Prince Albrecht of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg and Countess Ortrud of Ysenburg and Büdingen. The couple had issue. In 1913, a fire broke out at Schwerin Castle while the Grand Duke and Duchess were dining there with guests. Everyone was able to make it out safely, although the grand ducal couple had to apparently rush through flying sparks when making their escape. There were a reported $750,000 in damages, in which countless works of art, as well as important rooms were utterly destroyed. Certain reports blamed the fire on a vengeful servant, although an official court announcement stated it was merely an electrical issue. Honours Mecklenburg: Grand Cross of the Wendish Crown, with Crown in Ore and in Diamonds : Dame of the Order of Louise, 1st Division Ancestry References \|- House of Hanover House of Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1882 births 1963 deaths British princesses Hanoverian princesses People from Gmunden Duchesses of Mecklenburg-Schwerin Grand Duchesses of Mecklenburg-Schwerin
de	other	N/A	1928 / 285 p. 10 (Deutscher Reichsanzeiger) 1928 / 285 p. 10 (Deutscher Reichsanzeiger) scan diff Kraftloserklärung der uoch im Umlauf befindlichen Stammaktieu über je nominell RM 60,— der Schuhfabrik Herz A. G., Frank: furt a. Main. Unter Bezugnahme auf unsere im Deutshen Reichsanzeiger und ljdn ordd Staatsanzeiger sowie in der Frankfurter Zeitung vom 24. Februar, T4. März und 15. April 1928 er- chienene Bekanntmachung, betr. Zu- geei Minas und Umtausch unserer Stammaktien bis spätestens 31. August 1928, werden die bis jeßt niht ein- gereichten Stammoktien über je nom. RM 60,—, gemäß 8§ 2 der 7, Ver- ordnung zur Durchführung der Ver- ordnung uber Goldbilanzen in Ver- bindung mit den §8 290, 219 A 2 H.-G.-B., hiermit für kraftlos erklärt. Die an Stelle dec für kraftlos exklärten Sitiammaktien auszugebenden neuen Stammaktien über je nom. RM 100,— werden für Rechnung der Beteiligten verkauft werden. Der Erlös wird ab- gügli derx entstehenden Kosten an die Bere ptigten ausgezahlt bzw. für diese Hinterlegt. Frankfurt a. M., den 1, Dezember 1928. Schuhfabrik Herz A. G. Bayerisches Brauhaus Pforzheim Y Bilanz þpex 30. September 1928. Aktiva. íSmitnobilien l (Brauerei) . Xmmobilien 11 (Wirt)chaft.) Brauereieinrihtung Borräte, Kasse, Bankgut- haben und Außenstände Hypoth.-Aufw.-Ausgleih . 304 000\|— 969 000 292 100 669 334 61 142/21 2 255 576/49 Passiva, Aktienkapital . . « MNejerve!onds « « o. Delkredere; « « e « Dividenden . « « « QOUpotheten E fe Auwwertungthypotheken . Sonstige Verpflichtungei Nettogewinn 750 000\|— 75 000\|-—— 5 000\|— L 527160 i 401 024/79 237 421169 689 415/85 97 286/56 2 255 576/49 Gewinn- und Verluftkonto per: 30. September 1928. Soll. An Braülonid . co n „ Ab1chreibungen « « - « Nätogewiin «aa 1 186 751/54 106 789/10 97 286/56 1 390 827/20 13 026/79 1 377 800/41 Ll 390 827/20 Die Dividende von 7 9% wird sofort nah Abzug der Steuer mit A 31,90 für den Dividendenschein Nr. 39 bei der Rhei- nischen Creditbank und deren Filialen ausbezahlt. Pforzheim, den 1. Dezember 1928, Der Vorstand. Frit Jordan. Haben. Per Vortrag von 1926/27 (Fr10s für Bier und Nebenprodukte « « [77052] Bayerische Eggenfabrik Aktien- gesellschaft, Feucht bei Nürnberg. Bilanz am 30. Juni 1928. Aktiva. Umd bE Mobilien C Betu1iebsanlage - . . Kassa und Außenstände . . Warenbestände . « « +- 241 000\|— 131 000 15 001 254 447 336 842 Paffiva. Aktienkapital . Net1ervetonds, ges. . Umstellungsreserve . Hypothekenc.ufwertung G E Kreditoren Reingewinn: Vortrag 1926/27 12 051,60 Reingewinn A anA is 990, LO i 600 000 A 24 882\|: s 19 000 14 427 1 500 298 094/14 20 3387/7 978 291 Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung am 30. Funi 1928. Soll, Generalunkosten . . . .. Gewinnvortrag 1926/27 ._. 8336,16 3l 937/81 201 812/38 1927/28 , 20 387/76 254 137/95 Haben. Bruttogewinn aus Waren Gewinnvortrag 1926/27 . 242 086/35 12 051160 954 137/95 Feucht b. Nürnberg, den 30. Juni 1928, Der Vorstand. A. Löffler. Lat Generalversammlunasbes{chluß vom 17. November 1928 erhalten die §§ 9 Abs. 1 und 22 Abzj, l folgende Fassung: 95 Abs. 1 lautet: Das Grundkapital der Zesellichaft beträgt NM 600 000 und ist eingeteilt in 6000 Attien über je NM 100 (Lit. B). § 22 Abs. 1 lautet: In der -\| Tung unterer Gejellshaft vom 27. No- Ersie Anzeigenbeilage zum Neichs- und Staatsanzeiger Nr. 285 vom 6. Dezember 1928, S, 4, Chem. Fabrik Kossat A. G., Düsseldorf. Bilauz zum 31. De ember 1927. Aktiva. Simobilien. . « o o Inventar . E EA Schuldner und Banken . Kasse. e E Warenvorräte. Beteiligung und Effekter Noch nicht eingezahltes Ka- 031 010/36 Passiva. Aktienkapital A 4 300 000 Nejervefonds . « « - V 15 000 Delkredere C E N . 1 IZ0 Beirpflichtungen « 30 000 Hypotheken A Gewinnvortrag aus 1926 3 297,63 Gewinn 1927 24327, 97 585 1 031 010/36 Gewinn- und Verlustrechuung zum 31. Dezember 1927. Soll, M \|S Abschreibungen . 15 615/26 Reingewinn . « o « o e st +127 585/14 43 200/40 Haben. (Gewinnvortrag 1926 Fabrikationsgewinn aller Unkosten « 3 257/63 39 942/77 43 200/40 Kossack. Hecht. Der Vorstand. [77026 Drahtlofser Dienst Aktiengesellschaft. Aktiva, NRNM A 830 Kasse 43 5980 DANTIRUt aben e e 6 Wertpapiere und Geschäfts- anteile . 454 014.30 Abschreibung 21 610,— L De S Inventar . . « Abschreibung - 432 404: 13 722 2,20 7 71,20 1 — 490 538 02 Aktienkapital E DOrdentlicher Reservefonds . D16positionsfonds S Außerordentliche Reserve . Steuerrejerve . « « « « « Kreditorén «« e ae o Neingewinn: ; Vortrag aus 1926/27 13 305,98 Gewinn aus 1927/28 27 176,97 150 000 5 0990\| — 225 000] - 20 000/- 33 575 6 479 40 482 490 538 Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung zum 30. Funi 1928. Soll, Nachrichtenkosten SN Sende- und Fernsprechkosien Ge a va a0 MATOMEE ae Padioanlagen . « « Ausstellungézus{uß Abichreibungen . « k 23 981/20 Sue. ea o , 13 318/20 Neingewinn: Vortrag 1926/27 13 305,98 Gewinn . 27 176,97 RM [s 81 316/55 40 26110 é 1 70585 ¿ 10 000 40 482/95 371 733/41 Haben. Gewinnvortrag . . - + « Einnahmen aus Nachrichten- vermittlung Tus Gewinne aus Aktien und Geschäftsanteilen « Q E Sia 13 305/98 277 148/62 76 936/36 4 342/49 371 733/41 Berlin, den 16. September 1928. Drahtloser Dienst Aktiengesellschaft. Dr. Erlinghagen. Dr. Näu1 cher. vember 1928 ist Herr Buchhorn, Mitglied des Landtags, in den Auksichtä1at unterer Gejellschaft wiedergewählt worden. Aus- geschieden sind die Herren Ministerialrat Drück und Legationérat Dr. Dittler. An deren Stelle wurden gewählt Herr Vor- tragender Legationsrat Dr. Katenberger und Herr Ministerialrat Dr. Widmann. Fecner wurden neu gewählt : Herr Dr. von Kries, i Petr Chefredakteur Gottfried Kockel- orn, Herr Nedakteur Karl Brammer, . Herr Chefredakteur Erich Altringhaus . Herr Direktor Christian Krauß, err Chefredakteur Hermann Orth, . Herr Direktor Lotz, . Herr Ministerialdirektora. D. Spiecker, . Herr Nedakteur Ernst Heilmann, . Herr Nedakteur Klühs, . Herr Redakteur Hannt Heinrih Bor- mann, . Herr Professor Jäckh, . Herr Studienrat Monzel, . Herr Staatesekre'är a. D. Baake. Berlin, den 3 Dezember 1928, OLISIRRP N einer ordentlichen Generalverjamm- lung auf den 31. Dezember 1928, vormittags 10 Uhr, in den Geschä'té- räumen des Notars Dr. Gaßner, Hannover, Aegidientorplaß \|, ein. 1. Vorlage der Geichärtsberihte und Bilanzen per 31, März 1926, 1927 und 1928 nebst Genehmigung derselben. . Entlastung von Au!sfichtérat und Vorstand, 3. Herabtezung des Aktienkapitals. . Érteilung der Ermächtigung an die Verwaltung zur Wiedererhöhung des Aftienkavitals nebst Aenderung der ent) prechenden Paragraphen der Sagungen. 4 l 5, Umwandlung der Aktiengesellschaft in éine G. m. b. H. 6. Aufsichtsratswahl. : ver]ammlung bestimmen wir gemäß § 12 un)erer Sagungen als Einreichungbstelle untere Gejellshaftsfasse in Hannover. Hannover, den 3. Dezember 1928. Fabrik elektrisher Apparate. Der Auffichtsrat. Raa i O R I s B E E eer E E N So rat eni Mes {77050] Gesellschaft für Baumwoll-Fudustrie (vorm. Ludw. & Gust, Cramer) in Hilden. Generalbilanz 1927/28 am 30. Juni 1928. Aktiva. M Immobilien (Grundftücke) 80 000 Fabrif- und Wohngebäude 686 975 M es 518 856 E R 24 239 Kassen- u. Wechselbestand, Pee u. Reichs- ANTGUEDabeN v ao e Schuldner Warenbestände 97 8174 1 685 270 4 745 301 Passiva. Aktienkapital Gb oa 600 MNésérbeloubs «a 6 Gewinnvortr. a. 1926/7 26 345,55 Verlust 1927/8 17 925,99 2 000 000 2721 8682\|: 15 000\| — . * e os * 8419/5 4 745 301 Gewinn- und Verlustkonto am 30. Juni 1928. An Soll, M B Abichreibungen 99 565/28 Gewinnvortr. a. 1926/7 26 346 55 Verlust 1927/8 17 925,99 8 419/56 107 984/84 - 107 984/84 107 984\|84 Per Haben. Fabrikalionsgewinn « « - Hilden, 1. Dezember 1928. Der Anffichtsrat. Der Vorstand. [77043] Bilanz vom 31. Dezember 1927. Aktiva, Grundstücke „ . Ge e 155 854/45 Ma\|\chinen u. Großgeräte 164 352/18 Werkzeuge und Kleingeräte 1\|— Geichäftseinrihtung - - 1\|— Gleisan)\chlüsse cs 1\|— Kraftwagen und Fuhrpark 3 416/60 Vorrâte: Gans a) Gerüste . b) Vorrats- u. 48 763,08 c) Materialien103 486,34 170 333/68 Schalhol A 176 137 1407 7942\|! Ne N Bauk- und Postsheck 2500 Beteiligungen . . Hypotheken . . Schuldner: {. lfd. 636 276 56 Dubiose . 7863,30 Bauarbeiten21% 940,79 Verlustvortrag aus 1926 Avale 32 900 Nechnung 6 860 080 113 710 [l 655 340 Passiva. Aktienkapital Getezmäßige Rücklagen Oupotheten Gläubiger: i. lfd. Nechnung 723 784,35 Vorauszahlungen . a. Bauarbeiten 118 388,74 842 173 Delkredere E 37 286 Gewinn aus 1927 . « « 2980 Avale 32 900 600 000) 150 900 23 300 1 655 340 Gewinn- und Verluftrechnung vom 31. Dezember 1927. Soll, Abschreibungen « « « «+ « Reini ¿e eo 110 066 2 580 112 647\|4: Bruttogewinn . . 112 647 Düsseldorf, im Juli 1928. Ernst Gandvoß A.-G. Nohstoffgesellschaft für cchemifch- (77051] technijche Erzeugnisse Aktiengejellichaft, Berlin. Biianz per 31. Dezember 1927. RM \|4g 6 150 142 255/22 17 335137 165 740/59 Aktiva. XFnventar und Fuhrpark Debitoren und Waren . E n : Paffiva, Aktienkapital s Kieditoren E Mena. «q 20 000\| — 144 353/89 1 386170 165 740 59 Gewinn- und Verlustkonto. NM. 19 102 791/20 18 689 1 386 Handlungsunkosten „ « « Ab\chreibungen Reingewinn Gewinnvortrag 1926. . 54115 Bruttogewinn 122 325 122 866 Berlin, den 16. November 1928. Der Vorftand. A. Bakholt. S R I C E S E E T I L] [79151] Neupa A.-G. für Papier- u. Pappenvertrieb, Berlin O. 17, Bilanz per 30. Juni 1928. 1 040/99 337 123\| — 11 289! —- 14 307178 615 876173 74 455/10 15 971/93 1 070094/13 Aktiva. Nässaloûnto. „o Aen Ton S s Inventarkonto . « « Wech\|elkonto . L » Kontokorrentkonto . Diver\|e Debitoren . « - Neinverlust p. 30. Junt 1928 Pasfiva. ; Grundkapitalkonto . 125 000\| — Kontokorrentkonto 459 536161 Neservefonds T . 5 ¿ 115 658/38 Reservefonds IL . 12 500) — Diverse Kreditoren . 357 399/14 \| 1 070 094/13 Verlust- und Gewinnkonto. Em o SUbentartonto es __ 9594/60 Generalunkostenkonto 338 134/46 338 729/06 206 48771 116 269/82 ; 15971 93 338 72906 Herr Justizrat Dr. Alfred Friedmann, Berlin W. 62, Kurfürstenstr 119, ist aus dem Aufsichtsrat ausge\|chieden. Den Autsichtsrat bilden : Josef Schimek. Berlin W. 15, Meinekestraße 7, Herbert Maier-Picard, Charlottenburg, Halm- straße 10 a, Dr. Felix Zernik, Charlotten- burg, Mommsenstraße 43, Paul Schimek. Charlottenburg, Halmstr. 10a, Elisabeth Köhler, Berlin O. 17, Naalerstr. 26, Neupa A.-:G. für Papier- u. Pappenvertrieb, Der Vorstand. 10. Gesellschaften A m. b. Ÿ. Die Firma Steiumet & Co. G. m. b. H., Berlin W. 8, Französische Str. 21, ist aufgelöst. Die Gläubigcr werden auf- gefordert, sich bet ihr zu taelden. Die Liquidatorkin der Fa. Steinmeß & Co. G. m, b, S,: Heymann. Warenbruttogewinn « Diverse M oos §6.0 9..0 (76671) F Die Gesellschaft Ziegelei Zeschnig, Ge- fellshaft mit beschränfter Haftung in Zeichnig, ist durch Beschluß der Gefell- \chaîter au'gelöst. Etroaige Gläubiger werden aufgetordert, \fih bei der Gesell- ¡haft zu melden. : Zeschnig, dea 3. Dezember 1928, Ziegelei Zeschnig G. m. b. H. in Zeschnig. von Carlsburg, Liquidator. Die Gesellschaft ist aufgelöst, Die Gläubiger werden hiermit aufgefordert, sich bei der Gesellschaft zu melden. Aachener Reitinftitut H, Dibbert G. m. b. H,, Aachen, Nhld. Der Liquidator: H. Dibbert. [75500] Motorschiffahrts-Gesellschaft „Hansa“ m. b. H, zu Hamburg. Die vorbezeichnete Gesellshatt ist auf- gelöst. Die Gläubiger der Gesellschast werden aufaefordert, sich bei ihr zu melden. Das Ge1ichättslokal befindet sih in Ham- burg, Sandtorquai 1 I1, bei Tengelmann. Motorschiffahrts-Gesellschaft „Hansa“ m. b. H, in Liquidation. (Unter)chrift), Liquidätor. (75498] i Die Firma Deutscher Landwirtschafts- dienst U. Cleve & Co., G. m. b. S., Berlin SW. 68, Lndenstr, 16/17, ist au'gelöst. Die Gläubiger der Ge!ellichatt werden aufgetordert, sih bei ihr zu melden. Berlin, den 10, November 1928, Die G. M. Schwager, Großhandels- Gesellschaft mit beichränkter Haftung, Bamberg. wird aufgeiöft. Die Glän- biger werden aufgefordert. sich zu melden, Der Liquidator. 72954] Transozeanflug Gesellschaft mit beschränktier Haftung. Wir geben bekannt, daß unsere Gesell- {aft aufgelöst ist. Die Gläubiger der Gejellschaft werden aufgefordert, fi bei uns zu melden. Berlin, den 19. November 1928. Der Liquidator: Korge. E E S S CRE R E R R E R L SUEME E E 77350) Bekanntmachung. Von der Franfturter Ptandbrief-Bank Attierge\|elishaft ist bei uns der Antrag auf Zulassung von : E 8 % igen vor dem 1. Juli 1933 nit rückzatlba1en Goldpfandbriefea 1. der Deutschen Hypothekenbank in Meiningen Emission KVILT im WBetrage von Goldmark 3 000 000 (1 Goldmark = !/5799k& Feingold) als Erweiterung der bereits zum Börsenhandel zugelassenen gletchen Emission in Höhe von Goldmark 15 000 000, , der Preußischen Boden-Credit- Actien- Bank in Berlin Emijsion XKVIUE im Betrage von Goldmark 3 000 000 (1 Goldmark = 3799 kg Feingold) als Erweiterung der bereits zum Bör)enhandel zugelassenen gleichen Emission in Höhe von Goldmark 10 000 000 zum Handel und zur Notierung an der hiesigen Börse eingereiht worden. Frankfurta. M., den 3. Dezember 1928, Zulassungsstelle an der Börse zu Frankfurt a. M, Die Generalversammlung des Vater- ländischen Frauen-Vereins Wilmers- dorf findet nicht am 7. Dezember 1ondern am . 17. Dezember im Vereinsbüro, Berliner Straße 41 1, statt. (77349] Bekanntmachung. Die Mitglieder des Unterftüßungs- verein „Nothilfe e. V.“, Schwerin i. Meckl., werden hiermit zu der am 28, Dezember, vormittags 11 Uhr, in Schwerin, Obotritenring 11, s\tatt- findenden Versammlung eingeladen, 2, Sagzungasänderung. 3, Verschiedenes, Zur Teilnahme an der Versammlung berechtigt find nur volljährige Mitglieder. Stimmberechtigung ist durch Vorlegung des Mitgliedsbuches und der leßten Bel- tragéquittung nachzuweisen. Wollen ab- wesende stimmberechtigte Ginzelmitglieder die Ausübung ihres Stimmrechts einem anderen übertragen, lo ift eine \|chriftlihe Vollmacht dem Vorstand bis zum 26. De- ¡zember einzureichen. Zur gleichen Zeit ist auch die Stimmberechtigung des Auf- traagebers, wie oben angegeben, nahzu- weijen. Schwerin, den 4. Dezember 1928, Der Vorstand. Schlichting. Stargardk, [77379] Bekanntmachung. Hierdurch laden wir die Mitglieder unserer Vereinigung zu dec am Montag, ven 17, Dezember 1928, nachm, 4 Uhx, in den Räumen der Brandens- burgi\|chen Provinzialbank und Girozentrale Berlin SW. 68, Alte Jakobstr. 130/32 (kleiner Sißungsfaal), stattfindenden ordentlichen Mitgliederversamm- lung ein. Tagesordnung: i 1. Bericht des Vorstands und Beirats. 2, Entlastung des Vorstands und Beirats. 3. Vergütung an den biéherigen Vorstand, 4. Bevellung eines neuen Vorstands. 5, Wahlen zum Beirat. 6, Sonstiges. : i: Zur Teilnahme und Abstimmung in der Mitgliederverjammlung find diejenigen Mitglieder berechtigt, welhe spätestens 2 Tage vor der Mitgliederversammlung ihre Zertifikate bei der Preußischen Staats- bank (Seehandlung) Berlin W. 96, Mark- gratenstraße 38, hinterlegt haben. Das Stimmrecht in der Veranmlung kann auch durch einen mit schriftlicher Vollmacht vertehenen Vertreter autgeübt werden. Berlin NW. 6, Albrechtstr. 11, den 5, Dezember 1928. Freie Vereinigung der J. Roth-Obligationäre E. V. Der Beirat. Der Vorstand. Dr. Dernbura Di Mann {76684] Bekanntmachung. Sn der ordentlichen Mitgliederversamm- lung des Vereins Seemanns - Er- holungsheim, E. V., am 23. November 1928 bin ich, der Unterzeichnete, zum alleinigen Liquidator ernannt worden. Ich fordere die etwaigen Gläubiger des Ver« eins Seemanns - Erholungsheim, E. V, aur, ihre Ansprüche bei mir geltend zu machen. Berlin-Charlottenburg 4, Schlüter- straße 38, den 2. Dezember 1928. Generalver)ammlung gewährt jede Aktie cine Stimme. Draht11oser Dienst Akt. Ges. Dr. Erlinghagen. Dr. Näuscher. Fr. Flach. Spithaler. ide mtrinat berde Éecratard arm elbe wer weni ere twe eemznke eurer Äh eder ermnern eet deen Prien Lr tete ra i eurer treu armen ddr wehen Endet É erder egan ain emden Ée ewe rw O E E E Der Liquidator; Erich Falk. Unter}huchungs& und Strafsachen, . Zwangsversteigerungen, . Autgebote, Oeffentliche Zustellungen, Verlust- und Fundsacben, Auélosung usw. von Wertpaplteren, Aktiengesell\|haften, 8. Kommaynditgesellshatten auf Aktien, 9 Deutsche Kolonialgesellshaften, 0. Gefsellshaften m b De 1 Genossen!caften, [77241] Zwangsversteigerung. «3m Wege der Zwangsvollstreckung soll am 19, März 1929, 10 Uhr, an der Gerichtsstelle, Neue Friedrich- straße 13/14, drittes Stockwerk, Zimmer Nr. 113/115, versteigert werden das in Berlin, Wilsnacker Straße 29 Ecke Kruppstraße 12, belegene, im Grundbuch von Moabit Band 61 Blatt Nr, 2810 (eingetragenex Eigentümer am 21. Mai 1928, dem Tage der Eintragung des Versteigerungsvermerks: Baumeister Siegfried Löowenthal in Berlin) einge- tragene Grundstück: Vordereckwohnhaus mit linkem Seitenflügel und unter- tellertem Hof, Gemarkung Berlin, Kartenblatt 14, Parzelle 752/2, 5 a 64 qm groß, Grundsteuermutterrolle Art, 2071, Nubungswert 20 000 #, Ge- bäudesteuerrolle 2071. — 85. K. 93. 28, Berlin, den 29. November 1928. Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte, Abt. 85. [77240] Zwangsversteigerung. Im Wege dexr Zwangsvollstreckung joU am 22. März 1929, 10 Uhr, œn der Gerichtsstelle, Neue Friedrich- straße 13/14, drittes Stockwerk, Zimmer Nr. 113/115, versteigert werden das in Berlin, Fischerstraße 35, belegene, im Grundbuch von Alt Cölln Band 4 Blatt Nr. 340 (eingetragene Eigentümerin am 19. November 1928, dem Tage derx Ein- tragung des Versteigerungsvermerks: Fcau Kaufmann Hedwig Wichmann geb. Shumachex in Berlin) eingetragene Grundstück: Vorderwohnhaus mit ab- gesonderten Klosetis und zwei Höfen, Doppelquerwohngebäude, Remise rechts im exsten Hof und Stall quer im zweiten Hof, Gemarkung Berlin, ungetrennte Hofräume, nicht vermessen, Nußungs- wert 3280 M, Gebäudesteuerrolle No, 124 —— 80, K 273. 928, Verlin, den 30. November 1928. Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte. Abt, 85. [77242] Das Aufgebotsverfahren, betreffend die Ÿ 9/9 igen Neichs\huldverschreibungen Nr. 2378417/18, 10840735/36 über ie 1000 Æ, Nr. 473513 über 500 M, Ne: (6835390/32 Uber je 200: #Æ Nr. 7395713 über 100 4 i} eingestellt. Die Zahlungssperre, betreffend die 5 °% igen Neichsfhuldver\|chreibungen Nr. 3434635/39 und 658 über je 100 #Æ und die 34 (vorm. - 4) */6 igen Preußischen Konsols Nr. 186566 über 900 4 und 161893 über 200 6 sowie die 49% igen Schuldver- schreibungen der Stadt Berlin von 1919 Nr. 260359/60 über je 500.4, Nr.178916/17 über je 200 4, Nr. 182643 über 100 4 ist autgehoben. Gen. VILL 1. 26. f Durch Beschluß vom 14. November 1928 ist das Aufgebotsverfahren bezügli der Antoil\cheine Nr. 2941 bis 2944, 2948, 3304, 3305, 3817 bis 3322, 3338, 3339, 3343 3344 der Niedersächsishen Eisenerz- und Erdölbohrgesellshaft, Verwaltungssiß B eingetragen auf Erdöl-Terrain- Hanbdels-Gesellshaft m. b. H., Hannover, Antragsteller Kaufmann Albert Graul, Hannover, erledigt. Hannover, den 3. Dezember 1928. Amtsgericht. 27. [77244] Aufgebot. In Sachen der Ehefrau Elise Hammer- \chlag, geb. Frank, Berlin W. 15, Fajanen- straße 63, vertreten durch die Commerz- und Privat-Bank A.-G., betreffend das Aufgebot der am 1. Oktober 1898 ausge- stell:en, angebli verlorengeaangenen Aktien Nr. 43882/85, 46151/54, 46706 und 49001 der Osnabrücker Bank in Osnabrück über je 1000 Papiermark, umgestellt auf fe zwanzig Neichsmark, wird der auf den 22 Dezember 1928 anberaumte Aufgebots- termin aufgehoben. Neuer Aufgebots- termin wird vor dem unterzeihneten Ge- rit, Zimmer 4, auf den 27. November 1929, 109 Uhr, angeseßt und der Jne haber der Aftien aukfgetordert, spätestens in diesem Termin seine Nehte anzumelden und die Aktien vorzulegen, widrigenfalls die Kraftloserklärung der Aktien erkfolgen wtrd. Amtsgericht, VI, Osnabrück, 29, 11. 1928, Das Aufgebot nebst Zahlungssperre, betreffs der Auslosungs\|{eine zur Anleihe- ablöfungs\chuld des Deut)ichen Neihs von 1925 Gr. 41 Nr. 14544 über 25 RM, aufgehoben bezw. eingestellt. Amtégeriht Berlin-Mitte, Abt, 216. P. 127: 28: Das Aufgebot nebst Zahlungssperre der Schuldverschreibungen der Anleihé- ablösungsshuld des Deutschen Reichs von 1925 Nr. 62010/11 über je 200 NM lowie der Auélosungsscbeine zu dieser An- leibe (Gr. 3 Nr. 2010/11 und 30481 über je 200 NM ist aufgehoben. Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte. Abt. 216, Ve:736. 28: 77246] Aufgebot. Die Trinkhalm-Fndustrie G. m. b. H, in Bremen hat das Aufgebot des an- geblih verlorengegangenen, am 5. März 1928 von dem Pferdehändler Otto Haus- wald in Freiberg ausgestellten und auf den Gutsbesißer Hans Carl von Car- lowiß in Großhartmannsdorf bei Frei- berg in Sachsen gezogenen und von diesem afkzeptierten, am 5. Funi 1928 fallig gewesenen Wechsels übex 250 Reichsmark, dex die “Jndossamente Hermann Schröder, Wilhelm Schröder, Trinkhalm - Fndustrie G. m. b. H,, Bremen, trägt, beantragt. Dex {Fnhaber dieser Wechselurkunde wird auf@efordert, spätestens in dem auf den 12. Juni 1929, vormittags 9 Uhr, vor dem unterzeichneten Gericht anberaumten Aufgebotstermin seine Rechte anzu- melden und die Wechselurkunde vor- zulegen, widrigenfalls deren Kraftlos- erklärung erfolgen wird. — SR 433/28. Brand-Erbisdorf, 3. Dezbr. 1928, Des Amtsgericht. [77245] Aufgebot. Dex Karl Bl int Kreseld Alte Linner Straße 87, hat dæs Aufgebot des in Verlust geratenen, von der Firma Walther Dahl & Co. in Krefeld aus- gestellten und von dem Heinrich Brülls in Anrath angenommenen Wechsels über 40,50 M, fällig gewesen am 21. Mai 1928, beantragt. Der Fnhaber dex Urkunde wird - aufgefordert, #pä- testens in dem auf den 5. Juli 1929, vormittags 9 Uhr, vor dent unter- zeihneten Gericht, Zimmer : 202, an- beraumten Aufgebotstermin seine Rechte anzumelden und die Urkunde vor- zulegen, widrigenfalls die Kraftlos- erklärung der Urkunde erfolgen wird. Krefeld, den 1. Dezember 1928, Das Amtsgeriht în Braunschweig, Abt, 22, ‘hat folgendes Aufgebot er- lassen: Der Direktor Robert Kahle in Braunschweig hat das Aufgebot des Hypothekenbriefs vom 8. März 1926 Uber die im Grundbuch von Braun- {weig Band 18 A Blatt 50 in Ab- teilung TIT unter Nr. 6 eingetragene Hypothek zu 10 000 GM beantragt. Dex JFnhaber derx Urkunde wird aufgefordert, spätestens in dem auf den 18. Juni 1929, vormittags 10 Uhr, vor dem Amtsgericht in Braunschweig, Wilhelm- straße 53 — Zimmer Nr. 22 —, anbe- raumten Aufgebotstermin seine Rechte anzumelden und die Urkunde vorzulegen, widrigenfalls die Kraftloserklärung der Urkunde erfolgen wird. Braunschweig, 4. Dezember 1928. Der Urkundsbeamte dex Geschäftsstelle 22 des Amtsgerichts. [77249] Aufgebot. Die offene Handelsgesellschaft in Firma Artiphon-Record Herrmann Eisner in Berlin SW. 19, O 1, vertreten durch die Rehtsanwälte Dr. Feder und Arthur Loewe in Berlin, hat das Auf- gebot des Grundschuldbriefs übex die im Grundbuh von Köln-Deuß Bd. 28 Vlatt 1099 in Abt. IIl Nr. 7 für den Kaufmann Jakob Baumann in Köln eingetragene Grundschuld von 3,6 kg Feingold beantragt. Dex Fnhabex der Urkunde wird aufgefordert, spätestens in dem auf den 12, März 1929, vor- mitiags 11 Uhr, vorx dem unterzeih- neten Gericht, Reichenspergerplaß 1, Zimmer 361, anberaumten Aufgebots- termin seine Rechte anzumelden und die Urkunde vorzulegen, widrigenfalls die Sans der Urkunde erfolgen wird. Köln, den 28. November 1928. Amtsgericht. Abteilung 71. [77248] Aufgebot. Die Ehefrau Universitätsprofessor Dr. Foerster, verwitwete Buchholz geb. Fuchs în Crommenohl, Bez. Köln, und W. Jungbluth in Bonn, Kölnstr. 179, haben das Aufgebot des verloren- gegangenen Hypothekenbriefes über die im Grundbuh von Siegburg Band 52 Blatt 2057 in Abt. 111 unter Nx. 3 eingetragenen Hypothek von 15 000 PM Gr. 29 Nr. 17235 über 50 NM wird 1 zugunsten der Ehesrau Dr. Foerster, verioitwete Emil Petex Buchholz, be- antragt. Der Fnhaber der Urkunde wird aufgefordert, spätestens in dem ut den 7, Juni 1929, vormittags 1606,30 Uhr, vor dem unterzeihneten Gericht anberaumten Aufgebotstermin e Rechte anzumelden und die Ur- unde Laregen, widrigenfalls die Kraftloserklärung der Urkunde er- folgen wird. Siegburg, den 29. November 1928. j Das Amtsgericht. [77247] Aufgebot. 1. Dex Haus- und Fuhrwerksbesiyer Franz Widlinski und dessen Ehefrau Nosa, beide 11 TM. O. S, 2 dex Gärtner Josef Pordzik in Ciochowiy, 3, der Landwirt Philipp Garbos in Ciochowiß, 4. die Witwe Anastasia Dobiosch in Ciochowiß, 5. der Landwirt osef Hatlapa in Ciochowiß, 6, die Witwe Klara Hlubek in Tost, O.S,, 7. dex Grubenarbeiter und Landwirt Karl Cubexr in Ponishowibß, 8. die Frau Tierarzt Margarethe Zwirner geb, Gabbey in Bexlin O0. 34, Wilhelm- Stolze-Straße 81, 9. der Landwirt Paul Bujara in Langendorf, sämtlih- ver- treten durch den Justizrat Siehr in Tost, O. S., haben das Aufgebot zur Ausschließung der unbekannten Gläubiger nachfolgender Hypotheken bzw, das Aufgebot verlorengegangener Hypothekenbriese beantragt, nämlich: gu 1: 241 Taler 20 Silbergroshen für ie Fleishermeistersfrou Fulianna Jablonka geb. Niebish zu Schimiano- wiß, auf Toft Blatt Nr. 26 Abt. II1 e Nx, 12 u 2: 2410 U Die Provinzialhilfskasse von Schlesien in Breslau auf Ciohowiy Blatt Nr. 4 Abt. IIT Ne: 10, zu 3: 245 Æ füx die Provinzialhilfskasse von Schlesien in Breslau auf Ciohowiß Blatt Nr, 139 Abt. Ill Nr. 1, zu 4: 245 A für die Provinzialhilfskasse von Schlesien in Breslau auf Ciohowiß Blatt Nr. 140 \| Abt. Lll Nr. 1: zu 5: 245 Æ für die \| Provinzialhilfskasse von Schlesien in ! Breslau auf Ciochowihÿ Blatt Nr. 145 \| Abt. TI1 Nx. 1, zu 6: 1000 Talex für \| den verstorbenen Zimmermeister Paul \| Hlubek 1n Tost, D.S., auf Tost Blatt \| Nr. -409- Abt. 11l Nr. 9, zu 7: 300 K E den Wirtschaftsinspektor Emil Poliß in Slupsko auf Ponischowit \| Blatt Nr. 64 Abt. I1l Nx. 2, zu 8: \| 3000 M für die Frau Tierarzt Marga- \| rethe Zwirnec geb. Gabbey in Barten \| (Ostpreußen) auf Tost Blatt Nr. 114\| Abt. Ul Nx. 2/7 zu .9::180 Æ für den \| Bauer Andreas Bujara auf Nr. 132 Langendorf in At. II1 unter \| Nr. 2. Die unbekannten Hypothekens- \| gläubiger zu 1, 7, 9 werden auf- gefordert, spätestens im Aufgebots- \| termin am 22. März 1929, vor- mittags 9 Uhr, vor dem unter- geen Gericht ihr Recht anzumelden zw. etwaige Briefe vorzulegen, widrigenfalls sie mit ihren Rethten \| ausgeschlossen und die Briefe für kraft- \| los erklärt werden. Die JFnhaber der \| Urkunden zu 2—6, 8 werden auf-\| gefordert, spätestens im Aufgebots- \| termin am 28. Juni 1929, vor- \| mittags D Uhr, vor dem unter- \| zeihneten Geriht ihre Rechte anzus- \| melden und die Urkunden vorzulegen, \| widrigenfalls die Kraftloserklärung der \| Urkunden erfolgen wird. Tost, O. S., 29. November 1928. Amtsgericht. [77254] Aufgebot. _Die Frau Charlotte Friederiszik geb. \| Becker in Gelsenkirchen, Bornstr. Nx. 21, \| hat beantragt, den verschollenen Arbeiter \| Ludwig Friederiszik, ihren Ehemann, \| zuleßt wohnhaft in Soltmanen, Kr. Lyck, \| für tot zu erklären. Der bezeichnete Verschollene wird aufgefordert, sich \pä- \| testens in dem auf den 5. Juni 1929, \| mittags 12 Uhr, vor dem unterzeich- \| neten Gericht anberaumten Aufgebots- \| termin zu melden, widrigenfalls die \| Todeserklärung erfolgen wird. An alle, \| welche Auskunft Uber Leben odex Tod ! des Verschollenen zu erteilen vermögen, \| ergeht die Aufforderung, spätestens im Aufgebotstermin dem Gericht Anzeige zu machen. \| Bialla, den 24, Novembex 1928. \| Das Amtsgericht. [77263] Aufgebot, \| 1, Die Friedrih-Wilhelm-Lebensver- \| siherungs-Aktiengesellshaf in Berlin, \| Behrenstraße 59/61, 2, die Witwe \| Marie Vohms geb. Fürsting_ in Berlinck- \| Karlshorst, Dönhoffstraße 27, Prozeß- \| bevollmächtigte: Rehtsanwälte Justizrat \| Dr. Becherer, Dr. Otto Gruner und Dr. Viereck in Berlin W, 8, Mohrenstraße \| 13/14, haben beantragt, 1, den ver-\| schollenen Schlosser Alwin (Albin) \| Leitel, geboren am 16. 5. 1875 in Friedrichsberg bei Berlin, zuleßt wohn- \| haft in Charlottenburg, Kurfürsten- \| straße 105, 2. das verschollene Fräulein Helene Leitel, geboren am 26. 4, 1883 \| widrigenfalls die \| folgt. ! Steierm. in Berlin, zuleßt wohnhaft in Char- lottenburg, Cauerstraße 24 bei Falken- berg, für tot zu erklären. Die bezeich- neten Verschollenen werden aufge- fordert, sich spötestens in dem auf den 22, Juni 1929, vormittags 1114 Uhr, vor dem unterzeichneten Gericht, Abteilung 13, Zim!ner 222 11, anberaumten Aufgebotstermin zu mel- den, widrigenfalls die Todeserklärung erfolgen wird. An alle, welche Aus=- kunft über Leben oder Tod der Ver=- schollenen zu erteilen vermögen, ergeht die Aufforderung, spätestens im Auf- gebotstermin dem Gericht Anzeige gzu machen. Charlottenburg, 30. November 1928. Amtsgeriht, 13. F, 175/27. [77255] Aufgebot. Der Heinrih Schulex in Taucha bei Leipzig, Am Park 10, hat beantragt, feine Schwester, die verschollene Wil helmine Schuler, geb. in Saarbrüdcken am 14. Mäárz 1889, zuleßt wohnhaft in Köln, für tot zu erflären. Die be- zeichnete Verschollene wird aufgefordert, fich spätestens in dem auf den 11 Juni 1929, vormittags 1X Uhr, vor dem unterzeichneten Gericht, Reichen3pergerplaß 1, Zim- mer 361, anberaumten Aufgebotstermin zu melden, widrigenfalls die Todes=- erklärung erfolgen wird. An alle, welche Auskunft über Leben oder Tod dex Verschollenen zu erteilen vermögen, ergeht die Auffordecung, spätestens im Aufgebotstermin dem Gericht Anzeige zu machen, Kölir, den 26. November 1928 Amtsgericht, Abt. 71 [77251] Das Bayerishe Amtsgericht Markt- heidenfeld hat am 30. November 1928 folgendes Aufgebot erlassen: Dex am 12, September 1857 in Lengfurt a. M. — Bayern — geborene Eduard Höchft, Dreher, zuleßt in Lengfurt a. M, wohn- haft, ist im Fahre 1882 nah Amerika \| ausgewandert und seitdem verschollen. Der Rechtsanwali Otto Müllex in Frankfurt a. M. hat als bestellter Ab- wesenheitspfleger den Antrag gestellt, den Verschollenen für tot zu erklären. Der Verschollene wird daher auf- aefordert, sich spätestens in dem auf Dienstag, den 9. Juli 1929, vor- \| mittags 9 Uhr, vor dem unterfertigten Geriht — Sißungssaal Nr. 11 — an- beraumten Aufgebotstermin zu melden, Todeserklärung €L- Ferner ergeht die Aufforderung an alle, welche Auskunft über Leben \| odex Tod des Verschollenen zu erteilen vermögen, spätestens im Aufgebots=- \| termin dem Gericht Anzeige zu machen. Marktheidenfeld, 3. Dezember 1928. Geschäftsstelle des Amtsgerichts. 77252] Auf Antrag ihres Bruders, des Kauf- manns Ludwia Kopp in Hohlweiler b. Scheinfeld, soll die am 19. November 1891 in Königshofen i. Grabfeld gch- \| borene und zuleßt in Würzburg wohn- haft gewesene ledige berufslose Anna Maria Kopp für tot erklärt werden. Anna Maria Kopp verließ s{chon in jugendlihen Fahren das Elternhaus, trieb sich berufslos umher und Hielt sich vielfach auch im Ausland auf. Die lebte Nachricht von ihr ist vom 19. Oktober 1916, wo sie nah einex Mitteilung der Landesversorgungsanstalten=- verwaltung in Graz aus dem Landes- kronkenhaus dortselbst entlassen wurde. Es ergeht die Aufforderung an die obengenannte Verschollene, sich spätestens im Aufgebotstærmin zu melden, wi- drigenfalls die Todeserklärung erfolgen wivd. Ferner werden alle, die Aus=- kunft über Leben odex Tod der Ver- shollenen zu erteilen vermögen, auf- gefordert, spätestens im Aufgebotstermin dem Gericht Anzeige zu machen. Der Aufgebotstermin wird bestimmt auf Mittwoch, den 10. Juli 1929, vor- mittags H Uhr, im Sißungssaal Nr. 70/1 des Amtsgerihts Würzburg. Würzburg, den 20. November 1928. [77272] Berlin W, 15, Knesebeckstraße 59/60, den 10. November 1928. An die unbekannten Miterben des verstorbenen Herrn Katasterdirektors Karl Weimer. Fn der Versicherungs- angelegenheit des Herrn Katal]ter- direktors Karl Weimer müssen wix eine Leistungspflicht unserer Anstalt aus der Versicherung Nx, 182 128 ablehnen, da Herx Weimer — wie die Prüfung der Krankengeschichte ergeben hat — bereits hon vorx Antragstellung an Herzmuskel- entartung gelitten, Beshwerden gchabt und in ärztliher Behandlung gestanden hat, Herr W,. ist hließlich an den ¡Folgen dieses Leidens gestorben. Fn dem Vexsicherungsantrag vom 7, Fe- bruar 1927 ‘hat der Versicherke sich den obigen Angaben entgegen als zurzeit vollkommen gesund bezeihnet und ans- gegeben, daß er „an keinen“ Krank- heiten odex ihren Folgezuständen und Beschwerden leide. Auch die Fragen, ob der zu Versichernde jemals an den 1m Antrag namentlich aufgeführten (u. a. Herzkrankheiten) oder sonstigen Krank- heitèn gelitten habe und von welchen Aerzten ex behandelt worden sei, sind verneinend beantwortet. Von seiten des Versicherten sind mithin bei Antrags stellung ihm bekannte und für die Uebernahme dex Gefahr derart erhebliche Umstände vershwiegen, daß wix bei deren Kenntnis den Antrag glatt abs gelehnt hätten. Gemäß §8 21 und 22 des Reichsgeseßes über den Versiches rungsvertrag sowie § 13 der beiliegenden Versicherungsbedingungen treten wix daher Jhnen, als“ Miterben des ver- storbenen Versihherungs8nehmers, gegens übex wegen Verleßung der Anzeiges pflicht von der Versicherung Nr. 182 128 zurück und fechten diese außerdem an. Pflihtgemäß machen wir auf § 2 Absatz 1 der Allgemeinen Versiherung8- bedingungen aufmerksam, wonach die Anstalt von der Verpflihtung zur Leistung frei ist, falls niht der Anspru innerhalb sechs Monaten bei dem zus ständigen Gericht geltend gemacht wird. Hochachtung8voll Deutsche Lebensver- sicherung für Wehrmachtangehörige und Beamte Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts. (gez.) 2 Unterschriften. Die öffentlihe Zustellung willigt. — 6. 11. 94. 28/2. j Charlottenburg, 1. Dezember 1928 Der Urkundsbeamte dex Geschäftsstelle. Die von dem Albert Lick und dessen Ehefrau Frieda Lick in Berlin, Küstriner Plaß 8, akzéptierten, am 14. März 1928 ohne Unterschrift auê- gestellten, dem Kaufmann Franz Lewtn in Stettin von den Akzeptanten ge- gebenen, am 22, März 1928, am 1. April 1928 und am 15. Mai 1928 fälligen Wechsel über 161 RM bgw. 950 RM bzw. 250 RM find für kraftlos erklärt worden. — F, 327, 28 ; Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte.' Abt, 216. [77258] Beschluß. “ Der vom Thüring. Amtsgericht Gotha am 26. Februar 1928 erteilte Erbschein über den Nachlaß des am 18, Dezember 1913 in Botha verstorbenen Komunrter- zijenrats Gottfvied Friedtich Emiz Wittzacl wird für kraftlos erklärt, Gotha, den 27. November 1928. Thüring. Amtsgericht, 4 —— ———_—Ack 4. VNeffentlihe Zujtellungen. [77259] Oeffentliche Zustellung. Es klagen und laden: 1. die Are beiterin Babette Ricbier geb. Röder, Fürth i. B., Leyherstraße 22, Klägerin, Prozeßbevollmächtigter: Rechtsanwalt Dr. Möller in Aïtona, gegen ihren Ehemann, Maurer Hugo - Richter, früher in Harksheide, jeßt unbekannten uts alts, Béklagten, 2. die Ehefrau Mathilde Ohland in Heidgraben, Post Tornesh, Klägerin, Prozeßbevollmäch- tigte: Rechtsanwälte rFustizrat Uflacker, Dres. Petersen und Frahm in Altona, gegen ihren Ehemann, Arbeiter Her- mann Dietrih Ohland, früher in Friedrihskoog bei Hofbesißer Bech- mann jut, jeßt unbekannten Aufente halts, Beklagten, 3. die Ehefrau Anna Stasiack geb. Wegner in“ Glückstadt, Kl. Neuwerk 5, Klägerin, Progeßbevolls mächtigte: Rechtsanwälte Dres. Möllex und Sternberg in Altona, gegen ihren Ehemann, Arbeiter Stanislaus Sta- siack, früher Elmshorn, Mühlen- straße 23, jeßt unbekannten Aufente halts, Beklagten, 4. die Ehefrau Meta Thun geb. Schulze, Hamburg, Nagel8- weg 47 1, Klägerin, Prozeßbevollmäch- tigter: Rechtsanwalt Dr. Ehlers in Altona, gegen ihren Ehemann, Ober- \hweizer Otto Thun, früher in Altona, jeßt unbekannten Aufenthalts, Beklagten, 5. die Ehefrau Meta Both geb. Ristow, Altona, Kl. Rain- straße 33 111, Klägerin, Prozeßbevoll- mächtigter: Rechtsanwalt Dr. Hoff- mann in Altona, gegen ihren Ehe- mann, Fensterpußer Heinri Both, zuleßt in Altona, Gr. Bergstr. 233 I1, bei Wagner, jeßt unbekannten Auf- enthalts, Beklagien, 6. die Ehefrau Lina Ebentheuer geb. Wischer in Li- beck, Hüxtstraße 103, Klägerin, Prozeß- bevollmächtigte: Rechtsanwälte Dres. Heymann und Warburg in Altona, gegen ihren Ehemann, Kaufmann Max Ebentheuer, früher Altona, Hum-
hu	wikipedia	N/A	A csillagok, akár a por (angolul: The Stars Like Dust) Isaac Asimov tudományos-fantasztikus regénye, amely először 1951-ben jelent meg. Magyarul 1992-ben jelent meg a Móra Ferenc Könyvkiadónál F. Nagy Piroska fordításában. Ez a könyv Asimov Birodalom-sorozatának első regénye. Történet A regény cselekménye a távoli jövőben játszódik, amikor a Föld bolygó területe már csak részben lakható a radioaktív szennyezettség miatt, és az emberiség már a galaxis számos más lakható bolygóján letelepedett. A lakott világok közül a Tyrann bolygó egy-két generációval korábban kiemelkedett katonai erejének köszönhetően. Sorban meghódította a Csillagköd királyságok bolygóit, többek között a Rhodia, a Nephelos és a Lingane bolygókat, és függő helyzetbe kényszerítette őket. A regény főhőse Biron Farill, a Nephelos bolygó urának fia, akinek apját a Tyrann elleni lázadás vádjával kivégezték. Biron is menekülni kényszerül, otthagyja a Földet, ahol egyetemi tanulmányait végezte, majd a Rhodián rögtön a tirannok fogságába esik, akik azonban csaliként használják, hogy leleplezzék a további összeesküvőket. A Rhodia bolygó igazgatója Hinrik Hinriad, aki a tirannok bábjaként viselkedik. Farill először tőle kér menedékjogot, azonban Hinrik rájön a csapdára és feladja őt a tirannoknak. Farillnak azonban sikerül elmenekülnie a palotából Hinrik lánya, Artemisia és testvére, Gillbret segítségével. Artemisia és Gillbret is vele tartanak – Artemisia egy házasság elől menekül, Gillbret pedig az összeesküvéshez szeretne csatlakozni a „lázadó bolygón”, hogy ott legyen, amikor elkezdődik a harc a tirannok ellen. Zsákmányolnak egy tirann hadihajót, azonban a tirannok továbbra is szemmel tartják és követik őket. Gillbret javaslatára a Lingane bolygóra mennek. A Lingane országfelelőse, Sander Jonti, aki az összeesküvés vezetője. A „lázadó bolygó” pontos helyét azonban ő sem tudja, ezért együtt indulnak el megkeresni: úgy sejtik, hogy csakis a Lófej-köd belsejében lehet. A tirann hadihajók azonban továbbra is a nyomukban vannak. Farill azonban nem bízik Jontiban, mert rájött, hogy Jonti volt az, aki feladta őt a tirannoknak, amikor a Földről távozott és a Földön is ő rendezte meg az ellene elkövetett merényletet. Jonti ugyan elismeri tettét, de az összeesküvés érdekeivel indokolja azt. Farill azonban továbbra is gyanakszik és ezért a Lófej csillagködbe érve csapdát állít Jontinak. Gyanúja beigazolódik: Jonti megpróbálja megölni őt, és eközben bevallja, hogy Farill apját is ő ölte meg. Az összeesküvés vezetője tehát áruló. Mielőtt azonban az árulót elítélhetnék, mindannyian a tirannok fogságában esnek. Jonti elárulja a tirannoknak a „lázadó bolygó” feltételezett helyét, amiért a többiek megölik őt. A „lázadó bolygó” azonban nem létezik, a megjelölt helyen nem találnak lakott bolygót. Simok Aratap, az üldöző tirannok vezetője végül politikai okokból elengedi magas rangú foglyait: Gillbret, Artemisia és Biron visszatérhetnek a Rhodiára, azonban a Rhodia bolygót többé nem hagyhatják el. A visszafelé úton Biron megfejti a „lázadó bolygó” rejtélyét: a lázadó bolygó valójában a Rhodia, a lázadás vezetője pedig Hinrik, akire a tirannok eddig nem is gyanakodtak. Megjelenések angol nyelven The Stars, Like Dust, Doubleday, 1951 magyarul A csillagok, akár a por. Birodalom sorozatának 1. kötete; ford. F. Nagy Piroska; Galaktika, Bp., 1992 (Alapítvány és birodalom sorozat) Asimov teljes Alapítvány-Birodalom-Robot Univerzuma, 2. kötet, Szukits Könyvkiadó, Szeged, 2002, ford.: F. Nagy Piroska Hivatkozások Isaac Asimov: A csillagok, akár a por, Móra Ferenc Ifjúsági Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1992, Külső hivatkozások Magyar nyelvű megjelenések Angol nyelvű megjelenések az ISFDB-től Jegyzetek Isaac Asimov sci-fi regényei 1951 regényei
pl	wikipedia	N/A	Neoporteria Backeb. – rodzaj sukulentów z rodziny kaktusowatych. Systematyka Synonimy Neoporteria Br. & R., Eriosyce Philippi Neoporteria w większości systemów klasyfikacyjnych jest uważana za synonim rodzaju Eriosyce Philippi. Reveal w swojej systematyce wyróżnia obydwa rodzaje, nie przedstawia jednak wykazu ich gatunków. Pozycja systematyczna według APweb (aktualizowany system APG III z 2009) Jako rodzaj Eriosyce należy do rodziny kaktusowatych (Cactaceae) Juss., która jest jednym z kladów w obrębie rzędu goździkowców (Caryophyllales) i klasy roślin okrytonasiennych. W obrębie kaktusowatych należy do plemienia Notocacteae, podrodziny Cactoideae. Pozycja w systemie Reveala (1993-1999) Gromada okrytonasienne (Magnoliophyta Cronquist), podgromada Magnoliophytina Frohne & U. Jensen ex Reveal, klasa Rosopsida Batsch, podklasa goździkowe (Caryophyllidae Takht.), nadrząd Caryophyllanae Takht., rząd goździkowce (Caryophyllales Perleb), podrząd Cactineae Bessey in C.K. Adams, rodzina kaktusowate (Cactaceae Juss.), rodzaj Meoporteria Backeb. Przypisy Kaktusowate
es	other	N/A	BOE.es - Documento BOE-A-2013-9041 Documento BOE-A-2013-9041 «BOE» núm. 198, de 19 de agosto de 2013, páginas 61070 a 61106 (37 págs.) Para cursar las enseñanzas enumeradas en el artículo anterior se convocan para el curso 2013-2014 becas que incluirán alguna o algunas de las siguientes cuantías. El importe será el del precio público oficial que se fije en el curso 2013-2014 para los servicios académicos. No formarán parte de la beca de matrícula aquellos créditos que excedan del mínimo necesario para obtener la titulación de que se trate. 4. Este componente de la beca se hará efectivo mediante la exención al becario del importe correspondiente y su compensación a las universidades en los términos previstos en el Real Decreto-Ley 14/2012, de 20 de abril, de medidas urgentes de racionalización del gasto público en el ámbito educativo y en la disposición adicional tercera del Real Decreto 609/2013, de 2 de agosto, por el que se establecen los umbrales de renta y patrimonio familiar y las cuantías de las becas y ayudas al estudio del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte para el curso 2013-2014 y se modifica parcialmente el Real Decreto 1721/2007, de 21 de diciembre por el que se establece el régimen de las becas y ayudas al estudio personalizadas y mediante el procedimiento que se establece en el artículo 52 de esta resolución. No obstante este procedimiento de pago, la condición de beneficiario de beca de matrícula recaerá en los estudiantes a quienes se les adjudique de conformidad con lo dispuesto en esta resolución. Nmax= Nota media obtenida por el mejor decil de becarios en el caso de estudiantes no universitarios, o nota media obtenida por el mejor decil de becarios de la misma área de conocimiento del becario en el caso de estudiantes universitarios. Para el cálculo de Nmax no se computarán las notas de aquellos becarios a los que, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en esta convocatoria, les corresponda percibir la cuantía variable mínima. 2. Podrán ser beneficiarios de la cuantía variable los solicitantes que cursen tanto enseñanzas universitarias como no universitarias. No obstante, quienes cursen estudios en modalidad distinta a la presencial, quienes opten por la matrícula parcial, oferta específica para personas adultas, quienes cursen los estudios enumerados en las letras h), i) y j) del apartado 1 del artículo 3, en las letras c) y d) del apartado 2 del artículo 3 de esta convocatoria, así como quienes realicen el proyecto de fin de carrera que no constituya una asignatura ordinaria del plan de estudios o titulaciones de planes a extinguir sin docencia presencial recibirán la cuantía variable mínima. Las cuantías de las becas de carácter general para el curso 2013-2014 serán las siguientes: A) Gratuidad de la matrícula: comprenderá el precio público oficial de los servicios académicos universitarios correspondiente a los créditos en que se haya matriculado el estudiante por primera vez en el curso 2013-2014. 1. Los estudiantes de enseñanzas universitarias afectados de una discapacidad legalmente calificada de grado igual o superior al 65 por ciento podrán reducir la carga lectiva a matricular en los términos previstos en los artículos 21.5 y 26.6 de esta convocatoria. 2. Cuando no se haga uso de la matrícula reducida y el estudiante formalice la matrícula en la totalidad de los créditos señalados en los artículos 21.1 y 26.1, las cuantías de las becas que les correspondan se incrementarán en un 50 por ciento, con excepción de la beca de matrícula que se concederá por el importe fijado en el curso 2013-2014 para los créditos de los que se haya matriculado por primera vez. Para obtener alguna de las becas convocadas por esta resolución será preciso cumplir los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 4.1 del Real Decreto 1721/2007, de 21 de diciembre, por el que se establece el régimen de las becas y ayudas al estudio personalizadas y en el Real Decreto 609/2013, de 2 de agosto, por el que se establecen los umbrales de renta y patrimonio familiar y las cuantías de las becas y ayudas al estudio del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte para el curso 2013-2014 y se modifica parcialmente el Real Decreto 1721/2007, de 21 de diciembre por el que se establece el régimen de las becas y ayudas al estudio personalizadas. Los requisitos establecidos en el apartado d) del citado artículo 4 deberán reunirse a 31 de diciembre de 2012. A los efectos de lo dispuesto en dicho apartado tendrán la consideración de «familiares» el cónyuge o la pareja legal así como los ascendientes directos a cargo y los descendientes directos a cargo menores de 21 años. 2. La renta familiar a efectos de beca se obtendrá por agregación de las rentas de cada uno de los miembros computables de la familia que obtengan ingresos de cualquier naturaleza, calculadas según se indica en los apartados siguientes y de conformidad con la normativa reguladora del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas. A efectos de las becas y ayudas al estudio del curso 2013-2014, se computará el ejercicio 2012. 1. Para el cálculo de la renta familiar a efectos de beca, son miembros computables de la familia el padre y la madre, el tutor o persona encargada de la guarda y protección del menor, en su caso; el solicitante, los hermanos solteros menores de veinticinco años y que convivan en el domicilio familiar a 31 de diciembre de 2012 o los de mayor edad, cuando se trate de personas con discapacidad, así como los ascendientes de los padres que justifiquen su residencia en el mismo domicilio que los anteriores con el certificado municipal correspondiente. 1. Para poder ser tenidas en cuenta las deducciones que se indican en los párrafos siguientes, deberá acreditarse que las situaciones que dan derecho a la deducción concurrían a 31 de diciembre de 2012. b) 500,00 euros por cada hermano, incluido el solicitante, que conviva en el domicilio familiar, cuando se trate de familias numerosas de categoría general y 765,00 euros para familias numerosas de categoría especial, siempre que tenga derecho a este beneficio. La deducción aplicable al solicitante universitario será de 2.000,00 euros cuando éste se encuentre afectado de una discapacidad de grado igual o superior al sesenta y cinco por ciento. Cuando sea el propio solicitante el titular de la familia numerosa, las cantidades señaladas serán computadas en relación con los hijos que la compongan. 1. Para ser beneficiario de las becas que se convocan por esta resolución, los solicitantes deberán estar matriculados en el curso 2013-2014 en alguno de los estudios mencionados en el artículo 3 y cumplir los requisitos de naturaleza académica que se establecen a continuación. La cuantificación del aprovechamiento académico del solicitante se realizará en la forma dispuesta en los artículos siguientes. 1. Para obtener beca en las enseñanzas a que se refiere esta sección los solicitantes deberán estar matriculados en el curso 2013-2014 del siguiente número mínimo de créditos: b) Quienes cursen estudios de Grado o de primero o segundo ciclo en modalidad distinta a la presencial podrán obtener la beca de matrícula y la cuantía variable mínima. Para obtener la beca en el siguiente curso deberán aprobar la totalidad de los créditos en que hubieran estado matriculados. c) En aquellos casos en los que, en virtud de la normativa propia de la universidad, resulte limitado el número de créditos en que puedan quedar matriculados todos los estudiantes, el solicitante podrá obtener todas las cuantías de beca que le correspondan de conformidad con lo dispuesto en esta convocatoria si se matricula en todos los créditos. Si dichos créditos se cursan en un cuatrimestre/semestre, la cuantía de la beca será del 50 por ciento de la cantidad que le hubiese correspondido con excepción de la beca de matrícula y la cuantía variable a los que no se aplicará esta reducción del 50 por ciento. En el supuesto de que el alumno se matricule también en el segundo cuatrimestre/semestre correspondiente al curso académico, se completará la cuantía de la beca con el 50 por ciento restante. 6. Los estudiantes que, estando en posesión de un título de diplomado, maestro, ingeniero o arquitecto técnico, cursen los créditos complementarios necesarios para obtener una titulación de Grado deberán quedar matriculados en la totalidad de los créditos restantes para la obtención de la mencionada titulación. Cuando cursen complementos de formación para proseguir estudios oficiales de segundo ciclo deberán matricularse de la totalidad de dichos complementos. en las asignaturas superadas 5. En todo caso, el número mínimo de créditos en que debió estar matriculado en el curso 2012-2013 será el que, para cada caso, se indica en el artículo anterior. 7. Quienes realicen el proyecto de fin de carrera que no constituya una asignatura ordinaria del plan de estudios deberán haber superado todos los créditos de que conste dicho plan. para enseñanzas de arquitectura e ingeniería/técnicas, dependiendo de que el solicitante se acoja a la primera o a la segunda de las opciones señaladas en el apartado 2 del artículo 22. para las enseñanzas universitarias adscritas a las ramas o áreas de conocimiento de Ciencias y de Ciencias de la Salud, dependiendo de que el solicitante se acoja a la primera o a la segunda de las opciones señaladas en el apartado 2 del artículo 22. A los efectos de esta convocatoria, se entiende por dobles titulaciones aquellas que aparecen como tales en el Registro de Universidades, Centros y Títulos. 1. Para obtener alguna de las becas que se convocan por esta Resolución para estudios de másteres oficiales, el solicitante deberá estar matriculado, en el curso 2013-2014 en, al menos, 60 créditos. En el caso de matricularse en un número de créditos superior al mínimo exigido, todos ellos serán tenidos en cuenta para la valoración del rendimiento académico del solicitante. 2. No obstante, podrán obtener también beca los alumnos que se matriculen de entre 30 y 59 créditos en el curso académico 2013-2014. A los efectos de esta convocatoria, esta situación se denominará matrícula parcial y podrán obtener la beca de matrícula y la cuantía variable mínima Para obtener la beca en el siguiente curso deberán aprobar la totalidad de los créditos en que hubieran estado matriculados. 3. Quienes cursen estudios de Máster en modalidad distinta a la presencial podrán obtener la beca de matrícula y la cuantía variable mínima. Para obtener la beca en el siguiente curso deberán aprobar la totalidad de los créditos en que hubieran estado matriculados. 6. Los estudiantes que estén afectados de discapacidad de un grado igual o superior al 65 por ciento, podrán reducir la carga lectiva necesaria para cumplir el requisito de matriculación indicado en el párrafo 1 de este artículo hasta un máximo del 50 por ciento quedando sujetas las cuantías a lo establecido en el artículo 12 de la presente resolución. En ningún caso podrá optar a beca con una matrícula inferior a 30 créditos. 7. Los estudiantes que cursen complementos de formación deberán quedar matriculados en la totalidad de los créditos. ● Los estudiantes de primer curso de másteres que habilitan o que sean condición necesaria para el ejercicio de una profesión regulada deberán acreditar una nota media de 6,50 puntos en los estudios previos que les dan acceso al máster. En los restantes estudios de máster dicha nota media será de 7,00 puntos. A estos efectos, las notas medias procedentes de estudios de enseñanzas técnicas se multiplicarán por el coeficiente 1,17. ● Los estudiantes de segundo curso de másteres que habilitan o que sean condición necesaria para el ejercicio de una profesión regulada deberán acreditar una nota media de 6,50 puntos en primer curso. En los restantes estudios de máster dicha nota media será de 7,00 puntos. 2. En todo caso, además de las notas medias fijadas en los apartados anteriores, los solicitantes de beca para segundo curso de masteres deberán acreditar haber superado la totalidad de los créditos de que hubieran estado matriculados en primer curso. Este mismo criterio se aplicará también a los casos de estudiantes con discapacidad igual o superior al 65 por ciento, que hubieran aplicado la reducción de carga lectiva. 1. Matriculación. Para obtener beca en las enseñanzas a que se refiere este artículo, los solicitantes deberán matricularse en el curso 2013-2014 de curso completo o, al menos, de la mitad de los módulos que componen el correspondiente ciclo. Los módulos convalidados o exentos no se tendrán en cuenta a efectos del cumplimiento de los requisitos académicos exigidos en esta resolución. Los estudiantes de segundos y posteriores cursos organizados por módulos deberán acreditar haber superado en el curso anterior al menos un número de módulos que supongan el 85 % de las horas totales del curso en que hubieran estado matriculados que, como mínimo, deberán ser los que se señalan en el párrafo anterior. 1. Matriculación. Para obtener beca en las enseñanzas a que se refiere este artículo, los solicitantes deberán matricularse en el curso 2013-2014 de curso completo o, al menos, de la mitad de los módulos que comprenden el correspondiente ciclo. Las materias, asignaturas o módulos convalidados o exentos no se tendrán en cuenta a efectos del cumplimiento de los requisitos académicos establecidos en esta resolución. 1. Matriculación. Para obtener beca en estas enseñanzas será preciso quedar matriculado tanto en el curso 2012-2013 como en el 2013-2014 de curso completo según el correspondiente plan de estudios. 3. Número de años con condición de becario. Podrá disfrutarse de la condición de becario durante un año más de los establecidos en el correspondiente plan de estudios. En este supuesto, la cuantía de la beca que se conceda para dicho año será la cuantía variable mínima y el cincuenta por ciento de las demás cuantías que le hubiesen correspondido. 2. La ocultación de cualquier fuente de renta o elemento patrimonial dará lugar a la denegación de la beca solicitada o a la modificación o revocación de la de concesión. 5. Por el conjunto de circunstancias que concurran en cada caso concreto, podrá apreciarse la existencia de falseamiento de los requisitos necesarios para la concesión de la beca o de ocultación de las circunstancias que habrían determinado su denegación. En estos supuestos, se procederá a denegar la beca solicitada o a modificar la de su concesión o acordar su reintegro según el procedimiento previsto en esta resolución y en la Ley 38/2003, de 17 de noviembre, General de Subvenciones. 1. Finalizado el curso 2013-2014, la Subdirección General de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicaciones remitirá a todos los órganos gestores de las Comunidades Autónomas y a todas las universidades relación nominal de todos sus estudiantes que hayan obtenido alguna de las becas convocadas por esta Resolución con indicación de su documento nacional de identidad, clases y cuantía de la beca concedida. 2. A través de las secretarías de los centros docentes, los citados órganos y universidades comprobarán que los mencionados estudiantes han destinado la beca para la finalidad para la que fue concedida. A estos efectos, se entenderá que los estudiantes universitarios no han destinado la beca para dicha finalidad cuando concurra alguna de las siguientes situaciones: c) En el caso de estudiantes que hayan obtenido la beca para la realización del proyecto fin de carrera, no haber presentado dicho proyecto en el plazo de dos años desde la fecha de la resolución de concesión de la beca. Tanto el acuerdo de inicio como la resolución de reintegro o sobreseimiento del expediente, en su caso, serán notificados vía telemática en la sede electrónica del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, previa comunicación que reúna las garantías a que hace referencia el artículo 28 de la Ley 11/2007, de 22 de julio, de Acceso Electrónico de los Ciudadanos a los Servicios Públicos. f) Que, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 43 de esta convocatoria, manifiestan su voluntad de recibir notificaciones de forma telemática vía SMS certificados. A) el 15 de octubre de 2013, inclusive, para los estudiantes universitarios. B) el 30 de septiembre de 2013, inclusive, para los estudiantes no universitarios. 2. No obstante podrán presentarse solicitudes de beca después de los plazos señalados y hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2013 en los siguientes casos: 1. Para el estudio de las solicitudes presentadas y selección de posibles becarios universitarios, en cada universidad se constituirá en el mes de septiembre de 2013, un órgano colegiado de selección de becarios con la composición que a continuación se señala: 2. Para las becas no universitarias, en cada dirección provincial del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte se constituirá en el mes de septiembre de 2013 una comisión provincial de selección de becarios con la siguiente composición: 1. Los órganos de selección a que se refiere el artículo anterior examinarán las solicitudes presentadas para requerir al interesado en su caso, que subsane los eventuales defectos o acompañe los documentos preceptivos en el plazo de diez días contados desde la recepción del requerimiento, con indicación de que, si así no lo hiciera, se le tendrá por desistido de su petición, archivándose previa resolución que deberá ser dictada en los términos del artículo 42.1 de la Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común. 4. Los mencionados órganos de selección remitirán a la Subdirección General de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicaciones del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte quincenalmente y, en todo caso, antes del 30 de diciembre de 2013 y por cualquiera de las vías informáticas habilitadas al efecto, un informe en el que se concrete el resultado de la evaluación efectuada de los solicitantes que reúnan los mencionados requisitos generales. 7. De acuerdo con el artículo 84 de la Ley 30/1992, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común y con el artículo 24.4 de la Ley 38/2003, General de Subvenciones, instruido el procedimiento e inmediatamente antes de redactar la propuesta de resolución, se pondrá de manifiesto a los interesados para que en el plazo de quince días aleguen y presenten los documentos y justificaciones que estimen pertinentes. No obstante, se podrá prescindir del trámite de audiencia cuando no figuren en el procedimiento ni sean tenidos en cuenta en la resolución otros hechos ni otras alegaciones y pruebas que los aducidos por el/la interesado. 2. La Subdirección General de Becas y Atención al Estudiante, Orientación e Inserción Profesional, como órgano instructor del procedimiento, elevará la oportuna propuesta de concesión de las mencionadas cuantías. Por delegación de la Secretaria de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades (Orden ECD/465/2012, de 2 de marzo de delegación de competencias del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte) el Secretario General de Universidades dictará en el plazo de seis meses desde el 15 de octubre, fecha de finalización de presentación de solicitudes para enseñanzas universitarias, la resolución parcial de la convocatoria. No obstante, podrán dictarse órdenes parciales y sucesivas de concesión a medida que los órganos de selección formulen las correspondientes propuestas. Los órganos de selección de las comunidades autónomas y de las universidades y, en su defecto, la Subdirección General de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicaciones del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte emitirán las credenciales de concesión de las mencionadas cuantías a quienes resulten beneficiarios. d) Determinación del o de la/s cuantía/s concedidas y su importe en euros. 4. Asimismo, los mencionados órganos de selección de las universidades y de las comunidades autónomas y, en su defecto, la Subdirección General de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicaciones del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte emitirán las oportunas notificaciones de denegación a quienes no cumplan los requisitos exigibles, haciendo constar la causa que la motiva e informándoles de los recursos que pueden interponer. 5. Tanto las notificaciones de concesión como de denegación podrán emitirse por cualquiera de los medios admitidos en la normativa reguladora del procedimiento administrativo incluidos correos electrónicos, debiendo los interesados proceder a efectuar la descarga de su contenido en la dirección electrónica https://sede.educacion.gob.es en el apartado correspondiente a «Notificaciones». 7. Efectuada dicha asignación, la Subdirección General de Becas y Atención al Estudiante, Orientación e Inserción Profesional, como órgano instructor del procedimiento, elevará la propuesta de concesión de las cuantías variables. Por delegación de la Secretaria de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades (Orden ECD/465/2012, de 2 de marzo de delegación de competencias del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte) el Secretario General de Universidades dictará en el plazo de seis meses desde el 15 de octubre, fecha de finalización de presentación de solicitudes para enseñanzas universitarias, la resolución definitiva de la convocatoria. La concesión de la cuantía variable se notificará a sus beneficiarios por el mismo procedimiento establecido en el apartado 3 anterior. 8. Los listados de becarios en cada curso serán públicos. A estos efectos, por resolución del Director General de Política Universitaria que será publicada en el Boletín Oficial del Estado se ordenará la publicación de la relación definitiva de los solicitantes a quienes se concede la beca, en los tablones de anuncios y en la página web de las universidades y de las administraciones educativas correspondientes entendiéndose denegadas el resto de las solicitudes por el mismo motivo que consta en la propuesta de denegación. 2. El Secretario General de Universidades y el Director General de de Política Universitaria, en el ámbito de sus respectivas competencias, ordenarán la provisión de fondos al Tesoro Público y a las comunidades autónomas firmantes del convenio a que se refiere la disposición transitoria primera de esta Resolución, que efectuarán el pago de las becas concedidas a la cuenta corriente o libreta de ahorro que el interesado haya consignado en la solicitud y que deberá estar abierta a nombre del becario y, tratándose de menores, también de la persona cuya representación corresponda legalmente en entidades de crédito. 3. En el curso 2013-2014, el Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte aportará a las Universidades, en concepto de compensación de los precios públicos por servicios académicos correspondientes a los alumnos becarios exentos de su pago, una cantidad por alumno becado igual a la del precio público fijado para la titulación correspondiente en el curso 2011/2012, actualizada en un 1 % de conformidad con lo previsto en el artículo 7.2 del Real Decreto-ley 14/2012, de 20 de abril, de medidas de racionalización del gasto público en el ámbito educativo. A estos efectos, no se considerarán precios públicos los precios especiales que se devenguen como consecuencia de convalidaciones, reconocimiento o adaptaciones de estudios, asignaturas o créditos. 5. A la vista de la documentación aportada, la Secretaria General de Universidades, por delegación de la Secretaria de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades, resolverá el procedimiento mediante resolución que deberá ser adoptada en un plazo no superior a dos meses desde la fecha señalada. Acto seguido, la mencionada resolución se publicará en el Boletín Oficial del Estado. 2. Las solicitudes de beca, que deberán ser formuladas en la forma prevista en esta resolución podrán consignar los ingresos de la familia en la moneda propia del país en que se obtengan. El cálculo de su contravalor en euros se hará aplicando el tipo oficial que dé un resultado menor y que hubiera tenido la moneda respectiva el primer día hábil de 2013. En este caso se podrán consignar los ingresos de la familia en la moneda propia del país en que se obtengan. El cálculo de su contravalor en euros se hará aplicando el tipo oficial que dé un resultado menor y que hubiera tenido la moneda respectiva el primer día hábil de 2013. Las propuestas de concesión de beca correspondientes a convenios o sentencias judiciales, así como las que, por razón de plazos, no puedan ser tratadas por el procedimiento ordinario que se describe en esta convocatoria, serán tramitadas directamente por el Dirección General de Política Universitaria. La concesión o denegación de becas correspondientes a cursos anteriores al de 2013-2014 continuará rigiéndose por sus normas respectivas. Sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la disposición transitoria tercera, quedan derogadas las Resoluciones de 2 de agosto de 2012 de la Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades por la que se convocan becas de carácter general y de movilidad para el curso académico 2012-13 para estudiantes de enseñanzas universitarias y para alumnado que curse estudios postobligatorios y superiores no universitarios, así como cuantas otras disposiciones de igual o inferior rango se opongan a lo dispuesto en esta Resolución. Madrid, 13 de agosto de 2013.–La Secretaria de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades, Montserrat Gomendio Kindelan.
sk	caselaw	EU	23.12.2019 SK Úradný vestník Európskej únie C 432/19 Odvolanie podané 6. augusta 2019: Rietze GmbH & Co. KG proti rozsudku Všeobecného súdu (ôsma komora) zo 6. júna 2019 vo veci T-43/18, Rietze GmbH & Co. KG/Úrad Európskej únie pre duševné vlastníctvo (Vec C-599/19 P) (2019/C 432/23) Jazyk konania: nemčina Účastníci konania Odvolateľka: Rietze GmbH & Co. KG (v zastúpení: M. Krogmann, advokát) Ďalší účastník konania: Úrad Európskej únie pre duševné vlastníctvo Súdny dvor Európskej únie (komora rozhodujúca o prípustnosti odvolaní) uznesením z 24. októbra 2019 rozhodol, že odvolanie je neprípustné a odvolateľka znáša vlastné trovy konania.
it	wikipedia	N/A	In matematica, in particolare in geometria, per angolo nullo si intende l'angolo che ha come lati due semirette coincidenti e che non contiene altri punti oltre a quelli dei suoi lati. L'angolo nullo misura in radianti 0 e in gradi 0. L'angolo nullo è anche definibile come il risultato della sottrazione di un angolo con se stesso. Voci correlate Angolo Angolo acuto Angolo ottuso Angolo retto Angolo piatto Angolo giro Tipi di angolo
fi	wikipedia	N/A	Kamal Fouad Jumblatt (arab. كمال فؤاد جنبلاط‎) (6. joulukuuta 1917 – 16. maaliskuuta 1977) oli libanonilainen druusipoliitikko, jolla oli perinnöllinen asema druusien johtajana. Jumblatt toimi maan sisäministerinä vuosina 1969–1970. Syyrian hyökkäys Libanoniin vuonna 1976 oli suuressa määrin Jumblatin-vastainen operaatio, sillä Syyria ei halunnut druusien aseman vahvistuvan. Tämä johti Libanonin sisällissotaan. Jumblatt perusti Libanonin edistyksellisen sosialistipuolueen 1949 ja kasvatti vaikutusvaltaansa erityisesti yhteistyöllä palestiinalaisten kanssa. Sen sijaan hänellä oli huonot välit Libanonin naapurimaan Syyrian kanssa. Jumblat murhattiin vuonna 1977. Hänen pojastaan Walid Jumblatista tuli druusien uusi perinnöllinen johtaja. Lähteet Libanonilaiset henkilöt Libanonilaiset poliitikot Libanonilaiset henkirikosten uhrit Vuonna 1917 syntyneet Vuonna 1977 kuolleet
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Kakashi Gaiden är en spinoff-manga baserad på Naruto av Masashi Kishimoto. Kishimoto publicerade miniserien i den japanska Shonen Jump när första delen av Naruto blev klar. Kakashi Gaiden är kapitlen 239-244. Kakashi Gaiden avslöjar även Kakashis bakgrund och om hur han fick Sharingan fast han inte var en Uchiha. Man får också se när Obito Uchiha förändrar Kakashis liv genom sitt tal: "Den som bryter en regel i ninjornas värld blir kallad för skräp... Men den som inte bryr sig om sin kamrat är ännu värre skräp". Handling Kakashi Gaiden handlar om den 12-åriga Kakashi Hatake som utför ett uppdrag tillsammans med sitt team, Obito Uchiha och Rin. Man får även se en glimt av Yondaime (Fjärde Hokagen) när han var vid liv. Det är det tredje ninjakriget och Kakashi som nyss har blivit en Jonin blir den nya kaptenen i sitt tremannateam istället för Yondaime som var deras sensei. De får instruktioner av Yondaime att de ska förstöra en bro som tillåter Stenlandet att få livsmedel och att han skulle avleda fienderna så att Kakashis team fick chansen att förstöra bron. Uchiha Obito dör när hans högra sida av kroppen krossas av stenar. Innan han dör ber han Rin, läkarninjan i teamet, att operera ut hans vänstra öga och ge det till Kakashi. Det var så Kakashi fick Sharingan, fastän han inte alls tillhör Uchiha-klanen. Innan Obito dog var Kakashi bestämd och allvarlig av sig, och han var ofta dum mot Obito och nedvärderade honom. Men efter att Obito dött så förändrades han och började ta efter sin vän. Många har sagt att Tobi i Akatsuki egentligen är Obito Uchiha, vilket nu visat sig stämma. Hans partner Uchiha Madara, en av de mäktigaste ninjorna i Uchiha-klanen. Mangaserier
de	wikipedia	N/A	A161 ist die ehemalige Nummer einer Fernstraße regionaler Bedeutung in Südsibirien, Russland. Sie führt von der Hauptstadt der Republik Chakassien Abakan zur Kleinstadt Ak-Dowurak im Westen von Tuwa und ist eine der zwei Straßen, die diese Republik an das Straßennetz der Russischen Föderation anbinden. Verlauf Von Abakan, wo Anschluss an die von Krasnojarsk über die tuwinische Hauptstadt Kysyl zur mongolischen Grenze verlaufende Magistrale R257 Jenissei besteht, folgt die Straße zunächst auf etwa 130 Kilometern dem Jenissei-Nebenfluss Abakan auf seiner linken (westlichen) Seite, vorbei an den größeren Ortschaften Askis (Rajonverwaltungszentrum) und Beltirskoje. Beim Dorf Ust-Jes verlässt sie den Fluss und folgt dem linken Nebenfluss Taschtyp aufwärts, um ihn beim gleichnamigen Dorf und Rajonzentrum Taschtyp zu überqueren. Über einen knapp hohen Pass wird bei der Bergbaustadt Abasa, dem Endpunkt einer Eisenbahnstrecke, wieder der Abakan erreicht und dort überquert. Nach der Überwindung zweier weiterer Pässe (gut sowie hoch) erreicht die Straße nach etwa 50 Kilometern den rechten Abakan-Nebenfluss Ona und folgt diesem, wobei sie ihn viermal überquert, und später dem rechten Zufluss Großer On (Bolschoi On) bis in dessen Quellgebiet nach weiteren 100 Kilometern. Dort wird nach einem steilen Anstieg der Hauptkamm des Westsajan, dessen Kammlinie die Grenze zwischen Chakassien und Tuwa markiert, mit dem hohen Sajanski-Pass überquert. Der Pass muss in der Regel zwischen September und Mai mit Räumgerät schneefrei gehalten werden. Auf der tuwinischen Seite fällt die Straße steil in das Tal des Kara-Sug ab, eines Quellflusses des linken Chemtschik-Nebenflusses Ak-Sug. Die Straße folgt Kara-Sug und Ak-Sug in ihren engen Tälern durch das Alasch-Hochland (russisch Alaschskoje nagorje), bis sie über einen gut hohen Pass in das nahe Tal des westlicheren Chemtschik-Nebenflusses Alasch wechselt. Nach weiteren 30 Kilometern und zwei niedrigeren Pässen wird der Endpunkt der Straße Ak-Dowurak erreicht. Auf den knapp 250 Kilometern zwischen Abasa und Abakan gibt es keinerlei nennenswerte Ortschaften. Kurz vor Ak-Dowurak vereinigt sich die Straße mit der früheren A162 (seit 2010 93N-17/93K-02), der Hauptverkehrsader der westlichen Republik Tuwa von Teeli nach Kysyl, die vier der fünf Städte der Republik miteinander verbindet. Streckenführung 0 km – Abakan, Anschluss an die Magistrale R257 Jenissei von Krasnojarsk über Kysyl zur mongolischen Grenze 93 km – Askis 106 km – Beltirskoje 154 km – Taschtyp 183 km – Abasa 325 km – Sajanski-Pass () 424 km – Anschluss an die frühere A162 (heute 93N-17/93K-02) von Teeli nach Kysyl 428 km – Ak-Dowurak Geschichte Die A161 entstand in den 1960er-Jahren aus der Notwendigkeit heraus, eine kürzere Verbindung von Chakassien in den Westteil der Republik Tuwa, als über die bestehende und viel weiter östlich verlaufende M 54, zu schaffen. Hauptgrund für den Bau war die Anbindung der großen Asbestmine bei Ak-Dowurak an die knapp 250 Kilometer entfernte Eisenbahnstrecke bei Abasa. Die Straße wurde 1969 eröffnet. 2010 wurde die Nummer A161 an eine föderale Straße in einem ganz anderen Teil Russlands neu vergeben: die frühere A301 von Wladikawkas zur georgischen Grenze im Nordkaukasus. Die Verbindung Abakan – Ak-Dowurak erhielt als Fernstraße regionaler Bedeutung auf dem Abschnitt bis Abasa die Nummer 95K-002 unter Verwaltung Chakassiens, auf dem Abschnitt von Abasa bis Ak-Dowurak, der von der Republik Tuwa betrieben wird, obwohl größtenteils auf chakassischem Territorium verlaufend, die Nummer 93K-01. Einzelnachweise Straße in Sibirien
de	caselaw	Switzerland	Sozialversicherungsgericht des Kantons Zürich Entscheid: IV.2015.01129 [9C_532/2016] Drucken Zurück Sozialversicherungsgericht des Kantons Zürich IV.2015.01129 damit vereinigt IV.2015.01220 IV. Kammer Sozialversicherungsrichter Hurst, Vorsitzender Sozialversicherungsrichterin Philipp Sozialversicherungsrichter Vogel Gerichtsschreiberin F. Brühwiler Urteil vom 6. Juni 2016 in Sachen X._ Beschwerdeführerin vertreten durch Rechtsanwältin Stephanie Schwarz Sigg Schwarz Advokatur Theaterstrasse 3, Postfach 2336, 8401 Winterthur gegen Sozialversicherungsanstalt des Kantons Zürich, IV-Stelle Röntgenstrasse 17, Postfach, 8087 Zürich Beschwerdegegnerin Sachverhalt: 1. 1.1 X._ , geboren 1983, leidet an einer Muskeldystrophie ( Erstma nifestation im zwölften Lebensjahr, progredienter Verlauf, Urk. 12/146/3, Urk. 12/171/3). Aufgrund dieses Leidens wurden ihr verschie dene Hilfsmittel zugesprochen und sie bezieht eine Hilflosenentschädigung leichten Grades (seit Januar 2010) respektive e ine Hilflosenentschädigung mitt leren Grades (seit April 2010; Urk. 12/82, Urk. 12/84). Die Versicherte war bis Ende April 2014 als Treuhänderin bei der Y._ AG angestellt (Urk. 12/107/12) , wobei sie ab dem 7. November 2013 zu 40 % arbeitsunfähig geschrieben war (Urk. 12/107/13, Urk. 12/136/11) . Seit Mai 2014 ist sie als Treuhänderin in einem 60%-Pensum bei der Z._ GmbH angestellt (Urk. 12/156, Urk. 12/149/1) , bei welcher sie Gesellschafterin und Vorsitzende der Geschäftsführung ist (I nternet-Handelsregister-Auszug). 1.2 Am 14. März 2014 meldete sich die Versicherte bei der Sozialversicherungsan stalt des Kantons Zürich, IV-Stelle, unter Hinweis auf die bestehende Muskel dystrophie zum Leistungsbezug (Berufliche Massnahmen/Rente) an (Urk. 12/110). Die IV-Stelle tätigte erwerbliche und medizinische Abklärungen, wobei sie insbesondere Berichte bei den behandelnden Ärzte n einholte (Urk. 12/146, Urk. 12/171 ). Mit Vorbescheid vom 11. Februar 201 5 (Urk. 12/179) stellte die IV-Stelle der Versicherten gestützt auf einen Invalidi tätsgrad von 40 % die Ausrichtung einer Viertelsrente mit Wirkung ab dem 1. November 2014 in Aussicht. Dagegen erhob die Versicherte am 11. März 2015 Einwände (Urk. 12 /188 ), worauf die IV-Stelle m it neuem Vorbe scheid vom 11. Mai 2015 gestützt auf einen Invaliditätsgrad von 50 % die Ausrichtung einer halben Rente mit Wirkung ab 1. November 2014 in Aussicht stellte (Urk. 12 /195). Die Versicherte erhob dagegen am 10. Juni 201 5 erneut Ein wände (Urk. 12/204). Mit Verfügungen vom 1. Oktober 2015 (für die Zeit ab 1. Oktober 2015) und 29. Oktober 2015 (für den Zeitraum vom 1. November 2014 bis 30. September 2015) sprach die IV-Stelle der Versicherten wie ange kündigt eine halbe Rente zu (Urk. 2, Urk. 7/2). 2. 2.1 Mit Eingaben vom 30. Oktober 2015 respektive 26. November 2015 erhob X._ gegen beide Verfügungen Beschwerde und beantragte, es sei ihr sowohl für den Zeitraum vom 1. November 2014 bis 30. September 2015 als auch für die Zeit ab 1. Oktober 2015 eine höhere als die halbe Rente zuzu sprechen (Urk. 1 S. 2, Urk. 7/1 S. 2). Mit Verfügung vom 3. Dezember 2015 wurden die zwei Beschwerdeverfahren vereinigt (Urk. 8 ). 2.2 Mit Beschwerdeantwort vom 30. Dezember 201 5 (Urk. 11 unter Beilage ihrer Akten, Urk. 12/1-232) erklärte die Beschwerdegegnerin, es bestehe lediglich Anspruch auf eine Viertelsrente , und beantragte eine Abänderung der ange fochtenen Verfügungen zuungunsten der Beschwerdeführerin ( reformatio in peius ). 2.3 Am 24. Februar 2016 fand eine Instruktionsverhandlung statt, wobei der Beschwerdeführerin im Anschluss an diese Verhandlung bis 7. März 2016 Frist angesetzt wurde, um schriftlich mitzuteilen, ob an der Beschwerde festgehalten werde (Urk. 15). Innert zweimalig erstreckter Frist (Urk. 17, Urk. 18) teilte die Beschwerdeführerin am 13. April 2016 mit, an der Beschwerde fes tzuhalten (Urk. 19) , wobei sie einen zusätzlichen Arztbericht z u den Akten reichte (Urk. 20/1) . Die Beschwerdeführerin ersuchte darum , die Kosten für diesen Bericht der Beschwerdegegnerin aufzuerlegen . Ausserdem seien allfällige wei tere Fragen direkt an ihren behandelnden Speziala rz t zu stellen. Eventualiter sei bei einer Rückweisung der Sache an die Beschwerdegegnerin die bisherige Rente weiterhin auszurichten (Urk. 19 S. 3 f.). 2.4 Mit Besch luss vom 25. April 2016 (Urk. 22) zeigte das Gericht der Beschwerde führerin an, gestützt auf eine vorläufige Prüfung der Akten bestehe die Mög lichkeit, dass die angefochtene Verfügung in dem Sinne zu ihren Ungunsten abgeändert werde , als lediglich Anspruch auf eine Viertelsrente bestehe , wes halb ihr Frist zur Stellungnahme oder zum Rückzug der Beschwerde angesetzt werde. Mit Eingabe vom 17. Mai 2016 (Urk. 24) teilte die Beschwerdeführerin mit, an der Beschwerde fest zuhalten und stellte zusätzlich den Eventualantrag, die angefochtenen Verfügungen seien zu ändern und die Sache se i, soweit ein Anspruch auf einen eine Viertelsrente übersteigenden Rentenanspruch abge wiesen werde, aufzuheben und die Sache zur ergänzenden Abklärung der medi zinischen Entwicklung der chronischen Erkrankung und der Arbeitsfähigkeit an die Beschwerdegegnerin zur gutachterlichen und beruflich-erwerblichen Abklärung zurückzuweisen. Subeventualiter sei en die angefochtenen Verfügun gen aufzuheben und die Sache sei zur ergänzenden Abklärung der medizini schen Entwicklung der chronischen Erkrankung und der Arbeitsfähigkeit an die Beschwerdegegnerin zur gutachterlichen und beruflich-erwerblichen Abklärung zurückzuweisen (Urk. 24 S. 1 f.). Das Gericht zieht in Erwägung: 1. 1.1 Invalidität ist die voraussichtlich bleibende oder längere Zeit dauernde ganze oder teilweise Erwerbsunfähigkeit (Art. 8 Abs. 1 des Bundesgesetzes über den Allgemeinen Teil des Sozialversicherungsrechts, ATSG). Sie kann Folge von Geburtsgebrechen, Krankheit oder Unfall sein (Art. 4 Abs. 1 des Bundesgesetzes über die Invalidenversicherung, IVG). Erwerbsunfähigkeit ist der durch Beein trächtigung der körperlichen, geistigen oder psychischen Gesundheit verur sachte und nach zumutbarer Behandlung und Eingliederung verbleibende ganze oder teilweise Verlust der Erwerbsmöglichkeiten auf dem in Betracht kommen den ausgeglichenen Arbeitsmarkt (Art. 7 Abs. 1 ATSG). Für die Beurteilung des Vorliegens einer Erwerbsunfähigkeit sind ausschliesslich die Folgen der gesund heitlichen Beeinträchtigung zu berücksichtigen. Eine Erwerbsunfähigkeit liegt zudem nur vor, wenn sie aus objektiver Sicht nicht überwindbar ist (Art. 7 Abs. 2 ATSG). 1.2 Anspruch auf eine Rente haben gemäss Art. 28 Abs. 1 IVG Versicherte, die: a. ihre Erwerbsfähigkeit oder die Fähigkeit, sich im Aufgabenbereich zu betäti gen, nicht durch zumutbare Eingliederungsmassnahmen wieder herstellen, erhalten oder verbessern können; b. während eines Jahres ohne wesentlichen Unterbruch durchschnittlich mindes tens 40 % arbeitsunfähig ( Art. 6 ATSG) gewesen sind; und c. nach Ablauf dieses Jahres zu mindestens 40 % invalid ( Art. 8 ATSG) sind. Bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 40 % besteht Anspruch auf eine Vier telsrente , bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 50 % auf eine halbe Rente, bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 60 % auf eine Dreiviertels rente und bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 70 % auf eine ganze Rente ( Art. 28 Abs. 2 IVG). 1.3 Bei erwerbstätigen Versicherten ist der Invaliditätsgrad gemäss Art. 16 ATSG in Verbindung mit Art. 28a Abs. 1 IVG aufgrund eines Einkommensvergleichs zu bestimmen. Dazu wird das Erwerbseinkommen, das die versicherte Person nach Eintritt der Invalidität und nach Durchführung der medizinischen Behandlung und allfälliger Eingliederungsmassnahmen durch eine ihr zumutbare Tätigkeit bei aus geglichener Arbeitsmarktlage erzielen könnte (sog. Invalideneinkom men ), in Bezie hung gesetzt zum Erwerbseinkommen, das sie erzielen könnte, wenn sie nicht in valid geworden wäre (sog. Valideneinkommen ). Der Einkom mensvergleich hat in der Regel in der Weise zu erfolgen, dass die b eiden hypo thetischen Erwerbsein kommen ziffernmässig möglichst genau ermittelt und einander gegenübergestellt werden, worauf sich aus der Einkommensdifferenz der Invaliditätsgrad bestimmen lässt (sog. allgemeine Methode des Einkom mensvergleichs ; BGE 130 V 343 E. 3.4.2 mit Hinweisen). 1.4 Um den Invaliditätsgrad bemessen zu können, ist die Verwaltung (und im Beschwerdefall das Gericht) auf Unterlagen angewiesen, die ärztliche und gege benenfalls auch andere Fachleute zur Verfügung zu stellen haben. Aufgabe des Arztes oder der Ärztin ist es, den Gesundheitszustand zu beurteilen und dazu Stellung zu nehmen, in welchem Umfang und bezüglich welcher Tätigkeiten die versicherte Person arbeits unfähig ist (BGE 125 V 256 E. 4). Im Weiteren sind die ärztlichen Auskünfte eine wichtige Grundlage für die Beurteilung der Frage, welche Arbeitsleistungen der versicherten Person no ch zugemutet werden kön nen (BGE 125 V 256 E. 4 mit Hinweisen; AHI 2002 S. 70 E. 4b/cc). 2. 2.1 Die Beschwerdegegnerin erwog in den angefochtenen Verfügungen (Urk. 2, Urk. 7/2) , gestützt auf die medizinischen Abklärungen sei die Beschwerdeführe rin seit November 2013 in ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit erheblich eingeschränkt . In der angestammten Tätigkeit als Treuhänderin bestehe noch ein e 60 % ige Arbeitsfähigkeit . Es sei davon auszugehen, dass die Beschwerdeführerin ohne gesundheitliche Beeinträchtigung bei der Y._ AG im Jahr 2014 ein Einkommen von Fr. 109‘649.75 erzielt hätte. G estützt auf die vom Bundes amt für Statistik periodisch herausgegebenen Lohnstrukturerhebungen (LSE) sei von einem Invalideneinkommen von Fr. 54‘322.80 auszugehen . Die Beschwer degegnerin ermittelte somit ein en Invalid i tätsgrad von 50 % und sprach der Beschwerdeführerin nach Ablauf des Wartejahres eine halbe Rente zu . 2.2 Die Beschwerdeführerin brachte dagegen in den Beschwerde schrift en vom 30. Oktober und 26. November 2015 (Urk. 1 , Urk. 7/1 ) im Wesentlichen vor , sie habe bei der Y._ AG mehr verdient als von der Beschwerdegeg nerin angenommen, weshalb ihr Valideneinkommen entsprechend zu erhöhen sei. Beim Invalideneinkommen sei sodann zu beachten, dass auch bei einer ver bleibenden Arbeitsfähigkeit von 60 % lohnmindernde Faktoren zu berücksichti gen und die Tabel lenlöhne dementsprechend herabzusetzen seien. Dass sie nur noch im Rahmen einer Teilzeittätigkeit und zudem ohne Ressourcen für Über stunden einsetzbar sei, wirke sich lohnmindernd aus. Zudem benötige sie mehr Zeit für Kundenbesuche und könne nur noch Kunden besuchen, die über roll stuhlgerechte Räume verfügen würden. Sie sei sodann aufgrund ihrer Mobili tätseinschränkung auch während der Anwesenheit im Büro langsamer, was die Leistung während der Präsenzzeit von 60 % senke. Zusätzlich sei sie auf die Unterstützung durch Mitarbeiter ang ewiesen . Es sei daher ein behinderungsbe dingter Abzug vom Tabellenlohn im Umfang von 25 % zu gewähren. Da eine Diskriminierung durch Statistik vorliege, sei allenfalls sogar ein höherer A bzug vorzunehmen . Ausserdem seien vom so ermittelten Invalide neinkommen invali ditätsbedingte K osten für den Arbeitsweg ab z uziehen. 2.3 Mit Beschwerdeantwort vom 30. Dezember 2015 (Urk. 11) hielt die Beschwerde gegnerin fest, sie habe das Valideneinkommen in den angefochtenen Verfügun gen zu Unrecht gestützt auf das zuletzt erzielte Einkommen bei der Y._ AG ermittelt. Da mit Blick auf das Kündigungsschreiben vom 20. Februar 2014 davon auszugehen sei, dass dieses Arbeitsverhältnis aus wirt schaftlichen Gründen aufgelöst worden sei, hätte für das Valideneinkommen ebenfalls auf statistische Werte abgestellt werden müssen. Da die Beschwerde führerin in der angestammten Tätigkeit als Treuhänderin weiterhin zu 60 % arbeitsfähig sei – was durch die Beschwerdeführerin nicht bestritten werde – seien somit beide Vergleichseinkommen anhand derselben Grundlagen zu ermitteln. Demzufolge könne ein Prozentvergleich vorgenommen werden, womit ein Invaliditätsgrad von 40 % resultiere und somit lediglich Anspruch auf eine Viertelsrente bestehe . Gründe für einen behinderungs bedingten Abzug seien keine ersichtlich, da sämtliche Einschränkungen bereits bei der Beurtei lung der Arbeitsfähigkeit berücksichtigt worden seien. Selbst wenn jedoch ein Abzug von 15 % gewährt würde, ergäbe sich kein höherer Rentenanspruch . 2.4 I m Anschluss an die Instruktionsverhandlung vom 24. Februar 2016 reichte die Beschwerdeführerin einen durch ihren behandelnden Arzt ausgefüllten Frage bogen vom 8. April 2016 ein (Urk. 19 , Urk. 20 /1) und machte unter Verweis auf diesen Arztb ericht im Wesentlichen geltend, die Beschwerdegegnerin sei zu Unrecht von einer 60%ig en Arbeitsfähigkeit ausgegangen. Ihre Arbeitsfähigkeit betrage lediglich 30 % . I m Übrigen sei bei der Ermittlung des Invalideneinkom mens zu berücksichtigen, dass sie alle ein bis zwei Jahre auf eine stationäre Rehabilitation von jeweils zwei bis drei Wochen angewiesen se i . 2.5 Stellungnehmend zum gerichtlichen Beschluss vom 25. April 2016 (Urk. 22) hielt die Beschwerdeführerin am 17. Mai 2016 (Urk. 24) sodann dafür , die medi zinische Beurteilung, wonach im Zeitpunkt der Verfügung eine 60%ige Arbeitsfähigkeit bestanden habe, beruhe auf einer unvol lständigen Sachver haltsabklärung . Die von der Beschwerdegegnerin eingeholten medizinischen Berichte würden zur Klärung der Streitfrage nicht genügen. Es handle sich bei den eingeholten Arztberichten um eher kurze Formulararztberichte. Die Beschwerdegegnerin hätte zusätzlich beruflich-erwerbliche Abklärungen vor nehmen müssen. Be i einer Abklärung vor Ort hätte sich die Beschwerdegegnerin ein Bild über die zusätzlich lohnwirksamen Auswirkungen bei der attestierten Teilarbeitsfähigkeit machen müssen. Sofern die Beschwerde nicht gutgeheissen werden könne, sei die Sache daher an die Beschwerdegegnerin zu weiteren Abklärungen zurückzuweisen. Des Weiteren brachte die Beschwerdeführerin vor , die Arbeitsstelle bei der Y._ AG sei ihr aus gesundheitlichen Gründen gekündigt worden. Ein Prozentvergleich sei daher unzulässig. Ein solcher sei im Übrigen auch nicht zulässig, da sie gesundheitlich nicht mehr in der Lage sei, die in der früheren Tätigkeit als Mandatsleiterin erforderlichen Überstunden zu leisten und Kun denbesuche zu machen (Urk. 24). 3. 3.1 3.1 .1 Prof. Dr. med. A._ , Klinik für Neurologie des B._ , attestierte nach einer am 7. November 2013 durch geführten Kontrolle ab diesem Datum eine 40%ige Arbeitsunfähigkeit ( Bericht vom 7. November 2013, Urk. 12/128/1). Die Beschwerdeführerin gab an , zu 100 % in einem Treuhand büro angestellt zu sein , wobei sie sich in diesem Pensum überfordert fühle und auf 60 % reduzieren möchte (Urk. 12/128/2). 3.1 .2 Zuhanden des Krankentaggeldversicherers hielt Prof. Dr. A._ am 26. März 2014 dafür, in der klinisch-neurologischen Untersuchung habe sich eine deutli che Muskelschwäche gezeigt, was mit der fortgeschrittenen lipomatösen Atro phie der Muskulatur übereinstimme. Anamnestisch habe sich nach der klini schen Erstmanifestation mit einer Schwäche in den Oberschenkeln und Beinen ein langsam progredienter Verlauf mit zunehmender Ausweitung der Symptome auf Schulter , Arme und Rumpf gezeigt. Klinisch zeigten sich Gesicht und Schlund sowie die kognitive Funktion nicht betroffen. Die Gehstrecke mit Hal ten betrage ungefähr fünf Meter. Die Beschwerdeführerin klage über vermin derte Mobilität durch die progrediente Muskelerkrankung, über Fussdeformitä ten sowie Rückenbeschwerden bei langem Sitzen. Sie sei in der bisherigen Tätigkeit als Treuhänderin bezogen auf ein 100%-Pensum aufgrund massiv verminderter Mobilität und Muskelkraft, vermehrter Erschöpfbarkeit sowie Schmerzen bei längerem Sitzen aktuell zu 60 % arbeitsfähig . In Zukunft sei mit einem weiteren Rückgang der Arbeitsfähigkeit zu rechnen (Urk. 12/136/5). 3 .1 .3 Gegenüber der Beschwerdegegnerin hielt Prof. Dr. A._ stellungnehmend zur Arbeitsfähigkeit mit Bericht vom 14. Juli 2014 (Urk. 12/146) dafür, die Beschwerdeführerin sei in der zuletzt ausgeübten Tätigkeit als Treuhänderin seit mindestens November 2013 bis auf weiteres zu 40 % arbeitsunfähig . Dies auf grund einer massiv verminderten Mobilität und Muskelkraft, einer vermehrten Erschöpfbarkeit sowie aufgrund von Schmerzen bei längerem Sitzen. Die Beschwerdeführerin sei in der bisherigen Tätigkeit noch zu 60 % arbeitsfähig in einem zeitlich flexibel gestalteten Rahmen (Urk. 12/146/5) . 3.1 .4 PD Dr. med. univ. C._ , Facharzt für Neurologie, Regionaler Ärztlicher Dienst (RAD) , erachtete in Beurteilung der Aktenlage am 22. August 2014 (Urk. 12/177/3 f.) die Einschätzung der behandelnden Ärzte, wonach die Beschwerdeführerin in der bisherigen Tätigkeit als Treuhänderin noch zu 60 % arbeitsfähig sei, als nachvollziehbar . 3.1 .5 Die Hausärztin der Beschwerdeführerin, Dr. med. D._ , FMH für Allge meinmedizin, berichtete am 27. November 2014 zuhanden der Beschwerdegeg nerin (Urk. 12/171), gemäss der Beschwerdeführerin habe anlässlich der letzten Kontrolle im Februar 2014 eine 60%ige Arbeitsfähigkeit bestanden. Die Arbeits unfähigkeit werde vom B._ attestiert . Die Beschwerdeführerin sei als Treuhän derin tätig und diese Arbeit sei , soweit ihr bekannt , als solche noch zumutbar (Urk. 12/171/4). 3.2 Wenn die Beschwerdegegnerin gestützt auf diese Arztberichte davon ausging, dass die Beschwerdeführerin in der angestammten Tätigkeit zu 60 % arbeitsfä hig sei (E. 2.1), ist dies nicht zu beanstanden. So hielten die Ärzte übereinstim mend fest, dass noch eine 60%ige Arbeitsfähigkeit in der angestammten Tätig keit bestehe. Auch die Krankentaggeldversicherung ging von einer 60 %igen Arbeitsfähigkeit respektive einer 40%igen Arbeitsunfähigkeit in der ange stammten Tätigkeit aus und erbrachte entsprechende Taggeldleistungen (Urk. 12/231/66 ; siehe Abrechnung en bis Ende September 2015, Urk. 12/231/65 , Urk. 12/224/4 ). Dies wurde denn von der Beschwerdeführerin – soweit ersicht lich – auch nie bemängelt. Die Beschwerdeführerin gab selber wiederholt an, zu 60 % arbeitsfähig zu sein, so beispielsweise anlässlich der Anmeldung im März 2014 ( Urk. 12/183), im Rahmen eines Gesuches um bauliche Massnahmen für den neuen Arbeitsplatz im März 2014 (Urk. 12/117) , im Rahmen des Standort gespräches im April 2014 (Urk. 12/127/3 f. ), sowie im Rahmen der Abklärungen für Hilfsmittel im Zusammenhang mit dem Fahrzeug im Juli 2014 (Urk. 12/156). Auch im Vorbescheidverfahren reichte sie schliesslich keine abweichenden medizinischen Beurteilungen zu den Akten , sondern legte ihren Ausführungen ausdrücklich eine medizinisch attestierte Arbeitsfähigkeit von 60 % zugrunde (Urk. 12/188/3 , Urk. 12/204/3 f. ). Dass die Beschwerdegegnerin trotz medizinischen übereinstimmenden Beurteilun gen der Arbeitsfähigkeit weitere Abklärungen zur Arbeitsfähigkeit, namentlich eine Abklärung vor Ort, hätte vornehmen müssen – wie die Beschwerdeführerin im vorliegenden Verfahren in der Stellungnahme vom 17. Mai 2016 nunmehr einwendet (Urk. 24 S. 4) - ist nicht einsichtig. 3.3 Soweit die Beschwerdeführerin nun nach durchgeführter Instruktionsver handlung vom 24. Februar 2016 einen von Prof. Dr. A._ am 8. April 2016 ausgefüllten Fragebogen einreicht (Urk. 20/1) , mit welchem ihr eine Arbeits un fähigkeit von 70 % attestiert wird , vermag dies zu keiner anderen Beurteilung zu führen. Prof. Dr. A._ hält darin , bezugnehmend auf die von ihm mit einem Bericht vom 21. Januar 2015 attestierte 60%ige Arbeitsfähigkeit (Urk. 20/1 S. 2 unten) und davon abweichend , dafür , die Arbeitsfähigkeit betrage 30 % bei einer zumutbaren Präsenzzeit von 60 % und einer während dieser Präsenzzeit um 50 % verminderte n Leistungsfähigkeit . Eine Begründung dafür, weshalb Prof. Dr. A._ die Arbeitsfähigkeit der Beschwerdeführerin nunmehr weit geringer einschätzen sollte, als bisher von ihm attestiert und von der Beschwer deführerin wiederholt bestätigt (vgl. oben), lässt sich dem Schreiben nicht ent nehmen, weshalb diese Einschätzung - sollte damit eine rückwirkende Ände rung der Arbeitsfähigkeit bescheinigt werden - angesichts der oben angeführten übereinstimmenden Berichte und der übrigen Aktenlage nicht nachvollziehbar wäre. Es drängt sich denn vielmehr die Vermutung auf, dass der Fragenkatalog die aktuelle Beurteilung des behandelnden Arztes wiedergibt. Die gegenwärtige gesundheitliche Situation der Beschwerdeführerin bildet jedoch nicht Gegen stand des vorliegenden Verfahrens, sondern wäre allenfalls im Rahmen einer Revision zu überprüfen. Es besteht damit kein Anlass, von der Beurteilung, wonach die Arbeitsfähigkeit – zumindest im Zeitpunkt der angefochtenen Ver fügungen - 60 % betrug , abzuweichen , zumal die von Prof. Dr. A._ genannten Einschränkungen (lang samer aufgrund Mobilitätseinschränkung, verminderte Muskelkraft) bereits Grund für die attestierte Arbeitsunfähigkeit von 40 % war (vgl. E. 3.1.1 ff . ) . Wenn die Beschwerdeführerin sodann anführt , die Referentin habe anlässlich der Instruktionsverhandlung erwähnt, dass sich der medizinische Sachverhalt als allenfalls ungenügend abgeklärt erweisen könnte (Urk. 24 S. 4), i st darauf hinzuweisen, dass das Gericht der Erfahrungstatsache Rechnung tragen soll, dass behandelnde Ärzte im Hinblick auf ihre auftragsrechtliche Vertrauensstel lung in Zweifelsfällen eher zu Gunsten ihrer Patienten aussagen und oftmals nicht alleine gestützt auf die Einschätzung der behandelnden Ärzte Leistungen zugesprochen werden können ( BGE 125 V 351 E. 3b/cc, BGE 135 V 465 E. 4.5 ) . Vorliegend lassen jedoch die übereinstimmenden ärztlichen Beurteilungen eine abschliessende Beurteilung bis zum Verfügungszeitpunkt zu (E. 3.2), weshalb sich diesbezügliche gutachterliche Abklärungen erübrigen. 3.4 Es ist somit gestützt auf die vorliegende Aktenlage mit dem Beweis - grad der über wiegenden Wahrscheinlichkeit erstellt, dass die Beschwerde - führerin – zumindest noch im Oktober 2015 - in der angestammten Tätigkeit zu 60 % arbeitsfähig war . 4. 4.1 Zu prüfen bleibt anhand des Einkommensvergleichs (E. 1.3 ), wie sich die einge schränkte Leistungsfähigkeit der Beschwerdeführerin in erwerblicher Hinsicht auswirkt. 4.2 Vorliegend kann offen bleiben, ob der Beschwerdeführerin aus wirtschaftlichen oder gesundheitlichen Gründen gekündigt wurde . Da die Beschwerdeführerin in der angestammten Tätigkeit zumindest zu 60 % arbeitsfähig ist (E. 3.4) , läuft der Einkommensvergleich auf einen Prozentvergleich hinaus (Urteil des Bundesge richts 8C_558/2015 vom 22. Dezember 2015, E. 4.2.6) und es resultiert eine Erwerbseinbusse von 40 %. 4.3 Lohnmindernde Faktoren liegen entgegen der Ansicht der Beschwerdeführerin keine vor. Einerseits wirkt sich bei Frauen Teilzeit arbeit proportional eher lohnerhöhend aus (Urteil des Bundesgerichts 8C_379/2011 vom 26. August 2011, E. 4.2.2.2). Dass die Beschwerdeführerin im Übrigen früher regelmässig Überstunden geleistet hätte und nun aufgrund des Teilzeitpensums diesbezüglich eine zusätzliche Lohneinbusse erleide n würde (Urk. 1 S. 6 , Urk. 24 S. 5 ), ergibt sich nicht aus den Akten. Was die als lohnmindernd geltend gemachten Einschränkungen in der Mobilität (Urk. 1 S. 6) betreffen, so sind diese bereits in der attestierten Verminderung der Arbeitsfähigkeit auf 60 % enthalten, weshalb sich eine erneute Berücksichti gung als lohnmindernder Faktor verbietet ( vgl. E. 3.1.1 ff. ). Soweit sodann gewisse Tätigkeiten , wie schwere Bücher aus dem Gestell zu holen, Kunden mit Kaffee zu bedienen oder schwere Pakete auf die Post zu bringen (Urk. 1 S. 7 ) , nicht mehr möglich sein sollte n , i st darauf hinzuweisen, dass es der Beschwerdeführerin zumutbar ist, diese Tätigkeiten zu delegieren resp. den Arbeits platz entsprechend einzurichten. Dass dies zu einer relevanten zusätzlichen Einbusse führen würde, erscheint nicht nachvollziehbar, zumal davon au s gegangen werden darf, dass bei der Tätigkeit als qualifizierte Treu händerin – unabhängig vom Gesundheitszustand - ein Sekretariat zur Verfü gung steht . D ie Beschwerdeführerin macht weiter invali ditätsbedingte Kosten im Zusam menhang mit dem privaten Fahrzeug geltend (Urk. 1 S. 10 ff. , Urk. 19 S. 2 , Urk. 24 S. 6 ) . Angesichts dessen, dass d ie Tramverbindung zwischen Wohn- und Arbeitsort durchgehend rollstuhlgängig ist (vgl. www.vbz.ch/handicap ) - was denn von der Beschwerdeführerin auch nicht bestritten w ird - erscheint es nicht einsichtig , weshalb ihr die Benützu ng dieser öffentlichen Verkehrs mittel nicht zumutbar wäre. Wenn Prof. Dr. A._ auf Ersuchen der Beschwerdeführerin am 8. April 2016 nunmehr dafürhält, auf grund der körperlichen Einschränkungen und de utlich verminderten körperli chen Belastbarkeit sei die regelmässige Benutzung von öffentlichen Verkehrs mitteln für den Arbeitsweg nicht zumutbar, unter anderem auch, weil dadurch die für die Erwerbstätigkeit zu verwendenden körperlichen Ressourcen einge schränkt würden (Urk. 24 S. 3), ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass Grund für die Attestierung der eingeschränkten Arbeitsfähigkeit bereits die verminderte Mobi lität, Muskelkraft und vermehrte Erschöpfbarkeit war (E. 3.1.1 ff.) und entspre chende Einschränkungen somit bereits in der attestierten Arbeitsunfähigkeit mitberücksichtigt sind. Sodann ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass der Beschwerde führerin bereits invaliditätsbedingte Umbaukosten am privaten Fahrzeug ver gütet wurden (Urteil des Sozialversicherungsgerichts IV.2015.00499 vom 2 2. September 2015), jährliche Amortisationsbeiträge ausgerichtet werden ( Urk. 12/74, Urk. 12/230/3 f.) und ohnehin nur invaliditätsbedingte Mehrkosten (unter Abzug allgemein üblicher Kosten) zu berücksichtigen wären. Des Weiteren bringt die Beschwerdeführerin – unter Verweis auf den Bericht Prof. Dr. A._ (Urk. 21 S. 3) - vor, sie sei alle ein bis zwei Jahre auf eine statio näre Rehabilitation von jeweils zwei bis drei Wochen angewiesen. Diese regel mässigen Abwesenheiten würden sich noch einmal zusätzlich lohnmindernd auswirken (Urk. 19 S. 2). Aus den Akten ergibt sich nicht, dass ein solcher Rehabilitationsaufenthalt bisher stattgefunden hätte (vgl. bspw. Urk. 12/171/3), was die Beschwerdeführerin denn auch selber nicht geltend macht. Bislang sind somit auch keine Lohneinbussen entstanden. Dementsprechend können selbst redend auch keine berücksichtigt werden. Soweit die Beschwerdeführerin schliesslich eine Diskriminierung durch Statistik und damit weitere lohnmindernde Faktoren geltend macht (Urk. 1 S. 8 ff.), ist sie auf das zur Publikation vorgesehene Urteil des Bundesgerichts 9C_632/2015 vom 4. April 2016 zu verweisen. 5. Zusam menfassend ergibt sich, dass der Invaliditätsgrad 40 % beträgt. Die ange fochtene n Verfügung en vom 1. und 29. Oktober 2015 sind deshalb aufzuheben, un d es ist festzustellen, dass die Beschwerdeführer in nach Ablauf des Warte jahres anfangs November 2014 lediglich Anspruch auf eine Viertelsrente hat . Dies führt zur Abweisung der Beschwerde. 6. Da es um die Bewilligung oder Verweigerung von Versicherungsleistungen geht, ist das Verfahren kostenpflichtig. Die Gerichtskosten sind nach dem Verfahrens aufwand und unabhängig vom Streitwert festzulegen ( Art. 69 Abs. 1 bis IVG) und auf Fr. 8 00.-- anzusetzen. Entsprechend dem Ausgang des Verfahrens sind sie de r unterliegenden Beschwerdeführer in aufzuerlegen. Das Gericht erkennt: 1. Die Beschwerde wird abgewiesen . Die angefochtenen Verfügungen vom 1. und 29. Oktober 2015 werden mit der Feststellung abgeändert, dass die Beschwerdeführe rin ab 1. November 2014 Anspruch auf eine Viertelsrente hat . 2. Die Gerichtskosten von Fr. 800 .-- werden der Beschwerdeführerin auferlegt. Rechnung und Einzahlungsschein werden der Kostenpflichtigen nach Eintritt der Rechtskraft zuge stellt. 3. Zustellung gegen Empfangsschein an: Rechtsanwältin Stephanie Schwarz Sozialversicherungsanstalt des Kantons Zürich, IV-Stelle , unter Beilage des Doppels der Urk. 24 Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen sowie an: Gerichtskasse (im Dispositiv nach Eintritt der Rechtskraft) 4. Gegen diesen Entscheid kann innert 30 Tagen seit der Zustellung beim Bundesgericht Beschwerde eingereicht werden ( Art. 82 ff. in Verbindung mit Art. 90 ff. des Bundes gesetzes über das Bundesgericht, BGG). Die Frist steht während folgender Zeiten still: vom siebten Tag vor Ostern bis und mit dem siebten Tag nach Ostern, vom 1 5. Juli bis und mit 1 5. August sowie vom 1 8. Dezember bis und mit dem 2. Januar ( Art. 46 BGG). Die Beschwerdeschrift ist dem Bundesgericht, Schweizerhofquai 6, 6004 Luzern, zuzu stellen. Die Beschwerdeschrift hat die Begehren, deren Begründung mit Angabe der Beweismit tel und die Unterschrift des Beschwerdeführers oder seines Vertreters zu enthalten; der angefochtene Entscheid sowie die als Beweismittel angerufenen Urkunden sind beizulegen, soweit die Partei sie in Händen hat ( Art. 42 BGG). Sozialversicherungsgericht des Kantons Zürich Der Vorsitzende Die Gerichtsschreiberin Hurst F. Brühwiler
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Alexander Gillespie "Alex" Raymond, född 2 oktober 1909 i New Rochelle, New York, död 6 september 1956 i Westport, Connecticut, var en amerikansk serietecknare. Han var en av 1900-talets mest stilbildande och viktigaste serieskapare, och skapade serierna Blixt Gordon, Djungel-Jim, Agent X9 och Rip Kirby. Biografi Tidig karriär Raymond var äldst i en syskonskara bestående av fem bröder och en syster. Alla sex gillade att teckna. 1929 började Raymond sin professionella karriär som tecknare som assistent till Russ Westover på dennes serie Tillie the Toiler. Året efter blev han Chic Youngs assistent på dennes Blondie. Från att under sitt första år på Blondie mest ägnat sig åt att teckna bakgrunder, kan man från mitten av 1931 kan tydligt se spår av Raymonds stil hos seriens olika bifigurer. Ungefär samtidigt började Raymond dessutom arbeta för Chic Youngs bror, Lyman Young, som gjorde serien Tim Tyler’s Luck. Raymond arbetade fortfarande anonymt 1933 när chefen för King Features Syndicate Joseph V. Connolly skickade ut ett PM till sina anställda där han efterlyste en ny science fiction-serie som kunde ta upp kampen med den konkurrerande serien Buck Rogers och dessutom en djungelserie som kunde matcha Hal Fosters serie Tarzan. Raymond satte igång att rita sina egna serier på lediga stunder under hösten 1933. Blixt Gordon Sålunda debuterade serien Blixt Gordon (Flash Gordon) den 7 januari 1934 i färg i de amerikanska seriebilagorna som medföljer med de amerikanska morgontidningarna på söndagarna. Redan från början är det full fart på äventyret. En underlig främmande planet rusar mot jorden – bara ett mirakel kan rädda oss! Blixt Gordon och flickvännen Dale Arden försöker tillsammans med vetenskapsmannen doktor Hans Zarkov rädda jorden genom genskjuta planeten i en rymdraket. Den tredje veckan visar det sig att det är den ondsinte diktatorn Ming på planeten Mongo som ligger bakom det hela. Och nu börjar en sju och halvt år lång kamp om herraväldet över planeten Mongo innan Ming slutligen störtas. Resan dit kantas av fruktansvärda drakar, svekfulla förrädare, jättar, dvärgar, vackra prinsessor och fantasifull framtidsteknik. Raymonds teckningar fulländades allt mer från vecka till vecka. Från början kan hans stil karaktäriseras som något valhänt och svulstig. Men efter drygt tre år är hans linjer säkra, skuggor och muskler sitter där de ska. Han har en elegant illustratörsstil som bildat skola för mängder av efterföljare. Den så kallade Raymond-stilen står i bjärt kontrast till den andra samtida förhärskande Caniff-stilen, uppkallad efter den amerikanske serieskaparen Milton Caniff (Terry och piraterna och Steve Canyon) som tvärtemot skapade spänning med hjälp av kontrast mellan svarta och ljusa ytor. Den sista Blixt Gordon-söndagssida som Raymond ritade publicerades den 30 april 1944. Själv hade redan två månader tidigare tagit värvning i marinen och han tjänstgjorde någonstans i Stilla Havet. Hollywood var inte sen att haka på intresset för Blixt Gordon. Bara två efter serien startat hade den första filmserien premiär där huvudrollen spelades av den förre olympiske guldmedaljören i simning Larry ”Buster” Crabbe. Ytterligare två filmserier producerades 1938 och 1940. Den senare, Blixt Gordon och Purpurdöden (Flash Gordon Conquers the Universe) har visats på svensk TV två gånger. Under 1954 kunde man i amerikansk TV se en 39 avsnitt lång TV-serie om Blixt Gordon. Den senaste filmatiseringen är från 1980 då den elake Ming spelades av Max von Sydow och musiken framfördes av rockgruppen Queen. En ny film är planerad till 2006. Djungel-Jim Samma datum som Blixt Gordon gjorde entré startade också Raymonds andra serie Djungel-Jim, placerad ovanför Blixt Gordon utgjorde den en tredjedel av sidan (Blixt Gordon tog upp de andra två tredjedelarna). Jim Bradley, som är huvudfigurens riktiga namn, var en äventyrare och storviltsjägare klart inspirerad av den verklige äventyraren Frank Buck. Handlingen var till en början inte så avancerad; Jim ställdes öga mot öga med diverse bestar som tigrar, lejon, gorillor, ja till och med en haj! När serieförfattaren Don Moore tog över manuset till serien i slutet av 1934 blev det bättre ordning. Men jämfört med Blixt Gordon kom Djungel-Jim alltid tvåa i jämförelse. Raymond lämnade serien i början av 1944. Agent X9 Som om det inte var nog att teckna två serier samtidigt åtog sig Raymond även arbetet att teckna King Features Syndicates nya deckarserie Agent X9 (Secret Agent X-9) som startade den 22 januari 1934. Till skillnad från Blixt Gordon och Djungel-Jim, som bara publicerades på söndagarna, var X9 en dagsstrippserie med fortsättning måndag till lördag. Syndikatets idé var att ta upp kampen med Chester Goulds mycket populära polisserie Dick Tracy som startat tre år tidigare. För att försäkra sig om en succé anlitades ingen mindre än deckarförfattaren Dashiell Hammett (Riddarfalken från Malta) som manusförfattare. Hammett hade vid denna tidpunkt fem framgångsrika romaner bakom sig (och fler skulle det inte bli). Uppdraget som manusförfattare till Agent X9 kom att bli bland det sista som Hammett någonsin skrev. Inledningsberättelsen (som varade sju och en halv månad!) visade dock tydligt att det var skillnad på att skriva en roman och en fortsättningsserie till dagstidningar. Det blev en snårig berättelse, där den hemliga hjälten bekämpade organiserad brottslighet och läsarna hade svårt att hänga med. Raymond kom bara att göra sex avsnitt av Agent X9 innan han lämnade över till andra tecknare i slutet av 1935. Arbetsbördan med att samtidigt rita tre serier blev helt enkelt övermäktig. Hammett stannade å sin sida bara ett år, innan andra (oftast anonyma) författare tog vid. Skaparen av romanerna om Helgonet, Leslie Charteris skrev serien under ett år 1935 – 1936. Rip Kirby När Raymond återvände till det civila efter andra världskriget hade han planer på att ta upp Blixt Gordon igen. Men tidningssyndikatet hade redan tecknat ett fyraårskontrakt med tecknaren Austin Briggs för serien. Istället gav man Raymond möjlighet att skapa en ny egen serie. En serie som han dessutom själv skulle få äga rättigheterna till. Resultatet blev dagsstrippserien med amatördeckaren Rip Kirby (på svenska även kallad Peter Falk i vissa dagstidningar) som hade premiär den 4 mars 1946. Kirby var åtminstone delvis en ny typ av hjälte för Raymond. Där Blixt Gordon hade använt sin fysiska styrka, tog Kirby sin hjärna till hjälp. Rip Kirby var i mångt och mycket Raymonds eget alter ego; båda var återvändande från kriget, de spelade golf, rökte pipa och körde snabba sportbilar. För att öka på Kirbys intelligens försågs han med glasögon. Hans betjänt, Cecil Desmond, var en före detta engelsk inbrottstjuv med kassaskåp som specialitet. Bland de övriga i det fasta persongalleriet märks Kirbys flickvän, den vackra, blonda flickvännen Honey Dorian och hennes mörka rival Pagan Lee. Ärkeskurken Mangler rymmer ofta och gärna ur fängelset för att ställa till det för Kirby. 1949 erhöll Raymond seriepriset Reuben Award från det amerikanska National Cartoonist Society. Och nu hade Raymonds stil förändrats så att den med fog kan kallas fotorealistisk. Manusförfattaren Ward Greene som varit Raymond behjälplig tröttnade på att arbeta i det fördolda och 1952 tog istället Fred Dickenson över författandet. Rip Kirby publiceras sedan 1974 i svenska Agent X9. Död På eftermiddagen den 6 september 1956 besökte Raymond sin serietecknande kollega Stan Drake (Eva & Jag) (The Heart of Juliet Jones). De bestämde sig för en provtur i Drakes nya sportbil. Efter ett tag tog Raymond över ratten och accelererade. Drake bad honom att sakta ned, men Raymond svarade inte utan körde rakt förbi en stoppskylt och hann sedan inte väja på den hala vägen. Bilen flög 20 meter genom luften och båda kastades ur bilen. Raymond avled omedelbart, Drake klarade sig som genom ett mirakel undan med avslitna öron och ett flertal frakturer. Efteråt kom det fram att Raymonds privatliv låg i spillror. Han hade separerat från sin fru och att han hade vårdats på sjukhus fyra gånger de senaste månaderna efter bilolyckor. Raymond blev 46 år. Betydelse och eftermäle Raymond bildade tidigt skola för andra serietecknare. Alla de som övertog hans egna serier var dugliga och i en del fall mycket bra tecknare. Men ingen har lyckats överträffa Raymond. 1940 startades den svartvita dagsstrippversionen av Blixt Gordon tecknad av Austin Briggs. Till skillnad från söndagsversionen, som nästan undantagslöst hade berättande texter inne i rutor (samma berättarteknik som exempelvis Prins Valiant har), så hade den dagliga versionen istället pratbubblor som de flesta andra serier. Samme Briggs övertog som redan nämnts ovan även söndagsversionen i färg 1944, samtidigt lades den dagliga serien ned. Briggs efterträddes i sin tur av Mac Raboy 1948. Dan Barry återupptog dagsstrippsversionen från 1951 och övertog även söndagsversionen när Mac Raboy dog 1967. Barry stannade på serien ända till 1990. Serien övertogs då av Bruce Jones (manus) och Ralph Reese (teckningar). 1993 lades den dagliga versionen ner igen. Mellan januari 1996 och 2003 tecknades och skrevs söndagsserien av Jim Keefe. Efter ett kontraktsbråk mellan Keefe och King Features Syndicate publiceras för närvarande repriser av serien i de amerikanska söndagsbilagorna. Agent X9 övertogs först 1935 av Charles Flanders (senare King vid gränspolisen). I rask takt följde sedan tecknarna Nicholas Afonsky och Austin Briggs. Den som tecknat serien längst var Mel Graff som gjorde den 1940 – 1960. Graff hade en helt annan, mindre realistisk teckningsstil än Raymond. Graff gav den hittills anonyme agenten namnet Phil Corrigan och gifte dessutom bort honom. Graffs version av serien publicerades i början av 1970-talet i den svenska serietidningen Fantomen fast då under namnet Agent Kelly. 1975 flyttade serien över till serietidningen Agent X9 och man behöll namnet Agent Kelly för att läsarna inte skulle förväxla serien med senare versioner av serien Agent X9 som också publicerades i tidningen. Efter Graff tog tecknaren Bob Lubbers (alias Bob Lewis) över. Lubbers förde serien gradvis tillbaka mot en realistisk stil. 1967 övertog Raymonds främste lärjunge Al Williamson serien (med manus av Archie Goodwin). Williamson tecknade serien fram till 1980, då den betydligt mindre begåvade George Evans tog över manteln och fortsatte till serien slutligen lades ner den 10 februari 1996. Vid Raymonds frånfälle fanns det bara material som räckte i tre veckor färdigställt för Rip Kirby. Man fick snabbt utse en ersättare och valet föll på John Prentice som gjorde ett gott jobb att imitera Raymond till en början. Men efterhand blev hans stil alltmer slarvig och mekanisk, samtidigt som Fred Dickenson hade en osviklig förmåga att upprepa sina manus om och om igen. Prentice stannade på serien ända till 1999 då den lades ner den 26 juni. Det finns mängder av andra tecknare på helt andra serier som är mer eller mindre inspirerade av Raymond. Al McWilliams tecknade serierna Tvillingplaneterna, Davy Jones och Toppreportrarna (de två senare har gått i svenska Agent X9) i en närliggande stil. Andra värda att nämna är engelsmännen John McLusky som under 1960-talet ritade serieversionen av James Bond och Harry Bishop som gjorde Matt Dillon (Gun Law) serieversionen av TV-serien Krutrök (Gunsmoke). Referenser Amerikanska serieskapare Födda 1909 Avlidna 1956 Män
fi	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 32003R0749 Komission asetus (EY) N:o 749/2003, annettu 28 päivänä huhtikuuta 2003, asetuksessa (EY) N:o 1279/98 säädettyjä naudanlihan tariffikiintiöitä koskevien, huhtikuussa 2003 esitettyjen tuontitodistushakemusten hyväksyttävyydestä Puolan tasavallan, Unkarin tasavallan, Tšekin tasavallan, Slovakian, Bulgarian ja Romanian osalta Virallinen lehti nro L 106 , 29/04/2003 s. 0031 - 0031 Komission asetus (EY) N:o 749/2003,annettu 28 päivänä huhtikuuta 2003,asetuksessa (EY) N:o 1279/98 säädettyjä naudanlihan tariffikiintiöitä koskevien, huhtikuussa 2003 esitettyjen tuontitodistushakemusten hyväksyttävyydestä Puolan tasavallan, Unkarin tasavallan, Tsekin tasavallan, Slovakian, Bulgarian ja Romanian osaltaEUROOPAN YHTEISÖJEN KOMISSIO, jokaottaa huomioon Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuksen,ottaa huomioon neuvoston asetuksissa (EY) N:o 2290/2000, (EY) N:o 2433/2000, (EY) N:o 2434/2000, (EY) N:o 2851/2000 ja (EY) N:o 1408/2002 sekä neuvoston päätöksessä 2003/18/EY Bulgarialle, Tsekille, Slovakialle, Puolalle, Unkarille ja Romanialle säädettyjen naudanlihan tariffikiintiöiden soveltamista koskevien yksityiskohtaisten sääntöjen vahvistamisesta 19 päivänä kesäkuuta 1998 annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1279/98(1), sellaisena kuin se on viimeksi muutettuna asetuksella (EY) N:o 529/2003(2), ja erityisesti sen 4 artiklan 4 kohdan,sekä katsoo seuraavaa:Asetuksen (EY) N:o 1279/98 1 ja 2 artiklassa vahvistetaan Puolasta, Unkarista, Tsekin tasavallasta, Slovakiasta, Romaniasta ja Bulgariasta peräisin olevien tiettyjen naudanliha-alan tuotteiden painona ilmaistu vastaava lihamäärä, joka voidaan tuoda erityisedellytyksin 1 päivästä huhtikuuta 30 päivään kesäkuuta 2003. Unkarista, Tsekin tasavallasta ja Romaniasta peräisin olevien tiettyjen naudanliha-alan tuotteiden määrät, joille tuontitodistuksia on haettu, ovat sellaiset, että hakemukset voidaan hyväksyä kokonaisuudessaan. Puolasta peräisin olevia tiettyjä naudanliha-alan tuotteita koskevia hakemuksia on kuitenkin vähennettävä suhteellisesti mainitun asetuksen 4 artiklan 4 kohdan mukaisesti,ON ANTANUT TÄMÄN ASETUKSEN:1 artiklaKaikki asetuksessa (EY) N:o 1279/98 tarkoitettujen kiintiöiden mukaisesti 1 päivän huhtikuuta ja 30 päivän kasäkuuta 2003 väliselle ajanjaksolle esitetyt tuontitodistushakemukset hyväksytään seuraavasti:a) 100 prosenttia haetuista määristä CN-koodeihin 0201 ja 0202 kuuluvien Unkarista ja Tsekin tasavallasta peräisin olevien tuotteiden osalta;b) 100 prosenttia haetuista määristä CN-koodeihin 0201 , 0202 , 1602 50 31 , 1602 50 39 ja 1602 50 80 kuuluvien Romaniasta peräisin olevien tuotteiden osalta;c) 1,23324 prosenttia haetuista määristä CN-koodeihin 0201 , 0202 ja 1602 50 kuuluvien Puolasta peräisin olevien tuotteiden osalta.2 artiklaTämä asetus tulee voimaan 29 päivänä huhtikuuta 2003.Tämä asetus on kaikilta osiltaan velvoittava, ja sitä sovelletaan sellaisenaan kaikissa jäsenvaltioissa.Tehty Brysselissä 28 päivänä huhtikuuta 2003.Komission puolestaJ. M. Silva RodríguezMaatalouden pääjohtaja(1) EYVL L 176, 20.6.1998, s. 12.(2) EUVL L 78, 25.3.2003, s. 5.
en	other	N/A	Matter of Town of Ipswich, No. 2002-109 (DALA 2009) \| Mass.gov Decision Matter of Town of Ipswich, No. 2002-109 (DALA 2009) 2002-109 Petitioner: Department of Environmental Protection Respondent: Town of Ipswich Administrative Magistrate: Natalie S. Monroe Remand Order This appeal involves a water withdrawal permit that the Department of Environmental Protection (the "DEP") issued to the Town of Ipswich under the Water Management Act, G.L. c. 21G, and its implementing regulations, 310 CMR 36.00. For the reasons set forth below, I remand the permit to the DEP to calculate the safe yield of the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin in compliance with G.L. c. 21G, §§ 7, 11 and 310 CMR 36.31. I also instruct the DEP to determine whether the combined volume of existing, permitted and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield of the relevant water source. In 1985, the Legislature passed the Water Management Act, G.L. c. 21G (the "WMA" or the "Act"), which established a system for planning and managing water use and conservation in the Commonwealth. The WMA vested the Massachusetts Water Resources Commission with the authority to set the principles, policies and guidelines governing the system, while the DEP was charged with implementing the system. G.L. c. 21G, § 3. The WMA gave the DEP the authority to regulate all water withdrawals in excess of 100,000 gallons per day from a single "water source." G.L. c. 21G, § 4. The WMA defines a "water source" as any natural or artificial aquifer or body of surface water, including its watershed where ground and surface water sources are interconnected in a single hydrological system. Id. at § 2. Existing water users in 1985 were required to register with the DEP all existing water withdrawals above the threshold volume of 100,000 gallons per day. Id. at § 5. Those wishing to make a new water withdrawal over the threshold volume must obtain a water withdrawal permit from the DEP. Id. at § 7. The WMA further provides that when the DEP reviews a water withdrawal application, the agency must consider, among other things, the "safe yield" of the water source from which the water would be withdrawn. G.L. c. 21G, § 7. The Act defines "safe yield" as follows: the maximum dependable withdrawals that can be made continuously from a water source, including ground or surface water, during a period of years in which the probable driest period or period of greatest water deficiency is likely to occur; provided, however, that such dependability is relative and is a function of storage and drought probability. Id. at § 2. The Act further states that, [i]f the department finds that the combined volume of existing, permitted and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield of a water source ... it shall deny all applications for permits for withdrawals from that water source. Id. at § 11 (emphasis added). The Regulations similarly provide that every permit "shall be conditioned on at least the following: ... that the withdrawal in combination with other registered and permitted withdrawals shall not exceed the safe yield of the water source." 310 CMR 36.28(1)(j). See also 310 CMR 36.30(2) (the DEP "shall deny any and all permit applications" for a water source if the combined permitted, registered and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield of the water source). The WMA does not contain a procedure or formula for calculating the safe yield of a water source, but the Regulations do. They provide that, in computing safe yield, the DEP "may ... consider at least the following:" (a) minimum streamflow guidelines as developed by the Department of Environmental Management and the [Massachusetts Water Resources] Commission; (b) the water balance of the water source; (c) the hydrologic impacts of proposed, existing and permitted withdrawals; (d) the safe yield of any isolated or severely impacted subbasin within the water source; [and] (e) any additional applicable information. 310 CMR 36.31(1). The Regulations further provide that, "[i]n water sources deemed appropriate by the [DEP]," the agency shall use a "water streamflow analysis" to determine safe yield. 310 CMR 36.31(2). The "water streamflow analysis" utilizes three inputs: the average daily stream flows in the water source in the summers of 1980 and 1981, the size of the drainage area of the water source, and a "reference streamflow value" for the water source developed by the Water Resources Commission. Id. Finally, the Regulations provide that for purposes of calculating safe yield, a water source may be determined by the [DEP] to be either a river basin, or a hydrologically distinct portion thereof, dependent on information satisfactory to the [DEP] for the establishment of safe yield.... 310 CMR 36.03. On May 24, 2002, the DEP issued a water withdrawal permit to the Town of Ipswich authorizing the Town to withdraw 340,000 gallons of water per day from the Parker River basin. Before issuing the permit, the DEP did not calculate the safe yield of the Parker River basin or any "hydrologically distinct" sub-basin. See G.L. 21G, § 7; 310 CMR 36.03. Nor did the DEP determine whether "the combined volume of existing, permitted and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield of [the applicable] water source...." G.L. c. 21G, § 11. See also 310 CMR 36.28(1)(j); 310 CMR 36.30(2). On June 19, 2002, the petitioner, a group of ten citizens, filed this appeal to challenge several aspects of the permit, including the DEP's compliance with the safe yield requirements in the Act and Regulations. On November 8, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Mark Silverstein held a pre-hearing conference. Following the conference, ALJ Silverstein issued a pre-hearing conference report which, among other things, established a pre-hearing schedule and identified the following issues for adjudication: 1. (a) What are the streamflow requirements for maintaining interests protected by G.L. c. 21G in the Parker River Basin, including fisheries and water quality? (b) Does the permit reasonably protect these interests? 2. (a) What is the applicable safe yield? (b) Does the permit allow a water withdrawal in excess of the safe yield? 3. (a) What were the projected water demand and water requirements for the Town of Ipswich at the time the permit was issued? (b) Does the permit authorize a water withdrawal that is needed to meet the projected water demand and water requirements? 4. What permit conditions are needed to protect the Egypt River and the Ipswich River? See Pre-hearing Conference Report, dated November 12, 2002. On February 6, 2003, Administrative Law Judge Kristin Palace granted the parties' joint motion to stay the case to allow them to explore settlement. When more than two years had passed and no settlement had been reached, the stay was lifted. After ruling on motions to dismiss and for summary decision, I held a hearing from December 5, 2006 to December 7, 2006. The parties filed post-hearing briefs on February 21, 2007. During the hearing and in closing briefs, the parties continued to dispute the DEP's obligation to perform a safe yield calculation before issuing the permit. As part of this disagreement, the parties disputed whether the "water source" for the permit was the Parker River basin or one of its sub-watersheds, called the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. The DEP contended that, even though the permit states that the water source is the Parker River basin, the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin is the actual water source for the permitted withdrawals. The petitioner advocated for the Parker River basin, arguing both that the permit was issued for the Parker River basin and that the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin is not hydrologically distinct. On July 13, 2007, the Superior Court issued its decision in Town of Hamilton v. Department of Environmental Protection, C.A. No. 06-745 (Mass. Super. Ct., July 13, 2007). That case involved an appeal of a water withdrawal permit that the DEP had issued to the Town of Hamilton authorizing water withdrawals from the Ipswich River basin. In its decision, the Superior Court held that both the WMA and Regulations require the DEP to perform two "safe yield" functions before issuing a water withdrawal permit: (1) calculate the safe yield of the relevant water source; and (2) ensure that the combined volume of existing, permitted and proposed withdrawals does not exceed the safe yield of the water source. Slip op. at pp. 17-20. The Court explained that these are statutory and regulatory mandates that the DEP must follow prior to granting a permit. Id. The Court then remanded the matter to the DEP for a recalculation of the safe yield of the Ipswich River basin "as soon as is reasonably possible." Id. at 20. As previously discussed, the DEP has never calculated the safe yield of either the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. In light of Hamilton, therefore, I ordered the DEP to show cause why the Town's permit should not either be vacated or remanded to the agency to calculate safe yield. The show cause order also provided a schedule for the petitioner and the Town to respond to the order. For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that the Town's permit must be remanded to the DEP to (1) calculate the safe yield of either the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin; and (2) determine whether the combined volume of existing, permitted and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield of the relevant water source. The DEP maintains that the case should proceed to a final decision, despite the Superior Court's ruling in Hamilton. The agency contends that it could not calculate safe yield in this case because the Water Resources Commission (the "WRC") never approved a reference streamflow value for the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. The DEP states that, in any event, it properly issued the permit because it had no information that the Ipswich permit would exceed the safe yield of the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. It further states that, instead of computing safe yield, the agency considered comments from other state agencies and the public. The Town agrees with the DEP and asserts that this case should proceed to a final decision. It argues both that Hamilton is not binding precedent and also is distinguishable on the facts. It further maintains that the DEP was neither required nor permitted to calculate the safe yield of the water source in this case. The petitioner argues that the permit cannot be upheld because it was issued in contravention of the Act. It also disputes the DEP's claim that the agency could not calculate safe yield. While it agrees that the DEP did not have a reference streamflow value from the WRC, it maintains that the DEP could have used an alternate method to compute safe yield. Finally, the petitioner disagrees with the DEP's contention that there was no evidence that the Town's withdrawals would exceed the safe yield of the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. The petitioner's position is correct. A. The Permit Was Issued in Violation of the Act and Regulations. The Superior Court's ruling is clear and unequivocal: the DEP cannot issue a water withdrawal permit unless it both calculates the safe yield of the water source and ensures that the total withdrawals from that water source will not exceed the safe yield. Hamilton, slip op. at pp. 18-19. Despite the Town's argument to the contrary, the Superior Court's ruling concerning safe yield is binding on this tribunal. Moreover, the Court's ruling in Hamilton is consistent with established Massachusetts law. The WMA states that the DEP "shall" consider the safe yield of the water source at issue in the permit application and "shall deny" the application if the combined volume of existing, permitted and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield. G.L. c. 21G, §§ 7, 11. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that when the Legislature directs that an agency or other political subdivision "shall" act in a specified manner, actions taken contrary to the statutory directive are not lawful. See, e.g., Massachusetts Soc. of Graduate Physical Therapists, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Med., 330 Mass. 601, 603, 116 N.E.2d 264, 266 (1953) ("shall [is] a word of command"); Johnson v. District Atty. for the Northern Dist., 342 Mass. 212, 215, 172 N.E.2d 703, 705 (1961) ("The word 'shall' in a statute is commonly a word of imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion"). The statute need not explicitly state that noncompliance is unlawful. See, e.g., Phipps, 387 Mass. at 690 n.1, 443 N.E.2d at 117 n.1; Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609-10, 446 N.E.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1983). Thus, under Massachusetts law, the safe yield calculation is a mandatory prerequisite to issuing a water withdrawal permit. Moreover, the DEP cannot grant a permit unless it also determines that the total withdrawals in the water source will not exceed the safe yield. See, e.g., Massachusetts Soc. of Graduate Physical Therapists, 330 Mass. at 603, 116 N.E.2d at 266. Furthermore, there is no dispute that before it issued the subject permit to the Town of Ipswich, the DEP did not compute the safe yield of the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. Consequently, the permit was issued in violation of the WMA. See Hamilton, slip op. at pp. 17-20. Nor did the DEP follow its own regulations when it issued the permit. See 310 CMR 36.28(1)(j) (every permit "shall be conditioned on at least the following: ... that the withdrawal in combination with other registered and permitted withdrawals shall not exceed the safe yield of the water source"); 310 CMR 36.30 (the DEP shall deny a permit if the combined permitted, registered and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield of the water source). Finally, safe yield is not a minor aspect of the Water Management Act, but is a cornerstone of both the Act and its implementing regulations. The Preface to the Regulations provides: The concept of safe yield is fundamental to the proper management of a water source, taking into account the natural variability of streamflow, and serves as the principal regulatory basis for determining the scope of the permitted water withdrawals of the water source. 310 CMR 36.00 (Preface). The DEP also has stated: The principal basis for controlling permitted water withdrawals under the Water Management Act is the concept of safe yield. Safe yield is the volume of water that can be removed from surface or groundwater without unreasonable damage to the water source. DEP's Water Management Policy for Permit and Permit Amendment Applications and 5-Year Reviews, dated April 2, 2004. Thus, this is not a situation where the DEP's failure to comply with a statutory mandate could be considered trivial or de minimis. 1. The DEP's arguments. In concluding that the permit violates the WMA, I considered the DEP's contention that it could not compute the safe yield of the Parker River basin or Egypt/Rowley sub-basin because it did not have a reference streamflow value from the WRC. Nothing in the WMA or Regulations requires the DEP to use a reference streamflow value from the WRC, however. Rather, the Regulations provide that the DEP shall use the WRC reference streamflow value "[i]n water sources deemed appropriate by the [DEP]." 310 CMR 36.31(2). The Regulations give the DEP discretion to compute safe yield by other methods. See 310 CMR 36.31(1)-(2). In any event, the absence of a reference streamflow value does not excuse the DEP from complying with a statutory mandate. I also considered, but was not persuaded by, the DEP's argument that it properly issued the permit because it had no information indicating that the permit would exceed the safe yield of the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. Both the WMA and the Regulations require the DEP to (1) calculate safe yield and (2) to ensure that the proposed water withdrawal does not exceed that safe yield. An absence of information does not meet those statutory or regulatory obligations. Indeed, the DEP's approach directly contradicts the WMA because it allows the DEP to issue a permit unless it receives proof that safe yield would be exceeded. The WMA demands the opposite: before issuing a permit, the DEP must affirmatively determine that safe yield will not be exceeded. Finally, in its reply brief, the DEP argues that it used alternative methods to determine the safe yield of the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. See Department's Reply to Petitioner and Town's Responses to Department's Motion to Show Cause at p. 2. The testimony that the DEP cited in support of this contention demonstrates that the agency did not calculate the safe yield of the sub-basin, but instead elicited comments from interested public agencies, private organizations and individuals. See Pre-filed Testimony of Duane Levangie at ¶¶ 15-18, 23-29; Pre-filed Testimony of Kellie O'Keefe at ¶¶ 13-15. Although valuable, seeking input from others is not equivalent to calculating the total quantity of water than can be withdrawn safely from a water source. See G.L. c. 21G, § 2 (defining "safe yield"); 310 CMR 36.03 (same). Stated differently, the DEP cannot consider the safe yield of a water source in its permitting decision unless it knows what the safe yield is, i.e., unless it has actually numerically calculated the safe yield. The DEP also cannot decide whether it must deny a permit because combined withdrawals exceed a water source's safe yield without knowing what the safe yield is. The DEP never calculated the safe yield in this case, and never determined whether the combined withdrawals exceeded safe yield. 2. The Town's arguments. The Town contends that Hamilton is distinguishable because the Town withdraws some of its water from two reservoirs, while the Town of Hamilton used only groundwater wells. The Town explains that because it utilizes reservoirs, the DEP was required only to calculate the safe yield of the reservoirs, which it did. The Town is confusing the difference between a water source and the withdrawal points within that water source. The permit allows the Town to withdraw 340,000 gallons of water per day from the Parker River basin (or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin). The permit further states that this 340,000 gallons can be withdrawn from three specific locations, or "withdrawal points," within the basin. Two of the withdrawal points are wells (the Mill Lane and Browns wells) and one is a dual reservoir (the Dow and Bull Brook reservoirs). Section 11 of the WMA mandates that the DEP calculate the numeric safe yield of the water source at issue, which in this case is either the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. See G.L. c. 21G, § 11. See also 310 CMR 36.31. When reviewing a permit application, the DEP also may calculate the safe yield of the withdrawal points - both reservoirs and wells - that a town intends to use and then may limit the amount of water that can be taken from a particular withdrawal point. See, e.g., 310 CMR 36.31(6). This second-level calculation does not supplant the WMA's directive to compute the numeric safe yield of the entire water source. See G.L. c. 21G, § 11. Indeed, the purpose of determining the safe yield of the entire water source is to ensure that the combined registered and permitted withdrawals from all water users do not overtax the water source. Id. Identifying the safe yield of individual withdrawal points does not serve this purpose (or comply with the plain language of the WMA). As a variation of its previous argument, the Town next argues that the DEP does not have the authority to calculate the safe yield of the Parker River basin because the Town's withdrawals are from both reservoirs and wells. It states: [T]he regulations are silent as to how the Department is to consider permit applications when the public water supply uses both reservoirs and wells, and this tribunal cannot write a new requirement into the regulations as part of this proceeding. Town of Ipswich's Reply to Department's Motion to Show Cause at p. 2. The Town is again mixing apples and oranges. The WMA requires the DEP to compute the safe yield of every water source, regardless of the types of withdrawal points within the water source. G.L. c. 21G, §§ 7, 11. B. Should the Permit Be Vacated or Remanded to the DEP? Both the DEP and the Town argue that, even if the agency has to calculate safe yield, I should adopt the approach taken in Hamilton and decide the merits of the appeal while simultaneously remanding the safe yield determination to the DEP. This option is not viable. The Superior Court has the authority and discretion to craft equitable remedies that this tribunal does not possess. As part of the administrative review process, I cannot sustain a permit that was issued in contravention of the WMA and Regulations. The DEP and Town's approach also would be highly inefficient. One of the issues for adjudication (Issue No. 2) asks the very questions that are being remanded to the DEP: what is the applicable safe yield and does the permit allow a water withdrawal in excess of safe yield? Additionally, safe yield is directly relevant to the other issues for adjudication, especially Issue Nos. 1 and 4. Finally, the DEP's safe yield calculation could cause the agency to modify permit conditions, such as the amount of water Ipswich can withdraw. This could change the current issues for adjudication and/or raise new issues. The petitioner, on the other hand, states that I must vacate the permit because it was issued in violation of the statute. Vacating the permit, however, would impose a real hardship on the Town. See, e.g., Department's Motion to Show Cause at pp. 4-5. It also would subject the parties to the time and expense of filing and reviewing a new water withdrawal application. I conclude that the permit must be remanded to the DEP for the calculation of the safe yield of the Parker River basin or Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. This would maintain the status quo pending the DEP's safe yield review. Moreover, a remand is within the discretion of this tribunal. See, e.g., Matter of Todesca Equip. Co., Inc., Remand Decision, 4 DEPR 233 (Dep. Envtl. Prot., Dec. 31, 1997), adopted by Final Decision, 4 DEPR 243 (Dec. 31, 1997). A remand also is consistent with Magistrate Rooney's ruling in Matter of Danvers, et. al., Ruling on Issues to Be Adjudicated: Safe Yield, 11 DEPR 59 (Div. Admin. Law App., Apr. 2, 2004). He stated in that decision: If it could be shown that the DEP needed to recalculate the safe yield of the Ipswich River basin in order to fulfill its obligations when modifying the water withdrawal permits in a basin, the result would not be a new calculation of safe yield by an Administrative Magistrate, but a return by the magistrate of the appeals to DEP to determine safe yield. Id. at 60. C. What is the Appropriate Water Source? As previously discussed, the parties dispute whether the appropriate water source is the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. The Regulations provide that for purposes of calculating safe yield, a water source may be determined by the [DEP] to be either a river basin, or a hydrologically distinct portion thereof, dependent on information satisfactory to the [DEP] for the establishment of safe yield.... 310 CMR 36.03. Thus, the DEP has the discretion, within the confines set forth in 310 CMR 36.03, to determine whether to calculate the safe yield of the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. Id. Section 7 of the WMA requires the DEP to consider the safe yield of a water source when it reviews a water withdrawal permit application for that water source. G.L. c. 21G, § 7. Section 11 of the WMA requires the DEP to deny all applications for permits for a water source if the combined volume of existing, permitted and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield of that water source. Id. at § 11. Thus, Sections 7 and 11 make safe yield the gatekeeper for withdrawals, and the DEP must calculate the safe yield of a water source before granting any water withdrawal permits for that water source. Before issuing the subject permit to Ipswich, the DEP did not calculate the safe yield of either the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin. Accordingly, I hereby remand this appeal to the DEP to (1) calculate the safe yield of either the Parker River basin or the Egypt/Rowley sub-basin; and (2) determine whether the combined volume of existing, permitted and proposed withdrawals exceeds the safe yield of that water source. The DEP shall file and serve a status report when it has completed its work. At that time, I will schedule a status conference to discuss the next steps in this appeal. Dated: April 30, 2009 _____/s/________________ Natalie S. Monroe
en	caselaw	US	104 S.W.3d 552 (2000) Bernhardt TIEDE, II, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. No. 12-99-00182-CR. Court of Appeals of Texas, Tyler. June 30, 2000. Discretionary Review Refused November 8, 2000. Discretionary Review Granted November 8, 2000. 556 Clifton L. Holmes, Longview, Eric M. Albritton, Albritton & Albritton, Rockwall, for Appellant. Danny Buck Davidson, Carthage, for state. Panel consists of RAMEY, C.J., HADDEN, J., and WORTHEN, J. Appellant's Discretionary Review Refused November 8, 2000. Appellee's Discretionary Review Granted November 8, 2000. HADDEN, Justice. Appellant Bernhardt Tiede, II appeals his conviction for the murder of Marjorie Nugent. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charged offense. After a change of venue to San Augustine County, the jury found Appellant guilty and sentenced him to confinement for life in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division ("TDCJ ID") and a $10,000 fine. Appellant complains on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) overruling his challenges to the jury composition based on Batson v. Kentucky; (2) admitting his confession which he contends was taken after he had invoked his right to counsel; and (3) refusing to admit certain testimony of his psychologist at the punishment phase. We will reverse the judgment of the trial court as it pertains to punishment and remand the case to the trial court for a new hearing on punishment only. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellant became the companion of Marjorie Nugent ("Nugent") of Carthage in approximately 1990. In 1993, Appellant left his job at Hawthorn Funeral Home to work for Nugent. They shopped together 557 and traveled together extensively. In November of 1996, Nugent was reported missing. The Panola County Sheriff investigated her disappearance, and in the course of that investigation, talked to Appellant on several occasions. Appellant first said that Nugent was visiting a relative. He later told officers that Nugent had had a stroke and was recovering at Scott & White Hospital in Temple. On August 18, 1997, sheriff's officers found Mrs. Nugent's body in her own freezer. She had been shot four times in the back. Captain David Jeter interrogated Appellant, who ultimately confessed to shooting Nugent. APPELLANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE STATE'S USE OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES In his first four points of error, Appellant contends that the court erred in overruling his objections to the State's use of its peremptory strikes. Specifically, Appellant complains that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination when it struck prospective jurors Allen Roberts, Gregory Johnson, and Rayford Roberts on the basis of their race and religion. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). 1. Standard of Review When reviewing a Batson challenge, a reviewing court must afford great deference to the trial court's determination of discriminatory intent. Alexander v. State, 866 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). The trial court must assess the credibility and content of the State's explanation of its strikes and all other relevant facts and circumstances. Id. The reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Esteves v. State, 849 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993). A ruling is only clearly erroneous if, after searching the record, the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992). If the trial court's ruling is supported by the record, the prosecutor's explanation of his strikes, appellant's evidence, and any impeaching evidence, the ruling is not clearly erroneous. Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 689 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992). 2. Applicable Law The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the State from exercising its strikes solely on the basis of race. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). However, neither Batson nor its progeny condemns peremptory challenges based on religious belief. Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171, 117 S. Ct. 1438, 137 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1997); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 496 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (op. on reh'g). To challenge the prosecution's exercise of its peremptory strikes, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that the State exercised its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S. Ct. 1712; Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Tex. Cr.App.1992). A defendant establishes a prima facie case by showing facts and circumstances that raise an inference that the State used its strikes to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of race. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1722 (1986). See, e.g., Dewberry v. State, 776 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (prima facie case found where five of six eligible black venirepersons were struck by the State); Miller-El v. State, 748 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (where State struck ten of eleven eligible black venirepersons, defendant established 558 prima facie case of discrimination). Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the State to demonstrate a race-neutral explanation for its exercise of the strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995). The explanation need not be persuasive or even plausible. Id.; Rodriguez v. State, 919 S.W.2d 136, 140 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no pet.). See, e.g., Lee v. State, 949 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, pet. ref'd) (State did not exercise its strike on the basis of race where prosecutor struck black male juror with two earrings, but did not strike white male juror with only one earring); Tate v. State, 939 S.W.2d 738, 745 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd) (a prospective juror's inattentiveness was a sufficiently race-neutral reason to justify the use of a peremptory strike); Newsome v. State, 829 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.) (a juror's carelessness or error in completing the juror information card is also a race-neutral reason for exercising a strike). If the State provides a race-neutral explanation for its strikes, the defendant has the burden to rebut the State's explanation or to show the explanation was merely a sham or pretext. See Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). In order to prevail, the defendant must persuade the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations of purposeful discrimination are true. Williams v. State, 767 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd). A defendant does not meet this burden by merely disagreeing with the State's explanation for its strike. Webb v. State, 840 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.). In order to evaluate a Batson challenge, an appellate court may consider whether the prosecutor questioned potential jurors and whether he treated non-minority veniremembers similarly to those of a minority. Esteves, 849 S.W.2d at 823-24. A viewing court cannot automatically imply racial bias in every situation where one of the State's reasons for using a peremptory challenge would technically apply to an unchallenged member of the venire. Esteves, 849 S.W.2d at 824 n. 2. A prosecutor who exercises strikes in a disparate manner on the basis of a single factor does exhibit racial bias. Id. Conversely, the State's offer of multiple reasons for striking a particular person indicates a lack of disparate treatment. Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 689. When the State offers numerous race-neutral reasons for challenging a potential juror, the fact that other jurors possessed one or more of the objectionable attributes is not sufficient to establish disparate treatment. Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 689 ("It is unlikely that two venirepersons on one panel will possess the same objectionable attribute or character trait in precisely the same degree. Such quantitative distinctions may cause a prosecutor to challenge one venireperson and not the other.") In the present case, the trial court excused various members of the venire for cause. Of the 32 persons that remained in the strike zone, 15 were African Americans. The record does not reflect the racial makeup of the remaining 17 members. The State used 8 of its 10 available strikes on African Americans. After the exercise of peremptory strikes by the State and defense, 7 of the 12 jurors selected were African Americans, as was one alternate. Appellant objected that the State had violated Batson in the exercise of its strikes. Venireperson Allen Roberts Regarding his exercise of a peremptory strike on Allen Roberts, the prosecutor 559 said, "He seemed disinterested in everybody's testimony. Not just mine. His religious affiliation he put as `black.' His body English was bad. He has a gold chain and two earrings." Thereafter, defense counsel testified to dispute the prosecutor's observations of the prospective jurors. He stated that he paid particular attention to the demeanor of the black jurors because this is often used as a pretext by prosecutors. He stated that he observed Allen Roberts to be attentive. Defense counsel stated that Allen Roberts' body language was similar to that of several others who were accepted by both sides. He also testified that several male members of the venire wore earrings, including one male juror who was accepted by the prosecutor. Appellant failed to prove that the State's use of a strike on Allen Roberts was discriminatory. The prosecutor stated numerous reasons for his strike of the juror. Disinterest, body language, and earrings worn by male jurors can be race-neutral reasons for striking a juror. Defense counsel disagreed with the prosecutor's assessment of Allen Roberts' demeanor and interest, but his mere disagreement is insufficient to establish purposeful discrimination. See Webb, 840 S.W.2d at 544. Regarding Appellant's contention that the State discriminated against him on the basis of religious affiliation, Batson does not prohibit the exercise of strikes on the basis of religion. See Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d at 496. We hold that the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's objection to the State's exercise of its strike on Allen Roberts. Venireperson Gregory Johnson The prosecutor explained his strike of Gregory Johnson ("Johnson") in the following manner: "He lists no religion. We think religion is important in this case. His body English; he seemed disinterested." Regarding the importance placed on religion by the prosecutor, Appellant points out in his brief that the prosecutor did not make an issue of religion during his voir dire, but only asked one question about religion. He asked whether any juror would be unable to sit in judgment of another and assess punishment because of his religious beliefs. Two jurors answered in the affirmative, but Johnson did not answer this question. Defense counsel disputed the prosecutor's opinion that Johnson was disinterested and testified that he observed him to be attentive. The record reflects that the State struck two of the three members of the venire who left blank the space for their religious preference. There is no evidence, however, that the State struck only African American persons who failed to indicate a religious association, and this Court is unable to impute discriminatory intent to the State without evidence of disparate treatment. Further, although Appellant disagreed with the prosecutor's assessment of Johnson's demeanor, the trial court was present and had the opportunity to observe Johnson and the attorneys. This court affords great deference to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, we hold that Appellant failed to establish purposeful discrimination by the State in the exercise of its strike of Johnson. Venireperson Rayford Roberts Regarding Rayford Roberts, the prosecutor said, "He has two earrings and he appeared to be-he slept. He was asleep; his body English; he seemed disinterested." In response to the prosecutor's explanation of this strike, defense counsel testified that he did not observe Rayford Roberts sleeping. He further stated that there was at least one man 560 eventually seated on the jury that had an earring. Again, Appellant's dispute about the potential juror's body language is insufficient to prove purposeful discrimination. Neither is there sufficient evidence regarding the persons that wore earrings to establish the State's disparate treatment of Rayford Roberts. Based on the evidence before this court, we do not determine that the trial court was clearly erroneous in overruling Appellant's objections to the venire. Therefore, we overrule Appellant's first, second, third, and fourth points of error. ADMISSIBILITY OF APPELLANT'S CONFESSION In his fifth point of error, Appellant contends that his confession was inadmissible because it was obtained by police interrogation after he had invoked his right to counsel. Specifically, Appellant argues that he indicated that he wanted to speak with a lawyer during Jeter's initial interrogation and that Jeter recommenced interrogation. 1. Standard of Review An appellate court reviews motions to suppress illegal statements under the standard set forth in Guzman v. State. 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). See also Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1998) (holding Guzman standard applies to all motions to suppress). Under Guzman, an appellate court should show "almost total deference" to a trial court's determination of historical facts based on an evaluation of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. 955 S.W.2d at 89. However, when considering a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact that is not reliant upon an evaluation of a witness's demeanor, the appellate court should review the lower court's ruling de novo. Id. An appellate court will sustain a judge's ruling that evidence is admissible if there is any basis to support it. Carter v. State, 700 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.App.- Dallas 1985, pet. dism'd). Therefore, if the record shows a reasonable basis for denying a motion to suppress, the appellate court will uphold it, even if the trial court's grounds for denying the motion were erroneous. Id. 2. Applicable Law Prior to a custodial interrogation, an accused must be advised that he has the right to consult with an attorney. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624-25, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 720 (1966); Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Interrogation must cease immediately if a suspect indicates that he wants an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S. Ct. at 1628. However, the request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous. Russell, 727 S.W.2d at 575. The mere mention of the word "lawyer" is insufficient to invoke the right. Id. There are no magic words required to invoke the right to counsel, and each case must be determined on an analysis of all the facts and circumstances. Collins v. State, 727 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987); see, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 455, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 368 (1994) (held that "maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was too ambiguous to invoke right to counsel); but see Jones v. State, 742 S.W.2d 398, 405-06 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (statement, "I think I want a lawyer," was held to be a clear and unequivocal assertion of right to counsel). Once a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the police cannot interrogate him further until counsel has been provided for him, or until the suspect himself initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 561 L.Ed.2d 378 (1980); Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 143 (Tex.Cr.App.1999), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 9, 2000). "This rule seeks to ensure `that any statement made in a subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures.'" Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 252-53 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 149-50, 111 S. Ct. 486, 489, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990). Captain David Jeter ("Jeter") of the Panola County Sheriff's Department conducted two interviews with Appellant. At the first interview, Jeter read Appellant a form containing certain rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to have a lawyer advise him before and during any questioning. Jeter read Appellant each right, asked him if he understood it, then placed a check next to the number associated with that right. Appellant read the form and initialed each check. Appellant testified that, during the course of the first interview, he told Jeter, "I think I need a lawyer."[1] Jeter terminated the interview immediately. Appellant had previously consented to the search of his residence, and Jeter had advised him that he was going to conduct the search. Appellant asked Jeter to let him know what they found at his home. After the search, Jeter returned to the detention center to tell Appellant what they had found at his house. As Jeter began discussing the list of items, Appellant stated that he wanted to tell Jeter what had happened. Jeter advised him that he could not talk to him unless he waived his right to counsel. Sheriff Paul Ellett ("Ellett") repeated this warning to Appellant. Then, in the presence of Jeter and Ellett, Appellant twice stated that he wished to make a statement. Jeter went through a formal reading and waiver of Appellant's rights. Thereafter, Appellant dictated his statement to Jeter. On the advice of Texas Ranger Ronnie Griffith, Jeter wrote at the beginning of the statement, "I had requested a lawyer before, but have waived my right to an attorney, and have asked to give this statement to Capt. Jeter of my own free will." Appellant signed the statement. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Appellant did not make a clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. Although not in the clearest of terms, Appellant invoked his right to counsel with the words, "I think I need a lawyer." See Jones, 742 S.W.2d at 405-06. It was, therefore, appropriate for Jeter to terminate the interview. However, Appellant re-opened the conversation by asking Jeter to let him know what they found at his home. When Appellant told Jeter that he wanted to tell him what happened, Jeter again advised him of this right. Jeter called Ellett, who also told Appellant that he had to waive his right to counsel. Appellant said he wanted to talk and waived his right to counsel. The particular facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that Appellant initiated the second interrogation about the offense. Various officers informed Appellant of his rights on numerous occasions. The record also shows that appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Although the trial court stated an erroneous ground for denying the motion to suppress, this court will uphold that order because it was otherwise supportable. See Carter, 700 S.W.2d at 291. We therefore hold that the trial court properly admitted Appellant's confession, and overrule Appellant's fifth point. 562 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST TESTIMONY OFFERED AT PUNISHMENT STAGE In his sixth and seventh points of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by excluding certain expert testimony about his lack of future dangerousness and mitigating mental disorder. Specifically, Appellant alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present his defense and erroneously excluded evidence appropriate to a determination of punishment under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.07, § 3(a). Prior to the testimony of Dr. Frederick Mears ("Mears") before the jury, the prosecutor examined the witness on voir dire. Mears stated that he was a clinical neuropsychologist and that he had doctorate degrees in psychology and neuropsychology. Mears examined Appellant three times and administered numerous psychological tests to him. He stated that he would testify about Appellant's mental state and relation to traditional mental disorders as of the time of the offense. Mears was prepared to testify as follows: 1) regarding the issues of "sudden passion" and "adequate cause," Appellant's capacity for cool reflection was degraded or diminished by the stress of his relationship with Nugent and the demands that she placed on him; 2) regarding the issue of Appellant's future dangerousness, Appellant posed no danger to anyone in the prison system; and 3) regarding Appellant's behavior after the offense, Mears would testify that Appellant had experienced certain dissociative episodes in which he mentally separated from the act of killing Nugent. This last factor was in direct response to the State's continued characterization of Appellant as a person who could kill Nugent in a cold, calculating fashion and then appear with a normal, undisturbed demeanor and conduct his usual business without effect. Mears defined dissociative disorder as follows: a situation in which the person can really more or less become somewhat different than they normally were, and it is an identified disorder as listed in the American Psychiatric Association's DSM4 .... So some people can become dissociative, and that means they really are sort of engaging in a high level of repression where they can almost develop two different aspects of themselves. Not a Dr. Jeckel Mr. Hyde kind of thing. But can have two different kinds of personalities so to speak, or different kinds of behavior, and in some cases, that can be stress-induced behavior. The State objected to Mears' testimony on the ground that it was not admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 in that it was not helpful to the jury. The trial court allowed Mears to testify about dissociative behavior in general, but did not allow him to discuss his examination, testing, or evaluation of Appellant specifically. 1. Standard of Review An appellate court reviews a trial court's exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). An abuse of discretion is established "only when the trial judge's decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree." Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926, 113 S. Ct. 3046, 125 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1993). 2. Evidence Allowed At Punishment Phase of Trial At the punishment phase of a criminal trial, evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the 563 court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, and opinion regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and ... any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act.... Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2000). Relevant evidence is that evidence that has a tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex.R. Evid. 401. However, there are no facts of consequence at the punishment phase of a criminal trial. Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990). Evidence is relevant to the assessment of punishment if it provides information about the defendant's life and characteristics. Brooks v. State, 961 S.W.2d 396-400 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). The Legislature has declared that the issue of sudden passion is relevant to punishment. At the punishment phase of a murder trial, the defendant may prove that he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 19.02(d) (Vernon 1994). If the defendant obtains an affirmative finding on sudden passion, the offense is punishable as a second degree felony, instead of a felony of the first degree. Id. Further, an expert witness's opinion on the future dangerousness of a defendant is proper evidence at the punishment phase. Jurors may consider what sentence will punish the defendant and what sentence is appropriate to deter future criminal conduct of a defendant. Lopez v. State, 860 S.W.2d 938, 946 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no pet.). An expert may testify at the punishment stage of trial about a particular defendant's propensity to commit violence in the future. Wunneburger v. State, 844 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1992, pet. ref'd). However, an expert witness may not recommend a particular punishment to the jury. Id. If a defendant cannot be rehabilitated, the jury may extend his sentence to protect society. Lopez, 860 S.W.2d at 946. Rule 702, governing testimony by experts, requires that such testimony be helpful to the jury. Tex.R. Evid. 702; Perkins v. State, 902 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd). The trial court must determine whether the proffered expert testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to help the jury in reaching accurate results. Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). On the State's objection that Mears' testimony would not be helpful to the jury, the court ruled that Mears could testify generally about certain psychological disorders, but not as they applied to Appellant. Mears testified regarding his qualifications and testing methods. While the court enjoyed discretion in the admission of expert testimony, it does not appear from the record that the court excluded Mears' testimony on the ground that it was unreliable. In fact, rather than find that such testimony was unreliable, the court admitted portions of Mears' testimony while excluding others. Because the unreliability of the evidence does not appear to have been the basis of the court's ruling, we turn to an analysis of its relevance to the issues at punishment. Appellant offered Mears' testimony on the issues of sudden passion, future dangerousness, and explaining aspects of Appellant's own life and character. Each of these issues is relevant to a determination of punishment. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 19.02(d) (Vernon 1994); Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 564 2000); and Lopez, 860 S.W.2d at 946. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony of Mears. Having determined that the trial court erred, we next consider whether such error was harmful. In harmful error analysis, the appellate court must first decide whether error in a criminal case is constitutional. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2; Brown v. State, 960 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.). If error is of constitutional magnitude, the appellate court must reverse unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. Tex.R.App. 44.2(a). Any other error that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. Tex.R.App. 44.2(b). Generally, a trial court's error in the exclusion of evidence is non-constitutional. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). However, the right to present witnesses to establish a defense is a fundamental element of due process. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 1023 (1967); Brazelton v. State, 947 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet.). The right to offer the testimony of witnesses is the right to present the defendant's own version of the facts so that the jury may decide the truth. Id. Because the trial court's failure to admit evidence of Appellant's defense is constitutional error, we review that error under the more stringent standard of Rule 44.2(a). Rule 44.2(a) requires an appellate court to reverse the trial court's judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b). Once an appellate court determines that trial court error implicates a substantial right, the reviewing court must consider whether the error adversely affected that right, assessing (1) the source of the error, (2) the nature of the error, (3) whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, (4) the probable collateral consequences of the error, (5) how much weight a juror would probably place on the error, and (6) whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. Cooper v. State, 961 S.W.2d 222, 227 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd), (citing Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex. Cr.App.1989)). In the present case, the source of the error was the trial court's ruling excluding the proffered evidence. That ruling prevented Appellant from explaining his conduct after the commission of the murder. It also precluded Appellant from presenting evidence of sudden passion and adequate cause, matters deemed proper for punishment by the Legislature. Further, the court prevented Appellant's expert from giving his opinion on Appellant's future dangerousness, also properly considered by a jury in the matter of punishment. The most alarming result of the court's exclusionary ruling, however, was that it left unchallenged the State's characterization of Appellant as a cold-blooded killer who could continue his routine affairs as if he had never killed Nugent. From voir dire to closing argument at punishment, the State continuously emphasized this theme. Although it is not the role of this Court to say whether Appellant was indeed the cold killer portrayed by the State, it is the role of the jury, and that body should have had the opportunity to hear Appellant's version of the facts. After reviewing the entire record, this court cannot say that the degree of emphasis placed on Appellant's character by the State, coupled with the trial court's refusal to allow Appellant to rebut this evidence, 565 did not contribute to the punishment assessed by the jury. Appellant received the absolute maximum sentence allowed by law for the offense of murder, life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Because the court is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error did not contribute to the punishment verdict, we hold that the error was harmful and sustain Appellant's sixth and seventh points. In his eighth point, Appellant contends that the court erred in excluding Mears' testimony on rebuttal because the State opened the door through the testimony of its own psychiatric expert. Due to our disposition of points six and seven, it is unnecessary to address point eight. The judgment of the trial court is reversed as it pertains to punishment, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial on punishment only. See Levy v. State, 818 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991) (holding that when an appellate court finds error at the punishment stage, the case may be remanded to the trial court for the proper assessment of punishment only). NOTES [1] Jeter's report and the testimony of Texas Ranger Ronnie Griffith support this version of events. However, at the suppression hearing, Jeter testified that Appellant asked, "David, do you think I need an attorney?"
es	wikipedia	N/A	El Aris de Tesalónica (en griego: Αθλητικός Σύλλογος Άρης - Athlitikos Syllogos Aris = Asociación Deportiva Aris) es un club polideportivo griego de la ciudad de Tesalónica. Fundado el 25 de marzo de 1914, tiene secciones en diferentes disciplinas deportivas, entre las que destacan las secciones de fútbol y baloncesto. Sus equipos visten pantalones y camisetas de color amarillo. El club debe su nombre a Ares, el dios de la guerra de la Antigua Grecia, cuya imagen (como se ilustra en el Ares Ludovisi) aparece en el escudo del club. Fútbol El Aris de Tesalónica FC es un club de fútbol griego, de la ciudad de Tesalónica, en la región griega de Macedonia. Fue fundado en 1914 y juega en la Super League Greece Baloncesto La sección de baloncesto del Aris de Tesalónica fue creada en 1922. Es el primer club de baloncesto de Tesalónica, por delante del PAOK de Tesalónica, y el segundo club de baloncesto de Grecia en número de títulos, tras el Panathinaikos BC de Atenas. Los mejores años del club fueron los años 80, cuando ganaron 6 ligas y cuatro copas griegas, y los años 1990, cuando no solo siguieron triunfando en el baloncesto heleno sino que también conquistaron una Copa de Europa (antigua Recopa, en 1993) y una Copa Korac (1997). Actualmente compite por la Eurocopa. Waterpolo Palmarés 4 veces campeón de la liga de Grecia de waterpolo masculino (1928, 1929, 1930, 1932) Enlaces externos Sitio web oficial (fútbol) Sitio web oficial (baloncesto)
nl	caselaw	EU	Belangrijke juridische mededeling \| 61986C0250 Conclusie van advocaat-generaal Mischo van 12 mei 1989. - RAR (REFINARIAS DE ACUCAR REUNIDAS) SA TEGEN RAAD VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN EN COMMISSIE VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN. - BEROEP TOT NIETIGVERKLARING - ONTVANKELIJKHEID - STEUN VOOR RAFFINADERIJEN VAN RUWE SUIKER. - GEVOEGDE ZAKEN 250/86 EN 11/87. Jurisprudentie 1989 bladzijde 02045 Pub.RJ bladzijde Pub somm Conclusie van de advocaat generaal ++++Advocaat-generaal J . Mischo heeft op 12 mei 1989 conclusie genomen . () Hij heeft het Hof in overweging gegeven : "1 ) primair, de twee beroepen niet-ontvankelijk te verklaren, met verwijzing van verzoekster in de kosten; 2 ) zo de beroepen, of een ervan, toch ontvankelijk worden verklaard, de mondelinge behandeling te heropenen ter aanvulling van de informatie waarover het Hof beschikt met betrekking tot verzoeksters vordering tot betaling van een voorschot op de raffinagesteun; 3 ) de overige argumenten van verzoekster ongegrond te verklaren ." () Oorspronkelijke taal : Frans .
en	contracts	US	EXHIBIT 10.87 SEPARATION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Antol) This SEPARATION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”) is entered into on January 10, 2017 (the “Effective Date”) by and among ELITE DATA SERVICES INC., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and STEPHEN ANTOL (“Antol”). The Company and Antol are collectively referred to herein as the “Parties” and each as a “Party.” RECITALS WHEREAS, Company is a technology driven management company which owns and operates businesses in areas of online marketing and gaming operations from two (2) subsidiaries: Elite Data Marketing LLC, and Elite Gaming Ventures LLC, collectively hereinafter referred to as (the “Company”); WHEREAS, Antol is the former Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer for the Company; WHEREAS, on or about May 18, 2016, Company and Antol executed that certain Independent Contractor Agreement (the “Antol Agreement”), pursuant to which the Company continued the engagement of Antol for his services as Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer to the Company and for such other services, as deemed necessary by the Board of Directors, from time to time, as set forth in such agreement; WHEREAS, on or about January 10, 2017, Antol resigned as the Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer; WHEREAS, the Parties wish to resolve all claims either one or more of the Parties may have against the other Parties under, including but not limited to, any promises or commitments, verbal or written during any and all business transactions with each other and otherwise resolve their respective disputes on an amicable basis. AGREEMENTS NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, and the covenants, representations and warranties set forth herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged and accepted, the Parties, intending to be legally bound, hereby agree as follows: 1. Recitals. The Parties each acknowledge that the Recitals set forth above are true and accurate. Each of the Recitals is incorporated into this Agreement by reference and is made a part hereof. 1 2. Consideration. In consideration of the terms, representations, promises, settlements, waivers and releases contained in herein, the Company shall, on the Effective Date, issue to Antol a one year Convertible Redeemable Note (the "Antol Note") in the principal amount of USD $40,000, at a rate of ten percent (10%) per annum commencing on date of issuance, convertible into shares of the Company's common stock at a conversion price equal to the lesser of $0.01 per share or a discount of fifty-eight percent (58%) of the lowest trading price for the ten (10) prior trading days, and other terms and conditions set forth therein, in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A. 3. Releases. (a) Antol and his respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, assigns and all others claiming through or under them, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby release, acquit, and forever discharge Company Releasees (as defined below) and their respective present and former employees, officers, directors, members, managers, shareholders, agents, consultants, counselor representatives, and its successors and assigns (collectively, the “Company Releasees”), and each of them, of and from any and all obligations, claims, debts, demands, covenants, contracts, promises, agreements, liabilities, controversies, costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees, actions or causes of action of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, accrued or not accrued, direct or indirect, which the Rickett ever had, now have, or can, shall or may have, up to the Effective Date, against the Company Releasees, or any of them, either alone or in combination with others. (b) Company behalf of itself and its respective successors and assigns and all others claiming through or under them, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby release, acquit, and forever discharge the Antol and his respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, assigns (collectively, the “Antol Releasees”), and each of them, of and from any and all obligations, claims, debts, demands, covenants, contracts, promises, agreements, liabilities, controversies, costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees, actions or causes of action of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, accrued or not accrued, direct or indirect, which the Company ever had, now have, or can, shall or may have, up to the Effective Date, against the Antol Releasees, or any of them, either alone or in combination with others. 4. Representations of the Company. Company, severally and not jointly, represents and warrants to Antol as follows: (a) Authority. Company has all requisite authority and power (corporate and other), authorizations, consents and approvals to enter into and deliver this Agreement and any other certificate, agreement, document or instrument to be executed and delivered by the Company in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby and to perform its obligations hereunder and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby. The execution and delivery of this Agreement by Company and the performance by Company of its obligations hereunder and the consummation by Company of the transactions contemplated hereby have been duly authorized by all necessary action on the part of such Company. Company does not need to give any notice to, make any filing with, or obtain any authorization, consent or approval of any person or governmental authority in order for the Parties to execute, deliver or perform this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby. (b) Binding Obligations. Assuming this Agreement has been duly and validly authorized, executed and delivered by the Parties other than Company, this Agreement is duly authorized, executed and delivered by Company and constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligations of Company enforceable against Company in accordance with its terms, except as such enforcement is limited by general equitable principles, or by bankruptcy, insolvency and other similar laws affecting the enforcement of creditors rights generally. 2 (c) No Conflicts. Neither the execution nor the delivery by Company, nor the consummation or performance by Company of the transactions contemplated hereby or thereby will, directly or indirectly, (a) contravene, conflict with, or result in a violation of any provision of the Company’s certificate of incorporation, certificate or organization, bylaws, operating agreement or partnership agreement, as applicable, (b) contravene, conflict with or result in a violation of any law, order, charge or other restriction or decree applicable to Company, or by which Company or any of its assets and properties are bound or affected, (c) contravene, conflict with, result in any breach of, or constitute a default (or an event that with notice or lapse of time or both would become a default) under, impair the rights of Company under, or alter the obligations of any person under, or create in any person the right to terminate, amend, accelerate or cancel, or require any notice, report or other filing (whether with a governmental authority or any other person) pursuant to, or result in the creation of a lien on any of the assets or properties of Company under, any note, bond, mortgage, indenture, contract, agreement, lease, license, permit, franchise or other instrument or obligation to which Company is a party or by which Company or any of its assets and properties are bound or affected; or (d) contravene, conflict with, or result in a violation of, the terms or requirements of, or give any governmental authority the right to revoke, withdraw, suspend, cancel, terminate or modify, any licenses, permits, authorizations, approvals, franchises or other rights held by Company or that otherwise relate to the business of, or any of the properties or assets owned or used by Company, except, in the case of clauses (b), (c), or (d), for any such contraventions, conflicts, violations, or other occurrences as would not have a material adverse effect on Company. 5. Representations of Antol. Antol, severally and not jointly, represents and warrants to the Company as follows: (a) Authority. Antol has all requisite authority and power, authorizations, consents and approvals to enter into and deliver this Agreement and any other certificate, agreement, document or instrument to be executed and delivered by Antol in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby and to perform its obligations hereunder and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby. The execution and delivery of this Agreement by Antol and the performance by such Antol of its obligations hereunder and the consummation by Antol of the transactions contemplated hereby have been duly authorized by all necessary action on the part of Antol. Antol does not need to give any notice to, make any filing with, or obtain any authorization, consent or approval of any person or governmental authority in order for the Parties to execute, deliver or perform this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby. (b) Binding Obligations. Assuming this Agreement has been duly and validly authorized, executed and delivered by the Parties other than Antol, this Agreement is duly authorized, executed and delivered by Antol and constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligations of Antol enforceable against Antol in accordance with its terms, except as such enforcement is limited by general equitable principles, or by bankruptcy, insolvency and other similar laws affecting the enforcement of creditors rights generally. (c) No Conflicts. Neither the execution nor the delivery by Antol, nor the consummation or performance by Antol of the transactions contemplated hereby or thereby will, directly or indirectly have a material adverse effect on Antol. 6. Restrictive Covenants. (a) Non-Disparagement. Following the date of the Effective Date, (i) Antol will not make or cause to be made any statements or remarks (including, without limitation, the repetition or distribution of disparaging, derogatory or damaging rumors, allegations, negative reports or comments), whether written, electronic or oral, that are directly or indirectly disparaging, derogatory or damaging to the Company or any of its past, current or future affiliates, officers, directors, shareholders, employees, consultants, advisors, representatives, trustees, subsidiaries, divisions, parent companies, clients or customers or their policies and procedures, business, practices or financial condition; and (ii) the Company will not make or cause to be made any statements or remarks (including, without limitation, the repetition or distribution of disparaging, derogatory or damaging rumors, allegations, negative reports or comments), whether written, electronic or oral, that are directly or indirectly disparaging, derogatory or damaging to Antol as a past officer, director, shareholder, employee, consultant, advisor, or representatives for the Company; provided, however, that the foregoing restrictions shall not apply to any statements by Antol or by the Company that are made truthfully in response to a subpoena or as otherwise required by applicable law or other compulsory legal process. 3 (b) Confidentiality. The Company has provided Antol with access to, and has confided in him, information, business methods and systems, techniques and methods of operation developed at great expense by the Company and which are assets of the Company. Antol recognizes and acknowledges that: (i) all Confidential Information (defined below) is the property of the Company and is unique, extremely valuable and developed and acquired by great expenditures of time, effort and cost; (ii) the misuse, misappropriation or unauthorized disclosure by Antol of the Confidential Information would constitute a breach of trust and would cause serious irreparable injury to the Company; and (iii) it is essential to the protection of the Company’s goodwill and to the maintenance of the Company’s competitive position that the Confidential Information be kept secret and that Antol not disclose the Confidential Information to others or use same to his own advantage or to the advantage of others. Accordingly, Antol shall not, directly or indirectly, in any manner, utilize or disclose to any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity, or use on his own behalf, any confidential and proprietary information of the Company, including, but not limited to, information relating to its business methods, strategies, policies, procedures, techniques, research, historical or projected financial information, budgets, trade secrets, sales, costs, client lists, client preferences, client identities, marketing materials, investment strategies, systems, computer programs, or the business affairs and financial condition of the Company, or any of its clients, (collectively “Confidential Information”), except for (i) such disclosures where required by law, but only after written notice to the Company detailing the circumstances and legal requirement for the disclosure; or (ii) such disclosures where such information was at the time of disclosure to Antol or thereafter became public acknowledge through no fault or omission of Antol. (c) Non-Interference. During the two (2) year period following the date of the Effective Date (the “Restricted Period”), for whatever reason, Antol will not, directly or indirectly, for himself or on behalf of any third party, at any time or in any manner: i. persuade, induce, solicit, influence or attempt to influence, or cause any person who is an employee of the Company to terminate his or her relationship with the Company or refer any such employee to anyone, without prior written approval from the Company; ii. request or cause any of the Company’s clients or potential clients to cancel, modify or terminate any existing or continuing or, to Antol’s knowledge, prospective business relationship with the Company; iii. engage in or participate in any effort or act to induce, or in any way cause, any client or, to Antol’s knowledge, prospective client of the Company, to deal with Antol or any other person or entity except in a capacity as representative of the Company, or otherwise take any action which might reasonably be expected to be disadvantageous to the Company; iv. persuade, induce, solicit, influence or attempt to influence, or cause any client or, to Antol’s knowledge, prospective client of the Company to cease or refrain from doing business, or to decline to do business, or to change or alter any existing or prospective business relationship, with the Company; v. accept business from, or perform or provide any services for, any client, or to Antol’s knowledge, prospective client of the Company; vi. contract with or communicate with, in either case in connection with services, any client or, to Antol’s knowledge, prospective client of the Company; or vii. provide any third party with any information concerning any client, or to Antol’s knowledge, prospective client of the Company, including but not limited to, the disclosure of any client name or data, in whatever form, to such third party. 4 (d) Noncompetition. During the Restricted Period, Antol shall not, directly or indirectly, engage or participate in, or become employed by, or affiliated with, or enter into or maintain a contractual relationship with, or render advisory or any other services to, any person or business entity or organization, of whatever form, that competes with the Company in the United States or any other location in which the Company conducts businesss as of the Effective Date. (e) Injunctive Relief. Antol acknowledges that his compliance with the covenants in Sections 9(b), 9(c) and 9(d) hereof is necessary to protect the good will, Confidential Information and other proprietary interests of the Company, that such covenants are supported by adequate and sufficient consideration, and that, in the event of any violation or threatened violation by Antol of any such provision, the Company will sustain serious, irreparable and substantial harm to its business, the extent of which will be difficult to determine and impossible to remedy by an action at law for money damages. Accordingly, Antol agrees that, in the event of such violation or threatened violation by him, the Company shall be entitled to an injunction before trial from any court of competent jurisdiction as a matter of course and upon the posting of not more than a nominal bond, in addition to all such other legal and equitable remedies as may be available to the Company. Antol further acknowledges that he has carefully considered the nature and extent of the restrictions contained herein and the rights and remedies conferred upon the Company under this Agreement, and hereby acknowledges and agrees that the same are reasonable, are designed to protect the legitimate business interests of the Company, and do not confer benefits upon the Company disproportionate to the detriment upon him. In the event that Antol violates any of the covenants in this Agreement and the Company commences legal action for injunctive or other relief, the Company shall have the benefit of the full period of the covenants, computed from the date Antol ceased violation of the covenants, either by order of the court or otherwise. Antol acknowledges that any claim or cause of action he may have against the Company shall not constitute a defense to the enforcement by the Company of the other covenants of the Antol in this Agreement. Antol also acknowledges that his experience and capabilities are such that he can obtain suitable employment otherwise than in violation of the covenants in this Agreement and that the enforcement of these covenants will not prevent the earning of a livelihood nor cause undue hardship. (f) Remedies Cumulative and Concurrent. The rights and remedies of the Company as provided in this Section 9 shall be cumulative and concurrent and may be pursued separately, successively or together, at the sole discretion of the Company, and may be exercised as often as occasion therefor shall arise. The failure to exercise any right or remedy shall in no event be construed as a waiver or release thereof. (g) Authorization. Antol authorizes the Company to inform any third parties, including future employers, prospective employers and the Company’s clients or prospective clients, of the existence of this Agreement and his obligations under it. (h) Definitions. For purposes of this Section 9, the term “Company” shall include the Company and each of their respective successors, assigns, subsidiaries or affiliates and the term “Antol” shall include the Antol and each of their respective heirs, successors, assigns, subsidiaries or affiliates (other than the Company Parties and any of their respective subsidiaries). 7. Miscellaneous. (a) Expenses. Each Party will bear its respective expenses incurred in connection with the preparation, execution, and performance of this Agreement and the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, including all fees and expenses of agents, representatives, counsel, and accountants. 5 (b) Notices. All notices, demands, consents, requests, instructions and other communications to be given or delivered or permitted under or by reason of the provisions of this Agreement or in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby shall be in writing and shall be deemed to be delivered and received by the intended recipient as follows: (i) if personally delivered, on the business day of such delivery (as evidenced by the receipt of the personal delivery service), (ii) if mailed certified or registered mail return receipt requested, two (2) business days after being mailed, (iii) if delivered by overnight courier (with all charges having been prepaid), on the business day of such delivery (as evidenced by the receipt of the overnight courier service of recognized standing), or (iv) if delivered by facsimile transmission or other electronic means, including email, on the business day of such delivery if sent by 6:00 p.m. in the time zone of the recipient, or if sent after that time, on the next succeeding business day. If any notice, demand, consent, request, instruction or other communication cannot be delivered because of a changed address of which no notice was given (in accordance with this Section 7(b)), or the refusal to accept same, the notice, demand, consent, request, instruction or other communication shall be deemed received on the second business day the notice is sent (as evidenced by a sworn affidavit of the sender). All such notices, demands, consents, requests, instructions and other communications will be sent to the following addresses or facsimile numbers as applicable: If to the Company, to: 4447 N. Central Exwy., Ste. 110-135 Dallas, TX 75205 Attn: Chief Executive Officer Tel No.: (972) 885-3981 Email: [email protected] If to the Antol, to: ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ Tel. No.: _________________ Email: ___________________ or such other addresses as shall be furnished in writing by any Party in the manner for giving notices hereunder. (c) Further Assurances. The Parties agree (a) to furnish upon request to each other such further information, (b) to execute and deliver to each other such other documents, and (c) to do such other acts and things, all as the other Parties may reasonably request for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement and the documents referred to in this Agreement. (d) Waiver. The rights and remedies of the Parties are cumulative and not alternative. Neither the failure nor any delay by any Party in exercising any right, power, or privilege under this Agreement will operate as a waiver of such right, power, or privilege, and no single or partial exercise of any such right, power, or privilege will preclude any other or further exercise of such right, power, or privilege or the exercise of any other right, power, or privilege. To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, (i) no claim or right arising out of this Agreement can be discharged by one Party, in whole or in part, by a waiver or renunciation of the claim or right unless in writing signed by the other Parties; (ii) no waiver that may be given by a Party will be applicable except in the specific instance for which it is given; and (iii) no notice to or demand on one Party will be deemed to be a waiver of any obligation of such Party or of the right of the Party giving such notice or demand to take further action without notice or demand as provided in this Agreement. 6 (e) Entire Agreement and Modification. This Agreement supersedes all prior agreements between the Parties with respect to its subject matter and constitutes a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement between the Parties with respect to its subject matter. This Agreement may not be amended except by a written agreement executed by the Party against whom the enforcement of such amendment is sought. (f) Assignments, Successors, and No Third-Party Rights. No Party may assign any of its rights under this Agreement without the prior consent of the other Parties. Subject to the preceding sentence, this Agreement will apply to, be binding in all respects upon, and inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by the respective successors and permitted assigns of the Parties. Except as set forth in Section 6 hereof, nothing expressed or referred to in this Agreement will be construed to give any person other than the Parties any legal or equitable right, remedy, or claim under or with respect to this Agreement or any provision of this Agreement. (g) Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable by any court of competent jurisdiction, the other provisions of this Agreement will remain in full force and effect. Any provision of this Agreement held invalid or unenforceable only in part or degree will remain in full force and effect to the extent not held invalid or unenforceable. (h) Section Headings. The headings of Sections in this Agreement are provided for convenience only and will not affect its construction or interpretation. All references to “Section” or “Sections” refer to the corresponding Section or Sections of this Agreement, unless the context indicates otherwise. (i) Construction. The Parties have participated jointly in the negotiation and drafting of this Agreement. In the event an ambiguity or question of intent or interpretation arises, this Agreement shall be construed as if drafted jointly by the Parties and no presumption or burden of proof shall arise favoring or disfavoring any Party by virtue of the authorship of any of the provisions of this Agreement. Any reference to any federal, state, local, or foreign statute or law shall be deemed also to refer to all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, unless the context requires otherwise. Unless otherwise expressly provided, the word “including” shall mean including without limitation. The Parties intend that each representation, warranty, and covenant contained herein shall have independent significance. If any Party has breached any representation, warranty, or covenant contained herein in any respect, the fact that there exists another representation, warranty, or covenant relating to the same subject matter (regardless of the relative levels of specificity) which the Party has not breached shall not detract from or mitigate the fact that the Party is in breach of such representation, warranty, or covenant. All words used in this Agreement will be construed to be of such gender or number as the circumstances require. (j) Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which will be deemed to be an original copy of this Agreement and all of which, when taken together, will be deemed to constitute one and the same agreement. In the event that any signature is delivered by facsimile transmission or by e-mail delivery of a “.pdf” format data file, such signature shall create a valid and binding obligation of the Party executing (or on whose behalf such signature is executed) with the same force and effect as if such facsimile or “.pdf” signature page were an original thereof. 7 (k) Specific Performance. Each of the Parties acknowledges and agrees that the other Parties would be damaged irreparably in the event any of the provisions of this Agreement are not performed in accordance with their specific terms or otherwise are breached. Accordingly, each of the Parties agrees that the other Parties shall be entitled to an injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches of the provisions of this Agreement and to enforce specifically this Agreement and the terms and provisions hereof in any action instituted in any court of the United States or any state thereof having jurisdiction over the Parties and the matter (subject to the provisions set forth in Section 7(l) below), in addition to any other remedy to which they may be entitled, at Law or in equity. (l) Governing Law; Submission to Jurisdiction. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the Laws of the State of Florida, without regard to conflicts of laws principles. Each of the Parties submits to the jurisdiction of any state or federal court sitting in the State of Florida, in any action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement and agrees that all claims in respect of the action or proceeding may be heard and determined in any such court. Each of the Parties waives any defense of inconvenient forum to the maintenance of any action or proceeding so brought and waives any bond, surety, or other security that might be required of any other Party with respect thereto. Any Party may make service on any other Party by sending or delivering a copy of the process to the Party to be served at the address and in the manner provided for the giving of notices in Section 7(b) above. Nothing in this Section 7(l), however, shall affect the right of any Party to serve legal process in any other manner permitted by law or at equity. Each Party agrees that a final judgment in any action or proceeding so brought shall be conclusive and may be enforced by suit on the judgment or in any other manner provided by law or at equity. (m) Waiver of Jury Trial. EACH OF THE PARTIES HEREBY IRREVOCABLY WANES ANY AND ALL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY LEGAL PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR THE TRANSACTIONS CONTEMPLATED HEREBY. [Signatures follow on next page] 8 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have caused this Agreement to be executed by their duly authorized respective officers, as of the date first above written. COMPANY ELITE DATA SERVICES INC. A Florida Corporation By: /s/ Brenton Mix Brenton Mix Chief Executive Officer ANTOL By: /s/ Stephen Antol Stephen Antol Individually 9 EXHIBIT A CONVERTIBLE REDEEMABLE NOTE (Antol Note) THIS NOTE AND THE COMMON STOCK ISSUABLE UPON CONVERSION OF THIS NOTE HAVE NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE REGISTERED WITH THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR THE SECURITIES COMMISSION OF ANY STATE PURSUANT TO AN EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION PROVIDED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, AND THE RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED THEREUNDER (THE "1933 ACT"). US $40,000.00 ELITE DATA SERVICES, INC. CONVERTIBLE REDEEMABLE NOTE FOR VALUE RECEIVED, ELITE DATA SERVICES, INC. (the "Company") promises to pay to the order of STEPHEN ANTOL, an individual and its authorized successors and permitted assigns ("Holder"), the aggregate principal face amount of FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS (U.S. $40,000.00), at ten percent (10%) interest per annum commencing on the date of execution (the "Effective Date"), due and payable to Holder by Company, plus accrued interest on the twelve month anniversary date following the execution of this Note (each a "Maturity Date"), pursuant to the terms of the Definitive Agreement dated even date herewith between Company and Holder, of which this Note is made apart. The Company will pay interest payment and the outstanding principal due upon this Note on the Maturity Date. The forwarding of such check or wire transfer shall constitute a payment of outstanding principal hereunder and shall satisfy and discharge the liability for principal on this Note to the extent of the sum represented by such check or wire transfer. Interest shall be payable in Common Stock (as defined below) pursuant to paragraph 3(f) herein. This Note is subject to the following additional provisions: 1. The Company shall be entitled to withhold from all payments any amounts required to be withheld under applicable laws. 2. This Note may be transferred or exchanged only in compliance with the Securities Act of 1933, as amended ("Act"), and applicable state securities laws. Holder shall provide the Company with 3-day written notice of the Note's transfer and shall presume that any attempted transfer to a party is deemed qualified by the Holder. Any attempted transfer to a non-qualifying party shall be treated by the Company as void. Prior to due presentment for transfer of this Note, the Company and any agent of the Company may treat the person in whose name this Note is duly registered on the Company's records as the owner hereof for all other purposes, whether or not this Note be overdue, and neither the Company nor any such agent shall be affected or bound by notice to the contrary. Any Holder of this Note electing to exercise the right of conversion set forth in Section 3(a) hereof, in addition to the requirements set forth in Section 3(b) and 3(c), and any prospective transferee of this Note, also is required to give the Company written confirmation that this Note is being converted ("Notice of Conversion") in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A-1. The date of receipt (including receipt by telecopy) of such Notice of Conversion shall be the Conversion Date. 10 3. Note Conversions; Interest Payments; Prepayments, Transfers, Etc. (a) The Holder of this Note is entitled, at its option, beginning on the 181th day after Effective Date, at any time, to convert all or any amount of the principal face amount of this Note then outstanding into shares of the Company's common stock (the " Common Stock ") at a price (" Conversion Price ") for each share of Common Stock equal to a discount of fifty percent (50%) of the lowest trading price of the Common Stock as reported on the OTCQB marketplace which the Company's shares are traded or any market upon which the Common Stock may be traded in the future (" Exchange "), for the ten (10) prior trading days including the day upon which a Notice of Conversion is received by the Company and its transfer agent (provided such Notice of Conversion is delivered by electronic method of communication to the Company or its transfer agent after 4 P.M. Eastern Standard or Daylight Savings Time if the Holder wishes to include the same day closing price) beginning on the 181st day after Effective Date. (b) If the shares have not been delivered within three (3) business days, the Notice of Conversion may be rescinded. Such conversion shall be effectuated by the transfer agent of the Company delivering the shares of Common Stock to the Holder within three (3) business days of receipt by the Company of the Notice of Conversion. Accrued but unpaid interest shall be subject to conversion. No fractional shares or scrip representing fractions of shares will be issued on conversion, but the number of shares issuable shall be rounded to the nearest whole share. To the extent the Conversion Price of the Company's Common Stock closes below the par value per share, the Company will take all steps necessary to solicit the consent of the stockholders to reduce the par value to the lowest value possible under law. The Company agrees to honor all conversions submitted pending this decrease. (c) At any time or times on or after the Maturity Date, the Holder shall be entitled to convert all of the outstanding and unpaid principal amount of this Note into fully paid and non-assessable shares of Common Stock in accordance with the stated Conversion Price. The Holder shall not be entitled to convert on a Conversion Date that amount of the Note in connection with that number of shares of Common Stock which would be in excess of the sum of (i) the number of shares of Common Stock beneficially owned by the Holder and its affiliates on a Conversion Date, (ii) any Common Stock issuable in connection with the unconverted portion of the Note, and (iii) the number of shares of Common Stock issuable upon the conversion of the Note with respect to which the determination of this provision is being made on a Conversion Date, which would result in beneficial ownership by the Holder and its affiliates of more than 4.99% of the outstanding shares of Common Stock of the Company on such Conversion Date. For the purposes of the provision to the immediately preceding sentence, beneficial ownership shall be determined in accordance with Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Regulation 13d-3 thereunder. Subject to the following, the Holder shall not be limited to aggregate conversions of 4.99% ("Conversion Limitation 1"). The Holder shall have the authority to determine whether the restriction contained in this Section 3(c) will limit any conversion hereunder. The Holder may waive the conversion limitation described in this Section 3(c), in whole or in part, upon and effective after 61-days prior written notice to the Company to increase such percentage to up to 9.99% ("Conversion Limitation 2"). (d) The Company shall not issue any fraction of a share of Common Stock upon any conversion; if such issuance would result in the issuance of a fraction of a share of Common Stock, the Company shall round such fraction of a share of Common Stock up to the nearest whole share except in the event that rounding up would violate the conversion limitation set forth in section 3(c) above. 11 (e) If the Company, at any time after the Issuance Date, shall issue any securities convertible into or exchangeable for, directly or indirectly, Common Stock ("Convertible Securities"), other than the Note, or any rights or warrants or options to purchase any such Common Stock or Convertible Securities, shall be issued or sold (collectively, the "Common Stock Equivalents") and the aggregate of the price per share for which Additional Shares of Common Stock may be issuable thereafter pursuant to such Common Stock Equivalent, plus the consideration received by the Company for issuance of such Common Stock Equivalent divided by the number of shares of Common Stock issuable pursuant to such Common Stock Equivalent (the "Aggregate Per Common Share Price") shall be less than the applicable Conversion Price then in effect, or if, after any such issuance of Common Stock Equivalents, the price per share for which Additional Shares of Common Stock may be issuable thereafter is amended or adjusted, and such price as so amended shall make the Aggregate Per Share Common Price be less than the applicable Conversion Price in effect at the time of such amendment or adjustment, then the applicable Conversion Price upon each such issuance or amendment shall be reduced to the lower of: (i) the Conversion Price; or (ii) a twenty-five percent (25%) discount to the lowest Aggregate Per Common Share Price (whether or not such Common Stock Equivalents are actually then exercisable, convertible or exchangeable in whole or in part) as of the earlier of (A) the date on which the Company shall enter into a firm contract for the issuance of such Common Stock Equivalent, or (B) the date of actual issuance of such Common Stock Equivalent. No adjustment of the applicable Conversion Price shall be made under this Section 6 upon the issuance of any Convertible Security which is outstanding on the day immediately preceding the Issuance Date. No adjustment shall be made to the Conversion Price upon the issuance of Common Stock pursuant to the exercise, conversion or exchange of any Convertible Security or Common Stock Equivalent where an adjustment to the Conversion Price was made as a result of the issuance or purchase of any Convertible Security or Common Stock Equivalent. (f) Interest on any unpaid principal balance of this Note shall be paid at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum with the first payment being made on the sixth-month anniversary of this Note. Interest shall be paid by the Company in Common Stock ("Interest Shares"). Holder may, at any time after six months, send in a Notice of Conversion to the Company for Interest Shares based on the formula provided in Section 3(a) above. The dollar amount converted into Interest Shares shall be all or a portion of the accrued interest calculated on the unpaid principal balance of this Note to the date of such notice. (g) The Notes may be prepaid, in whole or in part, with the following penalties: (i) if the note is prepaid within 90 days of the issuance date, then at 120% of the face amount plus any accrued interest; (ii) if the note is prepaid within 91 days after the issuance date but less than 150 days after the issuance date, then at 130% of the face amount plus any accrued interest; (iii) if the note is prepaid within 150 days after the issuance date but less than 180 days after the issuance date, then at 140% of the face amount plus any accrued interest. This Note may not be prepaid after the 180th day without written permission from Holder. Such redemption must be closed and funded within three (3) days of giving notice of redemption of the right to redeem shall be null and void. (h) Upon (i) a transfer of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company to any person in a single transaction or series of related transactions, (ii) a reclassification, capital reorganization or other change or exchange of outstanding shares of the Common Stock, other than a forward or reverse stock split or stock dividend, or (iii) any consolidation or merger of the Company with or into another person or entity in which the Company is not the surviving entity (other than a merger which is effected solely to change the jurisdiction of incorporation of the Company and results in a reclassification, conversion or exchange of outstanding shares of Common Stock solely into shares of Common Stock) (each of items (i), (ii) and (iii) being referred to as a "Sale Event"), then, in each case, the Company shall, upon request of the Holder, redeem this Note in cash for 150% of the principal amount, plus accrued but unpaid interest through the date of redemption, or at the election of the Holder, such Holder may convert the unpaid principal amount of this Note (together with the amount of accrued but unpaid interest) into shares of Common Stock immediately prior to such Sale Event at the Conversion Price. (i) In case of any Sale Event (not to include a sale of all or substantially all of the Company's assets) in connection with which this Note is not redeemed or converted, the Company shall cause effective provision to be made so that the Holder of this Note shall have the right thereafter, by converting this Note, to purchase or convert this Note into the kind and number of shares of stock or other securities or property (including cash) receivable upon such reclassification, capital reorganization or other change, consolidation or merger by a holder of the number of shares of Common Stock that could have been purchased upon exercise of the Note and at the same Conversion Price, as defined in this Note, immediately prior to such Sale Event. The foregoing provisions shall similarly apply to successive Sale Events. If the consideration received by the holders of Common Stock is other than cash, the value shall be as determined by the Board of Directors of the Company or successor person or entity acting in good faith. 12 4. The Holder agrees that so long as this Note from the Holder and the Company remains outstanding, the Holder will not enter into or effect "short sales" of the Common Stock or hedging transaction which establishes a net short position with respect to the Common Stock of the Company. The Company acknowledges and agrees that upon delivery of a conversion notice by the Holder, the Holder immediately owns the shares of Common Stock described in the conversion notice and any sale of those shares issuable under such conversion notice would not be considered short sales. 5. No provision of this Note shall alter or impair the obligation of the Company, which is absolute and unconditional, to pay the principal of, and interest on, this Note at the time, place, and rate, and in the form, herein prescribed. 6. The Company hereby expressly waives demand and presentment for payment, notice of non-payment, protest, notice of protest, notice of dishonor, notice of acceleration or intent to accelerate, and diligence in taking any action to collect amounts called for hereunder and shall be directly and primarily liable for the payment of all sums owing and to be owing hereto. 7. The Company agrees to pay all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, which may be incurred by the Holder in collecting any amount due under this Note. 8. If one or more of the following described "Events of Default" shall occur: (a) The Company shall default in the payment of principal or interest on this Note to the Holder by the Company as of the Maturity Date; or (b) Any of the representations or warranties made by the Company herein or in any certificate or financial or other written statements heretofore or hereafter furnished by or on behalf of the Company in connection with the execution and delivery of this Note under which this note was issued shall be false or misleading in any respect; or (c) The Company shall fail to perform or observe, in any respect, any covenant, term, provision, condition, agreement or obligation of the Company under this Note or any other note issued to the Holder; or (d) The Company shall (1) make an assignment for the benefit of creditors or commence proceedings for its dissolution; (2) apply for or consent to the appointment of a trustee, liquidator or receiver for its or for a substantial part of its property or business; (3) file a petition for bankruptcy relief, consent to the filing of such petition or have filed against it an involuntary petition for bankruptcy relief, all under federal or state laws as applicable; or (e) A trustee, liquidator or receiver shall be appointed for the Company or for a substantial part of its property or business without its consent and shall not be discharged within sixty (60) days after such appointment; or (f) Any governmental agency or any court of competent jurisdiction at the instance of any governmental agency shall assume custody or control of the whole or any substantial portion of the properties or assets of the Company; or 13 (g) One or more money judgments, writs or warrants of attachment, or similar process, in excess of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in the aggregate, shall be entered or filed against the Company or any of its properties or other assets and shall remain unpaid, unvacated, unbonded or unstayed for a period of thirty (30) days or in any event later than five (5) days prior to the date of any proposed sale thereunder with the exception of the current litigation that is already disclosed as reported on the Company's public filings; or (h) The Company shall have its Common Stock delisted from a market (including the OTCQB marketplace) or, if the Common Stock trades on an exchange, then trading in the Common Stock shall be suspended for more than ten (10) consecutive days; (i) The Company shall not deliver to the Holder the Common Stock pursuant to paragraph 4 herein without restrictive legend within three (3) business days of its receipt of a Notice of Conversion (provided that a reasonable attorney opinion has been provided by Holder to the Company in which it deems it can reasonably rely); or (j) The Company shall not be "current" in its filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and such shall not be cured within ten (10) business days; or (k) The Company shall lose the "bid" price for its stock and a market (including the OTCBB marketplace or other exchange) Then, or at any time thereafter, unless cured within five (5) business days, and in each and every such case, unless such Event of Default shall have been waived in writing by the Holder (which waiver shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any subsequent default) at the option of the Holder and in the Holder's sole discretion, the Holder may consider this Note immediately due and payable, without presentment, demand, protest or (further) notice of any kind (other than notice of acceleration), all of which are hereby expressly waived, anything herein or in any note or other instruments contained to the contrary notwithstanding, and the Holder may immediately, and without expiration of any period of grace, enforce any and all of the Holder's rights and remedies provided herein or any other rights or remedies afforded by law. Upon an Event of Default, interest shall accrue at a default interest rate of 24% per annum or, if such rate is usurious or not permitted by current law, then at the highest rate of interest permitted by law. In the event of a breach of Section 8(i) the penalty shall be $50 per day the shares are not issued beginning on the 5th day after the conversion notice was delivered to the Company. This penalty shall increase to $100 per day beginning on the 10th day. The penalty for a breach of Section 8(k) shall be an increase of the outstanding principal amounts by 20%. In case of a breach of Section 8(h), the outstanding principal due under this Note shall increase by 50%. Further, if a breach of Section 8(m) occurs or is continuing after the 6-month anniversary of the Note, then the Holder shall be entitled to use the lowest closing bid price during the delinquency period (after cure period) as a base price for the conversion. For example, if the lowest closing bid price during the delinquency period is $0.01 per share and the conversion discount is 50% the Holder may elect to convert future conversions at $0.001 per share. If this Note is not paid at maturity, the outstanding principal due under this Note shall increase by ten percent (10%). 9. At the Holder's election, if the Company fails for any reason to deliver to the Holder the conversion shares by the by the 3rd business day following the delivery of a Notice of Conversion to the Company and if the Holder incurs a Failure to Deliver Loss, then at any time the Holder may provide the Company written notice and documentary evidence indicating the amounts payable to the Holder in respect of the Failure to Deliver Loss and the Company must make the Holder whole as follows: Failure to Deliver Loss = [(High trade price at any time on or after the day of exercise) x (Number of conversion shares)]. Such failure to deliver will be repayable in the Company's Common Stock. 10. In case any provision of this Note is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be excessive in scope or otherwise invalid or unenforceable, such provision shall be adjusted rather than voided, if possible, so that it is enforceable to the maximum extent possible, and the validity and enforceability of the remaining provisions of this Note will not in any way be affected or impaired thereby. 14 11. Neither this Note nor any term hereof may be amended, waived, discharged or terminated other than by a written instrument signed by the Company and the Holder. 12. The Company represents that it is not a "shell" issuer and has never been a "shell" issuer or that if it previously has been a "shell" issuer that at least 12 months have passed since the Company has reported Form 10 type information indicating it is no longer a "shell issuer. 13. The Holder agrees that so long as this Note from the Holder and the Company remains outstanding, the Holder will not enter into or effect "short sales" of the Common Stock or hedging transaction which establishes a net short position with respect to the Common Stock of the Company. The Company acknowledges and agrees that upon delivery of a conversion notice by the Holder, the Holder immediately owns the shares of Common Stock described in the conversion notice and any sale of those shares issuable under such conversion notice would not be considered short sales. 14. The Company will give the Holder direct notice of any corporate actions, including but not limited to name changes, stock splits, recapitalizations etc. This notice shall be given to the Holder as soon as possible under law. 15. Any dispute or claim arising to or in any way related to this Note or the rights and obligations of each of the parties hereto may be settled by binding arbitration pursuant. All arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). AAA shall designate an arbitrator from an approved list of arbitrators following both parties' review and deletion of those arbitrators on the approved list having a conflict of interest with either party. The Company agrees that a final non-appealable judgment in any such suit or proceeding shall be conclusive and may be enforced in other jurisdictions by suit on such judgment or in any other lawful manner. The Company hereto knowingly and voluntarily waives any and all rights it may have to a trial by jury with respect to any litigation based on, or arising out of, under, or in connection with, this note. 16. This Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Florida applicable to contracts made and wholly to be performed within the State of Florida and shall be binding upon the successors and assigns of each party hereto. The Holder and the Company hereby mutually waive trial by jury and consent to exclusive jurisdiction and venue in the courts of the State of Florida. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, and the facsimile transmission of an executed counterpart to this Agreement shall be effective as an original. [SIGNATURES ON PAGE TO FOLLOW] 15 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Note to be duly executed by an officer thereunto duly authorized on the date referenced below. ELITE DATA SERVICES, INC. Date: January 10, 2017 By: /s/ Brenton Mix Brenton Mix Chief Executive Officer 16 EXHIBIT A-1 NOTICE OF CONVERSION (To be Executed by the Registered Holder in order to Convert the Note) The undersigned hereby irrevocably elects to convert $___________ of the above Note into _________ Shares of Common Stock of Elite Data Services, Inc. ("Shares"), according to the conditions set forth in such Note, as of the date written below. If Shares are to be issued in the name of a person other than the undersigned, the undersigned will pay all transfer and other taxes and charges payable with respect thereto. Date of Conversion: ________________________________________ Applicable Conversion Price: _________________________________ Signature: _______________________________________________ [Print Name of Holder and Title of Signer] Address: ________________________________________________ SSN or EIN: ______________________________________________ Shares are to be registered in the following name: Name: ______________________________ Address: ____________________________ ____________________________ Tel: ________________________________ SSN or EIN: _________________________ Shares are to be sent or delivered to the following account: Account Name: _______________________ _______________________ Address: ____________________________ ____________________________ ____________________________ 17
cs	legislation	EU	Důležité právní upozornění \| 32002R1406 Úřední věstník L 208 , 05/08/2002 S. 0001 - 0009 Nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1406/2002ze dne 27. června 2002,kterým se zřizuje Evropská agentura pro námořní bezpečnost(Text s významem pro EHP)EVROPSKÝ PARLAMENT A RADA EVROPSKÉ UNIE,s ohledem na Smlouvu o založení Evropského společenství, a zejména na čl. 80 odst. 2 této smlouvy,s ohledem na návrh Komise [1],s ohledem na stanovisko Hospodářského a sociálního výboru [2],s ohledem na stanovisko Výboru regionů [3],v souladu s postupem stanoveným v článku 251 Smlouvy [4],vzhledem k těmto důvodům:(1) Ve Společenství byl přijat velký počet právních předpisů s cílem zvýšit bezpečnost a zabránit znečištění v námořní dopravě. Aby tyto právní předpisy byly účinné, musí být v celém Společenství uplatňovány řádným a jednotným způsobem. Tím se zajistí rovné podmínky pro všechny, sníží se narušení hospodářské soutěže následkem hospodářských výhod pro ty, kteří provozují nevyhovující lodě, a seriózní provozovatelé námořní plavby budou odměněni.(2) Některé úkoly dnes plněné na úrovni Společenství nebo na vnitrostátní úrovni by mohl vykonávat specializovaný odborný subjekt. Ve skutečnosti vzniká potřeba technické a vědecké účasti a vysoké úrovně stabilního odborného posuzování v zájmu řádného uplatňování právních předpisů Společenství v oblastech námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi, sledování provádění těchto právních předpisů a vyhodnocení účinnosti zavedených opatření. Proto je třeba v rámci stávající institucionální struktury a při dodržení rovnováhy pravomocí ve Společenství zřídit Evropskou agenturu pro námořní bezpečnost (dále jen "agentura").(3) Obecně má agentura představovat technický subjekt, který pro Společenství zajišťuje nezbytné prostředky k účinnému působení při prosazování celkové námořní bezpečnosti a pravidel o zabránění znečištění loděmi. Agentura by měla být nápomocna Komisi při trvalé aktualizaci a rozvoji právních předpisů Společenství v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi a měla by poskytovat nezbytnou podporu k zajištění soustředěného a účinného provádění těchto právních předpisů v celém Společenství tím, že bude pomáhat Komisi v plnění úkolů jí přidělených stávajícími a budoucími právními předpisy Společenství o námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi.(4) Pro řádné dosažení záměrů, kvůli nimž se agentura zřizuje, je vhodné, aby prováděla řadu jiných důležitých úkolů zaměřených na posílení námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění výsostných vod členských států loděmi. Z tohoto hlediska by měla agentura spolupracovat s členskými státy při organizaci vhodných školení o otázkách týkající se státní přístavní inspekce a působnosti státu vlajky, a rovněž by měla poskytovat technickou pomoc vztahující se k provádění právních předpisů Společenství. Měla by usnadňovat spolupráci mezi členskými státy a Komisí na základě směrnice Evropského parlamentu a Rady 2002/59/ES ze dne 27. června 2002, kterou se stanoví kontrolní a informační systém Společenství pro provoz plavidel a kterou se ruší směrnice Rady 93/75/EHS [5], a to rozvíjením a provozováním všech informačních systémů nezbytných pro dosažení cílů uvedené směrnice, a dále by měla usnadňovat činnosti týkající se vyšetřování závažných námořních nehod. Měla by Komisi a členským státům poskytnout objektivní, spolehlivé a srovnatelné informace a údaje o námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi k přijetí nezbytných kroků na posílení zavedených opatření a k vyhodnocení jejich účinnosti. Měla by poskytovat poznatky o námořní bezpečnosti ve Společenství státům žádajícím o přistoupení. Měla by být otevřená k účasti těchto států a ostatních třetích zemí, které uzavřely se Společenstvím dohody, na jejichž základě přijímají a provádějí právní předpisy Společenství v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi.(5) Agentura by měla podporovat zavádění lepší spolupráce mezi členskými státy a měla by rozvíjet a rozšiřovat nejlepší praxi ve Společenství. To by mělo zároveň přispívat k posilování celkového námořního bezpečnostního systému ve Společenství, jakož i k omezení nebezpečí námořních nehod, znečištění moří a ztrát lidských životů na moři.(6) V zájmu řádného výkonu úkolů svěřených agentuře je vhodné, aby její zaměstnanci navštěvovali členské státy a sledovali všeobecné fungování systému námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi ve Společenství. Návštěvy by měly být prováděny v souladu s politikou stanovenou správní radou agentury, a orgány členských států by je měly usnadňovat.(7) Agentura by měla uplatňovat příslušné právní předpisy Společenství o veřejném přístupu k dokumentům a ochraně jednotlivců při zpracovávání osobních údajů. Měla by veřejnosti a všem zúčastněným osobám podávat objektivní, spolehlivé a snadno srozumitelné informace o své práci.(8) Z hlediska smluvní odpovědnosti agentury, která se řídí právem použitelným pro smlouvy uzavírané agenturou, by měl pravomoc k rozhodování na základě jakékoli rozhodčí doložky obsažené ve smlouvě mít Soudní dvůr. Soudní dvůr by měl rovněž mít pravomoc ve sporech o náhradu jakýchkoli škod plynoucích z mimosmluvní odpovědnosti agentury.(9) V zájmu zajištění účinného výkonu funkcí agentury by měly členské státy a Komise být zastoupeny ve správní radě vybavené nezbytnými pravomocemi ke stanovení rozpočtu, ověřování jeho plnění, přijetí příslušných finančních pravidel, zavádění průhledných postupů pro rozhodování agentury, schvalování jejího plánu práce, posuzování požadavků členských států na technickou pomoc, definování politiky návštěv členských států a jmenování výkonného ředitele. S ohledem na vysoce technické a vědecké poslání a úkoly agentury je vhodné, aby se správní rada skládala z jednoho zástupce každého členského státu a čtyř zástupců Komise s vysokou úrovní odbornosti. Aby byla ve správní radě dále zajištěna nejvyšší úroveň odbornosti a zkušeností a s ohledem na účast odvětví nejúžeji spojených s úkoly agentury by Komise měla jmenovat nezávislé odborníky z těchto odvětví jako členy rady bez hlasovacího práva, a to nikoli jako zástupců konkrétních profesních organizací, ale na základě jejich osobního přínosu a zkušeností v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi.(10) Řádné fungování agentury vyžaduje jmenování jejího výkonného ředitele na základě zásluh a prokázaných správních a řídicích schopností, jakož i způsobilosti a zkušenosti týkající se námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi a výkonu jeho povinností s naprostou nezávislostí a pružností, pokud jde o organizaci vnitřního chodu agentury. Proto by měl výkonný ředitel připravit a přijmout veškeré nutné kroky k zajištění řádného plnění plánu práce agentury, připravit každý rok návrh celkové zprávy k předání správní radě, měl by vypracovat odhady příjmů a výdajů agentury a plnit její rozpočet.(11) Za účelem zaručení plné samostatnosti a nezávislosti agentury se považuje za nutné poskytnout jí samostatný rozpočet, jehož příjmy v zásadě pocházejí z příspěvku Společenství.(12) Vytvářením více decentralizovaných agentur se v minulých letech rozpočtové orgány snažily zlepšit průhlednost a kontrolu správy finančních prostředků poskytnutých těmto agenturám Společenstvím, a zejména pokud jde o rozpočty poplatků, finanční kontrolu, pravomoci čerpání, příspěvky v systému sociálního zabezpečení a vnitřního rozpočtového procesu (kodex chování). Obdobně by nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1073/1999 ze dne 25. května 1999 o vyšetřování prováděném Evropským úřadem pro boj proti podvodům (OLAF) [6] mělo být bez omezení uplatňováno na agenturu, která by se měla přistoupit k interinstitucionální dohodě mezi Evropským parlamentem, Radou Evropské unie a Komisí Evropských společenství ze dne 25. května 1999 o interním vyšetřování prováděném Evropským úřadem pro boj proti podvodům (OLAF) [7].(13) Do pěti let ode dne, kdy agentura převezme své odpovědnosti, by měla správní rada zadat nezávislé externí vyhodnocení s cílem posoudit dopad tohoto nařízení, agentury a jejích obvyklých pracovních postupů na zajištění vysoké úrovně námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi,PŘIJALY TOTO NAŘÍZENÍ:KAPITOLA ICÍLE A ÚKOLYČlánek 1Cíle1. Tímto nařízením se zřizuje Evropská agentura pro námořní bezpečnost (dále jen "agentura") za účelem zajištění vysoké, jednotné a účinné úrovně námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi v rámci Společenství.2. Agentura poskytuje členským státům a Komisi potřebnou technickou a vědeckou pomoc na vysoké úrovni odbornosti s cílem pomoci jim správně uplatňovat právní předpisy Společenství v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi, sledovat jejich provádění a vyhodnocovat účinnost zavedených opatření.Článek 2ÚkolyZa účelem zajištění řádného plnění cílů stanovených v článku 1 vykonává agentura tyto úkoly:a) v případě potřeby je nápomocna Komisi v přípravných pracích na aktualizaci a vypracovávání právních předpisů Společenství v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi, zejména v souladu s vývojem mezinárodních právních předpisů v této oblasti. Tento úkol zahrnuje analýzu výzkumných projektů řešených v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi;b) je nápomocna Komisi v účinném uplatňování právních předpisů Společenství o námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi v celém Společenství. Agentura zejménai) sleduje celkové působení režimu státní přístavní inspekce ve Společenství, což může zahrnovat návštěvy v členských státech, a navrhuje Komisi veškerá možná zlepšení v této oblasti;ii) poskytuje Komisi pomoc nezbytnou k její účasti na práci technických orgánů Pařížského memoranda o porozumění o státní přístavní inspekci;iii) je nápomocna Komisi v plnění všech úkolů přidělených Komisí stávajícími a budoucími právními předpisy Společenství o námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi, zejména právními předpisy týkajícími se klasifikačních společností, bezpečnosti osobních lodí a bezpečnosti, výcviku, vydávání osvědčení a strážní služby posádek lodí;c) spolupracuje s členskými státy přii) případné organizaci odpovídajících výcvikových činností v oblastech spadajících do působnosti státu přístavu a státu vlajky;ii) rozvoji technických řešení a poskytování technické pomoci vztahující se k uplatňování právních předpisů Společenství;d) usnadňuje spolupráci mezi členskými státy a Komisí v oblasti působnosti směrnice 2002/59/ES. Agentura zejménai) podporuje spolupráci mezi pobřežními státy v oblastech zahrnutých uvedenou směrnicí;ii) vyvíjí a provozuje informační systém nezbytný k dosažení cílů uvedené směrnice;e) usnadňuje spolupráci mezi členskými státy a Komisí při rozvoji společné metodiky vyšetřování námořních nehod v souladu s dohodnutými mezinárodnímu zásadami, při zajišťování podpory členských států v činnostech týkajících se vyšetřování závažných námořních nehod a při provádění analýz stávajících zpráv o vyšetřování nehod, přičemž patřičně zohlední odlišnosti právních systémů členských států;f) poskytuje Komisi a členským státům objektivní, spolehlivé a srovnatelné informace a údaje o námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi s cílem umožnit jim přijetí nutných kroků ke zlepšení námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi a k vyhodnocení účinnosti stávajících opatření. Tyto úkoly zahrnují shromažďování, zaznamenávání a vyhodnocování technických údajů v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a námořní dopravy, jakož i v oblasti nezáměrného i záměrného znečištění moří, systematické využívání stávajících databází včetně jejich vzájemného obohacování a případný vývoj dalších databází. Na základě shromážděných údajů je agentura nápomocna Komisi při zveřejňování informací o lodích, kterým byl odepřen přístup do přístavů Společenství na základě směrnice Rady 95/21/ES ze dne 19. června 1995 o uplatňování mezinárodních norem pro bezpečnost lodí, zabránění znečištění a životní a pracovní podmínky na lodích, které využívají přístavy Společenství a plují ve výsostných vodách členských států (státní přístavní inspekce) [8]. Agentura je rovněž nápomocna Komisi a členským státům v jejich činnostech při zlepšování identifikace a kontroly lodí provádějících nezákonná vypouštění nečistot;g) v průběhu jednání se státy žádajícími o přistoupení může agentura poskytnout technickou pomoc při provádění právních předpisů Společenství v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi. Tento úkol je koordinován se stávajícími regionálními programy spolupráce a případně zahrnuje pořádání souvisejících výcvikových činností.Článek 3Návštěvy členských států1. K plnění úkolů jí svěřených může agentura provádět návštěvy členských států v souladu se zásadami definovanými správní radou. Vnitrostátní orgány členských států zaměstnancům agentury usnadňují práci.2. Agentura informuje dané členské státy o plánované návštěvě, o jménech pověřených úředníků a dni zahájení návštěvy. Pověření úředníci agentury před zahájením těchto návštěv předloží rozhodnutí výkonného ředitele agentury upřesňující účel a cíle návštěvy.3. Na konci každé návštěvy agentura vypracuje zprávu a zašle ji Komisi a danému členskému státu.Článek 4Průhlednost a ochrana informací1. Při vyřizování žádostí o přístup k dokumentům v držení agentury uplatňuje agentura zásady stanovené v nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1049/2001 ze dne 30. května 2001 o přístupu veřejnosti k dokumentům Evropského parlamentu, Rady a Komise [9].2. Agentura může z vlastního podnětu navazovat styk v oblastech svých úkolů. Zejména zajišťuje, aby veřejnost a každá zúčastněná osoba rychle obdržela objektivní, spolehlivé a snadno srozumitelné informace o práci agentury.3. Správní rada přijme nezbytná vnitřní prováděcí pravidla k odstavcům 1 a 2.4. Na informace shromážděné Komisí a agenturou v souladu s tímto nařízením se vztahuje nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 45/2001 ze dne 18. prosince 2000 o ochraně fyzických osob v souvislosti se zpracováním osobních údajů orgány a institucemi Společenství a o volném pohybu těchto údajů [10].KAPITOLA IIVNITŘNÍ STRUKTURA A PŮSOBENÍČlánek 5Právní postavení, regionální střediska1. Agentura je institucí Společenství. Má právní subjektivitu.2. V každém členském státě požívá agentura nejrozsáhlejší způsobilost k právním úkonům, jakou přiznávají právní předpisy daného členského státu právnickým osobám. Zejména může nabývat a zcizovat movitý nebo nemovitý majetek a může vystupovat před soudem.3. Na požádání Komise může správní rada se souhlasem daných členských států rozhodnout o zřízení regionálních středisek nezbytných k plnění úkolů týkajících se kontroly plavby a námořní dopravy, jak je stanoveno ve směrnici 2002/59/ES.4. Agenturu zastupuje její výkonný ředitel.Článek 6Zaměstnanci1. Pro zaměstnance agentury platí služební řád úředníků a pracovní řád ostatních zaměstnanců Evropských společenství a pravidla společně přijatá orgány Evropských společenství za účelem uplatnění tohoto služebního řádu a pracovního řádu. Správní rada přijme po dohodě s Komisí nezbytná prováděcí pravidla.2. Aniž je dotčen článek 16, vykonává agentura ve vztahu ke svým zaměstnancům pravomoci, které služební řád a pracovní řád svěřují orgánu oprávněnému ke jmenování.3. Zaměstnanci agentury sestávají z úředníků přidělených nebo dočasně převedených Komisí nebo členskými státy a z ostatních zaměstnanců, které zaměstnává agentura podle svých potřeb k vykonávání svých úkolů.Článek 7Výsady a imunityNa agenturu a její zaměstnance se vztahuje protokol o výsadách a imunitách Evropských společenství.Článek 8Odpovědnost1. Smluvní odpovědnost agentury se řídí právem použitelným pro smlouvu, o kterou se jedná.2. Soudní dvůr je příslušný rozhodovat na základě jakékoli rozhodčí doložky obsažené ve smlouvě uzavřené agenturou.3. V případě mimosmluvní odpovědnosti agentura v souladu se základními zásadami společnými právním řádům členských států nahrazuje jakoukoli škodu způsobenou jejími útvary nebo jejími pracovníky při plnění jejich povinností.4. Soudní dvůr je příslušný pro spory o náhradu škody podle odstavce 3.5. Osobní odpovědnost pracovníků agentury vůči agentuře je upravena služebním řádem nebo pracovním řádem vztahujícím se na tyto zaměstnance.Článek 9Jazyky1. Na agenturu se vztahuje nařízení č. 1 ze dne 15. dubna 1958 o užívání jazyků v Evropském hospodářském společenství [11].2. Překladatelské služby požadované pro činnost agentury poskytuje překladatelské středisko institucí Evropské unie.Článek 10Zřízení správní rady a její pravomoci1. Zřizuje se správní rada.2. Správní radaa) v souladu s článkem 16 jmenuje výkonného ředitele;b) ke dni 30. dubna každého roku schvaluje souhrnnou zprávu agentury za předchozí rok a předává ji členským státům, Evropskému parlamentu, Radě a Komisi;c) v rámci přípravy plánu práce posuzuje žádosti členských států o technickou pomoc podle čl. 2 písm. c) bodu ii);d) před 31. říjnem každého roku schvaluje s ohledem na stanovisko Komise plán práce agentury na příští rok a předává jej členským státům, Evropskému parlamentu, Radě a Komisi.Tento plán práce je schvalován, aniž je dotčen roční rozpočtový proces Společenství. Pokud Komise s ním do 15 dnů ode dne schválení plánu práce vyjádří nesouhlas, správní rada jej znovu posoudí a schválí s případnými změnami ve lhůtě dvou měsíců ve druhém čtení buď dvoutřetinovou většinou, včetně zástupců Komise, nebo jednomyslně zástupci členských států;e) před začátkem rozpočtového roku schvaluje konečný rozpočet agentury a v případě nutnosti jej upravuje podle výše příspěvku Společenství a jiných příjmů agentury;f) stanoví rozhodovací postupy výkonného ředitele;g) definuje politiku návštěv, které mají být vykonány podle článku 3;h) vykonává funkce vztahující se k rozpočtu agentury podle článků 18, 19 a 21;i) vykonává disciplinární funkci vůči výkonnému řediteli a vedoucím jednotek uvedeným v čl. 15 odst. 3;j) přijímá svůj jednací řád.Článek 11Složení správní rady1. Správní rada se skládá z jednoho zástupce každého členského státu a ze čtyř zástupců Komise, jakož i ze čtyř odborníků z nejvíce dotčených odvětví jmenovaných Komisí a bez hlasovacích práv.Členové rady jsou jmenováni na základě úrovně odpovídající zkušenosti a odbornosti, které nabyli v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi.2. Každý členský stát a Komise jmenuje své členy správní rady a náhradníky zastupující tyto členy v jejich nepřítomnosti.3. Funkční období trvá pět let. Funkční období lze jednou obnovit.4. Případná účast zástupců třetích zemí a její podmínky jsou stanoveny v ustanoveních zmíněných v čl. 17 odst. 2.Článek 12Předsednictví správní rady1. Správní rada volí ze svých členů předsedu a místopředsedu. Je-li předsedovi zabráněno věnovat se svým povinnostem, jeho místo z úřední moci zaujme místopředseda.2. Funkční období předsedy a zástupce předsedy trvá tři roky a končí zároveň s členstvím ve správní radě. Funkční období lze jednou obnovit.Článek 13Schůze1. Schůze správní rady svolává její předseda.2. Výkonný ředitel agentury se účastní jednání.3. Správní rada koná řádné schůze pravidelně dvakrát ročně. Navíc se schází z podnětu předsedy nebo na žádost Komise nebo jedné třetiny členských států.4. Jde li o důvěrné záležitosti nebo střet zájmů, může správní rada rozhodnout o prozkoumání určitých bodů pořadu jednání za nepřítomnosti členů jmenovaných jako odborníků z nejvíce dotčených odvětví. Prováděcí pravidla k tomuto ustanovení může stanovit jednací řád.5. Správní rada může přizvat jakoukoli osobu, jejíž stanovisko může být důležité, aby se zúčastnila jejích schůzí jako pozorovatel.6. Členům správní rady mohou být s výhradou jednacího řádu nápomocni poradci nebo odborníci.7. Sekretariát správní rady zajišťuje agentura.Článek 14Hlasování1. Správní rada přijímá rozhodnutí dvoutřetinovou většinou hlasů svých členů s hlasovacím právem.2. Každý člen má jeden hlas. Výkonný ředitel agentury nehlasuje.V nepřítomnosti člena je k výkonu hlasovacího práva oprávněn jeho náhradník.3. Jednací řád stanoví podrobnější uspořádání hlasování, zejména podmínky pro jednání člena v zastoupení jiného člena.Článek 15Funkce a pravomoci výkonného ředitele1. Agenturu řídí výkonný ředitel, který je při výkonu svých funkcí zcela nezávislý, aniž jsou dotčeny příslušné pravomoci Komise a správní rady.2. Výkonný ředitel má tyto funkce a pravomoci:a) připravovat plán práce a po konzultaci s Komisí jej předkládat správní radě. Výkonný ředitel činí kroky nezbytné pro jeho provedení. Odpovídá na každou žádost Komise nebo členského státu o pomoc v souladu s čl. 10 odst. 2 písm. c);b) po konzultaci s Komisí a na základě zásad stanovených správní radou podle čl. 10 odst. 2 písm. g) rozhodovat o provedení návštěv stanovených v článku 3;c) činit jakékoli nezbytné kroky k zajištění chodu agentury v souladu s tímto nařízením, včetně přijímání vnitřních správních pokynů a zveřejňování oznámení;d) organizovat účinný systém kontroly, aby bylo možné porovnávat výsledky agentury s jejími provozními cíli. Na tomto základě výkonný ředitel každý rok vypracuje návrh souhrnné zprávy a předá jej správní radě. Stanoví postup pravidelného hodnocení, který odpovídá uznávaným odborným normám;e) ve vztahu k zaměstnancům vykonávat pravomoci stanovené v čl. 6 odst. 2;f) v souladu s článkem 18 sestavovat odhady příjmů a výdajů agentury a v souladu s článkem 19 odpovídat za plnění rozpočtu.3. Výkonnému řediteli může být nápomocen jeden nebo více vedoucích jednotky. Je-li výkonný ředitel nepřítomen nebo existuje-li překážka výkonu funkce, zaujme jeho místo některý z vedoucích jednotky.Článek 16Jmenování výkonného ředitele1. Výkonného ředitele agentury jmenuje správní rada na základě zásluh a doložených správních a řídicích schopností, jakož i způsobilosti a zkušenosti vztahující se k námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi. Správní rada přijímá rozhodnutí čtyřpětinovou většinou hlasů svých členů s hlasovacím právem. Komise může navrhnout kandidáta nebo kandidáty.Pravomoc propustit výkonného ředitele má správní rada stejným postupem.2. Funkční období výkonného ředitele trvá pět let. Funkční období lze jednou obnovit.Článek 17Účast třetích zemí1. Agentura je otevřená účasti třetích zemí, které uzavřely dohody s Evropským společenstvím, na jejichž základě přijaly a uplatňují právo Společenství v oblasti námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi.2. Podle odpovídajících ustanovení těchto dohod budou vypracována opatření, která mimo jiné upřesňují povahu a rozsah prováděcích pravidel účasti těchto zemí na práci agentury včetně opatření o finančních příspěvcích a zaměstnancích.KAPITOLA IIIFINANČNÍ USTANOVENÍČlánek 18Rozpočet1. Příjmy agentury sestávajía) z příspěvku od Společenství;b) z možných příspěvků od kterékoli třetí země, která se účastní práce agentury v souladu s článkem 17;c) z poplatků za publikace, výcvik a jakékoli jiné služby poskytované agenturou.2. Výdaje agentury zahrnují výdaje na zaměstnance, správu, infrastrukturu a provoz.3. Výkonný ředitel sestavuje odhady příjmů a výdajů agentury na následující rozpočtový rok a spolu s plánem pracovních míst je předává správní radě.4. Příjmy a výdaje musí být v rovnováze.5. Nejpozději do 30. dubna každého roku schválí správní rada návrh rozpočtu včetně předběžného plánu práce a předá jej Komisi a třetím zemím, které se účastní práce agentury v souladu s článkem 17.Komise na základě návrhu rozpočtu zanese odpovídající odhady do předběžného návrhu souhrnného rozpočtu Evropské unie, který v souladu s článkem 272 Smlouvy překládá Radě. Stropy finančních výhledů Společenství pro další roky musí být dodrženy.6. Po schválení souhrnného rozpočtu Evropské unie správní rada konečný rozpočet agentury a konečný plán práce schválí a případně je upraví podle výše příspěvku Společenství. Předá je bez prodlení Komisi, rozpočtovému orgánu a třetím zemím, které se účastní práce agentury.Článek 19Plnění a kontrola rozpočtu1. Výkonný ředitel plní rozpočet agentury.2. Kontrolu závazku a plateb všech výdajů a kontrolu stavu a získávání všech příjmů agentury provádí finanční kontrolor Komise.3. Nejpozději do 31. března každého roku předá výkonný ředitel Komisi, správní radě a Účetnímu dvoru podrobné vyúčtování všech příjmů a výdajů za předchozí rozpočtový rok.Účetní dvůr vyúčtování prozkoumá v souladu s článkem 248 Smlouvy. Každoročně zveřejní zprávu o činnosti agentury.4. Evropský parlament vydá na základě doporučení správní rady výkonnému řediteli absolutorium za plnění rozpočtu.Článek 20Boj proti podvodům1. V zájmu boje proti podvodům, korupci a ostatním protiprávním činnostem se na agenturu vztahuje bez omezení nařízení (ES) č. 1073/1999.2. Agentura se připojí k interinstitucionální dohodě ze dne 25. května 1999 o interním vyšetřování prováděném Evropským úřadem pro boj proti podvodům (OLAF) a bez prodlení přijme vhodné předpisy vztahující se na veškeré její zaměstnance.3. Rozhodnutí týkající se dohod o financování a provádění a nástroje z nich vyplývající výslovně stanoví, že Účetní dvůr a OLAF mohou v případě potřeby provádět kontroly na místě u příjemců finančních prostředků agentury a činitelů odpovědných za přidělování těchto prostředků.Článek 21Finanční ustanoveníSprávní rada po obdržení souhlasu Komise a stanoviska Účetního dvora přijme finanční nařízení agentury. Toto finanční nařízení zejména vymezí postupy pro sestavování a plnění rozpočtu agentury v souladu s článkem 142 finančního nařízení ze dne 21. prosince 1997 o souhrnném rozpočtu Evropských společenství [12].KAPITOLA IVZÁVĚREČNÁ USTANOVENÍČlánek 22Vyhodnocení1. Do pěti let ode dne, kdy agentura začne vykonávat své úkoly, zadá správní rada nezávislé externí vyhodnocení uplatňování tohoto nařízení. Komise dá agentuře k dispozici veškeré informace, které agentura považuje za významné pro vyhodnocení.2. Vyhodnocení posoudí vliv tohoto nařízení, agentury a jejích obvyklých pracovních postupů na zajištění vysoké úrovně námořní bezpečnosti a zabránění znečištění loděmi. Správní rada po dohodě s Komisí a návazně na konzultace se zúčastněnými stranami stanoví zvláštní zmocnění.3. Správní rada obdrží vyhodnocení a podá Komisi doporučení týkající se změn tohoto nařízení, agentury a jejích obvyklých pracovních postupů. Vyhodnocení a doporučení předá Komise Evropskému parlamentu a Radě a zveřejní je.Článek 23Zahájení činností agenturyAgentura zahájí činnost do dvanácti měsíců ode dne vstupu tohoto nařízení v platnost.Článek 24Vstup v platnostToto nařízení vstupuje v platnost dvacátým dnem po vyhlášení v Úředním věstníku Evropských společenství.Toto nařízení je závazné v celém rozsahu a přímo použitelné ve všech členských státech.V Lucemburku dne 27. června 2002.Za Evropský parlamentpředsedaP. CoxZa RadupředsedaM. Arias Cañete[1] Úř. věst. C 120 E, 24.4.2001, s. 83 a Úř. věst. C 103 E, 30.4.2002, s. 184.[2] Úř. věst. C 221. 7.8.2001, s. 64.[3] Úř. věst. C 357, 14.12.2001, s. 1.[4] Stanovisko Evropského parlamentu ze dne 14. června 2001 (Úř. věst. C 53 E, 28.2.2002, s. 312), společný postoj Rady ze dne 7. března 2002 (Úř. věst. C 119 E, 22.5.2002, s. 27) a rozhodnutí Evropského parlamentu ze dne 12. června 2002 (dosud nezveřejněné v Úředním věstníku). Rozhodnutí Rady ze dne 25. června 2002.[5] Úř. věst. L 208, 5.8.2002, s. 10.[6] Úř. věst. L 136, 31.5.1999. s. 1.[7] Úř. věst. L 136, 31.5.1999, s. 15.[8] Úř. věst. L 157, 7.7.1995, s. 1. Směrnice naposledy pozměněná směrnicí Evropského parlamentu a Rady 2001/106/ES (Úř. věst. L 19, 22.1.2002, s. 17).[9] Úř. věst. L 145, 31.5.2001, s. 43.[10] Úř. věst. L 8, 12.1.2001, s. 1.[11] Úř. věst. 17, 6.10.1958, s. 385/58. Nařízení naposledy pozměněné aktem o přistoupení z roku 1994.[12] Úř. věst. L 356, 31.12.1977, s. 1. Nařízení naposledy pozměněné nařízením (ES, ESUO, Euratom) č. 762/2001 (Úř. věst. L 111, 20.4.2001, s. 1).--------------------------------------------------
en	other	N/A	EnduringVisions - Keynote Address - American Art Welcome to the Wiki page for the first Keynote Address, focusing on American Art! The Keynote sessions on this topic was held on October 20, 2011. The purpose of this wiki page is to allow those who attended the opportunity to pool resources and ideas gleaned from that institute. Feel free to post lesson plans, project ideas, or other ways that you have integrated the material or methods learned at this day's sessions into your classroom. What worked, or did not work? What materials have you discovered were most helpful? Or least helpful? What material (photos, documents, videos, etc) do you wish you had more of? And who has found some to recommend? Here are the Powerpoint slides for Dr. Freeberg's Keynote Address (due to the large nature of the files, I had to break it up into ten different sections): History through Art 1.pptxDetailsDownload6 MBHistory through Art 2.pptxDetailsDownload3 MB History through Art 3.pptxDetailsDownload3 MBHistory through Art 4.pptxDetailsDownload6 MBHistory through Art 5.pptxDetailsDownload4 MBHistory through Art 6.pptxDetailsDownload9 MBHistory through Art 7.pptxDetailsDownload6 MB History through Art 8.pptxDetailsDownload5 MBHistory through Art 9.pptxDetailsDownload6 MBHistory through Art 10.pptxDetailsDownload8 MB For Lewis Hine's TVA photos of the Norris Dam construction (as well as plenty of photos of the Kingsport area), visit this website. Here are the powerpoint slides that were used during Jason's sessions (before lunch). The Civil War portraits: Civil War Portraits.pptxDetailsDownload5 MB The photographs of Jacob Riis: Jacob Riis.pptxDetailsDownload4 MB The photographs of Lewis Hine: Lewis Hine.pptxDetailsDownload6 MB Here are the powerpoint slides that were used during William's sessions (before lunch). General overview, and how to interpret Political Cartoons: Analyzing Political Cartoons in the Classroom PPT.pptDetailsDownload438 KB For 4th and 8th grade teachers: Using Political Cartoons in the Classroom (4th & 8th) PPT.pptDetailsDownload3 MB For 5th grade teachers: Using Political Cartoons in the Classroom (5th) PPT.pptDetailsDownload7 MB For 11th grade teachers: Using Political Cartoons in the Classroom (11) PPT.pptDetailsDownload2 MB Here is, I hope, the Voice Thread that we worked on in the various groups:
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Boethos från Chalkedon var en grekisk bronskonstnär, verksam under 100- eller 200-talen före kristus. Boethos stod den mindreasiatiska skolan nära och blev berömd för bronsgruppen Gosse strypande en gås, varav exemplar finns i Vatikanen, Louvren och Glyptothek i München. Den hellenistiska gossgestalten Törnutdragaren, som bland annat finns i marmor på British Museum i London, har tillskrivits Boethos. Han var även berömd som konsthantverkare i brons, till exempel av reliefprydda vaser. Källor Svensk uppslagsbok, Malmö 1939. Grekiska skulptörer Födda okänt år Avlidna okänt år Män
lt	wikipedia	N/A	Fir Park – futbolo stadionas Madervelyje, Šiaurės Lanarkšyre, Škotijoje. Stadione namų rungtynes žaidžia Škotijos Premier lygos klubas „Motherwell FC“. 1895 m. klubas persikėlė iš Dalziel Park į naują stadioną. Po rekonstrukcijų stadione yra 13 742 sėdimos vietos. Rekordinis žiūrovų skaičius pasiektas 1952 m., Škotijos futbolo taurės metu, rungtynėse prieš „Rangers FC“. Tribūnos The Phil O’Donnell tribūna Pietų tribūna Rytų tribūna Davie Cooper tribūna Kita paskirtis Fir Park stadione vyko keli Škotijos Iššūkio taurės finalai ir du Škotijos futbolo lygos taurės pusfinaliai, tarp „Kilmarnock FC“ ir „Falkirk FC“ (2007 m.) bei tarp „Hearts FC“ ir „Saint Mirren FC“ (2010 m.). Nuorodos Fir Park stdionas oficialioje Motherwell FC svetainėje Škotijos futbolo stadionai
it	legislation	EU	29 . 12. 84 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee N. L 341 /27 REGOLAMENTO (CEE) N. 3697/84 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 27 dicembre 1984 che fissa le restituzioni applicabili all'esportazione degli alimenti composti a base di cereali per gli animali LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, degli alimenti composti e per i quali può essere fissata una restituzione ; visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità economica europea, considerando che il regolamento (CEE) n. 1913/69 visto il regolamento (CEE) n. 2727/75 del Consiglio, della Commissione, del 29 settembre 1969, relativo del 29 ottobre 1975, relativo all'organizzazione alla concessione ed alla fissazione in anticipo della comune dei mercati nel settore dei cereali ('), modifi restituzione all'esportazione degli alimenti composti a cato da ultimo dal regolamento (CEE) n. 1018/84 (2), in base di cereali per gli animali (% modificato da ultimo particolare l'articolo 16, paragrafo 2, quarto comma, dal regolamento (CEE) n. 537/83 0, ha previsto che il calcolo della restituzione all'esportazione deve essere visto il parere del comitato monetario, basato sulla media delle restituzioni concesse per i cereali di base più comunemente utilizzati, modificate considerando che, ai sensi dell'articolo 16 del regola in funzione del prezzo di entrata in vigore nel mese mento (CEE) n. 2727/75, la differenza tra i corsi o i dell'esportazione e sul prelievo applicabile al gran prezzi sul mercato mondiale dei prodotti di cui all'arti turco ; che tale calcolo deve ugualmente tener conto colo 1 di detto regolamento ed i prezzi di tali prodotti del contenuto in prodotti cerealicoli ; che è opportuno nella Comunità può essere compensata mediante una pertanto classificare, in vista di una semplificazione, gli restituzione all'esportazione ; alimenti composti in categorie e fissare la restituzione relativa a ciascuna categoria su base di una quantità di considerando che, in virtù dell'articolo 2 del regola granturco rappresentativa del contenuto abituale dei mento (CEE) n. 2746/75 del Consiglio, del 29 ottobre prodotti cerealicoli contenuti in ognuna delle categorie 1975, che stabilisce nel settore dei cereali le norme in causa ; che l'importo della restituzione deve generali relative alla concessione delle restituzioni d'altronde tener conto delle possibilità e delle condi all'esportazione e ai criteri in base ai quali viene fissato zioni di vendita dei prodotti in causa sul mercato il loro importo (3), le restituzioni devono essere fissate mondiale, della necessità di evitare perturbazioni sul tenendo conto della situazione e della probabile evolu mercato della Comunità e degli aspetti economici zione, da una parte, delle disponibilità di cereali e dei delle esportazioni ; relativi prezzi sul mercato comunitario, e, dall'altra, dei prezzi dei cereali e dei prodotti del settore cerealicolo considerando tuttavia che per la fissazione della resti sul mercato mondiale ; che conformemente allo stesso tuzione è opportuno basarsi, per il momento, sulla articolo occorre anche garantire ai mercati dei cereali differenza constatata, sul mercato comunitario e su una situazione equilibrata e uno sviluppo naturale dal quello mondiale, tra i costi delle materie prime gene punto di vista dei prezzi e degli scambi ; ralmente utilizzate negli alimenti composti in questione ; che in tal modo si può tener conto con considerando che l'applicazione di tali modalità alla maggior precisione della realtà economica delle espor situazione attuale dei mercati nel settore dei prodotti tazioni dei suddetti prodotti ; trasformati e degli alimenti composti a base di cereali porta a fissare la restituzione ad un importo che considerando che la situazione del mercato mondiale o compensa il divario tra i prezzi nella Comunità e quelli praticati sul mercato mondiale ; le esigenze specifiche di certi mercati possono rendere necessaria la differenziazione della restituzione per considerando che in virtù dell'articolo 7, paragrafo 1 , certi prodotti, a seconda della loro composizione e del regolamento (CEE) n. 2743/75 del Consiglio, del destinazione ; che per attuare tale differenziazione è 29 ottobre 1975, relativo al regime applicabile agli opportuno utilizzare le zone di destinazione determi alimenti composti a base di cereali per gli animali (4), nate nell'allegato II del regolamento (CEE) n. 1124/77, modificato dal regolamento (CEE) n. 2560/77 (), la del 27 maggio 1977, recante nuova delimitazione delle restituzione degli alimenti composti a base di cereali zone di destinazione per le restituzioni o i prelievi deve essere determinata tenendo conto dei soli all'esportazione e per determinati titoli d'esportazione prodotti che entrano abitualmente nella fabbricazione nei settori dei cereali e del riso (8), modificato dal rego lamento (CEE) n. 3634/83 (9) ; (') GU n. L 281 dell' i . 11 . 1975, pag. 1 . (2) GU n. L 107 del 19. 4. 1984, pag. 1 . (6) GU n. L 246 del 30. 9. 1969, pag. 11 . (3) GU n. L 281 dell' i . 11 . 1975, pag. 78 . Ó GU n. L 63 del 9. 3. 1983, pag. 10. (4) GU n. L 281 dell' I . 11 . 1975, pag. 60. (8) GU n. L 134 del 28. 5. 1977, pag. 53. 0 GU n. L 303 del 28 . 11 . 1977, pag. 1 . (') GU n. L 360 del 23. 12. 1983, pag. 21 . ---pagebreak--- N. L 341 /28 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 29. 12. 84 considerando che, al fine di permettere il normale considerando che il comitato di gestione per i cereali funzionamento del regime delle restituzioni, occorre non ha emesso alcun parere nel termine fissato dal suo applicare per il calcolo di queste ultime : presidente, — per le monete che restano tra di esse all'interno di uno scarto istantaneo massimo in contanti di 2,25 %, un tasso di conversione basato sul loro HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO : tasso centrale, cui si applica il coefficiente previsto dall'articolo 2 ter, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (CEE) n. 974/71 ('), modificato da ultimo dal rego Articolo 1 lamento (CEE) n. 855/84 (2), — per le altre monete, un tasso di conversione basato Le restituzioni all'esportazione degli alimenti composti sulla media aritmetica dei tassi di cambio in contemplati dal regolamento (CEE) n. 2727/75 e contanti di ciascuna di tali monete, constatato soggetti al regolamento (CEE) n. 2743/75, sono fissate durante un periodo determinato, in rapporto alle conformemente all'allegato del presente regolamento. monete della Comunità di cui al trattino prece dente e del predetto coefficiente ; Articolo 2 considerando che la restituzione deve essere fissata una volta al mese e che può essere modificata nel periodo Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il 1° gennaio intermedio : 1985. Il presente regolamento e obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri. Fatto a Bruxelles, il 27 dicembre 1984. Per la Commissione 1 Poul DALSAGER Membro della Commissione (') GU n. L 106 del 12. 5. 1971 , pag. 1 . (1) GU n. L 90 dell'I . 4. 1984, pag. 1 . ---pagebreak--- 29 . 12. 84 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee N. L 341 /29 ALLEGATO al regolamento della Commissione, del 27 dicembre 1984, che fissa le restituzioni applicabili all'esportazione degli alimenti composti a base di cereali per gli animali (ECU / tonnellata) Numero Specificazione della tariffa speciale Ammontare per la Nomenclatura a testo semplificato delle restituzioni doganale comune restituzione 23.07 B I Preparazioni utilizzate nell'alimentazione degli animali di cui al regolamento (CEE) n. 2743/75, contenenti, isolatamente o congiunta mente, anche mescolati con altri prodotti, amido o fecola, glucosio o sciroppo di glucosio delle sottovoci 17.02 B e 21.07 F II o prodotti lattiero-caseari (delle voci o sottovoci 04.01 , 04.02, 04.03, 04.04, 17.02 A e 21.07 F I) : il cui tenore, in peso, di prodotti lattiero-caseari è inferiore al 50 % ed il cui tenore in peso in prodotti cerealicoli (') è : 0510 — superiore al 5 % ed inferiore o uguale al 10 % 1,45 0 3,51 00 -0 1010 — superiore al 10 % ed inferiore o uguale al 20 % 2,91 0 7,02 00 - (4) 2010 — superiore al 20 % ed inferiore o uguale al 30 % 5,81 (2) 14,04 (2)O —0 3010 — superiore al 30 % ed inferiore o uguale al 40 % 8,72 0 21,06 00 -0 4010 — superiore al 40 % ed inferiore o uguale al 50 % 11,62 (2) 28,08 0 0 - (4) 5010 — superiore al 50 % ed inferiore o uguale al 60 % 14,53 (2) 35,11 (2) (3) —0 l 6010 — superiore al 60 % ed inferiore o uguale al 70 % 1 7,44 0 42,13 (2)0 - (4) 7010 — superiore al 70 % 19,02 (2) 45,96 0 0 —0 (') Sono considerati prodotti cerealicoli, i prodotti ripresi al capitolo 10 ed alle voci 1 1.01 ed 1 1.02 (eccezione fatta per la sottovoce 11.02 G) della tariffa doganale comune. (2) Per esportazioni verso le zone A, B, C, D e E definite nell'allegato II del regolamento (CEE) n. 1 1 24/77, modificato dal regola mento (CEE) n. 3634/83. 0 Contenuto minimo di granturco e/o di sorgo superiore a : 0510 : 5 % ; 1010 : 10 % ; 20 1 0 : 20 % ; 3010 : 30 % ; 4010 : 40 % ; 5010 : 50 % ; 6010 : 60 % ; 7010 : 60 % . Qualora tale contenuto minimo sia rispettato, tali restituzioni, su richiesta dell'interessato, sono applicabili anche nel caso in cui il tenore di prodotti cerealicoli superi il tenore massimo previsto alla stessa linea. (*) Per esportazioni verso gli altri paesi terzi.
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Oakham Castle är ett slott i Storbritannien. Det ligger i grevskapet District of Rutland och riksdelen England, i den sydöstra delen av landet, km norr om huvudstaden London. Oakham Castle ligger meter över havet. Terrängen runt Oakham Castle är platt, och sluttar österut. Den högsta punkten i närheten är meter över havet, km sydväst om Oakham Castle. Runt Oakham Castle är det ganska tätbefolkat, med invånare per kvadratkilometer. Närmaste större samhälle är Corby, km söder om Oakham Castle. Trakten runt Oakham Castle består till största delen av jordbruksmark. Kustklimat råder i trakten. Årsmedeltemperaturen i trakten är °C. Den varmaste månaden är augusti, då medeltemperaturen är °C, och den kallaste är januari, med °C. Kommentarer Källor Externa länkar Byggnadsverk i England
en	contracts	US	Old Mutual Funds II Supplement Dated APRIL 29, 2010 This Supplement updates certain information contained in the currently effective Class A, Class C, Class Z and Institutional Class Shares Statement of Additional Information of Old Mutual Funds II dated July 29, 2009, as supplemented (the “SAI”).You should retain your SAI and current supplements for future reference.You may obtain an additional copy of the SAI and all current supplements, free of charge, by calling 888-772-2888 or via the Internet at oldmutualfunds.com. BOARD OF TRUSTEES At a meeting of shareholders of Old Mutual Funds II (the “Trust”) held on April 19, 2010, shareholders elected John R. Bartholdson, Robert M. Hamje, Jarrett B. Kling, L. Kent Moore and Thomas M. Turpin to the Board of Trustees of the Trust (“Board”).Accordingly, the following replaces in its entirety the “Trustees” section of the SAI on pages 37 - 42: TRUSTEES The management and affairs of the Trust are supervised by the Board under the laws of the State of Delaware.The Board has approved contracts under which, as described above, certain companies provide essential management services to the Trust.The Trustees have no official term of office and generally serve until they reach the mandated retirement age of 72.The Trustees and executive officers of the Trust and their principal occupations for the last five years are set forth below.Each may have held other positions with the named companies during that period.The address for each of the Trustees and executive officers of the Trust is 4643 South Ulster Street, Suite 700, Denver, Colorado 80237. Trustees* Principal Occupation(s) During Past Five Years Independent Trustees John R. Bartholdson Trustee, Audit Committee Chair and Financial Expert Born 1944 Retired; Formerly Chief Financial Officer, The Triumph Group, Inc. (manufacturing) from 1992 to 2007. Director of ING Clarion Real Estate Income Fund from 2004 to 2009 and ING Clarion Global Real Estate Income Fund since 2004. Trustee of Old Mutual Funds I since 2004. Old Mutual Funds II Trustee since 1995.Currently oversees 20 funds in the Old Mutual complex. Robert M. Hamje Trustee Born 1942 Retired; Formerly President and Chief Investment Officer (1991 to 2003), TRW Investment Management Company (investment management) where he was employed from 1984 to 2003.Trustee of Old Mutual Funds I since 2004. Director of TS&W/Claymore Tax-Advantaged Balanced Fund and Old Mutual/ Claymore Long-Short Fund since 2004.Currently oversees 20 funds in the Old Mutual complex. Jarrett B. Kling Trustee Born 1943 Managing Director, ING Clarion Real Estate Securities (investment adviser) since 1998. Trustee of Old Mutual Funds I since 2004.Trustee, Hirtle Callaghan Trust since 1995; ING Clarion Real Estate Income Fund from 2004 to 2009, ING Clarion Global Real Estate Income Fund since 2004, and ING Clarion since 1998. Currently oversees 20 funds in the Old Mutual complex. L. Kent Moore Chairman Born 1955 Managing Member, Eagle River Ventures, LLC (investments) since 2003. Chairman, Foothills Energy Ventures, LLC, since 2006.Partner, WillSource Enterprise, LLC (oil and gas exploration and production), 2005 to 2006.Managing Director, High Sierra Energy, LP (holding company of natural resource related businesses), 2004 to 2005.Portfolio Manager and Vice President of Janus Capital Corp. (2000 to 2002). Senior Analyst and Portfolio Manager, Marsico Capital Management (1997 to 1999). Chairman of Board and Trustee of Old Mutual Funds I since 2004. Director of TS&W/Claymore Tax-Advantaged Balanced Fund and Old Mutual/ Claymore Long Short Fund since 2004. Currently oversees 20 funds in the Old Mutual complex. Interested Trustee Thomas M. Turpin Trustee Born 1960 Chief Executive Officer (June 2008 to present) and Chief Operating Officer (2002 to September 2006), Old Mutual Asset Management.Chief Executive Officer (October 2008 to present), Interim Chief Executive Officer (April 2008 to October 2008) and Chief Operating Officer (October 2006 to April 2008), Old Mutual US Holdings, Inc. Trustee of Old Mutual Funds II since 2007. Currently oversees 13 funds in the Old Mutual complex. Advisory Trustee* Walter W. Driver Chairman- Southeast of Goldman Sachs & Co. since 2006.Chairman (1999 to 2006) and a partner at King & Spaulding LLP, a law firm, from 1970-2006.Advisory Trustee to Old Mutual Funds I since 2006; formerly Trustee to OMF I (2004-2006).Serves as Advisory Trustee to 20 funds in the Old Mutual complex. * Each Trustee of the Trust will serve until his or her successor is duly qualified and elected, or until his earlier resignation or retirement. Mr. Turpin is a Trustee who may be deemed to be an “interested person” of the Trust, as that term is defined in the 1940 Act, because he is an officer of an affiliate of Old Mutual Capital. * The Advisory Trustee position is non-voting. Leigh Wilson, Albert Miller, and Jettie Edwards, former Trustees of the Trust, are Trustees Emeritus through December 31, 2011.As such, they are available to consult with the Board but do not have the power to vote on any Fund matters.Messrs. Wilson and Miller and Ms. Edwards receive compensation from the Funds for acting in such emeritus role, and Old Mutual Capital has agreed to reimburse the Funds for these emeritus fees. BOARD COMMITTEES The Board has two standing committees, an Audit Committee and a Governance, Nominating and Compliance Committee (“Nominating Committee”).Currently, the members of the Audit Committee are John R. Bartholdson, Robert M. Hamje, Jarrett B. Kling, and L. Kent Moore.The members of the Nominating Committee are John R. Bartholdson, Robert M. Hamje, Jarrett B. Kling, and L. Kent Moore. Audit Committee The Audit Committee, among other things, oversees the financial reporting process for the Trust, monitoring the Trust’s audit process and results.As part of this process, the Audit Committee recommends the selection of an independent audit firm for the approval by the Board and evaluates the independent audit firm’s performance, costs, and financial stability.During the Trust’s fiscal year ended March 31, 2009, the Audit Committee held 4 meetings. Governance, Nominating and Compliance Committee The Nominating Committee selects and nominates those persons for membership on the Board who are disinterested Trustees, reviews and determines compensation for the disinterested Trustees and selects independent legal counsel, as set forth in Rule 0-1(6), to provide the disinterested Trustees with legal advice, as needed. The Nominating Committee shall consider nominees recommended in writing by shareholders (other than shareholders who recommend themselves) to serve as Trustees, provided: (i) that such person is a shareholder of one or more series of the Trust at the time he or she submits such names, has been a shareholder for at least one year, and is entitled to vote at the meeting of shareholders at which Trustees will be elected; and (ii) that the Nominating Committee or the Board, as applicable, shall make the final determination of persons to be nominated. The Nominating Committee shall evaluate nominees recommended by shareholders to serve as Trustees in the same manner as they evaluate nominees identified by the Committee.During the Trust’s fiscal year ended March 31, 2009, the Nominating Committee held 4 meetings. A shareholder who desires to recommend a nominee shall submit a request in writing by regular mail or delivery service to the following address: Old Mutual Funds II, 4643 South Ulster Drive, Suite 600, Denver, Colorado 80237, Attention: Secretary of Old Mutual Funds II. Such request shall contain (i) the name, address and telephone number of, and number of Trust shares owned by, the person or entity or group of persons or entities on whose behalf the recommendation is being made, and the related account name, number and broker or account provider name, and (ii) if any of such persons were not record owners of the Trust at the time the recommendation was submitted, verification acceptable in form and substance to the Trust of such person’s ownership of the Trust at the time the recommendation was made. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES The tables below provide the dollar range of shares owned by each Trustee in the Trust and the aggregate dollar range of shares owned by each Trustee in registered investment companies overseen by each Trustee within the Old Mutual Fund Family as of February 12, 2010. Name of Trustee and/or Nominee Dollar Range of Equity Securities in the Funds Aggregate Dollar Range of Equity Securities in Old Mutual Complex Independent Trustees John R. Bartholdson Old Mutual Large Cap Growth Fund -$10,001 to $50,000 $50,001 to $100,000 Old Mutual Strategic Small Company Fund - $1 to $10,000 Old Mutual Analytic Long/Short Fund - $10,001 to $50,000 Old Mutual Focused Fund - $10,001 to $50,000 Robert M. Hamje None $50,001 to $100,000 Jarrett B. Kling None $10,001 to $50,000 L. Kent Moore None Over $100,000 Interested Trustee Thomas M. Turpin Old Mutual Barrow Hanley Value Fund– over $100,000 Over $100,000 Old Mutual TS&W Small Cap Fund- $10,001 to $50,000 None of the Trustees owned securities of the Adviser, the Distributor or their affiliates as of December 31, 2009. TRUSTEE COMPENSATION Each Independent Trustee receives a yearly retainer.The Trust currently pays each Independent Trustee and the Advisory Trustee a combined yearly retainer for service on the Trust and Old Mutual Funds I (“OMF I”), another mutual fund trust advised by Old Mutual Capital, Inc., of $75,000 plus travel and out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the Trustees and Advisory Trustee in attending Board meetings.The Chairman of the Boards of the Trust and OMF I receives a combined premium for both trusts of $37,500 and the Chairman of the Audit Committee receives a combined premium for both trusts of $10,000.Annual Board fees may be reviewed periodically and changed by the Board.The Trust has no plan or other arrangement pursuant to which any of the Trustees receive pension or retirement benefits. Therefore, none of the Trustees has estimated annual benefits to be paid by the Trust upon retirement. Each Trustee of the Trust received the following compensation during the Funds’ fiscal year ended March 31, 2009: Name of Person, Position Aggregate Compensation from Trust Pension or Retirement Benefits Accrued as Part of Trust Expenses* Estimated Annual Benefits Upon Retirement* Total Compensation from Trust and Trust Complex Paid to Trustees L. Kent Moore, Trustee $0 N/A N/A $117,000 for services on two Boards John R. Bartholdson, Trustee N/A N/A $124,000for services on four Boards Robert M. Hamje, Trustee $0 N/A N/A $112,000 for services on two Boards Jarrett Kling ,Trustee $0 N/A N/A $87,000for services on two Boards Thomas M. Turpin, Trustee* N/A N/A N/A N/A * The Trust has no plan or other arrangement pursuant to which the Trustees receive pension or retirement benefits. Compensation expenses are allocated pro rata based on the relative net assets of each Fund included in the Trust Complex.During the Trust’s fiscal year ended March 31, 2009, each of the Trustees also served as trustees for the Old Mutual Funds III, a separate trust whose funds were liquidated on December 5, 2009.During the Trust’s fiscal year ended March 31, 2009, Mr. Bartholdson also served as a trustee for Old Mutual Insurance Series Fund, a separate trust that was deregistered with the SEC on March 25, 2009. * Mr. Turpin is a Trustee who may be deemed to be an “interested person” of the Trust, as that term is defined in the 1940 Act, and consequently receives no compensation from the Trust. PERMITTED INVESTMENTS The following is added under the section of the SAI entitled “Description of Permitted Investments – Debt Securities” on page 8: Municipal Securities.“Municipal Securities” include debt obligations of states, territories or possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia and their political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, issued to obtain funds for various public purposes, including the construction of a wide range of public facilities such as airports, bridges, highways, housing, hospitals, mass transportation, schools, streets and water and sewer works. Other public purposes for which Municipal Securities may be issued include the refunding of outstanding obligations, obtaining funds for general operating expenses and lending such funds to other public institutions and facilities. The two major classifications of Municipal Securities are bonds and notes. Bonds may be further classified as "general obligation" or "revenue" issues. General obligation bonds are secured by the issuer's pledge of its full faith, credit and taxing power for the payment of principal and interest. Revenue bonds are payable from the revenues derived from a particular facility or class of facilities, and in some cases, from the proceeds of a special excise or other specific revenue source, but not from the general taxing power. Tax-exempt industrial development bonds are in most cases revenue bonds and do not generally carry the pledge of the credit of the issuing municipality. Notes are short-term instruments which usually mature in less than two years. Most notes are general obligations of the issuing municipalities or agencies and are sold in anticipation of a bond sale, collection of taxes or receipt of other revenues. Municipal Securities also include the following securities: · Bond Anticipation Notes usually are general obligations of state and local governmental issuers which are sold to obtain interim financing for projects that will eventually be funded through the sale of long-term debt obligations or bonds. · Tax Anticipation Notes are issued by state and local governments to finance the current operations of such governments. Repayment is generally to be derived from specific future tax revenues. Tax anticipation notes are usually general obligations of the issuer. · Revenue Anticipation Notes are issued by governments or governmental bodies with the expectation that future revenues from a designated source will be used to repay the notes. In general, they also constitute general obligations of the issuer. · Tax-Exempt Commercial Paper (Municipal Paper) is similar to taxable commercial paper, except that tax-exempt commercial paper is issued by states, municipalities and their agencies. A Fund also may purchase participation interests or custodial receipts from financial institutions. These participation interests give the purchaser an undivided interest in one or more underlying Municipal Securities. After purchase by a Fund, an issue of Municipal Securities may cease to be rated by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. (Moody's) or Standard and Poor's Ratings Services (S&P), or another nationally recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO), or the rating of such a security may be reduced below the minimum credit quality rating required for purchase by the Fund.Neither event would require the Fund to dispose of the security. To the extent that the ratings applied by Moody's, S&P or another NRSRO to Municipal Securities may change as a result of changes in these rating systems, the Fund will attempt to use comparable credit quality ratings as standards for its investments in Municipal Securities. A Fund may invest in Municipal Securities that are insured by financial insurance companies. Since a limited number of entities provide such insurance, the Fund may invest more than 25% of its assets in securities insured by the same insurance company.Since a Fund invests in Municipal Securities backed by insurance companies and other financial institutions, changes in the financial condition of these institutions could cause losses to the Fund and affect its share price. A Fund may also invest in taxable municipal securities. Taxable municipal securities are debt securities issued by or on behalf of states and their political subdivisions, the District of Columbia, and possessions of the United States, the interest on which is not exempt from federal income tax. The yields on Municipal Securities are dependent on a variety of factors, including general economic and monetary conditions, money market factors, conditions of the Municipal Securities market, size of a particular offering, and maturity and rating of the obligation. Because many Municipal Securities are issued to finance similar projects, especially those related to education, health care, transportation and various utilities, conditions in those sectors and the financial condition of an individual municipal issuer can affect the overall municipal market. The market values of the Municipal Securities held by a Fund will be affected by changes in the yields available on similar securities. If yields increase following the purchase of a Municipal Security, the market value of such Municipal Security will generally decrease. Conversely, if yields decrease, the market value of a Municipal Security will generally increase. Distributed by Old Mutual Investment Partners R-10-01804/2010
en	caselaw	US	In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 18-0196V (not to be published) NANCI DAMNER, Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, v. Filed: February 4, 2020 SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Special Processing Unit (SPU); HUMAN SERVICES, Attorney’s Fees and Costs Respondent. Leah VaSahnja Durant, Law Offices of Leah V. Durant, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Debra A. Filteau Begley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DECISION ON ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1 On February 7, 2018, Nanci Damner (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq., 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) after receiving the tetanus/diphtheria (“Tdap”) vaccination on May 16, 2017. (Petition at 1, ¶ 1). On July 15, 2019, a decision was issued awarding compensation to Petitioner based on the parties’ stipulation. (ECF No. 29). 1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E- Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012). Petitioner has now filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, dated January 13, 2020, (ECF No. 34), requesting a total award of $28,313.83 (representing $27,731.30 in fees and $582.53 in costs). In accordance with General Order #9 Petitioner filed a signed statement indicating that Petitioner incurred no out-of-pocket expenses. (Id. at 2.) Respondent reacted to the motion on January 27, 2020 indicating that he is satisfied that the statutory requirements for an award of attorney’s fees and costs are met in this case and defers to the Court’s discretion to determine the amount to be awarded. (ECF No. 35). On January 27, 2020, Petitioner filed her reply requesting the Court award all fees and costs requested. (ECF No. 36). I have reviewed the billing records submitted with Petitioner’s request. In my experience, the request appears reasonable, and I find no cause to reduce the requested hours or rates. The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. § 15(e). Accordingly, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s Motion for attorney’s fees and costs. I award a total of $28,313.83 (representing $27,731.30 in fees and $582.53 in costs) as a lump sum in the form of a check jointly payable to Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel. In the absence of a timely-filed motion for review (see Appendix B to the Rules of the Court), the Clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this decision. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Brian H. Corcoran Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master 3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice renouncing their right to seek review. 2
ro	legislation	EU	\| 52010PC0111 Propunere de decizie de punere în aplicare a consiliului de autorizare a Republicii Federale Germania și a Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului să aplice o măsură de derogare de la articolul 5 din Directiva 2006/112/CE privind sistemul comun al taxei pe valoarea adăugată /* COM/2010/0111 final - NLE 2010/0070 */ [pic] \| COMISIA EUROPEANĂ \|Bruxelles, 6.4.2010COM(2010)111 final2010/0070 (NLE)Propunere deDECIZIE DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE A CONSILIULUIde autorizare a Republicii Federale Germania și a Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului să aplice o măsură de derogare de la articolul 5 din Directiva 2006/112/CE privind sistemul comun al taxei pe valoarea adăugatăEXPUNERE DE MOTIVECONTEXTUL PROPUNERIIMotivele și obiectivele propuneriiÎn temeiul articolului 395 alineatul (1) din Directiva 2006/112/CE din 28 noiembrie 2006 privind sistemul comun al taxei pe valoarea adăugată (denumită în continuare „directiva TVA”), Consiliul, hotărând în unanimitate la propunerea Comisiei, poate autoriza orice stat membru să aplice măsuri speciale de derogare de la dispozițiile directivei respective, în scopul simplificării procedurii de colectare a taxei pe valoarea adăugată (TVA) sau al prevenirii anumitor forme de evaziune fiscală sau de fraudă.Prin scrisori înregistrate la Secretariatul General al Comisiei la 15 octombrie și, respectiv, 18 noiembrie 2009, Republica Federală Germania și Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului au solicitat autorizarea de a aplica o măsură de derogare de la articolul 5 din directiva TVA. În conformitate cu articolul 395 alineatul (2) din directiva TVA, Comisia a informat celelalte state membre, printr-o scrisoare datată 25 februarie 2010, cu privire la cererile înaintate de acestea. Printr-o scrisoare datată 2 martie, Comisia a notificat Republicii Federale Germania și Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului faptul că deține toate informațiile necesare pentru a analiza cererile.Contextul generalPentru a facilita transportul rutier între teritoriile lor și tranzitul pe aceste teritorii, Republica Federală Germania și Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului au decis să adopte un acord prin care să lege șoseaua federală germană B 419 și șoseaua luxemburgheză N1 între Wellen și Grevenmacher și să renoveze, în acest scop, podul de frontieră peste râul Mosel atât pe partea germană, cât și pe partea luxemburgheză. Acest pod de frontieră se întinde de pe teritoriul Republicii Federale Germania pe teritoriul exclusiv al Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului peste râul Mosel care traversează teritoriul administrat în comun (condominiu).Conform acordului, șantierul podului de frontieră și podul în sine ar urma să fie considerate drept teritoriul Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului în scopuri de TVA în ceea ce privește furnizarea de bunuri și servicii și achizițiile intracomunitare de bunuri legate de renovarea și mentenanța subsecventă a podului de frontieră.Potrivit normelor obișnuite, principiul delimitării teritoriale stabilit la articolul 5 din directiva TVA ar cere ca pentru lucrările de renovare și de mentenanță realizate în Germania să se perceapă TVA aplicată în Germania. În același mod, lucrările de renovare și de mentenanță realizate pe teritoriul luxemburghez se supun TVA aplicate în Luxemburg. Aplicarea normelor obișnuite ar presupune stabilirea locului exact al tranzacțiilor supuse taxei, în funcție de teritoriul pe care a fost desfășurată fiecare parte a lucrărilor. În plus, lucrările aferente teritoriului administrat în comun nu pot fi taxate în mod unilateral.Republica Federală Germania și Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului consideră că aplicarea normelor obișnuite ar crea complicații fiscale pentru întreprinderile responsabile cu lucrările în cauză și că prevederile fiscale din acord sunt justificate în vederea simplificării responsabilităților fiscale ale întreprinderilor. Comisia acceptă că în aceste cazuri taxarea uniformă a lucrărilor de renovare și de mentenanță va reprezenta o simplificare, care va face în așa fel încât aplicarea normelor fiscale de către întreprinderile implicate să se realizeze mai ușor decât în cazul în care s-ar aplica normele fiscale obișnuite.Dispoziții în vigoare în domeniul propuneriiConsiliul a autorizat în mai multe rânduri statele membre să aplice derogări de la principiul delimitării teritoriale cu privire la proiecte din zonele de frontieră.REZULTATELE CONSULTĂRILOR CU PĂRȚILE INTERESATE ȘI ALE EVALUĂRII IMPACTULUIConsultarea părților interesate \|Nu este cazul. \|Obținerea și utilizarea expertizei \|Nu a fost necesar să se recurgă la expertiză externă. \|Evaluarea impactului Propunerea de decizie vizează simplificarea procedurii de percepere a TVA cu referire la renovarea și mentenanța unui pod de frontieră și, prin urmare, are un potențial impact economic pozitiv. Însă datorită domeniului restrâns al derogării, impactul va fi în orice caz limitat. \|ELEMENTELE JURIDICE ALE PROPUNERIIRezumatul acțiunii propuseAutorizarea Republicii Federale Germania și a Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului de a deroga de la aplicarea teritorială a TVA în ceea ce privește renovarea și mentenanța unui pod de frontieră între cele două țări.Temeiul juridicArticolul 395 din directiva TVA.Principiul subsidiaritățiiÎn conformitate cu articolul 395 din directiva TVA, un stat membru care dorește să introducă măsuri de derogare de la respectiva directivă trebuie să obțină autorizarea Consiliului, sub forma unei decizii a Consiliului. Prin urmare, propunerea respectă principiul subsidiarității.Principiul proporționalitățiiPropunerea respectă principiul proporționalității din următorul (următoarele) motiv(e).Decizia se referă la o autorizație acordată unor state membre la cererea acestora și nu constituie nicio obligație.Având în vedere domeniul de aplicare restrâns al derogării, măsura specială este proporțională cu obiectivul vizat.Alegerea instrumentelorÎn temeiul articolului 395 din directiva TVA, derogarea de la normele comune în materie de TVA este posibilă numai cu autorizarea Consiliului hotărând în unanimitate la propunerea Comisiei. În plus, o decizie a Consiliului este cel mai adecvat instrument, deoarece poate fi adresată statelor membre în mod individual.IMPLICAȚIILE BUGETAREPropunerea nu are implicații pentru bugetul comunitar.2010/0070 (NLE)Propunere deDECIZIE DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE A CONSILIULUIde autorizare a Republicii Federale Germania și a Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului să aplice o măsură de derogare de la articolul 5 din Directiva 2006/112/CE privind sistemul comun al taxei pe valoarea adăugatăCONSILIUL UNIUNII EUROPENEavând în vedere Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene,având în vedere Directiva 2006/112/CE a Consiliului din 28 noiembrie 2006 privind sistemul comun al taxei pe valoarea adăugată[1], în special articolul 395 alineatul (1),având în vedere propunerea Comisiei Europene,întrucât:1. Prin scrisori înregistrate la Secretariatul General al Comisiei la 15 octombrie și, respectiv, 18 noiembrie 2009, Republica Federală Germania și Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului au solicitat autorizarea de a aplica o măsură de derogare de la dispozițiile Directivei 2006/112/CE în ceea ce privește renovarea și mentenanța unui pod de frontieră.2. În conformitate cu articolul 395 alineatul (2) din Directiva 2006/112/CE, Comisia a informat celelalte state membre, printr-o scrisoare datată 25 februarie 2010, cu privire la solicitările înaintate de Republica Federală Germania și de Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului. Prin scrisoarea din 2 martie 2010, Comisia a notificat Republicii Federale Germania și Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului faptul că deține toate informațiile necesare pentru a analiza cererile.3. Scopul măsurii este acela ca, în ceea ce privește furnizarea de bunuri și servicii și achizițiile intracomunitare de bunuri destinate renovării și mentenanței subsecvente a podului de frontieră peste râul Mosel, podul și șantierul aferent acestuia să fie considerate a fi pe teritoriul Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului, conform acordului dintre cele două țări.4. În absența unei măsuri speciale ar fi necesar să se stabilească dacă locul impozitării este Republica Federală Germania sau Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului. Lucrările la podul de frontieră executate pe teritoriul german ar face obiectul taxei pe valoarea adăugată percepută în Germania, iar cele executate pe teritoriul Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului ar face obiectul taxei pe valoarea adăugată percepută în Luxemburg. În plus, podul traversează un teritoriu administrat în comun (condominiu), iar lucrările în această zonă nu ar putea fi atribuite exclusiv teritoriului unuia dintre cele două state membre pentru a se alege un singur loc de prestare de servicii.5. Prin urmare, scopul măsurii este simplificarea procedurii de percepere a taxei pentru renovarea și mentenanța podului în cauză.6. Derogarea nu va avea niciun impact negativ asupra resurselor proprii ale Comunității provenind din taxa pe valoarea adăugată,ADOPTĂ PREZENTA DECIZIE DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE:Articolul 1Prin derogare de la articolul 5 din Directiva 2006/112/CE, Republica Federală Germania și Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului sunt autorizate, în legătură cu podul de frontieră care se întinde în prezent peste râul Mosel și leagă șoseaua germană B 419 și șoseaua luxemburgheză N1 între Wellen și Grevenmacher, să considere respectivul pod, precum și șantierul aferent acestuia, a fi în întregime pe teritoriul Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului în ceea ce privește furnizarea de bunuri și servicii și achizițiile intracomunitare de bunuri destinate renovării și mentenanței subsecvente a acestui pod.Articolul 2Prezenta decizie de punere în aplicare se adresează Republicii Federale Germania și Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului.Adoptată la Bruxelles,Pentru ConsiliuPreședintele [1] JO L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1.
hu	wikipedia	N/A	Kožino () falu Horvátországban Zára megyében. Közigazgatásilag Zárához tartozik. Fekvése Zára központjától 7 km-re északnyugatra a Zárai-öböl felett fekszik. A falu régi része a tengertől távolabb a dombtetőn, újabb része a tengerpart mentén található. A tengerparti rész a 20. század második felétől a turizmusnak köszönhetően dinamikusan fejlődik. Története Kožino 1105-ben szerepel először az írásos forrásokban, amikor IV. Krešimir Péter király Čika nevű lánytestvére, a zárai Szűz Mária kolostor megújítója “in loco qui dicitur Caproli” vásárol birtokot egy fehér lóért. A második adat 1387-ből származik, amikor egy Diklo melletti, a tenger fölé emelkedő dombon levő helyet Kožino Seloként említenek. Ez a név újra megjelenik 1666-ban a glagolita anyakönyvekben. A név egy zárai nemesi család a Kože (Cosse) nevéből származik, amelynek egykor itt volt a birtoka. Miután Velence 1409-ben elfoglalta Zárát ez a terület is fennhatósága alá került. Templomát 1522-ben építették, plébániáját 1575-ben alapították. A falut 1636-ban felégette a török, de két éven belül újra benépesült. Amikor a török megszállta a Zárai-öböl környékét a helyiek előbb Dikloba, majd a Sveti Ivan nevű, Zárához tartozó elővárosba és Sukošanba menekültek. A törökkel kötött béke után hamarosan visszatértek otthonaikba. 1575 és 1706 között plébániájához tartozott Diklo és Petrčane is. A 18. század végén Napóleon megszüntette a Velencei Köztársaságot. 1797 és 1805 között Habsburg uralom alá került, majd az egész Dalmáciával együtt a Francia Császárság része lett. 1815-ben a bécsi kongresszus újra Ausztriának adta, amely a Dalmát Királyság részeként Zárából igazgatta 1918-ig. 1857-ben 153, 1910-ben 316 lakosa volt. Ezt követően előbb a Szerb-Horvát-Szlovén Királyság, majd Jugoszlávia része lett. Lakói hagyományosan földművesek (főként szőlő- és olajbogyó termesztés), halászok voltak, de a 20. század második felétől egyre inkább az idegenforgalom lett a megélhetés fő forrása. 2011-ben 815 lakosa volt. Lakosság Nevezetességei Szent Mihály arkangyal tiszteletére szentelt plébániatemploma 1522-ben épült. 1884-ben újjáépítették, majd 1987-ben teljesen megújították. A márvány főoltár a tabernákulummal 1793-ban készült. Az oltárkép Szűz Máriát a gyermek Jézussal és Szent Mihály főangyalt ábrázolja. Rajta kívül a templomnak még két, fából faragott barokk mellékoltára van. A keleti falnál levő oltár képén Jézus bemutatása a jeruzsálemi templomban látható. A nyugati falnál levő oltáron Szent Mihály, Szent Jeromos és Szűz Mária szobrai állnak. A templom értékes tárgyai közül említésre méltó az öt barokk körmeneti kereszt a 17. és 18. századból, a két ezüstkehely és az 1741-ben készített, jó állapotban fennmaradt papi miseruha. A templom mellett a nyugati oldalon nagy harangtorony emelkedik benne két haranggal, melyek működését 1995 óta elektromosan vezérlik. További információk A zárai érsekség honlapja Kožino - turistainformációk Kožino – turistainformációk Jegyzetek Zára megye települései
en	wikipedia	N/A	Mr Gay World 2014, the 6th Mr Gay World competition, was held in Rome, Italy on August 31, 2014. At the end of the event Chris Olwage, Mr Gay World 2013 from New Zealand crowned Stuart Hatton Mr. Gay U.K., his successor as Mr Gay World 2014. Results Special awards Mister Gay World Congeniality Winner 2014 Mister Gay World Art Challenge Winner 2014 Mister Gay World Online Voting Winner 2014 Mister Gay World Sports Challenge Winner 2014 Mister Gay World Photogenic Winner 2014 Video Presentation Challenge Winner 2014 DNA Photoshoot Challenge Winner 2014 Written Test Challenge Winner 2014 - Christepher Wee Special Challenge Winner (Baking) 2014 - Sushant Divgikar Contestants 32 delegates have been confirmed: National pageant notes Debuts Returning countries Last competed in 2010: Last competed in 2011: Last competed in 2012: References 2014 2014 beauty pageants Beauty pageants in Italy 2014 in Italy 2014 in LGBT history August 2014 events in Italy 2010s in Rome
de	other	N/A	Bundesfinanzhof, Urteil vom 16.09.1998 mit dem Az.: VI R 37/98 /* Banner Ads */ Aktenzeichen: VI R 37/98 FGO § 62 Abs. 3 Satz 2 Die Kläger und Revisionskläger (Kläger) haben mit Schriftsatz vom 22. November 1996 durch Steuerberater B Klage wegen Einkommensteuer 1986 bis 1989 erhoben und angekündigt, daß eine Vollmacht nachgereicht werde. Auf den diesbezüglichen Hinweis des Gerichts wurde mitgeteilt, daß die Prozeßvollmacht bereits zum Verfahren der Kläger Az.: ... wegen Einkommensteuer 1990 vorgelegt worden sei. Auf der dortigen --undatierten-- Vollmacht sind die Veranlagungszeiträume 1983 bis 1996 angegeben, wobei B bevollmächtigt worden war, die Kläger in ihren "Steuer ... angelegenheiten vor allen Gerichten ..." zu vertreten. Nachdem der Hinweis, die dortige Vollmacht reiche für das hiesige Verfahren nicht aus, unbeantwortet geblieben ist, setzte die Berichterstatterin mit Verfügung vom 21. Februar 1997 zur Vorlage der Vollmacht gemäß § 62 Abs. 3 Satz 2 der Finanzgerichtsordnung (FGO) Frist bis zum 24. März 1997 mit ausschließender Wirkung. Nachdem die Klägerseite auch hierauf nicht reagierte, erging zunächst ein Gerichtsbescheid und nach Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung ein Urteil, mit dem die Klage als unzulässig verworfen wurde. Das Finanzgericht (FG) führte in dem in Entscheidungen der Finanzgerichte (EFG) 1998, 1211 veröffentlichten Urteil aus, die für ein anderes Klageverfahren eingereichte Vollmacht reiche dem Gericht als Nachweis für eine Bevollmächtigung im vorliegenden Streitfall nicht aus. Mit der Revision rügen die Kläger Verletzung von Bundesrecht, insbesondere von Art. 1 Abs. 1, Art. 2 Abs. 1, Art. 19 Abs. 4 und Art. 103 Abs. 3 des Grundgesetzes (GG) sowie der §§ 62 Abs. 3 und 96 Abs. 2 FGO. Die Kläger beantragen, das angefochtene Urteil aufzuheben und die Sache zurückzuverweisen. Ausweislich der Vollmachtsurkunde, von der das FG eine Fotokopie zu seinen Akten genommen hatte, war B zur Prozeßführung vor dem FG (dazu unten) und --da die Bevollmächtigung "vor allen Gerichten" gilt-- auch vor dem Bundesfinanzhof (BFH) befugt. Der erkennende Senat hat das Original der Vollmacht, welches sich in den Akten des Verfahrens der Kläger wegen Einkommensteuer 1990 befindet, eingesehen, weil diese Akten in dem zwischenzeitlich beim Senat anhängigen Verfahren vorgelegt worden sind. 2. Die Revision ist auch begründet. Sie führt zur Aufhebung des angefochtenen Urteils und zur Zurückverweisung der Sache an das FG zur anderweitigen Verhandlung und Entscheidung (§ 126 Abs. 3 Nr. 2 FGO). a) Wie das FG zutreffend ausgeführt hat, genügt die Bezugnahme auf eine in einem anderen Verfahren beigebrachte Prozeßvollmacht ausnahmsweise als Nachweis der Bevollmächtigung, wenn dem erkennenden Gericht die Einsicht in diese Vollmachtsurkunde ohne weiteres möglich ist und aus ihr hervorgeht, daß sie auch für das Verfahren, in dem die Bezugnahme erfolgt, bestimmt ist (ständige höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung, z.B. BFH-Beschluß vom 30. Juli 1991 VIII B 88/89, BFHE 165, 22, BStBl II 1991, 848; zuletzt BFH-Urteil vom 23. Juli 1997 X R 125/96, BFH/NV 1998, 58, m.w.N.). Im Streitfall war die Einsichtnahme offenbar ohne weiteres möglich, was dem Umstand entnommen werden kann, daß das FG Feststellungen über den Inhalt der im Verfahren wegen Einkommensteuer 1990 vorgelegten Vollmacht getroffen und eine Fotokopie dieser Vollmacht zu seinen Akten genommen hat. b) Eine Vollmacht ist für das Verfahren, in dem die Bezugnahme erfolgt, jedenfalls dann bestimmt, wenn sich aus der Vollmachtsurkunde als solcher eine Bevollmächtigung auch für dieses Verfahren ergibt. Das ist der Fall, wenn die an den Nachweis einer Bevollmächtigung im FG-Verfahren allgemein gestellten Anforderungen erfüllt sind, nämlich, daß aus der Urkunde hervorgeht, wer bevollmächtigt hat, wer bevollmächtigt ist und wozu bevollmächtigt wurde (ständige höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung, z.B. BFH-Urteil vom 15. März 1991 III R 112/89, BFHE 164, 210, BStBl II 1991, 726, und vom 20. September 1991 III R 115/89, BFH/NV 1992, 671, jeweils m.w.N.). Wie auch vom FG nicht in Zweifel gezogen wird, ist ausweislich der Vollmachtsurkunde B von den Klägern bevollmächtigt worden, sie hinsichtlich der Veranlagungszeiträume 1983 bis 1996 in ihren Steuerangelegenheiten vor den Gerichten zu vertreten. Eine derartige Vollmacht eröffnete eine Vertretungsbefugnis nicht nur für das Verfahren wegen Einkommensteuer 1990 sondern auch wegen Einkommensteuer 1986 bis 1989, also das anhängige Verfahren 2 K 5023/96. Dabei ist maßgebend, daß sich durch Auslegung des Inhalts der Urkunde als Gegenstand der Bevollmächtigung auch die Befugnis ergibt, Rechtsstreitigkeiten über Einkommensteuer der Streitjahre 1986 bis 1989 zu führen. Demgegenüber ist irrelevant, daß B zunächst selbst angekündigt hatte, eine Prozeßvollmacht nachzureichen. Die Rechtsprechung, die anstelle einer zu den Akten des betreffenden Verfahrens einzureichenden Originalvollmacht unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen eine Bezugnahme auf die in einem anderen Verfahren vorgelegte Vollmacht genügen läßt, trägt dem Umstand Rechnung, daß der Zugang zu einer Sachentscheidung und damit ein effektiver Rechtsschutz nicht an bloßen Förmeleien scheitern soll, wenn das Gericht sich ohne weiteres davon überzeugen kann, daß die anderweitig vorgelegte Vollmacht auch zum Führen des zusätzlichen Verfahrens berechtigt. Diese Rechtsprechung schließt denknotwendig ein, daß die anderweitig eingereichte Vollmacht sich nicht lediglich auf das dortige konkrete Verfahren bezieht, sondern zu darüber hinausgehenden Prozeßhandlungen des Bevollmächtigten berechtigt. In Übereinstimmung hiermit kann eine Vollmacht, die über die Vertretung im konkreten Rechtsstreit hinaus zu weiteren Maßnahmen berechtigt, regelmäßig weder im Verfahren, für das sie eingereicht worden ist, mit der Begründung zurückgewiesen werden, daß sich eine wirksame Prozeßvollmacht ausschließlich auf den konkreten Rechtsstreit beziehen dürfe, noch darf sie in dem weiteren Verfahren, in dem die Bezugnahme erfolgt ist, mit der Begründung zurückgewiesen werden, sie sei im vorgelegten Verfahren durch Zweckerreichung erloschen. Der Senat braucht nicht dazu Stellung zu nehmen, welche Folgen sich für den Fall ergeben, daß in der in Bezug genommenen Urkunde eines der Erfordernisse einer ordnungsgemäßen Vollmacht --Aussteller, Bevollmächtigter und Vollmachtsgegenstand-- nicht selbst enthalten ist, aber dem Umstand entnommen werden kann, daß die Vollmacht einem Schriftsatz angeheftet ist, der den Verwendungszusammenhang ergibt (vgl. BFH-Urteil vom 29. Juli 1997 IX R 20/96, BFHE 183, 369, BStBl II 1997, 823, m.w.N.). Insbesondere kann dahinstehen, ob eine derartige, erst durch ein Begleitschreiben vervollständigte Urkunde als Vollmachtsnachweis in einem anderen Verfahren überhaupt in Betracht kommt. Deshalb sind die vom FG herangezogenen BFH-Entscheidungen nicht einschlägig, die sich auf Vollmachten beziehen, denen die Mußerfordernisse einer Bevollmächtigung nicht selbst zu entnehmen sind. c) Eine den Formerfordernissen genügende Prozeßvollmacht kann wegen "berechtigter" Zweifel zurückzuweisen sein, wenn die Vollmacht offensichtlich rechtsmißbräuchlich verwendet wird oder die Umstände den Schluß erlauben, daß eine einmal erteilte Vollmacht nicht mehr durch eine Innenvollmacht gedeckt ist. Hierzu reichen die vom FG angeführten Gründe indessen nicht aus. aa) Wie der Senat im Urteil vom 27. Februar 1998 VI R 88/97 (BFHE 185, 126, BStBl II 1998, 445) entschieden hat, kann --von bestimmten Mißbrauchsfällen abgesehen-- das Ausmaß der vermeintlichen Aussichtslosigkeit des konkreten Klageantrages nicht zum Maßstab dafür gemacht werden, ob eine Vollmacht den Anforderungen des § 62 Abs. 3 Satz 1 FGO genügt. Im Streitfall wurde die Klage mit dem Ziel erhoben, in den Streitjahren 1986 bis 1989 für zwei Kinder auf 6 000 DM erhöhte Kinderfreibeträge zu gewähren. Ein solches Klageziel läßt trotz des Umstandes, daß die Entscheidung zur Höhe der Kinderfreibeträge gemäß § 165 Abs. 1 der Abgabenordnung (AO 1977) vorläufig erging, für sich gesehen nicht den Schluß zu, daß die diesbezügliche Prozeßvollmacht mißbräuchlich verwendet werde. Ebensowenig kann ein Mißbrauch daraus geschlossen werden, daß das nämliche, vom selben Berater vertretene Klagebegehren in einer Vielzahl von Fällen vor dem FG erfolglos geblieben ist. Schließlich kann die Wirksamkeit einer Prozeßvollmacht auch nicht davon abhängig gemacht werden, ob der Mandant in Kenntnis weiterer Umstände das Prozeßrisiko ebenfalls eingegangen wäre. bb) Hinweise dafür, daß B im Innenverhältnis nicht bzw. nicht mehr befugt war, von der ihm erteilten Vollmacht Gebrauch zu machen, sind im Streitfall nicht ersichtlich. Insbesondere läßt sich ein solcher Hinweis nicht aus dem Umstand herleiten, daß B trotz gerichtlicher Aufforderung zur Vorlage einer neuen Vollmacht untätig geblieben ist. Da eine formal ordnungsgemäße Vollmacht vorlag, hätte B nur reagieren müssen, wenn beispielsweise die konkrete Prozeßführung oder durch Beweisanzeichen veranlaßte Zweifel am Weitergelten der Vollmacht über bloße Mutmaßungen hinausgehende "berechtigte" Zweifel ausgelöst hätte. Derartige Zweifel haben sich auch nicht daraus ergeben, daß die Kläger, nachdem ihnen der in dieser Sache ergangene Gerichtsbescheid vom 2. April 1997 zusätzlich persönlich zugestellt worden ist, nicht reagiert haben. Es kann dahinstehen, ob es den Klägern oblegen hätte, einen etwaigen Vollmachtsmißbrauch zu unterbinden, sofern die im Parallelverfahren vorgelegte Vollmacht nicht von ihnen als Generalvollmacht oder als Vollmacht für mehrere Veranlagungszeiträume erteilt oder später von ihnen eingeschränkt worden sein sollte. Jedenfalls läßt ihr Schweigen keine Schlüsse auf berechtigte Zweifel zu. Der Senat weist darauf hin, daß mit der an Gesichtspunkten einer einfachen Handhabung des FG-Verfahrens orientierten Entscheidung zum Vorrang einer formal ordnungsgemäßen Vollmacht im Regelfall nicht etwa auch ein Urteil darüber abgegeben wird, daß eine im Innenverhältnis mißbräuchlich verwendete Vollmacht nicht zu Schadensersatzansprüchen berechtigte.
sk	wikipedia	N/A	Slobodomurári sú nadnárodné neverejné združenie, ktoré vznikalo ako aristokraticko-meštianske, neskôr ako elitné buržoázne výrazne kozmopolitné kluby sociálno-etického a humanitárneho charakteru, venujúce sa filozofickej činnosti, v minulosti aj alchýmii. Tajuplnosť slobodomurárov v minulosti viedla k obvineniam zo vzájomného poskytovania obchodných a iných výhod, či vplyvu na políciu. Dejiny Mytologické Slobodomurárska mytológia odvodzuje vznik hnutia od staviteľov pyramíd v starovekom Egypte. Iná legenda hovorí o vzniku slobodného murárstva pri stavbe Šalamúnovho chrámu. Podľa tejto tradície poslal Hiram, kráľ Týru, staviteľa Hirama Abiho ku kráľovi Šalamúnovi na vedenie stavby jeruzalemského chrámu. Hiram rozdelil robotníkov na tri stupne – učňovský, tovarišský a majstrovský. Stupne mali svoje tajomstvá, dorozumievacie znaky, slová a dotyky. Mzdu vyplácali učňom a tovarišom pred stĺpmi a majstrom v strednej izbe, pričom sa museli preukázať daným znakom, slovom a dotykom – tzv. tehlovanie. Traja lakomí tovariši napadli Hirama, jeden pravítkom, druhý zdvíhadlom a tretí kladivom. Hiramovu mŕtvolu zakopali na lúke, kde ju po hľadaní našli deviati robotníci. Ďalšie legendy hovoria o slobodomurárstve u Chaledejcov a Feničanov, ktorí sa preplavili do Británie a odovzdali svoje poznatky druidom. Niektorí započítali k slobodomurárom aj účastníkov križiackych výprav. Reálne Prehistória slobodného murárstva pravdepodobne stojí na stavebných a kamenárskych cechoch. Pripomínali ich hlavne svojim uzavretým charakterom a obradným prijímaním členov. Keďže kamenári sa v stredoveku nemuseli podriaďovať mestskému cechovému systému a mohli sa slobodne pohybovať, vytvorili špecifickú organizáciu význačnú súdržnosťou, symbolikou a zvykmi. Za oficiálny vznik slobodného murárstva sa považuje 24. jún 1717, keď sa v Londýne spojili štyri lóže stretávajúce sa v miestnych hostincoch do Londýnskej veľkolóže (The Grand Lodge of London and Westminster) pod vedením veľmajstra Anthonyho Sayera, názov ktorej sa neskôr zmenil na Veľkú lóžu Anglicka. V roku 1723 boli vydané Staré povinnosti slobodných murárov (The Constitutions of the Free-masons) od Jamesa Andersona, ktorá zakotvila politickú toleranciu, náboženský pluralizmus v deistickej forme, nutnosť riadenia sa morálnymi zásadami a rovnosť členov. Staré povinnosti zaviedli tzv. Svätojánsky systém, tj. tri stupne členstva - učňov, tovarišov a majstrov. Postupne rástla spoločenská prestíž hnutia a rástol aj počet členov. Do britských lóží vstupovali aj cudzinci v roku 1730 bol do lóže uvedený barón Charles-Louis de Montesquieu a v roku 1731 dokonca vojvoda František Lotrinský. V roku 1733 pribudla prvá americká lóža v Massachusetts a v roku 1776 už slobodomurári zohrávali dôležitú úlohu pri písaní americkej demokratickej ústavy. Roku 1735 vznikol Veľký Orient Francúzska. V rokoch 17511766 vychádza vo Francúzsku Encyklopédia, na ktorej sa podieľali aj slobodomurári. Organizácia Veľkolóža alebo Veľký Orient je nezávislý a suverénny subjekt, ktorý spája slobodné murárske hnutie v danej krajine alebo geografickej oblasti. Murárstvo nemá žiaden všeobecný jednotný zastrešujúci výkonný a riadiaci orgán. Lóža je základná organizačná jednotka slobodného murárstva. Každá nová lóža musí mať dekrét oprávňujúci lóžu k stretávaniu a murárskej práci. Lóža vzniká rituálom Vnesenia svetla. Členstvo v lóži je zväčša trojstupňové (svätojánsky systém). Od jedného k druhému stupňu vedie zasvätenie (iniciácia). Prvým stupňom je stupeň učňa, potom sa dosahuje hodnosť tovariša a majstra. Lóžu vedie tzv. „ctihodný majster", ktorého si slobodne volia členovia lóže každý rok. Napriek tomu, že je fakticky štatutárom lóže, vystupuje ako tzv. „primus inter pares", čiže prvý medzi rovnými. Niektoré ríty a lóže poznajú ešte tzv. „vysoké stupne“ (Side degrees). Slobodomurárstvo na Slovensku Najväčšou slovenskou organizáciou Slobodných murárov je Veľká lóža Slovenska. Uznávajú ju desiatky veľkých lóží na celom svete, vrátane britskej veľkej lóže United Grand Lodge of England. Svojich zástupcov vo Veľkej lóži Slovenska má päť slobodomurárskych lóží. Najstaršou je lóža Humanizmus,, založená Petrom Bú pod záštitou VOF (Veľký Orient Francúzska) do ktorej bolo vnesené svetlo v roku 1993. Po nej vznikli lóže Kozmopolis a Libertas. V roku 2014 vznikla v Košiciach lóža Pavol Jozef Šafárik a v Bratislave lóža Quatuor Coronati. Dňa 1. októbra 2016 vznikla bratislavská lóža Generál Štefánik. Dňa 9.12.2019 vznikol v Bardejove slobodomurársky trojuholník s názvom Miškovský. Do tejto vetvy slobodomurárstva môžu vstupovať iba muži (ide o takzvaný konzervatívny smer slobodomurárstva), ktorí musia veriť vo vyšší tvorivý princíp. Na Slovensku existuje aj zmiešané slobodomurárstvo, v jeho rámci v Lóžach pracujú spoločne ženy aj muži. Túto vetvu na Slovensku reprezentuje Lóža Phoenix (R:. L:. Phoenix Or:. Bratislava). Lóža ma číslo 1962 a pracuje v rámci medzinárodného zmiešaného rádu Le Droit humain, ktorého prvá Lóža vznikla na území dnešného Československa už v roku 1913. Hlavné prúdy V priebehu dejín slobodomurárstva sa odlíšili rôzne prúdy, ktoré sa zväčša odlišujú iba počtom stupňov. Staroveký a prijatý rítus škótsky sa zameriava viac na mystiku a individuálnu duchovnú cestu. Škótsky rítus má 33 stupňov zasvätenia. Francúzsky rítus alebo tiež kontinentálny či liberálny, zameraný nielen na etiku a filozofiu, ale aj na otázky sociálneho usporiadania a politiky. Okrem základných troch stupňov (svätojánsky systém) má ďalšie štyri stupne. Švédsky rítus je variáciou slobodomurárstva používaný v Švédsku, Nórsku, Dánsku, Fínsku a na Islande. Členstvo zahŕňa tri Svätojánske stupne potom ďalšie tri tzv. Sväto-Ondrejské stupne, štyri Hlavné stupne a čestný Stupeň rytiera červeného kríža. Yorkský rítus alebo tiež americký obrad. Je to vlastne zoskupenie samostatných organizácií - Kráľovská murárska archa, Murári hrobky a Templárski rytieri. Rítus prísnej observencie žiadal odstránenie vplyvu okultných vied a prísnu disciplínu. Rítus zanikol v roku 1782. Podobné tajné spoločnosti Po rozšírení slobodomurárstva začali vznikať podobné hnutia, ktoré sa začlenili priamo do murárskych lóží alebo existovali samostatne a verejnosťou boli spájané so slobodnými murármi. Ilumináti boli zväzom založeným v roku 1776 v Ingolstadte profesorom cirkevného práva Adamom Weishauptom. Ilumináti sa snažili šíriť myšlienky osvietenstva prostredníctvom spisov francúzskych encyklopedistov a zakladaním čitateľských spoločností. Neskôr sa podarilo zapojiť iluminátstvo do slobodomurárstva, pričom prvé stupne mali slúžiť ako príprava na činnosť v lóžach. Rosenkruciánske hnutie je vysokostupňové ezoterické združenie. Hlavným poslaním sa stala alchýmia. V ráde sa dodržiavala úplná mlčanlivosť. Rytieri a bratia sv. Jána Evanjelistu z Ázie v Európe alebo ázijskí bratia boli okultným výrazne protiosvieteneckým spoločenstvom vychádzajúcim zo slobodomurárstva, pričom základom ich systému a obradov je kabala a číselná symbolika. Hodnotenie Kritici slobodomurárov ich často chybne vnímajú ako náboženskú organizáciu, oni sami takéto zaradenie odmietajú a označujú sa ako bratstvo. Postoj k náboženstvu sa mení s dobou a miestom, dnes môžu slobodomurári v tej istej lóži vyznávať rozdielne náboženstvá, alebo v liberálnom, otvorenom slobodomurárstve - aj nevyznávať nijaké. V otvorenejších francúzskych, španielskych, portugalských, talianskych a iných Rádoch viera nie je povinná, je otázkou osobného presvedčenia. 27. apríla 1738 pápež Klement XII. vydal bulu In eminenti, v ktorej zatracuje slobodomurárov pod trestom kliatby, pretože "spôsobujú zlo nielen štátnemu pokoju, ale aj spáse duše." Až nové znenie katolíckeho práva z roku 1983 neobsahuje hrozbu exkomunikácie latae sententiae slobodomurárov. Napriek tomu katolíci považujú príslušnosť k slobodomurárom za hriech. Katolícka cirkev však upravila svoje rozhodnutie a preto trvá na tom, že príslušnosť k lóžam je nezlučiteľná s katolíckou vierou. Vyhlásenie Kongregácie pre náuku viery z roku 1984 tiež tvrdí, že vstup do slobodomurárskych združení „zostáva v cirkvi naďalej zakázané" a veriaci, ktorí tam vstúpili „sú v stave ťažkého hriechu a nemôžu pristupovať k svätému prijímaniu". Slobodomurárstvo je obľúbený námet rôznych konšpiračných teórií a antisemiti ho často označovali ako „židomurárske“. Slobodomurári boli zakázaní v nacistickom Nemecku aj v komunistických štátoch - s výnimkou Kuby. Dnes sú legálni takmer všade, vrátane katolíckych krajín. Referencie Literatúra o slobodomurároch ANTONÍN, Luboš: Zlatý věk svobodného zednářství v Čechách. Praha : Půdorys — Argo, 2010. ISBN 978-80-257-0317-5 BERÁNEK, Josef: Tajemství lóží : Svobodné zednářství bez legend a mýtů. Praha : Mladá fronta, 1994. BERESNIAK, Daniel: Slobodomurári - Stavitelia svetla. Bratislava : Sofa, 2002. ISBN 80-89033-21-0 BLACKSTOCK, Peter (ed.): Tajný symbol. Praha : Argo, 2010. BOROVIČKA, Michael: Tajné dějiny zednářských lóží. Praha : Ottovo nakladatelství — Cesta, 2003. ISBN 80-7181-814-3 BOUCHER, Jules: Zednářská symbolika, aneb, Královské umění opětovně objasněné a obnovené podle pravidel tradiční esoterické symboliky. Praha : Trigon, 1998. ISBN 80-86159-09-4 BRADLEY, Michael: Tajemství svobodných zednářů. Praha : Area, 2007. ISBN 978-80-7390-000-7 CECHUROVÁ, Jana: Čeští svobodní zednáři ve XX. století. Praha : Libri, 2008. COOPER, Robert: Tajemství zednářského kódu. Bratrstvo v proměnách času. Plejáda; 2010 DEDOPULOS, Tim: Svobodní zednáři : neznámý svět nejznámějšího bratrstva v historii. Praha : Metafora, 2006. ISBN 80-7359-055-7 DUCHANEOVÁ, Sangeet: Svobodné zednářství. Praha : Slovart, 2007. ISBN 978-80-7209-954-2 GRANDT, Guido: Černá kniha svobodných zednářů. Praha : Knižní klub; 2010. ISBN 978-80-242-2585-2 HAUBELT, Josef: Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart v jasu svobodného zednářství. Praha : Slávy dcera, 2006. ISBN 80-903725-1-1 HRADSKÁ, Katarína: Slobodomurárske lóže v Bratislave. Tajné dejiny Bratislavy. Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo PT, 2005. JAVOR, Martin: Slobodomurárske hnutie v českých krajinách a v Uhorsku v 18. storočí. Prešov : Prešovská univerzita, 2009. JAVOR, Martin: Slobodomurárske Košice, Sofa; 2010 JIROUNEK, Petr: Mezi Prahou a Ženevou : Neurověda, životní náhody a svobodní zednáři. Praha : Galén, 2010. ISBN 978-80-7262-651-9 KINNEY, Jay: Svobodní zednáři: Mýtus a skutečnost; odhalení pravdy o jejich historii, symbolech a tajných rituálech., Praha : Práh, 2010. ISBN 978-80-7252-311-5 KNIGHT, Christopher, LOMAS, Robert: Klíč k Chírámovi. Praha : Argo, 2010. ISBN 978-80-257-0261-1 LOMAS, Robert: Otočiť Chíramovým kľúčom, Remedium; 2007. LOMAS, Robert: Vidění v temnotách. Praha : BB art, 2006. MACNULTY, Kirk W.: Svobodné zednářství - symboly, tajemství, význam. Praha : Knižní klub, 2008. STEWART, Michael James Alexander, princ z Albany: Templáři a tajná moudrost islámu. Neznámé dějiny svobodného zednářství. Praha : Grada, 2010. ISBN 978-80-247-3222-0 RIDLEY, Jasper: Svobodní zednáři. Praha : BB art, 2004. ISBN 80-7341-358-2 RIPA MONTESANO, Domenico V.: Vademecum di Loggia. Roma : Edizione Gran Loggia Phoenix, 2009. ISBN 978-88-905059-0-4 ROBINSON, John: Zrozeni v krvi : ztracená tajemství svobodných zednářů., Olomouc : Votobia, 1996. ISBN 80-7198-113-3 SRB, Tomáš: Řád svobodných zednářů 1. Praha : Emitent, 2001. ISBN 80-7281-085-5 SRB, Tomáš: Řád svobodných zednářů 2. Praha : Emitent, 2003. ISBN 80-7281-111-8 SRB, Tomáš: Řád svobodných zednářů 3. Praha : Emitent, 2009. ISBN 978-80-7281-329-2 SUMONYI, Zoltán: Znovuobjavené tajomstvo, 2005 SÝS, Karel: Praha zednářská. Praha : BVD, 2009. ISBN 978-80-87090-27-5 VONKA, Rudolf Jordán: Co je zednářství? Praha : vl. nákladom, 1935. VONKA, Rudolf Jordán: Zednářská symbolika. Praha 1928 WALLACE-MURPHY, Tim: Svobodní zednáři. Dějiny hnutí a mystické souvislosti., Praha : Svojtka & Co., 2007. ISBN 978-80-7352-625-2 WENDLING, Peter: Neomylní. Tajomstvá exkluzívnych klubov, lóží a krúžkov. Bratislava : Slovenský spisovateľ, 1999. ZACHYSTAL, František: Vznik svobodného zednářstva v Čechách. Praha : Jiří A. Drégr, 1937. Externé odkazy Slobodomurárstvo na Slovensku Bratislavská Lóža Humanizmus Slobodomurári - moderní filantropi článok v Historickej revue Zmiešané slobodomurárstvo v Čechách a na Slovensku Medzinárodný Slobodomurársky Rád “Le Droit humain” Lóža Phoenix, R∴ L∴ Phoenix, No 1962, Or∴ Bratislava Iné projekty Tajné spoločnosti História Ezoterika Náboženstvo
fr	caselaw	France	Sur le moyen unique : Vu l'article 5-1 du Code de procédure pénale ; Attendu, selon ce texte, que même si le demandeur s'est constitué partie civile devant la juridiction répressive, la juridiction civile, saisie en référé, demeure compétente pour ordonner toutes mesures provisoires relatives aux faits qui font l'objet des poursuites lorsque l'existence de l'obligation n'est pas sérieusement contestable ; Attendu, selon l'arrêt infirmatif attaqué, que, victime d'un dommage dont M. Y... a été déclaré entièrement responsable par un jugement d'un tribunal correctionnel, M. X..., qui s'était constitué partie civile, contestant les conclusions de l'expertise ordonnée par le même jugement, a saisi le tribunal d'une demande de nouvelle expertise et d'une provision complémentaire ; qu'en ayant été débouté il a, à la fois, formé un appel qui a été ultérieurement déclaré irrecevable et, invoquant les dispositions de l'article 5-1 du Code de procédure pénale, réitéré ses demandes devant le juge des référés ; Attendu que pour dire qu'il n'y avait lieu à référé, l'arrêt énonce qu'il résulte de la combinaison des articles 484 du nouveau Code de procédure civile, 5-1 et 10, alinéa 2, du Code de procédure pénale que la compétence donnée à la juridiction civile, saisie en référé, pour ordonner toutes mesures provisoires relatives aux faits qui sont l'objet de poursuites pénales lorsque l'existence de l'obligation n'est pas sérieusement contestable, cesse dès qu'il a été statué sur l'action publique, le juge pénal, saisi du principal sur les intérêts civils devenant seul compétent pour ordonner, en observant les règles de la procédure civile, les mesures d'instruction qu'il estime nécessaires ; Qu'en statuant ainsi, la cour d'appel a violé le texte susvisé ; PAR CES MOTIFS : CASSE ET ANNULE l'arrêt rendu le 12 juillet 1984, entre les parties, par la cour d'appel de Douai ; remet, en conséquence, la cause et les parties dans l'état où elles se trouvaient avant ledit arrêt et, pour être fait droit, les renvoie devant la cour d'appel d'Amiens
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en	caselaw	US	Victor E. Hurst brought an action of ejectment against the appellants in this case, asserting title to a small strip of waterfront land in the town of Secretary, in Dorchester County. The defendants filed the general issue plea and a special plea asserting title by adverse possession for more than 20 years. After a warrant of resurvey had been issued and duly returned, the case was tried before the court, without a jury. The court refused the defendants' demurrer prayer and entered judgment for the plaintiff. Page 522 The general issue plea put in issue the plaintiff's claim of title. There was no dispute as to the location. The plaintiff proved that all of the adjoining lands as well as the land in dispute, comprising a tract called "Carthagenia," were conveyed to Joseph Cook and Joseph H. Conkle, by deed dated August 19, 1886. By deed dated March 22, 1897, Cook conveyed his interest to Joseph H. Conkle. By deed dated February 1, 1901, Joseph H. Conkle and Mary A. Conkle conveyed to Myrtle L. Hurst and Mary A. Conkle, as tenants in common, all their right, title and interest in such parts of the tract as "have not been sold and conveyed by Joseph H. Conkle, prior to the execution of these presents," including "the dwelling house property and the land connected therewith, at present occupied by Mary A. Conkle as a residence." On April 12, 1944, Myrtle L. Wieneke and William Wieneke, her husband, conveyed the land in dispute to Calvin L. Brinsfield, who in turn conveyed it to the plaintiff. The deed from Myrtle L. Wieneke and husband recited that the land was "a part of and the remainder of all that property conveyed to the said Myrtle L. Wieneke and Mary A. Conkle, as tenants in common," in 1901, and that Myrtle L. Wieneke "inherited the interest of the said Mary A. Conkle as the only heir of the said Mary A. Conkle who died intestate on or about July 2, 1926." The strip in dispute was never assessed to any one. The appellants contend that the plaintiff offered no evidence to identify the Mary A. Conkle whom he named in his claim of title, or to show that she was the mother of Myrtle L. Wieneke, the grantor of Brinsfield. They also contend there was no proof that she died intestate and that Myrtle L. Wieneke was her only heir. Such facts may be proved dehors the record. In PotomacLodge No. 31, I.O.O.F., v. Miller, 118 Md. 405, 412, 84 A. 554, 557, it was said: "If A dies intestate, leaving children or other heirs, his real estate descends to his heirs, but if they or their assignees institute an action of ejectment, relying onthat title, in order to Page 523 recover they must prove that A died intestate and who his heirs were. There may be, and often is, no record evidence to prove who the heirs were, and resort is had to parol evidence to establish that, as well as the fact that the ancestor died intestate." See also Kelso v. Stigar, 75 Md. 376, 404, 24 A. 18. The plaintiff testified he knew Mrs. Mary Conkle, that she was married to Joseph Conkle, who predeceased her about 1926, and that she was the mother of Myrtle L. Wieneke. The defendant, Joseph Wanex, testified that he knew Mrs. Wieneke, as Myrtle Conkle. The defendants put in evidence a deed from Joseph H. Conkle and Mary A. Conkle, his wife, and Myrtle L. Wieneke (Weiniske) and William Wieneke (Weiniske), her husband, dated June 9, 1921. It was under this deed that the defendants claimed title to adjoining lots, separated from the strip in dispute only by a right of way. We think this testimony was sufficient to identify Mary A. Conkle, and to show that she was the mother of Myrtle L. Wieneke. But there is no testimony, other than the recitals in the deed to Brinsfield of April 12, 1944, to show that Myrtle was the only heir of her mother, or that Mrs. Conkle died intestate. We think the proof was insufficient. "Recitals are evidence against the parties to the deed and their privies, but not against strangers. Viewed as a recital of intestacy and pedigree, a recital in a deed that the former owner died intestate leaving surviving him no other heir than a named person is not binding on a stranger to the title. The general rule is that recitals in a deed are mere hearsay and are inadmissible in evidence as against a third person who claims by a paramount title." Thompson, Real Property, (perm. ed.) Sec. 3186;Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.), Sec. 1573; In re Marsh, 152 Misc. 454, 272 N.Y.S. 807, 816. The latter rule is subject to qualification in the case of ancient deeds. Brock v. AtlanticRefining Co., 273 Pa. 76, 116 A. 552. We hold, therefore, that the plaintiff failed to establish his paper-title to the one-half interest of Mary A. Page 524 Conkle, but that he made out his paper-title to the one-half interest of Myrtle L. Wieneke (formerly Myrtle Conkle). He may recover to the extent of the title shown, although not entitled to the whole estate. Code, Art. 75, § 83; Matthews v.Turner, 64 Md. 109, 121, 21 A. 224; 18 Am. Jur. sec. 70; Poe,Pleading (5th Ed.), Sec. 271. The appellants contend that there was no proof that the land in dispute was part of the tract conveyed by Joseph Conkle to his wife and daughter. On this point we think the resurvey shows clearly that the land in dispute passed under this deed. It was part of the original tract conveyed to Conkle, and it is not contended that it passed under any subsequent conveyance. The record also clearly shows that Wanex took title to adjoining property from Joseph Conkle, and that Conkle was the owner of the entire tract known as "Carthagenia," which he occupied as a farm and place of abode, until he began the subdivision which resulted in the town. Compare Gore v. Todd, 150 Md. 285, 289,133 A. 126. Moreover, it was shown that the appellants' only claim of paper-title was under Conkle, the common grantor. Jay v.Michael, 82 Md. 1, 33 A. 322. The appellants contend, however, that if the plaintiff established a title prima facie good, he failed to establish a right to possession, not barred by limitations. Upon this point he relies strongly upon the case of Joseph v. Bonaparte,118 Md. 591, 85 A. 962. In that case the plaintiff established his paper-title, but he also proved that the defendant had been in exclusive possession for 17 years or more and that neither the plaintiff nor his predecessors in title had ever been in possession, except that one of the intermediate grantors had been in possession for a short time, more than 20 years before the institution of the suit. Upon this record the court held that the plaintiff had not made out a case. We think the case is distinguishable. In the instant case the common grantor was in possession. His right of possession passed prima facie to his successive Page 525 grantees, and the plaintiff is entitled to possession unless the right was lost by the adverse possession of other persons. Doeex dem. Campbell v. Fletcher, 37 Md. 430. "In cases of this description, upon proof by the defendant of such adversary possession for twenty years, the prima facie case made out by the plaintiff upon the face of his paper-title is rebutted and his right of possession is lost to him." (Poe, Pleading, 5th Ed.), Sec. 263. See also Malone v. Long, 128 Md. 377,97 A. 643; Merryman v. Cumberland Paper Co., 98 Md. 223, 225,56 A. 364; Hackett v. Webster, 97 Md. 404, 55 A. 480; Walsh v.McIntire, 68 Md. 402, 13 A. 348; Davis v. Furlow's Lessee,27 Md. 536. We think the appellants failed to make out a case of adverse possession. The appellant, Joseph Wanex, testified that he and his sons began to use the strip in dispute after he bought the adjoining lots in 1921, for a landing place to pull up boats and unload fish; all the watermen in that locality used the shore for that purpose; that "Conkle never stopped anybody from pulling their boats up. Of course, when I got it I never stopped them either." He testified that Conkle told him the shore went with the lot. Wanex ran a drain pipe through the strip when he built his store. His son testified that the strip was not in the deed to his father; his father went to Mr. Conkle. "Mr. Conkle says `it's yours anyhow. It isn't worth anything * * * you bought all I had there'." Wanex "kept store" on the adjoining property for two or three years, after 1921, then he moved to a farm. He took back the store about 1934. In 1935, some watermen built a wharf on the property, with Wanex's permission, with timber he supplied. Leo Wanex testified that he built a fishhouse on the strip in 1939, a building about 12' x 14' on cement blocks. In 1944, Wanex put a fence around the strip. The appellee testified that he had used the strip repeatedly since 1930, like every one else, and bought fish from the other watermen; that he was in the seafood business in Secretary. He testified, and other witnesses also Page 526 testified, that they never asked permission of any one to use the shore. The testimony falls short of establishing an exclusive use by the appellants; at most it establishes only a use in common with the general public. This is not sufficient. "The acts of userand ownership relied on, must be such as comport with the title or claim of one asserting ownership against all the world, and not such as may be done with impunity by any and all persons in common with him who claims to be the real owner." Gittings v.Moale, 21 Md. 135, 148; Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co.,10 Md. 129, 130; Malone v. Long, supra. The more decisive acts of building a fishhouse and erecting a fence are quite recent; there is no evidence to support exclusive possession for the statutory period. The statements attributed to Conkle do not aid the appellants' case. "Occupancy merely under a parol gift is not possession under color of title." Walsh v. McIntire, supra, 68 Md., page 415, 13 A. 350. It follows that the appellee having proved a paper-title to an undivided one-half of the property, and the appellants having failed to establish a title by adverse possession, the appellee is entitled to recover for the one-half interest he has established. We shall accordingly remand the case with directions that judgment be entered for such interest, unless the appellee shall, within a period to be fixed by the lower court, move for further hearing with leave to both parties to take additional testimony to determine whether Mrs. Wieneke inherited her mother's interest in the property. Judgment reversed and remanded, with costs. Page 527
en	contracts	US	UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 SCHEDULE 14A PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Filed by the Registrant þ Filed by a Party other than the Registrant o Check the appropriate box: þ Preliminary Proxy Statement o Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e) (2)) o Definitive Proxy Statement o Definitive Additional Materials o Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12 Cicero, Inc. (Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter) Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box) þ No fee required. o Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules14a-6(i) (1)and 0-11. Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies: Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies: Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (Set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined): Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction: Total fee paid: o Fee paid previously with preliminary materials. o Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule0-11(a) (2)and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing. Amount Previously Paid: Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.: Filing Party: Date Filed: Cicero, Inc. 8000 Regency Parkway Cary, North Carolina 27518 Notice of Annual Meeting Dear Stockholder: You are cordially invited to attend the Annual Meeting of Stockholders of Cicero, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”).The Annual Meeting will be held at [●] a.m. on August 25, 2015 at []. The meeting will be held for the following purposes: 1. To elect seven directors to serve for the ensuing year and until their successors are elected; 2. To consider and vote upon a proposal to amend the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock, par value $0.001 per share, from 215,000,000 to 600,000,000, subject to the Board of Directors’ authority to abandon such amendment; 3. For the holders of the Company’s Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock to consider and vote upon a proposal to amend Article IV (Conversion) of the Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations to the effect that the Series A-1 Preferred Stock will automatically convert into common stock upon the Company consummating an equity financing for at least $1,000,000; 4.For the holders of the Company’s Series B Convertible Preferred Stock to consider and vote upon a proposal to amend the requirement in Section 6 (Automatic Conversion) of the Series B Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations to the effect that the Series B Preferred Stock will automatically convert into common stock upon the Company consummating an equity financing for at least $1,000,000; 5.To consider and vote upon a proposal to amend the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to allow stockholders to be able to act by written consent only while Privet Fund LPand its affiliates own an aggregate of at least 30% of the Company’s outstanding voting stock, subject to the Board of Directors’ authority to abandon such amendment; 6.To consider and vote upon a proposal to amend the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to provide that only the Board of Directors may call a special meeting of stockholders of the Company, subject to the Board of Directors’ authority to abandon such amendment; 7.To consider and vote upon a proposal to amend the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to renounce the Company’s expectancy regarding certain corporate opportunities presented to a Privet Stockholder, subject to the Board of Directors’ authority to abandon such amendment; 8.To consider and vote upon a proposal to amend the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Corporation to not be governed by the provisions of Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, subject to the Board of Directors’ authority to abandon such amendment; 9.To consider and vote upon a proposal to amend the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation establishing the courts located within the State of Delaware as the exclusive forum for the adjudication of certain legal actions by the stockholders, subject to the Board of Directors’ authority to abandon such amendment; 10.To consider and vote upon a proposal to amend the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to authorize 10,000,000 shares of “blank check” preferred stock, par value $0.001 per share, subject to the Board of Directors’ authority to abandon such amendment; 11.To consider and cast an advisory vote on a non-binding resolution to approve the compensation of our executive officers disclosed in this Proxy Statement; 12. To consider and cast an advisory vote upon a non-binding resolution to determine the frequency of an advisory vote on executive compensation; 13. To ratify the selection by the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of Cherry Bekaert LLP as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2015; and 14. To conduct any other business properly brought before the meeting. These items of business are more fully described in the Proxy Statement accompanying this Notice. The record date for the Annual Meeting is July 30, 2015. Only stockholders of record at the close of business on that date may vote at the meeting or any adjournment thereof. By order of the Board of Directors Date John Broderick Chief Executive Officer Cary, North Carolina [], 2015 YOUR VOTE IS IMPORTANT THIS PROXY STATEMENT IS FURNISHED IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOLICITATION OF PROXIES BY THE COMPANY, ON BEHALF OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, FOR THE 2[], 2015. YOU CAN VOTE YOUR SHARESUSING ONE OF THE FOLLOWING METHODS: • COMPLETE AND RETURN A WRITTEN PROXY CARD; OR • ATTEND THE COMPANY'S 2 ALL STOCKHOLDERS ARE CORDIALLY INVITED TO ATTEND THE MEETING. HOWEVER, TO ENSURE YOUR REPRESENTATION AT THE MEETING, YOU ARE URGED TO MARK, SIGN, DATE AND RETURN THE ENCLOSED PROXY CARD AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE IN THE POSTAGE-PREPAID ENVELOPE ENCLOSED FOR THAT PURPOSE. ANY STOCKHOLDER ATTENDING THE MEETING MAY VOTE IN PERSON EVEN IF HE OR SHE HAS RETURNED A PROXY CARD. IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF PROXY MATERIALS FOR THE STOCKHOLDERS MEETING TO BE HELD ON AUGUST 25, 2015 — THE PROXY STATEMENT AND THE 2[]. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. GENERAL INFORMATION 1 PROPOSAL I ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 PROPOSAL IIAPPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION INCREASING THE NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED SHARES OF COMMON STOCK FROM 215,000,,000,000 SHARES 11 PROPOSAL IIIAPPROVAL to amend Article IV (Conversion) of the Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations to the effect that the Series A-1 Preferred Stock will automatically convert into common stock upon the Company consummating an equity financing for at least $1,000,000 14 PROPOSAL IVAPPROVAL to amend SECTION 6 (AUTOMATIC Conversion) of the Series B Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations to the effect that the Series B Preferred Stock will automatically convert into common stock upon the Company consummating an equity financing for at least $1,000,000 16 PROPOSAL VAPPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION to allow stockholders to able to act by written consent only WHILE Privet Fund LP and its affiliates own an aggregate of at least 30% of the Company’s outstanding voting stock 18 PROPOSAL VIAPPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION to provide that only the Board of Directors may call a special meeting of stockholders of the Company 20 PROPOSAL VIIAPPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION to RENOUNCE THE COMPANY’S EXPECTANCY REGARDING CERTAIN CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES presented to a privet stockholder 21 PROPOSAL VIIIAPPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION to ELECT not be governed by the provisions of Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 23 PROPOSAL IXAPPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION establishing the courts located within the State of Delaware as the exclusive forum for the adjudication of certain legal actions 24 PROPOSAL XAPPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION to authorize 10,000,000 shares of “blank check” preferred stock, par value $0.001 per share 25 PROPOSAL XIADVISORY (NON-BINDING) VOTE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 27 PROPOSAL XIIADVISORY (NON-BINDING) VOTE ON THE FREQUENCY OF ADVISORY VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 28 PROPOSAL XIIIRATIFICATION OF SELECTION OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 29 SECURITY OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN BENEFICIAL OWNERS AND MANAGEMENT 31 SECTION 16(A) BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING COMPLIANCE 33 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 33 CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS 37 UNAUDITED PRO FORMA FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 38 HOUSEHOLDING OF PROXY MATERIALS 38 OTHER MATTERS 38 DOCUMENTS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 40 APPENDIX A – SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION APPENDIX B – AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARTER Cicero, Inc. 8000 Regency Parkway Cary, North Carolina 27518 PROXY STATEMENT FOR THE 2 GENERAL INFORMATION This proxy statement contains information related to the 2015 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (“Annual Meeting”) of Cicero, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“we”, “us”, “our”, “Cicero”, or “the Company”), to be held at [] on August 25, 2015 at [●] a.m., local time, and at any postponements or adjournments thereof. The approximate date of mailing for this proxy statement and a copy of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014 is [], 2015. You are invited to attend the Annual Meeting, and we request that you vote on the proposals described in this Proxy Statement. You do not need to attend the meeting to vote your shares. Instead, you may simply complete, sign and return the enclosed proxy card. Record Date and Quorum Our Board of Directors has fixed the close of business on July 30, 2015 as the record date (the “Record Date”) for determination of stockholders entitled to notice of, and to vote at, the Annual Meeting. The presence, in person or by proxy, of the holders of record of capital stock representing a majority of the votes entitled to be cast at the Annual Meeting will constitute a quorum. Voting Securities and Required Vote As of the Record Date, we had issued and outstanding 180,353,377 shares of common stock, par value $0.001 per share, 1,499.628 shares of our Series A-1 Preferred Stock, par value $0.001 per share, and 10,400 shares of our Series B Preferred Stock, par value $0.001 per share.Holders of common stock are entitled to one vote for each share of common stock held on the Record Date; holders of Series A-1 Preferred Stock are entitled to one thousand votes for each share of Series A-1 Preferred Stock held on the Record Date; andholders of Series B Preferred Stock are entitled to one thousand votes for each share of Series B Preferred Stock held on the Record Date. Proposal I - Directors are elected by a plurality of the affirmative votes cast by those shares of stock present in person, or represented by proxy, and entitled to vote at the Annual Meeting. Seven directors are to be elected by the holders of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, voting together as a single class. Proposal II – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock), voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. Proposal III – The affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the issued and outstanding shares of our Series A-1 Preferred Stock, voting together separately as a class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. None of these shares are held by brokers. Proposal IV – The affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the issued and outstanding shares of our Series B Preferred Stock, voting together separately as a class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. None of these shares are held by brokers. Proposal V – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock), voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. Proposal VI – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock), voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. 1 Proposal VII – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock), voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. Proposal VIII – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock), voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. Proposal IX – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock), voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. Proposal X – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock), voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have the same effect as an “Against” vote. Proposal XI – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock) present and entitled to vote at the meeting, voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions will have the same effect as an “Against” vote while vote broker non-votes will have no effect on the outcome of the vote. Proposal XII – The number of years receiving the greatest number of votes (i.e. one, two or three years) from the holders of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock), voting together as a single class, will be considered the frequency recommended by stockholders. Abstentions and broker non-votes will have no effect on the outcome of the vote. Proposal XIII – The affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of our voting stock (which consists of our common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock) present and entitled to vote at the meeting, voting together as a single class, is required to approve this proposal. Abstentions will have the same effect as an “Against” vote while vote broker non-votes will have no effect on the outcome of the vote. Voting by Proxy If your shares are registered directly in your name with American Stock Transfer & Trust Company, our transfer agent, you are considered a stockholder of record. As a stockholder of record at the close of business on the Record Date, you can vote in person at the Annual Meeting or you can provide a proxy to be voted at the meeting by signing and returning the enclosed proxy card. If you submit a proxy card, we will vote your shares as you direct. If you submit a proxy card without giving specific voting instructions, those shares will be voted as recommended by the Board of Directors. If you return a signed and dated proxy card without marking any voting selections, your shares will be voted “For” all the nominees to the Board of Directors in Proposal I, “For” Proposals II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI and XIII, and “3-Years” for Proposal XII. If any other matter is properly presented at the Annual Meeting, your proxy (i.e., one of the individuals named on your proxy card) will vote your shares using his or her best judgment. If your shares are held in a stock brokerage account or otherwise by a nominee (that is, in “street name”), you will need to obtain a proxy form from the institution that holds your shares and follow the instructions included on that form regarding how to instruct your broker to vote your shares. If you do not give instructions to your broker, your broker can vote your shares with respect to “discretionary” items, but not with respect to “non-discretionary” items. Discretionary items are proposals considered routine under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange on which your broker may vote shares held in street name in the absence of your voting instructions. On non-discretionary items for which you do not give your broker instructions, the shares cannot be voted and will be treated as broker non-votes. 2 Revocation of Proxy Your execution of the enclosed proxy will not affect your right as a stockholder to attend the Annual Meeting and to vote in person. Any stockholder giving a proxy has the right to revoke it at anytime by either (i) a later-dated proxy, (ii) a written revocation sent to and received by the Secretary of the Company prior to the Annual Meeting, or (iii) attendance at the Meeting and voting in person. If your shares are held in street name, you must follow the instructions provided by your broker or bank. Cost of Proxy Solicitation We will pay for the entire cost of soliciting proxies by our Board of Directors. In addition to the solicitation of proxies by mail, solicitation may be made personally or by telephone or electronic communication by our directors, officers and employees, none of whom will receive additional compensation for these services. We will reimburse brokers and other nominees for their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with distributing forms of proxies and proxy materials to the beneficial owners of our common stock. Stockholder Proposals for next Annual Meeting Under Rule 14a-8 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), stockholders of the Company may present proper proposals for inclusion in the Company's Proxy Statement and for consideration at the next annual meeting of stockholders by submitting their proposals to the Company in a timely manner. In order to be considered for inclusion in the Proxy Statement distributed to stockholders prior to the annual meeting of stockholders in the year 2016, a stockholder proposal must be received by the Company no later than [April 1, 2016] and must otherwise comply with the requirements of Rule 14a-8. Stockholder proposals should be delivered in writing to Cicero Inc., 8000 Regency Parkway, Cary, North Carolina 27518 Attention: Secretary. 3 PROPOSAL I ELECTION OF DIRECTORS There are seven nominees for election to the Company's Board of Directors. The names of the persons who are nominees for director and their positions and offices with the Company are set forth in the table below. Each director to be elected will hold office until the 2016 Annual Meeting of Stockholders and until his successor is elected and has qualified, or until such director's earlier death, resignation or removal. Directors are elected by a plurality of the votes present in person or represented by proxy and entitled to vote at the Annual Meeting. Shares represented by executed proxies will be voted, if authorization to do so is not withheld, for the election of the seven nominees named below. In the event that any nominee should be unavailable for election as a result of an unexpected occurrence, your shares will be voted for the election of a substitute nominee as the Board of Directors may propose. Each of the nominees listed below has been nominated for and has agreed to stand for election and management has no reason to believe that any nominee will be unable to serve. The following table provides information regarding each nominee to our Board of Directors: Name Age Position John L Steffens 73 Chairman of the Board John Broderick 66 Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director Mark Landis 73 Director Bruce D. Miller 64 Director Don Peppers 64 Director Ryan Levenson 40 Director Thomas Avery 61 Director John L. Steffens Mr. Steffens was appointed to our Board of Directors on May 16, 2007, and is the Founder and Senior Managing Director of Spring Mountain Capital, LP. Prior to founding Spring Mountain Capital in 2001, Mr. Steffens spent 38 years at Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., where he held numerous senior management positions, including President of Merrill Lynch Consumer Markets, Vice Chairman of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., and Chairman of its U.S. Private Client Group. Under his leadership, the Private Client Group experienced tremendous growth, increasing assets under management from $200 billion to $1.6 trillion. Mr. Steffens also served on the board of directors of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. from April 1986 until July 2001. Mr. Steffens currently serves on the board of directors of Colony Financial, Inc. He also serves on the board of managers of HealthpointCapital and the advisory boards of StarVest Partners and Wicks Communication & Media Partners, L.P. In addition, he is currently National Chairman Emeritus of the Alliance for Aging Research and a member of the Board of Overseers of the Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth. Previously, Mr. Steffens served as Chairman of the Securities Industry Association (now the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, or SIFMA) and as a Trustee of the Committee for Economic Development. In 2010, Mr. Steffens was the recipient of the Billie Jean King Contribution Award from the Women's Sports Foundation. Mr. Steffens received a B.A. in Economics from Dartmouth College and also completed Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program. We believe Mr. Steffen’s qualifications to serve on our Board of Directors include his experience in leading complex enterprises and his experience as a senior executive. John P. Broderick Mr. Broderick is currently the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company and is also a director. Mr. Broderick has served as a director and as the Chief Executive Officer of the Company since June 2005, as the Chief Financial Officer of the Company since April 2001, and as Corporate Secretary since August 2001. Prior to joining our Company, Mr. Broderick was Executive Vice President of Swell Inc., a sports media e-commerce company where he oversaw the development of all commerce operations and served as the organization's interim Chief Financial Officer. Previously, Mr. Broderick served as Chief Financial Officer and Senior Vice President of North American Operations for Programmer's Paradise, a publicly held international software marketer.Mr. Broderick received his B.S. degree in accounting from Villanova University.We believe Mr. Broderick’s qualifications to serve on our Board of Directors include his intimate knowledge of our operations as a result of day to day leadership as our Chief Executive Officer. 4 Mark Landis Mr. Landis has been a director of the Company since July 2005. Mr. Landis retired in 2003 from Siemens Building Technology’s where he served as president of the North American Security Division since 2001.Previously he served as CEO of Security Technologies Group from 1988 until it was sold to Siemens Building Technology’s in 2001.In 2008 he became Chairman of Docassist, LLC.Mr. Landis earned his B.A. from Cornell University and his Juris Doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania.Mr. Landis received his Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriter (CPCU) from the American Institute for Property and Liability Underwriters.We believe Mr. Landis’ qualifications to serve on our Board of Directors include his experience in leading enterprises and his experience as a senior executive. Bruce D. Miller Mr. Miller has been a director since July 2005.He has served as General Partner of Delphi Partners, Ltd. a closely held investment partnership, since 1989.Mr. Miller is a long-standing member of the board of Cape Air/Nantucket Airlines and was recently named a Trustee of the Cape Cod Five Cent Savings Bank. He has been involved with numerous non-profits in his home town of Nantucket, Massachusetts.Mr. Miller received both a B.S. in Finance and an M.B.A. from Lehigh University.We believe Mr. Miller’s qualifications to serve on our Board of Directors include his experience as General Partner of a privately owned investment partnership. Don Peppers Mr. Peppers has been a Director since June 2007.Mr. Peppers formed Marketing 1:1, Inc. in January 1992 which became Peppers & Rogers Group, a customer-centered management consulting firm with offices located in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and South Africa.He has written or co-authored ten books on marketing, sales, and customer relationships issues.Peppers & Rogers Group is now a unit of TeleTech Holdings (TTEC), a business process outsourcer based in Denver, Colorado.From October 1990 to January 1992, Mr. Peppers was the Chief Executive Officer of Perkins/Butler Direct Marketing, a top-20 U.S.-direct-marketing agency.Prior to marketing and advertising, he worked as an economist in the oil business and as the director of accounting for a regional airline. Mr. Peppers holds a Bachelor's Degree in astronautical engineering from the U.S. Air Force Academy, and a Master's Degree in public affairs from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School.We believe Mr. Pepper’s qualifications to serve on our Board of Directors include his years of experience providing strategic advisory services to organizations. Ryan Levenson Mr. Levenson was appointed to the Board of Directors on July 15, 2015, pursuant to a director designation right granted to Privet Fund LP (“Privet”) in connection with the Stock and Warrant Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”) entered into by the Company with Privet, five directors of the Company, including John L. Steffens, Donald Peppers, Mark Landis, Bruce Miller and Thomas Avery and three other persons (see Proposal II for more details regarding the Purchase Agreement). Mr. Levenson is currently and has been Principal and Managing Member of Privet Fund Management LLC, an investment firm, since its founding in February 2007. Mr. Levenson currently serves as a director of RELM Wireless Corp., a manufacturer and distributor of wireless communications products. Previously, Mr. Levenson served as a director and member of the Compensation, Organization and Corporate Governance Committee of Material Sciences Corp. from May 2013 until its sale in March 2014. Mr. Levenson also served as a member of the board of directors and Compensation and Audit Committees of The Middleby Corporation from May 2006 until November 2012. Prior to founding Privet Fund Management LLC in February 2007, Mr. Levenson served as Vice President of Business Development at MSI, a privately held building products distributor and construction services company, from 2003 until 2006. Prior to his service with MSI, Mr. Levenson served as a financial analyst for Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn’s long/short equity hedge fund after working at SAC Capital Advisors LLC in a similar capacity. Mr. Levenson graduated from Vanderbilt University with a degree in art history. We believe Mr. Levenson’s qualifications to serve on our Board of Directors include his experience with making value-oriented investments in small capitalization companies across all levels of the capital structure. 5 Thomas Avery Mr. Avery was appointed to the Board of Directors on July 15, 2015, pursuant to a director designation right granted to Privet in connection with the Purchase Agreement entered into by the Company with Privet, five directors of the Company, including John L. Steffens, Donald Peppers, Mark Landis, Bruce Miller and Thomas Avery and three other persons (see Proposal II for more details regarding the Purchase Agreement). Mr. Avery has over 37 years of investment banking and venture capital experience which includes serving as a Managing Director at Raymond James & Associates from 2000 until 2014; the head of the investment banking group at Interstate/Johnson-Lane from 1995 to 2000; a general partner at Noro-Moseley Partners from 1989 to 1995; a general partner at Summit Partners from 1984 to 1989; and Senior Vice President at The Robinson-Humphrey Company from 1977 to 1984. During his career as a venture capitalist, Mr. Avery served on numerous private company boards, assisting those companies with advice and help in financing their enterprises, planning and executing growth strategies, and building effective management teams. Mr. Avery is currently serving on the board of directors of KIPP Metro Atlanta, a national charter school organization serving low income, minority children. Mr. Avery graduated Summa Cum Laude from the Georgia Institute of Technology with a bachelor’s degree in industrial management and from the Harvard Business School with a master’s degree in business administration. We believe Mr. Avery’s qualifications to serve on our Board of Directors include his many years of investment banking and venture capital experience. Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement, Mr. Steffens and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Privet agreed to vote their respective shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock in favor of electing Messrs. Levenson and Avery to the Board of Directors. As Mr. Steffens and Privet together control over 68% of the aggregate voting power of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, Messrs. Levenson and Avery will be elected to the Board at the Annual Meeting. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" ALL OF THE NOMINEES IN PROPOSAL I CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Board Leadership Structure The Board considers and establishes the appropriate leadership structure for the Company. The Board has concluded that the Company and its stockholders are best served by not having a formal policy on whether the same individual should serve as both Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board. The Board believes that it is important to retain the flexibility to make this determination based on the circumstances at the time of the determination, recognizing that no single leadership structure will best serve the Company in all cases. This allows the Board to use its broad experience and knowledge to elect the most qualified director as Chairman of the Board, while maintaining its ability to either separate or combine the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. 6 The Boardhas decided to separate the roles of Chief Executive Officer (John Broderick) and Chairman of the Board (John Steffens) in recognition of the differences between the two roles. Our Chief Executive Officer is responsible for setting the strategic direction for the Company and the day to day leadership and performance of the Company, while the Chairman of the Board provides guidance to our Chief Executive Officer and sets the agenda for Board meetings and presides over meetings of the full Board. Independence of the Board of Directors Our Board of Directors currently consists of seven members.They are John L. Steffens, John P. Broderick, Mark Landis, Bruce D. Miller, Don Peppers, Ryan Levenson and Thomas Avery. Mr. Steffens is the Company’s Chairman of the Board and Mr. Broderick is the Company’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer.The Company’s stock is quoted on the Over The Counter Bulletin Board, which does not have director independence requirements. Under Item 407(a) of Regulation S-K, the Company has chosen to measure the independence of its directors under the definition of independence used by the NYSE MKT, which can be found in the NYSE MKT Company Guide, §803(A)(2).Under such definition, Messrs. Steffens, Landis, Miller, Peppers, Levenson and Avery are independent directors. Committees of the Board of Directors The Board has established three standing committees: an Audit Committee, a Compensation Committee and a Nominating Committee. Audit Committee The Audit Committee is currently composed of Mark Landis and Bruce Miller.Bruce Hasenyager and John W. Atherton, Jr. were members of the Audit Committee prior to their resignations from the Board on April 7, 2015 and July 15, 2015, respectively. The Board plans to appoint new members to the Audit Committee after the Annual Meeting. The responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the appointment of, retention, replacement, compensation and overseeing the work of the Company’s independent accountants and tax professionals. The Audit Committee reviews with the independent accountants the results of the audit engagement, approves professional services provided by the accountants including the scope of non-audit services, if any, and reviews the adequacy of our internal accounting controls. The Audit Committee met formally four times during our fiscal year ended December 31, 2014. Each member attended every meeting while they were appointed to the Audit Committee. The Board of Directors has determined that the members of the Audit Committee were and are independent.Mr. Landis qualifies as an “audit committee financial expert” as defined in Item 407(d)(5) of Regulation S-K. The Audit Committee does have a written charter, which is attached to this proxy statement as Appendix B. Compensation Committee The Compensation Committee was, prior to their respective resignations from the Board on July 15, 2015, composed of Jay Kingley and Charles Porciello. The Board plans to appoint new members to the Compensation Committee after the Annual Meeting.The Compensation Committee met once in 2014. The Compensation Committee does not have a written charter. The Compensation Committee has responsibility for establishing, implementing and monitoring adherence with the Company’s compensation philosophy.Its duties include: • Setting the total compensation of our Chief Executive Officer and evaluating his performance based on corporate goals and objectives; • Reviewing and approving the Chief Executive Officer’s decisions relevant to the total compensation of the Company’s other executive officer; 7 •Making recommendations to the Board of Directors with respect to equity-based plans in order to allow us to attract and retain qualified personnel; and • Reviewing director compensation levels and practices, and recommending, from time to time, changes in such compensation levels and practices of the Board of Directors. Nominating Committee The Nominating Committee was, prior to his resignation from the Board on July 15, 2015, composed of Bruce Hasenyager. The Board plans to appoint new members to the Nomination Committee after the Annual Meeting The functions of the Nominating Committee include identification and recommendation of director nominees qualified to serve on the Board of Directors. The Nominating Committee did not meet in 2014. The Nominating Committee does not have a written charter. The Nominating Committee considers persons identified by its members, management, shareholders, potential investors, investment bankers and others. The Nominating Committee may also use the services of search firms to assist in identifying potential directors, in gathering information about the background and experience of such persons and acting as an intermediary with such persons. The Nominating Committee does not have any formal criteria for nominees; however, it believes that persons to be nominated should be actively engaged in business endeavors, have an understanding of financial statements, corporate budgeting and capital structure, be familiar with the requirements of a publicly traded company, be familiar with industries relevant to the Company’s business endeavors, be willing to devote significant time to the oversight duties of the board of directors of a public company, and be able to promote a diversity of views based on the person’s education, experience and professional employments. The Nominating Committee evaluates each individual in the context of the Board as a whole, with the objective of recommending a group of persons that can best implement our business plan, perpetuate our business and represent shareholder interests. The Nominating Committee may require certain skills or attributes, for example financial or accounting experience, to meet specific Board needs that arise from time to time. The Nominating Committee does not distinguish among nominees recommended by shareholders and other persons. Shareholders and others wishing to suggest candidates to the Nominating Committee for consideration as directors must submit written notice to our corporate Secretary, who will provide it to the Nominating Committee. Meetings of the Board of Directors The Board of Directors met four times during 2014. All incumbent directors attended at least 75% of the meetings of the Board of Directors held during the period for which they were a director. We expect all of our directors to attend the 2015 Annual Meeting of Stockholders. We do not maintain a formal policy regarding director attendance at our annual meeting of stockholders. The Board's Role in Risk Oversight The Board of Directors has an active role, as a whole and also at the committee level, in overseeing management of the Company's risks. The Board regularly reviews information regarding the Company's credit, liquidity and operations, as well as the risks associated with each. The Compensation Committee is responsible for overseeing the management of risks relating to the Company's executive compensation plans and arrangements. The Audit Committee oversees management of financial risks. The Nominating Committee manages risks associated with the independence of the Board of Directors and potential conflicts of interest of director nominees. While each committee is responsible for evaluating certain risks and overseeing the management of such risks, the entire Board of Directors is regularly informed through committee reports about such risks. 8 Stockholder Communications with the Board of Directors Stockholders may contact members of the Board of Directors by writing to them c/o Cicero Inc., Suite 542, 8000 Regency Parkway, Cary, North Carolina 27518 Attention: Secretary. The Secretary will forward correspondence to the directors from time to time. Code of Business Conduct and Ethics Our Board of Directors has adopted a code of ethics and a code of conduct that applies to all of our Directors, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and employees.We will provide copies of our code of conduct and code of ethics without charge upon request. To obtain a copy of the code of ethics or code of conduct, please send your written request to Cicero Inc., Suite 542, 8000 Regency Pkwy, Cary, North Carolina 27518, Attention: Secretary.The code of ethics is also available on the Company’s website at www.ciceroinc.com. 9 REPORT OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS* The Audit Committee oversees the Company's financial reporting process on behalf of the Board of Directors. Management has the primary responsibility for the financial statements and the reporting process, including the systems of internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures. In fulfilling its oversight responsibilities, the Audit Committee reviewed the audited financial statements included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014 with management, including a discussion of the quality, not just the acceptability, of the accounting principles, the reasonableness of significant judgments, and the clarity of disclosures in the financial statements. The Audit Committee is responsible for reviewing, approving and managing the engagement of the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm, including the scope, extent and procedures of the annual audit and compensation to be paid therefore, and all other matters the audit committee deems appropriate, including the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm’s accountability to the Board of Directors and the Audit Committee. The Audit Committee reviewed with the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm, which is responsible for expressing an opinion on the conformity of audited financial statements with generally accepted accounting principles, its judgment as to the quality, not just the acceptability, of the Company's accounting principles and such other matters as are required to be discussed with the audit committee under auditing standards generally accepted in the United States, including those described in Auditing Standard 16, as amended, “Communication with Audit Committees,” and discussed and reviewed the results of the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm’s examination of the financial statements. In addition, the Audit Committee discussed with the Company's independent registered public accounting firm the independent registered public accounting firm’s independence from management and the Company, including the matters in the written disclosures and the letter regarding its independence as required by the applicable requirements of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board regarding the independent accountant's communications with the audit committee concerning independence. The Audit Committee also considered whether the provision of any non-audit services was compatible with maintaining the independent registered public accounting firm's independence. The Audit Committee discussed with the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm the overall scope and plans for its audits, and received from them written disclosures and letter regarding their independence. The Audit Committee meets with the Company's independent registered public accounting firm, with and without management present, to discuss the results of its examinations and the overall quality of the Company's financial reporting. The Audit Committee held four meetings during the fiscal year ended December 31, 2014. In reliance on the reviews and discussions referred to above, the Audit Committee recommended to the Board of Directors (and the Board of Directors approved) that the audited financial statements be included in the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014 for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The audit committee has also retained Cherry Bekaert LLP as theCompany's independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2015. Audit Committee: Mark Landis Bruce Miller The material in this report is not “soliciting material,” is not deemed “filed” with the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whether made before or after the date hereof and irrespective of any general incorporation language in any such filing. 10 PROPOSAL II APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATIO INCREASING THE NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED SHARES OF COMMON STOCK FROM 215,000,,000,000 SHARES General The Board of Directors is proposing for stockholder approval an amendment to the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (the “Charter”) to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock, par value $0.001 per share, from 215,000,000 shares to 600,000,000 shares. At a meeting held on July 8, 2015, the Board of Directors approved this amendment, subject to stockholder approval, and directed that this amendment be submitted to a vote of the Company’s stockholders at the Annual Meeting. The Charter also authorizes the issuance of up to 10,000,000 shares of convertible preferred stock, par value $0.001 per share, of which 1,499.628 shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock and 10,400 shares of Series B Preferred Stock are currently issued or outstanding. This proposed amendment will not increase or otherwise affect the Company’s authorized shares of preferred stock; however, at the Annual Meeting (A) holders of the Company’s Series A-1 Preferred Stock will be voting on a proposal to amend the requirement in Article IV (Conversion) of the Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations which provides that the Series A-1 Preferred Stock be automatically converted into common stock upon the Company consummating an equity financing for at least $5,000,000 to consummating an equity financing for at least $1,000,000, which will cause an automatic conversion of the Series A-1 Preferred Stock into common stock (see Proposal III); (B) holders of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stock will be voting on a proposal to amend the requirement in Article 6 (Automatic Conversion) of the Series B Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations which provides that the Series B Preferred Stock be automatically converted into common stock upon the Company consummating an equity financing for at least $5,000,000 to consummating an equity financing for at least $1,000,000, which will cause an automatic conversion of the Series B Preferred Stock into common stock (see Proposal IV); and (C) all stockholders will be voting on a proposal to amend the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to authorize 10,000,000 shares of “blank check” preferred stock, par value $0.001 per share (see Proposal X). The Board believes that it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock in order to allow the Company to meet certain contractual commitments and to give the Company greater flexibility in considering and planning for future potential business needs. Purpose The Charter currently authorizes the issuance of up to 215,000,000 shares of common stock, par value $0.001 per share. As of the close of business on July 30, 2015, 180,353,377 shares of common stock were issued and outstanding. In addition, as of the close of business on July 30, 2015, there were 207,959,111 shares of common stock issuable upon exercise of outstanding warrants, 3,603,110 shares of common stock issuable upon exercise of outstanding stock options, 898,090 shares of common stock reserved for issuance for future grants under the Company’s 2007 Employee Stock Option Plan and Outside Director Stock Option Plan (collectively, the “Current Option Plans”) and 11,899,628 shares of common stock issuable upon conversion of the Company’s Series A-1 and Series B Preferred Stock. Assuming all currently outstanding warrants, options and shares of Series A-1 and Series B Preferred Stock were exercised or converted and all options reserved for issuance under the Current Option Plans were issued and exercised, the Company would not have enough authorized shares of common stock to allow exercise of the warrants issued to the purchasers in the transaction described below. On July 15, 2015, the Company entered into a Stock and Warrant Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”) with investors named therein, including Privet Fund LP (“Privet”), five directors of the Company, including John L. Steffens, Donald Peppers, Mark Landis, Bruce Miller and Thomas Avery and three other persons (collectively the nine investors are referred to as the “Purchasers”). Pursuant to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Company issued to the Purchasers an aggregate of 25,000,000 shares of common stock and warrants to purchase up to an aggregate of 205,277,778 shares of common stock, in return for an aggregate investment of $1,000,000. The warrants, if exercised, would result in a cash inflow to the Company of approximately $9,000,000. 11 Therefore, the purposes of this amendment to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock from 215,000,000 to 600,000,000 are: · to allow the Company to issue additional shares of common stock for any proper corporate purposes, including but not limited to, public or private financings, stock splits, stock dividends, potential strategic transactions, including mergers, acquisitions, strategic partnerships, joint ventures and other business combinations, as well as for other general corporate transactions; and · to allow exercised of the above-described options, warrants, including the warrants issued to Purchasers (the exercise of which could result in a cash inflow to the Company of up to $9,000,000), and conversion of outstanding preferred and promissory notes. Other than as described above and the conversion of the Company’s Series A-1 Preferred Stock (Proposal III) and Series B Preferred Stock (Proposal IV), the Company has no current plan, commitment, arrangement, understanding or agreement regarding the issuance of the additional shares of common stock resulting from the proposed increase in the number of authorized shares of common stock. The additional shares of common stock will be available for issuance from time to time as determined by the Board of Directors for any proper corporate purposes. Having these additional shares of authorized common stock available for future use will allow the Company to issue additional shares of common stock without the expense and delay of arranging a special meeting of stockholders. Possible Effects and Anti-takeover Considerations Once the amendment to the Charter is approved, the additional authorized shares would be available for issuance at the discretion of the Board and without further stockholder approval. It is not the present intention of the Board of Directors to seek stockholder approval prior to any issuance of shares of common stock that would become authorized by the amendment unless otherwise required by law or regulation. Frequently, opportunities arise that require prompt action, and it is the belief of the Board of Directors that the delay necessitated for stockholder approval of a specific issuance could be to the detriment of the Company and its stockholders. The additional shares of authorized common stock would have the same rights and privileges as the shares of common stock currently issued and outstanding. The adoption of the amendment would not have any immediate dilutive effect on the proportionate voting power or other rights of existing stockholders. Shares of common stock issued in the future (including for the purposes described above in the section entitled “Purpose”), other than for a stock split, may decrease existing stockholders’ percentage equity ownership and, depending on the price at which they are issued, could have a financially dilutive effect on previously issued shares of common stock and have a negative effect on the market price of the common stock. The Company cannot provide assurances that any such transactions will be consummated on favorable terms or at all, that they will enhance stockholder value or that they will not adversely affect the Company’s business or the trading price of our stock. Current stockholders have no preemptive or similar rights. The Company has not proposed the increase in the number of authorized shares of common stock with the intention of using the additional authorized shares for anti-takeover purposes, but the Company would be able to use the additional shares to oppose a hostile takeover attempt or delay or prevent changes in control or management of the Company. For example, without further stockholder approval, the Board could sell shares of common stock or preferred stock, including preferred stock convertible into shares of common stock, in a private transaction to purchasers who would oppose a takeover or favor the current Board. Although this proposal to increase the authorized number of shares of common stock has been prompted by the need to fulfill contractual obligations and other business and financial considerations, and not by the threat of any known or threatened hostile takeover attempt, stockholders should be aware that approval of this proposal could facilitate future efforts by the Company to oppose changes in control of the Company and perpetuate the Company’s management, including transactions in which the stockholders might otherwise receive a premium for their shares over then current market prices. 12 Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon As described above, in connection with the Purchase Agreement, the Company issued warrants to John L. Steffens, Tom Avery, Mark Landis, Bruce Miller and Don Peppers, each a director of the Company, to purchase up to an aggregate of 51,319,445 shares of common stock. These warrants are exercisable for a term of three years at exercise prices ranging from $0.04 to $0.05 per share. Some of the additional shares of common stock authorized by this proposal may be issued to Messrs. Steffens, Avery, Landis, Miller and Peppers upon exercise of their respective warrants. In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement, Mr. Steffens and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Privet agreed to vote their respective shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens and Privet together control over 68% of the aggregate voting power of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting. Effective Date In order for the increase in the number of authorized shares of common stock to 600,000,000 shares to become effective, we will have to file a Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment (a copy of which is attached to this Proxy Statement as Appendix A) with the Delaware Secretary of State. Upon obtaining stockholder approval of this proposal, we intend to file the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment as soon as practicable. The Board of Directors reserves the right, notwithstanding stockholder approval of this proposal and without further action by our stockholders, not to proceed with the corporate action authorized by this proposal at any time before the filing of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment. Regarding the authorized capital structure of the Company, the first sentence of the Fourth Article of the Charter currently reads as follows: “The total number of shares of capital stock which the Corporation is authorized to issue is two hundred twenty five million 225,000,000 shares, consisting of: (i) Two Hundred Fifteen million (215,000,000) shares of Common Stock, par value $.001 per share (“Common Stock”); and (ii) Ten million (10,000,000) shares of preferred stock, par value $.001 per share (“preferred stock”). The first sentence of Section 4.01 of Article IV of the Company’s Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment, as approved by the Board of Directors, reads as follows: “Total Authorized Shares.The total number of shares of capital stock that the Corporation shall have authority to issue is 610,000,000, which shall be divided into 600,000,000 shares of common stock, par value $0.001 (the “Common Stock”), and 10,000,000 shares of preferred stock, par value $0.001 per share (the “Preferred Stock”).” Dissenter’s Rights Delaware law does not provide for appraisal or other similar rights for dissenting stockholders in connection with this proposal. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL II 13 PROPOSAL III APPROVAL TO AMEND ARTICLE IV (CONVERSION) OF THE SERIES A-1 CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK CERTIFICATE OF DESIGNATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SERIES A-1 PREFERRED STOCK WILL AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT INTO COMMON STOCK UPON THE COMPANY CONSUMMATING AN EQUITY FINANCING FOR AT LEAST $1,000,000 General The Board of Directors is proposing for approval by the holders of the Company’s Series A-1 Preferred Stock an amendment to Article IV (Conversion) of the Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations which provides that the Series A-1 Preferred Stock be automatically converted into common stock upon the Company consummating an equity financing for at least $5,000,000 to consummating an equity financing for at least $1,000,000, with recognition that the consummation of the Purchase Agreement (as describe in Proposal II) would satisfy this requirement, approval of this proposal would cause an automatic conversion of all 1,499.628 shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock into 1,499,628 shares of common stock. At a meeting held on July 8, 2015, the Board of Directors approved this amendment, subject to stockholder approval, and directed that this amendment be submitted to a vote of the Company’s Series A-1 Preferred Stockholders at the Annual Meeting. Purpose The purpose of this proposal is to cause the automatic conversion of all outstanding shares of the Company’s Series A-1 Preferred Stock. Additionally, with the full conversion of the Series A-1 Preferred Stock, the Company will be able to eliminate that class of preferred stock. If the Class B Preferred Stock is similarly converted (see Proposal IV), then the terms and provisions of the Company’s convertible preferred stock can be eliminated and replaced by a form of “blank check” preferred stock, as is being submitted for approval by the stockholders under Proposal X. The Board of Directors believes that converting all of the outstanding shares of the Company’s Series A-1 Preferred Stock to be in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders because as by no longer having any outstanding shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock (or Series B Preferred Stock – see Proposal IV), the Company will be cleaning up its capitalization structure and thus making the Company possibly more attractive to any potential equity investors who may want to invest in the Company in the future. Amendment The holders of the Company’s Series A-1 Preferred Stock are being asked to vote on the following resolution: RESOLVED, that Article IV.B of the Certificate of Designations, Preferences and Rights of Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock be deleted in its entirety as replaced as follows: “B.Mandatory Conversion.The Series A-1 Preferred Stock shall automatically be converted into Common Stock at the then applicable Conversion Ratio upon the occurrence of one of the following events: (1) The Corporation has consummated since January 1, 2015 or consummates at least an additional $1,000,000.00 equity financing from institutional or strategic investors; and/or (2) The Corporation having four (4) consecutive quarters of positive cash flow as reflected on the Corporation’s financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).” 14 Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon John L. Steffens and Mark Landis, directors of the Company, own an aggregate of 1,340.968 shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock. Their interest in this proposal is solely as holders of Series A-1 Preferred Stock and they will be treated the same as any other holder of Series A-1 Preferred Stock. In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement, Mr. Steffens, Mr. Landis, Carolyn Landis (Mr. Landis’ wife) and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens, Mr. Landis and Mrs. Landis agreed to vote their shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens, Mr. Landis and Mrs. Landis collectively own over 89% of the outstanding shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting and all shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock will, upon approval, automatically convert into share of common stock in accordance with the Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations, as amended. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL III 15 PROPOSAL IV APPROVAL TO AMEND SECTION 6 (AUTOMATIC CONVERSION) OF THE SERIES B CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK CERTIFICATE OF DESIGNATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SERIES B PREFERRED STOCK WILL AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT INTO COMMON STOCK UPON THE COMPANY CONSUMMATING AN EQUITY FINANCING FOR AT LEAST $1,000,000 General The Board of Directors is proposing for approval by the holders of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stock an amendment to Section 6 (Automatic Conversion) of the Series B Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations which provides that the Series B Preferred Stock be automatically converted into common stock upon the Company consummating an equity financing for at least $5,000,000 to consummating an equity financing for at least $1,000,000, with recognition that the consummation of the Purchase Agreement (as describe in Proposal II) would satisfy this requirement, approval of this proposal would cause an automatic conversion of all 10,400 shares of Series B Preferred Stock into 10,400,000 shares of common stock. At a meeting held on July 8, 2015, the Board of Directors approved this amendment, subject to stockholder approval, and directed that this amendment be submitted to a vote of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stockholders at the Annual Meeting. Purpose The purpose of this proposal is to cause the automatic conversion of all outstanding shares of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stock. Additionally, with the full conversion of the Series B Preferred Stock, the Company will be able to eliminate that class of preferred stock. If the Class A-1 Preferred Stock is similarly converted (see Proposal III), then the terms and provisions of the Company’s convertible preferred stock can be eliminated and replaced by a form of “blank check” preferred stock, as is being submitted for approval by the stockholders under Proposal X. The Board of Directors believes that converting all of the outstanding shares of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stock to be in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders because as by no longer having any outstanding shares of Series B Preferred Stock (or Series A-1 Preferred Stock – see Proposal III), the Company will be cleaning up its capitalization structure and thus making the Company possibly more attractive to any potential equity investors who may want to invest in the Company in the future. Amendment The holders of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stock are being asked to vote on the following resolution: RESOLVED, that Section 6(a) of the Certificate of Designations, Preferences and Rights of Series B Convertible Preferred Stock be deleted in its entirety as replaced as follows: “6. Automatic Conversion. (a) Automatic Conversion of Series B Preferred Stock. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, each outstanding share of Series B Preferred Stock shall automatically be converted into shares of Common Stock at the then applicable conversion rate determined pursuant to Section 5 upon the earlier to occur of the following events (each, an “Automatic Conversion Triggering Event”): (i) the Company has consummated since January 1, 2015 or consummates at least an additional $1,000,000 equity financing from institutional or strategic investors; and/or (ii) the Company has four (4) consecutive quarters of positive cash flow as reflected on the Company’s financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The foregoing automatic conversion shall be effective upon the occurrence of the applicable Automatic Conversion Triggering Event (the “Automatic Conversion Date”), notwithstanding that the holders of Series B Preferred Stock may not receive notice of conversion until after the Automatic Conversion Date.” 16 Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon John L. Steffens and Don Peppers, directors of the Company, own an aggregate of 7,733 shares of Series B Preferred Stock. Their interest in this proposal is solely as a holder of Series B Preferred Stock and they will be treated the same as any other holder of Series B Preferred Stock. In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement, Mr. Steffens, Mr. Peppers and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Mr. Peppers agreed to vote their shares of Series B Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens and Mr. Peppers collectively own over 74% of the outstanding shares of Series B Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting and all shares of Series B Preferred Stock will, upon approval, automatically convert into share of common stock in accordance with the Series B Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations, as amended. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL IV 17 PROPOSAL V APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION TO ALLOW STOCKHOLDERS TO ABLE TO ACT BY WRITTEN CONSENT ONLY WHILE PRIVET FUND LP AND ITS AFFILIATES OWN AN AGGREGATE OF AT LEAST 30% OF THE COMPANY’S OUTSTANDING VOTING STOCK General The Board of Directors is proposing for stockholder approval an amendment to the Company’s Charter to allow stockholders to be able to act by written consent only while Privet Fund LP and its affiliates and their respective affiliates, subsidiaries, members, partners, directors, officers and employees, in each case other than the Company and its subsidiaries (collectively, the “Privet Stockholders”), own an aggregate of at least 30% of the Company’s outstanding voting stock. At a meeting held on July 8, 2015, the Board of Directors approved this amendment, subject to stockholder approval, and directed that this amendment be submitted to a vote of the Company’s stockholders at the Annual Meeting. For the complete text of the amendment, please see Article VII (Stockholder Action By Written Consent) of the Company’s Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment, attached to this Proxy Statement as Annex A. Purpose and Effect The Company’s By-laws currently provide that, except as otherwise provided in the Company’s certificate of incorporation, any action required or permitted to be taken at an annual or special meeting of stockholders of the Company may be taken without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote of stockholders. The Company’s Charter is currently silent as to stockholder action by written consent. The purpose of this amendment is to afford the Privet Stockholders a special right to attempt to obtain stockholder approval by written consent while they hold 30% or more of the Company’s outstanding shares of voting stock. This provision was bargained for as part of the terms of the Purchase Agreement (see Proposal II) and was an inducement for Privet Fund LP to make its investment in the Company. This provision effectively eliminates the current ability of stockholders to use the written consent process to approve any stockholder action until the time that the Privet Stockholders are in a 30% ownership position. The Privet Stockholders do not have a 30% ownership at this time and may never obtain a 30% ownership interest in the Company. Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement, Mr. Steffens and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Privet agreed to vote their respective shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens and Privet together control over 68% of the aggregate voting power of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting. Effective Date We will have to file a Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment with the Delaware Secretary of State in order for the amendment to become effective. We intend to file the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment as soon as practicable following stockholder approval of this proposal. The Board of Directors reserves the right, notwithstanding stockholder approval of this proposal and without further action by our stockholders, not to proceed with the corporate action authorized by this proposal at any time before the filing of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment. 18 Dissenter’s Rights Delaware law does not provide for appraisal or other similar rights for dissenting stockholders in connection with this proposal. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL V 19 PROPOSAL VI APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION TO PROVIDE THAT ONLY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS MAY CALL A SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY General The Board of Directors is proposing for stockholder approval an amendment to the Company’s Charter to provided that only the Board of Directors may call a special meeting of stockholders of the Company. At a meeting held on July 8, 2015, the Board of Directors approved this amendment, subject to stockholder approval, and directed that this amendment be submitted to a vote of the Company’s stockholders at the Annual Meeting. For the complete text of the amendment, please see Article VIII (Special Meetings of Stockholders) of the Company’s Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment, attached to this Proxy Statement as Annex A. Purpose and Effect The Company’s By-laws currently provide thata special meeting of the Company’s stockholders may be called at any time only by or at the direction of the Board of Directors pursuant to a resolution of the Board adopted by a majority of the total number of authorized directors and the stockholders shall not have the power to call a special meeting of the stockholders. While the Company’s By-laws do not currently allow for stockholders to call a special meeting of stockholders, the By-laws may be subsequently amended by the Board of Directors without stockholder approval. By amending the Company’s Charter, it means that this provision may only be subsequently amended with the approval of the Board of Directors and the Company’s stockholders, as opposed to the Board alone.This amendment makes consistent the terms of the Company’s By-Laws and certificate of incorporation. Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement (see Proposal II), Mr. Steffens and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Privet agreed to vote their respective shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens and Privet together control over 68% of the aggregate voting power of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting. Effective Date We will have to file a Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment with the Delaware Secretary of State in order for the amendment to become effective. We intend to file the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment as soon as practicable following stockholder approval of this proposal. The Board of Directors reserves the right, notwithstanding stockholder approval of this proposal and without further action by our stockholders, not to proceed with the corporate action authorized by this proposal at any time before the filing of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment. Dissenter’s Rights Delaware law does not provide for appraisal or other similar rights for dissenting stockholders in connection with this proposal. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL VI 20 PROPOSAL VII APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION TO RENOUNCE THE COMPANY’S EXPECTANCY REGARDING CERTAIN CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED TO A PRIVET STOCKHOLDER General On July 15, 2015, the Company entered into a Stock and Warrant Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”) with investors named therein, including Privet Fund LP (“Privet”), five directors of the Company, including John L. Steffens, Donald Peppers, Mark Landis, Bruce Miller and Thomas Avery and three other persons (collectively the nine investors are referred to as the “Purchasers”). Pursuant to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Company issued to the Purchasers an aggregate of 25,000,000 shares of common stock and warrants to purchase up to an aggregate of 205,277,778 shares of common stock, in return for an aggregate investment of $1,000,000. Concurrent with and as a condition of the consummation of the Purchase Agreement, Ryan Levenson was appointed to a vacant position on the Company’s Board of Directors. Mr. Levenson is Principal and Managing Member of Privet Fund Management LLC, an affiliate of Privet, and maintains positions with certain other Privet-affiliated entities. Mr. Levenson, as well as other officers, representatives, directors, agents, stockholders, members, partners of Privet, its affiliates and their respective affiliates (each, a “Privet Stockholder”), may from time to time be presented with certain corporate opportunities of potential interest to both the Company and other entities of which such persons serve as a officers, representatives, directors, agents, stockholders, members, partners, such as Privet and its affiliates (each, a “Privet Entity”). In recognition of the foregoing, the Board of Directors, on July 8, 2015, approved, subject to stockholder approval, an amendment (the “Corporate Opportunities Amendment”) to our Charter, and directed that this amendment be submitted to a vote of the Company’s stockholders at the Annual Meeting, that will have the effect of renouncing the Company’s expectancy regarding certain corporate opportunities presented to the Privet Stockholders. For the complete text of the amendment, please see Article X (Competition and Corporate Opportunities) of the Company’s Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment, attached to this Proxy Statement as Annex A. Purpose and Effect Directors and officers of a corporation, as part of their duty of loyalty to the corporation and its stockholders, generally have a fiduciary duty to disclose to the corporation opportunities that are related to its business and are prohibited from pursuing those opportunities unless such corporation determines that it is not going to pursue them. Directors and officers that serve in a fiduciary capacity of multiple entities, then, could become conflicted as to which entity should be presented with any given corporate opportunity. Section 122(17) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) expressly permits a Delaware corporation, such as the Company, to renounce in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors any interest or expectancy of the corporation in certain opportunities. This proposed Corporate Opportunities Amendment in part would renounce our right to certain corporate opportunities in order to more clearly delineate the responsibilities of Privet Stockholders with respect to corporate opportunities of which they may become aware. Specifically, after the Corporate Opportunities Amendment is enacted, we would renounce any interest and expectancy in any business opportunity (other than a business opportunity that is expressly offered in writing to a Privet Stockholder solely in his or her capacity as a director or officer of the Company), such that a Privet Stockholder may freely present such business opportunity to a Privet Entity rather than the Company, and the Privet Entity may freely pursue such business opportunity, even if it is competitive with our business or might otherwise constitute an attractive opportunity for the Company. 21 Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement, Mr. Steffens and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Privet agreed to vote their respective shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens and Privet together control over 68% of the aggregate voting power of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting. Effective Date We will have to file a Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment with the Delaware Secretary of State in order for the amendment to become effective. We intend to file the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment as soon as practicable following stockholder approval of this proposal. The Board of Directors reserves the right, notwithstanding stockholder approval of this proposal and without further action by our stockholders, not to proceed with the corporate action authorized by this proposal at any time before the filing of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment. Dissenter’s Rights Delaware law does not provide for appraisal or other similar rights for dissenting stockholders in connection with this proposal. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL VII 22 PROPOSAL VIII APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION TO ELECT NOT BE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION General The Board of Directors is proposing for stockholder approval an amendment to the Company’s Charter to elect not be governed by the provisions of Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”). At a meeting held on July 8, 2015, the Board of Directors approved this amendment, subject to stockholder approval, and directed that this amendment be submitted to a vote of the Company’s stockholders at the Annual Meeting. Privet Fund LP (“Privet”) is not subject to the restrictions on business combinations set forth in Section 203 because the Board of Directors took action to waive application of Section 203 in respect of the investment in the Company by Privet (see Proposal II). For the complete text of the amendment, please see Article XI (Section 203 of the General Corporation Law) of the Company’s Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment, attached to this Proxy Statement as Annex A. Purpose and Effect Section 203 of the DGCL provides that any person or entity who acquires 15% or more in voting power of a corporation’s voting stock (thereby becoming an “interested stockholder”) may not engage in a wide range of transactions (referred to as “business combinations”) with the corporation for a period of three years following the date the person became an interested stockholder, subject to certain exceptions. The exceptions are (i) the board of directors of the corporation has approved, prior to that acquisition date, either the business combination or the transaction that resulted in the person becoming an interested stockholder, (ii) upon consummation of the transaction that resulted in the person becoming an interested stockholder, that person owns at least 85% in voting power of the corporation's voting stock outstanding at the time the transaction commenced (excluding certain shares), or (iii) the business combination is approved by the board of directors and authorized, at a shareholder meeting and not by written consent, by the affirmative vote of at least 662/3% in voting power of the outstanding voting stock not owned by the interested stockholder. Under Section 203 of the DGCL, a corporation can elect not to be subject to Section 203 if the corporation inserts a provision to that effect in its certificate of incorporation or if the stockholders of the corporation insert a provision to that effect in the bylaws of the corporation. The purpose of this amendment is to give the Company greater flexibility in the future to enter into any potential business combinations (such as mergers, asset sales and securities issuances) with any future “interested stockholder” without having to go through the time and expense in waving the application of Section 203 with respect to such future “interested stockholder.” Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement (see Proposal II), Mr. Steffens and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Privet agreed to vote their respective shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens and Privet together control over 68% of the aggregate voting power of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting. Effective Date We will have to file a Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment with the Delaware Secretary of State in order for the amendment to become effective. We intend to file the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment as soon as practicable following stockholder approval of this proposal. The Board of Directors reserves the right, notwithstanding stockholder approval of this proposal and without further action by our stockholders, not to proceed with the corporate action authorized by this proposal at any time before the filing of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment. Dissenter’s Rights Delaware law does not provide for appraisal or other similar rights for dissenting stockholders in connection with this proposal. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL VIII 23 PROPOSAL IX APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION ESTABLISHING THE COURTS LOCATED WITHIN THE STATE OF DELAWARE AS THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF CERTAIN LEGAL ACTIONS General The Board of Directors is proposing for stockholder approval of an amendment to the Company’s Charter establishing the courts located within the State of Delaware as the exclusive forum for the adjudication of certain legal actions. At a meeting held on July 8, 2015, the Board of Directors approved this amendment, subject to stockholder approval, and directed that this amendment be submitted to a vote of the Company’s stockholders at the Annual Meeting. For the complete text of the amendment, please see Article XIII (Forum) of the Company’s Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment, attached to this Proxy Statement as Annex A. Possible Effects and Anti-takeover Considerations The Amendment would designate the state courts of the State of Delaware or, if no state court located within the State of Delaware has jurisdiction, the federal district court for the District of Delaware, as the sole and exclusive forum for: (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Company, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer, employee or agent of the Company to the Company or the Company’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim against the Company arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the Company’s certificate of incorporation or by-laws, or (iv) any action asserting a claim against the Company or any director or officer or other employee of the Company governed by the internal affairs doctrine. The Board of Directors believes that our stockholders will benefit from having disputes of this nature litigated in the Delaware courts. Although some plaintiffs could prefer to litigate matters in a forum outside of Delaware because another court may be more convenient to them (among other reasons), the Board of Directors believes that the proposed provision provides substantial benefits to the Company and its stockholders as a whole. Delaware state courts offers a specialized system to deal with corporate law questions, with streamlined procedures and processes that help provide relatively quick decisions. This accelerated schedule can limit the time, cost and uncertainty of litigation for all parties. The Delaware state courts have developed considerable expertise in dealing with corporate law issues, as well as a substantial and influential body of case law construing Delaware’s corporate law and long-standing precedent regarding corporate governance. This provides stockholders and the Company with more certainty with respect to the outcome of intra-corporate disputes. In addition, adoption of the provision would reduce the risk that the Company could be involved in duplicative litigation in more than one forum, as well as the risk that the outcome of cases in multiple forums could be inconsistent, even though each forum purports to follow Delaware law. Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement, Mr. Steffens and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Privet agreed to vote their respective shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens and Privet together control over 68% of the aggregate voting power of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting. Effective Date We will have to file a Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment with the Delaware Secretary of State in order for the amendment to become effective. We intend to file the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment as soon as practicable following stockholder approval of this proposal. The Board of Directors reserves the right, notwithstanding stockholder approval of this proposal and without further action by our stockholders, not to proceed with the corporate action authorized by this proposal at any time before the filing of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment. Dissenter’s Rights Delaware law does not provide for appraisal or other similar rights for dissenting stockholders in connection with this proposal. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL IX 24 PROPOSAL X APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT TO THE COMPANY’S AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION TO AUTHORIZE 10,000, “BLANK CHECK” PREFERRED STOCK, PAR VALUE $0. General The Board of Directors is proposing for stockholder approval an amendment to the Company’s Charter to authorize 10,000,000 shares of “blank check” preferred stock, par value $0.001 per share to replace the current class of convertible preferred stock. The Charter currently authorizes the issuance of up to 10,000,000 shares of preferred stock, par value $0.001 per share, of which 1,499.628 shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock and 10,400 shares of Series B Preferred Stock are currently issued or outstanding. However, at the Annual Meeting (A) holders of the Company’s Series A-1 Preferred Stock will be voting on a proposal to amend Article IV (Conversion) of the Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations which, when approved, will cause an automatic conversion of the Series A-1 Preferred Stock into common stock (see Proposal III); and (B) holders of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stock will be voting on a proposal to amend Article 6 (Automatic Conversion) of the Series B Convertible Preferred Stock Certificate of Designations which, when approved, will cause an automatic conversion of the Series B Preferred Stock into common stock (see Proposal IV). Therefore, upon conclusion of the Annual Meeting, assuming Proposals III and IV are approved, all shares of the Company’s preferred stock currently outstanding will have converted into common stock. Purpose and Effect The term “blank check” is often used to refer to preferred stock, the creation and issuance of which is authorized by the stockholders in advance and the terms, rights and features of which are determined by the Board of Directors from time to time. Therefore, once authorized, the Board of Directors will be able to issue the shares in classes without further shareholder approval. The authorization of blank check preferred stock permits the Board of Directors to create and issue preferred stock from time to time in one or more series. Under the Company’s Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, the Board of Directors would be expressly authorized, at its discretion, to adopt resolutions to issue preferred shares, to fix the number of shares and to change designations, preferences and relative, participating, optional or other special rights, qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof, including dividend rights, dividend rates, terms of redemption, redemption prices, voting rights, conversion rights, and liquidation preferences of the shares constituting any series of preferred stock, in each case without any further action or vote by the stockholders.To the extent that any preferred stock is convertible into common stock, upon conversion the existing holders of common stock would suffer dilution of their percentage ownership of the Company and may suffer economic dilution as a result of more common stock outstanding and trading in the market.Because the terms of any preferred stock are not yet established, it is not possible to quantify the extent of any dilutive impact on the common stock, but it could be substantial.The Board of Directors would be required to make any determination to issue shares of preferred stock based on its judgment that doing so would be in the best interests of the Company and all its stockholders. The authorization of “blank check” preferred stock will provide the Company with increased flexibility in meeting future capital requirements by providing another type of security in addition to its common stock, as it will allow the Company to issue preferred stock from time to time with such features as may be determined by the Board of Directors for any proper corporate purpose. Such uses may include, without limitation, issuance for cash as a means of obtaining capital for use by the Company, or issuance as all or part of the consideration to be paid by the Company for acquisitions of other businesses or their assets. The Board of Directors has no present intent, plans, understandings, agreements or commitments to issue any preferred stock. 25 Possible Effects and Anti-takeover Considerations The issuance of preferred stock could, under certain circumstances, have the effect of delaying or preventing a change of control of the Company by increasing the number of outstanding shares entitled to vote and by increasing the number of votes required to approve a change of control of the Company. Shares of voting or convertible preferred stock could be issued, or rights to purchase such shares could be issued, to make it more difficult to obtain control of the Company by means of a tender offer, proxy contest, merger or otherwise. The ability of the Board of Directors to issue such additional shares of preferred stock, with the rights and preferences it deems advisable, could discourage potential acquirors, and could therefore deprive stockholders of benefits they might otherwise obtain from an attempt by a third-party to acquire ownership or control of the Company, such as selling their shares at a premium over market price. Moreover, the issuance of such additional shares to persons friendly to the Board of Directors could make it more difficult to remove incumbent directors from office in the event such change were to be deemed advisable by the stockholders. While the amendment may have anti-takeover consequences, the Board of Directors believes that the benefits it would confer on the Company outweigh any disadvantages. In addition to the enhanced ability to finance purchases and secure capital, as discussed above, the Company would gain a degree of protection from hostile takeovers that might be contrary to the interests of the Company and the stockholders. The Board of Directors believes it is in the best interest of the Company and the stockholders to encourage potential acquirers to negotiate directly with the Board rather than taking unilateral action. Only when empowered to negotiate on behalf of the Company can the Board have the best possible opportunity to secure the terms that best serve the interests of the Company and all the stockholders. Interest of Certain Persons in Matters to be Acted Upon In connection with and as a condition to the Company entering into the Purchase Agreement (see Proposal II), Mr. Steffens and Privet entered into a voting agreement whereby Mr. Steffens and Privet agreed to vote their respective shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock in favor of this proposal. As Mr. Steffens and Privet together control over 68% of the aggregate voting power of the Company’s outstanding shares of common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, this proposal will be approved at the Annual Meeting. Effective Date We will have to file a Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment with the Delaware Secretary of State in order for the amendment to become effective. We intend to file the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment as soon as practicable following stockholder approval of this proposal. The Board of Directors reserves the right, notwithstanding stockholder approval of this proposal and without further action by our stockholders, not to proceed with the corporate action authorized by this proposal at any time before the filing of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Amendment. Dissenter’s Rights Delaware law does not provide for appraisal or other similar rights for dissenting stockholders in connection with this proposal. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL X 26 PROPOSAL XI ADVISORY (NON-BINDING) VOTE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION The Company is providing stockholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation as required by Section 14A of the Exchange Act. Section 14A was added to the Exchange Act by Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). Stockholders are urged to read the Executive Compensation section of this Proxy Statement, which discusses how our compensation philosophy and how our compensation policies and procedures implement our compensation philosophy, as well as the Summary Compensation Table and other related compensation tables. The Board of Directors believes that the policies and procedures articulated in the Executive Compensation section are effective in implementing our compensation philosophy and in achieving its goals and that the compensation of our executive officers reflects and supports these compensation policies and procedures. Stockholders are being asked to vote on the following resolution: RESOLVED, that the compensation paid to the Company’s executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including the compensation tables and narrative discussion, is hereby APPROVED. This advisory vote on executive compensation, commonly and herein referred to as a “say-on-pay” advisory vote, is not binding on our Board of Directors. However, the Board of Directors will take into account the result of the vote when determining future executive compensation arrangements. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL XI 27 PROPOSAL XII ADVISORY (NON-BINDING) VOTE ON THE FREQUENCY OF ADVISORY VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION As required by Section 14A of the Exchange Act and Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act, we are also providing stockholders an advisory vote on the frequency with which the stockholders shall have the advisory say-on-pay vote on executive compensation (see Proposal XI). The advisory vote on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote is a non-binding vote as to how often the say-on-pay vote should occur: every year, every two years, or every three years. In addition, stockholders may abstain from voting. The Dodd-Frank Act requires us to hold the advisory vote on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote at least once every six years. After careful consideration, the Board of Directors recommends that future stockholder say-on-pay advisory votes on executive compensation be conducted every three years. A vote every three years provides stockholders and advisory firms the opportunity to evaluate the Company’s compensation program on a more thorough, longer-term basis than an annual or bi-annual vote. Although the Board of Directors recommends a say-on-pay vote every three years, stockholders are not voting to approve or disapprove the Board’s recommendation. Stockholders are being asked to vote on the following resolution: RESOLVED, that the stockholders of the Company determine, on an advisory basis, whether the frequency with which the stockholders shall have an advisory vote on executive compensation set forth in the Company’s Proxy Statement for its annual meeting of stockholders, beginning with the 2015 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, shall be (i) every year, (ii) every 2 years, or (iii) every 3 years. Although this advisory vote on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote is not binding on our Board of Directors, the Board of Directors will take into account the result of the vote when determining the frequency of future say-on-pay votes. The enclosed proxy card gives you three choices of periods for voting on this proposal. The choice of the period for the advisory vote which receives the highest number of votes will be deemed the choice of the stockholders. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE “FOR” THE THREE-YEAR FREQUENCY 28 PROPOSAL XIII RATIFICATION OF SELECTION OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors has selected Cherry Bekaert LLP as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2015. Representatives of Cherry Bekaert LLP are expected to be available to respond to appropriate questions at the Annual Meeting. Stockholder ratification of the selection of Cherry Bekaert LLP as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm is not required by the Company’s By-laws or otherwise. However, the Board of Directors, on behalf of the Audit Committee, is submitting the selection of Cherry Bekaert LLP to the stockholders for ratification as a matter of good corporate practice. If the stockholders fail to ratify the selection, the Audit Committee will reconsider whether or not to retain that firm. Even if the selection is ratified, the Audit Committee in its discretion may direct the appointment of different independent registered public accounting firm at any time during the year if they determine that such a change would be in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL XIII 29 Principal Accountant Fees Cherry Bekaert LLP audited our consolidated financial statements for the years ended December 31, 2014 and 2013. Audit Fees.Audit fees include fees for the audit of the Company’s annual consolidated financial statements, fees for the review of the Company’s interim consolidated financial statements, and fees for services that are normally provided by the independent registered public accounting firm in connection with statutory and regulatory filings or engagements. The aggregate fees billed by Cherry Bekaert LLP for professional services rendered to our Company for the audit of the Company's annual consolidated financial statements for fiscal year 2014 and 2013 (and reviews of quarterly consolidated financial statements on Form 10-Q) were $81,150 and $78,750, respectively. Audit-Related Fees. Audit-related fees include fees for assurance and related services that are reasonably related to the performance of the audit or review of the Company’s consolidated financial statements. There were no audit-related fees billed by Cherry Bekaert LLP for fiscal years 2014 and 2013. Tax Fees.Tax fees include fees for tax compliance, tax advice and tax planning. There were no fees billed by Cherry Bekaert LLP for these services in 2014 and 2013. All Other Fees.All other fees include fees for all services except those described above. There were no other fees billed by Cherry Bekaert LLP for fiscal years 2014 and 2013. Pre-Approval of Audit and Non-Audit Services The Audit Committee has adopted a policy that all audits, audit-related, tax and any other non-audit service to be performed by the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm must be pre-approved by the Audit Committee. It is the Company’s policy that all such services be pre-approved prior to commencement of the engagement. The Audit Committee is also required to pre-approve the estimated fees for such services, as well as any subsequent changes to the terms of the engagement. 30 SECURITY OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN BENEFICIAL OWNERS AND MANAGEMENT The following table sets forth certain information regarding the ownership of the Company’s common stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, as of July 30, 2015, by: (i) each director; (ii) each of our executive officers; (iii) all executive officers and directors of the Company as a group; and (iv) all those known by the Company to be beneficial owners of more than five percent of any class of the Company’s voting stock. Unless otherwise indicated, the address for each person listed is c/o Cicero Inc., 8000 Regency Parkway, Suite 542, Cary, North Carolina 27518. The chart is based on 180,353,377 shares of common stock, 1,499.628 shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock and 10,400 shares of Series B Preferred stock outstanding as of July 30, 2015.Beneficial ownership is determined in accordance with Rule 13-3(d) promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.Except as otherwise stated in the footnotes below, the named persons have sole voting and investment power with regard to the shares shown as beneficially owned by such persons. Name of Beneficial Owner No. of Common Shares % of Class No. of Series A1 Shares % of Class No. of Series B Shares % of Class % of Combined Classes Executive Officers and Directors John L. Steffens(1) % % % %(2) Ryan Levenson(3) % * * %(4) Mark and Carolyn P. Landis(5) % % * %(6) Bruce Miller % * * %(7) Don Peppers % * % %(8) Thomas Avery % * * %(9) John P. Broderick % * * %(10) Antony Castagno % * * %(11) All current directors and executive officers as a group (8) persons) % % % %(12) 5% Stockholders Jonathan Gallen(13) % * % %(14) Scott Lustgarten * * % %(15) * Represents less than one percent of the outstanding shares. 31 1. The address of John L. Steffens is 65 East 55th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022. 2. Includes 106,517,669 shares of common stock, 14,832 common shares issuable upon conversion of the Series A-1 Convertible Preferred Stock, 6,400,000 common shares issuable upon conversion of the Series B Convertible Preferred Stock, 40,391,063 shares issuable upon the exercise of outstanding warrants and 18,000 shares subject to stock options. 3. The address of Mr. Levenson is c/o Privet Fund LP, 79 West Paces Ferry Road, Suite 200B Atlanta, GA 30305. 4. Includes 18,250,000 shares of common stock and 149,852,778 common shares issuable upon conversion of outstanding warrants held of record by Privet Fund LP. Mr. Levenson has sole voting and dispositive power with respect to the securities held by the Privet Fund LP. 5. The address of Mark and Carolyn P. Landis is 54 Dillon Way, Washington Crossing, PA 18977. 6. Includes 4,146,717 shares of common stock, 1,326,136 common shares issuable upon conversion of the Series A-1 Preferred Stock, 3,079,167 common shares issuable upon exercise of outstanding warrants and 12,000 shares subject to stock options. 7. Includes of 2,640,388 shares of common stock, 3,179,167 common shares issuable upon exercise of outstanding warrants and 18,000 shares subject to stock options. Also includes 509,267 shares of common stock held of record by Delphi Partners, Ltd. Mr. Miller has shared voting and dispositive power with respect to the securities held by Delphi Partners, Ltd. 8. Includes 1,832,179 shares of common stock, 1,333,333 common shares issuable upon conversion of the Series B Preferred Stock, 2,252,778 shares of common stock issuable upon exercise of outstanding warrants and 12,000 shares subject to stock options. 9. Includes 500,000 shares of common stock and 4,105,555 common shares issuable upon exercise of outstanding warrants. Includes 3,248 shares of common stock, 624,360 shares subject to stock options and 2,049,360 shares of unvested restricted stock. Includes 286,539 shares subject to stock options. Also includes 2,000,000 shares of common stock, 100,000 common shares issuable upon exercise of outstanding warrants, 6,169,953 shares of common stock issuable upon conversion of the principal and accumulated interest of a $700,000 convertible promissory note, 5,955,447 common shares issuable upon conversion of the principal and accumulated interest of another $700,000 convertible promissory note, and 2,808,687 common shares issuable upon conversion of the principal a $421,000 convertible promissory note, in each case, held of record by SOAdesk LLC. Mr. Castagno has shared voting and dispositive power with respect to the securities held by SOAdesk LLC. Includes shares issuable upon conversion of shares of preferred stock and exercise of options and warrants as described in above notes for each officer and director. The address of Mr. Gallen is 299 Park Avenue New York, New York 10171. Ahab Partner, L.P. (“Partners”) and Ahab International, Ltd. (“International”, and together with Partners, the “Funds”) holds in aggregate 9,183,173 shares of common stock and 1,667,000 common shares issuable upon conversion of the Series B Preferred Stock. Jonathan Gallen has sole voting and dispositive power with respect to the securities held by the Funds. In addition, Jonathan Gallen held the power to direct the disposition of 100,000 shares of common stock held in private investment account. Includes 1,193,934 shares of common stock, 1,000,000 common shares issuable upon conversion of the Series B Preferred Stock and 200,000 shares of common stock issuable upon exercise of outstanding warrants. 32 SECTION 16(A) BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING COMPLIANCE Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, requires the Company’s officers, directors and persons who own more than ten percent of the Company’s Common Stock (collectively, “Reporting Persons”) to file reports of ownership and changes in ownership with the SEC.Reporting Persons are required by SEC regulations to furnish the Company with copies of all Section 16(a) reports they file. Based solely on its review of the copies of such reports received by it and written representations, the Company believes that all Section 16(a) reports were filed in a timely manner. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION General Compensation Philosophy As a technology company, we operate in an extremely competitive and rapidly changing industry. We believe that the skill, talent, judgment and dedication of our executive officers are critical factors affecting the long term value of our Company. The Compensation Committee’s philosophy and objectives in setting compensation policies for executive officers are to align pay with performance, while at the same time providing fair, reasonable and competitive compensation that will allow us to retain and attract superior executive talent. The Compensation Committee strongly believes that executive compensation should align executives’ interests with those of shareholders by rewarding achievement of specific annual, long-term and strategic goals by the Company, with an ultimate objective of providing long-term stockholder value. The specific goals that our current executive compensation program rewards are focused primarily on revenue growth and profitability. To that end, the Compensation Committee believes executive compensation packages provided by the Company to its executive officers should include a mix of both cash and equity based compensation that reward performance as measured against established goals. As a result, the principal elements of our executive compensation are base salary, non-equity incentive plan compensation, long-term equity incentives generally in the form of stock options and/or restricted stock and post-termination severance and acceleration of stock option vesting upon termination and/or a change in control. Our goal is to maintain an executive compensation program that will fairly compensate our executives, attract and retain qualified executives who are able to contribute to our long-term success, induce performance consistent with clearly defined corporate goals and align our executives’ long-term interests with those of our stockholders. The decision on the total compensation for our executive officers is based primarily on an assessment of each individual’s performance and the potential to enhance long-term stockholder value. Often, judgment is utilized in lieu of total reliance upon rigid guidelines or formulas in determining the amount and mix of compensation for each executive officer. Factors affecting such judgment include performance compared to strategic goals established for the individual and the Company at the beginning of the year, the nature and scope of the executive’s responsibilities and effectiveness in leading initiatives to achieve corporate goals. Role of Chief Executive Officer in Compensation Decisions The Compensation Committee of our Board of Directors determines the base salary (and any bonus and equity-based compensation) for each executive officer annually. John Broderick, our Chief Executive Officer, confers with members of the Compensation Committee, and makes recommendations, regarding the compensation of all executive officers other than himself. He does not participate in the Compensation Committee's deliberations regarding his own compensation. In determining the compensation of our executive officers, the Compensation Committee does not engage in any benchmarking of total compensation or any material element of compensation. Components of Executive Compensation The compensation program for our Executive Officers consists of: •Base salary; •Non-equity incentive compensation; and •Long-term equity incentive compensation. 33 Base Salary The Company provides our executive officers and other employees with base salary to compensate them for services rendered during the fiscal year. The Compensation Committee considered the scope and accountability associated with each executive officer’s position and such factors as the performance and experience of each executive officer, individual leadership and level of responsibility when approving the base salary levels for fiscal year 2014. Non-Equity Incentive Compensation Non-equity incentive plan compensation for our executive officers is designed to reward performance against key corporate goals and for certain of our executives for performance against individual business development goals. Our executive officers’ incentive targets are designed to motivate management to exceed specific goals related to profitability objectives. We believe that these metrics correlate to stockholder value. Our Chief Executive Officer achieved a non-equity bonus of $25,000 in each of fiscal 2014 and 2013 and our Chief Technology Officer achieved a non-equity bonus of $7,632 in 2014 and $45,372 in 2013. Our Chief Executive Officer is eligible for non-equity incentive plan compensation with a target bonus of $75,000 for achieving targeted pretax income for fiscal 2015. Long-Term Equity Incentive Awards The Company presently has one equity-based compensation plan under which grants may be made, entitled Cicero Inc. 2007 Employee Stock Option Plan (the “2007 Plan”). The 2007 Plan provides for the grant of incentive and non-qualified stock options to employees, and the grant of non-qualified options to consultants and to directors and advisory board members. In addition, various other types of stock-based awards, such a stock appreciation rights, may be granted under the 2007 Plan. The 2007 Plan is administered by the Compensation Committee of our Board of Directors, which determines the individuals eligible to receive options or other awards under the 2007 Plan, the terms and conditions of those awards, the applicable vesting schedule, the option price and term for any granted options, and all other terms and conditions governing the option grants and other awards made under the 2007 Plan. Under the 2007 Plan, 3,603,110 shares of our common stock were issuable under granted options or restricted stock awards.At July 30, 2015, 898,090 shares were available for future option grants and awards. To date, awards have been mainly in the form of non-qualified stock options granted under the 2007 Plan. The Compensation Committee grants these stock-based incentive awards from time to time for the purpose of attracting and retaining key executives, motivating them to attain the Company's long-range financial objectives, and closely aligning their financial interests with long-term stockholder interests and share value. Grants to other employees are typically made upon initial employment and then periodically as the Compensation Committee so determines. The Compensation Committee has empowered our Chief Executive Officer to issue grants of up to 75,000 options to new employees at the fair market value of the stock on the date of employment. Any proposed option grants in excess of that amount require Compensation Committee approval. Our stock options typically vest over two years with one third being immediately vested upon the date of grant and one third vesting on each of the next two anniversaries of the date of grant.During fiscal 2014, the Company granted options to purchase up to 15,000 shares of common stock to our employees. 34 Summary Compensation Table The following summary compensation table sets forth the compensation earned by all persons serving as the Company’s executive officers (“named executive officers”) during fiscal years 2014 and 2013: Name and Principal Position Fiscal Year Salary Non- Equity Incentive Plan Compensation All Other Compensation5 Total John P. Broderick, 2014 1 3 Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer 1 3 Antony Castagno, 2014 2 4 Chief Technology Officer 2 4 (1) Mr. Broderick is currently deferring $25,000 of his annual salary which commenced in July 2013. (2) Mr. Castagno is currently deferring $25,000 of his annual salary which commenced in April 2014. (3) Non-equity incentive plan compensation for Mr. Broderick includes a bonus for certain revenue transactions earned during fiscal year ended December 31, 2014 and 2013. The revenue transaction was the acceptance of the first contract greater than $300,000 for each fiscal year. (4) Non-equity incentive plan compensation for Mr. Castagno includes a bonus for any revenues in excess of his base salary when engaged in consulting services on behalf of the Company. (5) Other compensation includes the Company’s portion of major medical insurance premiums and long-term disability premiums for named executives during fiscal years ended December 31, 2014 and 2013, respectively. Grants of Plan Based Awards The Company did not award any stock options or any stock appreciation rights (SARs) to the named executive officers during fiscal 2014 and 2013. Outstanding Equity Awards at December 31, 2014 The following table presents the number and values of exercisable options as of December 31, 2014 by the named executive officers: Option Awards Stock Awards Name Number of Securities Underlying Unexercised OptionsExercisable Number of Securities Underlying Unexercised OptionsUnexercisable Option Exercise Price Option Expiration Date Number of Shares of Stock That Have Not Vested Market Value of Shares of Stock That Have Not Vested John P. Broderick 1 08/17/2017 3 10,993 2 08/20/2020 4 Antony Castagno 2 08/20/2020 (1) These options were granted on August 17, 2007. This stock option vested in three equal installments with the first installment vesting on August 17, 2007. (2) These options were granted on August 20, 2010. This stock option vested in three equal installments with the first installment vesting on August 20, 2010. (3) These are restricted stock granted on August 17, 2007.The shares will vest to him upon Mr. Broderick’s resignation or termination or a change of control. (4) These are restricted stock granted on November 9, 2012.The shares will vest to Mr. Broderick in the event of the termination, with or without cause, of his employment by the Company or his resignation from the Company with or without cause or in the event of a change of control. 35 Options Exercised The named executive officers did not exercise any options during the year ended December 31, 2014. Employment Agreements, Termination of Employment and Change-In-Control Arrangements Under the employment agreement between the Company and Mr. Broderick effective January 1, 2014, we agreed to pay Mr. Broderick an annual base salary of $175,000 and performance bonuses in cash of up to $250,000 per annum based upon exceeding certain revenue goals and operating metrics, as determined by the Compensation Committee, in its discretion.Upon termination of Mr. Broderick’s employment by the Company without cause, we agreed to pay Mr. Broderick a lump sum payment of one year of Mr. Broderick’s then current base salary within 30 days of termination and any unpaid deferred salaries and bonuses. In the event there occurs a substantial change in Mr. Broderick’s job duties, there is a decrease in or failure to provide the compensation or vested benefits under the employment agreement or there is a change in control of the Company, we agreed to pay Mr. Broderick a lump sum payment of one year of Mr. Broderick’s then current base salary within thirty (30) days of termination. Additionally, as part of his employment agreement for fiscal 2012, Mr. Broderick will be entitled to receive 1,500,000 shares of the Company’s common stock in the event of the termination, with or without cause, of his employment by the Company or his resignation from the Company with or without cause or in the event of a change of control (as that term is defined in the Employment Agreement) of the Company.Mr. Broderick will have thirty (30) days from the date written notice is given about either a change in his duties or the announcement and closing of a transaction resulting in a change in control of the Company to resign and execute his rights under this agreement. If Mr. Broderick’s employment is terminated for any reason, Mr. Broderick has agreed that, for two (2) year after such termination, he will not directly or indirectly solicit or divert business from us or assist any business in attempting to do so or solicit or hire any person who was our employee during the term of his employment agreement or assist any business in attempting to do so. Under the employment agreement between the Company and Mr. Castagno effective January 1, 2013, we agreed to pay Mr. Castagno an annual base salary of $150,000 and a performance cash bonus of up to $215,000 per annum based upon exceeding certain pre-tax operating net income metrics, as determined by and at the discretion of the Compensation Committee.If the Company terminates Mr. Castagno’s employment without cause, we agreed to pay Mr. Castagno an amount equivalent to six (6) months of Mr. Castagno’s then current base salary in equal semi-monthly installments over that six (6) month period following termination. If Mr. Castagno’s employment is terminated for any reason, Mr. Castagno has agreed that, for two (2) year after such termination, he will not directly or indirectly solicit or divert business from us,assist any business in attempting to solicit or divert business from us, solicit or hire any person who was our employee during the employment agreement term, or assist any business in attempting to solicit or hire any person who was our employee during the employment agreement term. During 2013 the Company amended Mr. Castagno’s employment agreement to provide that Mr. Castagno could engage in consulting services on behalf of the Company and would be compensated for any revenues in excess of his base salary as a bonus. Estimated Payments and Benefits Upon Termination The amount of compensation and benefits payable to the named executive officers has been estimated in the table below and assume a termination date of December 31, 2014.Since all options held by the named executive officers are out-of-the-money, we have not estimated any value for option acceleration. Deferred compensation reflects amounts voluntarily deferred from salaries during fiscal 2012 through 2014 that had not been paid in fiscal 2014. Name Base Salary Restricted Shares Award Deferred Compensation Total Compensation and Benefits John P. Broderick Death Disability Involuntary termination without cause Change in Control Anthony Castagno Death Disability Involuntary termination without cause Change in Control 36 The amounts shown in the table above do not include payments and benefits to the extent they are provided on a non-discriminatory basis to salaried employees generally upon termination, such as unreimbursed business expenses payable. Stock Option Plan In 2007, the Board of Directors approved the 2007 Cicero Employee Stock Option Plan (the “2007 Plan”) which permits the issuance of incentive and nonqualified stock options, stock appreciation rights, performance shares, and restricted and unrestricted stock to employees, officers, directors, consultants, and advisors. The aggregate number of shares of common stock that may be issued under the 2007 Plan shall not exceed 4,500,000 shares upon the exercise of awards and provide that the term of each award be determined by the Board of Directors. During fiscal year 2014, the Company granted options to purchase 15,000 shares to its employees; however, no grants were awarded to our named executive officers during fiscal years 2014 and 2013. Director Compensation No cash or non-cash compensation was paid during fiscal year 2014 by us to our non-employee directors who served during fiscal year 2014. CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS Transactions with related persons, promoters and certain control persons On July 15, 2015, the Company entered into a Stock and Warrant Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”) with investors named therein, including Privet Fund LP (“Privet”), five directors of the Company, including John L. Steffens, Donald Peppers, Bruce D. Miller, Mark Landis and Thomas Avery, and three other persons (collectively the nine investors are referred to as the “Purchasers”), pursuant to which the Purchasers severally purchased, in the aggregate, 25,000,000 shares of the Company’s common stock and warrants to purchase up to an aggregate of 205,277,778 shares of the Company’s common stock for an aggregate consideration of $1,000,000 From time to time during 2012 through 2014, the Company entered into several short-term notes payable with John L. Steffens, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, for various working capital needs. The notes bear interest at 12% per year and are unsecured. In March 2013, Mr. Steffens agreed to extend the maturity date of all outstanding short-term notes until April 1, 2014.In March 2014, Mr. Steffens agreed to extend the maturity date of all outstanding short-term notes until April 1, 2015. At December 31, 2014, the Company was indebted to Mr. Steffens in the approximate amount of $6,691,000 of principal and $1,139,000 in interest. In April 2015, the Company entered into an Exchange Agreement with Mr. Steffens to convert an aggregate of $6,950,514 of principal amount of debt into 69,505,140 shares of the Company’s common stock at a conversion rate of $0.10 per share. In connection with and as a condition to the consummation of the Purchase Agreement (see above), Mr. Steffens gave an option to the Company for it to require the conversion of outstanding interest due on previously converted notes in favor of Mr. Steffens at a conversion rate of $0.10 per share, which as of July 8, 2015, would have resulted in the issuance of 13,608,700 shares of the Company’s common stock if the Company option were exercised. Mr. Steffens has continued to lend working capital to the Company and, at August 17, 2015, the amount of debt aggregate $425,000. This indebtedness of the Company is in the form of an unsecured non-interest bearing promissory note, due December 31, 2015. It is expected that Mr. Steffens will continue to lend working capital to the Company. 37 During 2012 and 2013, the Company entered into several short-term notes payable with John Broderick, the Chief Executive Office and Chief Financial Officer, for various working capital needs. The notes bore interest at 12% and were unsecured. At December 31, 2013, the Company was indebted to Mr. Broderick in the approximate amount of $6,000 in principal and $500 in interest. The notes and interest were paid in full in 2014. Antony Castagno, the Company’s Chief Technology Officer and former director, who resigned as a director only on July 15, 2015, is part-owner of SOAdesk LLC which was acquired by the Company in 2010. During 2013, the Company entered into a short term note payable with Mr. Castagno for various working capital needs. The note bore interest of 10% and were unsecured. At December 31, 2014, the Company was indebted to Mr. Castagno in the approximate amount of $15,000 in principal and $1,400 in interest. The note and interest were paid in full in March 2015. Policy and Procedures Governing Related Person Transactions The Audit Committee is responsible for reviewing and approving transactions with related persons. In certain instances, our Board of Directors may review and approve a transaction. UNAUDITED PRO FORMA FINANCIAL STATEMENTS The following unaudited pro forma condensed consolidated balance sheet as of June 30, 2015 is based on Cicero’s unaudited consolidated balance sheet as of June 30, 2015 and gives effect to the transactions described below as if each had occurred on June 30, 2015. The unaudited pro forma condensed consolidated statement of operations as of June 30, 2015 has been derived from Cicero’s unaudited consolidated statement of operations for the six months ended June 30, 2015 and gives effect to the transactions described below as if each had occurred on June 30, 2015. ● $1 million gross proceeds from a private placement of 25,000,000 shares of the Company’s common stock consummated on July 15, 2015; and ● The conversion of 1,499.6 shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock and 10,400 shares of Series B Preferred Stock as a result of the proposed change to the respective Certificate of Designations of the Series A-1 and Series B Preferred Stock to automatically convert into common shares. The pro forma information presented herein does not purport to be indicative of the financial position or results of operations that would have actually occurred had the transactions occurred on the dates indicated or that may occur in the future. Cicero, Inc. Unaudited Pro Forma Statement of Equity as of June 30, 2015 Historical Pro forma adjustments Pro forma consolidated Stockholders' deficit: Convertible preferred stock, $0.001 par value, 10,000,000 shares authorized Series - A1 1,499.6 shares issued and outstanding at June 30, 2015.No shares issued and outstanding post pro forma. $
it	other	N/A	In Movimento! - Il ruolo della Cassazione.... Sei qui: Home Attività Documenti del gruppo Il ruolo della Cassazione.... Il ruolo della Cassazione.... \| \| Visite: 5134 Aula Magna 13 dicembre 2005 Il ruolo della Corte di Cassazione nelle recenti riforme: un nuovo vertice della magistratura? 1. INTRODUZIONE pag. 2 2. I PROFILI ORDINAMENTALI pag. 4 A. PREMESSA pag. 4 A1. Lo stato delle cose. Ordinamento giudiziario: check up sul cammino dei decreti delegati pag. 4 B. IL CONSIGLIO DIRETTIVO pag. 8 C. MODIFICA DELL’ORGANICO DELLA CORTE DI CASSAZIONE E DELLA DISCIPLINA RELATIVA AI MAGISTRATI DI MERITO APPLICATI pag. 9 C1. Premessa pag. 9 C2. Osservazioni all’art. 5, primo comma pag. 10 C3. Osservazioni all’art. 5, secondo comma pag. 11 D. L’ACCESSO IN CASSAZIONE NELLA NUOVA DISCIPLINA ORDINAMENTALE pag. 11 D1. Il sistema di attribuzione pag. 11 D2. I tempi pag. 12 D3. Funzioni direttive di legittimità e merito pag. 12 D4. La disciplina transitoria pag. 13 E. ISTITUZIONE DELLA SCUOLA SUPERIORE DELLA MAGISTRATURA pag. 13 F. LA PROCURA GENERALE PRESSO LA CORTE DI CASSAZIONE NELLA NUOVA DISCIPLINA pag. 15 F1. La Procura generale della Corte di cassazione nel nuovo disegno dell’ufficio del pubblico ministero pag. 15 F2. Gli effetti dell’obbligatorietà dell’azione disciplinare pag. 17 3. I PROFILI PROCESSUALI E SOSTANZIALI pag. 18 A. SETTORE PENALE pag. 18 A1. Disegno di legge n. 3600/S (modifiche al codice di procedura penale in materia di inappellabilità delle sentenze di proscioglimento) pag. 18 A2. Disegno di legge n. 3247/B S (modifiche al codice penale e alla legge 26 luglio 1975 n. 354 in materia di attenuanti generiche, di recidiva, di giudizio di comparazione delle circostanze di reato per i recidivi) pag. 20 B. SETTORE CIVILE pag. 21 B1. Premessa pag. 21 B2. La reintroduzione dell’appello per le sentenze pronunziate secondo equità dal giudice di pace pag. 22 B3. La formulazione del quesito di diritto pag. 23 B4. La riforma del procedimento in camera di consiglio pag. 24 B5. L’autorità del principio di diritto enunciato dalle sezioni unite pag. 25 B6. L’estensione del vizio di motivazione al ricorso straordinario ex art. 111 cost. pag. 25 B7. Le altre riforme pag. 25 B8. Conclusioni sul settore civile pag. 26 4. SPUNTI DI CONCLUSIONE pag. 26 Per quanto riguarda la giustizia, questa legislatura forse ha fatto segnare il primato della riforme e delle trasformazioni legislative. Fin dall’inizio, con l’intervento sul diritto societario, si sono susseguite le novità, a tutto campo: dalle norme processuali a quelle sostanziali, da riforme codicistiche a innegabili novità in ambito ordinamentale, dal civile al penale, e finanche alle procedure concorsuali, in genere trascurate, per non parlare poi delle autentiche fibrillazioni riguardanti il codice della strada, per il quale il tourbillon delle novità non sembra terminato, data la mancata conversione del decreto legge governativo. E il carosello riformatore non si ferma ancora: mentre infatti in tema di ordinamento giudiziario si stanno emanando i decreti delegati, pende in parlamento –ed anzi nel frattempo è stato approvato- il progetto che ridisegna due istituti fondamentali del diritto penale, prescrizione e recidiva, e si discute di una modifica profonda del sistema delle impugnazioni nel processo penale. In questo convulso panorama da “grandi opere” spiccano però tre elementi: il primo è la scarsissima attenzione verso i temi organizzativi, dai quali dipende la possibilità che la giustizia diventi un servizio pubblico serio e non rimanga un esempio di inaccettabile disfunzione. O i tempi della giustizia si trasformano da biblici in ragionevoli, come prescrive anche la nuova versione dell’art. 111 della Costituzione, o la nostra democrazia continuerà a presentare un evidente deficit di credibilità. Ma l’altra grande assente nel lavoro, o lavorio, riformatore di questi anni è la razionalità complessiva del sistema, anzi l’idea stessa di sistema. L’impressione più forte è che si siano affrontati e modificati singoli segmenti di un insieme complicato ed interattivo sulla spinta di motivazioni del tutto contingenti, senza un minimo di capacità o di volontà previsionale. Il risultato di questo affastellamento di riforme rischia di essere un labirinto normativo, di nessuna utilità agli interpreti ed anzi ad elevato rischio di dannosità, data la presenza contemporanea di leggi in palese o comunque sostanziale contrasto. Il terzo filo rosso che emerge è la forte opposizione all’insieme delle riforme da parte di tutti i soggetti interessati, per motivi oltretutto in parte coincidenti ed in parte opposti (ovviamente nel computo non si contano i destinatari di norme di favore ad personam, che purtroppo non mancano). E questo strano fenomeno di contrarietà molto diffusa ha travolto tutto o quasi il panorama di riforme, dividendo l’opinione pubblica in due schieramenti contrapposti, pro o contro, talvolta al di là di approfondimenti puntuali degli aspetti di merito. Il Movimento per la giustizia, invece, vuole tentare di affrontare il tema con un esame oggettivo e di sistema, a cominciare da un capitolo, il giudizio di cassazione, che potrebbe sembrare l’ultimo del libro, ma che, secondo noi, è una eccellente cartina di tornasole proprio per verificare l’esattezza di quelle che altrimenti potrebbero restare impressioni maligne o maliziose. Una domanda per cominciare: dal complesso di riforme di questi anni emerge un disegno di normalizzazione/burocratizzazione della magistratura, che prevede una ricollocazione della Corte di cassazione (e, ancora di più, nella funzione requirente, della Procura generale presso la Corte) come vertice della magistratura? Se questo è il disegno, due sono le ragioni per ritenerlo profondamente errato: la prima è che la trasformazione del giudizio di legittimità, avvicinato sempre più al merito, fino a porlo come giudizio su fatti, ed atti, e non su sentenze, comporterebbe necessariamente un intollerabile aumento del carico di lavoro e una rischiosissima moltiplicazione dei contrasti giurisprudenziali; la seconda, ancora più importante, sarebbe la scomparsa inevitabile del ruolo “alto” della Corte, che dovrebbe, nella sua funzione di nomofilachia, fornire al sistema gli indispensabili elementi di certezza e prevedibilità delle decisioni, altra grande richiesta dei cittadini per un servizio giustizia accettabile. Il tutto senza influire affatto sulla attuale situazione di forte degrado, che traspare dalle recenti preoccupate denunce del Primo Presidente: già oggi, infatti, l’impegno dei magistrati della cassazione, malgrado sia aumentato negli anni, non riesce a reggere all’incremento dei ricorsi, e, oltretutto, la situazione complessiva è squilibrata fortemente, perché un ricorso in materia penale viene deciso in media dopo 7 mesi, mentre uno in civile richiede più di tre anni. Della corte, concludendo, si vuole accrescere il ruolo, quasi a renderla custode di una magistratura burocratizzata e affidabile, ma intanto, in maniera assolutamente schizofrenica, si interviene sui profili processuali in modo tale da rendere del tutto insostenibile il carico di lavoro e assolutamente inadeguato l’esercizio della funzione di nomofilachia. In sostanza, se questo è il segno generale, anche se confuso e approssimativo, a chi serve questa riforma? E, soprattutto, quale effetto può avere sui tre grandi problemi della nostra giustizia, i tempi, la certezza e la professionalità? Noi siamo convinti che la giustizia debba essere - contemporaneamente - in sintonia con i veri problemi di oggi, affidabile ed efficiente: solo così, ponendosi nei confronti della giustizia come di fronte ad un grande servizio pubblico, si può riempire di concretezza un fondamentale diritto di cittadinanza, assumendo come stella polare la c.d. “soddisfazione del consumatore”, trasposizione in linguaggio consumistico della frase famosa del mugnaio tedesco al re Federico il Grande “ci saranno pure dei giudici a Berlino”. Solo se si trasformerà in questo senso, con una vera e propria rivoluzione copernicana, l’ottica tradizionale, che ha affrontato la questione giustizia come se fosse esclusivamente terreno di confronto, o di scontro, tra poteri, si potrà recuperare un equilibrio positivo e unificante tra i protagonisti di un sistema sinceramente democratico. E, per puntare a questo traguardo, bisogna ripercorrere, passo per passo, il cammino di riforme caotiche, totalmente scollegate tra loro, spesso abborracciate e in conclusione poco condivisibili. Profondamente convinti della necessità di una posizione non aprioristicamente e totalmente negativa, ma criticamente costruttiva, e il più possibile condivisa, vogliamo - nel sereno rispetto dei ruoli - cominciare a costruire, nel palazzo, una risposta forte ed aperta alle domande che vengono dall’esterno del palazzo. Quindi il nostro incontro non può e non vuole essere un esame complessivo di tutte le riforme, ma una specie di “spaccato” del nuovo tessuto normativo, definito o ancora in via di approvazione, partendo da un punto di vista, quello del processo in cassazione, che, come si diceva sopra, ha la peculiarità di evidenziare i molti aspetti negativi di una attività riformatrice francamente preoccupante. Su questa premessa, il documento di base si articola in parti separate, dedicate alle modifiche del processo civile e di quello penale, all’introduzione del consiglio direttivo, all’accesso in cassazione, al problema dell’organico, e della correlata sistemazione dei magistrati che non hanno ancora le funzioni di legittimità, alla procura generale, specie per i riflessi delle riforme in ambito disciplinare, alla scuola per la magistratura; nei capitoli connessi si parlerà anche delle conseguenze dell’eventuale approvazione delle nuove norme in materia di recidiva e prescrizione, e di inappellabilità delle sentenze di proscioglimento. Sul documento abbiamo chiamato a discutere colleghi di tutte le appartenenze, o anche di nessuna appartenenza, e, per sfuggire al rischio dell’autoreferenzialità, abbiamo invitato ad una riflessione complessiva il professor Stefano Rodotà, figura di grande autorevolezza e di significativa esperienza, al di fuori dell’ambito della magistratura. Sicuri, in questo nostro impegno, e per evitare polemiche in gran parte pretestuose, che il giudice deve essere interprete della legge, però nessuno può impedirgli di portare il suo contributo professionale durante il percorso di formazione delle leggi, che poi sarà chiamato ad applicare, una specie di anticipazione del ruolo cardine, assegnatogli dall’ordinamento, nella valutazione di un aspetto fondamentale delle leggi, la loro sintonia con la Costituzione. Perciò non può essere criticato chi, disponendo del potere di provocare un giudizio sulla rispondenza delle leggi alla Costituzione, sceglie di anticipare al momento formativo della norma il suo intervento, ovviamente con caratteri e conseguenze ben diverse. Sempre che, si capisce, a tutti sia comune l’intenzione di rispettare, nella forma e nella sostanza, la tavola dei valori costituzionali. Alla luce di queste irrinunciabili premesse ci sentiamo impegnati a portare il nostro contributo per disegnare un sistema giustizia riformato, pienamente inserito nella cornice della Costituzione. 2. I PROFILI ORDINAMENTALI A. Premessa Non è facile estrapolare con esattezza dalla complessa normativa – legge delega e decreti legislativi delegati - che riforma in profondità l’ordinamento giudiziario, quelle parti che disciplinano struttura e funzionamento della corte di cassazione e delle procura generale presso la corte. Già ad un primo esame, infatti, si possono scorgere riflessi sulla materia di disposizioni dettate per altri istituti e altre fattispecie, e la prassi si incaricherà di portare alla luce ulteriori nodi critici, per quella parte della riforma che reggerà alla valutazione di impatto costituzionale, la cui intensità e prossimità temporale è prevedibilissima. Noi abbiamo deciso di occuparci degli istituti riferiti, o riferibili, senza dubbio a corte e procura generale, seguendo uno schema logico, che parte dall’istituto di maggiore novità - il consiglio direttivo - prosegue poi per la riforma di più immediato impatto – l’organico della corte e la disciplina relativa ai magistrati di merito applicati - approfondisce la nuova disciplina generale per l’accesso in cassazione, sia a regime che nel periodo transitorio, esamina l’istituzione della scuola superiore della magistratura, anche nei rapporti con la “nuova” cassazione, e termina con l’esposizione delle conseguenze della riforma sulla procura generale. Ma, prima di entrare nel merito delle questioni, abbiamo ritenuto utile premettere alla trattazione delle questioni uno schema riassuntivo, che aiuti a fare il punto della situazione. A1. LO STATO DELLE COSE. Ordinamento giudiziario: check up sul cammino dei decreti delegati Il 30 luglio 2005 è entrata in vigore la legge 25 luglio 2005 n. 150 (cfr.articolo2, comma 48), con la quale il Parlamento ha delegato il Governo ad adottare uno o più decreti legislativi per la riforma dell'ordinamento giudiziario. A oggi il Governo ha già fatto propri alcuni schemi di Dlgs, proviamo quindi a fare il punto sullo stato di attuazione della legge delega. Esercizio della delega base - La data di entrata in vigore costituisce il dies a quo per il computo del tempo stabilito per l'esercizio della delega. E infatti entro un anno dal 30 luglio, devono essere adottati i decreti delegati volti a ridisciplinare, rispetto alla normativa vigente e in primis al Rdlgt n. 12 del 1941, le seguenti materie: - l'accesso in magistratura, progressione economica e funzioni dei magistrati, competenze dei dirigenti amministrativi degli uffici (articolo 1, comma 1, lettera a); - l'istituzione della Scuola superiore della magistratura, tirocinio e formazione degli uditori, aggiornamento professionale e formazione dei magistrati (articolo 1, comma 1, lettera b); - i consigli giudiziari,l'istituzione del consiglio direttivo della Corte di cassazione (articolo 1, comma 1, lettera c); - l'ufficio del pubblico ministero (articolo 1, comma 1, lettera d); . - l'organico della Corte di cassazione e disciplina magistrati applicati alla medesima (articolo 1, comma 1, lettera e); - l'illecito disciplinare dei magistrati e relative sanzioni, l'incompatibilità, la dispensa dal servizio e il trasferimento d'ufficio (articolo l, comma l, lettera f); - la pubblicità incarichi extragiudiziari (articolo l, comma 1, lettera g); - il decentramento, su base regionale, del ministero della Giustizia (articolo 2, comma 12); - i Consigli di presidenza della Corte dei conti e della Giustizia amministrativa (articolo 2, comma 17). Esercizio delle deleghe collegate -Alla scadenza del suddetto termine è ancorato il dies ad quem per l'esercizio delle ulteriori deleghe attribuite al Governo. Entro i novanta giorni successivi dovranno, infatti, essere adottati i decreti legislativi per il coordinamento delle norme delegate con le altre leggi dello Stato, la disciplina transitoria, l'abrogazione delle disposizioni incompatibili (articolo l, comma 3). Esercizio della delega "provvisoria" - Entro sei mesi, a partire dal 30 luglio 2005, invece, deve essere adottato il Dlgs recante la disciplina degli incarichi direttivi giudicanti e requirenti di legittimità,nonché di primo e secondo grado, anteriore all'entrata in vigore della disciplina che sarà adottata nell'esercizio della delega base (articolo 2, comma 10). Il procedimento di adozione dei decreti delegati - La legge n. 400 del 1988, nel disciplinare il procedimento per l'adozione dei Dlgs, prevede che, qualora il termine per l'esercizio della delega superi i due anni il Governo è tenuto a chiedere alle Camere il parere sugli schemi dei decreti. Analoga disposizione, anche se poi articolata in modo diverso, è contenuta nell'articolo 1, comma 4 della legge n. 150 del 2005. Gli schemi dei decreti legislativi adottati nell'esercizio delle deleghe di cui all'articolo l, comma l, nonché articolo 2, commi 10 e 12, devono essere trasmessi al Senato e alla Camera, ai fini dell'espressione dei pareri da parte delle Commissioni parlamentari competenti per materia e per le conseguenze di carattere finanziario. Questi ultimi devono essere resi entro il termine di sessanta giorni dalla data di trasmissione, decorso il quale i decreti sono emanati anche in mancanza dei pareri. Entro i trenta giorni successivi all'espressione dei pareri, il Governo, ove non intenda conformarsi alle condizioni ivi eventualmente formulate, esclusivamente con riferimento all'esigenza di garantire il rispetto dell'articolo 81, comma 4, della Costituzione, ritrasmette alle Camere i testi, corredati dai necessari elementi integrativi di informazione, per i pareri definitivi delle Commissioni competenti, che sono espressi entro trenta giorni dalla data di trasmissione. Per i decreti delegati aventi a oggetto al disciplina transitoria i termini per esprimere i pareri sono ridotti della metà. I decreti delegati devono quindi essere trasmessi almeno venti giorni prima della scadenza della delega al Presidente della Repubblica per l'emanazione. Gli schemi di Dlgs già adottati – Il Governo ha adottato la maggior parte dei decreti delegati previsti: 1) schema di decreto legislativo recante istituzione della Scuola superiore della magistratura, nuove norme in tema di tirocinio e formazione degli uditori giudiziari, nonché in tema di aggiornamento professionale e formazione dei magistrati,in attuazione degli articoli 1,comma 1, lettera b) e 2, comma 2, della legge n. 150 del 2005 (atto, Governo n. 544); 2) schema di decreto legislativo recante disciplina della composizione, delle competenze della durata in carica dei Consigli giudiziari, nonché istituzione del Consiglio direttivo della Corte di cassazione, in attuazione degli articoli 1, comma1, lettera c), e 2, comma 3, della legge n. 150 del 2005(atto Governo n.545); 3) schema di Dlgs recante disciplina del conferimento degli incarichi direttivi giudicanti e requirenti di legittimità, nonché degli incarichi direttivi giudicanti e requirenti di primo e secondo grado nel periodo antecedente all'entrata in vigore delle disposizioni di cui all'articolo 2, comma 1, lettere h), n. 17, e i), n. 6), della legge150/2005, in attuazione dell'articolo 2, comma 10, della medesima (atto Governo n. 546); 4) schema di Dlgs recante modifica dell'organico della Corte di cassazione e della disciplina relativa ai magistrati di merito applicati presso la Corte stessa, in attuazione degli articoli 1,comma1,lettera e),e 2, comma 5, della legge n. 150 del 2005 (atto Governo n. 547); 5) schema di Dlgs recante pubblicità degli incarichi extragiudiziari conferiti ai magistrati,in attuazione della delega di cui agli articoli 1,comma1, lettera g), e 2, comma 8, della legge n. 150 del 2005 (atto Governo n. 553); 6) schema di Dlgs recante norme in materia di organizzazione dell'Ufficio del pubblico ministero, in attuazione della delega di cui agli articoli 1,comma 1, lettere d) e 2, comma 4 ,della legge 150/2005 (atto Governo 554); 7) schema di Dlgs recante modifica della disciplina concernente il Consiglio di presidenza della Corte dei conti e il Consiglio di presidenza della giustizia amministrativa, in attuazione della delega di cui all'articolo 2, comma 17, della legge n. 150 del 2005 (atto Governo n. 556); 8) schema di Dlgs recante modifica per l'accesso in magistratura, nonché della disciplina della progressione economica e delle funzioni dei magistrati, in attuazione degli articoli 1, lettera a) e 2, comma1, lettere a),b),c),d),e),f),g), h),i), l), m), n), o),p), q) e r), della legge 150/20005 nonché regime transitorio di cui agli articoli 1, comma 3, e 2, comma 9, della medesima (atto Governo n.559); 9) schema di decreto legislativo recante disciplina degli illeciti disciplinari dei magistrati e delle relative sanzioni e della procedura per la loro applicazione, nonché modifica della disciplina interna di incompatibilità,dispensa dal servizio e trasferimento di ufficio dei magistrati,in attuazione degli articoli 1, comma 1, lettera f) e 2, commi 6 e 7, della legge n. 150 del 2005 (atto Governo n. 561). L'esame delle commissioni Giustizia di Camera e Senato degli schemi dei decreti delegati - Gli schemi di Dlgs sopra richiamati sono stati trasmessi alle Camere per il previsto parere e sono all'ordine del giorno delle rispettive commissioni Giustizia. Come si è rilevato,la mancata adozione del parere decorso il previsto termine non incide sul procedimento di emanazione dei decreti delegati. La Commissione Giustizia del Senato, nella seduta del 19 ottobre 2005, ha accolto la richiesta di audizione avanzata dall'Associazione nazionale magistrati, dandovi poi corso nella settimana successiva. All' ordine del giorno delle sedute della Commissione Giustizia del Senato, fissate per i giorni 15, 16 e 17 novembre, è stato fissato il prosieguo dell'esame congiunto degli schemi del Dlgs nn. 544, 545, 546, 547 e 553 e l'esame degli schemi dei Dlgs nn. 554, 556, 559 e 561. Anche all'ordine del giorno della Commissione Giustizia della Camera, fissato per la seduta del 15 novembre, è previsto l'esame degli schemi di Dlgs in questione. All'ordine del giorno della Commissione Giustizia della Camera, per la seduta del 16 novembre, sono previste, altresì, le audizioni informali dei rappresentanti dell'Associazione italiana giovani avvocati, nonché dei rappresentanti del Consiglio nazionale forense, dell'Associazione nazionale magistrati, dell'Unione delle Camere penali italiane e dell'Organismo unitario dell'avvocatura. I pareri del Csm - Il Consiglio superiore della magistratura, nella seduta del 10 novembre, a seguito della richiesta formulata dal ministro della Giustizia ai sensi dell'articolo 10 della legge 24 marzo 1958 n. 195, ha approvato due delibere aventi a oggetto i pareri formulati in ordine a due degli schemi di decreti delegati, e rispettivamente: - l’'istituzione del Consiglio direttivo della Corte di cassazione e nuova disciplina dei consigli giudiziari; - istituzione della Scuola superiore della magistratura, tirocinio e formazione degli uditori giudiziari, aggiornamento e formazione professionale dei magistrati. Va altresì ricordato come il Csm, nella seduta del 21 settembre 2005, ha approvato gli indirizzi interpretativi e operativi per il conferimento di uffici direttivi in ragione della disciplina transitoria, a effetto immediato,introdotta dall'articolo 2, comma 45 della legge 150 del 2005 (permanenza in servizio – prima dell'ordinario collocamento a riposo - rispettivamente di almeno due e quattro anni per il conferimento, rispettivamente di incarichi direttivi di legittimità,e di incarichi direttivi di primo e secondo grado). Le osservazioni dell'Anm - Osservazioni su tutti gli schemi dei decreti delegati varati dal Consiglio dei Ministri (ad eccezione di quello sul c.d. decentramento amministrativo, ancora in corso di redazione) sono state formulate dall'Associazione nazionale magistrati. Le osservazioni dell'Oua – Anche l'Organismo unitario dell'avvocatura italiana, nell'assemblea del 21/23 ottobre 2005, ha espresso valutazioni sui decreti delegati in questione, ad eccezione di quello sull'illecito disciplinare all'epoca non ancora diffuso. Le deleghe da ultimo esercitate – Nel corso della redazione del presente documento il Governo ha esercitato la delega anche in merito alle attribuzioni del magistrato capo dell'ufficio giudiziario,del dirigente dell'ufficio di cancelleria e ai poteri di intervento del Guardasigilli (articolo2, comma 1, lettera s); all'organizzazione tecnica e gestione dei servizi presso le Corti di appello di Roma, Milano, Napoli e Palermo (articolo 2, comma 1, lettera t); al decentramento, su base regionale, del ministero della Giustizia (articolo 2,comma 12). Manca ad oggi una specifica ed organica disciplina di coordinamento nonché di espressa previsione delle disposizioni abrogate. 1. Non c’è dubbio che l’istituzione del Consiglio direttivo della Corte di cassazione rappresenta la realizzazione di aspettativa dei magistrati di legittimità e della Corte medesima e, come tale, si ascrive tra le deboli “luci” del sistema prefigurato dalla riforma. L’Assemblea generale dei magistrati della Corte di cassazione «costituì» il 23 aprile 1999 - in attesa che il legislatore istituisse «...il Consiglio giudiziario della Corte di cassazione, conformandolo alle peculiarità del ruolo e delle funzioni della Corte stessa...» - un «organo consultivo» presso la Presidenza della Corte «formato da magistrati di tutte le sezioni, rappresentativo delle stesse, nonché da due magistrati della Procura generale, come da mozione presentata dalla Giunta sezionale dell’ Associazione nazionale magistrati». Un punto di delibera che si inseriva in un contesto di aspettative ben diverse da quelle che oggi vede attuare il Consiglio “direttivo” (perché “direttivo”, poi e non “giudiziario”?). Si auspicava più che una selezione per concorso l’assunzione di «iniziative dirette ad agevolare l’accesso alla Corte di cassazione di magistrati provenienti da ogni parte d’Italia, per garantire il più ampio contributo di esperienze e di professionalità». Un auspicio dell’assemblea volto a quel principio di “unità e varietà della giurisdizione”, imposto dall’art. 25, comma 1, della Costituzione, in virtù del quale «nessuno può essere distolto dal giudice naturale precostituito per legge», principio che costituzionalizza “il pluralismo culturale” della magistratura.Infatti stabilire la precostituzione del giudice significa normativizzare la consapevolezza che la giurisdizione è espressione di una funzione indipendente e di un potere autonomo rispetto ad altri, caratterizzato da diversità culturali e ideali che non possono essere proprie di una struttura burocratica, alla quale, invece, il sistema configurato dalla legge delega vorrebbe ridurre la magistratura. Il giudice, in uno Stato Costituzionale, è colui che é chiamato dall’ordinamento a risolvere la questione che gli si pone, a scoprire e costruire la norma da applicare al caso concreto: il diritto è la sua pronuncia. 2. Scendendo da quelle prospettive alla riforma concreta, va subito rilevato che la composizione del Consiglio “direttivo” suscita non poche perplessità. Un organo consultivo composto da ben quattro magistrati titolari di uffici direttivi: il Presidente della Corte di cassazione, che ne è il “presidente” e il Procuratore generale, entrambi membri di diritto; un Presidente di sezione e il Procuratore aggiunto o un Avvocato generale, membri elettivi. E poi da altri tre togati, anch’essi elettivi: due consiglieri della Corte e un sostituto procuratore generale. Vi sono tre membri laici, l’uno di diritto, il presidente del Consiglio nazionale forense, gli altri nominati dai rispettivi Consigli nazionali d’appartenenza, un professore ordinario in materie giuridiche e un avvocato che “eserciti” da venti anni la professione e da cinque sia “iscritto” (forse sarebbe stato meglio anche qui il requisito di “effettivo esercizio”?), nell’albo speciale per il patrocinio davanti alle giurisdizioni superiori. Una prima notazione appare ictu oculi percepibile e, forse, è questa la ragione della diversa scelta dell’aggettivo “direttivo” anziché semplicemente di quello “giudiziario”: un “dirigismo” eccessivo nella composizione. Sarebbe stato più conforme, oltre che al principio di pari dignità delle funzioni, alla regola di buon andamento della amministrazione che i membri togati elettivi fossero individuati tra i consiglieri della Corte e della Procura generale e distinti solo tra appartenenti al settore civile e a quello penale. Qualche perplessità può far nascere, inoltre, la presidenza attribuita ope legis al Presidente della Corte, tenuto conto che il Presidente della Corte di cassazione è componente di diritto del Consiglio superiore della magistratura e del suo Comitato di presidenza. Le competenze del Consiglio “direttivo” sono identiche, ad eccezione di quelle riguardanti l’ufficio di giudice di pace, alle competenze dei Consigli giudiziari. Esse sono elencate nell’art. 7 della schema di decreto legislativo e la evidente novità è rappresentata dalla competenza ad adottare atti concernenti lo “stato giuridico e economico” dei magistrati: aspettative e congedi, riconoscimento di dipendenza di infermità da cause di servizio, equo indennizzo, pensioni privilegiate e concessione di sussidi. La scelta è, per un verso, diretta a ridurre notevolmente il trasferimento di carteggi da uffici periferici e le attività del Consiglio superiore della magistratura e, per altro verso, soddisfa l’efficienza e l’efficacia della soluzione di “pratiche” relative più al rapporto di servizio che a quello “funzionale”. Gli atti in questione sono “definitivi” e l’unico rimedio per l’interessato è il ricorso agli organi di giustizia amministrativa. La scelta, però, ha profili di dubbia costituzionalità, e sarebbe stato più corretto e conforme agli artt. 105 e 107 della Costituzione prevedere il reclamo degli interessati al Consiglio superiore della magistratura. Al pari di quanto previsto per i Consigli giudiziari, i componenti “avvocati e professori” possono partecipare alle deliberazioni in tema di pareri sulle tabelle della Corte e di vigilanza sull’andamento degli uffici e non anche a quelle riguardanti lo “stato giuridico” dei magistrati. Questo assetto del Consiglio direttivo, per così dire, a geometria variabile, rende irrazionale la disposizione dell’art. 3 dello schema nella parte in cui prevede che l’Organo elegga al suo interno un vice-presidente tra i componenti non togati, perché la disposizione è inattuabile laddove il Consiglio si riunisca a composizione esclusivamente togata. In realtà, la disposizione è stata modellata a imitazione dell’art. 104, quinto comma, Cost., che prevede che il vice-presidente del C.S.M. sia eletto tra i componenti designati dal Parlamento, ma in una situazione completamente diversa, poiché in quel caso l’organo si riunisce sempre nella medesima composizione. Inoltre, il successivo art. 8 non prevede, e del resto non lo stabilisce la direttiva della delega, se la limitazione riguardi anche il Presidente del Consiglio nazionale forense. La questione non è di poco conto e sarebbe stata opportuna maggiore chiarezza del testo normativo. Anche se la formulazione della norma sembra fare generico riferimento ai componenti “avvocati”, vi sono argomenti contrari che legittimano anche una soluzione diversa. Se la voluntas legis fosse quella di estendere la limitazione de quo anche al Presidente del Consiglio nazionale forense avrebbe dovuto riferirsi ai “componenti non togati”, come prescritto per la elezione del vice presidente del Consiglio “direttivo”. Inoltre, per i pareri sull’attività dei magistrati è prescritta l’acquisizione delle “motivate e dettagliate valutazioni del Consiglio nazionale forense”, che potrebbe indurre a ritenere legittima la partecipazione del suo Presidente, in tale veste chiamato a far parte di diritto del Consiglio “direttivo”, alle deliberazioni de quibus. E, a conferma della scarsa chiarezza dello schema normativo, un interrogativo. Ci si chiede se il Consiglio “direttivo” potrà essere investito di richieste di pareri “su questioni reputate meritevoli di esame dal Primo Presidente o dal Procuratore Generale”, come prevede l’attuale art.1, comma 2, del “regolamento del gruppo consultivo presso la Prima Presidenza” e come la prassi ha definito in pareri su disegni di legge che abbiano ad oggetto disposizioni processuali e di ordinamento giudiziario riguardanti la Corte di cassazione. L’art. 7 dello schema del decreto legislativo sembra escludere tale competenza, tranne, per la verità anche qui forse, se il parere non sia oggetto di una espressa richiesta del Consiglio superiore della magistratura. Ferma la competenza generale, in materia di pareri, del C.S.M., sarà la prassi, speriamo, a risolvere il problema del rapporto tra C.S.M. e Consiglio direttivo per le questioni specifiche riguardanti Corte e Procura generale. C. MODIFICA DELL’ORGANICO DELLA CORTE DI CASSAZIONE E DELLA DISCIPLINA RELATIVA AI MAGISTRATI DI MERITO APPLICATI Il Consiglio dei Ministri ha provveduto ad emanare lo schema di decreto legislativo recante modifica dell’organico della Corte di cassazione e della disciplina relativa ai magistrati di merito applicati presso la stessa. Quanto all’organico, sono istituiti 15 posti di consigliere di cassazione previa soppressione dei 30 posti di magistrato di appello attualmente previsti in organico presso la Corte stessa e sono istituiti 22 posti di sostituto procuratore generale presso la Corte di cassazione previa soppressione dei 22 posti di magistrato di appello destinato alla Procura generale presso la Corte di cassazione, attualmente previsti in organico. Sicché i posti di consigliere di cassazione previsti in organico aumenterebbero dagli attuali 288 (di cui solo 253 coperti) a 303, mentre quelli di sostituto procuratore generale presso la Corte medesima aumenterebbero dagli attuali 43 (tutti coperti) a 63 posti. Contestualmente , vengono soppressi i 30 posti di magistrato di appello destinato alla Corte (di cui 26 attualmente coperti) ed i 22 posti di magistrato di appello destinato alla procura generale (di cui 18 coperti). Secondo lo schema di ddl, della pianta organica della Corte di cassazione dovrebbero far parte 37 magistrati destinati all’ufficio del massimario e del ruolo mentre attualmente, i magistrati complessivamente addetti all’ufficio stesso risultano 52. Certamente, deve essere apprezzata l’ottica di razionalizzazione dell’utilizzazione delle risorse professionali disponibili, nonché di valorizzazione del ruolo della Suprema Corte, ma suscita notevoli perplessità la soppressione della figura di magistrato di appello presso il Massimario, perché, in base all’esperienza maturata negli anni, la destinazione alla partecipazione ai collegi per alcune udienze è stata una vera e propria palestra di formazione del magistrato di legittimità in linea proprio con il disegno riformatore che vuole valorizzare, mediante verifiche, una maggiore attitudine del magistrato a svolgere funzioni di legittimità. L’effettivo esercizio di tali funzioni (affidato anche ai magistrati di appello, pur se in misura ridotta rispetto ai consiglieri) è uno dei dati concreti per poter poi accertare l’attitudine di quel magistrato a svolgerle pleno iure. Per non perdere il patrimonio di preparazione maturato dai magistrati che da tempo, con funzioni di appello, sono destinati ai collegi, la disciplina transitoria prevede una regolamentazione che solo in parte può essere condivisa, in quanto limita l’assegnazione alla Cassazione solo a coloro che abbiano maturato i requisiti ad una certa data, mentre esclude gli altri magistrati che, con le stesse funzioni, stanno continuando ad essere destinati ai collegi di legittimità, ma non hanno ancora acquisito i requisiti previsti dalla norma transitoria. Una prima scelta che si impone, quindi, è quella di non stabilire alcuna data fissa per la maturazione dei requisiti, bensì di consentire ai magistrati che si trovino nelle condizioni previste successivamente all’entrata in vigore del decreto legislativo (e che continuino ad essere destinati ai collegi con i provvedimenti del Capo di Corte) di poter essere valutati dal Consiglio Superiore per il conferimento delle funzioni di legittimità. Questa norma dovrebbe applicarsi sia ai magistrati del massimario sia, a maggior ragione, a quelli applicati alla procura generale sino ad esaurimento del ruolo esistente. Qualora questa proposta, che appare la più ragionevole e, comunque, rispettosa delle funzioni già conferite e svolte dai magistrati di appello, sia requirenti che giudicanti, non sia condivisa, in via del tutto subordinata potrebbe esservi un’opzione che tuteli in parte questo interesse pubblico alla non dispersione di esperienze attraverso una proposta di modifica dell’attuale art. 5, primo comma, dello schema di decreto legislativo in esame. 2. Osservazioni all’art. 5, primo comma La disposizione dell’art. 5, comma 1, lettera b), dello schema appare in testuale contrasto con la legge delega. L’art. 2, comma 9, lettera i), della legge delega è, infatti, assolutamente inequivoco nello stabilire che ― ai fini del conferimento delle funzioni di legittimità da parte del C.S.M. ai magistrati in servizio nei posti soppressi ― i magistrati interessati debbono aver svolto le predette funzioni nei sei mesi antecedenti alla data di acquisto di efficacia del decreto legislativo recante la modifica dell’organico della Corte di cassazione, e non già nei sei mesi precedenti alla data di entrata in vigore della stessa legge delega, come invece si prevede nella disposizione in esame. La formula ”nei sei mesi precedenti la predetta data”, che compare nel n. 2 della citata lettera i) del comma 9, risulta chiaramente riferita, difatti, “alla data di acquisto di efficacia delle disposizioni emanate in attuazione del comma 5”, di cui è parola nell’alinea della medesima lettera i), che regge l’intera proposizione precettiva. Una soluzione di questo tipo è giustificata da ragioni giuridiche, oltre che logiche e amministrative, poiché solo con il decreto delegato sono soppressi i posti e si configura “il magistrato perdente posto” e, pertanto, dovrebbe essere questo il momento di verifica dei requisiti richiesti. 3. Osservazioni all’art. 5, secondo comma L’art. 2, comma 9, lettera l), della legge delega - nel prevedere il transitorio trattenimento in servizio dei magistrati di appello per i quali non sia stato possibile il conferimento delle funzioni di legittimità da parte del C.S.M. - presuppone evidentemente che essi mantengano in toto la posizione funzionale anteriore, anche per quel che concerne il possibile esercizio delle funzioni di legittimità in base a provvedimenti dei Capi degli uffici. E ciò nella logica prospettiva di evitare una irragionevole sperequazione in loro danno, dato che - diversamente - i predetti magistrati, pur conservati nel posto, non eserciterebbero più una parte rilevante delle loro attuali funzioni (ed anzi, nel caso dei magistrati di appello applicati presso la Procura generale della Corte di cassazione, rimarrebbero praticamente privi di compiti significativi, dato che presso la Procura generale non esiste un ufficio del massimario). Sembra quindi esservi un eccesso di delega nella soppressione dell’art. 115, primo comma, secondo periodo, O.G., laddove fa venir meno anche in via transitoria la possibilità per i Capi di Corte di applicare in udienza i magistrati del massimario Per quanto riguarda i magistrati destinati al massimario con funzioni di appello va posto in rilievo che la soppressione dell’art. 115 O.G. si pone in contrasto con lo stesso decreto legislativo laddove prevede che i magistrati di appello restano in via transitoria negli uffici soppressi nello stesso status rivestito di magistrato di appello. D. L’ACCESSO IN CASSAZIONE NELLA NUOVA DISCIPLINA ORDINAMENTALE 1. Il sistema di attribuzione Secondo la nuova disciplina, le funzioni giudicanti di legittimità vengono attribuite dal CSM sulla base di tre concorrenti presupposti: a) la frequenza del magistrato all’apposito corso di formazione tenuto dalla Scuola superiore ed il contenuto del giudizio finale formulato dalla Scuola al termine del corso; b) il conseguimento della idoneità nel concorso per titoli ed esami (scritti ed orali) ovvero nel concorso per soli titoli, secondo il giudizio dell’apposita commissione nominata dal CSM e composta di quattro magistrati e tre professori universitari di prima fascia (art.28, comma 3, dello schema di d.lgs.); c) il parere motivato dei consigli giudiziari ed “ulteriori elementi di valutazione rilevanti ai fini del conferimento delle funzioni giudicanti di legittimità” (art.23, comma 3). Con il concorso per titoli ed esami si attribuisce il 30 % dei posti disponibili, mentre con il concorso per soli titoli si attribuisce il restante 70 % dei posti. Quindi dalla sostanziale assenza di strumenti valutativi degli aspiranti alle funzioni di legittimità -situazione attuale- si passa ad un eccesso di tali strumenti, pesanti per il singolo aspirante e dannosi per il funzionamento della magistratura. Si passa, cioè, dal niente al troppo, secondo un andamento pendolare (da un difetto al difetto opposto) che caratterizza tante riforme italiane. Anche l’attribuzione degli incarichi direttivi di legittimità (riservata ai magistrati che esercitano funzioni giudicanti di legittimità da almeno quattro anni) presuppone la frequenza dell’apposito corso di formazione della Scuola con il giudizio finale, nonché il concorso per soli titoli, il quale ultimo sembra però che venga effettuato direttamente dal CSM, e non da un’apposita commissione. 2. I tempi Alle funzioni giudicanti di legittimità si potrà pervenire, secondo la nuova disciplina, in età nettamente inferiore rispetto a quella attuale. Compiuti otto anni dalla nomina ad uditore giudiziario (in essi compresi i due anni di tirocinio), il magistrato può partecipare al concorso per titoli ed esami per l’assegnazione delle funzioni di secondo grado; sono, invece, necessari tredici anni dalla stessa nomina per partecipare al concorso per soli titoli. Dopo appena tre anni di esercizio delle funzioni di secondo grado il magistrato può partecipare al concorso per soli titoli o per titoli ed esami per l’attribuzione delle funzioni di legittimità. Basandosi su tempi medi, i magistrati potranno pervenire all’esercizio delle funzioni di legittimità, superando anche il solo concorso per titoli, intorno ai 40-45 anni. Vi sarà una generazione di magistrati particolarmente fortunata perché, nella prima applicazione del nuovo regime, potrà pervenire alle funzioni di legittimità in età particolarmente giovane, conseguendo tutti i posti disponibili (sia il 30 che il 70 %). La loro età comporterà la lunga occupazione dei posti assegnati nella prima applicazione della nuova disciplina, onde per le successive generazioni di magistrati i posti disponibili in cassazione non saranno numerosi. Al riguardo occorre tenere presente che, per le funzioni di legittimità, non è prevista la temporaneità (neanche per gli incarichi direttivi). Sembra evidente l’irrazionalità di consentire che molti posti di funzioni di legittimità siano ricoperti da giovani magistrati, la maggioranza dei quali non avrà avuto bisogno di superare neanche il concorso per titoli ed esami. E’ prevedibile, allora, il successivo sostanziale blocco del sistema selettivo introdotto dal legislatore, e il rischio concreto di una “ingessatura” della giurisprudenza. 3. Funzioni direttive di legittimità e merito Un aspetto particolare è il rapporto tra le funzioni di legittimità e gli incarichi direttivi e semidirettivi di merito. I magistrati di legittimità possono partecipare ai concorsi per tali incarichi direttivi ed è loro riconosciuto anche titolo preferenziale a parità di graduatoria. In direzione opposta, i magistrati che hanno esercitato funzioni di legittimità hanno preferenza assoluta quando, dopo l’incarico direttivo o semidirettivo di merito, presentano domanda di riassegnazione alle funzioni di legittimità, tanto che il CSM mette a concorso i soli posti residui dopo detta riassegnazione. Questo passaggio agevolato tra funzioni di legittimità e funzioni direttive di merito crea una commistione tra le stesse che non sembra in linea con la normativa costituzionale, come interpretata dalle note sentenze della Corte costituzionale n. 86 e 87 del 10 maggio 1982, le quali hanno distinta la posizione dei magistrati di cassazione da quella dei magistrati di merito. 4. La disciplina transitoria Le precedenti considerazioni riguardano la nuova disciplina a regime. Nell’immediato è, però, prevista una disciplina transitoria. Per le funzioni di legittimità si prevede l’inapplicabilità della nuova disciplina a tutti i magistrati che, quando sarà attuata la delega, abbiano compiuto diciotto anni dalla nomina ad uditore giudiziario. Per questi magistrati continuerà ad applicarsi l’attuale regime senza alcuna innovazione. Tale protrazione della vecchia disciplina avviene per un periodo di tre anni, come è disposto dalla legge delega. Il citato art.25 aggiunge però: “Il termine triennale resta sospeso dalla data di presentazione della domanda sino alla data di comunicazione dell’esito della medesima”. Se non si interpreta male la norma, la domanda del singolo magistrato di conferimento di un posto di legittimità non fa decorrere il termine triennale di applicazione della vecchia disciplina fino alla decisione del CSM. Se tale decisione sarà negativa, sarà sufficiente al singolo magistrato presentare altra domanda per un posto libero per continuare a beneficiare della detta sospensione, e così successivamente sino a quando l’interessato non avrà ottenuto il posto sulla base della vecchia disciplina, anche se sia già divenuta applicabile la nuova disciplina particolarmente selettiva. In tal modo il termine triennale di applicazione del vecchio regime viene a dissolversi, a beneficio dei magistrati che, all’atto dell’iniziale applicazione della delega, avranno l’anzianità di almeno diciotto anni dalla nomina. La stessa osservazione vale per il regime transitorio relativo alla attribuzione degli incarichi direttivi di legittimità e degli incarichi superiori apicali. Anche qui l’art.49, comma 3, prevede che per il periodo di cinque anni non si applica la nuova disciplina che riserva i detti incarichi a magistrati della Cassazione, consentendone quindi l’accesso anche ai magistrati di merito o, più in generale, che non hanno i requisiti previsti dagli artt. 39-40 del d. lgs.. Ma il periodo quinquennale resta sospeso dalla data di presentazione della domanda per l’incarico direttivo alla data di comunicazione dell’esito della medesima, comunicazione all’istante – va osservato – che non è prevista dall’attuale ordinamento. Anche su questo problema, quindi, l’approssimazione del legislatore porta a conseguenze del tutto irrazionali, e in deciso contrasto con lo scopo della nuova disciplina. E. ISTITUZIONE DELLA SCUOLA SUPERIORE DELLA MAGISTRATURA L'istituzione della Scuola Superiore della Magistratura, prevista nello schema di decreto legislativo varato in attuazione della legge delega per la riforma dell'ordinamento giudiziario, risponde al lodevole intento di dar vita ad una struttura finalizzata al miglioramento della preparazione e della qualità professionale dei magistrati (esigenza tra l'altro già avvertita dal Consiglio superiore della magistratura, promotore di numerose iniziative in ordine all'organizzazione di incontri e convegni di studio per i magistrati). Ma, pur dopo la modifica dell'originario testo conseguente al messaggio del Presidente della Repubblica alle Camere, la normativa concreta non sfugge a rilievi sulla sua conformità al dettato costituzionale, specie agli artt. 101 e ss. Cost.. La considerazione preliminare di fondo, al di là di singoli punti, é che detta Scuola costituisce "una struttura didattica autonoma, con personalità giuridica di diritto pubblico, piena capacità di diritto privato e autonomia organizzativa, funzionale e gestionale, negoziale e contabile" (art. 1), tale da rappresentare un ente cui vengono delegati compiti e funzioni, tra cui soprattutto "in via esclusiva, l'aggiornamento e la formazione dei magistrati" (art. 2), rientranti invece nelle attribuzioni del Consiglio superiore della magistratura, organo non di natura amministrativa come la Scuola, bensì "costituzionale" o quantomeno "di rilevanza costituzionale" in senso tecnico. Con riferimento alla Corte di cassazione emerge all’evidenza come anche il nuovo disegno di “formazione” del corpus della magistratura - come l’intero disegno riformatore - contribuisca a trasformare l’organo posto al vertice del sistema delle impugnazioni in organo di vertice dell’organizzazione giudiziaria che acquista un notevole peso, attraverso i suoi rappresentanti più autorevoli, sulla formazione e sulla conseguente “progressione in carriera” dei magistrati. Il Comitato direttivo è infatti composto: dal primo Presidente della Cassazione e dal Procuratore generale della Cassazione - che sono membri di diritto – da due magistrati nominati dal C.S.M., da un rappresentante del ministro, da un avvocato nominato dal Consiglio nazionale forense e da un professore universitario nominato dal Consiglio universitario nazionale. Il primo Presidente ed il Procuratore generale possono peraltro delegare ad altro collega la loro partecipazione alla scuola. La norma (art. 6 dello schema di ddl) prevede espressamente che i magistrati delegati dai capi di Corte debbano avere funzioni non inferiori a quelle direttive di legittimità, rispettivamente giudicanti o requirenti. Nella stessa previsione si propone con immediatezza un dubbio concreto in ordine alla presenza nel Comitato del primo Presidente e del Procuratore generale della Cassazione: sono lì a titolo personale o perché rappresentano il vertice della cassazione (e quindi l’istituzione in sé, prescindendo dalle persone che fisicamente la rappresentano)? In questo secondo caso – che è il più verosimile - l’imponente presenza (due su quattro magistrati, gli altri due in ipotesi potendo pure essere cassazionisti) attesta obiettivamente che nel disegno complessivo della Riforma la Cassazione (e chi la compone) è giudice dei magistrati oltre che delle loro sentenze. Quanto ciò sia compatibile con l’art. 107, e con lo stesso 105, della Costituzione sarà da vedere. La durata del Comitato direttivo è di quattro anni. I componenti diversi dal primo Presidente e dal Procuratore generale o dai loro delegati non sono immediatamente rinnovabili e non possono far parte delle commissioni di concorso per uditore giudiziario. Ora, se si comprende la non rinnovabilità del primo Presidente e del Procuratore generale (che sono appunto componenti “di diritto”) non vi è alcuna ragione per l’estensione della rinnovabilità immediata ai loro delegati. Appare anzi incomprensibile ritenere che tra i magistrati della cassazione e della relativa procura generale non si possano agevolmente rinvenire altri idonei ad essere delegati per le incombenze della Scuola. Specialmente in una cassazione e in una procura generale “selezionate” dai filtri dei concorsi previsti dalla Riforma. Ed allora anche qui si nota che il legislatore non solo non ha avuto alcuna preoccupazione di evitare, il più possibile, la concentrazione della direzione della Formazione in poche persone poste ai vertici della Corte, ma sembra quasi favorirla. Questa incidenza dei vertici della cassazione sul percorso formativo degli uditori giudiziari e dei magistrati con funzioni è tanto più pericolosa se si pensa alle varie norme, che pure appaiono in contrasto con il precetto costituzionale, che attribuiscono alla Scuola competenze miste sulle attività di aggiornamento e di valutazione; commistione che non giova né all’una né all’altra funzione e che ha determinato il Capo dello Stato ad affermare, tra l’altro, nel messaggio di rinvio alle Camere, che i ”poteri del Consiglio Superiore risultano, in palese contrasto con il dettato costituzionale, sensibilmente ridimensionati, in quanto il sistema delineato nella legge delega colloca al centro di ogni procedura concorsuale la Scuola Superiore e apposite commissioni, anch’esse esterne allo stesso Consiglio”. Tali rilievi non sono stati superati, al punto che lo schema di decreto legislativo in esame prevede (art. 26) che al termine di ogni corso di aggiornamento venga rilasciata dalla scuola, sulla base dei pareri espressi dai docenti e dei risultati delle prove sostenute dai partecipanti, “una sintetica valutazione finale che tiene conto del livello di preparazione del magistrato e di specifici elementi attitudinali allo svolgimento delle funzioni giudiziarie” e che “la valutazione è inserita nel fascicolo personale del magistrato e il Consiglio superiore della magistratura ne tiene conto ai fini delle determinazioni relative al magistrato medesimo”. Di questa valutazione il C.S.M. deve tener conto sia nelle ipotesi di concorsi per le funzioni di secondo grado o di legittimità, mutamento di funzioni, ecc., sia per le valutazioni di professionalità al compimento del tredicesimo, ventesimo e ventottesimo anno dall' ingresso in magistratura ed in tutti questi casi il provvedimento dell’organo di ”autogoverno” deve basarsi, quale primo elemento, sul "giudizio valutativo della Scuola". Peraltro, proprio la commistione formazione-valutazione dimostra la assoluta irrazionalità, inattuabilità e ingestibilità sia della Scuola che dei sistemi di accesso, di progressione in carriera e dei concorsi, così come delineati nella riforma. Invero, secondo il complessivo disegno riformatore, ogni magistrato dovrà obbligatoriamente partecipare almeno ad un corso di aggiornamento ogni cinque anni. Ad essi vanno aggiunti i magistrati che debbono frequentare i corsi per le valutazioni periodiche di professionalità al compimento del tredicesimo, ventesimo e ventottesimo anno dall’ingresso in magistratura (lettera t) ed inoltre gli uditori giudiziari (almeno 300 all’anno), per le sessioni di tirocinio che durano sei mesi. Solo sulla base di questi dati, considerata l’attuale partecipazione media ad ogni corso di circa 70 magistrati, ed una durata non inferiore ai quattordici giorni (sei mesi le sessioni per gli uditori), si giunge a migliaia di giornate di corso (almeno 1.320). Vanno, inoltre considerati i magistrati che debbono sostenere i corsi al settimo anno dall’ingresso in magistratura, non esattamente quantificabili; quelli che debbono partecipare ai corsi che sono obbligatori, ma per i quali non è prevedibile il numero delle domande. Ovviamente, non si può stabilire a priori quanti magistrati faranno domanda per partecipare a questi corsi, ma è presumibile che, poiché molti corsi sono obbligatori per poter partecipare ai concorsi (per titoli e per esami) per le varie funzioni, tutti i magistrati, via via che maturano l’anzianità sufficiente per poter fare domanda per partecipare ad un concorso, facciano domanda per seguire il corso relativo, in modo da premunirsi del titolo necessario per partecipare al concorso, una volta che sarà bandito. Saranno comunque certamente almeno diverse centinaia, se non migliaia, ogni anno. Andrebbero, poi, calcolati i corsi non obbligatori, ma che in questi anni hanno costituito la indispensabile offerta formativa del sistema di governo autonomo, sia centrale che periferica. In sintesi, per quanto si vogliano fare stime prudenziali, si ottengono cifre assolutamente incomparabili con quelle stanziate nello schema di decreto legislativo (art. 37), a rischio di incostituzionalità anche per mancata copertura finanziaria, malgrado il parere favorevole, già espresso dalla Commissione Bilancio della Camera. E sulla funzionalità della Corte di cassazione penderà la “spada di Damocle” dei numerosissimi magistrati che verranno sottratti, temporalmente o parzialmente, alle funzioni giurisdizionali, per svolgere, quali docenti o quali discenti, gli appositi corsi di formazione. F. LA PROCURA GENERALE PRESSO LA CORTE DI CASSAZIONE NELLA NUOVA DISCIPLINA 1. La Procura generale della Corte di cassazione nel nuovo disegno dell’ufficio del pubblico ministero La Procura generale della Cassazione, e segnatamente il suo Procuratore generale, è inserita, in maniera apicale, nel nuovo disegno dell’ufficio del pubblico ministero, con accentuati profili di gerarchizzazione e burocratizzazione dei magistrati che lo compongono. La gerarchizzazione passa attraverso le disposizioni che individuano nel Procuratore generale della Corte di cassazione, titolare dell’azione disciplinare, il destinatario ultimo: a) di “dati e notizie” sul corretto e uniforme esercizio dell’azione penale, nonché sul puntuale esercizio da parte dei procuratori della Repubblica dei poteri di direzione, controllo e organizzazione degli uffici ai quali sono preposti; b) del provvedimento del procuratore della Repubblica di revoca della delega al suo sostituto in caso di divergenza o inosservanza dei criteri stabiliti in generale dal procuratore della Repubblica medesimo ovvero nel conferimento della delega in ordine alla trattazione del procedimento. La burocratizzazione dei magistrati del pubblico ministero non solo può considerarsi l’altra faccia della medaglia della gerarchizzazione di cui si è detto, ma si desume anche dall’omessa previsione di un controllo del CSM sui criteri adottati dal procuratore della Repubblica, dall’omessa previsione di una norma di salvaguardia dell’attività del singolo sostituto in udienza, ed infine dalla disposizione relativa all’inserimento, nel fascicolo personale, del provvedimento di revoca della delega (diretto evidentemente a disincentivare comportamenti non in linea con i “criteri” del capo e probabilmente a compromettere lo sviluppo della carriera, a prescindere dalla fondatezza o meno delle ragioni che hanno determinato la revoca). E’ chiaro che sono possibili più modelli di ufficio del pubblico ministero, rimessi alla discrezionalità del legislatore, da esercitarsi nell’ambito della garanzia di indipendenza che la Costituzione assicura anche ai magistrati appartenenti a tale ufficio. La riforma, invece, non garantisce il singolo magistrato del pubblico ministero da “interferenze” sul piano interno (ove il condizionamento da parte del capo o dei capi appare assolutamente pregnante); viceversa si ritiene generalmente che non sussista, nel nuovo modello, alcuna effettiva interferenza esterna sull’ufficio del pubblico ministero (grazie anche all’intervento del Presidente della Repubblica che per “motivi di palese incostituzionalità” ebbe a rinviare alle Camere - con messaggio del 16 dicembre 2004 - la legge delega sull’ordinamento giudiziario in precedenza approvata, imponendo al Parlamento, tra l’altro, l’eliminazione della norma sulla possibilità, per il Ministro della giustizia, di dettare “linee di politica giudiziaria”). E tuttavia, da un lato la concentrazione di potere su un unico magistrato (in definitiva sul Procuratore generale della Corte di cassazione, che, tra l’altro, verrà, con la riforma, ad essere nominato solo nell’ambito di una ridottissima rosa di legittimati – al massimo i cinque avvocati generali –, e quindi con un sistema del tutto irrazionale) sarà inevitabilmente foriera di polemiche sull’uso di tale potere, dall’altro lato la sottrazione dell’ufficio requirente alla cultura della giurisdizione per effetto della irreversibilità delle funzioni requirenti (trascorsi tre anni dopo l’espletamento del tirocinio), in uno con la gerarchizzazione e la burocratizzazione dell’ufficio già descritte, sono elementi che sembrano delineare una figura del singolo magistrato del pubblico ministero in concreto sempre più condizionato o condizionabile dalle esigenze e dalle richieste delle forze di polizia, con le quali egli quotidianamente si rapporta ed è destinato a rapportarsi per tutta la sua carriera nello svolgimento delle indagini. Sappiamo quante difficoltà concrete abbia trovato e trovi già oggi l’applicazione del principio costituzionale secondo cui l’Autorità giudiziaria dispone direttamente della polizia giudiziaria (ex art. 109 Cost.). E se con l’attuale sistema in qualche caso si è avuto il sospetto di un “appiattimento” (se non di “soggezione”) del pubblico ministero rispetto alla richieste delle forze di polizia, dalle quali il suo quotidiano lavoro in definitiva dipende, con il nuovo sistema, ove il magistrato del pubblico ministero non ha “vie d’uscita” rappresentate dal passaggio a funzioni giudicanti, la situazione potrà solo peggiorare, a discapito della funzione del pubblico ministero, che, quale parte pubblica, è chiamato ad agire nell’interesse generale all’osservanza della legge penale con l’obbligo di raccogliere anche le prove a favore dell’indagato (art. 358 c.p.p.). Le osservazioni che precedono consentono di sottolineare la peculiarità delle funzioni svolte dai magistrati del pubblico ministero presso la Procura generale della Corte di cassazione, sottolineata anche dalle norme della legge delega (e del decreto delegato) sull’ufficio del pubblico ministero, là dove ci si riferisce esclusivamente all’organizzazione delle procure di primo e secondo grado e non anche all’ufficio della Procura generale della Suprema Corte (ad eccezione delle particolari disposizioni, già menzionate, relative agli obblighi di informazione al Procuratore generale). In effetti le funzioni requirenti di legittimità attribuite ai magistrati della Procura generale presso la Suprema Corte, appaiono del tutto particolari, in quanto svolte senza alcun potere di indagine o di impugnazione e senza alcun legame di rappresentanza rispetto agli uffici di merito del pubblico ministero, in una posizione quindi di terzietà rispetto alle parti e, come già rilevato, di ausilio alla Corte nella precipua attività di nomofilachia (più che di giurisdizione di terzo grado). La scelta operata dal leg
bg	caselaw	EU	18.6.2015 BG Официален вестник на Европейския съюз C 201/7 РЕШЕНИЕ НА СЪДА от 28 януари 2015 година по дело E-13/14 Надзорен орган на ЕАСТ/Исландия (Неизпълнение от договаряща се страна на нейните задължения — Нетранспониране — Директива 2004/113/ЕО от 13 декември 2004 г. относно прилагане на принципа на равното третиране на мъжете и жените по отношение на достъпа до стоки и услуги и предоставянето на стоки и услуги) (2015/C 201/07) По дело E-13/14 Надзорният орган на ЕАСТ/Исландия – ИСК за постановяване, че като не е приела в определения срок и/или не е уведомила незабавно Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ за мерките, необходими за транспонирането на акта, посочен в точка 21в от приложение XVIII към Споразумението за ЕИП (Директива 2004/113/ЕО на Съвета от 13 декември 2004 г. относно прилагане на принципа на равното третиране на мъжете и жените по отношение на достъпа до стоки и услуги и предоставянето на стоки и услуги), адаптиран към Споразумението за ЕИП с Протокол 1 към него и с Решение No 147/2009 на Съвместния комитет от 4 декември 2009 г., Исландия не е изпълнила задълженията си по акта и по член 7 от Споразумението за ЕИП — Съдът в състав Carl Baudenbacher, председател, Per Christiansen и Páll Hreinsson (съдия докладчик), съдии, постанови на 28 януари 2015 г. решение, чийто диспозитив гласи: С настоящото Съдът: 1. Постановява, че с неприемането в определения срок на мерките, необходими за транспонирането на акта, посочен в точка 21в от приложение XVIII към Споразумението за ЕИП (Директива 2004/113/ЕО на Съвета от 13 декември 2004 г. относно прилагане на принципа на равното третиране на мъжете и жените по отношение на достъпа до стоки и услуги и предоставянето на стоки и услуги), адаптиран към Споразумението за ЕИП с Протокол 1 към него и с Решение No 147/2009 на Съвместния комитет от 4 декември 2009 г., Исландия не е изпълнила задълженията си по акта и по член 7 от Споразумението за ЕИП. 2. Осъжда Исландия да заплати съдебните разноски.
es	other	N/A	Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos: IMPORTACIONES - PDF Download "Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos: IMPORTACIONES" Lidia Ávila Iglesias 1 Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos: IMPORTACIONES Resolución General Bienes de extranjeros que obtengan residencia permanente en la República Argentina y de argentinos que retornan para residir en el país. Ley No y su modificación. Decreto No 616/10. Implementación. Bs. As., 9/5/2011 VISTO el Expediente No del Registro de esta Administración Federal CONSIDERANDO Que la Ley No y su modificación prevé la política migratoria de la República Argentina y su Decreto Reglamentario No 616 del 6 de mayo de 2010, mediante los Artículos 15 y 103 de su Anexo I, constituyó a la Dirección General de Aduanas, dependiente de esta Administración Federal como la autoridad competente para determinar el procedimiento, alcances y montos de los beneficios dispuestos para los extranjeros que obtengan su residencia permanente y para los argentinos que retornan al país, luego de haber residido en el exterior. Que la Subsecretaría de Ingresos Públicos del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas, mediante su Providencia SSIP No 748/10, determinó la competencia de este Organismo para dictar la normativa que torne operativos los aludidos beneficios. Que, atento a ello, corresponde el dictado de la presente a fin de establecer los requisitos y procedimientos aplicables a la importación de bienes pertenecientes a los extranjeros que obtengan su residencia permanente en la República Argentina y a los argentinos que retornan al país luego de haber residido más de DOS (2) años en el exterior. Que han tomado la intervención que les compete la Dirección de Legislación, las Subdirecciones Generales de Asuntos Jurídicos, Técnico Legal Aduanera y de Recaudación y la Dirección General de Aduanas. Que la presente se dicta en ejercicio de las facultades conferidas por los Artículos 15 y 103 del Anexo I del Decreto No 616 del 6 de mayo de 2010 y por el Artículo 7o del Decreto No 618 del 10 de julio de 1997, sus modificatorios y sus complementarios. Por ello, EL ADMINISTRADOR FEDERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACION FEDERAL DE INGRESOS PUBLICOS RESUELVE: Artículo 1o Establécense los requisitos y procedimientos aplicables a la importación de bienes pertenecientes a los extranjeros que obtengan su residencia permanente en la República Argentina y a los argentinos que retornan al país luego de haber residido más de 2 DOS (2) años en el exterior, en el marco de la Ley No y su modificación y del Decreto No 616 del 6 de mayo de Art. 2o Con los beneficios establecidos en la referida ley, podrán importarse los bienes que a continuación se detallan, según se trate de: 1. Extranjeros que obtengan su residencia permanente en el país: 1.1. Efectos personales y del hogar, nuevos o usados, destinados al uso del beneficiario o de su grupo familiar, siempre que por su cantidad, naturaleza o variedad no permitieren presumir que se importan con fines comerciales o industriales UN (1) automóvil por persona con DIECIOCHO (18) años cumplidos o emancipada, usado y registrado a nombre del interesado Se entenderá por automóvil a los vehículos comprendidos en el inciso a) del Artículo 5o de la Ley No y sus modificatorias y por usado al automóvil que haya rodado en la vía pública con una finalidad diferente a la de ensayos, pruebas o traslados a concesionarias o lugares de embarque El automóvil deberá estar registrado ante la autoridad oficial competente del país de procedencia, con TRES (3) meses de anticipación, como mínimo, a la fecha de ingreso al país del sujeto solicitante. 2. Argentinos que retornan al país luego de haber residido más de DOS (2) años en el exterior 2.1. Los bienes detallados en los puntos 1.1 y 1.2 anteriores y 2.2. los bienes destinados a su actividad laboral, entendiéndose como tales las herramientas, máquinas, aparatos e instrumentos siempre que acrediten ser necesarios para el ejercicio de su profesión, arte u oficio, y que no permitan presumir la instalación de talleres, laboratorios comerciales, industriales o semejantes. Art. 3o Están exentos del pago de derechos de importación, impuestos, tasas, contribuciones y demás gravámenes, los bienes indicados: 1. En los puntos 1.1 y 2.2 del Artículo 2o, sin límite de valor. 2. En el punto 1.2 del mencionado Artículo 2o, siempre que su valor en aduana sea inferior o igual a QUINCE MIL DOLARES ESTADOUNIDENSES (U$S ) o su equivalente en otra moneda. Cuando su valor sea superior al citado importe se deberá tramitar la importación del bien en el marco de la Resolución No 5107 (ANA) del 9 de diciembre de 1980 y sus modificatorias o la que en el futuro la reemplace y la totalidad de su valor quedará sujeto al pago de los tributos que gravan la importación para consumo. 3 Art. 4o Los bienes deberán arribar al país dentro de los TRES (3) meses anteriores o hasta los SEIS (6) meses posteriores al ingreso al país del beneficiario y sólo serán liberados después del arribo del mismo. En el caso de los extranjeros, el plazo establecido precedentemente se computará del siguiente modo: 1. Radicación obtenida con anterioridad al arribo definitivo: desde la fecha del ingreso de la persona. 2. Radicación obtenida después del arribo definitivo de la persona: desde la fecha del otorgamiento de la radicación definitiva. Art. 5o La solicitud de autorización de importación se formalizará mediante la presentación de una nota, según corresponda, ante la Dirección Aduana de Buenos Aires, la Dirección Aduana de Ezeiza o las Divisiones Aduana dependientes de la Subdirección General de Operaciones Aduaneras del Interior, la cual originará una Actuación del Sistema de Gestión de Expedientes y Actuaciones (SIGEA) de esta Administración Federal. Con la referida solicitud se deberá presentar, en original y copia, la siguiente documentación: 1. Documentación que acredite la identidad del interesado (Documento Nacional de Identidad o Pasaporte). 2. Para los extranjeros con residencia permanente en el país, la certificación emitida por la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, en el marco de la Ley No y su modificación. 3. Para los argentinos, el cambio de domicilio en el Documento Nacional de Identidad realizado en el exterior, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Artículo 47 de la Ley No y el certificado de residencia o baja consular solicitado por su traslado a la República Argentina, donde conste el tiempo de residencia en el extranjero. 4. Documento de transporte, a excepción de aquellos bienes que hayan ingresado por sus propios medios o en condición de equipaje. 5. Lista de empaque o declaración jurada consignando la descripción detallada de los bienes ingresados. 6. Factura de compra original o declaración jurada del valor del automóvil. 7. Constancia de inscripción del vehículo ante la autoridad oficial competente del país de procedencia o declaración jurada visada por el Consulado argentino. Las copias de la citada documentación serán certificadas por el agente interviniente de este Organismo, previo cotejo con los originales, los que se devolverán al interesado. 4 Art. 6o Cuando la documentación indicada en el artículo anterior esté redactada en idioma extranjero, deberá acompañarse su traducción al idioma español certificada por traductor público nacional. Asimismo, toda documentación emitida en el extranjero deberá estar debidamente certificada, legalizada o, en su caso, apostillada por el Consulado argentino con jurisdicción en el país de origen. Art. 7o La importación de los bienes se registrará con afectación del documento de transporte en el Sistema Informático MARIA (SIM) mediante una Declaración Sumaria PART, motivo "DR616", debiéndose consignar en el campo "importador" el número de Pasaporte o Documento Nacional de Identidad y en el campo "observaciones" el apellido y nombres completo del declarante. No obstante, la importación de las mercaderías que ingresan al país por sus propios medios (sin documento de transporte) se tramitará mediante la respectiva Actuación SIGEA. Art. 8o La Salida de Zona Primaria Aduanera tramitará, según el medio en el que hayan arribado los bienes, conforme a lo establecido en la Resolución No 630 (ANA) del 15 de marzo de 1994, la Resolución No 258 (ANA) del 29 de enero de 1993 o la Resolución No 970 (ANA) del 17 de marzo de 1995, y sus respectivas modificatorias y sus complementarias. Art. 9o Los bienes ingresados al amparo de esta resolución general quedan sujetos al régimen de comprobación de destino y se encuentran exentos del pago de la tasa correspondiente. A tales efectos, cumplida la operación, las solicitudes se remitirán a la dependencia de registro, la cual dará intervención a las áreas de comprobación de destino de la Dirección Aduana de Buenos Aires, Dirección Aduana de Ezeiza o de las Direcciones Regionales Aduaneras, según corresponda. Art. 10. El beneficiario deberá fijar y mantener actualizado su domicilio ante la Aduana de registro durante el plazo de DOS (2) años, contados a partir de la fecha del libramiento de la mercadería de que se trate. El cambio de domicilio deberá ser comunicado en un plazo no mayor a DOS (2) días hábiles administrativos de producido el mismo. Art. 11. La tenencia, posesión o propiedad de los bienes importados al amparo de este régimen no podrán ser objeto de cesión o transferencia a título oneroso, ni gravados, por el plazo de DOS (2) años contados a partir de la fecha de su introducción a plaza, sin autorización previa de la Dirección General de Aduanas de esta Administración Federal. Al inscribir la propiedad de los automotores en los Registros Nacionales de la Propiedad del Automotor y Créditos Prendarios se consignará: 5 a) En el certificado de identificación del vehículo y a continuación del apellido y nombres del titular, la leyenda: "Unico Autorizado para Conducir", y b) En el Título de Propiedad del Automotor la expresión: "El vehículo no podrá ser transferido hasta el día/mes/año". Art. 12. Los sujetos podrán acogerse a estos beneficios una vez cada SIETE (7) años, contados desde la fecha de emisión del acto administrativo por el que hayan sido acordados. Art. 13. El incumplimiento de las obligaciones establecidas en la presente será pasible de las sanciones dispuestas por el Código Aduanero. Art. 14. Cuando se disponga la apertura del sumario para imponer penas por el incumplimiento a este régimen, el juez administrativo competente dispondrá, en los términos del Artículo 1085 inciso b) del Código Aduanero, la interdicción con derecho a uso del automotor en cuestión y comunicará, mediante nota, tal circunstancia para su anotación al Registro Nacional de la Propiedad del Automotor y Créditos Prendarios que corresponda. Art. 15. Esta resolución general entrará en vigencia a partir del décimo día hábil administrativo inmediato siguiente al de su publicación en el Boletín Oficial, inclusive. Asimismo, sus disposiciones se aplicarán a los trámites pendientes que se encuentren sin autorización firme. Art. 16. Regístrese, dése a la Dirección Nacional del Registro Oficial para su publicación y publíquese en el Boletín de la Dirección General de Aduanas. Cumplido, archívese. Ricardo Echegaray.
de	caselaw	Germany	Tenor Der Antrag des Klägers auf Bewilligung von Prozesskostenhilfe unter Beiordnung von Rechtsanwalt X. aus Dortmund wird abgelehnt. Der Antrag auf Zulassung der Berufung gegen das Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts Arnsberg vom 27. März 2014 wird zurückgewiesen. Der Kläger trägt die Kosten des Zulassungsverfahrens, für das Gerichtskosten nicht erhoben werden. 1G r ü n d e : 2I. Der Antrag des Klägers auf Bewilligung von Prozesskostenhilfe unter Beiordnung von Rechtsanwalt X. aus Dortmund ist unbegründet. Die beabsichtigte Rechtsverfolgung bietet aus den nachstehenden Gründen keine hinreichende Aussicht auf Erfolg (§ 166 VwGO i. V. m. § 114 ZPO). 3II. Der Antrag des Klägers auf Zulassung der Berufung hat keinen Erfolg. 4Die Berufung ist nicht gemäß § 78 Abs. 3 Nr. 1 AsylVfG wegen der geltend gemachten grundsätzlichen Bedeutung der Rechtssache zuzulassen. 5Die Darlegung der Grundsatzbedeutung setzt voraus, dass eine bestimmte, obergerichtlich oder höchstrichterlich noch nicht hinreichend geklärte und für die Berufungsentscheidung erhebliche Frage rechtlicher oder tatsächlicher Art herausgearbeitet und formuliert wird; zudem muss angegeben werden, worin die allgemeine, über den Einzelfall hinausgehende Bedeutung bestehen soll. Darzulegen sind die konkrete Frage, ihre Klärungsbedürftigkeit, Klärungsfähigkeit und allgemeine Bedeutung. 6Vgl. OVG NRW, Beschlüsse vom 7. Januar 2013 ‐ 13 A 727/10.A -, vom 10. August 2012 - 13 A 151/12.A -, juris Rn. 2 und vom 24. Februar 2011 - 13 A 2839/10.A -. 7Gemessen daran hat die vom Kläger aufgeworfene Frage, 8„ob derzeit in Afghanistan in der Provinz Balkh aufgrund eines innerstaatlichen Konflikts eine erhebliche individuelle Gefahr für männliche Angehörige der Zivilbevölkerung anzunehmen ist, wobei sich diese Gefahr für zurückkehrende Asylbewerber bzw. Flüchtlinge intensiviert“ 9keine grundsätzliche Bedeutung. Denn selbst wenn in der Provinz Balkh ein innerstaatlicher Konflikt vorliegen würde, was das Verwaltungsgericht offen gelassen hat, würde die Feststellung eines Abschiebungsverbotes nach § 60 Abs. 2 AufenthG i.V.m. § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 1, 2 Nr. 3 AsylVfG voraussetzen, dass hieraus für den Kläger eine ernsthafte individuelle Bedrohung seines Lebens oder seiner Unversehrtheit resultiert. Eine solche kann in erster Linie durch gefahrerhöhende persönliche Umstände, die den Ausländer von der allgemeinen, ungezielten Gewalt stärker betroffen erscheinen lassen, etwa weil er von Berufs wegen gezwungen ist, sich nahe der Gefahrenquelle aufzuhalten, begründet sein. Abgesehen davon, dass weder ersichtlich noch dargelegt ist, inwieweit der Kläger als männlicher Rückkehrer aus dem europäischen Ausland gegenüber anderen Bevölkerungsgruppen konfliktbedingt stärker gefährdet ist, und er sonst keine seiner Person innewohnenden insoweit gefahrerhöhenden Umstände benannt hat, handelt es sich dabei um eine einzelfallabhängige Frage, die einer grundsätzlichen Klärung nicht zugänglich ist. 10Soweit ein Abschiebungsverbot nach § 60 Abs. 2 AufenthG i.V.m. § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 1, 2 Nr. 3 AsylVfG ausnahmsweise unabhängig von individuellen gefahrerhöhenden Umständen bei besonderer Verdichtung einer allgemeinen Gefahrenlage besteht, wenn der den bestehenden bewaffneten Konflikt kennzeichnende Grad willkürlicher Gewalt ein so hohes Niveau erreicht, dass stichhaltige Gründe für die Annahme bestehen, dass eine Zivilperson bei Rückkehr in das betreffende Land oder die betroffene Region allein durch ihre Anwesenheit in diesem Gebiet Gefahr liefe, einer solchen Bedrohung ausgesetzt zu sein, 11vgl. EuGH, Urteile vom 17. Februar 2009 - Rs. C 465/07 (Elgafaji) -, juris, Rn. 35 und 39 und vom 30. Januar 2014 - Rs. C 285/12 (Diakité) -, juris, Rn. 30; BVerwG, Urteile vom 27. April 2010 - 10 C 4.09 -, juris, Rn. 32 und vom 17. November 2011 - 10 C 13.10 -, juris, Rn. 19, 12hat der Kläger in tatsächlicher Hinsicht bereits nichts dazu vorgetragen, was die Annahme einer derartigen Gefahrverdichtung in der Provinz Balkh rechtfertigen könnte und ist deswegen bereits dem aus § 78 Abs. 4 Satz 4 AsylVfG folgenden Darlegungserfordernis nicht nachgekommen. 13Vgl. dazu BayVGH, Beschluss vom 5. September 2011 - 13a ZB 11.30010 -, juris, Rn. 5. 14Abgesehen davon ist das Zulassungsvorbringen auch nicht geeignet, die ausführlichen Feststellungen des Verwaltungsgerichts hierzu - die sich mit den Erkenntnissen des Senats zur Sicherheitslage in der Provinz Balkh decken - in Frage zu stellen. Der Senat teilt die Bewertung des Verwaltungsgerichts, dass auf der Grundlage dieser Erkenntnisse nicht von einer Gefahrverdichtung im Sinne der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union und des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts ausgegangenen werden kann. 15Vgl. ebenso OVG Rheinland-Pfalz, Urteil vom 21. März 2012 - 8 A 11050/10 -, juris, Rn. 28 ff; s. ferner Die Bundesregierung, Fortschrittsbericht Afghanistan zur Unterrichtung des Deutschen Bundestages, Stand: Januar 2014, S. 9 ff. und Stand: Juni 2014, S. 16 f. 16Soweit der Kläger darüber hinaus geklärt wissen möchte, 17„ob eine erhebliche Gefahr aufgrund seiner Zugehörigkeit zu der bestimmbaren sozialen Rolle als Mann in seinem Heimatland anzunehmen ist, da er insoweit Zeuge in einem Gerichtsprozess sein darf und durch die Zeugenaussage ein Mitglied der lokalen Sicherheitskräfte belastet wird“ 18ist auch diese Frage nicht grundsätzlich bedeutsam, weil sie nicht entscheidungserheblich ist. Die Zeugenstellung des Klägers knüpft an das von ihm geschilderte Verfolgungsschicksal an. Dies hat das Verwaltungsgericht insgesamt als unglaubhaft beurteilt und hat mit dieser Begründung einen Anspruch des Klägers auf die Zuerkennung der Flüchtlingseigenschaft bzw. die Feststellung eines Abschiebungsverbots selbstständig tragend abgelehnt. 19Auch die weitere Frage, 20„ob ein aus Deutschland zurückkehrender ausbildungsloser Asylbewerber in der Provinz Balkh nach mehr als sechs Jahren der Abwesenheit wenigstens das Existenzminimum erwirtschaften kann“ 21hat keine Grundsatzbedeutung, weil sie sich nicht verallgemeinernd beantworten lässt. Sie zielt auf die Feststellung eines Abschiebungsverbots nach § 60 Abs. 7 Satz 1 AufenthG aufgrund der wirtschaftlichen Existenzbedingungen in der Provinz Balkh ab. 22Die allgemeine Versorgungslage ist aber - unabhängig von individuellen gefahrbegründenden Umständen, die der Kläger der angegriffenen Entscheidung zufolge nicht glaubhaft dargetan hat - nur im Ausnahmefall geeignet, die Gewährung von Abschiebungsschutz zu rechtfertigen. Dies setzt voraus, dass der Ausländer bei einer Rückkehr aufgrund der Lebensbedingungen im Herkunftsstaat bzw. der Herkunftsregion mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit einer extremen Gefahrenlage ausgesetzt wäre. Nur dann gebieten es die Grundrechte aus Art. 1 Abs. 1 und Art. 2 Abs. 2 Satz 1 GG, ihm trotz einer fehlenden politischen Leitentscheidung nach § 60a Abs. 1 Satz 1 i.V.m. § 60 Abs. 7 Satz 2 AufenthG Abschiebungsschutz nach § 60 Abs. 7 Satz 1 AufenthG zu gewähren. Wann danach allgemeine Gefahren von Verfassungswegen zu einem Abschiebungsverbot führen, hängt wesentlich von den Umständen des Einzelfalles ab und entzieht sich einer rein quantitativen oder statistischen Betrachtung. 23Vgl. BVerwG, Urteil vom 8. September 2011 - 10 C 14.10 -, juris, 22 f. 24Die danach zu treffende Gefahrenprognose steht in Abhängigkeit zu dem individuellen Risikoprofil des Ausländers, das durch eine Vielzahl von Kriterien bestimmt wird. Die Zeit, die ein Ausländer außerhalb seines Herkunftslandes verbracht hat, ist dabei nur ein Einzelaspekt, der in der Gesamtschau mit weiteren Umständen unterschiedlich zu gewichten sein kann. Ob und in welchem Umfang sich ein solcher Auslandsaufenthalt risikoerhöhend, risikoneutral oder - was ebenfalls denkbar ist - risikomindernd auswirkt, hängt beispielsweise davon ab, welche Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten der Ausländer während dieser Zeit erworben hat und ob er bei Rückkehr in sein Heimatland - wie der Kläger - mit familiärer Unterstützung rechnen kann. 25Ebenfalls ohne Erfolg stützt der Kläger sein Zulassungsbegehren darauf, dass die Rechtssache besondere Schwierigkeiten in rechtlicher und tatsächlicher Hinsicht aufweise. Denn dabei handelt es sich um keinen der in § 78 Abs. 3 AsylVfG abschließend aufgeführten Zulassungsgründe. 26Die Kostenentscheidung beruht auf § 154 Abs. 2 VwGO, 83b AsylVfG. 27Dieser Beschluss ist gemäß § 80 AsylVfG unanfechtbar.
fr	wikipedia	N/A	est un mot anglais signifiant « beauté ». Il peut faire référence à : Beauty Tips and secrets of glowing face with https://www.glowingskin.site/2022/08/how-to-get-long-and-beautiful-hairs-at.html Roman , roman de publié en 2009. Téléfilm , téléfilm américain de diffusée le sur . Cinéma (De schoonheid), court-métrage néerlandais de sorti en 1970 ; , drame japonais de sorti le ; , film sud-africano-français d' sorti le . Musique Groupe , groupe canadien de roots-country. Album , album de sorti le ; , album de Neutral Milk Hotel sorti en 1992 ; , album de Ryūichi Sakamoto sorti le . Chanson , chanson d'Earth, Wind and Fire présente sur l'album sorti en ; , chanson d' présente sur l'album sorti le ; , chanson de Mötley Crüe présente sur l'album Generation Swine sorti le . Voir aussi
en	legislation	UK	Citation and commencement 1 This Order may be cited as the Metropolitan Police (Capital Finance) Order 2000 and shall come into force on 3rd July 2000. Credit ceiling 2 — In relation to the Metropolitan Police Authority, Part III of Schedule 3 to the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 shall apply as if — a for paragraph 8 there were substituted — 8 The credit ceiling of the Metropolitan Police Authority at 3rd July 2000 (in this Schedule referred to as the Authority’s “initial credit ceiling”) is £160,645,003. ; b paragraph 9 were omitted; c for each reference in paragraphs 10 to 14 to 1st April 1990 there were substituted a reference to 3rd July 2000. Amendment of Capital Finance Regulations 3 1 The Local Authorities (Capital Finance) Regulations 1997 shall be amended in accordance with the following provisions of this article. 2 After regulation 58A, insert the following regulation — Payments to the Metropolitan Police Authority 58B A sum received by the Metropolitan Police Authority in respect of a repayment of principal to be made by it in relation to financial liabilities which, by virtue of a scheme made under section 409(2) of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, have been transferred to it, shall be a capital receipt. . 3 After regulation 68A, insert the following regulation — Payments to the Metropolitan Police Authority 68B The reserved part shall be 100 per cent. in the case of a sum which is a capital receipt by virtue of regulation 58B. . 4 In regulation 116, after “1st April 1997” insert — (or in the case of the Metropolitan Police Authority 3rd July 2000) . 5 In regulation 125, add the following paragraph — 2 The starting point for determining the Metropolitan Police Authority’s adjusted credit ceiling on 3rd July 2000 shall be £145,169,757. . 6 After regulation 129, insert the following regulation — Amount set aside — the Metropolitan Police Authority 129A In determining their adjusted credit ceiling at any time, the Metropolitan Police Authority shall disregard any reduction in their credit ceiling which results from the setting aside under section 59(1) of the reserved part of a capital receipt where the sum received is a capital receipt by virtue of regulation 58B. . Signed by authority of the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Hilary Armstrong Minister of State, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 5th June 2000
es	other	N/A	caminando el horizonte: agosto 2008 En el Camino de Hoy DecidíAndando por el bosque del no querer, sin ver, sin sentir, sin de tantos sin encontreel camino de hoy decidí...Camino por el laberinto del tiempo, de todos los tiempos, pero en cada dirección empieza un nuevo inicio con muchas probabilidades.Camino hasta el horizonte donde se encuentran a otros, y entonces se sabe , se es!Ir allí, dónde todos llegamos con la meta cumplida y la misión para misionar hacia adelante, los cielos acompañan , las aguas , también, y todos en sus movimientos, fluyen,las estrellas titilan, la luna se mueve, los oceános y sus olas , olenadóse y nosotros andanado nuestros caminos.He preguntado a las estrellas de todos los firmamentos, he preguntado a todos los cielos, he preguntado a todas las aguas, he preguntado al secreto de la luna,he preguntado al gran sol,si ellos firman la vida y permitiran dejar sus huellas para que le sigamos.Entonces , he mirado, todo lo he mirado y no vislumbre a ninguno, eleve mi mirar a mi hermano cielo y tampoco; Eleve mi vista a los cielos, y ninguna chispa he notado, ni siquiera en Vela, ni Orion, ni Las tres Marías...Las arenas calientes se llevaron sus propias orillas y en eco llegan su historia, historias de tierras, de países, de Asturias... aquela asturias....Todo lo que he oído son solo sonidos bajos, mientras se tejen encajes de tiempo y ondulantes olas son acariciadas por brisas de los cuatro puntos cardinales.Creo que he estado soñando, así lo creo, pero el hilo del tiempo me demostro lo contrario, que estaba despertando..........., ese hilo me ha permitido formar uan línea de esperanza para andar el camino de retorno a este presente.Entonces tome la línea e inicie un nuevo comienzo buscando...Se que estoy buscando...podría estar a cortos pasos... podría...o bien a mitad de lo que me falta transitar...o quiza al final...No importa.He retornado mi andar en mi sendero propio, porque hoy, decidí, volver a camianr por la vida.En el andar por el caminocultivar una rosa roja,que perfume el andarpor el propio sendero;inmortalizandoel propio existir,marcandouna diferencia;entonces deberá serlo que se espara ser María del carmenPremiosEn esta oportunidad entrego a todos Ustedes los siguientes premiospor todo el apoyo, reconocimiento, consejos, mimos, amor, cariño, afecto y por haberme Resucitado!Por ello van estos premios a todos Ustedes.Premio Angel CustodioPara que les acompañe a Ustedes en cada instancia de su tiempo**************************************************************Premio Paz Para que la inocencia siembre paz en la tierra y en lo corazones de toda la humanidad*******************************************************Premio Corazones CompartidosPara compartir con Amor todo, en la tierra , sin discriminación alguna**************************************************************Premio Rosas RojasPor el Amor Universal************************************************************************************ Premio Estar Por el recocnocimiento, el apoyo y el estar. ******************************************************************Premio Gracias por la Vida Y agradecer la vida en sí y defenderla, y sembrar esta moción en la faz de la tierra***************************************************************Premio Arbol de la Vida Por la unión de todos*****************************************************************************Premio ÁcidoPor lo manifestado con responsabilidad, ética y sentimiento.********************************************************************Premio Proximidad Por la proximidad a pesar de las distancias.***************************************************************************Premio Blog Amigo Por la hermosa amistad que se gesto en este espacio, a fin que continue así y se multiplique. *********************************************************************************Premio Caminando Juntas- Juntos En Camino al Horizonte, la idea del mismo es andar la senda propia para juntos caminar al horizonte. Va por ello este premio**********************************************************************Premio CompromisoEste Premio se los entrego en virtud del compromiso! **************************************************Gracias, amigos por todo lo que me han brindado. se los agradezco con el corazón de mi alma, porque el otro es muy pequeño para ello.Ir a www.panconsusurros.blogspot..comwww.cuerposanoalmacalma.blogspot.comwww.lasrecetasdelaabuelamatilde.blgspot.comwww.newartdeco.blogspot.comNota:En todos mis blogs he incorporado debajo de Mi Perfil notas acorde a la temática de cada blog. Los Flagelos A Todos los CielosDe mi Mayor Consideración: Quién abajo firma la presente, solicita a Todos los Cielos una eficaz contribución a fin de resolver los flagelos imperantes por estos lares: la Tierra.El obrar de las gentes y el no hacer de las mismas ahonda ante las imperiosas necesidades y urgencias vitales de vivir, dónde tales penetran en almas desnudas, alejadas de sueños, dormidas bajo el amparo de un algo, despobladas de todo, y una llama infinita anima la materia en un quizás y aliemtada vaya a saber porque Secreto Celestial , anda andando en un casi sobrevivir, mientras continuá una interminable espera de esperar en vano.Por ende animo a decretar en la los humanos en pos de alivio alguno en el siguiente artículado, que reza así: artículo 1: No discriminar .Artículo 2: El agua y el pan es un derecho para todo ser.Artículo 3: Hay un sitio para todos y para cada uno de las especies que habitan este planeta, y el hombre debe contribuir a ello.Artículo 4: Decretar al unísono Amor, Paz y Justicia.Artículo 5: La sulud es de todos y para todos.Artículo 6: Cultivar los Valores.Artículo 7: Actuar con ética. Y a Todos los Cielos, invoco para que derramen consuelo divino, alivio al sufrir; Amor, af in de ablandar a corazones duros, alegrías por doquier, paz, mucha paz! Por consiguiente elevo esta misiva al Director de Todos Los Cielos a fin de que derrame sobre tal todas las bendiciones necesarias por que tales flagelos y que sean mimetizados a la partícula de la inexistencia.Quién esto escribe diariamente eleva plegarias matutinas por la salud del mundo, por los que sufren y tienen sed y hambre de justicia, por los desolados, por los desocupados, por pesares y sufrimientos, por los paz, por los países , por sus y las gentes, por los recursos naturales, por las ciudades, por su barrio, por sus vecinos, por sus amigos, por las necesidades y por la por la tierra misma!Solicito vuestra divina intervención con vuestro inmenso manto de Amor.Lo solicita con humildadMaría del Carmen La misiva ha sido elevada.*********************************************** AL Ángel Lumínico le pido su luz para.............aliviar y mitigar los flagelos que diezma a la humanidad en estos tiempos. ************************************El Flagelo de la DiscriminaciónTodos somos iguales a los ojos de Todos los Cielos .La discriminación divide, enfrenta y con su práctica se aleja el Amor***********************************************El Flagelo de la EnfermedadLos enfermos como los discapacitados tienen derechoa ser atendidos debidamente.Caso contrario aumenta la mendicidad.La salud es para todos!, y no un derecho de algunos.**********************************************El Flagelo del HambreAnte tal, queda como recurso la basura, con todas las implicancias que ello tiene.La buena alimentación es innato y digno de todo ser humano. ****************************************************************El flagelo......la imágen todo lo dice.Que cada ser vivente tenga el lugar real en la naturaleza.Ante esto Huelgan las palabras********************************************************El Flagelo de la Muerte InfantilEste flagelo cobr las vidas de niños y jóvenes por variados motivos, protegerlos desde el momento mismo en que han sido concebido es un deber de todos.Los invito a proteger en pensamiento la vida de los niños y jóvenes de todo el mundo.Ellos son el presente de un fututro que también es nuestro.Que todos los Cielos los acunen en bendiciones infinitas!********************************************************************El Flagelo de la Escasez del agua El agua potable no es un privilegio de algunos, es un derecho de todos.************************************************************El Flagelo de la DesolaciónCuando ya nada se tiene, todo se perdió, pero aún se tiene la vida.recomenzar es duro, pero se puede.Con Amor todo se puede. *******************************************************El Flagelo de Falta de VinculosEl primer vínculo de todo ser humano es la madre, con el amamantamiento surge tal.por ende el vincularse debe ser fomentado desde el inicio de la vida mismapor el derecho a tener mamá. Todos debemos bregar, para tener mejores relaciones. ******************************************************************************** El Falagelo de la Desocupación La falta de trabajo no contribuye a la realización personal, enferma a quién lo pdece y por efecto domino a la sociedad ,pueblos y naciones.El trabajo dignifica. *******************************************************************************El Flagelo de la Niñez AbandonadaTodo niño tiene derechos, entre ellos, hogar, alimentos, vestimenta, estudio, y sobre todo Amor.Los niños abandonados es el abandono mismo del hombre.Los niños de la calle, no son tales, sino que son niños en la calle. ************************************************************************* Flagelo de la Muerte todos tienen derecho a una muerte digna, y una sepultura respetada.Toda persona tiene derecho a tener un sitio para que su cuerpo tenga una última morada. *********************************************************************************Flagelo de la Soledad El abandonode persona, es otro tema, preocuapante, dado que se abandona a su suerte al recién nacido, pero el adulto desprotegido, que por infinitas razones es abandoonado en emociónes, companía, vínculos, u otras circunstancias.La soledad querida ensalza a la esencia del ser, la impuesta la ensombrece. *******************************************************************************El Flagelo de la Ancianidad La ancianidad es tan marvillosa como al juventud.La convierte en flagelo la sociedad que hace una apología y de la juventud y le rinde culto.La ancianidad es una etapa digna en sí misma, todo ser a ella llega.La misma encirra la sabiduría de tiempo, de vida, y de vidas, porque en ella estan sus ancestros, otras cuturas y momentos de valía históricos.Son el tesoro viviente de una sociedad, naciones y del mundo.Son un templo viviente!*******************************************************************REGALO Todos Los CielosPor un mundo de Amor, Paz y Justicia.Pueden llevar tal regalo a sus blogsDesde las sombras de los propios flagelos, quizá abismos propios, yacentes, permanecen, sienten, andan, estan e intentan aún vivir para dar un gran mensaje y desde su anonimato personal se tornan héroes de hambre de espacios y sed de los cielos.Ello también es un canto a la vida.*****************************************************Un minuto de reflexión por quienes padecen flagelo alguno.Puede una fecha quebrar el viento.Puede la piedra arrojada herir las aguas del mar.Puede el hombre dañar al semejante.Pueden todos pueden!Puede triunfar la saciedad en el mudo.Puede , se puede con El Amor de todos! **********************************************I r a :http://www.cuerposanoalmacalma.blogspot.com/http://www.panconsusurrros.blogspot.comhttp://www.newartdeco.blogspot.com/http://www.lasrecetasdelaabuelamatilde.blogspot.com/********************************************** Lo Esencial En La Vida************************************* Doce Cosas Para RecordarEl valor del tiempo.El placer de trabajar.La dignidad de ala simplicidadEl mérito del buen ca.rácter.El poder de la bondad.La influencia del ejemplo.La tranquilidad del deber cumplido.El perfeccionamiento propio.La alegría de crear.La virtud de la paciencia. Lo Que La Vida Enseña *********************************************El obstáculo más grande es el miedo.El tiempo más bello, el presente.Los mejores maestros, los niños.El más grande defecto el egoísmo...La peor crisis económica es el desánimo.l sentimiento más vil, la envidia.La peor cualidad, la soberbia.La mejor cualidad, la humildad.El mayor conocimiento, la esencia del ser...La felicidad más grande, estar en Paz.Lo más maravilloso el Amor!Para el ser que hay en cada quién:Amor para Celebrar!********************************************En un tiempo especial y con motivo de celebrarse el día del niño en mi tierra, República Argentina,el día domingo 10 de Agosto.presento al mundo estas rflexiones, y hago votos a fin que se esparcen flores y corazones a todos lso niños del mundo, para calmar las circunstancias que le apenan, para que haya más igualdad, y no se discriminen porque causa alguna a ningún niño. Que esta celebración sea eleada a todos los cielos, para que seesparzan Amores por doquier para "los mas bajitos"del planeta. Lo mejor es de este mundo es El Amor*********************************************************Dar amor a todos los niños, ha de reconfortar el ser de cada quién! Si Hubiere Amor...Si hubiere Amor real y suficiente en El mundo no se verían pies descalzos, dejando huellas en su andar , dolo de un rasgo más de la mendicinidad.Si hubiere Amor, tendrían calzado digno.***Tiempos todos, de otra manera, otras vivencias , la mendicidad, siempre en un eterno presente...Hoy, aún mendigan.... todavía, lastimosamente andan en su sendero mendigando... solo eso... mendi gan -andan!Si hubiere Amor en el mundo, no hubiere hambre.Si hubiere Amor, no se alimentarían las aves de niños desnutridos.Si hubiere Amor no hubiere desocupados, desolados, desamparadosPor todo elloUn gran corazón lleno de amor.Quién este de acuerdo con tales ideas, lleve este corazón a su blog para esparcir amor por doquier, quizás, cuál grano de mostaza ello contribuiría a mejorar o a reflexionar sobre el tema, y ya es bastante.Un minuto de silencio por todos los hermanos del mundo que atraviesan tales circunstancias. ****************************************Ir a:www.cuerposanoalmacalma.blogspot.comwww.panconsusurros.blogspot.comwww.lasrecetasdelaabuelamatilde.blogspot.comwww.newartdeco.blogspot.com ********************************* Publicado por *Vida,
en	wikipedia	N/A	John O'Dorman 'Jackie' Hood (born 8 January 1938) is a Scottish retired footballer who played as a centre forward in the Football League for Tranmere Rovers. He had previously been contracted to Everton, and won the Liverpool Senior Cup with their reserve team in 1957. He is the older brother of former Celtic forward Harry Hood. References 1938 births Living people Footballers from Glasgow Association football forwards Scottish footballers Glasgow United F.C. players Everton F.C. players Tranmere Rovers F.C. players East Fife F.C. players St Roch's F.C. players English Football League players Scottish Junior Football Association players Scottish Football League players
fi	legislation	EU	8.12.2017 FI Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti L 324/23 KOMISSION ASETUS (EU) 2017/2252, annettu 4 päivänä joulukuuta 2017, Belgian lipun alla purjehtivien alusten rauskujen kalastuksen kieltämisestä unionin vesillä alueilla VIII ja IX EUROOPAN KOMISSIO, joka ottaa huomioon Euroopan unionin toiminnasta tehdyn sopimuksen, ottaa huomioon unionin valvontajärjestelmästä, jonka tarkoituksena on varmistaa yhteisen kalastuspolitiikan sääntöjen noudattaminen, 20 päivänä marraskuuta 2009 annetun neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 1224/2009 (1) ja erityisesti sen 36 artiklan 2 kohdan, sekä katsoo seuraavaa: (1) Neuvoston asetuksessa (EU) 2017/127 (2) säädetään kiintiöistä vuodeksi 2017. (2) Komission saamien tietojen mukaan tämän asetuksen liitteessä tarkoitetun jäsenvaltion lipun alla purjehtivien tai kyseisessä jäsenvaltiossa rekisteröityjen alusten mainitussa liitteessä tarkoitetun kalakannan saaliit ovat täyttäneet vuoden 2017 kiintiön. (3) Sen vuoksi on tarpeen kieltää kyseisen kannan kalastus, ON HYVÄKSYNYT TÄMÄN ASETUKSEN: 1 artikla Kiintiön täyttyminen Tämän asetuksen liitteessä tarkoitetun jäsenvaltion vuotta 2017 koskevan kalastuskiintiön katsotaan täyttyneen tämän asetuksen liitteessä tarkoitetun kalakannan osalta mainitussa liitteessä vahvistetusta päivämäärästä alkaen. 2 artikla Kiellot Kielletään tämän asetuksen liitteessä tarkoitetun jäsenvaltion lipun alla purjehtivilta aluksilta tai kyseisessä jäsenvaltiossa rekisteröidyiltä aluksilta mainitussa liitteessä tarkoitetun kannan kalastus samassa liitteessä vahvistetusta päivästä alkaen. Erityisesti kielletään näillä aluksilla pyydettyjen kyseiseen kantaan kuuluvien kalojen aluksella pitäminen, siirtäminen, jälleenlaivaaminen ja purkaminen mainitun päivän jälkeen. 3 artikla Voimaantulo Tämä asetus tulee voimaan seuraavana päivänä sen jälkeen, kun se on julkaistu Euroopan unionin virallisessa lehdessä. Tämä asetus on kaikilta osiltaan velvoittava, ja sitä sovelletaan sellaisenaan kaikissa jäsenvaltioissa. Tehty Brysselissä 4 päivänä joulukuuta 2017. Komission puolesta, puheenjohtajan nimissä João AGUIAR MACHADO Pääjohtaja Meri- ja kalastusasioiden pääosasto (1) EUVL L 343, 22.12.2009, s. 1. (2) Neuvoston asetus (EU) 2017/127, annettu 20 päivänä tammikuuta 2017, unionin vesillä ja unionin kalastusaluksiin tietyillä unionin ulkopuolisilla vesillä sovellettavien tiettyjen kalakantojen ja kalakantaryhmien kalastusmahdollisuuksien vahvistamisesta vuodeksi 2017 (EUVL L 24, 28.1.2017, s. 1). LIITE Numero 25/TQ127 Jäsenvaltio Belgia Kanta SRX/89-C (ja RJC/89-C:n, RJH/89-C:n, RJN/89-C:n, RJU/8-C:n ja RJU/9-C:n erityisehdot) Laji Rauskut (Rajiformes) Alue Unionin vedet alueilla VIII ja IX Kalastuksen lopettamisen päivämäärä 10.10.2017