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among others. It is a version of the cosmological argument, being an argument
from the mere existence of the universe to the existence of God, as
opposed to arguing from the concept of God, as the ontological argument
does, or from particular features of the universe, such as evidence of design.
William Craig ’ s formulation of the argument is particularly concise, and
runs as follows:
Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the universe has a cause. (63)
This argument is clearly a valid modus ponens ; but how certain is the
truth of the premises? The major premise seems unproven. It is not self -
contradictory to assert that something could, or did, begin to exist without
any cause. There is, of course, a powerful empirical inductive argument
Craig , William L. The Kalam Cosmological Argument . London : Macmillan ,
1979 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
Β© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The Kalam Argument for the Existence of God 23
from the fact that there are billions upon billions of examples of something
beginning to exist and having a cause of its existence, and not a single
observed or recorded example of something coming to exist without a
cause. But this is insuffi cient for proof for two reasons. First, no inductive
argument gives us more than very good evidence that something is always
the case: however many confi rming instances we fi nd, an exception is
always a possibility, even if an unlikely one. Second, even if every individual
entity in the universe that began to exist has a cause of its existence, it does
not follow that this is true of the universe as a whole, since what is true
even of every part is not necessarily true of the totality and vice versa.
A third argument for the claim that whatever begins to exist has a cause
would be that though it is not self - contradictory that something might come
into existence without a cause, it is unimaginable. To this two replies might
be made. One is that this might be a feature of our minds rather than a
feature of how the world really is, that is, simply a limit on what we can
conceive and not a limit on what can happen. Secondly, the universe as a
whole is something totally beyond our experience: hence it might be said
that we simply have no idea what might or might not be possible. Hence,
the major premise of the argument cannot be proven by either logic or
experience. Nevertheless, the notion that something could come into being
from nothing, without a cause, seems close to incredible, so that the premise,
though unproven, seems very plausible.
On the other hand, the minor premise, that the universe has a beginning,
for a long time looked very vulnerable: there seemed to be no reason to
assert that the universe came into being rather than having always existed,
as most of the Greeks, including Aristotle, thought. The Kalam philosophers
themselves, and those who followed them, tried to argue that the notion of
an infi nite series of events back in time, with no fi rst event, is incoherent
or in some way impossible, but no convincing argument on these lines has
been produced. It is true that the idea that time has no beginning creates
problems for the mind, but there are equal problems in supposing that it
does have a beginning, since one can always ask, β€œ What happened before
that? ” What has reestablished the argument in a contemporary version, by
no means confi ned to Muslims, is the increasing scientifi c evidence that the
universe did have a beginning. This does not yet amount to proof: indeed,
it is not clear what astronomical or other observations could absolutely
prove the β€œ big bang ” theory of the beginning of the universe. But it makes
the proposition, that the universe had a beginning, plausible, something for
which there is evidence and which is believed by many who have studied
the evidence. So the Kalam argument for the existence of God is a valid
argument from two premises of which neither is proven nor certain, but
both are plausible. The jury is still out, and much depends on how science
develops and whether the minor premise looks increasingly plausible.
24 Harry Lesser
We should note, though, that the argument is incomplete. Even if the
universe has a cause outside itself, further argument is needed to establish
that the cause is an eternal and good being; in other words, that it is God.
Some who accept the argument think that one also has to show that the
cause is a personal being and have offered arguments for this. Certainly it
could be argued that only an eternal being could precede the universe and
therefore only an eternal being could cause it. It can also be argued that
the only kind of cause that could operate on the universe from outside, as
opposed to being part of it, would be the act of a personal being and only
a good personal being would wish to create a universe. But it is fair to say,
I think, that we have not yet got a full and rigorous working - out of this
part of the argument, though the above indicates the lines it might take.
Once again, we might say that it is plausible, but not proven, that the cause
of the universe is a good personal Creator, just as it is plausible, but not
proved, that the universe has a cause.
P1. If something begins to exist, then it has a cause.
P2. The universe began to exist.
C1. The universe has a cause ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
4
The Ontological Argument
Sara L. Uckelman
In philosophy of religion, arguments that attempt to prove the existence of
God on the basis of God ’ s essence are called ontological arguments because
they appeal only to the nature or essence of God ’ s being. The fi rst such
argument was given by Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033 – 1109) in Chapter
II of his Proslogion (written c .1077 – 8). Saint Anselm defi nes God as β€œ that
than which nothing greater can be thought ” and seeks to derive from this
defi nition a contradiction with the assumption that God does not exist.
Some modern commentators have also found another similar argument in
Proslogion III, which purportedly shows not only that God exists but that
God ’ s existence is necessary. However, it is the argument in Proslogion II
that is usually referred to simply as β€œ the ontological argument. ”
Anselm of Canterbury . Proslogion, in S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi
Opera Omnia , vol. 1 , edited by F. S. Schmitt , 93 – 104 . Seccovii : Abbatia ,
1938 – 61 .
Anselm of Canterbury . Proslogion, in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major
Works , edited by B. Davies and G. R. Evans , translated by M. J.