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regresses do not in fact exist. Many critics fi nd Aquinas ’ argument on this
point unconvincing, so one advantage of Clarke ’ s argument is that it simply
sidesteps this issue. According to Clarke, the problem with the idea of
everything ’ s being just an infi nite regress of dependent beings caused by
other dependent beings (equivalent to Aquinas ’ “ sensible beings with effi -
cient causes ” ) is not that such regresses are impossible but that this would
violate the Principle of Suffi cient Reason, an intuitive principle according
to which (roughly) there is an explanation for every being and every fact.
In such a case, there would be an explanation of the existence of every
particular dependent being, and there would even be an explanation of the
existence of that particular collection of dependent beings. There would
not, however, be an explanation of the fact that there are any dependent
beings at all, since no particular existing dependent being (or set of dependent
beings) could explain this. That is, we would lack an explanation of the
fact that there is something rather than nothing. Thus, there must be at
least one self - existent being that explains why there is something rather
than nothing. Elsewhere, Clarke undertakes to prove that this being has the
other attributes that we normally associate with divinity.
There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent
being. For since something must needs have been from eternity, as has been
already proved and is granted on all hands, either there has always existed
some one unchangeable and independent being from which all other beings
that are or ever were in the universe have received their original, or else there
has been an infi nite succession of changeable and dependent beings produced
one from another in an endless progression without any original cause at all.
Now this latter supposition is so very absurd that, though all atheism must
in its accounts of most things [ . . . ] terminate in it, yet I think very few atheists
ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly
impossible and contradictory to itself. I shall not argue against it from the
supposed impossibility of infi nite succession, barely and absolutely considered
in itself, for a reason which shall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we consider
such an infi nite progression as one entire endless series of dependent beings,
it is plain this whole series of beings can have no cause from without of its
existence because in it are supposed to be included all things that are, or ever
were, in the universe. And it is plain it can have no reason within itself for
its existence because no one being in this infi nite succession is supposed to be
self - existent or necessary (which is the only ground or reason of existence of
anything that can be imagined within the thing itself [ . . . ]), but every one
dependent on the foregoing. And where no part is necessary, it is manifest the
whole cannot be necessary – absolute necessity of existence not being an
extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination but an inward and essential
property of the nature of the thing which so exists. (Clark, 10)
20 Mark T. Nelson
Rowe ’ s terminology:
“ dependent being ” = “ a being whose existence is explained by the causal
activity of other things ”
“ self - existent being ” = “ a being whose existence is explained by itself,
that is, by its own nature ”
“ positive fact ” = “ a fact whose obtaining entails the existence of at least
one contingent being ”
“ contingent being ” = “ a being such that it is logically possible for that
being to exist and it is logically possible for that being not to exist ”
Principle of Suffi cient Reason (PSR):
PSR1. For every being that exists or ever existed, there is an explanation
of the existence of that being.
PSR2. For every positive fact, there is an explanation of that fact.
P1. Every being (that exists or ever existed) is either a dependent being or
a self - existent being.
P2. Not every being is a dependent being.
C1. There exists a self - existent being (disjunctive syllogism, P1, P2).
The argument is valid if it is interpreted as follows:
P1 * . Every being is a dependent being or some being is a self - existent being.
[Or: If no being is a self - existent being, then every being is a dependent
being.]
P2 * . It is not the case that every being is a dependent being.
C1 * . Some being is a self - existent being (disjunctive syllogism, P1 * , P2 * ).
The case for P1 * :
P1 may appear to be a tautology, but it is not, because it rules out one type
of case, namely, things whose existence is explained by nothing at all.
Thus, it is equivalent to PSR1.
The case for P2 * :
P3. If every being is a dependent being, then if there is an explanation for
the fact that any dependent beings exist (rather than nothing at all), this
will be in terms of the existence of either the totality of dependent beings
or some subset of that totality.
P4. That any dependent beings exist at all (rather than nothing) is a positive
fact (defi nitions of “ dependent being ” , “ positive fact ” ).
The Contingency Cosmological Argument 21
P5. There is an explanation of every positive fact (PSR2).
C2. There is an explanation for the fact that any dependent beings exist
at all (instantiation, P4, P5).
C3. If every being is a dependent being, then there is an explanation for
the fact that any dependent beings exist (rather than nothing at all),
in terms of the existence of either the totality of dependent beings or
some subset of that totality (instantiation, P3, C2).
P6. It is not possible to explain the fact that any dependent beings exist at
all (rather than nothing) simply in terms of the existence of either the
totality of dependent beings or of some subset of that totality.
C4. It is not the case that every being is a dependent being ( modus tollens ,
C3, P6).
Thus, P1 * depends on PSR1 and P2 * depends on PSR2, so, according
to Rowe, the success of Clarke ’ s contingency argument turns on the truth
or rational acceptability of the Principle of Suffi cient Reason itself.
3
The Kalam Argument for the
Existence of God
Harry Lesser
One of the most interesting arguments for the existence of God was developed
by the philosopher – theologians of the Kalam, the tradition of mediaeval
Muslim theology, and has recently been revived by William Craig,

regresses do not in fact exist. Many critics fi nd Aquinas ’ argument on this

point unconvincing, so one advantage of Clarke ’ s argument is that it simply

sidesteps this issue. According to Clarke, the problem with the idea of

everything ’ s being just an infi nite regress of dependent beings caused by

other dependent beings (equivalent to Aquinas ’ “ sensible beings with effi -

cient causes ” ) is not that such regresses are impossible but that this would

violate the Principle of Suffi cient Reason, an intuitive principle according

to which (roughly) there is an explanation for every being and every fact.

In such a case, there would be an explanation of the existence of every

particular dependent being, and there would even be an explanation of the

existence of that particular collection of dependent beings. There would

not, however, be an explanation of the fact that there are any dependent

beings at all, since no particular existing dependent being (or set of dependent

beings) could explain this. That is, we would lack an explanation of the

fact that there is something rather than nothing. Thus, there must be at

least one self - existent being that explains why there is something rather

than nothing. Elsewhere, Clarke undertakes to prove that this being has the

other attributes that we normally associate with divinity.

There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent

being. For since something must needs have been from eternity, as has been

already proved and is granted on all hands, either there has always existed

some one unchangeable and independent being from which all other beings

that are or ever were in the universe have received their original, or else there

has been an infi nite succession of changeable and dependent beings produced

one from another in an endless progression without any original cause at all.

Now this latter supposition is so very absurd that, though all atheism must

in its accounts of most things [ . . . ] terminate in it, yet I think very few atheists

ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly

impossible and contradictory to itself. I shall not argue against it from the

supposed impossibility of infi nite succession, barely and absolutely considered

in itself, for a reason which shall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we consider

such an infi nite progression as one entire endless series of dependent beings,

it is plain this whole series of beings can have no cause from without of its

existence because in it are supposed to be included all things that are, or ever

were, in the universe. And it is plain it can have no reason within itself for

its existence because no one being in this infi nite succession is supposed to be

self - existent or necessary (which is the only ground or reason of existence of

anything that can be imagined within the thing itself [ . . . ]), but every one

dependent on the foregoing. And where no part is necessary, it is manifest the

whole cannot be necessary – absolute necessity of existence not being an

extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination but an inward and essential

property of the nature of the thing which so exists. (Clark, 10)

20 Mark T. Nelson

Rowe ’ s terminology:

“ dependent being ” = “ a being whose existence is explained by the causal

activity of other things ”

“ self - existent being ” = “ a being whose existence is explained by itself,

that is, by its own nature ”

“ positive fact ” = “ a fact whose obtaining entails the existence of at least

one contingent being ”

“ contingent being ” = “ a being such that it is logically possible for that

being to exist and it is logically possible for that being not to exist ”

Principle of Suffi cient Reason (PSR):

PSR1. For every being that exists or ever existed, there is an explanation

of the existence of that being.

PSR2. For every positive fact, there is an explanation of that fact.

P1. Every being (that exists or ever existed) is either a dependent being or

a self - existent being.

P2. Not every being is a dependent being.

C1. There exists a self - existent being (disjunctive syllogism, P1, P2).

The argument is valid if it is interpreted as follows:

P1 * . Every being is a dependent being or some being is a self - existent being.

[Or: If no being is a self - existent being, then every being is a dependent

being.]

P2 * . It is not the case that every being is a dependent being.

C1 * . Some being is a self - existent being (disjunctive syllogism, P1 * , P2 * ).

The case for P1 * :

P1 may appear to be a tautology, but it is not, because it rules out one type

of case, namely, things whose existence is explained by nothing at all.

Thus, it is equivalent to PSR1.

The case for P2 * :

P3. If every being is a dependent being, then if there is an explanation for

the fact that any dependent beings exist (rather than nothing at all), this

will be in terms of the existence of either the totality of dependent beings

or some subset of that totality.

P4. That any dependent beings exist at all (rather than nothing) is a positive

fact (defi nitions of “ dependent being ” , “ positive fact ” ).

The Contingency Cosmological Argument 21

P5. There is an explanation of every positive fact (PSR2).

C2. There is an explanation for the fact that any dependent beings exist

at all (instantiation, P4, P5).

C3. If every being is a dependent being, then there is an explanation for

the fact that any dependent beings exist (rather than nothing at all),

in terms of the existence of either the totality of dependent beings or

some subset of that totality (instantiation, P3, C2).

P6. It is not possible to explain the fact that any dependent beings exist at

all (rather than nothing) simply in terms of the existence of either the

totality of dependent beings or of some subset of that totality.

C4. It is not the case that every being is a dependent being ( modus tollens ,

C3, P6).

Thus, P1 * depends on PSR1 and P2 * depends on PSR2, so, according

to Rowe, the success of Clarke ’ s contingency argument turns on the truth

or rational acceptability of the Principle of Suffi cient Reason itself.

3

The Kalam Argument for the

Existence of God

Harry Lesser

One of the most interesting arguments for the existence of God was developed

by the philosopher – theologians of the Kalam, the tradition of mediaeval

Muslim theology, and has recently been revived by William Craig,