metadata

base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
  - cosine_accuracy
  - dot_accuracy
  - manhattan_accuracy
  - euclidean_accuracy
  - max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
  - sentence-transformers
  - sentence-similarity
  - feature-extraction
  - generated_from_trainer
  - dataset_size:10000
  - loss:TripletLoss
widget:
  - source_sentence: >-
      individual autonomous human beings who make up the corporation and who
      intentionally bring about corporate acts through their own bodily
      movements. Such human individuals, and not "the corporation," are morally
      responsible for corporate acts. Moreover, to say that an entity is
      "morally responsible" for a wrongful act is to say that the entity is
      liable to blame and punishment. But it is not possible to impose blame and
      punishment on a corporation without inflicting it on corporate members.
      Thus, to say that a corporation (as an entity distinct from its members)
      is "morally responsible" for a wrongful corporate act is to imply that a
      (possibly innocent) corporate member legitimately may be punished for
      something for which another entity was morally responsible. This violates
      the moral principles that underlie blame and punishment. To hold that the
      corporation can be morally responsible for its acts is to adopt a
      dangerous organicism. [Published in vol. 2, no. 3 (Spring 1983)] The
      proposition that corporations can and should be viewed as morally
      responsible agents in society has been challenged and defended frequently
      in the growing literature on business ethics. Challenges to this
      proposition usually follow one of two paths. Either it is argued that
      corporations can be viewed as unified entities (more than the sum of their
      parts) but are amoral, or it is argued that corporations are not to be
      viewed as unified entities in the morally relevant sense. It is tri?"
      latter path that Manuel Velasquez seems to be taking in
    sentences:
      - >-
        "Why Corporations Are Not Responsible for Anything They Do." Velasquez
        offers two broad lines of argument against the view that corporations
        can be morally responsible. The first line of argument is analytical; it
        turns on the conditions governing the phrase "moral respon sibility" in
        what he calls its "backward-looking" sense. The conclusion he comes to
        is that attributions of moral responsibility to corporations do not
        "make sense." The second line of argument is moral, not analytical; it
        concludes that we should not attribute moral responsibility to
        corporations, quite apart from the question of whether it makes sense to
        do so. Both lines of argument are flawed, in my view, and most of my
        comments will be devoted to explaining how and why. I hope, however, to
        be fair to the intuitions lying behind the arguments. The Analytical
        Line Of Argument The basic form of the analytical line of argument as
        Velasquez presents it is straightforward. I will touch on each of the
        premises in an effort to evaluate both validity and soundness. The
        argument may be rendered as follows: Premise (Ai): The concept of moral
        responsibility (properly under stood) has at its core the concept of
        origination, which is further tied to the idea of liability for blame
        and punishment. Premise (A2): The concept of origination requires both a
        mental or intentional component (mens rea) and a physical or bodily
        component (actus reus). Premise (A3): Corporations (as opposed to
        persons who are members ot corporations) are possessed of neither minds
        nor
      - >-
        agents is that they assume that the existence of corporate agency
        implies UCMR.7 But this is not obvious. One might hold, as I do, that
        corporations are moral agents because the reciprocal adjustment of
        individual intentions and plans that takes place in such organizations
        yields a corporate intentionality that is more like human intentionality
        than it is like the efficient causality that might be attributed to
        blindly operating social wholes such as markets. One might hold that
        corporations are moral agents because to say so "saves the phenomena" of
        many things we say about corporate actions entirely apart from the issue
        posed by UCMR. Manuel Velasquez denies that corporations are moral
        agents in any sense.8 For this reason, the question concerning
        redistribution of corporate moral responsibility does not arise
        explicitly for him. If corporations cannot be morally responsible then,
        of course, there is no corporate moral responsibility to be
        redistributed. At the opposite extreme, French holds that corporations
        are moral agents and persons in the same sense as human beings. If this
        is true, it is difficult to separate the problem of corporate moral
        agency from the question whether UCMR is true, inasmuch as it would be
        an embarrassment for French's univocality thesis that corporate moral
        responsibility could be completely reassigned to corporate associates
        when obviously human respon sibility is not reassignable to the parts of
        the human being at all. But French's practice supports the claim that
        UCMR is a distinct issue, for he does not introduce UCMR until chapter
        10 of
      - >-
        available information' as the propositions accepted by the science of
        the agent's day, plus factual propositions justified by publicly
        accessible evidence (including testimony of others about themselves) and
        the principles of logic."8 Brandt notes that the 'information' need not
        be true. Finally, he adds that it is important to see that defining
        "rational" in this way does not import any substantive value judgments
        into the concept of rational action or rational desire. II In this
        section I shall present and consider objections to Brandt's account of
        rational action and rational desire. There are several problems with
        this view involving the notion of one's desires being what they would be
        were one exposed to available information or all the knowable facts that
        would strengthen or weaken one's desires. This condition would imply
        that certain actions which we ought not to think rational are rational
        and that certain actions which we ought to think rational are not
        rational. Let us imagine a man who has a headache and who wants to take
        some aspirin in order to be free from his headache. Suppose he goes to
        his attic, opens a bottle labeled "poison", and takes two of the pills
        which he believes, without any evidence, to be aspirin. Fortunately, his
        wicked uncle has replaced the poison tablets with aspirin and put the
        poison in the aspirin bottle. We may fmally suppose that the wicked
        uncle has had a change of heart and is at that moment confessing his
        evil deed to the police.
  - source_sentence: >-
      one or the other or both of these ways. A single solution to both problems
      might seem to lie in Kant's transcendental idealism: the conception of the
      world that human beings come up with would be nothing less than the way
      the world in general must be. But that doctrine as Sacks understands it
      implies that there is none the less a way things are in themselves that
      remains necessarily unavailable to minds like ours. That residual
      'ontological' concession is 'the price Kant pays for securing knowledge of
      empirical reality' (p. 317). Sacks, to his credit, is not willing to pay
      the price: it would still leave us without 'genuinely objective
      knowledge'. But behind the Kantian distinction between 'transcendental'
      and 'empirical' modes of investigation he finds an insight that promises a
      new and 'critical' conception of objectivity that would overcome or render
      ineffective both lines of dispiriting 'sceptical' reflection. More than
      two thirds of the book is devoted to exhibiting the inevitable pressures
      towards the two varieties of 'scepticism' implicit in 'the standard
      conception of objectivity'. A rather textbook-like outline of the
      empiricist theories of mind of Locke and (mostly) Hume is followed by a
      similar fifty-page digest of the Critique of Pure Reason. William James
      and Bergson are then sympathetically expounded for their opposition to the
      entrenched psychological atomism thought to be responsible for the failure
      of those earlier theories. But even they do not avoid the 'epistemic cost'
      of the basic 'Cartesian' assumption of a gulf between the subject with his
      thoughts
    sentences:
      - >-
        Hungarian population (N = 500). When defining the sample, we aimed at
        being able to segment the database by demographic variables (gender,
        age, qualification and region) during the analysis. Due to the random
        query, the database can be considered representative of the Hungarian
        population along these attributes. The aim of the telephone inquiry was
        to explore the expectations of the population in the field of corporate
        responsibility. While developing the questionnaire focusing on the
        population segment due to the lack of information in the field of CSR we
        concentrated on knowledge of and expectations on sponsorship. 3. Inner
        survey: during the year 2006 and 2007, the Kurt Lewin Foundation
        completed several studies among small and medium sized enterprises. The
        aim of the examinations was in all cases to scrutinize the commitment of
        employees towards the company's CSR activity laying emphasis on their
        motivations, attitudes and willingness for action. The survey method
        consisted of combining interviews with participant observation. 4.
        Action research elements: in the last two years, the Kurt Lewin
        Foundation worked together CSR Communication in Hungary 139 with
        numerous companies in working out their CSR strategy, implementing
        training courses aiming at social sensitivity, and researching (by means
        of questionnaire and interview) the attitudes of employees and the
        process of organizing and monitoring company charity acts. These
        projects provided information which could not be gained by other methods
        such as interviews or questionnaires. Csr Activities Of Hungarian
        Enterprises Although the focus of our research is not CSR
      - >-
        begins to sense the impossibility of shrugging off their empirical
        interpretation. But this is something which can be understood only in
        realist terms, as betrayed in our standard ways of speaking, and, so
        understood, it is false. Nevertheless, the characterization does,
        Dummett continues, "succeed in conveying something of the psychological
        effect of the two opinions". Should it turn out that, ultimately, only a
        characterization of this unsatisfactory kind is possible, then the point
        would be established. Anti-realist views would be among those whose fate
        is that they have to be stated in ways that are not right. In this
        essay, I hope to draw certain conclusions from Williams' contention that
        the predicament is also latent in the later work of Wittgenstein. I
        shall offer no substantial arguments for the contention, since I am
        principally interested in its consequences. It does however seem to me
        to be correct, subject to Williams's own qualification that the element
        of idealism in the later work of Wittgenstein which gives rise to the
        predicament is "concealed, qualified, overlaid with other things".'6 The
        predicament is certainly no more than latent. It arises with none of the
        dramatic urgency that accompanies it in Kant, for example. Given
        Wittgenstein's later conception of the correct way to do philosophy,
        this is hardly surprising. Philosophy, he tells us, consists of
        assembled reminders for particular purposes, not of theses.'7 So we
        should not expect to find him directly propounding some philosophical
        theory, still less one which
      - >-
        and the rest of the surrounding world. More or less equal expository
        space is given on the other side to the rejection of an 'egological'
        conception of the immersed thinking subject and to 380 Book Reviews
        sketches of a number of more recent 'naturalized Hegelian' conceptions.
        The views of Habermas, McDowell, Davidson, Wittgenstein, and Bernard
        Williams's idealist reading of Wittgenstein figure prominently in this
        story of the struggle with 'relativism'. One can come to wonder whether
        a selective historical survey of quite so much material on both sides of
        Sacks's fundamental issue is really needed for his philosophical
        purposes, especially since its stated aim is not primarily historical
        accuracy or interpretative thoroughness. The point is 'philosophical
        geography': to describe certain significant positions that he thinks
        would be worthy of attention even if they did not actually fit the
        thinkers that have been saddled with them in the past. The geography
        provided here goes well beyond what is needed for finding one's way
        without confusion from one place to another on Sacks's itinerary. The
        new and potentially liberating conception of objectivity pursued in the
        last third of the book is to be reached within a thoroughly 'naturalist'
        and 'post-metaphysical' setting, without appeal to 'any ontological
        system or order that transcends the empirical world towards which the
        natural sciences are directed' (p. 2). It will come from acknowledging
        and insisting on two different levels of possible reflection on
        ourselves and the world. The distinction is Kantian in spirit,
  - source_sentence: >-
      G3466 from the National Science Foundation, and under a grant from the
      Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, U.S.A. 74 but in the absence of
      (jp0 ^ q0) -> p = q this is an incomplete principle of extensionality,
      which at first sight seems to offer us a world in which intensions and
      extensions can coexist peacefully. Intensions (for example predicates of
      individuals) are denoted by X-expressions in the following way. If ...xK
      is a propositional function in which xL and xl alone is free, then
      (Xxt)(... jtt ) is the property asserted by ... x^ to characterize xK' one
      cannot prove, despite (2), that two coextensive properties of this kind
      are identical. (Of course by (1) and (2) we can assert (*a)(...xa= . -xa .
      .)_>(Xxa)(...xa) = (Xxa)(. -*a . .); (3) but unless we could prove ( p0 <
      > Qo)-* P = <7 we could not establish (3) with the first identity replaced
      by a material equivalence, and so we are entitled to regard X-expressions
      of type (oa) as denoting predicates rather than sets.) Extensions, running
      parallel with intensions, are introduced by the following ingenious
      device. A primitive description-operator ta(oa) obeys the axiom (E! xa)
      (foa x) >/(ta(oa)/) (4) where E! denotes unique existence. To each
      predicate /oa we now assign the characteristic function Ext / = (X *a) i(X
      «)[(« = 1 &fx) v (n = 0 &^/x)] (5) where 1 and 0 can be any two objects of
      the same type. Now if we define
    sentences:
      - >-
        relativity. But now after their sublation by this concrete category,
        they are no longer just being and nothing, as they were when they were
        regarded as pure disparates. Each of them now is invested with express
        relativity, and so neither of them can rightly be given its former name
        of being or of nothing. The process of sublation, in brief, has not only
        put the two together, but has changed them. Now this change of factors
        is of supreme importance in the logical dialectic. If we overlook it we
        lose sight of the significant fact that the synthesis is always more
        than an aggregating of elements. Hegel is well aware of this factor of
        change and of the consequent need for a continual reinterpretation of
        the elements that enter each synthesis. Hence being and nothing are now
        new meanings; in his metaphorical and, unfortunately, misleading
        terminology, they are both becomings, exhibiting in their movement the
        distinction between a becoming from nothing to being, that is, an
        arising, and from being to nothing, that is, a ceasing. Expressed in
        more strictly logical terms, we ought perhaps to say that each, now, is
        not simply a moment of a category of relativity, but each is itself
        expressly a category of relativity, the distinction between them being
        the difference of reference necessarily present where two factors are
        related. When we reach Daseyn, which is the synthesis of being and
        nothing as they are transformed into arising and ceasing, the same
        process of reinterpretation
      - >-
        x e y as short for G/MA & y Ext/) or alternatively as short for (yx) =
        1, we can use (2) to establish (*) (* s (Ext/) <_> x e (Ext g)) ->
        (Ext/) = (Ext g) (6) and (1) (4) and (5) to establish ... * > * e ( Ext
        (X y) (... y )) (7) so that expressions of the form Ext /oa can function
        in all ways as (extensional) class-names. (We have been increasingly
        sparing of typesubscripts of late; this practice will be continued as
        long as it favors legibility.) This concludes an account, sketchy but I
        hope adequate for our purposes, of the system of Church's early paper.
        Let us recall; it contains as theorems all formulae (1) (2) and (4), and
        in addition (like all the systems to be considered in this paper) the
        classical propositional calculus and the classical functional calculus
        in each type. It suggests the idea of a combined intensional-extensional
        system which admits both sets and predicates and distinguishes between
        them, thereby (we hope) escaping all the criticisms which have been made
        by the 75 extensionalists without involving us in the complexities of
        the sense-anddenotation solution. As it stands, the system (call it
        System I) is liable to a form of the numberof-the-planets paradox. For
        one can easily prove in it (actually without using either its
        intensional features or the modicum of extensionality provided by (2))
        the harmless-looking formula fx = v -> ((fx = y) = (/* =fx)) (8) from
      - >-
        presumably, of all systems whatsoever. It is this sort of generality
        that the present approach aims to achieve. The system proposed in this
        paper will not be directly defined, but rather a formulation of it,
        namely the calculus K. It is assumed that the nature of the system will
        be sufficiently clear from the nature of K. Indications will be given
        for supposing that every one of the general class of calculi mentioned
        above is "represented" in K, and from this it would follow that every
        combinatory system (and hence presumably every system) is definable in
        the formuland of K. 2. Formation rules for K. Let Y be an infinite class
        of symbols, no one of which occurs as part of any other. The members of
        Y will not be actually specified, since such specification is irrelevant
        to the results of this paper. It is assumed, however, that Y does not
        contain parentheses or other symbols specified hereafter to serve
        special purposes. The following definition will constitute, in effect,
        the "formation rules" for the calculus K. We may think of U as the class
        of sentences which can be constructed (but not necessarily proved) in
        the calculus K,4 whereas K itself (that is, the class of provable
        sentences of K) will be a proper subclass of U. 3 These sentences are to
        be thought of as already "interpreted," that is, as already understood
        as regards their meanings. In syntactical investigations a calculus is
        usually treated in abstraction from the meanings
  - source_sentence: >-
      if his theory of deduction is to run smoothly.7 But the require ments of
      deduction are as good a constraint as any, if the theory of truth is to
      run smoothly in its turn, and so his remarks on regimentation can stand as
      one component in a theory of predication, in the service of the compo nent
      still to come, namely, a theory of truth. A need for regimentation of the
      kind described is typical of token sen tences as uttered or as written.
      But Aristotle leaves room for a further set of sentences in which,
      apparently, the needed regimentation has already been achieved.
      Preparation for this further kind of sentence is made in a well known
      passage in the first chapter of the de InP. Now spoken sounds are symbols
      (oiSjiPoAxx) of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of
      spoken sound. And just as written marks are not the same for all men,
      neither are spoken sounds. But what in the first place (cbv... rcpokcov)
      these are signs (ar|p,evoi) of affections of the soul are the same for
      all;8 and what these affec tions are likenesses (0|ioia>|iaTa) of—pragmata
      ("things") — are also right off ("n5r)) the pale, in this case it is
      because both are accidents of the same thing," Metaphysics A7, 1017al5-16,
      cf. T4, 1007b2-5, 13-17,An.Po. A22, 83al0-12. 7) Topics A13-14; see also
      An. Pr. A32, 46b38 ff, where the project "is somewhat com parable to
      translating natural-language arguments into a formal language," namely,
      the language of Aristotle's theory of deduction, Robin Smith, Aristotle
      Prior Analytics, India
    sentences:
      - >-
        paper as nothing that follows turns on this distinction. 4 In the
        context of this paper I shall only consider mathematical rigour as it
        was conceived of after Frege and will ignore different conceptions of
        rigour operating before that. Informal al Rigour algorithmic system)
        which may be legitimately applied to produce such derivations. This
        historical process started with Prege's [8] and led to the revision of
        the old concept of mathematical rigour into the current one. The current
        notion of rigour combines the older idea of the virtues of gapless proof
        (a proof in which each inferential step is made explicit) with the
        understanding of rigour in terms of formalisation.5 Incompleteness
        results in mathematical logic seriously undermined the
        formalist-reductionist project and showed that the project could not
        provide the desired secure foundations for mathematics, at least not in
        its original formulât ion (s). More specifically, the incompleteness
        theorems undermined the claim that mathematical provability was indeed
        reducible to provability within a formal system, and accordingly a
        fundamental part of the project of giving axiomatic foundations to
        mathematics. Even though the effects of the incompleteness results were
        crucial to reductionist enterprises of tracing back mathematical
        theorems to a restricted class of truths, they did not extend as far as
        to undermine a second important aspect of the formalistreductionist
        project namely that of providing epistemic foundations for the edifice
        of mathematical knowledge.6 In particular the goal of identifying a
        notion of rigorous proof by which we can guarantee the certainty
      - >-
        napolis/Cambridge 1989, p. 161. It bears mentioning, however, that the
        theory of infer ence Aristotle prepares for in the Analytics has no
        interest in the simple singular predications that are our topic here,
        cf. n. 14 below. Aristotle is taken to task for the limitations of the
        Analytics account in Peter Geach, "History of the Corruption of Logic,"
        Leeds Inaugural Lecture, in his Logic Matters, Oxford, Blackwell, 1972;
        for a more charitable assessment, see most recently Max Kôlbel,
        "Aristotle's Logical Syntax," History and Philosophy of Logic
        (forthcoming). 8) Like the rest of the passage quoted, this clause is as
        contested a text as any in Aristotle. Commentators generally take the
        antecedent to 'these' ('what in the first place these are signs of) to
        be 'spoken sounds,' from the immediately preceding context. I prefer to
        think that the antecedent instead is, indifferently, 'written marks' and
        'spoken sounds' from the previous sentence, so that Aristotle's point is
        that linguistic tokens as inscribed and tokens as uttered are both
        interpreted finally through tokens as thought the former at two removes,
        the latter at one. Aristotle means to favour spoken over written tokens,
        and this preference is preserved if we think that, unlike the vaguer
        sign-of relation, the symbol-of relation is not transitive. But far more
        elaborate readings of the passage, and the sign-of/ symbol-of
        distinction, are available, see the discussion in C. W. A. Whitaker,
        Aristotle's De Lnterpretatione. Contradiction and Dialectic, Oxford
      - >-
        call a "sentence," since even a "phrase" suffices as X6yo;. The
        complexity of articulation, therefore, is opposed to the simplicity of
        expression (p6at;). Hence "sentence" is too determinate as a translation
        of X6yo;. Another possible translation of koXyo;, of course, is
        "speech," although in On Interpretation this rendering is too vague. 6
        By translating Tr as "ones," I do not intend to suggest anything as
        specific as "units"; rather, I am using "ones" merely as a place-filler
        for the previously mentioned linguistic entities, more along the lines
        of "those" or "what are." I prefer such a rendering to "things" or
        "entities," since these latter may obscure the continuity between [11
        and [2] as well as introduce notions too determinate in this context.
        THE OPENING OF ON INTERPRETATION 233 tC Cv tTpv, that is found in [2],
        and he is comfortable moving from a universal claim about "what are in
        vocal-sound" to a particular claim about "affirmations in vocal-sound."7
        Recognizing the continuity between [1] and [2], moreover, justifies the
        presence of 16a3-9 in On Interpretation, since it implies that this
        passage concerns the same linguistic entities discussed individually
        from Chapter 2 onward. In Chapter I as a whole, Aristotle is concerned
        with these linguistic entities as a group. In 16a3-9, on which this
        paper will focus, Aristotle attempts to explain how linguistic entities
        exist as both natural and conventional. In the remainder of the chapter
        (1 6a918), Aristotle divides the group. He sets names and verbs apart
        from the
  - source_sentence: >-
      the role. The basic idea is that it is the role of a semantic theory to
      assign to each assertoric sentence a mental state which it serves to
      express in virtue of the fact that being in that mental state is the
      assertability condition for that sentence. The full story begins with
      atomic sentences, assigning beliefs to the descriptive sentences and some
      sort of noncognitive state to the normative sentences. More complex
      sentences involving sentential connectives assign a more complex mental
      state to these more complex constructions, with the exact nature of the
      complex state depending on a function contributed by the connective and
      arguments contributed by the semantic values of the atomic sentences. It
      is only after these states have been determined as the semantic values of
      the sentences that certain types of sentences, the descriptive sentences,
      get associated with propositions—the propositions that are the objects of
      the beliefs which those sentences express. This means that expressivists
      are committed to a certain order of explanation being the correct one for
      natural language descriptive sentences. It isn’t that descriptive natural
      language sentences express beliefs because they express the propositions
      which are the contents of the beliefs that they are therefore apt to
      express. It is rather that they express these propositions because they
      are the contents of the mental states that are the appropriateness
      conditions for asserting those sentences (29–35). The Frege‐Geach Problem
      Peter Geach and John Searle famously highlighted noncognitivist
      shortcomings at providing a general
    sentences:
      - >-
        semantics for moral language.2 Noncognitivists had, at the time of this
        complaint, told us what free‐standing assertive utterances of simple
        declarative moral sentences meant by telling us about the noncognitive
        state that such utterances expressed, or the speech act they were used
        to perform.3 But without more it is not obvious how to extend their
        suggestions to embedded uses of these same expressions in more complex
        constructions. These complexes can be accepted by speakers who do not
        have the attitude which would be expressed were the embedded sentence to
        be used unembedded. Thus one simple extension of the noncognitivist
        story for simple declarations—that the embedded sentence expresses the
        very same attitude as its unembedded counterpart—seems to be ruled out
        from the start. Yet a criterion of adequacy for completing the
        noncognitivist story is that it explain the logical relations between
        different moral sentences. And the obvious way to accomplish that is for
        sentences to contribute the same contents to utterances whether they
        occur embedded or by themselves. This is why Geach thought it relevant
        to emphasize what he called “The Frege Point”: “A thought may have just
        the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition
        may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be
        recognizably the same proposition.” Contemporary expressivists such as
        Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn have taken this challenge especially
        seriously. Their central idea is that we can make the most headway in
        understanding all the features of moral discourse by beginning with an
        account
      - >-
        Humean metaphor of projection). The realist fiction is understood as a
        philosophical miscon ception of a discourse that is not fundamentally
        representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is,
        however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the
        subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of
        debunking but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed.
        Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist
        maintains, but in uttering a moral sentence competent speakers do not
        assert the moral proposition expressed but rather convey by means of it
        the noncognitive attitude centrally involved in moral acceptance. Moral
        fictionalism is this alternative to standard noncognitivism. Moral
        fiction alism is noncognitivism without nonfactualism. Not only does the
        distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism and nonfactualism raise
        the logical possibility of moral fictionalism, but it also makes clear
        the general form of argument required to establish its truth. To
        establish the truth of moral fictionalism, it suffices to: (1) argue for
        the psychological claim of noncognitivism. (2) argue against
        expressivist nonfactualism. Indeed, this was the argumentative strategy
        that I pursued in Moral Fictionalism. I am not going to talk about my
        case for noncognitivism, but I will talk about the problem that formed
        the basis of my case against expressivist nonfactualism. 2. The
        Frege-Geach Problem The Frege-Geach problem was first raised by Ross
        (1939: 33-34) and independently by Geach (1958, 1960, 1965) and Searle
        (1962, 1969) and was originally directed at expressivist proposals such
        as Ayer's emotivism: It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do
      - >-
        other hand, a view that identifies natural kinds with groups the
        distinguishing of which helps us to achieve our ends (e.g., Kitcher
        2007) transparently fails the content-independence requirement, as its
        fundamental categorical principle explic itly refers to features of the
        categorizer. Alternatively, some views fail the content independence
        requirement only when the commitments that inform the intended
        interpretation of the fundamental categorical principle are themselves
        considered. For instance, accounts that tie the naturalness of a kind to
        the role of that kind (or its connected category) in explanation and
        induction (e.g., Boyd 1991) will be anti realist if explanatory and
        inductive norms are themselves understood as correct or incorrect only
        relative to us. They would also be anti-realist, via a somewhat
        different route, if the particular explanations and inductions that a
        kind (or its connected category) must serve were to be selected by us,
        rather than being privileged by the agenda of the mind-independent
        universe. After all, different categories are suitable to different
        explanatory and inductive targets, a circumstance that (as will be
        considered more below) can yield mind-dependent—and thus anti
        realist—natural kinds. Somewhat more subtly, a theory of natural kinds
        is status independent just in case its fundamental categorical principle
        is understood as correct or incorrect mind independently, rather than it
        having an ultimately subjective grounding. That subjective grounding
        might involve some feature of our innate conceptual architecture or the
        output of a circuitous process of cultural change. No matter what,
model-index:
  - name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
    results:
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: nomic
          type: nomic
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.97
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.03
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.968
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.97
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.97
            name: Max Accuracy
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.9785
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.0215
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.979
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.9785
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.979
            name: Max Accuracy

SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

Model Type: Sentence Transformer
Base model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v7")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'the role. The basic idea is that it is the role of a semantic theory to assign to each assertoric sentence a mental state which it serves to express in virtue of the fact that being in that mental state is the assertability condition for that sentence. The full story begins with atomic sentences, assigning beliefs to the descriptive sentences and some sort of noncognitive state to the normative sentences. More complex sentences involving sentential connectives assign a more complex mental state to these more complex constructions, with the exact nature of the complex state depending on a function contributed by the connective and arguments contributed by the semantic values of the atomic sentences. It is only after these states have been determined as the semantic values of the sentences that certain types of sentences, the descriptive sentences, get associated with propositions—the propositions that are the objects of the beliefs which those sentences express. This means that expressivists are committed to a certain order of explanation being the correct one for natural language descriptive sentences. It isn’t that descriptive natural language sentences express beliefs because they express the propositions which are the contents of the beliefs that they are therefore apt to express. It is rather that they express these propositions because they are the contents of the mental states that are the appropriateness conditions for asserting those sentences (29–35). The Frege‐Geach Problem Peter Geach and John Searle famously highlighted noncognitivist shortcomings at providing a general',
    'semantics for moral language.2 Noncognitivists had, at the time of this complaint, told us what free‐standing assertive utterances of simple declarative moral sentences meant by telling us about the noncognitive state that such utterances expressed, or the speech act they were used to perform.3 But without more it is not obvious how to extend their suggestions to embedded uses of these same expressions in more complex constructions. These complexes can be accepted by speakers who do not have the attitude which would be expressed were the embedded sentence to be used unembedded. Thus one simple extension of the noncognitivist story for simple declarations—that the embedded sentence expresses the very same attitude as its unembedded counterpart—seems to be ruled out from the start. Yet a criterion of adequacy for completing the noncognitivist story is that it explain the logical relations between different moral sentences. And the obvious way to accomplish that is for sentences to contribute the same contents to utterances whether they occur embedded or by themselves. This is why Geach thought it relevant to emphasize what he called “The Frege Point”: “A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition.” Contemporary expressivists such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn have taken this challenge especially seriously. Their central idea is that we can make the most headway in understanding all the features of moral discourse by beginning with an account',
    "Humean metaphor of projection). The realist fiction is understood as a philosophical miscon ception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in uttering a moral sentence competent speakers do not assert the moral proposition expressed but rather convey by means of it the noncognitive attitude centrally involved in moral acceptance. Moral fictionalism is this alternative to standard noncognitivism. Moral fiction alism is noncognitivism without nonfactualism. Not only does the distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism and nonfactualism raise the logical possibility of moral fictionalism, but it also makes clear the general form of argument required to establish its truth. To establish the truth of moral fictionalism, it suffices to: (1) argue for the psychological claim of noncognitivism. (2) argue against expressivist nonfactualism. Indeed, this was the argumentative strategy that I pursued in Moral Fictionalism. I am not going to talk about my case for noncognitivism, but I will talk about the problem that formed the basis of my case against expressivist nonfactualism. 2. The Frege-Geach Problem The Frege-Geach problem was first raised by Ross (1939: 33-34) and independently by Geach (1958, 1960, 1965) and Searle (1962, 1969) and was originally directed at expressivist proposals such as Ayer's emotivism: It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do",
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Evaluation

Metrics

Triplet

Dataset: nomic
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.97
dot_accuracy	0.03
manhattan_accuracy	0.968
euclidean_accuracy	0.97
max_accuracy	0.97

Triplet

Dataset: nomic
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.9785
dot_accuracy	0.0215
manhattan_accuracy	0.979
euclidean_accuracy	0.9785
max_accuracy	0.979

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 10,000 training samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 263 tokens mean: 330.21 tokens max: 483 tokens	min: 278 tokens mean: 331.97 tokens max: 529 tokens	min: 271 tokens mean: 330.7 tokens max: 480 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
Plutarch of Athens, the teacher of Proclus' teacher, Syrianus, and argues that the demiurge is not the highest principle for Hierocles, nor does his work show any particular closeness to Christianity. However S. thinks that the One is not mentioned in the Commentary on the Golden Verses because the Commentary deals with ethics, rather than, as Hadot thought, because it is an elementary work. He suggests on p. 56 that Hierocles did differ from Plotinus in his view of man's ethical end: this was not return to the One or even full assimilation to the demiurge but rather a return to the highest level beneath the moon, which for Hierocles was the place from which the soul had fallen. The notes to the translations in Parts II and III are very full, offering a commentary on the text rather than just explanatory notes to the translations. S.'s work makes Hierocles much more accessible than before and will be required reading for anyone working on these texts. Commentaries on individual treatises of Plotinus continue to appear at a steady rate. The latest addition to the French series commentaries under I Hermann S. Schibli, Alexandria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002. P . xvi 419 60. the broader series title of 'Histoire des doctrines de l'antiquite classique' is Richard Dufour's edition of Ennead 2.1.2 Like the other volumes in the series this offers a full introduction to the treatise, a Greek text, taken from Henry and Schwyzer's OCT editio minor, a French translation and a very full commentary. Alongside it comes a reprint of the edition of	Ennead 6.6 first published in 1980 and arising out of Jean Pepin's seminar at the CNRS.3 A photographic reprint of the first edition is complemented by a final page of additional bibliography compiled by Luc Brisson. Meanwhile Pavlos Kalligas has produced another volume of his full edition of the Enneads, covering the whole of Ennead III.4 Like the previous volumes this offers a Greek text, a modern Greek translation and a full modern Greek commentary; bibliography is given both for individual treatises and in a general bibliography at the end of the volume. Two translations of a rather different kind have been published in the series CAGL (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Versiones latinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum). Both are facsimile editions of Renaissance Latin translations of the Aristotelian commentators.5 Vol. 9 contains Gauricus' translation of Ammonius' commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge and Rasarius' translation of Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories, while vol. 10 offers Hieronymus Bagolinus' translation of Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione. The translations of Ammonius are preceded by an introduction by Rainer Thiel, who covers Ammonius' life and work and the two commentaries included in the volume, and Charles Lohr, who contributes a couple of pages on Ammonius in the Latin tradition. Frans de Haas has written the introduction to the translation of Philoponus, including a discussion of Philoponus' GC commentary in the Latin tradition. Both introductions are useful but that by de	that group, are the most consistently provocative. They are unique documents in the history of philosophy, full of surprising and challenging arguments. The third part, outside the purview of this review, contains the works of some of the eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine commentators. This is material at the outermost reaches of the empire of Ancient Greek philosophy, but it is not without interest, particularly as a counterbalance to the mediaeval Latin Christian interpretations of the Greeks. The translations of Alexander by Madigan and Dooley, which continue their joint work in the publication of Metaphysics 2 and 3, reflect accurately the commentator's lapidary and somewhat pedantic style. There is an admirable consistency in vocabulary employed by the two translators. Scrupulous attention to the details of the text make these highly reliable tools. What philosophers will no doubt be interested in learning is to what extent these tools, and the other Alexander commentaries in the series, are of use in understanding Aristotle, and whether or not they have been permanently superseded by contemporary commentaries such as those in the Oxford Aristotle series. I can think of at least two reasons why the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias should be regarded by all students of Aristotle as indispensable. I shall confine my remarks to Metaphysics 4 and 5, but I believe they apply to all the rest. First, Alexander manifestly attempts to follow the arguments in their own terms. He is not so far removed from Aristotle in philosophical culture as
route of influence. However. I am not interested in chartThe ing causal chronology. I suspect that feminist perspectives are sometimes partial contributors to the shifts that have occurred in aesthetics over the past two decades, though sometimes there is less influence than coincidental kinship of conclusions. My aim is to outline several feminist challenges to concepts of art and cultural value, noting their congruence with changes in similar concepts and approaches operating in aesthetics. I hope that these considerations will suggest areas where awareness of gender issues ought to prod aesthetic theory to further revisions. I begin with an observation about philosophy in general and the recent dramatic rise of interest in theories of emotions in this discipline. This new attention to emotion can be found in moral theory, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science, as well as in aesthetics. Moreover, many of these analyses are devoted to refuting the bad reputation emotions have had since antiquity and to arguing for their cognitive, moral, and aesthetic value. In this aspect of their work, the vindicators of emotion are in stride with feminist critiques of the way the concept of reason operates in traditional philosophical discourse. A deep, basic claim of feminist scholarship in virtually all its guises is that a good portion of the history and tradition of philosophy is flawed by gender bias, often because of its reliance on concepts of rationality. Rationality-as a philosophical concept-is a human trait that has been delimited by its contrast to other mental capacities,	such as appetites, desires, and emotions. Classically (and medievally and modernly) the powers of the rational mind are conceived as the highest achievement of man. There is some generic connotation to this claim (for rationality distinguishes men from beasts), but also a good dose of the specific, for rationality fully achieved is usually cast as a preeminently masculine accomplishment. Just how equal is the potential for rational activity between males and females is a point of dispute. Plato gets a lot of credit for arguing for equal mental talents in Republic V; Aristotle comes in for a lot of blame for founding a pernicious and powerful tradition that limits the rational capability of females.3 In the Renaissance there is a flurry of debate over this issue, including arguments for complete equality of rationality between the sexes.4 In spite of a history of debate on the subject, when it comes to characterizing the field generally, there is an intransigent alignment of feminine temperament with the "less rational" regions of sensation, appetite-and emotion.5 Feminist scholars have discovered gender bias in basic philosophical concepts and argued that the reliance on rationality and correlative concepts like objectivity belies the putative universal scope of philosophical claims, revealing their gendered tailoring. This has opened the way to explorations of concepts less arrogated to males. Thus many feminist philosophers have turned their attentions to studies of the emotions. Perspectives emphasizing care rather than justice are being explored in ethics, and degrees of affect and	in generation? Do women and men relate to wisdom in the same or in different ways? Do women and men have the same or different virtues? These questions, she says, correspond to four traditional areas of philosophical thought: metaphysics, natural philosophy, epistemology, and moral philosophy. Allen then shows how the answers given by the philosophers to the above questions reveal a limited number of alternative theories about the relation of the sexes. These theories are: sex unity (men and women are equal and not significantly different), sex neutrality (ignores the issue of male and female differentiation), sex polarity (men and women are different and the male is superior), reverse sex polarity (men and women are different and the female is superior), and sex complementarity (men and women are different but equal). The primary debate in the history of philosophy, Allen claims, has been between theories of sex unity, championed by Plato and the Neo-Platonists, and sex polarity, developed by Aristotle and institutionalized by the early medieval philosophers. Not until Hildegard of Bingen do we find a secure foundation for the theory of sex complementarity, a theory which, by the way, is Allen's own preference. After Hildegard, according to Allen, there was a "movement back and forth between theories of sex unity, sex complementarity, and sex polarity, without any one theory dominating Western thought ... "(361). But with the discovery of certain Aristotelian texts and their translation into Latin, and with the decision of Thomas Aquinas to use Aristotle
too much of a good thing that grates on the nerves, an excessive beauty that strains the ears. That this should be James' orientation toward Bergson seems strange, given that the two of them were good friends, and that James openly appreciated both the thought and the style, the form and the content, of Bergson's work. It is not necessary, however, to tum to biographical information in order to undermine Stevens' dual interpretations of James' remarks. One has merely to turn to the broader quote from James from which Stevens is quoting in order to encounter a strikingly different appearance: 0 my Bergson, you are a magician, and your book is a marvel, a real wonder in the history of philosophy.... In finishing it I found the same after-taste remaining as after finishing Madame Bovary, such a flavor of persistent euphony, as of a rich river that never foamed or ran thin, but steadily and firmly proceeded with its banks full to the brim.3 Taken thus in its completion, James' remarks are anything but pejorative. James opens with a warm and affectionate greeting. The words magician, marvel, and wonder all suggest power and greatness. James' use of imagery from the sen sory modalities of taste and hearing—"after-taste," "flavor," and "euphony"— demonstrates one aspect of his literary, poetic flair and thereby reinforces the complimentary nature of his remarks. Lastly, James compares this "persistent euphony" to one of the most prominent images in all of his work, perhaps even the metaphor for which he is	most famous—that of the river or stream, as in the stream of consciousness. And the river Bergson has created, according to James, is of a near-perfect nature, never foaming or running thin, but "steadily and firmly proceeding] with its banks full to the brim." Evidently, when one plugs this more exhaustive understanding of James' quote into the two quotes from Stevens above, one recognizes that Stevens has completely obscured, misrepresented, and disguised James' perspective on Bergson. And this disguise thereby extends not only to James' evaluation of Bergson's style but also—with regard to the first quote from Stevens—to the content of Bergson's philosophy and to the content of philosophy in general as well. My next step in this now suspiciously attuned investigation is to turn to a closer examination of the entirety of Stevens Hall 2 Stevens On Poetry-Philosophy "I am not a philosopher," Stevens writes in this philosophically rich essay posit ing the existence of poetic philosophical ideas. This first irony aside, he defines these ideas as "ideas that are inherently poetic, as, for example, the concept of the infinity of the world" which "is a poetic idea because it gives the imagina tion sudden life" (cpp, 860,851). The tide of the essay, "A Collect of Philosophy," refers to the collect, "[a] brief prayer that is used in various Western liturgies before the epistle and var ies with the day."4 The title, then, suggests that Stevens is thinking of these remarks on poetic philosophical ideas as	sublime is of a character that, while yet an aspect of nature, is an aspect in some sense superior to nature, in that it grants nature its symmetry and concord: it grants its aesthetic. The sublime, as this aesthetic of nature, is thus realized by the human process in infinitely many ways: indeed, in works of art, but in the cosmic structures of the multiverse or in the snowbound fields of rural iowa as the eagles soar and swoop and circle above. And so the divine is thus subsumed, though not consumed, within and through the sublime. The divine becomes now an artwork, its infinite expressions infinite expressions of the sublime, thus in their turn inspiring poetry and symphonies and sculptures. And as expressions of the sublime, the gods can then too be translated to be more efficacious and less oppressive expressions: the divine is freed from the darker realms of the depth dimensions of nature to become a means to achieve wholeness and completeness. complimenting corriington’s refiguring of the divine through the sublime are notions of the American poet Wallace stevens to be found in two essays, “Two or Three ideas” and “A collect of Philosophy.”12 stevens was indeed a philosopher as well as a poet: in a letter to Paul Weiss, stevens expressed his 6. ibid., 167. 7. ibid., 181. 8. ibid., 171. 9. ibid., 172. 10. ibid. 11. ibid., 181. 12. belief that philosophy is a cosmic poetry. stevens was thus very much at home in

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 500 evaluation samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 271 tokens mean: 331.61 tokens max: 526 tokens	min: 277 tokens mean: 331.71 tokens max: 469 tokens	min: 279 tokens mean: 328.47 tokens max: 431 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
the cases which it is intended to include, the fact that acquaintance is in volved seems a priori evident, and not merely a statistical occurrence. I do not know what, precisely, is the logical difference between these two kinds of connection, but it seems plain that there is a difference. The kind of con nection intended in the definition is what we may call the a priori kind; and since the difficulties of the distinction belong solely to logic, we need not investigate them further at present. Theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is more difficult to define. To begin with, no definition can be satisfactory which introduces the word "knowledge," both because this word is highly ambiguous, and because every one of its possible meanings can only be made clear after much epistemological discussion. Then again, difficulties arise as regards the relations of epistemology to psychology and to logic respectively. It is obvious that much of episte mology is included in psychology. The analysis of experi ence, the distinctions between sensation, imagination, mem ory, attention, etc., the nature of belief or judgment, in 584 THE MONIST. short all the analytic portion of the subject, in so far as it does not introduce the distinction between truth and falsehood, must, I think, be regarded as strictly part of psychology. On the other hand, the distinction between truth and falsehood, which is plainly relevant to the theory of knowledge, would seem to belong to logic, though this is open to some	degree of doubt. And in any case, as soon as we reach the theory of judgment, even apart from truth and falsehood, the difficulties encountered are almost en tirely logical, and logical discoveries are what are most re quired for the progress of the subject. It can be shown1 that a judgment, and generally all thought whose expres sion involves propositions, must be a fact of a different logical form from any of the series : subject-predicate facts, dual relations, triple relations, etc. In this way, a difficult and interesting problem of pure logic arises, namely the problem of enlarging the inventory of logical forms so as to include forms appropriate to the facts of epistemology. It would seem, therefore, that it is impossible to assign to the theory of knowledge a province distinct from that of logic and psychology. Any attempt to mark out such a province must, I believe, be artificial and therefore harmful. The central problem of epistemology is the problem of distinguishing between true and false beliefs, and of find ing, in as many regions as possible, criteria of true belief within those regions. This problem takes us, through the analysis of belief and its presuppositions, into psychology and the enumeration of cognitive relations, while it takes us into logic through the distinction of truth and falsehood, which is irrelevant in a merely psychological discussion of belief. We may define epistemology in terms of this prob lem, as : The analysis of true and false belief and	assumption, that has been subjected or that can be subjected to critical evaluation and justification. In its first characterization, knowledge is trustworthy belief. It is a belief or a system of beliefs that can be logically justified. Within logical justification I include everything that may be thought relevant and adequate in logic and epistemology and scientific method. When we consider the trustworthiness of a belief apart from chains or systems of beliefs it is usual to speak of epistemology. When we consider beliefs in chains of deductive or. inductive proof or in other systematic interconnections we usually consider the subject as being logic. Yet, fundamentally, there is little difference here. In all these problems we are considering the logical evaluation or criticism of beliefs as purporting to be knowledge. Many philosophers seem to long for the good old days when they could be competent experts in the field of psychology. For better or for worse, those days are gone, probably never to return. The task of the philosopher now in this field is the same as his primary task has always been, to show what distinguishes more trustworthy from less trustworthy thought. Our beliefs, in all their groupings, are found, under critical or evaluative examination, to fall into a scale. With no pretence here of an adequate account of the matter, it seems that beliefs constitute a scale which runs from what might be called zero probability or zero evidence or zero plausibility to more and
draws a contrast between scientific objectivity and practical reason. He takes the unfashionably sane view that science tells us about the world that is already there independent of our theories, and elaborates this in terms of the idea (taken from his earlier book on Descartes) of an "absolute" conception of reality, a conception which is to a maximum degree independent of our human or personal perspectives and their peculiarities, but which at the same time places those perspectives within the world and explains both why the world appears to them as it does and how it is possible for us to form the absolute conception itself. The way the world really is explains how we can form a correct conception of it by transcending the appearances, even if we start from distinct subjective points of view. But ethical thought is concerned with the question how we should live, not how things are. Even if this question were to admit of convergence on a single answer from different perspectives, the explanation could not be anything like the one science offers for convergence in our beliefs about what the world is like. tions and disagreements are not like perceptions caused by the action on our senses of a single external world. So the defense of objective principles in ethics requires an alternative account of how convergence on the truth is possible, as well as a theory of error to explain the evident and frequent failures of convergence. But Williams argues that there is no such alternative. Mathematics provides no better a model for	ethical truth and knowledge than science does: any account must be specifically suited to the subject matter. The question is whether any of the leading candidates has a chance of being right. Not every ethical theory tries to provide ethics with a universal and inescapable foundation. Williams also criticizes certain forms of utilitarianism and contractualism, represented by R. M. Hare, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon, which start from the motivational assumption of some form of impartiality without claiming that such impartiality is itself universally required. He argues that they are in different ways motivationally unrealistic. [About the peculiar state of moral consciousness required by indirect or two-level utilitarianism, for example, he says: "One cannot separate, except by an imposed and illusory dissociation, the theorist in oneself from the self whose dispositions are being theorized" (110).] But I want to concentrate on his objections to the two traditions of strictly foundational theory he thinks it most important to rule out: the Kantian and the Aristotelian. One tries to ground ethics in our rationality and the other, in our humanity. This means the first has somewhat more universal pretensions than the second, but both attempt to prove the authority of ethics inescapable by basing it on something essential about us. And both purport to offer an objective solution, in the form of an endorsement of certain principles and dispositions from a standpoint outside the cultural and personal contingencies of our lives-a	philsophical appetites whetted turn to a careful reading of the book itself. 1. Williams is skeptical about the role of philosophy in ethical thought. We can think about ethics, he suggests. But philosophy cannot tell us how to do it. Neither can it play a crucial role in the process of ethical thinking. On the other hand, philosophy has had and continues to have a distorting impact on ethics because of its penchant for theory and for abstract and general thought. Much of what Williams has to say on this topic is developed around a discussion of prejudice, a phenomenon that has concerned moral theCritical Notice of Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 291 orists like R.M. Hare deeply. Williams' view is that prejudice cannot be shown to be irrational. It is wrong because it is unethical. Furthermore, the best way to deal with it is by thinking clearly using the 'thick' ethical notions made available by one's culture, not by spinning abstract ethical theories that distort the nature of ethical thought. What Williams has to say on this topic raises a serious problem. Who should be considered members of the moral community and who should not? Williams rejects the answer given to this question by utilitarians like Singer arguing that speciesism, for example, is not a mistake (118). Equally, he rejects the view that philosophical analysis of concepts like the concept of a person can be of any value, citing the abortion debate as an
while, the traditional approach and that he had spent more time doing what he promised early in the book to do. But I suppose this is asking for an altogether different kind of book. This is a report of the second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii from June 20 to July 28, 1949. The formal papers read before the conference, supplemented by an introductory chapter by the editor and a concluding chapter of reports from the seminars of the conference, constitute the content of the volume. The addresses are presented under the three heads of methodology, metaphysics, and ethics and social philzsophy; the reports of seminars are from the same three fields of inquiry. In the subtitle, the volume is advertised as an attempt at world philosophical synthesis"a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the East and West." No claim is made that such a synthesis was achieved by the conference. According to the editor, most participants in the conference were agreed that "the most significant general results of the conference consisted in a highly developed attitude of openmindedness and cordiality, without which no synthesis of East and West will ever be possible," and that "the great single result of the Conference-and its chief contribution to world philosophy-consists of the numerous provocative and highly significant proposed syntheses, or avenues towards synthesis, of Eastern and Western philosophy" (pp. 6, 9). There is talk of "the ideal of 'orchestrated unity'" and of "the attitude of world perspective-one way of expressing the entire spirit	of the Conference." But the question remains how the former differs from eclecticism and the latter from the attitude of open-mindedness and in what sense the attainment of these ideals would give us a world philosophy. There is no question, however, that the conference succeeded in sharpening the points of agreement and the points of disagreement between oriental and occidental methods of philosophizing and conceptions of its objective. To an outsider this appears to be the most significant accomplishment of the 72 ETHICS conference, and it is, in any event, an indispensable first step toward a world philosophical synthesis. title of this book is understood "roughly the twentieth century with a little background of the nineteenth." The currents of philosophy surveyed are, primarily, British and American: neo-Hegelian idealism; pragmatism; realism, New and Critical; the theory of sense data; emergent evolution; logical positivism. Croce and Gentile are given one chapter together, and Bergson and Whitehead one chapter each. The philosophical aspects of Marxism are outlined and evaluated in a chapter of seventeen pages, while Indian thought is given a chapter of forty pages under the title of "Indian Idealism" (K. C. Bhattacharya and S. Radhakrishnan) and an Appendix of eighteen pages, abstracted from the author's article in the November, 1948, issue of the Philosophical Review, under the title "The Contributions of Modern Indian Philosophy to World Philosophy" (Aurobindo, Tagore, Gandhi). An account of "existentialism" is omitted on the ground that it "is yet a little	subject in their departments of philosophy. Why should philosophy remain so little touched by the rapid currents of modern life? The philosophic thought of India and China has been far from insignificant. The influence of these philosophies upon millions of people is quite sufficient to justify their study. Under modern circumstances, a school of philosophy which allows its students to graduate without an acquaintance with non-European philosophical thought is really an anachronism. The fact that there are now three important centers of philosophy, not merely one, sets the problem of this paper: what are the tasks a modern philosophy should undertake with regard to these nonEuropean philosophies? The first task is naturally that of searching through these philosophies for new or previously unstressed concepts or solutions to philosophical problems. The larger the number of people and the more varied their backgrounds, the more likely that all the pertinent solutions to a problem will appear. In philosophy, the East does have important contributions to make. In recent centuries the concept of divine immanence, the stimulus to which came from India, has revolutionized the philosophy of religion, and the end of its transforming power is still far from having been reached. American Transcendentalism owed much to Hindu philosophy. The philosophers of the enlightenment, especially the continental philosophers, eagerly studied what they could find of Chinese philosophy, even though it came to them in an imperfect and garbled form. Only a few years ago there

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

eval_strategy: steps
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.01
warmup_ratio: 0.1
batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Click to expand

overwrite_output_dir: False
do_predict: False
eval_strategy: steps
prediction_loss_only: True
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
eval_accumulation_steps: None
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.01
adam_beta1: 0.9
adam_beta2: 0.999
adam_epsilon: 1e-08
max_grad_norm: 1.0
num_train_epochs: 3
max_steps: -1
lr_scheduler_type: linear
lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
warmup_ratio: 0.1
warmup_steps: 0
log_level: passive
log_level_replica: warning
log_on_each_node: True
logging_nan_inf_filter: True
save_safetensors: True
save_on_each_node: False
save_only_model: False
restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
no_cuda: False
use_cpu: False
use_mps_device: False
seed: 42
data_seed: None
jit_mode_eval: False
use_ipex: False
bf16: False
fp16: False
fp16_opt_level: O1
half_precision_backend: auto
bf16_full_eval: False
fp16_full_eval: False
tf32: None
local_rank: 0
ddp_backend: None
tpu_num_cores: None
tpu_metrics_debug: False
debug: []
dataloader_drop_last: False
dataloader_num_workers: 0
dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
past_index: -1
disable_tqdm: False
remove_unused_columns: True
label_names: None
load_best_model_at_end: False
ignore_data_skip: False
fsdp: []
fsdp_min_num_params: 0
fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
deepspeed: None
label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
optim: adamw_torch
optim_args: None
adafactor: False
group_by_length: False
length_column_name: length
ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
dataloader_pin_memory: True
dataloader_persistent_workers: False
skip_memory_metrics: True
use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
push_to_hub: False
resume_from_checkpoint: None
hub_model_id: None
hub_strategy: every_save
hub_private_repo: False
hub_always_push: False
gradient_checkpointing: False
gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
include_inputs_for_metrics: False
eval_do_concat_batches: True
fp16_backend: auto
push_to_hub_model_id: None
push_to_hub_organization: None
mp_parameters:
auto_find_batch_size: False
full_determinism: False
torchdynamo: None
ray_scope: last
ddp_timeout: 1800
torch_compile: False
torch_compile_backend: None
torch_compile_mode: None
dispatch_batches: None
split_batches: None
include_tokens_per_second: False
include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
neftune_noise_alpha: None
optim_target_modules: None
batch_eval_metrics: False
eval_on_start: False
batch_sampler: no_duplicates
multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional

Training Logs

Epoch	Step	Training Loss	loss	nomic_max_accuracy
0	0	-	-	0.92
0.04	100	0.008	0.0111	0.918
0.08	200	0.0076	0.0097	0.926
0.12	300	0.0056	0.0086	0.934
0.16	400	0.0068	0.0081	0.938
0.2	500	0.0068	0.0075	0.944
0.24	600	0.0048	0.0072	0.95
0.28	700	0.0057	0.0072	0.948
0.32	800	0.0048	0.0063	0.956
0.36	900	0.0061	0.0052	0.962
0.4	1000	0.0055	0.0058	0.96
0.44	1100	0.0035	0.0054	0.956
0.48	1200	0.0036	0.0045	0.964
0.52	1300	0.0043	0.0045	0.964
0.56	1400	0.003	0.0066	0.948
0.6	1500	0.0036	0.0043	0.962
0.64	1600	0.0035	0.0042	0.968
0.68	1700	0.0048	0.0043	0.966
0.72	1800	0.0034	0.0036	0.972
0.76	1900	0.0025	0.0034	0.972
0.8	2000	0.0051	0.0042	0.962
0.84	2100	0.0023	0.0035	0.97
0.88	2200	0.0046	0.0040	0.968
0.92	2300	0.0038	0.0044	0.968
0.96	2400	0.0055	0.0042	0.966
1.0	2500	0.004	0.0035	0.972
1.04	2600	0.0015	0.0033	0.97
1.08	2700	0.0014	-	0.979

Framework Versions

Python: 3.10.12
Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
Transformers: 4.42.4
PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
Accelerate: 0.32.1
Datasets: 2.21.0
Tokenizers: 0.19.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

TripletLoss

@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}