instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: IPV6BuildTestPacket(uint32_t id, uint16_t off, int mf, const char content,
int content_len)
{
Packet *p = NULL;
uint8_t *pcontent;
IPV6Hdr ip6h;
p = SCCalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + default_packet_size);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return NULL;
PACKET_INITIALIZE(p);
gettimeofday(&p->ts, NULL);
ip6h.s_ip6_nxt = 44;
ip6h.s_ip6_hlim = 2;
/* Source and dest address - very bogus addresses. */
ip6h.s_ip6_src[0] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[1] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[2] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_src[3] = 0x01010101;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[0] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[1] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[2] = 0x02020202;
ip6h.s_ip6_dst[3] = 0x02020202;
/* copy content_len crap, we need full length */
PacketCopyData(p, (uint8_t *)&ip6h, sizeof(IPV6Hdr));
p->ip6h = (IPV6Hdr *)GET_PKT_DATA(p);
IPV6_SET_RAW_VER(p->ip6h, 6);
/* Fragmentation header. */
IPV6FragHdr *fh = (IPV6FragHdr *)(GET_PKT_DATA(p) + sizeof(IPV6Hdr));
fh->ip6fh_nxt = IPPROTO_ICMP;
fh->ip6fh_ident = htonl(id);
fh->ip6fh_offlg = htons((off << 3) | mf);
DecodeIPV6FragHeader(p, (uint8_t *)fh, 8, 8 + content_len, 0);
pcontent = SCCalloc(1, content_len);
if (unlikely(pcontent == NULL))
return NULL;
memset(pcontent, content, content_len);
PacketCopyDataOffset(p, sizeof(IPV6Hdr) + sizeof(IPV6FragHdr), pcontent, content_len);
SET_PKT_LEN(p, sizeof(IPV6Hdr) + sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len);
SCFree(pcontent);
p->ip6h->s_ip6_plen = htons(sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len);
SET_IPV6_SRC_ADDR(p, &p->src);
SET_IPV6_DST_ADDR(p, &p->dst);
/* Self test. */
if (IPV6_GET_VER(p) != 6)
goto error;
if (IPV6_GET_NH(p) != 44)
goto error;
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(p) != sizeof(IPV6FragHdr) + content_len)
goto error;
return p;
error:
fprintf(stderr, "Error building test packet.\n");
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host. | Low | 168,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: AppModalDialog::AppModalDialog(WebContents* web_contents, const string16& title)
: valid_(true),
native_dialog_(NULL),
title_(title),
web_contents_(web_contents) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extension system in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 does not properly handle modal dialogs, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix a Windows crash bug with javascript alerts from extension popups.
BUG=137707
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10828423
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152716 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PdfCompositorClient::Composite(
service_manager::Connector* connector,
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle,
size_t data_size,
mojom::PdfCompositor::CompositePdfCallback callback,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> callback_task_runner) {
DCHECK(data_size);
if (!compositor_)
Connect(connector);
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle buffer_handle =
mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle, data_size, true);
compositor_->CompositePdf(
std::move(buffer_handle),
base::BindOnce(&OnCompositePdf, base::Passed(&compositor_),
std::move(callback), callback_task_runner));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,858 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: views::ImageButton* close_button() const {
return media_controls_view_->close_button_;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: A timing attack in SVG rendering in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Linux, Windows, and Mac allowed a remote attacker to extract pixel values from a cross-origin page being iframe'd via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253} | High | 172,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void gdImageCopyResized (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY, int srcX, int srcY, int dstW, int dstH, int srcW, int srcH)
{
int c;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int ydest;
int i;
int colorMap[gdMaxColors];
/* Stretch vectors */
int *stx, *sty;
if (overflow2(sizeof(int), srcW)) {
return;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof(int), srcH)) {
return;
}
stx = (int *) gdMalloc (sizeof (int) * srcW);
sty = (int *) gdMalloc (sizeof (int) * srcH);
/* Fixed by Mao Morimoto 2.0.16 */
for (i = 0; (i < srcW); i++) {
stx[i] = dstW * (i+1) / srcW - dstW * i / srcW ;
}
for (i = 0; (i < srcH); i++) {
sty[i] = dstH * (i+1) / srcH - dstH * i / srcH ;
}
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
colorMap[i] = (-1);
}
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + srcH)); y++) {
for (ydest = 0; (ydest < sty[y - srcY]); ydest++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; (x < (srcX + srcW)); x++) {
int nc = 0;
int mapTo;
if (!stx[x - srcX]) {
continue;
}
if (dst->trueColor) {
/* 2.0.9: Thorben Kundinger: Maybe the source image is not a truecolor image */
if (!src->trueColor) {
int tmp = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
mapTo = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (src, x, y);
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == tmp) {
/* 2.0.21, TK: not tox++ */
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
} else {
/* TK: old code follows */
mapTo = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == mapTo) {
/* 2.0.21, TK: not tox++ */
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
}
} else {
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox += stx[x - srcX];
continue;
}
if (src->trueColor) {
/* Remap to the palette available in the destination image. This is slow and works badly. */
mapTo = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(dst, gdTrueColorGetRed(c),
gdTrueColorGetGreen(c),
gdTrueColorGetBlue(c),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha (c));
} else {
/* Have we established a mapping for this color? */
if (colorMap[c] == (-1)) {
/* If it's the same image, mapping is trivial */
if (dst == src) {
nc = c;
} else {
/* Find or create the best match */
/* 2.0.5: can't use gdTrueColorGetRed, etc with palette */
nc = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(dst, gdImageRed(src, c),
gdImageGreen(src, c),
gdImageBlue(src, c),
gdImageAlpha(src, c));
}
colorMap[c] = nc;
}
mapTo = colorMap[c];
}
}
for (i = 0; (i < stx[x - srcX]); i++) {
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, mapTo);
tox++;
}
}
toy++;
}
}
gdFree (stx);
gdFree (sty);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the gdImageCreate function in gd.c in the GD Graphics Library (aka libgd) before 2.0.34RC1, as used in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted image dimensions.
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow | Medium | 167,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> scaleSkImage(sk_sp<SkImage> skImage,
unsigned resizeWidth,
unsigned resizeHeight,
SkFilterQuality resizeQuality) {
SkImageInfo resizedInfo = SkImageInfo::Make(
resizeWidth, resizeHeight, kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
resizeWidth * resizeHeight, resizedInfo.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> resizedPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
SkPixmap pixmap(
resizedInfo, resizedPixels->data(),
static_cast<size_t>(resizeWidth) * resizedInfo.bytesPerPixel());
skImage->scalePixels(pixmap, resizeQuality);
return SkImage::MakeFromRaster(pixmap,
[](const void*, void* pixels) {
static_cast<Uint8Array*>(pixels)->deref();
},
resizedPixels.release().leakRef());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Bad casting in bitmap manipulation in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936} | Medium | 172,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
{
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct path path;
struct sock *skpair;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int state;
unix_remove_socket(sk);
/* Clear state */
unix_state_lock(sk);
sock_orphan(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
path = u->path;
u->path.dentry = NULL;
u->path.mnt = NULL;
state = sk->sk_state;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
wake_up_interruptible_all(&u->peer_wait);
skpair = unix_peer(sk);
if (skpair != NULL) {
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM || sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
unix_state_lock(skpair);
/* No more writes */
skpair->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) || embrion)
skpair->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
unix_state_unlock(skpair);
skpair->sk_state_change(skpair);
sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
}
sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
}
/* Try to flush out this socket. Throw out buffers at least */
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) != NULL) {
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
unix_release_sock(skb->sk, 1);
/* passed fds are erased in the kfree_skb hook */
UNIXCB(skb).consumed = skb->len;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
if (path.dentry)
path_put(&path);
sock_put(sk);
/* ---- Socket is dead now and most probably destroyed ---- */
/*
* Fixme: BSD difference: In BSD all sockets connected to us get
* ECONNRESET and we die on the spot. In Linux we behave
* like files and pipes do and wait for the last
* dereference.
*
* Can't we simply set sock->err?
*
* What the above comment does talk about? --ANK(980817)
*/
if (unix_tot_inflight)
unix_gc(); /* Garbage collect fds */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in net/unix/af_unix.c in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 allows local users to bypass intended AF_UNIX socket permissions or cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted epoll_ctl calls.
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: pgm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int length,
register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct pgm_header *pgm;
register const struct ip *ip;
register char ch;
uint16_t sport, dport;
u_int nla_afnum;
char nla_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
uint8_t opt_type, opt_len;
uint32_t seq, opts_len, len, offset;
pgm = (const struct pgm_header *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
else
ip6 = NULL;
ch = '\0';
if (!ND_TTEST(pgm->pgm_dport)) {
if (ip6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: [|pgm]",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst)));
return;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: [|pgm]",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
return;
}
}
sport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_sport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_dport);
if (ip6) {
if (ip6->ip6_nxt == IPPROTO_PGM) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%s > %s.%s: ",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
tcpport_string(ndo, sport),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ",
tcpport_string(ndo, sport), tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
}
} else {
if (ip->ip_p == IPPROTO_PGM) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%s > %s.%s: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
tcpport_string(ndo, sport),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ",
tcpport_string(ndo, sport), tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
}
}
ND_TCHECK(*pgm);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PGM, length %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_length)));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x ",
pgm->pgm_gsid[0],
pgm->pgm_gsid[1],
pgm->pgm_gsid[2],
pgm->pgm_gsid[3],
pgm->pgm_gsid[4],
pgm->pgm_gsid[5]));
switch (pgm->pgm_type) {
case PGM_SPM: {
const struct pgm_spm *spm;
spm = (const struct pgm_spm *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*spm);
bp = (const u_char *) (spm + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&spm->pgms_nla_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SPM seq %u trail %u lead %u nla %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_seq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_leadseq),
nla_buf));
break;
}
case PGM_POLL: {
const struct pgm_poll *poll_msg;
poll_msg = (const struct pgm_poll *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*poll_msg);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "POLL seq %u round %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&poll_msg->pgmp_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&poll_msg->pgmp_round)));
bp = (const u_char *) (poll_msg + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_POLR: {
const struct pgm_polr *polr;
uint32_t ivl, rnd, mask;
polr = (const struct pgm_polr *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*polr);
bp = (const u_char *) (polr + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&polr->pgmp_nla_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
ivl = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
rnd = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
mask = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "POLR seq %u round %u nla %s ivl %u rnd 0x%08x "
"mask 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&polr->pgmp_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&polr->pgmp_round), nla_buf, ivl, rnd, mask));
break;
}
case PGM_ODATA: {
const struct pgm_data *odata;
odata = (const struct pgm_data *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*odata);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ODATA trail %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&odata->pgmd_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&odata->pgmd_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (odata + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_RDATA: {
const struct pgm_data *rdata;
rdata = (const struct pgm_data *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*rdata);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RDATA trail %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&rdata->pgmd_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&rdata->pgmd_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (rdata + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_NAK:
case PGM_NULLNAK:
case PGM_NCF: {
const struct pgm_nak *nak;
char source_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN], group_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
nak = (const struct pgm_nak *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*nak);
bp = (const u_char *) (nak + 1);
/*
* Skip past the source, saving info along the way
* and stopping if we don't have enough.
*/
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&nak->pgmn_source_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, source_buf, sizeof(source_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, source_buf, sizeof(source_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
/*
* Skip past the group, saving info along the way
* and stopping if we don't have enough.
*/
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, group_buf, sizeof(group_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, group_buf, sizeof(group_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
/*
* Options decoding can go here.
*/
switch (pgm->pgm_type) {
case PGM_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NAK "));
break;
case PGM_NULLNAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NNAK "));
break;
case PGM_NCF:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NCF "));
break;
default:
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%s -> %s), seq %u",
source_buf, group_buf, EXTRACT_32BITS(&nak->pgmn_seq)));
break;
}
case PGM_ACK: {
const struct pgm_ack *ack;
ack = (const struct pgm_ack *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*ack);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ACK seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ack->pgma_rx_max_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (ack + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_SPMR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SPMR"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UNKNOWN type 0x%02x", pgm->pgm_type));
break;
}
if (pgm->pgm_options & PGM_OPT_BIT_PRESENT) {
/*
* make sure there's enough for the first option header
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|OPT]"));
return;
}
/*
* That option header MUST be an OPT_LENGTH option
* (see the first paragraph of section 9.1 in RFC 3208).
*/
opt_type = *bp++;
if ((opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK) != PGM_OPT_LENGTH) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[First option bad, should be PGM_OPT_LENGTH, is %u]", opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK));
return;
}
opt_len = *bp++;
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_LENGTH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
opts_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
if (opts_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad total option length %u < 4]", opts_len));
return;
}
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPTS LEN %d", opts_len));
opts_len -= 4;
while (opts_len) {
if (opts_len < PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Total option length leaves no room for final option]"));
return;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|OPT]"));
return;
}
opt_type = *bp++;
opt_len = *bp++;
if (opt_len < PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad option, length %u < %u]", opt_len,
PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN));
break;
}
if (opts_len < opt_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Total option length leaves no room for final option]"));
return;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, opt_len - 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|OPT]"));
return;
}
switch (opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK) {
case PGM_OPT_LENGTH:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_LENGTH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPTS LEN (extra?) %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_FRAGMENT:
if (opt_len != 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_FRAGMENT option, length %u != 16]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRAG seq %u off %u len %u", seq, offset, len));
opts_len -= 16;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_LIST:
bp += 2;
opt_len -= sizeof(uint32_t); /* option header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NAK LIST"));
while (opt_len) {
if (opt_len < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Option length not a multiple of 4]"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
opt_len -= sizeof(uint32_t);
opts_len -= sizeof(uint32_t);
}
break;
case PGM_OPT_JOIN:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_JOIN option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " JOIN %u", seq));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_BO_IVL:
if (opt_len != 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NAK_BO_IVL option, length %u != 12]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BACKOFF ivl %u ivlseq %u", offset, seq));
opts_len -= 12;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_BO_RNG:
if (opt_len != 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NAK_BO_RNG option, length %u != 12]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BACKOFF max %u min %u", offset, seq));
opts_len -= 12;
break;
case PGM_OPT_REDIRECT:
bp += 2;
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_REDIRECT option, length %u != 4 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 4 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_REDIRECT option, length %u != 4 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 4 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " REDIRECT %s", nla_buf));
break;
case PGM_OPT_PARITY_PRM:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PARITY_PRM option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY MAXTGS %u", len));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PARITY_GRP:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PARITY_GRP option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY GROUP %u", seq));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CURR_TGSIZE:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_CURR_TGSIZE option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY ATGS %u", len));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NBR_UNREACH:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NBR_UNREACH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NBR_UNREACH"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PATH_NLA:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PATH_NLA [%d]", opt_len));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
case PGM_OPT_SYN:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_SYN option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " SYN"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_FIN:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_FIN option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FIN"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_RST:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_RST option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RST"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " CR"));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CRQST:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_CRQST option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " CRQST"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PGMCC_DATA:
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PGMCC DATA %u %s", offset, nla_buf));
break;
case PGM_OPT_PGMCC_FEEDBACK:
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PGMCC FEEDBACK %u %s", offset, nla_buf));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPT_%02X [%d] ", opt_type, opt_len));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
}
if (opt_type & PGM_OPT_END)
break;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%u]", length));
if (ndo->ndo_packettype == PT_PGM_ZMTP1 &&
(pgm->pgm_type == PGM_ODATA || pgm->pgm_type == PGM_RDATA))
zmtp1_print_datagram(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pgm]"));
if (ch != '\0')
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PGM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pgm.c:pgm_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13019: Clean up PGM option processing.
Add #defines for option lengths or the lengths of the fixed-length part
of the option. Sometimes those #defines differ from what was there
before; what was there before was wrong, probably because the option
lengths given in RFC 3208 were sometimes wrong - some lengths included
the length of the option header, some lengths didn't.
Don't use "sizeof(uintXX_t)" for sizes in the packet, just use the
number of bytes directly.
For the options that include an IPv4 or IPv6 address, check the option
length against the length of what precedes the address before fetching
any of that data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | Low | 167,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool WebMediaPlayerImpl::DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker() const {
if (data_source_)
return data_source_->DidGetOpaqueResponseViaServiceWorker();
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Service works could inappropriately gain access to cross origin audio in Media in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy for audio content via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} | Medium | 172,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
const String& strArg(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows(strArg, objArg, ec)));
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 170,591 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
const char **argv) {
struct passwd *pw = NULL, pw_s;
const char *user = NULL;
cfg_t cfg_st;
cfg_t *cfg = &cfg_st;
char buffer[BUFSIZE];
char *buf = NULL;
char *authfile_dir;
size_t authfile_dir_len;
int pgu_ret, gpn_ret;
int retval = PAM_IGNORE;
device_t *devices = NULL;
unsigned n_devices = 0;
int openasuser;
int should_free_origin = 0;
int should_free_appid = 0;
int should_free_auth_file = 0;
int should_free_authpending_file = 0;
parse_cfg(flags, argc, argv, cfg);
if (!cfg->origin) {
strcpy(buffer, DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX);
if (gethostname(buffer + strlen(DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX),
BUFSIZE - strlen(DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX)) == -1) {
DBG("Unable to get host name");
goto done;
}
DBG("Origin not specified, using \"%s\"", buffer);
cfg->origin = strdup(buffer);
if (!cfg->origin) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
goto done;
} else {
should_free_origin = 1;
}
}
if (!cfg->appid) {
DBG("Appid not specified, using the same value of origin (%s)",
cfg->origin);
cfg->appid = strdup(cfg->origin);
if (!cfg->appid) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory")
goto done;
} else {
should_free_appid = 1;
}
}
if (cfg->max_devs == 0) {
DBG("Maximum devices number not set. Using default (%d)", MAX_DEVS);
cfg->max_devs = MAX_DEVS;
}
devices = malloc(sizeof(device_t) * cfg->max_devs);
if (!devices) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
pgu_ret = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
if (pgu_ret != PAM_SUCCESS || user == NULL) {
DBG("Unable to access user %s", user);
retval = PAM_CONV_ERR;
goto done;
}
DBG("Requesting authentication for user %s", user);
gpn_ret = getpwnam_r(user, &pw_s, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &pw);
if (gpn_ret != 0 || pw == NULL || pw->pw_dir == NULL ||
pw->pw_dir[0] != '/') {
DBG("Unable to retrieve credentials for user %s, (%s)", user,
strerror(errno));
retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
goto done;
}
DBG("Found user %s", user);
DBG("Home directory for %s is %s", user, pw->pw_dir);
if (!cfg->auth_file) {
buf = NULL;
authfile_dir = secure_getenv(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR);
if (!authfile_dir) {
DBG("Variable %s is not set. Using default value ($HOME/.config/)",
DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR);
authfile_dir_len =
strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen("/.config") + strlen(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE) + 1;
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (authfile_dir_len));
if (!buf) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
snprintf(buf, authfile_dir_len,
"%s/.config%s", pw->pw_dir, DEFAULT_AUTHFILE);
} else {
DBG("Variable %s set to %s", DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR, authfile_dir);
authfile_dir_len = strlen(authfile_dir) + strlen(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE) + 1;
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (authfile_dir_len));
if (!buf) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
snprintf(buf, authfile_dir_len,
"%s%s", authfile_dir, DEFAULT_AUTHFILE);
}
DBG("Using default authentication file %s", buf);
cfg->auth_file = buf; /* cfg takes ownership */
should_free_auth_file = 1;
buf = NULL;
} else {
DBG("Using authentication file %s", cfg->auth_file);
}
openasuser = geteuid() == 0 && cfg->openasuser;
if (openasuser) {
if (seteuid(pw_s.pw_uid)) {
DBG("Unable to switch user to uid %i", pw_s.pw_uid);
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
DBG("Switched to uid %i", pw_s.pw_uid);
}
retval = get_devices_from_authfile(cfg->auth_file, user, cfg->max_devs,
cfg->debug, cfg->debug_file,
devices, &n_devices);
if (openasuser) {
if (seteuid(0)) {
DBG("Unable to switch back to uid 0");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
DBG("Switched back to uid 0");
}
if (retval != 1) {
n_devices = 0;
}
if (n_devices == 0) {
if (cfg->nouserok) {
DBG("Found no devices but nouserok specified. Skipping authentication");
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
goto done;
} else if (retval != 1) {
DBG("Unable to get devices from file %s", cfg->auth_file);
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
} else {
DBG("Found no devices. Aborting.");
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
}
}
if (!cfg->authpending_file) {
int actual_size = snprintf(buffer, BUFSIZE, DEFAULT_AUTHPENDING_FILE_PATH, getuid());
if (actual_size >= 0 && actual_size < BUFSIZE) {
cfg->authpending_file = strdup(buffer);
}
if (!cfg->authpending_file) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory for the authpending_file, touch request notifications will not be emitted");
} else {
should_free_authpending_file = 1;
}
} else {
if (strlen(cfg->authpending_file) == 0) {
DBG("authpending_file is set to an empty value, touch request notifications will be disabled");
cfg->authpending_file = NULL;
}
}
int authpending_file_descriptor = -1;
if (cfg->authpending_file) {
DBG("Using file '%s' for emitting touch request notifications", cfg->authpending_file);
authpending_file_descriptor = open(cfg->authpending_file, O_RDONLY | O_CREAT, 0664);
if (authpending_file_descriptor < 0) {
DBG("Unable to emit 'authentication started' notification by opening the file '%s', (%s)",
cfg->authpending_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (cfg->manual == 0) {
if (cfg->interactive) {
converse(pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON,
cfg->prompt != NULL ? cfg->prompt : DEFAULT_PROMPT);
}
retval = do_authentication(cfg, devices, n_devices, pamh);
} else {
retval = do_manual_authentication(cfg, devices, n_devices, pamh);
}
if (authpending_file_descriptor >= 0) {
if (close(authpending_file_descriptor) < 0) {
DBG("Unable to emit 'authentication stopped' notification by closing the file '%s', (%s)",
cfg->authpending_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (retval != 1) {
DBG("do_authentication returned %d", retval);
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
goto done;
}
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
done:
free_devices(devices, n_devices);
if (buf) {
free(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
if (should_free_origin) {
free((char *) cfg->origin);
cfg->origin = NULL;
}
if (should_free_appid) {
free((char *) cfg->appid);
cfg->appid = NULL;
}
if (should_free_auth_file) {
free((char *) cfg->auth_file);
cfg->auth_file = NULL;
}
if (should_free_authpending_file) {
free((char *) cfg->authpending_file);
cfg->authpending_file = NULL;
}
if (cfg->alwaysok && retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
DBG("alwaysok needed (otherwise return with %d)", retval);
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
}
DBG("done. [%s]", pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In Yubico pam-u2f 1.0.7, when configured with debug and a custom debug log file is set using debug_file, that file descriptor is not closed when a new process is spawned. This leads to the file descriptor being inherited into the child process; the child process can then read from and write to it. This can leak sensitive information and also, if written to, be used to fill the disk or plant misinformation.
Commit Message: Do not leak file descriptor when doing exec
When opening a custom debug file, the descriptor would stay
open when calling exec and leak to the child process.
Make sure all files are opened with close-on-exec.
This fixes CVE-2019-12210.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner of the SUSE Security Team for reporting
the issue. | Low | 169,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
b* (tob(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert2();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The HTML parser in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 does not properly address *lifetime and re-entrancy issues,* which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 170,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_fast(strm, start)
z_streamp strm;
unsigned start; /* inflate()'s starting value for strm->avail_out */
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
z_const unsigned char FAR *in; /* local strm->next_in */
z_const unsigned char FAR *last; /* have enough input while in < last */
unsigned char FAR *out; /* local strm->next_out */
unsigned char FAR *beg; /* inflate()'s initial strm->next_out */
unsigned char FAR *end; /* while out < end, enough space available */
#ifdef INFLATE_STRICT
unsigned dmax; /* maximum distance from zlib header */
#endif
unsigned wsize; /* window size or zero if not using window */
unsigned whave; /* valid bytes in the window */
unsigned wnext; /* window write index */
unsigned char FAR *window; /* allocated sliding window, if wsize != 0 */
unsigned long hold; /* local strm->hold */
unsigned bits; /* local strm->bits */
code const FAR *lcode; /* local strm->lencode */
code const FAR *dcode; /* local strm->distcode */
unsigned lmask; /* mask for first level of length codes */
unsigned dmask; /* mask for first level of distance codes */
code here; /* retrieved table entry */
unsigned op; /* code bits, operation, extra bits, or */
/* window position, window bytes to copy */
unsigned len; /* match length, unused bytes */
unsigned dist; /* match distance */
unsigned char FAR *from; /* where to copy match from */
/* copy state to local variables */
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
in = strm->next_in - OFF;
last = in + (strm->avail_in - 5);
out = strm->next_out - OFF;
beg = out - (start - strm->avail_out);
end = out + (strm->avail_out - 257);
#ifdef INFLATE_STRICT
dmax = state->dmax;
#endif
wsize = state->wsize;
whave = state->whave;
wnext = state->wnext;
window = state->window;
hold = state->hold;
bits = state->bits;
lcode = state->lencode;
dcode = state->distcode;
lmask = (1U << state->lenbits) - 1;
dmask = (1U << state->distbits) - 1;
/* decode literals and length/distances until end-of-block or not enough
input data or output space */
do {
if (bits < 15) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
}
here = lcode[hold & lmask];
dolen:
op = (unsigned)(here.bits);
hold >>= op;
bits -= op;
op = (unsigned)(here.op);
if (op == 0) { /* literal */
Tracevv((stderr, here.val >= 0x20 && here.val < 0x7f ?
"inflate: literal '%c'\n" :
"inflate: literal 0x%02x\n", here.val));
PUP(out) = (unsigned char)(here.val);
}
else if (op & 16) { /* length base */
len = (unsigned)(here.val);
op &= 15; /* number of extra bits */
if (op) {
if (bits < op) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
}
len += (unsigned)hold & ((1U << op) - 1);
hold >>= op;
bits -= op;
}
Tracevv((stderr, "inflate: length %u\n", len));
if (bits < 15) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
}
here = dcode[hold & dmask];
dodist:
op = (unsigned)(here.bits);
hold >>= op;
bits -= op;
op = (unsigned)(here.op);
if (op & 16) { /* distance base */
dist = (unsigned)(here.val);
op &= 15; /* number of extra bits */
if (bits < op) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
if (bits < op) {
hold += (unsigned long)(PUP(in)) << bits;
bits += 8;
}
}
dist += (unsigned)hold & ((1U << op) - 1);
#ifdef INFLATE_STRICT
if (dist > dmax) {
strm->msg = (char *)"invalid distance too far back";
state->mode = BAD;
break;
}
#endif
hold >>= op;
bits -= op;
Tracevv((stderr, "inflate: distance %u\n", dist));
op = (unsigned)(out - beg); /* max distance in output */
if (dist > op) { /* see if copy from window */
op = dist - op; /* distance back in window */
if (op > whave) {
if (state->sane) {
strm->msg =
(char *)"invalid distance too far back";
state->mode = BAD;
break;
}
#ifdef INFLATE_ALLOW_INVALID_DISTANCE_TOOFAR_ARRR
if (len <= op - whave) {
do {
PUP(out) = 0;
} while (--len);
continue;
}
len -= op - whave;
do {
PUP(out) = 0;
} while (--op > whave);
if (op == 0) {
from = out - dist;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--len);
continue;
}
#endif
}
from = window - OFF;
if (wnext == 0) { /* very common case */
from += wsize - op;
if (op < len) { /* some from window */
len -= op;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--op);
from = out - dist; /* rest from output */
}
}
else if (wnext < op) { /* wrap around window */
from += wsize + wnext - op;
op -= wnext;
if (op < len) { /* some from end of window */
len -= op;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--op);
from = window - OFF;
if (wnext < len) { /* some from start of window */
op = wnext;
len -= op;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--op);
from = out - dist; /* rest from output */
}
}
}
else { /* contiguous in window */
from += wnext - op;
if (op < len) { /* some from window */
len -= op;
do {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
} while (--op);
from = out - dist; /* rest from output */
}
}
while (len > 2) {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
len -= 3;
}
if (len) {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
if (len > 1)
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
}
}
else {
from = out - dist; /* copy direct from output */
do { /* minimum length is three */
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
len -= 3;
} while (len > 2);
if (len) {
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
if (len > 1)
PUP(out) = PUP(from);
}
}
}
else if ((op & 64) == 0) { /* 2nd level distance code */
here = dcode[here.val + (hold & ((1U << op) - 1))];
goto dodist;
}
else {
strm->msg = (char *)"invalid distance code";
state->mode = BAD;
break;
}
}
else if ((op & 64) == 0) { /* 2nd level length code */
here = lcode[here.val + (hold & ((1U << op) - 1))];
goto dolen;
}
else if (op & 32) { /* end-of-block */
Tracevv((stderr, "inflate: end of block\n"));
state->mode = TYPE;
break;
}
else {
strm->msg = (char *)"invalid literal/length code";
state->mode = BAD;
break;
}
} while (in < last && out < end);
/* return unused bytes (on entry, bits < 8, so in won't go too far back) */
len = bits >> 3;
in -= len;
bits -= len << 3;
hold &= (1U << bits) - 1;
/* update state and return */
strm->next_in = in + OFF;
strm->next_out = out + OFF;
strm->avail_in = (unsigned)(in < last ? 5 + (last - in) : 5 - (in - last));
strm->avail_out = (unsigned)(out < end ?
257 + (end - out) : 257 - (out - end));
state->hold = hold;
state->bits = bits;
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: inffast.c in zlib 1.2.8 might allow context-dependent attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging improper pointer arithmetic.
Commit Message: Use post-increment only in inffast.c.
An old inffast.c optimization turns out to not be optimal anymore
with modern compilers, and furthermore was not compliant with the
C standard, for which decrementing a pointer before its allocated
memory is undefined. Per the recommendation of a security audit of
the zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this "optimization" was removed, in order to
avoid the possibility of undefined behavior. | Low | 168,674 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadOneDJVUImage(LoadContext* lc,const int pagenum,
const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ddjvu_page_type_t
type;
ddjvu_pageinfo_t info;
ddjvu_message_t *message;
Image *image;
int logging;
int tag;
/* so, we know that the page is there! Get its dimension, and */
/* Read one DJVU image */
image = lc->image;
/* register PixelPacket *q; */
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(), " enter ReadOneDJVUImage()");
(void) logging;
#if DEBUG
printf("==== Loading the page %d\n", pagenum);
#endif
lc->page = ddjvu_page_create_by_pageno(lc->document, pagenum); /* 0? */
/* pump data untill the page is ready for rendering. */
tag=(-1);
do {
while ((message = ddjvu_message_peek(lc->context)))
{
tag=process_message(message);
if (tag == 0) break;
ddjvu_message_pop(lc->context);
}
/* fixme: maybe exit? */
/* if (lc->error) break; */
message = pump_data_until_message(lc,image);
if (message)
do {
tag=process_message(message);
if (tag == 0) break;
ddjvu_message_pop(lc->context);
} while ((message = ddjvu_message_peek(lc->context)));
} while (!ddjvu_page_decoding_done(lc->page));
ddjvu_document_get_pageinfo(lc->document, pagenum, &info);
image->x_resolution = (float) info.dpi;
image->y_resolution =(float) info.dpi;
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
int
flags;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
/*
Set rendering resolution.
*/
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
info.width=(int) (info.width*image->x_resolution/info.dpi);
info.height=(int) (info.height*image->y_resolution/info.dpi);
info.dpi=(int) MagickMax(image->x_resolution,image->y_resolution);
}
type = ddjvu_page_get_type(lc->page);
/* double -> float! */
/* image->gamma = (float)ddjvu_page_get_gamma(lc->page); */
/* mmc: set image->depth */
/* mmc: This from the type */
image->columns=(size_t) info.width;
image->rows=(size_t) info.height;
/* mmc: bitonal should be palettized, and compressed! */
if (type == DDJVU_PAGETYPE_BITONAL){
image->colorspace = GRAYColorspace;
image->storage_class = PseudoClass;
image->depth = 8UL; /* i only support that? */
image->colors= 2;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
} else {
image->colorspace = RGBColorspace;
image->storage_class = DirectClass;
/* fixme: MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH ?*/
image->depth = 8UL; /* i only support that? */
image->matte = MagickTrue;
/* is this useful? */
}
#if DEBUG
printf("now filling %.20g x %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
#endif
#if 1 /* per_line */
/* q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,image->rows); */
get_page_image(lc, lc->page, 0, 0, info.width, info.height, image_info);
#else
int i;
for (i = 0;i< image->rows; i++)
{
printf("%d\n",i);
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1);
get_page_line(lc, i, quantum_info);
SyncAuthenticPixels(image);
}
#endif /* per_line */
#if DEBUG
printf("END: finished filling %.20g x %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,
(double) image->rows);
#endif
if (!image->ping)
SyncImage(image);
/* indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image); */
/* mmc: ??? Convert PNM pixels to runlength-encoded MIFF packets. */
/* image->colors = */
/* how is the line padding / stride? */
if (lc->page) {
ddjvu_page_release(lc->page);
lc->page = NULL;
}
/* image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id]; */
if (tag == 0)
image=DestroyImage(image);
return image;
/* end of reading one DJVU page/image */
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: exsltStrAlignFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
xmlChar *str, *padding, *alignment, *ret;
int str_l, padding_l;
if ((nargs < 2) || (nargs > 3)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 3)
alignment = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
else
alignment = NULL;
padding = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_l = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
padding_l = xmlUTF8Strlen (padding);
if (str_l == padding_l) {
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, str);
xmlFree(padding);
xmlFree(alignment);
return;
}
if (str_l > padding_l) {
ret = xmlUTF8Strndup (str, padding_l);
} else {
if (xmlStrEqual(alignment, (const xmlChar *) "right")) {
ret = xmlUTF8Strndup (padding, padding_l - str_l);
ret = xmlStrcat (ret, str);
} else if (xmlStrEqual(alignment, (const xmlChar *) "center")) {
int left = (padding_l - str_l) / 2;
int right_start;
ret = xmlUTF8Strndup (padding, left);
ret = xmlStrcat (ret, str);
right_start = xmlUTF8Strsize (padding, left + str_l);
ret = xmlStrcat (ret, padding + right_start);
} else {
int str_s;
str_s = xmlStrlen (str);
ret = xmlStrdup (str);
ret = xmlStrcat (ret, padding + str_s);
}
}
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, ret);
xmlFree(str);
xmlFree(padding);
xmlFree(alignment);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | High | 173,295 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ResourceRequestBlockedReason BaseFetchContext::CanRequest(
Resource::Type type,
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const KURL& url,
const ResourceLoaderOptions& options,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy,
FetchParameters::OriginRestriction origin_restriction,
ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus redirect_status) const {
ResourceRequestBlockedReason blocked_reason =
CanRequestInternal(type, resource_request, url, options, reporting_policy,
origin_restriction, redirect_status);
if (blocked_reason != ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kNone &&
reporting_policy == SecurityViolationReportingPolicy::kReport) {
DispatchDidBlockRequest(resource_request, options.initiator_info,
blocked_reason);
}
return blocked_reason;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936} | Medium | 172,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT3(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
ssize_t
j,
y;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
unsigned char
alpha;
size_t
a0,
a1,
bits,
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read alpha values (8 bytes) */
a0 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
a1 = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickTrue);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (bits >> ((4*j+i)*2)) & 0x3;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
/*
Extract alpha value: multiply 0..15 by 17 to get range 0..255
*/
if (j < 2)
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a0 >> (4*(4*j+i))) & 0xf);
else
alpha = 17U * (unsigned char) ((a1 >> (4*(4*(j-2)+i))) & 0xf);
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
alpha));
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 16);
return MagickTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring. | Medium | 168,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return (1);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp,
SSL_USE_ETM(s))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return (0);
}
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num *= 2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("client random\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("server random\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("master key\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num))
goto err;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("\nkey block\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
/*
* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
* problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#endif
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL 1.1.0 before 1.1.0e to crash (dependent on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected.
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]> | Low | 168,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target, *originator;
u_short originator_port;
target = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator_port = packet_get_int();
packet_check_eom();
debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
!no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
"[email protected]", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
}
free(originator);
free(target);
return c;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4, when privilege separation is not used, creates forwarded Unix-domain sockets as root, which might allow local users to gain privileges via unspecified vectors, related to serverloop.c.
Commit Message: disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is disabled | Medium | 168,662 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: BOOL license_read_scope_list(wStream* s, SCOPE_LIST* scopeList)
{
UINT32 i;
UINT32 scopeCount;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, scopeCount); /* ScopeCount (4 bytes) */
scopeList->count = scopeCount;
scopeList->array = (LICENSE_BLOB*) malloc(sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) * scopeCount);
/* ScopeArray */
for (i = 0; i < scopeCount; i++)
{
scopeList->array[i].type = BB_SCOPE_BLOB;
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, &scopeList->array[i]))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the license_read_scope_list function in libfreerdp/core/license.c in FreeRDP through 1.0.2 allows remote RDP servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large ScopeCount value in a Scope List in a Server License Request packet.
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list() | Medium | 166,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: stub_charset ()
{
locale = get_locale_var ("LC_CTYPE");
locale = get_locale_var ("LC_CTYPE");
if (locale == 0 || *locale == 0)
return "ASCII";
s = strrchr (locale, '.');
if (s)
{
t = strchr (s, '@');
if (t)
*t = 0;
return ++s;
}
else if (STREQ (locale, "UTF-8"))
return "UTF-8";
else
return "ASCII";
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A heap-based buffer overflow exists in GNU Bash before 4.3 when wide characters, not supported by the current locale set in the LC_CTYPE environment variable, are printed through the echo built-in function. A local attacker, who can provide data to print through the "echo -e" built-in function, may use this flaw to crash a script or execute code with the privileges of the bash process. This occurs because ansicstr() in lib/sh/strtrans.c mishandles u32cconv().
Commit Message: | Low | 165,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool CustomButton::AcceleratorPressed(const ui::Accelerator& accelerator) {
SetState(STATE_NORMAL);
ui::MouseEvent synthetic_event(
ui::ET_MOUSE_RELEASED, gfx::Point(), gfx::Point(), ui::EventTimeForNow(),
ui::EF_LEFT_MOUSE_BUTTON, ui::EF_LEFT_MOUSE_BUTTON);
NotifyClick(synthetic_event);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The CustomButton::AcceleratorPressed function in ui/views/controls/button/custom_button.cc in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82 allows remote attackers to spoof URLs via vectors involving an unfocused custom button.
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130} | Medium | 172,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
int r, present;
u_int mechs;
OM_uint32 ms;
size_t len;
u_char *doid = NULL;
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
return (0);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mechs)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mechs == 0) {
debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
return (0);
}
do {
mechs--;
free(doid);
present = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &doid, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
doid[1] == len - 2) {
goid.elements = doid + 2;
goid.length = len - 2;
ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
} else {
logit("Badly formed OID received");
}
} while (mechs > 0 && !present);
if (!present) {
free(doid);
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
if (ctxt != NULL)
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
free(doid);
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
}
authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
/* Return the OID that we received */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, doid, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(doid);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
authctxt->postponed = 1;
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: OpenSSH through 7.7 is prone to a user enumeration vulnerability due to not delaying bailout for an invalid authenticating user until after the packet containing the request has been fully parsed, related to auth2-gss.c, auth2-hostbased.c, and auth2-pubkey.c.
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt | Low | 169,104 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: seamless_process_line(const char *line, void *data)
{
UNUSED(data);
char *p, *l;
char *tok1, *tok3, *tok4, *tok5, *tok6, *tok7, *tok8;
unsigned long id, flags;
char *endptr;
l = xstrdup(line);
p = l;
logger(Core, Debug, "seamless_process_line(), got '%s'", p);
tok1 = seamless_get_token(&p);
(void) seamless_get_token(&p);
tok3 = seamless_get_token(&p);
tok4 = seamless_get_token(&p);
tok5 = seamless_get_token(&p);
tok6 = seamless_get_token(&p);
tok7 = seamless_get_token(&p);
tok8 = seamless_get_token(&p);
if (!strcmp("CREATE", tok1))
{
unsigned long group, parent;
if (!tok6)
return False;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
group = strtoul(tok4, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
parent = strtoul(tok5, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok6, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_create_window(id, group, parent, flags);
}
else if (!strcmp("DESTROY", tok1))
{
if (!tok4)
return False;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok4, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_destroy_window(id, flags);
}
else if (!strcmp("DESTROYGRP", tok1))
{
if (!tok4)
return False;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok4, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_destroy_group(id, flags);
}
else if (!strcmp("SETICON", tok1))
{
int chunk, width, height, len;
char byte[3];
if (!tok8)
return False;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
chunk = strtoul(tok4, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
width = strtoul(tok6, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
height = strtoul(tok7, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
byte[2] = '\0';
len = 0;
while (*tok8 != '\0')
{
byte[0] = *tok8;
tok8++;
if (*tok8 == '\0')
return False;
byte[1] = *tok8;
tok8++;
icon_buf[len] = strtol(byte, NULL, 16);
len++;
}
ui_seamless_seticon(id, tok5, width, height, chunk, icon_buf, len);
}
else if (!strcmp("DELICON", tok1))
{
int width, height;
if (!tok6)
return False;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
width = strtoul(tok5, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
height = strtoul(tok6, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_delicon(id, tok4, width, height);
}
else if (!strcmp("POSITION", tok1))
{
int x, y, width, height;
if (!tok8)
return False;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
x = strtol(tok4, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
y = strtol(tok5, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
width = strtol(tok6, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
height = strtol(tok7, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok8, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_move_window(id, x, y, width, height, flags);
}
else if (!strcmp("ZCHANGE", tok1))
{
unsigned long behind;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
behind = strtoul(tok4, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok5, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_restack_window(id, behind, flags);
}
else if (!strcmp("TITLE", tok1))
{
if (!tok5)
return False;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok5, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_settitle(id, tok4, flags);
}
else if (!strcmp("STATE", tok1))
{
unsigned int state;
if (!tok5)
return False;
id = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
state = strtoul(tok4, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok5, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_setstate(id, state, flags);
}
else if (!strcmp("DEBUG", tok1))
{
logger(Core, Debug, "seamless_process_line(), %s", line);
}
else if (!strcmp("SYNCBEGIN", tok1))
{
if (!tok3)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_syncbegin(flags);
}
else if (!strcmp("SYNCEND", tok1))
{
if (!tok3)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
/* do nothing, currently */
}
else if (!strcmp("HELLO", tok1))
{
if (!tok3)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_begin(! !(flags & SEAMLESSRDP_HELLO_HIDDEN));
}
else if (!strcmp("ACK", tok1))
{
unsigned int serial;
serial = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_ack(serial);
}
else if (!strcmp("HIDE", tok1))
{
if (!tok3)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_hide_desktop();
}
else if (!strcmp("UNHIDE", tok1))
{
if (!tok3)
return False;
flags = strtoul(tok3, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr)
return False;
ui_seamless_unhide_desktop();
}
xfree(l);
return True;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | Low | 169,809 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
coerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4);
}
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_MUL:
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
*/
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_LSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
}
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_RSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
* be negative, then either:
* 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
* unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
* 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
* signed bounds
* 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
* about the result
* If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
* unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds.
* Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
* and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
* var_off of the result.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
default:
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging mishandling of 32-bit ALU ops.
Commit Message: bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification
32-bit ALU ops operate on 32-bit values and have 32-bit outputs.
Adjust the verifier accordingly.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> | Low | 167,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::createGraphicBufferSource(
OMX_U32 portIndex, sp<IGraphicBufferConsumer> bufferConsumer, MetadataBufferType *type) {
status_t err;
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& surfaceCheck = getGraphicBufferSource();
if (surfaceCheck != NULL) {
if (portIndex < NELEM(mMetadataType) && type != NULL) {
*type = mMetadataType[portIndex];
}
return ALREADY_EXISTS;
}
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
}
err = storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(portIndex, OMX_TRUE, type);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, oerr, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
if (def.format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
CLOGW("createInputSurface requires COLOR_FormatSurface "
"(AndroidOpaque) color format instead of %s(%#x)",
asString(def.format.video.eColorFormat), def.format.video.eColorFormat);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
uint32_t usageBits;
oerr = OMX_GetParameter(
mHandle, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits, &usageBits);
if (oerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
usageBits = 0;
}
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource = new GraphicBufferSource(this,
def.format.video.nFrameWidth,
def.format.video.nFrameHeight,
def.nBufferCountActual,
usageBits,
bufferConsumer);
if ((err = bufferSource->initCheck()) != OK) {
return err;
}
setGraphicBufferSource(bufferSource);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 174,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_pic_data_thread(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD32 i4_continue_decode;
WORD32 i4_cur_row, temp;
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
WORD32 i4_dequeue_job;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
i4_cur_row = ps_dec->u2_mb_y + 1;
i4_continue_decode = 1;
i4_dequeue_job = 1;
do
{
if(i4_cur_row > ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb)
{
i4_continue_decode = 0;
break;
}
{
if((ps_dec->i4_num_cores> 1) && (i4_dequeue_job))
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T e_ret;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
e_ret = impeg2_jobq_dequeue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 1);
if(e_ret != IV_SUCCESS)
break;
if(CMD_PROCESS == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
pu1_buf = ps_dec->pu1_inp_bits_buf + s_job.i4_bistream_ofst;
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream), pu1_buf,
(ps_dec->u4_num_inp_bytes - s_job.i4_bistream_ofst) + 8);
i4_cur_row = s_job.i2_start_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_start_mb_y = s_job.i2_start_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_end_mb_y = s_job.i2_end_mb_y;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y = ps_dec->i4_start_mb_y;
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left = (ps_dec->i4_end_mb_y - ps_dec->i4_start_mb_y) * ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb;
}
else
{
WORD32 start_row;
WORD32 num_rows;
start_row = s_job.i2_start_mb_y << 4;
num_rows = MIN((s_job.i2_end_mb_y << 4), ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
num_rows -= start_row;
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_disp_pic,
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf,
start_row, num_rows);
break;
}
}
e_error = impeg2d_dec_slice(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
}
}
/* Detecting next slice start code */
while(1)
{
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
temp = u4_bits_read & 0xFF;
i4_continue_decode = (((u4_bits_read >> 8) == 0x01) && (temp) && (temp <= 0xAF));
if(i4_continue_decode)
{
/* If the slice is from the same row, then continue decoding without dequeue */
if((temp - 1) == i4_cur_row)
{
i4_dequeue_job = 0;
break;
}
if(temp < ps_dec->i4_end_mb_y)
{
i4_cur_row = ps_dec->u2_mb_y;
}
else
{
i4_dequeue_job = 1;
}
break;
}
else
break;
}
}while(i4_continue_decode);
if(ps_dec->i4_num_cores > 1)
{
while(1)
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T e_ret;
e_ret = impeg2_jobq_dequeue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 1);
if(e_ret != IV_SUCCESS)
break;
if(CMD_FMTCONV == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
WORD32 start_row;
WORD32 num_rows;
start_row = s_job.i2_start_mb_y << 4;
num_rows = MIN((s_job.i2_end_mb_y << 4), ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
num_rows -= start_row;
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_disp_pic,
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf,
start_row, num_rows);
}
}
}
else
{
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_disp_pic) && ((0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P != ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)))
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_disp_pic,
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf,
0, ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: decoder/impeg2d_dec_hdr.c in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-04-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file that triggers a certain negative value, aka internal bug 26070014.
Commit Message: Fix for handling streams which resulted in negative num_mbs_left
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: Id9f063a2c72a802d991b92abaf00ec687db5bb0f
| Low | 173,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: __be32 ipv6_proxy_select_ident(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
static u32 ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
struct in6_addr buf[2];
struct in6_addr *addrs;
u32 id;
addrs = skb_header_pointer(skb,
skb_network_offset(skb) +
offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, saddr),
sizeof(buf), buf);
if (!addrs)
return 0;
net_get_random_once(&ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd,
sizeof(ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd));
id = __ipv6_select_ident(net, ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd,
&addrs[1], &addrs[0]);
return htonl(id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.1.7, a device can be tracked by an attacker using the IP ID values the kernel produces for connection-less protocols (e.g., UDP and ICMP). When such traffic is sent to multiple destination IP addresses, it is possible to obtain hash collisions (of indices to the counter array) and thereby obtain the hashing key (via enumeration). An attack may be conducted by hosting a crafted web page that uses WebRTC or gQUIC to force UDP traffic to attacker-controlled IP addresses.
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool CSPSourceList::matches(const KURL& url, ContentSecurityPolicy::RedirectStatus redirectStatus) const
{
if (m_allowStar)
return true;
KURL effectiveURL = m_policy->selfMatchesInnerURL() && SecurityOrigin::shouldUseInnerURL(url) ? SecurityOrigin::extractInnerURL(url) : url;
if (m_allowSelf && m_policy->urlMatchesSelf(effectiveURL))
return true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_list.size(); ++i) {
if (m_list[i].matches(effectiveURL, redirectStatus))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The CSPSourceList::matches function in WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/CSPSourceList.cpp in the Content Security Policy (CSP) implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 accepts a blob:, data:, or filesystem: URL as a match for a * pattern, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended scheme restrictions in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging a policy that relies on this pattern.
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950} | Medium | 171,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RenderWidgetHostViewAura(RenderWidgetHost* host)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(window_(new aura::Window(this))),
in_shutdown_(false),
is_fullscreen_(false),
popup_parent_host_view_(NULL),
popup_child_host_view_(NULL),
is_loading_(false),
text_input_type_(ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE),
can_compose_inline_(true),
has_composition_text_(false),
device_scale_factor_(1.0f),
current_surface_(0),
current_surface_is_protected_(true),
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_(true),
protection_state_id_(0),
surface_route_id_(0),
paint_canvas_(NULL),
synthetic_move_sent_(false),
accelerated_compositing_state_changed_(false),
can_lock_compositor_(YES) {
host_->SetView(this);
window_observer_.reset(new WindowObserver(this));
window_->AddObserver(window_observer_.get());
aura::client::SetTooltipText(window_, &tooltip_);
aura::client::SetActivationDelegate(window_, this);
gfx::Screen::GetScreenFor(window_)->AddObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 171,383 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void exit_io_context(void)
{
struct io_context *ioc;
task_lock(current);
ioc = current->io_context;
current->io_context = NULL;
task_unlock(current);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ioc->nr_tasks)) {
if (ioc->aic && ioc->aic->exit)
ioc->aic->exit(ioc->aic);
cfq_exit(ioc);
}
put_io_context(ioc);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The I/O implementation for block devices in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33 does not properly handle the CLONE_IO feature, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (I/O instability) by starting multiple processes that share an I/O context.
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Low | 169,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterPSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSF");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("PostScript");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In coders/ps.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-0 Q16, a DoS in ReadPSImage() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted PSD file, which claims a large *extent* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over *length* would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715 | Medium | 167,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static EAS_RESULT PushcdlStack (EAS_U32 *pStack, EAS_INT *pStackPtr, EAS_U32 value)
{
/* stack overflow, return an error */
if (*pStackPtr >= CDL_STACK_SIZE)
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
/* push the value onto the stack */
*pStackPtr = *pStackPtr + 1;
pStack[*pStackPtr] = value;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in sonivox in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-34031018.
Commit Message: eas_mdls: fix OOB read.
Bug: 34031018
Change-Id: I8d373c905f64286b23ec819bdbee51368b12e85a
| Medium | 174,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len;
size_t strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr,
&varint_len);
size_t last_len = strlen(last);
size_t prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
size_t suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
size_t path_len;
if (varint_len == 0)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the index.c:read_entry() function while decompressing a compressed prefix length in libgit2 before v0.26.2 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted repository index file.
Commit Message: index: fix out-of-bounds read with invalid index entry prefix length
The index format in version 4 has prefix-compressed entries, where every
index entry can compress its path by using a path prefix of the previous
entry. Since implmenting support for this index format version in commit
5625d86b9 (index: support index v4, 2016-05-17), though, we do not
correctly verify that the prefix length that we want to reuse is
actually smaller or equal to the amount of characters than the length of
the previous index entry's path. This can lead to a an integer underflow
and subsequently to an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by verifying that the prefix is actually smaller than the
previous entry's path length.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int set_geometry(unsigned int cmd, struct floppy_struct *g,
int drive, int type, struct block_device *bdev)
{
int cnt;
/* sanity checking for parameters. */
if (g->sect <= 0 ||
g->head <= 0 ||
g->track <= 0 || g->track > UDP->tracks >> STRETCH(g) ||
/* check if reserved bits are set */
(g->stretch & ~(FD_STRETCH | FD_SWAPSIDES | FD_SECTBASEMASK)) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (type) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
mutex_lock(&open_lock);
if (lock_fdc(drive)) {
mutex_unlock(&open_lock);
return -EINTR;
}
floppy_type[type] = *g;
floppy_type[type].name = "user format";
for (cnt = type << 2; cnt < (type << 2) + 4; cnt++)
floppy_sizes[cnt] = floppy_sizes[cnt + 0x80] =
floppy_type[type].size + 1;
process_fd_request();
for (cnt = 0; cnt < N_DRIVE; cnt++) {
struct block_device *bdev = opened_bdev[cnt];
if (!bdev || ITYPE(drive_state[cnt].fd_device) != type)
continue;
__invalidate_device(bdev, true);
}
mutex_unlock(&open_lock);
} else {
int oldStretch;
if (lock_fdc(drive))
return -EINTR;
if (cmd != FDDEFPRM) {
/* notice a disk change immediately, else
* we lose our settings immediately*/
if (poll_drive(true, FD_RAW_NEED_DISK) == -EINTR)
return -EINTR;
}
oldStretch = g->stretch;
user_params[drive] = *g;
if (buffer_drive == drive)
SUPBOUND(buffer_max, user_params[drive].sect);
current_type[drive] = &user_params[drive];
floppy_sizes[drive] = user_params[drive].size;
if (cmd == FDDEFPRM)
DRS->keep_data = -1;
else
DRS->keep_data = 1;
/* invalidation. Invalidate only when needed, i.e.
* when there are already sectors in the buffer cache
* whose number will change. This is useful, because
* mtools often changes the geometry of the disk after
* looking at the boot block */
if (DRS->maxblock > user_params[drive].sect ||
DRS->maxtrack ||
((user_params[drive].sect ^ oldStretch) &
(FD_SWAPSIDES | FD_SECTBASEMASK)))
invalidate_drive(bdev);
else
process_fd_request();
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.2.3, drivers/block/floppy.c allows a denial of service by setup_format_params division-by-zero. Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: the first one should set the drive geometry with .sect and .rate values that make F_SECT_PER_TRACK be zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called. It can be triggered by an unprivileged local user even when a floppy disk has not been inserted. NOTE: QEMU creates the floppy device by default.
Commit Message: floppy: fix div-by-zero in setup_format_params
This fixes a divide by zero error in the setup_format_params function of
the floppy driver.
Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: The first one should set the
drive geometry with such .sect and .rate values for the F_SECT_PER_TRACK
to become zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called.
A floppy disk is not required to be inserted. An unprivileged user
could trigger the bug if the device is accessible.
The patch checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK for a non-zero value in the
set_geometry function. The proper check should involve a reasonable
upper limit for the .sect and .rate fields, but it could change the
UAPI.
The patch also checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK in the setup_format_params, and
cancels the formatting operation in case of zero.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 169,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int usbhid_parse(struct hid_device *hid)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(hid->dev.parent);
struct usb_host_interface *interface = intf->cur_altsetting;
struct usb_device *dev = interface_to_usbdev (intf);
struct hid_descriptor *hdesc;
u32 quirks = 0;
unsigned int rsize = 0;
char *rdesc;
int ret, n;
quirks = usbhid_lookup_quirk(le16_to_cpu(dev->descriptor.idVendor),
le16_to_cpu(dev->descriptor.idProduct));
if (quirks & HID_QUIRK_IGNORE)
return -ENODEV;
/* Many keyboards and mice don't like to be polled for reports,
* so we will always set the HID_QUIRK_NOGET flag for them. */
if (interface->desc.bInterfaceSubClass == USB_INTERFACE_SUBCLASS_BOOT) {
if (interface->desc.bInterfaceProtocol == USB_INTERFACE_PROTOCOL_KEYBOARD ||
interface->desc.bInterfaceProtocol == USB_INTERFACE_PROTOCOL_MOUSE)
quirks |= HID_QUIRK_NOGET;
}
if (usb_get_extra_descriptor(interface, HID_DT_HID, &hdesc) &&
(!interface->desc.bNumEndpoints ||
usb_get_extra_descriptor(&interface->endpoint[0], HID_DT_HID, &hdesc))) {
dbg_hid("class descriptor not present\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
hid->version = le16_to_cpu(hdesc->bcdHID);
hid->country = hdesc->bCountryCode;
for (n = 0; n < hdesc->bNumDescriptors; n++)
if (hdesc->desc[n].bDescriptorType == HID_DT_REPORT)
rsize = le16_to_cpu(hdesc->desc[n].wDescriptorLength);
if (!rsize || rsize > HID_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
dbg_hid("weird size of report descriptor (%u)\n", rsize);
return -EINVAL;
}
rdesc = kmalloc(rsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rdesc)
return -ENOMEM;
hid_set_idle(dev, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber, 0, 0);
ret = hid_get_class_descriptor(dev, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
HID_DT_REPORT, rdesc, rsize);
if (ret < 0) {
dbg_hid("reading report descriptor failed\n");
kfree(rdesc);
goto err;
}
ret = hid_parse_report(hid, rdesc, rsize);
kfree(rdesc);
if (ret) {
dbg_hid("parsing report descriptor failed\n");
goto err;
}
hid->quirks |= quirks;
return 0;
err:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The usbhid_parse function in drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device.
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Low | 167,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: inline HTMLIFrameElement::HTMLIFrameElement(Document& document)
: HTMLFrameElementBase(iframeTag, document),
did_load_non_empty_document_(false),
collapsed_by_client_(false),
sandbox_(HTMLIFrameElementSandbox::Create(this)),
referrer_policy_(kReferrerPolicyDefault) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-601
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Resource Timing API in Google Chrome prior to 63.0.3239.84 allowed a remote attacker to infer browsing history by triggering a leaked cross-origin URL via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665} | Medium | 172,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DesktopSessionWin::OnChannelConnected() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlParseComment(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int len = 0;
xmlParserInputState state;
const xmlChar *in;
int nbchar = 0, ccol;
int inputid;
/*
* Check that there is a comment right here.
*/
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '!') ||
(NXT(2) != '-') || (NXT(3) != '-')) return;
state = ctxt->instate;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_COMMENT;
inputid = ctxt->input->id;
SKIP(4);
SHRINK;
GROW;
/*
* Accelerated common case where input don't need to be
* modified before passing it to the handler.
*/
in = ctxt->input->cur;
do {
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
}
get_more:
ccol = ctxt->input->col;
while (((*in > '-') && (*in <= 0x7F)) ||
((*in >= 0x20) && (*in < '-')) ||
(*in == 0x09)) {
in++;
ccol++;
}
ctxt->input->col = ccol;
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
goto get_more;
}
nbchar = in - ctxt->input->cur;
/*
* save current set of data
*/
if (nbchar > 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->comment != NULL)) {
if (buf == NULL) {
if ((*in == '-') && (in[1] == '-'))
size = nbchar + 1;
else
size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE + nbchar;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
len = 0;
} else if (len + nbchar + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *new_buf;
size += len + nbchar + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
new_buf = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf,
size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (new_buf == NULL) {
xmlFree (buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
buf = new_buf;
}
memcpy(&buf[len], ctxt->input->cur, nbchar);
len += nbchar;
buf[len] = 0;
}
}
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if (*in == 0xA) {
in++;
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
}
if (*in == 0xD) {
in++;
if (*in == 0xA) {
ctxt->input->cur = in;
in++;
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
continue; /* while */
}
in--;
}
SHRINK;
GROW;
in = ctxt->input->cur;
if (*in == '-') {
if (in[1] == '-') {
if (in[2] == '>') {
if (ctxt->input->id != inputid) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"comment doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
SKIP(3);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->comment != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (buf != NULL)
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, buf);
else
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, BAD_CAST "");
}
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated \n<!--%.50s\n",
buf);
else
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated \n", NULL);
in++;
ctxt->input->col++;
}
in++;
ctxt->input->col++;
goto get_more;
}
} while (((*in >= 0x20) && (*in <= 0x7F)) || (*in == 0x09));
xmlParseCommentComplex(ctxt, buf, len, size);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 171,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: zlib_advance(struct zlib *zlib, png_uint_32 nbytes)
/* Read nbytes compressed bytes; the stream will be initialized if required.
* Bytes are always being reread and errors are fatal. The return code is as
* follows:
*
* -1: saw the "too far back" error
* 0: ok, keep going
* 1: saw Z_STREAM_END (zlib->extra_bytes indicates too much data)
* 2: a zlib error that cannot be corrected (error message already
* output if required.)
*/
# define ZLIB_TOO_FAR_BACK (-1)
# define ZLIB_OK 0
# define ZLIB_STREAM_END 1
# define ZLIB_FATAL 2
{
int state = zlib->state;
int endrc = ZLIB_OK;
png_uint_32 in_bytes = 0;
struct file *file = zlib->file;
assert(state >= 0);
while (in_bytes < nbytes && endrc == ZLIB_OK)
{
png_uint_32 out_bytes;
int flush;
png_byte bIn = reread_byte(file);
png_byte bOut;
switch (state)
{
case 0: /* first header byte */
{
int file_bits = 8+(bIn >> 4);
int new_bits = zlib->window_bits;
zlib->file_bits = file_bits;
/* Check against the existing value - it may not need to be
* changed.
*/
if (new_bits == 0) /* no change */
zlib->window_bits = file_bits;
else if (new_bits != file_bits) /* rewrite required */
bIn = (png_byte)((bIn & 0xf) + ((new_bits-8) << 4));
}
zlib->header[0] = bIn;
zlib->state = state = 1;
break;
case 1: /* second header byte */
{
int b2 = bIn & 0xe0; /* top 3 bits */
/* The checksum calculation, on the first 11 bits: */
b2 += 0x1f - ((zlib->header[0] << 8) + b2) % 0x1f;
/* Update the checksum byte if required: */
if (bIn != b2)
{
/* If the first byte wasn't changed this indicates an error in
* the checksum calculation; signal this by setting file_bits
* (not window_bits) to 0.
*/
if (zlib->file_bits == zlib->window_bits)
zlib->cksum = 1;
bIn = (png_byte)b2;
}
}
zlib->header[1] = bIn;
zlib->state = state = 2;
break;
default: /* After the header bytes */
break;
}
/* For some streams, perhaps only those compressed with 'superfast
* compression' (which results in a lot of copying) Z_BUF_ERROR can happen
* immediately after all output has been flushed on the next input byte.
* This is handled below when Z_BUF_ERROR is detected by adding an output
* byte.
*/
zlib->z.next_in = &bIn;
zlib->z.avail_in = 1;
zlib->z.next_out = &bOut;
zlib->z.avail_out = 0; /* Initially */
/* Initially use Z_NO_FLUSH in an attempt to persuade zlib to look at this
* byte without confusing what is going on with output.
*/
flush = Z_NO_FLUSH;
out_bytes = 0;
/* NOTE: expression 3 is only evaluted on 'continue', because of the
* 'break' at the end of this loop below.
*/
for (;endrc == ZLIB_OK;
flush = Z_SYNC_FLUSH,
zlib->z.next_out = &bOut,
zlib->z.avail_out = 1,
++out_bytes)
{
zlib->rc = inflate(&zlib->z, flush);
out_bytes -= zlib->z.avail_out;
switch (zlib->rc)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
if (zlib->z.avail_out == 0)
continue; /* Try another output byte. */
if (zlib->z.avail_in == 0)
break; /* Try another input byte */
/* Both avail_out and avail_in are 1 yet zlib returned a code
* indicating no progress was possible. This is unexpected.
*/
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
endrc = ZLIB_FATAL; /* stop processing */
break;
case Z_OK:
/* Zlib is supposed to have made progress: */
assert(zlib->z.avail_out == 0 || zlib->z.avail_in == 0);
continue;
case Z_STREAM_END:
/* This is the successful end. */
zlib->state = 3; /* end of stream */
endrc = ZLIB_STREAM_END;
break;
case Z_NEED_DICT:
zlib_message(zlib, 0/*stream error*/);
endrc = ZLIB_FATAL;
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
/* The too far back error can be corrected, others cannot: */
if (zlib->z.msg != NULL &&
strcmp(zlib->z.msg, "invalid distance too far back") == 0)
{
endrc = ZLIB_TOO_FAR_BACK;
break;
}
/* FALL THROUGH */
default:
zlib_message(zlib, 0/*stream error*/);
endrc = ZLIB_FATAL;
break;
} /* switch (inflate rc) */
/* Control gets here when further output is not possible; endrc may
* still be ZLIB_OK if more input is required.
*/
break;
} /* for (output bytes) */
/* Keep a running count of output byte produced: */
zlib->uncompressed_digits = uarb_add32(zlib->uncompressed_bytes,
zlib->uncompressed_digits, out_bytes);
/* Keep going, the loop will terminate when endrc is no longer set to
* ZLIB_OK or all the input bytes have been consumed; meanwhile keep
* adding input bytes.
*/
assert(zlib->z.avail_in == 0 || endrc != ZLIB_OK);
in_bytes += 1 - zlib->z.avail_in;
} /* while (input bytes) */
assert(in_bytes == nbytes || endrc != ZLIB_OK);
/* Update the running total of input bytes consumed */
zlib->compressed_digits = uarb_add32(zlib->compressed_bytes,
zlib->compressed_digits, in_bytes - zlib->z.avail_in);
/* At the end of the stream update the chunk with the accumulated
* information if it is an improvement:
*/
if (endrc == ZLIB_STREAM_END && zlib->window_bits < zlib->ok_bits)
{
struct chunk *chunk = zlib->chunk;
chunk->uncompressed_digits = uarb_copy(chunk->uncompressed_bytes,
zlib->uncompressed_bytes, zlib->uncompressed_digits);
chunk->compressed_digits = uarb_copy(chunk->compressed_bytes,
zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits);
chunk->rewrite_buffer[0] = zlib->header[0];
chunk->rewrite_buffer[1] = zlib->header[1];
if (zlib->window_bits != zlib->file_bits || zlib->cksum)
{
/* A rewrite is required */
chunk->rewrite_offset = zlib->rewrite_offset;
chunk->rewrite_length = 2;
}
else
{
chunk->rewrite_offset = 0;
chunk->rewrite_length = 0;
}
if (in_bytes < nbytes)
chunk_message(chunk, "extra compressed data");
zlib->extra_bytes = nbytes - in_bytes;
zlib->ok_bits = zlib->window_bits;
}
return endrc;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| Low | 173,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_start_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
WORD32 i4_poc,
pocstruct_t *ps_temp_poc,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps)
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = ps_temp_poc;
pic_buffer_t *pic_buf;
ivd_video_decode_op_t * ps_dec_output =
(ivd_video_decode_op_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_out;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
/* high profile related declarations */
high_profile_tools_t s_high_profile;
WORD32 ret;
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->i1_next_ctxt_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 1)
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 1)
{
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores > 2)
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 2;
}
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 0;
if (ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0)
{
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 1;
}
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
/* If degrade is enabled, set the degrade flags appropriately */
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type && ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
WORD32 degrade_pic;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt++;
degrade_pic = 0;
/* If degrade is to be done in all frames, then do not check further */
switch(ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
case 4:
{
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 3:
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 2:
{
/* If pic count hits non-degrade interval or it is an islice, then do not degrade */
if((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt
!= ps_dec->i4_nondegrade_interval))
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 1:
{
/* Check if the current picture is non-ref */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
degrade_pic = 1;
}
break;
}
}
if(degrade_pic)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x2)
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 1;
/* MC degrading is done only for non-ref pictures */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x4)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x8)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
}
}
else
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt = 0;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9
&& ((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type
== SI_SLICE)))
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
else
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if(ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i == PIC_TYPE_I)
{
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag)
ih264d_reset_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag && ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending)
{
/* Reset the decoder picture buffers */
WORD32 j;
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
/* reset the decoder structure parameters related to buffer handling */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
/********************************************************************/
/* indicate in the decoder output i4_status that some frames are being */
/* dropped, so that it resets timestamp and wait for a new sequence */
/********************************************************************/
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
}
ret = ih264d_init_pic(ps_dec, u2_frame_num, i4_poc, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info = ps_dec->ps_frm_mb_info;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
UWORD16 pic_wd;
UWORD16 pic_ht;
UWORD32 num_mbs;
pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd;
pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht;
num_mbs = (pic_wd * pic_ht) >> 8;
if(ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map, 0,
(num_mbs * sizeof(UWORD16)));
}
}
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_computebs_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
/* Initialize all the HP toolsets to zero */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 0;
/* Get Next Free Picture */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
UWORD32 i;
/* Free any buffer that is in the queue to be freed */
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
continue;
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, i,
BUF_MGR_IO);
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i] = 0;
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i] = 0;
}
}
if(!(u1_field_pic_flag && 0 != ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)) //ps_dec->u1_second_field))
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_cur_pic;
WORD32 cur_pic_buf_id, cur_mv_buf_id;
col_mv_buf_t *ps_col_mv;
while(1)
{
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[cur_pic_buf_id])
{
break;
}
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
/*make first entry of list0 point to cur pic,so that if first Islice is in error, ref pic struct will have valid entries*/
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0]) = *ps_cur_pic;
}
if(!ps_dec->ps_cur_pic)
{
WORD32 j;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("------- Display Buffers Reset --------\n");
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_dec->apv_buf_id_pic_buf_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = (void *)ps_cur_pic;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ = SKIP_NONE;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("got a buffer\n");
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("did not get a buffer\n");
}
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_pic_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = ps_pps->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt =
ps_pps->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = ps_pps->i4_avg_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_time_stamp = ps_dec->u4_pts;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic = *(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic);
if(u1_field_pic_flag && u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
/* Point to odd lines, since it's bottom field */
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv +=
((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag += ((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht
* ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= BOT_FLD;
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= (ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
<< 2);
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row; //[0];
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row += 2;
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row;
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row += ((ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs + 2) << (1 - ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag));
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row += 2;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_top = ps_dec->ps_mv_top_p[0];
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->u1_mv_top_p = 0;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_left = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = -(SUB_BLK_SIZE);
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_pkd_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dma_buf_idx = 0;
ps_dec->ps_mv = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_bank_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_col_zero_flag = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = -1;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_dec_thread = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_bs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_intra_pred_line_ofst = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line
+ (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * MB_SIZE);
ps_dec->pu1_prev_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
/* Initialize The Function Pointer Depending Upon the Entropy and MbAff Flag */
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_mbaff;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_mbaff;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
}
/* Set up the Parameter for DMA transfer */
{
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
UWORD8 uc_lastmbs = (((ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 4)
% (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp >> u1_mbaff));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthY =
(uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 4) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 4));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthUV =
uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 3) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 3);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ui16_lastmbs_widthY += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
ui16_lastmbs_widthUV += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv;
}
/* Normal Increment of Pointer */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
/* End of Row Increment */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthY
+ (PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthUV
+ (PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
/* Assign picture numbers to each frame/field */
/* only once per picture. */
ih264d_assign_pic_num(ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_top_left_inc = (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
<< 2) - 1 - (u1_mbaff << 2);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_left_inc = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) - 1) << (4 + u1_mbaff);
}
/**********************************************************************/
/* High profile related initialization at pictrue level */
/**********************************************************************/
if(ps_seq->u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
if((ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
|| (ps_pps->i4_pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag))
{
ih264d_form_scaling_matrix_picture(ps_seq, ps_pps, ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 1;
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->i4_transform_8x8_mode_flag)
{
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 1;
}
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
/* required while reading the transform_size_8x8 u4_flag */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.s_cavlc_ctxt = ps_dec->s_cavlc_ctxt;
ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag = 1;
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3 && ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon;
}
}
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec,&(ps_dec->s_pad_mgr), &(ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon),
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
ps_dec->ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ih264d decoder in mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-08-01 mishandles slice numbers, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28673410.
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix slice number increment for error clips
Bug: 28673410
| Low | 173,545 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void alpha_perf_event_irq_handler(unsigned long la_ptr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct perf_event *event;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
int idx, j;
__get_cpu_var(irq_pmi_count)++;
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/* Completely counting through the PMC's period to trigger a new PMC
* overflow interrupt while in this interrupt routine is utterly
* disastrous! The EV6 and EV67 counters are sufficiently large to
* prevent this but to be really sure disable the PMCs.
*/
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_DISABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
/* la_ptr is the counter that overflowed. */
if (unlikely(la_ptr >= alpha_pmu->num_pmcs)) {
/* This should never occur! */
irq_err_count++;
pr_warning("PMI: silly index %ld\n", la_ptr);
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
idx = la_ptr;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
for (j = 0; j < cpuc->n_events; j++) {
if (cpuc->current_idx[j] == idx)
break;
}
if (unlikely(j == cpuc->n_events)) {
/* This can occur if the event is disabled right on a PMC overflow. */
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
event = cpuc->event[j];
if (unlikely(!event)) {
/* This should never occur! */
irq_err_count++;
pr_warning("PMI: No event at index %d!\n", idx);
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
hwc = &event->hw;
alpha_perf_event_update(event, hwc, idx, alpha_pmu->pmc_max_period[idx]+1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (alpha_perf_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx)) {
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs)) {
/* Interrupts coming too quickly; "throttle" the
* counter, i.e., disable it for a little while.
*/
alpha_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
}
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Low | 165,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void vrend_renderer_context_destroy(uint32_t handle)
{
struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx;
bool ret;
if (handle >= VREND_MAX_CTX)
return;
ctx = dec_ctx[handle];
if (!ctx)
return;
vrend_hw_switch_context(dec_ctx[0]->grctx, true);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The vrend_decode_reset function in vrend_decode.c in virglrenderer before 0.6.0 allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and QEMU process crash) by destroying context 0 (zero).
Commit Message: | Low | 164,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: const Block* SimpleBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return &m_block;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 174,285 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| Medium | 174,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_height;
UWORD16 u2_width;
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN) != SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u2_width = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
u2_height = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
if (0 == u2_width || 0 == u2_height)
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
return e_error;
}
if ((u2_width != ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size)
|| (u2_height != ps_dec->u2_vertical_size))
{
if (0 == ps_dec->u2_header_done)
{
/* This is the first time we are reading the resolution */
ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size = u2_width;
ps_dec->u2_vertical_size = u2_height;
if (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride = (UWORD32) (u2_width);
}
}
else
{
if (0 == ps_dec->i4_pic_count)
{
/* Decoder has not decoded a single frame since the last
* reset/init. This implies that we have two headers in the
* input stream. So, do not indicate a resolution change, since
* this can take the decoder into an infinite loop.
*/
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T) IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
}
else if((u2_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (u2_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height = u2_height;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width = u2_width;
return e_error;
}
else
{
/* The resolution has changed */
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
return e_error;
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* aspect_ratio_info (4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_aspect_ratio_info = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Frame rate code(4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
if (ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code > MPEG2_MAX_FRAME_RATE_CODE)
{
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* bit_rate_value (18 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,18);
GET_MARKER_BIT(ps_dec,ps_stream);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* vbv_buffer_size_value(10 bits), constrained_parameter_flag (1 bit) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,11);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the intra blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_intra_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the inter blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_inter_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In impeg2_fmt_conv_yuv420p_to_yuv420sp_uv_av8 of impeg2_format_conv.s there is a possible out of bounds write due to missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-74078669
Commit Message: Adding check for min_width and min_height
Add check for min_wd and min_ht. Stride is updated if header
decode is done.
Bug: 74078669
Change-Id: Ided95395e1138335dbb4b05131a8551f6f7bbfcd
(cherry picked from commit 84eba4863dd50083951db83ea3cc81e015bf51da)
| Medium | 174,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
int tab_index;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index)) {
DictionaryValue* changed_properties = new DictionaryValue();
changed_properties->SetBoolean(tab_keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 171,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void svc_rdma_put_req_map(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map)
{
spin_lock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
list_add(&map->free, &xprt->sc_maps);
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Low | 168,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int ps_files_valid_key(const char *key)
{
size_t len;
const char *p;
char c;
int ret = 1;
for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
/* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
|| c == ','
|| c == '-')) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
len = p - key;
/* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
if (len == 0 || len > 128) {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Session fixation vulnerability in the Sessions subsystem in PHP before 5.5.2 allows remote attackers to hijack web sessions by specifying a session ID.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void *SoftMP3::memsetSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader, int c, size_t len) {
if (len > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("memset buffer too small: got %lu, expected %zu", outHeader->nAllocLen, len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422022");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return NULL;
}
return memset(outHeader->pBuffer, c, len);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in codecs/mp3dec/SoftMP3.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29422022.
Commit Message: Fix build
Change-Id: I96a9c437eec53a285ac96794cc1ad0c8954b27e0
| Medium | 174,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t in_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
in_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
in_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
in_len = in[2] * 0x100;
in_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], in_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], in_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[in_len - 2] && (in_len - 2 > 0))
in_len--;
if (2 == in_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, in_len - 2);
*out_len = in_len - 2;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Various out of bounds reads when handling responses in OpenSC before 0.19.0-rc1 could be used by attackers able to supply crafted smartcards to potentially crash the opensc library using programs.
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. | Low | 169,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ChromeOSSetImePropertyActivated(
InputMethodStatusConnection* connection, const char* key, bool activated) {
DLOG(INFO) << "SetImePropertyeActivated: " << key << ": " << activated;
DCHECK(key);
g_return_if_fail(connection);
connection->SetImePropertyActivated(key, activated);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,527 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void perf_remove_from_owner(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct task_struct *owner;
rcu_read_lock();
owner = ACCESS_ONCE(event->owner);
/*
* Matches the smp_wmb() in perf_event_exit_task(). If we observe
* !owner it means the list deletion is complete and we can indeed
* free this event, otherwise we need to serialize on
* owner->perf_event_mutex.
*/
smp_read_barrier_depends();
if (owner) {
/*
* Since delayed_put_task_struct() also drops the last
* task reference we can safely take a new reference
* while holding the rcu_read_lock().
*/
get_task_struct(owner);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (owner) {
mutex_lock(&owner->perf_event_mutex);
/*
* We have to re-check the event->owner field, if it is cleared
* we raced with perf_event_exit_task(), acquiring the mutex
* ensured they're done, and we can proceed with freeing the
* event.
*/
if (event->owner)
list_del_init(&event->owner_entry);
mutex_unlock(&owner->perf_event_mutex);
put_task_struct(owner);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,994 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: BlobDataHandle::BlobDataHandle(PassOwnPtr<BlobData> data, long long size)
{
UNUSED_PARAM(size);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(m_internalURL, data);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 170,694 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int btsock_thread_post_cmd(int h, int type, const unsigned char* data, int size, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_USER_PRIVATE, 0, type, size, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("post cmd type:%d, size:%d, h:%d, ", type, size, h);
sock_cmd_t* cmd_send = &cmd;
int size_send = sizeof(cmd);
if(data && size)
{
size_send = sizeof(cmd) + size;
cmd_send = (sock_cmd_t*)alloca(size_send);
if(cmd_send)
{
*cmd_send = cmd;
memcpy(cmd_send + 1, data, size);
}
else
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("alloca failed at h:%d, cmd type:%d, size:%d", h, type, size_send);
return FALSE;
}
}
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, cmd_send, size_send, 0) == size_send;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void GCInfoTable::Resize() {
static const int kGcInfoZapValue = 0x33;
const size_t kInitialSize = 512;
size_t new_size =
gc_info_table_size_ ? 2 * gc_info_table_size_ : kInitialSize;
DCHECK(new_size < GCInfoTable::kMaxIndex);
g_gc_info_table =
reinterpret_cast<GCInfo const**>(WTF::Partitions::FastRealloc(
g_gc_info_table, new_size * sizeof(GCInfo), "GCInfo"));
DCHECK(g_gc_info_table);
memset(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(g_gc_info_table) +
gc_info_table_size_ * sizeof(GCInfo),
kGcInfoZapValue, (new_size - gc_info_table_size_) * sizeof(GCInfo));
gc_info_table_size_ = new_size;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434} | High | 173,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
int ret=0;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
#endif
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if ((m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) &&
BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING) &&
(m_out_bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) &&
BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING) &&
(m_inp_bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((unsigned long)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition: {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (OMX_DirOutput == portDefn->eDir) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition OP port");
bool port_format_changed = false;
m_display_id = portDefn->format.video.pNativeWindow;
unsigned int buffer_size;
/* update output port resolution with client supplied dimensions
in case scaling is enabled, else it follows input resolution set
*/
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("SetParam OP: WxH(%u x %u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
if (portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight != 0x0 &&
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth != 0x0) {
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
break;
}
if ((portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight != (unsigned int)fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height) ||
(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth != (unsigned int)fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width)) {
port_format_changed = true;
}
update_resolution(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
/* set crop info */
rectangle.nLeft = 0;
rectangle.nTop = 0;
rectangle.nWidth = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
rectangle.nHeight = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
eRet = is_video_session_supported();
if (eRet)
break;
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = %d , fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = %d",
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height, fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width);
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
if (eRet) {
break;
}
if (secure_mode) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SECURE_SCALING_THRESHOLD;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed getting secure scaling threshold : %d, id was : %x", errno, control.id);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
/* This is a workaround for a bug in fw which uses stride
* and slice instead of width and height to check against
* the threshold.
*/
OMX_U32 stride, slice;
if (drv_ctx.output_format == VDEC_YUV_FORMAT_NV12) {
stride = VENUS_Y_STRIDE(COLOR_FMT_NV12, portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
slice = VENUS_Y_SCANLINES(COLOR_FMT_NV12, portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
} else {
stride = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
slice = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Stride is %d, slice is %d, sxs is %d\n", stride, slice, stride * slice);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Threshold value is %d\n", control.value);
if (stride * slice <= (OMX_U32)control.value) {
secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Enabling secure scalar out of CPZ");
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NON_SECURE_OUTPUT2;
control.value = 1;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Enabling non-secure output2 failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
}
}
if (eRet) {
break;
}
if (!client_buffers.get_buffer_req(buffer_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error in getting buffer requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else if (!port_format_changed) {
if ( portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount &&
portDefn->nBufferSize >= drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size ) {
drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size = portDefn->nBufferSize;
drv_ctx.extradata_info.count = drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount;
drv_ctx.extradata_info.size = drv_ctx.extradata_info.count *
drv_ctx.extradata_info.buffer_size;
eRet = set_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone)
m_port_def = *portDefn;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OP Requirements(#%d: %u) Requested(#%u: %u)",
drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount, (unsigned int)drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
} else if (OMX_DirInput == portDefn->eDir) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition IP port");
bool port_format_changed = false;
if ((portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16) > 0 &&
(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16) <= MAX_SUPPORTED_FPS) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: frame rate set by omx client : %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16);
Q16ToFraction(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator,
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30");
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30;
}
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1;
frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: frm_int(%u) fps(%.2f)",
(unsigned int)frm_int, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator /
(float)drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
struct v4l2_outputparm oparm;
/*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames
* per second.*/
oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_streamparm sparm;
sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
sparm.parm.output = oparm;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, performance might be affected");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
break;
}
}
if (drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height !=
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight ||
drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width !=
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("SetParam IP: WxH(%u x %u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
port_format_changed = true;
OMX_U32 frameWidth = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
OMX_U32 frameHeight = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
if (frameHeight != 0x0 && frameWidth != 0x0) {
if (m_smoothstreaming_mode &&
((frameWidth * frameHeight) <
(m_smoothstreaming_width * m_smoothstreaming_height))) {
frameWidth = m_smoothstreaming_width;
frameHeight = m_smoothstreaming_height;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("NOTE: Setting resolution %u x %u "
"for adaptive-playback/smooth-streaming",
(unsigned int)frameWidth, (unsigned int)frameHeight);
}
update_resolution(frameWidth, frameHeight,
frameWidth, frameHeight);
eRet = is_video_session_supported();
if (eRet)
break;
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = output_capability;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = %d , fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = %d",fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height,fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width);
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
if (!is_down_scalar_enabled)
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
}
}
if (m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize
&& (portDefn->nBufferSize > m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Custom buffer size set by client: %d, trying to set: %d",
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize, portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount
|| portDefn->nBufferSize != drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size) {
port_format_changed = true;
vdec_allocatorproperty *buffer_prop = &drv_ctx.ip_buf;
drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size = (portDefn->nBufferSize + buffer_prop->alignment - 1) &
(~(buffer_prop->alignment - 1));
eRet = set_buffer_req(buffer_prop);
}
if (false == port_format_changed) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: IP Requirements(#%d: %u) Requested(#%u: %u)",
drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount, (unsigned int)drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else if (portDefn->eDir == OMX_DirMax) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
int ret=0;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat 0x%x, port: %u",
portFmt->eColorFormat, (unsigned int)portFmt->nPortIndex);
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
if (1 == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
enum vdec_output_fromat op_format;
if (portFmt->eColorFormat == (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32mMultiView ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar)
op_format = (enum vdec_output_fromat)VDEC_YUV_FORMAT_NV12;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
drv_ctx.output_format = op_format;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set output format failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
/*TODO: How to handle this case */
} else {
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (!client_buffers.set_color_format(portFmt->eColorFormat)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set color format failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn: {
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType %u",
(unsigned int)portFmt->nFramePackingFormat);
/* Input port */
if (portFmt->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (portFmt->nFramePackingFormat == OMX_QCOM_FramePacking_Arbitrary) {
if (secure_mode) {
arbitrary_bytes = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("setparameter: cannot set to arbitary bytes mode in secure session");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
arbitrary_bytes = true;
}
} else if (portFmt->nFramePackingFormat ==
OMX_QCOM_FramePacking_OnlyOneCompleteFrame) {
arbitrary_bytes = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.arbitrarybytes.mode", property_value, "0");
if (atoi(property_value)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("arbitrary_bytes enabled via property command");
arbitrary_bytes = true;
}
#endif
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown FramePacking format %u",
(unsigned int)portFmt->nFramePackingFormat);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (portFmt->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType OP Port");
if ( (portFmt->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
portFmt->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) &&
portFmt->nCacheAttr == OMX_QCOM_CacheAttrNone) {
m_out_mem_region_smi = OMX_TRUE;
if ((m_out_mem_region_smi && m_out_pvt_entry_pmem)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType OP Port: out pmem set");
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
}
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole: {
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole, "video_decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole, "video_decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if ((!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx311", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx4", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))
) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if ( (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.wmv",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))
) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE) ||
(!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vpx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole, "video_decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole, "video_decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown param %s", drv_ctx.kind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt: {
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_priority_mgm.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_priority_mgm.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier: {
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_buffer_supplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDecoderPictureOrder: {
QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER *pictureOrder =
(QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER *)paramData;
struct v4l2_control control;
int pic_order,rc=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDecoderPictureOrder %d",
pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder);
if (pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder == QOMX_VIDEO_DISPLAY_ORDER) {
pic_order = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DISPLAY;
} else if (pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder == QOMX_VIDEO_DECODE_ORDER) {
pic_order = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DECODE;
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
} else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER;
control.value = pic_order;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set picture order failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamConcealMBMapExtraData:
eRet = enable_extradata(VDEC_EXTRADATA_MB_ERROR_MAP, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamFrameInfoExtraData:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_ExtraDataFrameDimension:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEDIMENSION_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamInterlaceExtraData:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_INTERLACE_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264TimeInfo:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_TIMEINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoFramePackingExtradata:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEPACK_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPExtraData:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_QP_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoInputBitsInfoExtraData:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_BITSINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableExtnUserData:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_EXTNUSER_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamMpeg2SeqDispExtraData:
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_MPEG2SEQDISP_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDivx: {
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_DIVXTYPE* divXType = (QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_DIVXTYPE *) paramData;
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt: {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt OP Port");
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN* entryType = (OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN *) paramData;
if (entryType->type != OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: Platform Private entry type (%d) not supported.", entryType->type);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_out_pvt_entry_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
if ((m_out_mem_region_smi && m_out_pvt_entry_pmem)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt OP Port: out pmem set");
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode: {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode");
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set idr only decoding for thumbnail mode");
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc;
drv_ctx.idr_only_decoding = 1;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DECODE;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set picture order failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SYNC_FRAME_DECODE;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SYNC_FRAME_DECODE_ENABLE;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
/*Setting sync frame decoding on driver might change buffer
* requirements so update them here*/
if (get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.ip_buf)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed: falied to get buffer i/p requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed: falied to get buffer o/p requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType: {
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *extradataIndexType = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *) paramData;
if ((extradataIndexType->nIndex == OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) &&
(extradataIndexType->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) &&
(extradataIndexType->nPortIndex == 1)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType SmoothStreaming");
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_PORTDEF_EXTRADATA, false, extradataIndexType->bEnabled);
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamEnableSmoothStreaming: {
#ifndef SMOOTH_STREAMING_DISABLED
eRet = enable_smoothstreaming();
#else
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
#endif
}
break;
#if defined (_ANDROID_HONEYCOMB_) || defined (_ANDROID_ICS_)
/* Need to allow following two set_parameters even in Idle
* state. This is ANDROID architecture which is not in sync
* with openmax standard. */
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexEnableAndroidNativeBuffers: {
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams* enableNativeBuffers = (EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams *) paramData;
if (enableNativeBuffers) {
m_enable_android_native_buffers = enableNativeBuffers->enable;
}
#if !defined(FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED)
if (m_enable_android_native_buffers) {
if(!client_buffers.set_color_format(getPreferredColorFormatDefaultMode(0))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set native color format!");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
}
break;
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexUseAndroidNativeBuffer: {
eRet = use_android_native_buffer(hComp, paramData);
}
break;
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamEnableTimeStampReorder: {
QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER *reorder = (QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER *)paramData;
if (drv_ctx.picture_order == (vdec_output_order)QOMX_VIDEO_DISPLAY_ORDER) {
if (reorder->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) {
frm_int =0;
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(true);
} else
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
} else {
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
if (reorder->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) {
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam) {
m_profile_lvl.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_profile_lvl.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *metabuffer =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *)paramData;
if (!metabuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid param: %p", metabuffer);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Dynamic buffer mode disabled by setprop");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
break;
}
if (metabuffer->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
struct v4l2_control control;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_ALLOC_MODE_OUTPUT;
if (metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true) {
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_DYNAMIC;
} else {
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STATIC;
}
int rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL,&control);
if (!rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("%s buffer mode",
(metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true)? "Enabled dynamic" : "Disabled dynamic");
dynamic_buf_mode = metabuffer->bStoreMetaData;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to %s buffer mode",
(metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true)? "enable dynamic" : "disable dynamic");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode not supported for port: %u",
(unsigned int)metabuffer->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDownScalar:
{
QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR* pParam = (QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR*)paramData;
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc;
if (pParam) {
is_down_scalar_enabled = pParam->bEnable;
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_OUTPUT_MODE;
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_OUTPUT_SECONDARY;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDownScalar value = %d", pParam->bEnable);
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set down scalar on driver.");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_KEEP_ASPECT_RATIO;
control.value = 1;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set keep aspect ratio on driver.");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
}
#ifdef ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK_SUPPORTED
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoAdaptivePlaybackMode:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexPrepareForAdaptivePlayback");
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams* pParams =
(PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams *) paramData;
if (pParams->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
if (!pParams->bEnable) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (pParams->nMaxFrameWidth > maxSmoothStreamingWidth
|| pParams->nMaxFrameHeight > maxSmoothStreamingHeight) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"Adaptive playback request exceeds max supported resolution : [%u x %u] vs [%u x %u]",
(unsigned int)pParams->nMaxFrameWidth, (unsigned int)pParams->nMaxFrameHeight,
(unsigned int)maxSmoothStreamingWidth, (unsigned int)maxSmoothStreamingHeight);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else {
eRet = enable_adaptive_playback(pParams->nMaxFrameWidth, pParams->nMaxFrameHeight);
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"Prepare for adaptive playback supported only on output port");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoCustomBufferSize:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoCustomBufferSize");
QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE* pParam = (QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_BUFFER_SIZE_LIMIT;
control.value = pParam->nBufferSize;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set input buffer size");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.ip_buf);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Successfully set custom input buffer size = %d",
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to get buffer requirement");
}
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Custom buffer size in not supported on output port");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
}
default: {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
if (eRet != OMX_ErrorNone)
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Error: 0x%x, setting param 0x%x", eRet, paramIndex);
return eRet;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The mm-video-v4l2 vidc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate certain OMX parameter data structures, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27532721.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
| Medium | 173,791 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::canSetValueAttribute() const {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_readonlyAttr), "true"))
return false;
if (isProgressIndicator() || isSlider())
return true;
if (isTextControl() && !isNativeTextControl())
return true;
return !isReadOnly();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 171,909 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void IBusBusNameOwnerChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus,
const gchar* name, const gchar* old_name, const gchar* new_name,
gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(name);
DCHECK(old_name);
DCHECK(new_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Name owner is changed: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
if (name != std::string("org.freedesktop.IBus.Config")) {
return;
}
const std::string empty_string;
if (old_name != empty_string || new_name == empty_string) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Unexpected name owner change: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
return;
}
LOG(INFO) << "IBus config daemon is started. Recovering ibus_config_";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in mcrypt.c in the mcrypt extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted length value, related to the (1) mcrypt_generic and (2) mdecrypt_generic functions.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows | Low | 167,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetPowerLibrary(
PowerLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->power_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,643 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport const char *GetMagickFeatures(void)
{
return "DPC"
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_BUILD_MODULES) || defined(_DLL)
" Modules"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HDRI_SUPPORT)
" HDRI"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENCL_SUPPORT)
" OpenCL"
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
" OpenMP"
#endif
;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer truncation issue in coders/pict.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.5-0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted .pict file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,861 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int UDPSocketLibevent::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len)) {
Close();
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
}
rv = HANDLE_EINTR(connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len));
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(errno);
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 171,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: tight_detect_smooth_image(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
{
unsigned int errors;
int compression = vs->tight.compression;
int quality = vs->tight.quality;
if (!vs->vd->lossy) {
return 0;
}
if (ds_get_bytes_per_pixel(vs->ds) == 1 ||
vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel == 1 ||
w < VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_MIN_WIDTH || h < VNC_TIGHT_DETECT_MIN_HEIGHT) {
return 0;
}
if (vs->tight.quality != (uint8_t)-1) {
if (w * h < VNC_TIGHT_JPEG_MIN_RECT_SIZE) {
return 0;
}
} else {
if (w * h < tight_conf[compression].gradient_min_rect_size) {
return 0;
}
}
if (vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel == 4) {
if (vs->tight.pixel24) {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image24(vs, w, h);
if (vs->tight.quality != (uint8_t)-1) {
return (errors < tight_conf[quality].jpeg_threshold24);
}
return (errors < tight_conf[compression].gradient_threshold24);
} else {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image32(vs, w, h);
}
} else {
errors = tight_detect_smooth_image16(vs, w, h);
}
if (quality != -1) {
return (errors < tight_conf[quality].jpeg_threshold);
}
return (errors < tight_conf[compression].gradient_threshold);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,464 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The SPDY implementation in Google Chrome before 21.0.1180.89 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 170,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AutofillManager::GetAvailableSuggestions(
const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field,
std::vector<Suggestion>* suggestions,
SuggestionsContext* context) {
DCHECK(suggestions);
DCHECK(context);
bool is_autofill_possible = RefreshDataModels();
bool got_autofillable_form =
GetCachedFormAndField(form, field, &context->form_structure,
&context->focused_field) &&
context->form_structure->ShouldBeParsed();
if (got_autofillable_form) {
if (context->focused_field->Type().group() == CREDIT_CARD) {
context->is_filling_credit_card = true;
driver()->DidInteractWithCreditCardForm();
credit_card_form_event_logger_->OnDidInteractWithAutofillableForm(
context->form_structure->form_signature());
} else {
address_form_event_logger_->OnDidInteractWithAutofillableForm(
context->form_structure->form_signature());
}
}
context->is_context_secure =
!IsFormNonSecure(form) ||
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kAutofillRequireSecureCreditCardContext);
if (!is_autofill_possible || !driver()->RendererIsAvailable() ||
!got_autofillable_form)
return;
context->is_autofill_available = true;
if (context->is_filling_credit_card) {
*suggestions =
GetCreditCardSuggestions(field, context->focused_field->Type(),
&context->is_all_server_suggestions);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillCreditCardAblationExperiment) &&
!suggestions->empty()) {
context->suppress_reason = SuppressReason::kCreditCardsAblation;
suggestions->clear();
return;
}
} else {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillAlwaysFillAddresses) &&
IsDesktopPlatform() && !field.should_autocomplete) {
context->suppress_reason = SuppressReason::kAutocompleteOff;
return;
}
*suggestions = GetProfileSuggestions(*context->form_structure, field,
*context->focused_field);
}
if (!suggestions->empty() && context->is_filling_credit_card &&
!context->is_context_secure) {
Suggestion warning_suggestion(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_AUTOFILL_WARNING_INSECURE_CONNECTION));
warning_suggestion.frontend_id =
POPUP_ITEM_ID_INSECURE_CONTEXT_PAYMENT_DISABLED_MESSAGE;
suggestions->assign(1, warning_suggestion);
} else {
context->section_has_autofilled_field = SectionHasAutofilledField(
*context->form_structure, form, context->focused_field->section);
if (context->section_has_autofilled_field) {
std::set<base::string16> seen_values;
for (auto iter = suggestions->begin(); iter != suggestions->end();) {
if (!seen_values.insert(iter->value).second) {
iter = suggestions->erase(iter);
} else {
iter->label.clear();
iter->icon.clear();
++iter;
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID:
Summary: Unsafe handling of credit card details in Autofill in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315} | ??? | 173,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Transfer() {
CheckThread();
EnsureMailbox(kVerifiedSyncToken, GL_NEAREST);
detach_thread_at_next_check_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Incorrect, thread-unsafe use of SkImage in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427} | Medium | 172,598 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int pf_detect(void)
{
struct pf_unit *pf = units;
int k, unit;
printk("%s: %s version %s, major %d, cluster %d, nice %d\n",
name, name, PF_VERSION, major, cluster, nice);
par_drv = pi_register_driver(name);
if (!par_drv) {
pr_err("failed to register %s driver\n", name);
return -1;
}
k = 0;
if (pf_drive_count == 0) {
if (pi_init(pf->pi, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, pf_scratch, PI_PF,
verbose, pf->name)) {
if (!pf_probe(pf) && pf->disk) {
pf->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(pf->pi);
}
} else
for (unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; unit++, pf++) {
int *conf = *drives[unit];
if (!conf[D_PRT])
continue;
if (pi_init(pf->pi, 0, conf[D_PRT], conf[D_MOD],
conf[D_UNI], conf[D_PRO], conf[D_DLY],
pf_scratch, PI_PF, verbose, pf->name)) {
if (pf->disk && !pf_probe(pf)) {
pf->present = 1;
k++;
} else
pi_release(pf->pi);
}
}
if (k)
return 0;
printk("%s: No ATAPI disk detected\n", name);
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
blk_cleanup_queue(pf->disk->queue);
pf->disk->queue = NULL;
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&pf->tag_set);
put_disk(pf->disk);
}
pi_unregister_driver(par_drv);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.0.9. There is a NULL pointer dereference for a pf data structure if alloc_disk fails in drivers/block/paride/pf.c.
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Low | 169,521 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx->might_cancel) {
ctx->might_cancel = false;
spin_lock(&cancel_lock);
list_del_rcu(&ctx->clist);
spin_unlock(&cancel_lock);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in fs/timerfd.c in the Linux kernel before 4.10.15 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (list corruption or use-after-free) via simultaneous file-descriptor operations that leverage improper might_cancel queueing.
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]"
Cc: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> | High | 168,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct bsg_device *bd = file->private_data;
ssize_t bytes_written;
int ret;
dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_written = 0;
ret = __bsg_write(bd, buf, count, &bytes_written,
file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
*ppos = bytes_written;
/*
* return bytes written on non-fatal errors
*/
if (!bytes_written || err_block_err(ret))
bytes_written = ret;
dprintk("%s: returning %Zd\n", bd->name, bytes_written);
return bytes_written;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The sg implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.9 does not properly restrict write operations in situations where the KERNEL_DS option is set, which allows local users to read or write to arbitrary kernel memory locations or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging access to a /dev/sg device, related to block/bsg.c and drivers/scsi/sg.c. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-9576.
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void Label::SizeToFit(int max_width) {
DCHECK(is_multi_line_);
std::vector<std::wstring> lines;
base::SplitString(UTF16ToWideHack(text_), L'\n', &lines);
int label_width = 0;
for (std::vector<std::wstring>::const_iterator iter = lines.begin();
iter != lines.end(); ++iter) {
label_width = std::max(label_width,
font_.GetStringWidth(WideToUTF16Hack(*iter)));
}
label_width += GetInsets().width();
if (max_width > 0)
label_width = std::min(label_width, max_width);
SetBounds(x(), y(), label_width, 0);
SizeToPreferredSize();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 12.0.742.112 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG fonts.
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,556 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void CreateFusionSensor(
std::unique_ptr<PlatformSensorFusionAlgorithm> fusion_algorithm) {
auto callback =
base::Bind(&PlatformSensorFusionTest::PlatformSensorFusionCallback,
base::Unretained(this));
SensorType type = fusion_algorithm->fused_type();
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(provider_->GetMapping(type), provider_.get(),
std::move(fusion_algorithm), callback);
EXPECT_TRUE(platform_sensor_fusion_callback_called_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,832 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: StyleResolver::StyleResolver(Document& document)
: m_document(document)
, m_fontSelector(CSSFontSelector::create(&document))
, m_viewportStyleResolver(ViewportStyleResolver::create(&document))
, m_styleResourceLoader(document.fetcher())
, m_styleResolverStatsSequence(0)
, m_accessCount(0)
{
Element* root = document.documentElement();
m_fontSelector->registerForInvalidationCallbacks(this);
CSSDefaultStyleSheets::initDefaultStyle(root);
FrameView* view = document.view();
if (view)
m_medium = adoptPtr(new MediaQueryEvaluator(view->mediaType()));
else
m_medium = adoptPtr(new MediaQueryEvaluator("all"));
if (root)
m_rootDefaultStyle = styleForElement(root, 0, DisallowStyleSharing, MatchOnlyUserAgentRules);
if (m_rootDefaultStyle && view)
m_medium = adoptPtr(new MediaQueryEvaluator(view->mediaType(), &view->frame(), m_rootDefaultStyle.get()));
m_styleTree.clear();
initWatchedSelectorRules(CSSSelectorWatch::from(document).watchedCallbackSelectors());
#if ENABLE(SVG_FONTS)
if (document.svgExtensions()) {
const HashSet<SVGFontFaceElement*>& svgFontFaceElements = document.svgExtensions()->svgFontFaceElements();
HashSet<SVGFontFaceElement*>::const_iterator end = svgFontFaceElements.end();
for (HashSet<SVGFontFaceElement*>::const_iterator it = svgFontFaceElements.begin(); it != end; ++it)
fontSelector()->addFontFaceRule((*it)->fontFaceRule());
}
#endif
document.styleEngine()->appendActiveAuthorStyleSheets(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly perform a cast of an unspecified variable during processing of the root of the structure tree, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unknown other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ext4_insert_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
handle_t *handle;
struct ext4_ext_path *path;
struct ext4_extent *extent;
ext4_lblk_t offset_lblk, len_lblk, ee_start_lblk = 0;
unsigned int credits, ee_len;
int ret = 0, depth, split_flag = 0;
loff_t ioffset;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that an
* insert range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support insert range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Insert range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_insert_range(inode, offset, len);
offset_lblk = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
len_lblk = len >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Need to round down to align start offset to page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Take mutex lock */
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Check for wrap through zero */
if (inode->i_size + len > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Offset should be less than i_size */
if (offset >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_dio;
}
/* Expand file to avoid data loss if there is error while shifting */
inode->i_size += len;
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize += len;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ret = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (ret)
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, offset_lblk, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
depth = ext_depth(inode);
extent = path[depth].p_ext;
if (extent) {
ee_start_lblk = le32_to_cpu(extent->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(extent);
/*
* If offset_lblk is not the starting block of extent, split
* the extent @offset_lblk
*/
if ((offset_lblk > ee_start_lblk) &&
(offset_lblk < (ee_start_lblk + ee_len))) {
if (ext4_ext_is_unwritten(extent))
split_flag = EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1 |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2;
ret = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, &path,
offset_lblk, split_flag,
EXT4_EX_NOCACHE |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL);
}
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
if (ret < 0) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
}
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, offset_lblk,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - offset_lblk);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
/*
* if offset_lblk lies in a hole which is at start of file, use
* ee_start_lblk to shift extents
*/
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle,
ee_start_lblk > offset_lblk ? ee_start_lblk : offset_lblk,
len_lblk, SHIFT_RIGHT);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void br_multicast_del_pg(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port_group *pg)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
mp = br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &pg->addr);
if (WARN_ON(!mp))
return;
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
if (p != pg)
continue;
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p->next);
hlist_del_init(&p->mglist);
del_timer(&p->timer);
call_rcu_bh(&p->rcu, br_multicast_free_pg);
if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist &&
netif_running(br->dev))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, jiffies);
return;
}
WARN_ON(1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The bridge multicast implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 does not check whether a certain timer is armed before modifying the timeout value of that timer, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via vectors involving the shutdown of a KVM virtual machine, related to net/bridge/br_mdb.c and net/bridge/br_multicast.c.
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <[email protected]>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: StateBase* writeFile(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
File* file = V8File::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!file)
return 0;
if (file->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
int blobIndex = -1;
m_blobDataHandles.add(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle());
if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) {
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
m_writer.writeFileIndex(blobIndex);
} else {
m_writer.writeFile(*file);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the V8 bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper use of HashMap add operations instead of HashMap set operations, related to bindings/core/v8/DOMWrapperMap.h and bindings/core/v8/SerializedScriptValue.cpp.
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 171,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
list[i] = NULL;
}
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
} else
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c is vulnerable to an off-by-one error caused by malicious server responses, leading to DoS or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,749 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int bnep_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct bnep_connlist_req cl;
struct bnep_connadd_req ca;
struct bnep_conndel_req cd;
struct bnep_conninfo ci;
struct socket *nsock;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case BNEPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
nsock = sockfd_lookup(ca.sock, &err);
if (!nsock)
return err;
if (nsock->sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
sockfd_put(nsock);
return -EBADFD;
}
err = bnep_add_connection(&ca, nsock);
if (!err) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
sockfd_put(nsock);
return err;
case BNEPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return bnep_del_connection(&cd);
case BNEPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = bnep_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case BNEPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = bnep_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The bnep_sock_ioctl function in net/bluetooth/bnep/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not ensure that a certain device field ends with a '0' character, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory, or cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash), via a BNEPCONNADD command.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device"
field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of
alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name
made of contents of kernel stack.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_islice_data_cavlc(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD8 uc_more_data_flag;
UWORD8 u1_num_mbs, u1_mb_idx;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD16 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
WORD16 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff;
UWORD8 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row, u1_tfr_n_mb;
WORD32 ret = OK;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
/* initializations */
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
uc_more_data_flag = 1;
i2_cur_mb_addr = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
do
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
{
ret = ERROR_MB_ADDRESS_T;
break;
}
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/***************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/* mb_x, mb_y , neighbour availablity, */
/***************************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, 0);
/***************************************************************/
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
/***************************************************************/
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type = ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type | D_INTRA_MB;
/**************************************************************/
/* Macroblock Layer Begins, Decode the u1_mb_type */
/**************************************************************/
{
UWORD32 u4_bitstream_offset = *pu4_bitstrm_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_word, u4_ldz, u4_temp;
/***************************************************************/
/* Find leading zeros in next 32 bits */
/***************************************************************/
NEXTBITS_32(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
u4_ldz = CLZ(u4_word);
/* Flush the ps_bitstrm */
u4_bitstream_offset += (u4_ldz + 1);
/* Read the suffix from the ps_bitstrm */
u4_word = 0;
if(u4_ldz)
GETBITS(u4_word, u4_bitstream_offset, pu4_bitstrm_buf,
u4_ldz);
*pu4_bitstrm_ofst = u4_bitstream_offset;
u4_temp = ((1 << u4_ldz) + u4_word - 1);
if(u4_temp > 25)
return ERROR_MB_TYPE;
u1_mb_type = u4_temp;
}
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = u1_mb_type;
COPYTHECONTEXT("u1_mb_type", u1_mb_type);
/**************************************************************/
/* Parse Macroblock data */
/**************************************************************/
if(25 == u1_mb_type)
{
/* I_PCM_MB */
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = I_PCM_MB;
ret = ih264d_parse_ipcm_mb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = 0;
}
else
{
ret = ih264d_parse_imb_cavlc(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs, u1_mb_type);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
}
if(u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
uc_more_data_flag = MORE_RBSP_DATA(ps_bitstrm);
/* Store the colocated information */
{
mv_pred_t *ps_mv_nmb_start = ps_dec->ps_mv_cur + (u1_num_mbs << 4);
mv_pred_t s_mvPred =
{
{ 0, 0, 0, 0 },
{ -1, -1 }, 0, 0};
ih264d_rep_mv_colz(ps_dec, &s_mvPred, ps_mv_nmb_start, 0,
(UWORD8)(ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag << 1), 4,
4);
}
/*if num _cores is set to 3,compute bs will be done in another thread*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores < 3)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info,
(UWORD16)(u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff));
}
u1_num_mbs++;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| (!uc_more_data_flag);
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = (!uc_more_data_flag);
/*H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Pic: %d Mb_X=%d Mb_Y=%d",
ps_slice->i4_poc >> ps_slice->u1_field_pic_flag,
ps_dec->u2_mbx,ps_dec->u2_mby + (1 - ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topmb));
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag): %d", u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag));*/
if(u1_tfr_n_mb || (!uc_more_data_flag))
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb,
u1_end_of_row);
}
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
while(uc_more_data_flag);
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 6.x before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to decoder/ih264d_parse_islice.c and decoder/ih264d_parse_pslice.c, aka internal bug 25928803.
Commit Message: Decoder Update mb count after mb map is set.
Bug: 25928803
Change-Id: Iccc58a7dd1c5c6ea656dfca332cfb8dddba4de37
| Low | 173,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int __init ipgre_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "GRE over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
if (inet_add_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre init: can't add protocol\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto gen_device_failed;
err = rtnl_link_register(&ipgre_link_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto rtnl_link_failed;
err = rtnl_link_register(&ipgre_tap_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto tap_ops_failed;
out:
return err;
tap_ops_failed:
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
rtnl_link_failed:
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
gen_device_failed:
inet_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: net/ipv4/ip_gre.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when ip_gre is configured as a module, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending a packet during module loading.
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 165,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
BoxBlurContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = inlink->dst->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
int plane;
int cw = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, s->hsub), ch = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(in->height, s->vsub);
int w[4] = { inlink->w, cw, cw, inlink->w };
int h[4] = { in->height, ch, ch, in->height };
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
for (plane = 0; in->data[plane] && plane < 4; plane++)
hblur(out->data[plane], out->linesize[plane],
in ->data[plane], in ->linesize[plane],
w[plane], h[plane], s->radius[plane], s->power[plane],
s->temp);
for (plane = 0; in->data[plane] && plane < 4; plane++)
vblur(out->data[plane], out->linesize[plane],
out->data[plane], out->linesize[plane],
w[plane], h[plane], s->radius[plane], s->power[plane],
s->temp);
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Low | 165,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *pEAPKey, guint8 *decryption_key, PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa, guint eapol_len)
{
guint8 key_version;
guint8 *key_data;
guint8 *szEncryptedKey;
guint16 key_bytes_len = 0; /* Length of the total key data field */
guint16 key_len; /* Actual group key length */
static AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM dummy_key; /* needed in case AirPDcapRsnaMng() wants the key structure */
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *tmp_sa;
/* We skip verifying the MIC of the key. If we were implementing a WPA supplicant we'd want to verify, but for a sniffer it's not needed. */
/* Preparation for decrypting the group key - determine group key data length */
/* depending on whether the pairwise key is TKIP or AES encryption key */
key_version = AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(pEAPKey->key_information[1]);
if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP){
/* TKIP */
key_bytes_len = pntoh16(pEAPKey->key_length);
}else if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP){
/* AES */
key_bytes_len = pntoh16(pEAPKey->key_data_len);
/* AES keys must be at least 128 bits = 16 bytes. */
if (key_bytes_len < 16) {
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
}
if (key_bytes_len < GROUP_KEY_MIN_LEN || key_bytes_len > eapol_len - sizeof(EAPOL_RSN_KEY)) {
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* Encrypted key is in the information element field of the EAPOL key packet */
key_data = (guint8 *)pEAPKey + sizeof(EAPOL_RSN_KEY);
szEncryptedKey = (guint8 *)g_memdup(key_data, key_bytes_len);
DEBUG_DUMP("Encrypted Broadcast key:", szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
DEBUG_DUMP("KeyIV:", pEAPKey->key_iv, 16);
DEBUG_DUMP("decryption_key:", decryption_key, 16);
/* We are rekeying, save old sa */
tmp_sa=(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *)g_malloc(sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
memcpy(tmp_sa, sa, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
sa->next=tmp_sa;
/* As we have no concept of the prior association request at this point, we need to deduce the */
/* group key cipher from the length of the key bytes. In WPA this is straightforward as the */
/* keybytes just contain the GTK, and the GTK is only in the group handshake, NOT the M3. */
/* In WPA2 its a little more tricky as the M3 keybytes contain an RSN_IE, but the group handshake */
/* does not. Also there are other (variable length) items in the keybytes which we need to account */
/* for to determine the true key length, and thus the group cipher. */
if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP){
guint8 new_key[32];
guint8 dummy[256];
/* TKIP key */
/* Per 802.11i, Draft 3.0 spec, section 8.5.2, p. 97, line 4-8, */
/* group key is decrypted using RC4. Concatenate the IV with the 16 byte EK (PTK+16) to get the decryption key */
rc4_state_struct rc4_state;
/* The WPA group key just contains the GTK bytes so deducing the type is straightforward */
/* Note - WPA M3 doesn't contain a group key so we'll only be here for the group handshake */
sa->wpa.key_ver = (key_bytes_len >=TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN)?AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP:AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP;
/* Build the full decryption key based on the IV and part of the pairwise key */
memcpy(new_key, pEAPKey->key_iv, 16);
memcpy(new_key+16, decryption_key, 16);
DEBUG_DUMP("FullDecrKey:", new_key, 32);
crypt_rc4_init(&rc4_state, new_key, sizeof(new_key));
/* Do dummy 256 iterations of the RC4 algorithm (per 802.11i, Draft 3.0, p. 97 line 6) */
crypt_rc4(&rc4_state, dummy, 256);
crypt_rc4(&rc4_state, szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
} else if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP){
/* AES CCMP key */
guint8 key_found;
guint8 key_length;
guint16 key_index;
guint8 *decrypted_data;
/* Unwrap the key; the result is key_bytes_len in length */
decrypted_data = AES_unwrap(decryption_key, 16, szEncryptedKey, key_bytes_len);
/* With WPA2 what we get after Broadcast Key decryption is an actual RSN structure.
The key itself is stored as a GTK KDE
WPA2 IE (1 byte) id = 0xdd, length (1 byte), GTK OUI (4 bytes), key index (1 byte) and 1 reserved byte. Thus we have to
pass pointer to the actual key with 8 bytes offset */
key_found = FALSE;
key_index = 0;
/* Parse Key data until we found GTK KDE */
/* GTK KDE = 00-0F-AC 01 */
while(key_index < (key_bytes_len - 6) && !key_found){
guint8 rsn_id;
guint32 type;
/* Get RSN ID */
rsn_id = decrypted_data[key_index];
type = ((decrypted_data[key_index + 2] << 24) +
(decrypted_data[key_index + 3] << 16) +
(decrypted_data[key_index + 4] << 8) +
(decrypted_data[key_index + 5]));
if (rsn_id == 0xdd && type == 0x000fac01) {
key_found = TRUE;
} else {
key_index += decrypted_data[key_index+1]+2;
}
}
if (key_found){
key_length = decrypted_data[key_index+1] - 6;
if (key_index+8 >= key_bytes_len ||
key_length > key_bytes_len - key_index - 8) {
g_free(decrypted_data);
g_free(szEncryptedKey);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* Skip over the GTK header info, and don't copy past the end of the encrypted data */
memcpy(szEncryptedKey, decrypted_data+key_index+8, key_length);
} else {
g_free(decrypted_data);
g_free(szEncryptedKey);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
if (key_length == TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN)
sa->wpa.key_ver = AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP;
else
sa->wpa.key_ver = AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP;
g_free(decrypted_data);
}
key_len = (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP)?TKIP_GROUP_KEY_LEN:CCMP_GROUP_KEY_LEN;
if (key_len > key_bytes_len) {
/* the key required for this protocol is longer than the key that we just calculated */
g_free(szEncryptedKey);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* Decrypted key is now in szEncryptedKey with len of key_len */
DEBUG_DUMP("Broadcast key:", szEncryptedKey, key_len);
/* Load the proper key material info into the SA */
sa->key = &dummy_key; /* we just need key to be not null because it is checked in AirPDcapRsnaMng(). The WPA key materials are actually in the .wpa structure */
sa->validKey = TRUE;
/* Since this is a GTK and its size is only 32 bytes (vs. the 64 byte size of a PTK), we fake it and put it in at a 32-byte offset so the */
/* AirPDcapRsnaMng() function will extract the right piece of the GTK for decryption. (The first 16 bytes of the GTK are used for decryption.) */
memset(sa->wpa.ptk, 0, sizeof(sa->wpa.ptk));
memcpy(sa->wpa.ptk+32, szEncryptedKey, key_len);
g_free(szEncryptedKey);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: epan/crypt/airpdcap.c in the IEEE 802.11 dissector in Wireshark 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles certain length values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void GLManager::InitializeWithWorkaroundsImpl(
const GLManager::Options& options,
const GpuDriverBugWorkarounds& workarounds) {
const SharedMemoryLimits limits;
const base::CommandLine& command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
DCHECK(!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGLExtensions));
InitializeGpuPreferencesForTestingFromCommandLine(command_line,
&gpu_preferences_);
if (options.share_mailbox_manager) {
mailbox_manager_ = options.share_mailbox_manager->mailbox_manager();
} else if (options.share_group_manager) {
mailbox_manager_ = options.share_group_manager->mailbox_manager();
} else {
mailbox_manager_ = &owned_mailbox_manager_;
}
gl::GLShareGroup* share_group = NULL;
if (options.share_group_manager) {
share_group = options.share_group_manager->share_group();
} else if (options.share_mailbox_manager) {
share_group = options.share_mailbox_manager->share_group();
}
gles2::ContextGroup* context_group = NULL;
scoped_refptr<gles2::ShareGroup> client_share_group;
if (options.share_group_manager) {
context_group = options.share_group_manager->decoder_->GetContextGroup();
client_share_group =
options.share_group_manager->gles2_implementation()->share_group();
}
gl::GLContext* real_gl_context = NULL;
if (options.virtual_manager &&
!gpu_preferences_.use_passthrough_cmd_decoder) {
real_gl_context = options.virtual_manager->context();
}
share_group_ = share_group ? share_group : new gl::GLShareGroup;
ContextCreationAttribs attribs;
attribs.red_size = 8;
attribs.green_size = 8;
attribs.blue_size = 8;
attribs.alpha_size = 8;
attribs.depth_size = 16;
attribs.stencil_size = 8;
attribs.context_type = options.context_type;
attribs.samples = options.multisampled ? 4 : 0;
attribs.sample_buffers = options.multisampled ? 1 : 0;
attribs.alpha_size = options.backbuffer_alpha ? 8 : 0;
attribs.should_use_native_gmb_for_backbuffer =
options.image_factory != nullptr;
attribs.offscreen_framebuffer_size = options.size;
attribs.buffer_preserved = options.preserve_backbuffer;
attribs.bind_generates_resource = options.bind_generates_resource;
translator_cache_ =
std::make_unique<gles2::ShaderTranslatorCache>(gpu_preferences_);
if (!context_group) {
scoped_refptr<gles2::FeatureInfo> feature_info =
new gles2::FeatureInfo(workarounds);
context_group = new gles2::ContextGroup(
gpu_preferences_, true, mailbox_manager_, nullptr /* memory_tracker */,
translator_cache_.get(), &completeness_cache_, feature_info,
options.bind_generates_resource, &image_manager_, options.image_factory,
nullptr /* progress_reporter */, GpuFeatureInfo(),
&discardable_manager_);
}
command_buffer_.reset(new CommandBufferCheckLostContext(
context_group->transfer_buffer_manager(), options.sync_point_manager,
options.context_lost_allowed));
decoder_.reset(::gpu::gles2::GLES2Decoder::Create(
command_buffer_.get(), command_buffer_->service(), &outputter_,
context_group));
if (options.force_shader_name_hashing) {
decoder_->SetForceShaderNameHashingForTest(true);
}
command_buffer_->set_handler(decoder_.get());
surface_ = gl::init::CreateOffscreenGLSurface(gfx::Size());
ASSERT_TRUE(surface_.get() != NULL) << "could not create offscreen surface";
if (base_context_) {
context_ = scoped_refptr<gl::GLContext>(new gpu::GLContextVirtual(
share_group_.get(), base_context_->get(), decoder_->AsWeakPtr()));
ASSERT_TRUE(context_->Initialize(
surface_.get(), GenerateGLContextAttribs(attribs, context_group)));
} else {
if (real_gl_context) {
context_ = scoped_refptr<gl::GLContext>(new gpu::GLContextVirtual(
share_group_.get(), real_gl_context, decoder_->AsWeakPtr()));
ASSERT_TRUE(context_->Initialize(
surface_.get(), GenerateGLContextAttribs(attribs, context_group)));
} else {
context_ = gl::init::CreateGLContext(
share_group_.get(), surface_.get(),
GenerateGLContextAttribs(attribs, context_group));
g_gpu_feature_info.ApplyToGLContext(context_.get());
}
}
ASSERT_TRUE(context_.get() != NULL) << "could not create GL context";
ASSERT_TRUE(context_->MakeCurrent(surface_.get()));
auto result =
decoder_->Initialize(surface_.get(), context_.get(), true,
::gpu::gles2::DisallowedFeatures(), attribs);
if (result != gpu::ContextResult::kSuccess)
return;
capabilities_ = decoder_->GetCapabilities();
gles2_helper_.reset(new gles2::GLES2CmdHelper(command_buffer_.get()));
ASSERT_EQ(gles2_helper_->Initialize(limits.command_buffer_size),
gpu::ContextResult::kSuccess);
transfer_buffer_.reset(new TransferBuffer(gles2_helper_.get()));
const bool support_client_side_arrays = true;
gles2_implementation_.reset(new gles2::GLES2Implementation(
gles2_helper_.get(), std::move(client_share_group),
transfer_buffer_.get(), options.bind_generates_resource,
options.lose_context_when_out_of_memory, support_client_side_arrays,
this));
ASSERT_EQ(gles2_implementation_->Initialize(limits),
gpu::ContextResult::kSuccess)
<< "Could not init GLES2Implementation";
MakeCurrent();
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Inappropriate sharing of TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data between tabs in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111} | Medium | 172,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int sysMapBlockFile(FILE* mapf, MemMapping* pMap)
{
char block_dev[PATH_MAX+1];
size_t size;
unsigned int blksize;
unsigned int blocks;
unsigned int range_count;
unsigned int i;
if (fgets(block_dev, sizeof(block_dev), mapf) == NULL) {
LOGW("failed to read block device from header\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(block_dev); ++i) {
if (block_dev[i] == '\n') {
block_dev[i] = 0;
break;
}
}
if (fscanf(mapf, "%zu %u\n%u\n", &size, &blksize, &range_count) != 3) {
LOGW("failed to parse block map header\n");
return -1;
}
blocks = ((size-1) / blksize) + 1;
pMap->range_count = range_count;
pMap->ranges = malloc(range_count * sizeof(MappedRange));
memset(pMap->ranges, 0, range_count * sizeof(MappedRange));
unsigned char* reserve;
reserve = mmap64(NULL, blocks * blksize, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (reserve == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to reserve address space: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->ranges[range_count-1].addr = reserve;
pMap->ranges[range_count-1].length = blocks * blksize;
int fd = open(block_dev, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGW("failed to open block device %s: %s\n", block_dev, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
unsigned char* next = reserve;
for (i = 0; i < range_count; ++i) {
int start, end;
if (fscanf(mapf, "%d %d\n", &start, &end) != 2) {
LOGW("failed to parse range %d in block map\n", i);
return -1;
}
void* addr = mmap64(next, (end-start)*blksize, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, ((off64_t)start)*blksize);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to map block %d: %s\n", i, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->ranges[i].addr = addr;
pMap->ranges[i].length = (end-start)*blksize;
next += pMap->ranges[i].length;
}
pMap->addr = reserve;
pMap->length = size;
LOGI("mmapped %d ranges\n", range_count);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in minzip/SysUtil.c in the Recovery Procedure in Android 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01 allow attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26960931.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
| Low | 173,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_cdef_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 2.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems. | Medium | 168,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info_t *decoder_info,int size,int yposY,int xposY,int sub)
{
int width = decoder_info->width;
int height = decoder_info->height;
stream_t *stream = decoder_info->stream;
frame_type_t frame_type = decoder_info->frame_info.frame_type;
int split_flag = 0;
if (yposY >= height || xposY >= width)
return;
int decode_this_size = (yposY + size <= height) && (xposY + size <= width);
int decode_rectangular_size = !decode_this_size && frame_type != I_FRAME;
int bit_start = stream->bitcnt;
int mode = MODE_SKIP;
block_context_t block_context;
TEMPLATE(find_block_contexts)(yposY, xposY, height, width, size, decoder_info->deblock_data, &block_context, decoder_info->use_block_contexts);
decoder_info->block_context = &block_context;
split_flag = decode_super_mode(decoder_info,size,decode_this_size);
mode = decoder_info->mode;
/* Read delta_qp and set block-level qp */
if (size == (1<<decoder_info->log2_sb_size) && (split_flag || mode != MODE_SKIP) && decoder_info->max_delta_qp > 0) {
/* Read delta_qp */
int delta_qp = read_delta_qp(stream);
int prev_qp;
if (yposY == 0 && xposY == 0)
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qp;
else
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qpb;
decoder_info->frame_info.qpb = prev_qp + delta_qp;
}
decoder_info->bit_count.super_mode[decoder_info->bit_count.stat_frame_type] += (stream->bitcnt - bit_start);
if (split_flag){
int new_size = size/2;
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
}
else if (decode_this_size || decode_rectangular_size){
decode_block(decoder_info,size,yposY,xposY,sub);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the Cisco Thor decoder before commit 18de8f9f0762c3a542b1122589edb8af859d9813 allows local users to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) and execute arbitrary code via a crafted non-conformant Thor bitstream.
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code. | Low | 169,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: image_transform_png_set_@_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_@(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| Low | 173,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int ovl_remove_upper(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
{
struct dentry *upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry->d_parent);
struct inode *dir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *upper = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
int err;
inode_lock_nested(dir, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
err = -ESTALE;
if (upper->d_parent == upperdir) {
/* Don't let d_delete() think it can reset d_inode */
dget(upper);
if (is_dir)
err = vfs_rmdir(dir, upper);
else
err = vfs_unlink(dir, upper, NULL);
dput(upper);
ovl_dentry_version_inc(dentry->d_parent);
}
/*
* Keeping this dentry hashed would mean having to release
* upperpath/lowerpath, which could only be done if we are the
* sole user of this dentry. Too tricky... Just unhash for
* now.
*/
if (!err)
d_drop(dentry);
inode_unlock(dir);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: fs/overlayfs/dir.c in the OverlayFS filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.6 does not properly verify the upper dentry before proceeding with unlink and rename system-call processing, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a rename system call that specifies a self-hardlink.
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> | Low | 167,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding*[count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos,
size,
pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 174,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> receiver,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver));
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
if (!search_for_hole) {
Maybe<bool> result = Nothing<bool>();
if (DictionaryElementsAccessor::IncludesValueFastPath(
isolate, receiver, value, start_from, length, &result)) {
return result;
}
}
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary> dictionary(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
int entry = dictionary->FindEntry(isolate, k);
if (entry == SeededNumberDictionary::kNotFound) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
PropertyDetails details = GetDetailsImpl(*dictionary, entry);
switch (details.kind()) {
case kData: {
Object* element_k = dictionary->ValueAt(entry);
if (value->SameValueZero(element_k)) return Just(true);
break;
}
case kAccessor: {
LookupIterator it(isolate, receiver, k,
LookupIterator::OWN_SKIP_INTERCEPTOR);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
Handle<Object> element_k;
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(
isolate, element_k, JSObject::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (!JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *receiver)) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
if (*dictionary == receiver->elements()) continue;
if (receiver->GetElementsKind() != DICTIONARY_ELEMENTS) {
if (receiver->map()->GetInitialElements() == receiver->elements()) {
return Just(search_for_hole);
}
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, receiver, value, k + 1,
length);
}
dictionary = handle(
SeededNumberDictionary::cast(receiver->elements()), isolate);
break;
}
}
}
return Just(false);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: In CollectValuesOrEntriesImpl of elements.cc, there is possible remote code execution due to type confusion. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android. Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-111274046
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
| Medium | 174,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void __sock_recv_timestamp(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int need_software_tstamp = sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
struct scm_timestamping tss;
int empty = 1;
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps =
skb_hwtstamps(skb);
/* Race occurred between timestamp enabling and packet
receiving. Fill in the current time for now. */
if (need_software_tstamp && skb->tstamp == 0)
__net_timestamp(skb);
if (need_software_tstamp) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS)) {
struct timeval tv;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMP,
sizeof(tv), &tv);
} else {
struct timespec ts;
skb_get_timestampns(skb, &ts);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPNS,
sizeof(ts), &ts);
}
}
memset(&tss, 0, sizeof(tss));
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(skb->tstamp, tss.ts + 0))
empty = 0;
if (shhwtstamps &&
(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp, tss.ts + 2))
empty = 0;
if (!empty) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET,
SCM_TIMESTAMPING, sizeof(tss), &tss);
if (skb->len && (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS))
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS,
skb->len, skb->data);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The TCP stack in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 mishandles the SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS feature, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from the kernel's internal socket data structures or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted system calls, related to net/core/skbuff.c and net/socket.c.
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 168,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool WorkerProcessLauncherTest::LaunchProcess(
IPC::Listener* delegate,
ScopedHandle* process_exit_event_out) {
process_exit_event_.Set(CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL));
if (!process_exit_event_.IsValid())
return false;
channel_name_ = GenerateIpcChannelName(this);
if (!CreateIpcChannel(channel_name_, kIpcSecurityDescriptor, task_runner_,
delegate, &channel_server_)) {
return false;
}
exit_code_ = STILL_ACTIVE;
return DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(),
process_exit_event_,
GetCurrentProcess(),
process_exit_event_out->Receive(),
0,
FALSE,
DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS) != FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool ldap_push_filter(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldb_parse_tree *tree)
{
int i;
switch (tree->operation) {
case LDB_OP_AND:
case LDB_OP_OR:
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(tree->operation==LDB_OP_AND?0:1));
for (i=0; i<tree->u.list.num_elements; i++) {
if (!ldap_push_filter(data, tree->u.list.elements[i])) {
return false;
}
}
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_NOT:
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(2));
if (!ldap_push_filter(data, tree->u.isnot.child)) {
return false;
}
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_EQUALITY:
/* equality test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(3));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.equality.attr,
strlen(tree->u.equality.attr));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.equality.value.data,
tree->u.equality.value.length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_SUBSTRING:
/*
SubstringFilter ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeDescription,
-- at least one must be present
substrings SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
initial [0] LDAPString,
any [1] LDAPString,
final [2] LDAPString } }
*/
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(4));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.substring.attr, strlen(tree->u.substring.attr));
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0));
if (tree->u.substring.chunks && tree->u.substring.chunks[0]) {
i = 0;
if (!tree->u.substring.start_with_wildcard) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(0));
asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(data, tree->u.substring.chunks[i]);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
i++;
}
while (tree->u.substring.chunks[i]) {
int ctx;
if (( ! tree->u.substring.chunks[i + 1]) &&
(tree->u.substring.end_with_wildcard == 0)) {
ctx = 2;
} else {
ctx = 1;
}
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(ctx));
asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(data, tree->u.substring.chunks[i]);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
i++;
}
}
asn1_pop_tag(data);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_GREATER:
/* greaterOrEqual test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(5));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.attr,
strlen(tree->u.comparison.attr));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.value.data,
tree->u.comparison.value.length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_LESS:
/* lessOrEqual test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(6));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.attr,
strlen(tree->u.comparison.attr));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.value.data,
tree->u.comparison.value.length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_PRESENT:
/* present test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(7));
asn1_write_LDAPString(data, tree->u.present.attr);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
case LDB_OP_APPROX:
/* approx test */
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(8));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.attr,
strlen(tree->u.comparison.attr));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, tree->u.comparison.value.data,
tree->u.comparison.value.length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
case LDB_OP_EXTENDED:
/*
MatchingRuleAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
matchingRule [1] MatchingRuleID OPTIONAL,
type [2] AttributeDescription OPTIONAL,
matchValue [3] AssertionValue,
dnAttributes [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE
}
*/
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(9));
if (tree->u.extended.rule_id) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(1));
asn1_write_LDAPString(data, tree->u.extended.rule_id);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
if (tree->u.extended.attr) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(2));
asn1_write_LDAPString(data, tree->u.extended.attr);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(3));
asn1_write_DATA_BLOB_LDAPString(data, &tree->u.extended.value);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(4));
asn1_write_uint8(data, tree->u.extended.dnAttributes);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
break;
default:
return false;
}
return !data->has_error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The LDAP server in the AD domain controller in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22 does not check return values to ensure successful ASN.1 memory allocation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and daemon crash) via crafted packets.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* remember this map */
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf_map_inc(map, false);
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The BPF subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.5.5 mishandles reference counts, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application on (1) a system with more than 32 Gb of memory, related to the program reference count or (2) a 1 Tb system, related to the map reference count.
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> main_task_runner,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
const FilePath& binary_path,
bool launch_elevated,
const std::string& channel_security)
: main_task_runner_(main_task_runner),
io_task_runner_(io_task_runner),
binary_path_(binary_path),
channel_security_(channel_security),
launch_elevated_(launch_elevated),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: std::string ProcessRawBytesWithSeparators(const unsigned char* data,
size_t data_length,
char hex_separator,
char line_separator) {
static const char kHexChars[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
std::string ret;
size_t kMin = 0U;
ret.reserve(std::max(kMin, data_length * 3 - 1));
for (size_t i = 0; i < data_length; ++i) {
unsigned char b = data[i];
ret.push_back(kHexChars[(b >> 4) & 0xf]);
ret.push_back(kHexChars[b & 0xf]);
if (i + 1 < data_length) {
if ((i + 1) % 16 == 0)
ret.push_back(line_separator);
else
ret.push_back(hex_separator);
}
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.46 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted certificate.
Commit Message: return early from ProcessRawBytesWithSeperators() when data length is 0
BUG=109717
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9169028
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117241 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FindBarController::Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
FindManager* find_manager = tab_contents_->GetFindManager();
if (type == NotificationType::FIND_RESULT_AVAILABLE) {
if (Source<TabContents>(source).ptr() == tab_contents_->tab_contents()) {
UpdateFindBarForCurrentResult();
if (find_manager->find_result().final_update() &&
find_manager->find_result().number_of_matches() == 0) {
const string16& last_search = find_manager->previous_find_text();
const string16& current_search = find_manager->find_text();
if (last_search.find(current_search) != 0)
find_bar_->AudibleAlert();
}
}
} else if (type == NotificationType::NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED) {
NavigationController* source_controller =
Source<NavigationController>(source).ptr();
if (source_controller == &tab_contents_->controller()) {
NavigationController::LoadCommittedDetails* commit_details =
Details<NavigationController::LoadCommittedDetails>(details).ptr();
PageTransition::Type transition_type =
commit_details->entry->transition_type();
if (find_bar_->IsFindBarVisible()) {
if (PageTransition::StripQualifier(transition_type) !=
PageTransition::RELOAD) {
EndFindSession(kKeepSelection);
} else {
find_manager->set_find_op_aborted(true);
}
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to a *stale pointer.*
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,660 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int setup_ttydir_console(const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs,
const struct lxc_console *console,
char *ttydir)
{
char path[MAXPATHLEN], lxcpath[MAXPATHLEN];
int ret;
/* create rootfs/dev/<ttydir> directory */
ret = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/dev/%s", rootfs->mount,
ttydir);
if (ret >= sizeof(path))
return -1;
ret = mkdir(path, 0755);
if (ret && errno != EEXIST) {
SYSERROR("failed with errno %d to create %s", errno, path);
return -1;
}
INFO("created %s", path);
ret = snprintf(lxcpath, sizeof(lxcpath), "%s/dev/%s/console",
rootfs->mount, ttydir);
if (ret >= sizeof(lxcpath)) {
ERROR("console path too long");
return -1;
}
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/dev/console", rootfs->mount);
ret = unlink(path);
if (ret && errno != ENOENT) {
SYSERROR("error unlinking %s", path);
return -1;
}
ret = creat(lxcpath, 0660);
if (ret==-1 && errno != EEXIST) {
SYSERROR("error %d creating %s", errno, lxcpath);
return -1;
}
if (ret >= 0)
close(ret);
if (console->master < 0) {
INFO("no console");
return 0;
}
if (mount(console->name, lxcpath, "none", MS_BIND, 0)) {
ERROR("failed to mount '%s' on '%s'", console->name, lxcpath);
return -1;
}
/* create symlink from rootfs/dev/console to 'lxc/console' */
ret = snprintf(lxcpath, sizeof(lxcpath), "%s/console", ttydir);
if (ret >= sizeof(lxcpath)) {
ERROR("lxc/console path too long");
return -1;
}
ret = symlink(lxcpath, path);
if (ret) {
SYSERROR("failed to create symlink for console");
return -1;
}
INFO("console has been setup on %s", lxcpath);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | Low | 166,721 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void jas_matrix_bindsub(jas_matrix_t *mat0, jas_matrix_t *mat1, int r0,
int c0, int r1, int c1)
{
int i;
if (mat0->data_) {
if (!(mat0->flags_ & JAS_MATRIX_REF)) {
jas_free(mat0->data_);
}
mat0->data_ = 0;
mat0->datasize_ = 0;
}
if (mat0->rows_) {
jas_free(mat0->rows_);
mat0->rows_ = 0;
}
mat0->flags_ |= JAS_MATRIX_REF;
mat0->numrows_ = r1 - r0 + 1;
mat0->numcols_ = c1 - c0 + 1;
mat0->maxrows_ = mat0->numrows_;
if (!(mat0->rows_ = jas_alloc2(mat0->maxrows_, sizeof(jas_seqent_t *)))) {
/*
There is no way to indicate failure to the caller.
So, we have no choice but to abort.
Ideally, this function should have a non-void return type.
In practice, a non-void return type probably would not help
much anyways as the caller would just have to terminate anyways.
*/
abort();
}
for (i = 0; i < mat0->numrows_; ++i) {
mat0->rows_[i] = mat1->rows_[r0 + i] + c0;
}
mat0->xstart_ = mat1->xstart_ + c0;
mat0->ystart_ = mat1->ystart_ + r0;
mat0->xend_ = mat0->xstart_ + mat0->numcols_;
mat0->yend_ = mat0->ystart_ + mat0->numrows_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,699 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static __init int sctp_init(void)
{
int i;
int status = -EINVAL;
unsigned long goal;
unsigned long limit;
int max_share;
int order;
sock_skb_cb_check_size(sizeof(struct sctp_ulpevent));
/* Allocate bind_bucket and chunk caches. */
status = -ENOBUFS;
sctp_bucket_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sctp_bind_bucket",
sizeof(struct sctp_bind_bucket),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN,
NULL);
if (!sctp_bucket_cachep)
goto out;
sctp_chunk_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sctp_chunk",
sizeof(struct sctp_chunk),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN,
NULL);
if (!sctp_chunk_cachep)
goto err_chunk_cachep;
status = percpu_counter_init(&sctp_sockets_allocated, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (status)
goto err_percpu_counter_init;
/* Implementation specific variables. */
/* Initialize default stream count setup information. */
sctp_max_instreams = SCTP_DEFAULT_INSTREAMS;
sctp_max_outstreams = SCTP_DEFAULT_OUTSTREAMS;
/* Initialize handle used for association ids. */
idr_init(&sctp_assocs_id);
limit = nr_free_buffer_pages() / 8;
limit = max(limit, 128UL);
sysctl_sctp_mem[0] = limit / 4 * 3;
sysctl_sctp_mem[1] = limit;
sysctl_sctp_mem[2] = sysctl_sctp_mem[0] * 2;
/* Set per-socket limits to no more than 1/128 the pressure threshold*/
limit = (sysctl_sctp_mem[1]) << (PAGE_SHIFT - 7);
max_share = min(4UL*1024*1024, limit);
sysctl_sctp_rmem[0] = SK_MEM_QUANTUM; /* give each asoc 1 page min */
sysctl_sctp_rmem[1] = 1500 * SKB_TRUESIZE(1);
sysctl_sctp_rmem[2] = max(sysctl_sctp_rmem[1], max_share);
sysctl_sctp_wmem[0] = SK_MEM_QUANTUM;
sysctl_sctp_wmem[1] = 16*1024;
sysctl_sctp_wmem[2] = max(64*1024, max_share);
/* Size and allocate the association hash table.
* The methodology is similar to that of the tcp hash tables.
*/
if (totalram_pages >= (128 * 1024))
goal = totalram_pages >> (22 - PAGE_SHIFT);
else
goal = totalram_pages >> (24 - PAGE_SHIFT);
for (order = 0; (1UL << order) < goal; order++)
;
do {
sctp_assoc_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket);
if ((sctp_assoc_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0)
continue;
sctp_assoc_hashtable = (struct sctp_hashbucket *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order);
} while (!sctp_assoc_hashtable && --order > 0);
if (!sctp_assoc_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed association hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_ahash_alloc;
}
for (i = 0; i < sctp_assoc_hashsize; i++) {
rwlock_init(&sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].chain);
}
/* Allocate and initialize the endpoint hash table. */
sctp_ep_hashsize = 64;
sctp_ep_hashtable =
kmalloc(64 * sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sctp_ep_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed endpoint_hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_ehash_alloc;
}
for (i = 0; i < sctp_ep_hashsize; i++) {
rwlock_init(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].chain);
}
/* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table. */
do {
sctp_port_hashsize = (1UL << order) * PAGE_SIZE /
sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket);
if ((sctp_port_hashsize > (64 * 1024)) && order > 0)
continue;
sctp_port_hashtable = (struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN, order);
} while (!sctp_port_hashtable && --order > 0);
if (!sctp_port_hashtable) {
pr_err("Failed bind hash alloc\n");
status = -ENOMEM;
goto err_bhash_alloc;
}
for (i = 0; i < sctp_port_hashsize; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].chain);
}
pr_info("Hash tables configured (established %d bind %d)\n",
sctp_assoc_hashsize, sctp_port_hashsize);
sctp_sysctl_register();
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sctp_address_families);
sctp_v4_pf_init();
sctp_v6_pf_init();
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
if (status)
goto err_register_pernet_subsys;
status = sctp_v4_add_protocol();
if (status)
goto err_add_protocol;
/* Register SCTP with inet6 layer. */
status = sctp_v6_add_protocol();
if (status)
goto err_v6_add_protocol;
out:
return status;
err_v6_add_protocol:
sctp_v4_del_protocol();
err_add_protocol:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
err_register_pernet_subsys:
sctp_v6_protosw_exit();
err_v6_protosw_init:
sctp_v4_protosw_exit();
err_protosw_init:
sctp_v4_pf_exit();
sctp_v6_pf_exit();
sctp_sysctl_unregister();
free_pages((unsigned long)sctp_port_hashtable,
get_order(sctp_port_hashsize *
sizeof(struct sctp_bind_hashbucket)));
err_bhash_alloc:
kfree(sctp_ep_hashtable);
err_ehash_alloc:
free_pages((unsigned long)sctp_assoc_hashtable,
get_order(sctp_assoc_hashsize *
sizeof(struct sctp_hashbucket)));
err_ahash_alloc:
percpu_counter_destroy(&sctp_sockets_allocated);
err_percpu_counter_init:
kmem_cache_destroy(sctp_chunk_cachep);
err_chunk_cachep:
kmem_cache_destroy(sctp_bucket_cachep);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sctp_init function in net/sctp/protocol.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.3 has an incorrect sequence of protocol-initialization steps, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic or memory corruption) by creating SCTP sockets before all of the steps have finished.
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,606 |