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[ "Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non-\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in 11 European countries\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nSeth Flaxmani Swapnil Mishra*, Axel Gandy*, H JulietteT Unwin, Helen Coupland, Thomas A Mellan, Harrison\nZhu, Tresnia Berah, Jeffrey W Eaton, Pablo N P Guzman, Nora Schmit, Lucia Cilloni, Kylie E C Ainslie, Marc\nBaguelin, Isobel Blake, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Olivia Boyd, Lorenzo Cattarino, Constanze Ciavarella, Laura Cooper,\nZulma Cucunuba’, Gina Cuomo—Dannenburg, Amy Dighe, Bimandra Djaafara, Ilaria Dorigatti, Sabine van Elsland,\nRich FitzJohn, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe, Lily Geidelberg, Nicholas Grassly, Wi|| Green, Timothy Hallett, Arran\nHamlet, Wes Hinsley, Ben Jeffrey, David Jorgensen, Edward Knock, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati—Gilani, Pierre\nNouvellet, Kris Parag, Igor Siveroni, Hayley Thompson, Robert Verity, Erik Volz, Caroline Walters, Haowei Wang,\nYuanrong Wang, Oliver Watson, Peter Winskill, Xiaoyue Xi, Charles Whittaker, Patrick GT Walker, Azra Ghani,\nChristl A. Donnelly, Steven Riley, Lucy C Okell, Michaela A C Vollmer, NeilM.Ferguson1and Samir Bhatt*1\n\nDepartment of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London\n\nDepartment of Mathematics, Imperial College London\n\nWHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling\n\nMRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis\n\nAbdul LatifJameeI Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, Imperial College London\nDepartment of Statistics, University of Oxford\n\n*Contributed equally 1Correspondence: nei|[email protected], [email protected]\n\nSummary\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) and its spread outside of China, Europe\nis now experiencing large epidemics. In response, many European countries have implemented\nunprecedented non-pharmaceutical interventions including case isolation, the closure of schools and\nuniversities, banning of mass gatherings and/or public events, and most recently, widescale social\ndistancing including local and national Iockdowns. In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries.", "In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries. Our methods assume that changes in the\nreproductive number— a measure of transmission - are an immediate response to these interventions\nbeing implemented rather than broader gradual changes in behaviour. Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death.", "Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death. One of the key assumptions of the model is that each intervention has the same effect on the\nreproduction number across countries and over time. This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects.", "This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects. It also means that our results are driven strongly by the\ndata from countries with more advanced epidemics, and earlier interventions, such as Italy and Spain. We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier.", "We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier. In Italy, we estimate that the effective\nreproduction number, Rt, dropped to close to 1 around the time of Iockdown (11th March), although\nwith a high level of uncertainty. Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number.", "Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number. Our\nestimates have wide credible intervals and contain 1 for countries that have implemented a||\ninterventions considered in our analysis. This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value.", "This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value. With current interventions remaining in place to at least the end of March, we\nestimate that interventions across all 11 countries will have averted 59,000 deaths up to 31 March\n[95% credible interval 21,000-120,000]. Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels.", "Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels. We estimate that, across all 11\ncountries between 7 and 43 million individuals have been infected with SARS-CoV-Z up to 28th March,\nrepresenting between 1.88% and 11.43% ofthe population. The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics.", "The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics. Given the lag of 2-3 weeks between when transmission changes occur and when their impact can be\nobserved in trends in mortality, for most of the countries considered here it remains too early to be\ncertain that recent interventions have been effective. If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly.", "If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly. It is therefore critical that the current interventions remain in place and trends in\ncases and deaths are closely monitored in the coming days and weeks to provide reassurance that\ntransmission of SARS-Cov-Z is slowing. SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/.", "SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/. Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non—\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID—19 in 11 European countries. Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe.", "Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe. In response to the rising numbers of cases and deaths, and to maintain the\ncapacity of health systems to treat as many severe cases as possible, European countries, like those in\nother continents, have implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to control their\nepidemics. These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned.", "These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned. Understanding firstly, whether these interventions are having the desired impact of controlling the\nepidemic and secondly, which interventions are necessary to maintain control, is critical given their\nlarge economic and social costs. The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection.", "The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection. Ith is maintained at less than 1, the incidence of new\ninfections decreases, ultimately resulting in control of the epidemic. If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity.", "If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity. In China, strict movement restrictions and other measures including case isolation and quarantine\nbegan to be introduced from 23rd January, which achieved a downward trend in the number of\nconfirmed new cases during February, resulting in zero new confirmed indigenous cases in Wuhan by\nMarch 19th. Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement.", "Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement. Estimating reproduction numbers for SARS-CoV-Z presents challenges due to the high proportion of\ninfections not detected by health systems”7 and regular changes in testing policies, resulting in\ndifferent proportions of infections being detected over time and between countries. Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g.", "Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g. contacts of cases). Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends.", "Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends. An alternative way to estimate the course of the epidemic is to back-calculate infections from\nobserved deaths. Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed.", "Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed. Whilst the recent trends in deaths will therefore be informative, there is a time\nlag in observing the effect of interventions on deaths since there is a 2-3-week period between\ninfection, onset of symptoms and outcome. In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt).", "In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt). We fit the model jointly to COVID-19 data from all these countries to assess whether\nthere is evidence that interventions have so far been successful at reducing Rt below 1, with the strong\nassumption that particular interventions are achieving a similar impact in different countries and that\nthe efficacy of those interventions remains constant over time. The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts.", "The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts. Data in the coming weeks will enable estimation of country-specific Rt with\ngreater precision. Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions.", "Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions. 2 Results\n\nThe timing of interventions should be taken in the context of when an individual country’s epidemic\nstarted to grow along with the speed with which control measures were implemented. Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1).", "Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1). Most\ninterventions began around 12th-14th March. We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions.", "We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions. Currently, most countries in our\nstudy have implemented all major non-pharmaceutical interventions. For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12).", "For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12). Rt is the average number of secondary infections per infected individual, assuming that the\ninterventions that are in place at time t stay in place throughout their entire infectious period. Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place.", "Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place. Specific interventions are assumed to have the same relative impact on Rt in each country when they\nwere introduced there and are informed by mortality data across all countries. Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis.", "Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis. For further\ndetails see Appendix 8.6. 2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity.", "2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity. In Italy, our results suggest that, cumulatively, 5.9 [1.9-15.2] million people have been\ninfected as of March 28th, giving an attack rate of 9.8% [3.2%-25%] of the population (Table 1). Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date.", "Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date. Germany is estimated to have one of the lowest attack rates at 0.7% with 600,000\n[240,000-1,500,000] people infected. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020.", "Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020. Country % of total population infected (mean [95% credible intervall)\nAustria 1.1% [0.36%-3.1%]\nBelgium 3.7% [1.3%-9.7%]\nDenmark 1.1% [0.40%-3.1%]\nFrance 3.0% [1.1%-7.4%]\nGermany 0.72% [0.28%-1.8%]\nItaly 9.8% [3.2%-26%]\nNorway 0.41% [0.09%-1.2%]\nSpain 15% [3.7%-41%]\nSweden 3.1% [0.85%-8.4%]\nSwitzerland 3.2% [1.3%-7.6%]\nUnited Kingdom 2.7% [1.2%-5.4%]\n\n2.2 Reproduction numbers and impact of interventions\n\nAveraged across all countries, we estimate initial reproduction numbers of around 3.87 [3.01-4.66],\nwhich is in line with other estimates.1'8 These estimates are informed by our choice of serial interval\ndistribution and the initial growth rate of observed deaths. A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6).", "A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6). The initial reproduction\nnumbers are also uncertain due to (a) importation being the dominant source of new infections early\nin the epidemic, rather than local transmission (b) possible under-ascertainment in deaths particularly\nbefore testing became widespread. We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions. Our\nresults, which are driven largely by countries with advanced epidemics and larger numbers of deaths\n(e.g. Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt.", "Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt. Across all countries\nwe find current estimates of Rt to range from a posterior mean of 0.97 [0.14-2.14] for Norway to a\nposterior mean of2.64 [1.40-4.18] for Sweden, with an average of 1.43 across the 11 country posterior\nmeans, a 64% reduction compared to the pre-intervention values. We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times.", "We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times. In all\ncountries but Sweden, under the same assumptions, we estimate that the current reproduction\nnumber includes 1 in the uncertainty range. The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar.", "The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar. Overall, we cannot yet conclude whether current interventions are sufficient to drive Rt below 1\n(posterior probability of being less than 1.0 is 44% on average across the countries). We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time.", "We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time. There remains a high level of uncertainty in these estimates. It is too early to detect substantial\nintervention impact in many countries at earlier stages of their epidemic (e.g. Germany, UK, Norway).", "Germany, UK, Norway). Many interventions have occurred only recently, and their effects have not yet been fully observed\ndue to the time lag between infection and death. This uncertainty will reduce as more data become\navailable. For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests).", "For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests). We also found that our model can reliably forecast daily deaths 3 days into the future, by withholding\nthe latest 3 days of data and comparing model predictions to observed deaths (Appendix 8.3). The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4).", "The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4). However, when doing a sensitivity analysis (Appendix 8.4.3) with\nuninformative prior distributions (where interventions can increase deaths) we find similar impact of\n\nImperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\ninterventions, which shows that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\n\nmain analysis. Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt.", "Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt. Left: daily number of infections, brown\nbars are reported infections, blue bands are predicted infections, dark blue 50% credible interval (CI),\nlight blue 95% CI. The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention.", "The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention. Afterwards, if the Rt is above 1, the number of infections will starts growing again. Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot.", "Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot. Right: time-varying reproduction number Rt, dark green 50% CI, light green 95% CI. Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred.", "Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable 2: Totalforecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to 31 March in our model\nand in a counterfactual model (assuming no intervention had taken place). Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions.", "Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions. Numbers in brackets are 95% credible intervals. 2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e.", "2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e. the initial reproduction number\nestimated before interventions). Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time.", "Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time. The model without interventions was unable to capture\nrecent trends in deaths in several countries, where the rate of increase had clearly slowed (Figure 3). Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C).", "Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C). By comparing the deaths predicted under the model with no interventions to the deaths predicted in\nour intervention model, we calculated the total deaths averted up to the end of March. We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions.", "We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions. In Italy and Spain, where the epidemic is advanced, 38,000 [13,000-\n84,000] and 16,000 [5,400-35,000] deaths have been averted, respectively. Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted.", "Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted. These numbers give only the deaths averted that would have occurred up to 31 March. lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher.", "lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher. Figure 3: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for (a)\nItaly and (b) Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no interventions\ncounterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6.", "Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6. 03/0 25% 50% 753% 100%\n(no effect on transmissibility) (ends transmissibility\nRelative % reduction in R.\n\nFigure 4: Our model includes five covariates for governmental interventions, adjusting for whether\nthe intervention was the first one undertaken by the government in response to COVID-19 (red) or\nwas subsequent to other interventions (green). Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals.", "Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals. If 100% reduction is achieved, Rt = 0 and there is no more\ntransmission of COVID-19. No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced.", "No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced. Representing the\nCOVlD-19 infection process using a semi-mechanistic, joint, Bayesian hierarchical model, we can\nreproduce trends observed in the data on deaths and can forecast accurately over short time horizons. We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported.", "We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported. The high level\nof under-ascertainment of infections that we estimate here is likely due to the focus on testing in\nhospital settings rather than in the community. Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1).", "Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1). Our estimates imply that the populations in Europe are not\nclose to herd immunity (\"50-75% if R0 is 2-4). Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly.", "Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly. This implies that the virus will be able to spread\nrapidly should interventions be lifted. Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable.", "Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable. We estimate that major non-pharmaceutical interventions have had a substantial impact on the time-\nvarying reproduction numbers in countries where there has been time to observe intervention effects\non trends in deaths (Italy, Spain). lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths.", "lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths. Similarly, our estimates of\nthe impact ofinterventions in other countries should be viewed with caution if the same interventions\nhave achieved different levels of adherence than was initially the case in Italy and Spain. Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention.", "Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention. In some cases, such as Norway, where all interventions were\nimplemented at once, these individual effects are by definition unidentifiable. Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis).", "Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis). While the growth in daily deaths has decreased, due to the\nlag between infections and deaths, continued rises in daily deaths are to be expected for some time. To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model.", "To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model. Consider Italy and the UK - two countries at very different stages\nin their epidemics. For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics.", "For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics. The results suggest that interventions will have a\nlarge impact on infections and deaths despite counts of both rising. For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10).", "For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10). The counterfactual model for Italy suggests that despite mounting pressure on health systems,\ninterventions have averted a health care catastrophe where the number of new deaths would have\nbeen 3.7 times higher (38,000 deaths averted) than currently observed. Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March.", "Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March. 4 Conclusion and Limitations\n\nModern understanding of infectious disease with a global publicized response has meant that\nnationwide interventions could be implemented with widespread adherence and support. Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics.", "Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics. It is too early to be sure whether similar reductions will be seen in countries at earlier\nstages of their epidemic. While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths.", "While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths. When forecasting\n3 days and looking over the whole epidemic the number of deaths averted is substantial. We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections.", "We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections. We\ncannot say for certain that the current measures have controlled the epidemic in Europe; however, if\ncurrent trends continue, there is reason for optimism. Our approach is semi-mechanistic.", "Our approach is semi-mechanistic. We propose a plausible structure for the infection process and then\nestimate parameters empirically. However, many parameters had to be given strong prior\ndistributions or had to be fixed. For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies.", "For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies. As more data become available and better estimates arise, we will update these in\nweekly reports. Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0.", "Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0. Our infection fatality ratio, and infection-to-onset-to-death distributions strongly\ninfluence the rate of death and hence the estimated number of true underlying cases. We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic.", "We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic. This assumption implies that countries with early interventions and more deaths since these\ninterventions (e.g. Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g.", "Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g. Germany, UK). We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6.", "We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6. However, invariably there will be differences from country to country in the strength of\ntheir intervention — for example, most countries have banned gatherings of more than 2 people when\nimplementing a lockdown, whereas in Sweden the government only banned gatherings of more than\n10 people. These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data.", "These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data. We believe that our\nuncertainty to some degree can cover these differences, and as more data become available,\ncoefficients should become more reliable. However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime.", "However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime. In our Bayesian hierarchical framework, we robustly quantify the uncertainty in our parameter\nestimates and posterior predictions. This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates.", "This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates. Furthermore, we predict\nintervention impact at country-level, but different trends may be in place in different parts of each\ncountry. For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country.", "For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country. 5 Data\n\nOur model utilizes daily real-time death data from the ECDC (European Centre of Disease Control),\nwhere we catalogue case data for 11 European countries currently experiencing the epidemic: Austria,\nBelgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United\nKingdom. The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19.", "The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19. However, the case data are highly unrepresentative of the incidence of infections due to\nunderreporting as well as systematic and country-specific changes in testing. We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all.", "We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all. While the observed deaths still have some degree of unreliability, again due to\nchanges in reporting and testing, we believe the data are ofsufficient fidelity to model. For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions. We looked\nat the government webpages from each country as well as their official public health\ndivision/information webpages to identify the latest advice/laws being issued by the government and\npublic health authorities. We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely).", "We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely). In the case of Denmark\nand Sweden, we allowed partial school closures of only secondary schools. The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards).", "The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards). Case-based measures: This intervention comprises strong recommendations or laws to the general\npublic and primary care about self—isolation when showing COVID-19-like symptoms. These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated.", "These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated. Our definition is restricted to nationwide government advice to all individuals (e.g. UK) or to all primary\ncare and excludes regional only advice. These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China.", "These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China. Public events banned: This refers to banning all public events of more than 100 participants such as\nsports events. Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact.", "Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact. The dates used are those when social distancing has officially been\nrecommended by the government; the advice may include maintaining a recommended physical\ndistance from others. Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown.", "Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown. As an\noverall definition, we consider regulations/legislations regarding strict face-to-face social interaction:\nincluding the banning of any non-essential public gatherings, closure of educational and\n\npublic/cultural institutions, ordering people to stay home apart from exercise and essential tasks. We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g.", "We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g. France). The dates used are the effective dates when these legislations\nhave been implemented. We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented.", "We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented. First intervention: As Figure 1 shows, European governments have escalated interventions rapidly,\nand in some examples (Norway/Denmark) have implemented these interventions all on a single day. Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19.", "Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19. A full list of the timing of these interventions and the sources we have used can be found in Appendix\n8.6. 6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2).", "6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2). Replication\ncode is available at \n\nWe fit our model to observed deaths according to ECDC data from 11 European countries. The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix).", "The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix). Given these distributions and ratios, modelled deaths are a function of\nthe number of infections. The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number.", "The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number. Finally, the time-varying reproduction number is a\nfunction of the initial reproduction number before interventions and the effect sizes from\ninterventions. Figure 5: Summary of model components.", "Figure 5: Summary of model components. Following the hierarchy from bottom to top gives us a full framework to see how interventions affect\ninfections, which can result in deaths. We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible.", "We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible. From bottom to top in Figure 5, there is an\nimplicit lag in time that means the effect of very recent interventions manifest weakly in current\ndeaths (and get stronger as time progresses). To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set.", "To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set. Our\nmodel jointly estimates the effect sizes of interventions. We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4).", "We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4). 7 Acknowledgements\n\nInitial research on covariates in Appendix 8.6 was crowdsourced; we thank a number of people\nacross the world for help with this. This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel.", "This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel. 8 Appendix: Model Specifics, Validation and Sensitivity Analysis\n8.1 Death model\n\nWe observe daily deaths Dam for days t E 1, ...,n and countries m E 1, ...,p. These daily deaths are\nmodelled using a positive real-Valued function dam = E(Dam) that represents the expected number\nof deaths attributed to COVID-19. Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days.", "Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days. At the beginning of the epidemic, the observed deaths in a country can be dominated by deaths that\nresult from infection that are not locally acquired. To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model.", "To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model. To mechanistically link ourfunction for deaths to infected cases, we use a previously estimated COVID-\n19 infection-fatality-ratio ifr (probability of death given infection)9 together with a distribution oftimes\nfrom infection to death TE. The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups.", "The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups. To better match estimates of attack rates by age\ngenerated using more detailed information on country and age-specific mixing patterns, we scale\nthese estimates (the unadjusted ifr, referred to here as ifr’) in the following way as in previous work.4\nLet Ca be the number of infections generated in age-group a, Na the underlying size of the population\nin that age group and AR“ 2 Ca/Na the age-group-specific attack rate. The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing.", "The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing. This age-group was chosen as the\nreference as it had the lowest predicted level of underreporting in previous analyses of data from the\nChinese epidemic“. We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates.", "We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates. Using estimated epidemiological information from previous studies,“'11 we assume TE to be the sum of\ntwo independent random times: the incubation period (infection to onset of symptoms or infection-\nto-onset) distribution and the time between onset of symptoms and death (onset-to-death). The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86.", "The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86. The onset-to-death distribution is also Gamma distributed with a mean of 18.8 days and a\ncoefficient of va riation 0.45. ifrm is population averaged over the age structure of a given country. The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio.", "The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio. Figure 6: Left, infection-to-death distribution (mean 23.9 days). Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left.", "Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left. Using the probability of death distribution, the expected number of deaths dam, on a given day t, for\ncountry, m, is given by the following discrete sum:\n\n\nThe number of deaths today is the sum of the past infections weighted by their probability of death,\nwhere the probability of death depends on the number of days since infection. 8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process.", "8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process. This approach\nhas been used in numerous previous studies13'16 and has a strong theoretical basis in stochastic\nindividual-based counting processes such as Hawkes process and the Bellman-Harris process.”18 The\nrenewal model is related to the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, except the renewal is not\nexpressed in differential form. To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62).", "To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62). The serial interval distribution is shown below in Figure 7 and is assumed to be the same for all\ncountries. Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days.", "Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days. Given the serial interval distribution, the number of infections Eamon a given day t, and country, m,\nis given by the following discrete convolution function:\n\n_ t—1\nCam — Ram ZT=0 Cr,mgt—‘r r\nwhere, similarto the probability ofdeath function, the daily serial interval is discretized by\n\nfs+0.5\n\n1.5\ngs = T=s—0.Sg(T)dT fors = 2,3, and 91 = fT=Og(T)dT. Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution.", "Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution. This weighting is then scaled by the country-specific time-Varying\nreproduction number, Ram, that models the average number of secondary infections at a given time. The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times.", "The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times. We included 6 interventions, one of which is constructed\nfrom the other 5 interventions, which are timings of school and university closures (k=l), self—isolating\nif ill (k=2), banning of public events (k=3), any government intervention in place (k=4), implementing\na partial or complete lockdown (k=5) and encouraging social distancing and isolation (k=6). We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise.", "We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise. The covariate ”any government intervention” (k=4) indicates\nif any of the other 5 interventions are in effect,i.e.14’t’m equals 1 at time t if any of the interventions\nk E 1,2,3,4,5 are in effect in country m at time t and equals 0 otherwise. Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention.", "Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention. The effect of each\nintervention is assumed to be multiplicative. Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential.", "Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential. The impact of each intervention on\n\nRam is characterised by a set of parameters 0(1, ...,OL6, with independent prior distributions chosen\nto be\n\nock ~ Gamma(. 5,1).", "5,1). The impacts ock are shared between all m countries and therefore they are informed by all available\ndata. The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information.", "The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information. We assume that seeding of new infections begins 30 days before the day after a country has\ncumulatively observed 10 deaths. From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03).", "From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03). These seed\ninfections are inferred in our Bayesian posterior distribution. We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model.", "We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model. Fitting was done\nin the probabilistic programming language Stan,19 using an adaptive Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC)\nsampler. We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples.", "We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples. Posterior convergence was assessed using the Rhat statistic and by\ndiagnosing divergent transitions of the HMC sampler. Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below).", "Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below). 8.3 Validation\n\nWe validate accuracy of point estimates of our model using cross-Validation. In our cross-validation\nscheme, we leave out 3 days of known death data (non-cumulative) and fit our model. We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days.", "We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days. We present the individual forecasts for each day, as\nwell as the average forecast for those three days. The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8.", "The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8. Figure 8: Cross-Validation results for 3-day and 3-day aggregatedforecasts\n\nFigure 8 provides strong empirical justification for our model specification and mechanism. Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible.", "Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible. Along with from point estimates we all evaluate our posterior credible intervals using the Rhat\nstatistic. The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution).", "The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution). Figure 9 shows the Rhat\nstatistics for all of our parameters\n\n\nFigure 9: Rhat statistics - values close to 1 indicate MCMC convergence. Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged.", "Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged. In fitting we also ensured that the MCMC sampler\nexperienced no divergent transitions - suggesting non pathological posterior topologies. 8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt.", "8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt. A conclusion of this report is the prediction of a slowing of Rt in response to major interventions. To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale.", "To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale. On this scale a line which curves below a\nlinear trend is indicative of slowing in the growth of the epidemic. Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK.", "Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK. They show this slowing down in the daily number of deaths. Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic.", "Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic. We investigated the sensitivity of our estimates of starting and final Rt to our assumed serial interval\ndistribution. For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days.", "For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days. In Figure 13, we show our estimates of R0, the starting reproduction number before interventions, for\neach of these scenarios. The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings.", "The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings. However, as expected, the scale of Rt=0 is considerably affected by this change — a longer serial\ninterval results in a higher estimated Rt=0. This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0.", "This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0. Additionally, in Figure 14, we show our estimates of Rt at the most recent model time point, again for\neach ofthese scenarios. The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping.", "The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping. Figure 13: Initial reproduction number R0 for different serial interval (SI) distributions (means\nbetween 5 and 8 days). We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. Figure 14: Rt on 28 March 2020 estimated for all countries, with serial interval (SI) distribution means\nbetween 5 and 8 days. We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. 8.4.3 Uninformative prior sensitivity on or\n\nWe ran our model using implausible uninformative prior distributions on the intervention effects,\nallowing the effect of an intervention to increase or decrease Rt. To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4).", "To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4). In this\nseries of univariate analyses, we find (Figure 15) that all effects on their own serve to decrease Rt. This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis.", "This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis. Lockdown has a very large effect, most likely due to the fact that it occurs after other\ninterventions in our dataset. The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers.", "The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers. Figure 15: Effects of different interventions when used as the only covariate in the model. 8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution.", "8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution. We fit a model with a Gaussian\nprocess prior distribution to data from Italy where there is the largest signal in death data. We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data.", "We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data. The correspondence of a completely nonparametric function and our\npiecewise constant function suggests a suitable parametric specification of Rt. Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK).", "Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK). To ensure that we are not leveraging too much\ninformation from any one country we perform a ”leave one country out” sensitivity analysis, where\nwe rerun the model without a different country each time. Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain.", "Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain. In general, for all countries, we observed no significant\ndependence on any one country. Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model.", "Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model. See the\n\n\nFigure 17: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Spain for fitting the model. See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots.", "See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots. 8.4.6 Starting reproduction numbers vs theoretical predictions\n\nTo validate our starting reproduction numbers, we compare our fitted values to those theoretically\nexpected from a simpler model assuming exponential growth rate, and a serial interval distribution\nmean. We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model.", "We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model. As shown in Figure 18 there is large\ncorrespondence between our estimated starting reproduction number and the basic reproduction\nnumber implied by the growth rate r.\n\nR0 (red) vs R(FO) (black)\n\nFigure 18: Our estimated R0 (black) versus theoretically derived Ru(red) from a log-linear\nregression fit. 8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future.", "8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. DOI: \n\nPage 28 of 35\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\n8.6 Data sources and Timeline of Interventions\n\nFigure 1 and Table 3 display the interventions by the 11 countries in our study and the dates these\ninterventions became effective. Table 3: Timeline of Interventions.", "Table 3: Timeline of Interventions. Country Type Event Date effective\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.20 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of gatherings of more than 5 people.21 10/3/2020\nBanning all access to public spaces and gatherings\nLockdown of more than 5 people. Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys.", "Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys. Going outdoors only\nordered with household members or 1 friend.24 18/3/2020\nPublic transport recommended only for essential\nSocial distancing journeys, work from home encouraged, all public\nencouraged places e.g. restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport.", "restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport. All cultural\nSocial distancing institutions shut and recommend keeping\nencouraged appropriate distance.28 13/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nDenmark measures cough or fever.29 12/3/2020\n\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.30 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Bans of events >100 people.31 13/3/2020\nLockdown Everybody has to stay at home. Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people.", "Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people. Otherwise\nbanned regional restrictions only until lockdown.34 22/3/2020\nLockdown Gatherings of > 2 people banned, 1.5 m\nordered distance.35 22/3/2020\nSocial distancing Avoid social interaction wherever possible\nencouraged recommended by Merkel.36 12/3/2020\nAdvice for everyone experiencing symptoms to\nCase-based contact a health care agency to get tested and\nGermany measures then self—isolate.37 6/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.38 5/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans all public events.39 9/3/2020\nLockdown The government closes all public places. People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions.", "People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions. Including childcare\nordered facilities and all schools.42 13/3/2020\nPublic events The Directorate of Health bans all non-necessary\nbanned social contact.42 12/3/2020\nLockdown Only people living together are allowed outside\nordered together. Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred.", "Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred. NA\nPeople even with mild symptoms are told to limit\nSocial distancing social contact, encouragement to work from\nencouraged home.50 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSweden measures fever symptoms.51 10/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered No in person teaching until 4th of April.52 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >100 people.52 13/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Gatherings of more than 5 people are banned.53 2020-03-20\nAdvice on keeping distance. All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure.", "All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure. Childminders,\nSchool closure nurseries and sixth forms are told to follow the\nordered guidance.56 21/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Implemented with lockdown.57 24/3/2020\nGatherings of more than 2 people not from the\nLockdown same household are banned and police\nordered enforceable.57 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice to avoid pubs, clubs, theatres and other\nencouraged public institutions.58 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nUK measures cough or fever symptoms.59 12/3/2020\n\n\n9 References\n\n1. Li, R. et al.", "Li, R. et al. Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel\ncoronavirus (SARS-CoV2). Science (2020) .1126/science.abb3221. 2. Zhang, J. et al. Patterns of human social contact and contact with animals in Shanghai, China. 5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. Hong Kong: coronavirus cases.", "5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. 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[ "Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non-\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in 11 European countries\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nSeth Flaxmani Swapnil Mishra*, Axel Gandy*, H JulietteT Unwin, Helen Coupland, Thomas A Mellan, Harrison\nZhu, Tresnia Berah, Jeffrey W Eaton, Pablo N P Guzman, Nora Schmit, Lucia Cilloni, Kylie E C Ainslie, Marc\nBaguelin, Isobel Blake, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Olivia Boyd, Lorenzo Cattarino, Constanze Ciavarella, Laura Cooper,\nZulma Cucunuba’, Gina Cuomo—Dannenburg, Amy Dighe, Bimandra Djaafara, Ilaria Dorigatti, Sabine van Elsland,\nRich FitzJohn, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe, Lily Geidelberg, Nicholas Grassly, Wi|| Green, Timothy Hallett, Arran\nHamlet, Wes Hinsley, Ben Jeffrey, David Jorgensen, Edward Knock, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati—Gilani, Pierre\nNouvellet, Kris Parag, Igor Siveroni, Hayley Thompson, Robert Verity, Erik Volz, Caroline Walters, Haowei Wang,\nYuanrong Wang, Oliver Watson, Peter Winskill, Xiaoyue Xi, Charles Whittaker, Patrick GT Walker, Azra Ghani,\nChristl A. Donnelly, Steven Riley, Lucy C Okell, Michaela A C Vollmer, NeilM.Ferguson1and Samir Bhatt*1\n\nDepartment of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London\n\nDepartment of Mathematics, Imperial College London\n\nWHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling\n\nMRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis\n\nAbdul LatifJameeI Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, Imperial College London\nDepartment of Statistics, University of Oxford\n\n*Contributed equally 1Correspondence: nei|[email protected], [email protected]\n\nSummary\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) and its spread outside of China, Europe\nis now experiencing large epidemics. In response, many European countries have implemented\nunprecedented non-pharmaceutical interventions including case isolation, the closure of schools and\nuniversities, banning of mass gatherings and/or public events, and most recently, widescale social\ndistancing including local and national Iockdowns. In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries.", "In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries. Our methods assume that changes in the\nreproductive number— a measure of transmission - are an immediate response to these interventions\nbeing implemented rather than broader gradual changes in behaviour. Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death.", "Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death. One of the key assumptions of the model is that each intervention has the same effect on the\nreproduction number across countries and over time. This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects.", "This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects. It also means that our results are driven strongly by the\ndata from countries with more advanced epidemics, and earlier interventions, such as Italy and Spain. We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier.", "We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier. In Italy, we estimate that the effective\nreproduction number, Rt, dropped to close to 1 around the time of Iockdown (11th March), although\nwith a high level of uncertainty. Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number.", "Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number. Our\nestimates have wide credible intervals and contain 1 for countries that have implemented a||\ninterventions considered in our analysis. This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value.", "This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value. With current interventions remaining in place to at least the end of March, we\nestimate that interventions across all 11 countries will have averted 59,000 deaths up to 31 March\n[95% credible interval 21,000-120,000]. Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels.", "Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels. We estimate that, across all 11\ncountries between 7 and 43 million individuals have been infected with SARS-CoV-Z up to 28th March,\nrepresenting between 1.88% and 11.43% ofthe population. The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics.", "The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics. Given the lag of 2-3 weeks between when transmission changes occur and when their impact can be\nobserved in trends in mortality, for most of the countries considered here it remains too early to be\ncertain that recent interventions have been effective. If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly.", "If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly. It is therefore critical that the current interventions remain in place and trends in\ncases and deaths are closely monitored in the coming days and weeks to provide reassurance that\ntransmission of SARS-Cov-Z is slowing. SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/.", "SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/. Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non—\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID—19 in 11 European countries. Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe.", "Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe. In response to the rising numbers of cases and deaths, and to maintain the\ncapacity of health systems to treat as many severe cases as possible, European countries, like those in\nother continents, have implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to control their\nepidemics. These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned.", "These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned. Understanding firstly, whether these interventions are having the desired impact of controlling the\nepidemic and secondly, which interventions are necessary to maintain control, is critical given their\nlarge economic and social costs. The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection.", "The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection. Ith is maintained at less than 1, the incidence of new\ninfections decreases, ultimately resulting in control of the epidemic. If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity.", "If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity. In China, strict movement restrictions and other measures including case isolation and quarantine\nbegan to be introduced from 23rd January, which achieved a downward trend in the number of\nconfirmed new cases during February, resulting in zero new confirmed indigenous cases in Wuhan by\nMarch 19th. Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement.", "Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement. Estimating reproduction numbers for SARS-CoV-Z presents challenges due to the high proportion of\ninfections not detected by health systems”7 and regular changes in testing policies, resulting in\ndifferent proportions of infections being detected over time and between countries. Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g.", "Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g. contacts of cases). Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends.", "Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends. An alternative way to estimate the course of the epidemic is to back-calculate infections from\nobserved deaths. Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed.", "Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed. Whilst the recent trends in deaths will therefore be informative, there is a time\nlag in observing the effect of interventions on deaths since there is a 2-3-week period between\ninfection, onset of symptoms and outcome. In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt).", "In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt). We fit the model jointly to COVID-19 data from all these countries to assess whether\nthere is evidence that interventions have so far been successful at reducing Rt below 1, with the strong\nassumption that particular interventions are achieving a similar impact in different countries and that\nthe efficacy of those interventions remains constant over time. The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts.", "The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts. Data in the coming weeks will enable estimation of country-specific Rt with\ngreater precision. Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions.", "Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions. 2 Results\n\nThe timing of interventions should be taken in the context of when an individual country’s epidemic\nstarted to grow along with the speed with which control measures were implemented. Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1).", "Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1). Most\ninterventions began around 12th-14th March. We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions.", "We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions. Currently, most countries in our\nstudy have implemented all major non-pharmaceutical interventions. For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12).", "For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12). Rt is the average number of secondary infections per infected individual, assuming that the\ninterventions that are in place at time t stay in place throughout their entire infectious period. Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place.", "Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place. Specific interventions are assumed to have the same relative impact on Rt in each country when they\nwere introduced there and are informed by mortality data across all countries. Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis.", "Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis. For further\ndetails see Appendix 8.6. 2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity.", "2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity. In Italy, our results suggest that, cumulatively, 5.9 [1.9-15.2] million people have been\ninfected as of March 28th, giving an attack rate of 9.8% [3.2%-25%] of the population (Table 1). Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date.", "Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date. Germany is estimated to have one of the lowest attack rates at 0.7% with 600,000\n[240,000-1,500,000] people infected. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020.", "Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020. Country % of total population infected (mean [95% credible intervall)\nAustria 1.1% [0.36%-3.1%]\nBelgium 3.7% [1.3%-9.7%]\nDenmark 1.1% [0.40%-3.1%]\nFrance 3.0% [1.1%-7.4%]\nGermany 0.72% [0.28%-1.8%]\nItaly 9.8% [3.2%-26%]\nNorway 0.41% [0.09%-1.2%]\nSpain 15% [3.7%-41%]\nSweden 3.1% [0.85%-8.4%]\nSwitzerland 3.2% [1.3%-7.6%]\nUnited Kingdom 2.7% [1.2%-5.4%]\n\n2.2 Reproduction numbers and impact of interventions\n\nAveraged across all countries, we estimate initial reproduction numbers of around 3.87 [3.01-4.66],\nwhich is in line with other estimates.1'8 These estimates are informed by our choice of serial interval\ndistribution and the initial growth rate of observed deaths. A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6).", "A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6). The initial reproduction\nnumbers are also uncertain due to (a) importation being the dominant source of new infections early\nin the epidemic, rather than local transmission (b) possible under-ascertainment in deaths particularly\nbefore testing became widespread. We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions. Our\nresults, which are driven largely by countries with advanced epidemics and larger numbers of deaths\n(e.g. Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt.", "Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt. Across all countries\nwe find current estimates of Rt to range from a posterior mean of 0.97 [0.14-2.14] for Norway to a\nposterior mean of2.64 [1.40-4.18] for Sweden, with an average of 1.43 across the 11 country posterior\nmeans, a 64% reduction compared to the pre-intervention values. We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times.", "We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times. In all\ncountries but Sweden, under the same assumptions, we estimate that the current reproduction\nnumber includes 1 in the uncertainty range. The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar.", "The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar. Overall, we cannot yet conclude whether current interventions are sufficient to drive Rt below 1\n(posterior probability of being less than 1.0 is 44% on average across the countries). We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time.", "We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time. There remains a high level of uncertainty in these estimates. It is too early to detect substantial\nintervention impact in many countries at earlier stages of their epidemic (e.g. Germany, UK, Norway).", "Germany, UK, Norway). Many interventions have occurred only recently, and their effects have not yet been fully observed\ndue to the time lag between infection and death. This uncertainty will reduce as more data become\navailable. For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests).", "For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests). We also found that our model can reliably forecast daily deaths 3 days into the future, by withholding\nthe latest 3 days of data and comparing model predictions to observed deaths (Appendix 8.3). The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4).", "The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4). However, when doing a sensitivity analysis (Appendix 8.4.3) with\nuninformative prior distributions (where interventions can increase deaths) we find similar impact of\n\nImperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\ninterventions, which shows that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\n\nmain analysis. Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt.", "Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt. Left: daily number of infections, brown\nbars are reported infections, blue bands are predicted infections, dark blue 50% credible interval (CI),\nlight blue 95% CI. The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention.", "The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention. Afterwards, if the Rt is above 1, the number of infections will starts growing again. Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot.", "Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot. Right: time-varying reproduction number Rt, dark green 50% CI, light green 95% CI. Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred.", "Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable 2: Totalforecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to 31 March in our model\nand in a counterfactual model (assuming no intervention had taken place). Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions.", "Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions. Numbers in brackets are 95% credible intervals. 2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e.", "2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e. the initial reproduction number\nestimated before interventions). Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time.", "Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time. The model without interventions was unable to capture\nrecent trends in deaths in several countries, where the rate of increase had clearly slowed (Figure 3). Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C).", "Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C). By comparing the deaths predicted under the model with no interventions to the deaths predicted in\nour intervention model, we calculated the total deaths averted up to the end of March. We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions.", "We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions. In Italy and Spain, where the epidemic is advanced, 38,000 [13,000-\n84,000] and 16,000 [5,400-35,000] deaths have been averted, respectively. Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted.", "Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted. These numbers give only the deaths averted that would have occurred up to 31 March. lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher.", "lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher. Figure 3: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for (a)\nItaly and (b) Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no interventions\ncounterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6.", "Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6. 03/0 25% 50% 753% 100%\n(no effect on transmissibility) (ends transmissibility\nRelative % reduction in R.\n\nFigure 4: Our model includes five covariates for governmental interventions, adjusting for whether\nthe intervention was the first one undertaken by the government in response to COVID-19 (red) or\nwas subsequent to other interventions (green). Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals.", "Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals. If 100% reduction is achieved, Rt = 0 and there is no more\ntransmission of COVID-19. No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced.", "No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced. Representing the\nCOVlD-19 infection process using a semi-mechanistic, joint, Bayesian hierarchical model, we can\nreproduce trends observed in the data on deaths and can forecast accurately over short time horizons. We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported.", "We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported. The high level\nof under-ascertainment of infections that we estimate here is likely due to the focus on testing in\nhospital settings rather than in the community. Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1).", "Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1). Our estimates imply that the populations in Europe are not\nclose to herd immunity (\"50-75% if R0 is 2-4). Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly.", "Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly. This implies that the virus will be able to spread\nrapidly should interventions be lifted. Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable.", "Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable. We estimate that major non-pharmaceutical interventions have had a substantial impact on the time-\nvarying reproduction numbers in countries where there has been time to observe intervention effects\non trends in deaths (Italy, Spain). lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths.", "lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths. Similarly, our estimates of\nthe impact ofinterventions in other countries should be viewed with caution if the same interventions\nhave achieved different levels of adherence than was initially the case in Italy and Spain. Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention.", "Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention. In some cases, such as Norway, where all interventions were\nimplemented at once, these individual effects are by definition unidentifiable. Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis).", "Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis). While the growth in daily deaths has decreased, due to the\nlag between infections and deaths, continued rises in daily deaths are to be expected for some time. To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model.", "To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model. Consider Italy and the UK - two countries at very different stages\nin their epidemics. For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics.", "For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics. The results suggest that interventions will have a\nlarge impact on infections and deaths despite counts of both rising. For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10).", "For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10). The counterfactual model for Italy suggests that despite mounting pressure on health systems,\ninterventions have averted a health care catastrophe where the number of new deaths would have\nbeen 3.7 times higher (38,000 deaths averted) than currently observed. Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March.", "Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March. 4 Conclusion and Limitations\n\nModern understanding of infectious disease with a global publicized response has meant that\nnationwide interventions could be implemented with widespread adherence and support. Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics.", "Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics. It is too early to be sure whether similar reductions will be seen in countries at earlier\nstages of their epidemic. While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths.", "While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths. When forecasting\n3 days and looking over the whole epidemic the number of deaths averted is substantial. We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections.", "We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections. We\ncannot say for certain that the current measures have controlled the epidemic in Europe; however, if\ncurrent trends continue, there is reason for optimism. Our approach is semi-mechanistic.", "Our approach is semi-mechanistic. We propose a plausible structure for the infection process and then\nestimate parameters empirically. However, many parameters had to be given strong prior\ndistributions or had to be fixed. For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies.", "For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies. As more data become available and better estimates arise, we will update these in\nweekly reports. Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0.", "Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0. Our infection fatality ratio, and infection-to-onset-to-death distributions strongly\ninfluence the rate of death and hence the estimated number of true underlying cases. We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic.", "We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic. This assumption implies that countries with early interventions and more deaths since these\ninterventions (e.g. Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g.", "Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g. Germany, UK). We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6.", "We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6. However, invariably there will be differences from country to country in the strength of\ntheir intervention — for example, most countries have banned gatherings of more than 2 people when\nimplementing a lockdown, whereas in Sweden the government only banned gatherings of more than\n10 people. These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data.", "These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data. We believe that our\nuncertainty to some degree can cover these differences, and as more data become available,\ncoefficients should become more reliable. However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime.", "However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime. In our Bayesian hierarchical framework, we robustly quantify the uncertainty in our parameter\nestimates and posterior predictions. This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates.", "This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates. Furthermore, we predict\nintervention impact at country-level, but different trends may be in place in different parts of each\ncountry. For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country.", "For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country. 5 Data\n\nOur model utilizes daily real-time death data from the ECDC (European Centre of Disease Control),\nwhere we catalogue case data for 11 European countries currently experiencing the epidemic: Austria,\nBelgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United\nKingdom. The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19.", "The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19. However, the case data are highly unrepresentative of the incidence of infections due to\nunderreporting as well as systematic and country-specific changes in testing. We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all.", "We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all. While the observed deaths still have some degree of unreliability, again due to\nchanges in reporting and testing, we believe the data are ofsufficient fidelity to model. For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions. We looked\nat the government webpages from each country as well as their official public health\ndivision/information webpages to identify the latest advice/laws being issued by the government and\npublic health authorities. We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely).", "We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely). In the case of Denmark\nand Sweden, we allowed partial school closures of only secondary schools. The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards).", "The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards). Case-based measures: This intervention comprises strong recommendations or laws to the general\npublic and primary care about self—isolation when showing COVID-19-like symptoms. These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated.", "These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated. Our definition is restricted to nationwide government advice to all individuals (e.g. UK) or to all primary\ncare and excludes regional only advice. These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China.", "These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China. Public events banned: This refers to banning all public events of more than 100 participants such as\nsports events. Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact.", "Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact. The dates used are those when social distancing has officially been\nrecommended by the government; the advice may include maintaining a recommended physical\ndistance from others. Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown.", "Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown. As an\noverall definition, we consider regulations/legislations regarding strict face-to-face social interaction:\nincluding the banning of any non-essential public gatherings, closure of educational and\n\npublic/cultural institutions, ordering people to stay home apart from exercise and essential tasks. We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g.", "We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g. France). The dates used are the effective dates when these legislations\nhave been implemented. We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented.", "We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented. First intervention: As Figure 1 shows, European governments have escalated interventions rapidly,\nand in some examples (Norway/Denmark) have implemented these interventions all on a single day. Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19.", "Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19. A full list of the timing of these interventions and the sources we have used can be found in Appendix\n8.6. 6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2).", "6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2). Replication\ncode is available at \n\nWe fit our model to observed deaths according to ECDC data from 11 European countries. The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix).", "The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix). Given these distributions and ratios, modelled deaths are a function of\nthe number of infections. The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number.", "The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number. Finally, the time-varying reproduction number is a\nfunction of the initial reproduction number before interventions and the effect sizes from\ninterventions. Figure 5: Summary of model components.", "Figure 5: Summary of model components. Following the hierarchy from bottom to top gives us a full framework to see how interventions affect\ninfections, which can result in deaths. We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible.", "We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible. From bottom to top in Figure 5, there is an\nimplicit lag in time that means the effect of very recent interventions manifest weakly in current\ndeaths (and get stronger as time progresses). To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set.", "To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set. Our\nmodel jointly estimates the effect sizes of interventions. We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4).", "We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4). 7 Acknowledgements\n\nInitial research on covariates in Appendix 8.6 was crowdsourced; we thank a number of people\nacross the world for help with this. This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel.", "This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel. 8 Appendix: Model Specifics, Validation and Sensitivity Analysis\n8.1 Death model\n\nWe observe daily deaths Dam for days t E 1, ...,n and countries m E 1, ...,p. These daily deaths are\nmodelled using a positive real-Valued function dam = E(Dam) that represents the expected number\nof deaths attributed to COVID-19. Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days.", "Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days. At the beginning of the epidemic, the observed deaths in a country can be dominated by deaths that\nresult from infection that are not locally acquired. To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model.", "To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model. To mechanistically link ourfunction for deaths to infected cases, we use a previously estimated COVID-\n19 infection-fatality-ratio ifr (probability of death given infection)9 together with a distribution oftimes\nfrom infection to death TE. The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups.", "The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups. To better match estimates of attack rates by age\ngenerated using more detailed information on country and age-specific mixing patterns, we scale\nthese estimates (the unadjusted ifr, referred to here as ifr’) in the following way as in previous work.4\nLet Ca be the number of infections generated in age-group a, Na the underlying size of the population\nin that age group and AR“ 2 Ca/Na the age-group-specific attack rate. The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing.", "The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing. This age-group was chosen as the\nreference as it had the lowest predicted level of underreporting in previous analyses of data from the\nChinese epidemic“. We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates.", "We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates. Using estimated epidemiological information from previous studies,“'11 we assume TE to be the sum of\ntwo independent random times: the incubation period (infection to onset of symptoms or infection-\nto-onset) distribution and the time between onset of symptoms and death (onset-to-death). The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86.", "The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86. The onset-to-death distribution is also Gamma distributed with a mean of 18.8 days and a\ncoefficient of va riation 0.45. ifrm is population averaged over the age structure of a given country. The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio.", "The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio. Figure 6: Left, infection-to-death distribution (mean 23.9 days). Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left.", "Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left. Using the probability of death distribution, the expected number of deaths dam, on a given day t, for\ncountry, m, is given by the following discrete sum:\n\n\nThe number of deaths today is the sum of the past infections weighted by their probability of death,\nwhere the probability of death depends on the number of days since infection. 8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process.", "8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process. This approach\nhas been used in numerous previous studies13'16 and has a strong theoretical basis in stochastic\nindividual-based counting processes such as Hawkes process and the Bellman-Harris process.”18 The\nrenewal model is related to the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, except the renewal is not\nexpressed in differential form. To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62).", "To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62). The serial interval distribution is shown below in Figure 7 and is assumed to be the same for all\ncountries. Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days.", "Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days. Given the serial interval distribution, the number of infections Eamon a given day t, and country, m,\nis given by the following discrete convolution function:\n\n_ t—1\nCam — Ram ZT=0 Cr,mgt—‘r r\nwhere, similarto the probability ofdeath function, the daily serial interval is discretized by\n\nfs+0.5\n\n1.5\ngs = T=s—0.Sg(T)dT fors = 2,3, and 91 = fT=Og(T)dT. Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution.", "Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution. This weighting is then scaled by the country-specific time-Varying\nreproduction number, Ram, that models the average number of secondary infections at a given time. The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times.", "The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times. We included 6 interventions, one of which is constructed\nfrom the other 5 interventions, which are timings of school and university closures (k=l), self—isolating\nif ill (k=2), banning of public events (k=3), any government intervention in place (k=4), implementing\na partial or complete lockdown (k=5) and encouraging social distancing and isolation (k=6). We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise.", "We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise. The covariate ”any government intervention” (k=4) indicates\nif any of the other 5 interventions are in effect,i.e.14’t’m equals 1 at time t if any of the interventions\nk E 1,2,3,4,5 are in effect in country m at time t and equals 0 otherwise. Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention.", "Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention. The effect of each\nintervention is assumed to be multiplicative. Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential.", "Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential. The impact of each intervention on\n\nRam is characterised by a set of parameters 0(1, ...,OL6, with independent prior distributions chosen\nto be\n\nock ~ Gamma(. 5,1).", "5,1). The impacts ock are shared between all m countries and therefore they are informed by all available\ndata. The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information.", "The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information. We assume that seeding of new infections begins 30 days before the day after a country has\ncumulatively observed 10 deaths. From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03).", "From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03). These seed\ninfections are inferred in our Bayesian posterior distribution. We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model.", "We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model. Fitting was done\nin the probabilistic programming language Stan,19 using an adaptive Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC)\nsampler. We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples.", "We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples. Posterior convergence was assessed using the Rhat statistic and by\ndiagnosing divergent transitions of the HMC sampler. Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below).", "Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below). 8.3 Validation\n\nWe validate accuracy of point estimates of our model using cross-Validation. In our cross-validation\nscheme, we leave out 3 days of known death data (non-cumulative) and fit our model. We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days.", "We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days. We present the individual forecasts for each day, as\nwell as the average forecast for those three days. The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8.", "The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8. Figure 8: Cross-Validation results for 3-day and 3-day aggregatedforecasts\n\nFigure 8 provides strong empirical justification for our model specification and mechanism. Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible.", "Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible. Along with from point estimates we all evaluate our posterior credible intervals using the Rhat\nstatistic. The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution).", "The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution). Figure 9 shows the Rhat\nstatistics for all of our parameters\n\n\nFigure 9: Rhat statistics - values close to 1 indicate MCMC convergence. Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged.", "Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged. In fitting we also ensured that the MCMC sampler\nexperienced no divergent transitions - suggesting non pathological posterior topologies. 8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt.", "8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt. A conclusion of this report is the prediction of a slowing of Rt in response to major interventions. To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale.", "To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale. On this scale a line which curves below a\nlinear trend is indicative of slowing in the growth of the epidemic. Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK.", "Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK. They show this slowing down in the daily number of deaths. Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic.", "Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic. We investigated the sensitivity of our estimates of starting and final Rt to our assumed serial interval\ndistribution. For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days.", "For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days. In Figure 13, we show our estimates of R0, the starting reproduction number before interventions, for\neach of these scenarios. The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings.", "The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings. However, as expected, the scale of Rt=0 is considerably affected by this change — a longer serial\ninterval results in a higher estimated Rt=0. This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0.", "This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0. Additionally, in Figure 14, we show our estimates of Rt at the most recent model time point, again for\neach ofthese scenarios. The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping.", "The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping. Figure 13: Initial reproduction number R0 for different serial interval (SI) distributions (means\nbetween 5 and 8 days). We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. Figure 14: Rt on 28 March 2020 estimated for all countries, with serial interval (SI) distribution means\nbetween 5 and 8 days. We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. 8.4.3 Uninformative prior sensitivity on or\n\nWe ran our model using implausible uninformative prior distributions on the intervention effects,\nallowing the effect of an intervention to increase or decrease Rt. To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4).", "To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4). In this\nseries of univariate analyses, we find (Figure 15) that all effects on their own serve to decrease Rt. This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis.", "This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis. Lockdown has a very large effect, most likely due to the fact that it occurs after other\ninterventions in our dataset. The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers.", "The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers. Figure 15: Effects of different interventions when used as the only covariate in the model. 8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution.", "8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution. We fit a model with a Gaussian\nprocess prior distribution to data from Italy where there is the largest signal in death data. We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data.", "We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data. The correspondence of a completely nonparametric function and our\npiecewise constant function suggests a suitable parametric specification of Rt. Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK).", "Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK). To ensure that we are not leveraging too much\ninformation from any one country we perform a ”leave one country out” sensitivity analysis, where\nwe rerun the model without a different country each time. Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain.", "Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain. In general, for all countries, we observed no significant\ndependence on any one country. Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model.", "Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model. See the\n\n\nFigure 17: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Spain for fitting the model. See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots.", "See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots. 8.4.6 Starting reproduction numbers vs theoretical predictions\n\nTo validate our starting reproduction numbers, we compare our fitted values to those theoretically\nexpected from a simpler model assuming exponential growth rate, and a serial interval distribution\nmean. We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model.", "We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model. As shown in Figure 18 there is large\ncorrespondence between our estimated starting reproduction number and the basic reproduction\nnumber implied by the growth rate r.\n\nR0 (red) vs R(FO) (black)\n\nFigure 18: Our estimated R0 (black) versus theoretically derived Ru(red) from a log-linear\nregression fit. 8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future.", "8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. DOI: \n\nPage 28 of 35\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\n8.6 Data sources and Timeline of Interventions\n\nFigure 1 and Table 3 display the interventions by the 11 countries in our study and the dates these\ninterventions became effective. Table 3: Timeline of Interventions.", "Table 3: Timeline of Interventions. Country Type Event Date effective\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.20 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of gatherings of more than 5 people.21 10/3/2020\nBanning all access to public spaces and gatherings\nLockdown of more than 5 people. Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys.", "Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys. Going outdoors only\nordered with household members or 1 friend.24 18/3/2020\nPublic transport recommended only for essential\nSocial distancing journeys, work from home encouraged, all public\nencouraged places e.g. restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport.", "restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport. All cultural\nSocial distancing institutions shut and recommend keeping\nencouraged appropriate distance.28 13/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nDenmark measures cough or fever.29 12/3/2020\n\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.30 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Bans of events >100 people.31 13/3/2020\nLockdown Everybody has to stay at home. Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people.", "Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people. Otherwise\nbanned regional restrictions only until lockdown.34 22/3/2020\nLockdown Gatherings of > 2 people banned, 1.5 m\nordered distance.35 22/3/2020\nSocial distancing Avoid social interaction wherever possible\nencouraged recommended by Merkel.36 12/3/2020\nAdvice for everyone experiencing symptoms to\nCase-based contact a health care agency to get tested and\nGermany measures then self—isolate.37 6/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.38 5/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans all public events.39 9/3/2020\nLockdown The government closes all public places. People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions.", "People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions. Including childcare\nordered facilities and all schools.42 13/3/2020\nPublic events The Directorate of Health bans all non-necessary\nbanned social contact.42 12/3/2020\nLockdown Only people living together are allowed outside\nordered together. Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred.", "Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred. NA\nPeople even with mild symptoms are told to limit\nSocial distancing social contact, encouragement to work from\nencouraged home.50 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSweden measures fever symptoms.51 10/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered No in person teaching until 4th of April.52 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >100 people.52 13/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Gatherings of more than 5 people are banned.53 2020-03-20\nAdvice on keeping distance. All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure.", "All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure. Childminders,\nSchool closure nurseries and sixth forms are told to follow the\nordered guidance.56 21/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Implemented with lockdown.57 24/3/2020\nGatherings of more than 2 people not from the\nLockdown same household are banned and police\nordered enforceable.57 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice to avoid pubs, clubs, theatres and other\nencouraged public institutions.58 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nUK measures cough or fever symptoms.59 12/3/2020\n\n\n9 References\n\n1. Li, R. et al.", "Li, R. et al. Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel\ncoronavirus (SARS-CoV2). Science (2020) .1126/science.abb3221. 2. Zhang, J. et al. Patterns of human social contact and contact with animals in Shanghai, China. 5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. Hong Kong: coronavirus cases.", "5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. 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[ "Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non-\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in 11 European countries\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nSeth Flaxmani Swapnil Mishra*, Axel Gandy*, H JulietteT Unwin, Helen Coupland, Thomas A Mellan, Harrison\nZhu, Tresnia Berah, Jeffrey W Eaton, Pablo N P Guzman, Nora Schmit, Lucia Cilloni, Kylie E C Ainslie, Marc\nBaguelin, Isobel Blake, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Olivia Boyd, Lorenzo Cattarino, Constanze Ciavarella, Laura Cooper,\nZulma Cucunuba’, Gina Cuomo—Dannenburg, Amy Dighe, Bimandra Djaafara, Ilaria Dorigatti, Sabine van Elsland,\nRich FitzJohn, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe, Lily Geidelberg, Nicholas Grassly, Wi|| Green, Timothy Hallett, Arran\nHamlet, Wes Hinsley, Ben Jeffrey, David Jorgensen, Edward Knock, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati—Gilani, Pierre\nNouvellet, Kris Parag, Igor Siveroni, Hayley Thompson, Robert Verity, Erik Volz, Caroline Walters, Haowei Wang,\nYuanrong Wang, Oliver Watson, Peter Winskill, Xiaoyue Xi, Charles Whittaker, Patrick GT Walker, Azra Ghani,\nChristl A. Donnelly, Steven Riley, Lucy C Okell, Michaela A C Vollmer, NeilM.Ferguson1and Samir Bhatt*1\n\nDepartment of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London\n\nDepartment of Mathematics, Imperial College London\n\nWHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling\n\nMRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis\n\nAbdul LatifJameeI Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, Imperial College London\nDepartment of Statistics, University of Oxford\n\n*Contributed equally 1Correspondence: nei|[email protected], [email protected]\n\nSummary\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) and its spread outside of China, Europe\nis now experiencing large epidemics. In response, many European countries have implemented\nunprecedented non-pharmaceutical interventions including case isolation, the closure of schools and\nuniversities, banning of mass gatherings and/or public events, and most recently, widescale social\ndistancing including local and national Iockdowns. In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries.", "In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries. Our methods assume that changes in the\nreproductive number— a measure of transmission - are an immediate response to these interventions\nbeing implemented rather than broader gradual changes in behaviour. Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death.", "Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death. One of the key assumptions of the model is that each intervention has the same effect on the\nreproduction number across countries and over time. This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects.", "This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects. It also means that our results are driven strongly by the\ndata from countries with more advanced epidemics, and earlier interventions, such as Italy and Spain. We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier.", "We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier. In Italy, we estimate that the effective\nreproduction number, Rt, dropped to close to 1 around the time of Iockdown (11th March), although\nwith a high level of uncertainty. Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number.", "Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number. Our\nestimates have wide credible intervals and contain 1 for countries that have implemented a||\ninterventions considered in our analysis. This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value.", "This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value. With current interventions remaining in place to at least the end of March, we\nestimate that interventions across all 11 countries will have averted 59,000 deaths up to 31 March\n[95% credible interval 21,000-120,000]. Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels.", "Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels. We estimate that, across all 11\ncountries between 7 and 43 million individuals have been infected with SARS-CoV-Z up to 28th March,\nrepresenting between 1.88% and 11.43% ofthe population. The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics.", "The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics. Given the lag of 2-3 weeks between when transmission changes occur and when their impact can be\nobserved in trends in mortality, for most of the countries considered here it remains too early to be\ncertain that recent interventions have been effective. If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly.", "If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly. It is therefore critical that the current interventions remain in place and trends in\ncases and deaths are closely monitored in the coming days and weeks to provide reassurance that\ntransmission of SARS-Cov-Z is slowing. SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/.", "SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/. Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non—\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID—19 in 11 European countries. Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe.", "Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe. In response to the rising numbers of cases and deaths, and to maintain the\ncapacity of health systems to treat as many severe cases as possible, European countries, like those in\nother continents, have implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to control their\nepidemics. These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned.", "These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned. Understanding firstly, whether these interventions are having the desired impact of controlling the\nepidemic and secondly, which interventions are necessary to maintain control, is critical given their\nlarge economic and social costs. The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection.", "The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection. Ith is maintained at less than 1, the incidence of new\ninfections decreases, ultimately resulting in control of the epidemic. If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity.", "If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity. In China, strict movement restrictions and other measures including case isolation and quarantine\nbegan to be introduced from 23rd January, which achieved a downward trend in the number of\nconfirmed new cases during February, resulting in zero new confirmed indigenous cases in Wuhan by\nMarch 19th. Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement.", "Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement. Estimating reproduction numbers for SARS-CoV-Z presents challenges due to the high proportion of\ninfections not detected by health systems”7 and regular changes in testing policies, resulting in\ndifferent proportions of infections being detected over time and between countries. Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g.", "Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g. contacts of cases). Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends.", "Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends. An alternative way to estimate the course of the epidemic is to back-calculate infections from\nobserved deaths. Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed.", "Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed. Whilst the recent trends in deaths will therefore be informative, there is a time\nlag in observing the effect of interventions on deaths since there is a 2-3-week period between\ninfection, onset of symptoms and outcome. In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt).", "In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt). We fit the model jointly to COVID-19 data from all these countries to assess whether\nthere is evidence that interventions have so far been successful at reducing Rt below 1, with the strong\nassumption that particular interventions are achieving a similar impact in different countries and that\nthe efficacy of those interventions remains constant over time. The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts.", "The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts. Data in the coming weeks will enable estimation of country-specific Rt with\ngreater precision. Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions.", "Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions. 2 Results\n\nThe timing of interventions should be taken in the context of when an individual country’s epidemic\nstarted to grow along with the speed with which control measures were implemented. Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1).", "Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1). Most\ninterventions began around 12th-14th March. We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions.", "We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions. Currently, most countries in our\nstudy have implemented all major non-pharmaceutical interventions. For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12).", "For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12). Rt is the average number of secondary infections per infected individual, assuming that the\ninterventions that are in place at time t stay in place throughout their entire infectious period. Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place.", "Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place. Specific interventions are assumed to have the same relative impact on Rt in each country when they\nwere introduced there and are informed by mortality data across all countries. Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis.", "Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis. For further\ndetails see Appendix 8.6. 2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity.", "2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity. In Italy, our results suggest that, cumulatively, 5.9 [1.9-15.2] million people have been\ninfected as of March 28th, giving an attack rate of 9.8% [3.2%-25%] of the population (Table 1). Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date.", "Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date. Germany is estimated to have one of the lowest attack rates at 0.7% with 600,000\n[240,000-1,500,000] people infected. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020.", "Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020. Country % of total population infected (mean [95% credible intervall)\nAustria 1.1% [0.36%-3.1%]\nBelgium 3.7% [1.3%-9.7%]\nDenmark 1.1% [0.40%-3.1%]\nFrance 3.0% [1.1%-7.4%]\nGermany 0.72% [0.28%-1.8%]\nItaly 9.8% [3.2%-26%]\nNorway 0.41% [0.09%-1.2%]\nSpain 15% [3.7%-41%]\nSweden 3.1% [0.85%-8.4%]\nSwitzerland 3.2% [1.3%-7.6%]\nUnited Kingdom 2.7% [1.2%-5.4%]\n\n2.2 Reproduction numbers and impact of interventions\n\nAveraged across all countries, we estimate initial reproduction numbers of around 3.87 [3.01-4.66],\nwhich is in line with other estimates.1'8 These estimates are informed by our choice of serial interval\ndistribution and the initial growth rate of observed deaths. A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6).", "A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6). The initial reproduction\nnumbers are also uncertain due to (a) importation being the dominant source of new infections early\nin the epidemic, rather than local transmission (b) possible under-ascertainment in deaths particularly\nbefore testing became widespread. We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions. Our\nresults, which are driven largely by countries with advanced epidemics and larger numbers of deaths\n(e.g. Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt.", "Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt. Across all countries\nwe find current estimates of Rt to range from a posterior mean of 0.97 [0.14-2.14] for Norway to a\nposterior mean of2.64 [1.40-4.18] for Sweden, with an average of 1.43 across the 11 country posterior\nmeans, a 64% reduction compared to the pre-intervention values. We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times.", "We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times. In all\ncountries but Sweden, under the same assumptions, we estimate that the current reproduction\nnumber includes 1 in the uncertainty range. The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar.", "The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar. Overall, we cannot yet conclude whether current interventions are sufficient to drive Rt below 1\n(posterior probability of being less than 1.0 is 44% on average across the countries). We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time.", "We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time. There remains a high level of uncertainty in these estimates. It is too early to detect substantial\nintervention impact in many countries at earlier stages of their epidemic (e.g. Germany, UK, Norway).", "Germany, UK, Norway). Many interventions have occurred only recently, and their effects have not yet been fully observed\ndue to the time lag between infection and death. This uncertainty will reduce as more data become\navailable. For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests).", "For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests). We also found that our model can reliably forecast daily deaths 3 days into the future, by withholding\nthe latest 3 days of data and comparing model predictions to observed deaths (Appendix 8.3). The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4).", "The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4). However, when doing a sensitivity analysis (Appendix 8.4.3) with\nuninformative prior distributions (where interventions can increase deaths) we find similar impact of\n\nImperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\ninterventions, which shows that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\n\nmain analysis. Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt.", "Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt. Left: daily number of infections, brown\nbars are reported infections, blue bands are predicted infections, dark blue 50% credible interval (CI),\nlight blue 95% CI. The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention.", "The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention. Afterwards, if the Rt is above 1, the number of infections will starts growing again. Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot.", "Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot. Right: time-varying reproduction number Rt, dark green 50% CI, light green 95% CI. Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred.", "Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable 2: Totalforecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to 31 March in our model\nand in a counterfactual model (assuming no intervention had taken place). Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions.", "Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions. Numbers in brackets are 95% credible intervals. 2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e.", "2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e. the initial reproduction number\nestimated before interventions). Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time.", "Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time. The model without interventions was unable to capture\nrecent trends in deaths in several countries, where the rate of increase had clearly slowed (Figure 3). Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C).", "Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C). By comparing the deaths predicted under the model with no interventions to the deaths predicted in\nour intervention model, we calculated the total deaths averted up to the end of March. We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions.", "We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions. In Italy and Spain, where the epidemic is advanced, 38,000 [13,000-\n84,000] and 16,000 [5,400-35,000] deaths have been averted, respectively. Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted.", "Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted. These numbers give only the deaths averted that would have occurred up to 31 March. lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher.", "lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher. Figure 3: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for (a)\nItaly and (b) Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no interventions\ncounterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6.", "Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6. 03/0 25% 50% 753% 100%\n(no effect on transmissibility) (ends transmissibility\nRelative % reduction in R.\n\nFigure 4: Our model includes five covariates for governmental interventions, adjusting for whether\nthe intervention was the first one undertaken by the government in response to COVID-19 (red) or\nwas subsequent to other interventions (green). Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals.", "Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals. If 100% reduction is achieved, Rt = 0 and there is no more\ntransmission of COVID-19. No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced.", "No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced. Representing the\nCOVlD-19 infection process using a semi-mechanistic, joint, Bayesian hierarchical model, we can\nreproduce trends observed in the data on deaths and can forecast accurately over short time horizons. We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported.", "We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported. The high level\nof under-ascertainment of infections that we estimate here is likely due to the focus on testing in\nhospital settings rather than in the community. Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1).", "Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1). Our estimates imply that the populations in Europe are not\nclose to herd immunity (\"50-75% if R0 is 2-4). Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly.", "Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly. This implies that the virus will be able to spread\nrapidly should interventions be lifted. Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable.", "Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable. We estimate that major non-pharmaceutical interventions have had a substantial impact on the time-\nvarying reproduction numbers in countries where there has been time to observe intervention effects\non trends in deaths (Italy, Spain). lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths.", "lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths. Similarly, our estimates of\nthe impact ofinterventions in other countries should be viewed with caution if the same interventions\nhave achieved different levels of adherence than was initially the case in Italy and Spain. Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention.", "Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention. In some cases, such as Norway, where all interventions were\nimplemented at once, these individual effects are by definition unidentifiable. Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis).", "Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis). While the growth in daily deaths has decreased, due to the\nlag between infections and deaths, continued rises in daily deaths are to be expected for some time. To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model.", "To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model. Consider Italy and the UK - two countries at very different stages\nin their epidemics. For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics.", "For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics. The results suggest that interventions will have a\nlarge impact on infections and deaths despite counts of both rising. For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10).", "For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10). The counterfactual model for Italy suggests that despite mounting pressure on health systems,\ninterventions have averted a health care catastrophe where the number of new deaths would have\nbeen 3.7 times higher (38,000 deaths averted) than currently observed. Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March.", "Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March. 4 Conclusion and Limitations\n\nModern understanding of infectious disease with a global publicized response has meant that\nnationwide interventions could be implemented with widespread adherence and support. Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics.", "Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics. It is too early to be sure whether similar reductions will be seen in countries at earlier\nstages of their epidemic. While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths.", "While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths. When forecasting\n3 days and looking over the whole epidemic the number of deaths averted is substantial. We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections.", "We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections. We\ncannot say for certain that the current measures have controlled the epidemic in Europe; however, if\ncurrent trends continue, there is reason for optimism. Our approach is semi-mechanistic.", "Our approach is semi-mechanistic. We propose a plausible structure for the infection process and then\nestimate parameters empirically. However, many parameters had to be given strong prior\ndistributions or had to be fixed. For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies.", "For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies. As more data become available and better estimates arise, we will update these in\nweekly reports. Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0.", "Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0. Our infection fatality ratio, and infection-to-onset-to-death distributions strongly\ninfluence the rate of death and hence the estimated number of true underlying cases. We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic.", "We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic. This assumption implies that countries with early interventions and more deaths since these\ninterventions (e.g. Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g.", "Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g. Germany, UK). We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6.", "We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6. However, invariably there will be differences from country to country in the strength of\ntheir intervention — for example, most countries have banned gatherings of more than 2 people when\nimplementing a lockdown, whereas in Sweden the government only banned gatherings of more than\n10 people. These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data.", "These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data. We believe that our\nuncertainty to some degree can cover these differences, and as more data become available,\ncoefficients should become more reliable. However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime.", "However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime. In our Bayesian hierarchical framework, we robustly quantify the uncertainty in our parameter\nestimates and posterior predictions. This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates.", "This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates. Furthermore, we predict\nintervention impact at country-level, but different trends may be in place in different parts of each\ncountry. For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country.", "For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country. 5 Data\n\nOur model utilizes daily real-time death data from the ECDC (European Centre of Disease Control),\nwhere we catalogue case data for 11 European countries currently experiencing the epidemic: Austria,\nBelgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United\nKingdom. The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19.", "The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19. However, the case data are highly unrepresentative of the incidence of infections due to\nunderreporting as well as systematic and country-specific changes in testing. We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all.", "We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all. While the observed deaths still have some degree of unreliability, again due to\nchanges in reporting and testing, we believe the data are ofsufficient fidelity to model. For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions. We looked\nat the government webpages from each country as well as their official public health\ndivision/information webpages to identify the latest advice/laws being issued by the government and\npublic health authorities. We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely).", "We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely). In the case of Denmark\nand Sweden, we allowed partial school closures of only secondary schools. The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards).", "The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards). Case-based measures: This intervention comprises strong recommendations or laws to the general\npublic and primary care about self—isolation when showing COVID-19-like symptoms. These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated.", "These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated. Our definition is restricted to nationwide government advice to all individuals (e.g. UK) or to all primary\ncare and excludes regional only advice. These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China.", "These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China. Public events banned: This refers to banning all public events of more than 100 participants such as\nsports events. Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact.", "Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact. The dates used are those when social distancing has officially been\nrecommended by the government; the advice may include maintaining a recommended physical\ndistance from others. Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown.", "Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown. As an\noverall definition, we consider regulations/legislations regarding strict face-to-face social interaction:\nincluding the banning of any non-essential public gatherings, closure of educational and\n\npublic/cultural institutions, ordering people to stay home apart from exercise and essential tasks. We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g.", "We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g. France). The dates used are the effective dates when these legislations\nhave been implemented. We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented.", "We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented. First intervention: As Figure 1 shows, European governments have escalated interventions rapidly,\nand in some examples (Norway/Denmark) have implemented these interventions all on a single day. Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19.", "Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19. A full list of the timing of these interventions and the sources we have used can be found in Appendix\n8.6. 6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2).", "6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2). Replication\ncode is available at \n\nWe fit our model to observed deaths according to ECDC data from 11 European countries. The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix).", "The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix). Given these distributions and ratios, modelled deaths are a function of\nthe number of infections. The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number.", "The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number. Finally, the time-varying reproduction number is a\nfunction of the initial reproduction number before interventions and the effect sizes from\ninterventions. Figure 5: Summary of model components.", "Figure 5: Summary of model components. Following the hierarchy from bottom to top gives us a full framework to see how interventions affect\ninfections, which can result in deaths. We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible.", "We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible. From bottom to top in Figure 5, there is an\nimplicit lag in time that means the effect of very recent interventions manifest weakly in current\ndeaths (and get stronger as time progresses). To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set.", "To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set. Our\nmodel jointly estimates the effect sizes of interventions. We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4).", "We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4). 7 Acknowledgements\n\nInitial research on covariates in Appendix 8.6 was crowdsourced; we thank a number of people\nacross the world for help with this. This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel.", "This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel. 8 Appendix: Model Specifics, Validation and Sensitivity Analysis\n8.1 Death model\n\nWe observe daily deaths Dam for days t E 1, ...,n and countries m E 1, ...,p. These daily deaths are\nmodelled using a positive real-Valued function dam = E(Dam) that represents the expected number\nof deaths attributed to COVID-19. Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days.", "Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days. At the beginning of the epidemic, the observed deaths in a country can be dominated by deaths that\nresult from infection that are not locally acquired. To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model.", "To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model. To mechanistically link ourfunction for deaths to infected cases, we use a previously estimated COVID-\n19 infection-fatality-ratio ifr (probability of death given infection)9 together with a distribution oftimes\nfrom infection to death TE. The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups.", "The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups. To better match estimates of attack rates by age\ngenerated using more detailed information on country and age-specific mixing patterns, we scale\nthese estimates (the unadjusted ifr, referred to here as ifr’) in the following way as in previous work.4\nLet Ca be the number of infections generated in age-group a, Na the underlying size of the population\nin that age group and AR“ 2 Ca/Na the age-group-specific attack rate. The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing.", "The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing. This age-group was chosen as the\nreference as it had the lowest predicted level of underreporting in previous analyses of data from the\nChinese epidemic“. We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates.", "We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates. Using estimated epidemiological information from previous studies,“'11 we assume TE to be the sum of\ntwo independent random times: the incubation period (infection to onset of symptoms or infection-\nto-onset) distribution and the time between onset of symptoms and death (onset-to-death). The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86.", "The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86. The onset-to-death distribution is also Gamma distributed with a mean of 18.8 days and a\ncoefficient of va riation 0.45. ifrm is population averaged over the age structure of a given country. The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio.", "The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio. Figure 6: Left, infection-to-death distribution (mean 23.9 days). Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left.", "Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left. Using the probability of death distribution, the expected number of deaths dam, on a given day t, for\ncountry, m, is given by the following discrete sum:\n\n\nThe number of deaths today is the sum of the past infections weighted by their probability of death,\nwhere the probability of death depends on the number of days since infection. 8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process.", "8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process. This approach\nhas been used in numerous previous studies13'16 and has a strong theoretical basis in stochastic\nindividual-based counting processes such as Hawkes process and the Bellman-Harris process.”18 The\nrenewal model is related to the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, except the renewal is not\nexpressed in differential form. To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62).", "To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62). The serial interval distribution is shown below in Figure 7 and is assumed to be the same for all\ncountries. Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days.", "Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days. Given the serial interval distribution, the number of infections Eamon a given day t, and country, m,\nis given by the following discrete convolution function:\n\n_ t—1\nCam — Ram ZT=0 Cr,mgt—‘r r\nwhere, similarto the probability ofdeath function, the daily serial interval is discretized by\n\nfs+0.5\n\n1.5\ngs = T=s—0.Sg(T)dT fors = 2,3, and 91 = fT=Og(T)dT. Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution.", "Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution. This weighting is then scaled by the country-specific time-Varying\nreproduction number, Ram, that models the average number of secondary infections at a given time. The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times.", "The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times. We included 6 interventions, one of which is constructed\nfrom the other 5 interventions, which are timings of school and university closures (k=l), self—isolating\nif ill (k=2), banning of public events (k=3), any government intervention in place (k=4), implementing\na partial or complete lockdown (k=5) and encouraging social distancing and isolation (k=6). We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise.", "We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise. The covariate ”any government intervention” (k=4) indicates\nif any of the other 5 interventions are in effect,i.e.14’t’m equals 1 at time t if any of the interventions\nk E 1,2,3,4,5 are in effect in country m at time t and equals 0 otherwise. Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention.", "Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention. The effect of each\nintervention is assumed to be multiplicative. Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential.", "Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential. The impact of each intervention on\n\nRam is characterised by a set of parameters 0(1, ...,OL6, with independent prior distributions chosen\nto be\n\nock ~ Gamma(. 5,1).", "5,1). The impacts ock are shared between all m countries and therefore they are informed by all available\ndata. The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information.", "The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information. We assume that seeding of new infections begins 30 days before the day after a country has\ncumulatively observed 10 deaths. From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03).", "From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03). These seed\ninfections are inferred in our Bayesian posterior distribution. We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model.", "We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model. Fitting was done\nin the probabilistic programming language Stan,19 using an adaptive Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC)\nsampler. We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples.", "We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples. Posterior convergence was assessed using the Rhat statistic and by\ndiagnosing divergent transitions of the HMC sampler. Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below).", "Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below). 8.3 Validation\n\nWe validate accuracy of point estimates of our model using cross-Validation. In our cross-validation\nscheme, we leave out 3 days of known death data (non-cumulative) and fit our model. We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days.", "We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days. We present the individual forecasts for each day, as\nwell as the average forecast for those three days. The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8.", "The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8. Figure 8: Cross-Validation results for 3-day and 3-day aggregatedforecasts\n\nFigure 8 provides strong empirical justification for our model specification and mechanism. Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible.", "Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible. Along with from point estimates we all evaluate our posterior credible intervals using the Rhat\nstatistic. The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution).", "The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution). Figure 9 shows the Rhat\nstatistics for all of our parameters\n\n\nFigure 9: Rhat statistics - values close to 1 indicate MCMC convergence. Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged.", "Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged. In fitting we also ensured that the MCMC sampler\nexperienced no divergent transitions - suggesting non pathological posterior topologies. 8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt.", "8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt. A conclusion of this report is the prediction of a slowing of Rt in response to major interventions. To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale.", "To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale. On this scale a line which curves below a\nlinear trend is indicative of slowing in the growth of the epidemic. Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK.", "Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK. They show this slowing down in the daily number of deaths. Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic.", "Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic. We investigated the sensitivity of our estimates of starting and final Rt to our assumed serial interval\ndistribution. For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days.", "For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days. In Figure 13, we show our estimates of R0, the starting reproduction number before interventions, for\neach of these scenarios. The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings.", "The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings. However, as expected, the scale of Rt=0 is considerably affected by this change — a longer serial\ninterval results in a higher estimated Rt=0. This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0.", "This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0. Additionally, in Figure 14, we show our estimates of Rt at the most recent model time point, again for\neach ofthese scenarios. The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping.", "The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping. Figure 13: Initial reproduction number R0 for different serial interval (SI) distributions (means\nbetween 5 and 8 days). We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. Figure 14: Rt on 28 March 2020 estimated for all countries, with serial interval (SI) distribution means\nbetween 5 and 8 days. We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. 8.4.3 Uninformative prior sensitivity on or\n\nWe ran our model using implausible uninformative prior distributions on the intervention effects,\nallowing the effect of an intervention to increase or decrease Rt. To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4).", "To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4). In this\nseries of univariate analyses, we find (Figure 15) that all effects on their own serve to decrease Rt. This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis.", "This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis. Lockdown has a very large effect, most likely due to the fact that it occurs after other\ninterventions in our dataset. The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers.", "The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers. Figure 15: Effects of different interventions when used as the only covariate in the model. 8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution.", "8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution. We fit a model with a Gaussian\nprocess prior distribution to data from Italy where there is the largest signal in death data. We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data.", "We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data. The correspondence of a completely nonparametric function and our\npiecewise constant function suggests a suitable parametric specification of Rt. Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK).", "Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK). To ensure that we are not leveraging too much\ninformation from any one country we perform a ”leave one country out” sensitivity analysis, where\nwe rerun the model without a different country each time. Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain.", "Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain. In general, for all countries, we observed no significant\ndependence on any one country. Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model.", "Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model. See the\n\n\nFigure 17: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Spain for fitting the model. See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots.", "See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots. 8.4.6 Starting reproduction numbers vs theoretical predictions\n\nTo validate our starting reproduction numbers, we compare our fitted values to those theoretically\nexpected from a simpler model assuming exponential growth rate, and a serial interval distribution\nmean. We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model.", "We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model. As shown in Figure 18 there is large\ncorrespondence between our estimated starting reproduction number and the basic reproduction\nnumber implied by the growth rate r.\n\nR0 (red) vs R(FO) (black)\n\nFigure 18: Our estimated R0 (black) versus theoretically derived Ru(red) from a log-linear\nregression fit. 8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future.", "8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. DOI: \n\nPage 28 of 35\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\n8.6 Data sources and Timeline of Interventions\n\nFigure 1 and Table 3 display the interventions by the 11 countries in our study and the dates these\ninterventions became effective. Table 3: Timeline of Interventions.", "Table 3: Timeline of Interventions. Country Type Event Date effective\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.20 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of gatherings of more than 5 people.21 10/3/2020\nBanning all access to public spaces and gatherings\nLockdown of more than 5 people. Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys.", "Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys. Going outdoors only\nordered with household members or 1 friend.24 18/3/2020\nPublic transport recommended only for essential\nSocial distancing journeys, work from home encouraged, all public\nencouraged places e.g. restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport.", "restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport. All cultural\nSocial distancing institutions shut and recommend keeping\nencouraged appropriate distance.28 13/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nDenmark measures cough or fever.29 12/3/2020\n\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.30 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Bans of events >100 people.31 13/3/2020\nLockdown Everybody has to stay at home. Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people.", "Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people. Otherwise\nbanned regional restrictions only until lockdown.34 22/3/2020\nLockdown Gatherings of > 2 people banned, 1.5 m\nordered distance.35 22/3/2020\nSocial distancing Avoid social interaction wherever possible\nencouraged recommended by Merkel.36 12/3/2020\nAdvice for everyone experiencing symptoms to\nCase-based contact a health care agency to get tested and\nGermany measures then self—isolate.37 6/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.38 5/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans all public events.39 9/3/2020\nLockdown The government closes all public places. People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions.", "People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions. Including childcare\nordered facilities and all schools.42 13/3/2020\nPublic events The Directorate of Health bans all non-necessary\nbanned social contact.42 12/3/2020\nLockdown Only people living together are allowed outside\nordered together. Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred.", "Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred. NA\nPeople even with mild symptoms are told to limit\nSocial distancing social contact, encouragement to work from\nencouraged home.50 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSweden measures fever symptoms.51 10/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered No in person teaching until 4th of April.52 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >100 people.52 13/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Gatherings of more than 5 people are banned.53 2020-03-20\nAdvice on keeping distance. All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure.", "All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure. Childminders,\nSchool closure nurseries and sixth forms are told to follow the\nordered guidance.56 21/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Implemented with lockdown.57 24/3/2020\nGatherings of more than 2 people not from the\nLockdown same household are banned and police\nordered enforceable.57 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice to avoid pubs, clubs, theatres and other\nencouraged public institutions.58 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nUK measures cough or fever symptoms.59 12/3/2020\n\n\n9 References\n\n1. Li, R. et al.", "Li, R. et al. Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel\ncoronavirus (SARS-CoV2). Science (2020) .1126/science.abb3221. 2. Zhang, J. et al. Patterns of human social contact and contact with animals in Shanghai, China. 5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. Hong Kong: coronavirus cases.", "5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. 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[ "Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non-\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in 11 European countries\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nSeth Flaxmani Swapnil Mishra*, Axel Gandy*, H JulietteT Unwin, Helen Coupland, Thomas A Mellan, Harrison\nZhu, Tresnia Berah, Jeffrey W Eaton, Pablo N P Guzman, Nora Schmit, Lucia Cilloni, Kylie E C Ainslie, Marc\nBaguelin, Isobel Blake, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Olivia Boyd, Lorenzo Cattarino, Constanze Ciavarella, Laura Cooper,\nZulma Cucunuba’, Gina Cuomo—Dannenburg, Amy Dighe, Bimandra Djaafara, Ilaria Dorigatti, Sabine van Elsland,\nRich FitzJohn, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe, Lily Geidelberg, Nicholas Grassly, Wi|| Green, Timothy Hallett, Arran\nHamlet, Wes Hinsley, Ben Jeffrey, David Jorgensen, Edward Knock, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati—Gilani, Pierre\nNouvellet, Kris Parag, Igor Siveroni, Hayley Thompson, Robert Verity, Erik Volz, Caroline Walters, Haowei Wang,\nYuanrong Wang, Oliver Watson, Peter Winskill, Xiaoyue Xi, Charles Whittaker, Patrick GT Walker, Azra Ghani,\nChristl A. Donnelly, Steven Riley, Lucy C Okell, Michaela A C Vollmer, NeilM.Ferguson1and Samir Bhatt*1\n\nDepartment of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London\n\nDepartment of Mathematics, Imperial College London\n\nWHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling\n\nMRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis\n\nAbdul LatifJameeI Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, Imperial College London\nDepartment of Statistics, University of Oxford\n\n*Contributed equally 1Correspondence: nei|[email protected], [email protected]\n\nSummary\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) and its spread outside of China, Europe\nis now experiencing large epidemics. In response, many European countries have implemented\nunprecedented non-pharmaceutical interventions including case isolation, the closure of schools and\nuniversities, banning of mass gatherings and/or public events, and most recently, widescale social\ndistancing including local and national Iockdowns. In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries.", "In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries. Our methods assume that changes in the\nreproductive number— a measure of transmission - are an immediate response to these interventions\nbeing implemented rather than broader gradual changes in behaviour. Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death.", "Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death. One of the key assumptions of the model is that each intervention has the same effect on the\nreproduction number across countries and over time. This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects.", "This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects. It also means that our results are driven strongly by the\ndata from countries with more advanced epidemics, and earlier interventions, such as Italy and Spain. We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier.", "We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier. In Italy, we estimate that the effective\nreproduction number, Rt, dropped to close to 1 around the time of Iockdown (11th March), although\nwith a high level of uncertainty. Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number.", "Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number. Our\nestimates have wide credible intervals and contain 1 for countries that have implemented a||\ninterventions considered in our analysis. This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value.", "This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value. With current interventions remaining in place to at least the end of March, we\nestimate that interventions across all 11 countries will have averted 59,000 deaths up to 31 March\n[95% credible interval 21,000-120,000]. Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels.", "Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels. We estimate that, across all 11\ncountries between 7 and 43 million individuals have been infected with SARS-CoV-Z up to 28th March,\nrepresenting between 1.88% and 11.43% ofthe population. The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics.", "The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics. Given the lag of 2-3 weeks between when transmission changes occur and when their impact can be\nobserved in trends in mortality, for most of the countries considered here it remains too early to be\ncertain that recent interventions have been effective. If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly.", "If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly. It is therefore critical that the current interventions remain in place and trends in\ncases and deaths are closely monitored in the coming days and weeks to provide reassurance that\ntransmission of SARS-Cov-Z is slowing. SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/.", "SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/. Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non—\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID—19 in 11 European countries. Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe.", "Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe. In response to the rising numbers of cases and deaths, and to maintain the\ncapacity of health systems to treat as many severe cases as possible, European countries, like those in\nother continents, have implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to control their\nepidemics. These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned.", "These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned. Understanding firstly, whether these interventions are having the desired impact of controlling the\nepidemic and secondly, which interventions are necessary to maintain control, is critical given their\nlarge economic and social costs. The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection.", "The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection. Ith is maintained at less than 1, the incidence of new\ninfections decreases, ultimately resulting in control of the epidemic. If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity.", "If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity. In China, strict movement restrictions and other measures including case isolation and quarantine\nbegan to be introduced from 23rd January, which achieved a downward trend in the number of\nconfirmed new cases during February, resulting in zero new confirmed indigenous cases in Wuhan by\nMarch 19th. Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement.", "Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement. Estimating reproduction numbers for SARS-CoV-Z presents challenges due to the high proportion of\ninfections not detected by health systems”7 and regular changes in testing policies, resulting in\ndifferent proportions of infections being detected over time and between countries. Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g.", "Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g. contacts of cases). Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends.", "Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends. An alternative way to estimate the course of the epidemic is to back-calculate infections from\nobserved deaths. Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed.", "Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed. Whilst the recent trends in deaths will therefore be informative, there is a time\nlag in observing the effect of interventions on deaths since there is a 2-3-week period between\ninfection, onset of symptoms and outcome. In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt).", "In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt). We fit the model jointly to COVID-19 data from all these countries to assess whether\nthere is evidence that interventions have so far been successful at reducing Rt below 1, with the strong\nassumption that particular interventions are achieving a similar impact in different countries and that\nthe efficacy of those interventions remains constant over time. The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts.", "The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts. Data in the coming weeks will enable estimation of country-specific Rt with\ngreater precision. Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions.", "Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions. 2 Results\n\nThe timing of interventions should be taken in the context of when an individual country’s epidemic\nstarted to grow along with the speed with which control measures were implemented. Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1).", "Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1). Most\ninterventions began around 12th-14th March. We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions.", "We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions. Currently, most countries in our\nstudy have implemented all major non-pharmaceutical interventions. For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12).", "For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12). Rt is the average number of secondary infections per infected individual, assuming that the\ninterventions that are in place at time t stay in place throughout their entire infectious period. Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place.", "Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place. Specific interventions are assumed to have the same relative impact on Rt in each country when they\nwere introduced there and are informed by mortality data across all countries. Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis.", "Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis. For further\ndetails see Appendix 8.6. 2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity.", "2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity. In Italy, our results suggest that, cumulatively, 5.9 [1.9-15.2] million people have been\ninfected as of March 28th, giving an attack rate of 9.8% [3.2%-25%] of the population (Table 1). Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date.", "Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date. Germany is estimated to have one of the lowest attack rates at 0.7% with 600,000\n[240,000-1,500,000] people infected. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020.", "Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020. Country % of total population infected (mean [95% credible intervall)\nAustria 1.1% [0.36%-3.1%]\nBelgium 3.7% [1.3%-9.7%]\nDenmark 1.1% [0.40%-3.1%]\nFrance 3.0% [1.1%-7.4%]\nGermany 0.72% [0.28%-1.8%]\nItaly 9.8% [3.2%-26%]\nNorway 0.41% [0.09%-1.2%]\nSpain 15% [3.7%-41%]\nSweden 3.1% [0.85%-8.4%]\nSwitzerland 3.2% [1.3%-7.6%]\nUnited Kingdom 2.7% [1.2%-5.4%]\n\n2.2 Reproduction numbers and impact of interventions\n\nAveraged across all countries, we estimate initial reproduction numbers of around 3.87 [3.01-4.66],\nwhich is in line with other estimates.1'8 These estimates are informed by our choice of serial interval\ndistribution and the initial growth rate of observed deaths. A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6).", "A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6). The initial reproduction\nnumbers are also uncertain due to (a) importation being the dominant source of new infections early\nin the epidemic, rather than local transmission (b) possible under-ascertainment in deaths particularly\nbefore testing became widespread. We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions. Our\nresults, which are driven largely by countries with advanced epidemics and larger numbers of deaths\n(e.g. Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt.", "Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt. Across all countries\nwe find current estimates of Rt to range from a posterior mean of 0.97 [0.14-2.14] for Norway to a\nposterior mean of2.64 [1.40-4.18] for Sweden, with an average of 1.43 across the 11 country posterior\nmeans, a 64% reduction compared to the pre-intervention values. We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times.", "We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times. In all\ncountries but Sweden, under the same assumptions, we estimate that the current reproduction\nnumber includes 1 in the uncertainty range. The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar.", "The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar. Overall, we cannot yet conclude whether current interventions are sufficient to drive Rt below 1\n(posterior probability of being less than 1.0 is 44% on average across the countries). We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time.", "We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time. There remains a high level of uncertainty in these estimates. It is too early to detect substantial\nintervention impact in many countries at earlier stages of their epidemic (e.g. Germany, UK, Norway).", "Germany, UK, Norway). Many interventions have occurred only recently, and their effects have not yet been fully observed\ndue to the time lag between infection and death. This uncertainty will reduce as more data become\navailable. For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests).", "For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests). We also found that our model can reliably forecast daily deaths 3 days into the future, by withholding\nthe latest 3 days of data and comparing model predictions to observed deaths (Appendix 8.3). The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4).", "The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4). However, when doing a sensitivity analysis (Appendix 8.4.3) with\nuninformative prior distributions (where interventions can increase deaths) we find similar impact of\n\nImperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\ninterventions, which shows that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\n\nmain analysis. Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt.", "Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt. Left: daily number of infections, brown\nbars are reported infections, blue bands are predicted infections, dark blue 50% credible interval (CI),\nlight blue 95% CI. The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention.", "The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention. Afterwards, if the Rt is above 1, the number of infections will starts growing again. Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot.", "Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot. Right: time-varying reproduction number Rt, dark green 50% CI, light green 95% CI. Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred.", "Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable 2: Totalforecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to 31 March in our model\nand in a counterfactual model (assuming no intervention had taken place). Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions.", "Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions. Numbers in brackets are 95% credible intervals. 2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e.", "2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e. the initial reproduction number\nestimated before interventions). Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time.", "Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time. The model without interventions was unable to capture\nrecent trends in deaths in several countries, where the rate of increase had clearly slowed (Figure 3). Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C).", "Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C). By comparing the deaths predicted under the model with no interventions to the deaths predicted in\nour intervention model, we calculated the total deaths averted up to the end of March. We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions.", "We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions. In Italy and Spain, where the epidemic is advanced, 38,000 [13,000-\n84,000] and 16,000 [5,400-35,000] deaths have been averted, respectively. Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted.", "Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted. These numbers give only the deaths averted that would have occurred up to 31 March. lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher.", "lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher. Figure 3: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for (a)\nItaly and (b) Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no interventions\ncounterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6.", "Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6. 03/0 25% 50% 753% 100%\n(no effect on transmissibility) (ends transmissibility\nRelative % reduction in R.\n\nFigure 4: Our model includes five covariates for governmental interventions, adjusting for whether\nthe intervention was the first one undertaken by the government in response to COVID-19 (red) or\nwas subsequent to other interventions (green). Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals.", "Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals. If 100% reduction is achieved, Rt = 0 and there is no more\ntransmission of COVID-19. No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced.", "No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced. Representing the\nCOVlD-19 infection process using a semi-mechanistic, joint, Bayesian hierarchical model, we can\nreproduce trends observed in the data on deaths and can forecast accurately over short time horizons. We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported.", "We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported. The high level\nof under-ascertainment of infections that we estimate here is likely due to the focus on testing in\nhospital settings rather than in the community. Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1).", "Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1). Our estimates imply that the populations in Europe are not\nclose to herd immunity (\"50-75% if R0 is 2-4). Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly.", "Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly. This implies that the virus will be able to spread\nrapidly should interventions be lifted. Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable.", "Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable. We estimate that major non-pharmaceutical interventions have had a substantial impact on the time-\nvarying reproduction numbers in countries where there has been time to observe intervention effects\non trends in deaths (Italy, Spain). lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths.", "lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths. Similarly, our estimates of\nthe impact ofinterventions in other countries should be viewed with caution if the same interventions\nhave achieved different levels of adherence than was initially the case in Italy and Spain. Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention.", "Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention. In some cases, such as Norway, where all interventions were\nimplemented at once, these individual effects are by definition unidentifiable. Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis).", "Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis). While the growth in daily deaths has decreased, due to the\nlag between infections and deaths, continued rises in daily deaths are to be expected for some time. To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model.", "To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model. Consider Italy and the UK - two countries at very different stages\nin their epidemics. For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics.", "For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics. The results suggest that interventions will have a\nlarge impact on infections and deaths despite counts of both rising. For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10).", "For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10). The counterfactual model for Italy suggests that despite mounting pressure on health systems,\ninterventions have averted a health care catastrophe where the number of new deaths would have\nbeen 3.7 times higher (38,000 deaths averted) than currently observed. Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March.", "Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March. 4 Conclusion and Limitations\n\nModern understanding of infectious disease with a global publicized response has meant that\nnationwide interventions could be implemented with widespread adherence and support. Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics.", "Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics. It is too early to be sure whether similar reductions will be seen in countries at earlier\nstages of their epidemic. While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths.", "While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths. When forecasting\n3 days and looking over the whole epidemic the number of deaths averted is substantial. We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections.", "We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections. We\ncannot say for certain that the current measures have controlled the epidemic in Europe; however, if\ncurrent trends continue, there is reason for optimism. Our approach is semi-mechanistic.", "Our approach is semi-mechanistic. We propose a plausible structure for the infection process and then\nestimate parameters empirically. However, many parameters had to be given strong prior\ndistributions or had to be fixed. For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies.", "For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies. As more data become available and better estimates arise, we will update these in\nweekly reports. Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0.", "Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0. Our infection fatality ratio, and infection-to-onset-to-death distributions strongly\ninfluence the rate of death and hence the estimated number of true underlying cases. We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic.", "We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic. This assumption implies that countries with early interventions and more deaths since these\ninterventions (e.g. Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g.", "Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g. Germany, UK). We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6.", "We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6. However, invariably there will be differences from country to country in the strength of\ntheir intervention — for example, most countries have banned gatherings of more than 2 people when\nimplementing a lockdown, whereas in Sweden the government only banned gatherings of more than\n10 people. These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data.", "These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data. We believe that our\nuncertainty to some degree can cover these differences, and as more data become available,\ncoefficients should become more reliable. However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime.", "However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime. In our Bayesian hierarchical framework, we robustly quantify the uncertainty in our parameter\nestimates and posterior predictions. This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates.", "This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates. Furthermore, we predict\nintervention impact at country-level, but different trends may be in place in different parts of each\ncountry. For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country.", "For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country. 5 Data\n\nOur model utilizes daily real-time death data from the ECDC (European Centre of Disease Control),\nwhere we catalogue case data for 11 European countries currently experiencing the epidemic: Austria,\nBelgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United\nKingdom. The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19.", "The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19. However, the case data are highly unrepresentative of the incidence of infections due to\nunderreporting as well as systematic and country-specific changes in testing. We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all.", "We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all. While the observed deaths still have some degree of unreliability, again due to\nchanges in reporting and testing, we believe the data are ofsufficient fidelity to model. For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions. We looked\nat the government webpages from each country as well as their official public health\ndivision/information webpages to identify the latest advice/laws being issued by the government and\npublic health authorities. We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely).", "We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely). In the case of Denmark\nand Sweden, we allowed partial school closures of only secondary schools. The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards).", "The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards). Case-based measures: This intervention comprises strong recommendations or laws to the general\npublic and primary care about self—isolation when showing COVID-19-like symptoms. These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated.", "These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated. Our definition is restricted to nationwide government advice to all individuals (e.g. UK) or to all primary\ncare and excludes regional only advice. These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China.", "These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China. Public events banned: This refers to banning all public events of more than 100 participants such as\nsports events. Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact.", "Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact. The dates used are those when social distancing has officially been\nrecommended by the government; the advice may include maintaining a recommended physical\ndistance from others. Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown.", "Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown. As an\noverall definition, we consider regulations/legislations regarding strict face-to-face social interaction:\nincluding the banning of any non-essential public gatherings, closure of educational and\n\npublic/cultural institutions, ordering people to stay home apart from exercise and essential tasks. We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g.", "We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g. France). The dates used are the effective dates when these legislations\nhave been implemented. We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented.", "We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented. First intervention: As Figure 1 shows, European governments have escalated interventions rapidly,\nand in some examples (Norway/Denmark) have implemented these interventions all on a single day. Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19.", "Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19. A full list of the timing of these interventions and the sources we have used can be found in Appendix\n8.6. 6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2).", "6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2). Replication\ncode is available at \n\nWe fit our model to observed deaths according to ECDC data from 11 European countries. The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix).", "The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix). Given these distributions and ratios, modelled deaths are a function of\nthe number of infections. The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number.", "The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number. Finally, the time-varying reproduction number is a\nfunction of the initial reproduction number before interventions and the effect sizes from\ninterventions. Figure 5: Summary of model components.", "Figure 5: Summary of model components. Following the hierarchy from bottom to top gives us a full framework to see how interventions affect\ninfections, which can result in deaths. We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible.", "We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible. From bottom to top in Figure 5, there is an\nimplicit lag in time that means the effect of very recent interventions manifest weakly in current\ndeaths (and get stronger as time progresses). To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set.", "To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set. Our\nmodel jointly estimates the effect sizes of interventions. We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4).", "We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4). 7 Acknowledgements\n\nInitial research on covariates in Appendix 8.6 was crowdsourced; we thank a number of people\nacross the world for help with this. This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel.", "This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel. 8 Appendix: Model Specifics, Validation and Sensitivity Analysis\n8.1 Death model\n\nWe observe daily deaths Dam for days t E 1, ...,n and countries m E 1, ...,p. These daily deaths are\nmodelled using a positive real-Valued function dam = E(Dam) that represents the expected number\nof deaths attributed to COVID-19. Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days.", "Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days. At the beginning of the epidemic, the observed deaths in a country can be dominated by deaths that\nresult from infection that are not locally acquired. To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model.", "To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model. To mechanistically link ourfunction for deaths to infected cases, we use a previously estimated COVID-\n19 infection-fatality-ratio ifr (probability of death given infection)9 together with a distribution oftimes\nfrom infection to death TE. The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups.", "The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups. To better match estimates of attack rates by age\ngenerated using more detailed information on country and age-specific mixing patterns, we scale\nthese estimates (the unadjusted ifr, referred to here as ifr’) in the following way as in previous work.4\nLet Ca be the number of infections generated in age-group a, Na the underlying size of the population\nin that age group and AR“ 2 Ca/Na the age-group-specific attack rate. The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing.", "The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing. This age-group was chosen as the\nreference as it had the lowest predicted level of underreporting in previous analyses of data from the\nChinese epidemic“. We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates.", "We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates. Using estimated epidemiological information from previous studies,“'11 we assume TE to be the sum of\ntwo independent random times: the incubation period (infection to onset of symptoms or infection-\nto-onset) distribution and the time between onset of symptoms and death (onset-to-death). The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86.", "The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86. The onset-to-death distribution is also Gamma distributed with a mean of 18.8 days and a\ncoefficient of va riation 0.45. ifrm is population averaged over the age structure of a given country. The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio.", "The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio. Figure 6: Left, infection-to-death distribution (mean 23.9 days). Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left.", "Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left. Using the probability of death distribution, the expected number of deaths dam, on a given day t, for\ncountry, m, is given by the following discrete sum:\n\n\nThe number of deaths today is the sum of the past infections weighted by their probability of death,\nwhere the probability of death depends on the number of days since infection. 8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process.", "8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process. This approach\nhas been used in numerous previous studies13'16 and has a strong theoretical basis in stochastic\nindividual-based counting processes such as Hawkes process and the Bellman-Harris process.”18 The\nrenewal model is related to the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, except the renewal is not\nexpressed in differential form. To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62).", "To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62). The serial interval distribution is shown below in Figure 7 and is assumed to be the same for all\ncountries. Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days.", "Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days. Given the serial interval distribution, the number of infections Eamon a given day t, and country, m,\nis given by the following discrete convolution function:\n\n_ t—1\nCam — Ram ZT=0 Cr,mgt—‘r r\nwhere, similarto the probability ofdeath function, the daily serial interval is discretized by\n\nfs+0.5\n\n1.5\ngs = T=s—0.Sg(T)dT fors = 2,3, and 91 = fT=Og(T)dT. Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution.", "Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution. This weighting is then scaled by the country-specific time-Varying\nreproduction number, Ram, that models the average number of secondary infections at a given time. The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times.", "The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times. We included 6 interventions, one of which is constructed\nfrom the other 5 interventions, which are timings of school and university closures (k=l), self—isolating\nif ill (k=2), banning of public events (k=3), any government intervention in place (k=4), implementing\na partial or complete lockdown (k=5) and encouraging social distancing and isolation (k=6). We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise.", "We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise. The covariate ”any government intervention” (k=4) indicates\nif any of the other 5 interventions are in effect,i.e.14’t’m equals 1 at time t if any of the interventions\nk E 1,2,3,4,5 are in effect in country m at time t and equals 0 otherwise. Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention.", "Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention. The effect of each\nintervention is assumed to be multiplicative. Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential.", "Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential. The impact of each intervention on\n\nRam is characterised by a set of parameters 0(1, ...,OL6, with independent prior distributions chosen\nto be\n\nock ~ Gamma(. 5,1).", "5,1). The impacts ock are shared between all m countries and therefore they are informed by all available\ndata. The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information.", "The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information. We assume that seeding of new infections begins 30 days before the day after a country has\ncumulatively observed 10 deaths. From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03).", "From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03). These seed\ninfections are inferred in our Bayesian posterior distribution. We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model.", "We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model. Fitting was done\nin the probabilistic programming language Stan,19 using an adaptive Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC)\nsampler. We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples.", "We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples. Posterior convergence was assessed using the Rhat statistic and by\ndiagnosing divergent transitions of the HMC sampler. Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below).", "Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below). 8.3 Validation\n\nWe validate accuracy of point estimates of our model using cross-Validation. In our cross-validation\nscheme, we leave out 3 days of known death data (non-cumulative) and fit our model. We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days.", "We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days. We present the individual forecasts for each day, as\nwell as the average forecast for those three days. The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8.", "The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8. Figure 8: Cross-Validation results for 3-day and 3-day aggregatedforecasts\n\nFigure 8 provides strong empirical justification for our model specification and mechanism. Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible.", "Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible. Along with from point estimates we all evaluate our posterior credible intervals using the Rhat\nstatistic. The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution).", "The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution). Figure 9 shows the Rhat\nstatistics for all of our parameters\n\n\nFigure 9: Rhat statistics - values close to 1 indicate MCMC convergence. Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged.", "Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged. In fitting we also ensured that the MCMC sampler\nexperienced no divergent transitions - suggesting non pathological posterior topologies. 8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt.", "8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt. A conclusion of this report is the prediction of a slowing of Rt in response to major interventions. To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale.", "To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale. On this scale a line which curves below a\nlinear trend is indicative of slowing in the growth of the epidemic. Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK.", "Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK. They show this slowing down in the daily number of deaths. Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic.", "Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic. We investigated the sensitivity of our estimates of starting and final Rt to our assumed serial interval\ndistribution. For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days.", "For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days. In Figure 13, we show our estimates of R0, the starting reproduction number before interventions, for\neach of these scenarios. The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings.", "The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings. However, as expected, the scale of Rt=0 is considerably affected by this change — a longer serial\ninterval results in a higher estimated Rt=0. This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0.", "This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0. Additionally, in Figure 14, we show our estimates of Rt at the most recent model time point, again for\neach ofthese scenarios. The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping.", "The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping. Figure 13: Initial reproduction number R0 for different serial interval (SI) distributions (means\nbetween 5 and 8 days). We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. Figure 14: Rt on 28 March 2020 estimated for all countries, with serial interval (SI) distribution means\nbetween 5 and 8 days. We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. 8.4.3 Uninformative prior sensitivity on or\n\nWe ran our model using implausible uninformative prior distributions on the intervention effects,\nallowing the effect of an intervention to increase or decrease Rt. To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4).", "To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4). In this\nseries of univariate analyses, we find (Figure 15) that all effects on their own serve to decrease Rt. This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis.", "This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis. Lockdown has a very large effect, most likely due to the fact that it occurs after other\ninterventions in our dataset. The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers.", "The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers. Figure 15: Effects of different interventions when used as the only covariate in the model. 8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution.", "8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution. We fit a model with a Gaussian\nprocess prior distribution to data from Italy where there is the largest signal in death data. We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data.", "We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data. The correspondence of a completely nonparametric function and our\npiecewise constant function suggests a suitable parametric specification of Rt. Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK).", "Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK). To ensure that we are not leveraging too much\ninformation from any one country we perform a ”leave one country out” sensitivity analysis, where\nwe rerun the model without a different country each time. Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain.", "Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain. In general, for all countries, we observed no significant\ndependence on any one country. Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model.", "Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model. See the\n\n\nFigure 17: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Spain for fitting the model. See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots.", "See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots. 8.4.6 Starting reproduction numbers vs theoretical predictions\n\nTo validate our starting reproduction numbers, we compare our fitted values to those theoretically\nexpected from a simpler model assuming exponential growth rate, and a serial interval distribution\nmean. We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model.", "We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model. As shown in Figure 18 there is large\ncorrespondence between our estimated starting reproduction number and the basic reproduction\nnumber implied by the growth rate r.\n\nR0 (red) vs R(FO) (black)\n\nFigure 18: Our estimated R0 (black) versus theoretically derived Ru(red) from a log-linear\nregression fit. 8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future.", "8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. DOI: \n\nPage 28 of 35\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\n8.6 Data sources and Timeline of Interventions\n\nFigure 1 and Table 3 display the interventions by the 11 countries in our study and the dates these\ninterventions became effective. Table 3: Timeline of Interventions.", "Table 3: Timeline of Interventions. Country Type Event Date effective\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.20 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of gatherings of more than 5 people.21 10/3/2020\nBanning all access to public spaces and gatherings\nLockdown of more than 5 people. Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys.", "Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys. Going outdoors only\nordered with household members or 1 friend.24 18/3/2020\nPublic transport recommended only for essential\nSocial distancing journeys, work from home encouraged, all public\nencouraged places e.g. restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport.", "restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport. All cultural\nSocial distancing institutions shut and recommend keeping\nencouraged appropriate distance.28 13/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nDenmark measures cough or fever.29 12/3/2020\n\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.30 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Bans of events >100 people.31 13/3/2020\nLockdown Everybody has to stay at home. Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people.", "Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people. Otherwise\nbanned regional restrictions only until lockdown.34 22/3/2020\nLockdown Gatherings of > 2 people banned, 1.5 m\nordered distance.35 22/3/2020\nSocial distancing Avoid social interaction wherever possible\nencouraged recommended by Merkel.36 12/3/2020\nAdvice for everyone experiencing symptoms to\nCase-based contact a health care agency to get tested and\nGermany measures then self—isolate.37 6/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.38 5/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans all public events.39 9/3/2020\nLockdown The government closes all public places. People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions.", "People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions. Including childcare\nordered facilities and all schools.42 13/3/2020\nPublic events The Directorate of Health bans all non-necessary\nbanned social contact.42 12/3/2020\nLockdown Only people living together are allowed outside\nordered together. Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred.", "Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred. NA\nPeople even with mild symptoms are told to limit\nSocial distancing social contact, encouragement to work from\nencouraged home.50 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSweden measures fever symptoms.51 10/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered No in person teaching until 4th of April.52 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >100 people.52 13/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Gatherings of more than 5 people are banned.53 2020-03-20\nAdvice on keeping distance. All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure.", "All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure. Childminders,\nSchool closure nurseries and sixth forms are told to follow the\nordered guidance.56 21/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Implemented with lockdown.57 24/3/2020\nGatherings of more than 2 people not from the\nLockdown same household are banned and police\nordered enforceable.57 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice to avoid pubs, clubs, theatres and other\nencouraged public institutions.58 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nUK measures cough or fever symptoms.59 12/3/2020\n\n\n9 References\n\n1. Li, R. et al.", "Li, R. et al. Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel\ncoronavirus (SARS-CoV2). Science (2020) .1126/science.abb3221. 2. Zhang, J. et al. Patterns of human social contact and contact with animals in Shanghai, China. 5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. Hong Kong: coronavirus cases.", "5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. 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[ "Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non-\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in 11 European countries\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nSeth Flaxmani Swapnil Mishra*, Axel Gandy*, H JulietteT Unwin, Helen Coupland, Thomas A Mellan, Harrison\nZhu, Tresnia Berah, Jeffrey W Eaton, Pablo N P Guzman, Nora Schmit, Lucia Cilloni, Kylie E C Ainslie, Marc\nBaguelin, Isobel Blake, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Olivia Boyd, Lorenzo Cattarino, Constanze Ciavarella, Laura Cooper,\nZulma Cucunuba’, Gina Cuomo—Dannenburg, Amy Dighe, Bimandra Djaafara, Ilaria Dorigatti, Sabine van Elsland,\nRich FitzJohn, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe, Lily Geidelberg, Nicholas Grassly, Wi|| Green, Timothy Hallett, Arran\nHamlet, Wes Hinsley, Ben Jeffrey, David Jorgensen, Edward Knock, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati—Gilani, Pierre\nNouvellet, Kris Parag, Igor Siveroni, Hayley Thompson, Robert Verity, Erik Volz, Caroline Walters, Haowei Wang,\nYuanrong Wang, Oliver Watson, Peter Winskill, Xiaoyue Xi, Charles Whittaker, Patrick GT Walker, Azra Ghani,\nChristl A. Donnelly, Steven Riley, Lucy C Okell, Michaela A C Vollmer, NeilM.Ferguson1and Samir Bhatt*1\n\nDepartment of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London\n\nDepartment of Mathematics, Imperial College London\n\nWHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling\n\nMRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis\n\nAbdul LatifJameeI Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, Imperial College London\nDepartment of Statistics, University of Oxford\n\n*Contributed equally 1Correspondence: nei|[email protected], [email protected]\n\nSummary\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) and its spread outside of China, Europe\nis now experiencing large epidemics. In response, many European countries have implemented\nunprecedented non-pharmaceutical interventions including case isolation, the closure of schools and\nuniversities, banning of mass gatherings and/or public events, and most recently, widescale social\ndistancing including local and national Iockdowns. In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries.", "In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries. Our methods assume that changes in the\nreproductive number— a measure of transmission - are an immediate response to these interventions\nbeing implemented rather than broader gradual changes in behaviour. Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death.", "Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death. One of the key assumptions of the model is that each intervention has the same effect on the\nreproduction number across countries and over time. This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects.", "This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects. It also means that our results are driven strongly by the\ndata from countries with more advanced epidemics, and earlier interventions, such as Italy and Spain. We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier.", "We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier. In Italy, we estimate that the effective\nreproduction number, Rt, dropped to close to 1 around the time of Iockdown (11th March), although\nwith a high level of uncertainty. Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number.", "Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number. Our\nestimates have wide credible intervals and contain 1 for countries that have implemented a||\ninterventions considered in our analysis. This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value.", "This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value. With current interventions remaining in place to at least the end of March, we\nestimate that interventions across all 11 countries will have averted 59,000 deaths up to 31 March\n[95% credible interval 21,000-120,000]. Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels.", "Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels. We estimate that, across all 11\ncountries between 7 and 43 million individuals have been infected with SARS-CoV-Z up to 28th March,\nrepresenting between 1.88% and 11.43% ofthe population. The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics.", "The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics. Given the lag of 2-3 weeks between when transmission changes occur and when their impact can be\nobserved in trends in mortality, for most of the countries considered here it remains too early to be\ncertain that recent interventions have been effective. If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly.", "If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly. It is therefore critical that the current interventions remain in place and trends in\ncases and deaths are closely monitored in the coming days and weeks to provide reassurance that\ntransmission of SARS-Cov-Z is slowing. SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/.", "SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/. Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non—\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID—19 in 11 European countries. Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe.", "Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe. In response to the rising numbers of cases and deaths, and to maintain the\ncapacity of health systems to treat as many severe cases as possible, European countries, like those in\nother continents, have implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to control their\nepidemics. These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned.", "These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned. Understanding firstly, whether these interventions are having the desired impact of controlling the\nepidemic and secondly, which interventions are necessary to maintain control, is critical given their\nlarge economic and social costs. The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection.", "The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection. Ith is maintained at less than 1, the incidence of new\ninfections decreases, ultimately resulting in control of the epidemic. If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity.", "If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity. In China, strict movement restrictions and other measures including case isolation and quarantine\nbegan to be introduced from 23rd January, which achieved a downward trend in the number of\nconfirmed new cases during February, resulting in zero new confirmed indigenous cases in Wuhan by\nMarch 19th. Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement.", "Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement. Estimating reproduction numbers for SARS-CoV-Z presents challenges due to the high proportion of\ninfections not detected by health systems”7 and regular changes in testing policies, resulting in\ndifferent proportions of infections being detected over time and between countries. Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g.", "Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g. contacts of cases). Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends.", "Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends. An alternative way to estimate the course of the epidemic is to back-calculate infections from\nobserved deaths. Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed.", "Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed. Whilst the recent trends in deaths will therefore be informative, there is a time\nlag in observing the effect of interventions on deaths since there is a 2-3-week period between\ninfection, onset of symptoms and outcome. In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt).", "In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt). We fit the model jointly to COVID-19 data from all these countries to assess whether\nthere is evidence that interventions have so far been successful at reducing Rt below 1, with the strong\nassumption that particular interventions are achieving a similar impact in different countries and that\nthe efficacy of those interventions remains constant over time. The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts.", "The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts. Data in the coming weeks will enable estimation of country-specific Rt with\ngreater precision. Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions.", "Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions. 2 Results\n\nThe timing of interventions should be taken in the context of when an individual country’s epidemic\nstarted to grow along with the speed with which control measures were implemented. Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1).", "Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1). Most\ninterventions began around 12th-14th March. We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions.", "We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions. Currently, most countries in our\nstudy have implemented all major non-pharmaceutical interventions. For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12).", "For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12). Rt is the average number of secondary infections per infected individual, assuming that the\ninterventions that are in place at time t stay in place throughout their entire infectious period. Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place.", "Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place. Specific interventions are assumed to have the same relative impact on Rt in each country when they\nwere introduced there and are informed by mortality data across all countries. Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis.", "Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis. For further\ndetails see Appendix 8.6. 2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity.", "2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity. In Italy, our results suggest that, cumulatively, 5.9 [1.9-15.2] million people have been\ninfected as of March 28th, giving an attack rate of 9.8% [3.2%-25%] of the population (Table 1). Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date.", "Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date. Germany is estimated to have one of the lowest attack rates at 0.7% with 600,000\n[240,000-1,500,000] people infected. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020.", "Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020. Country % of total population infected (mean [95% credible intervall)\nAustria 1.1% [0.36%-3.1%]\nBelgium 3.7% [1.3%-9.7%]\nDenmark 1.1% [0.40%-3.1%]\nFrance 3.0% [1.1%-7.4%]\nGermany 0.72% [0.28%-1.8%]\nItaly 9.8% [3.2%-26%]\nNorway 0.41% [0.09%-1.2%]\nSpain 15% [3.7%-41%]\nSweden 3.1% [0.85%-8.4%]\nSwitzerland 3.2% [1.3%-7.6%]\nUnited Kingdom 2.7% [1.2%-5.4%]\n\n2.2 Reproduction numbers and impact of interventions\n\nAveraged across all countries, we estimate initial reproduction numbers of around 3.87 [3.01-4.66],\nwhich is in line with other estimates.1'8 These estimates are informed by our choice of serial interval\ndistribution and the initial growth rate of observed deaths. A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6).", "A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6). The initial reproduction\nnumbers are also uncertain due to (a) importation being the dominant source of new infections early\nin the epidemic, rather than local transmission (b) possible under-ascertainment in deaths particularly\nbefore testing became widespread. We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions. Our\nresults, which are driven largely by countries with advanced epidemics and larger numbers of deaths\n(e.g. Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt.", "Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt. Across all countries\nwe find current estimates of Rt to range from a posterior mean of 0.97 [0.14-2.14] for Norway to a\nposterior mean of2.64 [1.40-4.18] for Sweden, with an average of 1.43 across the 11 country posterior\nmeans, a 64% reduction compared to the pre-intervention values. We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times.", "We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times. In all\ncountries but Sweden, under the same assumptions, we estimate that the current reproduction\nnumber includes 1 in the uncertainty range. The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar.", "The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar. Overall, we cannot yet conclude whether current interventions are sufficient to drive Rt below 1\n(posterior probability of being less than 1.0 is 44% on average across the countries). We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time.", "We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time. There remains a high level of uncertainty in these estimates. It is too early to detect substantial\nintervention impact in many countries at earlier stages of their epidemic (e.g. Germany, UK, Norway).", "Germany, UK, Norway). Many interventions have occurred only recently, and their effects have not yet been fully observed\ndue to the time lag between infection and death. This uncertainty will reduce as more data become\navailable. For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests).", "For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests). We also found that our model can reliably forecast daily deaths 3 days into the future, by withholding\nthe latest 3 days of data and comparing model predictions to observed deaths (Appendix 8.3). The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4).", "The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4). However, when doing a sensitivity analysis (Appendix 8.4.3) with\nuninformative prior distributions (where interventions can increase deaths) we find similar impact of\n\nImperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\ninterventions, which shows that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\n\nmain analysis. Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt.", "Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt. Left: daily number of infections, brown\nbars are reported infections, blue bands are predicted infections, dark blue 50% credible interval (CI),\nlight blue 95% CI. The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention.", "The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention. Afterwards, if the Rt is above 1, the number of infections will starts growing again. Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot.", "Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot. Right: time-varying reproduction number Rt, dark green 50% CI, light green 95% CI. Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred.", "Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable 2: Totalforecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to 31 March in our model\nand in a counterfactual model (assuming no intervention had taken place). Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions.", "Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions. Numbers in brackets are 95% credible intervals. 2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e.", "2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e. the initial reproduction number\nestimated before interventions). Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time.", "Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time. The model without interventions was unable to capture\nrecent trends in deaths in several countries, where the rate of increase had clearly slowed (Figure 3). Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C).", "Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C). By comparing the deaths predicted under the model with no interventions to the deaths predicted in\nour intervention model, we calculated the total deaths averted up to the end of March. We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions.", "We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions. In Italy and Spain, where the epidemic is advanced, 38,000 [13,000-\n84,000] and 16,000 [5,400-35,000] deaths have been averted, respectively. Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted.", "Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted. These numbers give only the deaths averted that would have occurred up to 31 March. lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher.", "lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher. Figure 3: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for (a)\nItaly and (b) Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no interventions\ncounterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6.", "Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6. 03/0 25% 50% 753% 100%\n(no effect on transmissibility) (ends transmissibility\nRelative % reduction in R.\n\nFigure 4: Our model includes five covariates for governmental interventions, adjusting for whether\nthe intervention was the first one undertaken by the government in response to COVID-19 (red) or\nwas subsequent to other interventions (green). Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals.", "Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals. If 100% reduction is achieved, Rt = 0 and there is no more\ntransmission of COVID-19. No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced.", "No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced. Representing the\nCOVlD-19 infection process using a semi-mechanistic, joint, Bayesian hierarchical model, we can\nreproduce trends observed in the data on deaths and can forecast accurately over short time horizons. We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported.", "We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported. The high level\nof under-ascertainment of infections that we estimate here is likely due to the focus on testing in\nhospital settings rather than in the community. Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1).", "Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1). Our estimates imply that the populations in Europe are not\nclose to herd immunity (\"50-75% if R0 is 2-4). Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly.", "Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly. This implies that the virus will be able to spread\nrapidly should interventions be lifted. Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable.", "Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable. We estimate that major non-pharmaceutical interventions have had a substantial impact on the time-\nvarying reproduction numbers in countries where there has been time to observe intervention effects\non trends in deaths (Italy, Spain). lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths.", "lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths. Similarly, our estimates of\nthe impact ofinterventions in other countries should be viewed with caution if the same interventions\nhave achieved different levels of adherence than was initially the case in Italy and Spain. Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention.", "Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention. In some cases, such as Norway, where all interventions were\nimplemented at once, these individual effects are by definition unidentifiable. Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis).", "Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis). While the growth in daily deaths has decreased, due to the\nlag between infections and deaths, continued rises in daily deaths are to be expected for some time. To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model.", "To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model. Consider Italy and the UK - two countries at very different stages\nin their epidemics. For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics.", "For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics. The results suggest that interventions will have a\nlarge impact on infections and deaths despite counts of both rising. For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10).", "For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10). The counterfactual model for Italy suggests that despite mounting pressure on health systems,\ninterventions have averted a health care catastrophe where the number of new deaths would have\nbeen 3.7 times higher (38,000 deaths averted) than currently observed. Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March.", "Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March. 4 Conclusion and Limitations\n\nModern understanding of infectious disease with a global publicized response has meant that\nnationwide interventions could be implemented with widespread adherence and support. Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics.", "Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics. It is too early to be sure whether similar reductions will be seen in countries at earlier\nstages of their epidemic. While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths.", "While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths. When forecasting\n3 days and looking over the whole epidemic the number of deaths averted is substantial. We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections.", "We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections. We\ncannot say for certain that the current measures have controlled the epidemic in Europe; however, if\ncurrent trends continue, there is reason for optimism. Our approach is semi-mechanistic.", "Our approach is semi-mechanistic. We propose a plausible structure for the infection process and then\nestimate parameters empirically. However, many parameters had to be given strong prior\ndistributions or had to be fixed. For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies.", "For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies. As more data become available and better estimates arise, we will update these in\nweekly reports. Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0.", "Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0. Our infection fatality ratio, and infection-to-onset-to-death distributions strongly\ninfluence the rate of death and hence the estimated number of true underlying cases. We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic.", "We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic. This assumption implies that countries with early interventions and more deaths since these\ninterventions (e.g. Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g.", "Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g. Germany, UK). We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6.", "We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6. However, invariably there will be differences from country to country in the strength of\ntheir intervention — for example, most countries have banned gatherings of more than 2 people when\nimplementing a lockdown, whereas in Sweden the government only banned gatherings of more than\n10 people. These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data.", "These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data. We believe that our\nuncertainty to some degree can cover these differences, and as more data become available,\ncoefficients should become more reliable. However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime.", "However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime. In our Bayesian hierarchical framework, we robustly quantify the uncertainty in our parameter\nestimates and posterior predictions. This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates.", "This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates. Furthermore, we predict\nintervention impact at country-level, but different trends may be in place in different parts of each\ncountry. For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country.", "For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country. 5 Data\n\nOur model utilizes daily real-time death data from the ECDC (European Centre of Disease Control),\nwhere we catalogue case data for 11 European countries currently experiencing the epidemic: Austria,\nBelgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United\nKingdom. The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19.", "The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19. However, the case data are highly unrepresentative of the incidence of infections due to\nunderreporting as well as systematic and country-specific changes in testing. We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all.", "We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all. While the observed deaths still have some degree of unreliability, again due to\nchanges in reporting and testing, we believe the data are ofsufficient fidelity to model. For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions. We looked\nat the government webpages from each country as well as their official public health\ndivision/information webpages to identify the latest advice/laws being issued by the government and\npublic health authorities. We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely).", "We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely). In the case of Denmark\nand Sweden, we allowed partial school closures of only secondary schools. The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards).", "The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards). Case-based measures: This intervention comprises strong recommendations or laws to the general\npublic and primary care about self—isolation when showing COVID-19-like symptoms. These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated.", "These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated. Our definition is restricted to nationwide government advice to all individuals (e.g. UK) or to all primary\ncare and excludes regional only advice. These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China.", "These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China. Public events banned: This refers to banning all public events of more than 100 participants such as\nsports events. Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact.", "Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact. The dates used are those when social distancing has officially been\nrecommended by the government; the advice may include maintaining a recommended physical\ndistance from others. Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown.", "Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown. As an\noverall definition, we consider regulations/legislations regarding strict face-to-face social interaction:\nincluding the banning of any non-essential public gatherings, closure of educational and\n\npublic/cultural institutions, ordering people to stay home apart from exercise and essential tasks. We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g.", "We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g. France). The dates used are the effective dates when these legislations\nhave been implemented. We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented.", "We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented. First intervention: As Figure 1 shows, European governments have escalated interventions rapidly,\nand in some examples (Norway/Denmark) have implemented these interventions all on a single day. Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19.", "Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19. A full list of the timing of these interventions and the sources we have used can be found in Appendix\n8.6. 6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2).", "6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2). Replication\ncode is available at \n\nWe fit our model to observed deaths according to ECDC data from 11 European countries. The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix).", "The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix). Given these distributions and ratios, modelled deaths are a function of\nthe number of infections. The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number.", "The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number. Finally, the time-varying reproduction number is a\nfunction of the initial reproduction number before interventions and the effect sizes from\ninterventions. Figure 5: Summary of model components.", "Figure 5: Summary of model components. Following the hierarchy from bottom to top gives us a full framework to see how interventions affect\ninfections, which can result in deaths. We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible.", "We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible. From bottom to top in Figure 5, there is an\nimplicit lag in time that means the effect of very recent interventions manifest weakly in current\ndeaths (and get stronger as time progresses). To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set.", "To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set. Our\nmodel jointly estimates the effect sizes of interventions. We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4).", "We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4). 7 Acknowledgements\n\nInitial research on covariates in Appendix 8.6 was crowdsourced; we thank a number of people\nacross the world for help with this. This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel.", "This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel. 8 Appendix: Model Specifics, Validation and Sensitivity Analysis\n8.1 Death model\n\nWe observe daily deaths Dam for days t E 1, ...,n and countries m E 1, ...,p. These daily deaths are\nmodelled using a positive real-Valued function dam = E(Dam) that represents the expected number\nof deaths attributed to COVID-19. Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days.", "Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days. At the beginning of the epidemic, the observed deaths in a country can be dominated by deaths that\nresult from infection that are not locally acquired. To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model.", "To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model. To mechanistically link ourfunction for deaths to infected cases, we use a previously estimated COVID-\n19 infection-fatality-ratio ifr (probability of death given infection)9 together with a distribution oftimes\nfrom infection to death TE. The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups.", "The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups. To better match estimates of attack rates by age\ngenerated using more detailed information on country and age-specific mixing patterns, we scale\nthese estimates (the unadjusted ifr, referred to here as ifr’) in the following way as in previous work.4\nLet Ca be the number of infections generated in age-group a, Na the underlying size of the population\nin that age group and AR“ 2 Ca/Na the age-group-specific attack rate. The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing.", "The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing. This age-group was chosen as the\nreference as it had the lowest predicted level of underreporting in previous analyses of data from the\nChinese epidemic“. We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates.", "We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates. Using estimated epidemiological information from previous studies,“'11 we assume TE to be the sum of\ntwo independent random times: the incubation period (infection to onset of symptoms or infection-\nto-onset) distribution and the time between onset of symptoms and death (onset-to-death). The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86.", "The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86. The onset-to-death distribution is also Gamma distributed with a mean of 18.8 days and a\ncoefficient of va riation 0.45. ifrm is population averaged over the age structure of a given country. The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio.", "The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio. Figure 6: Left, infection-to-death distribution (mean 23.9 days). Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left.", "Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left. Using the probability of death distribution, the expected number of deaths dam, on a given day t, for\ncountry, m, is given by the following discrete sum:\n\n\nThe number of deaths today is the sum of the past infections weighted by their probability of death,\nwhere the probability of death depends on the number of days since infection. 8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process.", "8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process. This approach\nhas been used in numerous previous studies13'16 and has a strong theoretical basis in stochastic\nindividual-based counting processes such as Hawkes process and the Bellman-Harris process.”18 The\nrenewal model is related to the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, except the renewal is not\nexpressed in differential form. To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62).", "To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62). The serial interval distribution is shown below in Figure 7 and is assumed to be the same for all\ncountries. Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days.", "Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days. Given the serial interval distribution, the number of infections Eamon a given day t, and country, m,\nis given by the following discrete convolution function:\n\n_ t—1\nCam — Ram ZT=0 Cr,mgt—‘r r\nwhere, similarto the probability ofdeath function, the daily serial interval is discretized by\n\nfs+0.5\n\n1.5\ngs = T=s—0.Sg(T)dT fors = 2,3, and 91 = fT=Og(T)dT. Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution.", "Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution. This weighting is then scaled by the country-specific time-Varying\nreproduction number, Ram, that models the average number of secondary infections at a given time. The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times.", "The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times. We included 6 interventions, one of which is constructed\nfrom the other 5 interventions, which are timings of school and university closures (k=l), self—isolating\nif ill (k=2), banning of public events (k=3), any government intervention in place (k=4), implementing\na partial or complete lockdown (k=5) and encouraging social distancing and isolation (k=6). We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise.", "We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise. The covariate ”any government intervention” (k=4) indicates\nif any of the other 5 interventions are in effect,i.e.14’t’m equals 1 at time t if any of the interventions\nk E 1,2,3,4,5 are in effect in country m at time t and equals 0 otherwise. Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention.", "Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention. The effect of each\nintervention is assumed to be multiplicative. Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential.", "Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential. The impact of each intervention on\n\nRam is characterised by a set of parameters 0(1, ...,OL6, with independent prior distributions chosen\nto be\n\nock ~ Gamma(. 5,1).", "5,1). The impacts ock are shared between all m countries and therefore they are informed by all available\ndata. The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information.", "The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information. We assume that seeding of new infections begins 30 days before the day after a country has\ncumulatively observed 10 deaths. From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03).", "From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03). These seed\ninfections are inferred in our Bayesian posterior distribution. We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model.", "We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model. Fitting was done\nin the probabilistic programming language Stan,19 using an adaptive Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC)\nsampler. We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples.", "We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples. Posterior convergence was assessed using the Rhat statistic and by\ndiagnosing divergent transitions of the HMC sampler. Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below).", "Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below). 8.3 Validation\n\nWe validate accuracy of point estimates of our model using cross-Validation. In our cross-validation\nscheme, we leave out 3 days of known death data (non-cumulative) and fit our model. We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days.", "We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days. We present the individual forecasts for each day, as\nwell as the average forecast for those three days. The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8.", "The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8. Figure 8: Cross-Validation results for 3-day and 3-day aggregatedforecasts\n\nFigure 8 provides strong empirical justification for our model specification and mechanism. Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible.", "Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible. Along with from point estimates we all evaluate our posterior credible intervals using the Rhat\nstatistic. The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution).", "The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution). Figure 9 shows the Rhat\nstatistics for all of our parameters\n\n\nFigure 9: Rhat statistics - values close to 1 indicate MCMC convergence. Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged.", "Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged. In fitting we also ensured that the MCMC sampler\nexperienced no divergent transitions - suggesting non pathological posterior topologies. 8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt.", "8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt. A conclusion of this report is the prediction of a slowing of Rt in response to major interventions. To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale.", "To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale. On this scale a line which curves below a\nlinear trend is indicative of slowing in the growth of the epidemic. Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK.", "Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK. They show this slowing down in the daily number of deaths. Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic.", "Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic. We investigated the sensitivity of our estimates of starting and final Rt to our assumed serial interval\ndistribution. For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days.", "For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days. In Figure 13, we show our estimates of R0, the starting reproduction number before interventions, for\neach of these scenarios. The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings.", "The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings. However, as expected, the scale of Rt=0 is considerably affected by this change — a longer serial\ninterval results in a higher estimated Rt=0. This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0.", "This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0. Additionally, in Figure 14, we show our estimates of Rt at the most recent model time point, again for\neach ofthese scenarios. The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping.", "The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping. Figure 13: Initial reproduction number R0 for different serial interval (SI) distributions (means\nbetween 5 and 8 days). We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. Figure 14: Rt on 28 March 2020 estimated for all countries, with serial interval (SI) distribution means\nbetween 5 and 8 days. We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. 8.4.3 Uninformative prior sensitivity on or\n\nWe ran our model using implausible uninformative prior distributions on the intervention effects,\nallowing the effect of an intervention to increase or decrease Rt. To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4).", "To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4). In this\nseries of univariate analyses, we find (Figure 15) that all effects on their own serve to decrease Rt. This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis.", "This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis. Lockdown has a very large effect, most likely due to the fact that it occurs after other\ninterventions in our dataset. The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers.", "The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers. Figure 15: Effects of different interventions when used as the only covariate in the model. 8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution.", "8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution. We fit a model with a Gaussian\nprocess prior distribution to data from Italy where there is the largest signal in death data. We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data.", "We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data. The correspondence of a completely nonparametric function and our\npiecewise constant function suggests a suitable parametric specification of Rt. Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK).", "Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK). To ensure that we are not leveraging too much\ninformation from any one country we perform a ”leave one country out” sensitivity analysis, where\nwe rerun the model without a different country each time. Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain.", "Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain. In general, for all countries, we observed no significant\ndependence on any one country. Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model.", "Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model. See the\n\n\nFigure 17: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Spain for fitting the model. See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots.", "See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots. 8.4.6 Starting reproduction numbers vs theoretical predictions\n\nTo validate our starting reproduction numbers, we compare our fitted values to those theoretically\nexpected from a simpler model assuming exponential growth rate, and a serial interval distribution\nmean. We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model.", "We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model. As shown in Figure 18 there is large\ncorrespondence between our estimated starting reproduction number and the basic reproduction\nnumber implied by the growth rate r.\n\nR0 (red) vs R(FO) (black)\n\nFigure 18: Our estimated R0 (black) versus theoretically derived Ru(red) from a log-linear\nregression fit. 8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future.", "8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. DOI: \n\nPage 28 of 35\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\n8.6 Data sources and Timeline of Interventions\n\nFigure 1 and Table 3 display the interventions by the 11 countries in our study and the dates these\ninterventions became effective. Table 3: Timeline of Interventions.", "Table 3: Timeline of Interventions. Country Type Event Date effective\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.20 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of gatherings of more than 5 people.21 10/3/2020\nBanning all access to public spaces and gatherings\nLockdown of more than 5 people. Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys.", "Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys. Going outdoors only\nordered with household members or 1 friend.24 18/3/2020\nPublic transport recommended only for essential\nSocial distancing journeys, work from home encouraged, all public\nencouraged places e.g. restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport.", "restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport. All cultural\nSocial distancing institutions shut and recommend keeping\nencouraged appropriate distance.28 13/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nDenmark measures cough or fever.29 12/3/2020\n\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.30 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Bans of events >100 people.31 13/3/2020\nLockdown Everybody has to stay at home. Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people.", "Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people. Otherwise\nbanned regional restrictions only until lockdown.34 22/3/2020\nLockdown Gatherings of > 2 people banned, 1.5 m\nordered distance.35 22/3/2020\nSocial distancing Avoid social interaction wherever possible\nencouraged recommended by Merkel.36 12/3/2020\nAdvice for everyone experiencing symptoms to\nCase-based contact a health care agency to get tested and\nGermany measures then self—isolate.37 6/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.38 5/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans all public events.39 9/3/2020\nLockdown The government closes all public places. People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions.", "People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions. Including childcare\nordered facilities and all schools.42 13/3/2020\nPublic events The Directorate of Health bans all non-necessary\nbanned social contact.42 12/3/2020\nLockdown Only people living together are allowed outside\nordered together. Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred.", "Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred. NA\nPeople even with mild symptoms are told to limit\nSocial distancing social contact, encouragement to work from\nencouraged home.50 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSweden measures fever symptoms.51 10/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered No in person teaching until 4th of April.52 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >100 people.52 13/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Gatherings of more than 5 people are banned.53 2020-03-20\nAdvice on keeping distance. All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure.", "All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure. Childminders,\nSchool closure nurseries and sixth forms are told to follow the\nordered guidance.56 21/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Implemented with lockdown.57 24/3/2020\nGatherings of more than 2 people not from the\nLockdown same household are banned and police\nordered enforceable.57 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice to avoid pubs, clubs, theatres and other\nencouraged public institutions.58 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nUK measures cough or fever symptoms.59 12/3/2020\n\n\n9 References\n\n1. Li, R. et al.", "Li, R. et al. Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel\ncoronavirus (SARS-CoV2). Science (2020) .1126/science.abb3221. 2. Zhang, J. et al. Patterns of human social contact and contact with animals in Shanghai, China. 5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. Hong Kong: coronavirus cases.", "5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. Hong Kong: coronavirus cases. rldometers.info/co ronavirus/country/china-hong-kong-sar/. 4. Ferguson, N. et al. Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19\nmortality and healthcare demand (Report 9). disease-analysis/news--wuhan-coronavirus/. 5. Cereda, D. et al.", "disease-analysis/news--wuhan-coronavirus/. 5. Cereda, D. et al. The early phase of the COVID-19 outbreak in Lombardy, Italy. arXiv (2020). 6. Zhao, A. J. et al. Title: Antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2 in patients of novel coronavirus\ndisease 2019 Brief Title : Antibody responses in COVID-19 patients.", "Title: Antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2 in patients of novel coronavirus\ndisease 2019 Brief Title : Antibody responses in COVID-19 patients. (2020). 7. Jombart, T. et al. Inferring the number of COVID-19 cases from recently reported deaths. medRXiV 2020.03.10.20033761(2020).1101/2020.03.10.20033761. 8. Zhang, J. et al.", "medRXiV 2020.03.10.20033761(2020).1101/2020.03.10.20033761. 8. 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France bans gatherings of more than 100 people as coronavirus death toll rises -\nThe Local.", "France bans gatherings of more than 100 people as coronavirus death toll rises -\nThe Local. The Local \nto-fight-coronavirus-pandemic (2020). 32. Henley, Jon; Willsher, Kim; Kassam, A. Coronavirus: France imposes lockdown as EU calls for\n30-day travel ban. The Guardian \nspain-takes-over-private-healthcare-amid-more-european-lockdowns (2020). 33. Wikipedia.", "The Guardian \nspain-takes-over-private-healthcare-amid-more-european-lockdowns (2020). 33. Wikipedia. 2020 coronavirus pandemic in Germany. Wikimedia Foundation\n\n\n34. BMI. Coronavirus: Fragen und Antworten. Bundesministerium des Innern,fur Bau und Heimat\n\nmen/bevoelkerungsschutz/coronavirus/coronavirus-faqs.htmI#doc13738352bodyText7. 35. BBC News. Coronavirus: Germany tightens curbs and bans meetings of more than two.", "BBC News. Coronavirus: Germany tightens curbs and bans meetings of more than two. BBC\nNews (2020). 36. Bundesregierung. Kanzlerin trifft Regierungschefs der Lander Sozialkontakte vermeiden,\nAusbreitung verlangsamen. 1730186(2020)\n\n37. Robert Koch Institut. Antworten auf haufig gestellte Fragen zum Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2.", "Robert Koch Institut. Antworten auf haufig gestellte Fragen zum Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2. Robert Koch Institut\n\nAQ_Liste.html (2020). 38. Ministero della Salute. Governo annuncia sospensione dell’attivita didattica dal 5 a|15 marzo. Ministero della Salute\n\nliano&menu=multimedia&p=video&id=2052 (2020). 39. CNN.", "39. CNN. Italy prohibits travel and cancels all public events in its northern region. CNN\n\n(2020). 40. Attualita. Coronavirus: stop a pub, cinema, teatro e discoteche anche a Roma. Ecco cosa\nprevede il nuovo decreto. Roma Today \nteatri-locali-chiusi-nuovo-decreto.html (2020). 41. Gazzetta Ufficiale.", "Roma Today \nteatri-locali-chiusi-nuovo-decreto.html (2020). 41. Gazzetta Ufficiale. DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEl MINISTRI. Gazzetta Ufflclale\n (2020). 42. Helsedirektoratet. The Norwegian Directorate of Health has issued a decision to close schools\nand other educational institutions. Helsedirektoratet \nnorwegian-directorate-of—health-has-issued-a-decision-to-close-schools-and-other-educationa|-\ninstitutions (2020). 43.", "Helsedirektoratet \nnorwegian-directorate-of—health-has-issued-a-decision-to-close-schools-and-other-educationa|-\ninstitutions (2020). 43. Krostensen, Mette; Hellem-Hansen, Viktoria L.; Tandstad, B. Folkehelseinstituttet mener\n23.000 kan vaere smittet. NRK \nvaere-smittet-1.14958149 (2020). 44. Norweigen Government. The Government is establishing clear quarantine and isolation rules. regjeringen.no \nquarantine-and-isolation-rules/id2693647/ (2020). 45. Wikipedia.", "regjeringen.no \nquarantine-and-isolation-rules/id2693647/ (2020). 45. Wikipedia. 2020 coronavirus pandemic in Spain. Wikimedia Foundation\n\n\n46. Gabinete de Prensa. El Gobierno anuncia nuevas medidas para evitar la extension del nuevo\ncoronavirus COVID-19. Gobierno de Espana\n (2020). 47. Gabinete de Prensa.", "Gobierno de Espana\n (2020). 47. Gabinete de Prensa. El Consejo Interterritorial del SNS acuerda medidas concretas para zonas\ncon transmision comunitaria significativa de coronavirus. Gobierno de Espana\n (2020). 48. Folkhalsomyndigheten. Larosaten och gymnasieskolor uppmanas nu att bedriva\ndistansundervisning. Folkhdlsomyndigheten \npress/nyhetsarkiv/2020/mars/larosaten-och-gymnasieskolor-uppmanas-nu-att-bedriva-\ndistansundervisning(2020). 49. The Local.", "Folkhdlsomyndigheten \npress/nyhetsarkiv/2020/mars/larosaten-och-gymnasieskolor-uppmanas-nu-att-bedriva-\ndistansundervisning(2020). 49. The Local. Sweden bans large events to halt coronavirus spread. The Local\n (2020). 50. Radosevich. Stockholmers urged to work from home as COVID-19 community spread\nconfirmed. Sveriges Radio\n\n\n51. Folkhalsomyndigheten. 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Bundesamt fur Gesundheit BAG.", "Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft\n\n(20201\n\n55. Bundesamt fur Gesundheit BAG. Neue Hygiene- und Verhaltensregeln zum Schutz gegen das\nneue Coronavirus. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft \nbag/a ktuell/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-78304.html (2020). 56. UK Government, D. for E. Schools, colleges and early years settings to close. UK Government\n (2020). 57. UK Government.", "UK Government\n (2020). 57. UK Government. PM address to the nation on coronavirus: 23 March 2020. UK Government\n\n2020(20201\n\n58. Boycott-Owen, Mason; Bowman, Verity; Kelly-Linden, Jordan; Gartner, A. G. H. S. T.\nCoronavirus: Boris Johnson puts UK in lockdown as death tolls reaches 55.", "Boycott-Owen, Mason; Bowman, Verity; Kelly-Linden, Jordan; Gartner, A. G. H. S. T.\nCoronavirus: Boris Johnson puts UK in lockdown as death tolls reaches 55. The Telegraph\n\nupdate-covid-19-death-toll-cases/ (2020). 59. BBC News. 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[ "Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non-\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in 11 European countries\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nSeth Flaxmani Swapnil Mishra*, Axel Gandy*, H JulietteT Unwin, Helen Coupland, Thomas A Mellan, Harrison\nZhu, Tresnia Berah, Jeffrey W Eaton, Pablo N P Guzman, Nora Schmit, Lucia Cilloni, Kylie E C Ainslie, Marc\nBaguelin, Isobel Blake, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Olivia Boyd, Lorenzo Cattarino, Constanze Ciavarella, Laura Cooper,\nZulma Cucunuba’, Gina Cuomo—Dannenburg, Amy Dighe, Bimandra Djaafara, Ilaria Dorigatti, Sabine van Elsland,\nRich FitzJohn, Han Fu, Katy Gaythorpe, Lily Geidelberg, Nicholas Grassly, Wi|| Green, Timothy Hallett, Arran\nHamlet, Wes Hinsley, Ben Jeffrey, David Jorgensen, Edward Knock, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati—Gilani, Pierre\nNouvellet, Kris Parag, Igor Siveroni, Hayley Thompson, Robert Verity, Erik Volz, Caroline Walters, Haowei Wang,\nYuanrong Wang, Oliver Watson, Peter Winskill, Xiaoyue Xi, Charles Whittaker, Patrick GT Walker, Azra Ghani,\nChristl A. Donnelly, Steven Riley, Lucy C Okell, Michaela A C Vollmer, NeilM.Ferguson1and Samir Bhatt*1\n\nDepartment of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London\n\nDepartment of Mathematics, Imperial College London\n\nWHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling\n\nMRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis\n\nAbdul LatifJameeI Institute for Disease and Emergency Analytics, Imperial College London\nDepartment of Statistics, University of Oxford\n\n*Contributed equally 1Correspondence: nei|[email protected], [email protected]\n\nSummary\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) and its spread outside of China, Europe\nis now experiencing large epidemics. In response, many European countries have implemented\nunprecedented non-pharmaceutical interventions including case isolation, the closure of schools and\nuniversities, banning of mass gatherings and/or public events, and most recently, widescale social\ndistancing including local and national Iockdowns. In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries.", "In this report, we use a semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical model to attempt to infer the impact\nof these interventions across 11 European countries. Our methods assume that changes in the\nreproductive number— a measure of transmission - are an immediate response to these interventions\nbeing implemented rather than broader gradual changes in behaviour. Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death.", "Our model estimates these\nchanges by calculating backwards from the deaths observed over time to estimate transmission that\noccurred several weeks prior, allowing for the time lag between infection and death. One of the key assumptions of the model is that each intervention has the same effect on the\nreproduction number across countries and over time. This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects.", "This allows us to leverage a greater amount of\ndata across Europe to estimate these effects. It also means that our results are driven strongly by the\ndata from countries with more advanced epidemics, and earlier interventions, such as Italy and Spain. We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier.", "We find that the slowing growth in daily reported deaths in Italy is consistent with a significant impact\nof interventions implemented several weeks earlier. In Italy, we estimate that the effective\nreproduction number, Rt, dropped to close to 1 around the time of Iockdown (11th March), although\nwith a high level of uncertainty. Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number.", "Overall, we estimate that countries have managed to reduce their reproduction number. Our\nestimates have wide credible intervals and contain 1 for countries that have implemented a||\ninterventions considered in our analysis. This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value.", "This means that the reproduction number may be above or\nbelow this value. With current interventions remaining in place to at least the end of March, we\nestimate that interventions across all 11 countries will have averted 59,000 deaths up to 31 March\n[95% credible interval 21,000-120,000]. Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels.", "Many more deaths will be averted through ensuring that\ninterventions remain in place until transmission drops to low levels. We estimate that, across all 11\ncountries between 7 and 43 million individuals have been infected with SARS-CoV-Z up to 28th March,\nrepresenting between 1.88% and 11.43% ofthe population. The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics.", "The proportion of the population infected\n\nto date — the attack rate - is estimated to be highest in Spain followed by Italy and lowest in Germany\nand Norway, reflecting the relative stages of the epidemics. Given the lag of 2-3 weeks between when transmission changes occur and when their impact can be\nobserved in trends in mortality, for most of the countries considered here it remains too early to be\ncertain that recent interventions have been effective. If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly.", "If interventions in countries at earlier stages of\ntheir epidemic, such as Germany or the UK, are more or less effective than they were in the countries\nwith advanced epidemics, on which our estimates are largely based, or if interventions have improved\nor worsened over time, then our estimates of the reproduction number and deaths averted would\nchange accordingly. It is therefore critical that the current interventions remain in place and trends in\ncases and deaths are closely monitored in the coming days and weeks to provide reassurance that\ntransmission of SARS-Cov-Z is slowing. SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/.", "SUGGESTED CITATION\n\nSeth Flaxman, Swapnil Mishra, Axel Gandy et 0/. Estimating the number of infections and the impact of non—\npharmaceutical interventions on COVID—19 in 11 European countries. Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe.", "Imperial College London (2020), doi:\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nFollowing the emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-Z) in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and\nits global spread, large epidemics of the disease, caused by the virus designated COVID-19, have\nemerged in Europe. In response to the rising numbers of cases and deaths, and to maintain the\ncapacity of health systems to treat as many severe cases as possible, European countries, like those in\nother continents, have implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to control their\nepidemics. These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned.", "These large-scale non-pharmaceutical interventions vary between countries but include\nsocial distancing (such as banning large gatherings and advising individuals not to socialize outside\ntheir households), border closures, school closures, measures to isolate symptomatic individuals and\ntheir contacts, and large-scale lockdowns of populations with all but essential internal travel banned. Understanding firstly, whether these interventions are having the desired impact of controlling the\nepidemic and secondly, which interventions are necessary to maintain control, is critical given their\nlarge economic and social costs. The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection.", "The key aim ofthese interventions is to reduce the effective reproduction number, Rt, ofthe infection,\na fundamental epidemiological quantity representing the average number of infections, at time t, per\ninfected case over the course of their infection. Ith is maintained at less than 1, the incidence of new\ninfections decreases, ultimately resulting in control of the epidemic. If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity.", "If Rt is greater than 1, then\ninfections will increase (dependent on how much greater than 1 the reproduction number is) until the\nepidemic peaks and eventually declines due to acquisition of herd immunity. In China, strict movement restrictions and other measures including case isolation and quarantine\nbegan to be introduced from 23rd January, which achieved a downward trend in the number of\nconfirmed new cases during February, resulting in zero new confirmed indigenous cases in Wuhan by\nMarch 19th. Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement.", "Studies have estimated how Rt changed during this time in different areas ofChina from\naround 2-4 during the uncontrolled epidemic down to below 1, with an estimated 7-9 fold decrease\nin the number of daily contacts per person.1'2 Control measures such as social distancing, intensive\ntesting, and contact tracing in other countries such as Singapore and South Korea have successfully\nreduced case incidence in recent weeks, although there is a riskthe virus will spread again once control\nmeasures are relaxed.3'4\n\nThe epidemic began slightly laterin Europe, from January or later in different regions.5 Countries have\nimplemented different combinations of control measures and the level of adherence to government\nrecommendations on social distancing is likely to vary between countries, in part due to different\nlevels of enforcement. Estimating reproduction numbers for SARS-CoV-Z presents challenges due to the high proportion of\ninfections not detected by health systems”7 and regular changes in testing policies, resulting in\ndifferent proportions of infections being detected over time and between countries. Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g.", "Most countries\nso far only have the capacity to test a small proportion of suspected cases and tests are reserved for\nseverely ill patients or for high-risk groups (e.g. contacts of cases). Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends.", "Looking at case data, therefore,\ngives a systematically biased view of trends. An alternative way to estimate the course of the epidemic is to back-calculate infections from\nobserved deaths. Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed.", "Reported deaths are likely to be more reliable, although the early focus of most\nsurveillance systems on cases with reported travel histories to China may mean that some early deaths\nwill have been missed. Whilst the recent trends in deaths will therefore be informative, there is a time\nlag in observing the effect of interventions on deaths since there is a 2-3-week period between\ninfection, onset of symptoms and outcome. In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt).", "In this report, we fit a novel Bayesian mechanistic model of the infection cycle to observed deaths in\n11 European countries, inferring plausible upper and lower bounds (Bayesian credible intervals) of the\ntotal populations infected (attack rates), case detection probabilities, and the reproduction number\nover time (Rt). We fit the model jointly to COVID-19 data from all these countries to assess whether\nthere is evidence that interventions have so far been successful at reducing Rt below 1, with the strong\nassumption that particular interventions are achieving a similar impact in different countries and that\nthe efficacy of those interventions remains constant over time. The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts.", "The model is informed more strongly\nby countries with larger numbers of deaths and which implemented interventions earlier, therefore\nestimates of recent Rt in countries with more recent interventions are contingent on similar\nintervention impacts. Data in the coming weeks will enable estimation of country-specific Rt with\ngreater precision. Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions.", "Model and data details are presented in the appendix, validation and sensitivity are also presented in\nthe appendix, and general limitations presented below in the conclusions. 2 Results\n\nThe timing of interventions should be taken in the context of when an individual country’s epidemic\nstarted to grow along with the speed with which control measures were implemented. Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1).", "Italy was the\nfirst to begin intervention measures, and other countries followed soon afterwards (Figure 1). Most\ninterventions began around 12th-14th March. We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions.", "We analyzed data on deaths up to 28th March, giving a\n2-3-week window over which to estimate the effect of interventions. Currently, most countries in our\nstudy have implemented all major non-pharmaceutical interventions. For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12).", "For each country, we model the number of infections, the number of deaths, and Rt, the effective\nreproduction number over time, with Rt changing only when an intervention is introduced (Figure 2-\n12). Rt is the average number of secondary infections per infected individual, assuming that the\ninterventions that are in place at time t stay in place throughout their entire infectious period. Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place.", "Every\ncountry has its own individual starting reproduction number Rt before interventions take place. Specific interventions are assumed to have the same relative impact on Rt in each country when they\nwere introduced there and are informed by mortality data across all countries. Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis.", "Figure l: Intervention timings for the 11 European countries included in the analysis. For further\ndetails see Appendix 8.6. 2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity.", "2.1 Estimated true numbers of infections and current attack rates\n\nIn all countries, we estimate there are orders of magnitude fewer infections detected (Figure 2) than\ntrue infections, mostly likely due to mild and asymptomatic infections as well as limited testing\ncapacity. In Italy, our results suggest that, cumulatively, 5.9 [1.9-15.2] million people have been\ninfected as of March 28th, giving an attack rate of 9.8% [3.2%-25%] of the population (Table 1). Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date.", "Spain\nhas recently seen a large increase in the number of deaths, and given its smaller population, our model\nestimates that a higher proportion of the population, 15.0% (7.0 [18-19] million people) have been\ninfected to date. Germany is estimated to have one of the lowest attack rates at 0.7% with 600,000\n[240,000-1,500,000] people infected. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020.", "Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable l: Posterior model estimates of percentage of total population infected as of 28th March 2020. Country % of total population infected (mean [95% credible intervall)\nAustria 1.1% [0.36%-3.1%]\nBelgium 3.7% [1.3%-9.7%]\nDenmark 1.1% [0.40%-3.1%]\nFrance 3.0% [1.1%-7.4%]\nGermany 0.72% [0.28%-1.8%]\nItaly 9.8% [3.2%-26%]\nNorway 0.41% [0.09%-1.2%]\nSpain 15% [3.7%-41%]\nSweden 3.1% [0.85%-8.4%]\nSwitzerland 3.2% [1.3%-7.6%]\nUnited Kingdom 2.7% [1.2%-5.4%]\n\n2.2 Reproduction numbers and impact of interventions\n\nAveraged across all countries, we estimate initial reproduction numbers of around 3.87 [3.01-4.66],\nwhich is in line with other estimates.1'8 These estimates are informed by our choice of serial interval\ndistribution and the initial growth rate of observed deaths. A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6).", "A shorter assumed serial interval results in\nlower starting reproduction numbers (Appendix 8.4.2, Appendix 8.4.6). The initial reproduction\nnumbers are also uncertain due to (a) importation being the dominant source of new infections early\nin the epidemic, rather than local transmission (b) possible under-ascertainment in deaths particularly\nbefore testing became widespread. We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "We estimate large changes in Rt in response to the combined non-pharmaceutical interventions. Our\nresults, which are driven largely by countries with advanced epidemics and larger numbers of deaths\n(e.g. Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt.", "Italy, Spain), suggest that these interventions have together had a substantial impact on\ntransmission, as measured by changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt. Across all countries\nwe find current estimates of Rt to range from a posterior mean of 0.97 [0.14-2.14] for Norway to a\nposterior mean of2.64 [1.40-4.18] for Sweden, with an average of 1.43 across the 11 country posterior\nmeans, a 64% reduction compared to the pre-intervention values. We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times.", "We note that these estimates are\ncontingent on intervention impact being the same in different countries and at different times. In all\ncountries but Sweden, under the same assumptions, we estimate that the current reproduction\nnumber includes 1 in the uncertainty range. The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar.", "The estimated reproduction number for Sweden is higher,\nnot because the mortality trends are significantly different from any other country, but as an artefact\nof our model, which assumes a smaller reduction in Rt because no full lockdown has been ordered so\nfar. Overall, we cannot yet conclude whether current interventions are sufficient to drive Rt below 1\n(posterior probability of being less than 1.0 is 44% on average across the countries). We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time.", "We are also\nunable to conclude whether interventions may be different between countries or over time. There remains a high level of uncertainty in these estimates. It is too early to detect substantial\nintervention impact in many countries at earlier stages of their epidemic (e.g. Germany, UK, Norway).", "Germany, UK, Norway). Many interventions have occurred only recently, and their effects have not yet been fully observed\ndue to the time lag between infection and death. This uncertainty will reduce as more data become\navailable. For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests).", "For all countries, our model fits observed deaths data well (Bayesian goodness of fit tests). We also found that our model can reliably forecast daily deaths 3 days into the future, by withholding\nthe latest 3 days of data and comparing model predictions to observed deaths (Appendix 8.3). The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4).", "The close spacing of interventions in time made it statistically impossible to determine which had the\ngreatest effect (Figure 1, Figure 4). However, when doing a sensitivity analysis (Appendix 8.4.3) with\nuninformative prior distributions (where interventions can increase deaths) we find similar impact of\n\nImperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\ninterventions, which shows that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\n\nmain analysis. Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt.", "Figure 2: Country-level estimates of infections, deaths and Rt. Left: daily number of infections, brown\nbars are reported infections, blue bands are predicted infections, dark blue 50% credible interval (CI),\nlight blue 95% CI. The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention.", "The number of daily infections estimated by our model drops immediately after an\nintervention, as we assume that all infected people become immediately less infectious through the\nintervention. Afterwards, if the Rt is above 1, the number of infections will starts growing again. Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot.", "Middle: daily number of deaths, brown bars are reported deaths, blue bands are predicted deaths, CI\nas in left plot. Right: time-varying reproduction number Rt, dark green 50% CI, light green 95% CI. Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred.", "Icons are interventions shown at the time they occurred. Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\nTable 2: Totalforecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to 31 March in our model\nand in a counterfactual model (assuming no intervention had taken place). Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions.", "Estimated averted deaths\nover this time period as a result of the interventions. Numbers in brackets are 95% credible intervals. 2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e.", "2.3 Estimated impact of interventions on deaths\n\nTable 2 shows total forecasted deaths since the beginning of the epidemic up to and including 31\nMarch under ourfitted model and under the counterfactual model, which predicts what would have\nhappened if no interventions were implemented (and R, = R0 i.e. the initial reproduction number\nestimated before interventions). Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time.", "Again, the assumption in these predictions is that intervention\nimpact is the same across countries and time. The model without interventions was unable to capture\nrecent trends in deaths in several countries, where the rate of increase had clearly slowed (Figure 3). Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C).", "Trends were confirmed statistically by Bayesian leave-one-out cross-validation and the widely\napplicable information criterion assessments —WA|C). By comparing the deaths predicted under the model with no interventions to the deaths predicted in\nour intervention model, we calculated the total deaths averted up to the end of March. We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions.", "We find that,\nacross 11 countries, since the beginning of the epidemic, 59,000 [21,000-120,000] deaths have been\naverted due to interventions. In Italy and Spain, where the epidemic is advanced, 38,000 [13,000-\n84,000] and 16,000 [5,400-35,000] deaths have been averted, respectively. Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted.", "Even in the UK, which is\nmuch earlier in its epidemic, we predict 370 [73-1,000] deaths have been averted. These numbers give only the deaths averted that would have occurred up to 31 March. lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher.", "lfwe were to\ninclude the deaths of currently infected individuals in both models, which might happen after 31\nMarch, then the deaths averted would be substantially higher. Figure 3: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for (a)\nItaly and (b) Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no interventions\ncounterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6.", "Other countries\nare shown in Appendix 8.6. 03/0 25% 50% 753% 100%\n(no effect on transmissibility) (ends transmissibility\nRelative % reduction in R.\n\nFigure 4: Our model includes five covariates for governmental interventions, adjusting for whether\nthe intervention was the first one undertaken by the government in response to COVID-19 (red) or\nwas subsequent to other interventions (green). Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals.", "Mean relative percentage reduction in Rt is shown\nwith 95% posterior credible intervals. If 100% reduction is achieved, Rt = 0 and there is no more\ntransmission of COVID-19. No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced.", "No effects are significantly different from any others, probably due to the\nfact that many interventions occurred on the same day or within days of each other as shown in\nFigure l.\n\n3 Discussion\n\nDuring this early phase of control measures against the novel coronavirus in Europe, we analyze trends\nin numbers of deaths to assess the extent to which transmission is being reduced. Representing the\nCOVlD-19 infection process using a semi-mechanistic, joint, Bayesian hierarchical model, we can\nreproduce trends observed in the data on deaths and can forecast accurately over short time horizons. We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported.", "We estimate that there have been many more infections than are currently reported. The high level\nof under-ascertainment of infections that we estimate here is likely due to the focus on testing in\nhospital settings rather than in the community. Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1).", "Despite this, only a small minority of individuals in\neach country have been infected, with an attack rate on average of 4.9% [l.9%-ll%] with considerable\nvariation between countries (Table 1). Our estimates imply that the populations in Europe are not\nclose to herd immunity (\"50-75% if R0 is 2-4). Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly.", "Further, with Rt values dropping substantially, the rate\nof acquisition of herd immunity will slow down rapidly. This implies that the virus will be able to spread\nrapidly should interventions be lifted. Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable.", "Such estimates of the attack rate to date urgently need to be\nvalidated by newly developed antibody tests in representative population surveys, once these become\navailable. We estimate that major non-pharmaceutical interventions have had a substantial impact on the time-\nvarying reproduction numbers in countries where there has been time to observe intervention effects\non trends in deaths (Italy, Spain). lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths.", "lfadherence in those countries has changed since that initial period,\nthen our forecast of future deaths will be affected accordingly: increasing adherence over time will\nhave resulted in fewer deaths and decreasing adherence in more deaths. Similarly, our estimates of\nthe impact ofinterventions in other countries should be viewed with caution if the same interventions\nhave achieved different levels of adherence than was initially the case in Italy and Spain. Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention.", "Due to the implementation of interventions in rapid succession in many countries, there are not\nenough data to estimate the individual effect size of each intervention, and we discourage attributing\n\nassociations to individual intervention. In some cases, such as Norway, where all interventions were\nimplemented at once, these individual effects are by definition unidentifiable. Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis).", "Despite this, while\nindividual impacts cannot be determined, their estimated joint impact is strongly empirically justified\n(see Appendix 8.4 for sensitivity analysis). While the growth in daily deaths has decreased, due to the\nlag between infections and deaths, continued rises in daily deaths are to be expected for some time. To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model.", "To understand the impact of interventions, we fit a counterfactual model without the interventions\nand compare this to the actual model. Consider Italy and the UK - two countries at very different stages\nin their epidemics. For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics.", "For the UK, where interventions are very recent, much of the intervention strength\nis borrowed from countries with older epidemics. The results suggest that interventions will have a\nlarge impact on infections and deaths despite counts of both rising. For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10).", "For Italy, where far more time has\npassed since the interventions have been implemented, it is clear that the model without\ninterventions does not fit well to the data, and cannot explain the sub-linear (on the logarithmic scale)\nreduction in deaths (see Figure 10). The counterfactual model for Italy suggests that despite mounting pressure on health systems,\ninterventions have averted a health care catastrophe where the number of new deaths would have\nbeen 3.7 times higher (38,000 deaths averted) than currently observed. Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March.", "Even in the UK, much earlier\nin its epidemic, the recent interventions are forecasted to avert 370 total deaths up to 31 of March. 4 Conclusion and Limitations\n\nModern understanding of infectious disease with a global publicized response has meant that\nnationwide interventions could be implemented with widespread adherence and support. Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics.", "Given\nobserved infection fatality ratios and the epidemiology of COVlD-19, major non-pharmaceutical\ninterventions have had a substantial impact in reducing transmission in countries with more advanced\nepidemics. It is too early to be sure whether similar reductions will be seen in countries at earlier\nstages of their epidemic. While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths.", "While we cannot determine which set of interventions have been most\nsuccessful, taken together, we can already see changes in the trends of new deaths. When forecasting\n3 days and looking over the whole epidemic the number of deaths averted is substantial. We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections.", "We note that\nsubstantial innovation is taking place, and new more effective interventions or refinements of current\ninterventions, alongside behavioral changes will further contribute to reductions in infections. We\ncannot say for certain that the current measures have controlled the epidemic in Europe; however, if\ncurrent trends continue, there is reason for optimism. Our approach is semi-mechanistic.", "Our approach is semi-mechanistic. We propose a plausible structure for the infection process and then\nestimate parameters empirically. However, many parameters had to be given strong prior\ndistributions or had to be fixed. For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies.", "For these assumptions, we have provided relevant citations to\nprevious studies. As more data become available and better estimates arise, we will update these in\nweekly reports. Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0.", "Our choice of serial interval distribution strongly influences the prior distribution for\nstarting R0. Our infection fatality ratio, and infection-to-onset-to-death distributions strongly\ninfluence the rate of death and hence the estimated number of true underlying cases. We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic.", "We also assume that the effect of interventions is the same in all countries, which may not be fully\nrealistic. This assumption implies that countries with early interventions and more deaths since these\ninterventions (e.g. Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g.", "Italy, Spain) strongly influence estimates of intervention impact in countries at\nearlier stages of their epidemic with fewer deaths (e.g. Germany, UK). We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6.", "We have tried to create consistent definitions of all interventions and document details of this in\nAppendix 8.6. However, invariably there will be differences from country to country in the strength of\ntheir intervention — for example, most countries have banned gatherings of more than 2 people when\nimplementing a lockdown, whereas in Sweden the government only banned gatherings of more than\n10 people. These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data.", "These differences can skew impacts in countries with very little data. We believe that our\nuncertainty to some degree can cover these differences, and as more data become available,\ncoefficients should become more reliable. However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime.", "However, despite these strong assumptions, there is sufficient signal in the data to estimate changes\nin R, (see the sensitivity analysis reported in Appendix 8.4.3) and this signal will stand to increase with\ntime. In our Bayesian hierarchical framework, we robustly quantify the uncertainty in our parameter\nestimates and posterior predictions. This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates.", "This can be seen in the very wide credible intervals in more recent\ndays, where little or no death data are available to inform the estimates. Furthermore, we predict\nintervention impact at country-level, but different trends may be in place in different parts of each\ncountry. For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country.", "For example, the epidemic in northern Italy was subject to controls earlier than the rest of\nthe country. 5 Data\n\nOur model utilizes daily real-time death data from the ECDC (European Centre of Disease Control),\nwhere we catalogue case data for 11 European countries currently experiencing the epidemic: Austria,\nBelgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United\nKingdom. The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19.", "The ECDC provides information on confirmed cases and deaths attributable to COVID-19. However, the case data are highly unrepresentative of the incidence of infections due to\nunderreporting as well as systematic and country-specific changes in testing. We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all.", "We, therefore, use only deaths attributable to COVID-19 in our model; we do not use the ECDC case\nestimates at all. While the observed deaths still have some degree of unreliability, again due to\nchanges in reporting and testing, we believe the data are ofsufficient fidelity to model. For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions.", "For population\ncounts, we use UNPOP age-stratified counts.10\n\nWe also catalogue data on the nature and type of major non-pharmaceutical interventions. We looked\nat the government webpages from each country as well as their official public health\ndivision/information webpages to identify the latest advice/laws being issued by the government and\npublic health authorities. We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely).", "We collected the following:\n\nSchool closure ordered: This intervention refers to nationwide extraordinary school closures which in\nmost cases refer to both primary and secondary schools closing (for most countries this also includes\nthe closure of otherforms of higher education or the advice to teach remotely). In the case of Denmark\nand Sweden, we allowed partial school closures of only secondary schools. The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards).", "The date of the school\nclosure is taken to be the effective date when the schools started to be closed (ifthis was on a Monday,\nthe date used was the one of the previous Saturdays as pupils and students effectively stayed at home\nfrom that date onwards). Case-based measures: This intervention comprises strong recommendations or laws to the general\npublic and primary care about self—isolation when showing COVID-19-like symptoms. These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated.", "These also\ninclude nationwide testing programs where individuals can be tested and subsequently self—isolated. Our definition is restricted to nationwide government advice to all individuals (e.g. UK) or to all primary\ncare and excludes regional only advice. These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China.", "These do not include containment phase interventions such\nas isolation if travelling back from an epidemic country such as China. Public events banned: This refers to banning all public events of more than 100 participants such as\nsports events. Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact.", "Social distancing encouraged: As one of the first interventions against the spread of the COVID-19\npandemic, many governments have published advice on social distancing including the\nrecommendation to work from home wherever possible, reducing use ofpublictransport and all other\nnon-essential contact. The dates used are those when social distancing has officially been\nrecommended by the government; the advice may include maintaining a recommended physical\ndistance from others. Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown.", "Lockdown decreed: There are several different scenarios that the media refers to as lockdown. As an\noverall definition, we consider regulations/legislations regarding strict face-to-face social interaction:\nincluding the banning of any non-essential public gatherings, closure of educational and\n\npublic/cultural institutions, ordering people to stay home apart from exercise and essential tasks. We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g.", "We\ninclude special cases where these are not explicitly mentioned on government websites but are\nenforced by the police (e.g. France). The dates used are the effective dates when these legislations\nhave been implemented. We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented.", "We note that lockdown encompasses other interventions previously\nimplemented. First intervention: As Figure 1 shows, European governments have escalated interventions rapidly,\nand in some examples (Norway/Denmark) have implemented these interventions all on a single day. Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19.", "Therefore, given the temporal autocorrelation inherent in government intervention, we include a\nbinary covariate for the first intervention, which can be interpreted as a government decision to take\nmajor action to control COVID-19. A full list of the timing of these interventions and the sources we have used can be found in Appendix\n8.6. 6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2).", "6 Methods Summary\n\nA Visual summary of our model is presented in Figure 5 (details in Appendix 8.1 and 8.2). Replication\ncode is available at \n\nWe fit our model to observed deaths according to ECDC data from 11 European countries. The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix).", "The\nmodelled deaths are informed by an infection-to-onset distribution (time from infection to the onset\nof symptoms), an onset-to-death distribution (time from the onset of symptoms to death), and the\npopulation-averaged infection fatality ratio (adjusted for the age structure and contact patterns of\neach country, see Appendix). Given these distributions and ratios, modelled deaths are a function of\nthe number of infections. The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number.", "The modelled number of infections is informed by the serial interval\ndistribution (the average time from infection of one person to the time at which they infect another)\nand the time-varying reproduction number. Finally, the time-varying reproduction number is a\nfunction of the initial reproduction number before interventions and the effect sizes from\ninterventions. Figure 5: Summary of model components.", "Figure 5: Summary of model components. Following the hierarchy from bottom to top gives us a full framework to see how interventions affect\ninfections, which can result in deaths. We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible.", "We use Bayesian inference to ensure our modelled deaths can\nreproduce the observed deaths as closely as possible. From bottom to top in Figure 5, there is an\nimplicit lag in time that means the effect of very recent interventions manifest weakly in current\ndeaths (and get stronger as time progresses). To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set.", "To maximise the ability to observe intervention impact\non deaths, we fit our model jointly for all 11 European countries, which results in a large data set. Our\nmodel jointly estimates the effect sizes of interventions. We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4).", "We have evaluated the effect ofour Bayesian\nprior distribution choices and evaluate our Bayesian posterior calibration to ensure our results are\nstatistically robust (Appendix 8.4). 7 Acknowledgements\n\nInitial research on covariates in Appendix 8.6 was crowdsourced; we thank a number of people\nacross the world for help with this. This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel.", "This work was supported by Centre funding from the UK Medical\nResearch Council under a concordat with the UK Department for International Development, the\nNIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Modelling Methodology and CommunityJameel. 8 Appendix: Model Specifics, Validation and Sensitivity Analysis\n8.1 Death model\n\nWe observe daily deaths Dam for days t E 1, ...,n and countries m E 1, ...,p. These daily deaths are\nmodelled using a positive real-Valued function dam = E(Dam) that represents the expected number\nof deaths attributed to COVID-19. Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days.", "Dam is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with\n\n\nThe expected number of deaths (1 in a given country on a given day is a function of the number of\ninfections C occurring in previous days. At the beginning of the epidemic, the observed deaths in a country can be dominated by deaths that\nresult from infection that are not locally acquired. To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model.", "To avoid biasing our model by this, we only include\nobserved deaths from the day after a country has cumulatively observed 10 deaths in our model. To mechanistically link ourfunction for deaths to infected cases, we use a previously estimated COVID-\n19 infection-fatality-ratio ifr (probability of death given infection)9 together with a distribution oftimes\nfrom infection to death TE. The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups.", "The ifr is derived from estimates presented in Verity et al11 which assumed\nhomogeneous attack rates across age-groups. To better match estimates of attack rates by age\ngenerated using more detailed information on country and age-specific mixing patterns, we scale\nthese estimates (the unadjusted ifr, referred to here as ifr’) in the following way as in previous work.4\nLet Ca be the number of infections generated in age-group a, Na the underlying size of the population\nin that age group and AR“ 2 Ca/Na the age-group-specific attack rate. The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing.", "The adjusted ifr is then given\n\nby: ifra = fififié, where AR50_59 is the predicted attack-rate in the 50-59 year age-group after\n\nincorporating country-specific patterns of contact and mixing. This age-group was chosen as the\nreference as it had the lowest predicted level of underreporting in previous analyses of data from the\nChinese epidemic“. We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates.", "We obtained country-specific estimates of attack rate by age, AR“, for the 11\nEuropean countries in our analysis from a previous study which incorporates information on contact\nbetween individuals of different ages in countries across Europe.12 We then obtained overall ifr\nestimates for each country adjusting for both demography and age-specific attack rates. Using estimated epidemiological information from previous studies,“'11 we assume TE to be the sum of\ntwo independent random times: the incubation period (infection to onset of symptoms or infection-\nto-onset) distribution and the time between onset of symptoms and death (onset-to-death). The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86.", "The\ninfection-to-onset distribution is Gamma distributed with mean 5.1 days and coefficient of variation\n0.86. The onset-to-death distribution is also Gamma distributed with a mean of 18.8 days and a\ncoefficient of va riation 0.45. ifrm is population averaged over the age structure of a given country. The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio.", "The\ninfection-to-death distribution is therefore given by:\n\num ~ ifrm ~ (Gamma(5.1,0.86) + Gamma(18.8,0.45))\n\nFigure 6 shows the infection-to-death distribution and the resulting survival function that integrates\nto the infection fatality ratio. Figure 6: Left, infection-to-death distribution (mean 23.9 days). Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left.", "Right, survival probability of infected\nindividuals per day given the infection fatality ratio (1%) and the infection-to-death distribution on\nthe left. Using the probability of death distribution, the expected number of deaths dam, on a given day t, for\ncountry, m, is given by the following discrete sum:\n\n\nThe number of deaths today is the sum of the past infections weighted by their probability of death,\nwhere the probability of death depends on the number of days since infection. 8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process.", "8.2 Infection model\n\nThe true number of infected individuals, C, is modelled using a discrete renewal process. This approach\nhas been used in numerous previous studies13'16 and has a strong theoretical basis in stochastic\nindividual-based counting processes such as Hawkes process and the Bellman-Harris process.”18 The\nrenewal model is related to the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, except the renewal is not\nexpressed in differential form. To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62).", "To model the number ofinfections over time we need to specify a serial\ninterval distribution g with density g(T), (the time between when a person gets infected and when\nthey subsequently infect another other people), which we choose to be Gamma distributed:\n\ng ~ Gamma (6.50.62). The serial interval distribution is shown below in Figure 7 and is assumed to be the same for all\ncountries. Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days.", "Figure 7: Serial interval distribution g with a mean of 6.5 days. Given the serial interval distribution, the number of infections Eamon a given day t, and country, m,\nis given by the following discrete convolution function:\n\n_ t—1\nCam — Ram ZT=0 Cr,mgt—‘r r\nwhere, similarto the probability ofdeath function, the daily serial interval is discretized by\n\nfs+0.5\n\n1.5\ngs = T=s—0.Sg(T)dT fors = 2,3, and 91 = fT=Og(T)dT. Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution.", "Infections today depend on the number of infections in the previous days, weighted by the discretized\nserial interval distribution. This weighting is then scaled by the country-specific time-Varying\nreproduction number, Ram, that models the average number of secondary infections at a given time. The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times.", "The functional form for the time-Varying reproduction number was chosen to be as simple as possible\nto minimize the impact of strong prior assumptions: we use a piecewise constant function that scales\nRam from a baseline prior R0,m and is driven by known major non-pharmaceutical interventions\noccurring in different countries and times. We included 6 interventions, one of which is constructed\nfrom the other 5 interventions, which are timings of school and university closures (k=l), self—isolating\nif ill (k=2), banning of public events (k=3), any government intervention in place (k=4), implementing\na partial or complete lockdown (k=5) and encouraging social distancing and isolation (k=6). We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise.", "We denote\nthe indicator variable for intervention k E 1,2,3,4,5,6 by IkI’m, which is 1 if intervention k is in place\nin country m at time t and 0 otherwise. The covariate ”any government intervention” (k=4) indicates\nif any of the other 5 interventions are in effect,i.e.14’t’m equals 1 at time t if any of the interventions\nk E 1,2,3,4,5 are in effect in country m at time t and equals 0 otherwise. Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention.", "Covariate 4 has the\ninterpretation of indicating the onset of major government intervention. The effect of each\nintervention is assumed to be multiplicative. Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential.", "Ram is therefore a function ofthe intervention indicators\nIk’t’m in place at time t in country m:\n\nRam : R0,m eXp(— 212:1 O(Rheum)-\n\nThe exponential form was used to ensure positivity of the reproduction number, with R0,m\nconstrained to be positive as it appears outside the exponential. The impact of each intervention on\n\nRam is characterised by a set of parameters 0(1, ...,OL6, with independent prior distributions chosen\nto be\n\nock ~ Gamma(. 5,1).", "5,1). The impacts ock are shared between all m countries and therefore they are informed by all available\ndata. The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information.", "The prior distribution for R0 was chosen to be\n\nR0,m ~ Normal(2.4, IKI) with K ~ Normal(0,0.5),\nOnce again, K is the same among all countries to share information. We assume that seeding of new infections begins 30 days before the day after a country has\ncumulatively observed 10 deaths. From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03).", "From this date, we seed our model with 6 sequential days of\ninfections drawn from cl’m,...,66’m~EXponential(T), where T~Exponential(0.03). These seed\ninfections are inferred in our Bayesian posterior distribution. We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model.", "We estimated parameters jointly for all 11 countries in a single hierarchical model. Fitting was done\nin the probabilistic programming language Stan,19 using an adaptive Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC)\nsampler. We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples.", "We ran 8 chains for 4000 iterations with 2000 iterations of warmup and a thinning factor 4\nto obtain 2000 posterior samples. Posterior convergence was assessed using the Rhat statistic and by\ndiagnosing divergent transitions of the HMC sampler. Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below).", "Prior-posterior calibrations were also performed\n(see below). 8.3 Validation\n\nWe validate accuracy of point estimates of our model using cross-Validation. In our cross-validation\nscheme, we leave out 3 days of known death data (non-cumulative) and fit our model. We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days.", "We forecast\nwhat the model predicts for these three days. We present the individual forecasts for each day, as\nwell as the average forecast for those three days. The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8.", "The cross-validation results are shown in the Figure\n8. Figure 8: Cross-Validation results for 3-day and 3-day aggregatedforecasts\n\nFigure 8 provides strong empirical justification for our model specification and mechanism. Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible.", "Our\naccurate forecast over a three-day time horizon suggests that our fitted estimates for Rt are\nappropriate and plausible. Along with from point estimates we all evaluate our posterior credible intervals using the Rhat\nstatistic. The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution).", "The Rhat statistic measures whether our Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) chains have\n\nconverged to the equilibrium distribution (the correct posterior distribution). Figure 9 shows the Rhat\nstatistics for all of our parameters\n\n\nFigure 9: Rhat statistics - values close to 1 indicate MCMC convergence. Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged.", "Figure 9 indicates that our MCMC have converged. In fitting we also ensured that the MCMC sampler\nexperienced no divergent transitions - suggesting non pathological posterior topologies. 8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt.", "8.4 SensitivityAnalysis\n\n8.4.1 Forecasting on log-linear scale to assess signal in the data\n\nAs we have highlighted throughout in this report, the lag between deaths and infections means that\nit ta kes time for information to propagate backwa rds from deaths to infections, and ultimately to Rt. A conclusion of this report is the prediction of a slowing of Rt in response to major interventions. To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale.", "To\ngain intuition that this is data driven and not simply a consequence of highly constrained model\nassumptions, we show death forecasts on a log-linear scale. On this scale a line which curves below a\nlinear trend is indicative of slowing in the growth of the epidemic. Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK.", "Figure 10 to Figure 12 show these\nforecasts for Italy, Spain and the UK. They show this slowing down in the daily number of deaths. Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic.", "Our\nmodel suggests that Italy, a country that has the highest death toll of COVID-19, will see a slowing in\nthe increase in daily deaths over the coming week compared to the early stages of the epidemic. We investigated the sensitivity of our estimates of starting and final Rt to our assumed serial interval\ndistribution. For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days.", "For this we considered several scenarios, in which we changed the serial interval\ndistribution mean, from a value of 6.5 days, to have values of 5, 6, 7 and 8 days. In Figure 13, we show our estimates of R0, the starting reproduction number before interventions, for\neach of these scenarios. The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings.", "The relative ordering of the Rt=0 in the countries is consistent in all settings. However, as expected, the scale of Rt=0 is considerably affected by this change — a longer serial\ninterval results in a higher estimated Rt=0. This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0.", "This is because to reach the currently observed size of the\nepidemics, a longer assumed serial interval is compensated by a higher estimated R0. Additionally, in Figure 14, we show our estimates of Rt at the most recent model time point, again for\neach ofthese scenarios. The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping.", "The serial interval mean can influence Rt substantially, however, the posterior\ncredible intervals of Rt are broadly overlapping. Figure 13: Initial reproduction number R0 for different serial interval (SI) distributions (means\nbetween 5 and 8 days). We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. Figure 14: Rt on 28 March 2020 estimated for all countries, with serial interval (SI) distribution means\nbetween 5 and 8 days. We use 6.5 days in our main analysis.", "We use 6.5 days in our main analysis. 8.4.3 Uninformative prior sensitivity on or\n\nWe ran our model using implausible uninformative prior distributions on the intervention effects,\nallowing the effect of an intervention to increase or decrease Rt. To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4).", "To avoid collinearity, we ran 6\nseparate models, with effects summarized below (compare with the main analysis in Figure 4). In this\nseries of univariate analyses, we find (Figure 15) that all effects on their own serve to decrease Rt. This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis.", "This gives us confidence that our choice of prior distribution is not driving the effects we see in the\nmain analysis. Lockdown has a very large effect, most likely due to the fact that it occurs after other\ninterventions in our dataset. The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers.", "The relatively large effect sizes for the other interventions are most likely\ndue to the coincidence of the interventions in time, such that one intervention is a proxy for a few\nothers. Figure 15: Effects of different interventions when used as the only covariate in the model. 8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution.", "8.4.4\n\nTo assess prior assumptions on our piecewise constant functional form for Rt we test using a\nnonparametric function with a Gaussian process prior distribution. We fit a model with a Gaussian\nprocess prior distribution to data from Italy where there is the largest signal in death data. We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data.", "We find\nthat the Gaussian process has a very similartrend to the piecewise constant model and reverts to the\nmean in regions of no data. The correspondence of a completely nonparametric function and our\npiecewise constant function suggests a suitable parametric specification of Rt. Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK).", "Nonparametric fitting of Rf using a Gaussian process:\n\n8.4.5 Leave country out analysis\n\nDue to the different lengths of each European countries’ epidemic, some countries, such as Italy have\nmuch more data than others (such as the UK). To ensure that we are not leveraging too much\ninformation from any one country we perform a ”leave one country out” sensitivity analysis, where\nwe rerun the model without a different country each time. Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain.", "Figure 16 and Figure 17 are examples for\nresults for the UK, leaving out Italy and Spain. In general, for all countries, we observed no significant\ndependence on any one country. Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model.", "Figure 16: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Italy for fitting the model. See the\n\n\nFigure 17: Model results for the UK, when not using data from Spain for fitting the model. See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots.", "See caption\nof Figure 2 for an explanation of the plots. 8.4.6 Starting reproduction numbers vs theoretical predictions\n\nTo validate our starting reproduction numbers, we compare our fitted values to those theoretically\nexpected from a simpler model assuming exponential growth rate, and a serial interval distribution\nmean. We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model.", "We fit a linear model with a Poisson likelihood and log link function and extracting the daily\ngrowth rate r. For well-known theoretical results from the renewal equation, given a serial interval\ndistribution g(r) with mean m and standard deviation 5, given a = mZ/S2 and b = m/SZ, and\n\na\nsubsequently R0 = (1 + %) .Figure 18 shows theoretically derived R0 along with our fitted\n\nestimates of Rt=0 from our Bayesian hierarchical model. As shown in Figure 18 there is large\ncorrespondence between our estimated starting reproduction number and the basic reproduction\nnumber implied by the growth rate r.\n\nR0 (red) vs R(FO) (black)\n\nFigure 18: Our estimated R0 (black) versus theoretically derived Ru(red) from a log-linear\nregression fit. 8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future.", "8.5 Counterfactual analysis — interventions vs no interventions\n\n\nFigure 19: Daily number of confirmed deaths, predictions (up to 28 March) and forecasts (after) for\nall countries except Italy and Spain from our model with interventions (blue) and from the no\ninterventions counterfactual model (pink); credible intervals are shown one week into the future. DOI: \n\nPage 28 of 35\n\n30 March 2020 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team\n\n8.6 Data sources and Timeline of Interventions\n\nFigure 1 and Table 3 display the interventions by the 11 countries in our study and the dates these\ninterventions became effective. Table 3: Timeline of Interventions.", "Table 3: Timeline of Interventions. Country Type Event Date effective\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.20 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of gatherings of more than 5 people.21 10/3/2020\nBanning all access to public spaces and gatherings\nLockdown of more than 5 people. Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys.", "Advice to maintain 1m\nordered distance.22 16/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Recommendation to maintain a distance of 1m.22 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nAustria measures Implemented at lockdown.22 16/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.23 14/3/2020\nPublic events All recreational activities cancelled regardless of\nbanned size.23 12/3/2020\nCitizens are required to stay at home except for\nLockdown work and essential journeys. Going outdoors only\nordered with household members or 1 friend.24 18/3/2020\nPublic transport recommended only for essential\nSocial distancing journeys, work from home encouraged, all public\nencouraged places e.g. restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport.", "restaurants closed.23 14/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nBelgium measures cough or fever.25 10/3/2020\nSchool closure Secondary schools shut and universities (primary\nordered schools also shut on 16th).26 13/3/2020\nPublic events Bans of events >100 people, closed cultural\nbanned institutions, leisure facilities etc.27 12/3/2020\nLockdown Bans of gatherings of >10 people in public and all\nordered public places were shut.27 18/3/2020\nLimited use of public transport. All cultural\nSocial distancing institutions shut and recommend keeping\nencouraged appropriate distance.28 13/3/2020\nCase-based Everyone should stay at home if experiencing a\nDenmark measures cough or fever.29 12/3/2020\n\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.30 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Bans of events >100 people.31 13/3/2020\nLockdown Everybody has to stay at home. Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people.", "Need a self-\nordered authorisation form to leave home.32 17/3/2020\nSocial distancing\nencouraged Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/3/2020\nCase-based\nFrance measures Advice at the time of lockdown.32 16/03/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.33 14/3/2020\nPublic events No gatherings of >1000 people. Otherwise\nbanned regional restrictions only until lockdown.34 22/3/2020\nLockdown Gatherings of > 2 people banned, 1.5 m\nordered distance.35 22/3/2020\nSocial distancing Avoid social interaction wherever possible\nencouraged recommended by Merkel.36 12/3/2020\nAdvice for everyone experiencing symptoms to\nCase-based contact a health care agency to get tested and\nGermany measures then self—isolate.37 6/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Nationwide school closures.38 5/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans all public events.39 9/3/2020\nLockdown The government closes all public places. People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions.", "People\nordered have to stay at home except for essential travel.40 11/3/2020\nA distance of more than 1m has to be kept and\nSocial distancing any other form of alternative aggregation is to be\nencouraged excluded.40 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing symptoms\nItaly measures and quarantine if tested positive.41 9/3/2020\nNorwegian Directorate of Health closes all\nSchool closure educational institutions. Including childcare\nordered facilities and all schools.42 13/3/2020\nPublic events The Directorate of Health bans all non-necessary\nbanned social contact.42 12/3/2020\nLockdown Only people living together are allowed outside\nordered together. Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred.", "Everyone has to keep a 2m distance.43 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing The Directorate of Health advises against all\nencouraged travelling and non-necessary social contacts.42 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nNorway measures cough or fever symptoms.44 15/3/2020\n\nordered Nationwide school closures.45 13/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Banning of all public events by lockdown.46 14/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Nationwide lockdown.43 14/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice on social distancing and working remotely\nencouraged from home.47 9/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nSpain measures cough or fever symptoms.47 17/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered Colleges and upper secondary schools shut.48 18/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >500 people.49 12/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered No lockdown occurred. NA\nPeople even with mild symptoms are told to limit\nSocial distancing social contact, encouragement to work from\nencouraged home.50 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSweden measures fever symptoms.51 10/3/2020\nSchool closure\nordered No in person teaching until 4th of April.52 14/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned The government bans events >100 people.52 13/3/2020\nLockdown\nordered Gatherings of more than 5 people are banned.53 2020-03-20\nAdvice on keeping distance. All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure.", "All businesses where\nSocial distancing this cannot be realised have been closed in all\nencouraged states (kantons).54 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate if experiencing a cough or\nSwitzerland measures fever symptoms.55 2/3/2020\nNationwide school closure. Childminders,\nSchool closure nurseries and sixth forms are told to follow the\nordered guidance.56 21/3/2020\nPublic events\nbanned Implemented with lockdown.57 24/3/2020\nGatherings of more than 2 people not from the\nLockdown same household are banned and police\nordered enforceable.57 24/3/2020\nSocial distancing Advice to avoid pubs, clubs, theatres and other\nencouraged public institutions.58 16/3/2020\nCase-based Advice to self—isolate for 7 days if experiencing a\nUK measures cough or fever symptoms.59 12/3/2020\n\n\n9 References\n\n1. Li, R. et al.", "Li, R. et al. Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel\ncoronavirus (SARS-CoV2). Science (2020) .1126/science.abb3221. 2. Zhang, J. et al. Patterns of human social contact and contact with animals in Shanghai, China. 5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. Hong Kong: coronavirus cases.", "5cLRep.9,1—11(2019)\n\n3. Worldometers.info. Hong Kong: coronavirus cases. rldometers.info/co ronavirus/country/china-hong-kong-sar/. 4. Ferguson, N. et al. Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19\nmortality and healthcare demand (Report 9). disease-analysis/news--wuhan-coronavirus/. 5. Cereda, D. et al.", "disease-analysis/news--wuhan-coronavirus/. 5. Cereda, D. et al. The early phase of the COVID-19 outbreak in Lombardy, Italy. arXiv (2020). 6. Zhao, A. J. et al. Title: Antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2 in patients of novel coronavirus\ndisease 2019 Brief Title : Antibody responses in COVID-19 patients.", "Title: Antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2 in patients of novel coronavirus\ndisease 2019 Brief Title : Antibody responses in COVID-19 patients. (2020). 7. Jombart, T. et al. Inferring the number of COVID-19 cases from recently reported deaths. medRXiV 2020.03.10.20033761(2020).1101/2020.03.10.20033761. 8. Zhang, J. et al.", "medRXiV 2020.03.10.20033761(2020).1101/2020.03.10.20033761. 8. Zhang, J. et al. Age profile of susceptibility, mixing, and social distancing shape the dynamics\nof the novel coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in China. (2020) .1101/2020.03.19.20039107. 9. Lourenco, J. et al.", "(2020) .1101/2020.03.19.20039107. 9. Lourenco, J. et al. Fundamental principles of epidemic spread highlight the immediate need\nfor large-scale serological surveys to assess the stage of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic. .1101/2020.03.24.20042291\n\n10. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World\nPopulation Prospects 2019: Data Booket. ST/ESA/SER.A/424.", "World\nPopulation Prospects 2019: Data Booket. ST/ESA/SER.A/424. (2019). 11. Verity, R. et al. Estimates ofthe severity of COVID-19 disease. Lancet Infect Dis in press, (2020). 12. Walker, P. G. T. et al.", "12. Walker, P. G. T. et al. Report 12: The Global Impact of COVID-19 and Strategies for Mitigation\nand Suppression. 13. Fraser, C. Estimating Individual and Household Reproduction Numbers in an Emerging\nEpidemic. PL05 ONE 2, e758 (2007). 14.", "PL05 ONE 2, e758 (2007). 14. Cori, A., Ferguson, N. M., Fraser, C. & Cauchemez, S. A New Framework and Software to\nEstimate Time-Varying Reproduction Numbers During Epidemics. Am. J. Epidemiol. 178, 1505—1512\n(20131\n\n15. Nouvellet, P. et al.", "J. Epidemiol. 178, 1505—1512\n(20131\n\n15. Nouvellet, P. et al. A simple approach to measure transmissibility and forecast incidence. Epidemics 22, 29—35 (2018). 16. Cauchemez, 8., Valleron, A. J., Boelle, P. Y., Flahault, A.", "Cauchemez, 8., Valleron, A. J., Boelle, P. Y., Flahault, A. & Ferguson, N. M. Estimating the\nimpact of school closure on influenza transmission from Sentinel data. Nature 452, 750—754 (2008). 17. Bellman, R. & Harris, T. On Age-Dependent Binary Branching Processes. Ann. Math.", "Ann. Math. 55, 280—\n295(19521\n\n18. Bellman, R. & Harris, T. E. On the Theory of Age-Dependent Stochastic Branching Processes. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 34, 601—604 (1948). 19. Stan Development Team. 2018. The Stan Core Library, Version 2.18.0. 20.", "Stan Development Team. 2018. The Stan Core Library, Version 2.18.0. 20. Bundesministerium. Coronavirus (COVID-19): Status quo — Schulen, Hochschulen,\nUniversitaten und Forschungsinstitutionen. 21. Henley, J. Coronavirus: EU states enact tough measures to stem spread. The Guardian\n\nafter-italian-lockdown (2020). 22. Bundesministerium.", "The Guardian\n\nafter-italian-lockdown (2020). 22. Bundesministerium. Coronavirus - Aktuelle MaBnahmen. MaBnahmen.html (2020). 23. Federal Public Service. Coronavirus : Phase 2 maintained, transition to the federal phase and\nadditional measures. transition-to-the-federal-phase-and-additional-measures/ (2020). 24. Belgium.be. Coronavirus: reinforced measures | Belgium.be. (2020).", "24. Belgium.be. Coronavirus: reinforced measures | Belgium.be. (2020). 25. Federal Public Service. Protect yourself and protect the others. coronavirus.be/en/2020/03/10/protect-yourself—and-protect-the-others/ (2020). 26. Wikipedia. 2020 coronavirus pandemic in Denmark. Wikimedia Foundation\n\n\n27.", "26. Wikipedia. 2020 coronavirus pandemic in Denmark. Wikimedia Foundation\n\n\n27. Stephensen, Emma K|inker; Hansen, T. S. Danmark lukker ned: Her er regeringens nye tiltag. TV2 \n(20201\n\n28. Politi. Nye tiltag mod covid-19. Politi \nmyndighederne/nye-tiltag-mod-covid-19 (2020). 29. Styrelsen for Patientsikkerhed.", "Politi \nmyndighederne/nye-tiltag-mod-covid-19 (2020). 29. Styrelsen for Patientsikkerhed. Indberetning om covid-19zlnformation om mulighed for\np\\aabud til enkeltpersoner (coronavirus/covid-19). retningslinjer/vejledning/indberetning-om-covid-19/#. 30. Wikipedia. 2020 coronavirus pandemic in France. Wikimedia Foundation\n\n\n31. The Local. France bans gatherings of more than 100 people as coronavirus death toll rises -\nThe Local.", "France bans gatherings of more than 100 people as coronavirus death toll rises -\nThe Local. The Local \nto-fight-coronavirus-pandemic (2020). 32. Henley, Jon; Willsher, Kim; Kassam, A. Coronavirus: France imposes lockdown as EU calls for\n30-day travel ban. The Guardian \nspain-takes-over-private-healthcare-amid-more-european-lockdowns (2020). 33. Wikipedia.", "The Guardian \nspain-takes-over-private-healthcare-amid-more-european-lockdowns (2020). 33. Wikipedia. 2020 coronavirus pandemic in Germany. Wikimedia Foundation\n\n\n34. BMI. Coronavirus: Fragen und Antworten. Bundesministerium des Innern,fur Bau und Heimat\n\nmen/bevoelkerungsschutz/coronavirus/coronavirus-faqs.htmI#doc13738352bodyText7. 35. BBC News. Coronavirus: Germany tightens curbs and bans meetings of more than two.", "BBC News. Coronavirus: Germany tightens curbs and bans meetings of more than two. BBC\nNews (2020). 36. Bundesregierung. Kanzlerin trifft Regierungschefs der Lander Sozialkontakte vermeiden,\nAusbreitung verlangsamen. 1730186(2020)\n\n37. Robert Koch Institut. Antworten auf haufig gestellte Fragen zum Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2.", "Robert Koch Institut. Antworten auf haufig gestellte Fragen zum Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2. Robert Koch Institut\n\nAQ_Liste.html (2020). 38. Ministero della Salute. Governo annuncia sospensione dell’attivita didattica dal 5 a|15 marzo. Ministero della Salute\n\nliano&menu=multimedia&p=video&id=2052 (2020). 39. CNN.", "39. CNN. Italy prohibits travel and cancels all public events in its northern region. CNN\n\n(2020). 40. Attualita. Coronavirus: stop a pub, cinema, teatro e discoteche anche a Roma. Ecco cosa\nprevede il nuovo decreto. Roma Today \nteatri-locali-chiusi-nuovo-decreto.html (2020). 41. Gazzetta Ufficiale.", "Roma Today \nteatri-locali-chiusi-nuovo-decreto.html (2020). 41. Gazzetta Ufficiale. DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEl MINISTRI. Gazzetta Ufflclale\n (2020). 42. Helsedirektoratet. The Norwegian Directorate of Health has issued a decision to close schools\nand other educational institutions. Helsedirektoratet \nnorwegian-directorate-of—health-has-issued-a-decision-to-close-schools-and-other-educationa|-\ninstitutions (2020). 43.", "Helsedirektoratet \nnorwegian-directorate-of—health-has-issued-a-decision-to-close-schools-and-other-educationa|-\ninstitutions (2020). 43. Krostensen, Mette; Hellem-Hansen, Viktoria L.; Tandstad, B. Folkehelseinstituttet mener\n23.000 kan vaere smittet. NRK \nvaere-smittet-1.14958149 (2020). 44. Norweigen Government. The Government is establishing clear quarantine and isolation rules. regjeringen.no \nquarantine-and-isolation-rules/id2693647/ (2020). 45. Wikipedia.", "regjeringen.no \nquarantine-and-isolation-rules/id2693647/ (2020). 45. Wikipedia. 2020 coronavirus pandemic in Spain. Wikimedia Foundation\n\n\n46. Gabinete de Prensa. 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Bundesamt fur Gesundheit BAG.", "Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft\n\n(20201\n\n55. Bundesamt fur Gesundheit BAG. Neue Hygiene- und Verhaltensregeln zum Schutz gegen das\nneue Coronavirus. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft \nbag/a ktuell/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-78304.html (2020). 56. UK Government, D. for E. Schools, colleges and early years settings to close. UK Government\n (2020). 57. UK Government.", "UK Government\n (2020). 57. UK Government. PM address to the nation on coronavirus: 23 March 2020. UK Government\n\n2020(20201\n\n58. Boycott-Owen, Mason; Bowman, Verity; Kelly-Linden, Jordan; Gartner, A. G. H. S. T.\nCoronavirus: Boris Johnson puts UK in lockdown as death tolls reaches 55.", "Boycott-Owen, Mason; Bowman, Verity; Kelly-Linden, Jordan; Gartner, A. G. H. S. T.\nCoronavirus: Boris Johnson puts UK in lockdown as death tolls reaches 55. The Telegraph\n\nupdate-covid-19-death-toll-cases/ (2020). 59. BBC News. 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[ "BACKGROUND: China is at greatest risk of the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 due to its huge population and high residential density. The unclear comprehension and negative attitudes towards the emerging infectious disease among general population may lead to unnecessary worry and even panic. The objective of this study was to investigate the Chinese public response to H1N1 pandemic and provide baseline data to develop public education campaigns in response to future outbreaks.", "The objective of this study was to investigate the Chinese public response to H1N1 pandemic and provide baseline data to develop public education campaigns in response to future outbreaks. METHODS: A close-ended questionnaire developed by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention was applied to assess the knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among 10,669 responders recruited from seven urban and two rural areas of China sampled by using the probability proportional to size (PPS) method. RESULTS: 30.0% respondents were not clear whether food spread H1N1 virusand.", "RESULTS: 30.0% respondents were not clear whether food spread H1N1 virusand. 65.7% reported that the pandemic had no impact on their life. The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and H1N1vaccine were 7.5% and 10.8%, respectively.", "The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and H1N1vaccine were 7.5% and 10.8%, respectively. Farmers and those with lower education level were less likely to know the main transmission route (cough or talk face to face). Female and those with college and above education had higher perception of risk and more compliance with preventive behaviors.", "Female and those with college and above education had higher perception of risk and more compliance with preventive behaviors. Relationships between knowledge and risk perception (OR = 1.69; 95%CI 1.54-1.86), and knowledge and practices (OR = 1.57; 95%CI 1.42-1.73) were found among the study subjects. With regard to the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccination, there are several related factors found in the current study population, including the perception of life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95%CI 1.11-1.50), the safety of A/H1N1 vaccine (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11), the knowledge of free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78), the state's priority vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), and taking up seasonal influenza vaccine behavior (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23).", "With regard to the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccination, there are several related factors found in the current study population, including the perception of life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95%CI 1.11-1.50), the safety of A/H1N1 vaccine (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11), the knowledge of free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78), the state's priority vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), and taking up seasonal influenza vaccine behavior (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23). CONCLUSIONS: This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic. Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account.", "Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account. Text: At the end of March 2009, an outbreak of novel influenza A (H1N1) (here after called A/H1N1) infection occurred in Mexico, followed by ongoing spread to all over the world in a short period [1] . On June 11 2009, the World Health Organization raised its pandemic alert level to the highest level, phase 6 [2] , meaning that the A/H1N1 flu had spread in more than two continents and reached pandemic proportions.", "On June 11 2009, the World Health Organization raised its pandemic alert level to the highest level, phase 6 [2] , meaning that the A/H1N1 flu had spread in more than two continents and reached pandemic proportions. As of June 13, 2010, it had caused over 18,172 deaths in more than 214 countries and overseas territories or communities [3] . Most illness, especially the severe illness and deaths, had occurred among healthy young adults, which was markedly different from the disease pattern seen during epidemics of seasonal influenza [4, 5] .", "Most illness, especially the severe illness and deaths, had occurred among healthy young adults, which was markedly different from the disease pattern seen during epidemics of seasonal influenza [4, 5] . China is highly susceptible to A/H1N1 because of its huge population and high residential density, besides the high infectiousness of this novel influenza virus. After the first imported case reported on May 11, 2009 , the confirmed cases were reported in various provinces of China [6] .", "After the first imported case reported on May 11, 2009 , the confirmed cases were reported in various provinces of China [6] . By the late of October 2009, A/H1N1 cases had increased dramatically, with 44,981 cases and 6 deaths confirmed at the end of October 2009. The A/ H1N1 infection rate peaked in November 2009, when approximately 1500 new cases of A/H1N1 were being confirmed each day.", "The A/ H1N1 infection rate peaked in November 2009, when approximately 1500 new cases of A/H1N1 were being confirmed each day. By the end of this month, a total of 92,904 cases and 200 deaths had resulted from A/ H1N1-related causes [7] . The Chinese government has taken a series of preventive measures according to WHO guidelines, including the promotion of public knowledge about flu through mass media, patient isolation, quarantine of close contact person, and free vaccinations to population at high risk (e.g.", "The Chinese government has taken a series of preventive measures according to WHO guidelines, including the promotion of public knowledge about flu through mass media, patient isolation, quarantine of close contact person, and free vaccinations to population at high risk (e.g. young children, healthcare workers, and people with chronic disease) [8] . However, there were few public reports on the assessment of the effect of these policies and the level of knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) associating with A/H1N1 among general population.", "However, there were few public reports on the assessment of the effect of these policies and the level of knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) associating with A/H1N1 among general population. It is well-known that confused comprehension and negative attitude towards the emerging communicable disease may lead to unnecessary worry and chaos, even excessive panic which would aggravate the disease epidemic [9] . For instance, during SARS epidemic from 2002 to 2004, the misconceptions and the excessive panic of Chinese public to SARS led the public resistant to comply with the suggested preventive measures such as avoiding public transportation, going to hospital when they were sick, which contributed to the rapid spread of SARS and resulted in a more serious epidemic situation, making China one of the worst affected countries with over 5327 cases and 439 deaths [10, 11] .", "For instance, during SARS epidemic from 2002 to 2004, the misconceptions and the excessive panic of Chinese public to SARS led the public resistant to comply with the suggested preventive measures such as avoiding public transportation, going to hospital when they were sick, which contributed to the rapid spread of SARS and resulted in a more serious epidemic situation, making China one of the worst affected countries with over 5327 cases and 439 deaths [10, 11] . In addition, the panic of infectious disease outbreak could cause huge economic loss, for example the economic loss of SARS has been estimated at $30-$100 billion in US, though less than 10,000 persons were infected [12] . SARS experience has demonstrated the importance of monitoring the public perception in disease epidemic control, which may affect the compliance of community to the precautionary strategies.", "SARS experience has demonstrated the importance of monitoring the public perception in disease epidemic control, which may affect the compliance of community to the precautionary strategies. Understanding related factors affecting people to undertake precautionary behavior may also help decision-makers take appropriate measures to promote individual or community health. Therefore, it is important to monitor and analyze the public response to the emerging disease.", "Therefore, it is important to monitor and analyze the public response to the emerging disease. To investigate community responses to A/H1N1 in China, we conducted this telephone survey to describe the knowledge, attitudes and practices of A/H1N1 among general population in China and put forward policy recommendations to government in case of future similar conditions. This study was performed in seven urban regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Jingzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen cities) and two rural areas (Jingzhou and Zhengzhou counties) of China with over one million people in each region.", "This study was performed in seven urban regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Jingzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen cities) and two rural areas (Jingzhou and Zhengzhou counties) of China with over one million people in each region. Regarding the urban sites, Beijing as the capital of China locates in the northeast; Shanghai is a municipality in the east of China; Wuhan (the provincial capital of Hubei) and Zhengzhou (the provincial capital of Henan province) are both in the centre of China; Xi'an in the northwest of China is the provincial capital of Shanxi province; and Shenzhen of the Guangdong province is in the southeast of China. As for the rural sites, Jingzhou county and Zhengzhou county, from Hubei and Henan provinces, respectively, both locate in the centre of China.", "As for the rural sites, Jingzhou county and Zhengzhou county, from Hubei and Henan provinces, respectively, both locate in the centre of China. This current study was carried out in three phases during the pandemic peak season of A/H1N1. The first phase was from 30 November 2009 to 27 December 2009, the second from 4 January 2010 to 24 January 2010, and the third from 24 February to 25 March in 2010.", "The first phase was from 30 November 2009 to 27 December 2009, the second from 4 January 2010 to 24 January 2010, and the third from 24 February to 25 March in 2010. A two-stage proportional probability to size (PPS) sampling method was used in each phase. In stage І, about 30% of administrative regions in each study site were selected as primary sample units (PSUs) for cluster sampling.", "In stage І, about 30% of administrative regions in each study site were selected as primary sample units (PSUs) for cluster sampling. In stage II, telephone numbers were sampled randomly, of which the first four digitals were obtained from each PSU's post office as initial number and the other three or four digitals were obtained from random number generated by Excel 2003. Then each family was chosen as per unit (excluding school, hotel public or cell phone etc.)", "Then each family was chosen as per unit (excluding school, hotel public or cell phone etc.) and at least 400 families in each site at each phase were selected finally. If the family was selected repeatedly or refused to answer the questionnaire, we added one to the last digit of phone number and dial again.", "If the family was selected repeatedly or refused to answer the questionnaire, we added one to the last digit of phone number and dial again. If the line was busy or of no response, we would dial three times and then give up this phone number if there was still no respondent. Anonymous telephone interviews were conducted from 6:30 pm to 10:00 pm so as to avoid over-presenting the non-work population by well-trained interviewers with Bachelor degree of Epidemiology.", "Anonymous telephone interviews were conducted from 6:30 pm to 10:00 pm so as to avoid over-presenting the non-work population by well-trained interviewers with Bachelor degree of Epidemiology. The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of A/H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone was designed by the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC, Beijing). The majority of the questions were closed-ended and variables in the questionnaire were categorical, except age.", "The majority of the questions were closed-ended and variables in the questionnaire were categorical, except age. The inclusion criteria of subjects were: age≥18 and proper communication skills. There were seven questions related to the knowledge of A/H1N1, four referred to the attitude, and five concerning about the practice in this questionnaire (See additional file 1: The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China).", "There were seven questions related to the knowledge of A/H1N1, four referred to the attitude, and five concerning about the practice in this questionnaire (See additional file 1: The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China). This study was approved by the institutional review board of the Tongji Medical College of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. All respondents were informed consent.", "All respondents were informed consent. We respected their wishes whether to accept our survey and promised to protect their secrets. All data were entered into computer using Epidata V.3.1 and were analyzed in SPSS statistical software V.12. Chi-square test was applied to compare the immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/H1N1 vaccine.", "Chi-square test was applied to compare the immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/H1N1 vaccine. The associations between the socio-demographic factors and the KAP regarding A/H1N1 were firstly investigated by using univariate odds ratios (OR) and then stepwise logistic regression modeling applied. Adjusting for such background variables including gender, age, level of education, occupation, region, and survey wave, stepwise multivariate logistic regression models were applied to investigate the impact factors associated with the risk perception of A/H1N1, A/H1N1 vaccination uptake and the compliance with suggested preventive measures (avoid crowd places/wash hand frequently/keep distance from people with influenza-like symptoms).", "Adjusting for such background variables including gender, age, level of education, occupation, region, and survey wave, stepwise multivariate logistic regression models were applied to investigate the impact factors associated with the risk perception of A/H1N1, A/H1N1 vaccination uptake and the compliance with suggested preventive measures (avoid crowd places/wash hand frequently/keep distance from people with influenza-like symptoms). For the purposes of analysis, the factor knowledge about the main modes of transmission was divided into two groups according to whether the respondents knew both cough and talk faceto-face can spread A/H1N1. Odds ratios and respective 95% confidence intervals (CI) were obtained from the logistic regression analysis.", "Odds ratios and respective 95% confidence intervals (CI) were obtained from the logistic regression analysis. P values lower than 0.05 were judged to be statistically significant. A total of 88541 telephone numbers were dialed.", "A total of 88541 telephone numbers were dialed. Except 65323 invalid calls (including vacant numbers, fax numbers, busy tone numbers and non-qualified respondents whose age <18 and whose phones were from school, hotel or other public places), 23218 eligible respondents were identified. Among these respondents, 12360 completed the interview.", "Among these respondents, 12360 completed the interview. Therefore, the response rate was 46.8%. Excluding missing, and logical erroneous data, 10669 questionnaires in total were eligible for analysis. The baseline characteristics of the respondents were presented in Table1. The mean age of all respondents was 41.47 years (over range: 18-90 year) .", "The mean age of all respondents was 41.47 years (over range: 18-90 year) . Of all respondents, 54.4% were female, and 42.4% had received college or above education (Table 1) . The overall KAP related to A/H1N1 was reported in Table 2 .", "The overall KAP related to A/H1N1 was reported in Table 2 . As to knowledge, 75.6% of all respondents knew that influenza could be transmitted by coughing and sneezing, and 61.9% thought that talking face-to-face was the transmission route, whereas 30.0% believed the transmission could be through food. Less than one third of respondents knew that virus could be transmitted by handshaking and indirect hand contact (26.8% and 22.3%, respectively).", "Less than one third of respondents knew that virus could be transmitted by handshaking and indirect hand contact (26.8% and 22.3%, respectively). Multiple logistic regression analysis showed that those with middle school (OR = 1.71; 95%CI 1.48-1.98), or having an education level of college and above (OR = 2.16; 95%CI 1.83-2.54) were more likely to know the transmission routes comparing with other people. Comparing with students, teachers (OR = 1.46; 95%CI 1.09-1.96) were more likely to answer the above questions Table 3 and Table 4 ).", "Comparing with students, teachers (OR = 1.46; 95%CI 1.09-1.96) were more likely to answer the above questions Table 3 and Table 4 ). Regarding the A/H1N1vaccination, 69.9% respondents believed that the occurrence rate of adverse reactions caused by A/H1N1 vaccination was fairly low and they were not afraid of taking up vaccination. Most residents (96.1%) thought that the state's vaccination strategy was reasonable.", "Most residents (96.1%) thought that the state's vaccination strategy was reasonable. About half of the respondents (42.9%) had avoided going to crowded places during the past two weeks of our survey. In case people nearby held influenza-like symptoms such as fever or cough, 56.9% increased the frequency of hand-washing and 57.4% would stay away from them.", "In case people nearby held influenza-like symptoms such as fever or cough, 56.9% increased the frequency of hand-washing and 57.4% would stay away from them. Multiple logistic regression analysis indicated compliance with the preventive practices were more likely to be taken by those who were females (OR = 1. Table 3 and Table 4 ).", "Table 3 and Table 4 ). The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/ H1N1 in respondents were 7.5% and 10.8% respectively. The multivariate stepwise models further showed that except the health care workers (OR = 1.52; 95%CI 1.09-2.11), residents in other occupations (OR = 0.06-0.67) were less likely to take up the A/H1N1 vaccination comparing with students (in Table 3 ).", "The multivariate stepwise models further showed that except the health care workers (OR = 1.52; 95%CI 1.09-2.11), residents in other occupations (OR = 0.06-0.67) were less likely to take up the A/H1N1 vaccination comparing with students (in Table 3 ). Adjusting for the background covariates the knowledge about the free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78) and the state's initial vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), perception of daily life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95% CI 1.11-1.50), practice of injecting the seasonal influenza vaccine (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23) were significantly associated with behavior of taking up the A/H1N1 vaccination positively (in Table 5 ), and the adverse reaction of A/H1N1 vaccine negatively influenced people's practice (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11). Novel A/H1N1 has caused pandemic in this century.", "Novel A/H1N1 has caused pandemic in this century. It is important to encourage the public to adopt precautionary behaviors, which is based on the correct knowledge of the epidemic and appropriate response among residents. Many studies have examined the various levels of KAP about infectious disease outbreaks, such as SARS, avian influenza [13] [14] [15] .", "Many studies have examined the various levels of KAP about infectious disease outbreaks, such as SARS, avian influenza [13] [14] [15] . Some studies have been reported specifically on community responses to A/H1N1 in Australia and Europe [16, 17] . But through literature search, we haven't found any public reports on KAP regarding A/H1N1 among Chinese population until now.", "But through literature search, we haven't found any public reports on KAP regarding A/H1N1 among Chinese population until now. Therefore, we conducted this large population-based survey (10669 respondents) to investigate community responses to A/H1N1 and to provide baseline data to government for preventive measures in case of future outbreaks. Unless people have basic knowledge about the modes of transmission, they respond appropriately during an outbreak [16] .", "Unless people have basic knowledge about the modes of transmission, they respond appropriately during an outbreak [16] . It has been proved that influenza is transmitted through person to person via respiratory secretions [18] . Most residents in our survey recognized that OR m : odds ratio obtained from stepwise multivariate logistics regression analysis using univariately significant variables as candidate variables and adjusting for region; NU: not significant in the univariate analysis; *: P < 0.05; †: P < 0.01; ‡: P < 0.0001.\n\nthe risk of getting infected would increase when an infected person coughed or sneezed in close distance.", "Most residents in our survey recognized that OR m : odds ratio obtained from stepwise multivariate logistics regression analysis using univariately significant variables as candidate variables and adjusting for region; NU: not significant in the univariate analysis; *: P < 0.05; †: P < 0.01; ‡: P < 0.0001.\n\nthe risk of getting infected would increase when an infected person coughed or sneezed in close distance. This may be due to the previous experience of SARS and avian flu. Multivariate analysis results showed that workers and farmers with lower education level were less likely to have this knowledge, which indicated that the contents and forms of propaganda should be more understandable and acceptable.", "Multivariate analysis results showed that workers and farmers with lower education level were less likely to have this knowledge, which indicated that the contents and forms of propaganda should be more understandable and acceptable. A large proportion of residents in our survey overlooked the indirect hand contact and hand-shaking transmission route and about one third of public misconceived that A/H1N1 was food borne, which was associated with the previous knowledge of avian flu and the new A/H1N1 flu in the general population. The confusion with avian flu might mislead some residents to believe that the A/H1N1 virus is fatal and cause public panic [19] .", "The confusion with avian flu might mislead some residents to believe that the A/H1N1 virus is fatal and cause public panic [19] . Therefore, it is important for the government and health authorities to provide continuously updated information of the emerging disease through televisions, newspapers, radios, and Internet. There are regional differences in the perception of A/H1N1.", "There are regional differences in the perception of A/H1N1. For example, the public in Hong Kong did not perceive a high likelihood of having a local A/H1N1 outbreak [19] , but Malaysians were particularly anxious about the pandemic [20] . The current study shows that emotional distress was relatively mild in China as few residents worried about being infected (25.1%).", "The current study shows that emotional distress was relatively mild in China as few residents worried about being infected (25.1%). This phenomenon may also be related to the previous experience of the SARS epidemic, as well as the open epidemic information. A survey in Korean university showed that women perceived higher illness severity and personal susceptibility to A/ H1N1 infection, which had been reconfirmed in our study [21] .", "A survey in Korean university showed that women perceived higher illness severity and personal susceptibility to A/ H1N1 infection, which had been reconfirmed in our study [21] . Logistic regression analysis results suggested that women with higher educational level had higher perception of risk. As time went by, the knowledge about the main transmission route increased, but the risk perception of being infected in residents decreased, suggesting the positive effect of government policy regarding A/H1N1 infection prevention, as well as the promotion of the media.", "As time went by, the knowledge about the main transmission route increased, but the risk perception of being infected in residents decreased, suggesting the positive effect of government policy regarding A/H1N1 infection prevention, as well as the promotion of the media. The previous study presented various results of influencing factors on the the compliance with the preventive practices. The study in Saudi showed that older men with better education were more likely to take preventive practices [9] ; female students in Korean washed hands more frequently during the peak pandemic period of A/ H1N1 [21] ; in another pandemic study in USA, younger people was found to have greater uptake of recommended behaviors but not for gender [16] .", "The study in Saudi showed that older men with better education were more likely to take preventive practices [9] ; female students in Korean washed hands more frequently during the peak pandemic period of A/ H1N1 [21] ; in another pandemic study in USA, younger people was found to have greater uptake of recommended behaviors but not for gender [16] . We found female with higher education took more precautionary behaviors, but office staffs and farmers took less comparing with students. While such differences could result from study population demographics, profound differences may also exist in the knowledge of A/H1N1 and the perceptions of recommended behaviors in those countries.", "While such differences could result from study population demographics, profound differences may also exist in the knowledge of A/H1N1 and the perceptions of recommended behaviors in those countries. Adjusting for the background factors, the multivariate logistic regression showed the possible relationship between knowledge and risk perception, knowledge and practices (odd ratios were 1.57 and 2.09, respectively), which indicated that good knowledge is important to enable individuals to have better attitudes and practices in influenza risk reduction. Similar findings were observed in other studies performed during A/ H1N1 pandemic in Singapore [22] and during SARS pandemic in Hong Kong [13] .", "Similar findings were observed in other studies performed during A/ H1N1 pandemic in Singapore [22] and during SARS pandemic in Hong Kong [13] . Therefore, it is important to focus on inculcating the correct knowledge to individuals as it will influence both attitudes and practices. Injecting vaccination is an effective measure to prevent infectious disease [23] .", "Injecting vaccination is an effective measure to prevent infectious disease [23] . In China, the seasonal influenza vaccination is not included in the national immunization program and must be purchased by recipients. Those who are above 60 years old, the pupil and children in kindergarten, and people with chronic diseases are recommended to get inoculation.", "Those who are above 60 years old, the pupil and children in kindergarten, and people with chronic diseases are recommended to get inoculation. Data provided by China CDC in 2009 showed that the immunization rate of the seasonal flu in Chinese population was below 2% [24] , which was much lower than 7.5% in our study (P < 0.0001). This phenomenon is partly due to the state's prior vaccination strategy for population at high risk such as students, teachers, healthcare workers and people with chronic disease, as well as the confusion between seasonal flu vaccine and A/H1N1 vaccine in residents.", "This phenomenon is partly due to the state's prior vaccination strategy for population at high risk such as students, teachers, healthcare workers and people with chronic disease, as well as the confusion between seasonal flu vaccine and A/H1N1 vaccine in residents. People who couldn't access the A/H1N1 vaccine may take up seasonal flu vaccine as preventive behaviors. The A/ H1N1 vaccine was not available in China until the middle of September 2009.", "The A/ H1N1 vaccine was not available in China until the middle of September 2009. All populations at high risk above three years old were invited for vaccination free of charge [25] . A survey among 868 European travelers showed 14.2% participants were vaccinated against pandemic influenza A/H1N1 [26] , higher than 10.8% in our study (P < 0.01).", "A survey among 868 European travelers showed 14.2% participants were vaccinated against pandemic influenza A/H1N1 [26] , higher than 10.8% in our study (P < 0.01). Our study also showed students and health care workers were more likely to take up, which may be due to the prior vaccination strategy. Multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis, which allowed us to adjust for background factors, further showed the perceived risk of infection and the knowledge about the main modes of transmission related to A/H1N1 vaccination were insignificantly, similar results seen in Lau's study [8] .", "Multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis, which allowed us to adjust for background factors, further showed the perceived risk of infection and the knowledge about the main modes of transmission related to A/H1N1 vaccination were insignificantly, similar results seen in Lau's study [8] . Therefore, the vaccination rate of A/H1N1 is not expected to increase even if the virus becomes more prevalent or the knowledge of its transmission mode improved. Additionally, the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccine was associated with perceptions of vaccine's safety and influence on daily life by A/H1N1 as well as the knowledge about the free vaccination policy and the state's initial vaccination strategy.", "Additionally, the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccine was associated with perceptions of vaccine's safety and influence on daily life by A/H1N1 as well as the knowledge about the free vaccination policy and the state's initial vaccination strategy. This suggests that improving the safety of vaccine, the acceptability of side effect and the knowledge about the state's strategy related to A/H1N1 vaccination in residents may be helpful to promote A/H1N1 vaccination in the general population. The cross-sectional telephone survey adopted in the study has some limitations.", "The cross-sectional telephone survey adopted in the study has some limitations. We were unable to interview the people who did not have phones and the depth of the questionnaire was largely limited because questions and pre-existing answers could not be too long and complex. In addition, the telephone response rate was 46.8%, which means more than half of the interviewees rejected or didn't finish the survey.", "In addition, the telephone response rate was 46.8%, which means more than half of the interviewees rejected or didn't finish the survey. It was impossible to compare the difference between respondents and nonrespondents due to the lack of their basic information. This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic as most of them confused the transmission route of A/H1N1.", "This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic as most of them confused the transmission route of A/H1N1. There are many factors influencing the KAP related to A/H1N1. Female with higher educational level had higher perceived risk of infection and took more precautionary behaviors.", "Female with higher educational level had higher perceived risk of infection and took more precautionary behaviors. Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account. The data collected in this survey could be used as baseline data to monitor public perceives and behaviors in the event of future outbreak of infectious disease in China.", "The data collected in this survey could be used as baseline data to monitor public perceives and behaviors in the event of future outbreak of infectious disease in China. Additional file 1: Questionnaire. The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China." ]

[ "BACKGROUND: China is at greatest risk of the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 due to its huge population and high residential density. The unclear comprehension and negative attitudes towards the emerging infectious disease among general population may lead to unnecessary worry and even panic. The objective of this study was to investigate the Chinese public response to H1N1 pandemic and provide baseline data to develop public education campaigns in response to future outbreaks.", "The objective of this study was to investigate the Chinese public response to H1N1 pandemic and provide baseline data to develop public education campaigns in response to future outbreaks. METHODS: A close-ended questionnaire developed by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention was applied to assess the knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among 10,669 responders recruited from seven urban and two rural areas of China sampled by using the probability proportional to size (PPS) method. RESULTS: 30.0% respondents were not clear whether food spread H1N1 virusand.", "RESULTS: 30.0% respondents were not clear whether food spread H1N1 virusand. 65.7% reported that the pandemic had no impact on their life. The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and H1N1vaccine were 7.5% and 10.8%, respectively.", "The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and H1N1vaccine were 7.5% and 10.8%, respectively. Farmers and those with lower education level were less likely to know the main transmission route (cough or talk face to face). Female and those with college and above education had higher perception of risk and more compliance with preventive behaviors.", "Female and those with college and above education had higher perception of risk and more compliance with preventive behaviors. Relationships between knowledge and risk perception (OR = 1.69; 95%CI 1.54-1.86), and knowledge and practices (OR = 1.57; 95%CI 1.42-1.73) were found among the study subjects. With regard to the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccination, there are several related factors found in the current study population, including the perception of life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95%CI 1.11-1.50), the safety of A/H1N1 vaccine (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11), the knowledge of free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78), the state's priority vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), and taking up seasonal influenza vaccine behavior (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23).", "With regard to the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccination, there are several related factors found in the current study population, including the perception of life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95%CI 1.11-1.50), the safety of A/H1N1 vaccine (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11), the knowledge of free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78), the state's priority vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), and taking up seasonal influenza vaccine behavior (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23). CONCLUSIONS: This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic. Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account.", "Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account. Text: At the end of March 2009, an outbreak of novel influenza A (H1N1) (here after called A/H1N1) infection occurred in Mexico, followed by ongoing spread to all over the world in a short period [1] . On June 11 2009, the World Health Organization raised its pandemic alert level to the highest level, phase 6 [2] , meaning that the A/H1N1 flu had spread in more than two continents and reached pandemic proportions.", "On June 11 2009, the World Health Organization raised its pandemic alert level to the highest level, phase 6 [2] , meaning that the A/H1N1 flu had spread in more than two continents and reached pandemic proportions. As of June 13, 2010, it had caused over 18,172 deaths in more than 214 countries and overseas territories or communities [3] . Most illness, especially the severe illness and deaths, had occurred among healthy young adults, which was markedly different from the disease pattern seen during epidemics of seasonal influenza [4, 5] .", "Most illness, especially the severe illness and deaths, had occurred among healthy young adults, which was markedly different from the disease pattern seen during epidemics of seasonal influenza [4, 5] . China is highly susceptible to A/H1N1 because of its huge population and high residential density, besides the high infectiousness of this novel influenza virus. After the first imported case reported on May 11, 2009 , the confirmed cases were reported in various provinces of China [6] .", "After the first imported case reported on May 11, 2009 , the confirmed cases were reported in various provinces of China [6] . By the late of October 2009, A/H1N1 cases had increased dramatically, with 44,981 cases and 6 deaths confirmed at the end of October 2009. The A/ H1N1 infection rate peaked in November 2009, when approximately 1500 new cases of A/H1N1 were being confirmed each day.", "The A/ H1N1 infection rate peaked in November 2009, when approximately 1500 new cases of A/H1N1 were being confirmed each day. By the end of this month, a total of 92,904 cases and 200 deaths had resulted from A/ H1N1-related causes [7] . The Chinese government has taken a series of preventive measures according to WHO guidelines, including the promotion of public knowledge about flu through mass media, patient isolation, quarantine of close contact person, and free vaccinations to population at high risk (e.g.", "The Chinese government has taken a series of preventive measures according to WHO guidelines, including the promotion of public knowledge about flu through mass media, patient isolation, quarantine of close contact person, and free vaccinations to population at high risk (e.g. young children, healthcare workers, and people with chronic disease) [8] . However, there were few public reports on the assessment of the effect of these policies and the level of knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) associating with A/H1N1 among general population.", "However, there were few public reports on the assessment of the effect of these policies and the level of knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) associating with A/H1N1 among general population. It is well-known that confused comprehension and negative attitude towards the emerging communicable disease may lead to unnecessary worry and chaos, even excessive panic which would aggravate the disease epidemic [9] . For instance, during SARS epidemic from 2002 to 2004, the misconceptions and the excessive panic of Chinese public to SARS led the public resistant to comply with the suggested preventive measures such as avoiding public transportation, going to hospital when they were sick, which contributed to the rapid spread of SARS and resulted in a more serious epidemic situation, making China one of the worst affected countries with over 5327 cases and 439 deaths [10, 11] .", "For instance, during SARS epidemic from 2002 to 2004, the misconceptions and the excessive panic of Chinese public to SARS led the public resistant to comply with the suggested preventive measures such as avoiding public transportation, going to hospital when they were sick, which contributed to the rapid spread of SARS and resulted in a more serious epidemic situation, making China one of the worst affected countries with over 5327 cases and 439 deaths [10, 11] . In addition, the panic of infectious disease outbreak could cause huge economic loss, for example the economic loss of SARS has been estimated at $30-$100 billion in US, though less than 10,000 persons were infected [12] . SARS experience has demonstrated the importance of monitoring the public perception in disease epidemic control, which may affect the compliance of community to the precautionary strategies.", "SARS experience has demonstrated the importance of monitoring the public perception in disease epidemic control, which may affect the compliance of community to the precautionary strategies. Understanding related factors affecting people to undertake precautionary behavior may also help decision-makers take appropriate measures to promote individual or community health. Therefore, it is important to monitor and analyze the public response to the emerging disease.", "Therefore, it is important to monitor and analyze the public response to the emerging disease. To investigate community responses to A/H1N1 in China, we conducted this telephone survey to describe the knowledge, attitudes and practices of A/H1N1 among general population in China and put forward policy recommendations to government in case of future similar conditions. This study was performed in seven urban regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Jingzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen cities) and two rural areas (Jingzhou and Zhengzhou counties) of China with over one million people in each region.", "This study was performed in seven urban regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Jingzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen cities) and two rural areas (Jingzhou and Zhengzhou counties) of China with over one million people in each region. Regarding the urban sites, Beijing as the capital of China locates in the northeast; Shanghai is a municipality in the east of China; Wuhan (the provincial capital of Hubei) and Zhengzhou (the provincial capital of Henan province) are both in the centre of China; Xi'an in the northwest of China is the provincial capital of Shanxi province; and Shenzhen of the Guangdong province is in the southeast of China. As for the rural sites, Jingzhou county and Zhengzhou county, from Hubei and Henan provinces, respectively, both locate in the centre of China.", "As for the rural sites, Jingzhou county and Zhengzhou county, from Hubei and Henan provinces, respectively, both locate in the centre of China. This current study was carried out in three phases during the pandemic peak season of A/H1N1. The first phase was from 30 November 2009 to 27 December 2009, the second from 4 January 2010 to 24 January 2010, and the third from 24 February to 25 March in 2010.", "The first phase was from 30 November 2009 to 27 December 2009, the second from 4 January 2010 to 24 January 2010, and the third from 24 February to 25 March in 2010. A two-stage proportional probability to size (PPS) sampling method was used in each phase. In stage І, about 30% of administrative regions in each study site were selected as primary sample units (PSUs) for cluster sampling.", "In stage І, about 30% of administrative regions in each study site were selected as primary sample units (PSUs) for cluster sampling. In stage II, telephone numbers were sampled randomly, of which the first four digitals were obtained from each PSU's post office as initial number and the other three or four digitals were obtained from random number generated by Excel 2003. Then each family was chosen as per unit (excluding school, hotel public or cell phone etc.)", "Then each family was chosen as per unit (excluding school, hotel public or cell phone etc.) and at least 400 families in each site at each phase were selected finally. If the family was selected repeatedly or refused to answer the questionnaire, we added one to the last digit of phone number and dial again.", "If the family was selected repeatedly or refused to answer the questionnaire, we added one to the last digit of phone number and dial again. If the line was busy or of no response, we would dial three times and then give up this phone number if there was still no respondent. Anonymous telephone interviews were conducted from 6:30 pm to 10:00 pm so as to avoid over-presenting the non-work population by well-trained interviewers with Bachelor degree of Epidemiology.", "Anonymous telephone interviews were conducted from 6:30 pm to 10:00 pm so as to avoid over-presenting the non-work population by well-trained interviewers with Bachelor degree of Epidemiology. The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of A/H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone was designed by the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC, Beijing). The majority of the questions were closed-ended and variables in the questionnaire were categorical, except age.", "The majority of the questions were closed-ended and variables in the questionnaire were categorical, except age. The inclusion criteria of subjects were: age≥18 and proper communication skills. There were seven questions related to the knowledge of A/H1N1, four referred to the attitude, and five concerning about the practice in this questionnaire (See additional file 1: The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China).", "There were seven questions related to the knowledge of A/H1N1, four referred to the attitude, and five concerning about the practice in this questionnaire (See additional file 1: The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China). This study was approved by the institutional review board of the Tongji Medical College of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. All respondents were informed consent.", "All respondents were informed consent. We respected their wishes whether to accept our survey and promised to protect their secrets. All data were entered into computer using Epidata V.3.1 and were analyzed in SPSS statistical software V.12. Chi-square test was applied to compare the immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/H1N1 vaccine.", "Chi-square test was applied to compare the immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/H1N1 vaccine. The associations between the socio-demographic factors and the KAP regarding A/H1N1 were firstly investigated by using univariate odds ratios (OR) and then stepwise logistic regression modeling applied. Adjusting for such background variables including gender, age, level of education, occupation, region, and survey wave, stepwise multivariate logistic regression models were applied to investigate the impact factors associated with the risk perception of A/H1N1, A/H1N1 vaccination uptake and the compliance with suggested preventive measures (avoid crowd places/wash hand frequently/keep distance from people with influenza-like symptoms).", "Adjusting for such background variables including gender, age, level of education, occupation, region, and survey wave, stepwise multivariate logistic regression models were applied to investigate the impact factors associated with the risk perception of A/H1N1, A/H1N1 vaccination uptake and the compliance with suggested preventive measures (avoid crowd places/wash hand frequently/keep distance from people with influenza-like symptoms). For the purposes of analysis, the factor knowledge about the main modes of transmission was divided into two groups according to whether the respondents knew both cough and talk faceto-face can spread A/H1N1. Odds ratios and respective 95% confidence intervals (CI) were obtained from the logistic regression analysis.", "Odds ratios and respective 95% confidence intervals (CI) were obtained from the logistic regression analysis. P values lower than 0.05 were judged to be statistically significant. A total of 88541 telephone numbers were dialed.", "A total of 88541 telephone numbers were dialed. Except 65323 invalid calls (including vacant numbers, fax numbers, busy tone numbers and non-qualified respondents whose age <18 and whose phones were from school, hotel or other public places), 23218 eligible respondents were identified. Among these respondents, 12360 completed the interview.", "Among these respondents, 12360 completed the interview. Therefore, the response rate was 46.8%. Excluding missing, and logical erroneous data, 10669 questionnaires in total were eligible for analysis. The baseline characteristics of the respondents were presented in Table1. The mean age of all respondents was 41.47 years (over range: 18-90 year) .", "The mean age of all respondents was 41.47 years (over range: 18-90 year) . Of all respondents, 54.4% were female, and 42.4% had received college or above education (Table 1) . The overall KAP related to A/H1N1 was reported in Table 2 .", "The overall KAP related to A/H1N1 was reported in Table 2 . As to knowledge, 75.6% of all respondents knew that influenza could be transmitted by coughing and sneezing, and 61.9% thought that talking face-to-face was the transmission route, whereas 30.0% believed the transmission could be through food. Less than one third of respondents knew that virus could be transmitted by handshaking and indirect hand contact (26.8% and 22.3%, respectively).", "Less than one third of respondents knew that virus could be transmitted by handshaking and indirect hand contact (26.8% and 22.3%, respectively). Multiple logistic regression analysis showed that those with middle school (OR = 1.71; 95%CI 1.48-1.98), or having an education level of college and above (OR = 2.16; 95%CI 1.83-2.54) were more likely to know the transmission routes comparing with other people. Comparing with students, teachers (OR = 1.46; 95%CI 1.09-1.96) were more likely to answer the above questions Table 3 and Table 4 ).", "Comparing with students, teachers (OR = 1.46; 95%CI 1.09-1.96) were more likely to answer the above questions Table 3 and Table 4 ). Regarding the A/H1N1vaccination, 69.9% respondents believed that the occurrence rate of adverse reactions caused by A/H1N1 vaccination was fairly low and they were not afraid of taking up vaccination. Most residents (96.1%) thought that the state's vaccination strategy was reasonable.", "Most residents (96.1%) thought that the state's vaccination strategy was reasonable. About half of the respondents (42.9%) had avoided going to crowded places during the past two weeks of our survey. In case people nearby held influenza-like symptoms such as fever or cough, 56.9% increased the frequency of hand-washing and 57.4% would stay away from them.", "In case people nearby held influenza-like symptoms such as fever or cough, 56.9% increased the frequency of hand-washing and 57.4% would stay away from them. Multiple logistic regression analysis indicated compliance with the preventive practices were more likely to be taken by those who were females (OR = 1. Table 3 and Table 4 ).", "Table 3 and Table 4 ). The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/ H1N1 in respondents were 7.5% and 10.8% respectively. The multivariate stepwise models further showed that except the health care workers (OR = 1.52; 95%CI 1.09-2.11), residents in other occupations (OR = 0.06-0.67) were less likely to take up the A/H1N1 vaccination comparing with students (in Table 3 ).", "The multivariate stepwise models further showed that except the health care workers (OR = 1.52; 95%CI 1.09-2.11), residents in other occupations (OR = 0.06-0.67) were less likely to take up the A/H1N1 vaccination comparing with students (in Table 3 ). Adjusting for the background covariates the knowledge about the free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78) and the state's initial vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), perception of daily life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95% CI 1.11-1.50), practice of injecting the seasonal influenza vaccine (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23) were significantly associated with behavior of taking up the A/H1N1 vaccination positively (in Table 5 ), and the adverse reaction of A/H1N1 vaccine negatively influenced people's practice (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11). Novel A/H1N1 has caused pandemic in this century.", "Novel A/H1N1 has caused pandemic in this century. It is important to encourage the public to adopt precautionary behaviors, which is based on the correct knowledge of the epidemic and appropriate response among residents. Many studies have examined the various levels of KAP about infectious disease outbreaks, such as SARS, avian influenza [13] [14] [15] .", "Many studies have examined the various levels of KAP about infectious disease outbreaks, such as SARS, avian influenza [13] [14] [15] . Some studies have been reported specifically on community responses to A/H1N1 in Australia and Europe [16, 17] . But through literature search, we haven't found any public reports on KAP regarding A/H1N1 among Chinese population until now.", "But through literature search, we haven't found any public reports on KAP regarding A/H1N1 among Chinese population until now. Therefore, we conducted this large population-based survey (10669 respondents) to investigate community responses to A/H1N1 and to provide baseline data to government for preventive measures in case of future outbreaks. Unless people have basic knowledge about the modes of transmission, they respond appropriately during an outbreak [16] .", "Unless people have basic knowledge about the modes of transmission, they respond appropriately during an outbreak [16] . It has been proved that influenza is transmitted through person to person via respiratory secretions [18] . Most residents in our survey recognized that OR m : odds ratio obtained from stepwise multivariate logistics regression analysis using univariately significant variables as candidate variables and adjusting for region; NU: not significant in the univariate analysis; *: P < 0.05; †: P < 0.01; ‡: P < 0.0001.\n\nthe risk of getting infected would increase when an infected person coughed or sneezed in close distance.", "Most residents in our survey recognized that OR m : odds ratio obtained from stepwise multivariate logistics regression analysis using univariately significant variables as candidate variables and adjusting for region; NU: not significant in the univariate analysis; *: P < 0.05; †: P < 0.01; ‡: P < 0.0001.\n\nthe risk of getting infected would increase when an infected person coughed or sneezed in close distance. This may be due to the previous experience of SARS and avian flu. Multivariate analysis results showed that workers and farmers with lower education level were less likely to have this knowledge, which indicated that the contents and forms of propaganda should be more understandable and acceptable.", "Multivariate analysis results showed that workers and farmers with lower education level were less likely to have this knowledge, which indicated that the contents and forms of propaganda should be more understandable and acceptable. A large proportion of residents in our survey overlooked the indirect hand contact and hand-shaking transmission route and about one third of public misconceived that A/H1N1 was food borne, which was associated with the previous knowledge of avian flu and the new A/H1N1 flu in the general population. The confusion with avian flu might mislead some residents to believe that the A/H1N1 virus is fatal and cause public panic [19] .", "The confusion with avian flu might mislead some residents to believe that the A/H1N1 virus is fatal and cause public panic [19] . Therefore, it is important for the government and health authorities to provide continuously updated information of the emerging disease through televisions, newspapers, radios, and Internet. There are regional differences in the perception of A/H1N1.", "There are regional differences in the perception of A/H1N1. For example, the public in Hong Kong did not perceive a high likelihood of having a local A/H1N1 outbreak [19] , but Malaysians were particularly anxious about the pandemic [20] . The current study shows that emotional distress was relatively mild in China as few residents worried about being infected (25.1%).", "The current study shows that emotional distress was relatively mild in China as few residents worried about being infected (25.1%). This phenomenon may also be related to the previous experience of the SARS epidemic, as well as the open epidemic information. A survey in Korean university showed that women perceived higher illness severity and personal susceptibility to A/ H1N1 infection, which had been reconfirmed in our study [21] .", "A survey in Korean university showed that women perceived higher illness severity and personal susceptibility to A/ H1N1 infection, which had been reconfirmed in our study [21] . Logistic regression analysis results suggested that women with higher educational level had higher perception of risk. As time went by, the knowledge about the main transmission route increased, but the risk perception of being infected in residents decreased, suggesting the positive effect of government policy regarding A/H1N1 infection prevention, as well as the promotion of the media.", "As time went by, the knowledge about the main transmission route increased, but the risk perception of being infected in residents decreased, suggesting the positive effect of government policy regarding A/H1N1 infection prevention, as well as the promotion of the media. The previous study presented various results of influencing factors on the the compliance with the preventive practices. The study in Saudi showed that older men with better education were more likely to take preventive practices [9] ; female students in Korean washed hands more frequently during the peak pandemic period of A/ H1N1 [21] ; in another pandemic study in USA, younger people was found to have greater uptake of recommended behaviors but not for gender [16] .", "The study in Saudi showed that older men with better education were more likely to take preventive practices [9] ; female students in Korean washed hands more frequently during the peak pandemic period of A/ H1N1 [21] ; in another pandemic study in USA, younger people was found to have greater uptake of recommended behaviors but not for gender [16] . We found female with higher education took more precautionary behaviors, but office staffs and farmers took less comparing with students. While such differences could result from study population demographics, profound differences may also exist in the knowledge of A/H1N1 and the perceptions of recommended behaviors in those countries.", "While such differences could result from study population demographics, profound differences may also exist in the knowledge of A/H1N1 and the perceptions of recommended behaviors in those countries. Adjusting for the background factors, the multivariate logistic regression showed the possible relationship between knowledge and risk perception, knowledge and practices (odd ratios were 1.57 and 2.09, respectively), which indicated that good knowledge is important to enable individuals to have better attitudes and practices in influenza risk reduction. Similar findings were observed in other studies performed during A/ H1N1 pandemic in Singapore [22] and during SARS pandemic in Hong Kong [13] .", "Similar findings were observed in other studies performed during A/ H1N1 pandemic in Singapore [22] and during SARS pandemic in Hong Kong [13] . Therefore, it is important to focus on inculcating the correct knowledge to individuals as it will influence both attitudes and practices. Injecting vaccination is an effective measure to prevent infectious disease [23] .", "Injecting vaccination is an effective measure to prevent infectious disease [23] . In China, the seasonal influenza vaccination is not included in the national immunization program and must be purchased by recipients. Those who are above 60 years old, the pupil and children in kindergarten, and people with chronic diseases are recommended to get inoculation.", "Those who are above 60 years old, the pupil and children in kindergarten, and people with chronic diseases are recommended to get inoculation. Data provided by China CDC in 2009 showed that the immunization rate of the seasonal flu in Chinese population was below 2% [24] , which was much lower than 7.5% in our study (P < 0.0001). This phenomenon is partly due to the state's prior vaccination strategy for population at high risk such as students, teachers, healthcare workers and people with chronic disease, as well as the confusion between seasonal flu vaccine and A/H1N1 vaccine in residents.", "This phenomenon is partly due to the state's prior vaccination strategy for population at high risk such as students, teachers, healthcare workers and people with chronic disease, as well as the confusion between seasonal flu vaccine and A/H1N1 vaccine in residents. People who couldn't access the A/H1N1 vaccine may take up seasonal flu vaccine as preventive behaviors. The A/ H1N1 vaccine was not available in China until the middle of September 2009.", "The A/ H1N1 vaccine was not available in China until the middle of September 2009. All populations at high risk above three years old were invited for vaccination free of charge [25] . A survey among 868 European travelers showed 14.2% participants were vaccinated against pandemic influenza A/H1N1 [26] , higher than 10.8% in our study (P < 0.01).", "A survey among 868 European travelers showed 14.2% participants were vaccinated against pandemic influenza A/H1N1 [26] , higher than 10.8% in our study (P < 0.01). Our study also showed students and health care workers were more likely to take up, which may be due to the prior vaccination strategy. Multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis, which allowed us to adjust for background factors, further showed the perceived risk of infection and the knowledge about the main modes of transmission related to A/H1N1 vaccination were insignificantly, similar results seen in Lau's study [8] .", "Multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis, which allowed us to adjust for background factors, further showed the perceived risk of infection and the knowledge about the main modes of transmission related to A/H1N1 vaccination were insignificantly, similar results seen in Lau's study [8] . Therefore, the vaccination rate of A/H1N1 is not expected to increase even if the virus becomes more prevalent or the knowledge of its transmission mode improved. Additionally, the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccine was associated with perceptions of vaccine's safety and influence on daily life by A/H1N1 as well as the knowledge about the free vaccination policy and the state's initial vaccination strategy.", "Additionally, the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccine was associated with perceptions of vaccine's safety and influence on daily life by A/H1N1 as well as the knowledge about the free vaccination policy and the state's initial vaccination strategy. This suggests that improving the safety of vaccine, the acceptability of side effect and the knowledge about the state's strategy related to A/H1N1 vaccination in residents may be helpful to promote A/H1N1 vaccination in the general population. The cross-sectional telephone survey adopted in the study has some limitations.", "The cross-sectional telephone survey adopted in the study has some limitations. We were unable to interview the people who did not have phones and the depth of the questionnaire was largely limited because questions and pre-existing answers could not be too long and complex. In addition, the telephone response rate was 46.8%, which means more than half of the interviewees rejected or didn't finish the survey.", "In addition, the telephone response rate was 46.8%, which means more than half of the interviewees rejected or didn't finish the survey. It was impossible to compare the difference between respondents and nonrespondents due to the lack of their basic information. This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic as most of them confused the transmission route of A/H1N1.", "This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic as most of them confused the transmission route of A/H1N1. There are many factors influencing the KAP related to A/H1N1. Female with higher educational level had higher perceived risk of infection and took more precautionary behaviors.", "Female with higher educational level had higher perceived risk of infection and took more precautionary behaviors. Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account. The data collected in this survey could be used as baseline data to monitor public perceives and behaviors in the event of future outbreak of infectious disease in China.", "The data collected in this survey could be used as baseline data to monitor public perceives and behaviors in the event of future outbreak of infectious disease in China. Additional file 1: Questionnaire. The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China." ]

[ "BACKGROUND: China is at greatest risk of the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 due to its huge population and high residential density. The unclear comprehension and negative attitudes towards the emerging infectious disease among general population may lead to unnecessary worry and even panic. The objective of this study was to investigate the Chinese public response to H1N1 pandemic and provide baseline data to develop public education campaigns in response to future outbreaks.", "The objective of this study was to investigate the Chinese public response to H1N1 pandemic and provide baseline data to develop public education campaigns in response to future outbreaks. METHODS: A close-ended questionnaire developed by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention was applied to assess the knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among 10,669 responders recruited from seven urban and two rural areas of China sampled by using the probability proportional to size (PPS) method. RESULTS: 30.0% respondents were not clear whether food spread H1N1 virusand.", "RESULTS: 30.0% respondents were not clear whether food spread H1N1 virusand. 65.7% reported that the pandemic had no impact on their life. The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and H1N1vaccine were 7.5% and 10.8%, respectively.", "The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and H1N1vaccine were 7.5% and 10.8%, respectively. Farmers and those with lower education level were less likely to know the main transmission route (cough or talk face to face). Female and those with college and above education had higher perception of risk and more compliance with preventive behaviors.", "Female and those with college and above education had higher perception of risk and more compliance with preventive behaviors. Relationships between knowledge and risk perception (OR = 1.69; 95%CI 1.54-1.86), and knowledge and practices (OR = 1.57; 95%CI 1.42-1.73) were found among the study subjects. With regard to the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccination, there are several related factors found in the current study population, including the perception of life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95%CI 1.11-1.50), the safety of A/H1N1 vaccine (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11), the knowledge of free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78), the state's priority vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), and taking up seasonal influenza vaccine behavior (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23).", "With regard to the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccination, there are several related factors found in the current study population, including the perception of life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95%CI 1.11-1.50), the safety of A/H1N1 vaccine (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11), the knowledge of free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78), the state's priority vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), and taking up seasonal influenza vaccine behavior (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23). CONCLUSIONS: This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic. Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account.", "Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account. Text: At the end of March 2009, an outbreak of novel influenza A (H1N1) (here after called A/H1N1) infection occurred in Mexico, followed by ongoing spread to all over the world in a short period [1] . On June 11 2009, the World Health Organization raised its pandemic alert level to the highest level, phase 6 [2] , meaning that the A/H1N1 flu had spread in more than two continents and reached pandemic proportions.", "On June 11 2009, the World Health Organization raised its pandemic alert level to the highest level, phase 6 [2] , meaning that the A/H1N1 flu had spread in more than two continents and reached pandemic proportions. As of June 13, 2010, it had caused over 18,172 deaths in more than 214 countries and overseas territories or communities [3] . Most illness, especially the severe illness and deaths, had occurred among healthy young adults, which was markedly different from the disease pattern seen during epidemics of seasonal influenza [4, 5] .", "Most illness, especially the severe illness and deaths, had occurred among healthy young adults, which was markedly different from the disease pattern seen during epidemics of seasonal influenza [4, 5] . China is highly susceptible to A/H1N1 because of its huge population and high residential density, besides the high infectiousness of this novel influenza virus. After the first imported case reported on May 11, 2009 , the confirmed cases were reported in various provinces of China [6] .", "After the first imported case reported on May 11, 2009 , the confirmed cases were reported in various provinces of China [6] . By the late of October 2009, A/H1N1 cases had increased dramatically, with 44,981 cases and 6 deaths confirmed at the end of October 2009. The A/ H1N1 infection rate peaked in November 2009, when approximately 1500 new cases of A/H1N1 were being confirmed each day.", "The A/ H1N1 infection rate peaked in November 2009, when approximately 1500 new cases of A/H1N1 were being confirmed each day. By the end of this month, a total of 92,904 cases and 200 deaths had resulted from A/ H1N1-related causes [7] . The Chinese government has taken a series of preventive measures according to WHO guidelines, including the promotion of public knowledge about flu through mass media, patient isolation, quarantine of close contact person, and free vaccinations to population at high risk (e.g.", "The Chinese government has taken a series of preventive measures according to WHO guidelines, including the promotion of public knowledge about flu through mass media, patient isolation, quarantine of close contact person, and free vaccinations to population at high risk (e.g. young children, healthcare workers, and people with chronic disease) [8] . However, there were few public reports on the assessment of the effect of these policies and the level of knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) associating with A/H1N1 among general population.", "However, there were few public reports on the assessment of the effect of these policies and the level of knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) associating with A/H1N1 among general population. It is well-known that confused comprehension and negative attitude towards the emerging communicable disease may lead to unnecessary worry and chaos, even excessive panic which would aggravate the disease epidemic [9] . For instance, during SARS epidemic from 2002 to 2004, the misconceptions and the excessive panic of Chinese public to SARS led the public resistant to comply with the suggested preventive measures such as avoiding public transportation, going to hospital when they were sick, which contributed to the rapid spread of SARS and resulted in a more serious epidemic situation, making China one of the worst affected countries with over 5327 cases and 439 deaths [10, 11] .", "For instance, during SARS epidemic from 2002 to 2004, the misconceptions and the excessive panic of Chinese public to SARS led the public resistant to comply with the suggested preventive measures such as avoiding public transportation, going to hospital when they were sick, which contributed to the rapid spread of SARS and resulted in a more serious epidemic situation, making China one of the worst affected countries with over 5327 cases and 439 deaths [10, 11] . In addition, the panic of infectious disease outbreak could cause huge economic loss, for example the economic loss of SARS has been estimated at $30-$100 billion in US, though less than 10,000 persons were infected [12] . SARS experience has demonstrated the importance of monitoring the public perception in disease epidemic control, which may affect the compliance of community to the precautionary strategies.", "SARS experience has demonstrated the importance of monitoring the public perception in disease epidemic control, which may affect the compliance of community to the precautionary strategies. Understanding related factors affecting people to undertake precautionary behavior may also help decision-makers take appropriate measures to promote individual or community health. Therefore, it is important to monitor and analyze the public response to the emerging disease.", "Therefore, it is important to monitor and analyze the public response to the emerging disease. To investigate community responses to A/H1N1 in China, we conducted this telephone survey to describe the knowledge, attitudes and practices of A/H1N1 among general population in China and put forward policy recommendations to government in case of future similar conditions. This study was performed in seven urban regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Jingzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen cities) and two rural areas (Jingzhou and Zhengzhou counties) of China with over one million people in each region.", "This study was performed in seven urban regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Jingzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen cities) and two rural areas (Jingzhou and Zhengzhou counties) of China with over one million people in each region. Regarding the urban sites, Beijing as the capital of China locates in the northeast; Shanghai is a municipality in the east of China; Wuhan (the provincial capital of Hubei) and Zhengzhou (the provincial capital of Henan province) are both in the centre of China; Xi'an in the northwest of China is the provincial capital of Shanxi province; and Shenzhen of the Guangdong province is in the southeast of China. As for the rural sites, Jingzhou county and Zhengzhou county, from Hubei and Henan provinces, respectively, both locate in the centre of China.", "As for the rural sites, Jingzhou county and Zhengzhou county, from Hubei and Henan provinces, respectively, both locate in the centre of China. This current study was carried out in three phases during the pandemic peak season of A/H1N1. The first phase was from 30 November 2009 to 27 December 2009, the second from 4 January 2010 to 24 January 2010, and the third from 24 February to 25 March in 2010.", "The first phase was from 30 November 2009 to 27 December 2009, the second from 4 January 2010 to 24 January 2010, and the third from 24 February to 25 March in 2010. A two-stage proportional probability to size (PPS) sampling method was used in each phase. In stage І, about 30% of administrative regions in each study site were selected as primary sample units (PSUs) for cluster sampling.", "In stage І, about 30% of administrative regions in each study site were selected as primary sample units (PSUs) for cluster sampling. In stage II, telephone numbers were sampled randomly, of which the first four digitals were obtained from each PSU's post office as initial number and the other three or four digitals were obtained from random number generated by Excel 2003. Then each family was chosen as per unit (excluding school, hotel public or cell phone etc.)", "Then each family was chosen as per unit (excluding school, hotel public or cell phone etc.) and at least 400 families in each site at each phase were selected finally. If the family was selected repeatedly or refused to answer the questionnaire, we added one to the last digit of phone number and dial again.", "If the family was selected repeatedly or refused to answer the questionnaire, we added one to the last digit of phone number and dial again. If the line was busy or of no response, we would dial three times and then give up this phone number if there was still no respondent. Anonymous telephone interviews were conducted from 6:30 pm to 10:00 pm so as to avoid over-presenting the non-work population by well-trained interviewers with Bachelor degree of Epidemiology.", "Anonymous telephone interviews were conducted from 6:30 pm to 10:00 pm so as to avoid over-presenting the non-work population by well-trained interviewers with Bachelor degree of Epidemiology. The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of A/H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone was designed by the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC, Beijing). The majority of the questions were closed-ended and variables in the questionnaire were categorical, except age.", "The majority of the questions were closed-ended and variables in the questionnaire were categorical, except age. The inclusion criteria of subjects were: age≥18 and proper communication skills. There were seven questions related to the knowledge of A/H1N1, four referred to the attitude, and five concerning about the practice in this questionnaire (See additional file 1: The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China).", "There were seven questions related to the knowledge of A/H1N1, four referred to the attitude, and five concerning about the practice in this questionnaire (See additional file 1: The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China). This study was approved by the institutional review board of the Tongji Medical College of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. All respondents were informed consent.", "All respondents were informed consent. We respected their wishes whether to accept our survey and promised to protect their secrets. All data were entered into computer using Epidata V.3.1 and were analyzed in SPSS statistical software V.12. Chi-square test was applied to compare the immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/H1N1 vaccine.", "Chi-square test was applied to compare the immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/H1N1 vaccine. The associations between the socio-demographic factors and the KAP regarding A/H1N1 were firstly investigated by using univariate odds ratios (OR) and then stepwise logistic regression modeling applied. Adjusting for such background variables including gender, age, level of education, occupation, region, and survey wave, stepwise multivariate logistic regression models were applied to investigate the impact factors associated with the risk perception of A/H1N1, A/H1N1 vaccination uptake and the compliance with suggested preventive measures (avoid crowd places/wash hand frequently/keep distance from people with influenza-like symptoms).", "Adjusting for such background variables including gender, age, level of education, occupation, region, and survey wave, stepwise multivariate logistic regression models were applied to investigate the impact factors associated with the risk perception of A/H1N1, A/H1N1 vaccination uptake and the compliance with suggested preventive measures (avoid crowd places/wash hand frequently/keep distance from people with influenza-like symptoms). For the purposes of analysis, the factor knowledge about the main modes of transmission was divided into two groups according to whether the respondents knew both cough and talk faceto-face can spread A/H1N1. Odds ratios and respective 95% confidence intervals (CI) were obtained from the logistic regression analysis.", "Odds ratios and respective 95% confidence intervals (CI) were obtained from the logistic regression analysis. P values lower than 0.05 were judged to be statistically significant. A total of 88541 telephone numbers were dialed.", "A total of 88541 telephone numbers were dialed. Except 65323 invalid calls (including vacant numbers, fax numbers, busy tone numbers and non-qualified respondents whose age <18 and whose phones were from school, hotel or other public places), 23218 eligible respondents were identified. Among these respondents, 12360 completed the interview.", "Among these respondents, 12360 completed the interview. Therefore, the response rate was 46.8%. Excluding missing, and logical erroneous data, 10669 questionnaires in total were eligible for analysis. The baseline characteristics of the respondents were presented in Table1. The mean age of all respondents was 41.47 years (over range: 18-90 year) .", "The mean age of all respondents was 41.47 years (over range: 18-90 year) . Of all respondents, 54.4% were female, and 42.4% had received college or above education (Table 1) . The overall KAP related to A/H1N1 was reported in Table 2 .", "The overall KAP related to A/H1N1 was reported in Table 2 . As to knowledge, 75.6% of all respondents knew that influenza could be transmitted by coughing and sneezing, and 61.9% thought that talking face-to-face was the transmission route, whereas 30.0% believed the transmission could be through food. Less than one third of respondents knew that virus could be transmitted by handshaking and indirect hand contact (26.8% and 22.3%, respectively).", "Less than one third of respondents knew that virus could be transmitted by handshaking and indirect hand contact (26.8% and 22.3%, respectively). Multiple logistic regression analysis showed that those with middle school (OR = 1.71; 95%CI 1.48-1.98), or having an education level of college and above (OR = 2.16; 95%CI 1.83-2.54) were more likely to know the transmission routes comparing with other people. Comparing with students, teachers (OR = 1.46; 95%CI 1.09-1.96) were more likely to answer the above questions Table 3 and Table 4 ).", "Comparing with students, teachers (OR = 1.46; 95%CI 1.09-1.96) were more likely to answer the above questions Table 3 and Table 4 ). Regarding the A/H1N1vaccination, 69.9% respondents believed that the occurrence rate of adverse reactions caused by A/H1N1 vaccination was fairly low and they were not afraid of taking up vaccination. Most residents (96.1%) thought that the state's vaccination strategy was reasonable.", "Most residents (96.1%) thought that the state's vaccination strategy was reasonable. About half of the respondents (42.9%) had avoided going to crowded places during the past two weeks of our survey. In case people nearby held influenza-like symptoms such as fever or cough, 56.9% increased the frequency of hand-washing and 57.4% would stay away from them.", "In case people nearby held influenza-like symptoms such as fever or cough, 56.9% increased the frequency of hand-washing and 57.4% would stay away from them. Multiple logistic regression analysis indicated compliance with the preventive practices were more likely to be taken by those who were females (OR = 1. Table 3 and Table 4 ).", "Table 3 and Table 4 ). The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/ H1N1 in respondents were 7.5% and 10.8% respectively. The multivariate stepwise models further showed that except the health care workers (OR = 1.52; 95%CI 1.09-2.11), residents in other occupations (OR = 0.06-0.67) were less likely to take up the A/H1N1 vaccination comparing with students (in Table 3 ).", "The multivariate stepwise models further showed that except the health care workers (OR = 1.52; 95%CI 1.09-2.11), residents in other occupations (OR = 0.06-0.67) were less likely to take up the A/H1N1 vaccination comparing with students (in Table 3 ). Adjusting for the background covariates the knowledge about the free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78) and the state's initial vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), perception of daily life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95% CI 1.11-1.50), practice of injecting the seasonal influenza vaccine (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23) were significantly associated with behavior of taking up the A/H1N1 vaccination positively (in Table 5 ), and the adverse reaction of A/H1N1 vaccine negatively influenced people's practice (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11). Novel A/H1N1 has caused pandemic in this century.", "Novel A/H1N1 has caused pandemic in this century. It is important to encourage the public to adopt precautionary behaviors, which is based on the correct knowledge of the epidemic and appropriate response among residents. Many studies have examined the various levels of KAP about infectious disease outbreaks, such as SARS, avian influenza [13] [14] [15] .", "Many studies have examined the various levels of KAP about infectious disease outbreaks, such as SARS, avian influenza [13] [14] [15] . Some studies have been reported specifically on community responses to A/H1N1 in Australia and Europe [16, 17] . But through literature search, we haven't found any public reports on KAP regarding A/H1N1 among Chinese population until now.", "But through literature search, we haven't found any public reports on KAP regarding A/H1N1 among Chinese population until now. Therefore, we conducted this large population-based survey (10669 respondents) to investigate community responses to A/H1N1 and to provide baseline data to government for preventive measures in case of future outbreaks. Unless people have basic knowledge about the modes of transmission, they respond appropriately during an outbreak [16] .", "Unless people have basic knowledge about the modes of transmission, they respond appropriately during an outbreak [16] . It has been proved that influenza is transmitted through person to person via respiratory secretions [18] . Most residents in our survey recognized that OR m : odds ratio obtained from stepwise multivariate logistics regression analysis using univariately significant variables as candidate variables and adjusting for region; NU: not significant in the univariate analysis; *: P < 0.05; †: P < 0.01; ‡: P < 0.0001.\n\nthe risk of getting infected would increase when an infected person coughed or sneezed in close distance.", "Most residents in our survey recognized that OR m : odds ratio obtained from stepwise multivariate logistics regression analysis using univariately significant variables as candidate variables and adjusting for region; NU: not significant in the univariate analysis; *: P < 0.05; †: P < 0.01; ‡: P < 0.0001.\n\nthe risk of getting infected would increase when an infected person coughed or sneezed in close distance. This may be due to the previous experience of SARS and avian flu. Multivariate analysis results showed that workers and farmers with lower education level were less likely to have this knowledge, which indicated that the contents and forms of propaganda should be more understandable and acceptable.", "Multivariate analysis results showed that workers and farmers with lower education level were less likely to have this knowledge, which indicated that the contents and forms of propaganda should be more understandable and acceptable. A large proportion of residents in our survey overlooked the indirect hand contact and hand-shaking transmission route and about one third of public misconceived that A/H1N1 was food borne, which was associated with the previous knowledge of avian flu and the new A/H1N1 flu in the general population. The confusion with avian flu might mislead some residents to believe that the A/H1N1 virus is fatal and cause public panic [19] .", "The confusion with avian flu might mislead some residents to believe that the A/H1N1 virus is fatal and cause public panic [19] . Therefore, it is important for the government and health authorities to provide continuously updated information of the emerging disease through televisions, newspapers, radios, and Internet. There are regional differences in the perception of A/H1N1.", "There are regional differences in the perception of A/H1N1. For example, the public in Hong Kong did not perceive a high likelihood of having a local A/H1N1 outbreak [19] , but Malaysians were particularly anxious about the pandemic [20] . The current study shows that emotional distress was relatively mild in China as few residents worried about being infected (25.1%).", "The current study shows that emotional distress was relatively mild in China as few residents worried about being infected (25.1%). This phenomenon may also be related to the previous experience of the SARS epidemic, as well as the open epidemic information. A survey in Korean university showed that women perceived higher illness severity and personal susceptibility to A/ H1N1 infection, which had been reconfirmed in our study [21] .", "A survey in Korean university showed that women perceived higher illness severity and personal susceptibility to A/ H1N1 infection, which had been reconfirmed in our study [21] . Logistic regression analysis results suggested that women with higher educational level had higher perception of risk. As time went by, the knowledge about the main transmission route increased, but the risk perception of being infected in residents decreased, suggesting the positive effect of government policy regarding A/H1N1 infection prevention, as well as the promotion of the media.", "As time went by, the knowledge about the main transmission route increased, but the risk perception of being infected in residents decreased, suggesting the positive effect of government policy regarding A/H1N1 infection prevention, as well as the promotion of the media. The previous study presented various results of influencing factors on the the compliance with the preventive practices. The study in Saudi showed that older men with better education were more likely to take preventive practices [9] ; female students in Korean washed hands more frequently during the peak pandemic period of A/ H1N1 [21] ; in another pandemic study in USA, younger people was found to have greater uptake of recommended behaviors but not for gender [16] .", "The study in Saudi showed that older men with better education were more likely to take preventive practices [9] ; female students in Korean washed hands more frequently during the peak pandemic period of A/ H1N1 [21] ; in another pandemic study in USA, younger people was found to have greater uptake of recommended behaviors but not for gender [16] . We found female with higher education took more precautionary behaviors, but office staffs and farmers took less comparing with students. While such differences could result from study population demographics, profound differences may also exist in the knowledge of A/H1N1 and the perceptions of recommended behaviors in those countries.", "While such differences could result from study population demographics, profound differences may also exist in the knowledge of A/H1N1 and the perceptions of recommended behaviors in those countries. Adjusting for the background factors, the multivariate logistic regression showed the possible relationship between knowledge and risk perception, knowledge and practices (odd ratios were 1.57 and 2.09, respectively), which indicated that good knowledge is important to enable individuals to have better attitudes and practices in influenza risk reduction. Similar findings were observed in other studies performed during A/ H1N1 pandemic in Singapore [22] and during SARS pandemic in Hong Kong [13] .", "Similar findings were observed in other studies performed during A/ H1N1 pandemic in Singapore [22] and during SARS pandemic in Hong Kong [13] . Therefore, it is important to focus on inculcating the correct knowledge to individuals as it will influence both attitudes and practices. Injecting vaccination is an effective measure to prevent infectious disease [23] .", "Injecting vaccination is an effective measure to prevent infectious disease [23] . In China, the seasonal influenza vaccination is not included in the national immunization program and must be purchased by recipients. Those who are above 60 years old, the pupil and children in kindergarten, and people with chronic diseases are recommended to get inoculation.", "Those who are above 60 years old, the pupil and children in kindergarten, and people with chronic diseases are recommended to get inoculation. Data provided by China CDC in 2009 showed that the immunization rate of the seasonal flu in Chinese population was below 2% [24] , which was much lower than 7.5% in our study (P < 0.0001). This phenomenon is partly due to the state's prior vaccination strategy for population at high risk such as students, teachers, healthcare workers and people with chronic disease, as well as the confusion between seasonal flu vaccine and A/H1N1 vaccine in residents.", "This phenomenon is partly due to the state's prior vaccination strategy for population at high risk such as students, teachers, healthcare workers and people with chronic disease, as well as the confusion between seasonal flu vaccine and A/H1N1 vaccine in residents. People who couldn't access the A/H1N1 vaccine may take up seasonal flu vaccine as preventive behaviors. The A/ H1N1 vaccine was not available in China until the middle of September 2009.", "The A/ H1N1 vaccine was not available in China until the middle of September 2009. All populations at high risk above three years old were invited for vaccination free of charge [25] . A survey among 868 European travelers showed 14.2% participants were vaccinated against pandemic influenza A/H1N1 [26] , higher than 10.8% in our study (P < 0.01).", "A survey among 868 European travelers showed 14.2% participants were vaccinated against pandemic influenza A/H1N1 [26] , higher than 10.8% in our study (P < 0.01). Our study also showed students and health care workers were more likely to take up, which may be due to the prior vaccination strategy. Multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis, which allowed us to adjust for background factors, further showed the perceived risk of infection and the knowledge about the main modes of transmission related to A/H1N1 vaccination were insignificantly, similar results seen in Lau's study [8] .", "Multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis, which allowed us to adjust for background factors, further showed the perceived risk of infection and the knowledge about the main modes of transmission related to A/H1N1 vaccination were insignificantly, similar results seen in Lau's study [8] . Therefore, the vaccination rate of A/H1N1 is not expected to increase even if the virus becomes more prevalent or the knowledge of its transmission mode improved. Additionally, the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccine was associated with perceptions of vaccine's safety and influence on daily life by A/H1N1 as well as the knowledge about the free vaccination policy and the state's initial vaccination strategy.", "Additionally, the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccine was associated with perceptions of vaccine's safety and influence on daily life by A/H1N1 as well as the knowledge about the free vaccination policy and the state's initial vaccination strategy. This suggests that improving the safety of vaccine, the acceptability of side effect and the knowledge about the state's strategy related to A/H1N1 vaccination in residents may be helpful to promote A/H1N1 vaccination in the general population. The cross-sectional telephone survey adopted in the study has some limitations.", "The cross-sectional telephone survey adopted in the study has some limitations. We were unable to interview the people who did not have phones and the depth of the questionnaire was largely limited because questions and pre-existing answers could not be too long and complex. In addition, the telephone response rate was 46.8%, which means more than half of the interviewees rejected or didn't finish the survey.", "In addition, the telephone response rate was 46.8%, which means more than half of the interviewees rejected or didn't finish the survey. It was impossible to compare the difference between respondents and nonrespondents due to the lack of their basic information. This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic as most of them confused the transmission route of A/H1N1.", "This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic as most of them confused the transmission route of A/H1N1. There are many factors influencing the KAP related to A/H1N1. Female with higher educational level had higher perceived risk of infection and took more precautionary behaviors.", "Female with higher educational level had higher perceived risk of infection and took more precautionary behaviors. Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account. The data collected in this survey could be used as baseline data to monitor public perceives and behaviors in the event of future outbreak of infectious disease in China.", "The data collected in this survey could be used as baseline data to monitor public perceives and behaviors in the event of future outbreak of infectious disease in China. Additional file 1: Questionnaire. The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China." ]

[ "BACKGROUND: China is at greatest risk of the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 due to its huge population and high residential density. The unclear comprehension and negative attitudes towards the emerging infectious disease among general population may lead to unnecessary worry and even panic. The objective of this study was to investigate the Chinese public response to H1N1 pandemic and provide baseline data to develop public education campaigns in response to future outbreaks.", "The objective of this study was to investigate the Chinese public response to H1N1 pandemic and provide baseline data to develop public education campaigns in response to future outbreaks. METHODS: A close-ended questionnaire developed by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention was applied to assess the knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among 10,669 responders recruited from seven urban and two rural areas of China sampled by using the probability proportional to size (PPS) method. RESULTS: 30.0% respondents were not clear whether food spread H1N1 virusand.", "RESULTS: 30.0% respondents were not clear whether food spread H1N1 virusand. 65.7% reported that the pandemic had no impact on their life. The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and H1N1vaccine were 7.5% and 10.8%, respectively.", "The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and H1N1vaccine were 7.5% and 10.8%, respectively. Farmers and those with lower education level were less likely to know the main transmission route (cough or talk face to face). Female and those with college and above education had higher perception of risk and more compliance with preventive behaviors.", "Female and those with college and above education had higher perception of risk and more compliance with preventive behaviors. Relationships between knowledge and risk perception (OR = 1.69; 95%CI 1.54-1.86), and knowledge and practices (OR = 1.57; 95%CI 1.42-1.73) were found among the study subjects. With regard to the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccination, there are several related factors found in the current study population, including the perception of life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95%CI 1.11-1.50), the safety of A/H1N1 vaccine (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11), the knowledge of free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78), the state's priority vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), and taking up seasonal influenza vaccine behavior (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23).", "With regard to the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccination, there are several related factors found in the current study population, including the perception of life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95%CI 1.11-1.50), the safety of A/H1N1 vaccine (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11), the knowledge of free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78), the state's priority vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), and taking up seasonal influenza vaccine behavior (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23). CONCLUSIONS: This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic. Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account.", "Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account. Text: At the end of March 2009, an outbreak of novel influenza A (H1N1) (here after called A/H1N1) infection occurred in Mexico, followed by ongoing spread to all over the world in a short period [1] . On June 11 2009, the World Health Organization raised its pandemic alert level to the highest level, phase 6 [2] , meaning that the A/H1N1 flu had spread in more than two continents and reached pandemic proportions.", "On June 11 2009, the World Health Organization raised its pandemic alert level to the highest level, phase 6 [2] , meaning that the A/H1N1 flu had spread in more than two continents and reached pandemic proportions. As of June 13, 2010, it had caused over 18,172 deaths in more than 214 countries and overseas territories or communities [3] . Most illness, especially the severe illness and deaths, had occurred among healthy young adults, which was markedly different from the disease pattern seen during epidemics of seasonal influenza [4, 5] .", "Most illness, especially the severe illness and deaths, had occurred among healthy young adults, which was markedly different from the disease pattern seen during epidemics of seasonal influenza [4, 5] . China is highly susceptible to A/H1N1 because of its huge population and high residential density, besides the high infectiousness of this novel influenza virus. After the first imported case reported on May 11, 2009 , the confirmed cases were reported in various provinces of China [6] .", "After the first imported case reported on May 11, 2009 , the confirmed cases were reported in various provinces of China [6] . By the late of October 2009, A/H1N1 cases had increased dramatically, with 44,981 cases and 6 deaths confirmed at the end of October 2009. The A/ H1N1 infection rate peaked in November 2009, when approximately 1500 new cases of A/H1N1 were being confirmed each day.", "The A/ H1N1 infection rate peaked in November 2009, when approximately 1500 new cases of A/H1N1 were being confirmed each day. By the end of this month, a total of 92,904 cases and 200 deaths had resulted from A/ H1N1-related causes [7] . The Chinese government has taken a series of preventive measures according to WHO guidelines, including the promotion of public knowledge about flu through mass media, patient isolation, quarantine of close contact person, and free vaccinations to population at high risk (e.g.", "The Chinese government has taken a series of preventive measures according to WHO guidelines, including the promotion of public knowledge about flu through mass media, patient isolation, quarantine of close contact person, and free vaccinations to population at high risk (e.g. young children, healthcare workers, and people with chronic disease) [8] . However, there were few public reports on the assessment of the effect of these policies and the level of knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) associating with A/H1N1 among general population.", "However, there were few public reports on the assessment of the effect of these policies and the level of knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) associating with A/H1N1 among general population. It is well-known that confused comprehension and negative attitude towards the emerging communicable disease may lead to unnecessary worry and chaos, even excessive panic which would aggravate the disease epidemic [9] . For instance, during SARS epidemic from 2002 to 2004, the misconceptions and the excessive panic of Chinese public to SARS led the public resistant to comply with the suggested preventive measures such as avoiding public transportation, going to hospital when they were sick, which contributed to the rapid spread of SARS and resulted in a more serious epidemic situation, making China one of the worst affected countries with over 5327 cases and 439 deaths [10, 11] .", "For instance, during SARS epidemic from 2002 to 2004, the misconceptions and the excessive panic of Chinese public to SARS led the public resistant to comply with the suggested preventive measures such as avoiding public transportation, going to hospital when they were sick, which contributed to the rapid spread of SARS and resulted in a more serious epidemic situation, making China one of the worst affected countries with over 5327 cases and 439 deaths [10, 11] . In addition, the panic of infectious disease outbreak could cause huge economic loss, for example the economic loss of SARS has been estimated at $30-$100 billion in US, though less than 10,000 persons were infected [12] . SARS experience has demonstrated the importance of monitoring the public perception in disease epidemic control, which may affect the compliance of community to the precautionary strategies.", "SARS experience has demonstrated the importance of monitoring the public perception in disease epidemic control, which may affect the compliance of community to the precautionary strategies. Understanding related factors affecting people to undertake precautionary behavior may also help decision-makers take appropriate measures to promote individual or community health. Therefore, it is important to monitor and analyze the public response to the emerging disease.", "Therefore, it is important to monitor and analyze the public response to the emerging disease. To investigate community responses to A/H1N1 in China, we conducted this telephone survey to describe the knowledge, attitudes and practices of A/H1N1 among general population in China and put forward policy recommendations to government in case of future similar conditions. This study was performed in seven urban regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Jingzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen cities) and two rural areas (Jingzhou and Zhengzhou counties) of China with over one million people in each region.", "This study was performed in seven urban regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Jingzhou, Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen cities) and two rural areas (Jingzhou and Zhengzhou counties) of China with over one million people in each region. Regarding the urban sites, Beijing as the capital of China locates in the northeast; Shanghai is a municipality in the east of China; Wuhan (the provincial capital of Hubei) and Zhengzhou (the provincial capital of Henan province) are both in the centre of China; Xi'an in the northwest of China is the provincial capital of Shanxi province; and Shenzhen of the Guangdong province is in the southeast of China. As for the rural sites, Jingzhou county and Zhengzhou county, from Hubei and Henan provinces, respectively, both locate in the centre of China.", "As for the rural sites, Jingzhou county and Zhengzhou county, from Hubei and Henan provinces, respectively, both locate in the centre of China. This current study was carried out in three phases during the pandemic peak season of A/H1N1. The first phase was from 30 November 2009 to 27 December 2009, the second from 4 January 2010 to 24 January 2010, and the third from 24 February to 25 March in 2010.", "The first phase was from 30 November 2009 to 27 December 2009, the second from 4 January 2010 to 24 January 2010, and the third from 24 February to 25 March in 2010. A two-stage proportional probability to size (PPS) sampling method was used in each phase. In stage І, about 30% of administrative regions in each study site were selected as primary sample units (PSUs) for cluster sampling.", "In stage І, about 30% of administrative regions in each study site were selected as primary sample units (PSUs) for cluster sampling. In stage II, telephone numbers were sampled randomly, of which the first four digitals were obtained from each PSU's post office as initial number and the other three or four digitals were obtained from random number generated by Excel 2003. Then each family was chosen as per unit (excluding school, hotel public or cell phone etc.)", "Then each family was chosen as per unit (excluding school, hotel public or cell phone etc.) and at least 400 families in each site at each phase were selected finally. If the family was selected repeatedly or refused to answer the questionnaire, we added one to the last digit of phone number and dial again.", "If the family was selected repeatedly or refused to answer the questionnaire, we added one to the last digit of phone number and dial again. If the line was busy or of no response, we would dial three times and then give up this phone number if there was still no respondent. Anonymous telephone interviews were conducted from 6:30 pm to 10:00 pm so as to avoid over-presenting the non-work population by well-trained interviewers with Bachelor degree of Epidemiology.", "Anonymous telephone interviews were conducted from 6:30 pm to 10:00 pm so as to avoid over-presenting the non-work population by well-trained interviewers with Bachelor degree of Epidemiology. The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of A/H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone was designed by the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC, Beijing). The majority of the questions were closed-ended and variables in the questionnaire were categorical, except age.", "The majority of the questions were closed-ended and variables in the questionnaire were categorical, except age. The inclusion criteria of subjects were: age≥18 and proper communication skills. There were seven questions related to the knowledge of A/H1N1, four referred to the attitude, and five concerning about the practice in this questionnaire (See additional file 1: The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China).", "There were seven questions related to the knowledge of A/H1N1, four referred to the attitude, and five concerning about the practice in this questionnaire (See additional file 1: The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China). This study was approved by the institutional review board of the Tongji Medical College of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. All respondents were informed consent.", "All respondents were informed consent. We respected their wishes whether to accept our survey and promised to protect their secrets. All data were entered into computer using Epidata V.3.1 and were analyzed in SPSS statistical software V.12. Chi-square test was applied to compare the immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/H1N1 vaccine.", "Chi-square test was applied to compare the immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/H1N1 vaccine. The associations between the socio-demographic factors and the KAP regarding A/H1N1 were firstly investigated by using univariate odds ratios (OR) and then stepwise logistic regression modeling applied. Adjusting for such background variables including gender, age, level of education, occupation, region, and survey wave, stepwise multivariate logistic regression models were applied to investigate the impact factors associated with the risk perception of A/H1N1, A/H1N1 vaccination uptake and the compliance with suggested preventive measures (avoid crowd places/wash hand frequently/keep distance from people with influenza-like symptoms).", "Adjusting for such background variables including gender, age, level of education, occupation, region, and survey wave, stepwise multivariate logistic regression models were applied to investigate the impact factors associated with the risk perception of A/H1N1, A/H1N1 vaccination uptake and the compliance with suggested preventive measures (avoid crowd places/wash hand frequently/keep distance from people with influenza-like symptoms). For the purposes of analysis, the factor knowledge about the main modes of transmission was divided into two groups according to whether the respondents knew both cough and talk faceto-face can spread A/H1N1. Odds ratios and respective 95% confidence intervals (CI) were obtained from the logistic regression analysis.", "Odds ratios and respective 95% confidence intervals (CI) were obtained from the logistic regression analysis. P values lower than 0.05 were judged to be statistically significant. A total of 88541 telephone numbers were dialed.", "A total of 88541 telephone numbers were dialed. Except 65323 invalid calls (including vacant numbers, fax numbers, busy tone numbers and non-qualified respondents whose age <18 and whose phones were from school, hotel or other public places), 23218 eligible respondents were identified. Among these respondents, 12360 completed the interview.", "Among these respondents, 12360 completed the interview. Therefore, the response rate was 46.8%. Excluding missing, and logical erroneous data, 10669 questionnaires in total were eligible for analysis. The baseline characteristics of the respondents were presented in Table1. The mean age of all respondents was 41.47 years (over range: 18-90 year) .", "The mean age of all respondents was 41.47 years (over range: 18-90 year) . Of all respondents, 54.4% were female, and 42.4% had received college or above education (Table 1) . The overall KAP related to A/H1N1 was reported in Table 2 .", "The overall KAP related to A/H1N1 was reported in Table 2 . As to knowledge, 75.6% of all respondents knew that influenza could be transmitted by coughing and sneezing, and 61.9% thought that talking face-to-face was the transmission route, whereas 30.0% believed the transmission could be through food. Less than one third of respondents knew that virus could be transmitted by handshaking and indirect hand contact (26.8% and 22.3%, respectively).", "Less than one third of respondents knew that virus could be transmitted by handshaking and indirect hand contact (26.8% and 22.3%, respectively). Multiple logistic regression analysis showed that those with middle school (OR = 1.71; 95%CI 1.48-1.98), or having an education level of college and above (OR = 2.16; 95%CI 1.83-2.54) were more likely to know the transmission routes comparing with other people. Comparing with students, teachers (OR = 1.46; 95%CI 1.09-1.96) were more likely to answer the above questions Table 3 and Table 4 ).", "Comparing with students, teachers (OR = 1.46; 95%CI 1.09-1.96) were more likely to answer the above questions Table 3 and Table 4 ). Regarding the A/H1N1vaccination, 69.9% respondents believed that the occurrence rate of adverse reactions caused by A/H1N1 vaccination was fairly low and they were not afraid of taking up vaccination. Most residents (96.1%) thought that the state's vaccination strategy was reasonable.", "Most residents (96.1%) thought that the state's vaccination strategy was reasonable. About half of the respondents (42.9%) had avoided going to crowded places during the past two weeks of our survey. In case people nearby held influenza-like symptoms such as fever or cough, 56.9% increased the frequency of hand-washing and 57.4% would stay away from them.", "In case people nearby held influenza-like symptoms such as fever or cough, 56.9% increased the frequency of hand-washing and 57.4% would stay away from them. Multiple logistic regression analysis indicated compliance with the preventive practices were more likely to be taken by those who were females (OR = 1. Table 3 and Table 4 ).", "Table 3 and Table 4 ). The immunization rates of the seasonal flu and A/ H1N1 in respondents were 7.5% and 10.8% respectively. The multivariate stepwise models further showed that except the health care workers (OR = 1.52; 95%CI 1.09-2.11), residents in other occupations (OR = 0.06-0.67) were less likely to take up the A/H1N1 vaccination comparing with students (in Table 3 ).", "The multivariate stepwise models further showed that except the health care workers (OR = 1.52; 95%CI 1.09-2.11), residents in other occupations (OR = 0.06-0.67) were less likely to take up the A/H1N1 vaccination comparing with students (in Table 3 ). Adjusting for the background covariates the knowledge about the free vaccination policy (OR = 7.20; 95%CI 5.91-8.78) and the state's initial vaccination strategy(OR = 1.33; 95%CI 1.08-1.64), perception of daily life disturbed (OR = 1.29; 95% CI 1.11-1.50), practice of injecting the seasonal influenza vaccine (OR = 4.69; 95%CI 3.53-6.23) were significantly associated with behavior of taking up the A/H1N1 vaccination positively (in Table 5 ), and the adverse reaction of A/H1N1 vaccine negatively influenced people's practice (OR = 0.07; 95%CI 0.04-0.11). Novel A/H1N1 has caused pandemic in this century.", "Novel A/H1N1 has caused pandemic in this century. It is important to encourage the public to adopt precautionary behaviors, which is based on the correct knowledge of the epidemic and appropriate response among residents. Many studies have examined the various levels of KAP about infectious disease outbreaks, such as SARS, avian influenza [13] [14] [15] .", "Many studies have examined the various levels of KAP about infectious disease outbreaks, such as SARS, avian influenza [13] [14] [15] . Some studies have been reported specifically on community responses to A/H1N1 in Australia and Europe [16, 17] . But through literature search, we haven't found any public reports on KAP regarding A/H1N1 among Chinese population until now.", "But through literature search, we haven't found any public reports on KAP regarding A/H1N1 among Chinese population until now. Therefore, we conducted this large population-based survey (10669 respondents) to investigate community responses to A/H1N1 and to provide baseline data to government for preventive measures in case of future outbreaks. Unless people have basic knowledge about the modes of transmission, they respond appropriately during an outbreak [16] .", "Unless people have basic knowledge about the modes of transmission, they respond appropriately during an outbreak [16] . It has been proved that influenza is transmitted through person to person via respiratory secretions [18] . Most residents in our survey recognized that OR m : odds ratio obtained from stepwise multivariate logistics regression analysis using univariately significant variables as candidate variables and adjusting for region; NU: not significant in the univariate analysis; *: P < 0.05; †: P < 0.01; ‡: P < 0.0001.\n\nthe risk of getting infected would increase when an infected person coughed or sneezed in close distance.", "Most residents in our survey recognized that OR m : odds ratio obtained from stepwise multivariate logistics regression analysis using univariately significant variables as candidate variables and adjusting for region; NU: not significant in the univariate analysis; *: P < 0.05; †: P < 0.01; ‡: P < 0.0001.\n\nthe risk of getting infected would increase when an infected person coughed or sneezed in close distance. This may be due to the previous experience of SARS and avian flu. Multivariate analysis results showed that workers and farmers with lower education level were less likely to have this knowledge, which indicated that the contents and forms of propaganda should be more understandable and acceptable.", "Multivariate analysis results showed that workers and farmers with lower education level were less likely to have this knowledge, which indicated that the contents and forms of propaganda should be more understandable and acceptable. A large proportion of residents in our survey overlooked the indirect hand contact and hand-shaking transmission route and about one third of public misconceived that A/H1N1 was food borne, which was associated with the previous knowledge of avian flu and the new A/H1N1 flu in the general population. The confusion with avian flu might mislead some residents to believe that the A/H1N1 virus is fatal and cause public panic [19] .", "The confusion with avian flu might mislead some residents to believe that the A/H1N1 virus is fatal and cause public panic [19] . Therefore, it is important for the government and health authorities to provide continuously updated information of the emerging disease through televisions, newspapers, radios, and Internet. There are regional differences in the perception of A/H1N1.", "There are regional differences in the perception of A/H1N1. For example, the public in Hong Kong did not perceive a high likelihood of having a local A/H1N1 outbreak [19] , but Malaysians were particularly anxious about the pandemic [20] . The current study shows that emotional distress was relatively mild in China as few residents worried about being infected (25.1%).", "The current study shows that emotional distress was relatively mild in China as few residents worried about being infected (25.1%). This phenomenon may also be related to the previous experience of the SARS epidemic, as well as the open epidemic information. A survey in Korean university showed that women perceived higher illness severity and personal susceptibility to A/ H1N1 infection, which had been reconfirmed in our study [21] .", "A survey in Korean university showed that women perceived higher illness severity and personal susceptibility to A/ H1N1 infection, which had been reconfirmed in our study [21] . Logistic regression analysis results suggested that women with higher educational level had higher perception of risk. As time went by, the knowledge about the main transmission route increased, but the risk perception of being infected in residents decreased, suggesting the positive effect of government policy regarding A/H1N1 infection prevention, as well as the promotion of the media.", "As time went by, the knowledge about the main transmission route increased, but the risk perception of being infected in residents decreased, suggesting the positive effect of government policy regarding A/H1N1 infection prevention, as well as the promotion of the media. The previous study presented various results of influencing factors on the the compliance with the preventive practices. The study in Saudi showed that older men with better education were more likely to take preventive practices [9] ; female students in Korean washed hands more frequently during the peak pandemic period of A/ H1N1 [21] ; in another pandemic study in USA, younger people was found to have greater uptake of recommended behaviors but not for gender [16] .", "The study in Saudi showed that older men with better education were more likely to take preventive practices [9] ; female students in Korean washed hands more frequently during the peak pandemic period of A/ H1N1 [21] ; in another pandemic study in USA, younger people was found to have greater uptake of recommended behaviors but not for gender [16] . We found female with higher education took more precautionary behaviors, but office staffs and farmers took less comparing with students. While such differences could result from study population demographics, profound differences may also exist in the knowledge of A/H1N1 and the perceptions of recommended behaviors in those countries.", "While such differences could result from study population demographics, profound differences may also exist in the knowledge of A/H1N1 and the perceptions of recommended behaviors in those countries. Adjusting for the background factors, the multivariate logistic regression showed the possible relationship between knowledge and risk perception, knowledge and practices (odd ratios were 1.57 and 2.09, respectively), which indicated that good knowledge is important to enable individuals to have better attitudes and practices in influenza risk reduction. Similar findings were observed in other studies performed during A/ H1N1 pandemic in Singapore [22] and during SARS pandemic in Hong Kong [13] .", "Similar findings were observed in other studies performed during A/ H1N1 pandemic in Singapore [22] and during SARS pandemic in Hong Kong [13] . Therefore, it is important to focus on inculcating the correct knowledge to individuals as it will influence both attitudes and practices. Injecting vaccination is an effective measure to prevent infectious disease [23] .", "Injecting vaccination is an effective measure to prevent infectious disease [23] . In China, the seasonal influenza vaccination is not included in the national immunization program and must be purchased by recipients. Those who are above 60 years old, the pupil and children in kindergarten, and people with chronic diseases are recommended to get inoculation.", "Those who are above 60 years old, the pupil and children in kindergarten, and people with chronic diseases are recommended to get inoculation. Data provided by China CDC in 2009 showed that the immunization rate of the seasonal flu in Chinese population was below 2% [24] , which was much lower than 7.5% in our study (P < 0.0001). This phenomenon is partly due to the state's prior vaccination strategy for population at high risk such as students, teachers, healthcare workers and people with chronic disease, as well as the confusion between seasonal flu vaccine and A/H1N1 vaccine in residents.", "This phenomenon is partly due to the state's prior vaccination strategy for population at high risk such as students, teachers, healthcare workers and people with chronic disease, as well as the confusion between seasonal flu vaccine and A/H1N1 vaccine in residents. People who couldn't access the A/H1N1 vaccine may take up seasonal flu vaccine as preventive behaviors. The A/ H1N1 vaccine was not available in China until the middle of September 2009.", "The A/ H1N1 vaccine was not available in China until the middle of September 2009. All populations at high risk above three years old were invited for vaccination free of charge [25] . A survey among 868 European travelers showed 14.2% participants were vaccinated against pandemic influenza A/H1N1 [26] , higher than 10.8% in our study (P < 0.01).", "A survey among 868 European travelers showed 14.2% participants were vaccinated against pandemic influenza A/H1N1 [26] , higher than 10.8% in our study (P < 0.01). Our study also showed students and health care workers were more likely to take up, which may be due to the prior vaccination strategy. Multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis, which allowed us to adjust for background factors, further showed the perceived risk of infection and the knowledge about the main modes of transmission related to A/H1N1 vaccination were insignificantly, similar results seen in Lau's study [8] .", "Multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis, which allowed us to adjust for background factors, further showed the perceived risk of infection and the knowledge about the main modes of transmission related to A/H1N1 vaccination were insignificantly, similar results seen in Lau's study [8] . Therefore, the vaccination rate of A/H1N1 is not expected to increase even if the virus becomes more prevalent or the knowledge of its transmission mode improved. Additionally, the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccine was associated with perceptions of vaccine's safety and influence on daily life by A/H1N1 as well as the knowledge about the free vaccination policy and the state's initial vaccination strategy.", "Additionally, the behavior of taking up A/H1N1 vaccine was associated with perceptions of vaccine's safety and influence on daily life by A/H1N1 as well as the knowledge about the free vaccination policy and the state's initial vaccination strategy. This suggests that improving the safety of vaccine, the acceptability of side effect and the knowledge about the state's strategy related to A/H1N1 vaccination in residents may be helpful to promote A/H1N1 vaccination in the general population. The cross-sectional telephone survey adopted in the study has some limitations.", "The cross-sectional telephone survey adopted in the study has some limitations. We were unable to interview the people who did not have phones and the depth of the questionnaire was largely limited because questions and pre-existing answers could not be too long and complex. In addition, the telephone response rate was 46.8%, which means more than half of the interviewees rejected or didn't finish the survey.", "In addition, the telephone response rate was 46.8%, which means more than half of the interviewees rejected or didn't finish the survey. It was impossible to compare the difference between respondents and nonrespondents due to the lack of their basic information. This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic as most of them confused the transmission route of A/H1N1.", "This A/H1N1 epidemic has not caused public panic yet, but the knowledge of A/H1N1 in residents is not optimistic as most of them confused the transmission route of A/H1N1. There are many factors influencing the KAP related to A/H1N1. Female with higher educational level had higher perceived risk of infection and took more precautionary behaviors.", "Female with higher educational level had higher perceived risk of infection and took more precautionary behaviors. Public education campaign may take the side effects of vaccine and the knowledge about the state's vaccination strategy into account. The data collected in this survey could be used as baseline data to monitor public perceives and behaviors in the event of future outbreak of infectious disease in China.", "The data collected in this survey could be used as baseline data to monitor public perceives and behaviors in the event of future outbreak of infectious disease in China. Additional file 1: Questionnaire. The Questionnaire to Survey the Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Different Stages of H1N1 Pandemic by Telephone in China." ]

[ "In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) caused an outbreak in Wuhan, China, and soon spread to other parts of the world. It was believed that 2019-nCoV was transmitted through respiratory tract and then induced pneumonia, thus molecular diagnosis based on oral swabs was used for confirmation of this disease. Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs.", "Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs. However, many coronaviruses can also be transmitted through oral–fecal route by infecting intestines. Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested.", "Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested. We conducted investigation on patients in a local hospital who were infected with this virus. We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route.", "We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route. We also showed serology test can improve detection positive rate thus should be used in future epidemiology. Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes.", "Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes. Text: Coronaviruses (CoVs) belong to the subfamily Orthocoronavirinae in the family Coronaviridae and the order Nidovirales. A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003.", "A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003. Most recently, an SARS-related CoV was implicated as the etiological agent responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan, central China. This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] .", "This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] . The virus has spread to 23 other countries by travellers from Wuhan [1] . Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] .", "Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] . The disease was first called unidentified viral pneumonia. We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization).", "We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization). The newly identified virus is an SARS-related virus (SARSr-CoV) but shares only 74.5% genome identity to SARS-CoV [2] . We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes.", "We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes. Our previous studies indicate that qPCR method can be used for the detection of 2019-nCoV in oral swabs or in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) [5] . Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP.", "Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP. Using these serological tools, we demonstrate viral antibody titres increase in patients infected with 2019-nCoV [5] . Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation.", "Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation. Therefore, the presence of viral antigen in oral swabs was used as detection standard for 2019-nCoV. Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially.", "Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially. Here we launched an investigation of 2019-nCoV in a Wuhan hospital, aiming to investigate the other possible transmission route of this virus. Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases.", "Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases. Two investigations were performed. In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions.", "In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions. In the second investigation, we collected samples from 139 patients, yet their clinical records were not available. We only showed patients who were viral nucleotide detection positive. Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated.", "Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated. For swabs, 1.5 ml DMEM+2% FBS medium was added in each tube. Supernatant was collected after 2500 rpm, 60 s vortex and 15-30 min standing. Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction.", "Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction. Serum was separated by centrifugation at 3000 g for 15 min within 24 h of collection, followed by 56°C 30 min inactivation, and then stored at 4°C until use. Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification.", "Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification. RNA was extracted from 200 μl of samples with the High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche). RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR.", "RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR. QPCR detection method based on 2019-nCoV S gene can be found in the previous study [5] . In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd).", "In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd). The 20 μl qPCR reaction mix contained 10 μl 2× One Step SYBR Green Mix, 1 μl One Step SYBR Green Enzyme Mix, 0.4 μl 50 × ROX Reference Dye 1, 0.4 μl of each primer (10 μM) and 2 μl template RNA. Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine.", "Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine. In-house anti-SARSr-CoV IgG and IgM ELISA kits were developed using SARSr-CoV Rp3 NP as antigen, which shared above 90% amino acid identity to all SARSr-CoVs, as reported previously [5] . For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP.", "For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP. Human sera were used at 1:20 dilution for 1 h at 37°C. An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000.", "An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated. For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain).", "For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain). Human sera were used at 1:100 dilution for 40 min at 37°C, followed by anti-Rp3 NP-HRP conjugated (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) at a dilution of 1:4000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated.", "The OD value (450-630) was calculated. In the first investigation, we aimed to test whether viral positive can be found in anal swab and blood as well as oral swabs. We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission.", "We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission. We collected blood, oral swabs and anal swabs for 2019-nCoV qPCR test using previously established method [5] . We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments.", "We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments. Of these patients, 8 were oral swabs positive (53.3%), 4 were anal swabs positive (26.7%), 6 blood positives (40%) and 3 serum positives (20%). Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive.", "Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive. Not surprisingly, all serum positives were also whole serum positive (Table 1 ). In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs.", "In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs. It should be noted that although swabs may be negative, the patient might still be viremic. We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients.", "We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients. The target patients were those who received around 10 days of medical treatments upon admission. We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] .", "We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] . We showed that both IgM and IgG titres were relatively low or undetectable in day 0 (the day of first sampling). On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ).", "On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ). IgM positive rate increased from 50% (8/16) to 81% (13/16), whereas IgG positive rate increased from 81% (13/16) to 100% (16/16). This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below).", "This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below). For molecular detection, we found 8 oral swabs positive (50%) and 4 anal swabs (25%) in these 16 people on day 0. On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%).", "On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%). In contrast, we found 6 anal swabs positive (37.5%). When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0.", "When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0. However, this trend appears to change on day 5. We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%).", "We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%). Another observation is the reoccurrence of virus in 6 patients who were detected negative on day 0. Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) .", "Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) . These data suggested a shift from more oral positive during early period (as indicated by antibody titres) to more anal positive during later period might happen. Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools.", "Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools. This is the first molecular and serological study on this virus after the initial identification of 2019-NCoV from 7 patients diagnosed with unidentified viral pneumonia [5] . We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes.", "We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes. In addition, we successfully applied serology test a large population and showed which could greatly improved detection positive rate. We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect.", "We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect. The virus may be present in anal swabs or blood of patients when oral swabs detection negative. In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] .", "In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] . However, patients infected with 2019-nCoV may harbour the virus in the intestine at the early or late stage of disease. It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs.", "It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs. These patients would likely be considered as 2019-nCoV negative through routine surveillance, and thus pose a threat to other people. In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology.", "In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology. A possible shift from oral positive during early infection to anal swab positive during late infection can be observed. This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route.", "This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route. Above all, we strongly suggest using viral IgM and IgG serological test to confirm an infection, considering the unreliable results from oral swabs detection. In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes.", "In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes. Both molecular and serological tests are needed to definitively confirm a virus carrier." ]

[ "In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) caused an outbreak in Wuhan, China, and soon spread to other parts of the world. It was believed that 2019-nCoV was transmitted through respiratory tract and then induced pneumonia, thus molecular diagnosis based on oral swabs was used for confirmation of this disease. Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs.", "Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs. However, many coronaviruses can also be transmitted through oral–fecal route by infecting intestines. Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested.", "Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested. We conducted investigation on patients in a local hospital who were infected with this virus. We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route.", "We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route. We also showed serology test can improve detection positive rate thus should be used in future epidemiology. Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes.", "Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes. Text: Coronaviruses (CoVs) belong to the subfamily Orthocoronavirinae in the family Coronaviridae and the order Nidovirales. A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003.", "A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003. Most recently, an SARS-related CoV was implicated as the etiological agent responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan, central China. This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] .", "This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] . The virus has spread to 23 other countries by travellers from Wuhan [1] . Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] .", "Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] . The disease was first called unidentified viral pneumonia. We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization).", "We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization). The newly identified virus is an SARS-related virus (SARSr-CoV) but shares only 74.5% genome identity to SARS-CoV [2] . We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes.", "We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes. Our previous studies indicate that qPCR method can be used for the detection of 2019-nCoV in oral swabs or in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) [5] . Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP.", "Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP. Using these serological tools, we demonstrate viral antibody titres increase in patients infected with 2019-nCoV [5] . Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation.", "Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation. Therefore, the presence of viral antigen in oral swabs was used as detection standard for 2019-nCoV. Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially.", "Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially. Here we launched an investigation of 2019-nCoV in a Wuhan hospital, aiming to investigate the other possible transmission route of this virus. Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases.", "Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases. Two investigations were performed. In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions.", "In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions. In the second investigation, we collected samples from 139 patients, yet their clinical records were not available. We only showed patients who were viral nucleotide detection positive. Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated.", "Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated. For swabs, 1.5 ml DMEM+2% FBS medium was added in each tube. Supernatant was collected after 2500 rpm, 60 s vortex and 15-30 min standing. Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction.", "Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction. Serum was separated by centrifugation at 3000 g for 15 min within 24 h of collection, followed by 56°C 30 min inactivation, and then stored at 4°C until use. Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification.", "Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification. RNA was extracted from 200 μl of samples with the High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche). RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR.", "RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR. QPCR detection method based on 2019-nCoV S gene can be found in the previous study [5] . In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd).", "In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd). The 20 μl qPCR reaction mix contained 10 μl 2× One Step SYBR Green Mix, 1 μl One Step SYBR Green Enzyme Mix, 0.4 μl 50 × ROX Reference Dye 1, 0.4 μl of each primer (10 μM) and 2 μl template RNA. Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine.", "Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine. In-house anti-SARSr-CoV IgG and IgM ELISA kits were developed using SARSr-CoV Rp3 NP as antigen, which shared above 90% amino acid identity to all SARSr-CoVs, as reported previously [5] . For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP.", "For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP. Human sera were used at 1:20 dilution for 1 h at 37°C. An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000.", "An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated. For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain).", "For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain). Human sera were used at 1:100 dilution for 40 min at 37°C, followed by anti-Rp3 NP-HRP conjugated (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) at a dilution of 1:4000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated.", "The OD value (450-630) was calculated. In the first investigation, we aimed to test whether viral positive can be found in anal swab and blood as well as oral swabs. We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission.", "We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission. We collected blood, oral swabs and anal swabs for 2019-nCoV qPCR test using previously established method [5] . We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments.", "We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments. Of these patients, 8 were oral swabs positive (53.3%), 4 were anal swabs positive (26.7%), 6 blood positives (40%) and 3 serum positives (20%). Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive.", "Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive. Not surprisingly, all serum positives were also whole serum positive (Table 1 ). In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs.", "In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs. It should be noted that although swabs may be negative, the patient might still be viremic. We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients.", "We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients. The target patients were those who received around 10 days of medical treatments upon admission. We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] .", "We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] . We showed that both IgM and IgG titres were relatively low or undetectable in day 0 (the day of first sampling). On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ).", "On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ). IgM positive rate increased from 50% (8/16) to 81% (13/16), whereas IgG positive rate increased from 81% (13/16) to 100% (16/16). This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below).", "This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below). For molecular detection, we found 8 oral swabs positive (50%) and 4 anal swabs (25%) in these 16 people on day 0. On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%).", "On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%). In contrast, we found 6 anal swabs positive (37.5%). When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0.", "When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0. However, this trend appears to change on day 5. We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%).", "We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%). Another observation is the reoccurrence of virus in 6 patients who were detected negative on day 0. Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) .", "Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) . These data suggested a shift from more oral positive during early period (as indicated by antibody titres) to more anal positive during later period might happen. Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools.", "Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools. This is the first molecular and serological study on this virus after the initial identification of 2019-NCoV from 7 patients diagnosed with unidentified viral pneumonia [5] . We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes.", "We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes. In addition, we successfully applied serology test a large population and showed which could greatly improved detection positive rate. We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect.", "We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect. The virus may be present in anal swabs or blood of patients when oral swabs detection negative. In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] .", "In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] . However, patients infected with 2019-nCoV may harbour the virus in the intestine at the early or late stage of disease. It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs.", "It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs. These patients would likely be considered as 2019-nCoV negative through routine surveillance, and thus pose a threat to other people. In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology.", "In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology. A possible shift from oral positive during early infection to anal swab positive during late infection can be observed. This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route.", "This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route. Above all, we strongly suggest using viral IgM and IgG serological test to confirm an infection, considering the unreliable results from oral swabs detection. In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes.", "In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes. Both molecular and serological tests are needed to definitively confirm a virus carrier." ]

[ "In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) caused an outbreak in Wuhan, China, and soon spread to other parts of the world. It was believed that 2019-nCoV was transmitted through respiratory tract and then induced pneumonia, thus molecular diagnosis based on oral swabs was used for confirmation of this disease. Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs.", "Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs. However, many coronaviruses can also be transmitted through oral–fecal route by infecting intestines. Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested.", "Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested. We conducted investigation on patients in a local hospital who were infected with this virus. We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route.", "We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route. We also showed serology test can improve detection positive rate thus should be used in future epidemiology. Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes.", "Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes. Text: Coronaviruses (CoVs) belong to the subfamily Orthocoronavirinae in the family Coronaviridae and the order Nidovirales. A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003.", "A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003. Most recently, an SARS-related CoV was implicated as the etiological agent responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan, central China. This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] .", "This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] . The virus has spread to 23 other countries by travellers from Wuhan [1] . Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] .", "Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] . The disease was first called unidentified viral pneumonia. We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization).", "We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization). The newly identified virus is an SARS-related virus (SARSr-CoV) but shares only 74.5% genome identity to SARS-CoV [2] . We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes.", "We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes. Our previous studies indicate that qPCR method can be used for the detection of 2019-nCoV in oral swabs or in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) [5] . Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP.", "Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP. Using these serological tools, we demonstrate viral antibody titres increase in patients infected with 2019-nCoV [5] . Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation.", "Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation. Therefore, the presence of viral antigen in oral swabs was used as detection standard for 2019-nCoV. Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially.", "Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially. Here we launched an investigation of 2019-nCoV in a Wuhan hospital, aiming to investigate the other possible transmission route of this virus. Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases.", "Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases. Two investigations were performed. In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions.", "In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions. In the second investigation, we collected samples from 139 patients, yet their clinical records were not available. We only showed patients who were viral nucleotide detection positive. Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated.", "Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated. For swabs, 1.5 ml DMEM+2% FBS medium was added in each tube. Supernatant was collected after 2500 rpm, 60 s vortex and 15-30 min standing. Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction.", "Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction. Serum was separated by centrifugation at 3000 g for 15 min within 24 h of collection, followed by 56°C 30 min inactivation, and then stored at 4°C until use. Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification.", "Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification. RNA was extracted from 200 μl of samples with the High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche). RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR.", "RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR. QPCR detection method based on 2019-nCoV S gene can be found in the previous study [5] . In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd).", "In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd). The 20 μl qPCR reaction mix contained 10 μl 2× One Step SYBR Green Mix, 1 μl One Step SYBR Green Enzyme Mix, 0.4 μl 50 × ROX Reference Dye 1, 0.4 μl of each primer (10 μM) and 2 μl template RNA. Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine.", "Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine. In-house anti-SARSr-CoV IgG and IgM ELISA kits were developed using SARSr-CoV Rp3 NP as antigen, which shared above 90% amino acid identity to all SARSr-CoVs, as reported previously [5] . For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP.", "For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP. Human sera were used at 1:20 dilution for 1 h at 37°C. An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000.", "An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated. For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain).", "For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain). Human sera were used at 1:100 dilution for 40 min at 37°C, followed by anti-Rp3 NP-HRP conjugated (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) at a dilution of 1:4000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated.", "The OD value (450-630) was calculated. In the first investigation, we aimed to test whether viral positive can be found in anal swab and blood as well as oral swabs. We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission.", "We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission. We collected blood, oral swabs and anal swabs for 2019-nCoV qPCR test using previously established method [5] . We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments.", "We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments. Of these patients, 8 were oral swabs positive (53.3%), 4 were anal swabs positive (26.7%), 6 blood positives (40%) and 3 serum positives (20%). Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive.", "Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive. Not surprisingly, all serum positives were also whole serum positive (Table 1 ). In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs.", "In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs. It should be noted that although swabs may be negative, the patient might still be viremic. We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients.", "We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients. The target patients were those who received around 10 days of medical treatments upon admission. We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] .", "We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] . We showed that both IgM and IgG titres were relatively low or undetectable in day 0 (the day of first sampling). On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ).", "On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ). IgM positive rate increased from 50% (8/16) to 81% (13/16), whereas IgG positive rate increased from 81% (13/16) to 100% (16/16). This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below).", "This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below). For molecular detection, we found 8 oral swabs positive (50%) and 4 anal swabs (25%) in these 16 people on day 0. On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%).", "On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%). In contrast, we found 6 anal swabs positive (37.5%). When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0.", "When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0. However, this trend appears to change on day 5. We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%).", "We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%). Another observation is the reoccurrence of virus in 6 patients who were detected negative on day 0. Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) .", "Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) . These data suggested a shift from more oral positive during early period (as indicated by antibody titres) to more anal positive during later period might happen. Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools.", "Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools. This is the first molecular and serological study on this virus after the initial identification of 2019-NCoV from 7 patients diagnosed with unidentified viral pneumonia [5] . We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes.", "We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes. In addition, we successfully applied serology test a large population and showed which could greatly improved detection positive rate. We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect.", "We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect. The virus may be present in anal swabs or blood of patients when oral swabs detection negative. In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] .", "In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] . However, patients infected with 2019-nCoV may harbour the virus in the intestine at the early or late stage of disease. It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs.", "It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs. These patients would likely be considered as 2019-nCoV negative through routine surveillance, and thus pose a threat to other people. In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology.", "In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology. A possible shift from oral positive during early infection to anal swab positive during late infection can be observed. This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route.", "This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route. Above all, we strongly suggest using viral IgM and IgG serological test to confirm an infection, considering the unreliable results from oral swabs detection. In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes.", "In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes. Both molecular and serological tests are needed to definitively confirm a virus carrier." ]

[ "In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) caused an outbreak in Wuhan, China, and soon spread to other parts of the world. It was believed that 2019-nCoV was transmitted through respiratory tract and then induced pneumonia, thus molecular diagnosis based on oral swabs was used for confirmation of this disease. Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs.", "Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs. However, many coronaviruses can also be transmitted through oral–fecal route by infecting intestines. Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested.", "Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested. We conducted investigation on patients in a local hospital who were infected with this virus. We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route.", "We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route. We also showed serology test can improve detection positive rate thus should be used in future epidemiology. Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes.", "Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes. Text: Coronaviruses (CoVs) belong to the subfamily Orthocoronavirinae in the family Coronaviridae and the order Nidovirales. A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003.", "A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003. Most recently, an SARS-related CoV was implicated as the etiological agent responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan, central China. This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] .", "This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] . The virus has spread to 23 other countries by travellers from Wuhan [1] . Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] .", "Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] . The disease was first called unidentified viral pneumonia. We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization).", "We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization). The newly identified virus is an SARS-related virus (SARSr-CoV) but shares only 74.5% genome identity to SARS-CoV [2] . We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes.", "We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes. Our previous studies indicate that qPCR method can be used for the detection of 2019-nCoV in oral swabs or in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) [5] . Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP.", "Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP. Using these serological tools, we demonstrate viral antibody titres increase in patients infected with 2019-nCoV [5] . Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation.", "Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation. Therefore, the presence of viral antigen in oral swabs was used as detection standard for 2019-nCoV. Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially.", "Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially. Here we launched an investigation of 2019-nCoV in a Wuhan hospital, aiming to investigate the other possible transmission route of this virus. Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases.", "Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases. Two investigations were performed. In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions.", "In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions. In the second investigation, we collected samples from 139 patients, yet their clinical records were not available. We only showed patients who were viral nucleotide detection positive. Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated.", "Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated. For swabs, 1.5 ml DMEM+2% FBS medium was added in each tube. Supernatant was collected after 2500 rpm, 60 s vortex and 15-30 min standing. Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction.", "Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction. Serum was separated by centrifugation at 3000 g for 15 min within 24 h of collection, followed by 56°C 30 min inactivation, and then stored at 4°C until use. Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification.", "Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification. RNA was extracted from 200 μl of samples with the High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche). RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR.", "RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR. QPCR detection method based on 2019-nCoV S gene can be found in the previous study [5] . In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd).", "In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd). The 20 μl qPCR reaction mix contained 10 μl 2× One Step SYBR Green Mix, 1 μl One Step SYBR Green Enzyme Mix, 0.4 μl 50 × ROX Reference Dye 1, 0.4 μl of each primer (10 μM) and 2 μl template RNA. Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine.", "Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine. In-house anti-SARSr-CoV IgG and IgM ELISA kits were developed using SARSr-CoV Rp3 NP as antigen, which shared above 90% amino acid identity to all SARSr-CoVs, as reported previously [5] . For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP.", "For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP. Human sera were used at 1:20 dilution for 1 h at 37°C. An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000.", "An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated. For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain).", "For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain). Human sera were used at 1:100 dilution for 40 min at 37°C, followed by anti-Rp3 NP-HRP conjugated (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) at a dilution of 1:4000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated.", "The OD value (450-630) was calculated. In the first investigation, we aimed to test whether viral positive can be found in anal swab and blood as well as oral swabs. We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission.", "We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission. We collected blood, oral swabs and anal swabs for 2019-nCoV qPCR test using previously established method [5] . We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments.", "We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments. Of these patients, 8 were oral swabs positive (53.3%), 4 were anal swabs positive (26.7%), 6 blood positives (40%) and 3 serum positives (20%). Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive.", "Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive. Not surprisingly, all serum positives were also whole serum positive (Table 1 ). In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs.", "In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs. It should be noted that although swabs may be negative, the patient might still be viremic. We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients.", "We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients. The target patients were those who received around 10 days of medical treatments upon admission. We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] .", "We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] . We showed that both IgM and IgG titres were relatively low or undetectable in day 0 (the day of first sampling). On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ).", "On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ). IgM positive rate increased from 50% (8/16) to 81% (13/16), whereas IgG positive rate increased from 81% (13/16) to 100% (16/16). This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below).", "This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below). For molecular detection, we found 8 oral swabs positive (50%) and 4 anal swabs (25%) in these 16 people on day 0. On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%).", "On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%). In contrast, we found 6 anal swabs positive (37.5%). When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0.", "When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0. However, this trend appears to change on day 5. We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%).", "We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%). Another observation is the reoccurrence of virus in 6 patients who were detected negative on day 0. Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) .", "Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) . These data suggested a shift from more oral positive during early period (as indicated by antibody titres) to more anal positive during later period might happen. Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools.", "Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools. This is the first molecular and serological study on this virus after the initial identification of 2019-NCoV from 7 patients diagnosed with unidentified viral pneumonia [5] . We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes.", "We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes. In addition, we successfully applied serology test a large population and showed which could greatly improved detection positive rate. We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect.", "We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect. The virus may be present in anal swabs or blood of patients when oral swabs detection negative. In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] .", "In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] . However, patients infected with 2019-nCoV may harbour the virus in the intestine at the early or late stage of disease. It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs.", "It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs. These patients would likely be considered as 2019-nCoV negative through routine surveillance, and thus pose a threat to other people. In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology.", "In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology. A possible shift from oral positive during early infection to anal swab positive during late infection can be observed. This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route.", "This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route. Above all, we strongly suggest using viral IgM and IgG serological test to confirm an infection, considering the unreliable results from oral swabs detection. In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes.", "In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes. Both molecular and serological tests are needed to definitively confirm a virus carrier." ]

[ "In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) caused an outbreak in Wuhan, China, and soon spread to other parts of the world. It was believed that 2019-nCoV was transmitted through respiratory tract and then induced pneumonia, thus molecular diagnosis based on oral swabs was used for confirmation of this disease. Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs.", "Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs. However, many coronaviruses can also be transmitted through oral–fecal route by infecting intestines. Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested.", "Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested. We conducted investigation on patients in a local hospital who were infected with this virus. We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route.", "We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route. We also showed serology test can improve detection positive rate thus should be used in future epidemiology. Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes.", "Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes. Text: Coronaviruses (CoVs) belong to the subfamily Orthocoronavirinae in the family Coronaviridae and the order Nidovirales. A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003.", "A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003. Most recently, an SARS-related CoV was implicated as the etiological agent responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan, central China. This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] .", "This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] . The virus has spread to 23 other countries by travellers from Wuhan [1] . Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] .", "Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] . The disease was first called unidentified viral pneumonia. We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization).", "We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization). The newly identified virus is an SARS-related virus (SARSr-CoV) but shares only 74.5% genome identity to SARS-CoV [2] . We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes.", "We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes. Our previous studies indicate that qPCR method can be used for the detection of 2019-nCoV in oral swabs or in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) [5] . Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP.", "Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP. Using these serological tools, we demonstrate viral antibody titres increase in patients infected with 2019-nCoV [5] . Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation.", "Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation. Therefore, the presence of viral antigen in oral swabs was used as detection standard for 2019-nCoV. Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially.", "Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially. Here we launched an investigation of 2019-nCoV in a Wuhan hospital, aiming to investigate the other possible transmission route of this virus. Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases.", "Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases. Two investigations were performed. In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions.", "In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions. In the second investigation, we collected samples from 139 patients, yet their clinical records were not available. We only showed patients who were viral nucleotide detection positive. Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated.", "Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated. For swabs, 1.5 ml DMEM+2% FBS medium was added in each tube. Supernatant was collected after 2500 rpm, 60 s vortex and 15-30 min standing. Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction.", "Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction. Serum was separated by centrifugation at 3000 g for 15 min within 24 h of collection, followed by 56°C 30 min inactivation, and then stored at 4°C until use. Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification.", "Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification. RNA was extracted from 200 μl of samples with the High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche). RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR.", "RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR. QPCR detection method based on 2019-nCoV S gene can be found in the previous study [5] . In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd).", "In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd). The 20 μl qPCR reaction mix contained 10 μl 2× One Step SYBR Green Mix, 1 μl One Step SYBR Green Enzyme Mix, 0.4 μl 50 × ROX Reference Dye 1, 0.4 μl of each primer (10 μM) and 2 μl template RNA. Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine.", "Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine. In-house anti-SARSr-CoV IgG and IgM ELISA kits were developed using SARSr-CoV Rp3 NP as antigen, which shared above 90% amino acid identity to all SARSr-CoVs, as reported previously [5] . For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP.", "For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP. Human sera were used at 1:20 dilution for 1 h at 37°C. An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000.", "An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated. For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain).", "For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain). Human sera were used at 1:100 dilution for 40 min at 37°C, followed by anti-Rp3 NP-HRP conjugated (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) at a dilution of 1:4000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated.", "The OD value (450-630) was calculated. In the first investigation, we aimed to test whether viral positive can be found in anal swab and blood as well as oral swabs. We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission.", "We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission. We collected blood, oral swabs and anal swabs for 2019-nCoV qPCR test using previously established method [5] . We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments.", "We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments. Of these patients, 8 were oral swabs positive (53.3%), 4 were anal swabs positive (26.7%), 6 blood positives (40%) and 3 serum positives (20%). Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive.", "Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive. Not surprisingly, all serum positives were also whole serum positive (Table 1 ). In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs.", "In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs. It should be noted that although swabs may be negative, the patient might still be viremic. We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients.", "We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients. The target patients were those who received around 10 days of medical treatments upon admission. We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] .", "We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] . We showed that both IgM and IgG titres were relatively low or undetectable in day 0 (the day of first sampling). On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ).", "On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ). IgM positive rate increased from 50% (8/16) to 81% (13/16), whereas IgG positive rate increased from 81% (13/16) to 100% (16/16). This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below).", "This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below). For molecular detection, we found 8 oral swabs positive (50%) and 4 anal swabs (25%) in these 16 people on day 0. On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%).", "On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%). In contrast, we found 6 anal swabs positive (37.5%). When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0.", "When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0. However, this trend appears to change on day 5. We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%).", "We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%). Another observation is the reoccurrence of virus in 6 patients who were detected negative on day 0. Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) .", "Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) . These data suggested a shift from more oral positive during early period (as indicated by antibody titres) to more anal positive during later period might happen. Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools.", "Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools. This is the first molecular and serological study on this virus after the initial identification of 2019-NCoV from 7 patients diagnosed with unidentified viral pneumonia [5] . We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes.", "We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes. In addition, we successfully applied serology test a large population and showed which could greatly improved detection positive rate. We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect.", "We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect. The virus may be present in anal swabs or blood of patients when oral swabs detection negative. In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] .", "In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] . However, patients infected with 2019-nCoV may harbour the virus in the intestine at the early or late stage of disease. It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs.", "It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs. These patients would likely be considered as 2019-nCoV negative through routine surveillance, and thus pose a threat to other people. In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology.", "In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology. A possible shift from oral positive during early infection to anal swab positive during late infection can be observed. This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route.", "This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route. Above all, we strongly suggest using viral IgM and IgG serological test to confirm an infection, considering the unreliable results from oral swabs detection. In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes.", "In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes. Both molecular and serological tests are needed to definitively confirm a virus carrier." ]

[ "In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) caused an outbreak in Wuhan, China, and soon spread to other parts of the world. It was believed that 2019-nCoV was transmitted through respiratory tract and then induced pneumonia, thus molecular diagnosis based on oral swabs was used for confirmation of this disease. Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs.", "Likewise, patient will be released upon two times of negative detection from oral swabs. However, many coronaviruses can also be transmitted through oral–fecal route by infecting intestines. Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested.", "Whether 2019-nCoV infected patients also carry virus in other organs like intestine need to be tested. We conducted investigation on patients in a local hospital who were infected with this virus. We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route.", "We found the presence of 2019-nCoV in anal swabs and blood as well, and more anal swab positives than oral swab positives in a later stage of infection, suggesting shedding and thereby transmitted through oral–fecal route. We also showed serology test can improve detection positive rate thus should be used in future epidemiology. Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes.", "Our report provides a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be shed through multiple routes. Text: Coronaviruses (CoVs) belong to the subfamily Orthocoronavirinae in the family Coronaviridae and the order Nidovirales. A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003.", "A human coronavirus (SARS-CoV) caused the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS) outbreak in 2003. Most recently, an SARS-related CoV was implicated as the etiological agent responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan, central China. This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] .", "This outbreak is estimated to have started on 12th December 2019 and 17,332 laboratory confirmed cases with 361 deaths as of 3rd February 2020 in China [1] . The virus has spread to 23 other countries by travellers from Wuhan [1] . Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] .", "Typical symptoms are fever, malaise, shortness of breath and in severe cases, pneumonia [2] [3] [4] . The disease was first called unidentified viral pneumonia. We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization).", "We quickly identified the etiological agent, termed 2019-nCoV (virus name designated by the World Health Organization). The newly identified virus is an SARS-related virus (SARSr-CoV) but shares only 74.5% genome identity to SARS-CoV [2] . We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes.", "We developed molecular detection tools based on viral spike genes. Our previous studies indicate that qPCR method can be used for the detection of 2019-nCoV in oral swabs or in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid (BALF) [5] . Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP.", "Additionally, we developed IgM and IgG detection methods using a cross-reactive nucleocapsid protein (NP) from another SARSr-CoV Rp3 [6] , which is 92% identical to 2019-nCoV NP. Using these serological tools, we demonstrate viral antibody titres increase in patients infected with 2019-nCoV [5] . Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation.", "Like SARS-CoV, 2019-nCoV induced pneumonia through respiratory tract by clinical observation. Therefore, the presence of viral antigen in oral swabs was used as detection standard for 2019-nCoV. Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially.", "Similarly, two times of oral swabs negative in a 24-h interval was considered as viral clearance by patients officially. Here we launched an investigation of 2019-nCoV in a Wuhan hospital, aiming to investigate the other possible transmission route of this virus. Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases.", "Human samples, including oral swabs, anal swabs and blood samples were collected by Wuhan pulmonary hospital with the consent from all patients and approved by the ethics committee of the designated hospital for emerging infectious diseases. Two investigations were performed. In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions.", "In the first investigation, we collected samples from 39 patients, 7 of which were in severe conditions. In the second investigation, we collected samples from 139 patients, yet their clinical records were not available. We only showed patients who were viral nucleotide detection positive. Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated.", "Patients were sampled without gender or age preference unless where indicated. For swabs, 1.5 ml DMEM+2% FBS medium was added in each tube. Supernatant was collected after 2500 rpm, 60 s vortex and 15-30 min standing. Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction.", "Supernatant from swabs were added to lysis buffer for RNA extraction. Serum was separated by centrifugation at 3000 g for 15 min within 24 h of collection, followed by 56°C 30 min inactivation, and then stored at 4°C until use. Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification.", "Whenever commercial kits were used, manufacturer's instructions were followed without modification. RNA was extracted from 200 μl of samples with the High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche). RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR.", "RNA was eluted in 50 μl of elution buffer and used as the template for RT-PCR. QPCR detection method based on 2019-nCoV S gene can be found in the previous study [5] . In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd).", "In brief, RNA extracted from above used in qPCR by HiScript® II One Step qRT-PCR SYBR® Green Kit (Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd). The 20 μl qPCR reaction mix contained 10 μl 2× One Step SYBR Green Mix, 1 μl One Step SYBR Green Enzyme Mix, 0.4 μl 50 × ROX Reference Dye 1, 0.4 μl of each primer (10 μM) and 2 μl template RNA. Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine.", "Amplification was performed as follows: 50°C for 3 min, 95°C for 30 s followed by 40 cycles consisting of 95°C for 10 s, 60°C for 30 s, and a default melting curve step in an ABI 7500 machine. In-house anti-SARSr-CoV IgG and IgM ELISA kits were developed using SARSr-CoV Rp3 NP as antigen, which shared above 90% amino acid identity to all SARSr-CoVs, as reported previously [5] . For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP.", "For IgG test, MaxiSorp Nunc-immuno 96 well ELISA plates were coated (100 ng/well) overnight with recombinant NP. Human sera were used at 1:20 dilution for 1 h at 37°C. An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000.", "An anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used at a dilution of 1:40,000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated. For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain).", "For IgM test, Maxi-Sorp Nunc-immuno 96 wellELISA plates were coated (500 ng/well) overnight with anti-human IgM (µ chain). Human sera were used at 1:100 dilution for 40 min at 37°C, followed by anti-Rp3 NP-HRP conjugated (Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) at a dilution of 1:4000. The OD value (450-630) was calculated.", "The OD value (450-630) was calculated. In the first investigation, we aimed to test whether viral positive can be found in anal swab and blood as well as oral swabs. We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission.", "We conducted a molecular investigation to patients in Wuhan pulmonary hospital, who were detected as oral swabs positive for 2019-nCoV upon admission. We collected blood, oral swabs and anal swabs for 2019-nCoV qPCR test using previously established method [5] . We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments.", "We found 15 patients who still carry virus following days of medical treatments. Of these patients, 8 were oral swabs positive (53.3%), 4 were anal swabs positive (26.7%), 6 blood positives (40%) and 3 serum positives (20%). Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive.", "Two patients were positive by both oral swab and anal swab, yet none of the blood positive was also swabs positive. Not surprisingly, all serum positives were also whole serum positive (Table 1 ). In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs.", "In summary, viral nucleotide can be found in anal swab or blood even if it cannot be detected in oral swabs. It should be noted that although swabs may be negative, the patient might still be viremic. We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients.", "We then did another investigation to find out the dynamic changes of viral presence in two consecutive studies in both oral and anal swabs in another group of patients. The target patients were those who received around 10 days of medical treatments upon admission. We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] .", "We tested for both viral antibody and viral nucleotide levels by previously established method [5] . We showed that both IgM and IgG titres were relatively low or undetectable in day 0 (the day of first sampling). On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ).", "On day 5, an increase of viral antibodies can be seen in nearly all patients, which was normally considered as a transition from earlier to later period of infection ( Figure 1 and supplementary table 1 ). IgM positive rate increased from 50% (8/16) to 81% (13/16), whereas IgG positive rate increased from 81% (13/16) to 100% (16/16). This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below).", "This is in contrast to a relatively low detection positive rate from molecular test (below). For molecular detection, we found 8 oral swabs positive (50%) and 4 anal swabs (25%) in these 16 people on day 0. On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%).", "On day 5, we were only able to find 4 oral swabs positive (25%). In contrast, we found 6 anal swabs positive (37.5%). When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0.", "When counting all swab positives together, we found most of the positives came from oral swab (8/10, 80%) on day 0. However, this trend appears to change on day 5. We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%).", "We found more (6/8, 75%) anal swab positive than oral swab positive (4/8, 50%). Another observation is the reoccurrence of virus in 6 patients who were detected negative on day 0. Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) .", "Of note, 4 of these 6 viral positives were from anal swabs ( Table 2) . These data suggested a shift from more oral positive during early period (as indicated by antibody titres) to more anal positive during later period might happen. Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools.", "Within 1 month of the 2019-nCoV disease outbreak, we rapidly developed molecular and serological detection tools. This is the first molecular and serological study on this virus after the initial identification of 2019-NCoV from 7 patients diagnosed with unidentified viral pneumonia [5] . We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes.", "We detected the virus in oral swabs, anal swabs and blood, thus infected patients can potentially shed this pathogen through respiratory, fecal-oral or body fluid routes. In addition, we successfully applied serology test a large population and showed which could greatly improved detection positive rate. We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect.", "We show that the current strategy for the detection of viral RNA in oral swabs used for 2019-nCoV diagnosis is not perfect. The virus may be present in anal swabs or blood of patients when oral swabs detection negative. In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] .", "In SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV infected patients, intestinal infection was observed at later stages of infection [7] [8] [9] . However, patients infected with 2019-nCoV may harbour the virus in the intestine at the early or late stage of disease. It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs.", "It is also worth to note none of the patients with viremia blood had positive swabs. These patients would likely be considered as 2019-nCoV negative through routine surveillance, and thus pose a threat to other people. In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology.", "In contrast, we found viral antibodies in near all patients, indicating serology should be considered for 2019-nCoV epidemiology. A possible shift from oral positive during early infection to anal swab positive during late infection can be observed. This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route.", "This observation implied that we cannot discharge a patient purely based on oral swabs negative, who may still shed the virus by oral-fecal route. Above all, we strongly suggest using viral IgM and IgG serological test to confirm an infection, considering the unreliable results from oral swabs detection. In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes.", "In summary, we provide a cautionary warning that 2019-nCoV may be transmitted through multiple routes. Both molecular and serological tests are needed to definitively confirm a virus carrier." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China.", "Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters’ index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases.", "As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. Text: In the WHO European Region, COVID-19 surveillance was implemented 27 January 2020. We detail the first European cases. As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases.", "As at 21 February, nine European countries reported 47 cases. Among 38 cases studied, 21 were linked to two clusters in Germany and France, 14 were infected in China. Median case age was 42 years; 25 were male. Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases.", "Late detection of the clusters' index cases delayed isolation of further local cases. As at 5 March, there were 4,250 cases. A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] .", "A cluster of pneumonia of unknown origin was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1] . On 12 January 2020, Chinese authorities shared the sequence of a novel coronavirus termed severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) isolated from some clustered cases [2] . Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) .", "Since then, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 has been named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID -19) . As at 21 February 2020, the virus had spread rapidly mostly within China but also to 28 other countries, including in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region [3] [4] [5] . Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020.", "Here we describe the epidemiology of the first cases of COVID-19 in this region, excluding cases reported in the United Kingdom (UK), as at 21 February 2020. The study includes a comparison between cases detected among travellers from China and cases whose infection was acquired due to subsequent local transmission. On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] .", "On 27 January 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe asked countries to complete a WHO standard COVID-19 case report form for all confirmed and probable cases according to WHO criteria [6] [7] [8] . The overall aim of surveillance at this time was to support the global strategy of containment of COVID-19 with rapid identification and follow-up of cases linked to affected countries in order to minimise onward transmission. The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management.", "The surveillance objectives were to: describe the key epidemiological and clinical characteristics of COVID-19 cases detected in Europe; inform country preparedness; and improve further case detection and management. Data collected included demographics, history of recent travel to affected areas, close contact with a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, underlying conditions, signs and symptoms of disease at onset, type of specimens from which the virus was detected, and clinical outcome. The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] .", "The WHO case definition was adopted for surveillance: a confirmed case was a person with laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection (ECDC recommended two separate SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests), irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms, whereas a probable case was a suspect case for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 was inconclusive or positive using a pan-coronavirus assay [8] . By 31 January 2020, 47 laboratories in 31 countries, including 38 laboratories in 24 European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries, had diagnostic capability for SARS-CoV-2 available (close to 60% of countries in the WHO European Region), with cross-border shipment arrangements in place for many of those lacking domestic testing capacity. The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] .", "The remaining six EU/EEA countries were expected to have diagnostic testing available by mid-February [9] . As at 09:00 on 21 February 2020, 47 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported in the WHO European Region and one of these cases had died [4] . Data on 38 of these cases (i.e.", "Data on 38 of these cases (i.e. all except the nine reported in the UK) are included in this analysis. The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] .", "The first three cases detected were reported in France on 24 January 2020 and had onset of symptoms on 17, 19 and 23 January respectively [10] . The first death was reported on 15 February in France. As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further).", "As at 21 February, nine countries had reported cases ( Figure) : Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (12), Germany (16), Italy (3), Russia (2), Spain (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (9 -not included further). The place of infection (assessed at national level based on an incubation period presumed to be up to 14 days [11] , travel history and contact with probable or confirmed cases as per the case definition) was reported for 35 cases (missing for three cases), of whom 14 were infected in China (Hubei province: 10 cases; Shandong province: one case; province not reported for three cases). The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe.", "The remaining 21 cases were infected in Europe. Of these, 14 were linked to a cluster in Bavaria, Germany, and seven to a cluster in Haute-Savoie, France [12, 13] . Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease.", "Cases from the Bavarian cluster were reported from Germany and Spain, whereas cases from the Haute-Savoie cluster were reported from France All but two cases were hospitalised (35 of 37 where information on hospitalisation was reported), although it is likely that most were hospitalised to isolate the person rather than because of severe disease. The time from onset of symptoms to hospitalisation (and isolation) ranged between 0 and 10 days with a mean of 3.7 days (reported for 29 cases). The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe.", "The mean number of days to hospitalisation was 2.5 days for cases imported from China, but 4.6 days for those infected in Europe. This was mostly a result of delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany. In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six took only a mean of 2 days to be hospitalised. Symptoms at the point of diagnosis were reported for 31 cases. Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative.", "Two cases were asymptomatic and remained so until tested negative. The asymptomatic cases were tested as part of screening following repatriation and during contact tracing respectively. Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness.", "Of the remaining 29, 20 reported fever, 14 reported cough and eight reported weakness. Additional symptoms reported included headaches (6 cases), sore throat (2), rhinorrhoea (2), shortness of breath (2), myalgia (1), diarrhoea (1) and nausea (1). Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases.", "Fever was reported as the sole symptom for nine cases. In 16 of 29 symptomatic cases, the symptoms at diagnosis were consistent with the case definition for acute respiratory infection [16] , although it is possible that cases presented additional symptoms after diagnosis and these were not reported. Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease.", "Data on pre-existing conditions were reported for seven cases; five had no pre-existing conditions while one was reported to be obese and one had pre-existing cardiac disease. No data on clinical signs e.g. dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases.", "dyspnea etc. were reported for any of the 38 cases. All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia.", "All hospitalised cases had a benign clinical evolution except four, two reported in Italy and two reported in France, all of whom developed viral pneumonia. All three cases who were aged 65 years or over were admitted to intensive care and required respiratory support and one French case died. The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days.", "The case who died was hospitalised for 21 days and required intensive care and mechanical ventilation for 19 days. The duration of hospitalisation was reported for 16 cases with a median of 13 days (range: 8-23 days). As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised.", "As at 21 February 2020, four cases were still hospitalised. All cases were confirmed according to specific assays targeting at least two separate genes (envelope (E) gene as a screening test and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) gene or nucleoprotein (N) gene for confirmation) [8, 17] . The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate.", "The specimen types tested were reported for 27 cases: 15 had positive nasopharyngeal swabs, nine had positive throat swabs, three cases had positive sputum, two had a positive nasal swab, one case had a positive nasopharyngeal aspirate and one a positive endotracheal aspirate. As at 09:00 on 21 February, few COVID-19 cases had been detected in Europe compared with Asia. However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] .", "However the situation is rapidly developing, with a large outbreak recently identified in northern Italy, with transmission in several municipalities and at least two deaths [18] . As at 5 March 2020, there are 4,250 cases including 113 deaths reported among 38 countries in the WHO European region [19] . In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases).", "In our analysis of early cases, we observed transmission in two broad contexts: sporadic cases among travellers from China (14 cases) and cases who acquired infection due to subsequent local transmission in Europe (21 cases). Our analysis shows that the time from symptom onset to hospitalisation/case isolation was about 3 days longer for locally acquired cases than for imported cases. People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated.", "People returning from affected areas are likely to have a low threshold to seek care and be tested when symptomatic, however delays in identifying the index cases of the two clusters in France and Germany meant that locally acquired cases took longer to be detected and isolated. Once the exposure is determined and contacts identified and quarantined (171 contacts in France and 200 in Germany for the clusters in Haute-Savoie and Bavaria, respectively), further cases are likely to be rapidly detected and isolated when they develop symptoms [15, 20] . In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days.", "In the German cluster, for example, the first three cases detected locally were hospitalised in a mean of 5.7 days, whereas the following six were hospitalised after a mean of 2 days. Locally acquired cases require significant resources for contact tracing and quarantine, and countries should be prepared to allocate considerable public health resources during the containment phase, should local clusters emerge in their population. In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection.", "In addition, prompt sharing of information on cases and contacts through international notification systems such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism and the European Commission's European Early Warning and Response System is essential to contain international spread of infection. All of the imported cases had a history of travel to China. This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission.", "This was consistent with the epidemiological situation in Asia, and supported the recommendation for testing of suspected cases with travel history to China and potentially other areas of presumed ongoing community transmission. The situation has evolved rapidly since then, however, and the number of countries reporting COVID-19 transmission increased rapidly, notably with a large outbreak in northern Italy with 3,089 cases reported as at 5 March [18, 19] . Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] .", "Testing of suspected cases based on geographical risk of importation needs to be complemented with additional approaches to ensure early detection of local circulation of COVID-19, including through testing of severe acute respiratory infections in hospitals irrespectively of travel history as recommended in the WHO case definition updated on 27 February 2020 [21] . The clinical presentation observed in the cases in Europe is that of an acute respiratory infection. However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms.", "However, of the 31 cases with information on symptoms, 20 cases presented with fever and nine cases presented only with fever and no other symptoms. These findings, which are consistent with other published case series, have prompted ECDC to include fever among several clinical signs or symptoms indicative for the suspected case definition. Three cases were aged 65 years or over.", "Three cases were aged 65 years or over. All required admission to intensive care and were tourists (imported cases). These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe.", "These findings could reflect the average older age of the tourist population compared with the local contacts exposed to infection in Europe and do not allow us to draw any conclusion on the proportion of severe cases that we could expect in the general population of Europe. Despite this, the finding of older individuals being at higher risk of a severe clinical course is consistent with the evidence from Chinese case series published so far although the majority of infections in China have been mild [22, 23] . This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region.", "This preliminary analysis is based on the first reported cases of COVID-19 cases in the WHO European Region. Given the small sample size, and limited completeness for some variables, all the results presented should be interpreted with caution. With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] .", "With increasing numbers of cases in Europe, data from surveillance and investigations in the region can build on the evidence from countries in Asia experiencing more widespread transmission particularly on disease spectrum and the proportion of infections with severe outcome [22] . Understanding the infection-severity is critical to help plan for the impact on the healthcare system and the wider population. Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic.", "Serological studies are vital to understand the proportion of cases who are asymptomatic. Hospital-based surveillance could help estimate the incidence of severe cases and identify risk factors for severity and death. Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose.", "Established hospital surveillance systems that are in place for influenza and other diseases in Europe may be expanded for this purpose. In addition, a number of countries in Europe are adapting and, in some cases, already using existing sentinel primary care based surveillance systems for influenza to detect community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread.", "This approach will be used globally to help identify evidence of widespread community transmission and, should the virus spread and containment no longer be deemed feasible, to monitor intensity of disease transmission, trends and its geographical spread. Additional research is needed to complement surveillance data to build knowledge on the infectious period, modes of transmission, basic and effective reproduction numbers, and effectiveness of prevention and case management options also in settings outside of China. Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission.", "Such special studies are being conducted globally, including a cohort study on citizens repatriated from China to Europe, with the aim to extrapolate disease incidence and risk factors for infection in areas with community transmission. Countries together with ECDC and WHO, should use all opportunities to address these questions in a coordinated fashion at the European and global level. provided input to the outline, multiple versions of the manuscript and gave approval to the final draft." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]

[ "nan\n\nText: Globally, recent decades have witnessed a growing disjunction, a 'Valley of Death' 1,2 no less, between broadening strides in fundamental biomedical research and their incommensurate reach into the clinic. Plumbing work on research funding and development pipelines through recent changes in the structure of government funding, 2 new public and private joint ventures and specialist undergraduate and postgraduate courses now aim to incorporate pathways to translation at the earliest stages. Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day.", "Reflecting this shift, the number of biomedical research publications targeting 'translational' concepts has increased exponentially, up 1800% between 2003 and 2014 3 and continuing to rise rapidly up to the present day. Fuelled by the availability of new research technologies, as well as changing disease, cost and other pressing issues of our time, further growth in this exciting space will undoubtedly continue. Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants.", "Despite recent advances in the therapeutic control of immune function and viral infection, current therapies are often challenging to develop, expensive to deploy and readily select for resistance-conferring mutants. Shaped by the hostvirus immunological 'arms race' and tempered in the forge of deep time, the biodiversity of our world is increasingly being harnessed for new biotechnologies and therapeutics. Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway.", "Simultaneously, a shift towards host-oriented antiviral therapies is currently underway. In this Clinical & Translational Immunology Special Feature, I illustrate a strategic vision integrating these themes to create new, effective, economical and robust antiviral therapies and immunotherapies, with both the realities and the opportunities afforded to researchers working in our changing world squarely in mind. Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses.", "Opening this CTI Special Feature, I outline ways these issues may be solved by creatively leveraging the so-called 'strengths' of viruses. Viral RNA polymerisation and reverse transcription enable resistance to treatment by conferring extraordinary genetic diversity. However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information.", "However, these exact processes ultimately restrict viral infectivity by strongly limiting virus genome sizes and their incorporation of new information. I coin this evolutionary dilemma the 'information economy paradox'. Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost.", "Many viruses attempt to resolve this by manipulating multifunctional or multitasking host cell proteins (MMHPs), thereby maximising host subversion and viral infectivity at minimal informational cost. 4 I argue this exposes an 'Achilles Heel' that may be safely targeted via host-oriented therapies to impose devastating informational and fitness barriers on escape mutant selection. Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy.", "Furthermore, since MMHPs are often conserved targets within and between virus families, MMHP-targeting therapies may exhibit both robust and broadspectrum antiviral efficacy. Achieving this through drug repurposing will break the vicious cycle of escalating therapeutic development costs and trivial escape mutant selection, both quickly and in multiple places. I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology.", "I also discuss alternative posttranslational and RNA-based antiviral approaches, designer vaccines, immunotherapy and the emerging field of neo-virology. 4 I anticipate international efforts in these areas over the coming decade will enable the tapping of useful new biological functions and processes, methods for controlling infection, and the deployment of symbiotic or subclinical viruses in new therapies and biotechnologies that are so crucially needed. Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells.", "Upon infection, pathogens stimulate expression of numerous host inflammatory factors that support recruitment and activation of immune cells. On the flip side, this same process also causes immunopathology when prolonged or deregulated. 5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications.", "5 In their contribution to this Special Feature, Yoshinaga and Takeuchi review endogenous RNA-binding proteins (RBPs) that post-transcriptionally control expression of crucial inflammatory factors in various tissues and their potential therapeutic applications. 6 These RBPs include tristetraprolin and AUF1, which promote degradation of AU-rich element (ARE)-containing mRNA; members of the Roquin and Regnase families, which respectively promote or effect degradation of mRNAs harbouring stem-loop structures; and the increasingly apparent role of the RNA methylation machinery in controlling inflammatory mRNA stability. These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection.", "These activities take place in various subcellular compartments and are differentially regulated during infection. In this way, mRNA-destabilising RBPs constitute a 'brake' on the immune system, which may ultimately be toggled therapeutically. I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection.", "I anticipate continued efforts in this area will lead to new methods of regaining control over inflammation in autoimmunity, selectively enhancing immunity in immunotherapy, and modulating RNA synthesis and virus replication during infection. Another mRNA under post-transcriptional regulation by Regnase-1 and Roquin is Furin, which encodes a conserved proprotein convertase crucial in human health and disease. Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).", "Furin, along with other PCSK family members, is widely implicated in immune regulation, cancer and the entry, maturation or release of a broad array of evolutionarily diverse viruses including human papillomavirus (HPV), influenza (IAV), Ebola (EboV), dengue (DenV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Here, Braun and Sauter review the roles of furin in these processes, as well as the history and future of furin-targeting therapeutics. 7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity.", "7 They also discuss their recent work revealing how two IFN-cinducible factors exhibit broad-spectrum inhibition of IAV, measles (MV), zika (ZikV) and HIV by suppressing furin activity. 8 Over the coming decade, I expect to see an ever-finer spatiotemporal resolution of host-oriented therapies to achieve safe, effective and broad-spectrum yet costeffective therapies for clinical use. The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world.", "The increasing abundance of affordable, sensitive, high-throughput genome sequencing technologies has led to a recent boom in metagenomics and the cataloguing of the microbiome of our world. The MinION nanopore sequencer is one of the latest innovations in this space, enabling direct sequencing in a miniature form factor with only minimal sample preparation and a consumer-grade laptop computer. Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses.", "Nakagawa and colleagues here report on their latest experiments using this system, further improving its performance for use in resource-poor contexts for meningitis diagnoses. 9 While direct sequencing of viral genomic RNA is challenging, this system was recently used to directly sequence an RNA virus genome (IAV) for the first time. 10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account.", "10 I anticipate further improvements in the performance of such devices over the coming decade will transform virus surveillance efforts, the importance of which was underscored by the recent EboV and novel coronavirus (nCoV / COVID-19) outbreaks, enabling rapid deployment of antiviral treatments that take resistance-conferring mutations into account. Decades of basic immunology research have provided a near-complete picture of the main armaments in the human antiviral arsenal. Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere.", "Nevertheless, this focus on mammalian defences and pathologies has sidelined examination of the types and roles of viruses and antiviral defences that exist throughout our biosphere. One case in point is the CRISPR/Cas antiviral immune system of prokaryotes, which is now repurposed as a revolutionary gene-editing biotechnology in plants and animals. 11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions.", "11 Another is the ancient lineage of nucleocytosolic large DNA viruses (NCLDVs), which are emerging human pathogens that possess enormous genomes of up to several megabases in size encoding hundreds of proteins with unique and unknown functions. 12 Moreover, hundreds of human-and avian-infective viruses such as IAV strain H5N1 are known, but recent efforts indicate the true number may be in the millions and many harbour zoonotic potential. 13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity.", "13 It is increasingly clear that host-virus interactions have generated truly vast yet poorly understood and untapped biodiversity. Closing this Special Feature, Watanabe and Kawaoka elaborate on neo-virology, an emerging field engaged in cataloguing and characterising this biodiversity through a global consortium. 14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution.", "14 I predict these efforts will unlock a vast wealth of currently unexplored biodiversity, leading to biotechnologies and treatments that leverage the host-virus interactions developed throughout evolution. When biomedical innovations fall into the 'Valley of Death', patients who are therefore not reached all too often fall with them. Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers.", "Being entrusted with the resources and expectation to conceive, deliver and communicate dividends to society is both cherished and eagerly pursued at every stage of our careers. Nevertheless, the road to research translation is winding and is built on a foundation of basic research. Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda.", "Supporting industry-academia collaboration and nurturing talent and skills in the Indo-Pacific region are two of the four pillars of the National Innovation and Science Agenda. 2 These frame Australia's Medical Research and Innovation Priorities, which include antimicrobial resistance, global health and health security, drug repurposing and translational research infrastructure, 15 capturing many of the key elements of this CTI Special Feature. Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes.", "Establishing durable international relationships that integrate diverse expertise is essential to delivering these outcomes. To this end, NHMRC has recently taken steps under the International Engagement Strategy 16 to increase cooperation with its counterparts overseas. These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country.", "These include the Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED), tasked with translating the biomedical research output of that country. Given the reciprocal efforts at accelerating bilateral engagement currently underway, 17 the prospects for new areas of international cooperation and mobility have never been more exciting nor urgent. With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan.", "With the above in mind, all contributions to this CTI Special Feature I have selected from research presented by fellow invitees to the 2018 Awaji International Forum on Infection and Immunity (AIFII) and 2017 Consortium of Biological Sciences (ConBio) conferences in Japan. Both Australia and Japan have strong traditions in immunology and related disciplines, and I predict that the quantity, quality and importance of our bilateral cooperation will accelerate rapidly over the short to medium term. By expanding and cooperatively leveraging our respective research strengths, our efforts may yet solve the many pressing disease, cost and other sustainability issues of our time." ]