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24. In light of the above principles, now we will examine whether

there is any violation of principles of natural justice in the present

case.

25. Vide letter dated 12th February, 2008, the appellant was

informed by the Excise Department, Nanded, when he was posted

at Akola that hearing was fixed for 25th February, 2008. He

submitted a request for adjournment which, admittedly, was

received and placed before the office of the State Information

Commission. In addition thereto, another officer of the

Department had appeared, intimated the State Information

Commission and requested for adjournment, which was declined.

It was not that the appellant had been avoiding appearance

before the State Information Commission. It was the first date of

hearing and in the letter dated 25th February, 2008, he had given

a reasonable cause for his absence before the Commission on 25th

February, 2008. However, on 26th February, 2008, the impugned

order was passed. The appellant was entitled to a hearing before

an order could be passed against him under the provisions of

Section 20(2) of the Act. He was granted no such hearing. The

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State Information Commission not only recommended but

directed initiation of departmental proceedings against the

appellant and even asked for the compliance report. If such a

harsh order was to be passed against the appellant, the least that

was expected of the Commission was to grant him a

hearing/reasonable opportunity to put forward his case. We are of

the considered view that the State Information Commission should

have granted an adjournment and heard the appellant before

passing an order Section under 20(2) of the Act. On that ground

itself, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It may be

usefully noticed at this stage that the appellant had a genuine

case to explain before the State Information Commission and to

establish that his case did not call for any action within the

provisions of Section 20(2). Now, we would deal with the other

contention on behalf of the appellant that the order itself does not

satisfy the requirements of Section 20(2) and, thus, is

unsustainable in law. For this purpose, it is necessary for the

Court to analyse the requirement and scope of Section 20(2) of

the Act. Section 20(2) empowers a Central Information

Commission or the State Information Commission :

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(a) at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal;

(b) if it is of the opinion that the Central Public Information

Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case

may be, has without any reasonable cause and persistently,

failed to receive an application for information or has not

furnished information within the time specified under sub-

section (1) of Section 7 (i.e. 30 days);

(c) malafidely denied the request for information or intentionally

given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information; or

(d) destroyed information which was the subject of the request

or obstructed in any manner in furnishing the information;

(e) then it shall recommend for disciplinary action against the

stated persons under the relevant servicerules.

26. From the above dissected language of the provision, it is

clear that first of all an opinion has to be formed by the

Commission. This opinion is to be formed at the time of deciding

any complaint or appeal after hearing the person concerned. The

opinion formed has to have basis or reasons and must be relatable

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to any of the defaults of the provision. It is a penal provision as it

vests the delinquent with civil consequences of initiation of and/or

even punishment in disciplinary proceedings. The grounds stated

in the Section are exhaustive and it is not for the Commission to

add other grounds which are not specifically stated in the

language of Section 20(2). The section deals with two different

proceedings. Firstly, the appeal or complaint filed before the

Commission is to be decided and, secondly, if the Commission

forms such opinion, as contemplated under the provisions, then it

can recommend that disciplinary proceedings be taken against

the said delinquent Central Public Information Officer or State

Public Information Officer. The purpose of the legislation in

requiring both these proceedings to be taken together is obvious

not only from the language of the section but even by applying

the mischief rule wherein the provision is examined from the very

purpose for which the provision has been enacted. While deciding

the complaint or the appeal, if the Commission finds that the

appeal is without merit or the complaint is without substance, the

information need not be furnished for reasons to be recorded. If

such be the decision, the question of recommending disciplinary

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action under Section 20(2) may not arise. Still, there may be

another situation that upon perusing the records of the appeal or

the complaint, the Commission may be of the opinion that none of

the defaults contemplated under Section 20(2) is satisfied and,

therefore, no action is called for. To put it simply, the Central or

the State Commission have no jurisdiction to add to the

exhaustive grounds of default mentioned in the provisions of

Section 20(2). The case of default must strictly fall within the

specified grounds of the provisions of Section 20(2). This provision

has to be construed and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be

permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission.

27. Now, let us examine if any one or more of the stated grounds

under Section 20(2) were satisfied in the present case which