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340,279,892,905,069,500,000,000,000,000B
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340,272,304,251,680,200,000,000,000,000B
⌀ | cwe
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0 | openssl | ca989269a2876bae79393bd54c3e72d49975fc75 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=ca989269a2876bae79393bd54c3e72d49975fc75 | Use version in SSL_METHOD not SSL structure.
When deciding whether to use TLS 1.2 PRF and record hash algorithms
use the version number in the corresponding SSL_METHOD structure
instead of the SSL structure. The SSL structure version is sometimes
inaccurate. Note: OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later effectively do this already.
(CVE-2013-6449) | 1 | long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
{
long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
return alg2;
}
| 255,087,747,659,226,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | CVE-2013-6449 | The ssl_get_algorithm2 function in ssl/s3_lib.c in OpenSSL before 1.0.2 obtains a certain version number from an incorrect data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via crafted traffic from a TLS 1.2 client. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6449 |
1 | savannah | 190cef6eed37d0e73a73c1e205eb31d45ab60a3c | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commitdiff;h=190cef6eed37d0e73a73c1e205eb31d45ab60a3c | None | 1 | gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
*session_data_size = psession.size;
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
| 266,005,388,725,654,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-4128 | Buffer overflow in the gnutls_session_get_data function in lib/gnutls_session.c in GnuTLS 2.12.x before 2.12.14 and 3.x before 3.0.7, when used on a client that performs nonstandard session resumption, allows remote TLS servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a large SessionTicket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4128 |
2 | savannah | e82ef4545e9e98cbcb032f55d7c750b81e3a0450 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commitdiff;h=e82ef4545e9e98cbcb032f55d7c750b81e3a0450 | None | 1 | gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
| 162,619,476,999,663,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-4128 | Buffer overflow in the gnutls_session_get_data function in lib/gnutls_session.c in GnuTLS 2.12.x before 2.12.14 and 3.x before 3.0.7, when used on a client that performs nonstandard session resumption, allows remote TLS servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a large SessionTicket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4128 |
3 | savannah | 075d7556964f5a871a73c22ac4b69f5361295099 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=075d7556964f5a871a73c22ac4b69f5361295099 | None | 1 | getftp (struct url *u, wgint passed_expected_bytes, wgint *qtyread,
wgint restval, ccon *con, int count, wgint *last_expected_bytes,
FILE *warc_tmp)
{
int csock, dtsock, local_sock, res;
uerr_t err = RETROK; /* appease the compiler */
FILE *fp;
char *respline, *tms;
const char *user, *passwd, *tmrate;
int cmd = con->cmd;
bool pasv_mode_open = false;
wgint expected_bytes = 0;
bool got_expected_bytes = false;
bool rest_failed = false;
bool rest_failed = false;
int flags;
wgint rd_size, previous_rd_size = 0;
char type_char;
bool try_again;
bool list_a_used = false;
assert (con != NULL);
assert (con->target != NULL);
/* Debug-check of the sanity of the request by making sure that LIST
and RETR are never both requested (since we can handle only one
at a time. */
assert (!((cmd & DO_LIST) && (cmd & DO_RETR)));
/* Make sure that at least *something* is requested. */
assert ((cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_CWD | DO_RETR | DO_LOGIN)) != 0);
*qtyread = restval;
user = u->user;
passwd = u->passwd;
search_netrc (u->host, (const char **)&user, (const char **)&passwd, 1);
user = user ? user : (opt.ftp_user ? opt.ftp_user : opt.user);
if (!user) user = "anonymous";
passwd = passwd ? passwd : (opt.ftp_passwd ? opt.ftp_passwd : opt.passwd);
if (!passwd) passwd = "-wget@";
dtsock = -1;
local_sock = -1;
con->dltime = 0;
if (!(cmd & DO_LOGIN))
csock = con->csock;
else /* cmd & DO_LOGIN */
{
char *host = con->proxy ? con->proxy->host : u->host;
int port = con->proxy ? con->proxy->port : u->port;
/* Login to the server: */
/* First: Establish the control connection. */
csock = connect_to_host (host, port);
if (csock == E_HOST)
return HOSTERR;
else if (csock < 0)
return (retryable_socket_connect_error (errno)
? CONERROR : CONIMPOSSIBLE);
if (cmd & LEAVE_PENDING)
con->csock = csock;
else
con->csock = -1;
/* Second: Login with proper USER/PASS sequence. */
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Logging in as %s ... "),
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, user));
if (opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_ALWAYS, "\n");
if (con->proxy)
{
/* If proxy is in use, log in as username@target-site. */
char *logname = concat_strings (user, "@", u->host, (char *) 0);
err = ftp_login (csock, logname, passwd);
xfree (logname);
}
else
err = ftp_login (csock, user, passwd);
/* FTPRERR, FTPSRVERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPLOGREFUSED, FTPLOGINC */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPSRVERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error in server greeting.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPLOGREFUSED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("The server refuses login.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return FTPLOGREFUSED;
case FTPLOGINC:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Login incorrect.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return FTPLOGINC;
case FTPOK:
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Logged in!\n"));
break;
default:
abort ();
}
/* Third: Get the system type */
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> SYST ... ");
err = ftp_syst (csock, &con->rs, &con->rsu);
/* FTPRERR */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPSRVERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Server error, can't determine system type.\n"));
break;
case FTPOK:
/* Everything is OK. */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response && err != FTPSRVERR)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
/* 2013-10-17 Andrea Urbani (matfanjol)
According to the system type I choose which
list command will be used.
If I don't know that system, I will try, the
first time of each session, "LIST -a" and
"LIST". (see __LIST_A_EXPLANATION__ below) */
switch (con->rs)
{
case ST_VMS:
/* About ST_VMS there is an old note:
2008-01-29 SMS. For a VMS FTP server, where "LIST -a" may not
fail, but will never do what is desired here,
skip directly to the simple "LIST" command
(assumed to be the last one in the list). */
DEBUGP (("\nVMS: I know it and I will use \"LIST\" as standard list command\n"));
con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE;
con->st |= AVOID_LIST_A;
break;
case ST_UNIX:
if (con->rsu == UST_MULTINET)
{
DEBUGP (("\nUNIX MultiNet: I know it and I will use \"LIST\" "
"as standard list command\n"));
con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE;
con->st |= AVOID_LIST_A;
}
else if (con->rsu == UST_TYPE_L8)
{
DEBUGP (("\nUNIX TYPE L8: I know it and I will use \"LIST -a\" "
"as standard list command\n"));
con->st |= LIST_AFTER_LIST_A_CHECK_DONE;
con->st |= AVOID_LIST;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
/* Fourth: Find the initial ftp directory */
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> PWD ... ");
err = ftp_pwd (csock, &con->id);
/* FTPRERR */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPSRVERR :
/* PWD unsupported -- assume "/". */
xfree (con->id);
con->id = xstrdup ("/");
break;
case FTPOK:
/* Everything is OK. */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
#if 0
/* 2004-09-17 SMS.
Don't help me out. Please.
A reasonably recent VMS FTP server will cope just fine with
UNIX file specifications. This code just spoils things.
Discarding the device name, for example, is not a wise move.
This code was disabled but left in as an example of what not
to do.
*/
/* VMS will report something like "PUB$DEVICE:[INITIAL.FOLDER]".
Convert it to "/INITIAL/FOLDER" */
if (con->rs == ST_VMS)
{
char *path = strchr (con->id, '[');
char *pathend = path ? strchr (path + 1, ']') : NULL;
if (!path || !pathend)
DEBUGP (("Initial VMS directory not in the form [...]!\n"));
else
{
char *idir = con->id;
DEBUGP (("Preprocessing the initial VMS directory\n"));
DEBUGP ((" old = '%s'\n", con->id));
/* We do the conversion in-place by copying the stuff
between [ and ] to the beginning, and changing dots
to slashes at the same time. */
*idir++ = '/';
for (++path; path < pathend; path++, idir++)
*idir = *path == '.' ? '/' : *path;
*idir = '\0';
DEBUGP ((" new = '%s'\n\n", con->id));
}
}
#endif /* 0 */
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n"));
/* Fifth: Set the FTP type. */
type_char = ftp_process_type (u->params);
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> TYPE %c ... ", type_char);
err = ftp_type (csock, type_char);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPUNKNOWNTYPE */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPUNKNOWNTYPE:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Unknown type `%c', closing control connection.\n"),
type_char);
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPOK:
/* Everything is OK. */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
} /* do login */
if (cmd & DO_CWD)
{
if (!*u->dir)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("==> CWD not needed.\n"));
else
{
const char *targ = NULL;
int cwd_count;
int cwd_end;
int cwd_start;
char *target = u->dir;
DEBUGP (("changing working directory\n"));
/* Change working directory. To change to a non-absolute
Unix directory, we need to prepend initial directory
(con->id) to it. Absolute directories "just work".
A relative directory is one that does not begin with '/'
and, on non-Unix OS'es, one that doesn't begin with
"[a-z]:".
This is not done for OS400, which doesn't use
"/"-delimited directories, nor does it support directory
hierarchies. "CWD foo" followed by "CWD bar" leaves us
in "bar", not in "foo/bar", as would be customary
elsewhere. */
/* 2004-09-20 SMS.
Why is this wise even on UNIX? It certainly fouls VMS.
See below for a more reliable, more universal method.
*/
/* 2008-04-22 MJC.
I'm not crazy about it either. I'm informed it's useful
for misconfigured servers that have some dirs in the path
with +x but -r, but this method is not RFC-conformant. I
understand the need to deal with crappy server
configurations, but it's far better to use the canonical
method first, and fall back to kludges second.
*/
if (target[0] != '/'
&& !(con->rs != ST_UNIX
&& c_isalpha (target[0])
&& target[1] == ':')
&& (con->rs != ST_OS400)
&& (con->rs != ST_VMS))
{
int idlen = strlen (con->id);
char *ntarget, *p;
/* Strip trailing slash(es) from con->id. */
while (idlen > 0 && con->id[idlen - 1] == '/')
--idlen;
p = ntarget = (char *)alloca (idlen + 1 + strlen (u->dir) + 1);
memcpy (p, con->id, idlen);
p += idlen;
*p++ = '/';
strcpy (p, target);
DEBUGP (("Prepended initial PWD to relative path:\n"));
DEBUGP ((" pwd: '%s'\n old: '%s'\n new: '%s'\n",
con->id, target, ntarget));
target = ntarget;
}
#if 0
/* 2004-09-17 SMS.
Don't help me out. Please.
A reasonably recent VMS FTP server will cope just fine with
UNIX file specifications. This code just spoils things.
Discarding the device name, for example, is not a wise
move.
This code was disabled but left in as an example of what
not to do.
*/
/* If the FTP host runs VMS, we will have to convert the absolute
directory path in UNIX notation to absolute directory path in
VMS notation as VMS FTP servers do not like UNIX notation of
absolute paths. "VMS notation" is [dir.subdir.subsubdir]. */
if (con->rs == ST_VMS)
{
char *tmpp;
char *ntarget = (char *)alloca (strlen (target) + 2);
/* We use a converted initial dir, so directories in
TARGET will be separated with slashes, something like
"/INITIAL/FOLDER/DIR/SUBDIR". Convert that to
"[INITIAL.FOLDER.DIR.SUBDIR]". */
strcpy (ntarget, target);
assert (*ntarget == '/');
*ntarget = '[';
for (tmpp = ntarget + 1; *tmpp; tmpp++)
if (*tmpp == '/')
*tmpp = '.';
*tmpp++ = ']';
*tmpp = '\0';
DEBUGP (("Changed file name to VMS syntax:\n"));
DEBUGP ((" Unix: '%s'\n VMS: '%s'\n", target, ntarget));
target = ntarget;
}
#endif /* 0 */
/* 2004-09-20 SMS.
A relative directory is relative to the initial directory.
Thus, what _is_ useful on VMS (and probably elsewhere) is
to CWD to the initial directory (ideally, whatever the
server reports, _exactly_, NOT badly UNIX-ixed), and then
CWD to the (new) relative directory. This should probably
be restructured as a function, called once or twice, but
I'm lazy enough to take the badly indented loop short-cut
for now.
*/
/* Decide on one pass (absolute) or two (relative).
The VMS restriction may be relaxed when the squirrely code
above is reformed.
*/
if ((con->rs == ST_VMS) && (target[0] != '/'))
{
cwd_start = 0;
DEBUGP (("Using two-step CWD for relative path.\n"));
}
else
{
/* Go straight to the target. */
cwd_start = 1;
}
/* At least one VMS FTP server (TCPware V5.6-2) can switch to
a UNIX emulation mode when given a UNIX-like directory
specification (like "a/b/c"). If allowed to continue this
way, LIST interpretation will be confused, because the
system type (SYST response) will not be re-checked, and
future UNIX-format directory listings (for multiple URLs or
"-r") will be horribly misinterpreted.
The cheap and nasty work-around is to do a "CWD []" after a
UNIX-like directory specification is used. (A single-level
directory is harmless.) This puts the TCPware server back
into VMS mode, and does no harm on other servers.
Unlike the rest of this block, this particular behavior
_is_ VMS-specific, so it gets its own VMS test.
*/
if ((con->rs == ST_VMS) && (strchr( target, '/') != NULL))
{
cwd_end = 3;
DEBUGP (("Using extra \"CWD []\" step for VMS server.\n"));
}
else
{
cwd_end = 2;
}
/* 2004-09-20 SMS. */
/* Sorry about the deviant indenting. Laziness. */
for (cwd_count = cwd_start; cwd_count < cwd_end; cwd_count++)
{
switch (cwd_count)
{
case 0:
/* Step one (optional): Go to the initial directory,
exactly as reported by the server.
*/
targ = con->id;
break;
case 1:
/* Step two: Go to the target directory. (Absolute or
relative will work now.)
*/
targ = target;
break;
case 2:
/* Step three (optional): "CWD []" to restore server
VMS-ness.
*/
targ = "[]";
break;
default:
logprintf (LOG_ALWAYS, _("Logically impossible section reached in getftp()"));
logprintf (LOG_ALWAYS, _("cwd_count: %d\ncwd_start: %d\ncwd_end: %d\n"),
cwd_count, cwd_start, cwd_end);
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> CWD (%d) %s ... ", cwd_count,
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, target));
err = ftp_cwd (csock, targ);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNSFOD */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPNSFOD:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such directory %s.\n\n"),
quote (u->dir));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n"));
} /* for */
/* 2004-09-20 SMS. */
} /* else */
}
else /* do not CWD */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("==> CWD not required.\n"));
if ((cmd & DO_RETR) && passed_expected_bytes == 0)
{
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> SIZE %s ... ",
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, u->file));
}
err = ftp_size (csock, u->file, &expected_bytes);
/* FTPRERR */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
case FTPSRVERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPOK:
got_expected_bytes = true;
/* Everything is OK. */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%s\n",
expected_bytes ?
number_to_static_string (expected_bytes) :
_("done.\n"));
}
}
if (cmd & DO_RETR && restval > 0 && restval == expected_bytes)
{
/* Server confirms that file has length restval. We should stop now.
Some servers (f.e. NcFTPd) return error when receive REST 0 */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("File has already been retrieved.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return RETRFINISHED;
}
do
{
try_again = false;
/* If anything is to be retrieved, PORT (or PASV) must be sent. */
if (cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR))
{
if (opt.ftp_pasv)
{
ip_address passive_addr;
int passive_port;
err = ftp_do_pasv (csock, &passive_addr, &passive_port);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNOPASV, FTPINVPASV */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
return err;
case FTPNOPASV:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot initiate PASV transfer.\n"));
break;
case FTPINVPASV:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot parse PASV response.\n"));
break;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
} /* switch (err) */
if (err==FTPOK)
{
DEBUGP (("trying to connect to %s port %d\n",
print_address (&passive_addr), passive_port));
dtsock = connect_to_ip (&passive_addr, passive_port, NULL);
if (dtsock < 0)
{
int save_errno = errno;
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("couldn't connect to %s port %d: %s\n"),
print_address (&passive_addr), passive_port,
strerror (save_errno));
? CONERROR : CONIMPOSSIBLE);
}
pasv_mode_open = true; /* Flag to avoid accept port */
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
} /* err==FTP_OK */
}
if (!pasv_mode_open) /* Try to use a port command if PASV failed */
{
err = ftp_do_port (csock, &local_sock);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, bindport (FTPSYSERR), HOSTERR,
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case CONSOCKERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "socket: %s\n", strerror (errno));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPSYSERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Bind error (%s).\n"),
strerror (errno));
fd_close (dtsock);
return err;
case FTPPORTERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Invalid PORT.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
} /* port switch */
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
} /* dtsock == -1 */
} /* cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR) */
/* Restart if needed. */
if (restval && (cmd & DO_RETR))
{
if (!opt.server_response)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> REST %s ... ",
number_to_static_string (restval));
err = ftp_rest (csock, restval);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPRESTFAIL */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPRESTFAIL:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\nREST failed, starting from scratch.\n"));
rest_failed = true;
break;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (err != FTPRESTFAIL && !opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done. "));
} /* restval && cmd & DO_RETR */
if (cmd & DO_RETR)
{
/* If we're in spider mode, don't really retrieve anything except
the directory listing and verify whether the given "file" exists. */
if (opt.spider)
{
bool exists = false;
struct fileinfo *f;
uerr_t _res = ftp_get_listing (u, con, &f);
/* Set the DO_RETR command flag again, because it gets unset when
calling ftp_get_listing() and would otherwise cause an assertion
failure earlier on when this function gets repeatedly called
(e.g., when recursing). */
con->cmd |= DO_RETR;
if (_res == RETROK)
{
while (f)
{
if (!strcmp (f->name, u->file))
{
exists = true;
break;
}
f = f->next;
}
if (exists)
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("File %s exists.\n"),
quote (u->file));
}
else
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file %s.\n"),
quote (u->file));
}
}
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return RETRFINISHED;
}
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (!opt.server_response)
{
if (restval)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> RETR %s ... ",
quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, u->file));
}
}
err = ftp_retr (csock, u->file);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED, FTPNSFOD */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPNSFOD:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file %s.\n\n"),
quote (u->file));
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n"));
if (! got_expected_bytes)
expected_bytes = *last_expected_bytes;
} /* do retrieve */
if (cmd & DO_LIST)
{
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "==> LIST ... ");
/* As Maciej W. Rozycki ([email protected]) says, `LIST'
without arguments is better than `LIST .'; confirmed by
RFC959. */
err = ftp_list (csock, NULL, con->st&AVOID_LIST_A, con->st&AVOID_LIST, &list_a_used);
/* FTPRERR, WRITEFAILED */
switch (err)
{
case FTPRERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Error in server response, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case WRITEFAILED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Write failed, closing control connection.\n"));
fd_close (csock);
con->csock = -1;
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPNSFOD:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("No such file or directory %s.\n\n"),
quote ("."));
fd_close (dtsock);
fd_close (local_sock);
return err;
case FTPOK:
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!opt.server_response)
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("done.\n"));
if (! got_expected_bytes)
expected_bytes = *last_expected_bytes;
} /* cmd & DO_LIST */
if (!(cmd & (DO_LIST | DO_RETR)) || (opt.spider && !(cmd & DO_LIST)))
return RETRFINISHED;
/* Some FTP servers return the total length of file after REST
command, others just return the remaining size. */
if (passed_expected_bytes && restval && expected_bytes
&& (expected_bytes == passed_expected_bytes - restval))
{
DEBUGP (("Lying FTP server found, adjusting.\n"));
expected_bytes = passed_expected_bytes;
}
/* If no transmission was required, then everything is OK. */
if (!pasv_mode_open) /* we are not using pasive mode so we need
to accept */
}
| 114,753,069,609,161,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2015-7665 | Tails before 1.7 includes the wget program but does not prevent automatic fallback from passive FTP to active FTP, which allows remote FTP servers to discover the Tor client IP address by reading a (1) PORT or (2) EPRT command. NOTE: within wget itself, the automatic fallback is not considered a vulnerability by CVE. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-7665 |
5 | ghostscript | 83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607 | None | 1 | void fz_init_cached_color_converter(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, fz_colorspace *is, fz_colorspace *ds, fz_colorspace *ss, const fz_color_params *params)
{
int n = ss->n;
fz_cached_color_converter *cached = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, fz_cached_color_converter);
cc->opaque = cached;
cc->convert = fz_cached_color_convert;
cc->ds = ds ? ds : fz_device_gray(ctx);
cc->ss = ss;
cc->is = is;
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base, is, cc->ds, ss, params);
cached->hash = fz_new_hash_table(ctx, 256, n * sizeof(float), -1, fz_free);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cached->base);
fz_drop_hash_table(ctx, cached->hash);
fz_free(ctx, cached);
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
}
| 183,139,468,890,710,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | colorspace.c | 6,862,521,774,369,017,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-1000040 | In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple use of uninitialized value bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (crash) or influence program flow via a crafted file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000040 |
6 | ghostscript | f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607;hp=093fc3b098dc5fadef5d8ad4b225db9fb124758b | None | 1 | add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many)
{
int current;
cmap_splay *tree;
if (low > high)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name);
return;
}
tree = cmap->tree;
if (cmap->tlen)
{
unsigned int move = cmap->ttop;
unsigned int gt = EMPTY;
unsigned int lt = EMPTY;
if (check_for_overlap)
{
/* Check for collision with the current node */
do
{
current = move;
/* Cases we might meet:
* tree[i]: <----->
* case 0: <->
* case 1: <------->
* case 2: <------------->
* case 3: <->
* case 4: <------->
* case 5: <->
*/
if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high)
{
/* case 1, reduces to case 0 */
/* or case 2, deleting the node */
tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low;
tree[current].low = high + 1;
if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high)
{
move = delete_node(cmap, current);
current = EMPTY;
continue;
}
}
else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high)
{
/* case 4, reduces to case 5 */
tree[current].high = low - 1;
assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high);
}
else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high)
{
/* case 3, reduces to case 5 */
int new_high = tree[current].high;
tree[current].high = low-1;
add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, tree[current].many);
}
/* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */
if (tree[current].low > high) {
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
}
while (move != EMPTY);
}
else
{
do
{
current = move;
if (tree[current].low > high)
{
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
} while (move != EMPTY);
}
/* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */
/* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */
/* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */
if (!many)
{
/* Check for the 'merge' cases. */
if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = high;
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high;
delete_node(cmap, gt);
}
goto exit;
}
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[gt].low = low;
tree[gt].out = out;
goto exit;
}
}
}
else
current = EMPTY;
if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap)
{
int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256;
tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree);
cmap->tcap = new_cap;
}
tree[cmap->tlen].low = low;
tree[cmap->tlen].high = high;
tree[cmap->tlen].out = out;
tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current;
tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].many = many;
cmap->tlen++;
if (current == EMPTY)
cmap->ttop = 0;
else if (tree[current].low > high)
tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1;
else
{
assert(tree[current].high < low);
tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1;
}
move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1);
cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1;
exit:
{}
#ifdef CHECK_SPLAY
check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0);
#endif
#ifdef DUMP_SPLAY
dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, "");
#endif
}
| 73,361,849,657,881,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2018-1000039 | In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000039 |
7 | ghostscript | 4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05;hp=8ec561d1bccc46e9db40a9f61310cd8b3763914e | None | 1 | begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask;
fz_rect mask_bbox;
fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm;
fz_matrix mask_matrix;
fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace;
save->softmask = softmask;
if (softmask == NULL)
return gstate;
save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources;
save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
save_ctm = gstate->ctm;
pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox);
pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix);
pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
if (gstate->luminosity)
mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect;
else
{
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix);
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm);
}
gstate->softmask = NULL;
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask);
if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace)
mask_colorspace = fz_device_gray(ctx);
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1);
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from
* here the clip stack would be messed up. */
/* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */
}
fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev);
pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->ctm = save_ctm;
return gstate;
}
| 213,010,027,523,017,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pdf-op-run.c | 11,900,219,421,886,235,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2018-1000039 | In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000039 |
8 | ghostscript | 71ceebcf56e682504da22c4035b39a2d451e8ffd | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=71ceebcf56e682504da22c4035b39a2d451e8ffd;hp=7f82c01523505052615492f8e220f4348ba46995 | None | 1 | add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many)
{
int current;
cmap_splay *tree;
if (low > high)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name);
return;
}
tree = cmap->tree;
if (cmap->tlen)
{
unsigned int move = cmap->ttop;
unsigned int gt = EMPTY;
unsigned int lt = EMPTY;
if (check_for_overlap)
{
/* Check for collision with the current node */
do
{
current = move;
/* Cases we might meet:
* tree[i]: <----->
* case 0: <->
* case 1: <------->
* case 2: <------------->
* case 3: <->
* case 4: <------->
* case 5: <->
*/
if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high)
{
/* case 1, reduces to case 0 */
/* or case 2, deleting the node */
tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low;
tree[current].low = high + 1;
if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high)
{
move = delete_node(cmap, current);
current = EMPTY;
continue;
}
}
else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high)
{
/* case 4, reduces to case 5 */
tree[current].high = low - 1;
assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high);
}
else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high)
{
/* case 3, reduces to case 5 */
int new_high = tree[current].high;
tree[current].high = low-1;
add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, many);
}
/* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */
if (tree[current].low > high) {
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
}
while (move != EMPTY);
}
else
{
do
{
current = move;
if (tree[current].low > high)
{
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
} while (move != EMPTY);
}
/* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */
/* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */
/* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */
if (!many)
{
/* Check for the 'merge' cases. */
if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = high;
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high;
delete_node(cmap, gt);
}
goto exit;
}
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[gt].low = low;
tree[gt].out = out;
goto exit;
}
}
}
else
current = EMPTY;
if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap)
{
int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256;
tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree);
cmap->tcap = new_cap;
}
tree[cmap->tlen].low = low;
tree[cmap->tlen].high = high;
tree[cmap->tlen].out = out;
tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current;
tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].many = many;
cmap->tlen++;
if (current == EMPTY)
cmap->ttop = 0;
else if (tree[current].low > high)
tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1;
else
{
assert(tree[current].high < low);
tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1;
}
move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1);
cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1;
exit:
{}
#ifdef CHECK_SPLAY
check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0);
#endif
#ifdef DUMP_SPLAY
dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, "");
#endif
}
| 72,963,719,227,623,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pdf-cmap.c | 295,089,762,772,960,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2018-1000039 | In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple heap use after free bugs in the PDF parser could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, read memory, or cause a denial of service via a crafted file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000039 |
9 | ghostscript | b2e7d38e845c7d4922d05e6e41f3a2dc1bc1b14a | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=b2e7d38e845c7d4922d05e6e41f3a2dc1bc1b14a;hp=f51836b9732c38d945b87fda0770009a77ba680c | None | 1 | pdf_show_image(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, fz_image *image)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
fz_matrix image_ctm;
fz_rect bbox;
softmask_save softmask = { NULL };
if (pr->super.hidden)
return;
break;
case PDF_MAT_SHADE:
if (gstate->fill.shade)
{
fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox);
bbox = fz_unit_rect;
fz_transform_rect(&bbox, &image_ctm);
if (image->mask)
{
/* apply blend group even though we skip the soft mask */
if (gstate->blendmode)
fz_begin_group(ctx, pr->dev, &bbox, NULL, 0, 0, gstate->blendmode, 1);
fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image->mask, &image_ctm, &bbox);
}
else
gstate = pdf_begin_group(ctx, pr, &bbox, &softmask);
if (!image->colorspace)
{
switch (gstate->fill.kind)
{
case PDF_MAT_NONE:
break;
case PDF_MAT_COLOR:
fz_fill_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm,
gstate->fill.colorspace, gstate->fill.v, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
break;
case PDF_MAT_PATTERN:
if (gstate->fill.pattern)
{
fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox);
pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->fill.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_FILL);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
case PDF_MAT_SHADE:
if (gstate->fill.shade)
{
fz_clip_image_mask(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, &bbox);
fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->fill.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
}
}
else
{
fz_fill_image(ctx, pr->dev, image, &image_ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
}
if (image->mask)
{
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
if (gstate->blendmode)
fz_end_group(ctx, pr->dev);
}
else
pdf_end_group(ctx, pr, &softmask);
}
static void
if (pr->clip)
{
gstate->clip_depth++;
fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, pr->clip_even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
pr->clip = 0;
}
if (pr->super.hidden)
dostroke = dofill = 0;
if (dofill || dostroke)
gstate = pdf_begin_group(ctx, pr, &bbox, &softmask);
if (dofill && dostroke)
{
/* We may need to push a knockout group */
if (gstate->stroke.alpha == 0)
{
/* No need for group, as stroke won't do anything */
}
else if (gstate->stroke.alpha == 1.0f && gstate->blendmode == FZ_BLEND_NORMAL)
{
/* No need for group, as stroke won't show up */
}
else
{
knockout_group = 1;
fz_begin_group(ctx, pr->dev, &bbox, NULL, 0, 1, FZ_BLEND_NORMAL, 1);
}
}
if (dofill)
{
switch (gstate->fill.kind)
{
case PDF_MAT_NONE:
break;
case PDF_MAT_COLOR:
fz_fill_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm,
gstate->fill.colorspace, gstate->fill.v, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
break;
case PDF_MAT_PATTERN:
if (gstate->fill.pattern)
{
fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->fill.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_FILL);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
case PDF_MAT_SHADE:
if (gstate->fill.shade)
{
fz_clip_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, even_odd, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
/* The cluster and page 2 of patterns.pdf shows that fz_fill_shade should NOT be called with gstate->ctm. */
fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->fill.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->fill.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->fill.alpha, &gstate->fill.color_params);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
}
}
if (dostroke)
{
switch (gstate->stroke.kind)
{
case PDF_MAT_NONE:
break;
case PDF_MAT_COLOR:
fz_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm,
gstate->stroke.colorspace, gstate->stroke.v, gstate->stroke.alpha, &gstate->stroke.color_params);
break;
case PDF_MAT_PATTERN:
if (gstate->stroke.pattern)
{
fz_clip_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
pdf_show_pattern(ctx, pr, gstate->stroke.pattern, &pr->gstate[gstate->stroke.gstate_num], &bbox, PDF_STROKE);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
case PDF_MAT_SHADE:
if (gstate->stroke.shade)
{
fz_clip_stroke_path(ctx, pr->dev, path, gstate->stroke_state, &gstate->ctm, &bbox);
fz_fill_shade(ctx, pr->dev, gstate->stroke.shade, &pr->gstate[gstate->stroke.gstate_num].ctm, gstate->stroke.alpha, &gstate->stroke.color_params);
fz_pop_clip(ctx, pr->dev);
}
break;
}
}
if (knockout_group)
fz_end_group(ctx, pr->dev);
if (dofill || dostroke)
pdf_end_group(ctx, pr, &softmask);
}
| 327,424,409,628,836,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2018-1000037 | In MuPDF 1.12.0 and earlier, multiple reachable assertions in the PDF parser allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (assert crash) via a crafted file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000037 |
23 | savannah | c15c42ccd1e2377945fd0414eca1a49294bff454 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/commit/?id=c15c42ccd1e2377945fd0414eca1a49294bff454 | None | 1 | sparse_dump_region (struct tar_sparse_file *file, size_t i)
{
union block *blk;
off_t bytes_left = file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes;
if (!lseek_or_error (file, file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset))
return false;
while (bytes_left > 0)
{
size_t bufsize = (bytes_left > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : bytes_left;
size_t bytes_read;
blk = find_next_block ();
bytes_read = safe_read (file->fd, blk->buffer, bufsize);
if (bytes_read == SAFE_READ_ERROR)
{
read_diag_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
(file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].offset
+ file->stat_info->sparse_map[i].numbytes
- bytes_left),
bufsize);
return false;
}
memset (blk->buffer + bytes_read, 0, BLOCKSIZE - bytes_read);
bytes_left -= bytes_read;
{
size_t count;
size_t wrbytes = (write_size > BLOCKSIZE) ? BLOCKSIZE : write_size;
union block *blk = find_next_block ();
if (!blk)
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("Unexpected EOF in archive")));
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
file->dumped_size += count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
{
write_error_details (file->stat_info->orig_file_name,
count, wrbytes);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/* Interface functions */
enum dump_status
sparse_dump_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st)
{
return false;
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
count = blocking_write (file->fd, blk->buffer, wrbytes);
write_size -= count;
file->dumped_size += count;
mv_size_left (file->stat_info->archive_file_size - file->dumped_size);
file->offset += count;
if (count != wrbytes)
rc = sparse_scan_file (&file);
if (rc && file.optab->dump_region)
{
tar_sparse_dump_header (&file);
if (fd >= 0)
{
size_t i;
mv_begin_write (file.stat_info->file_name,
file.stat_info->stat.st_size,
file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++)
rc = tar_sparse_dump_region (&file, i);
}
}
pad_archive (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
| 265,039,722,963,046,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-835"
] | CVE-2018-20482 | GNU Tar through 1.30, when --sparse is used, mishandles file shrinkage during read access, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite read loop in sparse_dump_region in sparse.c) by modifying a file that is supposed to be archived by a different user's process (e.g., a system backup running as root). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20482 |
26 | haproxy | 58df5aea0a0c926b2238f65908f5e9f83d1cca25 | https://github.com/haproxy/haproxy | https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy.git;a=commit;h=58df5aea0a0c926b2238f65908f5e9f83d1cca25 | BUG: dns: Prevent stack-exhaustion via recursion loop in dns_read_name
When a compressed pointer is encountered, dns_read_name() will call
itself with the pointed-to offset in the packet.
With a specially crafted packet, it was possible to trigger an
infinite-loop recursion by making the pointer points to itself.
While it would be possible to handle that particular case differently
by making sure that the target is different from the current offset,
it would still be possible to craft a packet with a very long chain
of valid pointers, always pointing backwards. To prevent a stack
exhaustion in that case, this patch restricts the number of recursive
calls to 100, which should be more than enough.
To be backported to 1.8, probably also 1.7. | 1 | int dns_read_name(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *bufend,
unsigned char *name, char *destination, int dest_len,
int *offset)
{
int nb_bytes = 0, n = 0;
int label_len;
unsigned char *reader = name;
char *dest = destination;
while (1) {
/* Name compression is in use */
if ((*reader & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
/* Must point BEFORE current position */
if ((buffer + reader[1]) > reader)
goto err;
n = dns_read_name(buffer, bufend, buffer + reader[1],
dest, dest_len - nb_bytes, offset);
if (n == 0)
goto err;
}
label_len = *reader;
if (label_len == 0)
goto out;
/* Check if:
* - we won't read outside the buffer
* - there is enough place in the destination
*/
if ((reader + label_len >= bufend) || (nb_bytes + label_len >= dest_len))
goto err;
/* +1 to take label len + label string */
label_len++;
memcpy(dest, reader, label_len);
dest += label_len;
nb_bytes += label_len;
reader += label_len;
}
out:
/* offset computation:
* parse from <name> until finding either NULL or a pointer "c0xx"
*/
reader = name;
*offset = 0;
while (reader < bufend) {
if ((reader[0] & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
*offset += 2;
break;
}
else if (*reader == 0) {
*offset += 1;
break;
}
*offset += 1;
++reader;
}
return nb_bytes;
err:
return 0;
}
| 6,381,338,430,754,951,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-835"
] | CVE-2018-20103 | An issue was discovered in dns.c in HAProxy through 1.8.14. In the case of a compressed pointer, a crafted packet can trigger infinite recursion by making the pointer point to itself, or create a long chain of valid pointers resulting in stack exhaustion. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20103 |
27 | poppler | 284a92899602daa4a7f429e61849e794569310b5 | https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=284a92899602daa4a7f429e61849e794569310b5 | Did a mistake in the gmalloc -> gmallocn commit, it's a 4 here not a 3 | 1 | void SplashOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashImageSource src;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = maskColors;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
break;
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
src = maskColors ? &alphaImageSrc : &imageSrc;
splash->drawImage(src, &imgData, srcMode, maskColors ? gTrue : gFalse,
width, height, mat);
if (inlineImg) {
while (imgData.y < height) {
imgData.imgStr->getLine();
++imgData.y;
}
}
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
| 304,076,538,021,281,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2009-3605 | Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3605 |
28 | poppler | 7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a | https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a | Be paranoid, use gmallocn or gmallocn3 in all gmalloc with * | 1 | void ArthurOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg)
{
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int *dest;
int x, y;
ImageStream *imgStr;
Guchar *pix;
int i;
double *ctm;
QMatrix matrix;
int is_identity_transform;
buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4);
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgStr->reset();
/* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction
* so check its underlying color space as well */
is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB ||
(colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased &&
((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB);
if (maskColors) {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
for (i = 0; i < colorMap->getNumPixelComps(); ++i) {
if (pix[i] < maskColors[2*i] * 255||
pix[i] > maskColors[2*i+1] * 255) {
*dest = *dest | 0xff000000;
break;
}
}
pix += colorMap->getNumPixelComps();
dest++;
}
}
m_image = new QImage(buffer, width, height, QImage::Format_ARGB32);
}
else {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
}
m_image = new QImage(buffer, width, height, QImage::Format_RGB32);
}
if (m_image == NULL || m_image->isNull()) {
qDebug() << "Null image";
delete imgStr;
return;
}
ctm = state->getCTM();
matrix.setMatrix(ctm[0] / width, ctm[1] / width, -ctm[2] / height, -ctm[3] / height, ctm[2] + ctm[4], ctm[3] + ctm[5]);
m_painter->setMatrix(matrix, true);
m_painter->drawImage( QPoint(0,0), *m_image );
delete m_image;
m_image = 0;
free (buffer);
delete imgStr;
}
| 145,223,011,821,523,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ArthurOutputDev.cc | 151,245,726,146,927,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2009-3605 | Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3605 |
40 | shibboleth | b66cceb0e992c351ad5e2c665229ede82f261b16 | https://git.shibboleth.net/view/?p=cpp-opensaml | https://git.shibboleth.net/view/?p=cpp-sp.git;a=commit;h=b66cceb0e992c351ad5e2c665229ede82f261b16 | None | 1 | DynamicMetadataProvider::DynamicMetadataProvider(const DOMElement* e)
: saml2md::DynamicMetadataProvider(e),
m_verifyHost(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, true, verifyHost)),
m_ignoreTransport(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, ignoreTransport)),
m_encoded(true), m_trust(nullptr)
{
const DOMElement* child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Subst);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes()) {
auto_ptr_char s(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (s.get() && *s.get()) {
m_subst = s.get();
m_encoded = XMLHelper::getAttrBool(child, true, encoded);
m_hashed = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, hashed);
}
}
if (m_subst.empty()) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, Regex);
if (child && child->hasChildNodes() && child->hasAttributeNS(nullptr, match)) {
m_match = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, match);
auto_ptr_char repl(child->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
if (repl.get() && *repl.get())
m_regex = repl.get();
}
}
if (!m_ignoreTransport) {
child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e, _TrustEngine);
string t = XMLHelper::getAttrString(child, nullptr, _type);
if (!t.empty()) {
TrustEngine* trust = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().TrustEngineManager.newPlugin(t.c_str(), child);
if (!dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust)) {
delete trust;
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin.");
}
m_trust.reset(dynamic_cast<X509TrustEngine*>(trust));
m_dummyCR.reset(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().CredentialResolverManager.newPlugin(DUMMY_CREDENTIAL_RESOLVER, nullptr));
}
if (!m_trust.get() || !m_dummyCR.get())
throw ConfigurationException("DynamicMetadataProvider requires an X509TrustEngine plugin unless ignoreTransport is true.");
}
}
| 11,538,925,675,754,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-347"
] | CVE-2017-16852 | shibsp/metadata/DynamicMetadataProvider.cpp in the Dynamic MetadataProvider plugin in Shibboleth Service Provider before 2.6.1 fails to properly configure itself with the MetadataFilter plugins and does not perform critical security checks such as signature verification, enforcement of validity periods, and other checks specific to deployments, aka SSPCPP-763. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16852 |
41 | pengutronix | 574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208 | https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/fs/nfs.c?h=next&id=574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208 | https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/fs/nfs.c?h=next&id=574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208 | None | 1 | static int nfs_readlink_req(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct nfs_fh *fh,
char **target)
{
uint32_t data[1024];
uint32_t *p;
uint32_t len;
struct packet *nfs_packet;
/*
* struct READLINK3args {
* nfs_fh3 symlink;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resok {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* nfspath3 data;
* };
*
* struct READLINK3resfail {
* post_op_attr symlink_attributes;
* }
*
* union READLINK3res switch (nfsstat3 status) {
* case NFS3_OK:
* READLINK3resok resok;
* default:
* READLINK3resfail resfail;
* };
*/
p = &(data[0]);
p = rpc_add_credentials(p);
p = nfs_add_fh3(p, fh);
len = p - &(data[0]);
nfs_packet = rpc_req(npriv, PROG_NFS, NFSPROC3_READLINK, data, len);
if (IS_ERR(nfs_packet))
return PTR_ERR(nfs_packet);
p = (void *)nfs_packet->data + sizeof(struct rpc_reply) + 4;
p = nfs_read_post_op_attr(p, NULL);
len = ntoh32(net_read_uint32(p)); /* new path length */
p++;
*target = xzalloc(len + 1);
return 0;
}
| 165,064,796,667,373,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2019-15938 | Pengutronix barebox through 2019.08.1 has a remote buffer overflow in nfs_readlink_req in fs/nfs.c because a length field is directly used for a memcpy. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15938 |
42 | pengutronix | 84986ca024462058574432b5483f4bf9136c538d | https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/fs/nfs.c?h=next&id=574ce994016107ad8ab0f845a785f28d7eaa5208 | https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/net/nfs.c?h=next&id=84986ca024462058574432b5483f4bf9136c538d | None | 1 | static int nfs_readlink_reply(unsigned char *pkt, unsigned len)
{
uint32_t *data;
char *path;
int rlen;
int ret;
ret = rpc_check_reply(pkt, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
data = (uint32_t *)(pkt + sizeof(struct rpc_reply));
data++;
rlen = ntohl(net_read_uint32(data)); /* new path length */
data++;
path = (char *)data;
} else {
memcpy(nfs_path, path, rlen);
nfs_path[rlen] = 0;
}
| 197,742,048,742,816,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2019-15937 | Pengutronix barebox through 2019.08.1 has a remote buffer overflow in nfs_readlink_reply in net/nfs.c because a length field is directly used for a memcpy. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15937 |
53 | savannah | 7a42b78be9a4108d98833069a88e6fddb9285008 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/quagga.git/commit/?id=7a42b78be9a4108d98833069a88e6fddb9285008 | None | 1 | aspath_put (struct stream *s, struct aspath *as, int use32bit )
{
struct assegment *seg = as->segments;
size_t bytes = 0;
if (!seg || seg->length == 0)
return 0;
if (seg)
{
/*
* Hey, what do we do when we have > STREAM_WRITABLE(s) here?
* At the moment, we would write out a partial aspath, and our peer
* will complain and drop the session :-/
*
* The general assumption here is that many things tested will
* never happen. And, in real live, up to now, they have not.
*/
while (seg && (ASSEGMENT_LEN(seg, use32bit) <= STREAM_WRITEABLE(s)))
{
struct assegment *next = seg->next;
int written = 0;
int asns_packed = 0;
size_t lenp;
/* Overlength segments have to be split up */
while ( (seg->length - written) > AS_SEGMENT_MAX)
{
assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, AS_SEGMENT_MAX);
assegment_data_put (s, seg->as, AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
written += AS_SEGMENT_MAX;
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (written, use32bit);
}
/* write the final segment, probably is also the first */
lenp = assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, seg->length - written);
assegment_data_put (s, (seg->as + written), seg->length - written,
use32bit);
/* Sequence-type segments can be 'packed' together
* Case of a segment which was overlength and split up
* will be missed here, but that doesn't matter.
*/
while (next && ASSEGMENTS_PACKABLE (seg, next))
{
/* NB: We should never normally get here given we
* normalise aspath data when parse them. However, better
* safe than sorry. We potentially could call
* assegment_normalise here instead, but it's cheaper and
* easier to do it on the fly here rather than go through
* the segment list twice every time we write out
* aspath's.
*/
/* Next segment's data can fit in this one */
assegment_data_put (s, next->as, next->length, use32bit);
/* update the length of the segment header */
stream_putc_at (s, lenp, seg->length - written + next->length);
asns_packed += next->length;
next = next->next;
}
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (seg->length - written + asns_packed,
use32bit);
seg = next;
}
}
return bytes;
}
| 180,268,846,652,331,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | bgp_aspath.c | 200,855,845,823,688,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2017-16227 | The aspath_put function in bgpd/bgp_aspath.c in Quagga before 1.2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (session drop) via BGP UPDATE messages, because AS_PATH size calculation for long paths counts certain bytes twice and consequently constructs an invalid message. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16227 |
54 | samba | c252546ceeb0925eb8a4061315e3ff0a8c55b48b | https://github.com/samba-team/samba | https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=c252546ceeb0925eb8a4061315e3ff0a8c55b48b | None | 1 | void sum_update(const char *p, int32 len)
{
switch (cursum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_update(&md, (uchar *)p, len);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
if (len + sumresidue < CSUM_CHUNK) {
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, len);
sumresidue += len;
}
if (sumresidue) {
int32 i = CSUM_CHUNK - sumresidue;
memcpy(md.buffer + sumresidue, p, i);
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)md.buffer, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= i;
p += i;
}
while (len >= CSUM_CHUNK) {
mdfour_update(&md, (uchar *)p, CSUM_CHUNK);
len -= CSUM_CHUNK;
p += CSUM_CHUNK;
}
sumresidue = len;
if (sumresidue)
memcpy(md.buffer, p, sumresidue);
break;
case CSUM_NONE:
break;
}
}
| 337,655,106,013,087,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-354"
] | CVE-2017-15994 | rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15994 |
55 | samba | 9a480deec4d20277d8e20bc55515ef0640ca1e55 | https://github.com/samba-team/samba | https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=9a480deec4d20277d8e20bc55515ef0640ca1e55 | None | 1 | char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
const char *addr, const char *leader)
{
char *users = lp_auth_users(module);
char challenge[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
char **auth_uid_groups = NULL;
int auth_uid_groups_cnt = -1;
const char *err = NULL;
int group_match = -1;
char *tok, *pass;
char opt_ch = '\0';
/* if no auth list then allow anyone in! */
if (!users || !*users)
if (!users || !*users)
return "";
gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
return NULL;
}
| 98,721,516,615,150,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-354"
] | CVE-2017-15994 | rsync 3.1.3-development before 2017-10-24 mishandles archaic checksums, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions. NOTE: the rsync development branch has significant use beyond the rsync developers, e.g., the code has been copied for use in various GitHub projects. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15994 |
62 | busybox | 0402cb32df015d9372578e3db27db47b33d5c7b0 | http://git.busybox.net/busybox | https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=0402cb32df015d9372578e3db27db47b33d5c7b0 | bunzip2: fix runCnt overflow from bug 10431
This particular corrupted file can be dealth with by using "unsigned".
If there will be cases where it genuinely overflows, there is a disabled
code to deal with that too.
function old new delta
get_next_block 1678 1667 -11
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> | 1 | static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
{
struct group_data *hufGroup;
int dbufCount, dbufSize, groupCount, *base, *limit, selector,
i, j, runPos, symCount, symTotal, nSelectors, byteCount[256];
int runCnt = runCnt; /* for compiler */
uint8_t uc, symToByte[256], mtfSymbol[256], *selectors;
uint32_t *dbuf;
unsigned origPtr, t;
dbuf = bd->dbuf;
dbufSize = bd->dbufSize;
selectors = bd->selectors;
/* In bbox, we are ok with aborting through setjmp which is set up in start_bunzip */
#if 0
/* Reset longjmp I/O error handling */
i = setjmp(bd->jmpbuf);
if (i) return i;
#endif
/* Read in header signature and CRC, then validate signature.
(last block signature means CRC is for whole file, return now) */
i = get_bits(bd, 24);
j = get_bits(bd, 24);
bd->headerCRC = get_bits(bd, 32);
if ((i == 0x177245) && (j == 0x385090)) return RETVAL_LAST_BLOCK;
if ((i != 0x314159) || (j != 0x265359)) return RETVAL_NOT_BZIP_DATA;
/* We can add support for blockRandomised if anybody complains. There was
some code for this in busybox 1.0.0-pre3, but nobody ever noticed that
it didn't actually work. */
if (get_bits(bd, 1)) return RETVAL_OBSOLETE_INPUT;
origPtr = get_bits(bd, 24);
if ((int)origPtr > dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
/* mapping table: if some byte values are never used (encoding things
like ascii text), the compression code removes the gaps to have fewer
symbols to deal with, and writes a sparse bitfield indicating which
values were present. We make a translation table to convert the symbols
back to the corresponding bytes. */
symTotal = 0;
i = 0;
t = get_bits(bd, 16);
do {
if (t & (1 << 15)) {
unsigned inner_map = get_bits(bd, 16);
do {
if (inner_map & (1 << 15))
symToByte[symTotal++] = i;
inner_map <<= 1;
i++;
} while (i & 15);
i -= 16;
}
t <<= 1;
i += 16;
} while (i < 256);
/* How many different Huffman coding groups does this block use? */
groupCount = get_bits(bd, 3);
if (groupCount < 2 || groupCount > MAX_GROUPS)
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
/* nSelectors: Every GROUP_SIZE many symbols we select a new Huffman coding
group. Read in the group selector list, which is stored as MTF encoded
bit runs. (MTF=Move To Front, as each value is used it's moved to the
start of the list.) */
for (i = 0; i < groupCount; i++)
mtfSymbol[i] = i;
nSelectors = get_bits(bd, 15);
if (!nSelectors)
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
for (i = 0; i < nSelectors; i++) {
uint8_t tmp_byte;
/* Get next value */
int n = 0;
while (get_bits(bd, 1)) {
if (n >= groupCount) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
n++;
}
/* Decode MTF to get the next selector */
tmp_byte = mtfSymbol[n];
while (--n >= 0)
mtfSymbol[n + 1] = mtfSymbol[n];
mtfSymbol[0] = selectors[i] = tmp_byte;
}
/* Read the Huffman coding tables for each group, which code for symTotal
literal symbols, plus two run symbols (RUNA, RUNB) */
symCount = symTotal + 2;
for (j = 0; j < groupCount; j++) {
uint8_t length[MAX_SYMBOLS];
/* 8 bits is ALMOST enough for temp[], see below */
unsigned temp[MAX_HUFCODE_BITS+1];
int minLen, maxLen, pp, len_m1;
/* Read Huffman code lengths for each symbol. They're stored in
a way similar to mtf; record a starting value for the first symbol,
and an offset from the previous value for every symbol after that.
(Subtracting 1 before the loop and then adding it back at the end is
an optimization that makes the test inside the loop simpler: symbol
length 0 becomes negative, so an unsigned inequality catches it.) */
len_m1 = get_bits(bd, 5) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < symCount; i++) {
for (;;) {
int two_bits;
if ((unsigned)len_m1 > (MAX_HUFCODE_BITS-1))
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
/* If first bit is 0, stop. Else second bit indicates whether
to increment or decrement the value. Optimization: grab 2
bits and unget the second if the first was 0. */
two_bits = get_bits(bd, 2);
if (two_bits < 2) {
bd->inbufBitCount++;
break;
}
/* Add one if second bit 1, else subtract 1. Avoids if/else */
len_m1 += (((two_bits+1) & 2) - 1);
}
/* Correct for the initial -1, to get the final symbol length */
length[i] = len_m1 + 1;
}
/* Find largest and smallest lengths in this group */
minLen = maxLen = length[0];
for (i = 1; i < symCount; i++) {
if (length[i] > maxLen) maxLen = length[i];
else if (length[i] < minLen) minLen = length[i];
}
/* Calculate permute[], base[], and limit[] tables from length[].
*
* permute[] is the lookup table for converting Huffman coded symbols
* into decoded symbols. base[] is the amount to subtract from the
* value of a Huffman symbol of a given length when using permute[].
*
* limit[] indicates the largest numerical value a symbol with a given
* number of bits can have. This is how the Huffman codes can vary in
* length: each code with a value>limit[length] needs another bit.
*/
hufGroup = bd->groups + j;
hufGroup->minLen = minLen;
hufGroup->maxLen = maxLen;
/* Note that minLen can't be smaller than 1, so we adjust the base
and limit array pointers so we're not always wasting the first
entry. We do this again when using them (during symbol decoding). */
base = hufGroup->base - 1;
limit = hufGroup->limit - 1;
/* Calculate permute[]. Concurrently, initialize temp[] and limit[]. */
pp = 0;
for (i = minLen; i <= maxLen; i++) {
int k;
temp[i] = limit[i] = 0;
for (k = 0; k < symCount; k++)
if (length[k] == i)
hufGroup->permute[pp++] = k;
}
/* Count symbols coded for at each bit length */
/* NB: in pathological cases, temp[8] can end ip being 256.
* That's why uint8_t is too small for temp[]. */
for (i = 0; i < symCount; i++) temp[length[i]]++;
/* Calculate limit[] (the largest symbol-coding value at each bit
* length, which is (previous limit<<1)+symbols at this level), and
* base[] (number of symbols to ignore at each bit length, which is
* limit minus the cumulative count of symbols coded for already). */
pp = t = 0;
for (i = minLen; i < maxLen;) {
unsigned temp_i = temp[i];
pp += temp_i;
/* We read the largest possible symbol size and then unget bits
after determining how many we need, and those extra bits could
be set to anything. (They're noise from future symbols.) At
each level we're really only interested in the first few bits,
so here we set all the trailing to-be-ignored bits to 1 so they
don't affect the value>limit[length] comparison. */
limit[i] = (pp << (maxLen - i)) - 1;
pp <<= 1;
t += temp_i;
base[++i] = pp - t;
}
limit[maxLen] = pp + temp[maxLen] - 1;
limit[maxLen+1] = INT_MAX; /* Sentinel value for reading next sym. */
base[minLen] = 0;
}
/* We've finished reading and digesting the block header. Now read this
block's Huffman coded symbols from the file and undo the Huffman coding
and run length encoding, saving the result into dbuf[dbufCount++] = uc */
/* Initialize symbol occurrence counters and symbol Move To Front table */
/*memset(byteCount, 0, sizeof(byteCount)); - smaller, but slower */
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
byteCount[i] = 0;
mtfSymbol[i] = (uint8_t)i;
}
/* Loop through compressed symbols. */
runPos = dbufCount = selector = 0;
for (;;) {
int nextSym;
/* Fetch next Huffman coding group from list. */
symCount = GROUP_SIZE - 1;
if (selector >= nSelectors) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
hufGroup = bd->groups + selectors[selector++];
base = hufGroup->base - 1;
limit = hufGroup->limit - 1;
continue_this_group:
/* Read next Huffman-coded symbol. */
/* Note: It is far cheaper to read maxLen bits and back up than it is
to read minLen bits and then add additional bit at a time, testing
as we go. Because there is a trailing last block (with file CRC),
there is no danger of the overread causing an unexpected EOF for a
valid compressed file.
*/
if (1) {
/* As a further optimization, we do the read inline
(falling back to a call to get_bits if the buffer runs dry).
*/
int new_cnt;
while ((new_cnt = bd->inbufBitCount - hufGroup->maxLen) < 0) {
/* bd->inbufBitCount < hufGroup->maxLen */
if (bd->inbufPos == bd->inbufCount) {
nextSym = get_bits(bd, hufGroup->maxLen);
goto got_huff_bits;
}
bd->inbufBits = (bd->inbufBits << 8) | bd->inbuf[bd->inbufPos++];
bd->inbufBitCount += 8;
};
bd->inbufBitCount = new_cnt; /* "bd->inbufBitCount -= hufGroup->maxLen;" */
nextSym = (bd->inbufBits >> new_cnt) & ((1 << hufGroup->maxLen) - 1);
got_huff_bits: ;
} else { /* unoptimized equivalent */
nextSym = get_bits(bd, hufGroup->maxLen);
}
/* Figure how many bits are in next symbol and unget extras */
i = hufGroup->minLen;
while (nextSym > limit[i]) ++i;
j = hufGroup->maxLen - i;
if (j < 0)
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
bd->inbufBitCount += j;
/* Huffman decode value to get nextSym (with bounds checking) */
nextSym = (nextSym >> j) - base[i];
if ((unsigned)nextSym >= MAX_SYMBOLS)
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
nextSym = hufGroup->permute[nextSym];
/* We have now decoded the symbol, which indicates either a new literal
byte, or a repeated run of the most recent literal byte. First,
check if nextSym indicates a repeated run, and if so loop collecting
how many times to repeat the last literal. */
if ((unsigned)nextSym <= SYMBOL_RUNB) { /* RUNA or RUNB */
/* If this is the start of a new run, zero out counter */
if (runPos == 0) {
runPos = 1;
runCnt = 0;
}
/* Neat trick that saves 1 symbol: instead of or-ing 0 or 1 at
each bit position, add 1 or 2 instead. For example,
1011 is 1<<0 + 1<<1 + 2<<2. 1010 is 2<<0 + 2<<1 + 1<<2.
You can make any bit pattern that way using 1 less symbol than
the basic or 0/1 method (except all bits 0, which would use no
symbols, but a run of length 0 doesn't mean anything in this
context). Thus space is saved. */
runCnt += (runPos << nextSym); /* +runPos if RUNA; +2*runPos if RUNB */
if (runPos < dbufSize) runPos <<= 1;
////The 32-bit overflow of runCnt wasn't yet seen, but probably can happen.
////This would be the fix (catches too large count way before it can overflow):
//// if (runCnt > bd->dbufSize) {
//// dbg("runCnt:%u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
//// runCnt, bd->dbufSize);
//// return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
//// }
goto end_of_huffman_loop;
}
dbg("dbufCount:%d+runCnt:%d %d > dbufSize:%d RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, dbufSize);
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
literal used is the one at the head of the mtfSymbol array.) */
if (runPos != 0) {
uint8_t tmp_byte;
if (dbufCount + runCnt > dbufSize) {
dbg("dbufCount:%d+runCnt:%d %d > dbufSize:%d RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, dbufSize);
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
}
tmp_byte = symToByte[mtfSymbol[0]];
byteCount[tmp_byte] += runCnt;
while (--runCnt >= 0) dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)tmp_byte;
runPos = 0;
}
as part of a run above. Therefore 1 unused mtf position minus
2 non-literal nextSym values equals -1.) */
if (dbufCount >= dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
i = nextSym - 1;
uc = mtfSymbol[i];
/* Adjust the MTF array. Since we typically expect to move only a
first symbol in the mtf array, position 0, would have been handled
as part of a run above. Therefore 1 unused mtf position minus
2 non-literal nextSym values equals -1.) */
if (dbufCount >= dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
i = nextSym - 1;
uc = mtfSymbol[i];
uc = symToByte[uc];
/* We have our literal byte. Save it into dbuf. */
byteCount[uc]++;
dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)uc;
/* Skip group initialization if we're not done with this group. Done
* this way to avoid compiler warning. */
end_of_huffman_loop:
if (--symCount >= 0) goto continue_this_group;
}
/* At this point, we've read all the Huffman-coded symbols (and repeated
runs) for this block from the input stream, and decoded them into the
intermediate buffer. There are dbufCount many decoded bytes in dbuf[].
Now undo the Burrows-Wheeler transform on dbuf.
See http://dogma.net/markn/articles/bwt/bwt.htm
*/
/* Turn byteCount into cumulative occurrence counts of 0 to n-1. */
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
int tmp_count = j + byteCount[i];
byteCount[i] = j;
j = tmp_count;
}
/* Figure out what order dbuf would be in if we sorted it. */
for (i = 0; i < dbufCount; i++) {
uint8_t tmp_byte = (uint8_t)dbuf[i];
int tmp_count = byteCount[tmp_byte];
dbuf[tmp_count] |= (i << 8);
byteCount[tmp_byte] = tmp_count + 1;
}
/* Decode first byte by hand to initialize "previous" byte. Note that it
doesn't get output, and if the first three characters are identical
it doesn't qualify as a run (hence writeRunCountdown=5). */
if (dbufCount) {
uint32_t tmp;
if ((int)origPtr >= dbufCount) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
tmp = dbuf[origPtr];
bd->writeCurrent = (uint8_t)tmp;
bd->writePos = (tmp >> 8);
bd->writeRunCountdown = 5;
}
bd->writeCount = dbufCount;
return RETVAL_OK;
}
| 238,413,816,495,536,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-190"
] | CVE-2017-15873 | The get_next_block function in archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c in BusyBox 1.27.2 has an Integer Overflow that may lead to a write access violation. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15873 |
63 | libxfont | d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0 | None | 1 | BufCompressedFill (BufFilePtr f)
{
CompressedFile *file;
register char_type *stackp, *de_stack;
register char_type finchar;
register code_int code, oldcode, incode;
BufChar *buf, *bufend;
file = (CompressedFile *) f->private;
buf = f->buffer;
bufend = buf + BUFFILESIZE;
stackp = file->stackp;
de_stack = file->de_stack;
finchar = file->finchar;
oldcode = file->oldcode;
while (buf < bufend) {
while (stackp > de_stack && buf < bufend)
*buf++ = *--stackp;
if (buf == bufend)
break;
if (oldcode == -1)
break;
code = getcode (file);
if (code == -1)
break;
if ( (code == CLEAR) && file->block_compress ) {
for ( code = 255; code >= 0; code-- )
file->tab_prefix[code] = 0;
file->clear_flg = 1;
file->free_ent = FIRST - 1;
if ( (code = getcode (file)) == -1 ) /* O, untimely death! */
break;
}
incode = code;
/*
* Special case for KwKwK string.
*/
if ( code >= file->free_ent ) {
*stackp++ = finchar;
code = oldcode;
}
/*
* Generate output characters in reverse order
*/
while ( code >= 256 )
{
*stackp++ = file->tab_suffix[code];
code = file->tab_prefix[code];
}
/*
* Generate the new entry.
*/
if ( (code=file->free_ent) < file->maxmaxcode ) {
file->tab_prefix[code] = (unsigned short)oldcode;
file->tab_suffix[code] = finchar;
file->free_ent = code+1;
}
/*
* Remember previous code.
*/
oldcode = incode;
}
file->oldcode = oldcode;
file->stackp = stackp;
file->finchar = finchar;
if (buf == f->buffer) {
f->left = 0;
return BUFFILEEOF;
}
f->bufp = f->buffer + 1;
f->left = (buf - f->buffer) - 1;
return f->buffer[0];
}
| 314,816,336,443,270,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-2895 | The LZW decompressor in (1) the BufCompressedFill function in fontfile/decompress.c in X.Org libXfont before 1.4.4 and (2) compress/compress.c in 4.3BSD, as used in zopen.c in OpenBSD before 3.8, FreeBSD, NetBSD 4.0.x and 5.0.x before 5.0.3 and 5.1.x before 5.1.1, FreeType 2.1.9, and other products, does not properly handle code words that are absent from the decompression table when encountered, which allows context-dependent attackers to trigger an infinite loop or a heap-based buffer overflow, and possibly execute arbitrary code, via a crafted compressed stream, a related issue to CVE-2006-1168 and CVE-2011-2896. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2895 |
64 | musl | 45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395 | https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395 | https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395 | None | 1 | static int dns_parse_callback(void *c, int rr, const void *data, int len, const void *packet)
{
char tmp[256];
struct dpc_ctx *ctx = c;
switch (rr) {
case RR_A:
if (len != 4) return -1;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0;
memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 4);
break;
case RR_AAAA:
if (len != 16) return -1;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].family = AF_INET6;
ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt].scopeid = 0;
memcpy(ctx->addrs[ctx->cnt++].addr, data, 16);
break;
case RR_CNAME:
if (__dn_expand(packet, (const unsigned char *)packet + 512,
data, tmp, sizeof tmp) > 0 && is_valid_hostname(tmp))
strcpy(ctx->canon, tmp);
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 212,099,417,602,244,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-15650 | musl libc before 1.1.17 has a buffer overflow via crafted DNS replies because dns_parse_callback in network/lookup_name.c does not restrict the number of addresses, and thus an attacker can provide an unexpected number by sending A records in a reply to an AAAA query. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15650 |
65 | poppler | 61f79b8447c3ac8ab5a26e79e0c28053ffdccf75 | https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=61f79b8447c3ac8ab5a26e79e0c28053ffdccf75 | Allow only one %d in the filename
Fixes crashes if you had %s and similar in the filename
Inspired from patch by Pedro Ribeiro <[email protected]>
Bug #69434 | 1 | bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[4096];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
snprintf (pathName, sizeof (pathName) - 1, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
{
printUsage ("pdfseparate", "<PDF-sourcefile> <PDF-pattern-destfile>",
argDesc);
}
if (printVersion || printHelp)
exitCode = 0;
goto err0;
}
globalParams = new GlobalParams();
ok = extractPages (argv[1], argv[2]);
if (ok) {
exitCode = 0;
}
delete globalParams;
err0:
return exitCode;
}
| 41,887,122,719,404,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-4474 | Format string vulnerability in the extractPages function in utils/pdfseparate.cc in poppler before 0.24.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via format string specifiers in a destination filename. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4474 |
66 | poppler | b8682d868ddf7f741e93b791588af0932893f95c | https://github.com/freedesktop/poppler | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/utils/pdfseparate.cc?id=b8682d868ddf7f741e93b | pdfseparate: improve the path building
Make use of snprintf to limit the output to the pathName buffer;
while I'm there, expand its size to 4096 (might help longer paths),
although a better fix would be dynamically allocate its length
(and/or using GooString, maybe). | 1 | bool extractPages (const char *srcFileName, const char *destFileName) {
char pathName[1024];
GooString *gfileName = new GooString (srcFileName);
PDFDoc *doc = new PDFDoc (gfileName, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!doc->isOk()) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "Could not extract page(s) from damaged file ('{0:s}')", srcFileName);
return false;
}
if (firstPage == 0 && lastPage == 0) {
firstPage = 1;
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
}
if (lastPage == 0)
lastPage = doc->getNumPages();
if (firstPage == 0)
firstPage = 1;
if (firstPage != lastPage && strstr(destFileName, "%d") == NULL) {
error(errSyntaxError, -1, "'{0:s}' must contain '%%d' if more than one page should be extracted", destFileName);
return false;
}
for (int pageNo = firstPage; pageNo <= lastPage; pageNo++) {
sprintf (pathName, destFileName, pageNo);
GooString *gpageName = new GooString (pathName);
int errCode = doc->savePageAs(gpageName, pageNo);
if ( errCode != errNone) {
delete gpageName;
delete gfileName;
return false;
}
delete gpageName;
}
delete gfileName;
return true;
}
| 244,634,780,333,143,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pdfseparate.cc | 64,286,020,146,444,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-4473 | Stack-based buffer overflow in the extractPages function in utils/pdfseparate.cc in poppler before 0.24.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a source filename. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4473 |
70 | ghostscript | 97096297d409ec6f206298444ba00719607e8ba8 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commit;h=97096297d409ec6f206298444ba00719607e8ba8 | None | 1 | walk_string(fz_context *ctx, int uni, int remove, editable_str *str)
{
int rune;
if (str->utf8 == NULL)
return;
do
{
char *s = &str->utf8[str->pos];
size_t len;
int n = fz_chartorune(&rune, s);
if (rune == uni)
{
/* Match. Skip over that one. */
str->pos += n;
}
else if (uni == 32) {
/* We don't care if we're given whitespace
* and it doesn't match the string. Don't
* skip forward. Nothing to remove. */
break;
}
else if (rune == 32) {
/* The string has a whitespace, and we
* don't match it; that's forgivable as
* PDF often misses out spaces. Remove this
* if we are removing stuff. */
}
else
{
/* Mismatch. No point in tracking through any more. */
str->pos = -1;
break;
}
if (remove)
{
len = strlen(s+n);
memmove(s, s+n, len+1);
str->edited = 1;
}
}
while (rune != uni);
}
| 260,933,823,413,348,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2019-14975 | Artifex MuPDF before 1.16.0 has a heap-based buffer over-read in fz_chartorune in fitz/string.c because pdf/pdf-op-filter.c does not check for a missing string. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-14975 |
71 | spice | 53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d | https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/spice/spice | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d | Use RING_FOREACH_SAFE in red_channel.c functions which are missing it
Currently, both red_channel_pipes_add_type() and
red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg() use plaing RING_FOREACH() which is not
safe versus removals from the ring within the loop body.
Although it's rare, such a removal can occur in both cases. In the case
of red_channel_pipes_add_type() we have:
red_channel_pipes_add_type()
-> red_channel_client_pipe_add_type()
-> red_channel_client_push()
And in the case of red_channel_client_pipes_add_empty_msg() we have:
red_channel_client_pipes_add_empty_msg()
-> red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg()
-> red_channel_client_push()
But red_channel_client_push() can cause a removal from the clients ring if
a network error occurs:
red_channel_client_push()
-> red_channel_client_send()
-> red_peer_handle_outgoing()
-> handler->cb->on_error callback
= red_channel_client_default_peer_on_error()
-> red_channel_client_disconnect()
-> red_channel_remove_client()
-> ring_remove()
When this error path does occur, the assertion in RING_FOREACH()'s
ring_next() trips, and the process containing the spice server is aborted.
i.e. your whole VM dies, as a result of an unfortunately timed network
error on the spice channel.
Please apply.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]> | 1 | void red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg(RedChannel *channel, int msg_type)
{
RingItem *link;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
msg_type);
}
}
| 246,859,488,383,496,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | red_channel.c | 53,655,213,199,362,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-4130 | The (1) red_channel_pipes_add_type and (2) red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg functions in server/red_channel.c in SPICE before 0.12.4 do not properly perform ring loops, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (reachable assertion and server exit) by triggering a network error. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4130 |
72 | spice | 53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d | https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/spice/spice | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d | Use RING_FOREACH_SAFE in red_channel.c functions which are missing it
Currently, both red_channel_pipes_add_type() and
red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg() use plaing RING_FOREACH() which is not
safe versus removals from the ring within the loop body.
Although it's rare, such a removal can occur in both cases. In the case
of red_channel_pipes_add_type() we have:
red_channel_pipes_add_type()
-> red_channel_client_pipe_add_type()
-> red_channel_client_push()
And in the case of red_channel_client_pipes_add_empty_msg() we have:
red_channel_client_pipes_add_empty_msg()
-> red_channel_client_pipe_add_empty_msg()
-> red_channel_client_push()
But red_channel_client_push() can cause a removal from the clients ring if
a network error occurs:
red_channel_client_push()
-> red_channel_client_send()
-> red_peer_handle_outgoing()
-> handler->cb->on_error callback
= red_channel_client_default_peer_on_error()
-> red_channel_client_disconnect()
-> red_channel_remove_client()
-> ring_remove()
When this error path does occur, the assertion in RING_FOREACH()'s
ring_next() trips, and the process containing the spice server is aborted.
i.e. your whole VM dies, as a result of an unfortunately timed network
error on the spice channel.
Please apply.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]> | 1 | void red_channel_pipes_add_type(RedChannel *channel, int pipe_item_type)
{
RingItem *link;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_pipe_add_type(
SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link),
pipe_item_type);
}
}
| 261,946,911,680,290,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | red_channel.c | 53,655,213,199,362,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-4130 | The (1) red_channel_pipes_add_type and (2) red_channel_pipes_add_empty_msg functions in server/red_channel.c in SPICE before 0.12.4 do not properly perform ring loops, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (reachable assertion and server exit) by triggering a network error. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4130 |
73 | mindrot | 1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d | https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh | https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?h=V_6_9&id=1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d | None | 1 | x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
{
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
return 0;
debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
ucp[0]);
return -1;
}
| 186,655,838,205,464,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2015-5352 | The x11_open_helper function in channels.c in ssh in OpenSSH before 6.9, when ForwardX11Trusted mode is not used, lacks a check of the refusal deadline for X connections, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a connection outside of the permitted time window. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5352 |
74 | samba | 538d305de91e34a2938f5f219f18bf0e1918763f | https://github.com/samba-team/samba | https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=538d305de91e34a2938f5f219f18bf0e1918763f | CVE-2015-5330: next_codepoint_handle_ext: don't short-circuit UTF16 low bytes
UTF16 contains zero bytes when it is encoding ASCII (for example), so we
can't assume the absense of the 0x80 bit means a one byte encoding. No
current callers use UTF16.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <[email protected]>
Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]> | 1 | _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, size_t len,
charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
uint8_t buf[4];
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = MIN(len, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
if (descriptor == (smb_iconv_t)-1) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
/*
* this looks a little strange, but it is needed to cope with
* codepoints above 64k (U+1000) which are encoded as per RFC2781.
*/
olen = 2;
outbuf = (char *)buf;
smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen);
if (olen == 2) {
olen = 4;
outbuf = (char *)buf;
smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen);
if (olen == 4) {
/* we didn't convert any bytes */
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
olen = 4 - olen;
} else {
olen = 2 - olen;
}
*bytes_consumed = ilen_orig - ilen;
if (olen == 2) {
return (codepoint_t)SVAL(buf, 0);
}
if (olen == 4) {
/* decode a 4 byte UTF16 character manually */
return (codepoint_t)0x10000 +
(buf[2] | ((buf[3] & 0x3)<<8) |
(buf[0]<<10) | ((buf[1] & 0x3)<<18));
}
/* no other length is valid */
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
| 7,537,344,539,298,055,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2015-5330 | ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5330 |
75 | samba | 7f51ec8c4ed9ba1f53d722e44fb6fb3cde933b72 | https://github.com/samba-team/samba | https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=7f51ec8c4ed9ba1f53d722e44fb6fb3cde933b72 | CVE-2015-5330: ldb_dn: simplify and fix ldb_dn_escape_internal()
Previously we relied on NUL terminated strings and jumped back and
forth between copying escaped bytes and memcpy()ing un-escaped chunks.
This simple version is easier to reason about and works with
unterminated strings. It may also be faster as it avoids reading the
string twice (first with strcspn, then with memcpy).
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <[email protected]>
Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]> | 1 | static int ldb_dn_escape_internal(char *dst, const char *src, int len)
{
const char *p, *s;
char *d;
size_t l;
p = s = src;
d = dst;
while (p - src < len) {
p += strcspn(p, ",=\n\r+<>#;\\\" ");
if (p - src == len) /* found no escapable chars */
break;
/* copy the part of the string before the stop */
memcpy(d, s, p - s);
d += (p - s); /* move to current position */
switch (*p) {
case ' ':
if (p == src || (p-src)==(len-1)) {
/* if at the beginning or end
* of the string then escape */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
} else {
/* otherwise don't escape */
*d++ = *p++;
}
break;
/* if at the beginning or end
* of the string then escape */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
} else {
/* otherwise don't escape */
*d++ = *p++;
}
break;
case '?':
/* these must be escaped using \c form */
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = *p++;
break;
default: {
/* any others get \XX form */
unsigned char v;
const char *hexbytes = "0123456789ABCDEF";
v = *(const unsigned char *)p;
*d++ = '\\';
*d++ = hexbytes[v>>4];
*d++ = hexbytes[v&0xF];
p++;
break;
}
}
s = p; /* move forward */
}
| 165,702,818,458,270,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2015-5330 | ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5330 |
76 | samba | a118d4220ed85749c07fb43c1229d9e2fecbea6b | https://github.com/samba-team/samba | https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=a118d4220ed85749c07fb43c1229d9e2fecbea6b | CVE-2015-5330: strupper_talloc_n_handle(): properly count characters
When a codepoint eats more than one byte we really want to know,
especially if the string is not NUL terminated.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <[email protected]>
Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]> | 1 | _PUBLIC_ char *strupper_talloc_n_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *iconv_handle,
TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *src, size_t n)
{
size_t size=0;
char *dest;
if (!src) {
return NULL;
}
/* this takes advantage of the fact that upper/lower can't
change the length of a character by more than 1 byte */
dest = talloc_array(ctx, char, 2*(n+1));
if (dest == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
while (n-- && *src) {
size_t c_size;
codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle_ext(iconv_handle, src, n,
CH_UNIX, &c_size);
src += c_size;
c = toupper_m(c);
if (c_size == -1) {
talloc_free(dest);
return NULL;
}
size += c_size;
}
dest[size] = 0;
/* trim it so talloc_append_string() works */
dest = talloc_realloc(ctx, dest, char, size+1);
talloc_set_name_const(dest, dest);
return dest;
}
| 133,076,053,301,010,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2015-5330 | ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5330 |
80 | samba | f36cb71c330a52106e36028b3029d952257baf15 | https://github.com/samba-team/samba | https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=f36cb71c330a52106e36028b3029d952257baf15 | CVE-2015-5330: ldb_dn_explode: copy strings by length, not terminators
That is, memdup(), not strdup(). The terminators might not be there.
But, we have to make sure we put the terminator on, because we tend to
assume the terminator is there in other places.
Use talloc_set_name_const() on the resulting chunk so talloc_report()
remains unchanged.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <[email protected]>
Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <[email protected]>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <[email protected]>
Pair-programmed-with: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
Pair-programmed-with: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]> | 1 | static bool ldb_dn_explode(struct ldb_dn *dn)
{
char *p, *ex_name = NULL, *ex_value = NULL, *data, *d, *dt, *t;
bool trim = true;
bool in_extended = true;
bool in_ex_name = false;
bool in_ex_value = false;
bool in_attr = false;
bool in_value = false;
bool in_quote = false;
bool is_oid = false;
bool escape = false;
unsigned int x;
size_t l = 0;
int ret;
char *parse_dn;
bool is_index;
if ( ! dn || dn->invalid) return false;
if (dn->components) {
return true;
}
if (dn->ext_linearized) {
parse_dn = dn->ext_linearized;
} else {
parse_dn = dn->linearized;
}
if ( ! parse_dn ) {
return false;
}
is_index = (strncmp(parse_dn, "DN=@INDEX:", 10) == 0);
/* Empty DNs */
if (parse_dn[0] == '\0') {
return true;
}
/* Special DNs case */
if (dn->special) {
return true;
}
/* make sure we free this if allocated previously before replacing */
LDB_FREE(dn->components);
dn->comp_num = 0;
LDB_FREE(dn->ext_components);
dn->ext_comp_num = 0;
/* in the common case we have 3 or more components */
/* make sure all components are zeroed, other functions depend on it */
dn->components = talloc_zero_array(dn, struct ldb_dn_component, 3);
if ( ! dn->components) {
return false;
}
/* Components data space is allocated here once */
data = talloc_array(dn->components, char, strlen(parse_dn) + 1);
if (!data) {
return false;
}
p = parse_dn;
t = NULL;
d = dt = data;
while (*p) {
if (in_extended) {
if (!in_ex_name && !in_ex_value) {
if (p[0] == '<') {
p++;
ex_name = d;
in_ex_name = true;
continue;
} else if (p[0] == '\0') {
p++;
continue;
} else {
in_extended = false;
in_attr = true;
dt = d;
continue;
}
}
if (in_ex_name && *p == '=') {
*d++ = '\0';
p++;
ex_value = d;
in_ex_name = false;
in_ex_value = true;
continue;
}
if (in_ex_value && *p == '>') {
const struct ldb_dn_extended_syntax *ext_syntax;
struct ldb_val ex_val = {
.data = (uint8_t *)ex_value,
.length = d - ex_value
};
*d++ = '\0';
p++;
in_ex_value = false;
/* Process name and ex_value */
dn->ext_components = talloc_realloc(dn,
dn->ext_components,
struct ldb_dn_ext_component,
dn->ext_comp_num + 1);
if ( ! dn->ext_components) {
/* ouch ! */
goto failed;
}
ext_syntax = ldb_dn_extended_syntax_by_name(dn->ldb, ex_name);
if (!ext_syntax) {
/* We don't know about this type of extended DN */
goto failed;
}
dn->ext_components[dn->ext_comp_num].name = talloc_strdup(dn->ext_components, ex_name);
if (!dn->ext_components[dn->ext_comp_num].name) {
/* ouch */
goto failed;
}
ret = ext_syntax->read_fn(dn->ldb, dn->ext_components,
&ex_val, &dn->ext_components[dn->ext_comp_num].value);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
dn->ext_comp_num++;
if (*p == '\0') {
/* We have reached the end (extended component only)! */
talloc_free(data);
return true;
} else if (*p == ';') {
p++;
continue;
} else {
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
}
*d++ = *p++;
continue;
}
if (in_attr) {
if (trim) {
if (*p == ' ') {
p++;
continue;
}
/* first char */
trim = false;
if (!isascii(*p)) {
/* attr names must be ascii only */
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
if (isdigit(*p)) {
is_oid = true;
} else
if ( ! isalpha(*p)) {
/* not a digit nor an alpha,
* invalid attribute name */
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
/* Copy this character across from parse_dn,
* now we have trimmed out spaces */
*d++ = *p++;
continue;
}
if (*p == ' ') {
p++;
/* valid only if we are at the end */
trim = true;
continue;
}
if (trim && (*p != '=')) {
/* spaces/tabs are not allowed */
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
if (*p == '=') {
/* attribute terminated */
in_attr = false;
in_value = true;
trim = true;
l = 0;
/* Terminate this string in d
* (which is a copy of parse_dn
* with spaces trimmed) */
*d++ = '\0';
dn->components[dn->comp_num].name = talloc_strdup(dn->components, dt);
if ( ! dn->components[dn->comp_num].name) {
/* ouch */
goto failed;
}
dt = d;
p++;
continue;
}
if (!isascii(*p)) {
/* attr names must be ascii only */
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
if (is_oid && ( ! (isdigit(*p) || (*p == '.')))) {
/* not a digit nor a dot,
* invalid attribute oid */
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
} else
if ( ! (isalpha(*p) || isdigit(*p) || (*p == '-'))) {
/* not ALPHA, DIGIT or HYPHEN */
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
*d++ = *p++;
continue;
}
if (in_value) {
if (in_quote) {
if (*p == '\"') {
if (p[-1] != '\\') {
p++;
in_quote = false;
continue;
}
}
*d++ = *p++;
l++;
continue;
}
if (trim) {
if (*p == ' ') {
p++;
continue;
}
/* first char */
trim = false;
if (*p == '\"') {
in_quote = true;
p++;
continue;
}
}
switch (*p) {
/* TODO: support ber encoded values
case '#':
*/
case ',':
if (escape) {
*d++ = *p++;
l++;
escape = false;
continue;
}
/* ok found value terminator */
if ( t ) {
/* trim back */
d -= (p - t);
l -= (p - t);
}
in_attr = true;
in_value = false;
trim = true;
p++;
*d++ = '\0';
dn->components[dn->comp_num].value.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_strdup(dn->components, dt);
dn->components[dn->comp_num].value.length = l;
if ( ! dn->components[dn->comp_num].value.data) {
/* ouch ! */
goto failed;
}
dt = d;
dn->components,
struct ldb_dn_component,
dn->comp_num + 1);
if ( ! dn->components) {
/* ouch ! */
goto failed;
}
/* make sure all components are zeroed, other functions depend on this */
memset(&dn->components[dn->comp_num], '\0', sizeof(struct ldb_dn_component));
}
continue;
case '+':
case '=':
/* to main compatibility with earlier
versions of ldb indexing, we have to
accept the base64 encoded binary index
values, which contain a '+' or '='
which should normally be escaped */
if (is_index) {
if ( t ) t = NULL;
*d++ = *p++;
l++;
break;
}
/* fall through */
case '\"':
case '<':
case '>':
case ';':
/* a string with not escaped specials is invalid (tested) */
if ( ! escape) {
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
escape = false;
*d++ = *p++;
l++;
if ( t ) t = NULL;
break;
case '\\':
if ( ! escape) {
escape = true;
p++;
continue;
}
escape = false;
*d++ = *p++;
l++;
if ( t ) t = NULL;
break;
default:
if (escape) {
if (isxdigit(p[0]) && isxdigit(p[1])) {
if (sscanf(p, "%02x", &x) != 1) {
/* invalid escaping sequence */
ldb_dn_mark_invalid(dn);
goto failed;
}
p += 2;
*d++ = (unsigned char)x;
} else {
*d++ = *p++;
}
escape = false;
l++;
if ( t ) t = NULL;
break;
}
if (*p == ' ') {
if ( ! t) t = p;
} else {
if ( t ) t = NULL;
}
*d++ = *p++;
l++;
break;
}
}
}
| 56,521,152,564,463,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2015-5330 | ldb before 1.1.24, as used in the AD LDAP server in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, mishandles string lengths, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from daemon heap memory by sending crafted packets and then reading (1) an error message or (2) a database value. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5330 |
81 | ghostscript | a6807394bd94b708be24758287b606154daaaed9 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=a6807394bd94 | None | 1 | gs_call_interp(i_ctx_t **pi_ctx_p, ref * pref, int user_errors,
int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object)
{
ref *epref = pref;
ref doref;
ref *perrordict;
ref error_name;
int code, ccode;
ref saref;
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
int *gc_signal = &imemory_system->gs_lib_ctx->gcsignal;
*pexit_code = 0;
*gc_signal = 0;
ialloc_reset_requested(idmemory);
again:
/* Avoid a dangling error object that might get traced by a future GC. */
make_null(perror_object);
o_stack.requested = e_stack.requested = d_stack.requested = 0;
while (*gc_signal) { /* Some routine below triggered a GC. */
gs_gc_root_t epref_root;
*gc_signal = 0;
/* Make sure that doref will get relocated properly if */
/* a garbage collection happens with epref == &doref. */
gs_register_ref_root(imemory_system, &epref_root,
(void **)&epref, "gs_call_interp(epref)");
code = interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, -1);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
gs_unregister_root(imemory_system, &epref_root,
"gs_call_interp(epref)");
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = interp(pi_ctx_p, epref, perror_object);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
if (!r_has_type(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid)) {
*perror_object = i_ctx_p->error_object;
make_t(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid);
}
/* Prevent a dangling reference to the GC signal in ticks_left */
/* in the frame of interp, but be prepared to do a GC if */
/* an allocation in this routine asks for it. */
*gc_signal = 0;
set_gc_signal(i_ctx_p, 1);
if (esp < esbot) /* popped guard entry */
esp = esbot;
switch (code) {
case gs_error_Fatal:
*pexit_code = 255;
return code;
case gs_error_Quit:
*perror_object = osp[-1];
*pexit_code = code = osp->value.intval;
osp -= 2;
return
(code == 0 ? gs_error_Quit :
code < 0 && code > -100 ? code : gs_error_Fatal);
case gs_error_InterpreterExit:
return 0;
case gs_error_ExecStackUnderflow:
/****** WRONG -- must keep mark blocks intact ******/
ref_stack_pop_block(&e_stack);
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
case gs_error_VMreclaim:
/* Do the GC and continue. */
/* We ignore the return value here, if it fails here
* we'll call it again having jumped to the "again" label.
* Where, assuming it fails again, we'll handle the error.
*/
(void)interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p,
(osp->value.intval == 2 ?
avm_global : avm_local));
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
make_oper(&doref, 0, zpop);
epref = &doref;
goto again;
case gs_error_NeedInput:
case gs_error_interrupt:
return code;
}
/* Adjust osp in case of operand stack underflow */
if (osp < osbot - 1)
osp = osbot - 1;
/* We have to handle stack over/underflow specially, because */
/* we might be able to recover by adding or removing a block. */
switch (code) {
case gs_error_dictstackoverflow:
/* We don't have to handle this specially: */
/* The only places that could generate it */
/* use check_dstack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */
/* so if` we get this error, it's a real one. */
if (osp >= ostop) {
if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0)
return ccode;
}
/* Skip system dictionaries for CET 20-02-02 */
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, min_dstack_size, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
ref_stack_pop_to(&d_stack, min_dstack_size);
dict_set_top();
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_dictstackunderflow:
if (ref_stack_pop_block(&d_stack) >= 0) {
dict_set_top();
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
break;
case gs_error_execstackoverflow:
/* We don't have to handle this specially: */
/* The only places that could generate it */
/* use check_estack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */
/* so if we get this error, it's a real one. */
if (osp >= ostop) {
if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0)
return ccode;
}
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, 0, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
{
uint count = ref_stack_count(&e_stack);
uint limit = ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack) - ES_HEADROOM;
if (count > limit) {
/*
* If there is an e-stack mark within MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK of
* the new top, cut the stack back to remove the mark.
*/
int skip = count - limit;
int i;
for (i = skip; i < skip + MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK; ++i) {
const ref *ep = ref_stack_index(&e_stack, i);
if (r_has_type_attrs(ep, t_null, a_executable)) {
skip = i + 1;
break;
}
}
pop_estack(i_ctx_p, skip);
}
}
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_stackoverflow:
if (ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, o_stack.requested) >= 0) { /* We can't just re-execute the object, because */
/* it might be a procedure being pushed as a */
/* literal. We check for this case specially. */
doref = *perror_object;
if (r_is_proc(&doref)) {
*++osp = doref;
make_null_proc(&doref);
}
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, 0, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
ref_stack_clear(&o_stack);
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_stackunderflow:
if (ref_stack_pop_block(&o_stack) >= 0) {
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
break;
}
if (user_errors < 0)
return code;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) < 0)
return code; /* out-of-range error code! */
/* We refer to gserrordict first, which is not accessible to Postcript jobs
* If we're running with SAFERERRORS all the handlers are copied to gserrordict
* so we'll always find the default one. If not SAFERERRORS, only gs specific
* errors are in gserrordict.
*/
if (dict_find_string(systemdict, "gserrordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
(dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0 &&
(dict_find_string(systemdict, "errordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0))
)
return code; /* error name not in errordict??? */
doref = *epref;
epref = &doref;
/* Push the error object on the operand stack if appropriate. */
if (!GS_ERROR_IS_INTERRUPT(code)) {
/* Replace the error object if within an oparray or .errorexec. */
osp++;
if (osp >= ostop) {
}
*osp = *perror_object;
}
*osp = *perror_object;
errorexec_find(i_ctx_p, osp);
/* If using SAFER, hand a name object to the error handler, rather than the executable
* object/operator itself.
*/
if (i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions) {
code = obj_cvs(imemory, osp, buf + 2, 256, &rlen, (const byte **)&bufptr);
if (code < 0) {
const char *unknownstr = "--unknown--";
rlen = strlen(unknownstr);
memcpy(buf, unknownstr, rlen);
}
else {
buf[0] = buf[1] = buf[rlen + 2] = buf[rlen + 3] = '-';
rlen += 4;
}
code = name_ref(imemory, buf, rlen, osp, 1);
if (code < 0)
make_null(osp);
}
}
| 158,176,379,266,765,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-209"
] | CVE-2018-17961 | Artifex Ghostscript 9.25 and earlier allows attackers to bypass a sandbox protection mechanism via vectors involving errorhandler setup. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-17183. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17961 |
82 | samba | 4278ef25f64d5fdbf432ff1534e275416ec9561e | https://github.com/samba-team/samba | https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commitdiff;h=4278ef25f64d5fdbf432ff1534e275416ec9561e | CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file access outside the share).
Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <[email protected]> | 1 | NTSTATUS check_reduced_name_with_privilege(connection_struct *conn,
const char *fname,
struct smb_request *smbreq)
{
NTSTATUS status;
TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
const char *conn_rootdir;
size_t rootdir_len;
char *dir_name = NULL;
const char *last_component = NULL;
char *resolved_name = NULL;
char *saved_dir = NULL;
struct smb_filename *smb_fname_cwd = NULL;
struct privilege_paths *priv_paths = NULL;
int ret;
DEBUG(3,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege [%s] [%s]\n",
fname,
priv_paths = talloc_zero(smbreq, struct privilege_paths);
if (!priv_paths) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
if (!parent_dirname(ctx, fname, &dir_name, &last_component)) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
priv_paths->parent_name.base_name = talloc_strdup(priv_paths, dir_name);
priv_paths->file_name.base_name = talloc_strdup(priv_paths, last_component);
if (priv_paths->parent_name.base_name == NULL ||
priv_paths->file_name.base_name == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
if (SMB_VFS_STAT(conn, &priv_paths->parent_name) != 0) {
status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
goto err;
}
/* Remember where we were. */
saved_dir = vfs_GetWd(ctx, conn);
if (!saved_dir) {
status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
goto err;
}
/* Go to the parent directory to lock in memory. */
if (vfs_ChDir(conn, priv_paths->parent_name.base_name) == -1) {
status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
goto err;
}
/* Get the absolute path of the parent directory. */
resolved_name = SMB_VFS_REALPATH(conn,".");
if (!resolved_name) {
status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
goto err;
}
if (*resolved_name != '/') {
DEBUG(0,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: realpath "
"doesn't return absolute paths !\n"));
status = NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
goto err;
}
DEBUG(10,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: realpath [%s] -> [%s]\n",
priv_paths->parent_name.base_name,
resolved_name));
/* Now check the stat value is the same. */
smb_fname_cwd = synthetic_smb_fname(talloc_tos(), ".", NULL, NULL);
if (smb_fname_cwd == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
if (SMB_VFS_LSTAT(conn, smb_fname_cwd) != 0) {
status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
goto err;
}
/* Ensure we're pointing at the same place. */
if (!check_same_stat(&smb_fname_cwd->st, &priv_paths->parent_name.st)) {
DEBUG(0,("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: "
"device/inode/uid/gid on directory %s changed. "
"Denying access !\n",
priv_paths->parent_name.base_name));
status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
goto err;
}
/* Ensure we're below the connect path. */
conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname);
if (conn_rootdir == NULL) {
DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name_with_privilege: Could not get "
"conn_rootdir\n"));
status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
goto err;
}
}
| 1,187,391,106,808,919,600,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2015-5252 | vfs.c in smbd in Samba 3.x and 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3, when share names with certain substring relationships exist, allows remote attackers to bypass intended file-access restrictions via a symlink that points outside of a share. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5252 |
83 | savannah | dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a | None | 1 | plan_a (char const *filename)
{
char const *s;
char const *lim;
char const **ptr;
char *buffer;
lin iline;
size_t size = instat.st_size;
/* Fail if the file size doesn't fit in a size_t,
or if storage isn't available. */
if (! (size == instat.st_size
&& (buffer = malloc (size ? size : (size_t) 1))))
return false;
/* Read the input file, but don't bother reading it if it's empty.
When creating files, the files do not actually exist. */
if (size)
{
if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
{
int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
size_t buffered = 0, n;
if (ifd < 0)
pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
/* Some non-POSIX hosts exaggerate st_size in text mode;
or the file may have shrunk! */
size = buffered;
break;
}
if (n == (size_t) -1)
{
/* Perhaps size is too large for this host. */
close (ifd);
free (buffer);
return false;
}
buffered += n;
}
if (close (ifd) != 0)
read_fatal ();
}
| 8,366,090,498,822,481,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-59"
] | CVE-2019-13636 | In GNU patch through 2.7.6, the following of symlinks is mishandled in certain cases other than input files. This affects inp.c and util.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13636 |
84 | dbus | c3223ba6c401ba81df1305851312a47c485e6cd7 | http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=dbus/dbus | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?h=dbus-1.4&id=c3223ba6c401ba81df1305851312a47c485e6cd7 | _dbus_header_byteswap: change the first byte of the message, not just the struct member
This has been wrong approximately forever, for instance see:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/dbus/2007-March/007357.html
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38120
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=629938
Reviewed-by: Will Thompson <[email protected]> | 1 | _dbus_header_byteswap (DBusHeader *header,
int new_order)
{
if (header->byte_order == new_order)
return;
_dbus_marshal_byteswap (&_dbus_header_signature_str,
0, header->byte_order,
new_order,
&header->data, 0);
header->byte_order = new_order;
}
| 9,228,036,298,590,962,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | dbus-marshal-header.c | 126,065,746,591,921,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2011-2200 | The _dbus_header_byteswap function in dbus-marshal-header.c in D-Bus (aka DBus) 1.2.x before 1.2.28, 1.4.x before 1.4.12, and 1.5.x before 1.5.4 does not properly handle a non-native byte order, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (connection loss), obtain potentially sensitive information, or conduct unspecified state-modification attacks via crafted messages. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2200 |
85 | ghostscript | 79cccf641486a6595c43f1de1cd7ade696020a31 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=79cccf641486 | None | 1 | gs_nulldevice(gs_gstate * pgs)
{
int code = 0;
if (pgs->device == 0 || !gx_device_is_null(pgs->device)) {
gx_device *ndev;
code = gs_copydevice(&ndev, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device,
pgs->memory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/*
* Internal devices have a reference count of 0, not 1,
* aside from references from graphics states.
to sort out how the icc profile is best handled with this device.
It seems to inherit properties from the current device if there
is one */
rc_init(ndev, pgs->memory, 0);
if (pgs->device != NULL) {
if ((code = dev_proc(pgs->device, get_profile)(pgs->device,
&(ndev->icc_struct))) < 0)
return code;
rc_increment(ndev->icc_struct);
set_dev_proc(ndev, get_profile, gx_default_get_profile);
}
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
gs_free_object(pgs->memory, ndev, "gs_copydevice(device)");
}
return code;
}
| 84,413,200,937,845,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-78"
] | CVE-2018-16863 | It was found that RHSA-2018:2918 did not fully fix CVE-2018-16509. An attacker could possibly exploit another variant of the flaw and bypass the -dSAFER protection to, for example, execute arbitrary shell commands via a specially crafted PostScript document. This only affects ghostscript 9.07 as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16863 |
86 | ghostscript | 5516c614dc33662a2afdc377159f70218e67bde5 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=5516c614dc33 | None | 1 | zrestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
alloc_save_t *asave;
bool last;
vm_save_t *vmsave;
int code = restore_check_operand(op, &asave, idmemory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if_debug2m('u', imemory, "[u]vmrestore 0x%lx, id = %lu\n",
(ulong) alloc_save_client_data(asave),
(ulong) op->value.saveid);
if (I_VALIDATE_BEFORE_RESTORE)
ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p);
ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p);
/* Check the contents of the stacks. */
{
int code;
if ((code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, asave, false)) < 0 ||
(code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, asave, true)) < 0 ||
(code = restore_check_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, asave, false)) < 0
) {
osp++;
return code;
}
}
/* Reset l_new in all stack entries if the new save level is zero. */
/* Also do some special fixing on the e-stack. */
restore_fix_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, asave, false);
}
| 243,122,500,252,437,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-78"
] | CVE-2018-16863 | It was found that RHSA-2018:2918 did not fully fix CVE-2018-16509. An attacker could possibly exploit another variant of the flaw and bypass the -dSAFER protection to, for example, execute arbitrary shell commands via a specially crafted PostScript document. This only affects ghostscript 9.07 as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16863 |
87 | NetworkManager | 78ce088843d59d4494965bfc40b30a2e63d065f6 | https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager/commit/?id=78ce088843d59d4494965bfc40b30a2e63d065f6 | libnm-util: remove some left-over debugging code | 1 | destroy_one_secret (gpointer data)
{
char *secret = (char *) data;
/* Don't leave the secret lying around in memory */
g_message ("%s: destroying %s", __func__, secret);
memset (secret, 0, strlen (secret));
g_free (secret);
}
| 1,138,568,555,668,242,800,000,000,000,000,000,000 | nm-setting-vpn.c | 82,021,533,146,712,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2011-1943 | The destroy_one_secret function in nm-setting-vpn.c in libnm-util in the NetworkManager package 0.8.999-3.git20110526 in Fedora 15 creates a log entry containing a certificate password, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information by reading a log file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1943 |
90 | libxfont | d1e670a4a8704b8708e493ab6155589bcd570608 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d1e670a4a8704b8708e493ab6155589bcd570608 | None | 1 | PatternMatch(char *pat, int patdashes, char *string, int stringdashes)
{
char c,
t;
if (stringdashes < patdashes)
return 0;
for (;;) {
switch (c = *pat++) {
case '*':
if (!(c = *pat++))
return 1;
if (c == XK_minus) {
patdashes--;
for (;;) {
while ((t = *string++) != XK_minus)
if (!t)
return 0;
stringdashes--;
if (PatternMatch(pat, patdashes, string, stringdashes))
return 1;
if (stringdashes == patdashes)
return 0;
}
} else {
for (;;) {
while ((t = *string++) != c) {
if (!t)
return 0;
if (t == XK_minus) {
if (stringdashes-- < patdashes)
return 0;
}
}
if (PatternMatch(pat, patdashes, string, stringdashes))
return 1;
}
}
case '?':
if (*string++ == XK_minus)
stringdashes--;
break;
case '\0':
return (*string == '\0');
patdashes--;
stringdashes--;
break;
}
return 0;
default:
if (c == *string++)
break;
return 0;
}
}
| 235,016,592,504,912,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2017-13720 | In the PatternMatch function in fontfile/fontdir.c in libXfont through 1.5.2 and 2.x before 2.0.2, an attacker with access to an X connection can cause a buffer over-read during pattern matching of fonts, leading to information disclosure or a crash (denial of service). This occurs because '\0' characters are incorrectly skipped in situations involving ? characters. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-13720 |
91 | ghostscript | b575e1ec42cc86f6a58c603f2a88fcc2af699cc8 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=b575e1ec42cc86f6a58c603f2a88fcc2af699cc8 | None | 1 | gs_call_interp(i_ctx_t **pi_ctx_p, ref * pref, int user_errors,
int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object)
{
ref *epref = pref;
ref doref;
ref *perrordict;
ref error_name;
int code, ccode;
ref saref;
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
int *gc_signal = &imemory_system->gs_lib_ctx->gcsignal;
*pexit_code = 0;
*gc_signal = 0;
ialloc_reset_requested(idmemory);
again:
/* Avoid a dangling error object that might get traced by a future GC. */
make_null(perror_object);
o_stack.requested = e_stack.requested = d_stack.requested = 0;
while (*gc_signal) { /* Some routine below triggered a GC. */
gs_gc_root_t epref_root;
*gc_signal = 0;
/* Make sure that doref will get relocated properly if */
/* a garbage collection happens with epref == &doref. */
gs_register_ref_root(imemory_system, &epref_root,
(void **)&epref, "gs_call_interp(epref)");
code = interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, -1);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
gs_unregister_root(imemory_system, &epref_root,
"gs_call_interp(epref)");
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = interp(pi_ctx_p, epref, perror_object);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
if (!r_has_type(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid)) {
*perror_object = i_ctx_p->error_object;
make_t(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid);
}
/* Prevent a dangling reference to the GC signal in ticks_left */
/* in the frame of interp, but be prepared to do a GC if */
/* an allocation in this routine asks for it. */
*gc_signal = 0;
set_gc_signal(i_ctx_p, 1);
if (esp < esbot) /* popped guard entry */
esp = esbot;
switch (code) {
case gs_error_Fatal:
*pexit_code = 255;
return code;
case gs_error_Quit:
*perror_object = osp[-1];
*pexit_code = code = osp->value.intval;
osp -= 2;
return
(code == 0 ? gs_error_Quit :
code < 0 && code > -100 ? code : gs_error_Fatal);
case gs_error_InterpreterExit:
return 0;
case gs_error_ExecStackUnderflow:
/****** WRONG -- must keep mark blocks intact ******/
ref_stack_pop_block(&e_stack);
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
case gs_error_VMreclaim:
/* Do the GC and continue. */
/* We ignore the return value here, if it fails here
* we'll call it again having jumped to the "again" label.
* Where, assuming it fails again, we'll handle the error.
*/
(void)interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p,
(osp->value.intval == 2 ?
avm_global : avm_local));
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
make_oper(&doref, 0, zpop);
epref = &doref;
goto again;
case gs_error_NeedInput:
case gs_error_interrupt:
return code;
}
/* Adjust osp in case of operand stack underflow */
if (osp < osbot - 1)
osp = osbot - 1;
/* We have to handle stack over/underflow specially, because */
/* we might be able to recover by adding or removing a block. */
switch (code) {
case gs_error_dictstackoverflow:
/* We don't have to handle this specially: */
/* The only places that could generate it */
/* use check_dstack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */
/* so if` we get this error, it's a real one. */
if (osp >= ostop) {
if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0)
return ccode;
}
/* Skip system dictionaries for CET 20-02-02 */
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, min_dstack_size, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
ref_stack_pop_to(&d_stack, min_dstack_size);
dict_set_top();
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_dictstackunderflow:
if (ref_stack_pop_block(&d_stack) >= 0) {
dict_set_top();
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
break;
case gs_error_execstackoverflow:
/* We don't have to handle this specially: */
/* The only places that could generate it */
/* use check_estack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */
/* so if we get this error, it's a real one. */
if (osp >= ostop) {
if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0)
return ccode;
}
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, 0, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
{
uint count = ref_stack_count(&e_stack);
uint limit = ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack) - ES_HEADROOM;
if (count > limit) {
/*
* If there is an e-stack mark within MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK of
* the new top, cut the stack back to remove the mark.
*/
int skip = count - limit;
int i;
for (i = skip; i < skip + MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK; ++i) {
const ref *ep = ref_stack_index(&e_stack, i);
if (r_has_type_attrs(ep, t_null, a_executable)) {
skip = i + 1;
break;
}
}
pop_estack(i_ctx_p, skip);
}
}
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_stackoverflow:
if (ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, o_stack.requested) >= 0) { /* We can't just re-execute the object, because */
/* it might be a procedure being pushed as a */
/* literal. We check for this case specially. */
doref = *perror_object;
if (r_is_proc(&doref)) {
*++osp = doref;
make_null_proc(&doref);
}
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, 0, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
ref_stack_clear(&o_stack);
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_stackunderflow:
if (ref_stack_pop_block(&o_stack) >= 0) {
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
break;
}
if (user_errors < 0)
return code;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) < 0)
return code; /* out-of-range error code! */
/*
* For greater Adobe compatibility, only the standard PostScript errors
* are defined in errordict; the rest are in gserrordict.
*/
if (dict_find_string(systemdict, "errordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
(dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0 &&
(dict_find_string(systemdict, "gserrordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0))
)
return code; /* error name not in errordict??? */
doref = *epref;
epref = &doref;
/* Push the error object on the operand stack if appropriate. */
if (!GS_ERROR_IS_INTERRUPT(code)) {
/* Replace the error object if within an oparray or .errorexec. */
*++osp = *perror_object;
errorexec_find(i_ctx_p, osp);
}
goto again;
}
| 56,777,007,913,799,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | interp.c | 212,280,368,518,451,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-388"
] | CVE-2018-16542 | In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use insufficient interpreter stack-size checking during error handling to crash the interpreter. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16542 |
92 | ghostscript | 241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d | None | 1 | gs_main_finit(gs_main_instance * minst, int exit_status, int code)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
gs_dual_memory_t dmem = {0};
int exit_code;
ref error_object;
char *tempnames;
/* NB: need to free gs_name_table
*/
/*
* Previous versions of this code closed the devices in the
* device list here. Since these devices are now prototypes,
* they cannot be opened, so they do not need to be closed;
* alloc_restore_all will close dynamically allocated devices.
*/
tempnames = gs_main_tempnames(minst);
/* by the time we get here, we *must* avoid any random redefinitions of
* operators etc, so we push systemdict onto the top of the dict stack.
* We do this in C to avoid running into any other re-defininitions in the
* Postscript world.
*/
gs_finit_push_systemdict(i_ctx_p);
/* We have to disable BGPrint before we call interp_reclaim() to prevent the
* parent rendering thread initialising for the next page, whilst we are
* removing objects it may want to access - for example, the I/O device table.
* We also have to mess with the BeginPage/EndPage procs so that we don't
* trigger a spurious extra page to be emitted.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"/BGPrint /GetDeviceParam .special_op \
{{ <</BeginPage {pop} /EndPage {pop pop //false } \
/BGPrint false /NumRenderingThreads 0>> setpagedevice} if} if \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse \
.systemvar exec",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
/*
* Close the "main" device, because it may need to write out
* data before destruction. pdfwrite needs so.
*/
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
int code = 0;
if (idmemory->reclaim != 0) {
code = interp_reclaim(&minst->i_ctx_p, avm_global);
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (tempnames)
free(tempnames);
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf2(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", err_str, code);
}
else {
emprintf1(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d reclaiming the memory while the interpreter finalization.\n", code);
}
#ifdef MEMENTO_SQUEEZE_BUILD
if (code != gs_error_VMerror ) return gs_error_Fatal;
#else
return gs_error_Fatal;
#endif
}
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* interp_reclaim could change it. */
}
if (i_ctx_p->pgs != NULL && i_ctx_p->pgs->device != NULL) {
gx_device *pdev = i_ctx_p->pgs->device;
const char * dname = pdev->dname;
if (code < 0) {
ref error_name;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) >= 0) {
char err_str[32] = {0};
name_string_ref(imemory, &error_name, &error_name);
memcpy(err_str, error_name.value.const_bytes, r_size(&error_name));
emprintf3(imemory, "ERROR: %s (%d) on closing %s device.\n", err_str, code, dname);
}
else {
emprintf2(imemory, "UNKNOWN ERROR %d closing %s device.\n", code, dname);
}
}
rc_decrement(pdev, "gs_main_finit"); /* device might be freed */
if (exit_status == 0 || exit_status == gs_error_Quit)
exit_status = code;
}
/* Flush stdout and stderr */
gs_main_run_string(minst,
"(%stdout) (w) file closefile (%stderr) (w) file closefile \
serverdict /.jobsavelevel get 0 eq {/quit} {/stop} ifelse .systemexec \
systemdict /savedinitialgstate .forceundef",
0 , &exit_code, &error_object);
}
gp_readline_finit(minst->readline_data);
i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p; /* get current interp context */
if (gs_debug_c(':')) {
print_resource_usage(minst, &gs_imemory, "Final");
dmprintf1(minst->heap, "%% Exiting instance 0x%p\n", minst);
}
/* Do the equivalent of a restore "past the bottom". */
/* This will release all memory, close all open files, etc. */
if (minst->init_done >= 1) {
gs_memory_t *mem_raw = i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory;
i_plugin_holder *h = i_ctx_p->plugin_list;
dmem = *idmemory;
code = alloc_restore_all(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
emprintf1(mem_raw,
"ERROR %d while the final restore. See gs/psi/ierrors.h for code explanation.\n",
code);
i_iodev_finit(&dmem);
i_plugin_finit(mem_raw, h);
}
/* clean up redirected stdout */
if (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout)
&& (minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 != minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstderr)) {
fclose(minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2);
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->fstdout2 = (FILE *)NULL;
}
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_is_redirected = 0;
minst->heap->gs_lib_ctx->stdout_to_stderr = 0;
/* remove any temporary files, after ghostscript has closed files */
if (tempnames) {
char *p = tempnames;
while (*p) {
unlink(p);
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
free(tempnames);
}
gs_lib_finit(exit_status, code, minst->heap);
gs_free_object(minst->heap, minst->lib_path.container.value.refs, "lib_path array");
ialloc_finit(&dmem);
return exit_status;
}
| 143,975,174,954,705,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-416"
] | CVE-2018-16541 | In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use incorrect free logic in pagedevice replacement to crash the interpreter. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16541 |
93 | ghostscript | b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498 | None | 1 | zsetcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr ep;
const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs);
gs_client_color cc;
int n_comps, n_numeric_comps, num_offset = 0, code, depth;
PS_colour_space_t *space;
/* initialize the client color pattern pointer for GC */
cc.pattern = 0;
/* check for a pattern color space */
if ((n_comps = cs_num_components(pcs)) < 0) {
n_comps = -n_comps;
if (r_has_type(op, t_dictionary)) {
ref *pImpl, pPatInst;
code = dict_find_string(op, "Implementation", &pImpl);
if (code != 0) {
code = array_get(imemory, pImpl, 0, &pPatInst);
if (code < 0)
return code;
n_numeric_comps = ( pattern_instance_uses_base_space(cc.pattern)
? n_comps - 1
: 0 );
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
num_offset = 1;
} else
n_numeric_comps = n_comps;
/* gather the numeric operands */
code = float_params(op - num_offset, n_numeric_comps, cc.paint.values);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* The values are copied to graphic state and compared with */
/* other colors by memcmp() in gx_hld_saved_color_equal() */
/* This is the easiest way to avoid indeterminism */
memset(cc.paint.values + n_numeric_comps, 0,
sizeof(cc.paint.values) - sizeof(*cc.paint.values)*n_numeric_comps);
code = get_space_object(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &space);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (space->validatecomponents) {
code = space->validatecomponents(i_ctx_p,
&istate->colorspace[0].array,
cc.paint.values, n_numeric_comps);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
/* pass the color to the graphic library */
if ((code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc)) >= 0) {
if (n_comps > n_numeric_comps) {
istate->pattern[0] = *op; /* save pattern dict or null */
}
}
/* Check the color spaces, to see if we need to run any tint transform
* procedures. Some Adobe applications *eg Photoshop) expect that the
* tint transform will be run and use this to set up duotone DeviceN
* spaces.
*/
code = validate_spaces(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &depth);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */
/* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */
check_estack(5);
/* A place holder for data potentially used by transform functions */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'depth' of the space returned during checking above */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'stage' of processing (initially 0) */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store a pointer to the color space stored on the operand stack
* as the stack may grow unpredictably making further access
* to the space difficult
*/
ep = esp += 1;
*ep = istate->colorspace[0].array;
/* Finally, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setcolor_cont);
return o_push_estack;
}
| 204,275,868,331,229,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-704"
] | CVE-2018-16513 | In Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24, attackers able to supply crafted PostScript files could use a type confusion in the setcolor function to crash the interpreter or possibly have unspecified other impact. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16513 |
94 | ghostscript | 0edd3d6c634a577db261615a9dc2719bca7f6e01 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=0edd3d6c634a577db261615a9dc2719bca7f6e01 | None | 1 | ztype(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
ref tnref;
int code = array_get(imemory, op, (long)r_btype(op - 1), &tnref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&tnref, t_name)) {
/* Must be either a stack underflow or a t_[a]struct. */
check_op(2);
{ /* Get the type name from the structure. */
if (op[-1].value.pstruct != 0x00) {
const char *sname =
gs_struct_type_name_string(gs_object_type(imemory,
op[-1].value.pstruct));
int code = name_ref(imemory, (const byte *)sname, strlen(sname),
(ref *) (op - 1), 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
}
r_set_attrs(op - 1, a_executable);
} else {
ref_assign(op - 1, &tnref);
}
pop(1);
return 0;
}
| 6,725,827,723,091,209,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ztype.c | 330,954,443,935,725,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-704"
] | CVE-2018-16511 | An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 9.24. A type confusion in "ztype" could be used by remote attackers able to supply crafted PostScript to crash the interpreter or possibly have unspecified other impact. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16511 |
96 | savannah | ba6b44f6745b14dce414761a8e4b35d31b176bba | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=ba6b44f6745b14dce414761a8e4b35d31b176bba | None | 1 | fd_read_body (const char *downloaded_filename, int fd, FILE *out, wgint toread, wgint startpos,
wgint *qtyread, wgint *qtywritten, double *elapsed, int flags,
FILE *out2)
{
int ret = 0;
#undef max
#define max(a,b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b))
int dlbufsize = max (BUFSIZ, 8 * 1024);
char *dlbuf = xmalloc (dlbufsize);
struct ptimer *timer = NULL;
double last_successful_read_tm = 0;
/* The progress gauge, set according to the user preferences. */
void *progress = NULL;
/* Non-zero if the progress gauge is interactive, i.e. if it can
continually update the display. When true, smaller timeout
values are used so that the gauge can update the display when
data arrives slowly. */
bool progress_interactive = false;
bool exact = !!(flags & rb_read_exactly);
/* Used only by HTTP/HTTPS chunked transfer encoding. */
bool chunked = flags & rb_chunked_transfer_encoding;
wgint skip = 0;
/* How much data we've read/written. */
wgint sum_read = 0;
wgint sum_written = 0;
wgint remaining_chunk_size = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ
/* try to minimize the number of calls to inflate() and write_data() per
call to fd_read() */
unsigned int gzbufsize = dlbufsize * 4;
char *gzbuf = NULL;
z_stream gzstream;
if (flags & rb_compressed_gzip)
{
gzbuf = xmalloc (gzbufsize);
if (gzbuf != NULL)
{
gzstream.zalloc = zalloc;
gzstream.zfree = zfree;
gzstream.opaque = Z_NULL;
gzstream.next_in = Z_NULL;
gzstream.avail_in = 0;
#define GZIP_DETECT 32 /* gzip format detection */
#define GZIP_WINDOW 15 /* logarithmic window size (default: 15) */
ret = inflateInit2 (&gzstream, GZIP_DETECT | GZIP_WINDOW);
if (ret != Z_OK)
{
xfree (gzbuf);
errno = (ret == Z_MEM_ERROR) ? ENOMEM : EINVAL;
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
}
else
{
errno = ENOMEM;
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
}
#endif
if (flags & rb_skip_startpos)
skip = startpos;
if (opt.show_progress)
{
const char *filename_progress;
/* If we're skipping STARTPOS bytes, pass 0 as the INITIAL
argument to progress_create because the indicator doesn't
(yet) know about "skipping" data. */
wgint start = skip ? 0 : startpos;
if (opt.dir_prefix)
filename_progress = downloaded_filename + strlen (opt.dir_prefix) + 1;
else
filename_progress = downloaded_filename;
progress = progress_create (filename_progress, start, start + toread);
progress_interactive = progress_interactive_p (progress);
}
if (opt.limit_rate)
limit_bandwidth_reset ();
/* A timer is needed for tracking progress, for throttling, and for
tracking elapsed time. If either of these are requested, start
the timer. */
if (progress || opt.limit_rate || elapsed)
{
timer = ptimer_new ();
last_successful_read_tm = 0;
}
/* Use a smaller buffer for low requested bandwidths. For example,
with --limit-rate=2k, it doesn't make sense to slurp in 16K of
data and then sleep for 8s. With buffer size equal to the limit,
we never have to sleep for more than one second. */
if (opt.limit_rate && opt.limit_rate < dlbufsize)
dlbufsize = opt.limit_rate;
/* Read from FD while there is data to read. Normally toread==0
means that it is unknown how much data is to arrive. However, if
EXACT is set, then toread==0 means what it says: that no data
should be read. */
while (!exact || (sum_read < toread))
{
int rdsize;
double tmout = opt.read_timeout;
if (chunked)
{
if (remaining_chunk_size == 0)
{
char *line = fd_read_line (fd);
char *endl;
if (line == NULL)
{
ret = -1;
break;
}
else if (out2 != NULL)
fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2);
remaining_chunk_size = strtol (line, &endl, 16);
xfree (line);
if (remaining_chunk_size == 0)
{
ret = 0;
fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2);
xfree (line);
}
break;
}
}
rdsize = MIN (remaining_chunk_size, dlbufsize);
}
else
rdsize = exact ? MIN (toread - sum_read, dlbufsize) : dlbufsize;
if (progress_interactive)
{
/* For interactive progress gauges, always specify a ~1s
timeout, so that the gauge can be updated regularly even
when the data arrives very slowly or stalls. */
tmout = 0.95;
if (opt.read_timeout)
{
double waittm;
waittm = ptimer_read (timer) - last_successful_read_tm;
if (waittm + tmout > opt.read_timeout)
{
/* Don't let total idle time exceed read timeout. */
tmout = opt.read_timeout - waittm;
if (tmout < 0)
{
/* We've already exceeded the timeout. */
ret = -1, errno = ETIMEDOUT;
break;
}
}
}
}
ret = fd_read (fd, dlbuf, rdsize, tmout);
if (progress_interactive && ret < 0 && errno == ETIMEDOUT)
ret = 0; /* interactive timeout, handled above */
else if (ret <= 0)
break; /* EOF or read error */
if (progress || opt.limit_rate || elapsed)
{
ptimer_measure (timer);
if (ret > 0)
last_successful_read_tm = ptimer_read (timer);
}
if (ret > 0)
{
int write_res;
sum_read += ret;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBZ
if (gzbuf != NULL)
{
int err;
int towrite;
gzstream.avail_in = ret;
gzstream.next_in = (unsigned char *) dlbuf;
do
{
gzstream.avail_out = gzbufsize;
gzstream.next_out = (unsigned char *) gzbuf;
err = inflate (&gzstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
switch (err)
{
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
errno = ENOMEM;
ret = -1;
goto out;
case Z_NEED_DICT:
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
errno = EINVAL;
ret = -1;
goto out;
case Z_STREAM_END:
if (exact && sum_read != toread)
{
DEBUGP(("zlib stream ended unexpectedly after "
"%ld/%ld bytes\n", sum_read, toread));
}
}
towrite = gzbufsize - gzstream.avail_out;
write_res = write_data (out, out2, gzbuf, towrite, &skip,
&sum_written);
if (write_res < 0)
{
ret = (write_res == -3) ? -3 : -2;
goto out;
}
}
while (gzstream.avail_out == 0);
}
else
#endif
{
write_res = write_data (out, out2, dlbuf, ret, &skip,
&sum_written);
if (write_res < 0)
{
ret = (write_res == -3) ? -3 : -2;
goto out;
}
}
if (chunked)
{
remaining_chunk_size -= ret;
if (remaining_chunk_size == 0)
{
char *line = fd_read_line (fd);
if (line == NULL)
{
ret = -1;
break;
}
else
{
if (out2 != NULL)
fwrite (line, 1, strlen (line), out2);
xfree (line);
}
}
}
}
if (opt.limit_rate)
limit_bandwidth (ret, timer);
if (progress)
progress_update (progress, ret, ptimer_read (timer));
#ifdef WINDOWS
if (toread > 0 && opt.show_progress)
ws_percenttitle (100.0 *
(startpos + sum_read) / (startpos + toread));
#endif
}
| 323,589,515,235,597,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2017-13090 | The retr.c:fd_read_body() function is called when processing OK responses. When the response is sent chunked in wget before 1.19.2, the chunk parser uses strtol() to read each chunk's length, but doesn't check that the chunk length is a non-negative number. The code then tries to read the chunk in pieces of 8192 bytes by using the MIN() macro, but ends up passing the negative chunk length to retr.c:fd_read(). As fd_read() takes an int argument, the high 32 bits of the chunk length are discarded, leaving fd_read() with a completely attacker controlled length argument. The attacker can corrupt malloc metadata after the allocated buffer. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-13090 |
102 | drm | 9f1f1a2dab38d4ce87a13565cf4dc1b73bef3a5f | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc/commit/?id=9f1f1a2dab38d4ce87a13565cf4dc1b73bef3a5f | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc/commit/?id=9f1f1a2dab38d4ce87a13565cf4dc1b73bef3a5f | None | 1 | struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
const char *connector_name = connector->name;
char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL;
struct edid *edid;
if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
/*
* If there are multiple edid files specified and separated
* by commas, search through the list looking for one that
* matches the connector.
*
* If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep
* the last one found one as a fallback.
*/
fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
edidstr = fwstr;
while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {
if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname))
continue;
edidname = colon + 1;
break;
}
if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */
fallback = edidname;
}
| 277,136,060,870,051,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2019-12382 | An issue was discovered in drm_load_edid_firmware in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid_load.c in the Linux kernel through 5.1.5. There is an unchecked kstrdup of fwstr, which might allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash). NOTE: The vendor disputes this issues as not being a vulnerability because kstrdup() returning NULL is handled sufficiently and there is no chance for a NULL pointer dereference | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12382 |
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