Datasets:

coastalcph

/

lex_glue

like 50

Follow

CoAStaL NLP Group 28

[ "holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis", "holding the experts opinion testimony lacked a proper foundation when there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse and the experts admitted that their conclusions were based solely on the childrens statements that they had been abused", "holding that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying the appointment of the defendants requested expert as there was no undue prejudice to the defendant because the defendants claim on the predicted effect of the experts testimony was purely speculative", "holding there was no doubt that the trial judge erred in failing to appoint at least two experts", "holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent" ]

[ "holding that removal based on fraudulent joinder was not timely where it occurred more than thirty days after the removing defendants learned of facts showing that a nondiverse codefendant was fraudulently joined", "holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined", "holding that a notice of removal based on fraudulent joinder was procedurally defective because it was filed more than thirty days after defendants could have intelligently ascertained that the action was removable", "holding that removal was untimely where the removing defendant could have ascertained from the face of a complaint that certain nondiverse codefendants were fraudulently joined but did not seek removal based on fraudulent joinder until after the state court granted a motion to strike the plaintiffs allegations against the diversitydefeating codefendants", "holding that failure to remove within thirty days after receiving a statecourt complaint from which the removing defendant could have discerned fraudulent joinder of a nondiverse party rendered removal untimely" ]

[ "holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest", "recognizing right to refuse psychotropic medication in the absence of emergency as aspect of liberty guaranteed by due process clause", "holding that inmate has a liberty interest under the due process clause to refuse the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs", "holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate", "holding that prisoners possess a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and identifying procedures which comported with due process" ]

[ "holding an endorsement to an existing insurance policy which added a new vehicle did not create a new contract of insurance but was merged with and became a part of the original policy", "holding that pm a9962 was not a policy change requiring notice to hospitals but a clarification of existing policy", "holding that the plain meaning of the uim policy language was clear and not contrary to public policy", "holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth", "holding that absent follow form language provision that excess policy would continue as underlying policy did not impose coverage as provided in underlying policy" ]

[ "holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed", "holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice", "recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds", "holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review", "holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review" ]

[ "holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee", "recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole", "holding that the district where the defendant attorneys office was located was the proper venue because the defendants omissions related to their failure to communicate from their office in savannah the details of the ongoing case", "holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid", "holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement" ]

[ "holding of obviousness affirmed on the basis of the teachings of the prior art references in combination not on the basis of the contemporaneous invention", "holding that the moving party must show prior art references which alone or combined with other references would have rendered the invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention", "recognizing that courts must be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention", "holding the district court erred by considering the references in less than their entireties ie in disregarding disclosures in the references that diverge from and teach away from the invention at hand", "holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art" ]

[ "holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him", "holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station", "holding that plaintiff conceded argument raised in dispositive motion by failing to address it", "holding that a folded index card is not a singlepurpose container since officer conceded that contents were not immediately apparent to him", "holding that appellant did not unequivocally consent to a search when deputy asked him if he would mind if the contents of his pockets were removed and appellant did not respond" ]

[ "holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs", "holding that the csra precludes even those bivens claims for which the act prescribes no alternative remedy because it found no inadvertence by congress in omitting the remedy", "recognizing the civil service reform act as a special factor precluding a bivens remedy", "holding the privacy act to constitute a special factor precluding a bivens remedy", "recognizing a bivens remedy for undocumented immigrants who were subjects of a raid by federal immigration officials reasoning that if a bivens remedy were precluded the present plaintiffs would have no forum in which to seek a remedy for the defendants alleged constitutional violations" ]

[ "holding that the bank trustee of a relevant plan was not a fiduciary in regard to real estate interests because it performed only administrative and ministerial functions", "holding that bank as coexecutor of estate breached its fiduciary and statutory duties to creditor when it failed to pay creditors claim against estate and instead paid claims of bank and other creditors", "holding single coexecutors release of mortgage debt paid to estate was valid and binding on estate because acts of any coexecutor in respect to the administration of the effects of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all as where one releases a debt or settles an account of a person with the deceased or surrenders a term or sells the goods and chattels of the estate his act binds the others characterizing conversion of decedents personal property into cash as act in due course of administration of estate", "recognizing that the party can instead file a claim against the estate", "holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court" ]

[ "holding that a court should abstain when an exercise of jurisdiction might lead to a parallel federal regulatory review mechanism complicating state administration", "holding that federal district courts should abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings", "holding that courts should only abstain under younger if the state proceedings are coercive and not remedial and citing a number of district court opinions", "recognizing that the longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings generally requires federal courts to abstain from involvement in state criminal proceedings", "holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law" ]

[ "holding that the broad language of subsection 1491b demonstrated congresss expressed intent that the subsection encompass the entire procurement process", "holding that the language of the arbitration clause any controversy or claim arising out of was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract", "recognizing that subpart iia of the dol regulation overlaps with subsection i of the statutory definition", "holding that when the specification clearly disavows a feature that feature is outside the reach of the claim language even if the language might otherwise be broad enough to encompass the feature in question", "holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary " ]

[ "holding that the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks", "holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature", "holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes", "holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted", "holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature" ]

[ "holding that contractual provisions in an arbitration agreement purporting to prohibit consumers from prosecuting class actions for small sums of money per consumer but for a substantial number of consumers are irreconcilably at odds with the remedial purposes of fdutpa contrary to the public policy of this state and unenforceable for that reason", "holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable", "holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable", "holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth", "holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy" ]

[ "holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law", "holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions", "holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration", "recognizing intervention is generally impermissible after entry of final judgment and exception allowing postjudg ment intervention in the interests of justice is limited to permitting intervention by affected persons so that an appeal can be taken", "holding that an award deemed to final conclusive and binding implicitly agrees that federal court intervention may be sought to compel compliance" ]

[ "holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony", "holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony", "holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence", "holding that the prejudice prong in strickland was not satisfied because counsels failure to raise an evidentiary issue would not have altered the result of the proceedings because the erroneous admission of the evidence would have constituted harmless error", "holding that the states failure to designate its expert witnesses was not harmless in trial for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation where it was reasonably possible that defendant would have altered his trial preparation or strategy and that defendant would have deposed experts and possibly procured his own expert" ]

[ "holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law", "holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract", "holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party", "holding that performance may be valid acceptance", "holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination" ]

[ "holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage", "holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver", "holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel", "holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage", "holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel" ]

[ "holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc 841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc 80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state", "recognizing that we held in tilley that the forfeiture of proceeds from illegal drug sales pursuant to 21 usc 881a6 does not constitute punishment", "holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc 841", "holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property", "holding that property held by another as nominal owner for benefit of a drug dealer subject to forfeiture under 21 usc 853" ]

[ "holding evidence properly admitted as nonhearsay during trial in a title vii action to show nondiscriminatory intent", "holding in similar bus bid rigging trial that evidence of another conspiracy was properly admitted to show defendants knowledge and general intent", "holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute", "holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy", "holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged" ]

[ "holding that defense counsel opened the door to the states rebuttal remarks when defense counsel raised the issue in his closing argument", "holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity", "holding that the decision whether to seek a mistrial is a tactical decision entrusted to defense counsel binding the defendant even when the defendant expressed a contrary wish to his lawyer", "holding that defense counsel gathered sufficient evidence to make a reasonable tactical decision not to conduct further investigations into his clients mental health when psychiatric experts interviewed the defendant for more than twenty hours and informed defense counsel that they could not find any basis for a mental defense", "holding that defense counsels decision not to call defendant to the stand despite defendants repeatedly expressed desire to testify on his own behalf was not ineffective assistance of counsel but was a reasonable tactical decision by counsel not to subject defendant to all of the risk attendant on crossexamination" ]

[ "holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation", "holding in a companion case to the one before us that evidence submitted by the black firefighter with the city of franklin was enough to present a hostileworkenvironment claim to a jury where the firefighter had alleged sufficient facts in his eeoc charge to exhaust his administrative remedies", "holding that the petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claim involving a procedural error correctable by the bia", "holding that if the alleged retaliatory action occurs before the initial eeoc charge is filed a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim by including factual information in the charge that discloses the factual basis for the retaliation claim", "holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim" ]

[ "holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred the eeoc from seeking individualized benefits under the adea on behalf of individuals whose own suits were unsuccessful because the eeoc was in privity with those individuals", "holding that neither a letter from the eeoc nor an attached charge of age discrimination qualified as a claim under a claimsmade policy because the documents failed to request money or other relief and only served to put the plaintiff on notice that a demand for relief may subsequently follow", "holding that the pjlaintiff was not seeking the enforcement of a final eeoc order because he specifically requested more relief than the eeoc awarded", "holding that an arbitration agreement between a charging party and an employer precludes the eeoc from seeking purely monetary relief in federal court on behalf of the charging party but not from seeking broad injunctive relief", "holding that neither the faa nor principles of preclusion or waiver could operate to bar the eeoc from seeking monetary relief on behalf of aggrieved individuals" ]

[ "holding the same with respect to an apartment", "holding that g l c 127 133 established two classifications of criminal activity violent and nonviolent with respect to parole eligibility", "holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation", "holding congress may impose civil and criminal sanctions with respect to the same act or omission", "holding that a public housing authority may terminate benefits conferred by section 8 of the united states housing act of 1937 42 usc 1437f for the violent criminal activity of a family member without having to prove that the violent criminal activity threatens the health safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents" ]

[ "holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof", "holding that fifth amendment custody is a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest", "holding that a defendant who was told several times he was not under arrest and who never asked to leave during an interview with investigators was not in custody", "holding that since petitioner made specific request for counsel before interview policeinitiated interview was impermissible", "holding that there was a restraint of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest when juvenile went to stationhouse for interview but magistrate read defendant his mircmda warnings defendants grandmother was excluded from interview despite her request and defendant was alone in locked interrogation room with armed officer" ]

[ "holding that the loss of a statute of limitations defense prejudices a defendant", "holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury", "holding that the loss of a statute of limitations defense constitutes clear legal prejudice", "holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense", "holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause" ]

[ "holding unconstitutional a sexual harassment statute prohibiting conduct that alarmed or seriously annoyed the victim", "holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii", "holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment", "holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort", "holding an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting conduct entirely dependent upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed" ]

[ "holding that statutory maximum is twenty years when drug quantity is not charged as element of offense and found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt", "holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense", "holding a defendant can preserve the type of error at issue here by invoking the applicable decision here alleyne or by claiming that the issue of drug quantity should go to the jury that an element of the offense was not proved that the judge cannot determine quantity or that quantity must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not by a preponderance of the evidence quotations and alteration omitted", "holding that where the indictment charged drug quantity but drug quantity was not submitted to the jury the district court erred in using drug quantity to increase the penalty beyond the twentyyear maximum of 841b1c", "holding that apprendi dictates that in order to authorize the imposition of a sentence exceeding the maximum allowable without a jury finding of a specific threshold drug quantity the specific threshold quantity must be treated as an element of an aggregated drug trafficking offense ie charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt internal footnote omitted" ]

[ "holding that an anonymous tip that described a suspects appearance and location and alleged that he was carrying a concealed weapon was insufficiently corroborated by the officers observation of the appellant who matched the description hanging out at the indicated location", "holding that automobile exception applied to search of defendants tractor trailer where confidential informant who was detained at border with a trailer full of marijuana told agents that he was driving to meet the defendant to exchange trailers and defendant subsequently arrived at the location described at the time described in a tractor with an empty trailer that matched informants description", "holding tip to be sufficiently reliable where the officer confirmed an informants description of the suspects appearance and location though the officer did not personally witness any criminal behavior", "holding an anonymous tip had the requisite indicia of reliability to justify a stop when the caller told the police of the alleged erratic driving automobile location and vehicle description", "holding that stop of appellant was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion where anonymous 911 caller said that she had seen suspect pull gun out of his pocket 911 caller described suspect and suspects location responding officer located appellant near stated location appellant matched description and no one else in vicinity matched description" ]

[ "holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint", "holding the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting several photographs of a murder victims body", "holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial", "holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony", "holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact" ]

[ "holding that if police conduct unconstitutional searches that acquire information used to obtain a search warrant then evidence seized during the later search conducted pursuant to warrant would be inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree", "holding that evidence that would not have been obtained but for an unlawful search must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree", "holding evidence found pursuant to warrant based on probable cause provided by prior illegal entry was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree", "holding incriminating statements defendant made when police officers questioned him regarding heroin the officers found during an unlawful search of defendants house were fruit of the poisonous tree", "holding incriminating statements defendant made after a detective questioned defendant about serial numbers the detective had obtained during an unlawful search of a stolen car were fruit of the poisonous tree" ]

[ "holding that the potential harm caused to uocava voters far outweighed the burden placed upon the state because of the states legally mandated obligation to provide uocava voters the ability to vote", "recognizing the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters regardless of their political persuasion to cast their votes effectively", "holding that electors should have the fullest opportunity to vote for candidates of any political party and any restrictions that are destructive of freedom of choice by voters will not be upheld", "holding that the right to vote is fundamental", "holding that state may not compel political party to allow nonmembers to vote in its primary elections" ]

[ "holding that procedural unconscionability existed where a nursing home residents daughter met with the homes administrator for about five minutes during which time she was presented with a thirtyseven page document that included an arbitration clause and instructed that her fathers continued stay in the home was conditioned upon her signing the papers which the administrator flipped through and presented the signature pages", "holding nursing home was political subdivision both because homes directors were responsible to elected officials and because the daytoday administration of center was directly tied to city", "holding that where plaintiffs were entitled to recover both treble damages and punitive damages under the illinois nursing home care reform act both issues could be submitted to the jury and the plaintiff could choose which award to be reflected in the judgment", "holding that although the state regulated and subsidized the nursing homes private parties not state officials made the administrative decisions therefore the decisions could not be treated as state action", "holding that home purchased with spouses separate funds prior to marriage was transmuted into marital property because mortgage payments made from joint account home was used as marital residence and both parties devoted resources and energy into home" ]

[ "recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge", "holding that trial justice has wide discretion to determine relevancy of evidence", "recognizing that the trial judge must be given a wide range of discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be declared", "recognizing that wide discretion in imposition of sentence reposes in the trial judge", "holding that trial court has wide discretion in determining sufficiency of foundation for opinion testimony" ]

[ "recognizing that under the act states are granted federal funds to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment", "holding that 1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law", "holding that it may be decided as a matter of law", "recognizing that when congress has decided not to provide a particular federal remedy we are not free to supplement that decision in a way that makes it meaningless", "recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules" ]

[ "holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original", "holding no violation of title vii by the union in refusing to alter its seniority lists to accommodate a sabbatarian", "holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine", "holding that an agreedupon seniority system did not give way to an employers duty to reasonably accommodate religious observance under title vii", "holding that there is no individual liability under title vii" ]

[ "holding that batson applies to a prosecutors use of peremptory challenges regardless of whether the stricken juror is of the same race as the defendant", "holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges", "holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck", "holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause", "holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race" ]

[ "holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service", "holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle ", "holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle", "holding that the wcabs decision that an employees motor vehicle accident did not cause his injuries precluded a subsequent tort action on the same issue", "holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service" ]

[ "holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim", "holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run", "holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted", "holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate", "holding that a subsequent refund request on reassessed taxes was unnecessary as the government already had notice of the plaintiffs claim" ]

[ "holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute", "holding that 6103 qualifies as an exemption statute", "holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute", "holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes", "holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3" ]

[ "holding that a court may not change the term of sentence by subsequent amendment after the sentence becomes final", "holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the sentence originally imposed by imposing an additional term of fifteen years suspended sentence", "holding the court had no jurisdiction to modify a validly imposed sentence on prisoners own motion", "holding that a suspended lawyer remains subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court for acts committed while suspended", "holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration suspended and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence" ]

[ "holding agency claim requirements under the federal torts claim act must be exhausted before district court has jurisdiction", "holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court", "holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court", "holding on direct review from the bia that bjecause minasyans claim to citizenship is not patently frivolous we have jurisdiction to review it irrespective of whether he has exhausted his claim before the agency", "holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency" ]

[ "holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally ", "holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca", "holding that burglary is violent felony", "holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause", "holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act" ]

[ "holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings", "holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because it was filed without proper authority", "holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear defendants motion for reduction under section 3582c1a because the director of the bureau of prisons had not brought motion", "holding court lacked jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of denial of motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity by defendants who were not public officials", "holding in pertinent part that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal" ]

[ "holding defensive issues not applicable to the case within article 3614 of code of criminal procedure unless and until defense counsel raises issue by requesting jury instruction on issue", "holding that criminal defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of restitution under the oregon vehicle code", "holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel", "holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue", "holding a prior case was not precedent on an issue when the issue was not contested" ]

[ "holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional", "holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies", "holding the deprivation of the inmates property interest in his mail is not a cognizable constitutional injury given the availability of adequate state postdeprivation remedies under new york law internal quotation marks omitted", "recognizing probable cause as complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in new york internal quotation marks and brackets omitted", "holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available" ]

[ "holding that plan did not comply", "holding that such a general question regarding the prospective jurors willingness to follow the law did not comply with the 2007 amended version of rule 431b", "recognizing general rule", "holding that the february 28 2007 interim rule was invalid because it failed to comply with the administrative procedure act", "recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions" ]

[ "holding that the court may consider collateral evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement in determining whether the language of the agreement is unclear and if the evidence presented is so plain that no reasonable person could hold any way but one then the court may interpret the meaning as a matter of law", "holding that trial court may consider circumstances surrounding making of agreement in determining whether agreement is ambiguous and noting that ambiguity exists when language of agreement in and of itself supports reasonable interpretation distinct from reasonable interpretation reached when language is read in light of surrounding circumstances", "holding that when relevant contract language is ambiguous interpretation is turned over to the factfinder", "holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists", "holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave" ]

[ "holding that in passing 21 usc 846 congress left the common law burden of proving the affirmative defense of withdrawal on the defendant rather than requiring the government to prove nonexistence of withdrawal", "holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea", "holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea", "holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea", "holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence" ]

[ "holding that denial of outofcell exercise for an extended period violates the eighth amendment", "holding that the core judicial inquiry in resolving an eighth amendment excessive force claim is whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm", "holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the eighth amendment", "holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the eighth amendment", "holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under 2l12bla" ]

[ "recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children", "recognizing that pjarents have a fundamental liberty interest protected by both the florida and federal constitutions in determining the care and upbringing of their children", "holding that a parents right to control a childs upbringing is a fundamental liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment", "recognizing liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control as against law compelling publicschool attendance", "holding that liberty includes the right of parents to establish a home and bring up children and to control the education of their own" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiffs assertion that he neither knew nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known about the governments possible liability for his injury was irrelevant to accrual of his ftca claim", "holding that the destruction of documents which the party knew or should have known would be relevant to a pending or potential lawsuit is sanctionable", "holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances", "holding that in extraordinary circumstances where a police officer neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard qualified immunity may still be available", "holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong" ]

[ "holding that due process required a hearing so the putative father would have an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably have complied with utahs statutory requirements or deadlines because he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in utah", "holding that evidence necessary to the governments rebuttal of a defendants case could not be excluded under rule 403 but could have been if it was introduced only to bolster the prosecutions case", "holding that motion for reconsideration may only be granted if the movant demonstrates controlling law or factual matters put before the court on the underlying motion that the movant believes the court overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the courts decision", "holding that defendants substantial compliance with its permit requirements might moot the case but only if these events made it absolutely clear that defendants violations could not reasonably be expected to recur", "holding that if the defendants breach does not permit the plaintiff to reduce its overhead then defendant is not entitled to a reduction in the damages awarded against it" ]

[ "holding that grand jury witnesses may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on illegally seized evidence because any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best", "holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury", "holding that an in dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence", "holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence", "recognizing that although no obstruction occurs when an individual lies to fbi agents who might or might not testify before a grand jury it may occur if the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents" ]

[ "holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts", "holding all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the constitution is by that same authority inadmissible in a state court", "holding that forfeiture statute is subject to the fourth amendments prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures", "holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures", "holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment" ]

[ "holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal", "holding that unsuccessful job applicant for governmental employment had due process right to meaningful administrative appeal of rejection when regulations established right to such appeal", "recognizing the right to counsel on appeal", "holding that there is no due process right to appellate review", "holding violation of due process to penalize a criminal defendant for pursuing statutory right of appeal" ]

[ "holding that a colorable claim was asserted against the nondiverse agent of the insurer blocking removal of the suit to federal court", "holding that the limitation of 1367b applies only to plaintiffs efforts to join nondiverse parties", "holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined", "holding that district court appropriately dismissed suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the case was moot", "recognizing that a case becomes removable when nondiverse parties are dismissed subject to the oneyear limitation on removal" ]

[ "recognizing relevance of information and that need for this information outweighs the burden to appellants", "holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy", "holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause", "holding that certain information on police blotter show up and arrest sheets and front page of offense report are public information", "holding that coleman could use certain information to bring a new and separate suit even though that information was discovered subsequent to a violation of the courts protective order" ]

[ "holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy", "holding that it is not", "holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived", "holding that 523a15 is not an allornothing proposition", "holding that the title of an act is not an index but is merely a label" ]

[ "holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans", "holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process", "holding a zoning authority acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denies a permit meeting the general zoning qualifications solely because of the type of building to be constructed", "holding that in the limited circumstances when local zoning authorities actions prohibit personal wireless service the act preempts local zoning law", "holding that a zoning commission was capable of being sued directly under section 1983 because zjoning commissions function legislatively when adopting zoning regulations and holding public hearings for the adjudication of individual petitions for zoning redress" ]

[ "holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal", "holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment", "holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact", "holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal", "holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial" ]

[ "holding that defendant waived ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsels failure to emphasize certain evidence where amended motion for new trial did not assert claim of ineffectiveness on that ground and no argument related to the asserted ground was made at the motion for new trial hearing", "holding that the combined effect of trial counsels errors should be considered", "holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court", "holding ineffectiveness should be considered at hearing dedicated to considering all facts circumstances and rationale behind counsels actions including opportunity to explain why no objection was made in trial court", "holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully" ]

[ "holding that we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo", "holding we review claim construction de novo on appeal", "holding a de novo statutory appeal hearing in the court of common pleas cures any defects in the departments notice of suspension", "holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review", "recognizing de novo standard of review" ]

[ "recognizing there is no authority to proceed against unknown persons in the absence of statute", "holding that there is no spousal exception to the statute", "recognizing the legitimacy of a passon defense in the absence of any statute", "holding that there is no right of recovery against individual defendants under the ada", "holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify" ]

[ "holding high school which allowed student secular noncurricular activities to meet on school property was required to provide equal access to a christian student group", "holding that student has no fundamental right to participate in high school athletics", "holding that random drug testing for student athletes did not violate their fourth amendment rights", "holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver", "holding drug testing high school student athletes was constitutional" ]

[ "holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court", "holding that where the board of immigration is permitted to reopen proceedings in exceptional circumstances its decision not to reopen a case is unreviewable because there are no statutory regulatory or caselaw definitions of exceptional circumstances and thus no manageable standard to apply on review", "recognizing that this special circumstances exception is very narrowly limited and that only on rare occasions does a case present such circumstances", "holding that such a threat would not supply exceptional circumstances", "holding hardship is discovered in the rare case based on exceptional circumstances" ]

[ "holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants", "holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances", "holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant", "holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances", "holding that rule 60b6 only applies in extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay" ]

[ "holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor", "holding that pursuit of a parallel state court lawsuit involving claims and parties common to the federal action does not justify the district courts intervention in state court proceedings", "holding that the district court had discretion to stay declaratory judgment action where parallel proceedings presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues were underway in state court", "holding that a federal action was properly stayed pending the outcome of parallel state proceedings where the action involved a matter of state policythe scope of eminent domain powers of municipalities under state law", "holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law" ]

[ "holding that prior battery was admissible to prove defendants intent to injure", "holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute", "holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery", "holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime", "holding that 2a22b2b requires intent to injure" ]

[ "holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer", "holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony", "holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable", "holding that targeted murder committed on premises of sonic restaurant was not foreseeable result of sonics failure to employ security guard", "holding that murder committed by minor gang members was not foreseeable result of sale of alcohol to gang members" ]

[ "holding in accordance with other circuits that an intake questionnaire may serve as a charge of discrimination if the circumstances of the case demonstrate that the charging party manifested the intent to activate the administrative process", "holding that based on plain language in box 2 plaintiffs intake questionnaire could not be construed as timely eeoc charge", "holding that plaintiffs filing with the eeoc constituted a formal charge because the plaintiff attached a statement to the filed intake questionnaire that included a request for the agency to act", "holding an intake questionnaire to constitute a charge under the adea upon application of the manifestation of intent test although the eeoc did not consider the questionnaire to be a charge and the aggrieved person subsequently filed a formal charge", "holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date" ]

[ "holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity", "holding that attorney who knowingly assisted enterprise in execution of fraudulent scheme by providing legal services and advice could not be held liable under 1962c because his role was at all times limited to the provision of legal services and did not extend to operation or management of enterprise", "holding that negligence on the part of a legal secretary is imputed to the supervising attorney and the statute of limitations for professional services applies to both", "recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case", "holding that attorney who simply provided legal services to corporation did not participate in operation or management of enterprise regardless of whether he performed those services well or poorly properly or improperly" ]

[ "holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard", "holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction", "holding that the prejudicial effect of a direct reference to an accuseds failure to testify normally cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard", "holding that any misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction", "holding that instruction to disregard cured error from prosecutors improper comment during voir dire" ]

[ "holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion", "holding in a case where a store manager announced to disgruntled employees that the plaintiff a coworker was fired for gambling that in calling in fellow employees of plaintiff and explaining the circumstances of his separation defendant corporation was serving its own particular interest no privilege extended to the communication to them and the trial court properly so held", "holding employee has cause of action for retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy where employee was fired for reporting fellow employees alleged criminal activities to local law enforcement", "holding defendant failed to rebut statutory presumption where evidence was not particular to the facts and circumstances of the case", "holding that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff with regard to the safekeeping of evidence because there was no promise by the defendant or its employees to inspect or safeguard the evidence for the plaintiffs benefit and destruction of physical evidence was not criminal because destruction was innocent and designed to ensure the safety of the defendants employees" ]

[ "holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife", "holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds", "holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add claim when party opposing motion made no showing of prejudice from delay", "holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds", "holding that it may be held an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave unless there is a demonstrable showing of prejudice to an opposing party" ]

[ "holding that leaving the scene and failing to render assistance are separate and distinct offenses", "holding that plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium is separate and distinct from spouses malpractice claim for purposes of applying insurance policy limitations", "recognizing that an indemnity provision and an agreement to provide insurance are separate and distinct obligations", "holding that absent specific language to the contrary benefit funds are separate from union signatories to cbas and that employers obligations to funds are separate from obligations to unions under cbas", "holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision" ]

[ "holding that trial counsel did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance where appellant failed to specify the evidence which might have been revealed if the continuance had been granted and counsel had been afforded the opportunity to investigate further", "holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion", "holding that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing defendant to withdraw his waiver of jury trial where a lengthy continuance already had been granted", "holding that the ij did not abuse his discretion in denying request for further continuance where the ij granted previous request", "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form" ]

[ "holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "holding that an employer may not merely speculate that the employees suggested accommodation is not feasible but must gather sufficient information from qualified experts to determine the accommodations effectiveness", "holding that if all of an employees coworkers knew that he had a heart condition such knowledge would not amount to notice to the employer that the employee was so limited by a disability as to require special accommodations", "holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation", "holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada" ]

[ "holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty", "holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense", "holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge", "holding the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy if the jury found the defendant agreed with at least one other person where the indictment charged the defendant with conspiring with a single named individual and the evidence tended to show the defendant may have conspired with a number of persons not just the named coconspirator to commit an unlawful act", "holding the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it may find the defendant guilty if the jury found the defendant had conspired with the two coconspirators named in the indictment or both of them or others where evidence tended to show a conspiracy between the defendant and some person other than the named coconspirators" ]

[ "holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff", "holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract", "holding that a commercial lessee could retain possession and abate rent in response to a landlords material breach of covenant", "holding that in the employment context cause of action seeking tort remedies for breach of implied covenant is not permitted recovery for breach of this covenant is limited to contract remedies", "holding breach of contract claim not preempted as a straightforward breach of contract action as it alleged violation of specific covenant" ]

[ "holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant", "holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit", "holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid", "holding valid conditions for execution of the warrant which are constitutionally satisfactory stated in the affidavit that solicits the warrant and accepted by the issuing magistrate", "holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant" ]

[ "holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property", "holding that a renunciation pursuant to arizonas probate code does determine whether a person has any interest in property for federal tax purposes", "holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit", "holding that pursuant to maryland law the government maintains an everpresent interest in property owners land for tax purposes", "holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety" ]

[ "holding that group pleading did not render complaint infirm where complaint provided fair notice of claims", "holding that a pleading may give proper fair notice even where only the title of the theory is pled", "holding the employees complaints must give adequate notice to the employer that the employee is complaining of conduct prohibited by title vii", "holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate", "holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading" ]

[ "holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life", "holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury", "recognizing that defendants attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent", "holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose", "holding that defendants attempt to mislead a client by providing it with false information was illegal witness tampering because defendant was trying to corruptly persuade or mislead the client with the intent of influencing its potential testimony before the grand jury" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule", "holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all elements of section 523a15", "holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought", "holding that the court must balance these factors against one another and against the extent of the relief sought and movant bears the burden of proving entitlement to relief" ]

[ "holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute", "holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses", "recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress", "holding that police officers were immune from liability for damages resulting from alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress", "recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress" ]

[ "holding that a loan transaction is a business practice under the ucl", "holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan", "holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice", "holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan", "holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured" ]

[ "holding that the time to file an appeal never began to run because the clerk failed to enter a separate judgment as required by rule 58", "holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late", "holding that in order to prevent uncertainty rule 58 must be mechanically applied", "holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner", "holding rule 58 and bankruptcy rule 9021 applied in decision denying proofs of claim following adversary proceeding" ]

[ "holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record", "holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal", "holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative", "holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence", "holding that material submitted by appellant that is cumulative of evidence previously of record is not new" ]

[ "holding port authority required to provide basic loss benefits under section 204a4 of nofault act regardless of whether passenger continued to be occupant as bus was involved in an accident when passenger struck by passing vehicle after alighting from bus", "holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle", "holding that ttcas motorvehicle waiver did not apply to claim whose gravamen was that bus drivers failure to supervise the public by for example failing to supervise tortfeasor passenger and failing to return to pick up victim passenger allowed tortfeasor who had threatened victim on bus to assault victim after both had exited", "holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle", "holding that fourth amendment rights of a passenger of a legally stopped vehicle were not violated by police officers instruction that he remain inside the vehicle during traffic stop after passenger repeatedly tried to exit" ]

[ "holding among other things that the officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance without more did not establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime", "holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements", "holding individual defendant liable where he among other things made inquiries into the business obligations under the flsa", "holding it error to admit testimony where among other things there was no evidence that defendants appearance had changed since the time of the robbery", "holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract" ]

[ "holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits", "recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue", "holding the denial of a motion for summary judgment on an issue which is later submitted to the jury is not reviewable", "holding that we will not review under any standard the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits", "holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity" ]

[ "holding that where jury has been properly instructed counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to an instruction", "holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed", "holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury", "holding where defendant challenged jury instruction and also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his counsels failure to object to instruction because we find no error in the instructions defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must also be rejected", "holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel" ]

[ "holding that judgments for prospective relief that have an ancillary effect on the state treasury do not offend the eleventh amendment", "holding that the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury in the ordinary case", "holding that the inquiry under these sections focusefs primarily on the risk that the state program poses to the public treasury ", "holding that doc is entitled to sovereign immunity under 14 because a judgment against it would be paid from the treasury of the state", "holding that an alien must be released unless the government demonstrates at a bond hearing that the alien poses a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the community" ]

[ "holding that a trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense", "holding that trial court was not required to include all statutory definitions in its instructions but rather should refer only to those definitions having a rational basis in the evidence adduced at trial and not otherwise excludable", "holding that trial counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to raise the issue of the defendants mental health at trial", "holding defendant culpable for the natural and probable consequence of his conduct", "holding that statutory appeal bonds relate to the jurisdiction of the court" ]

[ "holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion", "holding the selection of the person to be appointed guardian is a matter which is committed largely to the discretion of the appointing court and an appellate court will interfere with the exercise of this discretion only in case of a clear abuse", "holding that questions concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and this court will not interfere in the absence of abuse appearing on the face of the record", "holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion", "holding that the faas action in this case was analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and noting that when prosecutorial discretion is at issue the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law" ]

[ "holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees", "holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants", "holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal", "holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment", "holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment" ]

[ "holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if cumulative", "holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless", "holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record", "holding that error in admission of videotape was harmless because it was cumulative of childs properly admitted live testimony", "holding that when evidence was erroneously admitted such error was harmless when the evidence was insignificant and cumulative" ]

[ "holding that a 75day delay justified the denial of a motion to withdraw", "holding that the district courts denial of motion to continue even though it required counsel to withdraw due to a scheduling conflict protected the adversarial process and the defendants substantial rights", "holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay", "recognizing the late date of a motion to withdraw filed three weeks before trial", "holding that the presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on appeal when the granting of an attorneys motion to withdraw had left the petitioner entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal" ]

[ "holding that a contempt finding may be averted if the alleged contemnor establishes 1", "holding that a civil contemnor must be permitted to be purged by complying with the disobeyed order", "holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for review", "holding that because civil contempt is only to obtain compliance it must be used only where the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the court order and the trial court specifically finds that the contemnor has that ability", "holding that the district court committed reversible error by imposing criminal sanctions in a civil proceeding which did not afford the contemnor the procedural protections the constitution requires for the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions" ]