ccore/rhetoric-saint-thomas-aquinas · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 80

Response: A part is twofold, essential and quantitative. The
essential parts are naturally the form and the matter, and logically
the genus and the difference. In this way, each sacrament is divided
into matter and form as its essential parts. Hence it has been said
above (Q. 60, AA. 5, 6) that sacraments consist of things and words.
But since quantity is on the part of matter, quantitative parts are
parts of matter: and, in this way, as stated above (A. 1), parts are
assigned specially to the sacrament of Penance, as regards the acts
of the penitent, which are the matter of this sacrament.

Now it has been said above (Q. 85, A. 3, ad 3) that an offense is
atoned otherwise in Penance than in vindictive justice. Because, in
vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge's
decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of
the person offended; whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned
according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against
Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not
only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive
justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship,
which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to
the will of the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on
the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by
contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment of the
priest standing in God's place, and this is done in confession; and
the third is that he atone according to the decision of God's
minister, and this is done in satisfaction: and so contrition,
confession, and satisfaction are assigned as parts of Penance.

Reply Objection 1: Contrition, as to its essence, is in the heart, and
belongs to interior penance; yet, virtually, it belongs to exterior
penance, inasmuch as it implies the purpose of confessing and making
satisfaction.

Reply Objection 2: Satisfaction confers grace, in so far as it is in man's
purpose, and it increases grace, according as it is accomplished,
just as Baptism does in adults, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 2; Q. 69,
A. 8).

Reply Objection 3: Satisfaction is a part of Penance as a sacrament, and a
fruit of penance as a virtue.

Reply Objection 4: More things are required for good, "which proceeds from
a cause that is entire," than for evil, "which results from each
single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). And thus,
although sin is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the
perfection of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with
confession in word and satisfaction in deed.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 90, Art. 3]

Whether These Three Are Integral Parts of Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that these three are not integral parts of
Penance. For, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 3), Penance is ordained
against sin. But sins of thought, word, and deed are the subjective
and not integral parts of sin, because sin is predicated of each one
of them. Therefore in Penance also, contrition in thought, confession
in word, and satisfaction in deed are not integral parts.

Objection 2: Further, no integral part includes within itself another that
is condivided with it. But contrition includes both confession and
satisfaction in the purpose of amendment. Therefore they are not
integral parts.

Objection 3: Further, a whole is composed of its integral parts, taken at
the same time and equally, just as a line is made up of its parts.
But such is not the case here. Therefore these are not integral parts
of Penance.

Contrary: Integral parts are those by which the perfection
of the whole is integrated. But the perfection of Penance is
integrated by these three. Therefore they are integral parts of
Penance.

Response: Some have said that these three are subjective parts
of Penance. But this is impossible, because the entire power of the
whole is present in each subjective part at the same time and
equally, just as the entire power of an animal, as such, is assured
to each animal species, all of which species divide the animal genus
at the same time and equally: which does not apply to the point in
question. Wherefore others have said that these are potential parts:
yet neither can this be true, since the whole is present, as to the
entire essence, in each potential part, just as the entire essence of
the soul is present in each of its powers: which does not apply to
the case in point. Therefore it follows that these three are integral
parts of Penance, the nature of which is that the whole is not
present in each of the parts, either as to its entire power, or as to
its entire essence, but that it is present to all of them together at
the same time.

Reply Objection 1: Sin forasmuch as it is an evil, can be completed in one
single point, as stated above (A. 2, ad 4); and so the sin which is
completed in thought alone, is a special kind of sin. Another species
is the sin that is completed in thought and word: and yet a third
species is the sin that is completed in thought, word, and deed; and
the quasi-integral parts of this last sin, are that which is in

Response: A part is twofold, essential and quantitative. The

essential parts are naturally the form and the matter, and logically

the genus and the difference. In this way, each sacrament is divided

into matter and form as its essential parts. Hence it has been said

above (Q. 60, AA. 5, 6) that sacraments consist of things and words.

But since quantity is on the part of matter, quantitative parts are

parts of matter: and, in this way, as stated above (A. 1), parts are

assigned specially to the sacrament of Penance, as regards the acts

of the penitent, which are the matter of this sacrament.

Now it has been said above (Q. 85, A. 3, ad 3) that an offense is

atoned otherwise in Penance than in vindictive justice. Because, in

vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge's

decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of

the person offended; whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned

according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against

Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not

only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive

justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship,

which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to

the will of the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on

the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by

contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment of the

priest standing in God's place, and this is done in confession; and

the third is that he atone according to the decision of God's

minister, and this is done in satisfaction: and so contrition,

confession, and satisfaction are assigned as parts of Penance.

Reply Objection 1: Contrition, as to its essence, is in the heart, and

belongs to interior penance; yet, virtually, it belongs to exterior

penance, inasmuch as it implies the purpose of confessing and making

satisfaction.

Reply Objection 2: Satisfaction confers grace, in so far as it is in man's

purpose, and it increases grace, according as it is accomplished,

just as Baptism does in adults, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 2; Q. 69,

A. 8).

Reply Objection 3: Satisfaction is a part of Penance as a sacrament, and a

fruit of penance as a virtue.

Reply Objection 4: More things are required for good, "which proceeds from

a cause that is entire," than for evil, "which results from each

single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). And thus,

although sin is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the

perfection of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with

confession in word and satisfaction in deed.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.

_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 90, Art. 3]

Whether These Three Are Integral Parts of Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that these three are not integral parts of

Penance. For, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 3), Penance is ordained

against sin. But sins of thought, word, and deed are the subjective

and not integral parts of sin, because sin is predicated of each one

of them. Therefore in Penance also, contrition in thought, confession

in word, and satisfaction in deed are not integral parts.

Objection 2: Further, no integral part includes within itself another that

is condivided with it. But contrition includes both confession and

satisfaction in the purpose of amendment. Therefore they are not

integral parts.

Objection 3: Further, a whole is composed of its integral parts, taken at

the same time and equally, just as a line is made up of its parts.

But such is not the case here. Therefore these are not integral parts

of Penance.

Contrary: Integral parts are those by which the perfection

of the whole is integrated. But the perfection of Penance is

integrated by these three. Therefore they are integral parts of

Penance.

Response: Some have said that these three are subjective parts

of Penance. But this is impossible, because the entire power of the

whole is present in each subjective part at the same time and

equally, just as the entire power of an animal, as such, is assured

to each animal species, all of which species divide the animal genus

at the same time and equally: which does not apply to the point in

question. Wherefore others have said that these are potential parts:

yet neither can this be true, since the whole is present, as to the

entire essence, in each potential part, just as the entire essence of

the soul is present in each of its powers: which does not apply to

the case in point. Therefore it follows that these three are integral

parts of Penance, the nature of which is that the whole is not

present in each of the parts, either as to its entire power, or as to

its entire essence, but that it is present to all of them together at

the same time.

Reply Objection 1: Sin forasmuch as it is an evil, can be completed in one

single point, as stated above (A. 2, ad 4); and so the sin which is

completed in thought alone, is a special kind of sin. Another species

is the sin that is completed in thought and word: and yet a third

species is the sin that is completed in thought, word, and deed; and

the quasi-integral parts of this last sin, are that which is in