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2013_12-815

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-815

. This case involves two proceedings, one pending in state court, the other in federal court. Each seeks review of an Iowa Utilities Board (IUB or Board) order. And each presents the question whether Windstream Iowa Communications, Inc. (Windstream), a local telecommunications carrier, may impose on Sprint Communications, Inc. (Sprint), intrastate access charges for telephone calls transported via the Internet. Federal-court jurisdiction over controversies of this kind was confirmed in Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635 (2002) . Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) , the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa abstained from adjudicating Sprint’s complaint in deference to the parallel state-court proceeding, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s abstention decision. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In the main, federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction. Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U. S. 350, 373 (1989) (NOPSI) (“[T]here is no doctrine that . . . pendency of state judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts.”). This Court has recognized, however, certain instances in which the prospect of undue interference with state proceedings counsels against federal relief. See id., at 368. Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution. This Court has extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975) , or that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U. S. 1 (1987) . We have cautioned, however, that federal courts ordinarily should entertain and resolve on the merits an action within the scope of a jurisdictional grant, and should not “refus[e] to decide a case in deference to the States.” NOPSI, 491 U. S., at 368. Circumstances fitting within the Younger doctrine, we have stressed, are “exceptional”; they include, as catalogued in NOPSI, “state criminal prosecutions,” “civil enforcement proceedings,” and “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Id., at 367–368. Because this case presents none of the circumstances the Court has ranked as “exceptional,” the general rule governs: “[T]he pendency of an action in [a] state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976) (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 282 (1910) ). I Sprint, a national telecommunications service provider, has long paid intercarrier access fees to the Iowa communications company Windstream (formerly Iowa Telecom) for certain long distance calls placed by Sprint customers to Windstream’s in-state customers. In 2009, however, Sprint decided to withhold payment for a subset of those calls, classified as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), after concluding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted intrastate regulation of VoIP traffic. [ 1 ] In response, Windstream threatened to block all calls to and from Sprint customers. Sprint filed a complaint against Windstream with the IUB asking the Board to enjoin Windstream from discontinuing service to Sprint. In Sprint’s view, Iowa law entitled it to withhold payment while it contested the access charges and prohibited Windstream from carrying out its disconnection threat. In answer to Sprint’s complaint, Windstream retracted its threat to discontinue serving Sprint, and Sprint moved, successfully, to withdraw its complaint. Because the conflict between Sprint and Windstream over VoIP calls was “likely to recur,” however, the IUB decided to continue the proceedings to resolve the underlying legal question, i.e., whether VoIP calls are subject to intrastate regulation. Order in Sprint Communications Co. v. Iowa Telecommunications Servs., Inc., No. FCU–2010–0001 (IUB, Feb. 1, 2010), p. 6 (IUB Order). The question retained by the IUB, Sprint argued, was governed by federal law, and was not within the IUB’s adjudicative jurisdiction. The IUB disagreed, ruling that the intrastate fees applied to VoIP calls. [ 2 ] Seeking to overturn the Board’s ruling, Sprint commenced two lawsuits. First, Sprint sued the members of the IUB (respondents here) [ 3 ] in their official capacities in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. In its federal-court complaint, Sprint sought a declaration that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the IUB’s decision; as relief, Sprint requested an injunction against enforcement of the IUB’s order. Second, Sprint petitioned for review of the IUB’s order in Iowa state court. The state petition reiterated the preemption argument Sprint made in its federal-court complaint; in addition, Sprint asserted state law and procedural due process claims. Because Eighth Circuit precedent effectively required a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before proceeding to federal court, see Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F. 2d 1138 (1990), Sprint urges that it filed the state suit as a protective measure. Failing to do so, Sprint explains, risked losing the opportunity to obtain any review, federal or state, should the federal court decide to abstain after the expiration of the Iowa statute of limitations. See Brief for Petitioner 7–8. [ 4 ] As Sprint anticipated, the IUB filed a motion asking the Federal District Court to abstain in light of the state suit, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) . The District Court granted the IUB’s motion and dismissed the suit. The IUB’s decision, and the pending state-court review of it, the District Court said, composed one “uninterruptible process” implicating important state interests. On that ground, the court ruled, Younger abstention was in order. Sprint Communications Co. v. Berntsen, No. 4:11–cv–00183–JAJ (SD Iowa, Aug. 1, 2011), App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. For the most part, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the District Court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, accepted by several of its sister courts, that Younger abstention is appropriate only when the parallel state proceedings are “coercive,” rather than “remedial,” in nature. 690 F. 3d 864, 868 (2012); cf. Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gómez, 585 F. 3d 508, 522 (CA1 2009) (“[P]roceedings must be coercive, and in most cases, state-initiated, in order to warrant abstention.”). Instead, the Eighth Circuit read this Court’s precedent to require Younger abstention whenever “an ongoing state judicial proceeding . . . implicates important state interests, and . . . the state proceedings provide adequate opportunity to raise [federal] challenges.” 690 F. 3d, at 867 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U. S. 423, 432 (1982) ). Those criteria were satisfied here, the appeals court held, because the ongoing state-court review of the IUB’s decision concerned Iowa’s “important state interest in regulating and enforcing its intrastate utility rates.” 690 F. 3d, at 868. Recognizing the “possibility that the parties [might] return to federal court,” however, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment dismissing Sprint’s complaint. In lieu of dismissal, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case, instructing the District Court to enter a stay during the pendency of the state-court action. Id., at 869. We granted certiorari to decide whether, consistent with our delineation of cases encompassed by the Younger doctrine, abstention was appropriate here. 569 U. S. ___ (2013). [ 5 ] II A Neither party has questioned the District Court’s jurisdiction to decide whether federal law preempted the IUB’s decision, and rightly so. In Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635 (2002) , we reviewed a similar federal-court challenge to a state administrative adjudication. In that case, as here, the party seeking federal-court review of a state agency’s decision urged that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the state action. We had “no doubt that federal courts ha[d federal question] jurisdiction under [28 U. S. C.] §1331 to entertain such a suit,” id., at 642, and nothing in the Telecommunications Act detracted from that conclusion, see id., at 643. Federal courts, it was early and famously said, have “no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821). Jurisdiction existing, this Court has cautioned, a federal court’s “obligation” to hear and decide a case is “virtually unflagging.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976) . Parallel state-court proceedings do not detract from that obligation. See ibid. In Younger, we recognized a “far-from-novel” exception to this general rule. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U. S. 350, 364 (1989) (NOPSI). The plaintiff in Younger sought federal-court adjudication of the constitutionality of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. Requesting an injunction against the Act’s enforcement, the federal-court plaintiff was at the time the defendant in a pending state criminal prosecution under the Act. In those circumstances, we said, the federal court should decline to enjoin the prosecution, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute. See 401 U. S., at 53–54. Abstention was in order, we explained, under “the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act . . . to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparably injury if denied equitable relief.” Id., at 43–44. “[R]estraining equity jurisdiction within narrow limits,” the Court observed, would “prevent erosion of the role of the jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions.” Id., at 44. We explained as well that this doctrine was “reinforced” by the notion of “ ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions.” Ibid. We have since applied Younger to bar federal relief in certain civil actions. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975) , is the pathmarking decision. There, Ohio officials brought a civil action in state court to abate the showing of obscene movies in Pursue’s theater. Because the State was a party and the proceeding was “in aid of and closely related to [the State’s] criminal statutes,” the Court held Younger abstention appropriate. Id., at 604. More recently, in NOPSI, 491 U. S., at 368, the Court had occasion to review and restate our Younger jurisprudence. NOPSI addressed and rejected an argument that a federal court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction to review a state council’s ratemaking decision. “[O]nly ex- ceptional circumstances,” we reaffirmed, “justify a fed- eral court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the States.” Ibid. Those “exceptional circumstances” exist, the Court determined after surveying prior decisions, in three types of proceedings. First, Younger precluded federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. See ibid. Second, certain “civil enforcement proceedings” warranted abstention. Ibid. (citing, e.g., Huffman, 420 U. S., at 604). Finally, federal courts refrained from interfering with pending “civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” 491 U. S., at 368 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 , n. 12 (1977), and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U. S. 1, 13 (1987) ). We have not applied Younger outside these three “exceptional” categories, and today hold, in accord with NOPSI, that they define Younger’s scope. B The IUB does not assert that the Iowa state court’s review of the Board decision, considered alone, implicates Younger. Rather, the initial administrative proceeding justifies staying any action in federal court, the IUB contends, until the state review process has concluded. The same argument was advanced in NOPSI. 491 U. S., at 368. We will assume without deciding, as the Court did in NOPSI, that an administrative adjudication and the subsequent state court’s review of it count as a “unitary process” for Younger purposes. Id., at 369. The question remains, however, whether the initial IUB proceeding is of the “sort . . . entitled to Younger treatment.” Ibid. The IUB proceeding, we conclude, does not fall within any of the three exceptional categories described in NOPSI and therefore does not trigger Younger abstention. The first and third categories plainly do not accommodate the IUB’s proceeding. That proceeding was civil, not criminal in character, and it did not touch on a state court’s ability to perform its judicial function. Cf. Juidice, 430 U. S., at 336, n. 12 (civil contempt order); Pennzoil, 481 U. S., at 13 (requirement for posting bond pending appeal). Nor does the IUB’s order rank as an act of civil enforcement of the kind to which Younger has been extended. Our decisions applying Younger to instances of civil enforcement have generally concerned state proceedings “akin to a criminal prosecution” in “important respects.” Huffman, 420 U. S., at 604. See also Middlesex, 457 U. S., at 432 (Younger abstention appropriate where “noncriminal proceedings bear a close relationship to proceedings criminal in nature”). Such enforcement actions are characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging the state action, for some wrongful act. See, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U. S., at 433–434 (state-initiated disciplinary proceedings against lawyer for violation of state ethics rules). In cases of this genre, a state actor is routinely a party to the state proceeding and often initiates the action. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U. S. 619 (1986) (state-initiated administrative proceedings to enforce state civil rights laws); Moore v. Sims, 442 U. S. 415 –420 (1979) (state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434, 444 (1977) (civil proceeding “brought by the State in its sovereign capacity” to recover welfare payments defendants had allegedly obtained by fraud); Huffman, 420 U. S., at 598 (state-initiated proceeding to enforce obscenity laws). Investigations are commonly involved, often culminating in the filing of a formal complaint or charges. See, e.g., Dayton, 477 U. S., at 624 (noting preliminary investigation and complaint); Middlesex, 457 U. S., at 433 (same). The IUB proceeding does not resemble the state enforcement actions this Court has found appropriate for Younger abstention. It is not “akin to a criminal prosecution.” Huffman, 420 U. S., at 604. Nor was it initiated by “the State in its sovereign capacity.” Trainor, 431 U. S., at 444. A private corporation, Sprint, initiated the action. No state authority conducted an investigation into Sprint’s activities, and no state actor lodged a formal complaint against Sprint. In its brief, the IUB emphasizes Sprint’s decision to withdraw the complaint that commenced proceedings before the Board. At that point, the IUB argues, Sprint was no longer a willing participant, and the proceedings became, essentially, a civil enforcement action. See Brief for Respondents 31. [ 6 ] The IUB’s adjudicative authority, however, was invoked to settle a civil dispute between two private parties, not to sanction Sprint for commission of a wrongful act. Although Sprint withdrew its complaint, administrative efficiency, not misconduct by Sprint, prompted the IUB to answer the underlying federal question. By determining the intercarrier compensation regime applicable to VoIP calls, the IUB sought to avoid renewed litigation of the parties’ dispute. Because the underlying legal question remained unsettled, the Board observed, the controversy was “likely to recur.” IUB Order 6. Nothing here suggests that the IUB proceeding was “more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases.” Huffman, 420 U. S., at 604. In holding that abstention was the proper course, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on this Court’s decision in Middlesex. Younger abstention was warranted, the Court of Appeals read Middlesex to say, whenever three conditions are met: There is (1) “an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) . . . provide[s] an adequate opportunity to raise [federal] challenges.” 690 F. 3d, at 867 (citing Middlesex, 457 U. S., at 432). Before this Court, the IUB has endorsed the Eighth Circuit’s approach. Brief for Respondents 13. The Court of Appeals and the IUB attribute to this Court’s decision in Middlesex extraordinary breadth. We invoked Younger in Middlesex to bar a federal court from entertaining a lawyer’s challenge to a New Jersey state ethics committee’s pending investigation of the lawyer. Unlike the IUB proceeding here, the state ethics committee’s hearing in Middlesex was indeed “akin to a criminal proceeding.” As we noted, an investigation and formal complaint preceded the hearing, an agency of the State’s Supreme Court initiated the hearing, and the purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the lawyer should be disciplined for his failure to meet the State’s standards of professional conduct. 457 U. S., at 433–435. See also id., at 438 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the “quasi-criminal nature of bar disciplinary proceedings”). The three Middlesex conditions recited above were not dispositive; they were, instead, additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger. Divorced from their quasi-criminal context, the three Middlesex conditions would extend Younger to virtually all parallel state and federal proceedings, at least where a party could identify a plausibly important state interest. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35–36. That result is irreconcilable with our dominant instruction that, even in the presence of parallel state proceedings, abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the “exception, not the rule.” Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 236 (1984) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 813). In short, to guide other federal courts, we today clarify and affirm that Younger extends to the three “exceptional circumstances” identified in NOPSI, but no further. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is Reversed. Notes 1 The Federal Communications Commission has yet to provide its view on whether the Telecommunications Act categorically preempts intrastate access charges for VoIP calls. See In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, 18002, ¶934 (2011) (reserving the ques-tion whether all VoIP calls “must be subject exclusively to federal regulation”). 2 At the conclusion of the IUB proceedings, Sprint paid Windstream all contested fees. 3 For convenience, we refer to respondents collectively as the IUB. 4 Since we granted certiorari, the Iowa state court issued an opinion rejecting Sprint’s preemption claim on the merits. Sprint Communications Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. CV–8638, App. to Joint Supp. Brief 20a–36a (Iowa Dist. Ct., Sept. 16, 2013). The Iowa court decision does not, in the parties’ view, moot this case, see Joint Supp. Brief 1, and we agree. Because Sprint intends to appeal the state-court decision, the “controversy . . . remains live.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., . 5 The IUB agrees with Sprint that our decision in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., , cannot independently sustain the Eighth Circuit’s abstention analysis. See Brief for Respondents 9; cf. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, . 6 To determine whether a state proceeding is an enforcement action under Younger, several Courts of Appeals, as noted, see supra, at 5, inquire whether the underlying state proceeding is “coercive” rather than “remedial.” See, e.g., Devlin v. Kalm, 594 F. 3d 893, 895 (CA6 2010). Though we referenced this dichotomy once in a footnote, see Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., , n. 2 (1986), we do not find the inquiry necessary or inevitably helpful, given the susceptibility of the designations to manipulation.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. JACOBS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 12–815. Argued November 5, 2013—Decided December 10, 2013 Sprint Communications, Inc. (Sprint), a national telecommunications service provider, withheld payment of intercarrier access fees imposed by Windstream Iowa Communications, Inc. (Windstream), a local telecommunications carrier, for long distance Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls, after concluding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted intrastate regulation of VoIP traffic. Windstream responded by threatening to block all Sprint customer calls, which led Sprint to ask the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) to enjoin Windstream from discontinuing service to Sprint. Windstream retracted its threat, and Sprint moved to withdraw its complaint. Concerned that the dispute would recur, the IUB continued the proceedings in order to resolve the question whether VoIP calls are subject to intrastate regulation. Rejecting Sprint’s argument that this question was governed by federal law, the IUB ruled that intrastate fees applied to VoIP calls. Sprint sued respondents, IUB members (collectively IUB), in Federal District Court, seeking a declaration that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the IUB’s decision. As relief, Sprint sought an injunction against enforcement of the IUB’s order. Sprint also sought review of the IUB’s order in Iowa state court, reiterating the preemption argument made in Sprint’s federal-court complaint and asserting several other claims. Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, the Federal District Court abstained from adjudicating Sprint’s complaint in deference to the parallel state-court proceeding. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s abstention decision, concluding that Younger abstention was required because the ongoing state-court review concerned Iowa’s important interest in regulating and enforcing state utility rates. Held: This case does not fall within any of the three classes of exceptional cases for which Younger abstention is appropriate. . (a) The District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether federal law preempted the IUB’s decision, see Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642, and thus had a “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear and decide the case, Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817. In Younger, this Court recognized an exception to that obligation for cases in which there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding. This Court has extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, or that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, but has reaffirmed that “only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the States,” New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (NOPSI). NOPSI identified three such “exceptional circumstances.” First, Younger precludes federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. See 491 U. S., at 368. Second, certain “civil enforcement proceedings” warrant Younger abstention. Ibid. Finally, federal courts should refrain from interfering with pending “civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Ibid. This Court has not applied Younger outside these three “exceptional” categories, and rules, in accord with NOPSI, that they define Younger’s scope. . (b) The initial IUB proceeding does not fall within any of NOPSI’s three exceptional categories and therefore does not trigger Younger abstention. The first and third categories plainly do not accommodate the IUB’s proceeding, which was civil, not criminal in character, and which did not touch on a state court’s ability to perform its judicial function. Nor is the IUB’s order an act of civil enforcement of the kind to which Younger has been extended. The IUB proceeding is not “akin to a criminal prosecution.” Huffman, 420 U. S., at 604. Nor was it initiated by “the State in its sovereign capacity,” Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444, to sanction Sprint for some wrongful act, see, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 433–434. Rather, the action was initiated by Sprint, a private corporation. No state authority conducted an investigation into Sprint’s activities or lodged a formal complaint against Sprint. Once Sprint withdrew the complaint that commenced administrative proceedings, the IUB argues, those proceedings became, essentially, a civil enforcement action. However, the IUB’s adjudicative authority was invoked to settle a civil dispute between two private parties, not to sanction Sprint for a wrongful act. In holding that abstention was the proper course, the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted this Court’s decision in Middlesex to mean that Younger abstention is warranted whenever there is (1) “an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) . . . provide[s] an adequate opportunity to raise [federal] challenges.” In Middlesex, the Court invoked Younger to bar a federal court from entertaining a lawyer’s challenge to a state ethics committee’s pending investigation of the lawyer. Unlike the IUB’s proceeding, however, the state ethics committee’s hearing in Middlesex was plainly “akin to a criminal proceeding”: An investigation and formal complaint preceded the hearing, an agency of the State’s Supreme Court initiated the hearing, and the hearing’s purpose was to determine whether the lawyer should be disciplined for failing to meet the State’s professional conduct standards. 457 U. S., at 433–435. The three Middlesex conditions invoked by the Court of Appeals were therefore not dispositive; they were, instead, additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger. Younger extends to the three “exceptional circumstances” identified in NOPSI, but no further. . 690 F.3d 864, reversed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

1960_284

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1960/284

MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. We are asked to decide in this case whether it was an unfair labor practice for both an employer and a union to enter into an agreement under which the employer recognized the union as exclusive bargaining representative of certain of his employees although, in fact, only a minority of those employees had authorized the union to represent their interests. The Board found that, by extending such recognition, even though done in the good faith belief that the union had the consent of a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, the employer interfered with the organizational rights of his employees in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, and that such recognition also constituted unlawful support to a labor organization in violation of § 8(a)(2). In addition, the Board found that the union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by its acceptance of exclusive bargaining authority at a time when, in fact, it did not have the support of a majority of the employees, and this in spite of its bona fide belief that it did. Accordingly, the Board ordered the unfair labor practices discontinued and directed the holding of a representation election. The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, granted enforcement, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 280 F.2d 616. We granted certiorari. 364 U.S. 811. We agree with the Board and the Court of Appeals that such extension and acceptance of recognition constitute unfair labor practices, and that the remedy provided was appropriate. In October, 1956, the petitioner union initiated an organizational campaign at Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation's knitwear manufacturing plant in San Antonio, Texas. No other labor organization was similarly engaged at that time. During the course of that campaign, on July 29, 1957, certain of the company's Topping Department employees went on strike in protest against a wage reduction. That dispute was in no way related to the union campaign, however, and the organizational efforts were continued during the strike. Some of the striking employees had signed authorization cards solicited by the union during its drive, and, while the strike was in progress, the union entered upon a course of negotiations with the employer. As a result of those negotiations, held in New York City where the home offices of both were located, on August 30, 1957, the employer and union signed a "memorandum of understanding." In that memorandum, the company recognized the union as exclusive bargaining representative of "all production and shipping employees." The union representative asserted that the union's comparison of the employee authorization cards in its possession with the number of eligible employees representatives of the company furnished it indicated that the union had in fact secured such cards from a majority of employees in the unit. Neither employer nor union made any effort at that time to check the cards in the union's possession against the employee roll, or otherwise, to ascertain with any degree of certainty that the union's assertion, later found by the Board to be erroneous, was founded on fact, rather than upon good faith assumption. The agreement, containing no union security provisions, called for the ending of the strike and for certain improved wages and conditions of employment. It also provided that a "formal agreement containing these terms" would "be promptly drafted . . . and signed by both parties within the next two weeks." Thereafter, on October 10, 1957, a formal collective bargaining agreement, embodying the terms of the August 30 memorandum, was signed by the parties. The bargaining unit description set out in the formal contract, although more specific, conformed to that contained in the prior memorandum. It is not disputed that, as of execution of the formal contract, the union in fact represented a clear majority of employees in the appropriate unit. In upholding the complaints filed against the employer and union by the General Counsel, the Board decided that the employer's good faith belief that the union in fact represented a majority of employees in the unit on the critical date of the memorandum of understanding was not a defense, "particularly where, as here, the Company made no effort to check the authorization cards against its payroll records." 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292. Noting that the union was "actively seeking recognition at the time such recognition was granted," and that "the Union was [not] the passive recipient of an unsolicited gift bestowed by the Company," the Board found that the union's execution of the August 30 agreement was a "direct deprivation" of the nonconsenting majority employees' organizational and bargaining rights. At pp. 1292, 1293, note 9. Accordingly, the Board ordered the employer to withhold all recognition from the union and to cease giving effect to agreements entered into with the union; the union was ordered to cease acting as bargaining representative of any of the employees until such time as a Board conducted election demonstrated its majority status, and to refrain from seeking to enforce the agreements previously entered. The Court of Appeals found it difficult to "conceive of a clearer restraint on the employees' right of self-organization than for their employer to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a minority of the employees." 280 F.2d at 619. The court distinguished our decision in Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union No. 639,, on the ground that there was involved here neither recognitional nor organizational picketing. The court held that the bona fides of the parties was irrelevant except to the extent that it "was arrived at through an adequate effort to determine the true facts of the situation." 280 F.2d at 622. At the outset, we reject as without relevance to our decision the fact that, as of the execution date of the formal agreement on October 10, petitioner represented a majority of the employees. As the Court of Appeals indicated, the recognition of the minority union on August 30, 1957, was "a fait accompli depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to choose their own representative." 280 F.2d at 621. It is, therefore, of no consequence that petitioner may have acquired, by October 10, the necessary majority if, during the interim, it was acting unlawfully. Indeed, such acquisition of majority status itself might indicate that the recognition secured by the August 30 agreement afforded petitioner a deceptive cloak of authority with which to persuasively elicit additional employee support. Nor does this case directly involve a strike. The strike which occurred was in protest against a wage reduction, and had nothing to do with petitioner's quest for recognition. Likewise, no question of picketing is presented. Lastly, the violation which the Board found was the grant by the employer of exclusive representation status to a minority union, as distinguished from an employer's bargaining with a minority union for its members only. Therefore, the exclusive representation provision is the vice in the agreement, and discussion of "collective bargaining," as distinguished from "exclusive recognition," is pointless. Moreover, the insistence that we hold the agreement valid and enforceable as to those employees who consented to it must be rejected. On the facts shown, the agreement must fail in its entirety. It was obtained under the erroneous claim of majority representation. Perhaps the employer would not have entered into it if he had known the facts. Quite apart from other conceivable situations, the unlawful genesis of this agreement precludes its partial validity. In their selection of a bargaining representative, § 9(a) of the Wagner Act guarantees employees freedom of choice and majority rule. J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board,,. In short, as we said in Brooks v. Labor Board,,, the Act placed "a nonconsenting minority under the bargaining responsibility of an agency selected by a majority of the workers." Here, however, the reverse has been shown to be the case. Bernhard-Altmann granted exclusive bargaining status to an agency selected by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the nonconsenting majority. There could be no clearer abridgment of § 7 of the Act, assuring employees the right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing" or "to refrain from" such activity. It follows, without need of further demonstration, that the employer activity found present here violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act, which prohibits employer interference with, and restraint of, employee exercise of § 7 rights. Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "contribute . . . support" to a labor organization. The law has long been settled that a grant of exclusive recognition to a minority union constitutes unlawful support in violation of that section, because the union so favored is given "a marked advantage over any other in securing the adherence of employees," Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,,. In the Taft-Hartley Law, Congress added § 8(b)(1)(A) to the Wagner Act, prohibiting, as the Court of Appeals held, "unions from invading the rights of employees under § 7 in a fashion comparable to the activities of employers prohibited under § 8(a)(1)." 280 F.2d at 620. It was the intent of Congress to impose upon unions the same restrictions which the Wagner Act imposed on employers with respect to violations of employee rights. The petitioner, while taking no issue with the fact of its minority status on the critical date, maintains that both Bernhard-Altmann's and its own good faith beliefs in petitioner's majority status are a complete defense. To countenance such an excuse would place in permissibly careless employer and union hands the power to completely frustrate employee realization of the premise of the Act -- that its prohibitions will go far to assure freedom of choice and majority rule in employee selection of representatives. We find nothing in the statutory language prescribing scienter as an element of the unfair labor practices are involved. The act made unlawful by § 8(a)(2) is employer support of a minority union. Here, that support is an accomplished fact. More need not be shown, for, even if mistakenly, the employees' rights have been invaded. It follows that prohibited conduct cannot be excused by a showing of good faith. This conclusion, while giving the employee only the protection assured him by the Act, places no particular hardship on the employer or the union. It merely requires that recognition be withheld until the Board-conducted election results in majority selection of a representative. The Board's order here, as we might infer from the employer's failure to resist its enforcement, would apparently result in similarly slight hardship upon it. We do not share petitioner's apprehension that holding such conduct unlawful will somehow induce a breakdown, or seriously impede the progress of collective bargaining. If an employer takes reasonable steps to verify union claims, themselves advanced only after careful estimate -- precisely what Bernhard-Altmann and petitioner failed to do here -- he can readily ascertain their validity and obviate a Board election. We fail to see any onerous burden involved in requiring responsible negotiators to be careful, by cross-checking, for example, well analyzed employer records with union listings or authorization cards. Individual and collective employee rights may not be trampled upon merely because it is inconvenient to avoid doing so. Moreover, no penalty is attached to the violation. Assuming that an employer in good faith accepts or rejects a union claim of majority status, the validity of his decision may be tested in an unfair labor practice proceeding. If he is found to have erred in extending or withholding recognition, he is subject only to a remedial order requiring him to conform his conduct to the norms set out in the Act, as was the case here. No further penalty results. We believe the Board's remedial order is the proper one in such cases. Labor Board v. District 50, U.M.W,. Affirmed.

In the bona fide but mistaken belief that a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit had authorized petitioner union to represent their interests, the union and the employer entered into an agreement under which the employer recognized the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain of its employees, although, in fact, only a minority of those employees had authorized the union to represent their interests. The Nation Labor Relations Board found that, by extending such recognition, the employer interfered with the organizational rights of its employees in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act and gave unlawful support to a labor organization in violation of § 8(a)(2), and that the union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by its acceptance of exclusive bargaining authority. The Board ordered the unfair labor practices discontinued and directed the holding of a representation election. The Court of Appeals granted enforcement of the Board's order. Held: the Board and the Court of Appeals correctly held that such extension and acceptance of recognition constituted unfair labor practices; the remedy provided was appropriate; and the judgment is affirmed. . (a) A different conclusion is not required by the fact that the union subsequently obtained authorization from a majority of the employees to represent their interests, since the earlier recognition of the minority union was a fait accompli depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to choose their own representative. P.. (b) The agreement was void in its entirety, and it cannot be held valid and enforcible as to those employees who consented to it. . (c) By granting exclusive bargaining status to a union selected by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that union upon the nonconsenting majority, the employer violated both § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(2). . (d) The employer's bona fide belief in the majority status of the union is no defense. . (e) The remedy provided by the Board's order was proper. . 108 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 280 F.2d 616, affirmed.

1957_16

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1957/16

MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns the scope of a contract carrier permit granted appellant by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The Commission interpreted "stock in trade of drug stores," a commodity description in appellant's permit, to authorize carriage of only those goods which, at time of movement, are, or are intended to become, part of the stock in trade of a drugstore. On the basis of that interpretation, an appropriate cease and desist order prohibiting carriage of unauthorized goods was entered. 63 M.C.C. 407. After a three-judge District Court refused to enjoin enforcement of the order, 150 F. Supp. 181, direct appeal was taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 352 U.S. 905 (1956). For reasons hereinafter stated we affirm the judgment of the District Court. Appellant's predecessor, Andrew G. Nelson, having operated as a contract carrier before enactment of the Motor Carrier Act, applied for a permit to continue his operation subsequent to passage of the Act, as contemplated by § 209(a) thereof. The application described Nelson's complete operation as "transportation . . . of store fixtures and miscellaneous merchandise, and household goods of employes, for Walgreen Co., in connection with the opening, closing and remodeling of stores." In a supporting affidavit, Nelson stated that he was "an interstate contract carrier of property for the Walgreen Company, and for it alone . . . , to and from Walgreen Retail Stores . . . , the commodities so transported [being] usually store fixtures and equipment and merchandise for the opening stock." Filed with the affidavit were 17 delivery receipts showing contract carriage for Walgreen in 1934-1935. On March 13, 1942, the Commission issued the permit in controversy without a hearing, relying on the application and supporting papers filed by Nelson. The permit authorized contract carriage of "[n]ew and used store fixtures, new and used household goods, and stock in trade of drug stores" over irregular routes in 10 States. Upon Nelson's incorporation in 1951, the Commission issued an identical permit to the corporation, the appellant here. In 1954, an investigation by the Commission to determine if appellant was operating beyond the bounds of its permit authority revealed that appellant was carrying a wide range of commodities for many kinds of shippers, including groceries for grocery stores, beer and wine to liquor distributors, dry glue to manufacturers of gummed products, and automobile batteries to department stores. The Commission held that such carriage, all of which appellant attempted to justify under the description "stock in trade of drug stores," violated § 209 of the Act, which prohibits contract carriage without a permit authorizing the business in question. Appellant contends that the critical language of the permit, "stock in trade of drug stores," is a generic description of commodities by reference to place of sale, entitling it to transport goods like those stocked by present-day drugstores to any consignee within the authorized operating territory. The Commission, however, regards these words as a description of commodities by reference to intended use, authorizing a more limited carriage: goods moving to a drugstore for sale therein, or, if moving elsewhere, then with the intention at the time of movement that they ultimately will become part of the goods stocked by a drugstore. Appellant argues that the intended use of the goods is of no consequence here, because (1) intended use restrictions are never applied to commodity descriptions by reference to place of sale, and (2) intended use restrictions were developed by the Commission long after issuance of Nelson's permit, and cannot now be applied retroactively. Finally, having offered evidence of a much more extensive grandfather operation than was set out in Nelson's application and affidavits, appellant contends that the Commission erred in excluding such evidence. Before considering these contentions, we first note that the plain meaning of words in a commodity description is controlling in the absence of ambiguity or specialized usage in the trade. Neither of the parties believes the description here patently ambiguous, nor do we consider it to be such. Moreover, appellant is unwilling to say that the instant description is a term of art, while the Commission specifically asserts that it is not. Consequently, the ordinary meaning of the words used in the permit is determinative. In ascertaining that meaning, we are not given carte blanche; just as "[t]he precise delineation of an enterprise which seeks the protection of the "grandfather" clause has been reserved for the Commission," Noble v. United States,, (1943), subsequent construction of the grandfather permit by the Commission is controlling on the courts unless clearly erroneous. Dart Transit Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 110 F. Supp. 876, aff'd, 345 U.S. 980 (1953). In construing "stock in trade of drug stores," the Commission found the controverted words to be a commodity description by reference to intended use; it held them equivalent to "drug stores' stock," and analogized the latter to such descriptions as "contractors' equipment" or "packing house supplies." On that basis, it required that the goods transported be intended for use by a drugstore as part of its stock in trade. The Commission rejected appellant's contention that the words of this permit are a description by reference to place of sale. In making that contention, appellant equates the permit's language with "goods such as are sold in drug stores." It is obvious to us that such a reading enlarges the ordinary meaning of the words. As pointed out by the examiner, 63 M.C.C. at 414, the description used in the permit connotes possession, and therefore lends itself more readily to "drug stores' stock" than it does to "goods such as are sold in drug stores." Moreover, an examination of the Commission's decisions indicates use of a definite and distinctive linguistic pattern whenever descriptions are made by reference to place of sale: if the Commission's purpose has been to authorize transportation of goods like those named in the permit, that purpose consistently has been revealed by use of the phrase "such as," or a close variation thereof. Yet there is no such phrase in the present permit. These considerations are bulwarked by the record Nelson put before the Commission in 1942, clearly showing that he was hauling Walgreen's drugstore stock, and not goods such as might be stocked for sale by Walgreen. On balance, therefore, we are compelled to think the Commission right; certainly it is not clearly wrong. Appellant contends that the permit language cannot embody an intended use restriction, because such restrictions were not formulated by the Commission until after issuance of Nelson's permit, and cannot be retroactively applied as a limitation on the same. The Commission challenges the assertion that the intended use restriction was never applied prior to issuance of the permit. It is unnecessary for us to resolve that question, however. Assuming that the intended use test first appeared as a commodity description technique after appellant's predecessor obtained his permit, we think the Commission still free to interpret the permit as it has done. Its determination accords with the common, ordinary meaning of the words used, and in no way strains or artificializes that meaning. If the controverted words fairly lend themselves now to the construction made here, they always have done so. Consequently, any retroactive application of the intended use test could work no prejudice to appellant; once it is determined that the ordinary meaning of the description is neither more nor less than the Commission's interpretation, the manner in which the Commission arrived at its conclusion is not controlling. Finally, appellant contends that the Commission's interpretation limits the actual -- though previously unasserted -- scope of grandfather operations carried on by appellant's predecessor, thus subverting the substantial parity which a grandfather permit should establish between pre-Act and post-Act operations. Alton R. Co. v. United States, (1942). If this be so, the remedy lies elsewhere: in the event the grandfather permit does not correctly reflect the scope of the grandfather operation, the carrier's recourse is to petition the Commissions for reopen the grandfather proceedings for consideration of the evidence not previously brought to the Commission's attention. Such a contention is no answer to the present charge of permit violation, since the permit cannot be collaterally attacked. Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. United States, (1953); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 651. To hold otherwise would render meaningless the congressional requirement of a permit to continue grandfather operations subsequent to the Act. Appellant's arguments based on noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011, have no merit. Affirmed.

Under the "grandfather clause" of § 209(a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the Interstate Commerce Commission granted contract carrier permits to appellant and its predecessor. Subsequently, after a hearing, the Commission interpreted "stock in trade of drug stores," a commodity description in appellant's permit, to authorize carriage of only those goods which at time of movement are, or are intended to become, part of the stock in trade of a drugstore. On the basis of this interpretation, the Commission issued an appropriate cease and desist order prohibiting carriage of unauthorized goods. Held: the Commission's order is sustained. (a) There being no patent ambiguity or specialized trade usage involved, the ordinary meaning of the words used in the commodity description is controlling. . (b) The Commission's intent in issuing the permit is not to be ascertained from evidence unknown to the Commission at the time of its issuance. P. 557, n 3. (c) The Commission's interpretation of "stock in trade of drug stores" is not clearly erroneous, and therefore it must be sustained. . (d) Since the Commission's interpretation accords with the plain meaning of the commodity description, it is immaterial whether the Commission had ever applied the intended use restriction prior to issuance of this permit. Retroactive application here, if any, of such restrictions could not prejudice appellant. . (e) If the permit, as thus construed, is not as broad as the operations carried on by appellant's predecessor prior to the Act, appellant's remedy is to petition the Commission to reopen the grandfather proceedings; the permit cannot be attacked collaterally in a proceeding for its violation. . (f) Appellant's arguments based on noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act have no merit. P.. 150 F. Supp. 181, affirmed.

1982_82-486

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-486

JUSTICE WHITE, delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the scope of the cause of action made available by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V) * to those injured by conspiracies formed "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." I A. A. Cross Construction Co., Inc. (Cross), contracted with the Department of the Army to construct the Alligator Bayou Pumping Station and Gravity Drainage Structure on the Taylor Bayou Hurricane Levee near Port Arthur, Tex. In accordance with its usual practice, Cross hired workers for the project without regard to union membership. Some of them were from outside the Port Arthur area. Employees of Cross were several times warned by local residents that Cross' practice of hiring nonunion workers was a matter of serious concern to many in the area, and that it could lead to trouble. According to the District Court, the evidence showed that, at a January 15, 1975, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Sabine Area Building and Construction Trades Council a citizen protest against Cross' hiring practices was discussed and a time and place for the protest were chosen. On the morning of January 17, a large group assembled at the entrance to the Alligator Bayou construction site. In the group were union members present at the January 15 meeting. From this gathering, several truckloads of men emerged, drove on to the construction site, assaulted and beat Cross employees, and burned and destroyed construction equipment. The District Court found that continued violence was threatened "if the nonunion workers did not leave the area or concede to union policies and principles." Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 227 (ED Tex.1978). The violence and vandalism delayed construction and led Cross to default on its contract with the Army. The plaintiffs in this case, after amendment of the complaint, were respondents Scott and Matthews -- two Cross employees who had been beaten -- and the company itself. The Sabine Area Building and Trades Council, 25 local unions, and various individuals were named as defendants. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants had conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their legally protected rights, contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The case was tried to the court. A permanent injunction was entered, and damages were awarded against 11 of the local unions, $5,000 each to the individual plaintiffs and $112,385.44 to Cross, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $25,000. In arriving at its judgment, the District Court recognized that, to make out a violation of § 1985(3), as construed in Griffin v. Breckenridge,, (1971), the plaintiff must allege and prove four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. The District Court found that the first, third, and fourth of these elements were plainly established. The issue, the District Court thought, concerned the second element, for in construing that requirement in Griffin, we held that the conspiracy not only must have as its purpose the deprivation of "equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," but also must be motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. at. Griffin having involved racial animus and interference with rights that Congress could unquestionably protect against private conspiracies, the issue the District Court identified was whether private conspiratorial discrimination against employees of a nonunionized entity is the kind of conduct that triggers the proscription of § 1985(3). The District Court concluded that the conspiracy encompassed violations of both the civil and criminal laws of the State of Texas, thus depriving plaintiff of the protections afforded by those laws, that § 1985(3) proscribes class-based animus other than racial bias, and that the class of nonunion laborers and employers is a protected class under the section. The District Court believed that "men and women have the right to associate or not to associate with any group or class of individuals, and concomitantly, to be free of violent acts against their bodies and property because of such association or non-association." 461 F. Supp. at 230. The conduct evidenced a discriminatory animus against nonunion workers; hence, there had been a violation of the federal law. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, except for setting aside for failure of proof the judgment against 8 of the 11 local unions, affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (CA5 1982). The Court of Appeals understood respondents' submission to be that petitioners' conspiracy was aimed at depriving respondents of their First Amendment right to associate with their fellow nonunion employees, and that this curtailment was a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of § 1985(3). The Court of Appeals agreed, for the most part, holding that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive plaintiffs of their First Amendment right not to associate with a union. The court rejected the argument that it was necessary to show some state involvement to demonstrate an infringement of First Amendment rights. This argument, it thought, had been expressly rejected in Griffin, and it therefore felt compelled to disagree with two decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit espousing that position. Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (1976); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (1972). The Court of Appeals went on to hold that § 1985(3) reached conspiracies motivated either by political or economic bias. Thus petitioners' conspiracy to harm the nonunion employees of a nonunionized contractor embodied the kind of class-based animus contemplated by § 1985(3) as construed in Griffin. Because of the importance of the issue involved, we granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 1034. We now reverse. II We do not disagree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that there was a conspiracy, an act done in furtherance thereof, and a resultant injury to persons and property. Contrary to the Court of Appeals, however, we conclude that an alleged conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights is not a violation of § 1985(3) unless it is proved that the State is involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State. We also disagree with the Court of Appeals' view that there was present here the kind of animus that § 1985(3) requires. A The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any State from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. The First Amendment, which by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now applies to state governments and their officials, prohibits either Congress or a State from making any "law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." Had § 1985(3) in so many words prohibited conspiracies to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment or of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, it would be untenable to contend that either of those provisions could be violated by a conspiracy that did not somehow involve or affect a State. "It is a commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection Clause itself arise only where there has been involvement of the State or of one acting under the color of its authority. The Equal Protection Clause 'does not . . . add any thing to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another.' United States v. Cruikshank,,. As Mr. JUSTICE DOUGLAS more recently put it, 'The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals.' United States v. Williams,, (dissenting opinion). This has been the view of the Court from the beginning. United States v. Cruikshank, supra; United States v. Harris,; Civil Rights Cases,; Hodges v. United States,; United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564. It remains the Court's view today. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton,; United States v. Price, post, p.." United States v. Guest,, (1966). The opinion for the Court by Justice Fortas in the companion case characterized the Fourteenth Amendment rights in the same way: "As we have consistently held 'The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals.' Williams I, 341 U.S. at (opinion of Douglas, J.)" United States v. Price,, (1966). In this respect, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was thus correct in holding that a conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights is not made out without proof of state involvement. Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, supra, at 1193. Griffin v. Breckenridge is not to the contrary. There we held that § 1985(3) reaches purely private conspiracies and, as so interpreted, was not invalid on its face or as there applied. We recognized that the language of the section referring to deprivations of "equal protection" or of "equal privileges and immunities" resembled the language and prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that, if § 1985(3) was so understood, it would be difficult to conceive of a violation of the statute that did not involve the State in some respect. But we observed that the section does not expressly refer to the Fourteenth Amendment, and that there is nothing "inherent" in the language used in § 1985(3) "that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the State." 403 U.S. at. This was a correct reading of the language of the Act; the section is not limited by the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment. The broader scope of § 1985(3) became even more apparent when we explained that the conspiracy at issue was actionable because it was aimed at depriving the plaintiffs of rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Section 1985(3) constitutionally can and does protect those rights from interference by purely private conspiracies. Griffin did not hold that, even when the alleged conspiracy is aimed at a right that is by definition a right only against state interference, the plaintiff in a § 1985(3) suit nevertheless need not prove that the conspiracy contemplated state involvement of some sort. The complaint in Griffin alleged, among other things, a deprivation of First Amendment rights, but we did not sustain the action on the basis of that allegation, and paid it scant attention. Instead, we upheld the application of § 1985(3) to private conspiracies aimed at interfering with rights constitutionally protected against private, as well as official, encroachment. Neither is respondents' position helped by the assertion that, even if the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide authority to proscribe exclusively private conspiracies, precisely the same conduct could be proscribed by the Commerce Clause. That is no doubt the case; but § 1985(3) is not such a provision, since it "provides no substantive rights itself" to the class conspired against. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Novotny,, (1979). The rights, privileges, and immunities that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere, and here the right claimed to have been infringed has its source in the First Amendment. Because that Amendment restrains only official conduct, to make out their § 1985(3) case, it was necessary for respondents to prove that the State was somehow involved in or affected by the conspiracy. The Court of Appeals accordingly erred in holding that § 1985(3) prohibits wholly private conspiracies to abridge the right of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Because of that holding, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine whether respondents' action could be sustained under § 1985(3) as involving a conspiracy to deprive respondents of rights, privileges, or immunities under state law or those protected against private action by the Federal Constitution or federal statutory law. Conceivably, we could remand for consideration of these possibilities, or we ourselves could consider them. We take neither course, for, in our view, the Court of Appeals should also be reversed on the dispositive ground that § 1985(3)'s requirement that there must be "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at, was not satisfied in this case. B As indicated above, after examining the language, structure, and legislative history of § 1985(3), the Griffin opinion emphatically declared that the section was intended to reach private conspiracies that in no way involved the State. The Court was nevertheless aware that the sweep of § 1985 as originally introduced in the House provoked strong opposition in that chamber and precipitated the proposal and adoption of a narrowing amendment, which limited the breadth of the bill so that the bill did not provide a federal remedy for "all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others." 403 U.S. at. In large part, opposition to the original bill had been motivated by a belief that Congress lacked the authority to punish every assault and battery committed by two or more persons. Id. at; Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68, 115, 153, 188, 315 (1871); id. at 485-486, 514. As we interpreted the legislative history 12 years ago in Griffin, the narrowing amendment "centered entirely on the animus or motivation that would be required. . . ." 403 U.S. at. Thus: "The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose -- by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. See the remarks of Representatives Willard and Shellabarger, quoted supra, at 100. The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted). This conclusion was warranted by the legislative history, was reaffirmed in Novotny, supra, and we accept it as the authoritative construction of the statute. Because the facts in Griffin revealed an animus against Negroes and those who supported them, a class-based, invidious discrimination which was the central concern of Congress in enacting § 1985(3), the Court expressly declined to decide "whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion of § 1985(3) before us." 403 U.S. at, n. 9. Both courts below answered that question; both held that the section not only reaches conspiracies other than those motivated by racial bias, but also forbids conspiracies against workers who refuse to join a union. We disagree with the latter conclusion, and do not affirm the former. C The Court of Appeals arrived at its result by first describing the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan as a political organization that sought to deprive a large segment of the Southern population of political power and participation in the governance of those States and of the Nation. The Court of Appeals then reasoned that, because Republicans were among the objects of the Klan's conspiratorial activities, Republicans in particular and political groups in general were to be protected by § 1985(3). Finally, because it believed that an animus against an economic group such as those who preferred nonunion association is "closely akin" to the animus against political association, the Court of Appeals concluded that the animus against nonunion employees in the Port Arthur area was sufficiently similar to the animus against a political party to satisfy the requirements of § 1985(3). We are unpersuaded. In the first place, it is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause, most notably Republicans. The central theme of the bill's proponents was that the Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them equal access to political power. The predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters. The latter included Republicans generally, as well as others, such as Northerners who came South with sympathetic views towards the Negro. Although we have examined with some care the legislative history that has been marshaled in support of the position that Congress meant to forbid wholly nonracial, but politically motivated, conspiracies, we find difficult the question whether § 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the influence of or do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means. To accede to that view would go far toward making the federal courts, by virtue of § 1985(3), the monitors of campaign tactics in both state and federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick to assume. If respondents' submission were accepted, the proscription of § 1985(3) would arguably reach the claim that a political party has interfered with the freedom of speech of another political party by encouraging the heckling of its rival's speakers and the disruption of the rival's meetings. We realize that there is some legislative history to support the view that § 1985(3) has a broader reach. Senator Edmunds' statement on the floor of the Senate is the clearest expression of this view. He said that, if a conspiracy were formed against a man "because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter, . . . then this section could reach it." Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 567 (1871). The provision that is now § 1985(3), however, originated in the House. The narrowing amendment, which changed § 1985(3) to its present form, was proposed, debated, and adopted there, and the Senate made only technical changes to the bill. Senator Edmunds' views, since he managed the bill on the floor of the Senate, are not without weight. But we were aware of his views in Griffin, 403 U.S. at, n. 9, and still withheld judgment on the question whether § 1985(3), as enacted, went any farther than its central concern -- combating the violent and other efforts of the Klan and its allies to resist and to frustrate the intended effects of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Lacking other evidence of congressional intention, we follow the same course here. D Even if the section must be construed to reach conspiracies aimed at any class or organization on account of its political views or activities, or at any of the classes posited by Senator Edmunds, we find no convincing support in the legislative history for the proposition that the provision was intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities. Such a construction would extend § 1985(3) into the economic life of the country in a way that we doubt that the 1871 Congress would have intended when it passed the provision in 1871. Respondents submit that Congress intended to protect two general classes of Republicans, Negroes and Northern immigrants, the latter because the Klan resented carpetbagger efforts to dominate the economic life of the South. Respondents rely on a series of statements made during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, of which § 1985 was a part, indicating that Northern laborers and businessmen who had come from the North had been the targets of Klan conspiracies. Brief for Respondents 42-44. As we understand these remarks, however, the speakers believed that these Northerners were viewed as suspect because they were Republicans and were thought to be sympathetic to Negroes. We do not interpret these parts of the debates as asserting that the Klan had a general animus against either labor or capital, or against persons from other States as such. Nor is it plausible that the Southern Democrats were prejudiced generally against enterprising persons trying to better themselves, even if those enterprising persons were from Northern States. The animus was against Negroes and their sympathizers, and perhaps against Republicans as a class, but not against economic groups as such. Senator Pool, on whose remarks respondents rely, identified what he thought was the heart of the matter: "The truth is that, whenever a northern man, who goes into a southern State, will prove a traitor to the principles which he entertained at home, when he will lend himself to the purposes of the Democracy or be purchased by them, they forget that he is a carpet-bagger and are ready to use him and elevate him to any office within their gift." Cong Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st. Sess., 607 (1871). We thus cannot construe § 1985(3) to reach conspiracies motivated by economic or commercial animus. Were it otherwise, for example, § 1985(3) could be brought to bear on any act of violence resulting from union efforts to organize an employer or from the employer's efforts to resist it, so long as the victim merely asserted and proved that the conduct involved a conspiracy motivated by an animus in favor of unionization, or against it, as the case may be. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), addresses in great detail the relationship between employer, employee, and union in a great variety of situations, and it would be an unsettling event to rule that strike and picket-line violence must now be considered in the light of the strictures of § 1985(3). Moreover, if anti-union, anti-nonunion, or anti-employer biases represent the kinds of animus that trigger § 1985(3), there would be little basis for concluding that the statute did not provide a cause of action in a variety of other situations where one economic group is pitted against another, each having the intent of injuring or destroying the economic health of the other. We think that such a construction of the statute, which is at best only arguable, and surely not compelled by either its language or legislative history, should be eschewed, and that group actions generally resting on economic motivations should be deemed beyond the reach of § 1985(3). Economic and commercial conflicts, we think, are best dealt with by statutes, federal or state, specifically addressed to such problems, as well as by the general law proscribing injuries to persons and property. If we have misconstrued the intent of the 1871 Congress, or, in any event, if Congress now prefers to take a different tack, the Court will, of course, enforce any statute within the power of Congress to enact. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. *

Respondent construction company hired nonunion workers for a project near Port Arthur, Tex., and a citizen protest against the company's hiring practice was organized at a meeting held by the Executive Committee of the Sabine Area Building and Construction Trades Council. During the protest at the construction site, company employees (including the two individual respondents) were assaulted and beaten, and construction equipment was burned and destroyed. The violence and vandalism delayed construction and led the company to default on its contract. In their action in Federal District Court against petitioners -- the Sabine Area Building and Construction Trades Council and certain local unions and individuals -- respondents asserted that petitioners had conspired to deprive respondents of their legally protected rights, contrary to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V) making available a cause of action to those injured by conspiracies formed "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." The District Court entered judgment for respondents, granting injunctive relief and awarding damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed in pertinent part, holding that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive respondents of their First Amendment right not to associate with a union, that for purposes of § 1985(3) it was not necessary to show some state involvement in the infringement of First Amendment rights, and that § 1985(3) reaches conspiracies motivated by political or economic bias as well as those motivated by racial bias, thus including the conspiracy to harm the nonunion employees of the nonunion contractor. Held: An alleged conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights is not a violation of § 1985(3) unless it is proved that the State is involved in the conspiracy or the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State. Moreover, the kind of animus that § 1985(3) requires is not present in this case. . (a) Griffin v. Breckenridge,, upheld the application of § 1985(3) to purely private conspiracies aimed at interfering with rights constitutionally protected against private as well as official encroachment, such as the rights involved in that case -- the right to travel and Thirteenth Amendment rights. However, Griffin did not hold or declare that, when the alleged conspiracy is aimed at a right that is, by definition, only a right against state interference, such as First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the plaintiff in a § 1985(3) suit nevertheless need not prove that the conspiracy contemplated state involvement of some sort. . (b) The language and legislative history of § 1985(3) establish that it requires "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Griffin, supra, at. . (c) Though the predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the then-prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters, it is not necessary to determine here whether § 1985(3) must be construed to reach only cases involving racial bias. . (d) Even if it is assumed that § 1985(3) is to be construed to reach conspiracies aimed at any class or organization on account of its political views or activities, the provision does not reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities. Neither the language nor the legislative history of § 1985(3) compels a construction that would include group action resting on economic or commercial animus, such as animus in favor of or against unionization. . 680 F.2d 979, reversed. WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,post, p..

1985_84-701

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-701

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., together with certain regulations promulgated under its authority by the Army Corps of Engineers, authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries. I The relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act originated in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, and have remained essentially unchanged since that time. Under §§ 301 and 502 of the Act, 33U.S.C. §§ 1311 and 1362, any discharge of dredged or fill materials into "navigable waters" -- defined as the "waters of the United States" -- is forbidden unless authorized by a permit issued by the Corps of Engineers pursuant to § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. After initially construing the Act to cover only waters navigable in fact, in 1975 the Corps issued interim final regulations redefining "the waters of the United States" to include not only actually navigable waters but also tributaries of such waters, interstate waters and their tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce. 40 Fed.Reg. 31320 (1975). More importantly for present purposes, the Corps construed the Act to cover all "freshwater wetlands" that were adjacent to other covered waters. A "freshwater wetland" was defined as an area that is "periodically inundated" and is "normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction." 33 CFR § 209.120(d)(2)(h) (1976). In 1977,the Corps refined its definition of wetlands by eliminating the reference to periodic inundation and making other minor changes. The 1977 definition reads as follows: "The term 'wetlands' means those areas that are in undated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." 33 CFR § 323.2(c) (1978). In 1982, the 1977 regulations were replaced by substantively identical regulations that remain in force today. See 33 CFR § 323.2 (1985). Respondent Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (hereafter respondent), owns 80 acres of low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan. In 1976, respondent began to place fill materials on its property as part of its preparations for construction of a housing development. The Corps of Engineers, believing that the property was an "adjacent wetland" under the 1975 regulation defining "waters of the United States," filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking to enjoin respondent from filling the property without the permission of the Corps. The District Court held that the portion of respondent's property lying below 575.5 feet above sea level was a covered wetland, and enjoined respondent from filling it without a permit. Civ. No. 77-70041 (Feb. 24, 1977) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a); Civ. No. 77-70041 (June 21, 1979) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a). Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the effect of the intervening 1977 amendments to the regulation. 615 F.2d 1363 (1980). On remand, the District Court again held the property to be a wetland subject to the Corps' permit authority. Civ. No. 77-70041 (May 10, 1981) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a). Respondent again appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed. 729 F.2d 391 (1984). The court construed the Corps' regulation to exclude from the category of adjacent wetlands -- and hence from that of "waters of the United States" -- wetlands that were not subject to flooding by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation. The court adopted this construction of the regulation because, in its view, a broader definition of wetlands might result in the taking of private property without just compensation. The court also expressed its doubt that Congress, in granting the Corps jurisdiction to regulate the filling of "navigable waters," intended to allow regulation of wetlands that were not the result of flooding by navigable waters. Under the court's reading of the regulation, respondent's property was not within the Corps' jurisdiction, because its semiaquatic characteristics were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters. Respondent was therefore free to fill the property without obtaining a permit. We granted certiorari to consider the proper interpretation of the Corps' regulation defining "waters of the United States" and the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, both of which were called into question by the Sixth Circuit's ruling. 469 U.S. 1206 (1985). We now reverse. II The question whether the Corps of Engineers may demand that respondent obtain a permit before placing fill material on its property is primarily one of regulatory and statutory interpretation: we must determine whether respondent's property is an "adjacent wetland" within the meaning of the applicable regulation, and, if so, whether the Corps' jurisdiction over "navigable waters" gives it statutory authority to regulate discharges of fill material into such a wetland. In this connection, we first consider the Court of Appeals' position that the Corps' regulatory authority under the statute and its implementing regulations must be narrowly construed to avoid a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We have frequently suggested that governmental land use regulation may, under extreme circumstances, amount to a "taking" of the affected property. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, (1985); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, (1978). We have never precisely defined those circumstances, see id. at, but our general approach was summed up in Agins v. Tiburon,, (1980), where we stated that the application of land use regulations to a particular piece of property is a taking only "if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Moreover, we have made it quite clear that the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, (1981). The reasons are obvious. A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property does not, itself, "take" the property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent "economically viable"use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred. If neither the imposition of the permit requirement itself nor the denial of a permit necessarily constitutes a taking, it follows that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a narrow reading of the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands was "necessary" to avoid "a serious taking problem." 729 F.2d at 398. We have held that, in general, "[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to a taking." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,, (1984) (footnote omitted). This maxim rests on the principle that, so long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional. Williamson County, supra, at. For precisely the same reason, the possibility that the application of a regulatory program may in some instances result in the taking of individual pieces of property is no justification for the use of narrowing constructions to curtail the program if compensation will, in any event, be available in those cases where a taking has occurred. Under such circumstances, adoption of a narrowing construction does not constitute avoidance of a constitutional difficulty, cf. Ashwander v. TVA,, (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); it merely frustrates permissible applications of a statute or regulation. Because the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, which presumptively supplies a means of obtaining compensation for any taking that may occur through the operation of a federal statute, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at, is available to provide compensation for takings that may result from the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction over wetlands, the Court of Appeals' fears that application of the Corps' permit program might result in a taking did not justify the court in adopting a more limited view of the Corps' authority than the terms of the relevant regulation might otherwise support. III Purged of its spurious constitutional overtones, the question whether the regulation at issue requires respondent to obtain a permit before filling its property is an easy one. The regulation extends the Corps' authority under § 404 to all wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and their tributaries. Wetlands, in turn, are defined as lands that are "inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 33 CFR § 323.2(c) (195) (emphasis added). The plain language of the regulation refutes the Court of Appeals' conclusion that inundation or "frequent flooding" by the adjacent body of water is a sine qua non of a wetland under the regulation. Indeed, the regulation could hardly state more clearly that saturation by either surface or ground water is sufficient to bring an area within the category of wetlands, provided that the saturation is sufficient to, and does, support wetland vegetation. The history of the regulation underscores the absence of any requirement of inundation. The interim final regulation that the current regulation replaced explicitly included a requirement of "periodi[c] inundation." 33 CFR § 209.120(d)(2)(h) (1976). In deleting the reference to "periodic inundation" from the regulation as finally promulgated, the Corps explained that it was repudiating the interpretation of that language "as requiring inundation over a record period of years." 42 Fed.Reg. 37128 (1977). In fashioning its own requirement of "frequent flooding" the Court of Appeals improperly reintroduced into the regulation precisely what the Corps had excised. Without the nonexistent requirement of frequent flooding,the regulatory definition of adjacent wetlands covers the property here. The District Court found that respondent's property was "characterized by the presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction," App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a, and that the source of the saturated soil conditions on the property was groundwater. There is no plausible suggestion that these findings are clearly erroneous, and they plainly bring the property within the category of wetlands as defined by the current regulation. In addition, the court found that the wetland located on respondent's property was adjacent to a body of navigable water, since the area characterized by saturated soil conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of respondent's property to Black Creek, a navigable waterway. Again, the court's finding is not clearly erroneous. Together, these findings establish that respondent's property is a wetland adjacent to a navigable waterway. Hence, it is part of the "waters of the United States" as defined by 33 CFR § 323.2 (1985), and if the regulation itself is valid as a construction of the term "waters of the United States" as used in the Clean Water Act, a question which we now address, the property falls within the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction over "navigable waters" under § 404 of the Act. IV A An agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress. Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,, (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,, (1984). Accordingly, our review is limited to the question whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the Act, for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to, but not regularly flooded by, rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable as "waters." On a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify "lands," wet or otherwise, as "waters." Such a simplistic response, however, does justice neither to the problem faced by the Corps in defining the scope of its authority under§ 404(a) nor to the realities of the problem of water pollution that the Clean Water Act was intended to combat. In determining the limits of its power to regulate discharges under the Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task: the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one. Rather, between open waters and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs -- in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land. Where on this continuum to find the limit of "waters" is far from obvious. Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of its regulatory authority, an agency may appropriately look to the legislative history and underlying policies of its statutory grants of authority. Neither of these sources provides unambiguous guidance for the Corps in this case, but together they do support the reasonableness of the Corps' approach of defining adjacent wetlands as "waters" within the meaning of§ 404(a). Section 404 originated as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which constituted a comprehensive legislative attempt "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251. This objective incorporated a broad, systemic view of the goal of maintaining and improving water quality: as the House Report on the legislation put it, "the word integrity' . . . refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems [are] maintained." H.R.Rep. No. 92911, p. 76(1972). Protection of aquatic ecosystems, Congress recognized, demanded broad federal authority to control pollution, for "[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles, and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source." S.Rep.No. 92414, p. 77 (1972). In keeping with these views, Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly. Although the Act prohibits discharges into "navigable waters," see CWA §§ 301(a), 404(a), 502(12), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(12), the Act's definition of "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States" makes it clear that the term"navigable" as used in the Act is of limited import. In adopting this definition of "navigable waters," Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes, and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed "navigable" under the classical understanding of that term. See S.Conf.Rep. No. 921236, p. 144 (1972); 118 Cong.Rec. 33756-33757(1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell). Of course, it is one thing to recognize that Congress intended to allow regulation of waters that might not satisfy traditional tests of navigability; it is another to assert that Congress intended to abandon traditional notions of "waters" and include in that term "wetlands" as well. Nonetheless, the evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term "waters" to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined. Following the lead of the Environmental Protection Agency, see 38 Fed.Reg. 10834 (1973), the Corps has determined that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters do, as a general matter, play a key role in protecting and enhancing water quality: "The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot rely on . . . artificial lines . . . , but must focus on all waters that together form the entire aquatic system. Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of this part of the aquatic system, regardless of whether it is above or below an ordinary high water mark, or mean high tide line, will affect the water quality of the other waters within that aquatic system." "For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction under Section 404 must include any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of the United States, as these wetlands are part of this aquatic system." 42 Fed.Reg. 37128 (1977). We cannot say that the Corps' conclusion that adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up with the "waters" of the United States -- based as it is on the Corps' and EPA's technical expertise -- is unreasonable. In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act. This holds true even for wetlands that are not the result of flooding or permeation by water having its source in adjacent bodies of open water. The Corps has concluded that wetlands may affect the water quality of adjacent lakes, rivers, and streams even when the waters of those bodies do not actually inundate the wetlands. For example, wetlands that are not flooded by adjacent waters may still tend to drain into those waters. In such circumstances, the Corps has concluded that wetlands may serve to filter and purify water draining into adjacent bodies of water, see 33 CFR§ 320.4(b)(2)(vii) (1985), and to slow the flow of surface runoff into lakes, rivers, and streams, and thus prevent flooding and erosion, see §§ 320.4(b)(2)(iv) and (v). In addition, adjacent wetlands may "serve significant natural biological functions, including food chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic . . . species." § 320.4(b)(2)(i). In short, the Corps has concluded that wetlands adjacent to lakes, rivers, streams, and other bodies of water may function as integral parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent bodies of water. Again, we cannot say that the Corps' judgment on these matters is unreasonable, and we therefore conclude that a definition of "waters of the United States" encompassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of the Act. Because respondent's property is part of a wetland that actually abuts on a navigable waterway, respondent was required to have a permit in this case. B Following promulgation of the Corps' interim final regulations in 1975, the Corps' assertion of authority under § 404 over waters not actually navigable engendered some congressional opposition. The controversy came to a head during Congress' consideration of the Clean Water Act of 1977, a major piece of legislation aimed at achieving "interim improvements within the existing framework" of the Clean Water Act. H.R.Rep. No. 95139, pp. 1-2 (1977). In the end, however, as we shall explain, Congress acquiesced in the administrative construction. Critics of the Corps' permit program attempted to insert limitations on the Corps' § 404 jurisdiction into the 1977 legislation: the House bill as reported out of committee proposed a redefinition of "navigable waters" that would have limited the Corps' authority under § 404 to waters navigable in fact and their adjacent wetlands (defined as wetlands periodically inundated by contiguous navigable waters). H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 16 (1977). The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, by contrast, contained no redefinition of the scope of the "navigable waters" covered by § 404, and dealt with the perceived problem of overregulation by the Corps by exempting certain activities (primarily agricultural) from the permit requirement, and by providing for assumption of some of the Corps' regulatory duties by federally approved state programs. S.1952, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 49(b) (1977). On the floor of the Senate, however, an amendment was proposed limiting the scope of "navigable waters" along the lines set forth in the House bill. 123 Cong.Rec. 26710-26711 (1977). In both Chambers, debate on the proposals to narrow the definition of navigable waters centered largely on the issue of wetlands preservation. See id. at 10426-10432 (House debate); id. at 26710-26729 (Senate debate). Proponents of a more limited § 404 jurisdiction contended that the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over wetlands and other nonnavigable"waters" had far exceeded what Congress had intended in enacting § 404. Opponents of the proposed changes argued that a narrower definition of "navigable waters" for purposes of § 404 would exclude vast stretches of crucial wetlands from the Corps' jurisdiction, with detrimental effects on wetlands ecosystems, water quality, and the aquatic environment generally. The debate, particularly in the Senate, was lengthy. In the House, the debate ended with the adoption of a narrowed definition of "waters"; but in the Senate the limiting amendment was defeated and the old definition retained. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate's approach: efforts to narrow the definition of "waters" were abandoned; the legislation as ultimately passed, in the words of Senator Baker, "retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation's waters exercised in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act." The significance of Congress' treatment of the Corps' § 404 jurisdiction in its consideration of the Clean Water Act of 1977 is twofold. First, the scope of the Corps' asserted jurisdiction over wetlands was specifically brought to Congress' attention, and Congress rejected measures designed to curb the Corps' jurisdiction, in large part because of its concern that protection of wetlands would be unduly hampered by a narrowed definition of "navigable waters." Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress' failure to act, a refusal by Congress to overrule an agency's construction of legislation is at least some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative construction has been brought to Congress' attention through legislation specifically designed to supplant it. See Bob Jones University v. United States,, (1983); United States v. Rutherford,,, and n. 10 (1979). Second, it is notable that even those who would have restricted the reach of the Corps' jurisdiction would have done so not by removing wetlands altogether from the definition of "waters of the United States," but only by restricting the scope of "navigable waters" under § 404 to waters navigable in fact and their adjacent wetlands. In amending the definition of "navigable waters" for purposes of § 404 only, the backers of the House bill would have left intact the existing definition of "navigable waters" for purposes of § 301 of the Act, which generally prohibits discharges of pollutants into navigable waters. As the House Report explained: "Navigable waters,' as used in section 301, includes all of the waters of the United States, including their adjacent wetlands." H.R.Rep. No. 95139, p. 24 (1977). Thus, even those who thought that the Corps' existing authority under § 404 was too broad recognized (1) that the definition of "navigable waters" then in force for both § 301 and § 404 was reasonably interpreted to include adjacent wetlands, (2) that the water quality concerns of the Clean Water Act demanded regulation of at least some discharges into wetlands, and (3) that whatever jurisdiction the Corps would retain over discharges of fill material after passage of the 1977 legislation should extend to discharges into wetlands adjacent to any waters over which the Corps retained jurisdiction. These views provide additional support for a conclusion that Congress in 1977 acquiesced in the Corps' definition of waters as including adjacent wetlands. Two features actually included in the legislation that Congress enacted in 1977 also support the view that the Act authorizes the Corps to regulate discharges into wetlands. First, in amending § 404 to allow federally approved state permit programs to supplant regulation by the Corps of certain discharges of fill material, Congress provided that the States would not be permitted to supersede the Corps' jurisdiction to regulate discharges into actually navigable waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, "including wetlands adjacent thereto." CWA § 404(g)(1), 33 U.S.C.§ 1344(g)(1). Here, then, Congress expressly stated that the term "waters" included adjacent wetlands. Second, the 1977 Act authorized an appropriation of $6 million for completion by the Department of Interior of a "National Wetlands Inventory" to assist the States "in the development and operation of programs under this Act." CWA § 208(i)(2), 33U.S.C. § 1288(i)(2). The enactment of this provision reflects congressional recognition that wetlands are a concern of the Clean Water Act, and supports the conclusion that, in defining the waters covered by the Act to include wetlands, the Corps is "implementing congressional policy, rather than embarking on a frolic of its own." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,, (1969). C We are thus persuaded that the language, policies, and history of the Clean Water Act compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in interpreting the Act to require permits for the discharge of fill material into wetlands adjacent to the "waters of the United States." The regulation in which the Corps has embodied this interpretation, by its terms, includes the wetlands on respondent's property within the class of waters that may not be filled without a permit; and, as we have seen, there is no reason to interpret the regulation more narrowly than its terms would indicate. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

The Clean Water Act prohibits any discharge of dredged or fill materials into "navigable waters" -- defined as the "waters of the United States" -- unless authorized by a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Construing the Act to cover all "freshwater wetlands" that are adjacent to other covered waters, the Corps issued a regulation defining such wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." After respondent Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (hereafter respondent), began placing fill materials on its property near the shores of Lake St. Clair, Michigan, the Corps filed suit in Federal District Court to enjoin respondent from filling its property without the Corps' permission. Finding that respondent's property was characterized by the presence of vegetation requiring saturated soil conditions for growth, that the source of such soil conditions was ground water, and that the wetland on the property was adjacent to a body of navigable water, the District Court held that the property was wetland subject to the Corps' permit authority. The Court of Appeals reversed, construing the Corps' regulation to exclude from the category of adjacent wetlands -- and hence from that of "waters of the United States" -- wetlands that are not subject to flooding by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation. The court took the view that the Corps' authority under the Act and its implementing regulations must be narrowly construed to avoid a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Under this construction, it was held that respondent's property was not within the Corps' jurisdiction, because its semi-aquatic characteristics were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters, and that therefore respondent was free to fill the property without obtaining a permit. Held: 1. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a narrow reading of the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands was necessary to avoid a taking problem. Neither the imposition of the permit requirement itself nor the denial of a permit necessarily constitutes a taking. And the Tucker Act is available to provide compensation for takings that may result from the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction over wetlands. . 2. The District Court's findings are not clearly erroneous, and plainly bring respondent's property within the category of wetlands, and thus of the "waters of the United States" as defined by the regulation in ques tion. . 3. The language, policies, and history of the Clean Water Act compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in interpreting the Act to require permits for the discharge of material into wetlands adjacent to other "waters of the United States." . 729 F.2d 391 reversed. WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

1959_119

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1959/119

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner was tried and convicted of knowingly transporting a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of the White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421. At the trial, the woman, who had since the date of the offense married the petitioner, was ordered, over her objection and that of the petitioner, to testify on behalf of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals, on appeal from a judgment of conviction, affirmed the ruling of the District Court. 263 F.2d 304. As the case presented significant issues concerning the scope and nature of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony, treated last Term in Hawkins v. United States,, we granted certiorari. 360 U.S. 908. We affirm the judgment. First. Our decision in Hawkins established, for the federal courts, the continued validity of the common law rule of evidence ordinarily permitting a party to exclude the adverse testimony of his or her spouse. However, as that case expressly acknowledged, the common law has long recognized an exception in the case of certain kinds of offenses committed by the party against his spouse. Id. at, citing Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209,. Exploration of the precise breadth of this exception, a matter of some uncertainty, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 2239, can await a case where it is necessary. For present purposes, it is enough to note that every Court of Appeals which has considered the specific question now holds that the exception, and not the rule, applies to a Mann Act prosecution, where the defendant's wife was the victim of the offense. Such unanimity with respect to a rule of evidence lends weighty credentials to that view. While this Court has never before decided the question, we now unhesitatingly approve the rule followed in five different Circuits. We need not embark upon an extended consideration of the asserted bases for the spousal privilege (see Hawkins, supra, at; Wigmore, op. cit., supra, § 2228(3)) and an appraisal of the applicability of each here, id., § 2239, for it cannot be seriously argued that one who has committed this "shameless offense against wifehood," id. at p. 257, should be permitted to prevent his wife from testifying to the crime by invoking an interest founded on the marital relation or the desire of the law to protect it. Petitioner's attempt to prevent his wife from testifying, by invoking an asserted privilege of his own, was properly rejected. Second. The witness wife, however, did not testify willingly, but objected to being questioned by the prosecution, and gave evidence only upon the ruling of the District Court denying her claimed privilege not to testify. We therefore consider the correctness of that ruling. The United States argues that, once having held, as we do, that, in such a case as this, the petitioner's wife could not be prevented from testifying voluntarily, Hawkins establishes that she may be compelled to testify. For, it is said, that case specifically rejected any distinction between voluntary and compelled testimony. 358 U.S. at. This argument fails to take account of the setting of our decision in Hawkins. To say that a witness spouse may be prevented from testifying voluntarily simply means that the party has a privilege to exclude the testimony; when, on the other hand, the spouse may not be compelled to testify against her will, it is the witness who is accorded a privilege. In Hawkins, the Government took the position that the spousal privilege should be that of the witness, and not that of the party, so that, while the wife could decline to testify, she could not be prevented from giving evidence if she elected not to claim a privilege which, it was said, belonged to her alone. Brief for the United States, No. 20, O.T.1958, pp. 22-43. In declining to hold that the party had no privilege, we manifestly did not thereby repudiate the privilege of the witness. While the question has not often arisen, it has apparently been generally assumed that the privilege resided in the witness as well as in the party. Hawkins referred to "a rule which bars the testimony of one spouse against the other unless both consent," supra, at. (Emphasis supplied.) See Stein v. Bowman, supra, 13 Pet. at (wife cannot "by force of authority be compelled to state facts in evidence"); United States v. Mitchell, supra, 137 F.2d at 1008 ("the better view is that the privilege is that of either spouse who chooses to claim it"); Wigmore, op. cit., supra, § 2241; McCormick, Evidence, § 66, n. 3. In its Hawkins brief, the Government, while calling for the abolition of the party's privilege, urged that the common law development could be explained, and its policies fully vindicated, by recognition of the privilege of the witness. Brief, pp. 22-25, 33, 42-43; see Hawkins, supra, at, and concurring opinion at. At least some of the bases of the party's privilege are in reason applicable to that of the witness. As Wigmore puts it, op. cit., supra at p. 264: "[W]hile the defendant husband is entitled to be protected against condemnation through the wife's testimony, the witness wife is also entitled to be protected against becoming the instrument of that condemnation -- the sentiment in each case being equal in degree and yet different in quality." In light of these considerations, we decline to accept the view that the privilege is that of the party alone. Third. Neither can we hold that, whenever the privilege is unavailable to the party, it is ipso facto lost to the witness as well. It is a question in each case, or in each category of cases, whether, in light of the reason which has led to a refusal to recognize the party's privilege, the witness should be held compellable. Certainly, we would not be justified in laying down a general rule that both privileges stand or fall together. We turn instead to the particular situation at bar. Where a man has prostituted his own wife, he has committed an offense against both her and the marital relation, and we have today affirmed the exception disabling him from excluding her testimony against him. It is suggested, however, that this exception has no application to the witness wife when she chooses to remain silent. The exception to the party's privilege, it is said, rests on the necessity of preventing the defendant from sealing his wife's lips by his own unlawful act, see United States v. Mitchell, supra, 137 F.2d at 1008-1009; Wigmore, op cit., supra, § 2239, and it is argued that where the wife has chosen not to "become the instrument" of her husband's downfall, it is her own privilege which is in question, and the reasons for according it to her in the first place are fully applicable. We must view this position in light of the congressional judgment and policy embodied in the Mann Act. "A primary purpose of the Mann Act was to protect women who were weak from men who were bad." Denning v. United States, 247 F. 463, 465. It was in response to shocking revelations of subjugation of women too weak to resist that Congress acted. See H.R.Rep. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 10-11. As the legislative history discloses, the Act reflects the supposition that the women with whom it sought to deal often had no independent will of their own, and embodies, in effect, the view that they must be protected against themselves. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (consent of woman immaterial in prosecution under that section). It is not for us to reexamine the basis of that supposition. Applying the legislative judgment underlying the Act, we are led to hold it not an allowable choice for a prostituted witness-wife "voluntarily" to decide to protect her husband by declining to testify against him. For if a defendant can induce a woman, against her "will," to enter a life of prostitution for his benefit -- and the Act rests on the view that he can -- by the same token, it should be considered that he can, at least as easily, persuade one who has already fallen victim to his influence that she must also protect him. To make matters turn upon ad hoc inquiries into the actual state of mind of particular women, thereby encumbering Mann Act trials with a collateral issue of the greatest subtlety, is hardly an acceptable solution. Fourth. What we have already said likewise governs the disposition of the petitioner's reliance on the fact that his marriage took place after the commission of the offense. Again, we deal here only with a Mann Act prosecution, and intimate no view on the applicability of the privilege of either a party or a witness similarly circumstanced in other situations. The legislative assumption of lack of independent will applies as fully here. As the petitioner, by his power over the witness, could, as we have considered should be assumed, have secured her promise not to testify, so, it should be assumed, could he have induced her to go through a marriage ceremony with him, perhaps "in contemplation of evading justice by reason of the very rule which is now sought to be invoked." United States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375, 380. The ruling of the District Court was correctly upheld by the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

Petitioner was tried and convicted in a Federal District Court of knowingly transporting a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421. At the trial, the woman, who had married petitioner since the date of the offense, was ordered over her objection and that of petitioner to testify for the prosecution. Held: the ruling was correct, and the judgment is affirmed. . (a) Though the common law rule of evidence ordinarily permitting a defendant to exclude the adverse testimony of his or her spouse still applies in the federal courts, there is an exception which permits the defendant's wife to testify against him when she was the victim of a violation of § 2421. . (b) The privilege accorded by the general rule resides in the witness, as well as in the defendant. . (c) In view of the purpose of § 2421, a prostituted witness-wife may not protect her husband by declining to testify against him. . (d) A different conclusion is not required by the fact that the marriage took place after the commission of the offense. . 263 F.2d 304, affirmed.

2015_15-138

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-138

. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§1961–1968, created four new criminal offenses involving the activities of organized criminal groups in relation to an enterprise. §§1962(a)–(d). RICO also created a new civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of those prohibitions. §1964(c). We are asked to decide whether RICO applies extraterritorially—that is, to events occurring and injuries suffered outside the United States. I A RICO is founded on the concept of racketeering activity. The statute defines “racketeering activity” to encompass dozens of state and federal offenses, known in RICO parlance as predicates. These predicates include any act “indictable” under specified federal statutes, §§1961(1)(B)–(C), (E)–(G), as well as certain crimes “chargeable” under state law, §1961(1)(A), and any offense involving bankruptcy or securities fraud or drug-related activity that is “punishable” under federal law, §1961(1)(D). A predicate offense implicates RICO when it is part of a “pattern of racketeering activity”—a series of related predicates that together demonstrate the existence or threat of continued criminal activity. H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 239 (1989) ; see §1961(5) (specifying that a “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two predicates committed within 10 years of each other). RICO’s §1962 sets forth four specific prohibitions aimed at different ways in which a pattern of racketeering activ-ity may be used to infiltrate, control, or operate “a[n] en-terprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” These prohibitions can be summarized as follows. Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful to invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise. Section 1962(b) makes it unlawful to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for a person employed by or associated with an enterprise to conduct the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Finally, §1962(d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the other three prohibitions.[1] Violations of §1962 are subject to criminal penalties, §1963(a), and civil proceedings to enforce those prohibitions may be brought by the Attorney General, §§1964(a)–(b). Separately, RICO creates a private civil cause of action that allows “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962” to sue in federal district court and recover treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. §1964(c).[2] B This case arises from allegations that petitioners—RJR Nabisco and numerous related entities (collectively RJR)—participated in a global money-laundering scheme in association with various organized crime groups. Respondents—the European Community and 26 of its member states—first sued RJR in the Eastern District of New York in 2000, alleging that RJR had violated RICO. Over the past 16 years, the resulting litigation (spread over at least three separate actions, with this case the lone survivor) has seen multiple complaints and multiple trips up and down the federal court system. See 2011 WL 843957, *1–*2 (EDNY, Mar. 8, 2011) (tracing the procedural his-tory through the District Court’s dismissal of the present complaint). In the interest of brevity, we confine our discussion to the operative complaint and its journey to this Court. Greatly simplified, the complaint alleges a scheme in which Colombian and Russian drug traffickers smuggled narcotics into Europe and sold the drugs for euros that—through a series of transactions involving black-market money brokers, cigarette importers, and wholesalers—were used to pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes into Europe. In other variations of this scheme, RJR allegedly dealt directly with drug traffickers and money launderers in South America and sold cigarettes to Iraq in violation of international sanctions. RJR is also said to have acquired Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation for the purpose of expanding these illegal activities. The complaint alleges that RJR engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of numerous acts of money laundering, material support to foreign terrorist organizations, mail fraud, wire fraud, and violations of the Travel Act. RJR, in concert with the other participants in the scheme, allegedly formed an association in fact that was engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, and therefore constituted a RICO enterprise that the complaint dubs the “RJR Money-Laundering Enterprise.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 238a, Complaint ¶158; see §1961(4) (defining an enterprise to include “any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”). Putting these pieces together, the complaint alleges that RJR violated each of RICO’s prohibitions. RJR allegedly used income derived from the pattern of racketeering to invest in, acquire an interest in, and operate the RJR Money-Laundering Enterprise in violation of §1962(a); acquired and maintained control of the enterprise through the pattern of racketeering in violation of §1962(b); operated the enterprise through the pattern of racketeering in violation of §1962(c); and conspired with other participants in the scheme in violation of §1962(d).[3] These violations allegedly harmed respondents in various ways, including through competitive harm to their state-owned cigarette businesses, lost tax revenue from black-market cigarette sales, harm to European financial institutions, currency instability, and increased law enforcement costs.[4] RJR moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that RICO does not apply to racketeering activity occurring outside U. S. territory or to foreign enterprises. The District Court agreed and dismissed the RICO claims as impermissibly extraterritorial. 2011 WL 843957, at *7. The Second Circuit reinstated the RICO claims. It concluded that, “with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and are alleged in this case, Congress has clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially.” 764 F. 3d 129, 133 (2014). “By incorporating these statutes into RICO as predicate racketeering acts,” the court reasoned, “Congress has clearly communicated its intention that RICO apply to extraterritorial conduct to the extent that extraterritorial violations of these statutes serve as the basis for RICO liability.” Id., at 137. Turning to the predicates alleged in the complaint, the Second Circuit found that they passed muster. The court concluded that the money laundering and material support of terrorism statutes expressly apply extraterritorially in the circumstances alleged in the complaint. Id., at 139–140. The court held that the mail fraud, wire fraud, and Travel Act statutes do not apply extraterritorially. Id., at 141. But it concluded that the complaint states domestic violations of those predicates because it “allege[s] conduct in the United States that satisfies every essential element” of those offenses. Id., at 142. RJR sought rehearing, arguing (among other things) that RICO’s civil cause of action requires a plaintiff to allege a domestic injury, even if a domestic pattern of racketeering or a domestic enterprise is not necessary to make out a violation of RICO’s substantive prohibitions. The panel denied rehearing and issued a supplemental opinion holding that RICO does not require a domestic injury. 764 F. 3d 149 (CA2 2014) (per curiam). If a foreign injury was caused by the violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially, the court concluded, then the plaintiff may seek recovery for that injury under RICO. Id., at 151. The Second Circuit later denied rehearing en banc, with five judges dissenting. 783 F. 3d 123 (2015). The lower courts have come to different conclusions regarding RICO’s extraterritorial application. Compare 764 F. 3d 129 (case below) (holding that RICO may apply extraterritorially) with United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F. 3d 965, 974–975 (CA9 2013) (holding that RICO does not apply extraterritorially; collecting cases). Because of this conflict and the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 576 U. S. ___ (2015). II The question of RICO’s extraterritorial application really involves two questions. First, do RICO’s substantive prohibitions, contained in §1962, apply to conduct that occurs in foreign countries? Second, does RICO’s private right of action, contained in §1964(c), apply to injuries that are suffered in foreign countries? We consider each of these questions in turn. To guide our inquiry, we begin by reviewing the law of extraterritoriality. It is a basic premise of our legal system that, in general, “United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437, 454 (2007) . This principle finds expression in a canon of statutory construction known as the presumption against extraterritoriality: Absent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010) . The question is not whether we think “Congress would have wanted” a statute to apply to foreign conduct “if it had thoughtof the situation before the court,” but whether Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that the statute will do so. Id., at 261. “When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” Id., at 255. There are several reasons for this presumption. Most notably, it serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U. S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at 4–5); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) (Aramco); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 U. S. 138, 147 (1957) . But it also reflects the more prosaic “commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197 , n. 5 (1993). We therefore apply the presumption across the board, “regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.” Morrison, supra, at 255. Twice in the past six years we have considered whether a federal statute applies extraterritorially. In Morrison, we addressed the question whether §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies to misrepresentations made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities traded only on foreign exchanges. We first examined whether §10(b) gives any clear indication of extraterritorial effect, and found that it does not. 561 U. S., at 262–265. We then engaged in a separate inquiry to determine whether the complaint before us involved a permissible domestic application of §10(b) because it alleged that some of the relevant misrepresentations were made in the United States. At this second step, we considered the “ ‘focus’ of congressional concern,” asking whether §10(b)’s focus is “the place where the deception originated” or rather “purchases and sale of securities in the United States.” Id., at 266. We concluded that the statute’s focus is on domestic securities transactions, and we therefore held that the statute does not apply to frauds in connection with foreign securities transactions, even if those frauds involve domestic misrepresentations. In Kiobel, we considered whether the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) confers federal-court jurisdiction over causes of action alleging international-law violations committed overseas. We acknowledged that the presumption against extraterritoriality is “typically” applied to statutes “regulating conduct,” but we concluded that the principles supporting the presumption should “similarly constrain courts considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.” 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). We applied the presumption and held that the ATS lacks any clear indication that it extended to the foreign violations alleged in that case. Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 7–14). Because “all the relevant conduct” regarding those violations “took place outside the United States,” id., at ___ (slip op., at 14), we did not need to determine, as we did in Morrison, the statute’s “focus.” Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues. At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. We must ask this question regardless of whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction. If the statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to the statute’s “focus.” If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U. S. territory. What if we find at step one that a statute clearly does have extraterritorial effect? Neither Morrison nor Kiobel involved such a finding. But we addressed this issue in Morrison, explaining that it was necessary to consider §10(b)’s “focus” only because we found that the statute does not apply extraterritorially: “If §10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need to determine which transnational frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them (barring some other limitation).” 561 U. S., at 267, n. 9. The scope of an extraterritorial statute thus turns on the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute’s foreign application, and not on the statute’s “focus.”[5] III With these guiding principles in mind, we first consider whether RICO’s substantive prohibitions in §1962 may apply to foreign conduct. Unlike in Morrison and Kiobel, we find that the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—but only with respect to certain applications of the statute. A The most obvious textual clue is that RICO defines racketeering activity to include a number of predicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct. These predicates include the prohibition against engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, which expressly applies, when “the defendant is a United States person,” to offenses that “tak[e] place outside the United States.” 18 U. S. C. §1957(d)(2). Other examples include the prohibitions against the assassination of Government officials, §351(i) (“There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this section”); §1751(k) (same), and the prohibition against hostage taking, which applies to conduct that “occurred outside the United States” if either the hostage or the offender is a U. S. national, if the offender is found in the United States, or if the hostage taking is done to compel action by the U. S. Government, §1203(b). At least one predicate—the prohibition against “kill[ing] a national of the United States, while such national is outside the United States”—applies only to conduct occurring outside the United States. §2332(a). We agree with the Second Circuit that Congress’s incorporation of these (and other) extraterritorial predicates into RICO gives a clear, affirmative indication that §1962 applies to foreign racketeering activity—but only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a particular case themselves apply extraterritorially. Put another way, a pattern of racketeering activity may include or consist of offenses committed abroad in violation of a predicate statute for which the presumption against extraterritoriality has been overcome. To give a simple (albeit grim) example, a violation of §1962 could be premised on a pattern of killings of Americans abroad in violation of §2332(a)—a predicate that all agree applies extraterritorially—whether or not any domestic predicates are also alleged.[6] We emphasize the important limitation that foreign conduct must violate “a predicate statute that manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially.” 764 F. 3d, at 136. Although a number of RICO predicates have extraterritorial effect, many do not. The inclusion of some extraterritorial predicates does not mean that all RICO predicates extend to foreign conduct. This is apparent for two reasons. First, “when a statute provides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit thatprovision to its terms.” Morrison, 561 U. S., at 265. Second, RICO defines as racketeering activity only acts that are “indictable” (or, what amounts to the same thing, “chargeable” or “punishable”) under one of the statutes identified in §1961(1). If a particular statute does not apply extraterritorially, then conduct committed abroad is not “indictable” under that statute and so cannot qualify as a predicate under RICO’s plain terms. RJR resists the conclusion that RICO’s incorporation of extraterritorial predicates gives RICO commensurate extraterritorial effect. It points out that “RICO itself” does not refer to extraterritorial application; only the underlying predicate statutes do. Brief for Petitioners 42. RJR thus argues that Congress could have intended to capture only domestic applications of extraterritorial predicates, and that any predicates that apply only abroad could have been “incorporated . . . solely for when such offenses are part of a broader pattern whose overall locus is domestic.” Id., at 43. The presumption against extraterritoriality does not require us to adopt such a constricted interpretation. While the presumption can be overcome only by a clear indication of extraterritorial effect, an express statement of extraterritoriality is not essential. “Assuredly context can be consulted as well.” Morrison, supra, at 265. Context is dispositive here. Congress has not expressly said that §1962(c) applies to patterns of racketeering activity in foreign countries, but it has defined “racketeering activ-ity”—and by extension a “pattern of racketeering activ-ity”—to encompass violations of predicate statutes that do expressly apply extraterritorially. Short of an explicit declaration, it is hard to imagine how Congress could have more clearly indicated that it intended RICO to have (some) extraterritorial effect. This unique structure makes RICO the rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of extraterritoriality. We therefore conclude that RICO applies to some foreign racketeering activity. A violation of §1962 may be based on a pattern of racketeering that includes predicate offenses committed abroad, provided that each of those offenses violates a predicate statute that is itself extraterritorial. This fact is determinative as to §1962(b) and §1962(c), both of which prohibit the employment of a pattern of racketeering. Although they differ as to the end for which the pattern is employed—to acquire or maintain control of an enterprise under subsection (b), or to conduct an enterprise’s affairs under subsection (c)—this difference is immaterial for extraterritoriality purposes. Section 1962(a) presents a thornier question. Unlike subsections (b) and (c), subsection (a) targets certain uses of income derived from a pattern of racketeering, not the use of the pattern itself. Cf. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451 –462 (2006). While we have no difficulty concluding that this prohibition applies to income derived from foreign patterns of racketeering (within the limits we have discussed), arguably §1962(a) extends only to domestic uses of the income. The Second Circuit did not decide this question because it found that respondents have alleged “a domestic investment of racketeering proceeds in the form of RJR’s merger in the United States with Brown & Williamson and investments in other U. S. operations.” 764 F. 3d, at 138, n. 5. RJR does not dispute the basic soundness of the Second Circuit’s reasoning, but it does contest the court’s reading of the complaint. See Brief for Petitioners 57–58. Because the parties have not focused on this issue, and because it makes no difference to our resolution of this case, see infra, at 27, we assume without deciding that respondents have pleaded a domestic investment of racketeering income in violation of §1962(a). Finally, although respondents’ complaint alleges a violation of RICO’s conspiracy provision, §1962(d), the parties’ briefs do not address whether this provision should be treated differently from the provision (§1962(a), (b), or (c)) that a defendant allegedly conspired to violate. We therefore decline to reach this issue, and assume without deciding that §1962(d)’s extraterritoriality tracks that of the provision underlying the alleged conspiracy. B RJR contends that, even if RICO may apply to foreign patterns of racketeering, the statute does not apply to foreign enterprises. Invoking Morrison’s discussion of the Exchange Act’s “focus,” RJR says that the “focus” of RICO is the enterprise being corrupted—not the pattern of racketeering—and that RICO’s enterprise element gives no clear indication of extraterritorial effect. Accordingly, RJR reasons, RICO requires a domestic enterprise. This argument misunderstands Morrison. As explained above, supra, at 9–10, only at the second step of the inquiry do we consider a statute’s “focus.” Here, however, there is a clear indication at step one that RICO applies extraterritorially. We therefore do not proceed to the “focus” step. The Morrison Court’s discussion of the statutory “focus” made this clear, stating that “[i]f §10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need to determine which transnational frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them (barring some other limitation).” 561 U. S., at 267, n. 9. The same is true here. RICO—or at least §§1962(b) and (c)—applies abroad, and so we do not need to determine which transnational (or wholly foreign) patterns of racketeering it applies to; it applies to all of them, regardless of whether they are connected to a “foreign” or “domestic” enterprise. This rule is, of course, subject to the important limitation that RICO covers foreign predicate offenses only to the extent that the underlying predicate statutes are extraterritorial. But within those bounds, the location of the affected enterprise does not impose an independent constraint. It is easy to see why Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises. A domestic enterprise requirement would lead to difficult line-drawing problems and counterintuitive results. It would exclude from RICO’s reach foreign enterprises—whether corporations, crime rings, other associations, or individuals—that operate within the United States. Imagine, for example, that a foreign corporation has operations in the United States and that one of the corporation’s managers in the United States conducts its U. S. affairs through a pattern of extortion and mail fraud. Such domestic conduct would seem to fall well within what Congress meant to capture in enacting RICO. Congress, after all, does not usually exempt foreigners acting in the United States from U. S. legal requirements. See 764 F. 3d, at 138 (“Surely the presumption against extraterritorial application of United States laws does not command giving foreigners carte blanche to violate the laws of the United States in the United States”). Yet RJR’s theory would insulate this scheme from RICO liability—both civil and criminal—because the enterprise at issue is a foreign, not domestic, corporation. Seeking to avoid this result, RJR offers that any “ ‘emissaries’ ” a foreign enterprise sends to the United States—such as our hypothetical U. S.-based corporate manager—could be carved off and considered a “distinct domestic enterprise” under an association-in-fact theory. Brief for Petitioners 40. RJR’s willingness to gerrymander the enterprise to get around its proposed domestic enterprise requirement is telling. It suggests that RJR is not really concerned about whether an enterprise is foreign or domestic, but whether the relevant conduct occurred here or abroad. And if that is the concern, then it is the pattern of racketeering activity that matters, not the enterprise. Even spotting RJR its “domestic emissary” theory, this approach would lead to strange gaps in RICO’s coverage. If a foreign enterprise sent only a single “emissary” to engage in racketeering in the United States, there could be no RICO liability because a single person cannot be both the RICO enterprise and the RICO defendant. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U. S. 158, 162 (2001) . RJR also offers no satisfactory way of determining whether an enterprise is foreign or domestic. Like the District Court, RJR maintains that courts can apply the “nerve center” test that we use to determine a corporation’s principal place of business for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77 (2010) ; 28 U. S. C. §1332(c)(1); 2011 WL 843957, at *5–*6. But this test quickly becomes meaningless if, as RJR suggests, a corporation with a foreign nerve center can, if necessary, be pruned into an association-in-fact enterprise with a domestic nerve center. The nerve center test, developed with ordinary corporate command structures in mind, is also ill suited to govern RICO association-in-fact enterprises, which “need not have a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command.’ ” Boyle v. United States, 556 U. S. 938, 948 (2009) . These difficulties are largely avoided if, as we conclude today, RICO’s extraterritorial effect is pegged to the extraterritoriality judgments Congress has made in the predicate statutes, often by providing precise instructions as to when those statutes apply to foreign conduct. The practical problems we have identified with RJR’s proposed domestic enterprise requirement are not, by themselves, cause to reject it. Our point in reciting these troubling consequences of RJR’s theory is simply to reinforce our conclusion, based on RICO’s text and context, that Congress intended the prohibitions in 18 U. S. C. §§1962(b) and (c) to apply extraterritorially in tandem with the underlying predicates, without regard to the locus of the enterprise. Although we find that RICO imposes no domestic enterprise requirement, this does not mean that every foreign enterprise will qualify. Each of RICO’s substantive prohibitions requires proof of an enterprise that is “engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” §§1962(a), (b), (c). We do not take this reference to “foreign commerce” to mean literally all commerce occurring abroad. Rather, a RICO enterprise must engage in, or affect in some significant way, commerce directly involving the United States—e.g., commerce between the United States and a foreign country. Enterprises whose activities lack that anchor to U. S. commerce cannot sustain a RICO violation. C Applying these principles, we agree with the Second Circuit that the complaint does not allege impermissibly extraterritorial violations of §§1962(b) and (c).[7] The alleged pattern of racketeering activity consists of five basic predicates: (1) money laundering, (2) material support of foreign terrorist organizations, (3) mail fraud, (4) wire fraud, and (5) violations of the Travel Act. The Second Circuit observed that the relevant provisions of the money laundering and material support of terrorism statutes expressly provide for extraterritorial application in certain circumstances, and it concluded that those circumstances are alleged to be present here. 764 F. 3d, at 139–140. The court found that the fraud statutes and the Travel Act do not contain the clear indication needed to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. But it held that the complaint alleges domestic violations of those statutes because it “allege[s] conduct in the United States that satisfies every essential element of the mail fraud, wire fraud, and Travel Act claims.” Id., at 142. RJR does not dispute these characterizations of the alleged predicates. We therefore assume without deciding that the alleged pattern of racketeering activity consists entirely of predicate offenses that were either committed in the United States or committed in a foreign country in violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially. The alleged enterprise also has a sufficient tie to U. S. commerce, as its members include U. S. companies, and its activities depend on sales of RJR’s cigarettes conducted through “the U. S. mails and wires,” among other things. App. to Pet. for Cert. 186a, Complaint ¶96. On these premises, respondents’ allegations that RJR violated §§1962(b) and (c) do not involve an impermissibly extraterritorial application of RICO.[8] IV We now turn to RICO’s private right of action, on which respondents’ lawsuit rests. Section 1964(c) allows “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962” to sue for treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. Irrespective of any extraterritorial application of §1962, we conclude that §1964(c) does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. A private RICO plaintiff therefore must allege and prove a domestic injury to its business or property. A The Second Circuit thought that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to §1964(c) independently of its application to §1962, reasoning that the presumption “is primarily concerned with the question of what conduct falls within a statute’s purview.” 764 F. 3d, at 151. We rejected that view in Kiobel, holding that the presumption “constrain[s] courts considering causes of action” under the ATS, a “ ‘strictly jurisdictional’ ” statute that “does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief.” 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). We reached this conclusion even though the underlying substantive law consisted of well-established norms of international law, which by definition apply beyond this country’s borders. See id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–7). The same logic requires that we separately apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to RICO’s cause of action despite our conclusion that the presumption has been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions. “The creation of a private right of action raises issues beyond the mere consideration whether underlying primary conduct should be allowed or not, entailing, for example, a decision to permit enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 727 (2004) . Thus, as we have observed in other contexts, providing a private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for international friction beyond that presented by merely applying U. S. substantive law to that foreign conduct. See, e.g., Kiobel, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6) (“Each of th[e] decisions” involved in defining a cause of action based on “conduct within the territory of another sovereign” “carries with it significant foreign policy implications”). Consider antitrust. In that context, we have observed that “[t]he application . . . of American private treble-damages remedies to anticompetitive conduct taking place abroad has generated considerable controversy” in other nations, even when those nations agree with U. S. substantive law on such things as banning price fixing. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 167 (2004). Numerous foreign countries—including some respondents in this case—advised us in Empagran that “to apply [U. S.] remedies would unjustifiably permit their citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a balance of competing considerations that their own domestic antitrust laws embody.” Ibid.[9] We received similar warnings in Morrison, where France, a respondent here, informed us that “most foreign countries proscribe securities fraud” but “have made very different choices with respect to the best way to implement that proscription,” such as “prefer[ring] ‘state actions, not private ones’ for the enforcement of law.” Brief for Republic of France as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 2009, No. 08–1191, p. 20; see id., at 23 (“Even when foreign countries permit private rights of action for securities fraud, they often have different schemes” for litigating them and “may approve of different measures of damages”). Allowing foreign investors to pursue private suits in the United States, we were told, “would upset that delicate balance and offend the sovereign interests of foreign nations.” Id., at 26. Allowing recovery for foreign injuries in a civil RICO action, including treble damages, presents the same danger of international friction. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31–34. This is not to say that friction would necessarily result in every case, or that Congress would violate international law by permitting such suits. It is to say only that there is a potential for international controversy that militates against recognizing foreign-injury claims without clear direction from Congress. Although “a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law” is not a prerequisite for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, Morrison, 561 U. S., at 255, where such a risk is evident, the need to enforce the presumption is at its apex. Respondents urge that concerns about international friction are inapplicable in this case because here the plaintiffs are not foreign citizens seeking to bypass their home countries’ less generous remedies but rather the foreign countries themselves. Brief for Respondents 52–53. Respondents assure us that they “are satisfied that the[ir] complaint . . . comports with limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction under international law and respects the dignity of foreign sovereigns.” Ibid. Even assuming that this is true, however, our interpretation of §1964(c)’s injury requirement will necessarily govern suits by nongovernmental plaintiffs that are not so sensitive to foreign sovereigns’ dignity. We reject the notion that we should forgo the presumption against extraterritoriality and instead permit extraterritorial suits based on a case-by-case inquiry that turns on or looks to the consent of the affected sovereign. See Morrison, supra, at 261 (“Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases”); cf. Empagran, 542 U. S., at 168. Respondents suggest that we should be reluctant to permit a foreign corporation to be sued in the courts of this country for events occurring abroad if the nation of incorporation objects, but that we should discard those reservations when a foreign state sues a U. S. entity in this country under U. S. law—instead of in its own courts and under its own laws—for conduct committed on its own soil. We refuse to adopt this double standard. “After all, in the law, what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for the gander.” Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6). B Nothing in §1964(c) provides a clear indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the United States. The statute provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a violation of §1962. §1964(c). The word “any” ordinarily connotes breadth, but it is insufficient to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. See Kiobel, 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). The statute’s reference to injury to “business or property” also does not indicate extraterritorial application. If anything, by cabining RICO’s private cause of action to particular kinds of injury—excluding, for example, personal injuries—Congress signaled that the civil remedy is not coextensive with §1962’s substantive prohibitions. The rest of §1964(c) places a limit on RICO plaintiffs’ ability to rely on securities fraud to make out a claim. This too suggests that §1964(c) is narrower in its application than §1962, and in any event does not support extraterritoriality. The Second Circuit did not identify anything in §1964(c) that shows that the statute reaches foreign injuries. Instead, the court reasoned that §1964(c)’s extraterritorial effect flows directly from that of §1962. Citing our holding in Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479 (1985) , that the “compensable injury” addressed by §1964(c) “necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern,” id., at 497, the Court of Appeals held that a RICO plaintiff may sue for foreign injury that was caused by the violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially, just as a substantive RICO violation may be based on extraterritorial predicates. 764 F. 3d, at 151. Justice Ginsburg advances the same theory. See post, at 4–5 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). This reasoning has surface appeal, but it fails to appreciate that the presumption against extraterritoriality must be applied separately to both RICO’s substantive prohibitions and its private right of action. See supra, at 18–22. It is not enough to say that a private right of action must reach abroad because the underlying law governs conduct in foreign countries. Something more is needed, and here it is absent.[10] Respondents contend that background legal principles allow them to sue for foreign injuries, invoking what they call the “ ‘traditional rule’ that ‘a plaintiff injured in a foreign country’ could bring suit ‘in American courts.’ ” Brief for Respondents 41 (quoting Sosa, 542 U. S., at 706–707). But the rule respondents invoke actually provides that a court will ordinarily “apply foreign law to determine the tortfeasor’s liability” to “a plaintiff injured in a foreign country.” Id., at 706 (emphasis added). Respondents’ argument might have force if they sought to sue RJR for violations of their own laws and to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction as a basis for proceeding in U. S. courts. See U. S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States”); 28 U. S. C. §1332(a)(4) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States”). The question here, however, is not “whether a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action provided by foreign or even international law. The question is instead whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under U. S. law” for injury suffered overseas. Kiobel, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8) (emphasis added). As to that question, the relevant background principle is the presumption against extraterritoriality, not the “traditional rule” respondents cite. Respondents and Justice Ginsburg point out that RICO’s private right of action was modeled after §4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. §15; see Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258 –268 (1992), which we have held allows recovery for injuries suffered abroad as a result of antitrust violations, see Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308 –315 (1978). It follows, respondents and Justice Ginsburg contend, that §1964(c) likewise allows plaintiffs to sue for injuries suffered in foreign countries. We disagree. Al-though we have often looked to the Clayton Act for guidance in construing §1964(c), we have not treated the two statutes as interchangeable. We have declined to transplant features of the Clayton Act’s cause of action into the RICO context where doing so would be inappropriate. For example, in Sedima we held that a RICO plaintiff need not allege a special “racketeering injury,” rejecting a requirement that some lower courts had adopted by “[a]nalog[y]” to the “antitrust injury” required under the Clayton Act. 473 U. S., at 485, 495. There is good reason not to interpret §1964(c) to cover foreign injuries just because the Clayton Act does so. When we held in Pfizer that the Clayton Act allows recovery for foreign injuries, we relied first and foremost on the fact that the Clayton Act’s definition of “person”—which in turn defines who may sue under that Act—“explicitly includes ‘corporations and associations existing under or authorized by . . . the laws of any foreign country.’ ” 434 U. S., at 313; see 15 U. S. C. §12.[11] RICO lacks the language that the Pfizer Court found critical. See 18 U. S. C. §1961(3).[12] To the extent that the Pfizer Court cited other factors that might apply to §1964(c), they were not sufficient in themselves to show that the provision has extraterritorial effect. For example, the Pfizer Court, writing before we honed our extraterritoriality jurisprudence in Morrison and Kiobel, reasoned that Congress “[c]learly . . . did not intend to make the [Clayton Act’s] treble-damages remedy available only to consumers in our own country” because “the antitrust laws extend to trade ‘with foreign nations’ as well as among the several States of the Union.” 434 U. S., at 313–314. But we have emphatically rejected reliance on such language, holding that “ ‘even statutes . . . that expressly refer to “foreign commerce” do not apply abroad.’ ” Morrison, 561 U. S., at 262–263. This reasoning also fails to distinguish between extending substantive antitrust law to foreign conduct and extending a private right of action to foreign injuries, two separate issues that, as we have explained, raise distinct extraterritoriality problems. See supra, at 18–22. Finally, the Pfizer Court expressed concern that it would “defeat th[e] purposes” of the antitrust laws if a defendant could “escape full liability for his illegal actions.” 434 U. S., at 314. But this justification was merely an attempt to “divin[e] what Congress would have wanted” had it considered the question of extraterritoriality—an approach we eschewed in Morrison. 561 U. S., at 261. Given all this, and in particular the fact that RICO lacks the language that Pfizer found integral to its decision, we decline to extend this aspect of our Clayton Act jurisprudence to RICO’s cause of action. Underscoring our reluctance to read §1964(c) as broadly as we have read the Clayton Act is Congress’s more recent decision to define precisely the antitrust laws’ extraterritorial effect and to exclude from their reach most conduct that “causes only foreign injury.” Empagran, 542 U. S., at 158 (describing Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982); see also id., at 169–171, 173–174 (discussing how the applicability of the antitrust laws to foreign injuries may depend on whether suit is brought by the Government or by private plaintiffs). Although this later enactment obviously does not limit §1964(c)’s scope by its own force, it does counsel against importing into RICO those Clayton Act principles that are at odds with our current extraterritoriality doctrine. C Section 1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or property and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries. The application of this rule in any given case will not always be self-evident, as disputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged injury is “foreign” or “domestic.” But we need not concern ourselves with that question in this case. As this case was being briefed before this Court, respondents filed a stipulation in the District Court waiving their damages claims for domestic injuries. The District Court accepted this waiver and dismissed those claims with prejudice. Respondents’ remaining RICO damages claims there-fore rest entirely on injury suffered abroad and must be dismissed.[13] * * * The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.Notes 1 In full, 18 U. S. C. §1962 provides: 2 In full, §1964(c) provides: 3 The complaint also alleges that RJR committed a variety of state-law torts. Those claims are not before us. 4 At an earlier stage of respondents’ litigation against RJR, the Second Circuit “held that the revenue rule barred the foreign sovereigns’ civil claims for recovery of lost tax revenue and law enforcement costs.” European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F. 3d 175, 178 (2005) (Sotomayor, J.), cert. denied, 546 U. S. 1092 (2006) . It is unclear why respondents subsequently included these alleged injuries in their present complaint; they do not ask us to disturb or distinguish the Second Circuit’s holding that such injuries are not cognizable. We express no opinion on the matter. Cf. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349 , n. 1 (2005). 5 Because a finding of extraterritoriality at step one will obviate step two’s “focus” inquiry, it will usually be preferable for courts to proceed in the sequence that we have set forth. But we do not mean to preclude courts from starting at step two in appropriate cases. Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223 –243 (2009). 6 The foreign killings would, of course, still have to satisfy the relatedness and continuity requirements of RICO’s pattern element. See H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229 (1989) . 7 As to §§1962(a) and (d), see supra, at 13–14. 8 We stress that we are addressing only the extraterritoriality question. We have not been asked to decide, and therefore do not decide, whether the complaint satisfies any other requirements of RICO, or whether the complaint in fact makes out violations of the relevant predicate statutes. 9 See Brief for Governments of Federal Republic of Germany et al. as Amici Curiae, O. T. 2003, No. 03–724, p. 11 (identifying “controversial features of the U. S. legal system,” including treble damages, extensive discovery, jury trials, class actions, contingency fees, and punitive damages); id., at 15 (“Private plaintiffs rarely exercise the type of self-restraint or demonstrate the requisite sensitivity to the concerns of foreign governments that mark actions brought by the United States government”); Brief for United Kingdom et al. as Amici Curiae, O. T. 2003, No. 03–724, p. 13 (“No other country has adopted the United States’ unique ‘bounty hunter’ approach that permits a private plaintiff to ‘recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.’ . . . Expanding the jurisdiction of this generous United States private claim system could skew enforcement and increase international business risks. It makes United States courts the forum of choice without regard to whose laws are applied, where the injuries occurred or even if there is any connection to the court except the ability to get in personam jurisdiction over the defendants”); see also Brief for Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 2003, No. 03–724, p. 14 (“[T]he attractiveness of the [U. S.] treble damages remedy would supersede the national policy decision by Canada that civil recovery by Canadian citizens for injuries resulting from anti-competitive behavior in Canada should be limited to actual damages”). Empagran concerned not the presumption against extraterritoriality per se, but the related rule that we construe statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with other nations’ sovereign authority where possible. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 164 (2004) ; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U. S. 764 –815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the two canons). As the foregoing discussion makes clear, considerations relevant to one rule are often relevant to the other. 10 Respondents note that Sedima itself involved an injury suffered by a Belgian corporation in Belgium. Brief for Respondents 45–46; see Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479 –484 (1985). Respondents correctly do not contend that this fact is controlling here, as the Sedima Court did not address the foreign-injury issue. 11 Pfizer most directly concerned whether a foreign government is a “person” that may be a Clayton Act plaintiff. But it is clear that the Court’s decision more broadly concerned recovery for foreign injuries, see 434 U. S., at 315 (expressing concern that “persons doing business both in this country and abroad might be tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expectation that the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at home”), as respondents themselves contend, see Brief for Respondents 44 (“[T]his Court clearly recognized in Pfizer that Section 4 extends to foreign injuries”). The Court also permitted an antitrust plaintiff to sue for foreign injuries in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690 (1962) , but the Court’s discussion in that case focused on the extraterritoriality of the underlying antitrust prohibitions, not the Clayton Act’s private right of action, see id., at 704–705, and so sheds little light on the interpretive question now before us. 12 This does not mean that foreign plaintiffs may not sue under RICO. The point is that RICO does not include the explicit foreign-oriented language that the Pfizer Court found to support foreign-injury suits under the Clayton Act. 13 In respondents’ letter notifying this Court of the waiver of their domestic-injury damages claims, respondents state that “[n]othing in the stipulation will affect respondents’ claims for equitable relief, including claims for equitable relief under state common law that are not at issue in this case before this Court.” Letter from David C. Frederick, Counsel for Respondents, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk of Court (Feb. 29, 2016). Although the letter mentions only state-law claims for equitable relief, Count 5 of respondents’ complaint seeks equitable relief under RICO. App. to Pet. for Cert. 260a–262a, Complaint ¶¶181–188. This Court has never decided whether equitable relief is available to private RICO plaintiffs, the parties have not litigated that question here, and we express no opinion on the issue today. We note, however, that any claim for equitable relief under RICO based on foreign injuries is necessarily foreclosed by our holding that §1964(c)’s cause of action requires a domestic injury to business or property. It is unclear whether respondents intend to seek equitable relief under RICO based on domestic injuries, and it may prove unnecessary to decide whether §1964(c) (or respondents’ stipulation) permits such relief in light of respondents’ state-law claims. We leave it to the lower courts to determine, if necessary, the status and availability of any such claims.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 . SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus RJR NABISCO, INC., et al. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 15–138. Argued March 21, 2016—Decided June 20, 2016 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibits certain activities of organized crime groups in relation to an enterprise. RICO makes it a crime to invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise “which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,” 18 U. S. C. §1962(a); to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, §1962(b); to conduct an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, §1962(c); and to conspire to violate any of the other three prohibitions, §1962(d). RICO also provides a civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of those prohibitions. §1964(c). Respondents (the European Community and 26 of its member states) filed suit under RICO, alleging that petitioners (RJR Nabisco and related entities (collectively RJR)) participated in a global money-laundering scheme in association with various organized crime groups. Under the alleged scheme, drug traffickers smuggled narcotics into Europe and sold them for euros that—through transactions involving black-market money brokers, cigarette importers, and wholesalers—were used to pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes into Europe. The complaint alleged that RJR violated §§1962(a)–(d) by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity that included numerous predicate acts of money laundering, material support to foreign terrorist organizations, mail fraud, wire fraud, and violations of the Travel Act. The District Court granted RJR’s motion to dismiss on the ground that RICO does not apply to racketeering activity occurring outside U. S. territory or to foreign enterprises. The Second Circuit reinstated the claims, however, concluding that RICO applies extraterritorially to the same extent as the predicate acts of racketeering that underlie the alleged RICO violation, and that certain predicates alleged in this case expressly apply extraterritorially. In denying rehearing, the court held further that RICO’s civil action does not require a domestic injury, but permits recovery for a foreign injury caused by the violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially. Held: 1. The law of extraterritoriality provides guidance in determining RICO’s reach to events outside the United States. The Court applies a canon of statutory construction known as the presumption against extraterritoriality: Absent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247 . Morrison and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. ___, reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues. First, the Court asks whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—i.e., whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. This question is asked regardless of whether the particular statute regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction. If, and only if, the statute is not found extraterritorial at step one, the Court moves to step two, where it examines the statute’s “focus” to determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute. If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the relevant conduct occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of whether other conduct occurred in U. S. territory. In the event the statute is found to have clear extraterritorial effect at step one, then the statute’s scope turns on the limits Congress has or has not imposed on the statute’s foreign application, and not on the statute’s “focus.” . 2. The presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted with respect to certain applications of RICO’s substantive prohibitions in §1962. . (a) RICO defines racketeering activity to include a number of predicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct, such as the prohibition against engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, §1957(d)(2), the prohibitions against the assassination of Government officials, §§351(i), 1751(k), and the prohibition against hostage taking, §1203(b). Congress has thus given a clear, affirmative indication that §1962 applies to foreign racketeering activity—but only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a particular case themselves apply extraterritorially. This fact is determinative as to §§1962(b) and (c), which both prohibit the employment of a pattern of racketeering. But §1962(a), which targets certain uses of income derived from a pattern of racketeering, arguably extends only to domestic uses of that income. Because the parties have not focused on this issue, and because its resolution does not affect this case, it is assumed that respondents have pleaded a domestic investment of racketeering income in violation of §1962(a). It is also assumed that the extraterritoriality of a violation of RICO’s conspiracy provision, §1962(d), tracks that of the RICO provision underlying the alleged conspiracy. . (b) RJR contends that RICO’s “focus” is its enterprise element, which gives no clear indication of extraterritorial effect. But focus is considered only when it is necessary to proceed to the inquiry’s second step. See Morrison, supra, at 267, n. 9. Here, however, there is a clear indication at step one that at least §§1962(b) and (c) apply to all transnational patterns of racketeering, subject to the stated limitation. A domestic enterprise requirement would lead to difficult line-drawing problems and counterintuitive results, such as excluding from RICO’s reach foreign enterprises that operate within the United States. Such troubling consequences reinforce the conclusion that Congress intended the §§1962(b) and (c) prohibitions to apply extraterritorially in tandem with the underlying predicates, without regard to the locus of the enterprise. Of course, foreign enterprises will qualify only if they engage in, or significantly affect, commerce directly involving the United States. . (c) Applying these principles here, respondents’ allegations that RJR violated §§1962(b) and (c) do not involve an impermissibly extraterritorial application of RICO. The Court assumes that the alleged pattern of racketeering activity consists entirely of predicate offenses that were either committed in the United States or committed in a foreign country in violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially. The alleged enterprise also has a sufficient tie to U. S. commerce, as its members include U. S. companies and its activities depend on sales of RJR’s cigarettes conducted through “the U. S. mails and wires,” among other things. . 3. Irrespective of any extraterritoriality of §1962’s substantive provisions, §1964(c)’s private right of action does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, and thus a private RICO plaintiff must allege and prove a domestic injury. . (a) The Second Circuit reasoned that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to §1964(c) independently of its application to §1962’s substantive provisions because §1964(c) does not regulate conduct. But this view was rejected in Kiobel, 569 U. S., at ___, and the logic of that decision requires that the presumption be applied separately to RICO’s cause of action even though it has been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions. As in other contexts, allowing recovery for foreign injuries in a civil RICO action creates a danger of international friction that militates against recognizing foreign-injury claims without clear direction from Congress. Respondents, in arguing that such concerns are inapplicable here because the plaintiffs are not foreign citizens seeking to bypass their home countries’ less generous remedies but are foreign countries themselves, forget that this Court’s interpretation of §1964(c)’s injury requirement will necessarily govern suits by nongovernmental plaintiffs. The Court will not forgo the presumption against extraterritoriality to permit extraterritorial suits based on a case-by-case inquiry that turns on or looks to the affected sovereign’s consent. Nor will the Court adopt a double standard that would treat suits by foreign sovereigns more favorably than other suits. . (b) Section 1964(c) does not provide a clear indication that Congress intended to provide a private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the United States. It provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a violation of §1962, but neither the word “any” nor the reference to injury to “business or property” indicates extraterritorial application. Respondents’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. In particular, while they are correct that RICO’s private right of action was modeled after §4 of the Clayton Act, which allows recovery for injuries suffered abroad as a result of antitrust violations, see Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308 –315, this Court has declined to transplant features of the Clayton Act’s cause of action into the RICO context where doing so would be inappropriate. Cf. Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479 . There is good reason not to do so here. Most importantly, RICO lacks the very language that the Court found critical to its decision in Pfizer, namely, the Clayton Act’s definition of a “person” who may sue, which “explicitly includes ‘corporations and associations existing under or authorized by . . . the laws of any foreign country,’ ” 434 U. S., at 313. Congress’s more recent decision to exclude from the antitrust laws’ reach most conduct that “causes only foreign injury,” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155 , also counsels against importing into RICO those Clayton Act principles that are at odds with the Court’s current extraterritoriality doctrine. . (c) Section 1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or property and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries. Respondents waived their domestic injury damages claims, so the District Court dismissed them with prejudice. Their remaining RICO damages claims therefore rest entirely on injury suffered abroad and must be dismissed. P. 27. 764 F. 3d 129, reversed and remanded. Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment, in which Breyer and Kagan, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment. Sotomayor, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

1960_44

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1960/44

"MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Georgia is the only State -- i(...TRUNCATED)

"\n\nThe Georgia Code, § 38-416, makes a person charged with a criminal offense incompetent to test(...TRUNCATED)

1983_83-321

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-321

"JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases require us to decide the extent to w(...TRUNCATED)

"\n\nAfter court-authorized wiretaps of telephones by Georgia police revealed a large lottery operat(...TRUNCATED)

1975_74-1471

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1471

"MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. The proxy rules promulgated by the Securit(...TRUNCATED)

"\n\nRule 14a-9, promulgated under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides that no(...TRUNCATED)