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Appeal No. 623 of 1975. From the Judgment and Order dated 25 6 74 of the Karna taka 'High Court in Civil Revision No 1981/73. S.S. JavaIi and B.P. Singh, for the Appellants. S.V. Gupte and K.N. Bhatt, for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. This appeal by special leave is from the judgment .dated 25 June, 1974 of the Karnataka High Court. The principal question in this appeal whether section 107 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 applies to the land in suit which was leased to the respondent. A large plot of land comprising an area of about 20 acres popularly known as "The Chamaraja Sewage Farm" situate in the city of Bangalore belongs to the appellant Corpora tion. The appellant :leased to the respondent by a regis tered lease dated 14 September, 270 1953 the aforementioned land for a period of 5 years on an annual rent of Rs. 13,555/ . The respondent by notice was called upon to hand over possession of the land immediately after the expiry of the period of lease. The respondent failed to deliver possession. The reason why the appellant required that land is that the Corporation proposed a scheme for the development and construction of a new township on that area. The respondent filed a suit for the grant of a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the possession. The Court upheld the contentions of the appellant that the lease had terminated by efflux of time. The respondent 's 'suit was dismissed. An appeal was pre ferred. The appeal was dismissed on 21 August,. The appellant then instituted the suit in appeal claim ing possession from the respondent. The appellant contended that the respondent was a trespasser and claimed damages for unauthorised occupation. The respondent contended that he was still a tenant. The respondent claimed protection under the Mysore Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961 being Act No. 15 of 1961. Section 3 of the Mysore Tenants (Temporary Protection from Evic . tion) Act, 1961 provided for prohibition against eviction. The appellant obtained a decree in the suit. The decree directed the respondent to deliver possession. The respond ent preferred an ' appeal. The High Court remanded the matter to the trial Court for assessment of damages. Upon remand the respondent applied for the amendment of the written statement. The respondent claimed protection under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. It may be stated here that the Mysore Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961 ceased to be in force in March, 1966. That is perhaps why the respondent made an applica tion for amendment of the written statement on 2 February 1973. The respondent contended relying on section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 that the. suit should be stayed by the civil court and should be referred to the Tribunal for decision. Section 112(B)(b) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 confers power on the Tribunal to decide inter alia whether a person is a tenant or not. The respondent contended that he was a person who was deemed to be a tenant. The appellant opposed the application for stay of the suit by the civil court and referring to the Tribunal for decision under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The trial Court held that the land ' belonging to the appellant was exempted from the application of the provisions of the Land Reforms Act. The trial Court dismissed the application of the respondent. The respondent presented a revision petition t0 the High Court. The High Court reversed the decision of the trial Court and directed the trial Court to refer such of the issues which are required to be. decided by the Tribunal. 271 Counsel for the respondent contended that the respondent is a tenant within the meaning of the word "tenant" defined in section 2(34) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. "Tenant" is defined to mean an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes (i) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under section 4 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, Section of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 states that a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivat ed personally by the owner and if such person is not (a) a member of the owner 's family, or (b) a servant or a hired labourer on wages, or (c) a mortgage in possession It was, therefore, said that the respondent could raise the con tention whether the respondent was a tenant or not. It was next contended that section 8 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 speaks of rent and rent is referable to tenant and therefore a dispute as to tenancy would be within the ambit of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. Section 107 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 states that subject to the provisions of section 110 nothing in this Act, except section 8 shall apply to lands, inter alia (iii) belonging to or held on lease or from a local authority. There is no dispute that the land was given on lease by the local authority. There is also no 'dispute that the land belongs to the local authority. There is also no dispute that the lease was detrmined by efflux of time. The question whether the respondent is a tenant or deemed to be a tenant does not at all arise because the tenancy came to an end. The 'respondent thereafter was a trespasser. Section 107 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 makes it quite clear that the only provision which applies, inter alia, to lands belonging to or hold on lease or from a local authority is section 8. No other section of the Land Reforms Act applies to these lands. Section 8 of the Karna taka Land Reforms Act, 1961 deals with rent. The suit in the present case was not for recovery of rent. The suit is for recovery of possession and for damages, for unauthorised occupation of the respondent. Section 2 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 is not applicable. Therefore, no question can be referred for determination by the Tribunal under section 133. The Mysore Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961 came into effect on 13 December, 1961. The Mysore Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961 remained in force till the month of March, 1966. The re spondent could not draw any support from that Act for pro tection against eviction. The land in question was outside the applicability of the Mysore Tenants (Temporary Protec tion from Eviction) Act, 1961. Further the Act ceased to be in operation in 1966 and no question could be referred for determination as to whether the respondent was a tenant under the Mysore Tenants (Temporary Protection from Evic tion) Act, 1961 or not. The trial Court in the present case rightly said that it could not be said that there was any dispute as to tenancy. 272 The respondent had filed a suit where he claimed to remain in possession. The suit of the respondent was dismissed. The appellant all along contended that the lease dated 14 September 1963 for a period of 5 years expired by efflux of time. The appellant claimed possession on the ground Of unauthorised occupation and claimed damages against the respondent, who was a trespasser. The High Court was clearly in error in referring to the Tribunal under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 1961 determi nation of the plea taken by the respondent that he was pro tected by the Mysore Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act 1961. Counsel for the respondent did not support the judgment on that ground. Counsel for the respondent contended that section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 1961 excludes jurisdiction of Civil court in suits for possession where the defendant claims to be a tenant. The plea of the respondent is utterly unsound. Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 1961 cannot apply to lands which are held by a person on lease from the local authority or where the lease had ex pired and the local authority sues for possession on the ground that there is unauthorised occupation. No provision of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act can be relied upon to contend that there should be protection against recovery of possession by the local authority. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the High Court is set aside. In view of the fact that no costs were al lowed by the High Court, there will be no order as to costs. M.R. Appeal allowed.

The respondent took the disputed land on lease for 5 years from the appellant Corporation, and held it unautho risedly after the lease period expired. His suit for a permanent injunction against interference with his posses sion, was dismissed, and his appeal rejected. The appellant then instituted the suit in appeal, claiming possession. The suit was decreed and the respondent was directed to deliver possession. On appeal, the High Court remanded the case. Upon remand, the respondent applied for an amendment of his written statement, claiming protection under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. He also applied for a stay of the suit by the Civil Court, and for a reference to the Tribunal for deciding whether he was a tenant or not. The application was dismissed, but on revision, the High Court reversed the decision. The principal question in appeal before this Court was whether section 107 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, was applicable to the disputed land held by the respondent. Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD: Section 107 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 makes it . quite clear that the only provision which applies to lands belonging to or held on lease or from a local authority is section 8. There is no dispute that the lease was determined by efflux of time. The question wheth er the respondent is a tenant or deemed to be a tenant does not arise because the tenancy came 'to an end. Section 8 is not applicable. Therefore no question can be referred for determination by the Tribunal under section 133. Section 133 cannot apply where the lease had expired and the local authority sues for possession on the ground that there is unauthorised occupation. [271 D, E, F, 272 C]

N: Criminal Appeal No. 718 of 1979 From the Judgment and Order dated 11 10 1979 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 110/77. A.K. Trivedi and S.S. Khanduja for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal is preferred by the three accused in Sessions Case No. 46 of 1976 against their conviction and sentence 354 imposed upon them by the High Court under the . The three appellants were tried by the Sessions Judge for commit ting offences punishable under section 302/120 B/323/324 read with section 34 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code for committing the murder of one Karsan Kala on 19 1 1976. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the three appellants of the charges levelled against them. The State of Gujarat filed an appeal against the order of Sessions Judge acquitting them, to the High Court of Gujarat. A division Bench of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 110/77 allowed the appeal of the State and reversed the order of acquittal by the Learned Sessions Judge and convicted them for offences under section 302/120 B and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. They were also convicted tor lesser offences and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment The prosecution strongly relied on the evidence of three eye witnesses Rata Mala, Ganesh and Ruda. Rata Mala was an injured eye witness having receives several incised injuries. The evidence of Ruda not accepted. The complainant Savai Kala, the brother of the deceased saw the latter part of the occurrence when the deceased was being carried away by the accused. When Savai Kala questioned, the accused attacked him and he was also injured The High Court in an elaborate judgment after thoroughly scrutinising the evidence of the eye witnesses accepted their testimony. It observed that the evidence of the eye witnesses Rata Mala is most reliable and trustworthy and so also the evidence of Ganesh. The High Court has referred to the circumstance under which the order of acquittal could be interfered 1, with in the light of the various decisions of this Court. The High Court taking into consideration the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for not accepting the testimony of the eye witnesses found them to be totally unacceptable. We have been taken through the evidence of the material witnesses. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the reasons given by the l rial Court for acquitting the accused are totally unacceptable. After hearing the learned counsel and examining the petition of appeal and after going through the relevant parts of the judgment of the High Court and the Sessions Court. we find that there are no sufficient grounds of interference. The appeal is summarily dismissed under S 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After we pronounced our judgment dismissing the appeal summarily under section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but before signing 355 the judgment, a decision of this Court Sita Ram & Ors. vs State of U.P. was brought to our notice wherein the scope of the power of the Courts to dismiss an appeal summarily under section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been referred. In that case an appeal was preferred to this Court under section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with section 2(a) of the . The appeal was listed for preliminary hearing under Rule 15(1) (c) of O.XXI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966. The Appellants filed an application for adducing additional grounds, namely, (1) the provisions under cl. (c) of sub rule (1) of Rule 15 of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal summarily is ultra vires being inconsistent with the provisions of the ; (2) the power of the Supreme Court to frame rules under article 145 of the Constitution cannot be extended to annul the rights conferred under an Act of Parliament and (3) an appeal under the cannot be dismissed summarily without calling for the records ordering notice to the State and without giving reasons. When the petition fr leave to adduce additional grounds came up before the Court, this Court ordered : "The appellants have challenged the constitutional validity of cl. (c) of sub rule (1) of rule 15 of O.XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, which enables an appeal of the kind with which we are concerned, to be placed for hearing ex parte before the Court for admission. In that view of the matter, we think that unless the question of the constitutional validity of the rule is decided, we cannot have a preliminary hearing. Of this appeal for admission. Let the records, therefore, be placed before the Hon 'ble the Chief Justice for giving such direction as he may deem fit and proper. " The matter was placed before a Bench of five Judges by the Hon 'ble the Chief Justice as the constitutional validity of cl. (c) of rule 15(1) of O.XXI of Supreme Court Rules, was challenged. Alongwith the question of constitutional validity, two other grounds referred to earlier were also raised. The contention of the Learned Counsel that a right of appeal cast an obligation on the Court to 356 send for records of the case, to hear both the parties and to make reasoned judgment, was not accepted by the judgment of the Court. Reasons given by the Court are as follows: "Counsel for the appellant insisted that an absolute right of appeal as he described it, casts an inflexible obligation on the court to send for the record of the case, to hear both parties, and to make a reasoned Judgment. Therefore, to scuttle the appeal by a summary hearing on a preliminary posting absent record, ex parte and absolved from giving reasons is to be absolutist a position absonent with the mandate of the Enlargement Act Act, indeed, of the Constitution in Article 134(1). Counsel 's ipsi dixit did not convince us but we have pondered over the issue in depth, being disinclined summarily to dismiss. " Regarding the power of the Court to summarily dismiss the appeal under section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the submission of the Learned Counsel was that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to the Supreme Court which contention was not accepted by the Court. Neither in the application for adducing additional grounds or in the order of the Court directing the matter to be placed before the Constitution Bench, there was any reference to The validity of section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Neither was it pleaded during the arguments that section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is ultra vires of the Constitution. As the question of validity of section 384 the Code of Criminal Procedure was neither raised nor argued, a discussion by the Court after "pondering over the issue in depth ' would not be a precedent binding on the Courts. The decision is an authority for the proposition that Rule ]5(1)(c) of O.XXI of the Supreme Court Rules should be read down as indicated in the decision. We are satisfied for the reasons stated above that the decision is no authority regarding the scope of section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order cf dismissal of the appeal summarily will stand, P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

The respondent a member of the Indian Air Force, retired from service on June 15, 1965 but was reemployed for a period of two years with effect from June 16, 1965. On September 7, 1966 the respondent was transferred to the Regular Air Force Reserve with effect from June 16, 1965 to June 15, 1970 i.e. for a period of five years. On March 13 1968 the reemployment given to the respondent ceased and his services were terminated with effect from April 1, 1968. A charge sheet was submitted against the respondent for having committed offences under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, during the period March 29, 1965 to March 16, 1967. The respondent filed a petition before the Special Judge for dropping the proceedings against him on the ground that the Judge could not take any cognizance of the offences in the absence of any valid sanction of the appointing authority OF the respondent. The application was rejected on the ground that as the respondent was not a Commissioned Officer in the Air Force at the time when the cognizance was taken, no sanction of the President was necessary. The respondent moved the High Court in revision, which quashed the proceedings, holding that as the respondent continued to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code inasmuch as he remained a member of Air Force Reserve, sanction was necessary before prosecuting the respondent. In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant: (1) that as the respondent had retired from the Indian Air Force and his employment was terminated with effect from April 1, 1968 he ceased to be a public servant and therefore no sanction was necessary, and (2) that reemployment under the provisions of the Regular Air Force Reserve Act would not amount to an employment in the Regular Force of the Service and therefore even though the respondent may have been reemployed he could not be said to hold the status of a public servant. Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. The prosecution must prove that at the time when cognizance of the offence was taken the respondent ceased to be a public servant. [700 C] In the instant case, the Special Judge took cognizance on June 19. 1969 at a time when the respondent continued to be a public servant having been reemployed and though his services were terminated only on April 1, 1968 he 698 continued to be a member of the Auxiliary Air Force upto July 15, 1970, that is a long time after cognizance of the offence was taken. [700 D] section A. Venkataraman vs The State ; State of West Bengal etc. vs Manmal Bhutoria & Ors. ; referred to. 2(i) The Provisions of the Auxiliary Air Force Act do not expressly contain the nature of the emoluments that the respondent may receive but the general tenor and setting of the Act clearly show that a member of the Auxiliary Force is as much a public servant as an acting member of the Indian Air Force. [703 G] (ii) Even after the respondent was transferred to the Auxiliary Air Force he retained his character as a public servant because he was required to undergo training and to be called up for service as and when required. [703 F]

it Petition (Civil) No. 623 of 1989. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). Rangarajan and San jay Parokh for the Petitioner. G.B. Pai, V.K. Sharma and R.K. Maheshwari for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 755 OJHA, J. The gravamen of the grievance of the petitioner is that even though she retired on 3 ist October 1977 on reaching the age of superannuation and even though she was entitled to pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits, the respondents have kept her deprived therefrom without any justification for all these long years. She has made a prayer that the respondents may be directed to make the requisite payments to her at least now when she was almost at the fag end of her life. Brief facts necessary for the decision of this petition are that the petitioner joined R.M. Arya Girls Patshala, New Delhi, which was an aided recognised school, as a primary teacher in the year 1952 and had been making contribution towards compulsory Provident Fund. On 17th October, 1975, the Administrator of the Delhi Administration in consultation with the Accountant General, Central Revenues, issued a notification in exercise of the power conferred on him by Rule 126 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) laying down detailed procedure for disbursement of pension and gratuity and accounting of General Provident Fund to the employees of the aided schools under the Delhi Education Act 1973 (for short the Act) and the Rules flamed thereunder. The sad notification, inter alia, provided: "Further rule 126 of the Delhi School Education Rules 1973 lays down that the Administrator shall, in consultation with the A.G.C.R. specify the detailed procedure for accounting of provident fund and payment of pension and gratuity to the employees of the aided schools. In order to implement the provision referred to above the detailed procedure is prescribed hereafter. In regard to matters not specified in the procedure the provi sions of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 as amended from time to time and other general provisions of the Act/ Rules shall apply. The employees of the aided schools shall be enti tled to pension and/or gratuity in accordance with the provisions and procedure applicable to the employees of the similar categories of Delhi Administration under the exist ing pension rules as contained in the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 as amended from time to time. These rules shall be applicable to these employees of the aided schools who were appointed on or after the commencement of the Act/Rules and also to the existing 756 employees who opt for the pension and gratuity within the stipulated period in the prescribed proforma. " The school in which the petitioner was working being an aided school under the Act and the notification aforesaid being applicable to its employees the petitioner made the requisite option in the prescribed proforma on 29th January 1976 which was duly countersigned by the Education Officer on 2nd April 1976. After her retirement, the petitioner made several representations for payment of pension and gratuity etc. to the authorities concerned but each time the peti tioner did not get any better response than an information that her case was under active consideration. By his letter dated 27th February, 1987, i.e. after nearly 10 years of the petitioner 's retirement, the Joint Director of Education (FIN.) Old Secretariat, Delhi, conveyed to her an additional information apart from the usual one namely that her case was under active consideration, that further action in the matter will be taken by the Department soon after the pro posal is approved by the Government of India. By a subse quent letter dated September 29, 1987, the petitioner was informed by the Education Officer that the Directorate of Education had referred the case to Government of India on 26th March, 1987 for policy decision. Ultimately the Direc torate Of Education, Delhi Administration, promulgated the decision of pension scheme in the primary aided schools on 6th December 1988. This decision, inter alia, provided for payment of grant in aid to the local authorities concerned for the implementation of the pension scheme already noti fied vide notification dated 17th October, 1975. The last paragraph of the decision provides that "pensionary benefits under these orders would apply with immediate effect, i.e. from the date of issue of these orders". The prayer made in this petition has been opposed by the New Delhi Municipal Committee by filing a counter affidavit. The objection raised by the said Committee is that since the pension scheme was finally promulgated in 1988 and has provided therein that the pensionary benefits were to apply from the date of issue of the requisite order in this behalf namely 6th December, 1988, the petitioner who retired on 31st October, 1977 that is more than 11 years before the final promulgation of the scheme was not entitled to any of the benefits claimed by her simply on the ground that she had opted for pension before her retirement in pursuance of the scheme notified on 17th October 1975 which was in the process of finalisation at the time of her retirement. It has also been contended on behalf of the said Committee that since modalities for grant in aid to the local authorities con 757 cerned for the implementation of the pension scheme were provided for by order dated 6th December 1988 the petitioner was not entitled to any pension before this date in any view of the matter. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the pleas raised on behalf of the Municipal Committee have no substance. As seen above, the requirement under the notification dated 17th October, 1975 with regard to the school, the employees of which were entitled to the benefits of the said notification was that it should be an aided school under the Act. The term "aided school" as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act means a recognised pri vate school which is receiving raid in the form of mainte nance grant from the Central Government, Administrator or local authority or any other authority assigned by the Central Government, Administrator or a 1ocal authority. In paragraph 1 of the petition under the caption "Facts" it has been specifically stated that R.M. Arya Girls Patshala was granted permanent recognition on 1.4.1936 and was also given grant in aid. The averments made in this behalf in sub paragraphs (b) and (c) ot paragraph III of the counter affidavit do not seem to seriously challenge what has been stated in paragraph 1 of the petition. It is, therefore, apparent that the school in which the petitioner was working was such, the employees of which were entitled to the bene fits/ conferred by the notification dated 17th October, 1975. The said notification as already pointed out above, inter alia, provided that in regard to matters not specified in the procedure the provisions of the Central Civil Serv ices (Pension), Rules, 1972 as amended from time to time shall apply. Rule 35 of these Rules provides that a superan nuation pension shall be granted to a Government servant who is retired on his attaining the age of compulsory retire ment. Rule 83 of these Rules, on the other hand, inter alia, lays down that the pension shall become payable from the date on which a government servant ceases to be borne on the establishment. Since these Rules will apply to the petition er as contemplated by notification dated 17th October 1975, she is obviously entitled to get pension with effect from the date on which she/ceased to be borne on the establish ment of the school in which she was working consequent upon reaching the age of superannuation. Rule 126 of the Rules under which the notification dated 17th October, 1975 had been issued gives the power to specify procedure for payment of pay and allowances, pension and gratuity etc. to the Administrator in consultation with the Accountant General, Central Revenues. The very opening words of the said notifi cation make it abundantly clear that the said notification had been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 126 of the Rules by the Administrator 758 in consultation with the Accountant General, Central Reve nues. The notification having thus been issued by the compe tent authority and the petitioner who was an existing em ployee of an aided school on the date of the issue of the said notification having opted for the pension and gratuity within the stipulated period in the prescribed proforma which was duly counter signed by the Education Officer, she obviously became entitled to the benefits conferred by the said notification. This is so all the more in view of the fact that the notification dated 17th October, 1975 did not contemplate finalisation of the modalities about contribu tion towards pension fund as a condition precedent to the entitlement of the benefits under the said notification. The finalisation of the said modalities was a matter of details among the authorities concerned and could have no bearing on the entitlement to the benefits of the notification dated 17th October, 1975. Such finalisation could not even defer the date of the entitlement: Likewise the said notification did not contemplate any approval by the Government of India as a condition precedent to its enforceability. In this connection, it is also of significance that no statutory provision has been brought to our notice which made approval by the Government of India of the notification dated 17th October, 1975 issued by the competent authority as a condition precedent to the enforce ability of the said notification. As seen above, for nearly 10 years after her retirement the petitioner was being informed in reply to her various representations that her case was under active consideration. It is only in 1987 that the plea that further action in the matter will be taken by the Department soon after the proposal is approved by the Government of India was raised and the case was referred by the Directorate of Education to the Government of India on 26th March 1987 for policy decision. Why it became necessary to do so in 1987 is a matter of anybody 's guess. If, at all, it only indicates the callous attitude of the authorities concerned towards the fate of retired employees of aided schools in the matter of grant of pension and other retire ment benefits to them. For ought we know, but for the sin cere effort made by the Indian Council for Legal Aid and Advice in this case, which apparently deserves commendation, the agony which the petitioner must have suffered during the long years after her retirement may have remained unnoticed and unmitigated. No acceptable justification having been given for denying the pension to the petitioner from the date of her retirement as also the other retirement benefits the petitioner is obviously entitled to these benefits. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The respon 759 dents are directed to pay to the petitioner pension admissi ble to her in pursuance of the notification dated 17th October, 1975 with effect from the date of her retirement and also to pay to her the other retirement benefits. They are further directed to finalise the requisite formalities in this behalf within three months and to issue payment orders immediately thereafter. The petitioner shall be entitled to her costs from respondents 1 and 2 which is assessed at Rs.2,000. G.N. Petition allowed.

M/s Dabur India Limited, petitioner in one set of peti tions, is a public limited company engaged in the manufac ture of Ayurvedic as well as Allopathic medicaments, along with cosmetics. It used to manufacture for and on behalf of M/s Sharda Boiren Laboratories The petitioner in the second set of petitions a Homeopathic tooth paste called 'Homeo dent ' out of the raw materials supplied by M/s Sharda, on job basis. It accordingly manufactured Homeodent during 1985 to 1988, duly paying duties of excise on Homeodent under the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944. The Superintendent of State Excise visited the factory of M/s Dabur on 18th January, 1988 and enquired about the excisability of Homeodent under the Medicinal & Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955. He was told that Homeodent had been classified under the 1944 Act in view of the orders passed by the Central Excise authorities. Howev er, when it was revealed that the Homeodent tooth paste was toilet preparation containing alcohol, within the meaning of section 2(k), read with Item 4 of the Schedule, referred to in section 3 of the 1955 Act, the District Excise Officer caused a common notice dated 17.3.1988 to be served on M/s Dabur requiring it to pay duty aggregating to Rs.68,13,334.20 under the provisions of the 1955 Act on such 295 goods manufactured and cleared between January 1985 and January 1988. This order was passed without issuing any notice to show cause, and without affording any opportunity of hearing, to the petitioner. The Petitioner sent a representation requesting for compliance with the principles of natural justice and also disputing the amount claimed as duty. On 18th March, 1988 the Superintendent of State Excise modified the earlier order and confirmed the demand of duty amounting to Rs.46.67 lakhs, on provisional basis. On that day the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 11.66 lakhs and further executed a bank guarantee for the balance. Simultaneously, the peti tioner appealed against the order dated 18th March, 1988. The Excise Commissioner dismissed the appeal. No appeal was filed by M/s Sharda against the demand notice of excise duty under the 1955 Act. The petitioner moved the High Court. On 13th May, 1988 the High Court directed the petitioner to file a revision petition with the Central Government. Both the petitioners then approached the Central Government in revision. On 22nd September, 1988 the Additional Secretary to the Government of India in exercise of his revisional powers allowed the revision filed by M/s Dabur and declared the orders of the District Excise Officer and the Excise Commissioner as null and void having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The revision filed by M/s Sharda was not entertained by the Central Government on the ground that a right of appeal was vested in Sharda, which was not availed of. The High Court dismissed Sharda 's petition challenging the order of the Central Government declining to entertain its review. Against the order of the High Court M/s Sharda have filed the special leave petition in this Court. On the basis of the revision order, the petitioners called upon the District Excise Officer to refund the amount of Rs.46.67 lakhs recovered from it by way of cash payment and encashment of bank guarantee. The State Excise authori ties however failed to grant the refund, and instead issued a fresh show cause notice to the petitioners jointly on 2nd November, 1988. In December 1988, M/s Dabur moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing and setting aside the showcase notice dated 2.11.1988 and for refund of duty amounting to Rs.46.67. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The High Court was 296 of the opinion that the question whether Homeodent tooth paste was sans alcohol could not be adjudicated upon under the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The High Court however came to the conclusion that both the 1944 and 1955 Acts operated in different fields and there was no overlapping between the two. The High Court further observed that where the parties fully acquiesced with the matter and subjected themselves to the statutory procedure, no action should be allowed to be taken under Article 226 of the Constitution unless the case was patently without jurisdiction. In this connection, it was emphasised by the High Court that once the parties chose the statutory procedure they must go to the logical end. It was inter alia urged before this Court on behalf of the petitioner that it was not seeking to circumvent the alternative remedy provided under the Act but in view of the conflicting claims of the Central and State Excise authori ties seeking to classify Homeodent tooth paste under the respective Acts of 1944 and 1955, the petitioner was left with no other alternative but to challenge the actions by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was further contended that Homeodent did not contain alcohol but contained ingredient "mother tincture" contain ing alcohol, which had a tendency to evaporate during the process of manufacture of Homeodent; that no test result as required under the 1955 Act was obtained to establish wheth er Homeodent contained alcohol or not; and that on 31st August, 1987 the Assistant Collector of Central Excise had already passed an order classifying Homeodent under the Act of 1944 which order had been upheld by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals). The main point that the petitioner sought to emphasis was that the High Court ought to have appreciated that Homeodent tooth paste having been subjected to duty under the provisions of the 1944 Act, the question of levying and recovering duty under the 1955 Act did not and could not arise. Dismissing the petitions, this Court, HELD: (1) Homeodent is a homeopathic preparation but it is also a tooth paste. Therefore, it is a toilet prepara tion. Whether or not such Homeodent would not be dutiable under the Medicinal & Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955 would depend upon whether it contained alcohol or not. [315E] (2) It is undisputed that mother tincture was one of the components that was used in the preparation of Homeodent and it has been found that alcohol was there and mother tincture was added in the 297 medicinal preparation as its component. [315G] M/s Baidyanath Aryurved Bhawan (Pvt.) Ltd. Jhansi vs The Excise Commissioner U.P., , referred to. (3) The authorities charged with the duties of enforcing a particular Act are enjoined with the task of determining the question whether alcohol is contained therein or not. [310D] (4) It has been determined by the authorities enjoined to enforce the 1955 Act that Homeodent was a medicinal and toilet preparation and liable to excise duty, and such finding has not been assailed on any cogent ground in any proper manner. If that is the position, then it must be upheld that Homeodent was dutiable. [317D] Union of India vs Bombay Tyre International Ltd., ; ; Mohanlal Magan Lal Bhavsar vs Union of India, and N.B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay vs The Elphinston Spinning and Weav ing Mills Co. Ltd.; , , referred to. (5) Provisions for rebate of duty on alcohol contained in section 4 of the 1955 Act show that multipoint tax on medicinal preparations containing alcohol was within the contemplation, otherwise there was no purpose in incorporat ing section 4 into the Act. [316B] (6) Justice requires that provisions for claiming refund of this duty should be made more clear. However, in the view of the facts and the circumstances that have happened, it is directed that if the petitioners are entitled to any refund of the duty already paid to the Central Government in view of the duty imposition now upheld against them in favour of the State Government such refund application should be entertained and considered in accordance with law. [316E F] (7) In a case of this nature, where there is some doubt as to whether duty was payable to the Central Government under the 1944 Act or whether the item was dutiable under the 1955 Act, it would be just and proper and in consonance with justice infiscal administration that the Central Gov ernment should consider in the light of the facts found, if an application is made under section 11B of the 1944 Act, and circumstances of this case, the limitation period under section 11B of the 1944 Act should not apply. This direction must be confined in the facts and the circumstances of this case only. [316G H; 317A] 298 Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. vs D.R.O., [1973] Mad. Law Journal 99; Union of India vs Bombay Tyre Interna tional Ltd.; , and Assistant Collector of Central Excise vs Madras Rubber Factory Ltd., [1986] supp. SCC 751, referred to. (8) Government should consider feasibility of a machin ery under a Council to be formed under Article 263 of the Constitution to adjudicate and adjust the dues of the re spective Governments. [318D] (9) This Court would not like to hear from a litigant in this country that the Government is coercing citizens of this country to make payment which the litigant is contend ing not leviable. Government, of course, is entitled to enforce payment and for that purpose to take all legal steps but the Government, Central or State, cannot be permitted to play dirty games with the citizens to coerce them in making payments which the citizens were not legally obliged to make. If any money is due to the Government, the Government should take steps but not take extra legal steps or manoeu vre. Therefore, the right of renewal of the petitioner of licence must be judged and attended to in accordance with law and the occasion not utilised to coerce the petitioners to a course of action not warranted by law and procedure. [318A C]

Appeals Nos. 50 of 1968 and 1201 of 1970. From the judgment and Order dated the 20th January 1966, and ' 26th November 1968 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 1124 of 1963 and 153 of 1966. K.S. Ramamurthy and section Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in both the appeals). S.V. Gupte and A.S. Nambiar, for respondent Nos. 1 3 (in both ., the appeals). section Govindaswaminathan, A.V. Rangam, N.S. Sivam and A. Subshashini, for respondent No. 5 (in both the appeals). B.R. Agrawala, for intervener (in C.A. 50/68). The Judgment of A.N. Ray, C.J., H.R. Khanna and A. Alagiri swami, JJ. was delivered by Alagiriswami, J. The dissenting Opinion of ' K.K. Mathew and P.N. Bhagwati JJ. was delivered by Bhagwati, J. ALAGIRISWAMI, J. The appellants are the tenants of a property bearing door Nos. 16 and 17 on the Poonamallee High Road in the city of Madras. They became tenants of this building in May 1929, when the property was with one of the predecessors in title of the present landlords, who are the respondents in these appeals. Though, the appellants became tenants in 1929 a registered lease deed came into existence only in 1935 under which the lease was to run upto 1 5 1969. The lessee was entitled to renewal on the same terms, and conditions for another period of fifteen years. The monthly rent agreed upon was Rs. 225/ and a sum of Rs. 225/ was payable as an annual contribution towards repairs and Rs. 220/ towards public charges and taxes. In 1949 the parties mutually agreed that the tenants were to pay a 25 per cent increase in rent and also certain other amounts, The present landlords purchased the property in 1962 and soon after filed an application under Section 4 of the Madras (now Tamil Nadu) Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 for fixation of fair rent. Thereupon the tenants filed writ Petition No. 1124 of 1963 seeking, to restrain the landlords from proceeding with that petition. The learned Single Judge who heard the petition felt that in view of a long, series of decisions of Madras High Court under the various Rent Control Acts in force in Madras that they applied also to contractual 632 tenancies in the matter of payment of rent as well as eviction, the matter should be considered by a Full Bench in view of the decisions of this Court in Rent Control cases from certain other States. The Full Bench after an elaborate consideration came to the conclusion that the Act controls both contractual as well as statutory tenancies, that it is a complete Code, and enables both landlords and tenants to seek the benefit of fixation of fair rent, whether a contractual tenancy prevails or it has been determined. Thereafter the matter again came up before the same learned Single Judge who, applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case held that the Act did not apply to the premises in question. On appeal by the landlords a Division Bench of the High Court held that the premises were not exempted from the provisions of the Act and the Rent Controller has therefore jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of on merits the application for fixation of fair rent filed by the landlords. These two appeals ;are against the judgments of the Full Bench (reported in and the Division Bench respectively. Before we go further into a discussion of the questions that arise :it is necessary to look into certain relevant provisions of the Act. Clause (6) of section 2 of the Act defines landlord thus : "Landlord" includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account .or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or ' .,guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant;" Clause 8, in so far as it is relevant, defines tenant as follows "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant 's family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. Section 4 provides for an application for fixation of a fair rent by the tenant as well as the landlord. The fair rent for any residential building is to be six per cent gross return per annum on the total cost of the building if it is residential and nine percent if it is nonresidential. The total cost has to be calculated by taking the cost of const ruction at prescribed rates less depreciation at prescribed rates as well as the market value of the site on which the building stands. It is to include allowances for such considerations as locality, features of architectural interest, accessibility to market, dispensary or hospital, nearness to the railway station or educational institution and such ,other amenities as may be prescribed. 633 Section 5 provides that when the fair rent of a building has been fixed no further increase shall be permissible except in cases where some addition, improvement or alteration has been carried out at the landlord 's expense and at the tenant 's request. Similarly,. if there is a decrease or diminution in the accommodation or amenities provided,, the tenant may claim a reduction in the fair rent. Section 6 provides for payment of additional sums in cases where the taxes and cesses payable to local authorities are increased. Section 7 prohibits the landlord from claiming or receiving or stipulating for the payment of any premium or anything in excess of ' fair rent. It also provides that where a fair rent has not been fixed the landlord shall not claim anything in excess of the agreed rent. Section 10 deals with the eviction of tenants and lays down the conditions under which an eviction could be asked for. One of those conditions mentioned in sub section (3) is when the Landlord requires. a residential building for his own occupation or a non residential building for the purpose of his business. Clause (d) of sub section (3) provides that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under that sub section before the expiry of such period. Sections 12 and 14 provide for recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for reconstruction. Section 17 provides that the landlord is not to interfere with the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. Section 30 exempts from the provisions of the Act (1) any building the construction of which was completed after the commencement of the Act, and (2) any residential building in respect of which the monthly rent payable exceeds two hundred and, fifty rupees. We shall refer to other details as and when they become relevant. The above short analysis of the Act would show that the Act provides for every contingency that is likely to arise in the relationship ,of landlord and tenant. On behalf of the appellants reliance is placed upon two decisions of this Court, Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwanddin vs Dave Bhagwat prasad Prabhuprasad ; and Manujendra vs Purendu Prasad ; They are cases dealing with eviction. In those two cases it was held, broadly speaking, that the provisions of the Acts there under consideration were in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. There are certain general observations in those two decisions upon which reliance was placed to contend that they apply to cases of fixation of rent also. The argument was that as it was held in those cases that the Acts did not provide the landlord with additional rights which he did not possess under his contract of tenancy, similarly where there was a subsisting 634 contract of tenancy it is not open . to the landlord to take advantage of the provisions of the Act to apply for fixation of a fair rent at a figure higher than the contract rent. We are not called upon in this case to consider whether those two cases were correctly decided. But we must point out that the general observations therein should be confined to the facts of those cases. Any general observation ,cannot apply in interpreting the provisions of an Act unless this Court has applied its mind to and analysed the provisions of that particular Act. We may also point out that in both those cases the contract of 'tenancy was not subsisting. In a sense, therefore, the observations therein were not really necessary for deciding those cases. We may also point out that in Rai Brii Raj Krishna vs S.K. Shaw Bros. ; dealing with the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 and interpreting section 11 of that Act this Court observed as follows : '. 'Section 11 begins with the words 'Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the,contrary ', and hence any attempt to import the provisions relating to the law of transfer of property for the interpretation of the section would seem to be out of place. Section II is a self contained section, and it is wholly unnecessary to go outside the Act for determining whether a tenant is liable to be evicted or not, and under what conditions he can be evicted. It clearly provides that a tenant is not liable to be evicted except on certain conditions, and one of the conditions laid down for the eviction of a month to month tenant is non payment of rent." 'Similarly in Shri Hem Chand vs Shrimati Sham Devi (ILR 1955 Punj 36) which dealt with the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, section 13(i) of which provided that no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, it was h. Id that the Act provided the procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment and that being so the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer or Property Act had no relevance. Both these cases were referred to in the decision in Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwanddin vs Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad. Therefore, the following observations in Manujendra ,vs Purendu Prosad that "Rent Acts are not ordinarily intended to interfere with contractual leases and are Acts for the protection of tenants and are consequently restrictive and not enabling, conferring no new rights of action but restricting the existing rights either under the contract or under the general law." should not be held to apply to all Rent Acts irrespective of the scheme of those Acts and their provisions. The decision of the Madras High 'Court in R. Krishnamurthy vs Parthasarathy (AIR 1949 Mad. 780 1 949 where it was held that section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1946 had its own scheme 635 of procedure and therefore there was no question of an attempt to reconcile that Act with the Transfer of Property Act and that an application for eviction could be made to the Rent Controller even before the contractual tenancy was terminated by a notice to quit, should not have been summarily dismissed on the grounds that it was contrary to the decisions of this Court in Abbasbhai 's Case ; and Mangilal 's Case ; and therefore was not a correct law, without examining the provisions of that Act. Be that as it may, we are now concerned with the question of fixation of a fair rent. The legislation regarding control of rents started during the Second World War. In Madras first two orders under the Defence of India Rules were issued as the Madras House Rent Control Orders, 1941 and the Madras Godown Rent Control Order, 1942. In1945 these orders were reissued with slight changes, as the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945 and the Madras Non Residential Buildings Rent Control Order, 1945. These were replaced by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946. Under that Act for the first time both the tenant as well as the landlord were given the right to apply for fixation of a fair rent. This Act was later replaced by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, which again had a similar provision. But the important thing to note about the fixation of a fair rent under both these Acts is that the fair rent was related to the rents prevailing in April 1940 and only a fixed percentage of increase from 8 11/3 to 50 per cent depending upon the rent payable was allowed. The 1960 Act which replaced the 1949 Act adopted a completely new scheme of its own. It provided for the fixation of a fair rent on the basis of the cost of construction and the cost of land and after allowing for depreciation provided for a return of 6 per cent in the case of residential buildings and 9 per cent in the case of non residential buildings. It also provided for increase in rent for such factors as locality, nearness to railway station, market, hospital, school etc. Another significant fact is that all new buildings constructed after 1960 were exempt from the scope of the Act. Still another departure was that the Act applies, in the case of residential buildings, only if the monthly rent does not exceed Rs. 250. The Act also provides for fixation of fair rent under the new provisions even though fair rent for the building might have been fixed under the earlier repealed enactments. All these show that the Madras Legislature had applied its mind to the problem of housing and control of rents and provided a scheme of its own. It did not proceed on the basis that the legislation regarding rent control was only for the benefit of the tenants. It wanted it to be fair both to the landlord as well as the tenant. Apparently it realised that the pegging of the rents at the 1940 rates had discouraged building construction activity which ultimately is likely to affect every body and therefore in order to encourage new constructions exempted them altogether from the provisions of the Act. It did not proceed on the basis that all tenants belonged to the weaker section of the community and needed protection and that all landlords 636 belonged to the better off classes. It confined the protection of the Act to the weaker section paying rents below Rs. 250. It is. clear, therefore, that the Madras Legislature deliberately proceeded on the basis that fair rent was to be fixed which was to be fair both to the landlords as well as to the tenants and that only the poorer classes of tenants needed protection. The facile assumption on the basis of which an argument was advanced before this Court that all Rent Acts are intended for the protection of tenants and, therefore, this Act also should be held to be intended only for the protection of tenants breaks down when the provisions of the Act are examined in detail. The provision that both the tenant as well as the landlord can apply for fixation of a fair rent would become meaningless if fixation of fair rent can only be downwards from the contracted rent and the contract rent was not to be increased. Of course, it has happened over the last few years that rents have increased enormously and that is why it is argued on behalf of the tenants that the contract rents should not be changed. If we could contemplate a situation where rents and prices are coming down this argument will break down. It is a realisation of the fact that prices and rents have enormously increased and there fore if the rents are pegged at 1940 rates there would be no new construction and the community as a whole would suffer that led the Madras Legislature to exempt new buildings from the scope of the Act, it realised apparently how dangerous was the feeling that only "fools build houses for wise men to live in". At the time the 1960 Act was passed the Madras Legislature had before it the precedent of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956. That Act provides for fixation of fair rent. It also provides that the contract rent, if lower, will be payable during the contract period. Even if the contract rent is higher only the fair rent will be payable. After the contract period is over only the fair rent is payable. The Madras Legislature having this Act in mind still made only the fair rent payable and not the contract rent if it happens to be lower. It is clear, therefore, that the fair rent under the present Act is payable during the contract period as well as after the expiry of the contract period. It was argued that the basis of the decisions in Rai Brij Raj Krishan 's Case and Shri Hem Chand 's Case was the non obstante clause in those two Acts. But it is well settled that the intention that a legislation should, take effect notwithstanding any earlier legislation on the subject can be both explicit and implicit and that is the Position in the present case. We do not also feel called upon to refer to the decisions in Glossop vs Ashley , a Newell vs Crayford Cottage Society , and Kerr vs Bryde , nor to the various statements regarding the law in Megarry 's work on the Rent Acts relied upon by Sri K. section Ramamurthy on behalf of the appellants. They are based on the relevant provisions of the Act,in force in England particularly section 3(1) of the Increase of Rent & Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920 which reads. 637 "Nothing in this Act shall be taken to authorise any increase of rent except in respect of a period during which but for this Act the landlord would be entitled to obtain possession. " The provisions of the Act under considerations show that the are to take effect notwithstanding any contract even during the subsistence of the contract. We have already referred to the definition of the terms 'landlord ' and 'tenant ' which applies both to subsisting tenancies as well as tenancies which might have come to an end. We may also refer to the provision in section 7(2) which lays down that where the fair rent of a building has not been fixed the landlord shall not claim anything in addition to the agreed rent, thus showing that the fair rent can be fixed even where there is an agreed rent. That is why we have earlier pointed out that the various English decisions which provide for fixation of rent only where the contractual tenancy has come to an end do not apply here. We may also refer to sub section (3) of section 16 which deals with cases where a landlord requires a residential or non residential building for his own use. Clause (d) of that sub section provides that where the tenancy is for a term the landlord cannot get possession before the expiry of the term, thus showing that in other cases of eviction covered by section 10 eviction is permissible even during the continuance of the contractual tenancy if the conditions laid down in section 10 are satisfied. The Madras High Court reviewed all the decisions of this Court ' except the latest one in Manujendra vs Purendu Prosad. We have already pointed out that the criticism made in that decision regarding Krishnamurthy 's Case was not justified. We are in agreement with the view of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court that the various decisions of this Court were based upon particular provisions of the Acts. which were under consideration, mainly the Bombay Act which is vitally different from the Madras Act. A close analysis of the Madras Act shows that it has a scheme of its own and it is intended to provide a complete code in respect of both contractual tenancies as well as what are popularly called statutory tenancies. As noticed earlier the definition of the term 'landlord ' as well as the term 'tenant ' shows that the Act applies to contractual tenancies as well as cases of "statutory tenants" and their. landlords. On some supposed general principles governing all Rent Acts it cannot be argued that such fixation can only be for the benefit of the tenants when the Act clearly lays down that both landlords and tenants can apply for fixation of fair rent. A close reading of the Act shows that the fair rent is fixed for the building and it is payable by whoever is the tenant whether a contractual tenant. or statutory tenant. What is fixed is not the fair rent payable by the tenant or to the landlord who applies for fixation of fair rent act fair rent for the building, something like an incident of the fair regarding the building. We have then to deal with Civil Appeal No. 1201 of 1970.The learned Single Judge considering that as the total amount annually in respect of these premises was Rs. 5032/ , which lakhs the rent payable to exceed Rs. 400/ a month, the building was outside 15 M602Sup. CI 74 638 the scope of the Act and therefore the petition for fixation of fair rent does not lie. (This provision was removed by an Amending Act of 1964). The learned Judges of the Division Bench on the other hand held that the agreement of the year 1949 between the landlord and the tenant by which the rent was increased was one in variation of a written contract and therefore evidence of it is barred under section 92 of the Evidence Act. Clearly any variation of rent reserved by a registered lease deed must be made by another registered instrument. We are not able to accept the argument of Sri K. section Ramamurthy on behalf of the tenants that the agreement of 1949 was one by the landlord to give up his right to apply for fixation of fair rent in consideration of the additional rent agreed to be paid by the tenant and is, therefore, not covered by section 92 of the Evidence Act. The correspondence between the parties makes it clear beyond doubt that the agreement was to pay increased rent. If this agreement is left out of account the rent payable is below Rs. 400/ a month, and, therefore, the decision of the Division Bench is correct. Before concluding we must refer to one other argument on behalf of the appellants. Under section 30 of the Act, as originally enacted, any residential building the rent of which exceeded Rs. 250 / per month and any non residential building whose rent exceeded Rs. 400/ a month were outside the scope of the Act. In 1964 the Act was amended so as to provide that all non residential buildings would be within the scope of the Act. This amendment was attacked on the ground that it contravened the provisions of article 19(1) of the Constitution. In view of our finding earlier that this case should be decided on the basis of the monthly rent being below Rs. 400/ this argument does not fall to be considered. In the result the appeals are dismissed. The appellants will pay the respondents ' costs. BHAGWATI J. We have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by our brother Alagiriswami, J., and though we, agree with him in regard to the decision in Civil Appeal No. 1201 of 1970, we find it difficult to assent to the view taken by him in Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1968. The facts giving rise to the two appeals have been stated clearly and succinctly in the judgment given by our learned brother and we think it would be a futile exercise to reiterate them. We may straight away proceed to examine the question which arises for consideration in. Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1968. The question is whether a landlord can during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, apply for fixation of fair rent under section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960). The determination of this question depends on the true interpretation of certain provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 and we may, therefore, refer to those provisions and see what is their proper meaning and effect. The long title and the preamble of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 show that it is enacted "to amend and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and non residential buildings and the control of rents of such buildings and the preven 639 tion of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil .Nadu". See, 2, cl. (6) gives an inclusive definition of 'landlord ' and according to this definition, 'landlord ' includes "the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant". Thus the owner of a building which becomes vacant would be 'landlord ' within the meaning of that expression as defined in section 2, cl. (6) and so also would be the landlord during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy as also after the termination of the contractual tenancy where the tenant continues to remain in possession of the building. 'Tenant ' is defined in section 2, cl. (8) to mean "any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who had been living with to tenant in the building as a member of the tenant 's family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour". This definition is wide enough to include not only a contractual tenant but also a tenant remaining in possession of the building affect the termi nation of the contractual tenancy. Section 3 enacts detailed provisions regulating the letting of residential and non residential buildings. The broad scheme of this section is that when a building becomes vacant, the landlord is required to give notice of the vacancy to the authorised officer and if the building is required "for the purposes of the State or Central Government or of any local authority or of any public institution under the control of any such Government or for the occupation of any officer of such Government", the authorised officer may give necessary intimation in that behalf to the landlord and on receipt of such intimation, the landlord would be bound to deliver possession of the building to the authorised officer or to the allottee named by the authorised officer, as the case may be, and the Government would be deemed to be the tenant of the landlord on such terms as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the Government, or in default of agreement, determined by the Controller. The rent payable by the Government to the landlord would be the "fair rent, if any, fixed for the. building under the provisions of this Act and if no fair rent has been so fixed, such reasonable rent as the authorised officer may determine", but "the reasonable rent fixed by the authorised officer shall be subject to such fair rent as may be fixed by the Controller". Section 4 provides for fixation of fair rent of a building on the application of the tenant or the landlord. Sub section (1) of the section is material and it says that "The Controller shall, on, application by the tenant or the landlord of a building and .after holding such inquiry as the Controller thinks fit, fix the fair rent for such building in accordance with the principles set out in subsection (2) or in sub section (3) as the case may be, and such other principles as may be prescribed". Sub section (2) lays down the principles for fixation of fair rent of residential building and sub section (3), for fixation of fair rent of non residential building. The fiar rent is to be such as would provide 6 % gross_return per annum on 640 the total cost of the building, if it is residential and 9 gross return per annum on the total cost of the building, if it is non residential. The total cost of the building is to be computed by taking the cost of construction as calculated according to the prescribed rates less depreciation also at the prescribed rates and adding to it the market value of that portion of the site on which the building is constructed and making allowances for such considerations as locality in which the building is situated, features of architectural interest, accessibility to market, dispensary or hospital, nearness to the railway station or educational institution and such other amenities as may be prescribed. It may be pointed out that under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 and the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, which preceded the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, the scheme of fixation of fair rent was different, in that the fair rent was related "to the prevailing rate of rent in the locality for the same or similar accommodation in similar circumstances during the twelve months period to 1st April, 1940" and only a fixed percentage of increase varying from 8 1/3 % to 50 % was allowed on such rate of rent, depending upon whether it exceeded or did not exceed a certain limit ' But the Legislature while enacting the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 made a departure from that scheme presumably because it felt that in view of the staggering and disproportionately heavy fall in, the purchasing power of the rupee over the last 30 years, it was most, unrealistic to peg the fair rent to the level of rents prevailing during the period of 12 months prior to 1st April, 1940 and allow only an ad hoc percentage of increase, and therefore, in section 4, sub sections (2) and (3), it adopted a different basis for fixation of fair rent which would not unduly depreciate the yield permissible to the landlord and at the same time, be not extortionate or exploitative of the tenant. Now once the fair rent of a building is fixed under section 4, sub section (1), no further increase in such fair rent is 'permissible except in cases where some addition, improvement or alteration has been carried out at the expense of the landlord and if the building is then in the occupation of a tenant, at his request and similarly, if there is a decrease or diminution in the accommodation or amenities, the tenant may claim reduction in such fair rent. Vide section 5. Section 6 provides that where the amount of the taxes and cesses payable in respect of a building to a local authority for any half year commencing on 1st April, 1950 or on any later date exceeds the amount of taxes and cesses payable for the half year commencing on 30th September, 1946 or for the first complete half year after the date on which the building was first let out, whichever is later, the landlord shall be entitled to claim such excess from the tenant in addition to the rent payable for the building. The consequences of fixation of fair rent are set out in section 7, sub s (1) and (3). Sub section (1) says that where the Controller has fixed the fair rent of a building "(a) the landlord shall not claim, receive or stipulate for the payment of (i) any premium or other like sum in addition to such fair rent, or (ii) save as provided in section 5 or section 6, anything. in, excess of such fair rent 641 (b). any premium or other like. sum or any rent paid in addition to, or in excess of, such fair rent whether before or after the date of the commencement of this Act, in consideration of the grant, continuance or re newal of the tenancy of the building after the date of such commencement, shall be refunded by the landlord to the person by whom it was paid or at the option of such person, shall be otherwise adjusted by the landlord; Provided that where before the fixation of the fair rent, has been paid in excess thereof, the refund or adjustment shall be limited to the amount paid in excess for the period commencing on the date of application by the tenant or landlord under sub section (1) of section 4 and ending with the date of such fixation. " Sub sec. (3) declares that any stipulation in contravention of sub section (1) shall be null and void. These are the only provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 which have a direct bearing on the determination of the question before us, but reference was also made to certain other provisions of that Act dealing with eviction of tenants for the purpose of drawing support by way of an a logical reasoning from the decisions of this Court interpreting those provisions and we must, therefore, briefly advert to them. Section 10 confers protection on the tenant against eviction "in execution of a decree or otherwise" by providing that he shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of that section or sections 14 to 16. Sub sections (2) and (3) of section 10 set out the grounds on which the tenant my be evicted by the landlord. One of the grounds that set out in cl. (a) of sub section (3) is that the landlord requires the building, if residential, for his ,own occupation or for the occupation of his son, and if non residential, for a business which he or his son is carrying on, but in respect of this ground, there is a limitation imposed by cl. (d) of sub section (3) that when the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply for possession under sub section (3) before the expiry of such period. Sections 12 to 14 provide for recovery of possession of the building by the landlord for repairs or reconstruction. These provisions are not material and we need not refer to them in detail. Then we go straight to section 30 which exempts certain buildings from the operation of the Act. Every new building the construction of which is completed after the commencement of the Act is exempted under cl. The reason obviously is that the legislature wanted to encourage construction of new buildings so that more and more buildings would become available for residential as well as non residential purposes and that would help relieve shortage of accommodation. (ii) exempts any residential building or part thereof occupied by any tenant, if the monthly rent paid by him exceeds Rs. 250/Here the object of the Legislature clearly was that the the protection of the beneficent provisions of the Act should be available only to ,small tenants paying rent not exceeding Rs. 250/ per mouth, as they 642 belong to the weaker sections of the community and really need protection against exploitation by rapacious landlords. Those who can afford to pay higher rent would ordinarily be well to do people and they would not be so much in need of protection and can, with,out much difficulty, look after themselves. It is in the light of these provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, that we have to consider whether a landlord can, during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, apply for fixation of fair rent under. section 4, sub section Two basic considerations must guide our approach to this question. The first is that the agreed rent which is the result of contract between the parties must continue to bind them so long as the contract subsists, unless there is anything in the statute which expressly or by necessary implication overrides the contract, It is true that with the decline of the doctrine of laissez faire and the assumption by the State of a more dynamic and activists role, the principle of sanctity of contract which is one of the pillars of a free market economy, has in a number of cases been eroded by legislation. But if we examine such legislation it will be apparent that this has happened invariably in aid of the weaker party to the contract. Where there is unequal bargaining power between the parties, freedom of contract is bound to produce injustice and social legislation therefore steps in and overrides the. contract, with a view to protacting the weaker party from the baneful Consequences of the contract. It is to contract the injustice resulting from inequality in bargaining power and to bring about social or distributive justice that social legislation interferes with sanctity of contract. It seeks to restore the balance in the scales which are otherwise weighted in favour of the stronger party which has larger bargaining power. Ordinarily we do. not find, and indeed it would be a strange and rather incomprehensible phenomenon, that legislation intervenes to disturb the sanctity of contract for the benefit of a stronger party who does not need the protective hand of the legislature. This consideration we must constantly keep. before us while construing the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. Secondly the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, as its long title and preamble show, has been enacted inter alia with the object of controlling rents of residential and non residential buildings and preventing unreasonable eviction of tenants. Now, there can be no doubt that in so far as it is calculated to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants, the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 is a protective measure intended to safeguard tenants against indiscriminate eviction by landlords. Equally, by controlling the rents by keeping them within fair and reasonable limits, the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 seeks to protect tenants against greedy and rapacious landlords who taking advantage of the great scarcity of housing accommodation which prevails in almost all urban areas, may extract excessive and unconscionable rent from tenants. The Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 is in its essential character as also in its object and purpose similar to what may conveniently be described as rent control legislation, in other States, such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. 643 Now it is well settled by decisions of this Court that rent control Acts are "not ordinarily intended to interfere with contractual leases and are Acts for the protection of tenants and are consequently restrictive and not enabling or conferring any rights of action but restricting the existing rights either under the contract or under the general law. " That is what this Court said in Manuiendra Dutt vs Purendu Prosad Roy Chowdhury & Ors.(1), while dealing with the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. The same view was taken by this Court in Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwanddin vs 'Dave Bhagwat Prasad Prabhuprasad(2) in relation to Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates. Control Act, 1947 which prevails in Maharashtra and Gujarat and which has long title and preamble in almost the same terms as the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. This Court said in that case: "the Act,", that is the Bombay Rent Act "intended therefore to restrict the rights which the landlords possessed either for charging excessive rents or for evicting tenants". The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 was also construed in the same way by this Court in Mangilal vs Sugarchand Bathi.(3) This general purpose and intendment of rent control legislation and its positive thrust and emphasis on the protection of the tenant cannot be lost sight of when we are construing a similar legislation like the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. We may now turn to examine the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 against the background of these general considerations. Section 4, sub section (1) contemplates that an application for fixation of fair rent of a building may be made by the tenant or the landlord. The definition of "tenant", as we have pointed out above, includes contractual tenant as well as tenant remaining in possession of the building after determination of the contractual tenancy, that is, statutory tenant, and both contractual tenant and statutory tenant can, therefore, apply for fixation of fair rent under section 4, sub section (1). The Government, who is deemed to be the tenant of the landlord under section 3, sub section (5), can also similarly avail of the provision for fixation of fair rent in section 4, sub section The question is as to who are the persons comprehended within the expression 'landlord ' who can apply for fixation of fair rent under section 4, sub section The landlord, where the Government is deemed. to be the tenant under. section 3, sub section (5), would certainly be entitled to make such application and, having regard to the wide definition of the expression 'landlord ', which includes not only contractual landlord but also statutory landlord, if one may use that expression to describe the counterpart of statutory tenant, it was common ground between the parties that the statutory landlord can also avail of this provision, but the dispute was whether the contractual landlord is within the ambit of this provision. Can he apply for fixation of fair rent under section 4, sub section (1)p ? Now prima facie according to 'the definition as also according to its plain natural connotation, the expression 'landlord ' includes contractual landlord and it might, therefore, appear at first blush, on a purely literal construction, that the contractual landlord can make an application for fixation of fair rent under section 4, sub section But is well settled that a definition clause (1) ; (2) ; (3) ; 644 is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another or as strictly defining what the meaning of a term must be under all circumstances, but as merely declaring what may be comprehended within the term, when the circumstances require that it should be so comprehended. It would, therefore, always be a matter of interpretation whether or not a particular meaning given in the definition clause ,applies to the word as used in the statutory propriety. That would depend on the subject and the context. Moreover, it is equally well established that the meaning of words used in a statute. is to be found, not so much in strict etymological propriety of language, nor even in popular use, as in the subject or occasion on which they are used and the object which is intended to be achieved. The context, the ,collocation and the object of the words may show that they are not intended to be used in the sense which they ordinarily bear, but are meant to be used in a narrow and limited sense. Lord Herschell pointed out in Cox vs Hakes (1) "It cannot, I think, be denied that, for the purpose of construing any enactment, it is right to look, not only at the provision immediately under construction, but at any others found in connection with it which may throw light upon it, and afford an indication that general words employed in it were not intended to be applied without some limitation." However wide in the abstract, general words must be understood as used with reference to the subject matter in the mind of the legislature and limited to it. Thus, in Whethered vs Calcutta(2) a statute which, reciting the inconveniences arising from church wardens and overseers making clandestine rates, enacted that those officers should permit "every inhabitant" of the parish to inspect the rates under a penalty for refusal, was held not to apply to a refusal to one of the church wardens, who was also an inhabitant. As the object of the statute was to protect those in habitants who had previously no access to the rates (which the church wardens had, the meaning of the term 'inhabitants ' was limited to them. The same approach in interpretation must be adopted by us in the present case. We must not allow ourselves to be unduly obsessed by the meaning of 'landlord ' given in the definition or by its ordinary etymological meaning but we must examine the scheme of the relevant provisions of the statute, the contextual setting in which section 4, sub section (1) occurs and the object which the legislation is intended to achieve, in order to determine what is the sense in which the word 'landlord ' is used in section 4. sub section (1) whether it is intended to include contractual landlord. It is necessary for this purpose to consider what are the consequences of fixation of fair rent, for that furnishes the key to the solution of the problem before us. The fair rent, when fixed, becomes an attribute or incidence of the building and there can be no change in it except in the circumstances set out in section 5. When the fair rent is fixed, three possibilities may arise. The fair rent may be the same as the agreed rent in which case no difficulty arises. Or the fair rent may be less than the agreed rent. Where that happens, section 7, sub section (i), ,el. (a) operates and it provides that the landlord shall not be entitled to claim, receive or stipulate for payment of anything in excess of the (2) 645 fair rent. The landlord, can, in such a case, claim, receive or recover only the fair rent and nothing more, despite the contract of tenancy which provides for payment of higher rent. To that extent sanctity of contract is interfered with by the legislation in order to protect the tenant against exploitation by the landlord so that the landlord may not take undue advantage of shortage of housing accommodation and extract excessive rent from a needy and helpless tenant. The stipulation in the contract of tenancy for payment of higher rent would in such a case be clearly in contravention of sub section (1) of section 7 and would be null and void under section 7, sub section But what happens if the fair rent fixed is higher than the agreed rent? Can the landlord claim to recover such fair rent from the tenant, overriding the contract of tenancy which provides for payment of lesser rent? We do not think so. There is nothing in section 7 or in any other provision of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 which can by any process of construction be read as authorising the landlord to override the contract of tenancy and claim fair rent higher than the agreed rent from the tenant. If the legislative intent were that, even though the contract of tenancy is subsisting, the landlord should be entitled to recover fair rent higher than the agreed rent, we should have expected the Legislature to say so in so many terms, as it has done in section 7, sub section (1), cl. (a) when it wanted the landlord not to be able to recover the agreed rent where it is in excess of the fair rent. It may no noted that whenever the Legislature intended to confer on the landlord a right to recover any amount which he would not otherwise have under the contract or the general law, the Legislature has done so in clear and specific language as in section 6 of the Act. But here we do not find any such provision, either express or necessarily implied. We may also profitably com pare the language of the provision in section 3, sub section There it is provided that "the reasonable rent fixed by the authorised officer shall be subject to such fair rent as may be fixed by the Controller". The words "subject to" clearly take in both kinds of cases, where the fair rent fixed is higher as well as lower than the reasonable rent. in section 7, sub section (1), cl. (a), however the Legislature has departed from this phraseology and instead of saying that the agreed rent shall be subject to the fair rent or the rent payable by the tenant shall be the fair rent, the Legislature has merely laid an embargo on the landlord prohibiting him from recovering anything in excess of the fair rent. This provi sion is clearly, without doubt, restrictive in character. it is not an enabling provision empowering the landlord to recover the fair rent where it is higher than the agreed rent. But quite apart from these considerations, there is inherent evidence in section 7 itself which strongly reinforces our interpretation and that is to be found in sub section That sub section says that any stipulation in. contravention of sub section shall be null and void. If, therefore, there is a stipulation in the contract of tenancy for payment of rent higher than the fair rent, it would be invalid. , Such a stipulation would not be enforceable by the landlord against the tenant. Only the fair rent would be payable by the tenant. If, however, there is a stipulation for payment of rent which is less than the fair rent, it would not be in contravention of sub sec. (1) and hence would not be invalidated by sub section (3) but would remain 646 enforceable and binding on the parties and if that be so, the landlord would not be entitled to claim the fair rent in breach of such stipulation. Section 7, sub section (3) clearly indicates that the stipulation in the contract of tenancy as regards rent is overridden only where the fair rent is less than the agreed rent and not where it is higher than the agreed rent. This is the only rational construction which, in our opinion, can be placed on the relevant provisions of the Act relating to control of rent. It is not only compelled by grammar and language, but also accords with the broad general considerations we have already discussed. It is difficult to believe that the Legislature should have chosen to interfere with contractual rights and obligations in favour of the landlord who is ordinarily, in view of the acute shortage of housing accommodation, in a stronger and more dominating position than the tenant qua bargaining power. The Legislature while enacting a social legislation could not have intended to confer on the landlord a new right of action a right to override the contract of tenancy and to impose a greater burden on the tenant than that permitted under the contract of tenancy. It would be a startling proposition to assume that the Tamil Nadu Legislature was so solicitous of the welfare of the landlord, who is admittedly, as a class, stronger party and much more favorably situated in respect of bargaining power than the tenant, that it enacted a provision in the Act for relieving the landlord against the consequences of an unwise contract entered into by him with open. To take such a view would be to pervert the legitimate end of a social legislation and proselytise its true object and purpose. These considerations impel us to the conclusion that the Legislature could not have. intended that the landlord should have the right to apply for fixation of fair rent during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy. If it was not the intention of the Legislature to benefit the landlord by giving him a right to override the contract of tenancy and claim fair rent higher than the agreed rent from the tenant during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, it must follow a fortiorari that it could not have been intended by the Legislature that the landlord should have the right to apply for fixation of fair rent whilst the contract of tenancy is subsisting. Having regard to the basic character of the statute as a rent control legislation and the scheme of its provisions and reading section 4, sub section (1) in its contextual setting and in the light of the other provisions of the statute, the conclusion is inescapable that the word 'landlord ' in section 4, sub section (1) is used in a limited sense and it does not include contractual landlord. The landlord is not given the right to apply for fixation of fair rent during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy. It is only when the contract of tenancy is lawfully determined that he becomes entitled to, apply for fixation of fair rent, for it is only then that he can recover fair rent higher than the agreed rent from the statutory tenant, there being no contract of tenancy to bind him down to the agreed rent. We were referred to certain decisions of this Court relating to the interpretation of the provisions of various Rent Control Acts dealing with the eviction ' of tenants. Some of these decisions have 647 already been noticed by us earlier while discussing the general object and intendment of Rent Control Acts. They have no direct bearing on the determination of the question before us, but they do lend some support to the view we are taking as to the interpretation of the word 'landlord ' in section 4, sub section These decisions which are given in reference to Rent Control Acts of Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, clearly establish that the Rent Control Acts do not give a right to the landlord to evict a contractual tenant without first determining the contractual tenancy. So long as the contractual tenancy subsists, the tenant does not need protection because he cannot be evicted in breach of the 'Contract of tenancy. It is only after the contract of tenancy is determined and the landlord becomes entitled to the possession of the premises, that the tenant requires protection and it is there that the Rent Control Acts step in and prevent the landlord from enforcing his right to possession except under certain conditions. The Rent Control Acts do not confer on the landlord a new right of eviction, but merely restrict his existing right to recover possession under the contract or the general law. The landlord cannot, therefore, sue for recovery of possession on any of the grounds recognised as valid by the Rent Control Acts unless he has first determined the contractual tenancy of the tenant. This view. which has been taken by the decisions of this Court in regard to the Rent Control Acts of Maharashtra, Gujarat,, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, applies equally in regard to the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. It is true that the High Court of Madras took a different view in R. Krishnamurti vs Perthasarthi (1) in regard to the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act ' '1945 which was in material respects in almost identical terms as the, Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 and held that section 7 of that Act, corresponding to section 10 of the present Act, had its own scheme of procedure and there was no question of any attempt .to reconcile that Act with the Transfer of Property Act and an application for eviction could, therefore, be made under that Act without terminating the contractual tenancy of the tenant. But in Manujendra Dutt. vs Purendu Prosad Roy Choudhury & ors.(2) this decision of the Madras High Court was expressly overruled and held not to be correct law by this Court. The argument on behalf of the respondents was that the observation of this Court disapproving the view taken by the Madras High Court was a casual observation made without examining the scheme of the Madras Act and no validity could attach to it. We fail to see how such an argument can possibly be advanced with any degree of plausibility. It is clear from the dis cussion of the Madras decision which we find in the judgment of Court that the attention of this Court was specifically directed to the reasoning of the Madras decision which proceeded on the basis that section 7 of the Madras Act had its own self contained scheme which excluded the Transfer of Property Act and it was because this Court found the reasoning to be incorrect, that it held that the Madras decision was not good law. It would not be fair to presume that this Court cavalierly overruled the Madras decision without applying its mind and caring to examine the scheme of the Madras Act. (1) A.I.R. 1949 Mad. (2) ; 648 Such a charge cannot be made merely because this Court did not elaborately discuss the merits of the Madras decision but disposed it of in a few words. The brevity of the discussion does not signify casualness or lack of proper consideration. We must, in the circumstances, hold that the observation of this Court that the Madras decision cannot be regarded as good law was a deliberate and considered pro nouncement and the view taken by this Court in regard to the Rent Control Acts of Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh must equally prevail in regard to the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. We may point out that in any event we do not find any cogent reason to question the validity of the observation made by this Court disapproving of the Madras decision. We are wholly in agreement with that observation as we do not see any material difference between the language and the scheme of section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 and the language and scheme of the corresponding provisions of the other Rent Control Acts which came to be construed by this Court. The only distinctive feature which could be pointed out on behalf of the respondents was the provision in section 10, sub s ' (3), cl. But that provision does not make any material difference because all that it provides is that though, in a case where the tenancy is for a specified period and it is determined by forfeiture before the expiration of the term, the landlord would have been, but for cl. (d), entitled to recover possession of the building under cls. (a), (b) or (c), he shall be precluded from doing so until the expiration of the period for which the tenancy was created. If there is any other ground available to him for claiming possession, for example, a ground specified in section 10, sub section (2), he can seek to recover possession on that ground and cl. (d) would not afford the tenant any protection. But cl. (d) would stand in the way of the landlord, if possession is sought on any of the grounds set out in cls, (a), (b) and (c). The object of cl. (d) clearly is that even though the tenancy has come to an end by forfeiture and the landlord has become entitled to the possession of the building under the general law. , the tenant shall be protected from eviction on any of the grounds set out in cls. (a), (b) and (c) so long as the period for which the tenancy was created in his favour has not a expired, This construction receives considerable support from the tact that the Legislature has used the words "before the expiry of such period" and not the words "before the determination of the tenancy" to indicate the length of time for which protection is given to the tenant under cl. We do not therefore think that it would be right to infer from cl. (d) that, save in cases falling within that provision, the landlord would be entitled to apply for possession under sub section (2) or sub cl. (3) of section 10 without determining the tenancy of the tenant. There can be no doubt, having regard to the judicial pronouncements of this Court, that the word 'landlord ' in section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 :is used in a limited sense to refer only to a landlord who has terminated the tenancy of the tenant and does not include a contractual landlord. if the ' word 'landlord ' in section 10 is found subjected to a limitation excluding a contractual landlord, it forms a strong argument for subjecting the word 'landlord ' in s.4.,sub s.(1) also to the like limitation. 649 It may also be noted that, whatever be the correct interpretation of the word 'landlord ' in section IO, it is clear from the decisions of this Court in regard to the other Rent Control Acts. that it is not at all unusual,, having regard to the object and purpose of Rent Control legislation, to read the word 'landlord ' in a limited. sense so as 'to exclude contractual landlord and we are therefore not doing anything startling or extraordinary but merely following the path eked out by the decisions of this Court when we place a limited meaning on the word 'landlord 'in section 4, sub section (1) which would exclude contractual landlord. That is in fact in conformity with the object and purpose of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, which, to quote the words used by this Court in P.J. Irani vs State of Madras (1) in reference to the earlier Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1949 which was in material respects in identical terms as the present Act, is intended to protect "the rights of tenants in occupation of buildings from being charged unreasonable rates of rent" and not to benefit landlords by conferring on them a new right against tenants which they did not possess before. Since we are of the view that it is not competent to the landlord to apply for fixation of fair rent under section 4, sub section (1) during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, we set aside the decision of the High Court of Tamil Nadu which has taken the view that the Controller has jurisdiction to entertain the application of the respondents and allow Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1968. There will be no order as,. to costs all throughout. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the respondents costs.

The appellant, a judicial officer, was convicted and sentenced under the , by a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court. Registrar of Orissa High Court vs Bardakanta Mishra & Ors. I.L.R. [1973] Cuttack 134. The appellant 's career as a judicial officer was far from satisfactory. When he was working as Additional District and Sessions Judge he showed gross indiscretion and committed grave judicial misdemeanor. The contempt proceed ings arose out of the representation he made to the Governor for canceling the order of suspension passed against him by the High Court and the allegation he made in a memorandum of appeal he had filed earlier in the Supreme Court. In his representation to the Governor the appellant made false insinuations that the Governor cancelled the previous disciplinary proceedings against him on the ground that the same was vitiated as the High Court prejudged the matter and the government set aside the punishment because three of the judges were biased and were prejudiced against him, that the proceeding involved the Government in heavy expenses on account of the "palpably incorrect views of the High Court", that the High Court did not gracefully accept the Government 's order cancelling his demotion, that the High Court resorted to "subterfuge ' to counteract the said decision of the government by taking a novel step and that the High Court 's action suffered from patent mala fides. He stated that the other judges had no independent judgment of their own and were influenced by the Chief Justice to take a view different from what they bad already taken and characterised the High Court as an "engine of oppression" and his order of suspension as "mysterious". In another representation made to the Governor the appellant alleged that the High Court on the administrative side was seriously prejudiced and biased against him and it acted as if the charges stood established requiring extreme punishment and as such justice May not be meted out to him by the High Court, if it conducted the departmental inquiry. He also stated that he considered it risky to submit his explanation to the High Court and that the High Court in the best interests of justice, should not inquire into these charges again st him. He suggested that "the Court was not in a position to weigh the evidence and consider the materials on record and impose a sentence commensurate with his delinquency. " The action taken by the High Court was branded as "unusual". A copy of this representation was sent to the High Court with the remark that since the High Court was likely to withhold the representation it was submitted direct to the Governor. In the memo of appeal filed in the Supreme Court, the appellant alleged bias and prejudice against the High Court and its Chief Justice. He took the plea that the High Court had become disqualified to deal with the case and expressed the view that "the judges of the High Court had fallen from the path of rectitude and were vindictive" and had decided to impose substantive sentence and that "they were not in a position to mete even handed justice '. In appeal to this Court. it was contended : (i) that the passages about which the complaint was made did not amount to contempt of court since they did not purport to criticize any 'judicial, acts of the judges and criticism of the administrative acts of the High Court even in vilification terms did not amount 28 3 to contempt of court, and (ii) that the acts complained of were in the court of the appellant challenging his suspension and holding of disciplinary proceedings, in an appeal or representation to the Governor from the orders of the High Court and he gave expression to his grievance or had otherwise acted not with a view to malign the court or in defiance of it but with, the sole object of obtaining the reversal of the orders passed by the High Court against him. HELD : The imputations have grossly vilified the High Court tending to affect substantially administration of justice and, therefore, the appellant was rightly convicted of the offence of criminal contempt. [304F] (i)Proceedings in contempt are always with reference to administration of justice. All the three sub clauses of section 2(c) of the , define contempt in terms of obstruction or interference with administration of justice and scandalisation within the meaning of sub clause (1) must be in respect of the court or the Judge with reference to administration of justice. [297C D] Debi Prasad Sharma vs The King Emperor. 70 Indian Appeals. 216, referred to. (a)The question whether contemptuous imputations made with reference to the administrative acts of the High Court amount to contempt of court will depend upon whether the amputations affect the administration of justice. This is the basis on which the contempt is punished and must afford the necessary test. [298E] (b)The mere functions of adjudication between the parties is not the Whole of administration of justice for any court. The presiding judge of a Court embodies in himself the Court. and when engaged in the task of administering justice is assisted by a complement of clerks and ministerial officers. The Acts in which they are engaged are acts in aid of administration of justice. Therefore, when the Chief Justice appoints ministerial officers and assumes disciplinary control over them, that is a function which through described as administrative, is really in the course of administration of justice. Judical integrated function of Judge and cannot suffer any dissection nuance of high standards of rectitude in judical administration administration is an so far as maintain concerned. The whole set up of a court is for who ' purpose of administration of justice and the controlwhich the judge exercises over his assistants has also the object of maintaining the purity of administration of justice. [298F H; 299A] (c)The disciplinary control over the misdemeanors of the subordinate judiciary in their judicial administration is a function which the High Court must exercise in the interest of administration of justice. It is a function Which is essential for the administration of justice in the wide connotation it has received and, therefore, when the High Court functions in a disciplinary capacity, it Only does so in furtherance of administration of justice. it is as important for the superior court to be vigilant about the conduct and behaviour of the subordinately judge as it is to administer the law, because both functions are essential administration of justice. The Judge of the superior court in whom this disciplinary control is vested functions as much as a Judge in such, matters as when he bears and disposes of cases before him. [300E; 299D] (d) What is commonly described as an administrative function has been when vested in the High Court, constantly regarded by statutes as a function in the administration of justice. [299F G] Letters Patent for the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras a. 8; High Courts Act, 1861, a. 9; the Government of India Act, 1935, %. 224; Constitution of India, 1950, articles 225, 227 235; State of West Bengal V.Nripendra Nath Bagchi ; referred to. (e)Thus the courts of justice in a State froth the highest to the lowest are by their constitution entrusted with functions directly connected with the administration of justice and it is the expectation and confidence of all those who have or likely to 'have business there that the courts Perform all their functions 284 on a high level of rectitude without fear or favour, affection or ill will. And, it in this traditional confidence in the courts that justice will be administered in them which is Fought to be protected by proceedings in contempt. [300F G] Rex vs Almon [1765] Wilmot 's Notes of Opinions 243, referred to. (f) Scandalisation of the court is a species of contempt and may take several forms. A common form is the vilification of the Judge. When proceedings in contempt are taken for such vilification the question which the court has to ask is whether the vilification is of the Judge as a Judge or it is the vilification of the Judge as an individual. If the latter, the Judge is left to this private remedies and the court has no power to commit for contempt. If the former, the court will proceed to exercise the jurisdiction with scrupulous care in cases which are clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the court with have also to consider the degree of harm caused. as affecting administration of justice and if it is slight and beneath notice, courts will not punish for contempt. Ibis salutary practice is adopted by section 13 of the . If the attack on the Judge functioning as a Judge substantially affects administration of justice it becomes a public mischief punishable for contempt, and it matters not whether such an attack is based on what a Judge is alleged to have done in the exercise of his 'administrative ' responsibilities. A Judge 's functions may be divisible, but his integrity and authority are not divisible in the context of administration of justice. [301D F] Queen vs Gray, [1900] (2) Queen 's Bench, 36, at page 40, referred to. (g)"Judicial capacity" is an ambivalent term which means "capacity of or properto a Judge" and is capable of taking in all functional capacities of a Jurodge whetheradministrative, adjudicatory or any other, necessary for the administration of justice. There is no warrant for the narrow view that the offence of scandalisation of the court takes place only when the imputation has reference to the adjudicatory functions of a Judge in the seat of justice. [302D] Rex vs Almon [1765] Wilmot 's Notes of Opinion 243; MOti Lal Ghose and Others, XLV Calcutta, 169, The State of Bombay vs Mr. P. A.I.R. 1959 Bombay, 182, Debi Prasad Sharma vs The King Emperor, 70, Indian Appeals, 216, Special Reference from the Bahama Islands, A.C. 138 at 144, Queen vs Gray , referred to. Brahma Prak ash Sharma and others vs The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. 1169, Gobind Ram vs State of Maharashtra. and State vs The Editors and Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra, , held inapplicable. (ii)If in fact the language used amounts to contempt of court it will become punishable as criminal contempt. The right of appeal does not give the right to commit contempt of court nor can it be used as a cover to bring the autho rity of the High Court into disrespect and disregard. [298C D] Jugal Kishore vs Sitamarhi Central Co.op. ; referred to. Per Bhagwati & Krishna Iyer, JJ : (Concurring in ultimate decision) : The dilemma of the law of contempt arises because of the constitutional need to balance, two great but occasionally conflicting principles freedom of expression and f air and fearless justice. It is a moot point whether we should still be bound to the regal moorings of Rex vs Almon. [306E] (i)The emphasis in Ss. 2(c), 3 and 13 of the . to the interference with the course of justice or obstruction of the administration of Justice or scandalising or lowering the authority of the Court not the Judge highlights the judicial area as entitled to inviolability and suggests a functional rather than a personal or 'institutional ' immunity. The unique power to punish for contempt of itself inheres in a Court qua court, In its essential role of dispenser of public justice. The phraseological image projected 285 by the catena of expressions in the Act, the very conspectus of the statutory provisions and the ethos and raison d 'eire of the jurisdiction point to the conclusion that the text of the Act must take its colour from the general context and confine the contempt power to the judicial cum para judicial areas, including such administrative functions as are intimately associated with the exercise of judicial power. In short the accent is on the functional personality which is pivotal to securing justice to the people. Purely administrative acts like recruitmerits, transfers and postings, routine disciplinary action against subordinate staff, executive acts in running the establishment and ministerial business ancillary to office keeping these are common to all departments in the public sector and merely because they relate to the judicial wing of government cannot enjoy a higher immunity from criticism. The quintessence of the contempt power is protection of the public, not judicial personnel. If the slant on judict poalisation as a functional limitation on the contempt jurisdiction is accepted, it must exclude from its ambit interference with purely administrative acts of courts and non judicial functions of judges. This dichotomy is implicit in the decided cases. To treat as the High Court has done. "the image and personality of the lush Court as an integrated one" and to hold that every shadow that darkens it is contempt is to forget life, reason and political progress. The basic 'public duty" of a Judge in his "judicial capacity" is to dispense public justice in Court and anyone who obstructs or interferes in this area does so at his peril. Likewise, personal behaviour of judicial personnel, if criticised severally or even sinisterly. cannot be countered by the weapon of the contempt of court. [309C E, 3 10 A F] The paramount but restrictive jurisdiction to protect the public against substantial interference with the stream of justice cannot be polluted or diffused into an intimidatory power for the judges to strike. at adverse comments on administrative, legislative (as under articles 225, 226 and 227) and extra judicial acts. Commonsense and principle can certainly accept a valid administrative area so closely integrated with court work as to be stamped with judicial character such as constitution of benches, transfer of cases, issue of administrative directions regarding submission of findings or disposal of cases by subordinate courts and the like. Not everything covered by article 225, 227 and 235 will be of this texture. Thus even though Judges and courts have diverse duties functionally and historically and jurisprudentially, the value which is dear to the community and the function which deserves to be pardoned off from public molestation is judicial. Vicious criticism of personal and administrative acts of Judges may indirectly mar their image and weaken the confidence of the public in the judiciary but the countervailing good, not merely of free speech but also of greater faith generated by exposure to the acting light of bona fide even if marginally overzealous, criticism cannot be over looked. [315B E] In the instant case the suspension of the District Judge was so woven into and integrally connected with the administration of justice that it can be regarded as not purely an administrative act but a para judicial function. The appeal was against the suspension which was a preliminary to contemplated disciplinary action which was against the appellant in his judicial capacity for acts of judicial misconduct. The control was, therefore, judicial and hence the unbridled attack on the High Court for the step was punishable impugned conduct of the condemner was qua Judge and the evil a supervisory act of the High Court. [315G H] (ii)A large margin must be allowed for allegations in remedial representation; but extravagance forfeits the protection of good faith. [315H] In the matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands, ; 149; Debi Prasad Sharma vs The King Emperor, [1942] 70 I.A. 216, Kayiath Damodaran vs Induchoodan, A.I.R. 1961 Kerala 321, K. L. Gauba 's case, I.L.R. [1942] Lab. 411, 419, Rex vs B. section Nayyar, A.I.R. 1950 All '. 555, In re section B. Sarbadhicary, [1906] 14 XX I.A. 41, Brahma Prakash Sharma vs State of Uttar Pradesh, , State V. N. Nagamani, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 373 and In the matter of an. Advocate of Allahabad, A.T.R. 1935 All. 1, referred to. 28 6 Remedial process cannot be a mask to malign a judge. Irrelevant or unvarnished amputations under the pretext of grounds of appeal amount of foul play and perversion of the legal process. In the instant case the appellant, a senior officer who professionally weighs his thoughts and words has no justification for the immoderate abuse he has resorted to. In this sector even truth is no defence, as in the case of criminal insult in the latter because it May produce violent breaches and is forbidden in the name of public peace, and in, the former it may demoralise the community about courts and is forbidden in the interest of public justice as contempt of court. The Court being the guardian of the people 's rights, it has been held repeatedly that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt. [317C E; 318H] State of Uttar Pradesh vs Shyam Sunder Lal, A.I.R. 1954 All. 308, Rex vs R. section Nayyar, A.I.R. 1950 All. 549; 554, State of Madhya Pradesh vs Ravi Sharker. ; Govind Ram vs State of Maharashtra, , Swarnamayi Panigrahi vs B. Nayak, A.I.R. 1959 Orissa 89, Quintin Hogg. 1206 7. C. K. Paphtary vs O. P. Gupta, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1132 1141 para '52, R vs Gray,, , Special ,Reference No. 1 of 1964; , 501; referred to. (iii)In sum, the key note word is 'justice, not 'judge '; the 'key note thought is unobstructed public justice, not the self defence of a judge; the corner stone of the contempt law is the accommodation of two constitutional values the right of free speech and the right to independent justice. The ignition of con, tempt action should be substantial. and mala interference with fearless judicial action, not fair comment or trivial reflections on the judicial process and personnel. [319E]

N: Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1991. From the Judgment and order dated 16.6.1989 of the Madras High Court Crl. M.P. No. 2717 of 1988. T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, K. Rajeswara, N.D.B. Raju and K.R. Chaudhary for the Appellant. K.K. Lahiri, R.K. Jain (NP), Sreekant, N. Terdal, Mrs. Sushma Suri and A Subba Rao for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 745 K.N.SAIKIA, J. Special leave granted. The appellant Captain Subhash Kumar was the Master of the Merchant ship M.V. Eamaco owned by Eamaco Shipping Co. (P) Ltd. Singapore, hereinafter called `the ship '. On 12.8.86 the ship went into distress due to the vessel 's hold Nos. 2 & 3 taking in water, the pumping operations being insufficient and though initially the appellant sent radio message for help he failed to launch the life boats and life crafts and to abandon the ship to enable M.V. Shoun World to pick them up and due to the failure of motor life boats and life crafts, when the ship sank, only 11 out of 28 persons were rescued resulting in loss of life to the remaining persons. At about 18.25 Hrs. that day Madras Radio, which was the communication centre between the land and seafaring ships, informed the office of the Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Department, Madras, District Madras, hereinafter called as `Principal Officer ', that an urgent message had been received by the said Radio from the appellant and from that communication it was clear that the ship under the command of the appellant was posted at position 11 degrees 08 minutes North, 83 degrees 41 minutes East on 12th at 11.30 Greenwich meantime. The said message further indicated that the vessel 's hold Nos. 2 & 3 were taking in water and the pumping out operation was not sufficient and it called the assistance from all ships in the vicinity. At 20.28 Hrs. the Madras Radio again contacted the Principle officer and said that the Radio had received SOS message (distress message) and he took necessary steps. The Principal Officer filed a complaint in court of 14th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras 8 against the appellant for initiation of an inquiry proceeding under section 363 of the (Central Act No.4 of 1958), hereinafter called `the Act, complaining about the negligence of the appellant while he was the Master of the ship as aforesaid; and that at that time he was residing at Laxmi Niwas, 41, Marshal Road, Egmore, Madras 8 and further stating that the shipping casualty had occurred due to sheer negligence and gross incompetence on the part of the appellant in commanding the ship and the crew; and that the very fact that the life boats and life floats were not used and not even lowered so as to make use of that indicated that the appellant had not even thought about that which a Captain of the ship should have done, resulting in loss of the ship, the cargo and valuable lives of the sailors who had at no time doubted about the competency of the Master or revolted against him. The complaint accordingly said that the Magistrate 's Court by the provisions of section 363 had got powers to make inquiry into the charges of 746 incompetence or of misconduct of the appellant therein. It also said that the inquiry be commenced in accordance with the provisions of the Act so as to cancel the certificates of competency of the Master, namely, the appellant, which had been granted by the Central Government; and that cancellation might be recommended under the Act after holding the aforesaid inquiry. The complaint also said that the appellant rendered himself liable to be proceeded against under the provisions of part XII of the Act which envisaged various modes of investigation and inquiry; and under section 363 the court had powers to make an inquiry into the charges of incompetency or misconduct of the appellant. On 25.3.1988, the appellant received a notice stating that the inquiry proceedings were instituted against him before the 14th Metropolitan Magistrate under section 363 of the Act. The appellant thereupon filed Cr. M.P. No.2717 of 1988 in the High Court under section 482 of the Cr. P.C. stating that the proceedings were by an abuse of process of the court and the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint against the appellant when there was no negligence on his part. It was also stated that the fact that the appellant was a holder of a Master certificate issued by the Director General of Shipping, Calcutta would not attract the provisions of the Act inasmuch as the ship was a foreign ship and the Master certificate had been issued by a foreign country and the casualty had occurred in the high seas nearly 232 nautical miles away from India and being in open sea the ship was subject to the jurisdiction and also to the protection of the State under whose maritime flag it sailed. The appellant was, it was further stated, to be in command of the ship by virtue of the certificate issued by the Panamanian Government, the flag of the ship was of Panama and, therefore, the provisions of the Act would not at all apply, much less its section 363. In other words the proceedings were allegedly intended to harass the appellant without jurisdiction and it amounted to an abuse of process of court. The learned Single Judge who heard the petition rejected the contention that in view of the language of section 2 of the Act it would not be applicable and that it would not be a shipping casualty as defined in section 358 of the Act, and held that the Act was applicable in the instant case and the action of the petitioner amounted to sheer negligence and called for investigation and inquiry under the Act. Hence this appeal. Mr. T. Krishnamurthy Iyer, the learned cousel for the appel 747 lant, submits, inter alia, that the negligence complained of having occurred in respect of foreign ship flying foreign flag at a place 232 nautical miles away from India, and as such, outside the territorial waters of India the Act would not be applicable; and that even if it was applicable it would not amount to a shipping casualty as envisaged in part XII of the Act; and lastly that even assuming that chapter XII applied, the complaint could not have been filed by the Principal Officer in the court of the 14th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras 8 under section 363 of the Act. Mr. K. Lahiri, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the shipping casualty having occurred within the territorial waters of India which extended up to 200 nautical miles, the Act would be applicable and the complaint was rightly filed under section 363 of the Act; and that the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure rightly refused to quash the proceedings. Three questions, therefore, are to be decided in this appeal. First, whether the Act would at all be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case; secondly, if the Act was applicable whether part XII of the Act would apply; and thirdly, if both the Act and part XII were applicable whether the complaint made by the Principal Officer under section 363 of the Act would be maintainable. Taking the first question first, the Act is one to foster the development and ensure the efficient maintenance of India Mercantile Marine in the manner best suited to serve the national interest and for that purpose to establish a National Shipping Board and Shipping National Fund to provide for registration of India ship and the law relating to Merchant shipping. Section 2 of the Act deals with its application and says; "(1) Unless otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this Act which apply to (a) any vessel which is registered in India; or (b) any vessel which is required by this Act to be so registered; or (c) any other vessel which is owned wholly by persons to each of whom any of the descriptions specified in clause (a) or in clause (b) or in clause (c), as the case may be, of 748 section 21 applies, shall so apply wherever the vessel may be. (2) Unless otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this Act which apply to vessels other than those referred to in sub section (1) shall so apply only while any such vessel is within India, including the territorial waters thereof." In the instant case the ship was not registered in India and was not required by this Act to be so registered. Clause (c) refers so clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 21 which defines Indian ships, and says: "For the purposes of this Act, a ship shall not be deemed to be an Indian ship unless owned wholly by persons to each to whom any of the following descriptions applies: (a) a citizen of India; or (b) a company which satisfies the following requirements, namely: (i) the principal place of business of the company is in India; (ii) at least seventy five per cent of the share capital of the company is held by citizens of India: Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, alter such minimum percentage, and where the minimum percentage is so altered, the altered percentage shall, as from the date of the notification, be deemed to be substituted for the percentage specified in this sub clause; (iii) not less than three fourths of the total number of directors of the company are citizens of India; (iv) the chairmen of the board of directions and the managing director, if any, of the company are citizens of India; (v) the managing agents, if any, of the company are citizens of India or in any case where a company is the managing agent, the company satisfies the requirements specified in sub cls. (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). or 749 (c) a co operative society which satisfies the following requirements, namely: (i) the co operative society is registered or deemed to be registered under the , or any other law relating to co operative societies for the time being in force in any State, (ii) every individual who is a member of the co operative society and where any other co operative society is a member thereof, every individual who is a member of such other co operative society, is a citizen of India. " The ship was not a ship owned wholly by persons each of whom was a citizen of India or by a company satisfying the descriptions under clause (b) or (c). Sub section (2) of section 2 makes the provisions of the Act applicable to vessels other than those referred to in sub section (1) only while any such vessel is within India, including the territorial waters thereof. The ship a Panamanian ship registered in Panama would come within the purview of the Act only it is within India including the territorial waters. This leads us to the question as to the extent of territorial waters of India. The Territorial Waters, Continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (Act No. 80 of 1976) is an Act to provide for certain matters relating to the territorial waters continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, and other maritime zones of India. Section 2 of the Act defines "limit" in relation to the territorial waters, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone or any other maritime zones of India to mean the limit of such waters shelf or zone with reference to the mainland of India as well as the individual or composite group or groups of islands constituting part of the territory of India. Section 3 deals with sovereignty over, and limits of, territorial waters and says: "(1) The sovereignty of India extends and has always extended to the territorial waters of India (hereinafter referred to as the territorial waters) and to the seabed and subsoil underlying, and the air space over such waters. (2) The limit of the territorial waters is the line every point of which is at a distance of twelve nautical miles from the nearest point of the appropriate baseline. 750 (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (2), the Central Government may whenever it considers necessary so to do having regard to International Law and State practice, alter, by notification in the Official Gazette, the limit of the territorial waters. (4) No notification shall be issued under sub section (3) unless resolutions approving the issue of such notification are passed by both Houses of Parliament." Thus sub section (2) clearly provides that the limit of the territorial waters is a line every point of which is at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the nearest point of the appropriate baseline. Under Article 297 of the Constitution of India things of value within territorial waters or continental shelf and resources of the exclusive economic zone to vest in the Union. It says: "(1) All lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters, or the continental shelf, or the exclusive economic zone, of India shall vest in the Union and be held for the purposes of the Union. (2) All other resources of the exclusive economic zone of India shall also vest in the Union and be held for the purposes of the Union. (3) The limits of the territorial waters, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and other maritime zone, of India shall be such as may be specified, from time to time, by or under any law made by Parliament. " Sub section (3), thus, empowers the Central Government if it considers necessary so to do having regard to the International Law and State practice, alter, by notification in the Official Gazette, the limit of territorial waters. Under sub section (4) no such notification shall be issued unless resolutions approving the issue of such notification are passed by both Houses of Parliament. A proclamation was made by the President of India published on September 30, 1967 in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part III, section 2 Notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of External Affairs No. FL/III (1) 67. By a Notification of the Government of India dated 15th 751 January, 1977 the exclusive economic zone of India has been extended upto a distance of 200 nautical miles into the sea from shore and other maritime zones, 1976 under the 40th Constitution Amendment Act, 1976. The concepts of territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone are different concepts and the proclamation of exclusive economic zone to the limit of 200 nautical miles into the sea from the shore baseline would in no way extend the limit of territorial waters which extends to 12 nautical miles measured from the appropriate baseline. The submission that territorial waters extends to the limit of 200 nautical miles by virtue of the notification extending exclusive economic zone to 200 nautical miles has, therefore, to be rejected. Admittedly the ship (M.V.Eamaco) at the time of the casualty was at a place beyond the territorial waters of India and even the exclusive economic zone of India. If this be the position, the ship would not be covered by the provisions of section 2 of the Act and consequently the provisions of the Act would not apply to the instant casualty. Taking the second question it is obvious that the Act itself having not been applicable Chapter XII being a part of the Act will also not be applicable. This Chapter deals with investigations and inquiries and contain sections 357 to 389. Section 357 defines "coasts" to include the coasts of creeks and tidal rivers. Section 358 deals with shipping casualties and report thereof and says: "(1) For the purpose of investigations and inquiries under this Part, a shipping casualty shall be deemed to occur when (a) on or near the coasts of India, any ship is lost, abandoned, stranded or materially damaged; (b) on or near the coasts of India, any ship causes loss of material damage to any other ship; (c) any loss of life ensues by reason of any casualty happening to or on board any ship on or near the coasts of India; (d) in any place, any such loss, abandonment, stranding, material damage or casualty as above mentioned occurs to or on board any India ship and any competent witness thereof is found in India; 752 (e) any Indian ship is lost or is supposed to have been lost and any evidence is obtainable in India as to the circumstances under which she proceeded to sea or was last heard of. (2) In the cases mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub section (1), the master, pilot, harbour master or other person in charge of the ship, or (where two ships are concerned) in charge of each ship at the time of the shipping casualty, and in the cases mentioned in clause (d) of sub section (1), where the master of the ship concerned or (except in the case of a loss) where the ship concerned proceeds to any place in India from the place where the shipping casualty has occurred, the master of the ship, shall, on arriving in India, give immediate notice of the shipping casualty to the officer appointed in this behalf by the Central Government. " Clause (d) envisages shipping casualty in any place but occurring to or on board any Indian ship whether the Master of the ship concerned (except in the case of a loss) where the ship concerned proceeds to any place in India from the place where the shipping casualty of the ship has occurred, the Master of the ship. Thus this provision will not cover the ship. The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that the casualty in the instant case would not be a shipping casualty envisaged in section 358. Subsequent sections, namely, 359, 360, 361 and 362, relate to shipping casualties as envisaged in section 358. The impugned complaint was ex facie made under section 363 of the Act which deals with power of Central Government to direct inquiry into the charges of incompetency or misconduct, it says: "(1) If the Central Government has reason to believe that there are grounds for charging any master, mate or engineer with incompetency or misconduct, otherwise than in the course of a formal investigation into shipping casualty, the Central Government. (a) if the master, mate or engineer holds a certificate under this Act, in any case; 753 (b) if the master, mate or engineer holds a certificate under the law of any country outside India, in any case where the incompetency or misconduct has occurred on board an Indian ship; may transmit a statement of the case of any court having jurisdiction under section 361 which is at or nearest to the place where it may be convenient for the parties and witnesses to attend, and may direct that court to make an inquiry into that charge. (2) Before commencing the inquiry, the court shall cause the master, mate or engineer so charged to be furnished with a copy of the statement transmitted by the Central Government. " From the above provisions it appears that section 359 envisages the officers referred to in sub section (2) of section 358. Receiving the information that a shipping casualty has occurred and reporting in writing the information to the Central Government and his proceeding to make a preliminary inquiry into the casualty and sending a report thereof to the Central Government or such other authority as may be appointed by it in that behalf. Under section 360 the officer, whether he has made a preliminary inquiry or not, may, and, where the Central Government so directs, shall make an application to the court empowered under section 361 requesting it to make a formal investigation into any shipping casualty and the court shall thereupon make such investigation. Thus the officer himself may or when directed by the Central Government shall make an application to the court requesting it to make a formal investigation into any shipping casualty. Section 361 empowers the court to make a formal investigation under Part XII. A Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the Central Government and a Metropolitan Magistrate shall have jurisdiction to make formal investigation into any shipping casualty under Part XII. What has to be noted in this section is that the court on an application of the officer makes a formal investigation into shipping casualties and not a preliminary inquiry which could have been done by the officer referred to in sub section (2) of section 358, and under section 359 send a report to the Central Government. Section 360 also envisages making of application to court by the officer whether he had made preliminary inquiry or not, requesting it to make formal investigation into any shipping casualty. Thus under section 361 what is being envisaged is a formal investigation into a shipping 754 casualty and not a preliminary inquiry. Section 362 deals with only formal investigation and says that while making such investigation into a shipping casualty the court may inquire, into any charge of incompetency or misconduct arising, in the course of the investigation, against any master, mate or engineer, as well as into any charge of a wrongful act or default on his part causing the shipping casualty. Under sub section (2) a statement of the case has to be furnished to the Master, mate or Engineer. Section 362 does not envisage inquiring into any charge of incompetency or misconduct otherwise than in the course of the formal investigation into a shipping casualty, Section 363 (1) envisages the Central Government, when it has reason to believe that there are grounds for charging any master, mate or engineer with incompetency or misconduct, otherwise than in the course of a formal investigation into shipping casualty, (b) if he holds a certificate under the law or any country outside India, in any case where the incompetency or misconduct has occurred on board an Indian ship, and the transmitting of the statement of the case to any court having jurisdiction under section 361 where it may be convenient for the parties and witnesses to attend, and the Central Government may direct that court to make an inquiry into that charge. Under clause (a) the Central Government may exercise the power if the Master, mate or Engineer holds a certificate under the Act, in any case. Thus under this section the Central Government must have reason to believe that there are grounds for charging any master etc. with incompetency or misconduct, otherwise than in the course of a formal investigation into shipping casualty, in case of a master of a foreign ship who holds a certificate under the Act "in any case". It also envisages the transmitting the statement of the case to any court having a jurisdiction under section 361. The question is what would be the meaning of the words "in any case". Would it mean any case of shipping casualty, or it would mean any case irrespective of shipping casualty. In other words, under the above provisions if the appellant was the master of the ship and the casualty was outside the territorial waters of India and the ship involved was a foreign ship would the expression "in any case" cover the instanct case? If the preceding sections of Part XII dealt with only Shipping casualty, will it be permissible to interpret the words "in any case" irrespective of shipping casualty and anywhere outside the territorial waters of India and whoever is the owner of the Vessel? Will not the ejusdem generis rule apply? Again when the Act itself is not applicable to a case, can these words be given a meaning beyond the applicability of the Act? Verba secundum materiam subjectam intelligi nemo est qui nesciat. There is no one who does not know that words are to be understood according to their subject matter. The subject matter of 755 Part XII is investigations and inquiries into shipping casualty. Would 'in any case" then mean in any case of shipping casualty? We have read the other relevant provisions of the Act. Nemo aliquam partem recti intelligere potest, antequam totum interum atque itrerum parlegerit. No one can properly understand any part of a statute till he had read through the whole again and again. We find that Part VI of the Act deals with certificates of officers, namely, Masters, mates and Engineers, Section 76(1) provides: "Every foreign going Indian ship, every home trade Indian ship of two hundred tons gross or more when going to sea from any port or place in India and every ship carrying passengers between ports or places in India shall be provided with officers duly certificated under this Act according to the following scale, namely: (a) in every case, with a duly certificated master; (b) if the ship is a foreign going ship or a home trade passenger ship of one hundred and fifty tons gross or more, with at least one officer besides the master holding a certificate not lower than that of first mate in the case of a foreign going ship and of mate in the case of a home trade passenger ship; (c) if the ship is a home trade ship, not being a passenger ship, of four hundred and fifty tons gross or more, with at least one officer besides the master holding a certificate not lower than that of mate. (d) if the ship is a foreign going ship and carries more than one mate, then with the second mate duly certificated. " Section 79 deals with examination for, and grant of, certificate. Section 82 provides that a note of all orders made for canceling, suspending, altering or otherwise affecting any certificate of competency, in pursuance of the powers contained in this Act, shall be entered on the copy of the certificate kept under section 81. Section 87 empowers the Central Government to make rules, inter alia, to (f) prescribe the circumstances or cases if which certificates of competency may be canceled or suspended. Section 363 of the Act does not refer to Part VI and the rules for 756 suspension or cancellation of certificates. This would be consistent with the view that section 363 confines itself to cases of misconduct or incompetency associated with a shipping casualty. Assuming that it covers a case of a foreign ship on high seas, it would only be to make an inquiry into that charge and not into the shipping casualty itself. The question then arises, as has been submitted by Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, when the entire Act is not applicable to there instant casualty would it be consistent with the extent of applicability of the Act to pick up three words, namely, "in any case" and apply it to the prejudice of the appellant. Mr Lahiri submits that the certificate of competency issued under the Act by the appropriate authorities under part VI are valuable certificates and if the holder of such a certificate of competency issued under the provisions of Part VI is alleged to have committed misconduct or acts of incompetency there is no reason why an inquiry into that misconduct or incompetency cannot be ordered by the Central Government to a court competent to exercise jurisdiction under section 361 of the Act. Section 363 does not envisage the court acting on a statement transmitted by the Central Government to conduct a formal investigation into the shipping casualty but only the courts ' making an inquiry into the charge of incompetency or misconduct. Section 364 provides giving of opportunity to the person to make defence. Section 365 empowers the court to regulate its proceedings. Section 369 provides that the court shall, in the case of all investigations or inquiries under this Part, transmit to the Central Government a full report or its conclusions which it has arrived at together with the evidence. Under sub section (2) of that section where the investigation or inquiry affects master or an officer of a ship other than an Indian ship who holds a certificate under the law of any country outside India, the Central Government may tansmit a copy of the report together with the evidence to the proper authority in that country. Section 370 deals with power of court as to certificates granted by Central Government. A certificate can be canceled or suspended under clause (a) by a court holding formal investigation and under clause (v) by a court holding inquiry under this part into the conduct of the master, mate or engineer if the court finds that he is incompetent or has been guilty of any gross act of drunkenness, tyranny or other misconduct or in a case of collision has failed to render such assistance or gave such information as is required by section 348. Under sub section (3), where the court 757 cancels or suspends a certificate, the court shall forward it to the Central Government together with the report which it is required by this Part to transmit to it. Thus, this section deals with power of the court while holding a formal investigation into a shipping casualty under clause (a) and while holding an inquiry into the conduct of the master, mate or engineer i.e. otherwise than while holding a formal investigation into shipping casualty. If the expression "In any case" is interpreted to cover a foreign ship by a foreign master but holding an Indian certificate having a shipping casualty outside the territorial water sections 363 and 370b) may be applicable. If on the other hand the words "in any case" is not allowed to be interpreted to include such a master of such a ship and in such a casualty it may not be covered. The question then is whether the instant complaint can be construed as a statement of the Central Government as envisaged in section 363. One of the requisites of section 363 is that the Central Government must have reason to believe that there are grounds for charging any master etc. with incompetency or misconduct; and such reason to believe must have been arrived at otherwise than in the course of a formal investigation into the shipping casualty and it is the Central Government who why transmit the statement of a case to a court having jurisdiction under section 361. We have to examine whether the complaint is ex facie under section 363. It nowhere mentions that the Central Government had such reason to believe. It nowhere mentions that it was a transmission of the statement of a case to the court by the Central Government. It also nowhere mentions that reason to believe had been found otherwise than in the course of a formal investigation into the shipping casualty. On the other hand in para 2 it says that the complainant is the Principal Officer who is competent person appointed under the Act to complain about the negligence of the accused. There is no doubt that he is not empowered under section 363. In para 6 the complaint says that the court under section 363 has got powers to make an inquiry into the charges of incompetency or misconduct of the accused and para 8 mentions: "The inquiry so as to cancel the certificate of the competency of the master namely the accused which has been granted by the Central Government may be recommended under this Act after holding the above said inquiry and thus render justice." Therefore, prima facie the complaint does not disclose the ingredients required under section 363. We enquired of the respondents as to whether there have been earlier instances of such an inquiry having ever been made; and the 758 answer is in the negative. We feel that had such interpretation been given earlier the Act being an old one of 1958, some instances ought to have been available. However, the instant appeal is from an order of the High Court refusing to quash the complaint and the proceedings. Quashing of the complaint could have been done, if taken on its face value it failed to disclose any ingredient of the offence. The High Court found as fact that the appellant had two certificates issued under section 78 of the Act from the Director General of Shipping, Calcutta and Bombay respectively. The High Court correctly observed that section 363 enables the Central Government to transmit a case to the court which has jurisdiction under section 361 to make an inquiry against master, mate or engineer into the charges for incompetency or misconduct otherwise than in the course of formal investigation into shipping casualties but the High Court failed to notice that the complainant himself had no power under section 363. High Court has not considered the extent of applicability of the Act and whether all ingredients required under section 363 were satisfied in the impugned complaint. We accordingly set aside the Judgment of the High Court, quash the complaint and the proceedings before the 14th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras 8, but make it clear the it shall still be open for the Central Government to act under section 363 of the Act according to law if it so decides. Appeal allowed. R.S.S. Appeal allowed.

The grandfather of the appellants and respondents had two wives. The first wife and her only son died during his life time. The pre deceased son left behind four sons and a daughter. In 1947, the grand father made three oral gifts of certain properties in favour of his second wife, in lieu of maintenance. Later, the grandmother gifted some of these properties to two step grandsons. The gift was challenged by the other two grandsons. The lower court held that she had the absolute estate in the properties after the possing of the . In Second Appeal, the High Court held that she derived only a limited estate inasmuch as the gift in her favour would fall directly under section 14(2) of the and as such her limited estate would not stand enlarged into an absolute estate. This appeal is against the said judgment of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. There is no doubt that the donee had the right of maintenance and the gift was explicitly in lieu of maintenance. It was a case of her acquiring any new property by virtue of the gift but it was a case of her right of maintenance being given to her by way of a gift. It was a property acquired by gift in lieu of maintenance. The acquisition made on 26th April, 1947 having been prior to the , and she having acquired the property by way of gift in lieu of her antecedent right to maintenance, it would fail under sub section (1) and not under sub section (2) of section 14 of the and she derived absolute estate in the properties. [387E F] Bai Vajia (Dead) by Lrs. vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors. ; ; Gulwant Kaur & Anr. vs Mohinder Singh & Ors., ; ; Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal vs Maharaja Pillai Thillanayakom Pillai & Anr. , ; ; Jaswant Kaur V. Major 386 Harpal Singh, ; relied on. Karmi vs Amru & Ors., ; Kothi Satyanarayana vs Galla Sithayya & Ors. , ; ; distinguished.

ivil Appeal No. 2010 of 1986. From the Judgment and Order dated 15.4. 1986 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.A.O. Nos. 737 of 1981 275 of 1982 and 69 of 1984. Shanker Ghosh, A.V. Rangam and T.V. Ratnam for the Appellant. Ashok Sen. A. Subba Rao, Qamaruddin, Mrs, Qamaruddin, C.S.S. Rao and S.V. Deshpande for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 15th April, 1986. On or about th of April. 1948 Sail Nawaz Jung, the then ruler of Mukkalla State, South Yeman in Arabia settled some of the properties with which the appeal is concerned by a Registered Tamleeknama in favour of his son Sultan Awaz and his grand son Galib Bin Awaz. In 1954, there was Wakfnama by the said Sail Nawaz Jung. On or about 23rd of August, 1963 the Military Estate Officer, Secunderabad of. Andhra Pradesh requested for the requisition of the property named as "Sail Gulshan" with a vast extent of land and palaces with roads and surrounded by a compound wail measuring 19 acres and 10 guntas situated in the heart of Hyderabad city near Sarojini Devi Hospital. The property in question was taken possession of on or about 12th of September, 1963. In this appeal we are concerned with the claim for compensation for the said acquisition by one Abdul Khader who was a flower picker. He had claimed rights as a tenant during the requisition. His claim for compensation for requisition was settled by sharing the rent in or about 1969. The appellant is one of the owners of the property in question deriving their title 1233 and right from the said Sail Nawaz Jung. On or about 3rd February, 1970 the Collector issued notice for acquisition of the property under section 7(1) of the being Act 30 of 1952 (hereinafter called the Central Act). The Gazette Notification for the acquisition was issued on 12th March, 1970. The controversy in this case relates to the question whether Abdul Khader was 'a protected tenant ' under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 being Act No. XXI of 1950 (hereinafter called the Andhra Pradesh Act). The purpose of the said Act as the Preamble states was, inter alia, to enable the land holders to prevent the excessive sub division of agricultur al holdings and empower government to assume in certain circumstances the management of agricultural lands, to provide for the registration of Co operative Farms and to make further provision for matters incidental thereto. Section 2(r) states that the expression 'protected ' means a person who is deemed to be a protected tenant under the provisions of the said Act. Chapter IV of the Andhra Pradesh Act deals with protected tenants and section 34 of the said Act provides who is to be considered as a protected tenant and uses the expression that a person shall, subject to the provisions of sub sections (2) and (3), be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of the land if he has fulfilled the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of Section 34 of the said Act. Sub section (2) of Section 34 of the said Act also deals with "to be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of any land", for cer tain purposes. Section 35 of the said Act deals with deci sion on claims and stipulates by sub section (1) of Section 35 of the said Act that if any question arises whether any person, and if so what person, is deemed under Section 34 to be a protected tenant in respect of any land, the landhold er, or any person claiming to be so deemed, may, within one year from the commencement of the Act apply in the pre scribed form to the Tahsildar for the decision of the ques tion and the Tahsildar shall after enquiring into the claim or claims in the manner prescribed, declare what person is entitled to be deemed to be protected tenant or as the case may be, that no person is so entitled. Sub section (2) of Section 35 stipulates that a declaration by the Tahsildar that the person is deemed to be a protected tenant or, in the event of an appeal from the Tahsildar 's decision such declaration by the Collector on first appeal or by the Board of Revenue on second appeal, shall be conclusive that such person is a protected tenant and his rights as such shall be recorded in the Record of Right of where there is no Record of Rights in such village record as may be prescribed. Section 36 of the said Act deals with the recovery of pos session by protected tenant. Section 37 deals with persons not entitled 1234 under section 34 to be deemed in certain circumstances as protected tenants. Section 38 of the said Act deals with right of protected tenant to purchase land. Section 39 deals with right of protected tenants to exchange lands. Section 40 of the said Act makes rights of protected tenant herita ble. Sub section (2) of section 40 of the said Act indicates who are the heirs who would be entitled to hold the tenancy on the death of the protected tenant and on what terms. Sub section (3) of section 40 of the said Act provides that if a protected tenant dies without leaving any heirs all his rights shall be so extinguished. The explanation to sub section (3) of section 40 of the said Act provides who should be 'deemed to be the heirs ' of a protected tenant. Subsection (4) of section 40 stipulates that the interest of a protected tenant in the land held by him as a protected tenant shall form sixty per cent. It is necessary also to note the provisions of section 99 of the Act. It is as follows: "99. Bar of Jurisdiction: (1) Save as provid ed in this Act no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act re quired to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or by the Board of Revenue or Government. (2) No order of the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or of the Board of Revenue or Government made under this Act, shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. ' Section 102 of the said Act stipulates that the Act shall not apply to certain lands and areas and provides inter alia as follows: "102. Nothing in this Act shall apply (a) to lands leased, granted, alien ated or acquired in favour of or by the Cen tral Government or the State Government, a local authority or a Cooperative Society. " It is relevant at this stage to refer to certain provi sions of the Central Act to consider the controversy in volved in this appeal. The Central Act was enacted giving power for requisitioning and acquisi 1235 tion of immovable property for Union purposes. Section 3 of the said Act gave power to requisition immovable property. Section 4 of the said Act empowers taking possession of requisitioned property. Section 5 deals with rights over requisitioned property. Section 6 deals with the power of release from the requisitioning. Section 7 authorises the Central Government where it is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so to acquire requisitioned property. Sec tion 8 deals with 'principles and method of determining compensation either for requisitioning or acquisition of the property and, inter alia, provides for appointment of an arbitrator in certain contingencies in case there was no agreement for determining compensation. Section 9 deals with the payment of compensation and provides that the amount of compensation payable under an award shall, subject to any rules made under that Act, be paid by a competent authority to the person or persons entitled thereto in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the award. Suspect ing that the entry in the Protected Tenancy Register might not be genuine, on or about 24th of October, 1970 the Tah sildar passed an order cancelling that entry. The main question centres around the right of Abdul Khader, respond ent No. 1 herein to the compensation awarded by the arbitra tor, it is therefore, necessary to refer to the relevant portion of the said order which inter alia, stated as fol lows: "By perusal of the Tenancy Register of 1958 it is evident that Sri Mohd. Abdul Khader is not a genuine protected tenant. The entries of this particular so called tenant is doubtful. I suspect that somebody has tampered the register and entered the name of Sri Mohd. Abdul Khader. Separate enquiry in this connec tion is going on in this office to know under what circumstances such entry has been made and copy also issued without knowledge of the Tahsildar. Hence I suspect the entry and order to cancel the copy of the tenancy issued in favour of Sri Modh. Abdul Khader. Sd Tahsildar. Hyderabad West Taluk. " This order of cancellation was challenged by Abdul Khadar by filing a writ petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh being W .P. No. 1786 of 197 1 and by judgment and order passed on 27th August, 197 1, the learned single Judge, Vaidya, J. held, inter alia, as follows: 1236 "Whether the petitioner (Abdul Khader) is a protected tenant or whether he has any prima facie interest in the suit property are mat ters entirely within the sole jurisdiction of the arbitrator who has to be appointed under Section 8 of the 'Central Act '. " In the appeal of Abdul Khader the proceedings of Revenue Divisional Officer while questioning entry of the name of Abdul Khader in the Register is a genuine one or net and while it is stated that it was entered in the Register in such suspicious way by giving Serial No. 1/A between Serial Nos. 1 and 2 of Register being Exhibit A. 106 and Exhibit A. 107, it ultimately held that Abdul Khader was a protected tenant under section 37A of the Andhra Pradesh Act. On or about 19th of April, 1972 the order was passed by the Dis trict Revenue Officer who held that Abdul Khader was not a protected tenant. He held further that Khasra Pahani which is the basic record of occupancy period after spot inspec tions does not find the name of Abdul Khader and further held that all entries except this entry in the Protected Tenancy Register prepared under section 37A of the Andhra Pradesh Act was supported by an enquiry. It was in those circumstances held by him that the entry was a spurious one. In Civil Revision Petition No. 1006 of 1972 which was filed by Abdul Khader as against others, Justice R. Ramachandra Raju of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on or about 19th August, 1974 held that Abdul Khader was not a protected tenant and directed deletion of entry made in the Final Record of tenancies as a spurious one. The learned Judge observed, inter alia, as follows: "I am told by the counsel for both the parties that the lands in question were already ac quired for military purpose under the Requisi tion and Acquisition of Immovable property Act, 1952 and that Sri M.S. Sharma, the Addi tional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hydera bad has already been appointed as Arbitrator under the Act for determining the compensation and the persons entitled to it. Not only that, in the writ petition filed by the present petitioner in this Court, it was held that it is not necessary to go into the question whether the petitioner is a protected tenant or whether he has any prima facie interest in the property because they are the matters entirely within the sole jurisdiction of the arbitrator who has to be appointed under Section 8 of the Act. Now, as the arbitrator has already been appointed, he will go into the matter as to whether the 1237 petitioner was a protected tenant of the lands or not and if he was the protected tenant to what share in the compensation amount he would be entitled to. Under these circumstances, the C.R.P. is dismissed with a direction that the entry made in the Final Record of Tenancies that the petitioner was the protect ed tenant, for the lands in question which is spurious as found by both the Revenue Divi sional Officer and the District Revenue Offi cer should be deleted. " The matter was brought to this Court by a special leave application and this Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10 of 1975 on or about 30th January. 1975 held that since the question whether the petitioner in that case namely, Abdul Khader was a protected tenant had been left open by the High Court to be decided by the Arbitrator under section 8 of the Central Act, special leave petition was rejected with those observations. Thereafter there was an order appointing arbitrator on 29th of March, 1975 under section 8(1)(b) of the Central Act. Claim petition was filed by the appellant before the arbitrator ' Claim petition was also filed by Abdul Khader claiming 60 '% of compensation as a 'protected tenant '. There was an award by the arbitrator holding that as this Court had left it open to decide whether Abdul Khader was a protected tenant. Despite the objection exercising the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to go into the question of protected tenant, the arbitrator held that Abdul Khader was a protected tenant. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award, the appellant claiming as one of the owners of the property filed a statutory appeal to the High Court. In the meantime Abdul Khader filed an application on or about 21st of Octo ber, 1984 for adducing additional evidence to mark Kaulnama dated 2nd of December, 1950 for the first time and Oubu liatnama dated 2nd December, 1950 as exhibits in deciding the protected tenancy rights. The appellant objected to that application but the High Court on 1st April, 1985 appointed Advocate Commissioner to record additional evidence. On or about 22nd of April, 1985 the appellant filed the objection reserving the right of raising the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to go into the question whether Abdul Khader was a protected tenant in the light of the Act 21 of 1950. Three civil appeals were filed before this Court against the order of the High Court on 15th May, 1985. This Court passed the order, on 19th August, 1985. The said order is important and reads as follows: 1238 "Special leave are granted. The appeal is heard. Dr. Chitale learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court should be directed to consider the issues relating to the jurisdic tion of the arbitrator appointed and function ing under the , 195 i to decide whether a person is protected tenant of an agricultural land or not in the light of Sections 99 and 102 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950. We have heard the learned counsel for the respondents on the above question. After giving our due consideration to the question we are of the view that the High Court should determine this question. The High Court shall decide the question of juris diction referred to above in light of the submissions to be made by both the parties. Shri Subba Rao, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the appellants should not be permitted to withdraw from the authorities concerned more than 40 per cent of the total compensation awarded in respect of the lands in question pending disposal of the appeal before the High Court. We agree with his submission. We direct that the appellants shall withdraw not more than 40 per cent of the compensation pending disposal of the appeal before the High Court. The remaining 60 per cent shall be disbursed in accordance with the directions to be given by the High Court after hearing all the parties concerned. " The appeals were disposed of accordingly. Other C.M.Ps. were filed for clarification of the second part of the order dated 19th August, 1985 and this Court on 29th November, 1985 in CMPs. Nos. 4692 to 4694 of 1985 clarified and ob served that there was no need for further clarification. It was observed that the High Court was at liberty to consider the claims to be made by both the parties and pass any fresh order with regard to the disbursement of the remaining 60% of the compensation. The judgment under appeal was passed on 15th of April, 1986. This appeal arises out of the said judgment. In the judgment under appeal which is directed against the award made by the arbitrator formulated the following four issues (1) what is the value of the land; (2) who are entitled to the compensation amount; (3) whether Abdul Khader is a protected tenant of Sail Gulshan of the area 19 02 guntas excluding the 1239 land of buildings, wells, etc. and (4) what share is to be apportioned to successors of Sail Nawaz Jung. It has to be borne in mind that in the award, the arbitrator after ex haustively discussing the evidence on record held that Abdul Khader was a protected tenant and as such further held that he was entitled to 60% of the compensation money payable for the acquisition of the land excluding the land of buildings, wells etc. In this appeal we are concerned with the question wheth er the High Court was right in upholding the award of the arbitrator so far as it has held in favour of Abdul Khader and his rights to get 60% of the compensation. The High Court dealt with the value of the land. We are not concerned with the challenge to this aspect in this appeal. The High Court further modified a portion of the order in view of the decision of this Court in Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chandigarh, ; on the question of solati um and interest on the amount awarded. The judgment also dealt with the question as to who were the successors of Nawaz Jung. We are also not concerned with this aspect of the matter inasmuch as the same is the subject matter of another appeal being Civil Appeal No. 4406 of 1986. We are concerned in this appeal with the right of Abdul Khader. The High Court discussed 18 documents out of which two are challans and other depositions. Kowlnama executed in favour of Shaik Hussain was not filed. The Kowlnama executed in favour of the son, Mohd. Abdul Khader, on December 3, 1950 was filed and was marked as Exhibit C 1. The document recited: "permitted to utilise garden fruits, flowers and mango fruits". The tenant was permitted to raise flower trees at his own expenses. The High Court took into consid eration the judgment in Suit No. 13(1) of 195 1 52 by the tenant. The High Court on consideration of these documents was of the view that these documents showed unequivocally that the tenancy was in favour of Shaik Hussain from 1935. After his death Mohd. Abdul Khader was recognised as the tenant. The land was taken possession of under a panchanama dated 12th of September, 1963. According to the High Court the documents discussed in the judgment indicated that Shaik Hussain was a tenant from 1935. After his death on July 18, 1949, his son Mohd. Abdul Khader became a tenant. In this background the Court addressed itself to the question wheth er Abdul Khader was a protected tenant or not entitled to 60% of the compensation. No document was filed to show that Abdul Khader was declared by the revenue courts as a pro tected tenant. 1240 The High Court was of the view that there was surfeit of evidence prior to the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Act that Shaik Hussain was a tenant of the land. The question was whether on enforcement of the said Act Abdul Khader, respondent herein, was a protected tenant. The High Court thereafter discussed the facts mentioned hereinbefore about the order of the District Revenue Officer and the orders of this Court referred to hereinbefore. The High Court noticed the position that under the said Andhra Pradesh Act it was for the revenue authorities to order whether a tenant is a protected tenant under section 34, section 37 'and section 37A of the said Act. Section 37A was enacted on 12th of March, 1956. The High Court was, however, of the view that it cannot be said that it was for the revenue authorities alone to decide the issue because the arbitrator was ordered to decide the issue by the High Court on 19th August, 1974 and by this Court on 30th of January, 1975. The High Court also referred to the directions of this Court dated 19th August, 1985 mentioned hereinbefore. The High Court was of the view that the arbitrator was to decide that question and the arbitrator was not in error in deciding the issue in the manner it did. The Court reiterated that there was surfeit of evidence to declare that Abdul Khader was a tenant. If he was a tenant, the High Court observed. he was a protected tenant under section 34 read with section 37 or under sec tion 37 A of the Andhra Pradesh Act. The High Court on reciting the facts came to the conclusions, inter alia: (a) that Abdul Khader because he was a tenant between January, 1942 to January, 1948 for six years, therefore, was a pro tected tenant under sub clause (ii) of clause (1) of section 34 of the Andhra Pradesh Act; (b) that Abdul Khader held the land from October, 1943 to October, 1949, therefore, was a protected tenant of Sail Gulshan under sub clause (iii) of clause (1) of section 34 of Act 21 of 1950. In these circum stances, the High Court held that Adbul Khader was entitled to 60% of the compensation paid. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellants being the successor of the owner of the land in question is in appeal before us. Shri Shanker Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that under the said Andhra Pradesh Act it was mandatory under section 99 read with section 102 of the said Act in conjunction with the definition of section 2(r) of the Act for the revenue authorities to decide wheth er Abdul Khader was a protected tenant or not. There being no such finding by the revenue officer, on the other hand there being a finding mat Abdul Khader was not a protected tenant by the revenue authorities it was not open to the arbitrator to decide the question of 1241 protected tenancy. The arbitrator therefore, exceeded his jurisdiction and the High Court was in error. Shri A.K. Sen, on behalf of the respondents on the other hand contended that the compensation payable in respect of the requisitioning and acquisition must be determined under the Central Act and the arbitrator was the authority to decide that question. The question of Abdul Khader 's right to compensation had to be decided in accordance with law. He had claimed rights of a protected tenant. He had sought to establish his rights which must be found within the fourcor ners of the Andhra Pradesh Act along with other documents because under section 40(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Act the interest of a protected tenant in the land held by him as a protected tenant formed 60%. The rights of the protected tenants have been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Act and relevant provisions of that Act namely, sections 34, 37, 37A and 40 in conjunction with the definition under section 2(r) have to be taken into consideration in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case. The two orders of this Court as we have mentioned hereinbefore dated 30th of Janu ary, 1975 and 19th of August. 1985 reiterated the position that it was for the arbitrator to decide the question and he should decide the question in the light of sections 99 and 102 of the Andhra Pradesh Act as set out hereinbefore. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that there was a complete bar for any civil court to go into the question whether Abdul Khader was a protected tenant and as such the arbitrator and the High Court had no jurisdiction to decide this question. For this reliance was placed on Section 102 of the Andhra Pradesh Act which lays down that the Act will not apply to lands leased, granted, alienated or acquired in favour of or by the Central Government or the State Govern ment etc. and on Section 99 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to deal with any question which is under the Andhra Pradesh Act required to be settled, to be decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector. According to the appellant inasmuch as whether Abdul Khader was a protected tenant had not to be settled by the Collector or the Tribunal, the arbitrator and the High Court were in error in going to that question. We are unable to accept this submission. By the scheme of the Central Act compensation was payable to persons who had interest in the land acquired. Who are the persons who have interest in the land had to be decided in accordance with the law and the evidence. Determination by the revenue authorities and non determination is not conclusive or decisive. It is clear that section 102 of the Andhra 1242 Pradesh Act mentions that after acquisition the Act was not to apply in respect of certain land. Therefore, it was submitted by the respondents that section 99 of the Andhra Pradesh Act. which made the determination by the Tahsildar to be final and debarred other courts from going into the question did not apply in case of compensation payable. In the background of the totality of circumstances as manifest in the different orders it appeared to the arbitrator and the Court that the entry which was made in favour of Abdul Khader as the protected tenant was of doubtful validity. We are of the opinion that the High Court was not in error in so holding. It was the observation of the revenue authori ties that it was spurious. That in any event what was the interest of Abdul Khader had to be determined in determining the question of payment of compensation to him and in so determining the facts and circumstances and the proceedings before the revenue authorities and entries and subsequent deletions had to be taken into consideration by the arbitra tor. The arbitrator has done so. He had jurisdiction to do so. The High Court has so held. This Court by the two orders referred to hereinbefore had also affirmed this position. In that view of the matter we are unable to accept the challenge to the award. Furthermore, under section 99 of the Andhra Pradesh Act the bar was not against the arbitrator but against a civil court. In determining the amount of compensation payable to Abdul Khader under the Central Act, his interests in the property had to be determined. In another context, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh enunciated the position that it was necessary to determine the interest of the persons claiming compensation. Reference may be made to the decision in the case of Archi Appalareddi and another vs Special Tahsildar, land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam Municipality and mother, [1979] Andhra Weekly Reporter, Vol. 1 p. 101, where the Court observed in the context of the Land Acquisition Act that a tenant was a 'person inter ested ' as defined in clause (b) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act. He has a right to object to the acquisition and/or the quantum of compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer or the Court, as the case may be, had to ascertain the value of a claimant 's right in the property acquired and compensate him in that behalf. We may mention that in the two orders of this Court dated 30th of January, 1975 and 19th of August, 1985 referred to here inbefore, this Court had left it open to the High Court and to the arbitrator to decide whether he is a protected tenant or not. the arbitrator has decided that question and the High Court found 1243 over wheiming evidence in support of it. In that view of the matter we must uphold that decision however unsatisfactory it might appear that a fruit plucker gets 60% of the compen sation while the owners get only If that is the law let it be. In the aforesaid view of the matter this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs. P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

% The appellants were contractors for the supply of ballast to PWD. They were detained under section 3(2) of the . It was stated in the grounds of detention that on account of business rivalry, appellants and their companions attacked the complainant with fire arms and hand grenades with intent to kill him, FIR was lodged by the complainant, a case was registered against them under section 147, 149, 307 I.P.C. and section 6 of the Explosives Act, and a chargesheet put up against the appellants, and since they had applied for bail, and if released there was a possibility that they will again start activities causing breach of public order, it was necessary to detain them in order to prevent them from so acting. The detention orders were approved by the State Government under section 3(4) of the Act, and the representations made by the appellants having been rejected they were directed to be detained for a period of 12 months. Challenging their detention, the appellants filed writ petitions before the High Court contending that the alleged assault on the complainant affected only an individual and such a solitary act could not be considered to be an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The High Court, dismissing the writ petitions, held that the assault was to teach a lesson to the complainant and serve as warning to prospective tenderers who may not dare to submit their tenders and that the impact and reach of the act went beyond the individual and affected the community of contractors who take contracts for executing the public works. Allowing the appeals to this Court, 774 ^ HELD: Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be different. [778C D] A solitary act of omission or commission can be taken into consideration for being subjectively satisfied, by the detaining authority to pass an Order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act is such that it disturbs public tranquility by creating terror and panic in the society or a considerable number of the people in a specified locality where the act is alleged to have been committed. It is the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order. [779A C] In the instant case, the alleged act of assault by fire arms is confined to the complainant and not to others. It is an act infringing law and order and the reach and effect of the act is not so extensive as to affect considerable members of the society. In other words, this act does not disturb public tranquility, nor does it create any terror or panic in the minds of the people of the locality nor does it affect in any manner the even tempo of the life of the community. This criminal act emanates from business rivalry between the detenus and the complainant. Therefore, such an act cannot be the basis for subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass an order of detention on the ground that the impugned act purports to affect public order i.e. the even tempo of the life of the community, which is the sole basis for clamping the order of detention. Moreover, no injury was caused to the person of the complainant, by the appellants nor any damage was caused to the car though hand grenade was alleged to have been thrown on the car. No mark has been caused to the car also. [778E H] Gulab Mehra vs State of U. P. & Ors., 3 SC 559, applied.

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