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build.js | javascript.lang.security.detect-child-process.detect-child-process | Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `command`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. | child_process.exec(command, callback); |
travis_after_all.py | python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected | Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. | response = urllib2.urlopen(req).read() |
travis_after_all.py | python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected | Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. | response = urllib2.urlopen(req).read() |
ejs.js | javascript.lang.security.audit.unknown-value-with-script-tag.unknown-value-with-script-tag | Cannot determine what 'ejs' is and it is used with a '<script>' tag. This could be susceptible to cross-site scripting (XSS). Ensure 'ejs' is not externally controlled, or sanitize this data. | assert.equal(ejs.render('<%=\n// a comment\nname\n// another comment %>', {name: ' <script>'}), |
ejs.js | javascript.lang.security.audit.unknown-value-with-script-tag.unknown-value-with-script-tag | Cannot determine what 'ejs' is and it is used with a '<script>' tag. This could be susceptible to cross-site scripting (XSS). Ensure 'ejs' is not externally controlled, or sanitize this data. | assert.equal(ejs.render('<%= name %>', {name: ' <script>'}), |
ejs.js | javascript.lang.security.audit.unknown-value-with-script-tag.unknown-value-with-script-tag | Cannot determine what 'ejs' is and it is used with a '<script>' tag. This could be susceptible to cross-site scripting (XSS). Ensure 'ejs' is not externally controlled, or sanitize this data. | assert.equal(ejs.render('<%-\n// a comment\nname\n// another comment %>', {name: ' <script>'}), |
ejs.js | javascript.lang.security.audit.unknown-value-with-script-tag.unknown-value-with-script-tag | Cannot determine what 'ejs' is and it is used with a '<script>' tag. This could be susceptible to cross-site scripting (XSS). Ensure 'ejs' is not externally controlled, or sanitize this data. | assert.equal(ejs.render('<%- name %>', {name: '<script>'}), |
dictToCsv.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | data = pickle.load(open(file_path)) |
experiment_association_only.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | user_result = pickle.load(open(user_result_path)) |
experiment_association_only.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(user_class_category_pattern_type_feature_pattern_info_list_dict, f) |
experiment_association_only.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(category_class_count_list, f) |
experiment_association_only.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | user_class_category_pattern_type_feature_pattern_info_list_dict = pickle.load(open(output_dir + '/sequence_only_result_class.pickle')) |
experiment_association_only.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | category_class_count_list = pickle.load(open(output_dir + '/sequence_only_category_class_count_list.pickle')) |
experiment_sequence_only.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | rules = pickle.load(open("%s/%s.pickle" % (rules_dir_path, file_info))) |
experiment_sequence_only.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(pattern_len_boxplot_data_dict, f) |
experiment_sequence_only.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pattern_len_boxplot_data_dict = pickle.load(open('%s/%s' % (output_dir, 'pattern_len_boxplot_data_dict.pickle'))) |
feature_correlation.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | return pickle.load(open(output_filename)), output_filename |
feature_correlation.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | data = pickle.load(open(file_path)) |
feature_correlation.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(reindexed_data, f) |
pas_mining.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | all_unique_rule_list = pickle.load(open(ALL_UNIQUE_PATH)) |
pas_mining.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | all_rule_list = pickle.load(open(ALL_RULE_PATH)) |
pas_mining.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | items, rules_1, itemTimestampIndexDict, timestampList = pickle.load(open(APRIORI_RESULT_PATH)) |
pas_mining.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(rules_1_result, f) |
pas_mining.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(all_unique_rule_list, f_all_unique_rule) |
pas_mining.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(all_rule_list, f_all_rule) |
pas_mining.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(pattern_pair_entropy_result_list, f_entropy_result_pickle) |
pas_mining_performance.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | all_unique_rule_list = pickle.load(open(ALL_UNIQUE_PATH)) |
pas_mining_performance.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | all_rule_list = pickle.load(open(ALL_RULE_PATH)) |
pas_mining_performance.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | items, rules_1, itemTimestampIndexDict, timestampList = pickle.load(open(APRIORI_RESULT_PATH)) |
removed_default_value.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | return pickle.load(open(output_filename)), output_filename |
removed_default_value.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | data = pickle.load(open(input_filename)) |
removed_default_value.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(data, f) |
ruduce_category_features.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | return pickle.load(open(output_filename)), output_filename |
ruduce_category_features.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(reduced_feature_data, f) |
php_python.py | python.lang.security.audit.network.bind.avoid-bind-to-all-interfaces | Running `socket.bind` to 0.0.0.0, or empty string could unexpectedly expose the server publicly as it binds to all available interfaces. Consider instead getting correct address from an environment variable or configuration file. | sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) #TCP/IP |
process.py | python.lang.security.audit.exec-detected.exec-detected | Detected the use of exec(). exec() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. | exec (rpFunc, global_env, local_env) #函数调用 |
config-console.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | char *type = strtok(result, " "); |
config-console.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | char *arg = strtok(NULL, "\n"); |
contacts.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | char *command_token = strtok(command_buf, " \n"); |
contacts.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | char *args = strtok(NULL, "\n"); |
flagsay-2.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-string-copy-fn.insecure-use-string-copy-fn | Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by using strcpy_s instead (although note that strcpy_s is an optional part of the C11 standard, and so may not be available). | strncpy(tempFlag, flag, flagSize); |
guess_num.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-scanf-fn.insecure-use-scanf-fn | Avoid using 'scanf()'. This function, when used improperly, does not consider buffer boundaries and can lead to buffer overflows. Use 'fgets()' instead for reading input. | scanf("%32s", buf); |
secret.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-scanf-fn.insecure-use-scanf-fn | Avoid using 'scanf()'. This function, when used improperly, does not consider buffer boundaries and can lead to buffer overflows. Use 'fgets()' instead for reading input. | scanf("%x", ¬_secret); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-string-copy-fn.insecure-use-string-copy-fn | Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by using strcpy_s instead (although note that strcpy_s is an optional part of the C11 standard, and so may not be available). | strncpy(msg->text+2, new_text, len); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-string-copy-fn.insecure-use-string-copy-fn | Finding triggers whenever there is a strcpy or strncpy used. This is an issue because strcpy does not affirm the size of the destination array and strncpy will not automatically NULL-terminate strings. This can lead to buffer overflows, which can cause program crashes and potentially let an attacker inject code in the program. Fix this by using strcpy_s instead (although note that strcpy_s is an optional part of the C11 standard, and so may not be available). | strncpy(msg->text+2, text, length); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | char *command = strtok(line, " "); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | uint64_t id = strtoul(strtok(NULL, " "), NULL, 10); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | uint64_t id = strtoul(strtok(NULL, " "), NULL, 10); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | char *needle = strtok(NULL, ""); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | uint64_t uid = strtoul(strtok(NULL, " "), NULL, 10); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | char *text = strtok(NULL, ""); |
server.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-strtok-fn.insecure-use-strtok-fn | Avoid using 'strtok()'. This function directly modifies the first argument buffer, permanently erasing the delimiter character. Use 'strtok_r()' instead. | char *text = strtok(NULL, ""); |
vrgearconsole.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-gets-fn.insecure-use-gets-fn | Avoid 'gets()'. This function does not consider buffer boundaries and can lead to buffer overflows. Use 'fgets()' or 'gets_s()' instead. | gets(username); |
vrgearconsole.c | c.lang.security.insecure-use-gets-fn.insecure-use-gets-fn | Avoid 'gets()'. This function does not consider buffer boundaries and can lead to buffer overflows. Use 'fgets()' or 'gets_s()' instead. | gets(password); |
__init__.py | python.lang.security.audit.eval-detected.eval-detected | Detected the use of eval(). eval() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. | retval = sess.call(eval(js_code)) |
express.py | python.lang.security.audit.eval-detected.eval-detected | Detected the use of eval(). eval() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. | res = eval(self.__operator.join(eval_array), {}, {}) |
coco.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(coco_eval, fid, pickle.HIGHEST_PROTOCOL) |
eval_refinedetlite_coco.py | python.lang.security.use-defused-xml.use-defused-xml | The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. | import xml.etree.cElementTree as ET |
eval_refinedetlite_coco.py | python.lang.security.use-defused-xml.use-defused-xml | The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. | import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET |
eval_refinedetlite_coco.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(all_boxes, f, pickle.HIGHEST_PROTOCOL) |
eval_refinedetlite_voc.py | python.lang.security.use-defused-xml.use-defused-xml | The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. | import xml.etree.cElementTree as ET |
eval_refinedetlite_voc.py | python.lang.security.use-defused-xml.use-defused-xml | The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. | import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET |
eval_refinedetlite_voc.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump({'rec': rec, 'prec': prec, 'ap': ap}, f) |
eval_refinedetlite_voc.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(recs, f) |
eval_refinedetlite_voc.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | recs = pickle.load(f) |
eval_refinedetlite_voc.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | pickle.dump(all_boxes, f, pickle.HIGHEST_PROTOCOL) |
voc0712.py | python.lang.security.use-defused-xml.use-defused-xml | The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. | import xml.etree.cElementTree as ET |
voc0712.py | python.lang.security.use-defused-xml.use-defused-xml | The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. | import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET |
Cifar10.py | python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected | Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. | urllib.urlretrieve(cifar_data_url, cifar_data_file) |
Cifar10.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-cPickle | Avoid using `cPickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | raw = cPickle.load(f) |
Cifar10.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-cPickle | Avoid using `cPickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | raw = cPickle.load(f) |
client.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | content = loads(data) |
client.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | final_content = dumps(self._current_list) |
server.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | content = loads(data) |
server.py | python.lang.security.deserialization.pickle.avoid-pickle | Avoid using `pickle`, which is known to lead to code execution vulnerabilities. When unpickling, the serialized data could be manipulated to run arbitrary code. Instead, consider serializing the relevant data as JSON or a similar text-based serialization format. | final_content = dumps(self._current_list) |
cryptocurrency_correlator.py | python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected.dynamic-urllib-use-detected | Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. | df = urllib.request.urlopen('https://poloniex.com/public?command=' + "returnChartData" + '¤cyPair=' + str(pairing) + str(ticker) + '&start=' + str(start) + '&end=' + str(end) +'&period=' + str(period)) |
index.html | generic.html-templates.security.var-in-script-tag.var-in-script-tag | Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`). | chartData.push({{ stylesheet.chart|json }}); |
make-reference-docs.js | javascript.lang.security.detect-child-process.detect-child-process | Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `doc`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. | `api-documenter markdown --input-folder ${doc.input} --output-folder ${doc.output}`, |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ . }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ . }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ . }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_MPPB.png" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_MPPB.png" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_MPPB.png" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_MPPB.png" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_LAB.png" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_LAB.png" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_LAB.png" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_LAB.png" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_UFCG.jpg" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_UFCG.jpg" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_UFCG.jpg" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
about.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <img id="about-card-picture" src="{{ "/images/LOGO_UFCG.jpg" }}{{ if in . "//www.gravatar.com/avatar/" }}?s=110{{ end }}" alt="{{ i18n "global.author_picture" }}" /> |
actions.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <nav {{ if eq .Params.showPagination false }}style="visibility: hidden"{{ end }}> |
actions.html | generic.html-templates.security.unquoted-attribute-var.unquoted-attribute-var | Detected a unquoted template variable as an attribute. If unquoted, a malicious actor could inject custom JavaScript handlers. To fix this, add quotes around the template expression, like this: "{{ expr }}". | <nav {{ if eq .Params.showPagination false }}style="visibility: hidden"{{ end }}> |
actions.html | generic.html-templates.security.var-in-href.var-in-href | Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. If using Flask, use 'url_for()' to safely generate a URL. If using Django, use the 'url' filter to safely generate a URL. If using Mustache, use a URL encoding library, or prepend a slash '/' to the variable for relative links (`href="/{{link}}"`). You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. | <a class="post-action-btn btn btn--default tooltip--top" href="{{ .RelPermalink }}" data-tooltip="{{ .Title }}"> |
actions.html | generic.html-templates.security.var-in-href.var-in-href | Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. If using Flask, use 'url_for()' to safely generate a URL. If using Django, use the 'url' filter to safely generate a URL. If using Mustache, use a URL encoding library, or prepend a slash '/' to the variable for relative links (`href="/{{link}}"`). You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. | <a class="post-action-btn btn btn--default tooltip--top" href="{{ .RelPermalink }}" data-tooltip="{{ .Title }}"> |
actions.html | generic.html-templates.security.var-in-href.var-in-href | Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. If using Flask, use 'url_for()' to safely generate a URL. If using Django, use the 'url' filter to safely generate a URL. If using Mustache, use a URL encoding library, or prepend a slash '/' to the variable for relative links (`href="/{{link}}"`). You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. | <a class="post-action-btn btn btn--default tooltip--top" href="{{ .RelPermalink }}" data-tooltip="{{ .Title }}"> |
actions.html | generic.html-templates.security.var-in-href.var-in-href | Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. If using Flask, use 'url_for()' to safely generate a URL. If using Django, use the 'url' filter to safely generate a URL. If using Mustache, use a URL encoding library, or prepend a slash '/' to the variable for relative links (`href="/{{link}}"`). You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. | <a class="post-action-btn btn btn--default tooltip--top" href="{{ .RelPermalink }}" data-tooltip="{{ .Title }}"> |
actions.html | generic.html-templates.security.var-in-href.var-in-href | Detected a template variable used in an anchor tag with the 'href' attribute. This allows a malicious actor to input the 'javascript:' URI and is subject to cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks. If using Flask, use 'url_for()' to safely generate a URL. If using Django, use the 'url' filter to safely generate a URL. If using Mustache, use a URL encoding library, or prepend a slash '/' to the variable for relative links (`href="/{{link}}"`). You may also consider setting the Content Security Policy (CSP) header. | <a class="post-action-btn btn btn--default" target="new" href="{{ printf .url $.Permalink }}"> |
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