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5

The case concerns the detention of the applicant pending his asylum proceedings. The applicant crossed the Hungarian border from <COUNTRY> clandestinely on 25 September 2015. In view of his request for international protection, on 26 September 2015 the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Police Department suspended the alien administration procedure. On the same day the Office of Immigration and Nationality (hereinafter “the asylum authority”) commenced asylum proceedings. It would appear that the applicant was granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds for the duration of the asylum proceedings. The asylum authority ordered that the applicant be detained, with effect from 26 September 2015. It relied on section 31/A (1) (a) and (c) of Act no. LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (the “Asylum Act”, see O.<COUNTRY> , no. 9912/15, § 21, 5 July 2016), and noted that the applicant’s identity and nationality had not been clarified and that if left at large he could delay or frustrate the asylum proceedings and would present a risk of absconding. Given that he had no connections in the country or resources to subsist on, the asylum authority found that no less restrictive measure could be applied. After holding a hearing, the Debrecen District Court, on 29 September 2015, at the request of the asylum authority, decided to extend the applicant’s asylum detention until 29 November 2015. It noted that the applicant’s identity was unclear since he did not have any valid document to prove it, that he had arrived in <COUNTRY> unlawfully, and that he had no connections in the country or any means of subsistence. The court held that less stringent measures – such as an obligation to check in regularly with the authorities, to stay at a designated place of residence, or to pay asylum bail – were not appropriate to ensure the applicant’s availability to the authorities. In its reasoning it referred to Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. At the asylum hearing held on 17 November 2015 the applicant made further statements about his identity and the reasons for fleeing his country of origin. On 17 November 2015 the asylum authority again sought an extension of the asylum detention. In her submission of 20 November 2015 to the asylum authority, the applicant’s lawyer requested the termination of the asylum detention and the application of less stringent measures to ensure the applicant’s availability during the proceedings. On 24 November 2015 the Debrecen District Court extended the applicant’s asylum detention until 27 December 2015. The court relied on the facts that the applicant had no connection to <COUNTRY> and lacked any resources to subsist on and that his identity needed to be clarified. 7 . On 23 December 2015 the asylum authority dismissed the applicant’s request for asylum but granted him subsidiary protection. At the same time, it withdrew the residence permit that had been issued to him on humanitarian grounds. On the same day his asylum detention was terminated. The applicant’s asylum detention therefore lasted from 26 September to 23 December 2015. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his asylum detention had not been lawful.

Ukraine, Hungary

11

The present application concerns the refusal by the domestic authorities to register the applicant association established by the two individual applicants. In 2008 the two individual applicants (the second and third applicants, see appended list) established the applicant association, a non-governmental organisation called Election Monitoring and Democracy Education Centre ( Seçkilərin Monitorinqi və Demokratiyanın Tədrisi Mərkəzi ). They requested the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of <COUNTRY> (“the Ministry”) to register their association as a legal entity and submitted relevant documents. On 12 March 2009 the Ministry extended by thirty days the time-limit for examination of the documents submitted. 4 . In a letter of 29 April 2009 addressed to the second applicant, the Ministry indicated the following alleged deficiencies and returned those documents: (a) in accordance with Article 4 of the Law on State registration and the State register of legal entities (“the Law on State Registration”), a decision to establish the applicant association and adopt its charter should have been submitted, instead of a record of the meeting of the founders at which that decision was taken; and (b) in section 4 of the charter, the title of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (Public Associations and Funds) (“the Law on NGOs”) was written incorrectly. Having received the above-mentioned letter, the second and third applicants lodged a complaint against the Ministry with the Yasamal District Court. They argued that the Ministry’s allegations were false and unlawful because they had, in fact, submitted the decision establishing the association and adopting its charter – namely the document entitled “Decision” and subtitled “Extract from the record”. They also argued that there had been no valid “exceptional” reason, as required by Article 2 of the Law on State Registration, to extend the time ‑ limit for examination of the documents submitted. On 2 September 2009 the first-instance court dismissed the complaint, finding nothing unlawful in the Ministry’s actions. The Baku Court of Appeal upheld that judgment on 17 December 2009. However, on 13 August 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the lower courts’ judgments and remitted the case to the appellate court for re-examination. On 3 December 2010 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the complaint, finding that the Ministry had acted lawfully, both by extending the time-limit for examination of the documents and by refusing to register the applicant association. Regarding the refusal, the appellate court emphasised that the first finding made by the Ministry as to alleged deficiencies (summarised in paragraph 4 (a) above) had been lawful. On 20 April 2011 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment, largely reiterating the appellate court’s findings (the Supreme Court’s decision was sent to the applicants on 6 May 2011). 9 . In August 2014 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicants’ representative, Mr Aliyev. The investigating authorities seized many documents from his office, including the case file relating to the present application. The applicants complained before the Court that the Ministry’s actions had violated their right to freedom of association. 11 . They also complained that the seizure of their case file from the office of their lawyer had been in breach of Article 34 of the Convention.

Azerbaijan

10

The case concerns the domestic authorities’ denial of a request made by the applicant to access and report on living conditions in reception centres for asylum-seekers. The applicant is an investigative journalist who, at the material time, regularly published articles about migration and refugees on the Internet portal atlatszo.hu. On 27 July 2016 the applicant lodged a request for authorisation from the Office of Immigration and Nationality (hereinafter “the OIN”) to enter and make recordings at the reception centres for asylum-seekers and refugees in Bicske, Vámosszabadi, Körmend and Kiskunhalas, and at the reception centre designated for minors in Fót. On 28 July 2016 the applicant’s request in respect of the reception centres in Bicske, Vámosszabadi, Körmend and Kiskunhalas was denied by the OIN’s press department, who invoked the “safety and personal rights” of the people accommodated in the reception centres. She was advised that authorisation in respect of the reception centre in Fót should be requested from the Ministry of Human Resources. The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention that by refusing her request to enter the premises of the reception centres with a view to reporting on the living conditions of asylum-seekers the domestic authorities had interfered with her right to impart information.

P1-1

The case concerns the applicants’ complaints that they were deprived of their land through the application by the domestic courts of the constructive-expropriation rule ( accessione invertita or occupazione acquisitiva ). The applicants were the owners of plots of land in different municipalities (see the appended table for details). The national authorities issued orders authorising the urgent occupation of the applicants’ various plots of land with a view to their subsequent expropriation. Shortly thereafter, they took physical possession of the land. By the time the authorisations expired the land had been irreversibly altered by construction works, but the authorities had not issued formal expropriation orders. The applicants brought actions for damages in the national courts, arguing that the occupation of the land had been unlawful and seeking compensation. The domestic courts upheld the applicants’ complaints and found that the occupation of the applicants’ land, which had initially been legally authorised, had subsequently become unlawful, but that the land had been irreversibly altered following the completion of the public works. As a consequence, pursuant to the constructive-expropriation rule, the applicants were no longer the owners of the land. 6 . The domestic courts further accepted that the applicants were entitled to damages for the loss of their property, and ordered independent expert valuations of the land. They did not award compensation reflecting the market value of the expropriated land, but instead proceeded to make awards based on the criteria contained in section 5 bis of Legislative Decree no. 333 of 11 July 1992, as amended by Law no. 662 of 1996. Additionally, in applications nos. 22915/09, 43955/09 and 43275/12, the national courts awarded a sum as compensation for the unavailability of the land during the period of lawful occupation ( indennità di occupazione ). Further information on each application can be found in the appended table. The applicants complained that they had been unlawfully deprived of their land on account of the application by the domestic courts of the constructive-expropriation rule, in breach of their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 10 . They also complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, of the retrospective application of section 5 bis of Legislative Decree no. 333 of 11 July 1992, as amended by Law no. 662 of 1996. In their submission, this amounted to legislative interference with pending proceedings.

P1-1

The case concerns the deprivation of the applicant’s land pursuant to the rule on indirect or “constructive” expropriation. The applicant was the co-owner of a plot of land located in Mottola with another individual, F.On 25 July 1974 F.brought an action for damages in the Taranto District Court against the Mottola municipality. He argued that the municipality had occupied part of his land without permission and had built a road on it. He sought compensation for the dispossession of the relevant land as well as compensation for the depreciation in the value of the remainder. On 5 March 1980 the District Court struck the case out of its list in accordance with Article 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as both parties had been absent from two consecutive hearings. On 6 April 1984 F.brought the same action for damages in the Taranto District Court against the Mottola municipality. On an unspecified date the District Court ordered an independent expert valuation of the land. On 3 April 1986 the applicant joined the proceedings before the Taranto District Court. He submitted that he was the co-owner of part of the occupied land and was seeking compensation for the dispossession of that land. 8 . By a judgment of 29 March 1989 the District Court declared that the occupation of the land had been unlawful and that ownership of the land had been transferred to the municipality pursuant to the constructive-expropriation rule. It referred to the finding of the independent expert to the effect that the market value of the property, in so far as the applicant’s share in the land was concerned, had amounted to 10,946,450 Italian liras (ITL) in 1974. The court ordered the Mottola municipality to pay F.and the applicant the sums of ITL 143,139,473 and ITL 58,891,901 (30,415 euros (EUR)) respectively, corresponding to the property’s market value in 1974 as adjusted for inflation. On 15 June 1989 the Mottola municipality appealed to the Lecce Court of Appeal against that judgment. By a judgment of 14 March 1994 the Court of Appeal dismissed the municipality’s appeal. On 19 July 1994 the Mottola municipality appealed to the Court of Cassation against the Court of Appeal’s judgment, arguing, inter alia , that that court had failed to take into consideration its argument to the effect that the applicant’s right to compensation had become time-barred. By a judgment delivered on 3 March 1997 the Court of Cassation partly upheld the municipality’s appeal and remitted the case to the Bari Court of Appeal. 13 . By a judgment of 12 July 2000 the Bari Court of Appeal declared the applicant’s right to compensation time-barred, given that he had lodged his application more than five years after the date on which the construction of the road had been completed (20 November 1974). Referring to the Court of Cassation’s case-law on constructive expropriation, it found that the transfer of ownership to the administration had occurred upon the completion of the public works. On 5 September 2001 the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation against that judgment. On 23 September 2004 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal. In judgment no. 735/2015 of 19 January 2015 the constructive-expropriation rule was found to be incompatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention by the Court of Cassation sitting as a full court. The court held that individuals were entitled to request the restitution of their property unless they decided to claim damages. Moreover, it held that the five-year limitation period for claiming damages in respect of the dispossession of property should start to run from the date on which the claim was lodged with the court. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complained to the Court that he had been unlawfully deprived of his land by means of indirect or “constructive” expropriation and that he had not obtained any compensation for the dispossession of his property.

13, P4-2

The applications concern the travel bans imposed on the applicants, who are independent journalists, within the framework of criminal proceedings relating to the activities of Meydan TV, an online media channel with which they had collaborated. On different dates in 2015 and 2016 (see the appended table) the applicants learned that restrictions on their right to leave <COUNTRY> had been imposed and that they were no longer free to leave the country. The restrictions were imposed by the investigating authorities, in the absence of any judicial decision, within the framework of criminal proceedings relating to the activities of Meydan TV. The applicants were not convicted, accused or suspected persons in those criminal proceedings and had only been questioned as witnesses. On various dates, the applicants challenged the lawfulness of the restrictions imposed on them by lodging complaints both with the administrative courts and with the ordinary courts under the procedure concerning the review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the prosecuting authorities. By final decisions adopted on various dates – by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and by the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings relating to the review of the lawfulness of the prosecuting authorities’ actions and decisions – the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants’ complaints on the merits, finding that they did not have jurisdiction to examine such a complaint (see the appended table). The applicants complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention that their right to leave <COUNTRY> had been violated by the travel bans imposed on them by the domestic authorities and that they had no effective remedy at the domestic level in respect of those travel bans. 7 . They further complained under Article 10 of the Convention and Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention that the imposition of travel bans on them had violated their freedom of expression and that their Convention rights had been restricted for purposes other than those prescribed in the Convention. The applicant in application no. 1158/17 also complained under Article 8 of the Convention that she had been subjected to an unlawful search at Baku Airport on 6 December 2015, when she had not been allowed to leave the country. In their observations, the applicants lodged a further complaint, arguing that there had been a hindrance to the exercise of their right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention as there had been a delay in the delivery of their letters to the Court.

Azerbaijan

P1-1

The case concerns an imposed lease as a result of the application of Chapter 69 of the Laws of <COUNTRY>. The applicant’s property originally officially numbered 68 and 68A in Republic Street, Valletta, (hereinafter referred to as “the property’) was rented out to a third-party bank for thirty years. On the lapse of the contract, the tenant continued to occupy the property according to its right to an automatic renewal of the lease by operation of the provisions of the special rent laws, namely The Reletting of Urban Property (Regulation) Ordinance (Chapter 69 of the Laws of <COUNTRY>) by which it continued paying the same amount of rent which had been established in 1977, until 2009, when it started being revised in accordance with the law. The applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining of a violation of her property rights. By a judgment of 29 November 2019 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals and confirmed the first-instance judgment, finding a violation of the applicant’s rights and awarding her 80,000 euros (EUR) in compensation. In particular it noted that the tenant in the present case was not in need of social accommodation but operated a commercial bank; and that the economic needs of the country developed with time. Nevertheless, the tenant was not ready to negotiate a new amount of rent in line with the expert’s valuations. Further, while it was true that the imposed lease was meant to come to an end in 2028, it could not be guaranteed that the legislator would not interfere again with the system. In any event the applicant had already suffered a disproportionate burden for twelve years in the light of the low amount of rent when compared to the expert’s estimates. As to compensation it noted that the applicant had only relied on the expert’s valuations, but it had not been shown that those were real losses, and in any event a constitutional remedy was not intended to cover civil damage, but only pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses in connection with the breach. Thereafter, a new lease agreement was negotiated between the parties. The applicant complained that she was still a victim of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, despite the findings by the domestic courts, given the low amount of compensation awarded.

Malta

3, 5

The case concerns the applicants’ alleged ill-treatment by law‑enforcement officers, the lack of an effective investigation into those allegations and the lack of justification for the application of the preventive measure of pre-trial detention in respect of them. THE APPLICANTS’ ARREST AND ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT On 7 December 2012 the applicants, who had a small business in Nakhchivan, arrived, from the Turkish side, at the Sadarak customs point situated between <COUNTRY> and <COUNTRY> with their car loaded with goods. According to the applicants, on 8 December 2012 customs officers asked them for a bribe for carrying out the customs formalities relating to the import of their goods. They refused to pay the bribe and informed the media. Later that day, they returned to the customs point accompanied by a human rights defender (N.) and a journalist (E.A.) to retrieve their goods. According to the applicants, upon their arrival at the customs point, they were physically assaulted by approximately twenty customs officers. The customs officers then let E.A. and N. leave the area but arrested the applicants. The first applicant was transferred to the custody of the police, while the second applicant was at first allowed to leave the area before also being arrested by the police that night and taken to the Sadarak District Police Department (“the SDPD”). According to the Government, following a lawful request by customs officers for the applicants to unload their cargo after they had failed to submit the necessary documentation, the applicants had attacked the customs officers, inflicting injuries to two of them. According to the applicants, from 8 to 11 December 2012 they had been ill ‑ treated in the SDPD. In particular, the police officers had removed their clothes and kept them naked outside. Their hands had been handcuffed behind their heads and they had been forced to keep their legs wide open. The police officers had also hosed their feet with cold water. The first applicant had been deprived of food for three days. The second applicant had lost consciousness on three occasions as a result of torture and the police officers had had to call for an ambulance several times. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANTS AND THEIR PRE-TRIAL DETENTION On 10 December 2012 the Sadarak District Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicants for the use of violence against State officials on the basis of material provided by the SDPD and the following day they were charged with the said offence. Later charges of hooliganism were added. On 10 December 2012 the prosecutor issued decisions on the applicants’ arrest and the next day, in two separate decisions, the Sadarak District Court remanded the applicants in custody for a period of two months. The court justified the remand in custody by the gravity of the charges, the fact that the applicants had been charged with an offence punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment, and the likelihood that, if released, they might abscond and obstruct the investigation. It did not, however, give any reasons as to why it considered those grounds relevant to the applicants’ case, nor did it mention any case‑specific facts relevant to those grounds. Following appeals by the applicants, on 17 December 2012 the Supreme Court of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (“the SCNAR”) upheld the first-instance court’s decisions. During the course of the investigation, the applicants lodged requests asking the courts to replace their remand in custody with house arrest. However, the courts dismissed their requests, finding that there was no need to change the preventive measure. It appears that on 13 February 2013 the first-instance court convicted the applicants and sentenced them to imprisonment. Subsequently, the appellate court upheld the convictions but lowered the sentences to suspended sentences of two and three years’ imprisonment respectively. REMEDIES USED BY THE APPLICANTS IN RESPECT OF ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT In the meantime, on 24 December 2012 the applicants’ lawyer visited them. According to the lawyer, there were visible signs of ill-treatment on the second applicant’s body and, in particular, there was a haematoma of 10 cm on the inside of his right leg. The lawyer immediately informed the prosecutor orally of the ill-treatment and asked that an effective investigation be carried out. The lawyer subsequently wrote to the prosecutor requesting a medical examination of both applicants and the initiation of a criminal investigation into their alleged ill-treatment. On 9 January 2013 the prosecutor rejected the lawyer’s request for a medical examination of the applicants and for the investigation of their alleged ill-treatment. He noted that on 13 December 2012 the second applicant had been examined by a medical expert, who concluded that there were no injuries on his body. The prosecutor also stated that the first applicant had not previously raised the issue of ill-treatment during his questioning within the framework of the criminal case against him. On 15 January 2013 the lawyer lodged a complaint with the Sadarak District Court complaining of the applicants’ ill-treatment. He submitted that on 24 December 2012, during his meeting with the applicants, he had seen signs of ill-treatment on the second applicant’s body. He further relied on photographs of the second applicant taken after the incident with the customs officers and statements by both the applicants, as well as the statements of N. and E.A. On 18 January 2013 the District Court dismissed the claim, finding that it should not be examined by the court. It did not specify what authority should examine the complaint. On 28 January 2013 the SCNAR dismissed an appeal by the applicants as unsubstantiated. COMPLAINTS The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that they had been tortured in police custody and that the domestic authorities had failed to investigate their allegations of torture. They also complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that the domestic courts had failed to justify the application of the preventive measure of their remand in custody and had rejected, without giving any reason, their request for the replacement of remand in custody by house arrest.

Azerbaijan, Türkiye

6

The case concerns legislative intervention in the course of ongoing civil proceedings. The applicants are pensioners who, in accordance with the 1962 Italo ‑ Swiss Convention on Social Security, transferred to <COUNTRY> the pension contributions they had paid in <COUNTRY> in respect of work that they had performed there over several years. The Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (“the INPS”) calculated their pensions by employing a theoretical level of remuneration ( retribuzione teorica ) instead of their actual remuneration ( retribuzione effettiva ). This resulted in a readjustment on the basis of the existing ratio between the social security contributions paid in <COUNTRY> (8%) and in <COUNTRY> (7%). The calculation therefore had as its basis a notional salary which, according to the applicants, resulted in their receiving a much lower pension than that which they should have received. The applicants lodged claims with the national courts, contending that the INPS’s calculation methods were contrary to the spirit of the Italo-Swiss Convention. While the relevant proceedings were pending, Law no. 296 of 27 December 2006 (“Law no. 296/2006”) entered into force on 1 January 2007. Section 1, subsection 777, of that Law provided an authentic interpretation of the relevant legal framework, upholding the calculation methods used by the INPS. In view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006, the national courts dismissed the applicants’ claims. The applicants complained that the enactment of Law no. 296/2006 had violated their right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and constituted an unjustified interference with their possessions, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

Italy, Switzerland

5

The application concerns the legal basis of the applicant’s detention with a view to deportation. It raises issues under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant was convicted of the crime of people smuggling by the Mosonmagyaróvár District Court on 30 April 2013 and sentenced to four years of prison and eight years of expulsion from <COUNTRY>, as confirmed by the Győr High Court on 3 September 2013. His petition for review, in which he claimed that his marriage to a Hungarian national concluded in 2012 was an obstacle to expulsion, was rejected by the Kúria on 1 September 2015. The applicant was released on parole on 26 August 2015. On the same day, he was informed that he was considered not to fall under the provisions of Act no. I of 2017 on the entry and stay of persons possessing the right to free movement and stay (the “Szmtv.”) – and that he was to be deported in accordance with Act no. II of 2017 on the entry and stay of third country nationals (the “Harmtv.”). Alien-administration detention ensued which was discontinued on 15 October 2015 when the applicant applied for asylum. He was then placed in asylum detention. Following rejection of this application for asylum, he was again placed in alien ‑ administration detention on 3 November 2015. This detention was prolonged by the Nyírbátor District Court on 5 November and 30 December 2015 and by the Buda Central District Court on 24 February 2016, in accordance with the Harmtv. On 22 April 2016 the Buda Central District Court rejected the immigration authorities’ renewed request for prolongation of the detention, finding that there had been no legal basis for his alien-administration detention under the Harmtv., since he fell under the provisions of the Szmtv. He was released on 25 April 2016. Upon repeated requests by the Hungarian authorities, the Algerian Embassy in Budapest finally issued a passport for the applicant on 20 November 2019 and he was deported to <COUNTRY> on 27 November 2019. The applicant complained that his detention between 3 November 2015 and 25 April 2016 had no legal basis, in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

Algeria, Hungary

3

The cases concern the applicants’ sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole once they have served a minimum term of between thirty and forty years (see the appended table). The applicants complained that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. The

8

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention that the Hungarian authorities had failed to enforce decisions in relation to his contact rights with his daughter. On 24 October 2002 the Budapest II and III District Court dissolved the applicant’s marriage with A. and approved the parties’ agreement about custody rights concerning the couple’s daughter, B, born in 1997. Under the terms of the agreement the applicant was granted contact with B. every second weekend and during the Christmas holidays and was allowed to call B. every Thursday. The Budapest II District Guardianship Authority (“the Guardianship Authority”) subsequently fined A. on at least two occasions for not having complied with the terms of the agreement. The applicant did not have any contact with his daughter between 1 September 2005 and 8 April 2007. On 29 August 2011 the Budapest II and III District Court found A. guilty of endangering a minor and issued her with a warning. It appears that subsequently meetings between the applicant and his daughter took place regularly. On 27 December 2012 B. failed to appear at a scheduled meeting with her father and on 18 January 2013 the applicant lodged an enforcement request with the Guardianship Authority. The Guardianship Authority heard from both A. and B. several times. It decided to suspend the proceedings on 2 July 2013 since A. had lodged a request that the applicant’s contact rights be amended. Following an appeal by the applicant, the Budapest Governmental Authority overturned the first-instance decision and ordered the Guardianship Authority to continue the enforcement proceedings on 18 November 2013. Subsequently, A. was heard once by the Guardianship Authority. In the meantime, the applicant had lodged an enforcement request in respect of a visit that should have taken place on 1 June 2013; enforcement proceedings continued in respect of both requests. In parallel, the applicant had brought proceedings seeking the child’s placement under temporary protection on two occasions (2 August 2013 and 10 June 2014). The first request was dismissed, and no final decision was taken in the second set of proceedings until after 8 December 2015. On 29 July 2014 a forensic expert psychologist was appointed to carry out a psychological assessment of A. and B. A new expert was appointed on 28 January 2015 because B. had not complied with the measure. On 6 July 2015 a forensic psychologist carried out a psychological evaluation of B. and the applicant. On 9 July 2015 the Guardianship Authority ordered the parties to participate in mediation proceedings. On 1 September 2015 the Guardianship Authority discontinued the enforcement proceeding since B. had turned eighteen years old. At that point the applicant had had no contact with his daughter for three years. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the domestic authorities had failed to make sufficient efforts to enforce the contact arrangement in respect of his daughter, in breach of his right to respect for his family life.

8

The case concerns a custody dispute and alleged abuse of the second and third applicants by their mother, K.P. Following the first applicant’s divorce from K.P. in 2014, the couple’s children, the second and third applicants, were ordered to live with their mother, and the first applicant had regular contact rights. In November 2015, after the police were informed that K.P. was obstructing the children’s contacts with their father and emotionally abusing them, a criminal investigation was opened against her for violation of the children’s rights. In October 2016 K.P. admitted to the charges against her and agreed to seek professional help and enrol in a parenting school in order to postpone the prosecution against her. In July 2017 the charges against K.P. were dismissed because she had fulfilled the aforementioned conditions. 3 . Meanwhile, in 2016 the first applicant instituted court proceedings requesting that the children live with him because K.P. was obstructing their contacts, as well as manipulating and emotionally abusing the children. A multidisciplinary expert report dated 10 June 2016 by the Polyclinic for the Protection of Children in Zagreb concluded that the second and third applicants had been emotionally abused by their mother. The final report of the relevant social welfare centre (hereinafter: “the SWC”) dated 23 February 2018 noted that both parents had a loving relationship with the children and basic parenting skills. The report stated that, despite her progress through various treatments, K.P. had remained insufficiently self-critical which created a risk of repeated inadequate parenting. K.P.’s behavioural pattern had been observed by the Polyclinic as well as at the children’s school. Since the first applicant demonstrated better upbringings skills, the SWC proposed that the children live with him and maintain contact with their mother. The children’s appointed guardian ad litem agreed with that proposal. On 30 April 2018 the Zagreb Municipal Court, accepting in full the recommendation of the SWC, ordered that the children immediately move to live with their father , which they 6 . On appeal, on 4 September 2018, the Zagreb County Court reversed the first-instance judgment and ordered that the children return to live with their mother. Noting that the latest report of the SWC did not contain any information on abuse of the children, the second-instance court did not accept the SWC’s recommendation. K.P. had attended supportive therapy and counselling, had made notable progress and had become more self-critical about the children’s upbringing and her behaviour towards them. In the court’s opinion, the potential risk of repeated inadequate parenting harmful to the children could not be accepted as the reason to alter the custody decision because it was merely an assumed future possibility. Given that the children had an equally strong emotional bond with both parents and had no strong preference of the parent they wanted to live with, that the mother was extremely motivated to live with her children, and that the symptoms suggesting emotional abuse no longer obtained, there was no indication that the children would be in danger were they to live with their mother, with whom they had lived since birth. In the court’s view, any change in their lives could pose a risk of development of mental health disorders and this was particularly so because the case involved young children, who were normally more attached to their mother. In October 2018 the second and third applicants returned to live with K.P. The applicants’ constitutional complaint was dismissed on 9 April 2019, with three out of twelve judges of the Constitutional Court dissenting. 9 . Meanwhile, in November 2018 and March 2019 the relevant SWC filed two fresh criminal complaints against K.P. for inappropriate behaviour towards her children, including physical abuse. The criminal complaints were dismissed by the competent prosecuting authorities in September 2020 for lack of reasonable suspicion. The applicants complained that, by deciding that the children would live with K.P., the authorities failed to protect them from further abuse. They also complained that the Zagreb County Court failed to put forward relevant and sufficient reasons for its decision and that one of its reasons was discriminatory. They relied on Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention.

11

The present application concerns a refusal by the domestic authorities to register an association set up by the applicants. In 2014 the applicants set up a non-governmental organisation in the form of an association called Support to Development of Media and Democracy – Public Association ( “Demokratiyanın və Medianın İnkişafına Dəstək” Ictimai Birliyi ). They requested the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of <COUNTRY> (“the Ministry”) to register their association as a legal entity and submitted relevant documents. 3 . In a letter of 13 June 2014 addressed to the applicants, the Ministry indicated that, in contravention of Article 3 of the Law on Non ‑ Governmental Organisations (Public Associations and Funds) (“the Law on NGOs”), the charter of the association had not laid out guarantees for complaining internally about termination of membership of the association, including a procedure and time ‑ limits for examining such a complaint. The letter ended by stating that, on the basis of Article 1 of the Law on State Registration and the State Register of Legal Entities (“the Law on State Registration”), the documents were “being returned unexecuted” ( sənədlər icra olunmadan geri qaytarılır ). Having received that letter, the applicants lodged a complaint with the Baku Administrative Economic Court No. 1 against the Ministry’s refusal to register their organisation. They argued that the Ministry’s allegation was false and unlawful because sections 12 ‑ 15 of the charter regulated the termination of membership of the association, and section 15 specifically stipulated that a complaint about termination could be lodged both internally and before a court. Furthermore, Article 3 of the Law on NGOs did not require the charter to set out a procedure and time-limits for examination of a complaint lodged internally. That Article merely required that a charter guarantee the right to complain internally and before a court. On 16 October 2014 the first-instance court dismissed the complaint, finding that the Ministry had acted lawfully by refusing to register the association. The first-instance court emphasised that the finding made by the Ministry as to the alleged deficiency (summarised in paragraph 3 above) had been lawful. The Baku Court of Appeal upheld that judgment on 14 January 2015, largely reiterating the first-instance court’s findings. On 27 May 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the appellate court. The Supreme Court emphasised that the charter of the association guaranteed the right to complain internally and before a court about the termination of membership, but it did not fully and clearly explain a procedure for internal complaints. The applicants complained before the Court that the Ministry’s actions had violated their right to freedom of association.

Azerbaijan

P1-1

The case concerns the expropriation of the applicant institutes’ land and the subsequent award of compensation based on the criteria established by section 5 bis of Law no. 359 of 8 August 1992 (“Law no. 359/1992”). The applicant institutes were the owners of plots of land located in San Prisco and Marcianise (see the appended table for details). The national authorities adopted development plans, which included portions of the applicant institutes’ land, and authorised the immediate occupation of the land in question. Subsequently, they issued expropriation orders and offered to pay compensation, which the applicant institutes refused. The applicant institutes brought judicial proceedings, arguing that the compensation offered by the national authorities was insufficient. In each case, the national courts appointed experts to carry out a valuation of the land and awarded compensation for the expropriation and also for the period during which the land had been occupied before the expropriation order had been issued ( indennità di occupazione ). The calculation of those amounts was based on the criteria set out in section 5 bis of Law no. 359/1992, which had entered into force on 14 August 1992. Further details of each application and the compensation awarded can be found in the appended table. The applicant institutes complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of a disproportionate interference with their property rights on account of the allegedly inadequate amounts of compensation they had received for the expropriation of their land. They further complained that the compensation awarded to them had effectively been reduced by 20% on account of the amount they had had to pay in tax.

6

The application concerns civil proceedings between a State-founded agency and the applicant regarding a real-estate purchase contract. On 8 July 2005 the Real Estate Transactions and Brokerage Agency ( Agencija za pravni promet i posredovanje nekretninama ; hereinafter “the Agency”) and the applicant concluded a contract entitled “preliminary real ‑ estate purchase contract” ( predugovor o kupoprodaji nekretnine ) for a garage parking space. The contract stated that the parking space surface area was 73 sq. m and that the purchase price was 907.73 euros (EUR) per sq. m, amounting in total to EUR 7,924.The parties undertook to conclude the “main purchase contract” and determine the “final price” after the completion of the construction of the building. In particular, the applicant undertook to pay the difference in price if there was a significant change to the surface area of the parking space. The applicant paid the price stipulated in the preliminary contract and on 5 October 2007 entered into possession of the parking space. On 25 March 2009 the Agency sent the applicant the “main purchase contract”, which stated that the garage parking space surface was 48 sq. m and that the final price thus amounted to EUR 9,513.The applicant refused to sign that contract. In October 2009 the Agency brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court, asking it to order the applicant to conclude the main real ‑ estate purchase contract or, alternatively, to hand over possession of the parking space. 6 . The applicant argued that the initial contract contained all the essential elements to be considered to constitute the main contract. Moreover, that contract had been implemented in full since he had paid the price and had entered into possession of the parking space. The subsequent increase in price was contrary to the initial contract since the surface area of the parking space had not changed, but only the method used by the Agency for its calculation. 7 . On 7 October 2010 the Split Municipal Court delivered a judgment holding that the parties had concluded a preliminary real-estate purchase contract, and not the main contract. The court dismissed the Agency’s claim for the conclusion of the main contract, holding that it had been brought out of time. However, it accepted the Agency’s alternative claim and ordered the applicant to hand possession of the parking space over to the Agency, holding that, by not having signed the main purchase contract, the applicant had no legal basis for possession of the parking space. 8 . The applicant appealed, reiterating his arguments. 9 . On 20 October 2011 the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It simply stated that with the termination of the obligation to conclude the main contract, the preliminary contract was no longer valid, so the applicant had lost the legal basis for possession of the parking space. It did not address the applicant’s arguments as to the legal effect of the preliminary contract. The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that the lower courts’ decisions had entirely failed to address his arguments as to the legal effect of the initial contract. The contract in question was one of many identical contracts the Agency had concluded for the sale of garage parking spaces. Since there were several sets of proceedings pending before the lower courts, the applicant asked the Supreme Court to rule whether the standardised contract in question amounted to a preliminary one, or to the main real-estate purchase contract. He referred to a judgment of the Split Municipal Court of 5 October 2011, in which that court had held that the preliminary contract concluded with the Agency constituted the main real-estate purchase contract and that the defendant therefore had a legal basis for possession of the garage parking space. 11 . On 19 January 2016 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It held that the legal effect of the preliminary contract concluded between the applicant and the Agency was irrelevant, since at that point the only disputed issue in the case was whether the applicant had a legal basis for possession of the garage parking space. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, submitting that the decisions in his case had been arbitrary, and that meanwhile the Split Municipal Court had given several final judgments in factually and legally identical cases holding that the preliminary contracts constituted the main real-estate purchase contracts. On 25 May 2016 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. The applicant’s representative received that decision on 24 June 2016. The applicant is still in possession of the garage parking space but cannot be registered in the land register as its owner. The Agency can seek his eviction at any time. The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the domestic courts’ decisions ordering him to surrender possession of the property in question to the Agency had been arbitrary and contrary to the Supreme Court’s case-law and to the domestic courts’ decisions in cases concerning identical factual and legal circumstances.

10

The application concerns the criminal conviction of the applicant for defamation of two persons who were exercising their duties as guardians of an adult. On 13 December 2005 the applicant appeared on national television and made allegations against Th.G., the guardian of P., and , a member of P.’s guardianship council (“the guardians”). In particular, the applicant alleged that the two individuals in question had managed to place P. under guardianship, thus implementing an “evil plan”, had “caused P. to disappear”, and – “by administering psychoactive medication to and exercising psychological violence on” P. – had organised the transfer of part of the latter’s property to for a token amount ( έναντι ευτελούς αξίας ); he also called them “crooks” ( απατεώνες ). In 2007 both Th.G. and were removed from their duties as guardian and member of the guardianship council respectively on account of acts and omissions which had not served the best interests of P., as they had exchanged part of P.’s real estate for a piece of property belonging to worth less than half its value. In criminal proceedings which followed and which ended in 2010, they were convicted of embezzlement in connection with the above-mentioned actions. Following a criminal complaint by Th.G. and , the applicant was convicted in 2012 at first instance of slanderous defamation on account of his statements on national television and received a suspended nine-month prison sentence. Following an appeal by the applicant, in 2013 he was given a suspended seven-month prison sentence for simple defamation. The appellate court considered that the applicant’s statements concerning P.’s placement under guardianship and the transfer of part of his property to for a token amount were facts and that the rest of the statements either amounted to or closely resembled statements of fact, which were, moreover, untrue and had damaged Th.G.’s and ’s reputation. The fact that they had been removed from their duties or that they had been convicted of embezzlement on account of the exchange of P.’s real estate did not, by itself, make them “crooks”. However, the applicant had not known that his statements were untrue, so the appellate court changed the charges from slanderous defamation to simple defamation while rejecting the applicant’s argument that he had said those things out of legitimate interest. Following an appeal on points of law by the applicant, the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the appellate court. It considered that the latter had included sufficient reasoning in its judgment. There was nothing contradictory in the appellate court’s acceptance of the fact that the real estate had been transferred at a low price, as that was different from the token amount referred to by the applicant. The Court of Cassation also rejected the applicant’s argument that the appellate court had erroneously interpreted Article 362 of the Criminal Code. The applicant further alleged a violation of his rights under Article 10 in relation to the hearing procedure, which would have rendered the entire judicial proceedings null and void. The Court of Cassation rejected it as inadmissible, reasoning that that the grounds for annulment on account of a violation of the Convention related to the merits and not to the hearing procedure, as the applicant had erroneously argued. On those grounds, he was trying to reverse the appellate court’s judgment which had concluded that the statements had been untrue and that he had consequently exceeded the limits of freedom of expression. In any event, his right to freedom of expression had not been violated. The applicant complained before the Court that his criminal conviction amounted to a breach of his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.

6

The case concerns legislative intervention in the course of ongoing civil proceedings. The applicant was a pensioner who, in accordance with the 1962 Italo ‑ Swiss Convention on Social Security, transferred to <COUNTRY> the pension contributions he had paid in <COUNTRY> in respect of work that he had performed there over several years. The Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (“the INPS”) calculated his pension by employing a theoretical level of remuneration ( retribuzione teorica ) instead of his actual remuneration ( retribuzione effettiva ). This resulted in a readjustment on the basis of the existing ratio between the social security contributions paid in <COUNTRY> (8%) and in <COUNTRY> (7%). The calculation therefore had as its basis a notional salary which, according to the applicant, resulted in his receiving a much lower pension than that which he should have received. The applicant lodged claims with the national courts, contending that the INPS’s calculation methods were contrary to the spirit of the Italo-Swiss Convention. While the relevant proceedings were pending, Law no. 296 of 27 December 2006 (“Law no. 296/2006”) entered into force on 1 January 2007. Section 1, subsection 777, of that Law provided an authentic interpretation of the relevant legal framework, upholding the calculation methods used by the INPS. In view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006, the national courts dismissed the applicant’s claims. The applicant complained before the Court that the enactment of Law no. 296/2006 had violated his right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and constituted an unjustified interference with his possessions, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

Italy, Switzerland

6

The application concerns the applicant’s concern as to the impartiality of the court that upheld his criminal conviction. It raises issues under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In 2016 the applicant, a police officer, was convicted of the crime of complicity by the Szeged High Court. He was sentenced to a demotion and 60 days’ committal to a military facility. He was acquitted of the charge of abuse of office; and his accomplice was acquitted of the charge of bribery. On appeal, on 28 September 2016, Bench Kbf. (judges T, S and M) of the Budapest Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the first instance. In criticising the first-instance judgment, the Court of Appeal found procedural irregularities and, moreover, delved into the question of probative value of testimonies and of shortcomings of logic in the reasoning. Holding that the judgment was ill-founded, it instructed the lower court to hear again the accused and the witnesses, reassess the evidence and supplement the reasoning. In 2017, in the resumed proceedings, the applicant was convicted, this time by the Győr High Court, of bribery and abuse of office. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and a fine; his accomplice was sentenced to a fine. On appeal, on 4 April 2018, the exact same Bench Kbf. (judges T, S and M) of the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the conviction while somewhat reducing the sentence. The applicant’s complaint about the lack of objective impartiality was to no avail. On 2 July 2018 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint alleging unfair trial. The applicant complained that the repeated participation of Bench Kbf. rendered the trial unfair, in breach of Article 6 § l of the Convention.

6

The case concerns the lack of an oral hearing during minor offence proceedings against the applicant. The applicant was accused of indecent conduct against police officers ( nedostojno vedenje ) under the Protection of Public Order Act. The police imposed a fine of 417.29 euros (EUR) on the applicant, who lodged a request for judicial protection in which he disputed the police officers’ statements concerning his conduct. The Celje Local Court dismissed his request and upheld the payment order on the basis of the file forwarded by the police, which contained the payment order, the statement of facts prepared by the police and the applicant’s request for judicial protection. It rejected the applicant’s motion “to examine all witnesses” on the ground that it was unsubstantiated. No hearing was held. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Local Court’s judgment. The Constitutional Court, relying on section a(1), the fourth indent of section a(2) and section a(3) as well as the third indent of b(1) in connection with the fourth indent of section a(2) of the Constitutional Court Act, rejected it because the applicant had not made a reasoned proposal for exceptional consideration of a constitutional complaint. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Local Court did not hold a public hearing where he and the witnesses could have been examined.

3

The application concerns the alleged incompatibility of the applicant’s state of health with detention in prison and the alleged failure to provide him with adequate medical treatment. The applicant, convicted for a number of serious crimes, including membership of a mafia-type criminal organisation, and sentenced to life imprisonment, is currently detained in Parma Prison. He suffers from several health problems including a severe osteoporosis with multiple vertebral collapses and fibromyalgia. He has been recognised as 100% disabled and has limited mobility in the lower limbs. 4 . In early 2017, while he was detained in Rome Rebibbia Prison, the applicant started to complain of mobility impairments and was prescribed use of canes and an orthopaedic back corset, physiotherapy and further examinations. In the same period, he filed a request for the replacement of his detention in prison with house detention, to be carried out in a healthcare facility. 5 . The Rome court responsible for the execution of sentences ( tribunale di sorveglianza ) appointed an expert for the assessment of his state of health. By a report dated 3 July 2017 the expert stated that, although he could be treated in prison, the applicant needed physiotherapy and suggested his transfer to Milan Prison for better care. 6 . On 14 July 2017, based on the expert’s report, the Rome court rejected the applicant’s request for house detention and ordered his transfer to Milan Prison, which took place on 26 October 2017. 7 . At subsequent examinations, in October and November 2017, the doctors prescribed physiotherapy, use of crutches, a walker and a wheelchair and additional examinations. On 3 January 2018, the orthopaedist noted that neither the examinations nor the physiotherapy had taken place and that the applicant had not received a back corset. 8 . On 27 March 2018, the applicant started the first cycle of physiotherapy. According to subsequent reports, he had received a wheelchair and canes, but the crutches were of the wrong size and he had not received either the walker or the corset. The prescribed examinations took place between 7 and 11 May 2018. At an unspecified date, the applicant filed another request for the replacement of his detention in prison with house detention. On 25 June 2018, the Milan judge responsible for the execution of sentences ( magistrato di sorveglianza ) rejected the request, stating that the applicant received adequate treatment in prison. 10 . The applicant appealed and, on 23 November 2018, the Milan court responsible for the execution of sentences ordered the prison medical service to conduct additional examinations and provide the applicant with physiotherapy and a back corset. 11 . According to the medical reports issued in the following months, the applicant’s conditions were stable, he was assisted for his personal hygiene and other daily tasks and he disposed of crutches and a wheelchair; as to the back corset, he had been authorised to buy it at his own expense. The reports also stated that the applicant was on the waiting list for further physiotherapy cycles and suggested his transfer to Parma Prison for better treatment. 12 . On 15 January 2019 the Milan court reiterated the order to provide the applicant with a back corset at his own expense and with the necessary physiotherapy. On 16 February 2019 the applicant was transferred to Parma Prison, where he was placed in the intensive assistance section ( sezione di assistenza intensiva – “SAI”). Initially, he was allocated to a cell which did not allow him to access the shower autonomously and was helped by a nurse; on 9 May 2019, he was transferred to a cell without architectural barriers. 14 . The medical reports issued in the course of 2019 stated that the applicant’s conditions were stable, that he had been taught exercises that he could do autonomously and in June and July he had undergone two cycles of functional rehabilitation consisting of magnetotherapy. Nevertheless, according to a report of 17 June 2019, he was also in need of intensive rehabilitation treatment which had to be carried out in external facilities. 15 . On 13 December 2019, the Milan court appointed an expert to examine the applicant’s state of health and determine the best course of treatment. By a report dated 4 March 2020, the expert stated that the applicant’s mobility impairment was partially offset by the measures adopted by the prison and that his conditions could not be considered incompatible with detention. Nevertheless, he noted that the applicant needed regular rehabilitation treatment in order to prevent an aggravation of his symptoms and pointed out some delays in providing such treatment, as well as the delay in necessary examinations and orthopaedic devices. 16 . At that time, the prison reports pointed out the need for a corset and reinforcement exercises and noted that the applicant had undergone two cycles of magnetotherapy between June and September 2020. 17 . On 18 September 2020 the Milan court considered that the applicant’s health was not incompatible with detention and rejected his request. However, it noted the absence of regular physiotherapy, which was attributable to the long waiting list of public healthcare facilities, and insisted that the prison administration must ensure regular physiotherapy and the necessary orthopaedic equipment. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was rejected by the Court of Cassation on 28 May 2021. In the meantime, on 13 October 2020 the applicant lodged a request for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. On 14 October 2020 the Court (the duty judge) rejected the request. On 5 July 2021 the applicant underwent an orthopaedic examination at Bologna hospital, which indicated the need for daily walks, stretching and an orthopaedic corset. According to prison reports of 18 June and 6 July 2021, he received the necessary treatment in prison, had an orthopaedic mattress and crutches and his conditions were stable, although the waiting list for new cycles of physiotherapy was long. A subsequent report of 30 August stated that the applicant did not need constant physiotherapy. 20 . In the meantime, the applicant had filed two additional requests for the replacement of his detention with house arrest, which were rejected by the domestic courts based on the consideration that he received the necessary care in prison and there was no risk of an aggravation of his state of health. The final decision in these proceedings was rendered on 25 October 2022. The applicant complained that his continued detention in prison, in the absence of adequate treatment for his diseases, constituted a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

3

The case concerns the use of force by the police against the applicant resulting in injuries and the alleged lack of an effective investigation into the incident. It raises issues under Article 3 of the Convention. Late in the evening on 28 July 2017 the applicant was present on the terrace of a pub in the village of Majosháza, which was licensed to be open until 10 p.Police were passing by at 45 p., calling on the managers of the pub to close the premises, but in vain. They returned at 20 p.at which point in time only the applicant and the two managers were present on the terrace. The two police officers, one male and one female, ordered the pub to be closed immediately. According to the police report drawn up later, the applicant was then throwing insults at the officers. They in turn asked the applicant to produce an identity document. The applicant complied with this instruction. According to the applicant’s version, he started video-recording the conduct of the police, using his tablet; the female officer tried to grab the tablet, but the applicant would not let go of it. According to the testimonies given by the managers, the female officer had obtained the tablet, but the applicant was reaching for it, perhaps touching the officer. According to the Government, the applicant, drunken, acted aggressively towards the female officer. Subsequently, the male officer forced the applicant on the ground and handcuffed him. The applicant was committed to the local police station. He was held there for about two hours. During that time, a medical report was issued which recorded that the applicant sustained two abrasions of a few centimetres each, one on the right shoulder and one on the right knee. The applicant submitted a criminal complaint on 22 December 2017, complaining of the violent police measure. An investigation ensued. The authority examined the applicant’s testimony, various police reports, the local mayor’s statement on the unavailability of any relevant CCTV footage, and the witness testimonies of the managers of the pub. On 17 December 2018 the public prosecutor’s office rejected the criminal complaint and discontinued the investigation. According to the decision, the police measure had been lawfully applied and not constituted a criminal offence. The presumption of the police measure – taken in reaction to an assault – having been lawful could not be refuted. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Attorney General. It was rejected on 24 January 2019 on essentially the same grounds as the previous decision. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by the police and that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation.

11

The present applications primarily concern refusals by the domestic authorities to register associations founded by the applicants. In 2011 the applicants established non-governmental organisations in the form of associations (their names and the dates on which they were established are indicated in the appended table). They requested the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of <COUNTRY> (“the Ministry”) to register their associations as legal entities and submitted relevant documents. In letters addressed to the applicants the Ministry indicated certain alleged deficiencies in those documents and returned them to the applicants. 4 . In application no. 73088/13 the documents were returned first on 16 December 2011 and again on 21 May 2012, for, respectively, the following alleged deficiencies: (i) the title of the organisation failed to reflect its organisational legal form and the nature of its activity, in contravention of Article 1 of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (Public Associations and Funds) (“the Law on NGOs”); (ii) the charter did not outline the procedure for withdrawing from membership of the association, in contravention of Article 1 of the Law on NGOs. 5 . In application no. 47154/14 the documents were returned first on 2 November 2011 and again on 15 February, 22 May and 22 October 2012 for, respectively, the following alleged deficiencies: (i) the decision establishing the association did not detail the powers of its legal representative, in contravention of Article 1 of the Law on State Registration and the State Register of Legal Entities (“the Law on State Registration”); (ii) the charter did not delineate the powers of the chairman and vice ‑ chairman, in contravention of Article 1 of the Law on NGOs; (iii) the charter described only the rights of the founders, but not their responsibilities, in contravention of Article 2 of the Law on NGOs; (iv) the applicants had submitted a receipt confirming payment of 50 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) as a registration fee, instead of AZN 11, in contravention of Article 20 of the Law on State Fees. All the letters of the Ministry ended by stating that, on the basis of Article 1 of the Law on State Registration, the documents were “being returned” or “being returned unexecuted”. After receiving each letter from the Ministry the applicants made rectifications to the documents and resubmitted their requests for registration. Each time the Ministry returned the documents to the applicants in the same manner. Upon receiving the last of those letters from the Ministry, the applicants lodged complaints with the Baku Administrative Economic Court No. 1 against the Ministry’s refusal to register their associations. They argued that the Ministry’s allegations were unfounded and that, in any event, it should have acted in accordance with Article 3 of the Law on State Registration when returning the documents, namely by identifying all the alleged deficiencies in its first letter and giving the applicants an opportunity to rectify them. On 27 November 2012 and 25 June 2013 respectively, the first-instance court dismissed the applicants’ complaints. It held that the allegations made by the Ministry in its letters had a factual and legal basis. The Baku Court of Appeal, on 29 January and 14 March 2013 respectively, and the Supreme Court, on 22 May and 23 October 2013 respectively, upheld the judgments of the first-instance court in the two cases, largely reiterating the latter’s findings (the Supreme Court’s decision of 23 October 2013 was notified to the applicants on 24 December 2013). 11 . In application no. 73088/13 the domestic courts also held that the charter of the association submitted during the court proceedings did not contain the deficiency alleged by the Ministry in its last letter; however, the court found that the applicants had failed to prove that it was the same version of the charter which they had submitted to the Ministry. In application no. 47154/14 the courts held that the applicants had failed to prove that, contrary to the Ministry’s allegation in its last letter, they had submitted a receipt for payment of the State registration fee. 12 . In August 2014 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicants’ representative, Mr Aliyev. The investigating authorities seized a large number of documents from his office, including the case files relating to the present applications. The applicants complained before the Court that the refusals by the Ministry to register their associations had violated their right to freedom of association. 14 . They also complained that the seizure of their case files from the office of their lawyer had been in breach of Article 34 of the Convention. 15 . Lastly, the applicants in application no. 47154/14 complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Supreme Court had examined their case in their absence.

Azerbaijan

P4-2, 5

The case concerns a travel ban imposed on the applicant, an independent journalist, in the absence of any judicial decision in that regard, and his allegedly unlawful arrest and detention. On 22 June 2017 when attempting to cross the border between <COUNTRY> and <COUNTRY>, the applicant was informed that his right to leave <COUNTRY> had been restricted. He was detained by officers of the State Border Service, who subsequently transferred him to the Gazakh District Police Office (“the GDPO”), where he was held for approximately seven hours before being released. It appears that the restriction on the applicant’s right to leave <COUNTRY> had been imposed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the reason and legal basis for the imposition of such a restriction remain unclear. Following his inability to obtain an adequate explanation from the relevant authorities regarding the restriction imposed on him, the applicant challenged its lawfulness, by lodging a complaint with the administrative courts. He also complained that he had been unlawfully arrested and detained. The administrative courts refused to examine the applicant’s claims and dismissed them on procedural grounds. By a final decision of 13 March 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions. The applicant was served with a copy of the Supreme Court’s decision on 30 April 2018. The applicant complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention that his right to leave <COUNTRY> had been violated by the travel ban imposed on him by the domestic authorities. Relying on Articles 5 and 10 of the Convention, he also complained that his arrest and detention at the GDPO had been unlawful, and that the imposition of the travel ban on him had violated his freedom of expression.

Azerbaijan, Georgia

6

The present application concerns the criminal conviction of the applicant for active participation in actions causing a breach of public order following his participation in an unauthorised peaceful demonstration. According to the applicant, the organisers had given prior notice of a demonstration planned for 2 April 2011 to the relevant authorities. However, the authorities had refused to authorise the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers. The applicant had participated in the demonstration, which had been intended to be peaceful and had been conducted in a peaceful manner. It was dispersed by the police. On 11 May 2011 the applicant was arrested. According to the applicant, on that date he was first summoned and questioned as a witness. Then he took part in an identification parade at which two police officers, S.and N.A., declared that they recognised him, testifying that he had broken a pharmacy window during the demonstration on 2 April 2011. All those procedures were conducted without the participation of a defence lawyer. Later, a State-funded lawyer was appointed for the applicant. On 13 May 2011 the applicant was formally charged with a criminal offence under Article 233 of the Criminal Code (active participation in actions causing a breach of public order). On 10 October 2011 the Nasimi District Court convicted the applicant under Article 233 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. In the course of the court proceedings, the applicant pleaded not guilty, stating that he had not broken the pharmacy window and had participated peacefully in the demonstration. It appears from the judgment that after having declared the applicant’s identification by S.inadmissible in evidence, since S.had been shown his photograph prior to the identification parade, the court relied on the following evidence for finding the applicant guilty. (a) The police officer N.A., who attended one hearing, testified that during the demonstration, a slightly stout man of average height aged between 22 and 26 had thrown something towards a pharmacy and had run away and that the police had not been able to catch that protester. N.A. further stated that the protester was the applicant, and that he had recognised him during the identification parade. The applicant was not given an opportunity to question N.A. (b) The trial court examined video recordings of the demonstration and heard a number of prosecution witnesses who gave a general description of the events of 2 April 2011. Some prosecution witnesses, including the owner of the pharmacy and the persons working in the neighbourhood at that time, stated that during the demonstration someone had broken the pharmacy window. (c) Two witnesses for the applicant testified that they had been with the applicant during the demonstration and that he had not broken the pharmacy window. The court dismissed the testimony of those witnesses as biased, without explaining its reasons. The applicant lodged an appeal against that judgment, complaining that the first-instance court’s judgment lacked adequate reasoning; that his rights to equality of arms and adversarial proceedings had been breached; that his criminal conviction had been based mainly on the statement of N.A. but he had not been given an opportunity to question him; and that during the initial stage of the pre-trial questioning he had been deprived of legal assistance. On 1 December 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, finding it justified. The appellate court made no mention of the applicant’s specific complaints. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, reiterating his previous complaints and arguments. On 3 July 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s judgment. On 8 August 2014 criminal proceedings were instituted against Mr Aliyev, who represented the applicant before the Court. Those criminal proceedings were the subject of a separate application lodged by him with the Court (see Aliyev <COUNTRY> , nos. 68762/14 and 71200/14, 20 September 2018). On 8 and 9 August 2014 the investigating authorities seized a large number of documents from Mr Aliyev’s office, including all the case files relating to applications pending before the Court which were in the possession of Mr Aliyev as a representative. The file relating to the present case was also seized in its entirety. The facts relating to the seizure and the relevant proceedings are described in more detail in Annagi Hajibeyli <COUNTRY> (no. 2204/11, §§ 21-28, 22 October 2015). The applicant complained that his rights protected under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention had been breached by the domestic authorities and that, under Article 34, there had been a hindrance to the exercise of his right of individual petition.

Azerbaijan

8

The present case concerns the eviction of the applicant from a non-residential building where she has lived for several years. On an unspecified date in 1996 the applicant became homeless after she had lost her flat as a result of a fraud. On an unspecified date in 1996 she and her family were allowed by the Scientific Research Silkmaking Institute of <COUNTRY> (hereinafter “the Institute”) to move into a part of a non ‑ residential building belonging to the Ganja Experimental Practical Gene Pool Base of the Institute (hereinafter “the building”). On 11 July 2005 the Deputy Head of the Ganja City Executive Authority issued a letter stating that the Executive Authority “ha[d] no objection to the applicant residing in the building”. In 2011 the Institute lodged a claim against the applicant in the Kapaz District Court, arguing that her occupation of the building was unlawful and seeking an eviction order. On 5 July 2011 the Kapaz District Court ordered the applicant’s eviction, finding that she was occupying the building unlawfully. The applicant appealed, arguing that she had been living there for fifteen years without any objection by the Institute and that she did not have anywhere else to live. On 22 November 2011 the Ganja Court of Appeal and on 16 March 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment. The last communication from the parties indicated that the applicant was evicted from the building in June 2012. According to the applicant, the building from which she was evicted was demolished in 2017. On 8 August 2014 the applicant’s lawyer, Mr Aliyev, was arrested on charges of tax evasion, illegal entrepreneurship, and abuse of authority. During a search of his office, a number of documents were seized by the State authorities, including all the case files relating to applications before the Court that were in the possession of Mr Aliyev as the applicants’ representative. On 25 October 2014 some of the seized documents were returned to Mr J. Javadov, Mr. Aliyev’s counsel. By a fax dated 28 August 2014, Mr Aliyev informed the Court of the seizure of the case files, claiming a breach of Article 34 of the Convention in respect of all the applications affected. In the letters he sent to the Court in September 2014 Mr Aliyev reiterated his complaint concerning the seizure of the case files. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complained that her eviction had violated her Convention rights. She also argued that there had been a hindrance to the exercise of her right of individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention.

Azerbaijan

8

The present case concerns the seizure of a letter addressed by the applicant, who is serving a prison sentence, to another prisoner. The letter was withheld by the prison administration on the ground of its defamatory content. Between 15 July and 1 December 2016 the applicant was serving part of a custodial sentence in Ilava Prison. On 7 November 2016 the applicant wrote a letter to another prisoner detained in a different prison, the relevant part of which read as follows: “... I am fulfilling my civic duty and even if I live in fear that some silly guys full of complexes will come to beat me up too, I will not be intimidated ...” The letter was confiscated by the prison authorities pursuant to section 25(2) and (4) of Law no. 475/2005 Coll. on the execution of prison sentences (“the EPS Act”), which provided that the prison authorities could seize correspondence if it contained defamatory information. The applicant was informed of the seizure on the same day and immediately complained to the prosecutor about the confiscation of his letter. On 28 December 2016 the prosecutor of the Trenčín regional prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the prison authorities’ actions had been lawful and justified as the correspondence contained a defamatory statement, namely “some silly guys full of complexes”. On 1 April 2017 the applicant challenged the above decision before the Prosecutor General of the Slovak Republic, who dismissed his complaint on 12 June 2017. The applicant lodged both a complaint with the administrative courts and a separate complaint with the Constitutional Court. On 31 August 2017 the Constitutional Court dismissed the latter complaint as premature, given that the administrative complaint was still pending. On 14 September 2017 the Regional Court discontinued the proceedings relating to the administrative complaint owing to lack of jurisdiction, holding that the matter should be dealt with by the prosecutor’s office and that the applicant was also free to lodge a complaint with a court of general jurisdiction outside the administrative framework. On 31 October 2017 the applicant lodged a second complaint with the Constitutional Court, which on 15 February 2018 dismissed the complaint as ill-founded. The applicant complained under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention about the unjustified and arbitrary interference with his right to respect for correspondence, the lack of access to court and the lack of effective remedies.

3

The application concerns the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by the police and the potentially racist motives behind the incident, given the applicant’s Roma origin. It raises issues of Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention. In the night of 8/9 September 2014, police were called to the village of Fulókércs for breach of peace. Two officers arrived and fined the owner of a property where a loud party was ongoing. Several other, apparently intoxicated, guests appeared from inside the house and an altercation ensued. One of them was the applicant who got into an angry argument with the officers. Since he refused to stand down despite warnings, he was handcuffed and driven to the Encs Police Department together with the house owner. According to the applicant, he was repeatedly hit by one of the officers during the 15-kilometre trip and anti-Roma insults were uttered. More hits and racist insults occurred once in the yard of the police station and the applicant was sprayed with tear gas. The applicant was at the police station from 00:20 am to 03:30 am. On release, he signed off a statement that he had suffered no injuries while detained. In his application to the Court, the applicant submitted that he had been coaxed to sign the document without a chance to read it. On release, the applicant went to the local medical emergency point, where he was advised to present rather to the County Hospital. On 9 September 2014 the applicant reappeared at the police station and made a formal complaint according to which the officers had brutally handcuffed and ill-treated him during and after the night trip to the police station, and that he had been racially insulted. On 10 September 2014 he presented to the County Hospital. In the medical report issued, the applicant was found to have contusions of the chest and an open wrist wound. It was noted that the applicant had had wrist surgery, including sutures, on 24 August 2014 and that he complained that he had been handcuffed two days before presentation. Investigations for ill-treatment in official proceedings and light bodily injury were conducted by the Debrecen Investigating Prosecutor’s Office, which were discontinued on 19 May 2015 for lack of evidence. The applicant’s complaint was dismissed by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office on 15 July 2015. The applicant complained that he had been subjected to inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention

5, 5, 3

The first and second applicants are the father and mother, respectively, and the third to sixth applicants are their four children who at the time of the events in question were all minors (see the appended table). The family stayed at the Röszke transit zone at the border of <COUNTRY> and <COUNTRY> between 30 March 2017 and 24 October 2017. The applicants’ asylum requests were rejected on 5 May 2017. Further to their request for judicial review, the Immigration and Asylum Office (“the IAO”) reconsidered the case of its own motion and rejected their asylum requests again on 15 June 2017. The Szeged Administrative and Labour Court quashed the IAO’s decision on 16 August 2017. It also quashed the ruling designating the Röszke transit zone as the applicants’ place of accommodation due to insufficient reasoning. Subsequently, on 22 September 2017, the IAO modified the reasoning of that decision by stating that the applicants did not have special needs that could not been taken care of in the transit zone. On 20 October 2017 the applicants were granted refugee status. On 24 October 2017 they were transferred to the Vámosszabadi Reception Centre. On 28 October 2017 the applicants left <COUNTRY>. They currently reside in <COUNTRY>. In the Röszke transit zone the applicants stayed in the family section, where they were housed in one container with a separate bed and a wardrobe for each one of them. The general conditions and services provided in the Röszke transit zone are described in R.R. and Others <COUNTRY> (no. 36037/17, §§ 10-12, 14-17 and 30-31, 2 March 2021). In addition to describing the general conditions, the applicant alleged that the applicant father suffered from impaired hearing, back pain and mental-health problems but was given only painkillers. They also alleged that on one occasion the third applicant, who was still a minor, had been handcuffed and escorted by police when accompanying patients to a hospital in order to assist with interpretation. The fifth applicant experienced symptoms of anhelation. The applicants complained that the conditions of their confinement in the Röszke transit zone had been incompatible with the guarantees of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. Under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention they complained that there had been no effective remedy to complain about those conditions. Moreover, they complained that they had been detained in the transit zone in violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. Lastly, they alleged that the respondent State had failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court in violation of Article

Hungary, Serbia, Switzerland

6, 5, 11

The applications concern the administrative arrest, detention, and subsequent conviction of the applicants, prior to a demonstration, on charges of minor hooliganism. Application no. 13509/12 On 17 April 2011 the applicant in application no. 13509/12 (“the first applicant”), who was a reporter at the time, was arrested before a demonstration of opposition to the government. A record of his administrative arrest and an administrative-offence report were drawn up, indicating that he had been arrested on 17 April 2011 for failure to comply with a lawful request of the police to stop swearing in the street. He was charged with the administrative offence of minor hooliganism under Article 296 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”) and was kept in police custody overnight. On 18 April 2011 the first applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court, which found him guilty under Article 296 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine in the amount of 50 Azerbaijani manats (AZN – approximately 50 euros (EUR) at the material time). The domestic courts based their decision solely on the administrative-offence report and on two witness statements from the police officers who had carried out his arrest. The first applicant appealed against his administrative conviction, claiming that his arrest and detention had been unlawful and unjustified, that the District Court’s decision had not been sufficiently reasoned and that he had not been provided with the administrative-offence report or any other document so that he could prepare his defence. By a final decision of 19 May 2011, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as unsubstantiated. Application no. 64801/12 The applicant in application no. 64801/12 (“the second applicant”) was the chairman of the Central Executive Office of the Musavat Party at the time of the events. On 24 May 2012 opposition groups were planning to hold a demonstration and the second applicant was planning to participate in the event. At 55 a.on 24 May 2012 the second applicant was walking with his grandson when he was stopped by two plainclothes police officers and invited to the police station. The second applicant went with the police officers to the police station where he was held for around seven hours and was asked various questions. At 5 p.he was brought before the Binagadi District Court, which found him guilty of the administrative offence of failure to comply with a lawful request of a police officer under Article 310 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of AZN 20 (approximately EUR 20 at the material time). The second applicant appealed against his administrative conviction, claiming that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty, that the District Court had not given reasons for its decision and that he had been arrested to prevent him from participating in the demonstration of 24 May 2012. By a final decision of 21 June 2012, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal as unsubstantiated. Complaints The applicants complained that their rights protected under Article 5 § 1 and Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention had been breached by the domestic authorities. In addition, the second applicant complained under Article 11 of the Convention of a violation of his right to freedom of assembly.

8

The applications concern the applicant’s complaint about the domestic courts’ alleged failure to protect his right to reputation, and raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention. 2 . The applicant’s uncle A. went missing in 2003 and criminal proceedings were initiated in relation to his disappearance. At the time of the events described below, no one had been charged as a suspect in those proceedings. The applicant had been questioned as a witness. E.A., who was A.’s brother and the applicant’s other uncle and was a former rector of one of the private universities in <COUNTRY>, had fled the country pending criminal proceedings against him in relation to charges of corruption, and currently lives in <COUNTRY>. In 2013 an interview with R.Z., a lawyer, entitled “Warning bell from a well-known lawyer”, was published by the Təzadlar newspaper. The interview contained the following passage: “Some of you, ... – unlike his nephew, the lawyer in this case, the official spokesperson who has been jailed by the ‘Parisian uncle’ [referring to E.A.] and who is now presenting himself as his [E.A.’s] representative, whom I consider a suspect in killing [A.] as he attempted to flee the country but was prevented from doing so – are still not free from the disease of wanting to stay in the spotlight ... If you [referring to E.A.] loved your brother so much, why did you kill him for money and involve your other brothers and your nephew ... in this affair?” Criminal proceedings On 29 March 2013 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against R.Z. under the private prosecution procedure and asked the Yasamal District Court to find him guilty under Article 147.2 of the Criminal Code (defamation by accusing a person of having committed a serious crime). The applicant complained that, in his interview, R.Z. had accused him of committing an especially serious crime, namely killing his uncle A., and then attempting to flee the country. 5 . On 6 May 2013 the Yasamal District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint and acquitted R.Z. It held that R.Z. had merely passed on information that he had received from A.K., a client of his (who, at the relevant time, following a complaint by E.A., had been accused of fraud under Article 178 of the Criminal Code), to the investigation authorities for examination and had shared some of that information during his interview with the newspaper. The court further held that as the investigation of the criminal case in question was ongoing (see paragraph 2 above), it was not possible to establish whether the information given by R.Z. was true or false. On 5 July and 7 November 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court dismissed appeals brought by the applicant. Civil proceedings On 1 April 2013 the applicant brought civil proceedings against R.Z. and the Təzadlar newspaper, asking the Yasamal District Court to order the defendants to issue a retraction and an apology, to be published in the same newspaper. He complained that the defendants had defamed him and had caused him moral suffering and distress. On 5 June 2013 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant’s claim. Referring to the judgment of 6 May 2013 delivered in the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 5 above), it found that the statements in question were not defamatory. It noted that the statements made by R.Z. were of a general nature, that they did not specifically concern the applicant and that R.Z. had not mentioned the applicant by name. It held that R.Z.’s statements had to be regarded as assumptions or opinions which had been presented to the reader not as a concrete event that had already taken place, but as important information which required investigation. The applicant appealed, arguing that the first-instance court’s conclusion was devoid of any legal basis. He argued that it was evident from the text of the interview that R.Z. was talking about him, as he was the person who represented E.A.’s interests, and he had been unlawfully prevented from leaving the country when travelling to <COUNTRY>. He submitted that, moreover, R.Z. had himself admitted at the court hearing that the nephew mentioned in his interview was the applicant. On 4 December 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant, giving the same reasons. By a judgment of 25 April 2014 (sent to the applicant on 2 May 2014), the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s judgment. The applicant complained that the domestic courts had failed to protect his right to reputation.

Azerbaijan, France, Türkiye

P1-1

The case concerns the seizure of the applicant’s motorbikes in enforcement proceedings directed against the previous owner, limited liability company S. (hereafter “company S.”). In 2007 the National Tax and Customs Office, seeking to enforce its own claims against company S., issued a seizure order and applied to enter a notation concerning a prohibition on the disposition of the motorbikes of company S. in the register of vehicles (first set of proceedings). The claims became time-barred, and the enforcement proceedings were discontinued at some point in 2012, however, the seizure order was not lifted. On 10 March 2014 the applicant bought two of the motorbikes from company S. On 10 April 2014 company S. requested the notation concerning prohibition of disposal to be deleted from the register of vehicles, since the applicant’s ownership could not be registered otherwise. An application to that end was lodged by the National Tax and Customs Office on 12 June 2014 and the notation was deleted on 1 August 2014 by the Registry of the Vác Governmental Office. On 11 August 2014 bailiff Z. attached one of the motorbikes and the restraint on alienation and encumbrance was registered by the Pest Country Governmental Office on 7 October 2014 (second set of proceedings). On 8 August 2014, in separate enforcement proceedings, Z. attached the other motorbike as well. The notation concerning prohibition on disposition was registered on 3 September 2014 and the vehicle was withdrawn from traffic on 10 October 2014 (third set of proceedings). In 2014 the Mayor’s Office of Érd instituted enforcement proceedings against company S. The bailiff conducting the proceedings, S. Gy., issued an attachment order in respect of the motorbikes on 22 May 2014. Company S. complained about the enforcement measure to the creditor and on the latter’s request S. Gy. lifted the attachment of the motorbikes on 16 July 2015 (fourth set of proceedings). On 22 May 2015 the National Tax and Customs Office, seeking to enforce its own claims, issued a further seizure order on the motorbikes (fifth set of proceedings). In 2015 S. Gy. initiated enforcement proceedings against company S. On 14 January 2016, , the bailiff conducting the proceedings, issued an attachment order on the motorbikes (sixth set of proceedings). In March 2016 the applicant filed an action under section 115 (2) of Act no. LIII of 1994 (hereinafter the Enforcement Act) to release the motorbikes from seizure as they were his property. On 29 June 2017 the Dunakeszi District Court upheld the applicant’s action, finding that the motorbikes had been at the applicant’s property at the time the attachment order had been issued. The attachment was terminated by the Pest County Governmental Office on 27 September 2017 (sixth set of proceedings). As it appears from the casefile, the motorbikes are still attached in respect of the second and third set of proceedings. The applicant filed a new action to release the motorbikes from seizure. As it appears from the case file, these proceedings are still pending. The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the attachment of his motorbikes for the benefit of the creditors of the previous owner were due to the errors of the domestic authorities and constituted a disproportionate interference with his right to property.

6

The case concerns legislative intervention in the course of ongoing civil proceedings. The applicant’s father, F.P., was a pensioner who, in accordance with the 1962 Italo-Swiss Convention on Social Security, had transferred to <COUNTRY> the pension contributions he had paid in <COUNTRY> in respect of work that he had performed there over several years. The Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (“the INPS”) calculated his pension by employing a theoretical level of remuneration ( retribuzione teorica ) instead of his actual remuneration ( retribuzione effettiva ). This resulted in a readjustment on the basis of the existing ratio between the social security contributions paid in <COUNTRY> (8%) and in <COUNTRY> (7%). The calculation therefore had as its basis a notional salary which, according to the applicant, resulted in F.P.’s receiving a much lower pension than that which he should have received. In 2005 F.P. lodged a claim with the Lecce District Court, contending that the INPS’s calculation methods were contrary to the spirit of the Italo-Swiss Convention. While those proceedings were pending, Law no. 296 of 27 December 2006 (“Law no. 296/2006”) entered into force on 1 January 2007. Section 1, subsection 777, of that Law provided an authentic interpretation of the relevant legal framework, upholding the calculation methods used by the INPS. In view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006, by a judgment of 1 December 2008 the Lecce District Court rejected F.P.’s claim. Following an appeal by F.P., on 4 February 2013 the Lecce Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 1 December 2008 of the Lecce District Court. On 25 May 2012, while proceedings were pending before the Lecce Court of Appeal, F.P. died. The applicant did not appeal to the Court of Cassation in her capacity as F.P.’s heir, deeming this to be futile in the circumstances of the case. The applicant complained that the enactment of Law no. 296/2006 had violated her right, as F.P.’s heir, to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. On 1 February 2018 notice of the application was given to the Government. On 4 February 2019 F.P.’s widow, Ms Maria Petrarulo, and his two sons, Mr Mario Palaia and Mr Claudio Palaia, informed the Court that they were also heirs of F.P. and wished to take part in the proceedings instituted by the applicant.

Italy, Switzerland

P1-1

The case concerns the deprivation of the applicant’s land through the application by the domestic courts of the constructive-expropriation rule ( accessione invertita or occupazione acquisitiva ). 2 . The applicant was the owner of a plot of land in the municipality of Virgilio, recorded in the land register as folio no. 4, parcels nos. 19, 67, 561 and 562 and located at the intersection of two roads. According to the 1984 general land-use plan ( piano regolatore generale ), parcels nos. 19 and 561 were designated as ancillary residential zone, parcel no. 67 partially as ancillary residential zone and the rest for public facilities and services and parcel no. 562 as road buffer zone. 3 . On 6 June 1989, the National Autonomous Road Corporation ( Azienda nazionale autonoma delle strade ; “ANAS”) approved a project for the widening of the roads. On 10 December 1990, the Mantua prefect authorised the immediate occupation of the land and on 21 March 1991 the company entrusted with the construction works took physical possession of it. The works were completed on 14 November 1991 and affected 520 square metres of the applicant’s land, corresponding to parcels no. 561 and 562. Therefore, by the time the occupation authorisation expired, part of the applicant’s land had been irreversibly altered by construction works, but the authorities had not issued a formal expropriation order. The applicant brought an action for damages before the Mantua District Court, arguing that the occupation of the land had been unlawful and seeking compensation. On 18 February 2000, the District Court ordered an independent expert valuation of the land. The expert noticed that the expropriated land fell within an area that was designated for public facilities and as road buffer zone, and was thus non ‑ constructible. Nevertheless, he considered that the land was ancillary to a neighbouring commercial building and determined its value on the basis of a comparison with other land designated for productive or commercial purposes. He concluded that the value of the expropriated land amounted, as of November 1991, to 130,000 Italian lire ((ITL); 67 euros (EUR)) per square metre. 7 . In the course of an oral hearing, the expert clarified that the indicated amount was based on the market value of neighbouring constructible land and that – taking into account the fact that the land was non-constructible but could be used for the benefit of neighbouring constructible land – its value could be equitably determined between ITL 80,000 and 90,000 (between EUR 41 and 46) per square metre. On 9 May 2002 the District Court considered that the first expertise was non-exhaustive and appointed a new expert. The second expert confirmed that the expropriated land was non ‑ constructible. Nevertheless, he estimated the land’s value taking into account the fact that it contributed to the building potential of the entire plot. He therefore considered that the land’s value, as of the date of the expertise (13 January 2003) amounted to EUR 180 per square metre, for an overall amount of EUR 93,600. The expert further quantified the compensation due for the period of lawful occupation to EUR 10,150. 10 . By judgment of 4 May 2004, the District Court upheld the applicant’s complaints and found that part of his land had been irreversibly altered following the completion of the public works. As a consequence, pursuant to the constructive-expropriation rule, the applicant was no longer the owner of that land. Furthermore, the District Court accepted that the applicant was entitled to damages for the loss of his property in the amount indicated by the second expertise, and thus awarded EUR 93,600 as expropriation compensation and EUR 10,150 as compensation for the unavailability of the land during the period of lawful occupation, plus inflation adjustment and statutory interest. ANAS appealed against this judgment. 12 . By judgment of 20 June 2007, the Brescia Court of Appeal stated that the applicant had lost ownership of the land at the end of the period of lawful occupation, on 14 June 1994, and confirmed that the deprivation of property had been unlawful. 13 . As regards compensation, the Court of Appeal considered that the land had to be valued in light of the legal possibility to build on it rather than on a de facto building potential. Noting that the expropriated land was subject to prohibitions on building deriving, for parcel no. 562, from its designation as buffer zone and, for parcel no. 561, from the legal restrictions to build within a 10 metres distance from the road, it concluded that it had to be considered non-constructible. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal recognised that the land could be used for purposes other than agriculture, in light of its proximity to commercial buildings. Therefore, relying on the value of ITL 80,000 per square metre indicated by the first expert (see paragraph 7 above), it awarded the applicant EUR 21,484.60 as expropriation compensation. 14 . The Court of Appeal further considered that the deprivation of the property of parcel no. 561 had determined a loss of building potential of the remaining land, and awarded damages in the amount of EUR 4,400. As to compensation for the occupation of the land, the Court of Appeal considered that it fell outside the competence of the District Court and did not award any sum in that respect. Finally, the Court of Appeal established that the damage award should be subject to inflation adjustment and to a 3% interest from June 1994 to the date of the judgment. The applicant’s appeal to the Court of Cassation was dismissed on 2 October 2014. The applicant complained that he had been unlawfully deprived of his land on account of the application by the domestic courts of the constructive ‑ expropriation rule and that he had not received adequate compensation, in breach of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

P1-1, 13

The applicant’s property had been rented out to a third party (under title of temporary emphyteusis) by her ancestors. The contract expired in 1980, however, as a result of Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of <COUNTRY> the tenant retained the property under title of lease, at a rent of approximately 420 euros (EUR) per year with slight increases over the years. On 15 February 2018 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found a violation of the applicant’s property rights, noting in particular a decreasing legitimate aim since 1995 when the large majority of the property market had been liberalised. Bearing in mind the discrepancy in the rent received and the market value, particularly as of 2008, it awarded EUR 30,000 in pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 in non-pecuniary damage and declared that the tenant could no longer rely on the impugned law to maintain title to the property. No costs were to be paid by the applicant. On appeal by the State and the tenant, on 14 December 2018 the Constitutional Court confirmed the first-instance judgment but reduced the pecuniary award to EUR 25,000, having considered that it should not depart from the limits of compensation usually awarded in similar cases. The applicant was ordered to pay ¼ of the costs of the appeal proceedings. Act No. XXVII of 2018 entered into force on 1 August 2018 and its Article 12B provided, inter alia , that despite a judgment in the owner’s favour, it shall not be lawful for the owner to proceed to request the eviction of the occupier without first availing himself of the new procedure provided by that law. On an unspecified date before 8 May 2020 the applicant regained possession of the vacant property.

Malta

3

The applicant suffers from a psychiatric disease. In an incident on 20 July 2017, ambulance was called to her home. Because the medical staff could not enter the flat, police were called in, and they forced the door. In an effort to overcome the ensuing resistance of the applicant, found in the bath, the two officers manhandled and handcuffed her, twisting and breaking an arm. The officers forced the applicant, naked, to lie down on the floor so as to contain her. Eventually, she was transferred to the traumatology department and then admitted to psychiatry. Her ensuing criminal complaint was dismissed by various prosecution instances on 3 April and 4 June 2018, which held that the use of force had been lawful and proportionate in the situation. The officers were never questioned. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that she had been subjected to police brutality which had not been adequately investigated.

3

The application concerns the applicant’s continued detention in prison despite his multiple diseases and the risk of contracting COVID-19, as well as the medical care provided to him during detention. The applicant, aged 67, is serving a life sentence in Naples Secondigliano Prison, following his conviction for membership of a Mafia ‑ type criminal organisation, murder and unlawful possession of arms. He has been detained since 26 June 1998. 3 . The applicant suffers from several diseases, including a severe obstructive sleep apnoea syndrome, obesity, type 2 diabetes and hypertensive cardiopathy. On 31 December 2018 he asked the Naples Court responsible for the execution of sentences ( tribunale di sorveglianza – hereinafter “the Naples Court”) to either suspend the execution of his prison sentence or replace it with detention under house arrest. He had two expert reports produced on his behalf, which concluded that his state of health was incompatible with detention and reported significant delays in the provision of a CPAP machine (a ventilator used in the treatment of sleep apnoea), as well as in other examinations and treatments. On 10 April 2019 the Naples Court rejected the applicant’s request; however, that decision was subsequently quashed by the Court of Cassation and the case was sent back to the lower court. On 17 April 2020 the applicant filed an urgent request with the Naples judge responsible for the execution of sentences ( magistrato di sorveglianza ) on the basis of the risks posed by COVID-No information has been provided on the outcome of those proceedings. On 27 April 2020 the applicant requested the Court to indicate interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Court (the duty judge) asked the Government to provide a report prepared by an independent medical expert. 8 . The Government submitted a report drafted by F., an expert appointed by the regional healthcare administration. The report, dated 29 June 2020, stated that the applicant’s health was compatible with detention, his life was not in danger and his diseases were being adequately treated. Nevertheless, it identified certain shortcomings in his treatment which, though not life-threatening, were cause for concern and discomfort. In particular, the expert noted that since 2018, the applicant had been waiting for a CPAP ventilator, which he needed for his sleep apnoea; furthermore, endoscopic examinations for his polyposis and surgery for a fistula had been sought since June 2019 and had not yet taken place. Meanwhile, prison medical reports stated that the applicant’s conditions were stable and that he had access to the necessary treatment, whereas the expert reports produced on the applicant’s behalf had emphasised that his state of health was incompatible with detention. On 7 July 2020 the Court (the duty judge) rejected the applicant’s request for interim measures. 11 . On 22 July 2020, relying on the prison medical reports and on F.’s report, the Naples Court found that the applicant’s state of health was compatible with detention in prison and rejected his request. Nevertheless, in order to address the shortcomings identified by F., it ordered the applicant’s temporary hospitalisation. The subsequent appeal before the Court of Cassation was dismissed on 18 October 2021. The applicant remained in the hospital until 3 September 2020, when he was discharged and returned to prison. 13 . Following his return to prison, the applicant continued to complain of a lack of follow-up and treatment, with specific regard to the failure to calibrate the CPAP machine and submitted a new request for detention under house arrest with the Naples Court, as well as a new Rule 39 request. The latter was rejected by the Court (the duty judge) on 18 December 2020. 14 . On 11 May 2021 the applicant received the first dose of the vaccine against COVID-On 16 November 2022 the Naples Court rejected the applicant’s new request for detention under house arrest, confirming that he could be adequately treated in prison. At the same time, it ordered the prison administration to schedule a pneumological examination and ensure the calibration of the CPAP machine. 16 . According to a report issued on 9 December 2022 at the time of the pneumological examination, the applicant did not tolerate, and thus had not used, the CPAP machine provided to him in 2021. The hospital asked to be given further information and to undertake further examinations, with a view to resuming the treatment of the applicant’s respiratory problems. The applicant complained, under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, that he was not receiving adequate treatment for his diseases and had been exposed to a significant risk to his life and health, in particular with regard to COVID-19 and to the delays in carrying out specialist examinations and providing him with a functioning CPAP device. He further complained of the lack of a prompt and independent medical assessment.

6, 6

The issue in the case is whether the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been fair considering that he was not given an opportunity to examine or to have examined his co-defendant whose evidence was decisive for his conviction. On 8 August 2008 two rival criminal gangs engaged in a riot over the informal protection of a restaurant in O.Many participants carried melee weapons and multiple shots were fired by several persons. Four persons sustained gunshot wounds and one died as a result. The applicant was tried, alongside nineteen other defendants, for participating in a riot with the use of dangerous instruments (Article 159 of the Criminal Code). Based on the evidence given by one of his co-defendants (R.W., who was involved in the fight on the same side as the applicant), the applicant was also charged with illegal possession of a firearm (Article 263 § 2 of the Criminal Code), using that firearm during the events and shooting all four victims, including one fatally (Articles 148 § 1, 156 § 1, and 157 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The applicant was represented by defence lawyers throughout the domestic proceedings. Within the investigation, R.W. was questioned nine times by a prosecutor, without the applicant or his lawyer being present. During the first interview he did not identify the gunman. During the second one he gave the gunman’s criminal alias and later identified the applicant in a photograph. R.W.’s testimony identifying the applicant was not completely coherent – it varied as regards the applicant’s positioning, way of shooting and statements made after firing the shots. No audio or video recordings of R.W.’s testimony were made in the investigation. Before the court, benefiting from his right not to incriminate himself, R.W. only indicated that he wished to maintain his testimony incriminating the applicant, explained that he had initially omitted the identity of the gunman as he had felt intimidated by another member of the group and refused to answer any questions, including those of the court. He was exempted from having to appear before the court after the first three hearings. His testimony was read out at the trial. The applicant gave his own version of the events but was only considered credible as regards his admission that he had been present at the crime scene. On 2 December 2011, the Ostrołęka Regional Court acquitted the applicant of shooting two persons, including the one who died, and convicted him of the remaining charges, notably the attempted murder by shooting of Ł.W. and K. The applicant was sentenced to a cumulative penalty of 12 years’ imprisonment. R.W. was convicted of participating in a riot and sentenced to a fine of 1,200 Polish zlotys (approximately 270 euros). 7 . Based on testimony from multiple witnesses, the court established that there had been several gunmen at the scene but concluded that none other than the applicant could be identified. Based on the applicant’s approximate position during the events (near the restaurant entrance, among other “defenders” of the building) his involvement in the shooting of two persons was ruled out, as their wounds could not have been inflicted from that position. The court found that the gunman’s identity could not be established from CCTV footage from the scene. The weapon itself was never recovered. Out of the 19 co-defendants and 101 witnesses, only R.W. claimed that the applicant had carried or used a firearm at the scene. 9 . Noting the discrepancies in the testimony given by R.W. the court found one version, given during his second interview held on 18 February 2009, to be the sole credible version. The court accepted it as sufficient to establish that the applicant had carried a firearm, participated actively in the fight by firing the gun from near the restaurant entrance and had shot Ł.W. and K. In so far as some of the witnesses gave a description of the gunman which did not match the applicant or claimed that shots had been fired from a different direction than the applicant’s position, the court found them unreliable. The court concluded that none of evidence which was considered reliable disproved the version presented by R.W. The applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment. R.W did not. During the appellate proceedings, the applicant requested that the court admit as evidence the testimony of R.W., with simultaneous playback of the CCTV footage. On 25 October 2012 the Białystok Court of Appeal dismissed the request on the grounds that these two pieces of evidence had already been gathered at first instance and that the request had clearly been aimed at prolonging the proceedings. On 31 October 2012 the appellate court slightly amended the impugned judgment. The relevant charges against the applicant and his sentence remained unchanged. 13 . The appellate court explicitly stated that R.W.’s testimony had been the sole evidence linking the applicant to the injuries sustained by Ł.W. It concluded, however, that the fact that it was the only evidence did not mean that it was not sufficient. 14 . As regards the shooting of K., the court similarly invoked R.W.’s testimony as the only evidence which identified the applicant as the gunman. It further cited evidence with which the impugned testimony was confronted – namely, that indicating the gunman’s approximate position, but not his identity – and concluded that this had been sufficient to find the applicant guilty of that charge. 15 . The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, complaining notably under Article 6 of the Convention about the dismissal of his request for R.W.’s questioning and indicating that, as R.W.’s sentence had already become final, the latter would have been obliged to testify before the appellate court. On 8 November 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded without giving written reasons. The applicant complained, under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, that his conviction was based to a decisive extent on the statements of a witness whom he was unable to examine or have examined.

8

This protection of reputation case concerns the domestic adjudication of a civil action regarding defamatory and untrue statements about the alleged misuse of publicly funded equipment by the applicant, a ministry employee. The applicant, who had worked as one of several assistants and advisors to an outgoing Minister of Justice, brought a civil action for personal rights’ infringement against the incoming Minister in relation to the latter’s statements that the office laptops used by the outgoing Minister and by the applicant had been destroyed, and that the destruction had not been accidental and could possibly constitute a criminal offence. The impugned statements were made at a press conference during which the Minister did not mention the applicant by his name but referred to him as the former Minister’s assistant, and in a press release published on the Ministry of Justice’s website a day before the conference, in which the applicant’s name was mentioned. The applicant was also referred to by his name in the media coverage that was sourced in the press release and the press conference. The said media coverage was mainly focused on the outgoing Minister, and, collaterally, also on the applicant. Following these events, the applicant, who is an academic, allegedly received queries from his close circle, and criticism from his students. The applicant filed a civil action against the Minister in question for personal rights’ infringement. On 18 March 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court ( Sąd Okręgowy ) and, on 24 January 2014 the Warsaw Court of Appeal ( Sąd Apelacyjny ), ruled in the applicant’s favour. The courts observed that the defendant had lacked any basis to attribute the destruction of the laptop to the applicant, as at the time of the press conference, he had only had information about the extent, but not the cause, of the laptop’s damage. Reports that were obtained at the later stage concluded that, unlike the former Minister’s computer, the applicant’s laptop had suffered small damage that could have been caused through regular use rather than an intentional act. The state of the applicant’s laptop could have been easily visually assessed and had not required any specialised knowledge. The courts therefore concluded that the defendant should not have concluded that the computer in question had been destroyed on purpose and should not have shared such false information in public. Instead, the defendant should have limited himself to publicly commenting on the damage caused to the computer used by the former Minister that was significant, unusual, and visibly mechanical. The courts also found that although the defendant himself had not mentioned the applicant’s name, the information that he had publicly shared had allowed for the applicant’s identification by those who had read the Ministry’s press release or media coverage. Moreover, the defendant had not discouraged his staff who had been engaging with journalists from revealing the applicant’s name. The defendant should have known that the applicant had been identified by name on the Ministry’s website. Overall, as a trained lawyer and Minister of Justice, the defendant was bound by higher standards of conduct. On 23 July 2015 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the appellate court and remitted the case with the following observations. The applicant should be considered a public person. The remarks made by the defendant were of public interest and, although proven untrue, were part of a political process related to the change of the management of the Ministry of Justice and, therefore, were protected under Article 10 of the Convention. On 6 October 2015 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s action, considering itself bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the applicable law. It ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the proceedings and court fees, in total 9,834 Polish zlotys. The applicant decided not to bring another cassation appeal as, in his view it would have no prospect of success. Before the Court the applicant complained, invoking Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, of the breach of his right to respect for his private life and reputation.

6

The issue in the case is whether the applicant – who was declared to be a “fugitive” ( latitante ) and tried in absentia – had a fair trial according to Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, given that, in the proceedings that were reopened after his arrest, he was denied the opportunity to exercise certain rights of defence. On 4 October 1999, in the context of criminal proceedings against the applicant for drug offences, the judicial authorities ordered his pre-trial detention. Since the applicant – who was already listed in the investigation documents as living at an unknown address in Bratislava – was considered untraceable, on 25 October 1999 he was declared to be a fugitive and assigned an officially appointed lawyer. He was tried in absentia and sentenced to twenty-six years’ imprisonment by the Milan District Court by a judgment of 24 October 2001, which became final on 26 March 2002. All procedural documents, including the judgment, were served on the applicant’s lawyer. On 28 August 2013, after being arrested by the Albanian police, the applicant was extradited to <COUNTRY>. He applied under Article 175 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as applicable at the material time, for leave to appeal out of time against the judgment. Having obtained it, he lodged an appeal against the judgment. He requested, inter alia , that the proceedings be reopened ab initio , since he had been declared a fugitive even though he was not aware of the proceedings and had not voluntarily escaped them. He further contested the territorial jurisdiction of the courts of Milan and he requested, in any event, that the summary procedure ( rito abbreviato ) be adopted. In a judgment of 27 October 2014, the Milan Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance conviction, rejecting all of the applicant’s claims. It held that the applicant’s voluntarily evasion of the proceedings had been proven (he had no fixed address; some wiretaps had shown that he was aware that others involved in drug trafficking had been arrested and that he feared that he might also be arrested) and that he was not entitled to have the proceedings reopened ab initio . It further considered that the applicant was no longer within the time limit to request the adoption of the summary procedure and that the officially appointed lawyer should have challenged the territorial jurisdiction in the first-instance trial. In a judgment of 10 May 2016, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 1 June 2016, the Court of Cassation upheld the Milan Court of Appeal’s judgment. The applicant complained, under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, that he had been convicted in absentia without having had a genuine and effective opportunity of presenting his defence before the Italian courts. Despite the fact that he had become aware of the proceedings only when he was arrested, he had been refused the possibility to have the proceedings reopened ab initio . He further complained that, in any event, he was not heard personally and he was denied the right to contest the territorial jurisdiction and to be tried under the summary procedure.

Italy

6

The case concerns the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant. In 2001 a Magisterial inquiry into suspected money laundering took place during which the applicant was questioned by the Economic Crimes Unit. In 2008 he was questioned by the police and later charged with forgery and misappropriation of funds which occurred in 2007 and earlier, to the detriment of and S. On 29 August 2008 he was brought before the Court of Magistrates, as a court of criminal inquiry and on 10 December 2008 he was committed to trial. Following a number of hearings which were not attended by the applicant, and requests for adjournment by the prosecution, at the end of 2010 evidence started to be collected via letters rogatory with five different jurisdictions. In July 2012 the prosecution declared it had no further evidence to submit. The applicant no longer attended the criminal hearings and in June 2014 it resulted that he had left to the <COUNTRY>, during which time he was suffering health conditions and considered that he was not fit to return to <COUNTRY>. Following extradition proceedings, the applicant returned to <COUNTRY> in May 2017 and as of the next hearing a number of requests were lodged by the applicant mainly in relation to the collection of evidence. Around sixteen hearings took place until May 2019 when the proceedings were suspended sine die pending the outcome of constitutional redress proceedings lodged by the applicant, whereby he complained inter alia , about the length of the criminal proceedings which were still ongoing. By a judgment of 5 March 2020 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected all the applicant’s claims on the merits. Concerning the length of proceedings, it considered that the starting point for the calculation had to be 2008 as the applicant had not proved that he had been aware that he was being investigated prior to the issuing of the charges against him in 2008. It considered that the delay had to be imputed to him and his departure to the <COUNTRY>, despite him having been absent on some occasions because of health reasons. By a judgment of 20 July 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. In relation to the length of the criminal proceedings it considered that the starting point was 2008 as the interrogation in 2001 had nothing to do with the charge imputed to the applicant in 2008. Bearing in mind the behaviour of the parties all throughout, in the Constitutional Court’s view, it had been evident that the applicant had highly contributed to the delay, thus, his complaint was unfounded. The applicant complained that his rights under Article 6 of the Convention had been violated due to the length of criminal proceedings against him.

Malta, United Kingdom

6

The applicant was employed as an ambulance driver with the Korenica Health Centre (“the employer”), where part of his working time was spent on-call ( pripravnost ). 2 . The case concerns the allegedly excessive costs of civil proceedings which he was ordered to pay as a result of a civil action he had brought against his employer seeking various employment-related benefits (such as on-call duty; work on days before non-working days; shift work; overtime work; work on Saturdays, Sundays, and public holidays; night work; unused leave). 3 . During the proceedings, an expert evaluation specified that the difference in the compensation to the applicant for being on-call on days before non-working days and on public holidays amounted to 12,381.26 Croatian kunas (HRK). In a supplement to those findings, the expert confirmed that compensation for overtime work and days off during the applicant’s on-call duty amounted to HRK 254,141.12, but that such calculation had no basis in any of the payroll and salary compensation regulations applicable to the applicant. 4 . As a result, the applicant specified his claim in line with the expert evaluation seeking payment of HRK 254,141.12 (approximately 34,500 euros (EUR)) and made a subsidiary (alternative) claim – a possibility existing under section 188 of the Civil Procedure Act – for payment of HRK 12,381.26 (approximately EUR 1,600). 5 . On 28 June 2016 the first-instance court accepted the applicant’s subsidiary (alternative) claim in full and awarded him HRK 12,381, at the same time dismissing his primary claim for the amount of HRK 254,141 because the applicable regulations did not provide for compensation for days off during on-call duty. The court also ordered the defendant to reimburse the applicant the full amount of costs of proceedings he had incurred, that is HRK 34,750 (approximately EUR 4,700). 6 . On appeal, on 2 February 2017 the Osijek County Court upheld the first-instance judgment as regards the merits, but reversed it in respect of costs, ordering the applicant to reimburse the defendant costs of proceedings in the amount of HRK 13,375 (approximately EUR 1,800). Taking into account as the value of the subject ‑ matter in dispute both the primary and the subsidiary (alternative) claims, the second-instance court held that the applicant had succeeded only with a minor amount of his claim and that he should therefore reimburse the employer’s costs of proceedings in full. The judgment was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 16 March 2017 and the applicant pursued no further remedies. The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that the amount of costs he had been ordered to pay was unreasonably high. He also complained under Article 13 that he had not had an effective remedy in this respect, and under Article 14 of the Convention that he had been discriminated against on account of the diverging jurisprudence of the domestic courts.

8

The case concerns the applicants’ complaint under Article 8 of the Convention about the physical separation from their relative with a glass partition during their visits to him in prison. The first applicant, Ms Takó, is the wife of P.S. and the second applicant, Ms Visztné Zámbó, is the mother of P.S. As of 17 June 2014, P.S. was placed in pre ‑ trial detention in Budapest Prison, classified as a “high-security inmate”. Until 2017 the applicants were able to visit P.S. without physical separation. In 2017 the Hungarian Prison Service Headquarters issued an internal instruction that visitors and inmates were not allowed to have any physical contact and had to communicate through a glass partition. The applicants could visit P.S. in a high-security booth. On 16 November 2017 the commander of Budapest Prison requested the Budapest High Court to assess whether it was necessary to maintain the applicants’ visits in a high-security booth, not allowing for any physical contact between them and P.S. According to the opinion of the Budapest High Court issued on 20 November 2017, such restriction was not necessary. However, the restrictive measure was not lifted. The first applicant’s complaint about the measure was dismissed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Her request for review lodged with the Chief Prosecutor’s Office yielded no results either. In its reply of 10 November 2017, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office stated that the measure had been lawful. The second applicant lodged a similar complaint, which was dismissed on 8 February 2019. No further remedy lay against the decisions of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. The applicants complained of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of their separation from their relative by a glass partition during their visits to him.

8

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention that the Hungarian authorities had failed to enforce decisions in relation to his contact rights with his son. On 13 May 2009 the Budapest IV and XV District Court dissolved the applicant’s marriage to and approved the parties’ agreement about custody rights concerning the couple’s son, Z., born in 2007. The agreement was modified by the parents and approved by the Pest County Government Authority in 2015 in respect of regular visits and in 2016 in respect of intermittent visits. Under the new terms the applicant was granted contact with Z. every second weekend and for the first half of every school holiday. On 14 September 2016 the applicant lodged an enforcement request with the Pest County Government Authority since his summer holiday had been interrupted by the child’s mother, in breach of the contact agreement. Subsequently, the applicant could not exercise his contact rights between 26 August 2016 and April 2017. He lodged altogether twelve enforcement requests with the Government Authority and the latter initiated seven sets of enforcement proceedings during this period. It ordered the parties to provide factual information about the exercise of contact rights, but no decision was taken. On 17 June 2017 the applicant lodged a civil action seeking the amendment of the contact arrangements. Until September 2018 the applicant regularly appeared for the visits foreseen in the decision on contact rights but was only able to meet the child twice. Apparently, in the mother’s view, the visits were not to take place since Z. did not want to meet his father. In September 2018 the applicant requested to inform him when the child was ready to meet him. On 31 January 2019 the Government Authority fined 10,000 Hungarian forints (approximately 25 euros) in respect of the visit of August 2016. On 12 June 2019 the Buda Surroundings District Court issued an interim ruling gradually extending the applicant’s contact rights for the future. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Surroundings High Court on 16 July 2019. The applicant was able to meet his son regularly from that point on. On 30 October 2020 the Buda Surroundings District Court rendered its judgment, further extending the applicant’s contact rights. The judgment was upheld by the second-instance court on 3 September 2020. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the domestic authorities had failed to make sufficient efforts to enforce the contact arrangement in respect of his son, in breach of his right to respect for his family life.

P7-4

On 26 August 2011 the applicant was fined 500 Croatian kunas (HRK, approximately 66 euros (EUR)) in minor-offence proceedings for disturbance of public peace and order for having physically assaulted a certain N.and hit him with closed fists all over his face and body on 21 April 2011. By a judgment of 1 October 2013, which was upheld on appeal on 26 March 2014, the applicant was also convicted and sentenced to a suspended prison sentence in criminal proceedings initiated by N.for hitting him with closed fists all over his face and body thereby inflicting him bodily injury on 21 April 2011. The applicant’s subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed on 19 May 2016. The applicant complained that he had been tried and convicted twice for the same offence contrary to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.

P1-1, 6

The application concerns the non-enforcement of a decision awarding compensation for the excessive length of judicial proceedings under Law no. 89 of 24 March 2001, known as the “Pinto Act” (“Pinto” decision) issued by the Perugia Court of Appeal on 8 May 2017 (R.G. no. 518/2012). The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of the non-enforcement of the above domestic decision in her favour. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3 . The domestic law concerning the Pinto Act is set out in the Cocchiarella <COUNTRY> judgment ([GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 23-31, ECHR 2006‑V). The Pinto Act was subsequently amended in 2012 (Law-Decree no. 83 of 2012, converted into Law no. 134 of 7 August 2012) and in 2015 (section 1, paragraph 777, of Law no. 208 of 28 December 2015). 4 . The relevant provisions of the Pinto Act, following the above amendments, are as follows: Section 5 sexies (terms of payment) “In order to receive the payment of the sums awarded pursuant to the present Act, the creditor shall issue a declaration [...] to the debtor authority, certifying that no sums have been paid in execution of the relevant domestic decision, indicating whether enforcement proceedings have been instituted for the judgment debt, the sum that the authorities are still required to pay and the preferred method of payment pursuant to paragraph 9 of the present section. The creditor shall also submit the necessary documents required under the decrees indicated in paragraph ... A model declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 and the documents to be submitted to the debtor authority shall be determined by decrees of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, to be issued before 30 October 2016. The authorities shall publish the forms and documents referred to in the latter sentence on their institutional websites. ... In the event of an absent, incomplete or irregular submission of the declaration or documentation referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the payment order may not be issued. The authority shall make the payment within six months from the date on which the obligations provided for in the preceding paragraphs are fully discharged. The time-limit referred to in the preceding sentence shall not begin to run in the event of absent, incomplete or irregular submission of the declaration or documentation referred to in the preceding paragraphs. ... The payment of the sums owed under the present Act is made crediting the sums to the creditors’ current or payment accounts. Payments in cash and through bills of exchange are only possible for sums not exceeding 1,000 euros.”

Italy

8

The case concerns the alleged failure of the Hungarian authorities to conduct a swift examination in proceedings under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”). In 2009 the applicant met Ms B., a Hungarian national. They lived together for several years in <COUNTRY>, where they were married in 2015. From this union two children were born, in 2013 in <COUNTRY> and in 2015 in <COUNTRY>. In January 2017, after a family holiday with the children in a third country, the applicant returned to their home in Ibiza alone. B. went to <COUNTRY> with the children and announced to the applicant her intention to settle there permanently. THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HUNGARIAN COURTS The proceedings related to the return of the children On 15 February 2017 the applicant filed an application for the return of the children to <COUNTRY> based on the Hague Convention. On 13 July 2017, concluding that the children’s habitual residence was in <COUNTRY>, the Pest Central District Court ordered their return. In 2017 and 2018 the Budapest High Court and subsequently the Kúria confirmed this decision. On 13 February 2018 the Constitutional Court suspended the enforcement of the return orders and on 27 November 2018 cancelled the previous decisions on the grounds that the children’s interests had not been duly taken into account, in violation of B.’s right to a fair trial. On 25 March 2019, having obtained a report on the psychological evaluation of the children, the Pest Central District Court once again ordered their return to <COUNTRY>. The decision was upheld in the subsequent procedure by the High Court and the Kúria . All of these instances relied on evidence such as the common apartment of the family until the separation, the financial contribution of the parties to the family and the registration of the children in local communities, nurseries and health care services. On 21 October 2019 the Constitutional Court suspended anew the execution of the return proceedings and, on 25 February 2020, cancelled the last procedure on the grounds that the psychological impact of the return to <COUNTRY> on the children had been insufficiently evaluated and the mother had not had the opportunity to put questions to the expert. On 22 June 2020, having examined a private psychological expertise presented by the mother, the Pest Central District Court again ordered the children’s return to <COUNTRY>. Meanwhile, on 10 December 2019 the Debrecen District Court in <COUNTRY> recognised a Spanish judgment related to divorce and custodial rights in favour of the applicant and the return of the children as enforceable under EU Regulation 2201/2003 (see paragraphs 14 and 16 below). Other relevant decisions and facts The applicant was able to see his children five times in 2017, three times in 2018 and four times in 2019, after having applied numerous times to the Hungarian authorities in view of B.’s failure to cooperate. On 26 July 2020, during a parental visit, the applicant took the children to <COUNTRY> where they have remained with him since, according to the elements in the case file. On 24 November 2020 the Budapest High Court terminated the applicant’s return procedure in <COUNTRY> in view of this de facto reunification, after being informed of it by the Spanish authorities. THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SPANISH COURTS The proceedings related to the return of the children After the first above-mentioned decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the applicant also applied to the Spanish courts for the return of the children. 14 . On 30 October 2019 the certificate required by Article 42 of the Brussels II bis Regulation was transmitted to the Hungarian authorities for executing a decision ordering the return of the children to <COUNTRY> (see paragraph 16 below). Other relevant decisions On 31 January 2018, in a separate set of proceedings initiated by the applicant, the Court of First Instance of Ibiza granted him provisional custody of the children. 16 . On 23 February 2018, after a decision related to the lack of jurisdiction of the Hungarian courts, the applicant filed for divorce before the Court of First Instance of Ibiza, which pronounced the divorce on 21 January 2019. The Court established the children’s habitual residence with their father in <COUNTRY> and ordered their return, as well as indicating the modalities of custody, parental visits and B.’s contribution to alimony and putting a ban on her departure from Spanish territory with the children. COMPLAINTS The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention of delays in the proceedings related to the return of the children to their habitual residence, the misapplication of the Hague Convention by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the lack of assistance for implementing his parental contact rights during the relevant period and the non ‑ enforcement of the decisions of the Spanish courts.

Spain, Hungary

3

The applications concern the applicants’ removal to <COUNTRY> following the rejection of their asylum requests as inadmissible by the Hungarian authorities, which considered <COUNTRY> to be a “safe third country”. The applicants are Syrian nationals. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. At the end of April 2016 the applicants arrived in <COUNTRY> from <COUNTRY> and entered the Röszke transit zone, situated on Hungarian territory at the border between the two countries. They immediately applied for asylum. The asylum authority rejected the applicants’ requests as inadmissible within a few hours of their submission and ordered their expulsion. The applicants requested a judicial review of these decisions, to no avail. The Szeged Administrative and Labour Court found that, as the applicants had not rebutted the presumption that they had had an opportunity to enjoy effective international protection in <COUNTRY>, <COUNTRY> was to be considered a safe third country for them. Furthermore, the applicants’ failure to rebut the aforementioned presumption meant that they had not established any circumstances justifying the application of the non-refoulement principle. On being notified of the administrative courts’ rejection of their asylum claim, the applicants were taken out of the transit zone by the Hungarian authorities and were made to cross the border back into <COUNTRY> without any official arrangement with the Serbian authorities. The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that their expulsion to <COUNTRY> had taken place as a result of a deficient asylum procedure exposing them to (i) a risk that they would not be allowed access to an asylum procedure in <COUNTRY>; (ii) a risk of chain refoulement ; and (iii) inadequate reception conditions in <COUNTRY>. They also complained under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 that the domestic remedies concerning the rejection of their asylum request and their expulsion had been ineffective. The Court has previously considered the applicable domestic law and international material in Ilias and Ahmed <COUNTRY> ([GC], no. 47287/15, §§ 41-78, 21 November 2019).

Hungary, Serbia

3

The case concerns the confinement of the applicant family in the Hungarian transit zone. The first and second applicants are the mother and father, respectively, and the third and fourth applicants are their children, who were three and one year old at the time of the events in question (see the appended table). The family stayed at the Röszke transit zone at the border of <COUNTRY> and <COUNTRY> between 23 April and 19 November 2018. 3 . The applicants submitted asylum requests upon their arrival to the transit zone. The asylum proceedings were suspended because of the attempted forced return of the applicants to <COUNTRY>. The return had not taken place and the asylum proceedings were resumed on 23 May 2018. On 13 August 2018 the Immigration and Asylum Office (“the IAO”) rejected the applicants’ asylum requests and ordered their expulsion. The applicants challenged this decision in the judicial review proceedings, where they also made a request to be moved to an open reception facility as a matter of interim measure. They were unsuccessful. Their subsequent appeals were rejected for having been lodged out of time. Following their objection, the Metropolitan Court, on 31 October 2018, annulled the previous court decisions and the case was re-assessed by the Metropolitan Court. On 14 November 2018 the Metropolitan Court granted the applicants’ request for an interim measure and ordered that the execution of the expulsion decision be suspended and that the applicants be moved to a more appropriate accommodation. On 19 November 2018 the applicants were transferred to an open reception facility. On 10 January 2019 the Metropolitan Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals concerning the dismissal of their asylum requests and their placement in the transit zone, which the court found to have been lawful. The applicants in the meantime left <COUNTRY> and now live in <COUNTRY>. In the Röszke transit zone the applicants stayed in the family section, except for a few days when, after the initial dismissal of the applicants’ asylum requests, they were placed in the deportation section. They were housed in one container with a separate bed and a wardrobe for each one of them. The general conditions and services provided in the Röszke transit zone are described in R.R. and Others <COUNTRY> (no. 36037/17, §§ 10-12, 14-17 and 30-31, 2 March 2021). 5 . In addition to describing the general conditions, the applicants submitted that the first and third applicants had suffered from medical problems related to, inter alia , their past domestic abuse and distress due to their living condition. They repeatedly requested to be moved to an open reception facility and provided appropriate assistance. The first applicant met with a psychologist on fifteen occasions; however, the assistance was allegedly inadequate and conducted in a language she did not understand . She also was repeatedly treated by a psychiatrist with the assistance of an interpreter and was provided with prescribed medication for her mental ‑ health issues throughout her stay in the transit zone. She allegedly attempted suicide on 26 August 2018. 6 . In the deportation section, where the applicants remained for less than a week, the space within which the applicants could move freely had been much smaller than that in the family section, with no facilities, such as TV or toys. The second applicant was not provided any food while in the deportation section. The remaining applicants had to eat their meals outside that section and were not allowed to take food to the second applicant. The applicants complained that the conditions of their confinement in the Röszke transit zone had been incompatible with the guarantees of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. Under Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention they complained that there had been no effective remedy to complain about those conditions. Moreover, they complained that they had been detained in the transit zone in violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. Lastly, they alleged that the respondent State had failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court in violation of Article 34 as regards the first applicant and the applicant children.

Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, Germany

5

The present case concerns the allegedly excessive length of the applicant’s detention on remand. On 12 April 2015 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of setting fire to a house belonging to his partner’s parents. On 14 April 2015 the Koszalin District Court ( Sąd Rejonowy ) detained him on remand for three months. The court held that there was a high probability of his having committed the offence of which he was suspected and, in the light of a potentially lengthy prison sentence being imposed, it was possible that he might attempt to obstruct the proceedings. He did not appeal against that decision. The applicant’s detention was extended by rulings of the Koszalin Regional Court ( Sąd Okręgowy ) of 7 July, 6 October, 24 November 2015, 22 January, 1 April and 31 August 2016. The court repeated the same grounds as the District Court for keeping the applicant in detention in all of its decisions. The bill of indictment was lodged with the Koszalin Regional Court on 22 March 2016. The applicant was accused of arson and attempted murder. On 18 October 2016 that court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. On 8 March 2017 the Szczecin Court of Appeal ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. It found that the identified shortcomings amounted to a gross procedural injustice. In particular, it referred to the fact that a court-appointed expert had a conflict of interests and that there were serious doubts as to his impartiality. It also found that there was no evidence to prove that the applicant had intended to kill anyone. For these reasons, the appellate court ordered that the entire proceedings be repeated. On 18 April 2017 the Koszalin Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand, relying on the same grounds as previously. On 7 June 2017 the Szczecin Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. On 22 August 2017 the Koszalin Regional Court again extended the applicant’s detention on remand on the same grounds. On 12 September 2017 the Szczecin Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. On 22 November 2017 the Koszalin Regional Court conditionally extended the detention on remand for another three months, unless the applicant paid 30,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), (7,500 euros (EUR)). The applicant complied and was released on 27 November 2017. On 25 July 2019 the applicant was convicted of destruction of property and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, with the total period of his detention on remand (two years, seven months and fourteen days) being considered as time served. He was also ordered to pay PLN 44,000 (EUR 11,000) in compensation to his victims. His lawyer appealed against that judgment on 19 August 2019, and the Koszalin District Prosecutor appealed the following day. On 23 January 2020 the Szczecin Court of Appeal upheld the first ‑ instance judgment. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 that the length of his detention on remand had been excessive.

3

The application concerns the lack of an effective criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of rape when she was a minor. 2 . On 17 November 2015 the applicant’s parents lodged a complaint with the police claiming that their twelve-years old daughter (the applicant) had been raped the same day by a seventeen-years old boy, A.A. An investigation for rape was opened and statements were taken from the applicant and her parents, in the presence of an ex officio lawyer on behalf of the applicant, from which it appeared that the applicant had met A.A. on Facebook and, after a while, agreed to meet in person. On 17 November 2015 A.A. waited for the applicant to finish school and went with her in an empty area behind the school where he raped her. In his statement A.A. claimed that he was the applicant’s boyfriend and had her consent for the sexual act. In support of his allegations, he submitted copies of messages exchanged with the applicant. The medical examination of the applicant ordered by the police revealed signs of violence on the applicant’s body (excoriations on the legs and back) and signs of a recent defloration that may have dated from 17 November 2015. Blood was found on the applicant’s clothes. After the collection of the above elements, the police decided to change the legal qualification of the crime under investigation from rape to sexual act with a minor, as defined by Article 220(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code. In January 2016 the applicant’s representative submitted to the police a psychological examination that focused on the effects of the sexual act on the applicant and concluded that she had post-traumatic stress caused by the event under investigation. The representative also submitted an evaluation from the school attended by the applicant that attested to the fact that she was polite, respectful and disciplined and had very good school results. 7 . On 18 January 2016 the prosecutor in charge with the investigation, considering that A.A. had not known the applicant’s age at the time of the event, changed again the legal classification of the crime to the less severely punished “sexual act with a minor aged between thirteen and fifteen”, defined by Article 220(1) of the Criminal C ode. On 5 April 2016, after a new change in the legal classification of the crime with a view to taking into account the perpetrator’s age as a mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 113(3) of the Criminal Code, and a new series of statements from the parties, the police concluded the investigation with the proposal that A.A. be sent to trial for the crime defined by Article 220(1) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 7 above), applied in conjunction with Article 113(3) of the same code . 9 . On 19 December 2016 the applicant, accompanied by her parents, lodged a new complaint alleging that she had been raped again by A.A. The applicant stated that A.A. had accosted her on her way home from school and forced her to have sex with him on an empty field. A.A. stated in his testimony that, initially, the applicant explicitly said she did not want to have sex with him, however, when he took her on an empty field she eventually agreed to sexual intercourse and even provoked him by saying that she loved him. Considering from the above statements that the applicant had given her consent to the sexual act, the police considered that there was no rape and opened an investigation under Article 220(1) of the Criminal Code (paragraph 7 above). On 20 December 2016 A.A. was arrested until 20 January 2017 when he was placed under house arrest and ordered not to contact the applicant. The medical examination ordered by the police found that the applicant had traumatic lesions in the genital area and on the back of her shoulder that may have been produced on 19 December 2016. At the confrontation between the applicant and A.A. organised by the police, A.A. admitted that the applicant told him, during the encounter of 17 November 2015, that she was not ready to have sex. 13 . On 14 February 2017 the investigation into the two complaints of rape (see paragraphs 2 and 9 above) was concluded and A.A. was sent to trial for the crime under Article 220(1) of the Criminal Code of a sexual act with a minor. The prosecutor listed the evidence collected that included statements given by the applicant, her parents and A.A. to the police, the medical reports, photos of the crime scene and transcripts of messages exchanged between the applicant and A.A. from which it appeared that the latter had declared his love and made explicit sexual proposals to the applicant, who replied in the same tone, using A.A.’s words. The prosecutor considered that in spite of certain evidence pointing to a rape (such as the statements made by the applicant and her family, the lesions on the applicant’s body and the places where the sexual acts happened), there was no evidence of sexual acts under constraint or by taking advantage of the victim’s lack of capacity to express her will. The prosecutor relied in this respect on the fact that the applicant had agreed to meet A.A. on 17 November 2015 in order to “love each other” and had continued to exchange messages with A.A. even after that date. 14 . On 22 November 2017 the Pitesti Court of Appeal convicted A.A. with final effect of sexual act with a minor under Article 220(1) taken in conjunction with Article 113(3) of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to one ‑ year suspended sentence. The court further ordered A.A. not to contact the applicant or her family and to attend a rehabilitation course. The court focused its reasoning on the explicit sexual language used by the applicant in her messages to A.A. prior and after the first incident which, in the judges’ opinion, had showed that she had displayed a confusing attitude and had not categorically and explicitly refused to have sex with A.A. Therefore, the judges considered that the applicant had not been constrained to have sex with A.A. 15 . In separate civil proceedings brought against A.A., the latter was ordered to pay the applicant a total amount equivalent of 6,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

6

The application concerns the applicant company’s complaint that because of a wrongful interpretation of the domestic law regulating insolvency proceedings, namely Law no. 85/2014, and in particular Article 42 § 3 of that Law, the domestic courts denied it the right to have its claims against a private party become enforceable. The applicant company is a Bulgarian limited company whose sole shareholder is Mr R.S., who is also its managing director. On 15 December 2016 A., a Romanian company, filed for bankruptcy and a liquidator was appointed by the court, with responsibility for, inter alia , notifying all potential creditors about the bankruptcy proceedings. In accordance with Law no. 85/2014, the liquidator set the date of 30 January 2017 as the time-limit within which all creditors were to register their claims against A. R.S., in his private capacity as a creditor of A., submitted, within the time-limit set, a request to be registered as a creditor, his claims being separate from that of the applicant company. The applicant company was never notified about those proceedings, even though it had an uncontested claim of 848,104.77 [1] Romanian lei against A. It therefore submitted a request on 24 February 2017 to have its claim registered, relying on Article 42 § 3 of Law no. 85/2014, pursuant to which claims by creditors who had not been notified, in accordance with the rule set out in the Code of Civil Procedure, about the start of the insolvency proceedings so that they could be included in the statement of affairs concerning the insolvent company, were to be treated as having been submitted within the time-limit as of right, and were therefore allowed to be included in the statement of affairs. The liquidator registered the applicant company’s claim on that basis and issued the statement of affairs of A. The statement was challenged by F.B., another creditor of A., who argued that the applicant company’s claim had been submitted late and that the company should be removed from the final list of creditors. On 3 May 2018 the Timiș First-Instance Court decided in favour of F.B., and that decision was upheld on appeal by the Timiș Court of Appeal on 25 September 2018. The domestic courts decided to remove the applicant company’s claim from the statement of affairs in so far as they considered that it had been added outside the time-limit, because even though it had not been properly notified about the bankruptcy proceedings in accordance with Law no. 85/2014, it had to have been aware of those proceedings as of the time when its managing director, R.S., had joined his claim to the statement of affairs as a private creditor. The very purpose of the notification procedure was to make all potential creditors aware of the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, and that purpose had proved to have been accomplished as soon as R.S. had become aware of the bankruptcy proceedings against A. In support of its claim before the Court that the relevant domestic case ‑ law was contradictory, the applicant company submitted three final decisions given in 2018 in which, in similar circumstances to those in the present case, three different domestic appellate courts had held that if the creditors had not been properly notified of the start of the insolvency proceedings, any requests they may have lodged outside the time-limit set by the liquidator to have their claims included in the statement of affairs were to be accepted, it being irrelevant whether they could have become aware of those proceedings in other ways than by proper notification. The applicant company also argued that in so far as the notification procedure as set out in Law no. 85/2014 was individual, it should have been notified as such, its legal personality being different from that of its managing director. The fact that its managing director had been made aware in his personal capacity of the bankruptcy proceedings was of no relevance as far as the validity or the necessity of the notification procedure were concerned. 9 . The Government argued that there was no divergent case-law on the matter, relying on domestic judgments and opinions given by various courts across the country, which had essentially held that as a matter of principle, isolated cases did not constitute conflicting case-law; the courts had considered, however, that under Article 42 § 3 of Law no. 85/2014, the failure to notify creditors in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure implied that their claims were considered as of right to have been lodged within the time ‑ limit. Some courts had also considered it irrelevant whether the creditor was otherwise aware of the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor so long as he or she had not been properly notified thereof; in some opinions, the latter circumstance was acceptable only where the creditor lodged his or her claim against the debtor within the shortest time possible once he or she became aware of the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings. The Timiș Court of Appeal had confirmed that its line of case-law was similar to the decision given in the applicant company’s case. In any event, the Government stressed that the domestic court had found in the present case that even though the applicant company had not been properly notified of the bankruptcy proceedings as required by Law no. 85/2014, it had to have been aware of those proceedings as of the time when its managing director, R.S., had been included in the statement of affairs as a private creditor. The purpose of the notification procedure had therefore been accomplished in the sense that the applicant company had been aware of the bankruptcy proceedings, and yet had failed to act within the set time-limit. Therefore, it had been sanctioned for its inaction by having its claim denied.

3

The application concerns the lack of effective criminal proceedings into allegations of sexual abuse of the first applicant when she was thirteen years old and while placed by the child protection services in a privately run child ‑ care home. 2 . Following complaints by the first applicant’s father (the second applicant) lodged on 29 January 2019, and by representatives of the care home lodged on 30 January 2019, an investigation into allegations of sexual act with a minor set forth by Article 220(1) of the Criminal Code was opened by the police. The second applicant complained that his daughter, the first applicant, born in January 2005, had been sexually abused from the summer of 2018 and until January 2019 when she was still thirteen years old. He specifically complained that representatives of the care home had failed to take the necessary measures to protect his daughter from sexual abuse and had failed to duly notify the police. The first applicant stated to the police that, in January 2019, an older boy – a former resident who was regularly visiting the care home, had asked her to perform oral sex on him and she accepted. She mentioned that she knew the boy since the summer of 2018 and that he had initiated previous intimate encounters with her in hidden parts of the care home’s courtyard. The suspect, who was twenty years old at the time of the events, confirmed the intimate encounters (kissing and touching), the last such encounter happening in December 2018, but he denied that they ever had oral sex. A social worker employed by the care home was interviewed by the police and confirmed that she knew about the oral sex and stated that the issue had been discussed in a meeting with the employees of the care home. No indication was given as to the date of the meeting and no further details were requested. 3 . Psychological evaluations of the first applicant and the suspect were conducted, one by the psychologist of the care home, and were all focused on the difficult family situation of the first applicant, her lack of adaptability, her low school results and her emotional difficulties, while the suspect was portrayed as a responsible adult with a job and without any prior criminal convictions. It appears from the statements given to the police that the psychologist of the care home, who drafted one of the above reports, had asked the first applicant to apologise to the suspect for what she “had forced him” to do to her. 4 . On 14 May 2019 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Brașov County Court decided to close the investigation as the statements of the victim and the suspect were contradictory and no direct evidence was found in the case. Moreover, the prosecutor considered that, since she was born in January, the victim was already fifteen years old at the time of the alleged event and therefore, even assuming that a sexual act had taken place, she was already past the fifteen-years age limit imposed for the crime of sexual act with a minor. As regards the complaint made by the second applicant against the care home, the prosecutor stated that no investigation had been conducted on this aspect since representatives of the care home had duly and timely notified the authorities about the alleged abuse, on 30 January 2019. 5 . The second applicant’s complaint against the above decision was rejected with final effect by the Brașov District Court on 7 October 2019. The court held that the prosecutor had correctly decided to close the investigation since the suspect denied the facts and as there was no direct evidence of a sexual act. 6 . Documents in the investigation file attest to the fact that an ex officio lawyer and an employee of the care home had been appointed to represent the first applicant. However, none of them appear to have lodged any requests on her behalf, they did not appeal the prosecutor’s decision of 14 May 2019 and were not present before the court.

P1-1

When <COUNTRY> declared independence, the applicants were employed with the army of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”). Being stationed in the territory of <COUNTRY>, they were allocated military flats there. Mr Apostolovski bought his military flat shortly before the 1992-95 war (compare Đokić <COUNTRY> , no. 6518/04, 27 May 2010), whereas the other two applicants did not (compare Mago and Others <COUNTRY> , nos. 12959/05 and 5 others, 3 May 2012). All applicants left their flats when the war started and joined foreign armed forces. For that reason, their restitution claims were rejected after the war (pursuant to section 3a of the Restitution of Flats Act 1998). On 23 November 2012 and 25 April 2013, the Constitutional Court of <COUNTRY> found a breach of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of their pre-war flats in respect of Mr Knežević and Mr Popović , respectively. While reiterating that it was not disproportionate to reject restitution claims regarding military flats pursuant to section 3a of the Restitution of Flats Act 1998, the Constitutional Court held that the applicants had to be given fair compensation should it be established that they had not acquired a military flat in another State. It appears that they have not yet received any compensation in this connection.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

3

The case concerns the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment and the alleged lack of an effective investigation. It raises issues under Article 3 of the Convention. 2 . On 26 April 2013 the applicant was taken to Arabkir Police Station upon suspicion of having committed a robbery where he was allegedly beaten by several police officers aiming to extract a confession. That night the applicant was transferred to police holding cells where, at the time of admission, his body was inspected for injuries by a feldsher and two police officers. The Government alleged, which the applicant disputed, that no injuries had been discovered. On 27 April 2013 the applicant was taken back to the police station where his alleged ill-treatment continued. 3 . On 29 April 2013 the applicant, while in police custody, was questioned by a police investigator of the Arabkir Investigative Department investigating the criminal case against the applicant. The applicant denied his involvement in the robbery. 4 . On 30 April 2013 the applicant was transferred to Nubarashen Remand Prison following a court order to detain him. At the time of admission the applicant was examined by the remand prison’s doctor, G.A., who noted the following injuries: “bluish bruises on the front surface of both shins”. The applicant stated that the injuries had been inflicted at Arabkir Police Station. On 2 May 2013 the remand prison sent a notification of the applicant’s injuries and allegations to the General Prosecutor’s Office (“the GPO”) which received it on 6 May 2013. On 8 May 2013 the GPO forwarded the notification to the Special Investigative Service (“the SIS”) which received it on 13 May 2013. On 16 May 2013 the SIS investigator took a statement from the applicant who accused four senior and two junior rank police officers of ill-treatment. He alleged that, after taking him into custody, the police officers had tried to force him to confess to the robbery and would start beating him each time he would refuse, punching and kicking him in various parts of his body. His legs had been bruised and badly aching and he had received strong blows to the back and ribs. On the same date the investigator ordered the applicant’s forensic medical examination. 6 . On 18 May 2013 the forensic medical expert examined the applicant and recorded two grey, blue and crimson coloured “areas” on the lower parts of both shins, as well as two scratches on various parts of the legs. 7 . The investigator took statements from the feldsher and the two police officers of the police holding cells. They submitted that no injuries had been detected on the applicant’s body at the time of his admission to the holding cells. Statements were apparently also taken from the four senior police officers of the Arabkir Police Station who denied having ill-treated the applicant. 8 . On 1 June 2013 the forensic medical expert produced his conclusion, finding that the two scratches were too fresh and did not date back to the period in question, whereas the coloured “areas” on the applicant’s shins were not injuries and had resulted from changes associated with malnutrition. In reaching this conclusion, the medical expert took into account a statement allegedly taken from remand prison doctor G.A. by the investigator about one week earlier. During that interview G.A. was allegedly told by the investigator that the applicant’s forensic medical examination conducted on 18 May 2013 had revealed grey, blue and crimson coloured malnutrition “areas” which had resulted from vascular problems, and was asked to explain whether, given that finding, the “bruises” recorded by him at the time of the applicant’s admission to the remand prison had resulted from malnutrition or injury. G.A. replied that, after having seen the bruises, he had understood that they had been the consequence of changes associated with malnutrition which could have been due to vascular issues. However, since the applicant alleged ill-treatment in police custody, he had recorded also that allegation. 9 . On 14 June 2013 the SIS investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings and to prosecute the police officers, finding the applicant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. In doing so, he relied on several pieces of evidence, namely the statements provided during the inquiry (see paragraph 7 above), the conclusion of the forensic medical expert (see paragraph 8 above) and the fact that the applicant had not raised any allegations of ill ‑ treatment during his questioning on 29 April 2013 (see paragraph 3 above). The applicant’s appeals against the investigator’s decision were dismissed by the domestic courts.

6

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the fairness of Constitutional Court proceedings, because the Constitutional Court had not allowed him an opportunity to comment on observations filed by other participants in the proceedings. The impugned Constitutional Court proceedings concerned the fairness and outcome of the applicant’s war crimes trial before the Court of <COUNTRY> and, in particular, the issue whether the Appeals Chamber of that court had failed to consider his motion to have re-examined witnesses against him. In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court, the Court of <COUNTRY> and the Prosecutor of <COUNTRY> submitted their observations. Since this was not envisaged by its Rules at that time, the Constitutional Court did not transmit them to the applicant. On 11 March 2020 it dismissed the applicant’s case. That decision was served on the applicant on 2 June 2020. With a view to harmonising its procedure with the case-law of this Court, the Constitutional Court has later decided to start transmitting all observations to the appellants for comments.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

6

The application concerns the applicant’s right of access to a court in the context of misdemeanour proceedings related to a traffic offence. In particular, the domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s request for judicial review because he had not signed the penalty notice ( prekršajni nalog ) issued by the police. 2 . On 25 June 2018 police officers from the Ruma Police Department served the applicant with a penalty notice containing a fine in the amount of 5,000 Serbian dinars – approximately 42 euros (EUR) at that time – for the illegal parking of his motor vehicle. The applicant, however, did not sign the penalty notice in the space designated for this purpose. On the back of the penalty notice, it was furthermore specified that if a person did not accept responsibility for the misdemeanour at issue he or she had the right to request a judicial review of the case by submitting the penalty notice to the Misdemeanours Court within a period of eight days, in accordance with the Article 174 of the Misdemeanours Act. It was lastly stated that an unpaid fine could, inter alia , also be replaced by an effective prison term. Article 174 of the Misdemeanours Act, which was in force at the material time, provided, inter alia , that a person who did not accept responsibility for the misdemeanour in question had the right to submit a request for judicial review, by forwarding the signed penalty notice to the relevant court. On 28 June 2018 the applicant submitted a separate and signed request for judicial review with the Ruma Misdemeanours Court. In this submission, he contested the allegations from the penalty notice and requested a hearing. The applicant also attached the unsigned penalty notice. On 6 July 2018 the Ruma Misdemeanours Court dismissed the request for judicial review on the grounds that the applicant had failed to sign the penalty notice, as required by Article 174 of Misdemeanours Act. 6 . On 16 July 2018 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. Therein he referenced, inter alia , the earlier case-law of the Misdemeanours Court of Appeals which had allegedly stated that the signature of a penalty notice was not mandatory if it was submitted together with another signed document. On 28 August 2018 the Misdemeanours Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision rendered at first instance. 8 . On 18 April 2019 the Constitutional Court also ruled against the applicant (Už. no. 11919/2018) and in so doing found that he had suffered no significant disadvantage because of the amount of the fine imposed. 9 . On 6 April 2023, following the communication of the application giving rise to the proceedings in the present case to the respondent Government, the Constitutional Court addressed a case similar to the one brought by the applicant. In its decision (Už. no. 7921/2019), the Constitutional Court opined as follows: “Bearing in mind that the ... case [of] Bošnjački <COUNTRY> was ... [communicated] ... to the Republic of <COUNTRY> with a reference to the appropriate practice of the ECtHR regarding the violation of [one’s] access to a court, and that that case [in hand] concerns a substantially similar factual and legal situation ..., the Constitutional Court has decided to reconsider its previous practice ... with regard to the disputed legal issue – the unsigned misdemeanour notice and the right of access to a court...” 10 . The Constitutional Court then went on to rule in favour of the appellant and find a violation of his right to a fair trial based on excessive formalism. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he was deprived of his right of access to a court given that his request for the judicial review of his case was rejected by the national courts merely on the grounds that he had not signed the penalty notice itself.

Serbia

P1-1

The application concerns the delayed provision of compensation to the applicants for property of a predecessor of theirs, which was expropriated by the municipal authorities in Sofia in 1985 for urban development. By virtue of an order of 10 July 2006, the applicants were due to be provided with a flat in a building which the authorities intended to construct. The building was, however, never completed, and the company tasked to carry out the construction works went bankrupt in 2013. By letters of 28 December 2011 and 9 January 2013 to the municipal authorities, the applicants requested to be offered other flat(s) in compensation. The statements therein were not notarised, as required by domestic law. It appears that in letters dated 17 July 2012 and 8 August 2012, the mayor advised the applicants that they could request financial compensation in lieu of compensation by way of another flat. In 2013 the applicants brought proceedings against the municipality claiming the market value of the flat due to them, but the courts found their claim inadmissible, holding that the applicants had failed to submit valid requests to the authorities to replace the flat due to them with other assets. No compensation had yet been provided to the applicants by the time they filed their latest submissions with the Court in May 2021. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention.

6

The case concerns the applicants’ complaint about the alleged breach of their right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, after the domestic courts declared their tort action inadmissible as having been lodged out of time. In 2003 the applicants, who were employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, participated in a competition to occupy high ranking positions in different regional structures of the Ministry. As a result of the examination, other persons were selected for the positions chosen by two of the applicants and nobody was selected for the position chosen by the third one. According to the applicants, they had not been selected despite having obtained the highest grades among the competitors for the respective positions. In 2005 a criminal investigation was initiated in respect of several officers who had overseen the examination and selection process in the 2003 competition. It was alleged that the participants’ grades had been manipulated by the accused persons with a view to promoting other competitors than the ones who had obtained the highest grades. Between 2005 and 2011 the criminal investigation was discontinued and resumed on several occasions. While the applicants became aware of the investigation in the meantime, they had not been given any status in the proceedings and had not had access to the materials of the investigation until February 2011. On 23, 25 and 28 February 2011 they intervened as civil parties in the criminal proceedings. On 18 May 2011 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation discontinued the criminal proceedings on grounds of statute of limitations. It was considered that while the defendants’ guilt had been established, the limitation period for the criminal liability in the criminal proceedings against them had elapsed on 1 March 2011. The applicants appealed; however, without success. On 6 December 2011 their appeal was finally dismissed by the High Court of Cassation. On 5 March 2012 the applicants initiated a separate civil tort action against the three defendants in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code on tort liability. Later, they also introduced an action against the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as the defendants’ employer. They sought pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage from the defendants. On 19 December 2012 the civil section of the Bucharest Regional Court ( Tribunalul București) declined competence in favour of the administrative section of the same court. However, the administrative section disagreed with that decision and declined competence in favour of a civil court of lower level, given the monetary value of the action. The latter court considered the dispute to be of an administrative nature and the matter of competence had to be decided by the Bucharest Court of Appeal which decided that the matter was of civil and not administrative nature. The High Court of Cassation, which finally ruled on the matter on 23 October 2015, decided that the case was to be examined by the administrative courts in accordance with the 2004 Law on Administrative Courts (Legea Contenciosului Administrativ) . On 3 October 2016 the administrative section of the Bucharest Regional Court started the examination of the applicants’ tort action by allowing a motion by the defendants to declare the action time-barred in accordance with a provision from the 2004 Law on Administrative Courts setting a one-year limitation period for initiating court actions. The court considered that the limitation period had started running as from September 2003, when the applicants had learned for the first time that they had not been successful in the competition. The applicants appealed. On 27 October 2017 the Bucharest Court of Appeal finally dismissed the applicants’ appeal but held that the one-year limitation period had started running not from September 2003, as decided by the Regional Court, but from the dates when the applicants had intervened as civil parties in the criminal proceedings, e. from 23, 25 and 28 February 2011. Since their action was introduced on 5 March 2012, e. one year and several days later, it was lodged outside the limitation period.

8

The issue in the case is whether the refusal to grant legal recognition of the applicant’s gender identity was in breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The applicant is a transgender woman who was born in 1982. While she was assigned male at birth, she identified as a girl from a young age; she preferred behaving and socially presenting herself in a manner society expects of girls. Upon the appearance of secondary sexual characteristics during adolescence, she experienced a strong adverse reaction to the sex she had been assigned at birth. In 2013 and 2014 she was diagnosed with “sexual identity disorder” and commenced an integrative psychotherapeutic process and hormone replacement therapy. The applicant has been living as a woman ever since and is acknowledged as such in her current workplace. On 10 October 2016 she applied to the Timișoara District Court seeking authorisation to undergo sex reassignment surgery and to amend her legal gender marker, forename and national identification number in her civil status records. She subsequently withdrew the request concerning the surgery as she no longer wanted to undergo it. A forensic psychiatric report issued in September 2017 by the Timișoara Institute of Forensic Medicine, at the court’s request, found that the applicant met “the diagnostic criteria for sexual identity disorder – transsexualism” and that she had “the mental capacity to understand the consequences of identifying with a gender other than the one in her legal documents”. On 19 October 2017 the Timișoara District Court granted the applicant’s request in part, allowing the amendment of her legal gender marker from male to female. It relied on the provisions of the domestic legislation and Article 8 of the Convention, as well as on the Court’s case-law. The court rejected the applicant’s remaining claims, finding that the amendments of the forename and of the national identification number were to be obtained through a separate administrative procedure. Both the applicant and the defending authorities appealed against that decision to the Timiș County Court, which overturned it in a final decision of 23 May 2019; the court dismissed the application in full on the ground that the applicant had not undergone and was not planning to undergo sex reassignment surgery. The County Court reasoned that the applicant’s objective was to register a mainly psychological condition corresponding to her gender identity in her civil status records which concerned the sex characteristics, assigned at birth. This “public display of an inner disorder” would lead third parties to think they were interacting with a woman, when “the person was in reality a man from a biological point of view”. The most serious consequences might be encountered in the event of marriage or death; the applicant would end up being able to marry a man, thus violating domestic legislation, which prohibited marriage between persons of the same sex. Moreover, should there be a need for identification after death, her “biological characteristics” could lead to her gender being mistaken; the rights of potential heirs and their assets would therefore remain uncertain. The County Court’s decision was drafted on 21 June 2019. The applicant complained under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention that she had not been able to obtain legal gender recognition because she had not undergone and was not planning to undergo sex reassignment surgery. She further claimed, on the basis of the same facts, that she had been discriminated against.

8

The case concerns the alleged failure by the domestic courts to protect the applicants’ reputation from attacks in the online media. They complain under Article 8 of the Convention. The applicants are the heads of the College of Veterinary Medicine of <COUNTRY> (CVM). On 13 March 2013, the online publication Cotidianul.ro published an article by G.entitled “Danger to the Lives of Romanians: How the CVM’s Actions May Compromise Public Health.” The article concerned the CVM’s legal challenge on procedural grounds against a directive issued by the head of the National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority (“NSVFSA”), a directive aimed at increasing the scrutiny over the distribution of veterinary pharmaceuticals. The author of the article argued that the applicants’ actions seemingly prioritised the interests of pharmaceutical companies over public health imperatives and raised concerns that overturning the directive could result in the unregulated circulation of antibiotics and antiparasitic agents, a scenario at odds with prevailing European standards. Additionally, the author ventured into conjectures regarding potential corrupt practices, questioning whether Mr Harbuz and Mr Andronie (the second and third applicants) had been motivated by pecuniary incentives. The author finally mentioned rumours that Mr Daneș (the first applicant) had initially attempted to exert undue influence through bribery, followed by threats of dismissal from office, directed at the head of the NSVFSA in a bid to obstruct the issuance of the disputed directive. 5 . The article contained, inter alia , the following passages: [...] “The heads of the CVM are endangering the health of the population.” [...] [...] “The leadership of the CVM is endangering the health of Romanians by blocking in court Directive No. 41 from 3 May 2012.” [...] [...] “[The applicants] serve the huge commercial interests of the producers and distributors of veterinary pharmaceuticals.” [...] [...] “[The applicants] did not have the mandate of veterinary doctors to challenge in court Directive No. 41/2012.” [...] [...] “[The applicants] show criminal contempt for the recommendations of the European Commission.” [...] [...] “Viorel Andronie, Liviu Harbuz, Mihai Daneş and the other members of the organized group at the head of the CVM disregard, with criminal contempt, all the signals, warnings, and recommendations made by the Federation of Veterinarians of Europe and by the European Commission.” [...] [...] “[Was there] pressure in euros on Andronie and Harbuz?” [...] [...] “The decision of the CVM leadership might make one believe that there was a very high pressure from the producers and distributors of veterinary drugs, without however making it possible to measure the figure in euros to which this pressure could amount!” [...] [...] “According to some rumours, Daneș and a few other gurus of the Romanian veterinary medical education have exerted extraordinary pressure on the author and signatory of Directive No. 41/2012, the former president of NSVFSA, Dr. R.R., ranging from large sums of money offered for refraining from issuing the said order to threats of dismissal from office.” [...] [...] “The gang at the head of the veterinary medical profession puts itself in the service of the producers and distributors of veterinary drugs, with total contempt for the health of consumers in <COUNTRY> and the rest of the European Union.” [...] [...] “The irresponsible leadership of the CVM slavishly serves the venal interests of drug producers.” [...] On an unspecified date, the applicants initiated defamation proceedings against G.and the publication, arguing, inter alia , that the above phrases were defamatory of them. In a judgment of 17 October 2014, the Bucharest District Court granted the applicants’ action in part, having determined that the article was defamatory. 8 . On 10 May 2016 the Bucharest Regional Court overturned the above judgment and dismissed the applicants’ action. In reaching its decision, the court placed significant weight on the fact that the applicants were public figures and the impugned article pertained to their professional activities. Additionally, the court noted that the subject matter of the article was a matter of public interest which had sparked a public debate. Moreover, the defendants were deemed to have acted in good faith as the evidence did not indicate any ulterior motives beyond the intention of contributing to a public debate. Finally, the court concluded that the publication in question did not result in any detriment to the plaintiffs, as it did not impinge upon their honour, dignity, or professional standing.

Romania

3

The case concerns the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment and the alleged lack of an effective investigation. It raises issues under Article 3 of the Convention. 2 . On 15 June 2011 at 30 p.the applicant was taken to the Mashtots Police Station (MPS), where he was allegedly ill-treated by several police officers and confessed to a crime. The applicant was allegedly beaten with rubber clubs and parquet boards, resulting in broken fingers and a damaged nail on his left hand, and his back was allegedly burnt with an electric shock device. Thereafter he was questioned as a suspect by a police investigator who noted an injury on the applicant’s hand. The applicant stated that he had sustained it by punching a wall in a fit of anger several days prior to his arrest. On 16 June 2011 at 15 a.the applicant was admitted to a police temporary holding facility where a number of injuries were recorded, including “scratch wounds and bruises on his back, and a swollen right shin”. A forensic medical expert examined the applicant on the same day, as ordered by the police investigator, and confirmed a number of burns on his chest and back. The applicant stated to the expert that the “scratches” on his back had resulted from leaning on a wall and denied having been ill-treated. On 19 June 2011 the applicant was subjected to a medical examination at the detention facility and found to have “swellings on the left shin, scratches on the back of the shin, injuries to the back, including scratches, partly scabbed”. 3 . On 28 July 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor alleging his ill-treatment, which was forwarded for investigation to the Mashtots Investigative Department (MID), situated in the same building as the MPS. On 13 August 2011 the applicant was questioned by the MID investigator but refused to testify. On 15 September 2011 the forensic medical expert testified that the burns could not have been caused by an electric shock device because they had different shapes and locations and had been caused by a “hot object”. On 31 October 2011 the MID investigator refused to conduct a criminal prosecution in connection with the applicant’s injuries. In March 2012 the applicant lodged an out-of-time appeal against that decision. On 1 November 2012 the Court of Cassation found that the applicant had been justified in having missed the prescribed time-limit since the investigator’s decision had contained no mention of the procedure for appealing against it, including the time-limit for appeal and the authority with which such an appeal was to be lodged. It further held that the MID investigator had not been in a position to conduct an impartial inquiry since the case concerned his colleagues at the MPS. Following this decision, on 14 May 2013 the trial court ordered that the case be sent for a “new and impartial investigation by the Special Investigative Service” (SIS). On 20 June 2013 a criminal case was instituted in respect of the officers of the MPS and transferred for investigation to the SIS. The applicant was recognised as a victim and was questioned. A number of other investigative measures were conducted, including a new medical examination which confirmed that one of the applicant’s fingernails on his left hand was deformed. The police investigator and five police officers of the MPS, including its former chief, were also questioned and denied having ill-treated the applicant. On 31 October 2013 the SIS terminated the proceedings for insufficiency of evidence, which was later upheld by the courts.

6, 3

The case concerns the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment and the alleged lack of an effective investigation. It also concerns the alleged unfairness of the applicant’s trial as regards the reliance by the courts on his confession allegedly obtained under duress. It raises issues under Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention. 2 . On 23 September 2011 at 30 a.the applicant was taken to the Principal Department for the Fight Against Organised Crime (PDFAOC) of the Armenian Police, where he was allegedly subjected to several hours of ill-treatment by police officers who started by hitting the applicant on various parts of his body. At 30 a.the applicant was questioned and placed under arrest by an investigator of the Principal Department for Investigations (PDI) of the Armenian Police. His ill-treatment allegedly continued thereafter, and included stripping him and handcuffing his hands and feet to a chair, beating him with rubber batons, administering electric shocks and kicking him on the soles of his feet, back, ribs and other parts of the body, demanding that he confess to a crime. At 30 p.the applicant was admitted to a police temporary holding facility where a number of injuries were recorded, including “a wound and swelling on the left temple, reddish traces on the back, wounds on both shins, swelling of the right hand, swelling of both feet, and a wound on the right wrist”. A notification of the applicant’s injuries was sent to the PDI. On 24 September 2011 the PDI investigator questioned the applicant who confessed to the crime. On 1 October 2011 the PDI investigator examined the medical register of the temporary holding facility and on 3 October 2011 he questioned the applicant who refused to testify about his injuries. On 4 October 2011 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert, as ordered by the investigator, who confirmed part of the applicant’s injuries, finding that they had been inflicted by a blunt hard object. 3 . In October 2011 the applicant appointed a lawyer of his choosing who contested the results of the forensic medical examination, alleging the applicant’s ill-treatment. On 6 April 2012 the PDI investigator took statements from two PDFAOC officers who had effected the applicant’s arrest. Both made identical one-paragraph-long statements, denying the applicant’s ill-treatment and alleging that the applicant had resisted arrest, resulting in the use of force and the applicant falling during the incident, which may have been the cause of his injuries. No questions were posed by the investigator. In June and July 2012 the applicant complained in detail to the General Prosecutor about his alleged ill-treatment and requested that his allegations be investigated by the Special Investigative Service (SIS). His complaint of July 2012 was forwarded to that authority which questioned the applicant on 15 August 2012 who insisted on his complaint and refused to answer questions about his injuries. On 23 August 2012 the SIS refused to institute criminal proceedings, citing the statements of the two PDFAOC officers and the applicant’s refusal to testify and concluding that his injuries had resulted from the lawful use of force by the arresting officers who had tried to prevent the applicant’s flight. The applicant’s appeals against that decision were dismissed by the courts. Separately, the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment in the trial against him. In doing so, the courts relied, inter alia , on the applicant’s confession of 24 September 2011 and dismissed the applicant’s requests to exclude that evidence.

10

The applicant is a journalist working for a national daily newspaper, O Público . On 4 February 2012 a news article written by the applicant and entitled “Two more former spies targeted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office” was published in the above-mentioned newspaper. It reported on the search and seizure of the computers of the two suspects in a criminal investigation into high-level corruption, illegal access and abuse of power, in which former senior officials of the intelligence services, as well as high-ranking political figures, were allegedly involved in illegal operations to take control of a major Portuguese media group. The news item, which had already received media coverage, identified two former intelligence officials who had been hired as information technology experts by a media company whose operations were being investigated. The above-mentioned judicial investigation was under investigative secrecy as per a decision of the investigating judge during the period between 4 August 2011 and 7 May 2012. 4 . By judgment of the Lisbon District Court of 9 March 2017, upheld by the Lisbon Court of Appeal on 14 December 2017, the applicant was sentenced to a 100-day fine, corresponding to the amount of 1,000 euros (“EUR”) for disclosing information covered by investigative secrecy in the news article at issue. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant alleged that her criminal conviction had violated her right to freedom of expression.

6

The case concerns the restitution of agricultural land. The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention that the restitution procedure had not been completed for many years, without any due justification. The applicant’s father (who died in 2012 and was succeeded by the applicant) was among the heirs of K.Y. After at first only some of the heirs obtained the restitution of several plots of land, in 1997 the remaining ones brought proceedings and, in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 27 September 2002, secured judicial recognition that all the heirs were entitled to the restitution of all but two of the plots at issue. However, for many years the competent body, the Sliven agriculture department, refused to comply with the above-mentioned judgment, maintaining that it was unable to identify the two plots excluded from restitution; they had been described with their pre-nationalisation boundaries, whereas the existing plots that were subject to restitution had different boundaries and specifications. The department thus considered that the heirs needed to reach a settlement as to the land to be excluded. It was only on 24 October 2016 that the department took a decision acknowledging that all the heirs of K.Y. were entitled to restitution; that decision, which was not preceded by a settlement among the heirs, became enforceable on 18 July 2017, after being amended by the courts (for further details, see paragraph 11 below). There are indications that even after the decision at issue, the cadastral plans necessary to conclude the restitution procedure were not issued with regard to some of the plots. In accordance with his share of the inheritance, the applicant is entitled to the restitution of 6,000 square metres of land.

P1-1

On 5 June 2012 the relevant medical commission, having examined the applicant, issued a disability certificate which attested that she had a second ‑ degree disability, as a blind person. Based on that certificate and having regard to the period of her contribution to the state pension fund, on 13 July 2012 the applicant was granted the right to receive an old age pension. On 19 November 2015 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the HCCJ”) established by means of an appeal in the interests of the law that the term “blind” as mentioned in the disability legislation referred exclusively to a person with full visual impairment. Consequently, a wide-scale revision of pensions already granted to claimants such as the applicant was undertaken by the pension authorities. On 30 May 2018 the applicant’s pension decision of 2012 was revoked by the Bacǎu Pension Authority, which decided that, in the light of her second-degree disability (partial visual impairment) and of the period of her contribution to the pension fund, she had not been entitled to receive a pension. The applicant challenged this decision referring, inter alia , to the Court’s case Moskal <COUNTRY> (no. 10373/05, 15 September 2009). 6 . By final decision of 27 December 2019 (notified on 14 February 2020) the Bacǎu Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 30 May 2018 and found that the impugned decision was not disproportionate: the applicant was not fully deprived of an income, as she was receiving a monthly disability benefit of 375 Romanian lei (RON), which was approximately 75 euros (EUR), she co-owned an apartment with her husband, and owned a car. On 4 July 2018 the Bacǎu Pension Authority established that the applicant was to repay the amount of RON 37,110 (approximately EUR 7,600), received in undue pension for the period between 1 June 2015 and 31 May 2018. On 5 December 2018 the Bacǎu County Court found for the applicant and annulled the decision of 4 July 2018 as being disproportionate. It found that the pension authority had been at fault for having issued the pension decision, and for having delayed for more than three years the re-assessment procedure in the applicant’s case, once the HCCJ had indicated the interpretation of the relevant legal concepts. Moreover, it held that the required reimbursement would jeopardise her livelihood and put an excessive burden on her, given that her very low income was only composed of monthly disability benefits. On 25 February 2019 the pension authority revoked its decision of 4 July 2018. 10 . On 15 June 2020 the Bacǎu Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of 5 December 2018 finding that in the light of the lawfulness of the decision revoking the applicant’s pension (see paragraph 6 above), the consequent decision reclaiming the undue pension was also lawful and hence could not be annulled. 11 . On 17 September 2020 the pension authority revoked its decision of 25 February 2019, holding that the outstanding debt established in the decision of 4 July 2018 was still in force. That decision was upheld by the Bacǎu County Court on 17 February 2021, “as it was only reproducing the content of the previous decision of 4 July 2018, already declared lawful by the courts”. 12 . On 5 July 2021 the fiscal authorities launched enforcement proceedings against the applicant for an outstanding debt of RON 37,626 (approximately EUR 7,600). It appears that as of May 2021, the monthly amount withheld from the applicant’s income was RON 53 (approximately EUR 11); as of January 2022, that monthly amount was increased to RON 118 (approximately EUR 24).

Poland

8

The application concerns the non-enforcement of a court decision ordering the return of the applicant’s children to <COUNTRY>. FAMILY SITUATION AND THE RETURN ORDER The applicant, a Portuguese national, married a Romanian national, Ms The couple were resident in <COUNTRY>. Their children, A. and , were born respectively in 2010 and 2013 in <COUNTRY>. Since the summer of 2013 the family had travelled on several occasions between <COUNTRY> and <COUNTRY>. In March 2015 the applicant filed for divorce in the Cascais Family Court (Lisbon); it appears that in August 2015 made a similar request before the Romanian courts. On 8 April 2016, relying on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”), the applicant lodged proceedings with the Bucharest County Court for the return of the children to <COUNTRY>. 5 . On 8 July 2016 the County Court found that the children’s habitual residence was in <COUNTRY> and ordered their return. The decision was upheld by a final decision of 7 November 2016 of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 6 . On 4 May 2017 the Cascais Family Court pronounced the couple’s divorce; the custody matters remained pending. Meanwhile, on 13 September 2017 the children’s custody was granted to the applicant by an interim order. ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS IN BÂRLAD 7 . As opposed enforcement of the return order, on 19 January 2017 the applicant requested the services of a bailiff in Bârlad, where and the children lived. 8 . On 26 January 2017, at the bailiff’s request on behalf of the applicant, the Bârlad District Court allowed the enforcement proceedings. On 3 February 2017 the bailiff sent a notification to , inviting her to a meeting scheduled to take place on 9 February 2017 in his office with a view to handing over the children to the applicant. and the children did not attend the meeting. 9 . On 16 February 2017 the applicant asked the bailiff to continue the enforcement, to seek daily penalties from for the delays in the enforcement of the return order (Article 905 of the Code of Civil Procedure), to request, via the child protection authority, psychological counselling for the children and, in the case of continued non ‑ compliance, to lodge a criminal complaint against 10 . On 23 February 2017 the bailiff lodged a request for delay penalties with the Bârlad District Court. On 5 April 2017 the Bârlad District Court dismissed the request on the grounds that, as the bailiff’s notification had been sent by post and not handed directly to , it had not been established that , in bad faith, had refused to comply. 11 . In a final decision of 16 August 2017 the Vaslui County Court dismissed the bailiff’s and the applicant’s appeals, finding that after the beginning of the enforcement proceedings, the Vaslui County Court had rendered a decision (see paragraph 13 below) establishing the children’s residence with , who accordingly could no longer be compelled to enforce the return order. INTERIM RESIDENCE ORDER Meanwhile, lodged an interim request asking that the children be allowed to live with her in <COUNTRY> pending the outcome of the custody proceedings which had started meanwhile in the Cascais Family Court (see paragraph 6 above). In a decision of 15 December 2016 the Bârlad District Court dismissed the request, noting that the only reason for lodging the request was to put off the execution of the return order. 13 . appealed, and in a final decision of 7 June 2017 the Vaslui County Court established the children’s residence with , pending the outcome of the custody proceedings in <COUNTRY>. It asserted, based on Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility (“the Brussels II bis Regulation”), that it had jurisdiction to take provisional measures while the main custody proceedings were pending. It acknowledged that the return order still needed to be enforced, but observed that the children had already spent three years in <COUNTRY> and were integrated in their new environment. ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS IN BICAZ 14 . On an unspecified date, moved with the children. The applicant sought help from the Romanian Ministry of Justice to find their new address. They were eventually located in Bicaz. 15 . On 9 February 2018, the applicant ended the enforcement proceedings started in Bârlad (paragraphs 7-11 above) and started enforcement with a bailiff who had territorial jurisdiction in Bicaz. 16 . On 3 April 2018 the bailiff invited to come to his office on 19 April 2018, to hand over the children to the applicant. took the children out of school and did not attend the meeting. The bailiff informed the child protection authority of the situation and lodged a request for delay penalties before the Bicaz District Court. 17 . On 25 November 2020 the Bicaz District Court dismissed the request, on the grounds that it had not been established that had been aware of the enforcement proceedings and that, in any case, she had meanwhile moved with the children to Bârlad. CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS IN ROMANIA 18 . On 11 May 2018 lodged an action with the Bârlad District Court seeking attribution of parental responsibility for the children. In a decision of 28 November 2018 the court denied the request, finding that, as it had been established that the children’s habitual residence was in <COUNTRY>, the Romanian courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action. CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 19 . On 28 February 2018 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against for non-assistance to the enforcement authorities and non ‑ compliance with a court order concerning child custody arrangements (respectively Articles 287 and 379 of the Criminal Code). On 20 January 2020 the applicant complained about the length of the investigation and on 3 February 2020 the Bârlad District Court ordered the prosecutor’s office attached to the Bârlad District Court, which was supervising the investigation, to finalise it by 1 August 2020. 21 . On 30 July 2020 the Bârlad police proposed closing the investigations on the grounds that, concerning the first offence, did not have a duty to support the enforcement authorities, therefore she could not commit the offence in question; and, concerning the second offence, there was no court decision awarding custody or contact rights in the case. The police proposal was endorsed by the prosecutor’s office (31 July 2020) and upheld by the prosecutor in chief of the same office (22 September 2020) and by the Bârlad District Court (final decision of 24 December 2020). CURRENT SITUATION 22 . At the date of the most recent communication from the parties (5 January 2022), to the Court’s knowledge, the return order was still unenforced.

Portugal, Romania

3

The applicant was born in <COUNTRY> on 17 February 1975. By judgment of the Lisbon Criminal Court on 5 May 2006 he was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment for the aggravated murder of two police officers. 2 . After being detained in Linhó and Paços de Ferreira prisons, on 18 May 2007 the Director-General for Reintegration and Prison Services (the “DGRPS”) decided to place the applicant under the high security regime for preventive security reasons, in view of the seriousness of the offences committed and the threat he posed to prison security, in accordance with Article 15 of the Code on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions. The applicant was placed in the Monsanto High Security Prison. The security regime imposed on him was subsequently reviewed and extended every six months by the DGRSP, following a proposal by the Director of Monsanto Prison, based on an assessment of the applicant’s dangerousness and his behaviour in prison, which was characterised by disciplinary issues, interpersonal difficulties, isolation, lack of interest in any activity, and disregard for prison rules. Those decisions were notified to the Public Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Court for the Execution of Sentences of Lisbon (“the CESL”). 3 . The latest review took place on 29 November 2016. As in the previous reviews, the DGRPS imposed an additional period of six months on the basis of a technical opinion of 28 November 2016, on the proposal of the Director of the Monsanto prison. Referring to previous decisions, it concluded that the reasons for imposing the security regime on the applicant remained valid and that there was no evidence of positive progress in his behaviour in prison which could justify a change in the regime. The applicant challenged the decision before the CESL on the grounds that it was unfounded, requesting to be heard and to submit additional evidence. By decision of 1 February 2017 the CESL held that the DGRSP’s decision had been lawful. The applicant contested this decision as null and void because he had not been heard or given the opportunity to submit evidence. In a final decision dated 24 March 2017 the CESL upheld its decision, stating that a hearing or submission of evidence would not provide any new information beyond what the applicant had already argued at length. 5 . During his detention in Monsanto Prison, the applicant suffered from knee problems as a result of an injury sustained on 14 October 2008 during sports activities in the prison yard. This has led to his reduced mobility, and later to obesity and increased isolation. 6 . The applicant was confined alone to his cell most of the time and hardly participated in any activities. He was allegedly not informed of the activities taking place and his internal requests were ignored. He had initially enrolled in a distance learning law course, but eventually gave up as textbooks were allegedly withheld by the prison guards. He had limited contacts inside, including with other inmates, and outside the prison, including restrictions on contact with his family and on the use of the telephone. He was strip-searched every time he left or entered his cell, including to go to the vending machine. After the occasional visits from his parents or his lawyer, he had to strip naked and squat down so that his anus could be examined (“ revista por desnudamento e agachamento ”). 7 . On 19 January 2018, the applicant was transferred to <COUNTRY> in order to serve the remaining prison sentence there. 8 . Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the conditions of detention in the Monsanto High Security Prison. He alleged in particular that the lengthy imposition of the security regime and various restrictions on him, coupled with his lack of access to medical care and to any form of purposeful leisure or occupational activity, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. The applicant also complained, under Articles 6 and 13, of the lack of fairness in the decision-making process concerning the application of the security regime and the lack of effective domestic remedies in this respect.

Brazil

6

On 20 July 2015 the applicant brought civil proceedings against B. before the Neamţ County Court (“the County Court”) claiming 50,000 euros (EUR) for damage to her honour and reputation because B. had allegedly opened a social media account on Facebook by using the applicant’s private information and picture and posted messages on that account which had defamed the applicant within her circle of friends and work colleagues and affected her private and professional relationships. 2 . Upon the applicant’s request the court appointed an IT expert to prepare an expert report (“the report”) in order to determine the identity of the person who had created the account. The expert concluded that he could not uncover all technical data about the account and investigate further who opened it because his requests for information to Facebook had remained unanswered. During the proceedings the applicant asked the court to send an order compelling the company to provide the information required in case it refused to disclose confidential data to anyone other than a court. Her application was dismissed. The County Court held that a court order to Facebook was unnecessary because the expert had already written to them without receiving a response and had stated that in his experience the company did not respond to such requests. 4 . On 19 December 2017 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that for anyone to be found liable for the statements on the account, the applicant had to prove the identity of the person who made them. Her requests to have the expert send his requests for information to the company were allowed and the proceedings were adjourned twice pending a response, but Facebook had remained silent. Thus, the evidence adduced had not succeeded in clearly indicating whether the account had been fake. Moreover, the creator’s identity could not be established to prove beyond doubt that B. had posted the messages. 5 . In an appeal to the Bacău Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) the applicant argued that the dismissal of her request for a court order to be sent to Facebook unsupported by strong reasons had breached her rights of defence and to a fair hearing and had made proving her case impossible. The County Court had acknowledged that the clarifications requested by the expert had been necessary for the case. This information had been technical and confidential and she had asked for the County Court’s assistance because the expert could not obtain a response. If Facebook had persisted in its silence, the court could have imposed sanctions on them for delaying the proceedings. 6 . On 12 September 2018 the Court of Appeal dismissed a renewed request by the applicant for a court order to be sent to Facebook and her appeal. It held that the order was unnecessary for the examination of the appeal given the evidence adduced before the County Court, the arguments raised in the applicant’s appeal and what she intended to prove with this evidence. The County Court’s decision dismissing her request for the court order had been reasoned and well founded. That court had considered it unnecessary for the case. Its judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim had likewise been well founded, given that the applicant had not succeeded in proving that B. was the person who had posted the messages on the account.

3

The applicant was involved in an altercation with the police, after which he was taken to a police station where, immediately upon arrival, he was allegedly beaten by four police officers in the duty unit of the station. A criminal case was initiated against the applicant who was charged with assaulting the police but, after its transfer from the police to the Special Investigative Service (SIS), the case was dropped and the four police officers were charged with the applicant’s ill-treatment. Their case went to trial which ended with their acquittal by the domestic courts on the ground that the evidence obtained was not sufficient to conclude that the applicant’s injuries had been sustained specifically at the police station as a result of his ill-treatment. After the acquittal was upheld by the final judicial instance on 6 October 2011, the investigation into the circumstances of the applicant’s injuries was resumed, for the purpose of “identifying those responsible”, and was pending at the time of introduction of the present application. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention about his ill-treatment and the lack of an effective investigation.

6

The application concerns criminal proceedings for high treason against the applicant. He raises complaints under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. As a result of a search of the applicant’s apartment, the National Security Service (NSS) found various types of weapons and ammunition, personal notes, compact discs, military maps and military registry books. Some of those materials apparently contained classified information on various military operations, military orders and their execution, military shifts and equipment and other information of military significance. 3 . In September 2009 the NSS charged the applicant with high treason, spying for the special services of <COUNTRY>, and illegal possession of firearms. The applicant was taken in pre-trial detention. The NSS further prohibited the applicant from receiving visits (except from his lawyer) and from making or receiving telephone calls at the detention facility. 4 . The applicant’s trial before the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan (“the trial court”) was conducted in camera . By its decision of 22 January 2010 the trial court granted the prosecution’s request to conduct the trial in camera on the grounds that the case contained state and official secrets. During the trial the applicant complained that some of the materials of the criminal case were illegible, namely his pre-trial testimony and witness statements, as they had been handwritten by the investigator. The trial court ordered the prosecution to produce those materials in legible form. The prosecution submitted the typewritten versions of the impugned documents. On 13 May 2010 the trial court lifted the prohibition on the applicant’s visits. 7 . By the judgment of 25 October 2010, which was fully upheld on appeal, the trial court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. It relied on witness evidence obtained during the investigation and confirmed in court, the applicant’s intercepted communications and various pieces of material evidence, such as photographs of military positions, military maps, books, equipment and other materials of a military nature with an indication “top secret”. As regards the handwritten materials of the criminal case indicated by the applicant as illegible, the trial court concluded that his rights had not been breached as he had been questioned by the investigator in the presence of his lawyer, the materials of the criminal case had been disclosed to him and to his lawyer, and none of them had complained about the illegibility of those materials at that stage. On the same date the trial court also lifted the prohibition on the applicant to make or receive telephone calls at the detention facility. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the domestic courts’ decision to conduct the entirety of the judicial proceedings in camera had led to his trial being unfair. He further complained under the same provision that the domestic courts relied on illegible handwritten materials in evidence against him. The applicant also complained under Article 8 of the Convention of an interference with his right to respect for his correspondence on account of the restriction of his telephone conversations during the investigation and trial.

Azerbaijan

6

In 1992 the local authorities of Arevadasht village (executive committee of the Council of Peoples’ Deputies) allotted a plot of land to the applicant. He was issued a temporary certificate of ownership which stated that it had to be exchanged for a certificate of state registration of the title. 2 . In 1997 the local authority issued a certificate confirming that the applicant had been allotted a plot of land and that, since 1991, he had made a number of improvements - drilled a well, built an apartment, cattle shed and poultry yard and planted orchards of fruit trees. 3 . On 3 October 2011 the applicant asked the State Real Estate Registry to register his title to the given land. His request was refused on the grounds that by virtue of Government decree no. 1555-N of 18 November 2004 (“the Decree”) the State had transferred its ownership to land, which included the plot of land in question, to the local community of Arevadasht village, which had then alienated it to a third party. 4 . The applicant filed a claim with the Administrative Court seeking to have the Decree declared partly invalid in so far as the plot of land that had been allotted to him was concerned, arguing that the Government had no authority to alienate the plot of land which constituted his property. To support his claim, the applicant relied on Article 13 of the Land Code of 1991, according to which allotment of land at the relevant time was carried out by executive committees of the Council of Peoples’ Deputies, as well as Article 52 § 4 of the Land Code of 2001, which stated that official documents granting rights in respect of land issued or obtained before 6 May 1999 preserved their legal force, were not subject to re-registration and were considered a lawful basis for transactions. He also relied on Article 28 of the Constitution of 1995, which required a judicial procedure for deprivation of property and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. On 16 January 2012 the Administrative Court refused to admit the applicant’s claim for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the applicant had failed to mention any legal act of higher legal force with which the Government decree was allegedly incompatible, as required by Article 135 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (“the CAP”). 6 . Upon the applicant’s appeal, the Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 16 January 2012 and remitted the case for a new examination finding that the Administrative Court should have returned the claim to the applicant in order to correct the shortcomings of his claim instead of refusing to admit it. 7 . On 2 May 2012 the Administrative Court, referring to the Court of Appeal’s findings (see paragraph 6 above) refused to admit (returned) the claim. The applicant filed an appeal. 8 . At the same time, on 1 June 2012 the applicant filed an amended claim, raising the same arguments (see paragraph 4 above). 9 . On 8 June 2012 the Administrative Court refused to admit the amended claim finding that the applicant had failed to correct the shortcomings of his initial claim. The applicant appealed against that decision as well. 10 . On 11 July 2012 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 2 May 2012 (see paragraph 7 above). It found that the applicant had failed to comply with the main requirement of Article 135 of the CAP in that he had failed to indicate any legal act of higher legal force with which the contested Decree was allegedly incompatible. In so far as the applicant had referred to the Constitution and the Convention, the appellate court noted that disputes on the constitutionality of Government decrees were within the competence of the Constitutional Court while Article 135 of the CAP concerned only domestic law and not international treaties, including the Convention. 11 . On 23 July 2012 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 8 June 2012 on the same grounds namely that the applicant had failed to correct the shortcomings of his claim (see paragraph 9 above). 12 . The applicant’s appeals on points of law against the decisions of 11 and 23 July 2012 (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above) were declared inadmissible for lack of merit by the Court of Cassation in its decisions of 8 and 22 August 2012 respectively. The decision of 22 August 2012 was served on the applicant on 5 September 2012. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of lack of access to a court to contest the Decree whereby he had been deprived of his land and of the resultant breach of his property rights.

P1-1

The application concerns the delayed provision of compensation to the applicant for her property which was expropriated for urban development in 1984 by the municipal authorities of Dobrich. Тhe applicant was to be compensated with a flat in a building the authorities intended to construct. Construction work commenced in 2010; however, in 2014 this was postponed, apparently mainly due to financial difficulties experienced by the municipality. In November 2019 the construction work started again and, according to the Government, the building was expected to be completed by 30 July 2022. The applicant had not received her flat or any alternative compensation by the time the parties filed their last submissions with the Court in June 2022. The applicant complainеd under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention of the delays in the compensation procedure.

6

On 30 October 2015 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court ( Landesgericht für Strafsachen ) convicted the applicant of drug offences. It found that he had been unlawfully incited to commit the offences by a police informant ( bei der Polizei registrierte Vertrauensperson ) whose actions could be attributed to the criminal police, and, as a consequence, reduced his prison sentence by six months. 2 . In a plea of nullity to the Supreme Court based on Article 281 § 9b of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (see paragraph 7 below), the applicant relied on the Court’s case-law and argued that mitigation of sentence was not sufficient under Article 6 of the Convention to remedy unlawful State incitement. On 14 July 2016 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s plea of nullity on admissibility grounds. It confirmed that there had been unlawful State incitement but argued that the applicant should have based his plea of nullity on Article 281 § 4 (see paragraph 5 below) rather than on Article 281 § 9b of the CCP. According to the Supreme Court, there was no legal basis to support his argument that unlawful State incitement constituted a bar to criminal prosecution ( Verfolgungshindernis ). Article 133 § 5 of the CCP, which provided for a bar to criminal prosecution in cases of unlawful incitement and had entered into force on 1 June 2016, was not applicable to the applicant’s case since the regional court had rendered its judgment before that date. Therefore, there was no legal basis for a plea of nullity based on Article 281 § 9b of the CCP. The applicant had failed to raise his concern about the incitement during the oral hearing and he had not asked the regional court to refrain from using evidence obtained by means of the undercover police investigations which would have been necessary in order for him to rely on Article 281 § 4 of the CCP in his plea of nullity. Following an appeal by the applicant against his sentence, the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence by further nine months, thus in total by fifteen months. In his application to the Court the applicant complained that he had been incited to commit a criminal offence, in breach of his right to a fair trial, and that in the light of the Court’s judgment in the case of Furcht <COUNTRY> (no. 54648/09, 23 October 2014), the mitigation of his sentence did not constitute sufficient redress for the breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

Germany

8

Child custody proceedings 1 . On 8 July 1999 the applicant filed for dissolution of her marriage with K.T. and sole custody of their two children (a boy, , born on 23 October 1996, and a girl, R., born on 7 July 1998). On 21 February 2001 the Sombor Municipal Court granted her claims. On 18 November 2002 and 8 October 2003 that judgment was upheld by the Sombor District Court and the Supreme Court respectively. The judgment was not enforced and continued to live with K.T. 2 . On 19 February 2003 K.T. asked for revision of the judgment of 21 February 2001, seeking sole custody of On 23 February 2004 the Municipal Court stayed the enforcement of the judgment of 21 February 2001 pending the outcome of the proceedings. On 19 February 2008 the Municipal Court granted K.T.’s claims. The court awarded sole custody of to K.T. and granted contact rights to the applicant. The applicant appealed. On 16 May 2008 the District Court quashed the judgment of 19 February 2008 in the part concerning the custody of , noting, inter alia , that the Municipal Court had failed (i) to determine which party had better capacity to have custody of and (ii) to take into account where his best interests lay. 6 . On 2 December 2008 the Municipal Court again granted sole custody of to K.T., referring to the former’s wish to stay with his father and to the experts’ opinion that granting custody to K.T. was in ’s best interests. The subsequent appeals lodged by the applicant were to no avail. The final decision on the matter was taken by the Supreme Court on 2 September 2009. On 11 June 2009 the Municipal Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 21 February 2001. The applicant’s contact with 8 . According to the judgment of 2 December 2008, on several occasions prior to 10 March 2005, the applicant’s contact with lasted no more than two to three hours. She could see her son several times a year. In addition to that, on 17 and 24 December 2005, between 26 and 31 December 2005, between 5 and 13 January 2006 and on 7 January 2008 stayed overnight in the applicant’s house, having obtained K.T.’s consent. Thereafter, visited the applicant only once, in August 2009. According to the Government, the applicant worked as a secretary at the school which attended and was able to see her son on a daily basis. criminal Proceedings against K.T. 10 . On 22 December 2005 the Municipal Court found K.T. guilty of child abduction in respect of , as regards the period between 18 November 2002 and 22 December 2005, and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. His conviction became final on 28 March 2006. application to the constitutional court On 6 November 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court of <COUNTRY>. She sought redress for: (i) non-enforcement of the judgment of 2001; (ii) the excessive length of the two sets of custody proceedings; and (iii) the State’s failure to ensure her contact with and enable her to exercise her parental rights between 1998 and 2009. 12 . On 14 July 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint about the length and fairness of the custody proceedings as being manifestly ill-founded and dismissed the complaint about the allegedly excessive length of the first set of custody proceedings, taken together with the ensuing enforcement proceedings, as out of time. It further summarily dismissed the applicant’s complaint of a violation of her parental rights, as “she had failed to submit constitutional reasons to claim a breach of those rights”.

Serbia

P1-1

On 22 July 2008 the police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicants, mother and daughter originally from Russia, on account of human trafficking. They were suspected of having had brought to <COUNTRY> a number of young women from Russia who were then exploited as strippers in various nightclubs in <COUNTRY>. 2 . The following property was seized from them: two computers, a semi-basement in Yerevan purchased by the first applicant, her deposit of 12,500,000 Armenian Drams (AMD) in an Armenian bank, AMD 1,150,000 in cash, 3 US Dollar banknotes, 5 Iranian Rial banknotes of 10,000, two gold necklaces, gold earrings, AMD 15,530 and 129 Russian Rubles in cash. The second applicant’s deposit of AMD 6,500,000 in an Armenian bank and 110 pieces of jewellery kept in a safe deposit box at another bank in <COUNTRY> were also seized. All this property was admitted as material evidence. 3 . During the trial before the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (the District Court), the prosecution charged the applicants with aggravated human trafficking and money laundering in line with the amended Criminal Code (“the CC”). 4 . The first applicant testified that she had received income from her business in Russia and while working as a manager in a club in <COUNTRY>, and the second applicant testified, inter alia , that she had worked in nightclubs with the same conditions as the other girls and that she had earned more than the others. As with other girls, clients had given her jewellery as gifts; she had bought some of the jewellery with the money that she had earned, and some of the jewellery had been left from her grandmother. 5 . On 3 October 2011 the District Court convicted the first and second applicants of aggravated human trafficking (see paragraph 14 below), sentencing them to 9 and 7 years’ imprisonment respectively, and acquitted them of money laundering. It found it established that 24 young women had been trafficked from Russia to <COUNTRY> and exploited in nightclubs and the money they earned had been taken away. As concerns the charges of money laundering, the prosecution had failed to substantiate that the applicants had had the intention of concealing the proceeds of their criminal activity - they had acquired property and made bank deposits in their own name meaning that they had engaged in criminal activity in order to obtain those profits and use them. However, the prosecution had failed to find out and clarify which sums and assets referred to in the indictment had been obtained through criminal activity and which ones had been acquired legally. 6 . The District Court left the civil claim for damages filed by 7 victims unexamined on the grounds that it had been impossible to determine the actual damage suffered by them, stating that they had the possibility of claiming damages in separate civil proceedings after the trial. It decided that the two computers, the money and jewellery seized from the first applicant should be returned to her and that the seizure of her bank deposit and her immovable property should be lifted. The seizure of the second applicant’s bank deposit and jewellery should also be lifted. The applicants lodged appeals seeking full acquittal. 8 . The prosecution appealed as well seeking the applicants’ conviction also on account of money laundering with confiscation of their property. They also requested for the material evidence to be treated in accordance with the requirements of Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the CCP) (see paragraph 16 below), arguing that the applicants had failed to explain the origin of the property admitted into material evidence. Therefore, that property had been obtained by the income received from the exploitation of the victims (their earnings) and should be returned to them pursuant to Article 119 of the CCP (ibid.). 9 . On 26 January 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal (the Court of Appeal) rejected both appeals as regards the applicants’ conviction and sentences and granted the prosecution’s appeal in its part concerning the treatment of material evidence deciding that the seized material evidence in its entirety should be transferred into State ownership, reasoning as follows: “The Court of Appeal, having examined the [prosecution’s] reasoning with regard to the treatment of material evidence, came to the conclusion that the appeal should be granted in that part on the basis of Articles 115 and 119 of [the CCP, see paragraphs 15 and 16 below].” 10 . The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They argued, inter alia , that the Court of Appeal had provided no reasons for amending the District Court’s decision concerning the treatment of material evidence. The prosecution had never requested the transfer of the property to the State’s possession. They had thus been arbitrarily deprived of everything they had owned. The prosecution also appealed. 12 . On 30 March 2012 the Court of Cassation declared both appeals on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit. The applicants complained that the confiscation of their property was in breach of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. relevant legal framework Criminal code (in force until 1 July 2022) 14 . At the relevant time Article 132 § 2 (1) and (2) provided that human trafficking or exploitation of two or more persons committed by prior agreement by a group of persons was punishable by 7 to 12 years’ imprisonment with or without confiscation of property, and with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or conduct certain activities for a maximum period of 3 years. Code of criminal procedure (in force until 1 July 2022) 15 . Article 115 provided at the relevant time that material evidence included , inter alia , objects of criminal activity as well as illegally obtained money. 16 . Article 119 set out the rules concerning the treatment of material evidence upon completion of the criminal proceedings. According to Article 119 § 1(1) and (2) instruments of a crime were seized and transferred to relevant State agencies or destroyed if they did not have any value. Items of no value were destroyed or given to those interested upon their request. Article 119 § 1(3) stated that money, other valuables and other items, which had gone out of legal possession as a result of a crime, were given to the owners or their successors. Article 119 § 1(4) stated that illegally obtained money, other valuables and other items were, by a court judgment, directed towards compensation of judicial costs, damages suffered as a result of a crime and, if the person who had suffered damage was not known, were transferred to the State as income.

Armenia

6

The application concerns the fairness of criminal proceedings in which the applicant’s guilt was allegedly determined solely on the basis of “a flawed identification offered by the victim personally”. 2 . On 26 July 2010 Ms K.K. complained to the Kovačica police station that two Romani women had stolen money from her house. From photographs shown to her, those being photographs of the applicant only, she identified the applicant as a person whom she saw at the exit gate coming out of the yard, before she had discovered the theft. The police prepared an official note ( službena beleška ) in this respect. 3 . On 4 November 2010 the investigating judge issued a decision whereby this official note was excluded from the case file. On 25 November 2010 the applicant was charged with aggravated theft. 5 . On 12 January 2012 the first-instance court opened the trial. It heard the applicant, who maintained that she had never been in the village, contrary to the claims of Ms K.K. She could not explain how the victim had recognised her. The court questioned Ms K.K., who reiterated her previous statements regarding the incident and identified the applicant as the person she had seen at the exit gate coming out of her yard on the day when the money had been stolen from her. The court heard several other witnesses, all Ms K.K.’s neighbours. Most of them had not seen anyone in front of her house. They could only testify that they had seen a “suspicious car” in their village on the day in question, but they could not agree on the colour of the car or the direction it had come from. Only one witness stated that he had seen two women in front of Ms K.K.’s house, but he did not identify the applicant as one of them. 6 . On 24 September 2012 the court of first instance found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced her to one year’s imprisonment. The court stated that it had established the decisive facts concerning the time, place and manner of the commission of the offence on the basis of the statements given by Ms K.K. and the other witnesses, as well as the written documentation. The court found Ms K.K.’s statement credible, while dismissing the applicant’s version of the events as an attempt to avoid criminal liability and contradictory to Ms K.K.’s statement. 7 . On 8 October 2013 the Novi Sad Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment and made a distinction between the identification procedure under Article 104 and a witness statement given at the main trial, stating that no identification procedure under Article 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been carried out in the case at hand but that Ms K.K. had been able to see the applicant in the courtroom and to identify her as the person who had been in her yard on the day in question. On 18 December 2013 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. On 25 March 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s subsequent constitutional appeal. The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the fairness of the criminal proceedings in which she was found guilty of aggravated theft and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment based solely on evidence obtained through an identification which had itself been carried out in breach of the requirements of the Serbian Code of Criminal Procedure.

P1-1

After , father of the first and second applicants and husband of the third applicant (he passed away in 1997), had initiated restitution proceedings claiming a plot of agricultural land, in 1994 the local land commission informed him that restitution in kind was impossible and that he was entitled to compensation. In 2001 and 2011 the land commission took decisions concerning the compensation due. In a new decision issued on 28 June 2012 it refused once again restitution in kind. The applicants challenged this latter decision and it was quashed on 8 January 2013 by the Blagoevgrad District Court, which ordered restitution, holding that there were no impediments to it, and no grounds for the award of compensation. 2 . As a matter of fact, however, in 1986 a sports complex had been constructed on the plot claimed by the applicants, and in 2006 the State had transferred the land to a private company. In September 2013 an official of the Cadastre Agency refused to register the applicants as the plot’s owners, referring to an objection by the company which had referred to its own ownership claims. The applicants have thus been unable to enter into possession of the land but have not brought proceedings against the company to defend their alleged title to property. There have been no relevant developments after 2013. The applicants complained, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, of the excessive duration of the restitution proceedings.

2

The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association “21 December 1989” and Others <COUNTRY> (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12 ‑ 41, 24 May 2011) and Moroșanu and Others <COUNTRY> ([Committee], nos. 84271/17 and 4 others, §§ 4-11, 16 March 2021). 2 . The applicants’ close relatives were killed by gunfire during demonstrations in Brașov, Bucharest, Buzău and Constanța; those events took place in December 1989 and led to the fall of the communist regime. The applicants complained that the domestic authorities had not carried out an effective investigation within a reasonable time into the events of December 1989. They relied on Article 2 of the Convention. In 1990 the military prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice opened investigations, of its own motion, into the deaths of the applicants’ close relatives and of other participants in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was registered under file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). 4 . Between 1990 and 2007 the prosecutor decided, in different sets of proceedings concerning the applicants’ relatives, not to open an investigation, to discontinue the proceedings or to join the proceedings to the main criminal investigation. Their cases were all examined in the main criminal investigation, and the applicants brought civil claims. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12 ‑ 41) and in Moroșanu and Others (cited above, §§ 8-11). On 5 April 2019 the military prosecutor’s office sent for trial several individuals (namely a former Romanian president, a former Romanian prime minister and a former commander of the Romanian air force) for crimes against humanity, and discontinued the investigation with regard to various other individuals for a range of reasons which prevented the continuation of criminal proceedings (some of the charges were res judicatae , some of the suspects had died and some of the facts which had been investigated could not be classified as criminal offences). On 9 October 2020 the Preliminary Chamber of the High Court of Cassation and Justice ordered the return of the file to the military prosecutor’s office owing to irregularities found in the indictment. On 4 February 2021 the military prosecutor’s office recommenced proceedings after correcting the indictment. On the date of the latest information available to the Court (submitted by the Government on 14 April 2021), the proceedings were pending before the Preliminary Chamber of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. The legal provisions relevant to the criminal proceedings instituted in connection with the events of December 1989 are set out in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 95-100).

Romania

2

The applicant is the mother of S. Manukyan who died at the age of 19 during his compulsory military service. 2 . On 10 November 2009, when S. Manukyan was on duty in the sentry post, an argument started between him and Chief Lieutenant G., the platoon commander, when the latter insulted and punched S. Manukyan a number of times. Later that day, G.A., the commander of the military unit, punched S. Manukyan in the face because he had been late opening the gates for G.A.’s car. About ten minutes later S. Manukyan was found dead with a gunshot wound to the head. During the examination of the scene of the incident on the same day, traces of blood were found at a distance of about sixteen metres from the body. 3 . Criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 110 of the Criminal Code (incitement to suicide). The investigation concluded that S. Manukyan had committed suicide using his service gun. It was established that on 14 May 2009 S. Manukyan had already tried to commit suicide after G. had humiliated, verbally abused and punched him. G. had then ordered the other soldiers not to tell anyone about what had happened. The next day Captain S., the commander of the tank company, learnt about the incident but did not report it. 4 . According to an autopsy report, the cause of S. Manukyan’s death was a perforating ballistic trauma to the head. A number of other injuries were discovered on the body, such as a bruise on the left side of the chin and abrasions in the areas of the left glenohumeral joint, the right scapula, the right radiocarpal joint and the fifth digit of the right hand. During questioning, the forensic medical expert stated that it could not be ruled out that the bruise on the left side of the chin had been inflicted when G.A. had punched S. Manukyan. According to the ballistic report, no identifiable fingerprints were found on S. Manukyan’s service gun or on the bullets. An initial psychiatric and psychological post-mortem examination concluded that S. Manukyan had suffered extreme mental stress before committing suicide. G.’s actions had significantly affected S. Manukyan’s psychological condition and it could be assumed that there had been a causal link between them. The information available was not sufficient to conclude whether there had been a causal link between S. Manukyan’s psychological condition before the suicide and the actions of G.A. or to determine precisely whose actions had caused S. Manukyan to commit suicide. An additional psychological post-mortem examination concluded that S. Manukyan had committed suicide as a result of extreme emotional stress initially caused by G.’s unlawful actions and then exacerbated by the unlawful actions of G.A. The forensic examination of the blood samples, which had been discovered at a distance of about sixteen metres from the body (see paragraph 2 above), confirmed that they were of the same blood type as that of S. Manukyan, so they could have come from him. 5 . In April 2010 G. was charged with abuse of power for having provoked extremely intense psychological stress, causing S. Manukyan to commit suicide. G. was also charged for having physically abused another soldier several times in September 2009. S. was charged with abuse of power for not having informed the superior military command about the incident of 14 May 2009 out of fear of being reprimanded and for the lack of discipline and the unstable mental state of the conscripts in the unit under his leadership. 6 . In June 2010 G.A. was charged with abuse of power for not having reported the incidents of physical abuse of soldiers by G. and having issued unlawful orders to soldiers to open the gate of the sentry point without the permission of the sentry post leader or without the latter accompanying them. G.A. was also charged with punching S. Manukyan on 10 November 2009, which had not caused severe damage to his health, but had brought about a grave consequence, in that several minutes afterwards, S. Manukyan had committed suicide. G.A. was released on bail, after which he was dismissed from the post of commander of the military unit and moved to another position. Later, the investigator decided to suspend G.A.’s service on the basis of evidence that he had used his official capacity to exert undue influence on the participants in the proceedings. During the trial, which started in July 2010, the applicant lodged several requests seeking to have G.A. detained. Eventually the Syunik Regional Court placed G.A. under detention on 3 December 2010. 7 . By a judgment of 20 December 2010, which was fully upheld on appeal, the Regional Court found G., S. and G.A. guilty as charged (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) and sentenced them to imprisonment for six, two and seven years respectively. S. was exempted from serving his sentence following the application of an amnesty. Relying on Articles 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the death of her son during military service and that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the matter. She alleged that her son had been murdered.

10

The case concerns the defamation proceedings against the applicant and raises an issue under Article 10 of the Convention. In March 2010 criminal proceedings were instituted against the mayor of Lernapat village, Y., who was charged with embezzlement, abuse of authority and official falsification, on the basis of collective complaints by more than 250 villagers. In the course of the investigation a number of villagers alleged, inter alia , that Y. had granted financial aid to his relatives; had exempted the latter from paying property tax; and had paid for his publications from the local budget. On 21 December 2011 the charges against Y. were dropped. 3 . On 1 September 2010 article was published in a local newspaper featuring interviews with residents of Lernapat, including the applicant, critical of the mayor. The applicant’s statements, in so far as relevant, read as follows: “... The mayor himself allocated to my elder son a plot to build a house on, but asked for 500 dollars ... Then again he brought a complaint to the court saying that this was an illegal construction. We did not pay those 500 dollars since we knew what kind of a man he was. We thought we would try everything first and only then [statement A] ... I applied to the mayor many times when my grandchild was near death. Instead of 50,000 [Armenian drams (AMD)] he lent me [AMD] 15,000, but later – because of being short of money – wrote that I owed [AMD] 50,000. I am cancelling the [AMD] 15,000 he said. The other day I called my daughter-in-law and said: ‘My child, there is [a sum of financial aid]in your name as well’, and she said: ‘But, dad, I have not received any money’ [statement B]. There is [AMD] 50,000 [of financial aid] in my name, [another] [AMD] 50,000 on my son’s name, and also on my other son’s name, to whom he did not give anything at all, because he is a friend; he said: ‘Hovo, dear, bring that [AMD] 50,000, I need to buy petrol, I have expenses and I am in need’, but what need... He is always oppressing us. You go to get some paper from him; he is always rude to you, saying: ‘Go away. These are not my working hours’. You never know when his working hours are. If I lose my mind a little, I will just slaughter [(կսատկացնեմ)] him [statement C] . You cannot test someone’s patience forever ... We constantly live in an atmosphere of fear... He did not even allow us to sow wheat [statement D] . He said: ‘What do you need it for? Grow grass and sell it’...” ... “...By the way, according to Mitichyan, the mayor had hid and would not give the documents of [his son’s] house [statement E] ...” 4 . The mayor instituted civil proceedings against the applicant for defamation and insult, with respect to some of his statements (identified under letters A to E in paragraph 3 above). He submitted, among other things, a document that the alleged financial aid had been extended not to the applicant’s daughter-in-law but to another village resident having the same name and surname as her. The mayor also submitted certificates issued by himself that he had never allocated land to the applicant or his sons and had never brought a complaint against any of them with respect to the purported land allocation. Rather, the applicant’s son’s property had been recognised as illegal construction and only later bought back from the community. 5 . The applicant, relying on Article 10 of the Convention, objected to the mayor’s claim and submitted that as a local politician he should have displayed greater tolerance towards his criticism voiced in respect of his professional activities and following institution of a criminal case against him on charges of abuse of office. The applicant explained to the court that he had used the word “slaughter” to express his indignation with the mayor. He had further clarified that by statement A, the applicant had meant that the mayor had requested USD 500 to regularise his illegal construction, which the applicant had refused. 6 . The domestic courts, relying on the material submitted by the mayor, allowed partly his claim, holding that statements A and B had been defamatory because they were statements of fact tarnishing the mayor’s honour and dignity and which the applicant had failed to substantiate with any evidence. As regards statement C, it was considered an insult because the word “slaughter” was not to be used in respect of humans, and did not pursue any paramount public interest. It further transpires from the appeal court judgment that the remaining statements were considered neither defamation nor an insult. The applicant was ordered to apologise publicly for the insult and retract the defamatory statements through declarations to be published in the same newspaper, as well as to pay a total of AMD 60,000, about 110 euros (EUR) at the material time, in damages. As to the criminal case instituted against the mayor, the first-instance court noted that one should be presumed innocent until found guilty by a final court judgment, while the appeal court found that the allegations of misconduct by the mayor had had no relevance to the plaintiff’s civil claim. In reply to the applicant’s argument about his right to criticise the mayor, the domestic courts held that such a right could be restricted for the protection of reputation and rights of others.

8, 8

Mr. Jeffrey Dudgeon, who is 35 years of age, is a shipping clerk resident in Belfast, Northern <COUNTRY>. Mr. Dudgeon is a homosexual and his complaints are directed primarily against the existence in Northern <COUNTRY> of laws which have the effect of making certain homosexual acts between consenting adult males criminal offences. A. The relevant law in Northern <COUNTRY> The relevant provisions currently in force in Northern <COUNTRY> are contained in the Offences against the Person Act 1861 ("the 1861 Act"), the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 ("the 1855 Act") and the common law. Under sections 61 and 62 of the 1861 Act, committing and attempting to commit buggery are made offences punishable with maximum sentences of life imprisonment and ten years’ imprisonment, respectively. Buggery consists of sexual intercourse per anum by a man with a man or a woman, or per anum or per vaginam by a man or a woman with an animal. By section 11 of the 1885 Act, it is an offence, punishable with a maximum of two years’ imprisonment, for any male person, in public or in private, to commit an act of "gross indecency" with another male. "Gross indecency" is not statutorily defined but relates to any act involving sexual indecency between male persons; according to the evidence submitted to the Wolfenden Committee (see paragraph 17 below), it usually takes the form of mutual masturbation, inter-crural contact or oral-genital contact. At common law, an attempt to commit an offence is itself an offence and, accordingly, it is an offence to attempt to commit an act proscribed by section 11 of the 1885 Act. An attempt is in theory punishable in Northern <COUNTRY> by an unlimited sentence (but as to this, see paragraph 31 below). Consent is no defence to any of these offences and no distinction regarding age is made in the text of the Acts. An account of how the law is applied in practice is given below at paragraphs 29 to Acts of homosexuality between females are not, and have never been, criminal offences, although the offence of indecent assault may be committed by one woman on another under the age of As regards heterosexual relations, it is an offence, subject to certain exceptions, for a man to have sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of Until 1950 the age of consent of a girl to sexual intercourse was 16 in both England and Wales and in Northern <COUNTRY>, but by legislation introduced in that year the age of consent was increased to 17 in Northern <COUNTRY>. While in relation to the corresponding offence in England and Wales it is a defence for a man under the age of 24 to show that he believed with reasonable cause the girl to be over 16 years of age, no such defence is available under Northern <COUNTRY> law. B. The law and reform of the law in the rest of the <COUNTRY> The 1861 and 1885 Acts were passed by the <COUNTRY> Parliament. When enacted, they applied to England and Wales, to all <COUNTRY>, then unpartitioned and an integral part of the <COUNTRY>, and also, in the case of the 1885 Act, to Scotland. England and Wales In England and Wales the current law on male homosexual acts is contained in the Sexual Offences Act 1956 ("the 1956 Act") as amended by the Sexual Offences Act 1967 ("the 1967 Act"). The 1956 Act, an Act consolidating the existing statute law, made it an offence for any person to commit buggery with another person or an animal (section 12) and an offence for a man to commit an act of "gross indecency" with another man (section 13). The 1967 Act, which was introduced into Parliament as a Private Member’s Bill, was passed to give effect to the recommendations concerning homosexuality made in 1957 in the report of the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution established under the chairmanship of Sir John Wolfenden (the "Wolfenden Committee" and "Wolfenden report"). The Wolfenden Committee regarded the function of the criminal law in this field as "to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those who are specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special physical, official, or economic dependence", but not "to intervene in the private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of behaviour, further than is necessary to carry out the purposes we have outlined". The Wolfenden Committee concluded that homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in private was part of the "realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s business" and should no longer be criminal. The 1967 Act qualified sections 12 and 13 of the 1956 Act by providing that, subject to certain exceptions concerning mental patients, members of the armed forces and merchant seamen, buggery and acts of gross indecency in private between consenting males aged 21 years or over should not be criminal offences. It remains a crime to commit a homosexual act, of the kind referred to in these sections, with a person aged less than 21 in any circumstances. The age of majority for certain purposes, including capacity to marry without parental consent and to enter into contractual relations, was reduced from 21 to 18 by the Family Law Reform Act 1969. The voting age and the minimum age for jury service were likewise reduced to 18 by the Representation of the People Act 1969 and the Criminal Justice Act 1972, respectively. In 1977, the House of Lords rejected a Bill aimed at reducing the age of consent for private homosexual act to Subsequently, in a report published in April 1981, a committee established by the Home Office, namely the Policy Advisory Committee on Sexual Offences, recommended that the minimum age for homosexual relations between males should be reduced to A minority of five members favoured a reduction to Scotland When the applicant lodged his complaint in 1976, the relevant law applicable was substantially similar to that currently in force in Northern <COUNTRY>. Section 7 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976, a consolidating provision re-enacting section 11 of the 1885 Act, provided for the offence of gross indecency; the offence of sodomy existed at common law. However, successive Lord Advocates had stated in Parliament that their policy was not to prosecute in respect of acts which would not have been punishable if the 1967 Act had applied in Scotland. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 ("the 1980 Act") formally brought Scottish law into line with that of England and Wales. As in the case of the 1967 Act, the change in the law originated in amendments introduced in Parliament by a Private Member. Constitutional position of Northern <COUNTRY> Under an Act of the <COUNTRY> Parliament, the Government of <COUNTRY> Act 1920, a separate Parliament for Northern <COUNTRY> was established with power to legislate on all matters devolved by that Act, including criminal and social law. An executive known as the Government of Northern <COUNTRY> was also established with Ministers responsible for the different areas of the devolved powers. By convention, during the life of the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament (1921-9172) the <COUNTRY> Parliament rarely, if ever, legislated for Northern <COUNTRY> in respect of the devolved matters - in particular social matters - falling within the former Parliament’s legislative competence. In March 1972, the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament was prorogued and Northern <COUNTRY> was made subject to "direct rule" from Westminster (see the judgment of 18 January 1978 in the case of <COUNTRY> the <COUNTRY>, Series A no. 25, pp. 10 and 20-21, par. 19 and 49). Since that date, except for a period of five months in 1974 when certain legislative and executive powers were devolved to a Northern <COUNTRY> Assembly and Executive, legislation for Northern <COUNTRY> in all fields has been the responsibility of the <COUNTRY> Parliament. There are 12 members of the <COUNTRY> House of Commons, out of a total of 635, who represent constituencies in Northern <COUNTRY>. Under the provisions currently in force, power is conferred on Her Majesty to legislate for Northern <COUNTRY> by Order in Council. Save where there are reasons of urgency, no recommendation may be made to Her Majesty to make an Order in Council under these provisions unless a draft of the Order has been approved by each House of Parliament. It is the responsibility of the Government to prepare a draft Order and to lay it before Parliament for approval. A draft can only be approved or rejected in toto by Parliament, but not amended. The function of the Queen in Council in making an Order once it has been approved by Parliament is purely formal. In practice, much legislation for Northern <COUNTRY> is effected in this form rather than by means of an Act of Parliament. Proposals for reform in Northern <COUNTRY> No measures comparable to the 1967 Act were ever introduced into the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament either by the Government of Northern <COUNTRY> or by any Private Member. In July 1976, following the failure of the Northern <COUNTRY> Constitutional Convention to work out a satisfactory form of devolved government for Northern <COUNTRY>, the then Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY> announced in Parliament that the <COUNTRY> Government would thenceforth by looking closely at the need for legislation in fields which it had previously been thought appropriate to leave to a future devolved government, in particular with a view to bringing Northern <COUNTRY> law more closely into harmony with laws in other parts of the country. He cited homosexuality and divorce as possible areas for action. However, recognising the difficulties about such subjects in Northern <COUNTRY>, he indicated that he would welcome the views of the local people, including those of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights ("the Advisory Commission") and of Members of Parliament representing Northern <COUNTRY> constituencies. The Advisory Commission, which is an independent statutory body, was accordingly invited to consider the matter. As regards homosexual offences, the Advisory Commission received evidence from a number of persons and organisations, religious and secular. No representations were made by the Roman Catholic Church in Northern <COUNTRY> or by any of the 12 Northern <COUNTRY> Members of the <COUNTRY> House of Commons. The Advisory Commission published its report in April 1977. The Advisory Commission concluded that most people did not regard it as satisfactory to retain the existing differences in the law with regard to homosexuality and that few only would be strongly opposed to changes bringing Northern <COUNTRY> law into conformity with that in England and Wales. On the other hand, it did not consider that there would be support for legislation which went further, in particular by lowering the age of consent. Its recommendations were that the law of Northern <COUNTRY> should be brought into line with the 1967 Act, but that future amendments to the 1967 Act should not automatically apply to Northern <COUNTRY>. On 27 July 1978, the Government published a proposal for a draft Homosexual Offences (Northern <COUNTRY>) Order 1978, the effect of which would have been to bring Northern <COUNTRY> law on the matter broadly into line with that of England and Wales. In particular, homosexual acts in private between two consenting male adults over the age of 21 would no longer have been punishable. In a foreword to the proposal, the responsible Minister stated that "the Government had always recognised that homosexuality is an issue about which some people in Northern <COUNTRY> hold strong conscientious or religious opinions". He summarised the main arguments for and against reform as follows: "In brief, there are two differing viewpoints. One, based on an interpretation of religious principles, holds that homosexual acts under any circumstances are immoral and that the criminal law should be used, by treating them as crimes, to enforce moral behaviour. The other view distinguishes between, on the one hand that area of private morality within which a homosexual individual can (as a matter of civil liberty) exercise his private right of conscience and, on the other hand, the area of public concern where the State ought and must use the law for the protection of society and in particular for the protection of children, those who are mentally retarded and others who are incapable of valid personal consent. I have during my discussions with religious and other groups heard both these viewpoints expressed with sincerity and I understand the convictions that underlie both points of view. There are in addition other considerations which must be taken into account. For example it has been pointed out that the present law is difficult to enforce, that fear of exposure can make a homosexual particularly vulnerable to blackmail and that this fear of exposure can cause unhappiness not only for the homosexual himself but also for his family and friends. While recognising these differing viewpoints I believe we should not overlook the common ground. Most people will agree that the young must be given special protection; and most people will also agree that law should be capable of being enforced. Moreover those who are against reform have compassion and respect for individual rights just as much as those in favour of reform have concern for the welfare of society. For the individuals in society, as for Government, there is thus a difficult balance of judgment to be arrived at." Public comment on the proposed amendment to the law was invited. The numerous comments received by the Government in response to their invitation, during and after the formal period of consultation, revealed a substantial division of opinion. On a simple count of heads, there was a large majority of individuals and institutions against the proposal for a draft Order. Those opposed to reform included a number of senior judges, District Councils, Orange Lodges and other organisations, generally of a religious character and in some cases engaged in youth activities. A petition to "Save Ulster from Sodomy" organised by the Democratic Unionist Party led by Mr. Ian Paisley, a Member of the <COUNTRY> House of Commons, collected nearly 000 signatures. The strongest opposition came from certain religious groups. In particular, the Roman Catholic Bishops saw the proposal as an invitation to Northern Irish society to change radically its moral code in a manner liable to bring about more serious problems than anything attributable to the present law. The Roman Catholic Bishops argued that such a change in the law would lead to a further decline in moral standards and to a climate of moral laxity which would endanger and put undesirable pressures on those most vulnerable, namely the young. Similarly, the Presbyterian Church in <COUNTRY>, whilst understanding the arguments for the change, made the point that the removal from the purview of the criminal law of private homosexual acts between consenting adult males might be taken by the public as an implicit licence if not approval for such practices and as a change in public policy towards a further relaxation of moral standards. The strongest support for change came from organisations representing homosexuals and social work agencies. They claimed that the existing law was unnecessary and that it created hardship and distress for a substantial minority of persons affected by it. It was urged that the sphere of morality should be kept distinct from that of the criminal law and that considerations of the personal freedom of the individual should in such matters be paramount. For its part, the Standing Committee of the General Synod of the Church of <COUNTRY> accepted that homosexual acts in private between consenting adults aged 21 and over should be removed from the realm of criminal offence, but in amplification commented that this did not mean that the Church considered homosexuality to be an acceptable norm. Press reports indicated that most of the political formations had expressed favourable views. However, none of the 12 Northern <COUNTRY> Members of Parliament publicly supported the proposed reform and several of them openly opposed it. An opinion poll conducted in Northern <COUNTRY> in January 1978 indicated that the people interviewed were evenly divided on the global question of the desirability of reforming the law on divorce and homosexuality so as to bring it into line with that of England and Wales. On 2 July 1979, the then Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY>, in announcing to Parliament that the Government did not intend to pursue the proposed reform, stated: "Consultation showed that strong views are held in Northern <COUNTRY>, both for and against in the existing law. Although it is not possible to say with certainty what is the feeling of the majority of people in the province, it is clear that is substantial body of opinion there (embracing a wide range of religious as well as political opinion) is opposed to the proposed change ... [T]he Government have [also] taken into account ... the fact that legislation on an issue such as the one dealt with in the draft order has traditionally been a matter for the initiative of a Private Member rather than for Government. At present, therefore, the Government propose to take no further action ..., but we would be prepared to reconsider the matter if there were any developments in the future which were relevant." In its annual report for 1979-1980, the Advisory Commission reiterated its view that law should be reformed. It believed that there was a danger that the volume of opposition might be exaggerated. Since the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament was prorogued in 1972 (see paragraph 20 above), there has been no initiative of any kind for legislation to amend the 1861 and 1885 Acts from any of the mainstream political organisations or movements in Northern <COUNTRY>. E. Enforcement of the law in Northern <COUNTRY> In accordance with the general law, anyone, including a private person, may bring a prosecution for a homosexual offence, subject to the Director of Public Prosecutions’ power to assume the conduct of the proceedings and, if he thinks fit, discontinue them. The evidence as to prosecutions for homosexual offences between 1972 and 1981 reveals that none has been brought by a private person during that time. During the period from January 1972 to October 1980 there were 62 prosecutions for homosexual offences in Northern <COUNTRY>. The large majority of these cases involved minors that is persons under 18; a few involved persons aged 18 to 21 or mental patients or prisoners. So far as the Government are aware from investigation of the records, no one was prosecuted in Northern <COUNTRY> during the period in question for an act which would clearly not have been an offence if committed in England or Wales. There is, however, no stated policy not to prosecute in respect of such acts. As was explained to the Court by the Government, instructions operative within the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions reserve the decision on whether to prosecute in each individual case to the Director personally, in consultation with the Attorney General, the sole criterion being whether, on all the facts and circumstances of that case, a prosecution would be in the public interest. According to the Government, the maximum sentences prescribed by the 1861 and 1885 Acts are appropriate only for the most grave instances of the relevant offence and in practice no court would ever contemplate imposing the maximum sentence for offences committed between consenting parties, whether in private or in public. Furthermore, although liable to an unlimited sentence, a man convicted of an attempt to commit gross indecency would in practice never receive a sentence greater than that appropriate if the offence had been completed; in general, the sentence would be significantly less. In all cases of homosexual offences the actual penalty imposed will depend on the particular circumstances. F. The personal circumstances of the applicant The applicant has, on his own evidence, been consciously homosexual from the age of For some time he and others have been conducting a campaign aimed at bringing the law in Northern <COUNTRY> into line with that in force in England and Wales and, if possible, achieving a minimum age of consent lower than 21 years. On 21 January 1976, the police went to Mr. Dudgeon’s address to execute a warrant under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. During the search of the house a quantity of cannabis was found which subsequently led to another person being charged with drug offences. Personal papers, including correspondence and diaries, belonging to the applicant in which were described homosexual activities were also found and seized. As a result, he was asked to go to a police station where for about four and a half hours he was questioned, on the basis of these papers, about his sexual life. The police investigation file was sent to the Director of Prosecutions. It was considered with a view to instituting proceedings for the offence of gross indecency between males. The Director, in consultation with the Attorney General, decided that it would not be in the public interest for proceedings to be brought. Mr. Dudgeon was so informed in February 1977 and his papers, with annotations marked over them, were returned to him.

Ireland, United Kingdom

P1-1

The application concerns the delayed provision of compensation to the applicants for their mother’s property, expropriated in 1991 for urban development by the municipal authorities of Dobrich. The applicants (who succeeded their mother after she passed away on an unspecified date) were to be compensated with a flat in a building the authorities intended to construct. Construction work commenced in 2010; however, in 2014 this was postponed, apparently mainly due to financial difficulties experienced by the municipality. In November 2019 the construction work started again and, according to the Government, the building was expected to be completed by 30 July 2022. The applicants had not received their flat or any alternative compensation by the time the parties filed their last submissions with the Court in June 2022. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention of the delays in the compensation procedure.

P1-1

The case concerns the expropriation of the applicants’ property (for details see Appendix II) and the ensuing judicial proceedings. 2 . On 25 February 2010 “A&M RARE” LLC (“the Company”), which was registered on the same day following its establishment on 5 February 2010, submitted an application to the Government seeking to acquire land in Artavaz rural community in Kotayk Region for the construction of a mineral water plant. 3 . On the same date the Government adopted Decree no. 241-N (“the Decree”) approving the expropriation zones within the administrative boundaries of Artavaz rural community, which included the plots of agricultural land owned by the applicants. The Decree stated that the expropriation was justified by a prevailing public interest in the implementation of the investment project involving the construction of a mineral water plant aimed at ensuring proportionate regional development. According to the Decree, the effective implementation of the project could not be ensured without the expropriation of the given property since the selection of the land had been done considering its layout, position and the presence of fresh mineral water, among other factors. 4 . The Decree entered into force on 10 April 2010. 5 . On 13 July 2010 the Company sent draft contracts on alienation of real estate to applicants Yervand Naltakyan, Yurik Naltakyan, Mekhak Abrahamyan, Khoren Naltakyan, Tsovinar Matevosyan, Margush Badalyan, Lyova Samsonyan, Arturik Arustamyan and Aleksan Tavakalyan, who were either sole owners of their properties or their names appeared first on the ownership certificates of joint properties (owner applicants). Those draft contracts contained compensation offers in line with the market value determined in real estate valuation reports issued in June by Tosp LLC, a private real estate evaluation company hired by the Company. 6 . On 21 December 2010 the Company filed claims with the Kotayk Regional Court (the Regional Court) against the owner applicants based on the valuation and re-evaluation (showing that there had been no change in market value) reports issued by Tosp LLC in June and November 2010 respectively. The Regional Court did not notify the owner applicants about those claims upon the Company’s request on the grounds that there had been certain inaccuracies in the Decree concerning the sizes of the relevant plots of land. 7 . On 10 February 2011 the Government adopted Decree no. 100-N whereby they amended the Decree to state the correct measurements of the applicants’ (except Tsovinar Matevosyan and Ararat Ter-Mkrtchyan) plots of land. 8 . On 18 February 2011the Company filed claims with the Regional Court against owner applicants seeking to acquire their plots of land with payment of compensation. In support of its claims it referred to the Decree, as amended on 10 February 2011, the evaluation and re-evaluation reports of June and November 2010 respectively and certificates issued by Tosp LLC, which indicated the corrected sizes of the given plots of land and contained relevant adjustments in the market price (the amounts had been increased or decreased for some applicants or remained the same for others). 9 . The owner applicants filed written submissions questioning the existence of a public interest in the expropriation by stating that the residents of the given rural community would be deprived of property having vital importance for them in the sense that they would no longer be able to cultivate their land. They further argued that the entire procedure had been arbitrary. In particular, the Company had failed to initiate the expropriation procedure within the three-month time-limit from the entry into force of the Decree (see paragraph 4 above) that is before 10 July 2010 thereby losing the right to acquire their property (Sections 10 and 16 of the Law of 27 November 2006 on Alienation of Property for the needs of Society and the State (“the Law”)). Moreover, instead of supporting its claims by real estate evaluation reports in compliance with the Law on Real Estate Evaluation Activity, the Company had submitted certificates (letters) which could not serve as a lawful basis for the determination of the market value of their property. Even if those certificates indicated the correct sizes of their property, the market value indicated in them had not been based on the correct sizes, considering that no fresh valuation had been carried out after the sizes of their plots of land had been rectified (see paragraph 7 above). 10 . In the course of the proceeding the owner applicants submitted to the Regional Court a written clarification from the State Real Estate Registry in reply to their enquiry, that the certificates in question could not be considered a valuation report for the purposes of Section 11 of the Law on Real Estate Evaluation Activity. 11 . In April 2011 the Regional Court notified the applicants Gurgen Ghazaryan, Hranush Arustamyan, Anahit Naltakyan, Hambardzum Naltakyan, Arkadi Badalyan, Armine Naltakyan, Vardanush Naltakyan, Arshaluys Abrahamyan, Rudolf Abrahamyan Radik Abrahamyan, Nikolay Arustamyan, Levon Arustamyan, Serozh Naltakyan, Naira Naltakyan, Varsenik Naltakyan and Ararat Ter-Mkrtchyan (joint owner applicants) that they had been involved in the proceedings as co-respondents. The joint owner applicants filed similar submissions (see paragraph 9 above). 12 . The Regional Court rejected the applicants’ request to order a forensic expert evaluation of their property on the grounds that Tosp LLC was a licensed real estate evaluator and that the certificates issued subsequently had merely supplemented the evaluation and re-evaluation reports submitted previously. 13 . By 10 judgments delivered on 14 June 2011 the Regional Court authorised the expropriation with the payment of the amounts of compensation offered by the Company with the statutory 15% surplus (see Appendix 2 for details). Relying on Articles 328 and 329 of the Civil Code (calculation of monthly time-limits), the Regional Court found that the Company had respected the relevant time-limits (for sending the contracts and depositing the amounts of compensation) since their last days had fallen on non-working days extending them to the next working day. It also found that the evaluation of the property had been in accordance with the applicable legislation and that the compensation was adequate. 14 . On 14 July 2011 the applicants appealed reiterating their arguments about the Company’s failure to respect the relevant time-limits and the irregularities in the evaluation procedure resulting in inadequate compensation. The joint owner applicants argued that the Company had failed to undertake any action in respect of their shares in the joint ownership. The Regional Court had erred in the interpretation and application of Article 329 of the Civil Code since the rules of private law could not be applicable to a legal relationship involving compulsory deprivation of property for public interest which was regulated by the Law that contained specific rules for the calculation of the time-limits for the actions of the acquirer. 15 . In September and October 2011 the Civil Court of Appeal delivered decisions whereby it fully upheld the Regional Court’s judgments. As regards the joint owner applicants, it relied on Article 198 § 3 of the Civil Code according to which each owner in joint ownership had the right to dispose of the joint property, unless the joint owners had agreed otherwise to conclude that in such cases there was a presumption that all owners had endorsed the agreement entered by one of the owners. The applicants lodged appeals on points of law which were declared inadmissible for lack of merit by the Court of Cassation on 23 November, 7, 14 and 23 December 2011. 17 . In its decision of 24 February 2012 on the constitutionality of Article 198 § 3 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 15 above) the Constitutional Court noted that its application had been far from being certain in judicial practice and stressed the importance of safeguarding the rights of all owners in joint ownership of property noting that the positive agreement of all joint owners was required in case one owner concluded an agreement concerning property under joint ownership. The applicants complained that they were deprived of their property in breach of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

8

The application concerns the manner in which the courts decided on the residence of the applicant’s child, after the parents’ separation. The parents were granted joint parental responsibility. The applicant and Mr X had a son together, Y, born in 2008. In May 2015 the applicant left the family home, allegedly against her will, and was prevented from taking Y with her or seeing him afterwards. FIRST RESIDENCE ORDER 4 . Each parent requested that Y’s residence be fixed with them. By means of an enforceable albeit non-final decision of 26 May 2013 the Slatina District Court set Y’s residence with the applicant, but in a final decision of 29 November 2017 the Olt County Court reversed that order and established Y’s residence with his father. 5 . The County Court relied on the results of a psychological assessment of the child of 30 September 2017, which concluded that he was very close to his father and rejected his mother, being afraid that she would take him away from his father’s home. The report also found that X had alienated Y from his mother. 6 . The County Court considered that in order to avoid more trauma for Y, it would be in his interest to continue living with X, who should stop denigrating the applicant in front of the child. It recommended psychological counselling for X to learn to act in Y’s best interest. X admitted before the court that he had been violent towards the applicant during their relationship, allegedly because of her infidelity. 7 . In the meantime, on 15 September 2016, while the proceedings for a residence order were pending on appeal, a bailiff started enforcement of the 26 May 2013 decision (see paragraph 4 above). Y refused in absolute terms to leave the bailiff’s office with his mother. CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS 8 . As after the court decided to set Y’s residence with X (see paragraph 4 above) the latter denied contact between the applicant and Y, on an application lodged by her, the Slatina District Court, in a decision of 6 November 2018, set a contact schedule in the applicant’s favour. Despite the applicant’s repeated requests addressed to X, that schedule was never respected. 9 . On 16 July 2018, while the bailiff was attempting to enforce the contact schedule, Y said that he would only go with the applicant if X went with them. The three left the bailiff’s office together. 10 . Because of Y’s opposition, at the child protection authority’s request, based on the bailiff’s report of 16 July 2018, on 14 February 2019 the District Court ordered a three-month mandatory counselling programme for Y. It asked to see the report at the end of the programme. It also informed the applicant that if Y still refused contact at the end of the counselling programme, she could seek penalties from X for non-compliance with a court order. 11 . On 21 July 2020 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against X for non-compliance with the contact arrangements. SECOND RESIDENCE ORDER On 30 January 2019 the applicant lodged a new action before the Slatina District Court requesting that Y’s residence be set with her, on the grounds that X had not respected the contact schedule and had forbidden her to visit or speak on the telephone with Y. Their contacts were limited to visiting Y at school. On 16 September 2019 Y was interviewed by the court. He said he wanted to continue living with his father and to see his mother occasionally. 14 . The court further relied on the final decision of 29 November 2017 (see paragraphs 4 and 6 above), the psychological report of 30 September 2017 (see paragraph 5 above) and the bailiff’s reports of 15 September 2016 and 16 July 2018 (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). It also had at its disposal two social inquiry reports about the parents’ homes which concluded that they offered similar conditions for raising Y. 15 . The court also noted that in 2018 X had been violent towards his new partner, who obtained a six-month protection order against him and his eviction from their home; he had also been criminally convicted for refusing to submit to alcohol testing after being caught drunken driving. However, none of those episodes had taken place in Y’s presence and X had not committed any reproachable act towards Y. 16 . In a decision of 25 November 2019 the Slatina District Court dismissed the applicant’s action. The court considered that, bearing in mind that the parents offered similar conditions for raising Y, and despite the negative influence exerted by X over Y, it was more important for the child to maintain stability and continue living in a familiar environment where he felt safe. It considered that contact with the mother had to be re-established gradually and not forcibly through a change of residence. 17 . The applicant appealed, but in a final decision of 28 July 2020 the Olt County Court upheld the District Court’s findings. On 21 July 2020 the County Court heard Y, who reiterated that he did not wish to live with his mother, not even temporarily. The court observed that the situation had not changed since the first residence order (see paragraph 4 above) and that no reproach could be made to X about his behaviour towards Y. Moreover, Y was happy in his current environment. 20 . The court observed that Y refused to talk to the applicant and reiterated that they needed time to rebuild their relationship. It noted that the applicant could use other means of contact, including by seeking mandatory counselling for Y, within the enforcement of the contact order (see paragraph 8 above). It considered that X should encourage rebuilding the mother-child relationship. 21 . Lastly, the court considered that the fact that X prevented and obstructed contact and alienated Y from his mother did not constitute a valid reason for a change of residence.

3

THE EMERGENCY SITUATION AND ITS BACKGROUND The tragic and lasting crisis in Northern <COUNTRY> lies at the root of the present case. In order to combat what the respondent Government describe as "the longest and most violent terrorist campaign witnessed in either part of the island of <COUNTRY>", the authorities in Northern <COUNTRY> exercised from August 1971 until December 1975 a series of extrajudicial powers of arrest, detention and internment. The proceedings in this case concern the scope and the operation in practice of those measures as well as the alleged ill-treatment of persons thereby deprived of their liberty. Up to March 1975, on the figures cited before the Commission by the respondent Government, over 1,100 people had been killed, over 11,500 injured and more than £140,000,000 worth of property destroyed during the recent troubles in Northern <COUNTRY>. This violence found its expression in part in civil disorders, in part in terrorism, that is organised violence for political ends. A. Social, constitutional and political background Prior to 1922 the whole of the island of <COUNTRY> formed part of the <COUNTRY>. In that year, following a treaty of 1921, legislation was passed which endorsed the setting-up, with self-governing status within the British Commonwealth, of the Irish Free State comprising initially all of the island’s thirty-two counties. Provision was made for six of the nine counties of the province of Ulster in the north to opt out and remain within the <COUNTRY> and they did this in 1922. Thereafter, the Irish Free State became responsible for the government of the remaining twenty-six counties and, in 1937, a new Constitution was introduced proclaiming the independence and sovereignty of the State of what is now known as the Irish Republic. After the Second World War it left the Commonwealth and declared itself a republic. From the 1920’s onwards, Northern <COUNTRY>, that is the above-mentioned six counties, had a separate Government and Parliament of its own. In addition, the electorate of the province (meaning in this judgment the six counties) returned twelve members to the <COUNTRY> Parliament. With certain defined matters excepted, the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament and Government were the legislative and executive authorities for the six counties until 30 March 1972 when the <COUNTRY> authorities resumed "direct rule" of the province (see paragraph 49 below). Northern <COUNTRY> is not a homogeneous society. It consists of two communities divided by deep and long-standing antagonisms. One community is variously termed Protestant, Unionist or Loyalist, the other is generally labelled as Catholic, Republican or Nationalist. About two-thirds of the population of one and a half million belong to the Protestant community, the remaining third to the Catholic community. The majority group is descended from Protestant settlers who emigrated in large numbers from Britain to Northern <COUNTRY> during the seventeenth century. The now traditional antagonism between the two groups is based both on religion and on social, economic and political differences. In particular, the Protestant community has consistently opposed the idea of a united <COUNTRY> independent of the <COUNTRY>, whereas the Catholic community has traditionally supported it. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a clandestine organisation with quasi-military dispositions. Formed during the troubles prior to the partition of the island and illegal in the <COUNTRY> as well as in the Republic of <COUNTRY>, the IRA neither accepts the existence of Northern <COUNTRY> as part of the <COUNTRY> nor recognises the democratic order of the Republic. It has periodically mounted campaigns of terrorism in both parts of the island of <COUNTRY> and in Great Britain. After 1962, the IRA was not overtly active for some years. During the time covered by the complaints of the applicant Government that is from 1971 to 1975 virtually all those members of the IRA living and operating in Northern <COUNTRY> were recruited from among the Catholic community. Legislation designed to deal with matters affecting law and order and the security of the State was first enacted by the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament in 1922 in the form of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern <COUNTRY>). This legislation (hereinafter referred to as "the Special Powers Act") was an enabling Act under which Regulations were from time to time made and brought into operation. Thus, for instance, a Regulation dating from before 1949 declared illegal certain organisations, including the IRA. In 1950 and 1954, following raids carried out by the IRA in Great Britain and Northern <COUNTRY>, Regulations were introduced granting powers of entry and search. In 1956 and 1957, in order to combat an IRA campaign then being launched, further Regulations were made dealing with internment, curfew, special trial procedures, firearms and explosives control, and restriction on movement. An account of the particular Regulations at issue in the present case, namely Regulations 10, 11 (1), 11 (2) and 12 (1), appears below at paragraphs 81 to The differing aspirations of the two communities resulted in the division between the main political parties in Northern <COUNTRY> being based primarily on their attitude to the status of the province as part of the <COUNTRY> rather than on political differences of the type commonly found in the rest of the <COUNTRY> and elsewhere. The Protestant community in general voted for the Unionist Party, which wished Northern <COUNTRY> to remain within the <COUNTRY>, whilst the Catholic community in general supported candidates favouring a united, independent <COUNTRY>. Given the relative sizes of the two communities, the inevitable result of this polarisation was that the Unionist Party, supported almost exclusively by Protestants, had a permanent majority in the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament and formed the Government of the province throughout the fifty years leading up to direct rule in 1972. The abolition of proportional representation in the early 1920’s and the geographical arrangement of constituencies affected a great increase in the size of the Parliamentary majority. This situation understandably disenchanted the Catholic community. Thus, whilst only a small minority of the latter community has ever actively supported the IRA, a very much greater proportion had always been discontented with Unionist government and the effects of its in-built majority. The Catholics in the population regarded themselves as discriminated against on various counts. The Cameron Commission, a body appointed by the Northern <COUNTRY> Government in March 1969 to report, inter alia, on the causes of disturbances in the six counties in 1968-1969 (see paragraph 23 below), considered justified many of the grievances then felt by the Catholics, in particular those concerned with the allocation of houses, local authority appointments, limitations on local electoral franchise and deliberate manipulation of ward boundaries and electoral areas. The European Commission of Human Rights itself came to the conclusion that there certainly was an element of inherent bias in the whole political system in Northern <COUNTRY> in favour of one community. From the time of partition onwards there has always been a greater or lesser degree of tension between the two communities, although since the early 1920’s there have been no disturbances comparable in scale to those of recent years. B. Development of the crisis up to 1969 In 1963 the first moves towards a campaign for "civil rights" for the Catholic community began to be made. The objectives of this campaign were, broadly speaking, the removal of the discrimination referred to above. At the same time, though, manifestations of Protestant violence began to emerge. In 1964 there was serious rioting in Belfast following a Protestant march. In March 1966, several petrol bombs were thrown at Catholic schools and property. In May 1966, a body calling itself the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), previously unknown to the police, issued a statement declaring war on the IRA and warning of its intention to execute all IRA men. Shortly thereafter, two Catholics were murdered and two others seriously wounded in Belfast. Three Protestants, members of the UVF, were subsequently charged and convicted for these attacks. The UVF, believed by the police to have consisted of only 5 to 6 persons, was declared illegal in June 1966 and seems to have remained inactive from then until 1969. During this period, there was no violent activity of significance by the IRA, who, after 1962, appear to have concentrated on political activity. Throughout 1967, the movement for "civil rights" for the Catholic community gathered momentum. The first civil rights march took place in August 1968 without incident, but in October a clash with the police and two days’ rioting ensued after a march in Londonderry. On 22 November 1968, the Northern <COUNTRY> Government announced a reform programme to deal with the Catholic grievances. Nevertheless, the civil rights movement continued its campaign and marches. The marches again led to clashes with the police and to violent confrontation with Protestant counter-demonstrators, often armed with cudgels, stones and the like. The demonstrations, disturbances and rioting continued in various places into 1969. In paragraph 226 of its report, presented to the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament in September 1969, the Cameron Commission expressed the view that certain Protestant extremist organisations "must ... bear a heavy share of direct responsibility for [certain of] the disorders ... and also for inflaming passions and engineering opposition to lawful, and what would in all probability otherwise have been peaceful, demonstrations or at least have attracted only modified and easily controlled opposition". Police conduct in handling certain disturbances was also criticised by the Cameron Commission. In March and April 1969, five major explosions thought to have been caused by the UVF occurred at water and electricity installations in three counties. Units of British troops were flown into the province. The Northern <COUNTRY> Prime Minister, whose reform policies were unpopular with many Protestants, resigned at the end of April. A few days later, his successor declared a general amnesty for persons charged with or convicted of offences connected with the recent political protests and demonstrations. Tension remained high; sectarian disturbances continued periodically up to mid-August. On 12 August 1969, a traditional Protestant anniversary parade sparked off several days of large-scale rioting, first of all in Londonderry and thereafter spreading to Belfast and other places. After 10 civilians had been killed and 145 civilians and 4 policemen wounded, it was found necessary to call in aid units of the British army. The riots in August 1969 greatly exceeded in severity any that had occurred in the previous years. Casualties and damage to property were extensive. In Belfast, for instance, a large number of houses and licensed premises, mostly Catholic owned or occupied, were burnt down, destroyed or damaged. The Northern <COUNTRY> Prime Minister called a peace conference on 18 August which was attended by representatives of the two communities. On the next day, the <COUNTRY> and Northern <COUNTRY> Governments issued a joint declaration re-affirming, inter alia, their commitment to reforms in the six counties. In October, a programme of reform was announced; it included the reorganisation of the police force and local government, measures to prohibit discrimination in public employment, and the establishment of a Community Relations Commission and a central housing authority. However, the publication of a government report into the functions and organisation of the province’s police force had produced a violent reaction in Protestant circles. On 11 October, a policeman was shot dead by a bullet fired from a crowd of Protestant rioters in Belfast. He became the first member of the security forces to be killed during the disorders of the past few years. The IRA carried out no major acts of violence in 1969. However, at Easter 1969 they had reactivated their forces, placing all volunteers on full alert. At the same time, the IRA are thought to have gained much more support as a result of the riots and of an accompanying loss of confidence by Catholics in the police. Towards the end of the year, the IRA split into two wings. For some time there had been dissension in the movement between those who hoped to bring about a form of socialist people’s republic for all <COUNTRY> and those who considered that such involvement deflected the IRA from its traditional aims. The traditionalists formed themselves into the Provisional IRA whilst the followers of the new political doctrines became the Official IRA. Both factions remained organised along military lines. Situation from 1970 until the introduction of internment on 9 august 1971 The situation worsened in 1970. The number of explosions recorded by the police jumped dramatically from a total of 8 in 1969 to 155 in 1970. Some explosions were caused by Loyalists - about 25 according to statistics cited by the Commission - but there is no dispute that the majority were the work of the IRA. In total, 23 civilians and 2 policemen were killed during the course of the year. None of these deaths was attributed by the police to Protestant activity. The terrorist campaign by the IRA appears to have begun in earnest in 1970 and to have been one primarily of bombing buildings and attacking the security forces. There was also undoubtedly some terrorist activity on the part of Loyalists, directed largely against politicians seen as hostile to Unionism and against Catholic owned or occupied property, particularly licensed premises. Responsibility for certain explosions was in fact claimed by the UVF. The sharp increase in what may be termed terrorist-type activity was not accompanied by the cessation of inter-communal street disturbances which continued sporadically during the year of 1970 and accounted for the deaths of a number of people. Between January and July 1971, the violence intensified, being marked by a dramatic upsurge in terrorist activity by the IRA. Police statistics record a total of 304 explosions, including 94 for the one month of July. Shooting at the security forces’ patrols built up and for the first time soldiers numbered amongst those killed. By 9 August, 13 soldiers, 2 policemen and 16 civilians had died since the beginning of the year. In addition, serious and prolonged rioting occurred in both Catholic and Protestant areas. Apart from one explosion in which a civilian was killed, there is no evidence of any deaths or even injuries having been caused by Loyalist terrorists. On the applicant Government’s own approximate estimate, Loyalist explosions accounted for only 14 out of the overall total of 304. Furthermore, as in 1970, Loyalist terrorists used mainly pipe bombs which were not very powerful in comparison with the devices employed by the IRA. The Commission stated in its report that the IRA were indisputably responsible for the very great majority of the acts of violence during this period. Loyalist terrorist activity had declined; there is no evidence that such Loyalist terrorism as did exist formed part of a highly organised campaign in the sense that IRA activity The Commission’s conclusion was that the threat and reality of serious terrorism came almost exclusively from the IRA. On the political front during 1970 and 1971, progress was made in implementing the reforms announced in October 1969 (see paragraph 26 above). The Prime Minister of Northern <COUNTRY>, however, resigned in March 1971. In June 1971, his successor proposed a number of further steps designed to provide a positive role for representatives of the minority community in the actual process of government. 9 August 1971 (introduction of internment) until 30 March 1972 (introduction of direct rule) The decision to introduce internment It was against the background outlined above that on 9 August 1971 the Northern <COUNTRY> Government brought into operation extrajudicial measures of detention and internment of suspected terrorists. From 9 August 1971 until 7 November 1972, when certain of the Special Powers Regulations were replaced, the authorities in Northern <COUNTRY> in fact exercised four such extrajudicial powers: (i) arrest for interrogation purposes during 48 hours (under Regulation 10); (ii) arrest and remand in custody (under Regulation 11 (1)); (iii) detention of an arrested person (under Regulation 11 (2)); and (iv) internment (under Regulation 12 (1)). An account of the operation of these powers and the procedures there under is given below at paragraphs 81 to For some time, the possibility of internment had been extensively canvassed in the press and amongst politicians. Pressure had also been mounting within the Protestant community for its introduction; in the early months of 1971 there had been demonstrations against the then Prime Minister because of his Government’s alleged failure to deal with the IRA threat. The decision to introduce a policy of detention and internment was taken on 5 August 1971 by the Northern <COUNTRY> Government, following a meeting in London between the Northern <COUNTRY> and <COUNTRY> Governments. Prior to this, the question had been considered at the highest level in Northern <COUNTRY> and frequent consultations had taken place between the two Governments. In the latter half of July 1971, as an apparent last resort to avoid introducing internment, the security forces had intensified operations against suspected terrorists, mounting searches and detaining for questioning what were believed to be key figures in the IRA. Some 90 persons were arrested but no significant results were yielded. Prior to August 1971, the intelligence obtained by the police had failed to provide anything but a very general picture of the IRA organisation. Reasons for the decision to introduce internment The campaign of violence carried out by the IRA had attained unprecedented proportions by the middle of 1971. This was clearly the dominant factor behind the decision to exercise the extrajudicial powers. Three principal reasons for the decision have been cited by the respondent Government. Firstly, the authorities took the view that the normal procedures of investigation and criminal prosecution had become inadequate to deal with IRA terrorists; it was considered that the ordinary criminal courts could no longer be relied on as the sole process of law for restoring peace and order. The second reason given, which was closely related to the first, was the widespread intimidation of the population. Such intimidation often made it impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to secure a criminal conviction against a known IRA terrorist in the absence of an admissible confession or of police or army testimony. Furthermore, the conduct of police enquiries was seriously hampered by the grip the IRA had on certain so-called "no-go" areas, that is Catholic strongholds where terrorists, unlike the police, could operate in comparative safety. Thirdly, the ease of escape across the territorial border between Northern <COUNTRY> and the Republic of <COUNTRY> presented difficulties of control. In addition to the three "security" reasons, there was, in the judgment of both the Northern <COUNTRY> Government and the <COUNTRY> Government, no hope of winning over the terrorists by political means, the reform programme initiated in 1969 having failed to prevent continuing violence. The authorities therefore came to the conclusion that it was necessary to introduce a policy of detention and internment of persons suspected of serious terrorist activities but against whom sufficient evidence could not be laid in court. This policy was regarded as a temporary measure primarily aimed at breaking the influence of the IRA. It was intended that a respite would be provided so as to enable the political and social reforms already undertaken to achieve their full effects. The decision whom to arrest, detain and intern The possibility of interning Loyalists was discussed in the preparatory stages. The security forces were aware of some Loyalist terrorist activity in 1971 and also of certain Protestant extremists, described by those forces as "rabble rousers" and suspected by them of acts of violence or intimidation, if not of terrorism strictly speaking. However, the security forces did not judge at this stage that there was any serious threat coming from the Loyalist quarter. There was said to be no army or police intelligence then available which indicated that any organisation other than the IRA had been actively engaged in bombing and killing in the very recent months. On account of the unprecedented level it had reached, and because of its nature as a highly organised, politically motivated campaign designed to overthrow the State, IRA terrorism was regarded as the real menace to law and order. Protestant terrorist activity, which was in the main directed against the Catholic community and not the State or the security forces, was seen by the authorities more as sporadic and as being on a minute scale in comparison and on a much less organised basis. In the weeks preceding the introduction of internment, the police, in consultation with the army, were preparing lists of persons to be arrested. The lists included not only suspected IRA terrorists but also persons suspected of being involved or associated with the IRA or even, in a few cases, of possessing information about others so involved or associated. It was generally understood that the target of the planned exercise was the IRA. Operation Demetrius Starting at 00 a.on Monday, 9 August 1971, the army, with police officers occasionally acting as guides, mounted an operation to arrest the 452 persons whose names appeared on the final list. In the event, some 350 persons were arrested in accordance with the Special Powers Regulations. The arrested persons were taken to one of the three regional holding centres (Magilligan Weekend Training Centre in County Londonderry, Ballykinler Weekend Training Centre in County Down and Girdwood Park Territorial Army Centre in Belfast) that had been set up to receive the prisoners during 48 hours. All those arrested were subjected to interrogation by police officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). 104 persons were released within 48 hours. Those who were to be detained were sent on to the prison ship "Maidstone" or to Crumlin Road Prison, both in Belfast. Prior to being lodged in detention, 12 individuals were moved to one or more unidentified centres for "interrogation in depth" extending over several days. Operation Demetrius, as the Commission points out, was not a selective manoeuvre aimed at individuals but a "sweeping-up" exercise directed against the IRA organisation as a whole. It is generally accepted that because of the scale and speed of the operation, some persons were arrested or even detained on the basis of inadequate or inaccurate information. Events subsequent to Operation Demetrius At 15 a.on 9 August 1971, the Prime Minister of Northern <COUNTRY> announced to the public the introduction of internment. He stated, inter alia: "The main target of the present operation is the Irish Republican Army ... They are the present threat; but we will not hesitate to take strong action against any other individuals or organisations who may present such a threat in the future." Arrests continued to be made during the rest of the year, partly of persons on the above-mentioned list and partly of persons who came under suspicion thereafter. The three regional holding centres were closed down in August 1971 shortly after Operation Demetrius was completed, and in September/October 1971 police centres were established at Palace Barracks (Holywood, County Down), Girdwood Park (Belfast), Gough (County Armagh) and Ballykelly (County Londonderry) for the purpose of holding and interrogating persons arrested under the Special Powers Regulations. The introduction of internment provoked a violent reaction from the Catholic community and the IRA. Serious rioting broke out in Belfast and elsewhere, there was a considerable increase in shootings and bombings, and the security situation in general deteriorated rapidly. Within the minority community there occurred a further alienation from the authorities and the security forces, together with a rise in support for the IRA. Although surprised by the extent of this reaction, both the Northern <COUNTRY> and the <COUNTRY> Governments continued their efforts to secure political progress. In London, the Home Secretary announced in September 1971 his Government’s determination to ensure that the Catholic population in the province should have an active, permanent and guaranteed role in the conduct of public business. In the same month, a meeting took place in England between the Prime Ministers of the <COUNTRY>, Northern <COUNTRY> and the Irish Republic. In October, the Belfast Government published proposals for involving the opposition in government. However, these proposals were considered unacceptable by the political representatives of the Catholic community and nothing came of them. Neither internment nor the political initiatives ended the violence. On the contrary, the numbers of deaths, explosions and shootings recorded by the police for each month throughout the period from August to December 1971 were higher than those recorded in any of the previous seven months of the year. There was a total of 146 persons killed, including 47 members of the security forces and 99 civilians, 729 explosions and 1,437 shooting incidents. Apart from rioting and a small-scale bombing campaign of licensed premises, there was apparently little serious violence by Protestants in 1971. Only one death occurring between August and the end of the year, an assassination of a Protestant in September, was attributed by the police to Loyalists. On the other hand, intimidation of members of the opposite community to move from their homes seems to have become more prevalent on both sides, although the official figures indicate that Catholics were principally affected. On the Protestant side, the increased violence at this time led to the formation of defence associations or vigilante groups which ultimately amalgamated in or about September 1971 to become the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). The UDA did not appear openly on the streets until the spring of 1972. There was also seen the start of a development later to become significant, that is the holding of large, carefully prepared parades by Loyalist organisations (see paragraph 51 below). The latter and in particular the UDA were looked on by the police as primarily political organisations not engaged in violence as such. At the beginning of 1972, despite a small drop, the level of violence remained higher than at any time before 9 August 1971. On 30 January 1972, 13 people were killed by army gunfire in the course of disorders taking place in the predominantly Catholic town of Londonderry. This incident led to a new upsurge in support for the IRA amongst the Catholic community. In the first three months of 1972, 87 people were killed, including 27 members of the security forces. Two assassinations carried out in March, one of a Protestant and the other of a Catholic, were the only deaths attributed to Loyalist activity. 421 explosions, the vast majority attributed to the IRA, were caused during the same period. From August 1971 until 30 March 1972 there had been in Northern <COUNTRY> 1,130 bomb explosions and well over 2,000 shooting incidents. 158 civilians, 58 soldiers and 17 policemen had been killed, and 2,505 civilians, 306 soldiers and 107 RUC members injured. Throughout these months the numbers held under detention or internment orders proceeded to rise until a total of over 900 persons, all suspected of involvement with the IRA, were held at the end of March 1972. At the same time, the ordinary processes of the criminal law continued to be used, against Protestants as well as Catholics, whenever there was thought to be sufficient evidence to ground a criminal conviction. Thus, between 9 August 1971 and 31 March 1972, over 1,600 people were charged with "terrorist-type" offences. In March 1972, in view of the deteriorating circumstances, the Government in London decided that they should assume direct responsibility for the administration of law and order in Northern <COUNTRY> if there was to be any hope of political progress. This decision was unacceptable to the Government of the province and accordingly it was announced on 24 March 1972 that direct rule from Westminster not only on law and order but on all matters was to be introduced. Under the Northern <COUNTRY> (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Temporary Provisions Act"), which was passed by the <COUNTRY> Parliament and came into force on 30 March 1972, temporary provision was made for the exercise of the executive and legislative powers of the Northern <COUNTRY> Parliament and Government by the <COUNTRY> authorities. The Belfast Parliament was prorogued and the Queen empowered to legislate in its stead by Order in Council. The executive powers of the Belfast Government were transferred to the Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY>. This was a new office created for the purpose; its holder was a member of the <COUNTRY> Government and answerable to the <COUNTRY> Parliament. The legislation was enacted for a period of one year but was subsequently extended. E. 30 March 1972 (introduction of direct rule) until 5 February 1973 (first detention of loyalists) On assuming direct rule, the <COUNTRY> Government stated that one of their most important objectives was to bring internment under the Special Powers Act to an end and to consider how far the powers under that Act could be dispensed with. On 7 April 1972, the Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY> announced the immediate release of 47 internees and 26 detainees. By mid-May 259 persons had been released. The decision to phase out internment was not dictated by any fall in the level of violence. Rather it was intended to open the way for political progress by reducing tension as the first step in the process of reconciliation. On the political level, the <COUNTRY> was seeking the establishment of an equitable form of government for Northern <COUNTRY>, acceptable to both communities. The introduction of direct rule, together with the release of detainees, caused resentment and dismay amongst the Protestant community. A two-day strike, which proved largely effective, was immediately called by the leader of one of the extremist movements on the Loyalist side. Street demonstrations and marches called by the UDA appear to have begun shortly after 30 March 1972. The UDA was organised on pseudo-military lines, its members, estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 persons, giving themselves military ranks. The UDA used its forces to erect barricades, set up road blocks and disrupt civil life generally. They paraded in large numbers through the centre of Belfast and elsewhere, many of them masked and dressed in para-military uniforms and on occasions openly carrying weapons such as sticks or cudgels. Such demonstrations, however, seem rarely to have led to physical violence. Whilst it was illegal to block roads, wear uniforms or carry offensive weapons, the security forces did not attempt to arrest those taking part in UDA demonstrations since they feared that major riots would result. Neither were the extrajudicial powers of detention and internment ever used, against either Catholics or Protestants, to combat this kind of illegal activity. According to the respondent Government, consideration was given to the possibility of proscribing the UDA, but it was decided that on balance no good purpose would be served by doing so, not least because most of its members were not engaged in violence. It is generally accepted, however, that UDA membership overlapped, to some extent at least, with the smaller and more militant extremist bodies which were illegal, such as the UVF (see paragraph 20 above). Other aspects of Loyalist activity during this stage of the crisis included the erection of barricades and the continuing intimidation of Catholics, a problem that became particularly grave in the summer of 1972. There were serious disturbances in Protestant areas in September and October 1972, with Loyalist terrorists exchanging fire with the security forces. The rioting in October ceased after the UDA had ordered the confrontation with the security forces to stop. After the introduction of direct rule, there occurred a marked upward turn in Loyalist terrorism, evidenced by a few bombing attacks, a large-scale build-up of arms and ammunitions, and above all sectarian assassinations. Sectarian assassinations, which the respondent Government term the outstanding feature of Loyalist violence since 1972, first reached serious proportions in the spring of 1972. Victims seem largely to have been chosen at random on no other ground than their membership of, or links with, the other community. Kidnapping and torturing sometimes accompanied this kind of indiscriminate killing. While both sides committed sectarian murders, it is generally accepted that Protestants were responsible for more than Catholics. The police had difficulty in detecting those responsible for sectarian assassinations. In particular, witnesses were reluctant to come forward and were subjected to intimidation. Accordingly, a confidential telephone system was installed in August 1972, whereby information could be given anonymously to the security forces. Although Loyalist terrorist activity had grown significantly, it nonetheless remained that the great bulk of serious violence in this period was attributed to the IRA (see paragraph 61 below). The high level of IRA terrorism did not at all abate despite the phasing-out of internment. In fact, there was a steady rise in explosions, shooting incidents and casualties amongst the security forces over the period from March until the end of May. However, on 29 May 1972 the Official IRA, who had been responsible for a lesser amount of violence than the Provisionals, declared a truce which they have on the whole respected ever since. On 22 June 1972 the Provisional IRA in their turn announced a truce, becoming effective on 26 June. The Provisionals’ truce was, however, called off on 9 July following an incident arising out of a communal argument between the UDA and Catholics about the allocation of accommodation on a Belfast housing estate. After the breakdown of the ceasefire, Provisional IRA violence was resumed at an increased level. In July 1972 alone, 21 members of the security forces and 74 civilians were killed; in addition, there were nearly 200 explosions and 2,800 shooting incidents. These figures were the highest for any month in the entire emergency up to the end of 1974. Responsibility was attributed to Loyalists for 18 deaths and only 2 explosions. Faced with the mounting tide of violence, the <COUNTRY> Government decided to restore the presence of the security forces in the "no-go" areas. After due warning had been given to the civilian population, a large-scale manoeuvre, known as Operation Motorman, was mounted on 31 July beginning at 00 a.Even after Operation Motorman the police were still not able to function properly in Catholic areas. Access to Protestant areas remained easier for the police and they were not subject there to the same risk of attack. The army operated principally, and was employed to carry out police duties, in those areas where the minority community predominated. Nevertheless, the level of violence, although still high, immediately fell. In August, September and October, there was an overall total of approximately 2,200 shooting incidents as opposed to 2,800 for July alone. The monthly average of deaths was less than half the July total, and the number of explosions became progressively less. According to the respondent Government, a development contributing to the maintenance of this gradual reduction was the institution in November 1972 of a revised system for the detention of terrorists. In the months following the introduction of direct rule – including July, the worst of these months for violence - no new internment orders were made and fresh detentions virtually ceased. From September onwards, after the breakdown of the attempted ceasefire, the number of detention orders - as before, against IRA suspects only - increased, while the rate of releases fell. There was, however, no large-scale operation to re-detain and re-intern people. The political gesture of phasing out internment had not, as hoped, elicited a positive response from the IRA; on the contrary, violence had mounted to fresh heights. Furthermore, the authorities judged that the capability of the ordinary processes of law to counter IRA terrorism continued to be impeded by a number of circumstances such as the intimidation of potential witnesses and the difficulty of bringing to trial those responsible for directing terrorist operations. The <COUNTRY> Government therefore became convinced that it was necessary to find fresh means of separating known terrorists from the population at large. On 21 September 1972, the Government announced that it was to set up a Commission, subsequently appointed in October under the chairmanship of Lord Diplock, - to consider "what arrangements for the administration of justice in Northern <COUNTRY> could be made in order to deal more effectively with terrorist organisations by bringing to book, otherwise than by internment by the Executive, individuals involved in terrorist activities, particularly those who plan and direct, but do not necessarily take part in, terrorist acts"; and - "to make recommendations". Without waiting for the report of the Diplock Commission, the Government brought into effect on 7 November 1972 the Detention of Terrorists (Northern <COUNTRY>) Order 1972 (abbreviated hereafter to the "Terrorists Order"), an Order made in exercise of the powers conferred by the Temporary Provisions Act (see paragraph 49 above). This Order, which was of a temporary nature, revoked Regulations 11 (2) (detention) and 12 (1) (internment); in replacement it instituted, with further procedural guarantees for the protection of the individual concerned, a new system of "interim custody" and "detention" for persons suspected of participation in terrorist activities. Regulations 10 and 11 (1) (arrest) remained. Further details on the Order are given below at paragraphs 85 to The report of the Diplock Commission was presented to the <COUNTRY> Parliament in December 1972. This report analysed the minimum requirements of a judicial process, the effects of intimidation, possible changes in the rules of evidence and the need for detention without trial. It stated, inter alia: "The fear of intimidation is widespread and well-founded. Until it can be removed and the personal safety of witnesses and their families guaranteed, the use by the Executive of some extrajudicial process for the detention of terrorists cannot be dispensed with." The European Commission of Human Rights, on the basis of the evidence it had itself obtained, accepted that the findings of the Diplock report as to the level of intimidation were generally warranted. Another contributory factor invoked by the respondent Government in connection with the fall in violence (see paragraph 57 above) was the intensive programme of consultations which they undertook with the political parties in Northern <COUNTRY> on the question of the future government of the province. These consultations, first commenced in July and August 1972, continued throughout the last weeks of 1972 and the early months of 1973. Apart from the steps taken on the security front, the <COUNTRY> Government thus maintained the new emphasis placed, since the introduction of direct rule, on attempting to find a solution to the crisis through political means (see paragraph 50 above). The gradual reduction in the level of violence was maintained until the end of this period. The figures for deaths and explosions for January 1973 were, with one slight exception, lower than for any month since the introduction of internment. Despite this general reduction, though, the development of Loyalist militancy and terrorist activity continued. From 1 April 1972 until 31 January 1973, 398 persons were killed, 72 of these deaths being attributed to Loyalists. The overall total included 123 members of the security forces, the vast majority of whom were considered to have been killed by the IRA, and an equal number of victims of "factional or sectarian" assassinations. Of these assassinations, 69 were ascribed to Loyalists, 34 to the IRA, with no attribution being possible in the remaining 20 cases. For their part, explosions totalled 1,141; no more than a small percentage - for example, 29 out of 691 explosions recorded between 1 July 1972 and 31 January 1973 - were regarded as being the work of Loyalists. The increasing Protestant militancy was further evidenced by the statistics on intimidation, arms and ammunitions recovered, and charges brought for "terrorist-type offences". Thus, between 31 July 1972 and 31 January 1973, charges of the kind just referred to were laid against 640 persons, namely 402 Catholics and 238 Protestants; within this total, 45 individuals - 24 Protestants, including 16 in the one month of January 1973, and 21 Catholics – were charged with murder or attempted murder. Loyalist terrorism was linked by the police with Protestant extremist organisations, notably the UVF. The police considered that the UVF’s membership and acts of terrorism had increased from 1972 onwards following a period of relative inactivity after its 1969 bombing campaign (see paragraphs 24 and 30 above). It was looked on as a well-armed and organised body. In general, by about the middle of 1972 the police had reasonably good intelligence as to the identity of the violent elements on the Protestant side, but there were cases in 1972 in which it was impossible to procure sufficient evidence to bring such persons before the ordinary criminal courts. Nevertheless, none of the extrajudicial orders made between the introduction of direct rule and 5 February 1973 (see paragraph 64 below) applied to Loyalists. Loyalist violence, however, remained on a far smaller scale than that of the Provisional IRA who, as the above-cited figures show, were still responsible for the great bulk of the terrorist deeds recorded. In the view of the respondent Government and of the Commission, Loyalist and IRA violence were to be distinguished in further respects in addition to volume. Loyalist terrorism consisted largely of intimidation and sectarian assassinations, whereas the IRA campaign also included attacks on members of the security forces and the bombing of public places. As indicated earlier (paragraph 37 above), the character, aims and background of the various organisations engaged in terrorism on the two sides differed. The evidence suggests that the Loyalist terrorist groups were at the time more amorphous than the IRA. Within the security forces there was a tendency, which the Commission regarded as justified in many ways, to look on Loyalist terrorists as "criminals" or "hooligans" and on the IRA as the organised "terrorist" enemy. The prospects of obtaining sufficient admissible evidence for a criminal prosecution were, it seems, judged by the security forces as being better in relation to Loyalists than to IRA suspects. Given the continued inability of the police to operate normally in Catholic areas and the greater extent and organisation of the IRA campaign, the Commission found such an attitude "not surprising". Finally, the statistics referred to above at paragraph 61 indicate that action, in the form of searches, recovery of arms and the bringing of criminal charges, was being taken by the authorities against both sides. From 30 March until 7 November 1972 no new internment orders were made, although it was considered necessary to make 107 detention orders under Regulation 11 (2). By the latter date 628 men had been released from internment and 334 from detention, leaving 167 still interned and 119 still detained. Between the entry into force of the Terrorists Order and 31 January 1973, 166 interim custody orders and 128 detention orders were made while 94 persons were released. In the context of the period from 30 March 1972 to 5 February 1973, the Commission noted in its report that subsequent to the introduction of direct rule the extrajudicial powers appear to have been exercised on a more selective basis and, broadly speaking, in accordance with the following criteria: (i) extrajudicial orders were served only on persons suspected of involvement in serious and organised terrorism; (ii) they were used solely as a "last resort", that is only in cases where sufficient evidence was not available to justify prosecution before the ordinary courts; (iii) as a general practice, they were not made against a person in respect of matters for which he had been tried and acquitted by an ordinary court, provided that it had been possible to put before the court all the relevant evidence. At the beginning of February 1973, a British soldier was shot dead in a Protestant part of Belfast. Shortly afterwards, on 5 February 1973, two interim custody orders were made in respect of Loyalists. These two men were the first Loyalists against whom the extrajudicial powers were exercised. According to the applicant Government, the specific act of which one of these men was suspected - the bombing of a bus, responsibility for which had been claimed immediately after the event by the UVF - had caused a public outcry and had actually forced a decision to "intern" the first suspected Protestant terrorist. The decision itself had been the subject of discussions between the Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY>, the General Officer Commanding the British forces in the province and high ranking civil servants. The relevant higher authorities are noted in the Commission’s report as recognising that the detention of Loyalists would lead to repercussions in the security situation. The Commission accepts that the risk of a severe outbreak of Protestant violence in response was clearly a very real one. Prior to February 1973, it seems, no recommendations had been made to the Secretary of State for the detention or internment of Loyalists. F. 5 February 1973 onwards According to the applicant Government, the exercise of the extrajudicial powers against Loyalists brought in its wake widespread threats from the UDA. In general, however, the pattern of violence from February 1973 onwards can be said to have followed the previous pattern, although at a somewhat lower level than in 1972. The bulk of the terrorist acts that is most of the bombing and shooting attacks on members of the security forces were still perpetrated by the Provisional IRA, with the Loyalists committing the majority of the sectarian assassinations. From 1 February 1973 until 31 October 1974, the police registered 403 deaths, of which 116 were considered to be the responsibility of Loyalists. Of the 145 "factional or sectarian" murders recorded, 95 were ascribed to Loyalists and 40 to the IRA and in 10 cases no attribution was possible. In these twenty-two months, the number of explosions dropped to less than 1,600 - about 330 being attributed to Loyalists - as compared with approximately 1,400 in the one year of 1972. For their part, shootings fell from 10,628 to 7,112, although an increase occurred in punishment shootings such as "executions" and "knee-capping". On 8 August 1973, the Northern <COUNTRY> (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (hereafter abbreviated to the "Emergency Provisions Act") came into force. This Act, which was based mainly on the recommendations of the Diplock Commission (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above), repealed the 1922 Special Powers Act, Regulations 10 and 11 (1) and the 1972 Terrorists Order, while retaining in substance the procedure laid down in the latter Order. Briefly, the extrajudicial powers introduced under the Emergency Provisions Act were: (i) arrest and detention for 72 hours; (ii) interim custody for 28 days; and (iii) detention (see paragraphs 88 and 89 below for a fuller explanation). These emergency powers remained in force for a period of one year unless renewed. The Act also dealt with the trial and punishment by the ordinary courts of certain scheduled offences, for the most part offences concerned with violence. One provision, section 6, is referred to below at paragraph 136. Between 1 February 1973 and 31 October 1974, interim custody orders were served on 99 Protestants and 626 Catholics; at all times many more Catholics than Protestants were actually held. Shortly before Christmas 1973, 65 detainees, 63 of whom were Catholics, were released. During the same period, 2,478 persons were charged with "terrorist-type offences", the total being made up as follows: 1,042 Protestants, 1,420 Catholics and 16 soldiers. These figures included 60 Protestants and 66 Catholics charged with murder. In addition, searches were being conducted and arms recovered in relation to both sides. While the level of violence was reduced in the years 1973 and 1974, progress on the political front was somewhat erratic. In March 1973, the <COUNTRY> Government published a White Paper setting out proposals for the constitutional future of the six counties. These proposals envisaged a new regional government with participation at "cabinet" level by representatives of both communities. A 1973 Act provided for the election of a Northern <COUNTRY> Assembly before the main constitutional legislation was enacted. Elections, based on the principle of proportional representation in order to ensure a fair representation for the Catholic minority, were held on 30 June 1973. Of the 78 members elected to the Assembly, 51 were in favour of the proposed constitutional changes, even though the extreme Loyalist parties had conducted a campaign of opposition. The White Paper proposals were enacted in July 1973 in the form of the Northern <COUNTRY> Constitution Act 1973. This Act empowered the Assembly to legislate within certain limits and established an Executive. A Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights was instituted to advise the Secretary of State. The Act also specifically provided that legislation passed by the Assembly would be void if it discriminated on the ground of religious belief or political opinion; in addition, discrimination by public authorities on such grounds was expressly rendered unlawful. The provisions of the Act relating to legislative and executive powers required the passing by the <COUNTRY> Parliament of a Devolution Order. The Order was made on 19 December 1973 and the devolution became effective on 1 January 1974. This devolution, which was based on the principle of "power-sharing" between the two communities, marked for a certain time the end of direct rule. The Northern <COUNTRY> Executive came into office on 1 January 1974. For the first time, a Northern <COUNTRY> Government contained representatives of both the majority and minority communities, but its life proved to be very brief. In May 1974, Protestant extremist groups combined to organise a politically motivated strike which brought about the downfall of the Executive and a return to direct rule from Westminster. On 29 May, Her Majesty, acting under the Constitution Act referred to in the preceding paragraph, by Order in Council directed that the Northern <COUNTRY> Assembly should stand prorogued for four months. On 17 July 1974, the Northern <COUNTRY> Act 1974 was passed by the <COUNTRY> Parliament in order to make temporary provision for the government of the six counties. This Act suspended the functions of the above-mentioned Assembly and enabled laws to be made by Order in Council, enacted that no appointments to the Executive were to be made, and made the province’s departments subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY>. In 1974, the <COUNTRY> Government appointed the Gardiner Committee whose terms of reference were to consider what provisions and powers, consistent to the maximum extent practicable in the circumstances with the preservation of civil liberties and human rights, were required to deal with terrorism and subversion in Northern <COUNTRY>, including provisions for the administration of justice; to examine the working of the 1973 Emergency Provisions Act; and to make recommendations. The report of the Gardiner Committee was presented to the <COUNTRY> Parliament in January 1975. This report critically examined trial procedures before the ordinary courts, existing and proposed offences connected with terrorism, the powers of the security forces, prison accommodation, special category prisoners and detention. When dealing with the question of detention, the Gardiner Committee noted at paragraph 143: "... We have detailed evidence of 482 cases of intimidation of witnesses between 1st January 1972 and 31st August 1974: and there must be many more. Civilian witnesses to murder and other terrorist offences are either too afraid to make any statement at all, or, having made a statement identifying the criminal, refuse in any circumstances to give evidence in court. The prevalence of murder and knee-capping make this only too easy to understand." The Gardiner Committee, while making certain recommendations about detention and existing detention procedures, concluded at paragraphs 148 and 149: "After long and anxious consideration, we are of the opinion that detention cannot remain as a long-term policy. In the short term, it may be an effective means of containing violence, but the prolonged effects of the use of detention are ultimately inimical to community life, fan a widespread sense of grievance and injustice, and obstruct those elements in Northern <COUNTRY> society which could lead to reconciliation. Detention can only be tolerated in a democratic society in the most extreme circumstances; it must be used with the utmost restraint and retained only as long as it is strictly necessary. We would like to be able to recommend that the time has come to abolish detention; but the present level of violence, the risks of increased violence, and the difficulty of predicting events even a few months ahead make it impossible for us to put forward a precise recommendation on the timing. We think that this grave decision can only be made by the Government ..." The Emergency Provisions Act of 1973, the main subject of the examination by the Gardiner Committee, was extended by Orders of 17 July 1974, 17 December 1974 and 27 June 1975. On 7 August 1975, the <COUNTRY> Parliament, acting on the recommendations of the Gardiner report, passed the Northern <COUNTRY> (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act 1975 (hereafter abbreviated to the "Emergency Provisions Amendment Act"). This Act, which came into effect on 21 August 1975, amended the law relating to detention without trial (see paragraph 90 below), as well as containing further provisions concerned with criminal proceedings, the maintenance of order and the detection of crime in Northern <COUNTRY>. The Emergency Provisions Amendment Act is still in force, having twice been continued by Parliamentary Resolution. No detailed statistics for the year 1975 are before the Court, although a few figures as to murder charges appear in the Commission’s report. By 19 June, the police had been able to bring criminal charges against a total of 73 Protestants and 20 Catholics in respect of 49 sectarian murders. On 5 December 1975, the Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY> signed orders for the release from detention of the last 75 individuals held under the emergency legislation. Since December 1975, according to the data before the Court, no person has been held in detention under the extrajudicial measures in Northern <COUNTRY>. The terrorism and violence in the province have persisted through 1976 until the present day, accounting, for instance, for the murders of 173 persons and injuries to 770 others between 1 January and 28 June 1976. The respondent Government have drawn attention, before both the Commission and the Court, to the continuous programme of reform implemented in Northern <COUNTRY> since 1969 in order to tackle the problems of unfair discrimination which had prompted the civil rights movement. Radical changes have been made in the structure of local government in the province: universal suffrage was introduced in 1969, proportional representation in 1972, local government boundaries were revised in 1973, and many important functions such as education and housing were transferred to special area boards or to central government bodies in the hope of ending or reducing the fear of discrimination in the social field. In 1969, the Northern <COUNTRY> Government established a Parliamentary Commissioner (e. Ombudsman) for Administration and a Commissioner for Complaints. The provisions of the Northern <COUNTRY> Constitution Act of 1973 directed against discrimination have already been referred to (paragraph 72 above). The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, set up under the last-mentioned Act, began in 1975 a detailed study of the extent to which the existing legislation provides a sufficient protection for human rights in the six counties. Legislation making discrimination unlawful in the private sector was introduced in 1976. EXTRAJUDICIAL DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY During the period under consideration, in addition to the ordinary criminal law which remained in force and in use, the authorities had various special powers to combat terrorism in Northern <COUNTRY>. These were all discretionary and underwent modification from time to time, as is described below; they enabled the authorities to effect extrajudicial deprivation of liberty falling into the following three basic categories: - initial arrest for interrogation; - detention for further interrogation (originally called "detention" and subsequently "interim custody"); - preventive detention (originally called "internment" and subsequently "detention"). In accordance with Article 15 para. 3 (art. 15-3) of the Convention, the <COUNTRY> Government sent to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, both before and after the original application to the Commission, six notices of derogation in respect of these powers. Such notices, of which the first two are not pertinent in the present case, were dated 27 June 1957, 25 September 1969, 20 August 1971, 23 January 1973, 16 August 1973 and 19 September 1975 and drew attention to the relevant legislation and modifications thereof. A. The special powers act and regulations there under The Special Powers Act empowered the Minister of Home Affairs for Northern <COUNTRY>, until 30 March 1972, or, thereafter and until 8 August 1973, the Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY> to take all such steps and issue all such orders as might be necessary for preserving peace and maintaining order. It was an enabling Act whose substantive provisions were contained in Regulations made there under. Before direct rule, either House of Parliament of Northern <COUNTRY> could, at the time Regulations were made, request the Governor to annul them; subsequently, new Regulations were subject to approval by the <COUNTRY> Parliament. The number and scope of the Regulations in force varied over the years; they could be brought into use without any legislative act or proclamation. Those relevant to the present case were made in 1956 (Regulations 11 and 12) and 1957 (Regulation 10). They were utilised to implement the policy of internment introduced on 9 August 1971 and advice of their use was given to the Secretary-General by the <COUNTRY> Government’s notice of derogation of 20 August 1971 (Yearbook of the Convention, volume 14, page 32). They conferred the four powers described below. Arrest under Regulation 10 Under this Regulation - any individual could be arrested without warrant and detained for the purpose of interrogation; - the arrest could be authorised by any officer of the RUC; - the officer had to be of the opinion that the arrest should be realised "for the preservation of the peace and maintenance of order"; - the detention could not exceed forty-eight hours. Exercise of the power was not conditional on suspicion of an offence and, following a practice originating in instructions issued to the military police in May 1970, the individual was not normally informed of the reason for his arrest. Although looked upon in principle as a preliminary to detention and internment (see paragraphs 83 and 84 below), arrest sometimes had the object of interrogating a person about the activities of others. Some arrests, and some subsequent detention orders, seem to have been made on the basis of inadequate or inaccurate information. The individual could not apply for bail (see the judgment of 12 October 1971 delivered by the High Court of Justice in Northern <COUNTRY> in the case of In Re McElduff). Moreover, arrests under this Regulation could not as a general rule be questioned in the courts but it was held in the judgment of 18 February 1972 delivered by the Armagh County Court in the case of Moore Shillington and Ministry of Defence that failure to comply with the proper procedure, including certain fundamental principles of the common law, invalidated exercise of the power. On 8 August 1973 the Emergency Provisions Act (see paragraph 88 below) repealed Regulation 2,937 persons had been arrested there under prior to 30 March 1972, of whom 1,711 had been released within forty-eight hours and 1,226 had had their detention prolonged under other Regulations. Arrest under Regulation 11 (1) Under this Regulation - any individual could be arrested without warrant; - the arrest could be effected by any police constable, member of the forces or person authorised by the "Civil Authority" (e. the Minister of Home Affairs or his delegates); - the person making the arrest had to suspect the individual of acting, having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order or of having committed an offence against the Regulations; - the duration of the arrest was unlimited in law but limited in practice to seventy-two hours. Arrest under this Regulation could follow arrest under Regulation 10, giving a total of at most one hundred and twenty hours. The individual was not normally informed of the reason for his arrest. Judicial decisions show that review by the courts of the exercise of this power was limited. They could intervene if there had been bad faith, absence of a genuine suspicion, improper motive or failure to comply either with the statutory procedures or with such principles of the common law as were held not to be excluded by the language of the Regulation; however, they could not in general enquire into the reasonableness or fairness of the suspicion or of the decision to exercise the power (see the McElduff case and the judgment of 11 January 1973 delivered by the High Court of Justice in Northern <COUNTRY> in the case of Kelly Faulkner and others). Under Regulation 11 (4), the individual could apply to the Civil Authority for release on bail and, if that Authority so directed, might be conditionally discharged from custody by a magistrate; however, this right was abolished on 7 November 1972 with the revocation of Regulation 11 (4) by the Terrorists Order (see paragraph 85 below). Regulation 11 (1) was repealed on 8 August 1973 by the Emergency Provisions Act (see paragraph 88 below). Detention under Regulation 11 (2) Under this Regulation - any individual arrested under Regulation 11 (1) could be detained in prison or elsewhere on the conditions directed by the Civil Authority; - the power to make detention orders was vested in the Civil Authority and the initiative for them came from the police. The respondent Government said that they were always made on the personal decision, before direct rule, of the Prime Minister of Northern <COUNTRY> or, thereafter, of the Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY> or two other Ministers; - detention continued until the individual was discharged by the Attorney-General or brought before a court. Its duration was unlimited in law but limited in practice, generally, to twenty-eight days. The respondent Government said that detention orders were made to enable the police to complete enquiries. If they had sufficient evidence to secure a conviction, the individual would be brought before an ordinary court in which event he was entitled to at least twenty-four hours’ notice of the charge. Alternatively, he might be released after a limited period or be the subject of an internment order (see paragraph 84 below). The detainee had the limited right to apply for bail afforded by Regulation 11 (4) (see paragraph 82 above). The position concerning supervision by the courts was the same as under Regulations 10 and 11 (1) (see the McElduff and the Kelly cases) and there was no other procedure for review of the detention. More than 1,250 detention orders were made under Regulation 11 (2), the vast majority before 30 March 1972. Nearly 120 orders were still in force on 7 November 1972 when the Regulation was revoked by the Terrorists Order (see paragraph 85 below). Internment under Regulation 12 (1) Under this Regulation - any individual could by order be subjected to restrictions on movement or interned; - the power to make such orders was vested before direct rule in the Minister of Home Affairs for Northern <COUNTRY> on the recommendation of a senior police officer or of an advisory committee. The respondent Government said that they were always made on the personal decision of the Prime Minister of Northern <COUNTRY>; - the Minister had to be satisfied that for securing the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order it was expedient that a person suspected of acting, having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial te peace and order be subjected to such restrictions or interned; - the duration of internment was unlimited. In many cases, after prolongation under later legislation (see paragraphs 85 and 88 below), it lasted for some years. Every order had to provide for the consideration by and advisory committee of representations made by the individual. In fact it reviewed the position of all internees whether they made representations or not. The committee composed of a judge and two laymen, could recommend, but not order, release. The individual had no right in law to appear or be legally represented before the committee, to test the grounds for internment, to examine witnesses against him or to call his own witnesses. In fact, he was allowed to appear and be interviewed and every effort was made to trace witnesses he proposed. The committee required the security forces to produce the information in their possession but statements of evidence against the internee so obtained remained anonymous, apparently to avoid retaliation. According to the Commission, the committee probably relied on evidence not admissible in a court of law. The position concerning the review of internment orders by the courts was the same as under Regulations 10, 11 (1) and 11 (2) (see the Kelly case). 796 orders were made under Regulation 12 (1), all before the introduction of direct rule. Nearly 170 orders were still in force on 7 November 1972 when the Regulation was revoked by the Terrorists Order (see paragraph 85 below). By 30 March 1972, 588 of the 796 cases had been reviewed by the advisory committee (although 451 internees refused to appear) and 69 releases recommended. Of the 69 individuals all were released except 6 who refused to give an undertaking as to future good behaviour. B. The terrorists order The Terrorists Order, a temporary measure made under the Temporary Provisions Act (see paragraph 49 above), introduced an independent review of decisions on detention for further interrogation and on preventive detention whereas, previously, such decisions had been taken by the administrative authority alone. The Order revoked with effect from 7 November 1972 Special Powers Regulations 11 (2) and (4) and 12 (1) - but not 10 and 11 (1) - and converted existing detention or internment orders into interim custody orders (see paragraph 86 below). The Order defined "terrorism" as "the use of violence for political ends [including] any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear". The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe was advised of the making of this Order by the <COUNTRY> Government’s notice of derogation of 23 January 1973 (Yearbook of the Convention, volume 16, pages 24 and 26). The Order conferred the powers described below and was repealed by the Emergency Provisions Act on 8 August 1973 (see paragraph 88 below). Interim custody under Article 4 Under this Article - any individual could by an interim custody order be temporarily detained; - the power to make such orders was vested in the Secretary of State for Northern <COUNTRY>; - the power was exercisable where it appeared to the Secretary of State that the individual was suspected of having been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or the organisation of persons for the purpose of terrorism; - detention was limited to twenty-eight days unless the case was referred by the Chief Constable - or, as regards persons originally held under the Special Powers Regulations, by the Secretary of State - to a commissioner for determination, in which event it could continue only until such determination. The individual had to be released after twenty-eight days if his case had not by then been referred to a commissioner but, in fact, all cases, including those of persons originally detained or interned under the Special Powers Regulations, were so referred. During the order’s initial twenty-eight days and during its extension pending the commissioner’s adjudication, which could take up to six months, the individual had no means under the Terrorists Order of challenging the lawfulness of his detention. Figures for interim custody orders appear in paragraph 89 below. Detention under Article 5 Under this Article - where the case of an individual subject to an interim custody order under Article 4 was referred to a commissioner, he could make a detention order for that individual’s detention; - the commissioner had first to satisfy himself by enquiry that the individual had been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or the organisation of persons for the purpose of terrorism and that his detention was necessary for the protection of the public. If so satisfied, he had to make an order; if not, he had to direct the individual’s discharge; - the duration of detention was unlimited. In many cases, after prolongation under later legislation (see paragraph 88 below), it lasted for some years. Unlike the recommendation of the advisory committee under Regulation 12 (1), a commissioner’s decision to release was binding. The Secretary of State retained independent powers to release detainees with or without conditions and to recall to detention an individual conditionally released by him. He could also at any time refer a detention order case to a commissioner for review; in that event discharge was obligatory unless the commissioner considered continued detention necessary for public protection. Proceedings before a commissioner took place in private. At least three days before the hearing the individual had to be notified in writing of the nature of the terrorist activities to be enquired into. He had the right to legal aid and to be legally represented and had to be present unless removed on grounds of disorderly conduct or of security. He could be required to answer questions; he had no right to examine or have examined witnesses against him but the respondent Government said that, in practice, cross-examination took place. The individual had to be informed, as far as possible, of matters dealt with in his absence for security reasons but had no right to test evidence given at that time. The commissioner might receive evidence however obtained and irrespective of whether it would be admissible in a court of law. This procedure applied, mutatis mutandis, both to initial references to a commissioner and to later references for review. Article 6 of the Terrorists Order introduced a right for the individual to appeal within twenty-one days against a detention order to a detention appeal tribunal of at least three members. Procedurally the individual’s position before the tribunal was similar to his position before a commissioner; however, he was entitled to be present only when fresh evidence was produced, which was rare as the tribunal generally relied on the evidence furnished to the commissioner. Both commissioners and members of the tribunal had to have experience of judicial office or at least ten years’ experience as a barrister, advocate or solicitor. Figures for detention orders appear in paragraph 89 below. The emergency provisions act The Emergency Provisions Act, based on the recommendations of the Diplock Commission (see paragraph 59 above), repealed with effect from 8 August 1973 the Special Powers Act, Regulations 10 and 11 (1) and the Terrorists Order but maintained in effect - under its own provisions - the existing interim custody and detention orders. The emergency powers contained in the new Act were to remain in force for one year unless renewed for a period not exceeding one year by an Order of the Secretary of State approved by both <COUNTRY> Houses of Parliament; they were in fact renewed for six-monthly periods commencing on 25 July 1974, 25 January 1975 and 25 July 1975 and then amended on 21 August 1975 by the Emergency Provisions Amendment Act (see paragraph 90 below). The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe was advised of the new legislation, and of the subsequent renewal and amendment of the emergency powers, by the <COUNTRY> Government’s notices of derogation of 16 August 1973 (Yearbook of the Convention, volume 16, pages 26 and 28) and 19 September 1975 (document DH (75) 5, page 5). The new Act (section 10 (5) and Schedule 1) re-enacted, in substance, the powers contained in the Terrorists Order, retaining its definition of terrorism. Accordingly, the powers to make interim custody and detention orders, and the review thereof by a commissioner and the appeal tribunal, continued in the manner, on the conditions and subject to the procedure described in paragraph 86 and 87 above, with the significant differences that: - the individual had to receive a written statement concerning the terrorist activities to be investigated by the commissioner at least seven (rather than three) days before the hearing; - in addition to his optional power to refer, the Secretary of State had to refer to a commissioner the case of anyone held under a detention order for one year since the making of the order or for six months since the last review. Section 10 of the Act also provided that any constable might arrest without warrant a person whom he suspected of being a terrorist; detention after arrest was limited to seventy-two hours. The Act conferred certain other powers of arrest (sections 11 and 12) which are not in issue in the present case. Figures for interim custody and detention orders (under the Terrorists Order and the Emergency Provisions Act) are: - November 1972 to 1 February 1973: 166 interim custody orders (under the Terrorists Order); - November 1972 to January 1973: 128 individuals detained under the Terrorists Order and 94 released; - November 1972 to 5 September 1973: the commissioners reviewed 579 cases (296 interim custody orders made under the Terrorists Order or the Emergency Provisions Act; 165 former internments and 118 former detentions under the Special Powers Regulations); they made 453 detention orders and directed release in the remaining 126 cases; - November 1972 to 3 October 1973: 44 appeals were lodged with the detention appeal tribunal; 34 had been heard and 25 releases directed. The emergency provisions amendment act With effect from 21 August 1975, the Emergency Provisions Amendment Act, based on the recommendations of the Gardiner Committee (see paragraph 74 above), made, inter alia, new provisions for the detention of terrorists which have not been the subject of the present case. The Act reverted to the principle of detention by order of the Secretary of State, rather than of a commissioner, such order to be preceded by a report from a legally qualified Adviser. As indicated in the <COUNTRY> Government’s communication of 12 December 1975 to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe (Yearbook of the Convention, volume 18, page 18), on 5 December 1975 the Secretary of State signed orders for the release of the last 75 persons detained under the emergency legislation; all were released forthwith except those remanded in custody on criminal charges or serving sentences of imprisonment. Since then, according to the data before the Court, the power to make detention orders under the Emergency Provisions Amendment Act has not been exercised. ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREATMENT A. Introduction As recounted above at paragraphs 39 and 41, on 9 August 1971 and thereafter numerous persons in Northern <COUNTRY> were arrested and taken into custody by the security forces acting in pursuance of the emergency powers. The persons arrested were interrogated, usually by members of the RUC, in order to determine whether they should be interned and/or to compile information about the IRA. In all, about 3,276 persons were processed by the police at various holding centres from August 1971 until June 1972. The holding centres were replaced in July 1972 by police offices in Belfast and at Ballykelly Military Barracks. Allegations of ill-treatment have been made by the applicant Government in relation both to the initial arrests and to the subsequent interrogations. The applicant Government submitted written evidence to the Commission in respect of 228 cases concerning incidents between 9 August 1971 and 1974. The procedure followed for the purposes of ascertaining the facts (Article 28, sub-paragraph (a), of the Convention) (art. 28-a) was one decided upon by the Commission and accepted by the Parties. The Commission examined in detail with medical reports and oral evidence 16 "illustrative" cases selected at its request by the applicant Government. The Commission considered a further 41 cases (the so-called "41 cases") on which it had received medical reports and invited written comments; it referred to the remaining cases. The nature of the evidence submitted by the two Governments and the procedure followed by the Commission in its investigation of such evidence are set out in some detail in the Commission’s report. The Commission came to view that neither the witnesses from the security forces nor the case-witnesses put forward by the applicant Government had given accurate and complete accounts of what had happened. Consequently, where the allegations of ill-treatment were in dispute, the Commission treated as "the most important objective evidence" the medical findings which were not contested as such. The following account of events is based on the information set out in the Commission’s report and in the other documents before the Court. In order to protect the identity of certain persons, notably witnesses, the published version of the Commission’s report (see paragraph 7 above) incorporated changes to the original text; these changes mainly took the form of designating such persons by letters and/or figures. The Commission grouped the cases into five categories, according to the place where the ill-treatment was said to have been inflicted, namely: (1) the unidentified interrogation centre or centres; (2) Palace Barracks, Holywood; (3) Girdwood Park Barracks; (4) Ballykinler Regional Holding Centre; and (5) various other miscellaneous places. B. The unidentified interrogation centre or centres Twelve persons arrested on 9 August 1971 and two persons arrested in October 1971 were singled out and taken to one or more unidentified centres. There, between 11 to 17 August and 11 to 18 October respectively, they were submitted to a form of "interrogation in depth" which involved the combined application of five particular techniques. These methods, sometimes termed "disorientation" or "sensory deprivation" techniques, were not used in any cases other than the fourteen so indicated above. It emerges from the Commission’s establishment of the facts that the techniques consisted of: (a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a "stress position", described by those who underwent it as being "spread eagled against the wall, with their fingers put high above the head against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the body mainly on the fingers"; (b) hooding: putting a black or navy coloured bag over the detainees’ heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation; (c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room where there was a continuous loud and hissing noise; (d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving the detainees of sleep; (e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during their stay at the centre and pending interrogations. The Commission’s findings as to the manner and effects of the application of these techniques on two particular case-witnesses are referred to below at paragraph 104. From the start, it has been conceded by the respondent Government that the use of the five techniques was authorised at "high level". Although never committed to writing or authorised in any official document, the techniques had been orally taught to members of the RUC by the English Intelligence Centre at a seminar held in April 1971. The two operations of interrogation in depth by means of the five techniques led to the obtaining of a considerable quantity of intelligence information, including the identification of 700 members of both IRA factions and the discovery of individual responsibility for about 85 previously unexplained criminal incidents. Reports alleging physical brutality and ill-treatment by the security forces were made public within a few days of Operation Demetrius (described above at paragraph 39). A committee of enquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Edmund Compton was appointed by the <COUNTRY> Government on 31 August 1971 to investigate such allegations. Among the 40 cases this Committee examined were 11 cases of persons subjected to the five techniques in August 1971; its findings were that interrogation in depth by means of the techniques constituted physical ill-treatment but not physical brutality as it understood that term. The Committee’s report, adopted on 3 November 1971, was made public, as was a supplemental report of 14 November by Sir Edmund Compton in relation to 3 further cases occurring in September and October, one of which involved the techniques. 100. The Compton reports came under considerable criticism in the <COUNTRY>. On 16 November 1971, the British Home Secretary announced that a further Committee had been set up under the chairmanship of Lord Parker of Waddington to consider "whether, and if so in what respects, the procedures currently authorised for interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism and for their custody while subject to interrogation require amendment". The Parker report, which was adopted on 31 January 1972, contained a majority and a minority opinion. The majority report concluded that the application of the techniques, subject to recommended safeguards against excessive use, need not be ruled out on moral grounds. On the other hand, the minority report by Lord Gardiner disagreed that such interrogation procedures were morally justifiable, even in emergency terrorist conditions. Both the majority and the minority considered the methods to be illegal under domestic law, although the majority confined their view to English law and to "some if not all the techniques". 101. The Parker report was published on 2 March 1972. On the same day, the <COUNTRY> Prime Minister stated in Parliament: "[The] Government, having reviewed the whole matter with great care and with reference to any future operations, have decided that the techniques ... will not be used in future as an aid to interrogation." He further declared: "The statement that I have made covers all future circumstances. If a Government did decide ... that additional techniques were required for interrogation, then I think that ... they would probably have to come to the House and ask for the powers to do it." As foreshadowed in the Prime Minister’s statement, directives expressly prohibiting the use of the techniques, whether singly or in combination were then issued to the security forces by the Government (see paragraph 135 below). 102. At the hearing before the Court on 8 February 1977, the <COUNTRY> Attorney-General made the following declaration: "The Government of the <COUNTRY> have considered the question of the use of the ‘five techniques’ with very great care and with particular regard to Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention. They now give this unqualified undertaking, that the ‘five techniques’ will not in any circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation." 103. The Irish Government referred to the Commission 8 cases of persons submitted to the five techniques during interrogation at the unidentified centre or centres between 11 and 17 August 1971. A further case, that of T 22, considered in the Commission’s report in the context of Palace Barracks, concerned the use of the five techniques in October 1971. The Commission examined as illustrative the cases of T 6 and T 13, which were among the 11 cases investigated by the Compton Committee. 104. T 6 and T 13 were arrested on 9 August 1971 during Operation Demetrius. Two days later they were transferred from Magilligan Regional Holding Centre to an unidentified interrogation centre where they were medically examined on arrival. Thereafter, with intermittent periods of respite, they were subjected to the five techniques during four or possibly five days; neither the Compton or Parker Committees nor the Commission were able to establish the exact length of the periods of respite. The Commission was satisfied that T 6 and T 13 were kept at the wall for different periods totalling between twenty to thirty hours, but it did not consider it proved that the enforced stress position had lasted all the time they were at the wall. It stated in addition that the required posture caused physical pain and exhaustion. The Commission noted that, later on during his stay at the interrogation centre, T 13 was allowed to take his hood off when he was alone in the room, provided that he turned his face to the wall. It was not found possible by the Commission to establish for what periods T 6 and T 13 had been without sleep, or to what extent they were deprived of nourishment and whether or not they were offered food but refused to take it. The Commission found no physical injury to have resulted from the application of the five techniques as such, but loss of weight by the two case-witnesses and acute psychiatric symptoms developed by them during interrogation were recorded in the medical and other evidence. The Commission, on the material before it, was unable to establish the exact degree of any psychiatric after-effects produced on T 6 and T 13, but on the general level it was satisfied that some psychiatric after-effects in certain of the fourteen persons subjected to the techniques could not be excluded. 105. T 13 claimed in addition to have been beaten and otherwise physically ill-treated, but the medical evidence before the Commission, as the delegates explained at the hearing before the Court on 21 April 1977, gave reason to doubt that he had been assaulted to any severe degree, if at all. Accordingly, the Commission treated the allegations in regard to T 13 as concerning the five techniques only. T 6 similarly alleged that he was also assaulted in various ways at, or during transport to and from, the centre. On 17 August 1971 he was medically examined on leaving the centre and also on his subsequent arrival at Crumlin Road Prison where he was then detained until 3 May 1972. The medical reports of these examinations and photographs taken on the same day revealed on T 6’s body bruising and contusions that had not been present on 11 August. While not accepting all T 6’s allegations, the Commission was "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that certain of these injuries ... [were] the result of assaults committed on him by the security forces at the centre". As a general inference from the facts established in T 6’s case, the Commission also found it "probable that physical violence was sometimes used in the forcible application of the five techniques". 106. Although several other cases were referred to before the Commission by the applicant Government in connection with the unidentified interrogation centre or centres, no detailed allegations or findings are set out in the Commission’s report except in the case of T 22 which was one of the "41 cases". The medical evidence established that when leaving the centre and on entering Crumlin Road Prison, T 22 had suffered superficial bruising. The Commission’s short assessment of this case, which it described as comparable to the case of T 6, was that "there exists a strong indication that the course of events was similar to that found in the illustrative [case]". 107. T 13 and T 6 instituted civil proceedings in 1971 to recover damages for wrongful imprisonment and assault; their claims were settled in 1973 and 1975 respectively for £15,000 and £14,000. The twelve other individuals against whom the five techniques were used have all received in settlement of their civil claims compensation ranging from £10,000 to £25,000. Palace barracks Introduction 108. Palace Barracks, a military camp in Holywood, County Down, on the outskirts of Belfast, was used as a holding centre for some days in August 1971 and then from September 1971 until June 1972. During this period, when it was the main interrogation centre in Northern <COUNTRY>, some 2,000 persons from all over the province passed through Palace Barracks. The centre was operated jointly by the army and the RUC. Persons held there were photographed immediately after arriving and, from November 1971 onwards (see paragraph 133 below), examined by a doctor on entry as well as departure. The interrogations - records of which were kept for filing – were conducted solely by police, usually at least two in number, from the Special Branch of the RUC. These men, who were independent of the uniformed RUC, came under the responsibility of an officer in charge with the rank of inspector. Many of them interrogated prisoners both at Palace Barracks and at Girdwood Park on a rotating system. 109. A total of 45 cases concerned with Palace Barracks were submitted to the Commission by the applicant Government. The Commission examined in detail 9 illustrative cases, all relating to the period between September and November 1971. It also considered a further 8 cases, included in the "41 cases"; of these 8 cases, 6 covered the months October to December 1971 while 2 concerned events occurring in January and May 1972. The illustrative cases (a) The cases of T 2, T 8, T 12 and T 15 110. These four men were all arrested early on 20 September 1971 at their homes in County Tyrone and taken to Palace Barracks for interrogation. They were photographed and examined by an army doctor immediately after their arrest; apart from one small scar, no injuries were apparently found. The next day they were transferred together from Palace Barracks to Crumlin Road Prison. They all alleged that at various times they had been made to stand spread eagled against a wall and had been severely beaten or otherwise physically ill-treated, particularly during interrogations. On their arrival at Crumlin Road, a prison doctor found contusions and bruising on three of the men; on 23 September, another doctor found similar injuries on the fourth man. In the Commission’s view, this medical evidence made "it highly probable that all the four received their injuries while at Palace Barracks". Despite the absolute denials given in evidence by witnesses from the security forces at Palace Barracks, the Commission held the following facts, amongst others, to be established beyond reasonable doubt: "The four men ... were severely beaten by members of the security forces ... The beating was not occasional but it was applied in a sort of scheme in order to make them speak ..." Each man instituted civil proceedings for damages and rejected the offer of £750 made in settlement of his claim. (b) The cases of T 9 and T 14 111. T 9 and T 14 were arrested together by an army patrol in a Belfast street on the night of 16 October 1971. They were brought to Palace Barracks for interrogation and held there until the evening of 18 October when they were transferred to Crumlin Road Prison. On arrival at the latter institution, they were examined by a prison doctor. T 14 was immediately transported to the prison hospital wing where he spent the next three weeks. Both men soon made statements alleging ill-treatment at Palace Barracks. T 14, for instance, claimed that he had been made to stand spread eagled against a wall while being questioned by a Special Branch man who was kicking him continuously on the insides of the legs. They obtained legal assistance and were further medically examined. The medical evidence disclosed injuries described as "substantial" in T 9’s case and "massive" in T 14’s case. The Commission concluded that "the proved injuries must have been caused while the two men were at Palace Barracks". Fourteen members of the security forces at the centre gave evidence completely denying any knowledge of the injuries or their causes, but these denials were not believed by the Commission. While viewing certain of the two men’s assertions as exaggerated, invented or improbable, the Commission made the following finding: "T 9 and T 14 ... were subjected to physical violence, especially kicking and beating, during or between a series of ‘interviews’ conducted by the Special Branch." Civil proceedings seeking damages were instituted by T 14 and T 9; their claims were settled for £2,250 and £1,975 respectively. They also, it seems, complained to the police, but no evidence was produced to the Commission of a police enquiry into their complaints. (c) The cases of T 1 and T 4 112. These two cases, although not directly connected, have certain similarities and were grouped together by the Commission. 113. T 1 was arrested at his home in the early hours of 20 October 1971 and taken by soldiers to Palace Barracks. He was questioned several times that day. At about 30 p.he was released without being charged. The following morning, he was examined by a general practitioner who found what he considered to be rather superficial injuries. T 1 alleged that he had been kicked and punched while being made to stand against the wall with his weight on his fingertips. These allegations were completely denied by witnesses from the police. No corroborated evidence was produced by either side to confirm or rebut the suggestion made by police witnesses that T 1 might have received his injuries after his release while being "questioned" by the IRA. T 1 did concede having had some previous contacts, albeit superficial and undesired, with IRA members. The Commission found inter alia: "It cannot ... be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that [T 1] ... received these injuries in the way alleged by him." Although T 1 said that he had brought a civil action for damages, there is no information as to the outcome of those proceedings. He further stated that after complaint to the RUC, he was told that his allegations had been investigated but found to be unsubstantiated. 114. T 4 was arrested by an army patrol in the street near his home in the afternoon of 2 November 1971. He was taken by army vehicle first to a police station, where he stayed for less than an hour, and then on to Palace Barracks for questioning. He was released the same day. He alleged that he had been kicked and beaten by soldiers when lying on the floor of the army vehicle and thereafter beaten during interrogation by the police at Palace Barracks. Both the army and the police witnesses denied these allegations. The day after his release, T 4 saw his family doctor who found extensive bruising to his body. On 4 November, he was admitted to hospital where he remained under observation for about two weeks. The Commission considered that the medical evidence was difficult to reconcile with the account given by T 4 of his alleged ill-treatment. The findings of the Commission included the following: "Bearing in mind that twelve hours elapsed from his release until his medical examination, the statements of the soldiers and some doubt about T 4’s reliability, it cannot be concluded, solely on T 4’s own statements, that he received these injuries at the hands of the army or the police." There is no evidence of any civil action brought by T 4 or of any army investigation into complaints he apparently made; the results of a police enquiry are not known. (d) The case of T 10 115. T 10 was arrested at his house early in the morning of 18 November 1971 and subsequently taken to Palace Barracks for interrogation. The next day a detention order was served on him and he was transferred to Crumlin Road Prison. T 10 alleged that while at the interrogation centre he was subjected to what the Commission terms "comparatively trivial beatings". He was medically examined on arrival at Palace Barracks, when entering Crumlin Road Prison and on 20 November by his family doctor who saw him in prison. The latter two examinations revealed that T 10 had suffered a perforation to the right eardrum and some minor bruising. Despite absolute denials on the part of the five witnesses from the security forces, the Commission found it proved beyond reasonable doubt that T 10’s injuries could not have been caused in any way materially different from that described in his evidence. In the Commission’s view, it was to be taken as established that the acts complained of occurred at Palace Barracks. T 10 did not, it seems, institute civil proceedings for damages. On the other hand, he complained through his lawyer against a number of police officers, but no evidence was produced by the respondent Government of any real police investigation. The "41 cases" 116. Within this group, there are 8 cases (T 22, T 27, T 28, T 29, T 30, T 31, T 48 and one other) raising allegations of ill-treatment by the army during transport to Palace Barracks and by the police during interrogation there. The case of T 22 had already been mentioned in connection with the unidentified centre or centres (see paragraph 106 above). The medical reports show that the persons concerned had sustained injuries in varying degrees. No evidence, though, was obtained from the respondent Government. The Commission, while therefore feeling it unsafe to make any findings on the basis of the medical reports alone, stated in its short assessment: "Nevertheless, in those cases in which the victims were detained following their interrogation and were medically examined shortly after their committal to detention (the cases of T 22, T 27, T 48, T 29, T 30 and T 31), there exists a strong indication that the course of events was similar to that found in the illustrative cases." T 27, T 30 and T 31 accepted sums of £900, £200 and £750 respectively in settlement of civil claims brought. At the time of the Commission’s report, actions for damages were still pending in the cases of T 22 and T 29; a substantial sum was ultimately received by the former person as a victim of the five techniques (see paragraph 107 above). The remaining cases 117. In the absence of corroborative, including medical, evidence, the Commission did not find it possible to examine further another 28 cases concerning Palace Barracks. It merely confirmed that allegations of ill-treatment had been made and that, in some cases, compensation had been paid. General 118. The Commission considered on a number of grounds that the police officers in command at Palace Barracks at the relevant time could not have been ignorant of the acts of ill-treatment found to have been committed. Yet, on their own evidence, these officers took no action to prevent the occurrence or repetition of such ill-treatment. Knowledge on the part of the higher authorities of allegations regarding this centre was inferred by the Commission from various facts. Nevertheless, no evidence of police investigations into these allegations was produced to the Commission and, apart from Sir Edmund Compton’s "supplemental" report into three Palace Barracks cases (see paragraph 99 above), no general enquiry took place. Furthermore, no disciplinary or criminal proceedings seem to have been instituted against any of the police officers who either committed or failed to react against the acts established. No special instructions relating to the proper treatment of persons in custody were issued to the RUC until April 1972 (see paragraph 135 below). Through their inaction, the authorities in Northern <COUNTRY> were held by the Commission to have shown indifference towards the treatment of prisoners at Palace Barracks in the autumn of 1971. Girdwood park regional holding centre Introduction 119. This army camp on the outskirts of Belfast, adjacent to Crumlin Road Prison, was used as a regional centre for holding and interrogating suspects, 186 of whom passed through it in August 1971. It was temporarily closed in that month and re-opened in October 1971 as a police holding centre. The arrangements at Girdwood for receiving, detaining, interrogating and releasing suspects were essentially the same as at Palace Barracks (see paragraph 108 above). Illustrative case 120. Of 36 cases involving allegations of ill-treatment at Girdwood, the Commission examined in detail as illustrative that of T It found that this Protestant, aged over sixty and arrested in connection with the possession of arms and a radio aerial, had been severely injured on 13 August 1971 by army personnel during transport to Girdwood and following his arrival there. He had been insulted, kicked, beaten and dragged by the hair and his evidence had been corroborated by that of T 23 who had been arrested at the same time. T 16’s ill-treatment was not connected with his formal interrogation which was correctly conducted by the Special Branch. Although the army doctor at Girdwood treated T 16 for a diabetic condition, the Commission considered the medical examination inadequate since no notice was taken of the injuries which were observed later by other doctors. T 16 instituted civil proceedings for damages and the respondent Government indicated to the Commission that his action would certainly be settled. He had also complained immediately to the RUC but, according to the applicant Government, some three years elapsed before he was told that no action was going to be taken against the army; the British Government attributed the impossibility of initiating a prosecution to T 16’s inability to identify his assailants. The "41 cases" 121. The Commission also considered, from the "41 cases", the cases of T 23, T 32, T 33, T 49 and T 50, three of which dated from August 1971, one from November 1971 and one from January 1972. All these persons had been released after questioning, except T 49 who had been charged and presumably detained thereafter. They alleged that they had been assaulted by army personnel on arrest and during transport to Girdwood; T 49 also complained of ill-treatment by the Special Branch during interrogation. Each case was submitted by the Irish Government by means of a medical report and also, except for T 33, the complainant’s own statement; no evidence was obtained from the respondent Government. A medical examination, made within twenty-four hours of release or detention, revealed injuries to each individual. In the Commission’s view: (a) it was fairly safe to conclude that certain of T 23’s and T 50’s injuries had been caused as alleged, particularly in the case of T 23, where the circumstances had been examined in connection with T 16’s case (see paragraph 120 above). A strong probability also existed for T 32 whose claim for damages was later settled for £750; (b) although injuries had been found on T 33, it would be difficult to consider the facts established; (c) the allegations and injuries in the case of T 49 were comparable to those in the Palace Barracks cases; reference was made to the Commission’s assessment of some of the "41 cases" relating to that place (see paragraph 116 above). The remaining cases 122. In the absence of corroborative, including medical, evidence, the Commission did not find it possible to examine further another 30 cases concerning Girdwood. It merely confirmed that allegations of ill-treatment had been made and that, in some cases, compensation had been paid. E. Ballykinler regional holding centre Introduction 123. Ballykinler was an army camp in County Down used in August 1971 for holding and interrogating some of those arrested during Operation Demetrius (see paragraph 39 above). It was under the overall authority of the RUC, the army being responsible for security and the Special Branch conducting the interrogations. On 9 and 10 August, 89 persons were brought to Ballykinler of whom, by 11 August, 80 had been removed to a place of detention and the remainder released. The applicant Government requested the Commission to make findings on all the 18 cases in respect of which they had filed statements alleging ill-treatment at the camp. 124. Prior to the Commission’s enquiry, conditions at Ballykinler in August 1971 had been examined by the Compton Committee (see paragraph 99 above) and by the Armagh County Court in the Moore case. The Compton Committee considered that certain exercises which detainees had been made to do "under some degree of compulsion" must have caused hardship but were the result of lack of judgment rather than an intention to hurt or degrade; it accordingly made no findings of deliberate ill-treatment. In the Moore case, on the other hand, the judge rejected defence evidence, in particular as to the origin of the exercises, and concluded that the treatment of persons held at Ballykinler was "deliberate, unlawful and harsh"; he awarded the plaintiff £300, the maximum amount within his jurisdiction. Illustrative case 125. The Commission examined, as illustrative, the case of T 3 and found that: (a) he and other persons arrested were made (in some cases before medical examination) to do exercises which caused considerable strain and hardship, especially to the elderly and those in poor physical condition; (b) the exercises consisted partly of sitting on the floor with the legs outstretched and the hands raised high above, or clasped behind, the head, and partly of kneeling on the floor with the forehead touching the ground and the hands clasped behind the back; (c) it was not possible to ascertain the exact length of time during which, or the degree of compulsion with which, the exercises were enforced; (d) allegations, concerning both T 3 and others, of specific incidents of violence and of the use of considerable force had not been established; (e) the camp had been swept out, and beds removed for security reasons, before persons arrested arrived; for a purpose not sufficiently explained, bedding was provided only for those who had been interrogated. The "41" and the remaining cases 126. None of the "41 cases" concerned Ballykinler. There is no separate section in the Commission’s report on the remaining 17 cases relating to that centre but findings on the general conditions there were made within the context of T 3’s case. F. Miscellaneous places Introduction 127. 121 cases involving allegations of ill-treatment at miscellaneous places were referred to the Commission by the applicant Government. The allegations included beating and assaults by the army or the police at army posts, police stations, a prison, in the street, at home or during transport at dates falling between August 1971 and 1974. 65 of these cases were in connection with interrogation. The Commission examined in detail as illustrative the cases of T 7, T 11 and T The illustrative cases (a) The case of T 7 128. The Commission found that on 28 October 1971, without provocation or resistance, this civilian had been severely assaulted and injured in a street in Belfast by a corporal effecting his arrest. When it was realised that his arrest had been a mistake, he was discharged with apologies, having been given medical treatment. Neither his evidence nor the medical evidence was disputed and the respondent Government called no witnesses. The soldier in question was detained for four or five days and then admonished. T 7’s claim for damages was settled for £600. (b) The case of T 11 129. The Commission found that, after his arrest on 20 December 1971, this civilian had been severely assaulted and injured by a number of soldiers during interrogation at Albert Street Barracks, Belfast. Neither the main facts nor medical evidence of physical injuries were disputed, although medical opinion differed concerning mental after-effects. The respondent Government called no witnesses to rebut the charges of physical ill-treatment. Additional allegations of harassment by soldiers after the event were found by the Commission to be neither proved nor disproved. T 11’s claim for damages was settled for £300. He also lodged a complaint with the RUC which was still under investigation when the Commission heard evidence on his case; the respondent Government stated that they did not know the reason for the delay. (c) The case of T 5 130. T 5 alleged that he was kicked, punched and hooded by the army at St. Genevieve’s School, Belfast, on 13 August 1972. He was too young to be detained but, after arrest and questioning, he was taken, allegedly for identification purposes, to various army posts. A claim by T 5 for damages was settled in the sum of £236.His complaint to the RUC was unsuccessful. In the light of its review of the medical evidence and the evidence of the security force witnesses and of T 5, the Commission concluded that T 5’s allegations were not sufficiently established. The "41 cases" 131. From these cases, the Commission considered 28 on which the Parties had commented. It took the view that the evidence, in the shape of medical reports accompanied in some cases by a statement from the complainant, did not make it possible to establish beyond reasonable doubt the cause of the injuries. The remaining cases 132. In the absence of corroborative, including medical, evidence, the Commission did not find it possible to examine further the remaining 90 cases. It merely confirmed that allegations of ill-treatment had been made and that, in some cases, compensation had been paid. G. Measures concerning the treatment of persons arrested or held by the security forces Medical and other records 133. From May 1970 onwards, the army rule was that the person arrested and the arresting soldier were to be photographed together. With regard to the practice followed during Operation Demetrius, the Compton Committee noted that a photograph was taken of each person admitted to a regional holding centre and that on entry to Ballykinler and Magilligan, though not to Girdwood Park, a medical examination was carried out and its result recorded. As from 15 November 1971, every individual brought to a holding centre was medically examined on arrival and departure. Medical staff was instructed to submit reports whenever there was evidence of a complaint of ill-treatment. Furthermore, after a certain time, records were kept of the prisoner’s condition during his progress through interrogation. Provisions designed to prevent ill-treatment 134. It would appear that at the beginning of the internment operation reliance was simply placed on the normal regulations requiring humane treatment and forbidding the use of violence. 135. Following the Parker report and the Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament (see paragraph 101 above), a directive on interrogation was issued prohibiting the use of coercion and, in particular, of the five techniques. In addition, it made mandatory medical examinations, the keeping of comprehensive records and the immediate reporting of any complaints of ill-treatment. In April 1972, army instructions and the RUC Force Order 64/72, concerning respectively arrests under the Special Powers Regulations and the treatment of prisoners, directed that excessive force should never be used. Shortly after the introduction of direct rule, the <COUNTRY> Attorney-General gave a ministerial directive on the proper treatment of persons in custody, making it clear that where any form of ill-treatment was reported the Director of Public Prosecutions would prosecute. Further army and RUC instructions of August 1972 in respect of arrest and interrogation enjoined the proper and humane treatment of prisoners; they strictly forbade resort to violence, the five techniques, threats or insults and concluded with a prohibition similar to Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention. In August 1973 new instructions with regard to arrests by the army re-emphasised the need for correct behaviour. The respondent Government submitted that steps had been taken for the diffusion and enforcement at all levels of these orders and directives. However, both the Commission and the applicant Government considered that there was a lack of satisfactory evidence as to how the regulations were implemented and obeyed in practice. 136. Section 6 of the Emergency Provisions Act (see paragraph 68 above) contained provisions designed to exclude as evidence before an ordinary criminal court statements by an accused obtained by torture or inhuman or degrading treatment; the section did not apply to the extrajudicial procedures or to statements by third parties. Complaints procedures and criminal prosecutions (a) The police 137. Under the Police Act (Northern <COUNTRY>) 1970, an investigation department within the RUC had been set up to report to the Chief Constable on all complaints against the police whatever their source. An official committee of five members of the Police Authority of Northern <COUNTRY>, including two Catholics and two Protestants, examined each month the records of complaints kept by the Chief Constable. Where a serious criminal offence was disclosed, reports were submitted to the Attorney-General for Northern <COUNTRY> or, after the introduction of direct rule, to the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern <COUNTRY>, a newly-created office, for decision whether to prosecute. On 15 June 1972, the <COUNTRY> Attorney-General instructed the Director of Public Prosecutions to direct the RUC to investigate and report on any circumstances which might involve the commission of a criminal offence by a member of the security forces. From November 1972 onwards, all completed investigations of both police officers and army personnel had to be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions. In September 1973, new disciplinary regulations brought the arrangements for the investigation of complaints against the RUC into line with the arrangements existing elsewhere in the <COUNTRY>. In 1975, a fresh unit was established within the RUC under the direct control of the Deputy Chief Constable to be responsible for the investigation of complaints. 138. The Gardiner Committee in its report of January 1975 (see paragraph 74 above), while expressing itself satisfied that full investigations were made, nevertheless found a widespread belief in Northern <COUNTRY> that complaints against members of the security forces were not taken seriously. It therefore recommended the setting up of an independent means of investigating complaints. The Police (Northern <COUNTRY>) Order 1977 established a completely independent Police Complaints Board for Northern <COUNTRY> with supervisory functions in the matter. (b) The army 139. The policy of the General Officer Commanding, as stated in the evidence before the Commission, was that every complaint should be investigated. An investigator was automatically appointed as soon as an incident was reported, even before a formal complaint had been made. As with the RUC, notice was also taken of allegations in the press or from third parties. It would seem that in the early stages of the emergency complaints against soldiers were handled by the army authorities themselves; later on, two RUC officers were appointed to oversee army enquiries and subsequently investigations were actually carried out by the RUC, at least where there appeared to be a serious criminal offence. In addition, complainants were encouraged to channel their complaints through the police. On 20 January 1972 a joint army/RUC investigation team was created. Complaints against the army were referred to an outside authority - the Director of Public Prosecutions as from April 1972 – for directions whether to prosecute. (c) Statistics relating to complaints and prosecutions 140. Between 9 August 1971 and 30 November 1974, 2,615 complaints against the police were made, 1,105 alleging ill-treatment or assault; the 23 prosecutions for assault resulted in 6 convictions leading to fines and, in one case, a conditional discharge. As regards the army, from 31 March 1972 to 30 November 1974, 1,268 complaints in respect of assaults or shootings had been received and 1,078 cases of alleged assault were submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions. By January 1975, directions to prosecute had been given in 86 out of the 1,038 cases then dealt with. Overall, between April 1972 and the end of January 1977, 218 members of the security forces were prosecuted for assault at the direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions and 155 were convicted. (d) Particular instances of investigation, disciplinary action or prosecution 141. Soon after complaints relating to the arrests carried out on 9 August 1971 became known, nearly 1,800 soldiers, including 300 or so who had left Northern <COUNTRY>, were interviewed in order to determine their role in the arrest operation. The Commission’s report also mentions a few other specific examples of members of the security forces being investigated or disciplined, but these examples are not connected with the cases submitted by the applicant Government. No information of any investigation into the submitted cases was vouchsafed to the Commission by the respondent Government except in relation to the illustrative cases. Even as regards the illustrative cases, the Commission had before it just one item of direct evidence - the Compton reports, filed by the applicant Government - and it noted that in none of them had the authorities carried out a thorough investigation of the allegations of ill-treatment; evidence as to disciplinary action or prosecution was furnished to the Commission in one case alone, that of T 7 (see paragraph 128 above). Compensation 142. Procedures to obtain compensation were available before the domestic courts to all persons who considered themselves to have been ill-treated by the security forces. There is no suggestion that the domestic courts were or are anything other than independent, fair and impartial. The respondent Government have emphasised the difference between domestic civil and criminal law. Under the former the authorities are liable for any wrongful act, established on the balance of probabilities, committed in the course of their duty by soldiers or policemen, whether individually identified or not. The criminal law, in contrast, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of an identified individual. Like any plaintiff in a civil action, a plaintiff alleging ill-treatment by the security forces was entitled to obtain disclosure of relevant documents, for example medical reports, in the possession of the defendant authorities. 143. Between 9 August 1971 and 31 January 1975, compensation totalling £302,043 had been paid in settlement of 473 civil claims for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, leaving 1,193 actions still outstanding. At the time of the Commission’s report, compensation, ranging from about £200 to £25,000, had been paid in settlement of 45 of the 228 cases submitted by the applicant Government. In the only case of alleged physical ill-treatment which seems to have been fought, namely the case of Moore Shillington (see paragraph 124 above), the judge disbelieved the evidence of the security forces.

Ireland, United Kingdom

8

The case concerns a judgment of the Supreme Court of 2 December 2020 keeping joint legal custody of the child with both parents and establishing the domicile of the applicant’s daughter with her grandmother. Under Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained of a breach of his right to respect for his family life. The applicant is the father of , born on 17 July 2013, while he was in a relationship with when they were both minors. He lives in <COUNTRY>. lives in <COUNTRY> with her mother, , but stays mostly with her grandmother, On 16 June 2014 after becoming of age, the applicant requested sole custody of and the establishment of the child’s domicile with him, with contact rights granted to the mother. At that time the child was being monitored by the Commission for the Protection of Children and Youth ( Comissão de Proteção de Crianças e Jovens – hereinafter “the CPCJ”) following suspicions of negligence on the part of her carers, and However, since the applicant was residing abroad and in view of the fact that was being monitored, the Oporto Family Court provisionally decided that the legal custody of should be joint, that should live with and continue being monitored by the CPCJ. 4 . On 28 August 2017 the applicant lodged a second claim with the Oporto Family Court, reiterating his requests. He contended that he had a stable life and the means to look after his daughter. 5 . By a judgment of 9 February 2020 it was decided that should live with the applicant and contact rights were granted to , and other relatives. Joint legal custody of was kept with both parents. The Oporto Family Court firstly took into consideration the fact that was living with her grandmother, , who had been taking care of her since she was born, initially because was a minor and subsequently because had moved to live with her partner, J., who was a drug user. Secondly, it noted that ’s situation had been monitored by the CPCJ in 2014 and again between 2014 and 2019 owing to alleged instances of ill-treatment of and by J. and also because of ’s mental health. With respect to the applicant, the Oporto Family Court took into consideration the fact that had spent the summer holidays with him and his partner and younger daughter, that they had the means to live together in <COUNTRY>, and that the emotional ties between and the applicant were evident, as could be seen during the hearing. In addition, it considered that the child had said that she enjoyed living in <COUNTRY> with and but also that she loved the applicant and wanted to be with him in his new house. On 16 June 2020, following an appeal from , the Oporto Court of Appeal upheld that decision, taking the view that to live with her father was in ’s best interests. It considered, firstly, that it was with the parents that principal parental responsibility lay, and not with the grandparents or other persons. Secondly, it found that the mother did not fulfil the requirements for carrying out that duty. 7 . On 2 December 2020, following a further appeal from , the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Oporto Court of Appeal. It decided to establish the residence of with her grandmother, and to award the applicant contact rights. The joint legal custody was maintained. The Supreme Court noted that was living with her grandmother It acknowledged that was not living with but rather with J., at an unknown location, and that occasionally slept at ’s house, on a sofa in the living room. Nevertheless, it considered that that was a positive element to take into consideration in view of J.’s past of domestic violence and current drug addiction and that there was no evidence that that had affected the child. The Supreme Court thus found that there was no risk that could justify a change of domicile of the child, or any evidence that had completely relinquished her maternal obligations, even if was ’s main carer. 8 . The Supreme Court further decided that should live with and that should refrain from changing the child’s place of residence without judicial authorisation. As regards that point, it reasoned as follows: “However, there is a risk, in future, that ’s parental responsibilities would need to be limited since she is in a relationship and lives with J. at an unknown location and has mentioned that one day she would like to live with J. and ; J. consumes drugs; in June 2017 J. punished by locking her inside [their] car. Even if at present no risk exists for the child (who lives with ), there could be one in future.” Under Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the Supreme Court’s judgment of 2 December 2022 had not taken account of his daughter’s best interests. He further submitted that should not have been granted de facto custody of , since had not requested it.

France, Portugal

6

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the fairness of Constitutional Court proceedings, because the Constitutional Court had not allowed him an opportunity to comment on observations filed by other participants in the proceedings. 2 . The impugned Constitutional Court proceedings concerned the right to liberty, the right to respect for the applicant’s private life and correspondence and the right not to be ill-treated. In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court, the Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office of the Posavina Canton and the Orašje Municipal Court submitted their observations. Since this was not envisaged by its Rules at that time, the Constitutional Court did not transmit them to the applicant. On 20 May 2020 it dismissed the case. With a view to harmonising its procedure with the case-law of this Court, in 2021 the Constitutional Court decided to start transmitting all observations to the appellants for comments.

5, 6

The application concerns the applicant’s extended medical detention in a psychiatric hospital (since 2011) and the consequences this measure had for the conduct of civil proceedings concerning the property title to his family house. Background of the case 2 . In 1964 the applicant’s father, , sold his property (house, yard and garden, hereinafter “the house”) to , whom he married two months later (hereinafter “the 1964 sale”). In 1999 transferred the title to the house to her granddaughter. died in 1973 and in 2009. The applicant was treated for various psychiatric issued as from 1966, at Sibiu psychiatric hospital (“the SPH”). Proceedings concerning the 1964 sale 4 . On 15 January 2010 the applicant brought a court action against E.H., ’s daughter-in-law who was living on the property in question at that time. He sought annulment of the 1964 sale contract, arguing that it had been concluded with the sole purpose of depriving him of his inheritance. He explained that after ’s death, he had been thrown out of the family house by and her children. Since then he had been homeless, and had been unable to retrieve from the house his identity papers or personal belongings. E.H. claimed that the applicant had moved out of the house in 1946 with his mother, when his parents had divorced. 5 . On 9 June 2010 S. expressed her wish to become the applicant’s temporary guardian ( curator ) and was admitted to the proceedings. She explained that, with the applicant’s agreement, she had been appointed by Sibiu social welfare authority as his temporary guardian in a different set of proceedings concerning an action for recovery of possession of the house ( acţiune în revendicare ), which, on 20 May 2010, was stayed by the District Court pending the outcome of the action concerning the validity of the 1964 sale. There is no indication in the file that any of the parties requested that the proceedings for recovery of possession be reopened after the adoption of decision of 24 April 2014 (see paragraph 9 below). In the proceedings for the recovery of possession, before S.’s intervention, the social welfare authority had denied the court’s requests to appoint a temporary guardian for the applicant, on the grounds that he did not have a known address or valid identity papers. 6 . On 19 April 2011 the Sibiu District Court dismissed the action as being brought against a person without legal standing in the case. It found that E.H. was not ’s heir and did not own the house. 7 . On 10 May 2011 the applicant, to whom the decision was handed in person, lodged an appeal before the Sibiu County Court. He also complained that S. had acted against his interests. 8 . The applicant was informed by the court about the dates of the hearings scheduled in the case, but failed to appeal. The notifications were served on him by posting them on the door of the house. S. also received at least one notification but did not appear. 9 . On 7 November 2011 the County Court stayed the proceedings for lack of participation of the parties and on 24 April 2014 it terminated the proceedings for that reason ( perimarea acţiunii ). 10 . The applicant received a copy of the final decision on 11 October 2018. Medical detention 11 . On 23 November 2010, the judge who had sat in the proceedings concerning the 1964 sale (see paragraph 4 above) lodged with the prosecutor’s office attached to the Sibiu District Court (“the prosecutor”) a criminal complaint against the applicant, accusing him of inappropriate behaviour towards her. At the prosecutor’s request, on 8 June 2011 a commission of the Sibiu Service for Forensic Medicine examined the applicant and found that he was slightly mentally retarded and suffered from persistent delirium issues. 13 . Upon the commission’s recommendation, on 11 July 2011 the applicant was admitted to the SPH where, on 27 July 2011, he underwent a new psychiatric evaluation. The SPH evaluation commission confirmed his diagnosis, found that he had lacked the responsibility of his actions ( lipsa discernământului ), and considered that because of his potential aggressiveness and lack of compliance with treatment, he should be placed in medical detention. On 8 August 2011 the prosecutor ended the investigation and sought the applicant’s medical detention, under Article 114 of the Criminal Code applicable then (see N. <COUNTRY> , no. 59152/08, § 83, 28 November 2017). 15 . On 10 August 2011 the District Court accepted the prosecutor’s proposal and ordered the applicant’s placement in a psychiatric hospital until full recovery. The applicant and his court ‑ appointed lawyer agreed to the prosecutor’s request. 16 . The applicant did not appeal. He explained that that decision had never been served on him. On an unspecified date, he was able to obtain a copy which he appended to the present application. Extension of medical detention 17 . On 20 September 2011 the applicant was admitted to Ştei Hospital for Psychiatry and Preventive Measures where he underwent six forensic psychiatric assessments by a commission of the Bihor Service for Forensic Medicine: on 21 June 2012, 5 February 2015, 3 October 2017, 30 May 2018, 27 March 2019, and 16 March 2021. On four occasions, including the most recent, in 2021, the commission recommended that medical detention be replaced with an obligation to undergo medical treatment either at the same hospital or at a psychiatric hospital closer to his home. Each time, his medical detention was extended by court decision. 18 . In two such decisions submitted to the Court, e. final decisions of 23 July 2019 and 4 August 2020, the Bihor County Court found that the applicant’s health had not improved to such an extent as to make it possible to apply the more lenient measure of compulsory medical treatment or to terminate his medical detention. It relied on the conclusions of the forensic reports and noted the applicant’s advanced age, as well as the lack of social support to ensure that he would pursue his medical treatment if released from hospital. It also reiterated that he had committed criminal acts before his internment. It appears from the documents submitted by the parties that the applicant was not divested of his legal capacity and was not placed under legal guardianship.

Romania

6

The case concerns the denial to the applicant of the right to appeal against a lower court judgment refusing his compensation claim for his flat alienated by a local authority. Since 1999 the applicant had owned a two-room flat in Gugark village which was situated in a building damaged by an earthquake in 1988. It appears that in December 2004 Y.E., the then head of the village, sold the said building to a third person at auction, without the prior approval of the local council. Following this transaction the building, including the applicant’s flat, was demolished by the buyer, based on a permission granted by Y.E. 4 . At some point a criminal investigation was opened into possible abuse of authority by Y.E. in relation to the above events. A forensic construction examination was ordered which concluded, inter alia , that it had been impossible for the experts to determine the degree of damage and the market value of the building in question. According to the Government, the criminal case against Y.E. was discontinued because of the expiry of the relevant limitation period. On 11 December 2009 the applicant lodged a claim with the Lori Regional Court seeking compensation for the damage suffered as a result of the demolition of his flat. In particular, he requested to be provided with a two-room flat in Gugark village. The applicant paid 4,000 Armenian drams (AMD) in respect of court fees, which corresponded to the rate payable for non ‑ pecuniary claims before first-instance courts. On 17 December 2009 the Lori Regional Court decided to admit the applicant’s claim for examination on the merits, noting that it complied with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as in force at the time. 7 . On 16 March 2012 the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s claim on the grounds that he had not suffered any damage. Relying on certain expert reports from 2000 and 2002, according to which the building at issue had been damaged and subject to demolition, it concluded that even though Y.E. had acted unlawfully, the applicant had not suffered any real damage as a result of his actions because the flat at issue had not been suitable for living at the time of registration of the applicant’s title in 1999 and had not represented any value as a flat. The applicant lodged an appeal, accompanied with proof of payment of court fees in the amount of AMD 10,000 which corresponded to the rate payable in respect of non-pecuniary claims before appellate courts. 9 . On 7 May 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal returned the applicant’s appeal without examining it due to underpayment of court fees. It noted in particular that the applicant had disputed a judicial act which was of pecuniary nature. Hence, under the domestic law, he should pay 3 per cent of the market value of the property, to be determined by a relevant certificate or conclusion delivered by a competent body which should be attached to the appeal, less AMD 10,000 which had already been paid. The Court of Appeal gave the applicant a two-week time to rectify the error and resubmit his appeal. It also noted that the applicant could lodge an application for concessions in respect of court fees together with evidence necessary to grant such an application. The applicant appealed against this decision arguing, inter alia , that the Court of Appeal had failed to state what, in its opinion, was the correct amount due to be paid when concluding that he had underpaid the court fees. He further argued that, according to the established practice, court fees for pecuniary claims, the amount of which could not be determined, were paid according to the rates applicable to non ‑ pecuniary claims because there were no specific domestic rules in respect of such pecuniary claims. He claimed that this approach had been adopted by the Regional Court since it had admitted his claim while the Court of Appeal had arbitrarily left his appeal without examination. On 4 July 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.

10

The applicant represented the plaintiff in civil proceedings concerning damages. The civil courts upheld the plaintiff’s claim in part. In his appeal on the points of law, the applicant told a joke about a professor who expected his students to provide the names, and not only the number, of the victims of the bombing of Hiroshima, and stated that the second-instance court had treated him like the professor treated his students in that joke. On 22 November 2017 the Brčko District Court of Appeal, acting as the third-instance court, rejected the appeal on the points of law. Furthermore, on 20 December 2017 the same court fined the applicant 1,000 convertible marks (approximately 510 euros) for contempt of court. It considered the applicant’s remarks to be insulting. On 26 March 2018 and 26 March 2020, the Brčko District Court of Appeal, in another formation, and the Constitutional Court, respectively, upheld the decision of 20 December 2017. They relied on Žugić <COUNTRY> (no. 3699/08, 31 May 2011 ), in which the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant paid the fine in 2018.

Croatia

8

The application concerns proceedings regarding contact between the applicant and his child, , a girl born on 10 December 2008. The applicant and ’s mother divorced in 2016. Since then, has been living with her mother. The parents have been in dispute over the applicant’s contacts with for years; several provisional arrangements ultimately failed. On 26 February 2019 the Family Court ordered contact with the applicant every second Saturday and, after ten contact meetings, from Saturday to Sunday as well as during holidays. A custodian for the implementation of the contacts ( Umgangspfleger ) was temporarily appointed. The Family Court considered the most recent oral hearing of the child on 26 February 2019 where had stated – as on recent, similar occasions – that she did not wish to see the applicant. It based its decision on the observations submitted by the guardian ad litem appointed for , the Youth Office and, in particular, the German Association for the Protection of Children, which had accompanied several contact meetings between the applicant and in the past; these specialist parties were unanimous in advocating unaccompanied contact. The Family Court found that gradually increasing the meetings would enable to open up again to her father, step by step. It also held that the appointment of the custodian was necessary as ’s mother had been unable to prepare the child in a positive way for contact with the applicant. The mother, and then the applicant, appealed. During the appeal proceedings the Youth Office, the guardian ad litem and the custodian submitted new observations, all recommending obtaining a psychologist’s expert opinion. On 4 July 2019 the Court of Appeal heard the parents, the representative of the Youth Office and the custodian. On 31 October 2019 the Frankfurt Court of Appeal suspended the applicant’s contact until 30 June 2020. The Court of Appeal based its decision on ’s will not to see her father, as expressed during the first-instance proceedings, referring to a conflict of loyalty from which was suffering and from which she should be temporarily withdrawn. The court also briefly referred to new observations of the custodian, who had reported that strongly refused any contact with the applicant and that implementing contact was impossible under the given circumstances in the custodian’s view. The Court of Appeal also noted that the custodian had mentioned that was directly exposed to her mother’s opinions and added that it had to be admitted that the child’s mother had not only failed to promote the contact meetings but even more, at least non ‑ verbally, had encouraged ’s refusal of contact. The Court of Appeal believed that, notwithstanding the possible influence of her mother, ’s will was autonomously built and that the child’s mother was bound by her own statements that she would encourage contact. Lastly, the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to repeat some of the procedural acts undertaken before the Family Court, explaining briefly that it was unlikely that new elements would come to light. The applicant’s complaint about a violation of his right to be heard was to no avail, as was his constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court (no. 1 BvR 373/20). Relying on Articles 8 and 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the Court of Appeal’s decision amounted to a violation of his right to respect for his private and family life and to a fair hearing.

8

The case concerns a complaint about the absence of safeguards to ensure that the confidentiality of the applicant lawyer’s privileged data seized by the authorities, is respected. The applicant, a barrister, was searched on 14 February 2013 in the context of criminal proceedings against him. A portable memory key (“the memory key”) was seized from him at the end of the search, which took place without a prior judicial warrant, and without an objection from the applicant. The following day the search-and-seizure record was approved by a judge who wrote “approved!” on it and signed it. On 19 February 2013, the applicant asked the prosecutor to return the memory key to him as it contained information about his legal practice which was inviolable, and to prevent the examination, copying and checking of privileged information. The prosecutor’s related refusal was quashed by the relevant court on 23 May 2013, which ordered its return to the applicant as the prosecution had had enough time to examine it. 2 . On 15 May 2013, the prosecution ordered an expertise of the memory key, to be carried out by a specialised institute of the Ministry of Interior (“the institute”). The latter had to verify whether the memory key contained any files, to copy all files found on it, including from the deleted folder, and to print out a list of all the files found. The report, drawn up on 3 June 2013, noted that the memory key had been received in a sealed envelope bearing the prosecution stamp. Two copies of all the files found on the memory key had been recorded onto two disks and the objects subject of the expertise had been sealed in envelopes. 3 . At a court hearing in 2018 in the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the expert who had conducted the expertise (see paragraph 2 above) stated that he had not received additional guidance in relation to it, apart from the order for the expertise itself. The expert indicated that he had first copied all the files found on the memory key onto his computer, from where he had transferred them to disks handed to the authorities. While there were no legal requirements concerning either the keeping or the destruction of such information, he had thereafter deleted the files from his computer because of the lack of sufficient storage space and in line with the usual working practice. A copy of the information should have also been kept on a digital data carrier in the institute’s registry. The name of the memory key’s owner had been indicated in the expertise. The expert could not recall the content of the files, even if he had seen them at the time. The files however could be viewed in their entirety as they had been recorded in full in a digital format on disks. The applicant complained about the retention and subsequent handling by the authorities of his memory key containing materials related to his legal practice, and the inclusion of that information in his criminal case file. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention and on Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 about the absence of a related effective remedy.

2

The applicant’s daughter, Stepanyan, was born on 1 July 2009. 2 . On 6 July 2010 at around 9 p.Stepanyan, who was weak, had vomited and had diarrhoea, was admitted to Abovyan Medical Centre. She was examined by Dr H.A., who diagnosed acute intestinal infection, gastroenteritis and toxicosis with exicosis and placed her in the intensive therapy room. 3 . On 7 July 2009, at 55 a., Stepanyan’s condition sharply deteriorated and an intensive care specialist was urgently invited. The child died at 45 a.4 . On the same date criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 130 § 2 of the Criminal Code (medical negligence resulting in death). 5 . According to the autopsy report of 9 August 2010, the cause of death had been cardiopulmonary arrest as a result of myocarditis, cardiomyocyte contractile dysfunction, oedema, interstitial lung disease and bronchial desquamation. 6 . The expert panel report received on 4 November 2010 found, inter alia , that Stepanyan’s examinations after her admission to hospital had been insufficient and deficient while the provided treatment had been incomplete and incorrect. Taking into account the child’s extremely severe condition upon admission, intensive care with mechanical ventilation to support vital functions had been necessary. Considering the child’s acute condition, it could not be stated definitively whether it would have been possible to save her life, however, had the tests been fully done and the treatment organised in the intensive care unit, the probability of saving the child would have been higher. Thus, H.A. should have placed the child in the intensive care unit. 7 . On 18 February 2011 an additional expert panel report was delivered which found, inter alia , that Stepanyan’s cardiopulmonary pathology had not been diagnosed as a result of the failure to carry out the necessary medical examinations (blood and urine tests, electrocardiogram and chest X-ray). As a result, the child had not been provided with the treatment that had been necessary for her condition. In case of treatment in the intensive care unit the chances of a positive outcome could possibly have been higher. However, there was a high mortality rate among children suffering from such diseases and a negative outcome could not be ruled out even in case of correct diagnosis and treatment. 8 . On 4 March 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings finding that there was no causal link between the shortcomings in Stepanyan’s treatment and her death and that even with requisite and timely medical treatment a negative outcome could not possibly be ruled out. 9 . Upon the applicant’s appeal, by a decision of 15 June 2011 the Kotayk Regional Court set aside the decision to terminate the proceedings, finding that the investigator had failed to consider properly the results of the forensic medical examinations. It stated that Article 130 of the Criminal Code envisaged responsibility for failure by medical personnel to perform their professional duties properly and did not envisage exoneration from it for having secured a high or low probability of saving a patient’s life. There was sufficient forensic evidence that H.A. had failed to place Stepanyan in the intensive care unit and had wrongly diagnosed her illnesses, as a result of which H.A. had not provided any treatment in respect of the patient’s actual illnesses. 10 . The criminal proceedings were reopened and, upon the request of H.A., an additional expert examination was assigned. In its opinion of 21 December 2011 the new panel essentially reiterated the findings of the previous expert reports. 11 . On 26 December 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings on the same grounds as before. The applicant’s appeals against that decision were dismissed in the final instance on 14 July 2012 by the Court of Cassation. Relying on Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into his daughter’s death and that no effective mechanism was in place to enable him to obtain compensation.

10

The case concerns the defamation proceedings against the applicant and raises an issue under Article 10 of the Convention. In March 2010 criminal proceedings were instituted against the mayor of Lernapat village, Y., who was charged with embezzlement, abuse of authority and official falsification, on the basis of collective complaints by more than 250 villagers. In the course of the investigation a number of villagers alleged, inter alia , that Y. had granted financial aid to his relatives; had exempted the latter from paying property tax; and had paid for his publications from the local budget. On 21 December 2011 the charges against Y. were dropped. 3 . On 1 September 2010 an article was published in a local newspaper featuring interviews with residents of Lernapat, including the applicant, critical of the mayor. The applicant’s statements, in so far as relevant, read as follows: “I am the most well-off person in our village. I have watched our village being wiped out. In our village someone has even died of hunger [statement A] . I do not want to use his real name, because it sounds rude, but two years ago I told this very [Y.] ... that no Turk had ever set his foot into our village. He had an argument with me and I stood up to him. My grandfathers killed Turks in this village and did not allow them to conquer it, whereas he has obliterated this village [statement B] ... The village has split into two. Nobody is able to work because he is bribing them 5,000 [Armenian drams (AMD)] [statement C] . Hunger is a bad thing and poverty is the worst thing in the world. These people think that if [Y.] stays as the village mayor their benefits will be cut off. Today I am asking for an inspection from Yerevan to be sent here. There is an inhabitant in our village called [A.]. He is going to have his third child. His wife ... is not educated. She was deceived at the Mayor’s Office by [Y.’s] two sisters and [head of staff ] who made her write that her husband was employed [statement D] . The guy helps everyone. He has helped me, he has helped [B.A.], but he is not employed. He lives in a shack, his mother is disabled, he is in a very bad situation and they don’t give him any benefits. We have to ask [President] Serzh Sargsyan again to send an inspection to the Mayor’s Office to see that today [Y.’s] sister and granddaughter receive benefits [statement E] , that his sister works in the Mayor’s Office and his nephew is involved in big business in Moscow, today we all ask the government, we beg the government, we are all [supporters of the Republican Party]... enough is enough, they need to stop this corruption, have pity on this people... The bus that the village received as a gift from MP [A.H.] in order to transport children from the old village to the new one, [Y.] tried to sell it through the Vanadzor Mosaic [newspaper] and we returned it... [statement F]. Today we still have a problem with drinking water. We simply want the government to find out what the mayor is going to do with the two double beds which are at the Mayor’s Office [statement G] . How come [Y.’s] father received [AMD] 630,000 in financial aid and [Y.’s] nephew received [AMD] 1,100,000 in financial aid, while there are hungry people in the village who received nothing? ... He was told to repair the road to the cemetery and he said ‘What do I care?’ [statement H] Had he lost somebody [in the earthquake], he would have been compassionate. I am asking the government, our village is a village with a capital letter, the only village where no Turk has ever set his foot, and today we have a Turk born from among us. We are asking that this Turk be removed from among us [statement I] .” The mayor instituted civil proceedings against the applicant for defamation and insult, with respect to some of his statements (identified under letters A to I in paragraph 3 above). He submitted, inter alia , that he had in fact implemented a number of projects aimed at improving and developing the village, including the repairment of the road to the cemetery; that statement C had made no sense and there had been no such thing in the village as bribing; that his sister had never received any benefits; and that by his statement I the applicant had both insulted and defamed him. 5 . The applicant objected to the claim and submitted that he enjoyed the right to have an opinion and to impart information under Article 10 of the Convention, especially on such subjects of public concern as the mayor’s professional activities. He further clarified before the court that the mayor’s sister and granddaughter were one household, whereas the granddaughter had received benefits. The mayor had not repaired the road to the cemetery but had simply laid clay. By statement C he meant that the villagers had been reluctant to complain against the mayor as the latter had been “bribing” them by extending financial aid. Moreover, a witness testified in court that the mayor’s next of kin had offered him money to withdraw his complaint. 6 . The domestic courts partly allowed the mayor’s claim, holding that statements B, C, E, H and I had been defamatory because they had been statements of fact tarnishing the mayor’s honour and dignity and which the applicant had failed to substantiate with any evidence. As to the remaining statements, they had been considered to be expressions of the applicant’s subjective opinion, and statement D had not compromised the plaintiff’s rights. The courts also dismissed the applicant’s objection about his right to criticise the mayor holding that such right was not unlimited and could be restricted for the reputation and rights of others. As to the criminal case instituted against the mayor, it was noted that one should be presumed innocent until found guilty by a final court judgment. The applicant was ordered to retract the defamatory statements through declarations to be published in the same newspaper, as well as to pay a total of AMD 200,000, about 385 euros (EUR) at the material time, in damages.

6

The case pertains to the alleged lack of impartiality of the judges who finally determined a labour dispute between the applicant and his employer. In 1994 the applicant was appointed as the head of a state-owned commercial bank, known as B. In 1999, the said bank was acquired and subsumed by a state-owned commercial bank called Banca Comercială Română (“BCR”), resulting in the applicant being summarily discharged from his post. A lengthy succession of legal proceedings ensued between the applicant and BCR, however, the Court shall limit itself to referring to a select few that are relevant for the matter at hand. 4 . In 2003 the applicant initiated legal proceedings against BCR seeking re-employment. By virtue of a final judgment of 8 April 2005, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the claim on the ground that the employment contract was rendered null and void following the merger between B. and BCR. One of the judges sitting on the Court of Appeal’s panel was Judge Following a sequence of both extraordinary and ordinary appeals and other legal proceedings, the applicant succeeded in securing a judicial decision ordering re-employment with BCR and payment of damages. Nonetheless, the above judicial decision was not fully executed, and the applicant was never reinstated at the bank. 6 . In 2014 BCR launched legal proceedings against the applicant seeking a verdict that his employment contract had been null and void from 2007 onwards. By a judgment dated 16 December 2015, the Bucharest Regional Court dismissed the BCR’s claim. Both parties filed appeals. Before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, the case was referred to a bench composed of two judges, and U, whom the applicant raised objections against and lodged a motion for their recusal. 8 . With respect to Judge , the applicant contended that she had participated in rendering the judgment of 8 April 2005 (see paragraph 4 above) which concerned a factually and legally related set of civil proceedings between the same parties. Additionally, the applicant asserted that Judge had an ongoing banking relationship with BCR and had outstanding loans procured from that bank, although the particulars of the said loans were not known to him. 9 . With regard to Judge U., the applicant argued that the counsel representing BCR in the proceedings was formerly her superior from 1998 to 2000, when she served as the director of a department at the Ministry of Justice, while he served as the Minister. The applicant further contended that during the course of the proceedings, Judge U. had obtained a loan from BCR amounting to 189,000 lei (RON) (equivalent to approximately 42,000 euros (EUR)) to finance the purchase of an apartment. The terms and conditions of the loan were unknown to the applicant. 10 . On 7 November 2016 a different panel of the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s motion for recusal. It found that a judge’s participation in a case involving the same parties and related to the same subject matter was not problematic, as the authority of the res judicata obtained by the initial decision represented a guarantee for the parties. Therefore, a judge could not deviate from a previous solution, not due to vanity, but because the law did not allow it. As to the prior professional relationship between Judge U. and BCR’s attorney, the court considered that such an association was not proof of moral or professional subservience. Finally, the court concluded that there was no issue with both judges being clients of BCR and having secured loans from it. It held that BCR was one of the foremost financial institutions in the market, and it was open to judges as well as to any other citizens to borrow from it. On 17 November 2016 the panel of the Bucharest Court of Appeal composed of Judges and U. upheld the appeal lodged by BCR against the judgment of the Bucharest Regional Court of 16 December 2015 (see paragraph 6 above), finally determining that the employment contract between BCR and the applicant had become null and void as of 2007. Before the Court the applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lack of impartiality of Judges and U.

8, 3

Background On 6 December 2016 the applicant’s mother, , divorced the applicant’s father, R.S.The applicant was placed with her mother and a contact schedule was set for her father. R.S.would collect the applicant from kindergarten, spend the day with her and then take her to her mother’s home. In the evening of 2 February 2017 observed a change in the applicant’s behaviour and vocabulary about her intimate body parts and noticed that her genitalia were irritated. When asked what had happened, the applicant, who was three years and two months old at that time, explained that her father had told her her genitalia were dirty and needed cleaning. Worried about the applicant’s behaviour in the following days, confronted R.S.who denied any abuse (see paragraph 14 below). 5 . At ’s initiative, the applicant and her parents consulted two psychologists who issued their reports on 8 and 15 March 2017 respectively. They abstained from drawing any conclusion and recommended contacting the child protection authority (the Baia Mare Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection) on suspicion of sexual abuse. 6 . On 8 March 2017 contacted the child protection authority which evaluated the applicant, interviewed the parents about the incident of 2 February 2017 and recommended notifying the police about the suspicion of sexual abuse. Criminal investigation into sexual abuse 7 . On 23 March 2017 asked the Baia Mare Police to be present at all visits between R.S.and the applicant because of the child’s reaction after such contacts. Interviewed on the same day by the police, R.S.opposed ’s request. It appears received no answer to her request (see paragraph 31 below). 8 . On 10 April 2017 the child protection authority informed the police about the suspicion of sexual abuse (see paragraph 6 above). 9 . On 25 April 2017 lodged a criminal complaint with the prosecutor’s office attached to the Baia Mare District Court accusing R.S.of sexual aggression and sexual pressure against the applicant. She explained how, since 2 February 2017, the applicant’s behaviour had started to change and had become more sexualised after visits with her father. 10 . On 12 June 2017 the police started an investigation. 11 . On 19 June 2017, 16 November 2018, 20 December 2018 and 10 January 2019 asked the prosecutor to accelerate the investigation, reiterating the urgency of the matter. 12 . A psychological report rendered on 29 June 2017 upon request of the investigating authorities concluded that the applicant presented traumatic markers specific to sexual abuse, which were triggered only by R.S.No indications of abuse or alienation were identified in connection with or her new partner. The psychologist found that the applicant was unwilling to talk about R.S.13 . Between 13 June 2017 and 12 June 2018, the police interviewed twelve witnesses including , the applicant’s grandmothers and her nanny, the psychologists who had assessed her and a kindergarten assistant who had seen her with R.S.on 2 February 2017. 14 . On 19 February 2018 R.S., who just returned from an extended visit to his mother in the USA, was interviewed by the police. He explained that on 2 February 2017 the applicant had soiled herself at kindergarten and he had cleaned her first quickly in the toilet then properly in the shower, at his home. He submitted copies of photographs and video recordings they had made together on that day, showing that the applicant had been happy, dancing and singing with him. 15 . On 27 February 2019 the prosecutor decided to discontinue the investigation ( clasarea ) on the grounds that there was no evidence that R.S.had committed a crime. The prosecutor concluded that the acts performed by R.S.had been the normal gestures required for cleaning the applicant and could not be considered sexual abuse. On 12 June 2019 that decision was upheld by the deputy chief prosecutor of the prosecutor’s office attached to the Baia Mare District Court, on the same grounds. 17 . In a final decision of 17 October 2019, available to the parties on 3 December 2019, the Baia Mare District Court dismissed the objection lodged by It found that there was no “objective scientific” evidence supporting the allegations and that the psychological assessments did not unequivocally link the applicant’s sexualised behaviour to a sexual abuse. The court observed that the applicant was experiencing an emotionally difficult period following the parents’ separation, which could explain her behaviour. It thus concluded that the acts committed by R.S., namely washing the applicant, did not constitute a criminal offence. Protection orders 18 . On 25 April 2017, 13 December 2017 and 11 April 2018 applied to the District Court for protection orders for the applicant, to help her psychological recovery, prevent R.S.from aggravating her state, and help the criminal investigation. First and second protection orders The first two requests were initially dismissed by the Baia Mare District Court on 28 April and 14 December 2017. 20 . Upon appeal by , on 14 June 2017 and 17 January 2018 respectively two consecutive protection orders were issued by the Maramureş County Court on the grounds that as long as there was suspicion, as indicated by the evidence administered in the ongoing criminal investigation, that R.S.had sexually abused the applicant, it was in the latter’s best interest to avoid contact, in order to prevent irremediable psychiatric trauma and to allow her to calm down and “modify her sexualised behaviour”. The courts also considered that the contact limitation would help identify the source of her behaviour, which would benefit the ongoing criminal investigation. R.S.was also ordered to undergo psychological counselling. The last order was valid until 16 April 2018. R.S.was prevented from seeing the applicant from 14 June 2017 to 16 April 2018. 21 . From 5 February to 6 April 2018 R.S.underwent a psychological evaluation as ordered by the above decisions. The report of 10 April 2018 concluded that the possibility for R.S.to have sexually abused his daughter or to be predisposed to such behaviour was unfounded and unrealistic. Third protection order On 13 April 2018, during the proceedings for the third protection order, the applicant was interviewed by the judge of the Baia Mare District Court, in the presence of the prosecutor and a new psychologist of the child protection authority. The applicant identified S.G.O., her mother’s new husband, as her father. She then stated that she recalled R.S., that she still loved and missed him, that she wanted to play with him and that she expected him to bring her gifts. She further stated that R.S.had never upset her. The court took account of the expert psychological evaluation of R.S.(see paragraph 21 above) and further noted that he had not been in contact with the applicant after the second protection order. 23 . On 13 April 2018 the Baia Mare District Court dismissed the request for another protection order on the grounds that there was no evidence that R.S.represented a danger for the applicant and that there was no evidence that R.S.had committed violent acts during the period when the protection orders where in force. 24 . appealed, arguing that extending the prohibition was in the child’s interest, that R.S.had observed the previous orders because he had been out of the country, but that he had meanwhile returned (see paragraph 14 above). R.S.replied arguing that he had complied with the court order and had undergone psychological counselling, and that since his return to the country he had not contacted the applicant or her family. 25 . The decision was upheld by a final decision of 18 May 2018 of the Maramureş County Court. 26 . The court considered that the previous protection orders had been issued not because of evidence that R.S.had molested the applicant, but rather to protect the latter’s mental health ( starea psihică ) as at that time she had exhibited traumatic reactions in connection with her father. It further found that had failed to offer the applicant psychological counselling, which was, according to the court, the only method to verify whether R.S.was the trigger in the applicant’s sexualised behaviour. 27 . The court considered that the outcome of the criminal investigation could not contribute “to healing” the applicant and therefore, the fact that that investigation was ongoing could not justify issuing another protection order. 28 . should instead have requested either to change the contact schedule or request supervised visits, which would have been better methods of protecting the applicant from her father. It further stated that a child’s interest was to maintain contact with both parents and concluded that a new protection order would not serve that interest. Requests for a new contact schedule 29 . On 26 April 2017 had requested by way of interim proceedings a change in the contact schedule between the applicant and R.S.On 11 May 2017 the District Court dismissed the request, on the ground that had failed to prove that R.S.had sexually abused the applicant and that there were no circumstances warrant changing the contact schedule. The appeal lodged by was dismissed on 21 July 2017 by the County Court for the same reasons. 30 . On 1 January 2019 requested in the interim exclusive exercise of parental authority and a new, reduced contact schedule under the supervision of the child protection authority. On 5 February 2019 the District Court dismissed the requests. The court considered that the evidence did not prove with certainty that the applicant had been sexually abused, and that there was nothing to incriminate R.S.It also stated that the two protection orders had been issued preventively and were not based on evidence of wrongdoing by R.S.31 . It appears that after the incident of 2 February 2017, R.S.saw the applicant sporadically and only in ’s presence.

8

The case concerns the alleged failure by the domestic courts to protect the applicant’s reputation from attacks in the online media. 2 . On 24 January 2012 the applicant, who was a well-known businessman and philanthropist in his town, filed a criminal complaint against A., the manager of the Bistrițeanul.ro online publication, in which he accused her of blackmail. He alleged that a foundation led by him had been procuring advertising space from A.’s publication in the past. Following the cessation of such purchase, A. had allegedly resorted to blackmail to coerce him to continue purchasing advertising or face the prospect of unfavourable articles being published in the publication. According to the applicant, the prosecuting authority supervising the investigation informed him that the evidence in favour of the allegation was insufficient. Therefore, he decided to meet with A. and make an audio recording of their exchange to assemble evidence in support of his criminal complaint. Nonetheless, according to the applicant, A. purportedly perceived his proposal as a ruse and sent a journalist to the meeting who recorded the exchange with him. On 27 January 2012 Bistrițeanul.ro published an editorial by A., under the headline “The Hungarian Bulan [An equivocal reference to the applicant’s surname] wants to buy our silence” ( Unguru Bulan vrea să ne cumpere tăcerea ). The editorial expounded on the fact that the applicant, who aspired to run for the post of Mayor of Bistrița, was disseminating rumours that Bistrițeanul.ro was the only publication that was giving him negative press coverage since he had not procured any advertising space from it. The applicant had decided to resolve this issue by approaching a journalist from the publication and proposing money for silence. Little did he know that the conversation was being recorded by the journalist. The editorial went on to imply that the applicant was a morally bereft person implicated in reproachable conduct who thought that everything and everyone was for sale. In particular, the editorial contained the following assertions: “He is the individual who, in a similar vein, tried to buy building permits from the Bistrița Mayor’s Office, subsequent to building without documentation.” ( “Este omul care a încercat să cumpere prin metode similare autorizații de construcții de la Primăria Bistrița, după ce a construit fără acte.” ). “He is the individual who aspires to become Mayor with the aim of decimating the planning department because it had previously declined to accept his bribes and had refused to issue building permits to him whenever and however he desired.” ( Este omul care vrea să ajungă primar pentru a rade serviciul urbanism tocmai pentru că nu a acceptat șpăgile lui și nu i-a dat autorizații de construcții când și cum a vrut el.” ) “He is the individual who appropriated relief aid intended for the [flood] victims in Vișeu to finance his campaign in Bistrița.” ( “Este omul care a luat din ajutoarele sinistraților din Vișeu pentru a-și face campanie la Bistrița.” ) On an unspecified date, the applicant initiated defamation proceedings against A. and the publication, arguing, inter alia , that the aforementioned three phrases defamed him since they contained false allegations that he had perpetrated two criminal offences, bribery and theft. He also contended that the defendants had acted in bad faith and had launched a defamation campaign against him. The applicant mentioned as an example of their bad faith the fact that the publication had deleted all positive comments about him from the article published on its webpage and had blocked the IP addresses of the users who had posted such comments, while retaining only neutral or negative comments, including comments calling for his assassination. In a judgment of 18 November 2014, the Bistrița District Court granted the applicant’s action in part, having determined that the article was defamatory of him. On 1 April 2015 the Bistrița-Năsăud Regional Court overturned the above judgment and dismissed the applicant’s action. 7 . In so far as the first impugned phrase was concerned (see paragraph 2 above), the court considered that it had been written in a particular context: the day before, the applicant had attempted to pay the newspaper to avoid negative press coverage, and the press had previously reported on his building without appropriate permits. The court also noted that the applicant had admitted to having been sanctioned for building without a permit on one occasion. 8 . Concerning the second impugned phrase (see paragraph 2 above), the court relied on the defendants’ statement, according to which the applicant himself had stated to the press in 2010 that the Mayor and the architect in chief had taken away from him a plot of land ( m-au ușurat de ) of 700 square metres worth EUR 175,000 before issuing him a document ( notă de constatare ). The applicant had made this statement in the context of announcing that he had lodged a criminal complaint against the Mayor and the architect in chief, alleging blackmail. The court considered that the applicant had thus admitted to having given up the plot of land, albeit unwillingly, in exchange for a document. As to the term “bribes” used by the author of the editorial, the court concluded that this was an “artistic” exaggeration by the defendant journalist and not a defamatory statement. The court held that such an exaggerated expression was acceptable in the context of journalistic freedom. 9 . Finally, with regard to the third impugned phrase (see paragraph 2 above), the court relied on statements of a witness who was an employee of the defendant publication and a subordinate of A. The witness stated that during the 2008 flood, the goods collected for the relief of the victims had been stocked in an apartment belonging to the applicant. There were rumours at the time that some of those goods never reached the victims of the flood. The court concluded that as a public figure who intended to run for the position of Mayor, the applicant was subject to a wider range of acceptable criticism. On the other hand, the court noted that the defendants were members of the press and that they were reporting on an issue of public interest. Furthermore, the court found that all the impugned phrases contained factual statements, and that the defendants had acted in good faith and had a reasonable factual basis for their statements. The court held that the language employed by the defendants did not exceed the limits of exaggeration and provocation permitted by Article 10 of the Convention and that the applicant had not proven that the impugned editorial had caused him any damage. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the above judgment and argued that the Regional Court had treated the impugned statements as value judgments rather than as statements of facts. He submitted that the aim pursued by A. had not been to impart information of public interest but to slender him and that the defendants had not proved the veracity of the accusations contained in the impugned phrases. On 26 June 2015 the Cluj Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and confirmed the judgment of the Regional Court.

10

The case concerns the applicant’s criminal conviction for aggravated defamation of a public prosecutor. 2 . During a meeting with professionals responsible for the supervision of the applicant’s contact with his daughter, the applicant made the following statements regarding the public prosecutor who was representing his daughter in the proceedings in respect of his parental rights and responsibilities towards her ( regulação do poder paternal ): “this is an affront, it’s not a court, it’s nothing, that prosecutor, that B., he drinks, or I don’t know... he doesn’t open his mouth.” The social workers facilitating the meeting wrote down the comments in a report and sent it to the family court to which the proceedings had been allocated. The applicant was then sued by B. for aggravated defamation. 4 . By a judgment of the Lisbon District Court of 28 November 2018, the applicant was convicted of aggravated defamation and sentenced to a fine in the amount of 1,600 euros (EUR). 5 . It held as follows: “... [the applicant] intended to raise doubts regarding the public prosecutor’s personal and professional honour and to challenge his personal and professional ethics, harming him as a private individual and as a public prosecutor ... ...those statements ... imply that the public prosecutor doesn’t do his job properly – doesn’t open his mouth – is drunk in court – and likes to drink. Those statements are extremely serious ... [the applicant] cannot legitimise his conduct by arguing that he was unhappy or disappointed by the length or the outcome of the proceedings since there were legal mechanisms at his disposal to challenge possible delays or failures during the proceedings. In addition, those statements cannot be considered as mere venting. In fact, [the applicant] knew that the meeting was part of the judicial proceedings ... and that he was neither acting in a private sphere, nor amongst friends or family with whom he could vent, rather within an institutional domain. In addition, [the applicant] knew that the social workers would report to the court. Those statements show that [the applicant] did not agree with the implementation by the family court of supervised visits with his daughter. ...”. On 15 May 2019 the Lisbon Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. Under Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant alleged that his conviction amounted to a breach of his right to freedom of expression.

8

The application concerns the non-enforcement of court decisions setting the contact schedule between the applicant and his child. 2 . The applicant and X married in 2006 and in 2008 their daughter, Y, was born. On 14 November 2013 the Bucharest District Court pronounced the couple’s divorce, awarded the parents joint custody of their daughter, set her residence with X, and granted the applicant contact rights, that is allowing him to see his child every other week on Saturday and Sunday from 9 a.to 8 p.The contact schedule was to be exercised in the mother’s home until Y would turn eight years old, and outside the mother’s home after that date. 3 . On 20 January 2015 the applicant requested a bailiff office’s help for the enforcement of the contact schedule, arguing that X was hindering his efforts to see his daughter. On 8 February 2016, unsatisfied with the bailiff’s alleged inactivity, he ended the enforcement proceedings and contacted a new bailiff. The enforcement attempts made by the new bailiff also remained unsuccessful. In a report of 18 March 2016 the new bailiff concluded that Y refused to see the applicant. 4 . Upon a request made by the Bucharest Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (“the child‑protection authority”), based on the bailiff’s report (see paragraph 3 above), on 27 September 2016 the Corneţu District Court ordered three months of psychological counselling for Y in order to help re ‑ establish her relationship with her father. The court also ordered X to comply with the measures that the psychologist would indicate. 5 . On 25 October 2016, following Y’s eighth birthday, the Găeşti District Court, which had jurisdiction over the case following X and Y’s change of residence, deciding on an application brought by the applicant, set a new contact arrangement extending the applicant’s right to see the child to every other weekend, half of the school holidays and other significant days in the year. The applicant was allowed to exercise his contact rights at his home. The court considered that Y should start spending time with the applicant in order to develop harmonious relationships with both parents. It found that X had not sufficiently encouraged her daughter to maintain contact with her father. It observed that the child had been negatively affected by the conflict between her parents who did not refrain from fighting in her presence. 6 . In January 2017 the child-protection authority in charge of the case (see paragraph 4 above) sent several invitations to X at four different addresses where she was registered in the towns neighbouring Bucharest and contacted her on her telephone. X refused to take the child to counselling, explaining, via telephone on 9 January 2017 and in writing on 10 February 2017, that the court decision of 14 November 2013 whose enforcement was sought, was no longer in force, as it had been replaced by the decision of 25 October 2016 (see paragraphs 2 and 5 above). On 20 and 21 February 2017 the child ‑ protection authority informed the Corneţu District Court, the bailiff, and the applicant of X’s position. 7 . Relying on the decision of 25 October 2016, the applicant started new enforcement proceedings through the same bailiff, but remained unable to see his daughter. On 28 August 2017 the bailiff sought penalties for non ‑ enforcement on the applicant’s behalf, allowed by the Găeşti District Court on 25 April 2018. 8 . On 3 November 2017 the Bucharest District Court stayed the enforcement proceedings at the mother’s request. It found that X had not opposed contact between the applicant and the child, but that Y refused to see her father. 9 . On 11 April 2018 the applicant lodged a new request, seeking to modify the contact schedule. These proceedings were pending on the date of the Government’s observations on 15 January 2021. On 18 April 2018 he sought an interim order setting the child’s residence with him during the new proceedings, dismissed as lacking urgency by the Găeşti District Court. 11 . On 7 April 2021 the applicant informed the Court that he had made further attempts to see Y, which had remained unsuccessful. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been unable to see his daughter and exercise his parental rights, because of a series of failures by the competent authorities.