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6

The present case concerns the applicant’s conviction in administrative proceedings against him on the charge of failure to comply with the lawful order of a police officer. The applicant alleged that his rights protected under Article 5 § 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached by the domestic authorities. At noon on 9 January 2011 the applicant was arrested by the police officers and taken to the Binagadi District Police Station. According to the applicant, he was arrested at home in the presence of his wife and son by police officers who came to his home and asked him to follow them to the police station, without giving any explanation of the reasons for his arrest. On the day of the arrest, an administrative-offence report ( inzibati xəta haqqında protokol ) was issued. According to the report, the applicant had been making noise in front of the building, had failed to comply with a lawful order of the police officers to stop making noise and had resisted the police officers, in breach of Article 310.1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). The applicant refused to sign the report. On the same day, the first-instance court found the applicant guilty under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days’ administrative detention. The court relied only on the administrative-offence report drafted by the police officers and the witness testimony given by one of them. On 10 January 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first ‑ instance court’s judgment of 9 January 2011, arguing that he was not guilty of the offence in question and that the first-instance court’s judgment lacked adequate reasoning. The applicant requested that the appellate court examine other witnesses. He also produced written testimonies from his wife and son, who stated that at noon on 9 January 2011 the officers had come to their home and arrested the applicant without any explanation, and from his neighbours, who stated that they had seen the police officers entering the building in which the applicant resided and, subsequently, had seen them taking him to the police car. On 14 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal, after having heard the police officers who had arrested the applicant, upheld the first-instance court’s judgment and dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unsubstantiated. That decision was final and not subject to any further appeal.

3

The applicants are an Afghani father and his two minor children. On 25 February 2016 they were registered at Fylakio Reception and Identification Centre (RIC), Evros. 2 . The first applicant was suffering from a cyst on his hip and underwent surgery for this. On 2 March 2016 the applicants left the RIC and went to Idomeni camp. On 11 March 2016 the applicants lodged a request for an interim measure with the Court, which was refused on 1 April 2016. In December 2016 they left <COUNTRY>, returning in 2018. They complain under Article 3 regarding their living conditions in Idomeni camp and under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 13 regarding shortcomings of the asylum procedure. On 12 October 2018 the applicants applied for international protection and on 22 April 2020 they were recognised as refugees. The applicants’ account As regards living conditions in Idomeni camp during their stay between March and May 2016 The applicants submitted that they had fled <COUNTRY> on grounds of fear for their safety. Upon entering <COUNTRY>, they had been detained in Fylakio Evros. 9 . After their release on 2 March 2016, the applicants had reached Idomeni and aimed to travel to northern Europe, considering that <COUNTRY> and other countries on the Balkan route were not safe for them. In Idomeni they had lived in a tent without adequate protection against weather conditions. They complained of overpopulation, noting that more than 10,000 persons had been accommodated, exceeding the camp’s capacity. They further complained of inadequate hygiene and sanitation facilities, the risk of infection and inadequate nutrition. 11 . The applicants had suffered from bronchitis, fever and lung problems. The first applicant’s cyst had become infected and bled and he had not been able to obtain medical assistance. In addition, the children were hungry. 12 . The applicants submitted that the authorities had been aware of their vulnerability, notably in respect of the first applicant as a person with medical issues and in respect of the children on account of their age (4 and 7 years old), and that the living conditions in Idomeni taken together with their vulnerable status had not been compatible with Article 3 of the Convention. As regards access to the asylum procedure The applicants submitted that they had not been provided with information regarding access to asylum procedures during their registration by the police authorities. They noted that the Greek Asylum Service had designated the Skype platform as the only way for asylum-seekers to express their wish to apply for asylum and set a date for registration at the Regional Asylum Office (RAO). The applicants intensified their efforts in this respect, although they could not access internet as they did not own any device from which to call the Skype account. The applicants had attempted to request asylum, but the Asylum Service had been overloaded and they could not reach the Skype numbers provided. The only legal option, namely that asylum-seekers apply in person at the asylum offices, was no longer provided. Even if they had managed to use Skype to express their wish to apply for asylum, they would not have been considered as holding the status of asylum-seekers. The applicants further noted that on 3 March 2016 an administrative expulsion order had been issued against them, and its enforcement was suspended for one month in respect of the first applicant and for six months in respect of the children. They claimed that the suspension could be lifted prior to that deadline, and they could be subjected to direct or indirect return to their country of origin. At the time they seized the Court, the suspension of expulsion for the first applicant was to expire in two weeks, without him having been afforded the opportunity to lodge an asylum request, and thus they were all about to be exposed to refoulement. Subsequent developments following the applicants’ stay in Idomeni camp 18 . The applicants submitted that they had attempted to cross the borders illegally, but had been returned to <COUNTRY>. 19 . In May 2016 they had been informed by an official that they could be transferred to a camp. They moved to Diavata camp where they lived in a tent, without electricity and with inadequate nutrition. They received a pre ‑ registration asylum-seeker’s card, but had not kept a copy. The first applicant had been referred to hospital several times but to no avail, as there was no interpreter available and he could not communicate with the doctor. The children could not enrol at school and fell sick, but there was no pediatrician available. 21 . They pointed out that during their stay at Diavata camp between May and December 2016 the authorities had been aware of their presence. However, they could not submit an asylum request although their interest had been recorded. 22 . They stressed that after the evacuation of Idomeni camp no one could make a valid application for asylum as a pre-registration practice was announced, to be put in place by the end of July 2016. They noted that pre ‑ registration did not ensure access to the asylum procedure. This fact, taken together with their living conditions in Diavata camp, notably not being provided with special safeguards for vulnerable persons, exposed them to hardship exceeding the threshold of Article 3, including a risk of refoulement . In December 2016, due to the harsh conditions, they left Diavata camp and moved on to other countries. 24 . In September 2018 they decided to return to <COUNTRY> and on an unknown date they reached Athens, where they remained homeless. They alleged that they were provided with adequate housing in December 2019. Lastly, they submitted that the first applicant had not managed to undergo the operation indicated in 2016 and still indicated at the time of submission of their observations. They added that the youngest child of the family, born abroad in the meantime, had been suffering from medical issues. Due to the absence of interpretation, they had not managed to address their medical issues. The Government’s account As regards living conditions in Idomeni camp 26 . The Government noted that the first applicant had been examined by the medical team at the RIC and transferred to hospital for abscess drainage of his cyst. They stressed that, at the time, <COUNTRY> had been confronted with an extraordinary situation of humanitarian need because of the unprecedented migrant and refugee flow and that the authorities had made efforts to deal with the emergency. The situation was aggravated by the de facto closing of the Western Balkan route as of February 2016, preventing third country nationals from reaching Central and Northern Europe. As of the end of August 2015 thousands of refugees and migrants had gathered at Idomeni. An unofficial camp was constructed on 25 September 2015 under the responsibility and at the expense of NGOs and arranged with the support of regional municipalities. It included 5 tents with an accommodation capacity of 1000 persons, an area suitable for accommodating minors, 40 toilets, 20 showers and drinking water facilities. On 27 November 2015 a second camp came into operation on the initiative of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It included 3 tents with an accommodation capacity of 750 persons, 4 containers with capacity for 60 persons, 20 tents with capacity for 200 persons, 30 toilets, a cooking facility and portable heating devices. Healthcare services had been provided by the medical staff of local hospitals installed in the area and by NGO units. There was also a Health Centre at a short distance, where persons in need of further treatment would be transferred by ambulance. The food supply at Idomeni was ensured by NGOs and volunteers and residents could also obtain food from local shops. Police forces with interpretation assistance informed the residents about the prohibition on crossing borders and the possibility of their transfer to organised accommodation facilities. Following a police operation between 24 and 26 May 2016, the area was evacuated and the residents of Idomeni were transferred to organised state accommodation facilities where they were provided with reception conditions. The camps in Idomeni never constituted official accommodation facilities designated by the authorities for accommodation. 33 . The applicants had not been under detention, and they had moved on to Idomeni on their own initiative. Owing to the informal character of the Idomeni camp, the conditions prevailing there during the applicants’ stay, and its length, cannot be confirmed by the authorities, since no record of the applicants’ presence had been made. They pointed out that, in any event, no responsibility should be imputed to the authorities for the living conditions in the aforementioned camp. As regards access to the asylum procedure In June and July 2016 the Asylum Service implemented a pre ‑ registration operation at accommodation facilities for those who wished to apply for international protection. Pre-registered applicants were provided with an asylum-seeker’s card allowing them to reside lawfully in the country and providing them with access to health and education services. In addition, the Asylum Service had issued translated information material about the asylum procedure. They further stressed that any vulnerability was assessed and taken into consideration. 37 . The Government contested the applicants’ allegations about the lack of access to the asylum procedure during the period they spent at Idomeni exposing them to the risk of returning to their country where they would face inhuman and degrading treatment. They pointed out that there is no indication that the authorities refused to register the applicants’ asylum requests. They submitted that, during the reception proceedings at the RIC, the applicants were informed about the possibility of applying for international protection before the competent Regional Asylum Office (RAO), but they did not express a wish to apply. Their application was first submitted on 12 October 2018, whereas the applicants had not submitted any evidence indicating that they had attempted to apply for asylum earlier but that it had not been possible. 39 . They stated that access to asylum is enacted with a personal appearance before an RAO while, in parallel with the possibility to apply in person, the interested parties had been provided with the possibility of making an appointment through the Skype online platform for the registration of their asylum applications. The operation of such a platform did not preclude the applicants’ attendance at the competent RAO.

Greece, Afghanistan

10

The application concerns an alleged denial by the State authorities of access to information of public interest in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant is a journalist working for the Internet media outlet Ukrainska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth). On 16 March 2012 the applicant requested the Parliament of <COUNTRY> to provide her with information about the number of apartments, paid for out of the State budget, which were allocated to the sitting members of parliament (“the MPs) and the price and surface area of the apartments. She also asked for the names of the MPs who had received those apartments. The applicant asked for the relevant documentation, if possible, or for the provision of the information in any form available. She relied, inter alia , on the Law on the Status of the People’s Deputies and the Law on Access to Public Information (“the Law on Access”). By a letter of 29 March 2012 the Head of the Parliament Secretariat informed the applicant that a total of fifteen apartments of different surface areas were allocated to MPs but that their names could not be provided, as this constituted confidential information about a person and could not be disseminated without that person’s consent. In the latter context the letter referred to judgment no. 2-рп/2012 of the Constitutional Court of <COUNTRY>. The applicant challenged that refusal before the courts, complaining that she had received an incomplete reply to her request for information. She stated that it was important to know the names of the MPs who had received the housing in order for the public to be able to control such a large budgetary expenditure. She relied on section 35 of the Law on the Status of the People’s Deputies, which provided that the distribution of housing to MPs was to be conducted openly and publicly, and on section 6 of the Law on Access, pursuant to which information about public expenditure and the use of State property could not be restricted, in particular the names of persons receiving such property. The same section also set out a three-part test to be met when restricting access to information which, according to the applicant, had not been applied to her request. On 21 May 2012 the applicant’s claims were dismissed by the Kyiv City Administrative Court. In a judgment of one and a half pages it reasoned that the data about a person, including one’s name, address and financial status, was, pursuant to the Law on Information and judgment no. 2-рп/2012 of the Constitutional Court of <COUNTRY>, confidential information and could not be disseminated without that person’s consent. Therefore, the reply to the applicant’s information request had been provided in compliance with the legislation. The applicant appealed, essentially restating her arguments. She also noted that the local court had failed to conduct any examination of her arguments and the legislative provisions she had relied on. By a final ruling of 28 May 2013 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the findings of the local court.

Ukraine

P1-1

Both applications concern the demolition by the State authorities of buildings owned by the applicant companies and used by them for running their commercial activities (a café and a shop). The applicant companies complained that the interference with their property had been unlawful and unjustified. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 2 . The buildings in issue were constructed in the 1970s and located at “Kinnyy” marketplace in Kharkiv. In 1995 and 1994 respectively the applicant companies’ predecessors bought the buildings from the State and were issued property certificates accordingly. In January 2003 and December 2006, after the predecessors were reorganised into the applicant companies, the Kharkiv Technical Inventory Bureau issued an official certificate (“technical passport”) for the buildings in which the first and the second applicant company respectively were stated to be the owners. 3 . Until 2011 (application no. 31211/14) and 2010 (application no. 31338/14) the applicant companies rented the land plots occupied by the buildings at issue from the municipal authorities, under a signed lease which was extended. The lease contracts suggested that the aim of the lease was to ensure the maintenance and proper functioning of the café and shop which were located in the buildings. After 2010 the municipal authorities refused numerous requests from the applicant companies for extensions to their leases, referring to the need to reconstruct the area as part of their urban development plan. The applicant companies were repeatedly ordered to vacate the land plots as they no longer had a right to use them and to demolish the buildings as unauthorised constructions. The applicants’ refused, claiming that the orders were in breach of their property rights and requesting to prolong the lease contracts. The last order to vacate the land was issued to the applicant companies on 7 November 2012 and required that the buildings belonging to them be demolished by 6 p.on 8 November 2012 at the latest. On the same date, 7 November 2012, the City Council passed decision no. 679 on urban renewal, in which it ordered the relevant municipal authority to have some “unauthorised constructions” removed from the city. The buildings owned by the applicant companies were included in a list of “unauthorised constructions” attached to that decision. On the same date according to the official documents the buildings at issue were demolished by the authorities. The certificates of demolition referred to decision no. 679 of the City Council as the legal basis for the destruction of the buildings. The applicant companies challenged the lawfulness of City Council decision no. 679, in so far as it concerned their properties, as well as the demolition itself before the Kominternivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the District Court”). They claimed compensation for the demolished property. On 19 September 2013 the District Court found the demolition to be lawful. Having established that the applicant companies had been the lawful owners of the buildings, the District Court found that they had been using the land without any legal right to do so as their leases had come to an end. It therefore concluded that the local authorities, which had the power to exercise control over the use of the city land, had acted lawfully when they cleared the plots of the constructions which stood on them. It relied on the Law on Local Self-government and the Law on the Improvement of Human Settlements ( «Про благоустрій населених пунктів»). 7 . On 25 November 2013 the Kharkiv Administrative Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the judgment of 19 September 2013 and the reasoning given by the first-instance court. With respect to the applicant companies’ complaint that the buildings at issue had been destroyed in breach of their property rights, the Court of Appeal noted that the Civil Code of 2003 provided that the right of ownership was subject to State registration and that the applicant companies had failed to duly register their property rights in accordance with the procedure provided for by the Code. The applicant companies lodged appeals on points of law against the judgment of 19 September 2013, arguing that they had been unlawfully deprived of their property and submitting, among other things, that their property rights had been duly registered in accordance with the procedure valid at the time of purchase and required no re-registration. On 26 December 2013 the Higher Administrative Court rejected the applicant companies’ request for leave to appeal in cassation, stating in a general way that there had been no evidence of a breach of material law or procedural law by the lower courts. The applicants complained that there was no legal basis for declaring the buildings at issue to be unauthorised constructions and that their demolition on the basis of City Council decision no. 679 of 7 November 2008 had been contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No.

5, 5

The case concerns the alleged arbitrariness of a court order of 10 July 2013 to remand the applicant in custody, in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, and the unavailability of an effective procedure whereby he could obtain a review of the lawfulness of his detention, in breach of Article 5 § On 20 September 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having engaged in a number of fraudulent real-estate transactions in association with several other individuals. On 21 September 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Luhansk remanded the applicant in custody, referring to the gravity of the offences with which he had been charged and noting that, if at liberty, he could obstruct the investigation into his case or abscond. The court had particular regard to the fact that he was officially employed outside Lysychansk, whereas Lysychansk was the town in which he was registered as a resident. On 5 October 2012 the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the applicant against that decision and released him after he had given an undertaking not to abscond. It noted, in particular, that the applicant’s detention was unwarranted considering that his permanent residence was in Lysychansk; he had a family to support, including two minor children and his elderly mother; he was officially employed; he had provided positive character references; and he had no criminal record. The court also noted that the applicant’s alleged role in the offences with which he had been charged (involving other individuals) was minor. On 18 November 2012 the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Lysychansk City Court (“the Lysychansk Court”). On 10 July 2013 the prosecutor asked the court to remand the applicant in custody, referring to the gravity of the offences with which he had been charged and the fact that, if convicted, he could face a prison term exceeding three years. The prosecutor also submitted, without providing any details, that, while at liberty, the applicant was obstructing the investigation into his case and influencing witnesses to either refuse to testify or to give false testimonies. The Lysychansk Court granted the request on the same day that it was submitted, referring to the gravity of the offences with which the applicant had been charged and to the need to prevent him from absconding, obstructing the investigation and engaging in further criminal activity. The court also made reference to the need to secure procedural efficiency. In accordance with the applicable law, that decision was not subject to appeal. While in detention, the applicant lodged complaints with the Lysychansk Court and the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal requesting his release from detention, but to no avail. On 11 July 2014 the applicant was released from detention following a judgment given by the trial court on 8 July 2014 finding him guilty as charged but releasing him from serving the sentence.

P1-1

At the material time he lived in the village of Gökdoğan (district of Durağan – Sinop province). At the beginning of September 1987 the National Water Board (“the DSİ ” – Devlet Su İşleri ), a State body responsible, inter alia , for dam construction, expropriated two plots of land belonging to the applicant in the village of Gökdoğan (Sinop). Following the construction of the Altınkaya hydroelectric dam in the Kızılırmak valley, the land, which had been used for growing crops, was flooded, as was that of more than 3,000 families also affected by the scheme. After title to the land had been transferred to the authorities on 4 September 1987, the DSİ paid the applicant a total of 4,370,962 Turkish liras (TRL) for the two plots of land (being TRL 1,380,000 and TRL 2,990,962 respectively). On 2 October 1987 the applicant brought, in respect of the expropriation of each plot of land, an action in the Durağan Court of First Instance for increased compensation. The actions were registered under nos. 87/2837 and 87/2828. During the proceedings the court ordered two on-site valuations by experts in order to assess whether the amounts fixed by the expropriating authorities were correct. The two panels of experts relied on the same criteria in preparing their valuations, namely the criteria set out in Law no. 2942 on expropriation rules. As, however, they did not use the same methods of calculation, their valuations differed, but both were higher than the amount that had been paid by the DSİ on expropriation. An application by the parties for a third valuation was dismissed because the court considered that the two valuations had been based on criteria complying with the statutory requirements and contained sufficient relevant material to enable it to decide the case. Subsequently, the applicant stated in writing that he accepted the lower of the expert valuations. The Court of First Instance noted his agreement and made an order in those amounts. In action no. 87/2837, on 22 June 1989 the court ordered the DSİ to pay TRL 3,089,130 in additional compensation for expropriation. In action no. 87/2828 it awarded the applicant an additional TRL 3,895,692 on 10 May 1990. Those amounts bore simple interest for delay at the statutory rate of 30% a year running from 4 September 1987 (see paragraph 10 above). The Court of Cassation upheld those decisions on 17 September 1990 and 6 September 1991 respectively. The additional compensation awarded in action no. 87/2837 was paid to the applicant on 30 January 1992. It came to TRL 7,097,276, of which TRL 4,008,146 was interest for delay due up to December 1991. In action no. 87/2828 the applicant received the sum of TRL 10,116,692 on 7 January 1993, TRL 6,221,000 of which was interest for delay calculated up to December 1992.

8

The case concerns the allegedly unjustified refusal of the police on 12 March 2019 to disclose to the applicant the address where his minor son (born in April 2016) was living with his mother, separately from the applicant, although he also exercised parental authority. He complained of a violation of Article 8 on that account. 2 . An appeal by the applicant against that refusal was ultimately dismissed on 11 November 2019 by a decision of the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal, which found no fault on the part of the police. In particular, the court found that the police had duly established the child’s whereabouts but that the child’s mother had not given permission, as required by the data protection regulations (section 14(2) of the Law on Personal Data Protection and section 11 of the Law on Information), to have the address where she had been living with the child disclosed. On 23 December 2019 the Supreme Court found no grounds to review the case on points of law. 3 . In the meantime, on 7 August 2019 a local child welfare authority issued a “conclusion” setting out a schedule and conditions for meetings and contact between the applicant and his child. Subsequently, the applicant met with the child on 13 September 2019 and was also informed when the child moved to another place of residence. 4 . Between December 2018 and March 2020 the applicant instituted three sets of civil proceedings seeking the return of his son to his previous place of residence, the disclosure of his son’s new place of residence and the removal of obstacles to the applicant’s communication with the child. The applicant’s claim for the return of the child was dismissed as premature in March 2021. The proceedings regarding his two other claims, which the applicant eventually withdrew after reaching an agreement with the child’s mother regarding his contact with the child, were discontinued in November 2019 and January 2022.

6, 3

The present case concerns allegations, under Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention, that the applicant was tortured by officers of the Kharkiv Organised Crime Police Unit (“the UBOZ”); that his relevant complaint was not properly investigated; that his self-incriminating statements had served as a basis for his conviction on murder charges; and that the criminal proceedings against him had been inordinately lengthy. It is apparent from the available material that on 15 July 2003 the applicant, at that time detained in the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre (SIZO) on theft charges, was taken for questioning to the UBOZ unit, where he submitted two handwritten “statements of surrender” [1] incriminating himself and A.T. in two murders. It is not clear whether access to a lawyer was available to him on that day. According to a report by R., a forensic expert, dated 23 July 2003, he had given the applicant a physical examination on 16 July 2003 and established that he had had no injuries. It appears from the file that the applicant was given a copy of that report in May 2007 only. Between 16 and 25 July 2003 the applicant and A.T. (who had also given similar self-incriminating statements) – both assisted by lawyers - actively participated in the investigation, expanding on their initial statements and arguing with each other as to the scope and nature of their personal involvement in the two murders. During an interview on 17 November 2003, the applicant retracted his self-incriminating statements, alleging (without describing the relevant circumstances) that he had been subjected to duress. During various other interviews between 2004 and 2007, he insisted that he had been subjected to duress, but provided no or few details and refused to implicate any particular officers, stating that he feared reprisals. Nevertheless, in 2007 the investigator handling the applicant’s case conducted an inquiry of his own motion and on 10 May 2007 decided that there was no call to institute criminal proceedings. He noted, in particular, that the applicant, legally represented, had refused to provide a detailed account and had filed no formal complaints; that no injuries had been recorded by the forensic expert and in the SIZO medical file; and that law-enforcement officers and attesting witnesses, who took part in the investigative activities in July 2003, denied allegations of ill-treatment. On an unspecified date the applicant, together with A.T., was committed to stand trial before the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a first-instance court, on charges of having committed two murders. During that trial, the applicant argued that his statements of surrender had been false and extorted by torture. In particular, his limbs and genitals had been repeatedly twisted; he had been suffocated and electrocuted. The applicant further argued that expert R. had not examined him; that his report was false; and that its copy had not been provided to him until in 2007. The court requested the Kharkiv regional prosecutor’s office to inquire into those allegations. On 7 April 2008 the prosecutor’s office took a decision not to institute criminal proceedings, relying on the fresh statements by law-enforcement officers and otherwise copying the text of the aforementioned decision of 10 May 2007. In December 2009 and January 2010, respectively, two former employees of the Kharkiv SIZO, A.Ch. and Z, testified in court that in July 2003 the applicant had had red eyes and a swollen groin upon his return from the UBOZ. They explained that no record had been drawn up in that regard, at the request of the applicant and his father, who feared reprisals. The applicant’s father concurred with those accounts. On 9 March 2010 the court found the applicant and A.T. guilty of both murders and sentenced them to life imprisonment. It dismissed the applicant’s ill-treatment allegations as unsubstantiated. His father’s, A.Ch.’s and Z.’s accounts were rejected as lacking credibility and as being inconsistent with other material, including an account of various details given by the applicant and A.Ch.’s own previous statements made in court. The above judgment, upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal, became final on 7 September 2010. In 2014 the applicant and his father filed formal criminal complaints alleging that in 2003 the applicant had been tortured at the UBOZ. Criminal proceedings having been instituted on 29 July 2014, they were subsequently closed and reopened on several occasions on account of various flaws in the relevant inquiry and, as of the last update on the matter by the parties (July 2017), they were ongoing. On 11 November 2019 the Dergachivskyy District Court allowed an application by the applicant for extraordinary reopening of the murder proceedings against him. Since the last correspondence received from the parties (24 July 2021) the case was under re-examination.

2, 3

The application concerns the applicant’s threatened expulsion to Iran, where she would allegedly face a real risk of being sentenced to life imprisonment or death owing to her conversion from Islam to Christianity and of being subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of the Iranian authorities and/or her former husband. The applicant also complains of the alleged failure of the Turkish authorities and courts to conduct a proper and timely assessment of her allegations. 2 . On 4 March 2017 the applicant left Iran and legally entered <COUNTRY>. The applicant subsequently arranged for her son to enter <COUNTRY> illegally; the son joined her later in 2017. On 31 May 2017 the applicant lodged an application for asylum with the Trabzon governor’s office, following which an interview was conducted with the applicant on 6 July 2017 at the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (“the Migration Authority”). The applicant stated that she had had to flee Iran as a result of the harassment to which she had been subjected by her former husband. She further stated that she wished to apply for asylum in <COUNTRY> with a view to her eventually being resettled in Europe. She also stated that she was an adherent of the Shi’a branch of Islam and that she observed certain fundamental Islamic practices, such as fasting. 3 . The application for asylum lodged by the applicant was rejected by the domestic courts, which mainly deemed that the applicant’s allegations were unsubstantiated and lacked credibility. In its judgment of 21 November 2017, the Trabzon Administrative Court observed that although the applicant asserted that she and her son had been subjected to violence and harassment by her former husband (from whom she had been divorced ten years earlier) during the time that they had lived with him, the applicant and her son had subsequently lived by themselves in Tehran without any problems for eight years. As to the applicant’s assertion that her former husband had allegedly discovered their whereabouts in Tehran and had started to stalk the applicant and her son in 2016, the court stressed that there appeared to be no information (either lodged in the case file or contained in the applicant’s own statements) to indicate that that situation had prevented them from living safely in Iran or prevented them from changing their place of residence in that country. Taking into account the applicant’s statement that she had applied for asylum with a view to being resettled somewhere else in Europe, the Trabzon Administrative Court concluded that the applicant had failed to provide and to elaborate on a consistent account of her alleged fear of persecution and that her assertions had therefore been unfounded. On 20 April 2018 the Samsun Regional Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 21 November 2017 on appeal. Subsequently, the Trabzon governor’s office issued an order for the applicant’s deportation on the grounds that the applicant’s application for asylum had been rejected. On 23 May 2018 the applicant brought an action for the annulment of the deportation order. She argued that deporting her to Iran would expose her to a real risk of death or ill-treatment in view of the fact that after moving to <COUNTRY> she had converted from Islam to Christianity and that her former husband had informed the Iranian authorities of her conversion. In support of her claims, she submitted a copy of a baptism certificate dated 15 May 2018 and issued by the Gedikpaşa Armenian Evangelical Church ( Gedikpaşa Ermeni Protestan Kilisesi ). The Trabzon Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s case, referring solely to the findings in the judgment of 21 November 2017 with respect to the rejection of the applicant’s application for asylum. 6 . On 23 October 2018 the applicant lodged before the Constitutional Court a request for an interim measure suspending the deportation proceedings. She complained that she would be exposed if removed to Iran to a real risk of death or ill-treatment as a result of her sur place conversion (that is, her conversion in <COUNTRY> to Christianity – which had allegedly been disclosed to the Iranian authorities by her former husband) and the ongoing threats that she was receiving from the latter. In its summary decision of 12 November 2018, the Constitutional Court rejected the above-mentioned interim measure request and individual application as manifestly-ill founded. From the documents submitted it appears that the applicant and her son continue to reside in <COUNTRY>.

Türkiye

2

The present case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention about the ineffectiveness of the investigation and subsequent court proceedings concerning the circumstances of her son’s death, which allegedly involved State agents, and those under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the consideration of her civil claim lodged within the criminal proceedings. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. On 28 May 1993 the applicant’s son, driving a motorcycle with two passengers, collided with a police car in a street in Odesa. The next day he died in a hospital from the injuries sustained. On 4 June 1993 the Kyivskyy District Prosecutor’s Office of Odesa instituted criminal proceedings concerning the death of the applicant’s son. On 22 December 1993 the applicant was granted victim status. On 25 December 1993 G., the police officer who had been driving the police car, was served with a written obligation not to abscond. On 3 January 1994 this preventive measure was lifted. On 17 July 1994 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings against G. on account of the lack of corpus delicti in his actions. That decision was set aside in December 1994. On 5 January 1995 G. was identified as an accused person and the next day he was again served with a written obligation not to abscond. On 16 April 1996 the investigation was completed and on 8 May 1996 the criminal case was sent for trial. On 19 August 1996 G. was put on the wanted list because of his numerous failures to appear at court hearings and an order was made for his arrest and detention. On 24 October 2005 and on 11 November 2008 the applicant was informed that the police were still searching for G. and that following an internal police inquiry, it had been established that the search measures had not been appropriate and the police officers in charge had been disciplined. On 24 September 2009 G. was arrested. On 14 April 2010 the Kyivskyy District Court of Odesa delivered a guilty judgment, finding that G. had violated traffic safety rules, exceeded his powers and left the applicant’s son in danger and that all those actions had resulted in the latter’s death. The court sentenced G. to eight years’ imprisonment with a three-year driving ban and five years’ prohibition on holding any post with the law-enforcement authorities. On 2 December 2010 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned judgment as ill-founded and remitted the case to the prosecutor for additional investigation. The appellate court noted that the available evidence in support of the applicant’s version of events indicated that G. might have acted deliberately in order to stop the motorcycle and his actions might not have been properly categorised under the criminal law. It also considered that the measures taken to locate G. had been inappropriate taking into account his uncontested statements that he had always lived in his apartment in Russia and had known nothing about being wanted by the police in <COUNTRY>. On 23 August 2011, after the completion of the additional investigation, the Prymorskyy District Court of Odesa delivered a guilty verdict reiterating that G. had violated traffic safety rules and exceeded his powers and that those actions had resulted in the death of the applicant’s son. The court then exempted G. from criminal punishment because the limitation period had expired. He was released from custody on that day. On 24 January 2012 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the verdict of 23 August 2011 and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. On 8 October 2014 the Prymorskyy District Court of Odesa remitted the case to the prosecutor for additional investigation in order to establish the circumstances in which G.’s actions could have been incorrectly categorised. On 10 November 2015 the prosecutor approved a bill of indictment against G. and sent the case for trial. On 16 November 2016 the Kyivskyy District Court of Odesa returned the bill of indictment to the prosecutor for the elimination of procedural shortcomings. As of February 2017, the additional investigation was ongoing. The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in this connection. The applicant complained under Article 2 and Article 13 of the Convention that the investigation and subsequent court proceedings concerning the circumstances of her son’s death had not been effective. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that her civil claim for damages had remained undetermined for a considerable time.

Ukraine

P1-1

The applications concern the refusal by the authorities to grant a survivor’s pension to any of the applicants following the death of their partners. These four cases are part of a group of similar applications submitted by seven women (see the previous judgments of Valverde Digon <COUNTRY>, no. 22386/19, 26 January 2023 and Domenech Aradilla and Rodríguez González <COUNTRY> , nos. 32667/19 and 30807/20, 19 January 2023), all of which lived in Catalonia and lost their partners, to whom they were not married, between 2013 and 2015. All of them had been cohabitating with their respective partners for at least five years and/or had children in common, and in each case, the applicants were economically dependent on their partners. Prior to April 2014, all of them were in theory eligible for a survivor’s pension in the event that their partner died under Catalan civil law. However, the legal regime applicable in most other regions of <COUNTRY> (those which, unlike Catalonia, did not have their own Autonomous civil law in this respect) required, additionally, that in order to establish a civil partnership for the purposes of being eligible to receive a survivor’s pension, the couple have been formally constituted as a civil partnership through its registration in a public register set up for this purpose or a notarial deed, and this, at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. The different requirements for the constitution of a civil partnership and for the eligibility for a survivor’s pension in the different Autonomous Communities in <COUNTRY> raised concerns about the constitutional rights of Spanish citizens to be considered equal in the exercise of their rights and duties in the area of social security, and to have a uniform access to social benefits throughout the country. By a judgment published on 10 April 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the differences between the legislation of the Autonomous Communities (among which, Catalonia) in respect to the consideration of a couple as a civil partnership and hence, the access to a survivor’s pension, were unconstitutional. From that moment on, in order to be considered a civil partnership in <COUNTRY>, it was required for couples to meet: (i) A substantive requirement that the partners have cohabited for at least five years prior to the death of the deceased person; (ii) A formal requirement that – at least two years prior to the death of the deceased person – the couple have been formally constituted as a civil partnership through its registration in a public register set up for this purpose or a public deed. Only those who had been in a civil partnership as defined above and also met the economic criteria could, in the event of the death of one of the partners, be considered eligible for a survivor’s pension. The Constitutional Court further stipulated that the declaration of unconstitutionality applied to all new applications received after the entry into force of the judgment. For a more detailed review of the relevant legal framework and practice, see Valverde Digon , cited above, §§ 15-The seven applicants were affected by the entry into force of this new legal requirement, which resulted in their application for survivor’s pension being rejected, as explained in detail below. The first applicant (application no. 20942/19) and her partner lived together since 1998 and had two children in common. The first applicant’s partner died on 22 May 2014. She applied for a survivor’s pension on 14 July 2014. The following day, the National Institute of Social Security ( Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social – “the INSS”) issued a decision that rejected the applicant’s application for a survivor’s pension, on the basis of the applicant’s failure to meet one of the legal requirements for eligibility for a survivor’s pension: namely, the formalisation of the partnership by way of an entry in a register or by means of the issuance of a notarial deed at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. The first applicant lodged subsequent appeals, both administrative and judicial, and each time she saw her application for the pension rejected because of the lack of registration of her partnership two years prior to the death of her partner. The second applicant (application no. 33998/19) and her partner started living together on 23 August 2006. They had a daughter in 2013. The second applicant’s partner died in a work-related accident on 24 March 2015. On 19 June 2015, the second applicant lodged an application for a survivor’s pension with the private insurance company with which the Spanish social security system collaborates, and with which her partner had insurance covering work-related accidents. On 23 June 2015, the private insurance company issued a decision rejecting the second applicant’s application for a survivor’s pension based on the applicant’s failure to meet the requirements of formalisation of the partnership by way of an entry in a register or by means of the issuance of a public deed at least two years prior to the death of one or other of the partners. The second applicant lodged subsequent appeals. On 6 April 2017 Labour Court no. 33 of Barcelona upheld the applicant’s judicial appeal and recognised her right to receive a survivor’s pension, to be paid by the private insurance company. The Labour Court considered that “the new formal requirement of registration or certification before a notary two years prior to the death of the partner, could only be complied with in Catalonia from 10 April 2016 – two years after the publication in the Official State Gazette of Constitutional Court judgment 40/2014, which declared the provision that exempted them from that formal requirement null and void”. The domestic court ruled that when the applicant’s partner died it was still chronologically impossible to fulfil the new requirement (in Catalonia) of formalising the partnership by making an entry in a register or by means of the issuance of a notarial deed at least two years prior to the death of the partner. The INSS and the private insurance company appealed that judgment, and the High Court of Justice of Catalonia upheld the appeals and refused to award the second applicant a survivor’s pension. That court of appeals considered that the second applicant and her partner had had “sufficient time in which to formalise their cohabitation situation for the purposes of either of them being eventually entitled to receive a survivor’s pension from the social security system, which is governed by the laws and regulations in force at the time of the event giving rise to each benefit”. Her amparo appeal against that judgment was declared inadmissible. The third applicant (37119/19) and her partner lived together, without interruption, from January 2005. The third applicant’s partner died on 12 July 2015. She applied for a survivor’s pension on 19 January 2016. On 24 February 2016, the INSS issued a decision rejecting the applicant’s application for a survivor’s pension on the basis of the applicant’s failure to meet any of the legal requirements to be eligible for a survivor’s pension, including the formalisation of the partnership at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. She lodged an administrative appeal, to no avail, and subsequent judicial appeals. Although the labour courts considered that she and her partner had fulfilled all the remaining requirements to be entitled to a pension, it still concluded that they had not registered their partnership pursuant to the requirement provided in the fourth sub-paragraph of section 174(3) of the LGSS. The fourth applicant (application no. 57464/19) and her partner cohabited, without interruption, from 2000. They had two children in common. The fourth applicant’s partner died on 3 November 2014. She applied for a survivor’s pension on 27 January 2016. The INSS issued a decision rejecting the applicant’s application for a survivor’s pension, in view of the applicant’s failure to meet any of the legal requirements to be eligible for a survivor’s pension, including the formalisation of the partnership at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. The fourth applicant lodged an appeal, to no avail, but after that her judicial appeal was upheld by the Labour Court no. 11 of Barcelona. That court considered that the applicant met all the other legal requirements (including five years of cohabitation and having children in common). Moreover the Labour Court held that the new formal requirement of registration two years prior to the death of the partner could only be complied with in Catalonia from 10 April 2016 and that the applicant and her partner had been placed in an “absurd, unjustified and disproportionate situation of defencelessness” owing to the impossibility of their complying with the new requirement before the partner died. It held that to find otherwise would violate the right to legal certainty. However, the High Court of Justice of Catalonia later upheld the INSS’s appeal against that judgment, overturning the judgment delivered by the Labour Court, and refusing to award the fourth applicant a survivor’s pension. The court of appeals considered that the fourth applicant and her partner had had eight months in which to formalise their partnership for the purposes of either of them being eventually entitled to receive a survivor’s pension before he died, and that the requirement was fully applicable to them. The fourth applicant then lodged an amparo appeal, which was declared inadmissible. The four applicants complained of the refusal of the authorities to grant them a survivor’s pension. The applicants submitted that they had had a legitimate expectation of receiving a survivor’s pension because they and their respective partners had together constituted, under Catalan civil law, a civil partnership, which rendered them eligible for a survivor’s pension in case of death of the respective partner (seeing that the other requirements were also met). Their respective partners had died shortly after the Constitutional Court’s judgment STC 40/2014 had introduced, without any prior transitional period, a new requirement that their civil partnerships must have been formally registered at least two years prior to the death of one of the partners. They considered that the authorities failed to have regard to the objective impossibility for them to comply with the new requirement. They further alleged that the application of the new legal regime preventing them from receiving a survivor’s pension had constituted indirect discrimination on the basis of gender, since the great majority of recipients of survivor’s pensions in <COUNTRY> were women. The Government considered, firstly, that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was not applicable to the present case. In their view, the fact that the applicants’ partners’ deaths had taken place after the Constitutional Court had amended the rules governing access to a survivor’s pension had had a clear and undisputable consequence: the applicants had not met the eligibility criteria in respect of obtaining a survivor’s pension. As a result, they could not have had a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining a possession as defined by the Court under Article 1 of Protocol No. The Government also stated that, should the Court consider that the applicant’s mere hope of obtaining a survivor’s pension had amounted to a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining a possession, the deprivation of such a possession would have been justified by reasons of general interest: to render void a previous provision that had been discriminatory and unconstitutional. Lastly, the Government pointed out that having to formally register a partnership two years prior to the death of one of the partners in order for the surviving partner to obtain social benefits could not be considered to constitute an “excessive burden” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No.

Spain

8

The case concerns the material conditions of stay of the applicant, a minor migrant, in the Red Cross adults’ reception centre in Rome, Via Ramazzini, as well as the lack of application in his case of the procedural guarantees set up for minor migrants. The applicant’s arrival in <COUNTRY> and his age assessment 2 . On 29 January 2017 the applicant reached <COUNTRY> aboard a makeshift vessel. He was then transferred to the hotspot at Trapani. Since his arrival, he declared to the authorities that he was a minor and submitted a birth certificate showing his birthdate as being 19 December 1999. A healthcare card was attributed to him, stating his minor age. 3 . On 2 February 2017 the applicant underwent a medical examination to determine his age. The corresponding medical report stated that his bone age, as evaluated by X-ray examinations of his left wrist and hand, was compatible with that of a person aged at least eighteen. Therefore, on 7 February 2017 the applicant was transferred to the Red Cross adults’ reception centre in Rome, Via Ramazzini. It appears from the case file that, during his stay in the said centre, the applicant formed close ties with the educators of the association Laboratorio 53 as well as with his teachers in the framework of the Italian language classes that he attended. The applicant’s teachers, having realised that he was a minor after he had shown them his birth certificate, encouraged him to talk about his minor status and put him in contact with the lawyer who subsequently filed the present application with the Court. On 19 June 2017 the applicant’s representative sent a request to different institutions, including the Public Prosecutor of the Juvenile Court, the Directorate General of Immigration and the Director of the Red Cross Centre where the applicant was hosted, asking that the applicant be transferred to a reception centre dedicated to minors. 7 . On the following day the applicant was transferred to the minor reception centre “Villa Spada”, in Rome. On 30 June 2017 he underwent a medical visit which showed that his age was between seventeen and eighteen years old. Considering the margin of error, the applicant was then deemed to be a minor. On 1 July 2017 the applicant was transferred to a minor First Aid Centre in Pomezia and on 13 August 2017 to another minor centre in Rome. On 17 July 2017 a guardian was appointed. In the meantime, the procedure for the applicant’s asylum request was initiated and the applicant was eventually granted asylum. The material conditions of stay in the Red Cross adults’ reception Centre in Rome, Via Ramazzini The Red Cross adults’ reception centre in Rome, Via Ramazzini, opened in June 2016 as an emergency provisional reception centre meant to face the massive arrival of migrants in <COUNTRY> during that period. The aim of the centre was to host migrants for a short period of time, waiting for them to be dispatched to other facilities. The centre consisted of two blocks of tents hosting men and one fixed structure dedicated to women and their children. The centre had a capacity of 400 people; it was eventually closed in September 2017. A report by the association “ Osservatorio Accoglienza Casa dei Venti ” of 9 February 2017, provided by the applicant, related that the asylum seekers interviewed for the purpose of the report declared that the tents were cold during winter. The sanitary facilities consisted of 13 toilets and 15 showers for 380 individuals at the time. The guests indicated that the services were often broken, or that they were so dirty they were unusable. Warm water supplies were not sufficient to cover everyone’s needs. Although the “hub” was not intended for unaccompanied minors, the persons interviewed reported that numerous such minors had been hosted in the centre, some of them for a month and, in certain cases, for three to four months. The manager of the structure indicated that the prefecture sometimes wrongly sent unaccompanied minors to that facility and that they were quickly transferred to dedicated centres within a few days. The migrants also stated that the food was of poor quality and often cold. The report indicated that access to legal information in the centre, in particular regarding asylum requests, was insufficient. In addition to this report, a press article of 10 February 2017 provided by the applicant quoted the director of the Red Cross who expressed hope that the Centre of Via Ramazzini would close soon, as it was not providing decent reception conditions for migrants. The centre was supposed to close in December 2016 and the director expressed his fear that the centre would remain open regardless. A second article provided by the applicant, dated 14 February 2017, stated that a violent fight between migrants for unspecified reasons of cohabitation took place in the centre and required the intervention of several police patrols. The article indicated also that this was one of numerous fights which took place in the centre during that period. Moreover, during an interview with the educators on 21 June 2017, namely the day after the applicant’s transfer from Via Ramazzini, the applicant indicated that the conditions of stay in the Red Cross centre were particularly harsh, due to the poor quality of food, the absence of personal space and the cohabitation with the numerous guests. He declared that, in order to avoid conflict with the centre’s operators, he refused several times to take part in the protests concerning the centre’s conditions organised by groups of adult migrants.

Italy

P1-1

The present case concerns the applicant’s complaint that an increase in the licence fees for his gambling business was in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. In 2003 the applicant started a gambling business and obtained the necessary licences ( торгові патенти ). The annual rates for the gambling licences were provided for in the Licensing of Certain Kinds of Entrepreneurial Activities Act ( Про патентування деяких видів підприємницької діяльності – “the Licensing Act”). The rates were increased twice, on 27 November 2003 and 23 December 2004, by the State Budget Acts for 2004 and 2005 respectively. The applicant paid the difference. In 2006 he closed his gambling business and initiated court proceedings, arguing that the increase in the licence fees had been unlawful and unforeseeable and seeking a refund for the extra payments. On 24 July 2007 the Odesa Regional Commercial Court ordered the local authorities to return the difference which had resulted from the increased rates, as requested by the applicant. It referred to section 7(2) of the Taxation System Act, which provided that tax rates could not be changed by the State Budget Acts, and to Article 27 § 3 of the Budget Code, which provided that any law affecting income or expenses of the public budgets had to be published before 15 August of the preceding year, otherwise its effect had to be deferred for one year. On 27 May 2009 the Odesa Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision and dismissed the applicant’s claim as unfounded. It reasoned that the State Budget Acts for 2004 and 2005 had been valid, as they had not been declared unconstitutional. It held that the rules of the State Budget Acts prevailed over the rules cited by the first-instance court. Moreover, given that the applicant had not made a full payment in advance covering the entire period of validity of the gambling licences, he could not benefit from a special guarantee provided for in section 5(5) of the Licensing Act entitling certain licence holders to retain the original rate. On 19 April 2012 the Higher Administrative Court upheld the decision of the appellate court.

2

The present applications concern allegations under Article 2, Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention of ineffective investigations into the deaths of the applicants’ relatives in three separate road-traffic accidents. The applicants’ details and the relevant facts are set out in the appended table.

5

The case concerns the alleged failure of the Criminal Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) to carry out a speedy review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending extradition. The applicant, a Turkmen national who was facing criminal prosecution in his home country, was arrested upon his arrival at the Zvartnots International Airport and on 1 September 2017 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) ordered his detention pending extradition. 3 . On 6 September 2017 the applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision. By letter of 7 September 2017, the Court of Appeal asked the District Court to transfer the case file to it, which the latter did on 15 September 2017. The Court of Appeal received the case file on 20 September 2017, took over the applicant’s appeal on 22 September 2017 and set a hearing for 25 September 2017. According to the relevant audio recording of the court hearing of 25 September 2017, it had been impossible to ensure the applicant’s presence in court due the strict time-limits to review a detention decision. The presiding judge enquired from the applicant’s representative whether she would like to have the case adjourned because of the applicant’s absence. The representative replied that the applicant had expressed his wish to be present at the appeal hearing and thus she agreed to the adjournment. Then the prosecutor informed the court that the applicant had dismissed his representative and had appointed a new one. The Court of Appeal, while noting that the case should be adjourned to ensure the applicant’s new representative’s presence, went on to conclude that the case was being adjourned because of the applicant’s absence and that a summons would be sent to the new representative for the hearing set for 28 September 2017. The Court of Appeal asked the prosecutor if they could ensure the applicant’s presence for the following hearing or the court should assist them in that matter. In reply, the prosecutor requested the court to send a summons to the Nubarashen Remand Prison where the applicant had been held and, at the same time, undertook to ensure that the applicant attend the following hearing. According to the relevant audio recording of the court hearing of 28 September 2017, the applicant’s presence had not been ensured due to a technical reason. After enquiring from the applicant’s lawyer if he would prefer to have the hearing postponed due to the applicant’s absence, to which the lawyer agreed, the Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing until 4 October 2017. On the last-mentioned date it dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 8 December 2017 the applicant lodged a request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court asking the Court to, inter alia , prevent his removal to <COUNTRY>. On the same date the Court decided to grant the applicant’s request under Rule 39 to stay his extradition. The District Court extended the applicant’s detention twice, in particular on 26 October and then on 22 December 2017. On 27 December 2017 the applicant lodged an appeal against the last-mentioned decision. By letter of 28 December 2017, the Court of Appeal requested the case file from the District Court. On 16 January 2018 the applicant asked the District Court to transfer the case file to the Court of Appeal as soon as possible, pointing out that the excessive delay in considering his appeal against his detention was in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. 10 . On 17 January 2018 the District Court forwarded the case file to the Court of Appeal, which received it and took over the applicant’s appeal on 18 January 2018. It set a court hearing for 22 January 2018. According to the relevant audio recording of the appeal hearing of 22 January 2018, the Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing to obtain a translation of the Court’s letter informing the Government about the interim measure applied in the applicant’s case. The applicant agreed to the adjournment. On the next hearing, that is 25 January 2018, the Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing once again so that the parties would study the translation of the aforementioned letter of the Court. It set the next court hearing on 30 January 2018. The Government claimed that the Court of Appeal had adjourned the hearing of 30 January 2018 until 7 February 2018 because it fell on a non-working day. On the last-mentioned date the Court of Appeal retired to the deliberations room to adopt a decision which was delivered on 8 February 2018. In particular, the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal and ordered his release. On 1 July 2019 the applicant obtained refugee status and asylum in <COUNTRY>. On 25 May 2020 the Court lifted the interim measure indicated on 8 December 2017.

Turkmenistan, Armenia

10

The applications concern refusals to allow the applicant NGO to access the master plans of various urban settlements, allegedly in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant is an NGO dedicated to democratic governance and human rights. In November 2009 (and in January 2014 – application no. 38956/15) the applicant NGO requested 196 municipalities all over <COUNTRY> to provide it with information regarding their spatial planning. In its requests it asked whether and when master plans of settlements ( генеральні плани населених пунктів ) and other urban planning documents had been adopted, and how citizens could access those documents, in particular the graphic part of the master plans. It also asked the municipalities to provide it with copies (either printed or electronic) of the master plans. The requests (except the request in application no. 38956/15) mentioned that the applicant NGO was implementing a project aimed at monitoring the accessibility of the master plans of Ukrainian cities and that “systematised monitoring data would be widely published in national and regional media”. F ive municipalities provided the applicant NGO with copies of their master plans. The applications before the Court concern 14 unsuccessful requests made to the remaining 191 municipalities; no information was provided by the parties as to the other 177 unsuccessful requests. In application no. 48140/14 no reply was provided to the applicant NGO’s request. In applications nos. 5067/15 and 73450/14 the municipalities stated that the master plan (or at least “a version open to the public”) was available on the website. In application no. 56744/14 the municipality refused on the basis that it was unable to copy the master plan because of its size. In application no. 2855/15 the municipality proposed that the applicant NGO come to its premises to see the master plan, but with certain limitations. In all the remaining cases before the Court the municipalities refused to provide the textual and graphic parts of the master plans on the ground that they were marked “for internal use only” ( лише для службового користування ) and/or that they were “secret” ( таємно ). Some of the replies also mentioned that the master plans had been subject to public discussions at the time of their adoption as prescribed by the law. As regards the details of other spatial planning documents, they were provided where applicable. In its complaints to the domestic courts the applicant NGO claimed that the information requested, namely the master plans, was of public interest as it related to the distribution of land and its use, including planned use, within a given settlement. It also underlined that while some parts of the master plans might well be restricted (for example, information regarding strategic objects), others should be freely accessible. In application no. 48140/14, where no reply was provided to the applicant NGO’s request, the domestic courts ordered the municipality to examine the request and provide a reply, leaving the nature of the reply to the discretion of the municipality. The applicant NGO submitted that no reply had been provided. In the other thirteen cases the domestic courts ruled against the applicant NGO (see the dates of final judgments in the table below). In each case, including those where the municipalities’ refusal was grounded on their inability to copy documents the size of the master plan or on the reason that it was “secret”, the domestic courts relied on the Instruction on the procedure for the registration, storage and use of documents, case files, publications and other material sources of information containing confidential information owned by the State, adopted by Resolution no. 1893 of the Cabinet of Ministers of <COUNTRY> of 27 November 1998 (“the Instruction”). 10 . Under that Instruction, information could be categorised as being “for official use” ( для службового користування) by special expert commissions, with the decision having to be subsequently confirmed by the central or local authority holding the information at issue. Information so categorised could not be used for any publications or presentations to the general public and access to it was only possible upon approval from the relevant authority. In order to receive approval it was necessary to make a request stating one’s reasons for wishing to access the restricted information and the nature of the task for which it was needed. 12 . The domestic courts mentioned the details of the respective decisions adopted by the commissions and/or authorities in accordance with the above Instruction’s requirements in six cases. In the remaining seven cases they merely restated the provisions of the Instruction, concluding that the master plans were thereby restricted. Reference was also made to the Instruction in those cases where the initial grounds for refusal were unrelated to the restricted nature of the information or to the fact of its being “secret”, apparently because the municipalities had relied on the Instruction during the domestic proceedings as a further argument for preventing access.

Ukraine

2

The case concerns the death of the applicant’s son by drowning, following a police chase. The applicant complained under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. On 1 August 2016, between 30 a.and 3 a., the applicant’s son, Z.E., was allegedly driving at a high speed on the left bank of River Mtkvari in Tbilisi when he was ordered to pull over by two police officers who were out on patrol. Z.E. disobeyed, apparently accelerating his car, and the police officers gave chase in their police vehicle. Soon afterwards, Z.E. lost control of his car and crashed into a parked minivan. According to the statements of the two police officers, Z.E. then left his car and ran in the direction of a dark, bushy field. The two police officers started chasing him on foot but soon lost sight of him. They returned to their vehicle. In the meantime, five more police patrol vehicles stopped at the scene of the incident. According to the investigation case file, all of the police officers present searched again for Z.E. at the scene but could not find him in the dark. The police officers then left the scene, and Z.E.’s car was removed to a police car park. 3 . On the same day, one of the police officers who had chased the applicant drew up a traffic incident report, noting that at around 3 a.he and his colleague had spotted a vehicle driving at high speed. Despite an order to pull over, the driver had continued to speed up until he crashed into a parked car. According to the report, the driver had then fled the scene. The police officer noted in the report that they had requested the removal of the vehicle to a police car park and had then left the scene. The report mentioned neither the identity of the applicant’s son (his identity documents and other personal belongings were later found in his car), nor the fact that the two police officers had pursued him on foot and had lost sight of him, or that the other police officers who had arrived at the scene had also searched for him, unsuccessfully. 4 . On 3 August 2016 the body of the applicant’s son was found in the river. A criminal investigation into the offence of inciting suicide was started on the same date by the police and a number of investigative measures were carried out. The two police officers involved in the incident were questioned on 7 August 2016. They both stated that, after the crash, they had stopped their car and pursued Z.E. on foot. They had, however, soon lost him in the dark and had returned to their car. The other police officers who had arrived at the scene of the crash had also searched the area in vain. In reply to specific questions, the police officers stated that they had not seen the river flowing nearby, and that they had not heard the sound of anyone falling into the water. 5 . On 8 August 2016 the police investigator in charge sought to obtain closed ‑ circuit television (CCTV) footage from several road-traffic cameras situated in the relevant area. On 17 August 2016 the person in charge of such matters at the Tbilisi car-patrol police provided the investigator with part of the recordings, noting that the remaining cameras had not been working on the day of the incident. On 31 August 2016 the investigator requested additional video footage. On 3 September 2016 he was told that the footage was no longer available as the relevant storage period had expired on 31 August 2016. 6 . On 21 September 2016 the applicant complained to the supervising prosecutor that the investigation was not adequately examining all the relevant circumstances surrounding her son’s death and that, among other things, important CCTV footage from the cameras in the area had not been obtained and examined. On 23 September 2016 a forensic medical report was published, according to which the death of Z.E. had been caused by asphyxia as a result of suffocation in water. Multiple bruises and haemorrhages were also identified on his face and lower limbs. The level of alcohol in his blood was established at 68%. 8 . On 25 November 2016 the applicant was granted the status of a victim in respect of the investigation. The next day the investigator sought to obtain CCTV footage from private properties in the area but were told that no such footage was available. In December 2016 the investigator sought to obtain additional footage from road-traffic cameras, as well as from private CCTV cameras. However, they were informed that the recordings were no longer available. 9 . In December 2016 the remaining police officers were interviewed. They all maintained that by the time they had arrived at the scene, Z.E. had already disappeared; they had searched the area using a flashlight but had not seen or heard anything. On 6 November 2017, following several complaints by the applicant, the case was transferred for further investigation to the Tbilisi prosecutor’s office. All the relevant witnesses were interviewed again, and in August 2020 the investigation was extended to cover the offence of neglect of official duties. During their additional questioning, the two police officers who had pursued Z.E. stated that they had not called the rescue services because they had not thought that Z.E.’s life was at risk. According to their statements, they had reached the edge of the cliff during their search but had not seen the river and had not heard the sound of anyone falling into the water. Furthermore, they had been unable to see anything in the dark and, for that reason, they had not gone down the cliff to further inspect the area. According to the case file, the investigation is still ongoing, and no one has been charged to date.

6

The case concerns the applicant’s allegations that the criminal proceedings against him were unfair (Article 6 of the Convention), that the medical treatment he received while in detention was inadequate (Article 3) and that the exercise of his right of individual application was hindered (Article 34). Criminal proceedings against the applicant On 21 June 2005 the applicant and Mr G. confessed to the double murder of their landlords, Ms N. and Mr , on 25 May 2005. 3 . On 22 June 2005 the applicant was provided with a legal representative, Mr K., and was questioned in the latter’s presence. He confirmed his confessions. By agreement between the parties, given that the applicant and Mr G. did not speak Ukrainian, and upon their request, all investigative acts and the trial itself were conducted in Russian, a language in which they were fluent. After several requests for the assistance of a Romanian interpreter had been rejected on the grounds that the applicant understood the language of the case file, namely Russian, he and his lawyer studied the file on 14 September 2005 and made no complaints, requests or objections. On 25 November 2005 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a first-instance court, sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment for murder, theft and robbery, and Mr G. to fifteen years’ imprisonment for theft and murder. The court delivered its judgment in Russian. It further ordered the confiscation of property which had been acquired by the applicant with money that he had found in the house of the murdered landlords. On 26 December 2005 the applicant lodged his cassation appeal, written in Romanian, with the Supreme Court. On 20 January 2006 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal decided to dispose of the applicant’s appeal without examination. The court noted that by agreement the trial had been conducted in Russian (see paragraph 3 above) and that the appeal therefore had to be drafted in Russian. The applicant then submitted his appeal in Russian, complaining mainly about the severity of his punishment and seeking mitigation owing to his state of health and family situation. 7 . On 16 May 2006 the Supreme Court, in the presence of the public prosecutor but in the absence of the applicant, his lawyer and his co ‑ defendant, upheld the judgment of 20 January 2006. APPLICANT’S Medical treatment Upon his arrest in June 2005, the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis and other illnesses and was prescribed appropriate treatment. Between 1 July and 3 November 2005, he received treatment in Odessa City Tuberculosis Hospital No. On 3 November 2005 he was moved to an isolation block (“the SIZO”), in which he continued receiving treatment for tuberculosis. On 1 December 2005 he was moved to the building for prisoners serving a life sentence, in which he continued receiving his treatment. On 15 August 2006 the applicant refused to continue his medical treatment as he believed that he should receive medical assistance in the SIZO and not in the building for life-sentenced prisoners. He resumed treatment on 6 September 2006. On 13 November 2006 the applicant was found to have been cured of tuberculosis. On 3 December 2006 the applicant was transferred to Kharkiv Temnivska correctional colony no. 100. There he was periodically prescribed treatment to avert any relapse of tuberculosis. Right to lodge an application The applicant requested on several occasions to be provided with the case-file materials to support his submissions to the Court. These requests were satisfied, and the applicant was provided with the requested materials on 24 April 2008, 18 January 2010, and 13 July 2011. 14 . On 7 November 2008 Prison Officer K. reported to his superior that he had held discussions with the applicant. He stated as follows: “[The applicant] tries to draw the attention of the European Court and other human rights organisations to his criminal case through allegations of poor conditions of detention in the establishments of the prison system. The prisoner Gemu K. is deliberately misleading the Euro[pean] Court and other human rights organisations and he insists on his position. He doesn’t react to educational influences and doesn’t engage in any constructive discussion about his problems.”

P1-1

The case concerns the retention of the applicant company’s property by prosecution authorities for about eight months, allegedly in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. The applicant company is a limited liability company specialising in CD ‑ ROM manufacturing. On 7 June 2013 an investigating judge of the Boryspil Town Court authorised a search of the applicant company’s premises in the context of a criminal investigation into suspected production and sale of counterfeit CD-ROMs, having accepted an argument made by a prosecutor that the search might uncover evidence of criminal activity. The ruling authorised “items of relevance for the investigation” to be withheld. Following the search, which was carried out on 14 June 2013, various pieces of equipment and other materials related to CD-ROM production were withheld [1] . 5 . On the same date, an investigator issued a ruling declaring almost all of the withheld items [2] to be material evidence in the ongoing investigation. Those items were to be stored at the Boryspil police department. On 2 July 2013 the applicant company applied to the Boryspil Town Court for the return of those of the withheld items, which it considered essential for CD-ROMs’ production [3] . It submitted that, in accordance with Article 236 § 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), withheld property which was not specified explicitly in a search warrant, was to be considered “temporarily withheld”. The applicant company further referred to Article 171 § 5 of the CCP, which provided that, if an investigator did not apply for such property to be seized within a day of its being temporarily withheld, it was to be immediately returned to its owner. In the absence of such an application in the applicant company’s case, it argued that there were no legal grounds for the continued retention of its property. 7 . On 9 July 2013 the investigating judge, by a final ruling, allowed the applicant company’s claim and ordered the investigator to return the property in question. In so far as the investigator referred to his ruling of 14 June 2013 (see paragraph 5 above) as providing the legal grounds for the retention of the property, the judge noted that the delivery of such a ruling was not provided for by the CCP. 8 . On 10 July 2013 the same judge allowed an application by the prosecutor (lodged earlier that day) for the seizure of all the property withheld on 14 June 2013 [4] , stating that such a measure was necessary to ensure an effective investigation, without commenting on the earlier ruling (see paragraph 7 above). The judge held that the matter was to be examined without the applicant company being notified, given that the property in question was “not temporarily withheld”. On 10 and 11 July 2013 the applicant company, which was not aware of the aforementioned seizure order, applied to the investigator for the return of its property. On 11 July 2013 the investigator sent two letters to the applicant company: the first letter informed the company that its representative could retrieve the property in question from the Boryspil police department, whereas the second stated that the applicant company’s request could not be granted, given that the property had been seized on 10 July 2013. The applicant company’s attempts to challenge the seizure order or to have it lifted were unsuccessful. On 17 July 2013 the investigating judge [5] rejected an application by the applicant company for the seizure order to be lifted, and on 18 July 2013 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal, by a final ruling, rejected the applicant company’s appeal against the seizure order of 10 July 2013 (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant company’s arguments, notably that there was an unexplained contradiction between the rulings of 9 and 10 July 2013, were not addressed. On 20 February 2014 the investigation was discontinued for lack of evidence that a criminal offence had been committed, the seizure order was lifted, and the applicant company received its property back.

5

The present case concerns the arrest and detention of the applicant, in respect of whom the domestic courts issued a warning in administrative proceedings concerning charges of minor hooliganism and failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer. The applicant alleged that her rights protected under Article 5 § 1 and Article 6 of the Convention had been breached by the domestic authorities. According to the applicant, on 5 February 2013 she went to the Sabunchu District Prosecutor’s Office to lodge a complaint, but the prosecutor refused to receive her in person and she was invited to put her complaint in the mailbox. Following her insistence on being received by the prosecutor, the latter called the police to make her leave the building of the Sabunchu District Prosecutor’s Office. After the arrival of the police officers, she refused their orders to get into the police car and go to the Sabunchu District Police Station. On the same day, the applicant was arrested by the police officers and taken to the Sabunchu District Police Station. The police issued an administrative-offence report stating that at around 1 p.the applicant had entered the building of the Sabunchu District Prosecutor’s Office, had made a noise, disturbed the work of staff and sworn at them, and had failed to comply with a lawful order of the police officers who had arrived there, in breach of Articles 296 (minor hooliganism) and 310.1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). However, no record of an administrative arrest was drawn up. On the same day, the applicant was taken to the Sabunchu District Court. According to the transcript of the court hearing, at 30 p.she appeared before a judge, who found her guilty under Articles 296 and 310.1 of the CAO and imposed an administrative sanction on her in the form of a “warning” ( xəbərdarlıq ). The applicant was released from the courtroom. The applicant appealed against her administrative conviction, arguing that she had not committed any administrative offence. By a final decision of 11 March 2013, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, finding it justified.

2

The present application concerns the alleged failure of the authorities to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the death of the applicant’s son, in alleged breach of Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. On 26 July 2015 the dead body of S.H., the applicant’s son, was discovered in a village. A criminal investigation into the suspected murder was opened on the same day and a number of investigative measures were carried out. Individuals who had spotted a car belonging to S.H. near the crime scene and a witness who had seen some individuals fleeing were questioned. Biological and other material was collected for expert examination. 3 . On 30 July 2015 three individuals were charged with failure to report the preparation and commission of S.H.’s murder by a certain H., who, according to the case material, had come to <COUNTRY> for the purpose of killing S.H., and had left immediately afterwards and settled in Russia. The criminal investigation in respect of those three individuals in relation to the offence of failing to report a crime was conducted separately from the one concerning the suspected murder of the applicant’s son. Numerous expert and other examinations were implemented in 2015 and 2016 as part of the criminal investigation into the suspected murder. Multiple witnesses were questioned. On 5 January 2016 a prosecutor granted the applicant the procedural status of a victim in relation to the investigation. He was given an explanation of the relevant procedural rights. On 9 March 2016 a prosecutor supervising the activities of the regional prosecuting authorities examined the applicant’s complaint with respect to the alleged ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation into the murder and instructed the regional authorities to question the applicant and A.B., the victim’s wife, a further time. It was noted that the investigation was to determine the identity of the owner of a woman’s bag seized from the victim’s car and certain other matters relating to the case. A.B., who was based in <COUNTRY> at the time, visited <COUNTRY> on several occasions in 2017 but, despite the prosecutor’s telephone request, she did not report to the authorities for questioning. 7 . On 7 April 2016 the Akhaltsikhe District Court, in public proceedings attended by the applicant, acquitted the three individuals of the charge relating to failure to report a crime. The trial court noted as follows: “[I]n the instant case the document containing the charges indicates that the [three individuals charged with the offence of failure to report a crime] were made aware of a planned murder and its commission and failed to notify the law-enforcement authority, but it is unclear [from the document in question] when, by whom, and generally in what way they became aware that the murder had been under way. From an analysis of the evidence available in the case file, in particular the record of the questioning of A.[one of the individuals charged] and the investigative experiment (verifying his statement on the ground) we can assume that the charges imply that the accused directly participated in the planning of the offence, obtained the weapon and gave it to the person who committed the offence, indicated the victim’s whereabouts, helped him acquire the car which he had needed to move around to commit the crime, and bought the mobile phone SIM cards. These circumstances indicate the [possibility] that the actions of the persons charged with an offence [of failing to report a crime] were criminal in nature. The [prosecution] has not assessed whether the [three individuals concerned] have been charged with failure to report a crime in respect of which their reporting would have resulted in the initiation of criminal proceedings against them for aiding in the commission of a crime. Accordingly, in addition to the fact that the prosecution has not presented any evidence proving the possession of information regarding the preparation of a crime ..., the individuals are charged in such a manner (as is evident from the case material) that it is impossible to convict them. It would be unlawful to convict a person for failing to report a crime which that person had [possibly] committed himself or herself. Accordingly, the charge is unsubstantiated and is based only on assumptions, without the existence of a body of evidence proving guilt.” On 31 January 2017 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s reasoning and findings. It appears from the case file and the parties’ submissions that the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ findings. On 2 June 2017 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office (“the CPO”) sent a legal assistance request to the relevant Russian authorities. It noted that the domestic authorities had sufficient information to believe that H. – who had crossed from <COUNTRY> into Russia – had been behind S.H.’s murder. The CPO therefore asked its Russian counterparts to locate H. and to question him as a witness. A similar request was sent to the Armenian authorities in respect of another witness. On 17 August 2017 the investigator summoned the three acquitted individuals for additional questioning. They did not appear. On several occasions in 2017 the investigator tried to contact a taxi driver who had helped two Armenian men allegedly implicated in the murder of S.H. to buy the car used in the murder, with a view to summoning him for questioning and participation in the identification parade, but his phone was turned off. 12 . On 25 January 2018 the Prosecutor General’s Office of the <COUNTRY> responded to the CPO, noting that it had been unable to determine H.’s address. However, it had questioned a certain S.G., who had explained that H. had been living in Moscow since April 2017 but was unaware of H.’s address or contact information. 13 . It appears from information provided by the Government that between February 2018 and July 2022 various investigative measures were implemented. Among other things, in January 2022 the authorities sent a legal assistance request to their Armenian, Russian and Greek counterparts seeking the identification of certain witnesses and potential suspects. Genetic material was also forwarded for identification and comparison with the international DNA database. The respective authorities were unable to locate the individuals concerned and the genetic material submitted by the authorities could not be identified. On 14 April 2022 two photographic identification procedures took place with the participation of a taxi driver (who had been questioned on 29 July 2015 and had stated that he had transported two individuals potentially linked to the murder). The taxi driver could not identify the individuals presented to him as the persons who had ridden in his taxi. The criminal investigation is ongoing. The applicant complained under Article 2 and Article 13 of the Convention that the criminal investigation into the murder of his son had been ineffective.

Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia

3, 14

The application concerns an issue of domestic violence raised under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, as well as under Article 14 of the Convention and Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, taken in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. From 2007 to 2013 the applicant’s former husband, , inflicted bodily injuries on the applicant on five occasions. Those injuries were recorded and classified as minor in the relevant forensic reports. The police and the prosecutor’s office repeatedly refused to open criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti . Two out of the five incidents were examined in the domestic courts. The list of the dates of the incidents, forensic reports and refusals to open proceedings are set out in the appended table. Conviction of Following a second complaint lodged by the applicant with the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Lviv (“the District Court”) on 2 February 2011, on 11 May 2011 it opened proceedings in relation to incidents which had occurred on 14 January and 15 August 2010. In her application, the applicant stated that she had submitted the same complaint to the court in May 2010, but the court had referred the case to the prosecutor’s office, as it contained elements of another criminal offence, namely threatening murder. The prosecutor’s office sent her case to the police, which, in turn, refused to open proceedings for lack of corpus delicti . The applicant stressed that over many years her former husband had engaged in unlawful conduct against her, such as inflicting injuries on her, bullying her and uttering obscenities at her, and that her numerous complaints to the police had had no effect, despite the fact that under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the State had a positive obligation to protect her from inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted by a private party. stated before the District Court that on 14 January 2010 he had slapped the applicant across her face once because she had slashed the tyres of his car. Moreover, she had continuously made the conditions of their cohabitation unbearable, for instance by stealing his documents and personal belongings, spoiling his food or complaining to the police without any reason. On 27 June 2012 the District Court found guilty of inflicting minor bodily harm on the applicant in respect of the incident of 14 January 2010 and sentenced him to one hundred hours of community service, but released him from serving the sentence under the 2011 Amnesty Act in view of his dependent mother’s advanced age. That decision was not appealed against. Civil proceedings against Following the above-mentioned criminal sentence, the applicant brought a civil claim against seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 8 August 2013 the District Court awarded the applicant 5,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 17 December 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal reduced the amount of the award to UAH 2,000 (at the material time around 180 euros) on the grounds that had only been found guilty in respect of the incident of 14 January 2010 and that the applicant had not produced evidence of her medical treatment, only her forensic examination report. The appellate court “took into consideration the reason for the conflict between the parties to the case – which was provoked by the victim [the applicant] herself and her actions – the impairment of the applicant’s ability to carry out her daily activities and her discomfort, suffering and pain”. On 5 February 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of <COUNTRY> refused to open cassation proceedings.

Ukraine

6, 13

The case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention in respect of the length of criminal proceedings in which the applicant was recognised as a civil party. On 15 October 1998 the applicant was robbed at gunpoint. The robber took 22,256 <COUNTRY> dollars (USD) from her currency exchange shop. A criminal investigation was opened on 19 November 1998 and on 24 January 2000 the applicant was recognised as a civil party to the criminal proceedings in respect of pecuniary damage amounting to USD 22,256. On 18 February 2000 Z.J. – a security officer of the United Georgian Bank and an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – was indicted on charges of aggravated robbery and illegal purchase and storage of firearms and ammunition. The ensuing criminal proceedings consisted of six interrelated sets of proceedings as a result of multiple remittals of the case by the Supreme Court, either to the prosecuting authority for additional investigation or to the lower courts on procedural grounds. At different stages of each set of proceedings, Z.J. was both acquitted and convicted. The proceedings ended on 29 January 2021 with Z.J. being acquitted. The trial court’s judgment acquitting Z.J. found that there had been insufficient evidence to convict him and that some of the investigative activities had been implemented defectively and some had been in breach of the procedural legislation, reducing the probative value of the relevant evidence. It was also noted that the bullets seized as part of the investigation had been lost by the authorities and that a separate investigation had been ongoing in that respect. The applicant’s civil claim was rejected on account of Z.J.’s acquittal.

United States

5, 5, 5

The application concerns the alleged unlawfulness and the length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention and the trial court’s failure to properly examine his requests for release, in breach of Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention. On 11 January 2011 the applicant was arrested in the context of a criminal investigation into abuse of power, breach of home security and forgery of documents. On the same day the Tsentralno-Miskyi District Court in Kryvyi Rih ordered his detention because of his repeated failures to appear before the investigator. Although the court did not set a time-limit for his detention, under the domestic legislation in force at the time it could not have lasted longer than two months, that is, beyond 11 March 2011. On 14 January 2011 the court’s detention order was upheld on appeal. According to the applicant, on 10 March 2011 the investigation was completed and the indictment and case file were transferred to the trial court for examination. By 11 March 2011, when the detention order of 11 January 2011 expired, no fresh court decision regarding further detention of the applicant had been taken but he continued to be kept in custody. On 27 April 2011 the trial court ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial without specifying a time-limit. On 13 December 2011 the trial court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to a suspended term of imprisonment. The applicant was released on the same day. Following appeals by the applicant, the sentence was reviewed by the higher courts, resulting in the sentence of 13 December 2011 being quashed and the indictment then being returned to the investigator for corrections. On 26 August 2014 the criminal investigation against the applicant was eventually terminated owing to a lack of sufficient evidence of the applicant’s guilt. In the course of his detention the applicant lodged applications for release, arguing that there had been no justifiable reason for his detention and that his state of health had deteriorated. On 27 April, 1 and 22 June and 31 October 2011 the trial court rejected those applications without addressing the applicant’s specific arguments. After being notified of the application in the present case, the Government informed the Court that on 14 March 2017 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal had awarded the applicant 150,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 5,000 euros (EUR)) pursuant to the Compensation Act of 1994 (see Dubovtsev and Others <COUNTRY> , nos. 21429/14 and 9 others, § 48, 21 January 2021). That sum was paid on 23 August 2019. However, on 19 May 2021, following an appeal on points of law by the applicant, the Supreme Court increased the amount of compensation to UAH 750,000 (approximately EUR 25,000). In all of these decisions, the courts at various levels awarded the applicant compensation under the Compensation Act and declared that as a result of the termination of the criminal case against the applicant, his prosecution, the time he had spent in detention on remand and under an obligation not to abscond and his loss of salary as a result of suspension from work were all unlawful. According to both parties, as of December 2021, the sum awarded by the Supreme Court remained unpaid because of a lack of funds.

Ukraine

6, 5, 3

The applicants complained, in particular, under Article 3 of the Convention, that they had been subjected to ill-treatment by law-enforcement authorities and that their related complaints had not been effectively investigated. Some applicants also relied on Article 3 and/or Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention in respect of the same complaints. Mr O.Khrus (application no. 38328/14) additionally relied on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, complaining that he had been arrested at about 25 p.on 2 September 2011, whereas an arrest report had only been drawn up at 2 a.on 3 September 2011. In addition, he complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the length of the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been excessive and that his freedom of movement had been restricted for an unreasonably lengthy period in view of an undertaking not to abscond which he had been obliged to give to the national authorities in September 2011. The facts relevant to the individual applications are set out in detail in the appended tables.

P1-1

The case concerns a complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the allegedly unlawful revocation of the applicants’ property rights over agricultural plots of land. In 2007 reforms were introduced concerning privatisation of land in <COUNTRY>. On 11 July of that same year, Parliament passed the Law on the recognition of property rights to plots of land possessed (used) by natural and legal persons (“the Recognition Act”). The Recognition Act envisaged three possibilities for legalising ownership rights over land, namely lawful land ownership, lawful land use and land held in adverse possession. The implementation of the Recognition Act was facilitated by Order no. 525 of the President on the rule of recognition of property rights over land in possession (use) by natural and legal persons and approval of the certification of ownership rights, issued on 15 September 2007. Under the Presidential Order, a number of property recognition commissions (hereinafter referred to as “property commissions”) were established within local self-government bodies, tasked with the examination of applications from natural and legal persons for recognition of ownership over land. THE REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE FIRST APPLICANT The first applicant had been occupying a State-owned plot of land measuring 2,868 sq. m in the village of Gantiadi (Khelvachauri District) under a lease agreement since 2001. Following the termination of the lease agreement in 2004 he continued to possess and cultivate the plot and paid all the related taxes. It appears from the case file that he also built a house on the plot, in which he lived with his family. On 2 April 2008 the property commission, acting at the request of the first applicant, recognised his ownership rights to the plot concerned. On 8 April 2008 the applicant was provided with an ownership certificate and, on the basis of that certificate, he registered the plot in his name with the Public Registry. On 12 December 2008 the property commission began a review, on its own initiative, of the lawfulness of its previous decision concerning the recognition of the property rights of the first applicant. The latter was not informed of the initiation of the relevant administrative proceedings. On 15 May 2009 the property commission overturned its previous decision, revoking the applicant’s title. According to the minutes of that meeting, having conducted an on-site inspection and after re-examining the first applicant’s file, it established that the plot allocated to him was not an agricultural plot per se and that the first applicant had not been using it for agricultural purposes. The revocation decision was confirmed by the Khelvachauri District Court on 26 October 2009. The court concluded that the property commission’s initial examination of the first applicant’s request had been superficial, and that the applicant had failed to show that he had indeed been in possession of the plot in question or had occupied it, even unlawfully. Thus, the recognition of the applicant’s ownership had been erroneous from the outset. In reaching its conclusion the first-instance court referred to Article 60(1) § 1 of the General Administrative Code, by which a piece of delegated legislation was to be considered null and void if it contradicted a law or if other requirements for its drafting and issuing had been substantially violated. The first applicant appealed. He claimed that on the basis of the 2 April 2008 decision he had been registered as the owner of the plot by the Public Registry, and accordingly the property commission was not entitled to revoke his recognised title to the property. He also maintained that if he had failed to submit all the required documents in support of his request, the commission should have refused his request in the first place. On 30 March 2010 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It noted that the applicant had failed to identify the ground on which he was requesting the recognition of the title to the property. It concluded that the applicant had failed to show that he had been occupying, albeit unlawfully, the plot concerned before the enactment of the Recognition Act. By a decision of 13 September 2010, the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY> dismissed an appeal on points of law by the first applicant as inadmissible. THE REVOCATioN PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE SECOND APPLICANT The second applicant had been occupying and cultivating 2,712,6 sq. m of State-owned agricultural land in the village of Gantiadi (Khelvachauri District) since 2001. On 2 April 2008 the property commission recognised his ownership rights and provided him with the relevant property certificate. On 12 December 2008 the property commission overturned its previous decision revoking his title to the property. It concluded that 1,267 sq. m of the plot that had been allocated to the applicant overlapped with another plot of land owned by a third party. As such, his property certificate had to be revoked. The second applicant appealed. On 8 September 2009 the Khelvachauri District Court upheld the revocation decision. It observed that at the time of making the recognition request the applicant had failed to submit a cadastral plan and had thus violated the relevant provisions of the Recognition Act. The court further noted that in view of the ownership of a part of the plot by a third party, the applicant could not have physically occupied it. As such, the initial decision to recognise his title had been erroneous. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Kutaisi Court of Appeal on 27 January 2010. In connection with the second part of the plot, which did not overlap with another property, the court simply concluded that no separate request had been lodged for the recognition of property rights with respect to that part of the plot; hence no separate decision had been made by the property commission. On 22 September 2010 the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY> dismissed an appeal on points of law by the second applicant as inadmissible.

Georgia

3

The applicants alleged, under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, that they had been ill-treated by the police with a view to extracting false self ‑ incriminating statements from them and that the investigation into their respective complaints had been ineffective. The facts relevant to the individual applications are set out in detail in the appended tables.

6, 6

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention that he was not afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence in criminal proceedings against him. 2 . In September 2012 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of aggravated misappropriation of communal property, forgery of official documents and money laundering when occupying the post of director of a local communal utility company. 3 . After the pre-trial investigation had been completed, on 6 November 2012 the applicant and his lawyer received access to the case file, consisting of twenty-eight volumes and 6,893 pages in total. They were informed that they could study the file every day for an unlimited period of time. 4 . As confirmed by the records signed by the applicant and his lawyer, during the period from 6 November to 11 November 2012 they studied 3,477 pages of the case file. [1] Every day during that period the investigator wrote a report stating that the applicant and his lawyer had been deliberately protracting their familiarisation with the case file. It was noted that the lawyer had in fact studied more material than the applicant but had refused to confirm that; that the applicant had studied the same material many times; that both of them had declined the use of any technical assistance (for example, making photocopies) even though the investigator had explicitly informed them of such a possibility; and that the duration of their familiarisation with the file varied from four to six hours per day even though they had been informed that it could be unlimited. [2] The applicant and his lawyer were warned several times that if they did not change their approach to studying the case file the investigator would apply to the court to have the duration of that process limited. 5 . On 12 November 2012 the Kirovograd Leninskyy District Court (“the Leninskyy Court”), at the investigator’s request, set a time-limit for the applicant and his lawyer to finish studying the case file by 16 November 2012 at the latest. [3] It was noted in that ruling that it could be challenged on appeal within three days after its pronouncement. 6 . On 15 November 2012 the applicant lodged such an appeal. He pointed out that he and his lawyer had already studied a considerable part of the case file and that there were no reasons for the restriction in question. 7 . On 6 December 2012 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal without examination. It noted that on 17 November 2012 the case file had been sent to the Kirovograd Kirovskyy District Court (“the Kirovskyy Court”) for trial and that it was for that court to examine, during a preliminary hearing, any allegations of irregularities. 8 . On 10 December 2012 the Kirovskyy Court started the trial with a preliminary hearing, during which it dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unsubstantiated. It held as follows: “The arguments of the defence about not having had sufficient time for studying the case file are refuted by the ruling of [the Leninskyy Court] of 12 November 2012, which has become final and which established the time-limit at 16 November 2012 as sufficient for [the applicant and his lawyer] to study the case file; after the expiry of that time-limit they are therefore considered to have studied the case file in compliance with [the law].” 9 . Subsequently, however, the applicant’s request for additional access to the case file was granted. As a result, he and his lawyer studied the file during the period from 12 December 2012 to 2 March 2013 almost every day for about two hours per day. The trial continued during that period. On 3 June 2013 the Kirovskyy Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment, three years’ prohibition on holding administrative posts and confiscation of his personal property. 11 . The applicant challenged the above-mentioned judgment on appeal. He complained, among other things, that he had not been afforded sufficient time to study the case file after the pre-trial investigation. He also complained that, even though he had been given additional access to the file during the proceedings before the first-instance court, his trial had continued before he had finished studying the file. Furthermore, the applicant alleged that at that stage he and his lawyer had been obliged to study the file in a small and poorly lit room without any table, occupied by five to twelve persons at all times. 12 . The applicant and his lawyer were additionally given access to the case file, at their request, from 26 June to 17 July 2013, allegedly in the same poor conditions as before. On 18 October 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction. It did not comment on his complaints as set out above (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant reiterated his grievances in an appeal on points of law. 15 . On 13 February 2014 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters found against him. Like the appellate court, it did not comment on the applicant’s allegations of undue restrictions in respect of his familiarisation with the case file. The applicant complained that there had been a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention, firstly because insufficient time had been allocated for him and his lawyer to familiarise themselves with the case file after the completion of the pre-trial investigation and secondly because of the allegedly poor conditions in which they had been obliged to study the file on later occasions.

8

The case concerns the allegedly unlawful and unnecessary eviction of the applicants from a State-owned hostel. The applicants also complained that the domestic courts had not provided adequate reasons for their decisions or afforded them an effective remedy. The applicants relied on Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. In May 2012 the applicants sued the Kharkiv National Medical University (“the University”), seeking an acknowledgment of their right to protected tenancy of a flat in a State-owned student hostel managed by the defendant. They noted that the disputed flat, which had been allocated to them in 1998 in connection with the first applicant’s employment at the University, was their only home. The University administration lodged a counter-claim seeking the applicants’ eviction. They contended that they had not been obliged to extend the applicants’ lease agreement, which had been due to expire in August 2012, as in the spring of 2011 the first applicant had terminated his employment. The applicants contested that claim. They contended that in 1998, when they had first been allocated the disputed premises (which consisted of three separate rooms at that time), a special arrangement had been agreed with the Dzerzhynskyy District Council in Kharkiv, whereby those three rooms had been designated as a “separate flat” ( ізольована квартира ), and that they had entered into an open-ended protected tenancy agreement. The applicants had had to carry out the reconstruction work necessary in order to convert the three rooms into one flat at their own expense. In connection with that special arrangement, the applicants’ family had been taken off the social housing waiting list at that time. In 2009 the 1998 arrangement had been retroactively annulled by the District Council on the ground that it breached the applicable law. At that time the applicants were no longer able to regain the place that they had lost on the housing waiting-list and had been forced to sign fixed ‑ term annual leases with the University. Even so, they had considered that their occupancy right had remained protected, since the first applicant had served on the University faculty since 1974. By virtue of Article 125 of the Housing Code, which forbade employers owning corporate housing from evicting former employees of more than ten years’ standing, the first applicant and his family members had been protected from eviction unless other housing was provided. On 12 June 2013 the Dzerzhynskyy District Court, Kharkiv (“District Court”) dismissed the applicants’ claim and allowed the University’s counter ‑ claim, referring in its reasoning to the termination of the first applicant’s employment and the expiration of the lease agreement. The court noted that the first applicant had been retained by the University as the chair of the pathological physiology department since 2004 on the basis of a fixed ‑ term contract, which had subsequently been extended and eventually terminated in 2011. It further noted that Article 132 of the Housing Code stipulated that any entitlement of seasonal and fixed-term employees to occupy corporate hostel accommodation ceased upon termination of their employment. The District Court did not address the applicants’ submissions concerning their personal circumstances or their argument that they had a special entitlement under Article 125 of the Housing Code to keep their accommodation in view of the long-standing uninterrupted service of the first applicant as a university faculty member. The applicants appealed, reiterating their previous arguments and noting, in particular, that the first applicant had devoted his entire career to the University and had occupied various posts there without interruption since 1974. He had been a permanent faculty member until he had obtained his first “fixed-term” competitive post in 1999; and that he had left the faculty in 2011 on reaching the legal retirement age. The applicants also noted that in 2012 the second applicant had given birth to a child and that childcare authorities should therefore have been involved in the eviction proceedings. On 5 August 2013 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal. It endorsed the reasoning of the District Court and noted that the applicants’ arguments concerning their former occupancy of the disputed accommodation under a special protected tenancy arrangement and the birth of the second applicant’s child were immaterial, since the aforementioned arrangement had already been annulled and since the child’s right to occupy the disputed premises was derived from that of the first and second applicants. On 6 September 2013 the Higher Specialised Court rejected, in written proceedings, the applicants’ request for leave to appeal on points of law and on 9 December 2013 it further rejected their request for leave to submit an application for review with the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY>. On 7 October 2013 the applicants were evicted.

Ukraine

6

The case concerns the alleged failure of the domestic courts to examine the applicant’s claims on the merits (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention). ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS First set of proceedings 2 . The applicant worked as an attorney. On 20 November 2007 the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Sevastopol Bar Association (“the Commission”) decided to reprimand the applicant for his alleged failure to ensure proper defence of a certain Z. On 21 March 2008 the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar of <COUNTRY> (“the Higher Commission”) decided to annul the applicant’s attorney’s license. On 10 December 2007 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings before the Nakhimovskyi District Court of Sevastopol (“the Nakhimovskyi Court”) challenging the decision of the Commission. Later on, he amended his claims seeking to also declare void the decision the Higher Commission. 4 . On 26 December 2008 the Nakhimovskyi Court terminated the proceedings in the case on the grounds that on 21 April 2008 (see paragraph 8 below) it had already delivered a decision on an identical claim lodged by the applicant against the same defendants. The decision of 26 December 2008 was upheld on appeal on 14 June 2011. 5 . Following a cassation appeal by the applicant, on 20 April 2012 the Higher Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 26 December 2008 and 14 June 2011 and terminated the proceedings, ruling that the case was to be considered in civil proceedings. 6 . On 19 June 2012 the Higher Administrative Court refused to grant the applicant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Second set of proceedings On 9 April 2008 the applicant lodged a new identical administrative claim with the Nakhimovskyi Court against the above-mentioned decisions of the Commission and the Higher Commission. 8 . On 21 April 2008 the Nakhimovskyi Court terminated the proceedings in the case, ruling that the claim was not to be considered in administrative proceedings. The applicant appealed to the Sevastopol Administrative Court of Appeal and then at a later stage asked for his claim not to be examined. The Sevastopol Administrative Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s claim and noted in a decision of 26 July 2011 that the dispute should be considered within the framework of administrative proceedings. It quashed the decision of 21 April 2008 and closed the proceedings in accordance with the applicant’s request, stating that the applicant’s identical claims are pending before a civil court (see paragraphs 12-17 below). Civil proceedings On 26 May 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Leninskyi District Court of Sevastopol challenging the above decisions of the Commission and the Higher Commission. Claims against the Commission 12 . On 8 May 2009 the Leninskyi Court declined to consider the claim concerning the Commission, finding that the same claim was being considered by an administrative court. It is unclear to which of the above administrative proceedings the decision of 8 May 2009 referred. The decision of 8 May 2009 was upheld on appeal, but on 21 April 2010 the Supreme Court quashed it and remitted this claim to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. 13 . The applicant requested that the Leninskyi Court terminate the proceedings on the grounds that the case should not be examined in civil proceedings. On 30 July 2010 the Leninskyi Court allowed the request and terminated the proceedings. Proceedings against the Higher Commission On 8 May 2009 the Leninskyi Court transferred the claim against the Higher Commission to the Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv (“the Pecherskyi Court”) for consideration. The decisions of 8 May 2009 were upheld on appeal. On 16 January 2013 the Pecherskyi District Court received the applicant’s claim against the Higher Commission. 16 . On 15 February 2013 the Pecherskyi Court terminated the proceedings in question on the grounds that the case fell to be examined in administrative proceedings. 17 . On 11 September 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of <COUNTRY> upheld the decision of 15 February 2013, which therefore became final.

Ukraine

P1-3

The case concerns the alleged breach of the applicant’s passive electoral right under Article 3 of Protocol No. The applicant stood as a candidate for the main opposition party, “Batkivshchyna”, in the parliamentary elections of 28 October 2012 in single-seat electoral constituency no. 132 in Mykolayiv Region. According to the results established by the Constituency Election Commission (“the ConEC”) on the basis of the original results sheets (referred to as “protocols”) from the Precinct Election Commissions (“the PECs”), the applicant won the elections [1] , whereas Mr T., the candidate for the government party, “Party of Regions”, arrived second [2] . Once the ConEC transmitted those results electronically to the Central Election Commission (“the CEC”), they were published on the CEC website for information purposes early in the morning on 30 October 2012. However, later that day the CEC unexpectedly modified the results on its website, allegedly without any decision having been taken to that effect by the ConEC: while the number of votes for the applicant remained unchanged, those for Mr T. increased to 29,910 at the expense of several candidates with a minor score [3] . As a result, Mr T. was indicated as the winner, with 232 votes ahead of the applicant. The above-mentioned changes on the CEC website were noted in the observation mission report of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“the OSCE/ODIHR”) published in January 2013. In the results tabulation protocol drawn up shortly thereafter, the ConEC allegedly relied on the modified results published by the CEC instead of those in the original PECs’ protocols. Four of the ConEC members [4] wrote a dissenting opinion in that regard. Following Mr P.’s administrative claim challenging the ConEC’s protocol on the grounds of some alleged isolated irregularities in four polling stations, on 1 November 2012 the Mykolayiv Circuit Administrative Court (“the Mykolayiv Court”) instructed the ConEC to provide it with the originals or duly certified duplicates of all the PECs’ protocols. 7 . Under Section 91 of the Parliamentary Elections Act (as worded at the material time), each PEC drew up its protocol on voting results in a number of originals exceeding the number of the PEC members by four: the first and the second originals were to be transferred to the ConEC, the third one was kept with the PEC secretary, the fourth one was publicly displayed at the PEC premises, whereas the remaining originals were distributed among the PEC members. All the originals had equal legal validity. Candidates and their representatives, as well as official observers present during the count, were entitled to a duly certified duplicate of the protocol. All the protocols were drawn up on pre-printed blanks, each of which had its unique serial number. 8 . The ConEC decided that it would be appropriate to provide duplicates rather than originals to the Mykolayiv Court. Accordingly, a duplicate of the “first original” of each PEC’s protocol (see paragraph 7 above) was prepared. The accuracy of duplicates was certified by the chairman’s signature and the ConEC stamp. However, during the night of 1 to 2 November 2012, the State Bailiffs Service, assisted by the heavily numbered special police unit, withheld the first and the second originals of all the PECs’ protocols from the ConEC with a view to delivering them to the Mykolayiv Court. 9 . The applicant alleged that the duration of the transportation was inexplicably long – four hours for 170 km. As reported by the Mykolayiv Court’s administrative office, the protocols arrived in a damaged packaging and “were in disorder”. According to a representative of the “Batkivshchyna” party, involved in the proceedings as a third party, after the delivery of the PECs’ protocols to the court, the blanks’ serial numbers in thirty-four of them no longer corresponded to those in the “first originals” as recorded, in particular, by the ConEC chairman in the duplicates produced on 1 November 2012 (see paragraph 7 above). The voting results were allegedly modified in those protocols with a view to inflating Mr T.’s score. 10 . Although the Mykolayiv Court attached the received protocols as evidence, it did not mention them in its decision of 3 November 2012 rejecting Mr P.’s claim as unsubstantiated. On 4 November 2012 it also rejected the applicant’s claim in respect of the alleged falsifications at the tabulation stage, having held that it was the CEC’s competence to deal with that matter. On 5 November 2012 the CEC found it impossible to establish the election results in constituency no. 132. Its reasoning was limited to a broad reference to “numerous statements from participants of the electoral process about the impossibility to accurately establish the voting results”. The CEC applied to the Parliament for putting in place the necessary modalities for organising partial repeat elections. The applicant brought an administrative claim against the CEC submitting that he should have been declared the winner of the election. He complained, notably, that the ConEC’s protocol had not accurately reflected the voting results, that thirty-four PECs’ protocols had subsequently been falsified, and that the CEC had had no grounds for invalidating the election results in his constituency in spite of having conclusive evidence of his victory. According to him, that was proved by a significant number of the original PECs’ protocols in the possession of the PECs’ members, duly certified duplicates of the PECs’ protocols in the official observers’ possession, as well as the additional duplicates of “the first original” of all the PECs’ protocols certified by the ConEC chairman on 1 November 2012 (see paragraph 8 above). On 9 and 12 November 2012 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal and the Higher Administrative Court, respectively, found against the applicant. They held that the CEC’s decision was related to numerous complaints received by it rather than to any issues with the ConEC’s protocol.

8, 5, 3

The case concerns alleged ill-treatment by the police (all applicants); alleged ill-treatment by a warden in a detention facility (first applicant); lack of an effective investigation in respect of the ill-treatment allegations; allegedly unlawful deprivation of liberty; entry and search of the applicants’ home; and monitoring of their correspondence in detention. The applicants invoke Articles 3, 5 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention. The applicants alleged, in particular, that on 21 April 2012, while they were sleeping, the police had groundlessly stormed and entered their flat by breaking down the door, handcuffed them, and conducted an unlawful search. The applicants were subsequently taken to the Kharkiv organised crime police office (“UBOZ”), held in undocumented detention and tortured to incriminate themselves as having committed an armed robbery in another town. Poorly reasoned arrest reports were subsequently drawn up, wrongly indicating that the applicants had been arrested at 2 p., in the UBOZ office. It was not until the afternoon of 24 April 2012, that is, after the expiry of the maximum seventy-two-hour period allowed by the domestic law for police detention, that the applicants were brought before a judge who decided to remand them in custody. The applicants’ subsequent complaints to various authorities concerning the breaches of their rights had resulted in a superficial and ineffective inquiry. In addition to the above, prison officers had monitored the applicants’ correspondence with the authorities. The first applicant also alleged that on 15 September 2013, , a warden in the Kharkiv pre-trial detention facility (SIZO), had kicked him in the groin, causing him trauma with lasting effects. The first applicant’s complaints lodged with the prosecutor’s office were dismissed without a full ‑ scale investigation, because the wardens denied that the incident had taken place and no relevant medical record had been made. The parties have provided, in particular, the following documents concerning the events of 21 April 2012: (a) Statements by several police officers, given on various dates, indicating that at about 4 a.on 21 April 2012 they had stormed the applicants’ flat and arrested them, because they disposed of “operational data” that the perpetrators of an armed robbery committed several hours before in Vovchansk (another town) were in that flat; (b) A report on the incident site inspection (21 April 2012) indicating that between 5 a.and 15 a.the police searched the aforementioned flat (legal grounds not indicated) and seized a sum of money and a list of other items; (c) Police arrest reports (21 April 2012) indicating that the applicants were arrested in the UBOZ premises at 2 p.on 21 April 2012 on the following statutory grounds set out in Article 115 of the Criminal Procedure Code: “(1) when a person is caught while committing an offence or immediately after having committed it; (2) when eyewitnesses, including the victim, directly indicate that that person is the perpetrator of the offence; [and] (3) when apparent traces of the offence are detected on the suspect, on his or her clothing, in his or her possession, [or] in his or her dwelling.” Those reports contain no further explanation linking the above statutory grounds to the applicants’ specific case; and (d) Records of the applicants’ examinations by medical staff at the police detention facility (ITT; 21 April 2012) and by a forensic expert (same date) - indicating the presence of minor injuries (see the appendix for details). On 24 April 2012 the applicants, who pleaded guilty, were taken to the Kyivskyi District Court in Kharkiv, which remanded them in custody. On 12 December 2012 the Chervonozavodskyi District Court in Kharkiv, before which the applicants were committed to stand trial, informed the Kharkiv regional prosecutor that the applicants had retracted their confessional statements as having been given as a result of alleged torture, and requested that he enquire into that matter. Subsequently, on a number of occasions the applicants lodged complaints with various authorities, seeking a criminal investigation into the allegedly arbitrary intrusion by the police into their home, their arrest, and alleged ill-treatment. Several sets of criminal proceedings were instituted, in which the applicants, questioned as witnesses, were, however, denied victim status. After several rounds of closures and re ‑ openings of the proceedings in view of procedural flaws, the last set was closed on 4 November 2015 on the ground that no breaches of the applicants’ rights had taken place. The decision relied, primarily, on the statements given by Ch. and other police officers. It contained no findings concerning the possible origin of the applicants’ documented injuries and no explanations concerning the grounds for breaking into and searching of their flat or other complaints raised by the applicants. In its final decision of 4 February 2016, the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicants. On 28 September 2016 the Chervonozavodskyi District Court convicted the applicants of the armed robbery and sentenced them to various prison terms. The court considered that the applicants’ allegations of ill ‑ treatment were unsubstantiated and that the reported minor injuries could “possibly” have been sustained by them during arrest. The court did not examine any further the circumstances of the arrest or the proportionality of the force used to effect it. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 17 October 2016.

3

The case concerns, under Article 3 of the Convention, the alleged ill ‑ treatment of the applicant by police officers, and the alleged inadequacy of the investigation conducted in that regard. 2 . On 31 August 2014, at around 9 p., the applicant was stopped by two police officers, G.and J., for allegedly violating traffic rules. The applicant objected to being fined, following which the police officers pushed him against his car and G.punched him in the head. This episode was recorded on a camera fixed onto the police vehicle. A verbal altercation subsequently erupted, which, according to the applicant, ended in his physical assault by both police officers. That episode was not recorded on a camera although there were people at the nearby petrol station who, according to the applicant, witnessed it. The applicant was then handcuffed and arrested. According to the report on his administrative arrest, because of his resistance the police had to use physical force, as a result of which the applicant hit his head on the ground and sustained injuries to his left cheek and his skull, and tore his T-shirt. 3 . The applicant was taken to a police station where, because of the deterioration in his condition, a doctor was called for him. He was subsequently transferred to a temporary detention centre, where he underwent a visual examination. According to the report of the examination, the applicant had excoriations in the area of the skull, right eyebrow, left cheek and ear. He also had bruises across both wrists. As was indicated in the report, he claimed that the two police officers, who had effected his arrest, had physically and verbally assaulted him. On 1 September 2014 the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant of disobeying the lawful orders of law enforcement officers and imposed a fine of 600 Georgian laris. The decision was confirmed by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 30 September 2014. 5 . On 2 September 2014 the applicant, during an interview with a prosecutor, reiterated his allegations of having experienced physical and verbal abuse by both police officers. On the same date he underwent, at his own request, a medical examination which established that he had numerous bruises, haematomas and lesions on his head and body. He further complained of pain in the right part of his chest and right armpit, noting that it intensified when he breathed and moved, and of suffering from numbness in both of his forearms. On 10 September 2014 an X-ray examination showed that his fifth and seventh ribs were broken. The final report, issued by the National Forensic Bureau on 26 September 2014, concluded that the multiple injuries had been caused by a blunt object; they were of a less serious nature and could have been inflicted on the date of the incident. 6 . On 24 October 2014 the General Inspection Department of the Ministry of the Interior (“the MIA”), acting on a complaint by the applicant of 4 September 2014, issued a reprimand with respect to both police officers on account of verbally (both officers) and physically (G.B.) assaulting the applicant. On 7 November 2014 an investigation was opened into the applicant’s allegations under Article 333 of the Criminal Code (exceeding official authority). In his interview of 11 November 2014, the applicant described in detail the circumstances of his arrest and his alleged ill-treatment. The applicant’s request to reclassify the alleged acts as inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 144 3 of the Criminal Code) was rejected, as were several other of his procedural requests. On 1 December 2015 the applicant was informed of a decision of 24 November 2015 granting him victim status. He was also informed that G.had been charged with exceeding official authority on account of punching him in the head, and that no charges were being pressed concerning his beating by both officers. On 18 October 2016 the Tbilisi City Court convicted G.as charged on account of punching the applicant in the head. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment as the main sentence, and to one year and six months’ deprivation of the right to hold an official position as an ancillary sentence. On 28 December 2016 a plea bargain agreement, concluded between G.and the prosecutor’s office, was confirmed by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, and G.’s prison sentence was replaced by a suspended prison term of five years. 9 . In August 2015 the applicant brought a civil claim against the MIA, with the police officers acting as third parties, claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage for unlawful deprivation of liberty and infliction of damage to his health. On 16 May 2018 the Tbilisi City Court found that the applicant had suffered damage to his health during his administrative arrest and awarded him 2,000 Georgian laris (about 660 euros) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. Without drawing any explicit conclusion concerning the link between the force used by the police officers and the applicant’s fractured ribs, the court noted that although the results of the applicant’s X ‑ ray examination had been delayed, the applicant had already complained about pain and breathing difficulties on 2 September 2014, and moreover he had acted diligently in requesting a comprehensive medical examination at the earliest opportunity after his release. That decision was confirmed by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY> on 16 April and 10 September 2019 respectively.

Georgia

2

The case concerns the effectiveness of domestic proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations under Article 2 of the Convention that her child had died as a result of medical negligence. On 14 March 2008 at 30 a.the applicant was admitted to hospital for a planned labour induction. On 15 March at 48 p.the child was delivered by caesarean section. On 16 March at 2 a.he died of meconium aspiration syndrome. On 18 August 2008 the Health Inspectorate found deficiencies in the medical care provided to the applicant and her child. On 18 December 2008 criminal proceedings were instituted and two expert reports were commissioned. On 3 March 2010 the two doctors who during their shifts had overseen the delivery – S.G. and – were declared suspects. On 7 June 2010 they were charged with medical negligence that had caused the child’s death. On 30 June 2010 the case was sent for trial. In the first round of proceedings, on 26 October 2010 the first-instance court started hearing the case. Hearings were set at intervals between three and five months. On 29 July 2011 a third expert report was commissioned at the request by the prosecution since they considered that the second report was contradictory. On 23 March 2012 the prosecution withdrew charges against the doctors, finding that in view of the third expert report and other case material there was no causal connection between the medical negligence and the death of the applicant’s child. On 26 March 2012 the first-instance court terminated proceedings. On 7 August 2012 the appellate court quashed that decision and sent the case back to the first-instance court. It held that the third expert report was inadmissible on account of several procedural deficiencies. In the second round of proceedings, the first hearing was scheduled for 12 December 2012. Subsequent hearings were set at intervals between ten days and five months; the applicant caused a delay of no more than one month. On 12 February 2015 the first-instance court convicted the doctors of medical negligence that had caused the child’s death and imposed a sentence of imprisonment, in reliance on the first and second expert reports. On 27 April 2017 the appellate court, having set hearings at intervals between one and five months (the applicant caused a delay of no more than one month), upheld their conviction but imposed a fine. On 14 December 2017 the Supreme Court decided to examine the case orally and held a hearing on 14 June 2018. On that date it quashed the judgments of 12 February 2015 and 27 April 2017 and the appellate court’s decision of 7 August 2012 and sent the case back to the appellate court. The Supreme Court found that the decision of 7 August 2012 had breached the division of competences between the prosecution and the court. The appellate court had not had jurisdiction to reassess the evidence on which the withdrawal of charges had been based or to question it. Accordingly, the renewal of the criminal proceedings and the subsequent convictions had been unlawful. In the third round of proceedings, on 3 September 2018 the appellate court upheld the first-instance court’s decision of 26 March 2012 whereby the criminal proceedings against the doctors had been terminated. Its decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 23 April 2019.

5

The case concerns the applicant’s asylum detention. 2 . On 30 December 2018 the applicant arrived in <COUNTRY> by flight. On the same day, criminal proceedings were instituted against her concerning her use of a forged passport and she was placed in a pre-trial detention. During an interview with the airport police she provided accurate details on her identity. She maintained that she had been coerced to travel by her husband, and that she wished to return to <COUNTRY>. On 28 January 2019 the Budapest XVIII and XIX District Court convicted her of public deed forgery and sentenced her to a two-year long entry ban. 3 . On the same day, she was handed over to the Asylum and Immigration Office (“the IAO”). On 29 January 2019 the IAO held an interview during which the applicant explained that her family forced her into marriage as a minor. She also stated that she had travelled to <COUNTRY> under the coercion of her family and applied for asylum there. In <COUNTRY> she informed the UNHCR about her forthcoming involuntary travel and was advised by the UNHCR that she should request help from the police upon reaching <COUNTRY>. She stated that since arriving in <COUNTRY> she had had no connection with her family. On the basis of her statement and the record found in EURODAC, the IAO initiated her transfer to <COUNTRY> in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation and at the same time suspended the pending immigration proceedings. 4 . Following the interview (still on 29 January 2019) the IAO ordered the applicant’s asylum detention relying on section 31/A (1a) of Act no. LXXX of 2007 on Asylum on account of the pending Dublin transfer. The IAO found that less restrictive measures ensuring her availability during the procedure could not be applied. On 31 January 2019, upon the IAO’s request, the applicant filled in a questionnaire aiming at the early recognition of persons having suffered traumatic experiences. Based on the results she was considered to be at medium risk of traumatization. On 1 February 2019 the Nyírbátor District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention. The court found, referring to the IAO’s decision (see paragraph 4 above), that less restrictive measures ensuring her availability during the procedure could not be applied. On 11 March 2019 the IAO’s Dublin Coordination Department established that <COUNTRY> is responsible for the conduct of the applicant’s asylum proceedings. The next day, that is on 12 March 2019, the applicant requested asylum, referring to her fear of her husband and her family. She remained detained. On 27 March 2019 the IAO held an asylum interview and ordered her asylum detention referring to Section 31/A (1) (c) of the Asylum Act (risk of absconding) and noting that she had stated that she would rather return to <COUNTRY>. On 29 March 2019 the Nyírbátor District Court held a hearing concerning the applicant’s detention. The applicant stated that she was willing to stay in <COUNTRY> as she had nowhere to go on account of the refusal of <COUNTRY> to take her in. Furthermore, she alleged to have cooperated with the authorities and said that she did not want to remain in detention. Her legal representative argued that she was a victim of human trafficking. The Nyírbátor District Court prolonged her detention finding that less restrictive measures were not applicable as she did not speak the language, she had no travel document and connections in the country and there was a possibility that her relatives would make her leave <COUNTRY> illegally again. On 12 April 2019 the Counter-Terrorism Centre (“the CTC”) issued its opinion establishing that the stay of the applicant in the territory of <COUNTRY> poses a threat to national security. 10 . On 23 May 2019 the Nyírbátor District Court again prolonged the applicant’s asylum detention on the basis of Section 31/A (1) (c) and (d) of Asylum Act referring to the risk of absconding and the national security threat with reference to the CTC’s opinion. As to the risk of absconding, it noted that the applicant had stated that if her asylum application were not determined within six months she would rather return to <COUNTRY>. 11 . On 10 July 2019 the IAO rejected the asylum request and noted that her expulsion was to be executed on the basis of the criminal judgment (see paragraph 2 above). In the meantime, on 25 June 2019, on the inquiry of the IAO the CTC established that her statements might be credible but found that the applicant was not a victim of human trafficking because she had consented to be trafficked. 12 . On 27 November 2019 the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court quashed the IAO’s decision (see paragraph 11 above) and remitted the case for re-examination. The court judgment noted that the applicant’s uncle had inquired in person with the IAO on 29 and 30 January 2019 about the applicant’s whereabout and the progress of her case, which had been denied by the IAO due to the applicant’s fear and opposition to sharing this information. In the meantime, on 24 July 2019, the IAO designated the transit zone in Tompa as her place of accommodation since the duration of her asylum detention reached the statutory maximum of six months. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that her asylum detention had been arbitrary and that no alternatives to her detention had been genuinely considered by the domestic authorities despite her vulnerability.

Greece, Hungary

P1-1

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that equipment belonging to her and situated on municipal land had been unlawfully dismantled, for which she had been unable to obtain compensation. The applicant, a private entrepreneur, owned and operated three kiosks (temporary structures at which goods were sold) situated on municipal land in three locations in Cherkasy. 3 . The municipal authorities considered that her rights to use the land had expired. The applicant appealed against that assessment to the Cherkasy Regional Commercial Court, which issued preliminary injunctions on 14 August 2008 and 19 May 2009 prohibiting the municipal authorities from dismantling the equipment. On 31 March 2010, in a final decision, the court declared the authorities’ assessment unlawful and ruled that the applicant continued to have the right to rent the land in question. 4 . On 28 April 2009 the city’s executive committee ordered the municipal working group that dealt with unlawful structures to proceed with the removal of the applicant’s equipment. A member of the group, Mr K., the director of a municipal company, was directed to provide equipment for the dismantling operation and to arrange for the storage of the dismantled equipment. On 28 May 2009, despite the commercial court’s interim injunction (see paragraph 3 above), the municipal working group dismantled the applicant’s equipment and its contents (kiosks, cash registers, stock of goods for sale) and put them in storage. The applicant alleged that the equipment had been damaged in the dismantling process and had become unusable as a result, and the stocks had been lost. 6 . On 21 September 2010 the Cherkasy Sosnivsky District Court, in a final decision, declared the executive committee’s decision of 28 April 2009 (see paragraph 4 above) unlawful. It referred, in particular, to the fact that the decision had been taken in disregard of the commercial court’s injunctions (see paragraph 3 above). The applicant lodged a criminal complaint accusing the city officials of abuse of public office and other crimes. K. was eventually charged with criminal dereliction of duty in that connection. The applicant lodged a civil claim for damages within the framework of those proceedings against K. and the State Treasury. On 4 October 2013 K. was found guilty but released from serving his sentence. The civil claim was dismissed, the court pointing out that it could be resubmitted in separate civil proceedings. Subsequently the conviction was quashed and the case was remitted for further investigation, most recently on 16 February 2016. There is no information about further developments in those proceedings. The applicant sued the city council and the city executive committee in the administrative courts, seeking a declaration that their actions in removing her equipment had been unlawful and also damages. On 22 January 2014 the High Administrative Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions rejecting the claim. The courts reasoned in particular that it would be appropriate for the applicant to seek compensation within the framework of the criminal proceedings against K.

3

The present case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention about his handcuffing in a courtroom and, under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, about a breach of his defence rights in the criminal proceedings against him. 2006 Criminal proceedings against the applicant and HIS CONVICTION On 3 December 2001 the dead body of Mr was found, with a blood ‑ stained axe lying beside it. A criminal investigation was initiated in respect of premeditated murder. 3 . On 20 February 2006 the police reported to the investigator at Yagotyn district prosecutor’s office (Kyiv Region), who had been in charge of that criminal case, that the applicant had been involved in ’s murder, as fingerprints discovered at the crime scene belonged to the applicant. 4 . On 14 March 2006 the applicant, who was at the time serving a fixed ‑ term prison sentence for several counts of premeditated murder, confessed in writing that he had hit on the head with the back of an axe, and provided details. He submitted his confession to a prison officer. He confirmed his statement on 23 March 2006 when questioned as a witness in the absence of a lawyer, and during the following investigation and trial before the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal, in the presence of a legal aid lawyer who had been appointed on 23 June 2006 to represent him. In doing so, he submitted that he had confessed of his own free will. On 7 November 2006 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a first-instance court, found the applicant guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. It relied, among other evidence, on the applicant’s confession of 14 March 2006 and his witness statement of 23 March 2006 noting that the confession had been made voluntarily. 6 . In his cassation appeal the applicant mainly challenged the severity of his sentence. He insisted that he had murdered unintentionally and requested that his confession, which he had made of his own free will, and his cooperation with the investigating authorities and the court, be taken into account. 7 . On 22 February 2007 the Supreme Court, following a hearing in which the applicant was unrepresented, upheld his conviction. Re-examination of the applicant’s CRIMINAL case 8 . On 20 December 2011 the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) delivered a judgment in the applicant’s first case (see Maksimenko <COUNTRY> , no. 39488/07), in which it found a violation of on account of the absence of legal assistance in the proceedings before the Supreme Court (see paragraph 7 above). On 27 November 2012 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court (the HSCU) allowed the applicant’s application for the reopening of his case in the light of the 2011 judgment of the Court (see paragraph 8 above). It quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 22 February 2007 and ordered a new cassation review of the applicant’s case. 10 . On 14 February 2013 the HSCU, in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer, Mr Tarakhkalo, upheld the applicant’s conviction, slightly amending the reasoning on the basis of which the life sentence had to be imposed. It was suggested in the HSCU’s judgment that the applicant did not deny having murdered but wished L’s provocative behaviour and the applicant’s statement of confession to be taken into account when the court decided on the sentence. The HSCU did not address in its judgment a further complaint, raised by the applicant’s lawyer in a form of an addendum to the applicant’s cassation appeal of 2006 and reiterated in the hearing, concerning the lack of access to a lawyer at the initial stage of the investigation in 2006. The HSCU apparently considered that that complaint had been lodged in a procedurally incorrect way. 11 . According to the applicant, during the hearing before the HSCU on 14 February 2013 he was placed in a glass cabin where he remained handcuffed throughout the trial, whereas defendants in other cases had not been handcuffed. In reply to a complaint raised in this respect by the applicant’s lawyer on 20 May 2013, the head of the relevant convoy unit noted, in general way, that in accordance with the relevant regulations, persons sentenced to life imprisonment had to be handcuffed during the delivery of the verdict.

Ukraine

P7-2

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 that she was denied the right of appeal in administrative offence proceedings. On 16 May 2013 a judge of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Court found the applicant guilty of petty hooliganism (an administrative offence) and sentenced her to five days’ administrative detention. It was noted in the ruling that it could be appealed within ten days after its pronouncement, whereas the sentence was subject to immediate enforcement. The applicant was immediately placed in detention. She lodged an appeal and requested, without success, that the enforcement of her sentence be suspended pending the examination of her appeal. On 21 May 2013 the applicant was released having served the administrative detention in full. On 11 June 2013 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal returned her appeal without examination. It held that it was competent to examine appeals only in respect of local courts’ rulings which had not entered into force, whereas the ruling in the applicant’s case had entered into force and had been subject to enforcement immediately after its pronouncement. Accordingly, there were no legal grounds for appellate review.

P1-3

The case concerns the allegedly unlawful and arbitrary invalidation of the election results in the constituency, in which the applicant had initially been registered as the winner (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention). The applicant ran as a self-nominated candidate for the parliamentary elections of 28 October 2012 in single-seat constituency no. 133. The Central Election Commission (“the CEC”), which did not receive any complaints regarding that constituency, registered him as the winner (with 5,160 votes ahead) and he started performing his functions as a Member of Parliament (“MP”) in December 2012. However, following a complaint from another MP to the prosecution authorities in July 2013 that there had been some mass ‑ media reports of election-related irregularities in constituency no. 133, a criminal investigation was carried out. Relying on expert examinations of ballots, the Ministry of the Interior informed the CEC that 6,038 ballots with votes for the applicant had in fact been falsified. Namely, it appeared that initially marks had been made in front of other candidates’ names, but they had been erased and a new mark had been put in front of the applicant’s name. On 30 August 2013 the CEC replied to the investigator that there was nothing it could do. On the same date three individuals (including the MP who had raised the complaint to the prosecution authorities) brought an administrative claim against the CEC seeking, in particular, invalidation of the election results in constituency no. 133 and divesting the applicant of his MP mandate. The applicant who was involved in the proceedings as a third party contested the above claim. In addition to pointing out certain inconsistencies in the investigation findings, he submitted that the ostensibly falsified ballots in his favour might have been tampered with during the investigation-related inspection: the erased marks in front of other candidates’ names could have been put and erased post-factum to undermine the ballots’ validity. On 12 September 2013 the Higher Administrative Court allowed the claim in part. It invalidated the election results in constituency no. 133, quashed the applicant’s registration as the elected MP and held that it was impossible to establish the election results in that constituency. It also noted that the applicant’s references to certain inconsistencies did not prove that the ballots had not been falsified. On 20 September 2013 the applicant was divested of his parliamentary mandate.

3

The application concerns the living conditions of the applicant, a woman who was pregnant at the time of lodging her application with the Court. She arrived in Samos on 27 November 2019 and resided at the Samos Reception and Identification Centre (“the Samos RIC”) until 20 March 2020. On 11 February 2020 she lodged a request for an interim measure with the Court, which was granted. On 28 February 2020 she applied for international protection. On 20 March 2020 the applicant was moved to a guesthouse on the island of Samos and on 1 April 2020 she was included in a housing programme and transferred, while pregnant, to an apartment on the mainland. On 26 April 2020 she gave birth to her child. The applicant complained of her living conditions under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. THE APPLICANT’S VERSION AS TO THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE SAMOS RIC The applicant submitted, in particular, that upon her arrival she had been about five months pregnant. She alleged that she had been suffering from tuberculosis, gestational diabetes, hypertension and anaemia. At first she had not been provided with any housing and had been living in a shared tent outside the Samos RIC, owing to which she had had to use the sanitary facilities inside one of the containers. According to her submissions, on or around 4 March 2020 she had been placed in an overcrowded container within the RIC where there had been no heating. She had been asked to share a single bed with another pregnant woman so she had had no choice but to sleep on the floor. The sanitary facilities had been in a precarious hygienic condition as the toilets were used by numerous residents other than those of the container. As regards her access to healthcare, the applicant submitted that, because she was 40 years old, had previously given birth to three children, and the baby’s large size, her pregnancy was considered high-risk. The applicant had been examined only briefly by the camp doctor and midwife on one occasion prior to being referred to Samos hospital. She visited the hospital on 18 December 2019 and 16 January 2020 but had not received followed-up examinations by the hospital gynaecologist because she had been refused access owing to a suspected tuberculosis infection. She had not been provided with the required prenatal healthcare. The applicant argued that she had been in need of a reception environment that accommodated her particular needs as a pregnant woman, such as adequate accommodation, sanitary facilities and nutrition. THE GOVERNMENT’S VERSION AS TO THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE SAMOS RIC The Government submitted that the Samos RIC was an open accommodation structure. Temporary shelters had been constructed by the RIC’s residents near the area because of overpopulation. At the time of the applicant’s entry and registration the RIC’s population had been 7,453, although its official capacity had been 648 beds. The population had had free access to the medical and psychosocial support division located in the Samos RIC. Within the RIC there had been 35 communal toilets, and the residents had been offered food and water, as well as a monetary allowance. The applicant had arrived on 27 November 2019 and on the same date she had gone through identification and registration procedures. She had been placed in a container (C3.3B) where the conditions had been significantly better than those in the tents. On 23 February 2020 the authorities had requested from the UNHCR the applicant’s transfer to an apartment in Samos; the request had not been answered. On 18 March 2020 they had reiterated the request. The Government noted that at the time of the events in question <COUNTRY> had been confronted with a new migration crisis. The reception system had been under pressure, as it had become difficult to satisfy the particular needs of a large number of people. However, the applicant had, throughout her stay, received adequate meals and water, and her medical screening had taken place promptly. They further argued that the applicant had not sustained any kind of abuse during the short period of time she had resided in the RIC, even if her reception and living conditions had not been fully in line with the reception provisions owing to the massive number of arrivals in that period. The RIC’s capacity had been exceeded in the period under consideration and it had been impossible to place the applicant directly in any of the centre’s accommodation spaces. However, the applicant’s housing conditions had become adequate within less than four months. THE THIRD-PARTY INTERVENERS The third-party interveners, namely the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Defence for Children International-<COUNTRY>, submitted their observations regarding the living conditions in the RIC as follows. According to the UNHCR, the situation had been constantly characterised by overcrowding and inadequate services in respect of shelter, medical support, hygiene and sanitation. In September 2019 approximately 85 tents had been set up in the forest next to the RIC, where lack of access to electricity and washing facilities had been serious challenges for the people living there. Heavy rainfall had led to flooding in the tents and makeshift shelters. In early November 2019, 879 people had been living in the RIC containers while 5,353 people had been living in tents and makeshift shelters. Of those, 2,300 had been staying in woodland outside the RIC’s official perimeter. Sanitation facilities had been lacking in all the extended areas while those in the RIC had not been fully functioning. There had been no designated areas for people with specific needs. Women in advanced stages of pregnancy or with high-risk pregnancies had been living in precarious and unhygienic conditions in tents. The UNHCR concluded that the reception conditions in the Samos RIC, as well as in the informal settlement area, were at variance with the right to an adequate standard of living. According to Defence for Children International-<COUNTRY>, the living conditions of pregnant women and children had been incompatible with human dignity. REPORTS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE SAMOS RIC The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights As regards the situation in the RIC, on 31 October 2019 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, at the end of a five-day visit to <COUNTRY>, stated as follows: “The situation of migrants, including asylum seekers, in the Greek Aegean islands has dramatically worsened over the past 12 months ... There is a desperate lack of medical care and sanitation in the vastly overcrowded camps I have visited. People queue for hours to get food and to go to bathrooms, when these are available. On Samos, families are chipping away at rocks to make some space on steep hillsides to set up their makeshift shelters, often made from trees they cut themselves. This no longer has anything to do with the reception of asylum seekers. This has become a struggle for survival ... The authorities must boost the capacities of local hospitals, set up ad hoc medical facilities in the reception camps and increase the number of health care professionals in the islands in order to provide migrants and local residents with the medical care they are entitled to. Other practical measures with an immediate impact, such as improving the distribution of food and providing more washing facilities and toilets, can and must be taken”. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe In Resolution 2280 (2019), the Assembly, inter alia , welcomed the efforts of the Greek authorities to transfer all identified vulnerable people from the island centres to the mainland of <COUNTRY>. Nevertheless, the Assembly mentioned that the situation at the centres of Moria, Lesbos and Vathy (Samos), remained a matter of concern as large numbers of people were housed in tents, facing inadequate sanitary installations, insufficient food distribution, lack of health services and poor security, especially at night. It was noted that levels of violence and crime inside the centres were high. The Greek National Commission for Human Rights (GNCHR) 20 . During the on-site visit carried out by the GNCHR on 20 and 21 January 2020 at the Vathy RIC in Samos and the makeshift camp which surrounded it, the GNCHR delegation concluded that the reception system had collapsed. According to the report on the human rights situation of migrants at the borders by the GNCHR and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI), published in May 2021, the Samos RIC was designed to host up to 648 people, but in January 2020 the number of people in the centre or its surroundings (containers, tents and makeshift shacks) had reached 7,208. Applicants for international protection had been obliged to live in dire or even undignified living conditions during the processing of their applications for international protection, which could take up to several months or even years. The most alarming finding was the lack of control by the authorities over a large part of the informal camp outside the RIC where security incidents frequently occurred, such as violent confrontations leading to injuries between rival communities, extortion by traffickers or other organised groups, arson because of trespassing on forest land or other reasons, rapes of women and minors, and incidents of domestic violence and human trafficking. 21 . The GNCHR noted a big gap in the provision of health and psychological services due to a lack of staff and appropriate services such as interpretation and a shortage of medicine. As a result, the population of the camp was often affected by diseases and other health problems. According to the information collected during the GNCHR’s monitoring visit, 330 unaccompanied children were registered by the Vathy RIC; they were found to be living in unsuitable conditions and often sleeping outdoors.

Greece, Netherlands

3

The present case concerns allegations, under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, that the applicant was tortured by the police, his complaint was not properly investigated and no effective remedies were available in respect of that complaint. On 6 April 2010 the applicant complained to the Ministry of the Interior, stating that from about 2 p.until 7 p.on the previous day he had been arbitrarily detained by three police officers (subsequently identified as B., P. and Sh.) who had tortured him in the Frunzenskyi district police station in Kharkiv to coerce him into giving self-incriminating statements and that they had subsequently taken him to see expert S., who had issued a false report indicating that he had no injuries. Following the applicant’s complaints, forensic assessments were ordered and the experts concluded (reports of 18 May 2010 and 9 December 2013) that on or around 5 April 2010 he had sustained the following injuries classified as “minor”: cerebral trauma, bruising (on the face, head, neck, chest, lumbar area, arms and knee joints); abrasions on arms; and a subcapsular kidney haematoma. On 7 June 2010 the Kharkiv regional prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings, within the context of which on 17 February 2011 officers Sh. and P. were arrested and remanded in custody. As regards officer B., criminal proceedings against him were initiated on 15 January 2013 and, after having been terminated on several occasions and reopened following appeals by the applicant, were eventually closed on 7 October 2013 for want of any evidence that he had committed an offence. Further appeals by the applicant against that decision were dismissed by the Frunzenskyi District Court and the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal on 11 October and 4 November 2013 respectively. In the meantime, on 29 August 2011 officers P. and Sh. were committed for trial at the Leninskyi District Court in Kharkiv. As appears from the summary made by that court, the indictment was based on the following presentation of facts: at about 2 p.on 5 April 2010, having allegedly obtained unofficial operational information that the applicant had committed criminal acts, Sh., accompanied by B., dragged the applicant out of a car, handcuffed him and took him to the police station. The officers kept the applicant handcuffed there until about 7 p.without regularising his presence at the police station. During that period, Sh., subsequently joined by P., tried to coerce the applicant into giving self-incriminating statements. The applicant refused and Sh. grabbed him by his head and threw him to the floor. P. punched him in the left kidney and hit him on the face, stomach, neck and back. On several occasions the applicant, who remained handcuffed, lost consciousness. It also appears from the court’s summary that B. was present during the questioning. On 20 February 2014 the court found that the facts as established in the indictment had been corroborated by sufficient evidence and that P. and Sh. had committed an offence under Article 365 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The provision described abuse of authority by a law-enforcement officer as involving “violence ... [and the] application of ... special means or acts [which were] painful or degrading for the victim, [but] lacking any elements of torture”. The court sentenced the officers to seven years and six months’ imprisonment, deprived them of their ranks as officers, and prohibited them, for a period of three years, from occupying posts as law-enforcement officers. The Leninskyi District Court also allowed in part a civil claim lodged by the applicant, compensating his medical treatment costs in so far as they were found to be substantiated, and awarded him 20,000 Ukrainian hryvnias in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 8 July 2014 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, reviewing the case on appeal by the parties, decided that P. and Sh. (still detained on remand) could be released from further detention under the Amnesty Act of 2014, in particular because they had already served more than one-quarter of their prison sentence and because their offences had not involved “violence [which posed] a danger to life and health.” The court also reversed the prohibition on their occupying posts in law-enforcement bodies. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, arguing in particular that, regard being had to the nature of the offences, amnesty laws could not be applied. He also complained that the courts had not obliged the prosecution to further investigate B.’s role in the events in question, although they had established that he had participated in them and that expert S., who had issued a statement falsely indicating, at the request of police officers, that the applicant had no injuries upon his release, should have also been criminally prosecuted. On 26 September 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court found that the applicant had no standing to lodge that complaint.

3

The application concerns the living conditions of the applicant, a woman who was pregnant at the time of lodging her application with the Court. She arrived in Samos on 11 January 2020 and resided at the Samos Reception and Identification Centre (“the Samos RIC”). On 15 January 2020 she was classified as vulnerable because of her pregnancy, and she applied for international protection. On 11 February 2020 she lodged a request for an interim measure with the Court, which was granted. On 15 April 2020 the applicant was moved to a guesthouse on the island of Samos. On 18 April 2020, following her admission to the hospital, she gave birth to her daughter. On 29 July 2020 she was transferred to the mainland by the authorities, firstly to a hotel in Grevena and subsequently to the structure of Sintiki in the municipality of the Serres Region (“the Kleidi camp”). The applicant complained of her living conditions at the Samos RIC under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In her observations, she further complained of her living conditions and of restriction of freedom at the Kleidi camp. The applicant’s version AS TO the living conditions at THE SAMOS RIC AND the kleidi camp The living conditions at the Samos RIC The applicant submitted, in particular, that upon her arrival she had been seven months pregnant and suffering, inter alia , from gestational diabetes. She had not been provided with housing and had been living in a shared tent outside the RIC where she had had no access to sanitary facilities. One of the people with whom she had been sharing the tent was infected with tuberculosis and thus she had been referred to a hospital for testing. According to her submissions, on 20 February 2020 she had been placed in an overcrowded container within the RIC. There had been no heating and no protection against the weather conditions. The sanitary facilities had been in a precarious hygienic condition as the toilets were used by numerous residents other than those of the container. The applicant had often had to wait to use the toilet which was exhausting and painful in her stage of pregnancy. As regards the applicant’s access to healthcare, she had not been attended by the midwife of the medical unit and she had not been provided with the required prenatal healthcare. The applicant argued that she had been in need of a reception environment that accommodated her particular needs as a pregnant woman, such as adequate accommodation, sanitary facilities and nutrition appropriate to her medical condition of gestational diabetes. The living conditions in the Kleidi camp The applicant submitted, in her observations, that her living conditions significantly deteriorated from the time of her transfer to the Kleidi camp. She noted that the camp was a closed facility, surrounded by fences. She alleged that she had only been allowed to leave the camp for special reasons with permission and that her presence in the container had been checked every morning. She submitted that she had been sharing a container with two other families, the toilets had been located far from the container, the water had not been drinkable, and that the living conditions and the restriction of freedom had affected her psychological condition. The Government’s version AS TO the living conditions IN THE SAMOS RIC AND the kleidi camp The living conditions in the Samos RIC The Government submitted that the Samos RIC was an open accommodation structure. Temporary shelters had been constructed by the RIC’s residents near the area because of overpopulation. At the time of the applicant’s entry and registration the RIC’s population had been 7,300, although its official capacity had been 648 beds. The population had had free access to the medical and psychosocial support division located in the Samos RIC. Within the RIC there had been 35 communal toilets, and the residents had been offered food and water, as well as a monetary allowance. On 15 January 2020 the applicant had undergone a medical check-up and had been classified as vulnerable because of her pregnancy. In the following days, she had been placed in dormitory accommodation (D7) within the premises of the RIC. The Government noted that at the time of the events in question <COUNTRY> had been confronted with a new migration crisis. The reception system had been under pressure, as it had become difficult to satisfy the particular needs of a large number of people. However, the applicant had, throughout her stay, received adequate meals and water and her medical screening had taken place promptly. They further argued that the applicant had not sustained any kind of abuse during the short period of time she had resided in the RIC, even if her reception and living conditions had not been fully in line with the reception provisions owing to the massive number of arrivals in that period. The RIC’s capacity had been exceeded in the period under consideration and it had been impossible to place the applicant directly in any of the centre’s accommodation spaces. However, the applicant’s housing conditions had become adequate within less than three months. The living conditions in the Kleidi camp The Government denied the applicant’s allegations regarding her living conditions in the Kleidi camp, where she had been moved owing to the closure of the hotel she had previously been accommodated in. They submitted that she had been accommodated, along with her family, in a single-room house of 12 sq. with air conditioning and which they had not had to share, and that catering and medical care had been provided for her. The third-party interveners The third-party interveners, namely the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Defence for Children International-<COUNTRY>, submitted their observations regarding the reception conditions in the RIC as follows. According to the UNHCR, the situation had been constantly characterised by overcrowding and inadequate services in respect of shelter, medical support, hygiene and sanitation. In September 2019 approximately 85 tents had been set up in the forest next to the RIC, where lack of access to electricity and washing facilities had been serious challenges for the people living there. Heavy rainfall had led to flooding in the tents and makeshift shelters. In early November 2019, 879 people had been living in the RIC containers while 5,353 people had been living in tents and makeshift shelters. Of those, 2,300 had been staying in woodland outside the RIC’s official perimeter. Sanitation facilities had been lacking in all the extended areas while those in the RIC had not been fully functioning. There had been no designated areas for people with specific needs. Women in advanced stages of pregnancy or those with high-risk pregnancies had been living in precarious and unhygienic conditions in tents. The UNHCR concluded that the reception conditions in the Samos RIC, as well as in the informal settlement area, were at variance with the right to an adequate standard of living. According to Defence for Children International-<COUNTRY>, the living conditions of pregnant women and children had been incompatible with human dignity. Reports concerning the situation in THE samos ric The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 20 . As regards the situation in the RIC, on 31 October 2019 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, at the end of a five-day visit to <COUNTRY>, stated as follows: “The situation of migrants, including asylum seekers, in the Greek Aegean islands has dramatically worsened over the past 12 months ... There is a desperate lack of medical care and sanitation in the vastly overcrowded camps I have visited. People queue for hours to get food and to go to bathrooms, when these are available. On Samos, families are chipping away at rocks to make some space on steep hillsides to set up their makeshift shelters, often made from trees they cut themselves. This no longer has anything to do with the reception of asylum seekers. This has become a struggle for survival ... The authorities must boost the capacities of local hospitals, set up ad hoc medical facilities in the reception camps and increase the number of health care professionals in the islands in order to provide migrants and local residents with the medical care they are entitled to. Other practical measures with an immediate impact, such as improving the distribution of food and providing more washing facilities and toilets, can and must be taken”. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe In Resolution 2280 (2019), the Assembly, inter alia , welcomed the efforts of the Greek authorities to transfer all identified vulnerable people from the island centres to the mainland of <COUNTRY>. Nevertheless, the Assembly mentioned that the situation at the centres of Moria, Lesbos and Vathy (Samos), remained a matter of concern as large numbers of people were housed in tents, facing inadequate sanitary installations, insufficient food distribution, lack of health services and poor security, especially at night. It was noted that levels of violence and crime inside the centres were high. The Greek National Commission for Human Rights (GNCHR) 22 . During the on-site visit carried out by the GNCHR on 20 and 21 January 2020 at the Vathy RIC in Samos and the makeshift camp which surrounded it, the GNCHR delegation concluded that the reception system had collapsed. According to the report on the human rights situation of migrants at the borders by the GNCHR and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI), published in May 2021, the RIC in Samos was designed to host up to 648 people, but in January 2020 the number of people in the centre or its surroundings (containers, tents and makeshift shacks) had reached 7,208. Applicants for international protection had been obliged to live in dire or even undignified living conditions during the processing of their applications for international protection, which could take up to several months or even years. The most alarming finding was the lack of control by the authorities over a large part of the informal camp outside the RIC where security incidents frequently occurred, such as violent confrontations leading to injuries between rival communities, extortion by traffickers or other organised groups, arson because of trespassing on forest land or other reasons, rapes of women and minors, and incidents of domestic violence and human trafficking. 23 . The GNCHR noted a big gap in the provision of health and psychological services due to a lack of staff and appropriate services such as interpretation and a shortage of medicine. As a result, the population of the camp was often affected by diseases and other health problems. According to the information collected during the GNCHR’s monitoring visit, 330 unaccompanied children were registered by the Vathy RIC; they were found to be living in unsuitable conditions and often sleeping outdoors.

Greece, Netherlands

5, 5

The case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 5 of the Convention that his detention was arbitrary and unjustified, and that he did not have an effective and enforceable right to compensation for his detention. On 12 June 2013 the applicant was charged with having defrauded a minor by obtaining a mobile telephone from him under false pretences. On 16 July 2013 the applicant was subjected to a preventive measure in the form of a personal undertaking that he would comply with his procedural duties as a defendant. On 12 August 2013 the Solomyanskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the trial court”) held a preparatory hearing in the applicant’s case. The trial court heard the applicant’s and the prosecutor’s submissions as to whether the applicant should be committed for trial. According to the applicant, neither he nor the prosecutor made any applications to change the preventive measure imposed on the applicant, the trial court did not ask for their opinion as to such a possibility and it did not announce that it was considering any change to that measure. 5 . At the close of the preparatory hearing, the trial court gave a decision committing the applicant for trial and changing the preventive measure imposed on him from the personal undertaking to detention on remand. That decision was not amenable to appeal. The trial court stated that even though the offence of which the applicant was accused was not particularly serious and did not carry the punishment of imprisonment, the applicant had no registered permanent place of residence and the court had doubts as to whether he would attend further hearings. The trial court concluded that the applicant might commit another offence or interfere with the criminal proceedings. 6 . On 30 September 2013 the trial court convicted the applicant of fraud, sentencing him to restriction of liberty for one year and six months, suspended for three years with probation. The judgment referred to the applicant’s personal details, including a registered permanent place of residence in Kyiv. The applicant was immediately released from detention.

3, 3

The case concerns the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment in detention and the alleged inadequacy of the domestic investigation (Article 3 of the Convention). FIRST EPISODE The first incident took place on 17 February 2015 during a search of the applicant’s cell in the Zaporizhzhya pre-trial detention centre (“the SIZO”). According to the applicant, several guards hit him with truncheons and kicked him after he had protested against rude remarks which they had made. According to official records, “physical force and handcuffing” were applied to the applicant in response to his aggressive behaviour. The record of the SIZO medical unit stated that on that date the applicant had sustained abrasions and haematomas on the chin, forehead, scalp and neck, as well as on the left shoulder. On 18 February 2015 the applicant’s mother complained to the prosecution authorities of his alleged ill-treatment. On 19 March 2015 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Prosecutor’s Office launched a criminal investigation into the matter. On 11 June 2015 the applicant was questioned as an aggrieved party. 8 . On 18 August 2015 a forensic medical expert examination report based on the available medical documentation was issued. Given that in the meantime, on 27 February 2015, the applicant had sustained additional injuries (see paragraphs 11 and 12 below) and that the relevant medical records lacked precision, the expert found it impossible to establish the origin of the applicant’s injuries sustained on 17 February 2015. 9 . The investigation was discontinued on three occasions (on 29 December 2015, 22 March 2017 and 27 February 2022) for absence of any indication of a criminal offence in the actions of the SIZO staff. All those decisions were set aside as premature and unlawful (on 5 May 2016, 21 December 2021 and 31 May 2022 respectively) [2] . The investigation remains pending. SECOND EPISODE 11 . On 27 February 2015 the applicant, together with twelve other prisoners, was taken to Berdyansk Prison no. While still inside the van, the applicant and some of the other prisoners harmed themselves by cutting their forearms with disposable razor blades. According to the applicant, they did so to protest against the unjustified application of force on prisoners after they had heard sounds of ill-treatment from one of the van’s compartments. The applicant also alleged that, while the prisoners had not manifested any resistance or violence, they had been subjected to cruel beating. According to the applicant, his beating had continued after he had been dragged out of the van. He alleged that he had been taken to some industrial premises nearby, where several guards had hit and kicked him and poured water on him after he had fainted. According to the prison administration, force had been applied to the newly arrived prisoners after they had refused to get out of the van and had harmed themselves at the instigation of the applicant [3] . 12 . On 28 February 2015 a forensic medical expert examined the applicant. The report issued on 2 March 2015 stated that there were numerous bruises and abrasions all over the applicant’s body resulting from at least twelve traumatic impacts of blunt objects. In addition, a cut wound on his left forearm was noted, possibly self-inflicted with a razor blade. On 2 March 2015 a criminal investigation was launched into the applicant’s allegation that he had been ill-treated on 27 February 2015. On 6 March 2015 he was questioned as an aggrieved party (see paragraph 11 above for his version of the events). The prison guards concerned, who were also questioned at around the same time, submitted that the applicant had violently resisted their attempts to take him out of the van and that, as a result, they had hit him with a truncheon several times. Given that the floor of the van had been slippery, being covered with the prisoners’ blood as a result of their harming themselves, the guards noted that the applicant might have also accidentally hit himself. 15 . On 24 November 2015 an additional forensic medical expert examination report was issued. It determined that the applicant’s and the prison guards’ versions of the facts regarding the origin of the applicant’s injuries were equally plausible. The investigation was discontinued on four occasions (on 31 March, 12 May and 26 November 2015, as well as on 27 February 2022) for absence of constituent elements of a criminal offence in the prison officers’ actions. All those decisions were set aside as premature and unlawful (on 1 April and 28 July 2015, on an unspecified date between 26 November 2015 and 27 February 2022 and on 31 May 2022) [4] . 17 . The investigation is pending, its progress being hindered, in particular, by the fact that Berdyansk is currently under Russian occupation.

8

The case concerns the applicant’s complaints that her eviction, together with her minor son, from a publicly owned hostel had not been lawful and necessary and that the domestic courts had not provided adequate reasons for their decisions relating to the matter, nor had they afforded an effective remedy for her grievances. The applicant relied on Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. On 1 September 2009 the administration of the Information Technology and Land Management College (“the College”, a public educational facility affiliated to the National Aviation University (“the University”), of which the applicant was a faculty member at the material time, demanded that the applicant and her minor son vacate the College’s hostel, as their lease agreement had expired. On 30 October 2009 the applicant challenged that demand in court. She noted that a studio flat in that hostel had been allocated to her in March 2005 in connection with her employment at the University. It had been her and her son’s only home. Administratively, their residence was regularised via several fixed-term lease contracts. However, in accordance with Article 132 of the Housing Code, which prohibited the eviction from corporate hostels of active employees raising children as single parents, she was entitled to retain her occupancy, since her employment contract with the University had recently been extended. She also alleged that she had had to finance the flat’s complete renovation, including the installation of sanitary facilities, before moving in, and that regard being had to that special effort and to the personal ties her family had formed with the flat since 2005, its sudden and unexplained reallocation to an unspecified third party might have been an act of corruption. Finally, the applicant noted that she was in a precarious situation, namely that she was raising her minor child alone, that her child suffered from several chronic illnesses (she submitted medical certificates) and that keeping the lease was a matter of vital importance to her. On 16 February 2010 the Sviatoshinskyi District Court in Kyiv allowed the applicant’s claim. Referring to Article 132 of the Housing Code, the District Court found that she could not be evicted as her employment contract with the University had been extended. On 14 July 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal and ordered the applicant’s eviction on the ground that her lease agreement had expired. The court did not respond to the applicant’s arguments as regards her personal circumstances or her argument that she had a special entitlement under Article 132 of the Housing Code for her lease to be extended. The relevant part of the judgment read, essentially, as follows: “... lease agreement no. 36/08 ... had expired on 30 June 2009. ... As the term of the lease of residential premises had expired, the claim cannot be allowed. ...” The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing, in particular, that her lease could not be analysed as a private fixed-term housing rental agreement under civil law, as it fell within the scope of the Housing Code, in particular Article 132. The applicant also reiterated her arguments concerning her precarious situation and significant personal ties with the disputed flat and noted that the College administration had implicitly considered the lease agreement valid, as it had continued to send her invoices for the monthly rent and utility charges related to the flat, and she had dutifully and regularly paid them. The applicant’s request for leave to appeal having been rejected by the Supreme Court on 21 September 2010, she and her son were evicted in October 2010.

3, 3

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention that he was ill-treated during an emergency fire evacuation in Sokal Prison no. 47 on 27 March 2012 and that there was no effective domestic investigation into the matter. From 4 April to 2 June 2012 the applicant underwent inpatient medical treatment for post-traumatic encephalopathy and brachial plexitis (inflammation of the nerves) of his right shoulder. According to him, those conditions resulted from his ill-treatment. According to the Government, the causes of the applicant’s health problems were unknown. The applicant submitted that he had immediately complained to various authorities, but his complaints had not been passed on. As submitted by the Government, the applicant raised the ill-treatment allegation for the first time in his letter to the Sokal Prison governor on 30 November 2012, but his complaint was dismissed as unfounded.

13, 3

The case concerns the conditions of detention of a mother and her newborn child at the Kyiv pre-trial detention centre (“the SIZO”), as well as the medical care provided to the baby in that institution. It raises issues under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. Following her conviction on 19 October 2017 by the Obolonskyi District Court of Kyiv, the first applicant served her sentence at the Kyiv SIZO in cell no. 346 (“the cell”), which was designed to accommodate mothers with children. On 11 January 2018 she gave birth to the second applicant. Physical conditions in the cell 4 . The applicants and the Government provided different accounts of the physical conditions of detention in the cell. Each party provided photos supporting their description of the cell. The first applicant submitted to the Court a written statement describing her version of the facts, which had been signed by her cellmate, Ms P. (see Appendix I). Medical treatment of the applicants 5 . According to a medical certificate of 15 March 2018 issued by a SIZO doctor, on her arrival on 8 November 2016 the first applicant had undergone an X-ray, which revealed no disorders of her respiratory organs. On 28 February 2018 the first applicant underwent an X-ray, which revealed pathological changes in her lungs. On 13 March 2018 she was diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis and advised that she should be hospitalised for treatment. On 23 March 2018 the first applicant was taken to the Interregional Specialised Tuberculosis Hospital at the Zbarazh Prison no. 63, where she successfully underwent intensive treatment for tuberculosis. On 27 October 2018 the first applicant was returned to the SIZO. On 16 March 2018 the second applicant was taken to Children’s Clinical Hospital no. 2 (for more details about the second applicant’s medical treatment, see Appendix II). On 19 March 2018 he was taken to the Berizka orphanage in Kyiv (“the orphanage”). 10 . On 24 April 2018 the second applicant was admitted to the Kyiv City Clinical Children’s Tuberculosis Hospital (“the tuberculosis hospital”) to undergo a programme of anti-tuberculosis treatment for between nine and twelve months. On 18 July 2018 the second applicant was discharged from the tuberculosis hospital back to the orphanage. 12 . On 14 November 2018 the second applicant was discharged from the orphanage back to the SIZO, where he was reunited with the first applicant. 13 . On 19 November 2018 the second applicant was taken to Kyiv Children’s Hospital no. 8, suffering from a temperature of 1 o C, a cough and rhinitis. He stayed at that hospital until 3 December 2018. 14 . On 21 December 2018 and 3 January 2019, the head of a non ‑ governmental organisation (NGO) took the second applicant in his private car to the Institute of Traumatology and Orthopaedic Rehabilitation (“the Institute”) for a consultation with an orthopaedic surgeon. Application for release 15 . On 22 February 2019 the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv allowed an application by the first applicant for release from serving her sentence until the second applicant reached the age of three. It found, among other things, that the living conditions in the SIZO, as well as the nutrition and medical care provided to the second applicant, who was suffering from a number of diseases requiring medical supervision and assistance, could not be considered adequate and that the second applicant required special treatment and special conditions which it was impossible to arrange for a mother and her child at detention facilities. On 1 March 2019 the first applicant was released and the applicants left the SIZO.

5

The application, lodged under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, concerns the allegedly unlawful and arbitrary pre-trial detention of the applicant. On 12 September 2014 the applicant was arrested and charged with aggravated murder (“the first criminal case”). On 13 September 2014 he was placed in pre-trial detention with the statutory maximum time-limit of nine months for pre-trial detention expiring on 11 June 2015. On 9 June 2015 the applicant was remanded in custody in connection with new charges of making false accusations (“the second criminal case”). The second criminal case concerned events which took place in September 2014 when the applicant had alleged that he had been ill-treated in prison. After taking several investigative actions the prosecutor in charge of the investigation had decided not to proceed with the case for lack of evidence. The relevant investigation was discontinued on 13 October 2014 only to be reopened on 6 June 2015. The reason for the reopening referred to in the prosecution decision was that although the applicant’s allegations of ill ‑ treatment had been thoroughly investigated, the investigation had omitted to consider whether the applicant had committed the criminal offence of making false accusations. The applicant appealed against his pre-trial detention in connection with the second criminal case, arguing that the only reason for the reopening of the investigation, almost eight months after it had been closed, was to prevent his release after the expiry of his pre-trial detention in connection with the first criminal case. He submitted that with the pre-trial detention ordered in the second criminal case, the statutory maximum period of nine months for detention on remand, as provided for in Article 205 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 18 of the Constitution, had been exceeded. On 12 June 2015 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld the decision on the applicant’s pre-trial detention. On 29 July and 18 September 2015, the Tbilisi City Court rejected requests by the applicant for release. It held that the nine-month period was to be calculated separately for each set of criminal proceedings and that there were relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the applicant’s continued detention for the purposes of the second criminal case. In the meantime, on 15 September 2015 the Constitutional Court of <COUNTRY> delivered a decision in the case of Giorgi Ugulava the Parliament of <COUNTRY> , finding that the “normative content” of Article 205 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which could be understood as allowing repeated imposition of the nine-month time-limit separately in parallel criminal proceedings without any safeguards against arbitrariness, was unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court held that the nine-month period could in principle be calculated separately for each set of criminal proceedings, provided that an accused person who was already charged with one offence was subsequently indicted for a further offence committed after he or she had been remanded in custody in relation to the initial charges. What the Constitution proscribed, in its view, was either an intentional delay in charges being brought against a person or the delayed imposition of “consecutive” periods of pre-trial detention, in order to prolong the overall duration of pre-trial detention by counting the nine-month period separately for each consecutive indictment (see Ugulava <COUNTRY> , no. 5432/15, §§ 47 ‑ 48, 9 February 2023). The applicant’s pre-trial detention ended on 26 December 2015 with the Tbilisi City Court convicting him of aggravated murder in connection with the first criminal case and sentencing him to twenty years’ imprisonment. On 10 November 2017 the applicant was acquitted of the charges brought in connection with the second criminal case. His acquittal was upheld on appeal by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of <COUNTRY> on 23 April and 7 November 2018 respectively.

Georgia

3

The applicant fled Syria in March 2017. He entered the Tompa transit zone at the Serbian-Hungarian border on 19 July 2018 to seek asylum. On 9 August 2018 his asylum application was rejected as inadmissible by the Office for Immigration and Asylum (“the IAO”) without the examination of the merits. At the same time he was expelled to <COUNTRY>. He requested the judicial review of the IAO’s decision. On 12 March 2019 he submitted a request for “immediate legal protection” (“ azonnali jogvédelem iránti kérelem” ) to the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court to place him in an accommodation outside of the transit zone. He complained about the prison-like conditions, the extreme length of his detention (8 months) and his deteriorating mental health. On 3 April 2019 the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court granted the applicant’s request and instructed the IAO to immediately provide him with accommodation outside the transit zone, noting that the duration of the applicant’s stay in the transit zone had exceeded the limit of four weeks and was thus unlawful. The IAO had decided to place the applicant in an open reception centre in Balassagyarmat to where he was transferred on 5 April 2019. The applicant left the centre on 22 April 2019 for an unknown destination. He currently resides in the <COUNTRY>. In the Tompa transit zone the applicant was first placed in Sector D for single men. On 9 August 2018 he was transferred to the alien policing (expulsion) sector for about two weeks before being placed back in the sector for asylum seekers (Sector C). He was accommodated in a container of 13 square metres, furnished with beds and lockers, which he shared with other people (the exact number of which varied from period to period). Besides the general material conditions, he also complained about the heat, his prolonged isolation and the alleged deterioration of his mental health. He submitted that he did not receive adequate level of medical and psychological assistance. During his stay in the alien policing sector, between 9 and 11 August and between 14 and 16 August 2018 (for a total of six days), the applicant was not provided with any food by the Hungarian authorities. The applicant received food following the Court’s decision of 16 August 2018, by which the applicant’s request for interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court had been granted and the Government had been asked to provide the applicant with food during his stay in the transit zone (for administrative reasons, the interim measure request was registered with application no. 38679/18). The applicant submitted that the conditions of his confinement in the Tompa transit zone had been incompatible with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. Under Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention he complained that there had been no effective remedy to complain about those conditions. Moreover, he complained that he had been detained in the transit zone in violation of Article 5§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

Netherlands, Serbia

13, 3

The applicants alleged, under Article 3 of the Convention, that they had been ill-treated by the police with a view to extracting false self ‑ incriminating statements from them and that the investigations into their respective complaints had been ineffective. Mr Leontyev (application no. 43612/16) additionally relied on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, complaining that the conditions of his detention in Zaporizhzhia SIZO had been inhuman and degrading and that there had been no effective domestic remedies in that regard. In addition, he complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the length of the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been excessive. The facts relevant to the individual applications are set out in detail in the appended tables.

6

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the domestic courts did not properly examine his allegations of incitement in the administrative offence proceedings against him. The applicant, a State official employed by the State Revenue Service, was subjected, with his colleague , to an undercover operation ( operatīvais eksperiments ), organised by the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption ( Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs – “the KNAB”) and approved by the prosecutor’s office. At the request of a private person acting on the KNAB’s instructions, the applicant and delivered a large sum of cash from <COUNTRY> to <COUNTRY> and received 500 euros (EUR) each for those “services”. The KNAB instituted criminal proceedings but those proceedings were later discontinued in relation to the delivery of cash as no elements of a crime were present. The KNAB then instituted administrative offence proceedings in which he was held liable for breaching restrictions imposed on State officials, as he had not obtained prior permission to carry out other paid activities in addition to his duties as a State official. He was fined 65 Latvian lati (around EUR 92). The domestic courts in the administrative offence proceedings examined the case twice and upheld the fine imposed on the applicant. In the first round of proceedings, the appellate court quashed the first-instance court’s ruling and sent the case back for a fresh examination. In the second round of proceedings, by a final decision of 15 April 2013, the appellate court confirmed the reasoning of the first-instance court without assessing the applicant’s allegations of incitement.

Latvia, Estonia

8

The case concerns the alleged failure of the authorities to implement a judgment given by the Dniprovskyi District Court of Kyiv on 24 October 2016 and amended by the Kyiv Court of Appeal on 21 February 2017, setting out contact arrangements between the first and the second applicant, who were living separately from each other. The applicants complained of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 2 . The second applicant’s mother, , with whom she was living, failed to comply with those arrangements. For that reason, in the course of enforcement proceedings, which were initiated in September 2018 and are still ongoing, the bailiffs imposed two fines on , which she did not pay, and ordered a temporary suspension of her driving licence. In addition, because had repeatedly failed to respond to their summons, the bailiffs unsuccessfully sought the initiation of criminal proceedings against her and a temporary ban on her leaving the country. On 10 November 2018, during the only meeting which the bailiffs organised between the applicants in the presence of , the second applicant refused to communicate with the first applicant because she was afraid of him. According to the conclusions of a psychological examination, ordered by the bailiffs, of the second applicant on 26 June 2019, her negative attitude towards the first applicant was linked to the conflict between him and The psychologist pointed to the need to improve the relationship between the first applicant and as a precondition for re-establishing “psychological contact” between the applicants. The Government submitted that a representative of the local child welfare services had been involved in the enforcement proceedings, but they did not provide any further details.

5, 5, 5

The case concerns the allegedly unlawful pre-trial detention of the applicant under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and the alleged absence of relevant guarantees afforded to her under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention in connection with her detention. 2 . In February 2000 a police investigator instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for theft of State property, embezzlement and forgery. The applicant absconded and, in February 2001, she was consequently put on a wanted list. On 20 October 2011 the applicant was arrested in Russia. Before the applicant’s arrest, the criminal proceedings against her were suspended and resumed a number of times, mostly for the purpose of performing procedural formalities. On 22 October 2011, in the course of the procedure for the applicant’s extradition to <COUNTRY>, the Artemovsk Local Court of the Donetsk Region (“the Artemovsk Court”) ordered her detention, without specifying its time-limit. The seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant and the risks of her continuing her criminal activity, evading the investigation and hindering the establishment of the truth were given as grounds for her detention. On 11 July 2012 the applicant was extradited to <COUNTRY> and placed in the Artemovsk Pre-Trial Detention Centre. She stated that she had been unaware of the grounds for her detention until 20 August 2012, when she had been served with a copy of the court’s decision of 22 October 2011. 5 . On 17 September 2012 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) held a hearing in the absence of the applicant, who did not have a defence lawyer, but in the presence of the prosecutor, and dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Artemovsk Court’s decision of 22 October 2011. The decision reiterated the grounds for the applicant’s detention indicated by the Artemovsk Court and referred to the fact that she had been on the wanted list since 2001. On 20 September 2012 the applicant was released subject to an undertaking not to abscond.

Ukraine

2, 3, 5

The application concerns the lack of adequate medical treatment and assistance provided to the first applicant during his pre-trial detention, leading to his death, and the lack of adequate reasoning in the courts’ decisions to extend his pre-trial detention. Furthermore, the case concerns the allegations of the second applicant that the State should be held responsible for the death of her son, the first applicant, and for her serious suffering caused by the inhuman and degrading treatment of her son while in detention. The first applicant’s detention On 7 April 2016 the first applicant was arrested on suspicion of rape of a minor and of theft. On 8 April 2016 the Podilskyi District Court of Kyiv ordered his detention, indicating in general terms as the reasons for its decision the gravity of the charges against him, his previous conviction for a similar crime, the risk of his absconding from the investigation or influencing the victim, and the possibility of his committing new offences. The first applicant’s detention was extended several times for similar reasons to those indicated in the court’s initial detention order. On 9 March, 5 May and 17 July 2017 the trial court, which had examined the indictment against the first applicant, rejected as unsubstantiated the defence lawyer’s requests for the first applicant to be released on account of his poor state of health that was life-threatening. Conditions of the first applicant’s detention and medical care provided to him From 10 May 2016 onwards the first applicant was held in the Kyiv temporary detention centre (“the SIZO”). Upon admission he was examined by a physician and registered as having been HIV-positive since 2008. On 25 October 2016, following a deterioration in his health, the first applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis of the internal mammary lymph nodes and cryptococcal meningitis. The next day he was hospitalised in the SIZO medical unit, where he started receiving anti-tuberculosis treatment. His state of health deteriorated to the extent that he was unfit to participate in the court hearings scheduled for 1 and 11 November 2016. On 22 November 2016, following a blood test, he was diagnosed with stage 4 HIV. The anti-tuberculosis treatment had some positive effect on the first applicant’s state of health, although that was short-lived as he did not adhere to the proposed treatment. The Government submitted copies of several certificates issued by the SIZO doctors between 20 January and 23 February 2017, attesting the first applicant’s refusal to receive treatment. Later in February 2017, after his state of health had deteriorated again, the first applicant gave his consent for treatment, and it was resumed. On 2 [1] March 2017 the first applicant was prescribed an antiretroviral therapy. During the treatment his state of health was not stable, causing the development of side effects such as a high temperature, a headache, stomach pain, intoxication syndrome and immunosuppression. The combination of these problems led to the anti-tuberculosis treatment being interrupted. From 27 March to 3 April, from 6 to 12 June and from 16 to 23 June 2017 the first applicant received inpatient treatment in Kyiv City Hospital no. 5 (“the civilian hospital”). The transfers to the civilian hospital were the result of the sharp deterioration of his health while in the SIZO. In particular, on 16 June 2017 it was noted that he was having difficulty swallowing and speaking. Upon discharge each time from the civilian hospital his state of health was assessed as being of medium gravity. 7 . Between November 2016 and July 2017 the applicants submitted numerous applications requesting the penal authorities to provide the first applicant with medical care, as his state of health had significantly deteriorated. In April, June and July 2017 the SIZO authorities, when updating the trial court about the first applicant’s state of health, explained that it was deteriorating and might lead to his death, and that he required inpatient treatment at a specialist medical facility and nursing care as he was unable to control his bowel movements. They also requested the trial court to consider changing the preventive measure in respect of the first applicant to a non-custodial one. On 26 July 2017 the SIZO prepared a synopsis regarding the first applicant’s health, indicating that his grave condition could be explained by the resistance to medicines caused by long-term HIV infection and his failure to undergo regular medical examinations and receive antiretroviral therapy before his arrest. The case file contains a photograph of the first applicant, allegedly taken on the premises of the Podilskyi District Court of Kyiv on 17 July 2017, when an application for the extension of his detention was examined. The photograph shows the first applicant in a helpless position in a wheelchair. According to the second applicant, she visited her son in the SIZO on 18 July 2017 and saw that he could not move, speak or eat. On 21 July 2017 the Court applied Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that the first applicant should have access to and be provided with appropriate specialised care, including being transferred to a specialist medical institution. On 31 July 2017 the first applicant was again transferred to the civilian hospital and on 2 August he was placed in the intensive care unit. On 7 August he died of cryptogenic sepsis. Following the first applicant’s death, on 10 August 2017 a criminal investigation into medical negligence was instituted. At the time of exchange of the parties’ observations (September 2019), it was still ongoing. The first applicant’s handcuffing 13 . On 27 June 2017, in response to the second applicant’s complaints that her son, while in the civilian hospital, had been handcuffed to his bed and that his hands had been tied with a bedsheet, the head of the SIZO informed her that in accordance with domestic legislation, handcuffs were applied to all detainees who underwent medical treatment in civilian hospitals. The second applicant’s suffering in connection with her son’s condition 14 . On 30 June 2017 the second applicant applied to the head of the SIZO, seeking leave for a meeting with her son in the SIZO medical unit. She wished to look after her son, whose poor state of health and helpless condition required special care. On 6 July 2017 she was informed that the domestic legislation did not provide for meetings with detainees outside the specially equipped area or the possibility for individuals from outside the penal system to look after them.

3

The applicants are a mother (the first applicant) and her minor child (the second applicant), both Iraqi nationals. They complain about their four ‑ months confinement in a Hungarian transit zone and the degrading and inhuman conditions therein. They allegedly fled domestic abuse and physical violence inflicted on them by the first applicant’s husband. On 30 March 2017 the applicants entered the Tompa transit zone and submitted an application for asylum. 4 . They stayed there until 26 July 2017 when the Office for Immigration and Asylum placed them in an open reception centre in Kiskunhalas. The applicants left <COUNTRY> in August 2017 and have been, according to the latest available information, residing in <COUNTRY> . In the Tompa transit zone the applicants were accommodated in the separate sector for families. The general conditions in which the applicants had to live were very similar to that of the Röszke transit zone which have been described and examined in R.R. and Others <COUNTRY> (no. 36037/17, §§ 10-12, 14-17 and 30-31, 2 March 2021). Besides these, the applicants also complained about the heat during summer months, the state authorities’ ignorance of their vulnerable status, the second applicant’s food allergy and their deteriorating mental health as a consequence of their confinement in the transit zone. The first applicant claimed that despite her being in need of immediate psychological assistance, she could not ask for such support during her entire stay in the transit zone. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13, the applicants complained about the allegedly inhuman or degrading conditions in which they were held in the transit zone and the lack of an effective remedy in this respect. They also complained about their four ‑ months confinement to the transit zone under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

Hungary, Iraq

5, 2, 5, 3

The case mainly concerns the first applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and unlawful detention (Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention) and the seizure of the second applicant’s property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention). the first applicant Events as submitted by the first applicant 2 . On 5 April 2012 at about 6 a., several police officers approached the first applicant at a petrol station near a Chevrolet Lacetti (“the car”) belonging to the second applicant. The police officers knocked him to the ground, handcuffed him, put him in a police car and hit him. At around 8 a.they took him to the Kherson regional police station where he remained handcuffed and was punched. 3 . On 6 April 2012 police officers took him, still in handcuffs, to Volodymyr-Volynskyy police station (Volyn Region). On 7 April 2012 at 4 a., the first applicant arrived at the Volodymyr-Volynskyy police station where a police officer initiated criminal proceedings against him and ordered his detention for seventy-two hours for trafficking stolen goods. At around 7 a.that day, an ambulance doctor noted in a medical certificate, a copy of which is available in the case file, that he had an injury to his lip, a bruise under his eye, abrasions on his wrists and subluxation of both shoulders. From 7 to 9 April 2012, he was held in a temporary detention facility in Volyn Region. On 9 April 2012 a police officer ordered the first applicant’s release, but, instead, he was handcuffed, put in a police car and driven back to Kherson, arriving on 10 April 2012 at the Suvorovskyy District police station, where he remained in custody. On 16 April 2013 the applicant was released. On 12 July 2016 the criminal proceedings against him on a charge of selling a stolen car were terminated for lack of evidence. Investigation into the first applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and unlawful detention 7 . During the investigation conducted by the prosecutor’s office, initiated at the first applicant’s request in April or May 2012, police officers from both the above-mentioned police stations denied the applicant’s allegations. They submitted that he had gone to both police stations of his own volition and that they had not seen him after his release on 9 April 2012. , who had witnessed the events at the petrol station in person, confirmed the applicant’s account as described above. The investigation was terminated and resumed on the basis of court orders on several occasions. The courts noted that there had been no forensic medical examination of the applicant’s injuries. 8 . The prosecutors terminated the investigation, finding the first applicant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. In particular, they established that he had gone voluntarily to the Kherson regional police station with six police officers. Subsequently, he had gone, in unknown circumstances, to Volodymyr-Volynskyy police station. The first applicant did not appeal against these decisions. He complained under both the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 3, and under Article 5 §§ 1, 2 and 5 of the Convention, about his deprivation of liberty from 5 to 10 April 2012. THE SECOND APPLICANT (Seizure of THE car and other items of property) 10 . During the events of 5 April 2012 (see paragraph 2 above), the police seized a car and various items found in it (including 15,000 <COUNTRY> dollars). Subsequently, it was established that the car had been stolen from R., to whom the car was returned. During the investigation initiated at the second applicant’s request, the prosecutors established that the car was registered in the second applicant’s name (the case file also contains a copy of the registration certificate attesting to that fact). However, the investigation was finally terminated. 11 . The second applicant’s request, lodged under the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the courts order the police to return the car and other items of property to her was finally dismissed, the courts having found that R. was the lawful owner of the car and there was a lack of evidence that the applicant was the owner of the items found in the car. The second applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention regarding the seizure of the car and other items.

United States

10

The applications concern the refusal by the authorities, allegedly in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, of two requests by the applicant for access to information. At the material time the applicant was a journalist and a deputy editor ‑ in-chief of the newspaper Novosti Kramatorska (“Kramatorsk News”). In May 2011 and April 2013, using the newspaper’s official letterhead, he submitted two requests for information to the Kramatorsk City Council. In the first request he asked for copies of the mayor’s and his family members’ declarations of income, stating that he needed them in order to “report on the activities of the local authorities”. 4 . That request was rejected on the basis of section 6(6) of the Law on Access to Public Information (“the Law on Access”). Section 6 provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: “Information subject to restricted access shall comprise: (i) confidential information; (ii) secret information; and (iii) official information. Access to information may be limited in accordance with the law and in compliance with the following requirements: (1) exclusively in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public order in order to prevent riots or crime, to protect public health, to protect the reputation or rights of other people, to prevent the disclosure of information obtained in confidence, or to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary; (2) where the disclosure of information may cause significant damage to the above ‑ mentioned interests; (3) where the harm from the dissemination of such information would outweigh the public interest in obtaining it. ... Declarations of income of (i) persons, and members of their families, who are candidates for, or who occupy, elected posts in bodies of power and (ii) State and local officials of the first and second grades, shall not belong to the [category of] information with restricted access. ...” As the mayor’s post was of the third grade within the system of the local bodies of power, his declaration was found not to be public. The applicant challenged that refusal before the courts, claiming that as the mayor’s post was an elected one, his declarations were public. While the applicant’s claims had been granted by the local court, the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeal reversed the decision and dismissed the claims. It reasoned, with reference to the Law on Access and the Law on Service in Local Self-Government Authorities, that the mayor’s post was of the third grade in the system of local authorities, and that therefore his declarations were not public. On 20 February 2013 that judgment was upheld by the High Administrative Court, which fully endorsed the appellate court’s reasoning. In the second request, regarding copies of declarations of the mayor and some other local council officials, no reference was made by the applicant as to why he needed the information sought. This request was rejected as, pursuant to the amended version of section 6(6) of the Law on Access, only financial information contained in the declarations was public and not the declaration as a document itself. It was also noted that in accordance with the Law on Preventing and Fighting against Corruption, financial information from the officials’ declarations had to be published in official media outlets. The applicant challenged that refusal before the courts. He relied on, inter alia , section 6(7) of the Law on Access, according to which restrictions applied to information, and not to a document. Furthermore, should a document forming the subject of a request contain restricted information alongside open information, the open information had to be provided. He also referred to the Court’s case-law on the issue of access to State-held information. After one re-examination of the case, on 30 September 2015 the High Administrative Court upheld the appellate court’s decision, which allowed the applicant’s claims in part by ordering that the open information contained in the declarations be disclosed. The courts concluded, however, that copies of the declarations could not be provided to the applicant, as part of the information contained therein (such as addresses and individual tax numbers) was confidential.

3

The applicants are a father (the first applicant) and his minor child (the second applicant), both Iranian nationals. On 5 December 2018 the applicants entered the Röszke transit zone and submitted a request for asylum. The Office for Immigration and Asylum (“the IAO”) declared their request inadmissible on 12 February 2019, stating that <COUNTRY> was a safe third country and the applicants should have applied for asylum there. On 5 March 2019 the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the inadmissibility decision and against their placement in the transit zone. As a result, the IAO proceeded with the alien policing procedure with the view of returning the applicants to <COUNTRY>. The IAO also ruled that their compulsory place of stay during the alien policing procedure should be the Röszke transit zone. P ending their return to <COUNTRY>, from 27 March 2019 the first applicant was not receiving food from the authorities. He was only given food following the Court’s decision of 29 March 2019, by which the first applicant’s request for interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court had been granted and the Government had been asked to provide him with food during his stay in the transit zone. On 16 August 2019, the applicant s submitted a court action, arguing that the alien policing authority failed to place them in an open accommodation facility and to issue a formal decision on their de facto detention in the transit zone. On 18 December 2019, the Szeged Regional Court initiated an urgent preliminary reference procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU”). On 14 May 2020, the CJEU issued its judgment (C ‑ 924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, see R.R. and Others <COUNTRY> (no. 36037/17, 2 March 2021, § 28)). 9 . On 22 March 2022, the Szeged Regional Court adopted its decision, upholding the applicants’ claims. Based on the findings in the CJEU’s above judgment, the domestic court found that the IAO had acted unlawfully, as it had failed to designate the applicants’ place of stay outside the transit zone. It ruled that the applicants’ placement in the transit zone pending the asylum proceedings and the alien policing procedure was unlawful because of the absence of a formal reasoned detention order and in view of the lack of legal remedies. In the meantime, in December 2019, the applicants submitted a renewed asylum application. Following two remittals, the IAO decided to recognise the applicants as refugees on 11 August 2021. The applicants had remained in the transit zone until 20 May 2020, when it was closed by the Hungarian authorities. They were then transferred to an open accommodation facility. Since 14 January 2021, they have been living in a private accommodation in <COUNTRY>. In the transit zone, the applicants had been accommodated in the family sector and then, on 27 March 2019, transferred to the alien policing (expulsion) sector. Besides the general material conditions, they also complained about the length of their confinement, the alleged deterioration of their mental health and the lack of food provided to the first applicant during three days of his confinement. The applicants submitted that the conditions of their confinement in the transit zone had been incompatible with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and that under Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention there had been no effective remedy to complain about those conditions. Moreover, they complained that they had been detained in the transit zone in violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

Hungary, Serbia

13, 3

The case concerns the poor conditions of the applicant’s accommodations in the reception centre in Cona (Venice). The applicant reached the coast of Sicily on 29 May 2016 aboard a makeshift vessel. On 31 May 2016 he was transferred to the Cona reception centre. It appears from the case file that the applicant remained in the above ‑ mentioned reception facility until at least 27 January 2017.

P1-1

The application concerns the refusal of the tax authorities to refund overpaid income tax to the applicant allegedly in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In October 2007 the applicant signed a contract for the sale of a plot of land with Ms P., according to which the total price (9,336,405 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)) was to be paid to him in instalments up until January 2008. The applicant received the first payment of UAH 1,551,420 on the date of the contract. The contract was certified by a notary. The relevant legislation, in particular section 3 of the Law on Personal Income Tax (as worded at the material time – “the Law”), provided that a notary in such cases acted as a tax agent who determined the amount of tax to be paid, supervised the payment of that tax, and reported to the tax authorities. The applicant thus paid income tax in the amount of UAH 466,820.30 (more than 62,000 euros (EUR) at the material time), which had been calculated on the basis of the total amount he would receive under the contract in question. Ms P. failed to pay the totality of the agreed price and the contract was invalidated by the same notary in May 2008. The applicant refunded the first payment to Ms P. In view of the above, the applicant requested a refund from the tax authorities for the income tax he had paid in relation to the invalidated contract as, essentially, in the absence of any income he had paid it erroneously. To that request he attached his income declaration for the years 2007 and 2008, showing a total income of zero. The tax authorities refused his request, relying on the fifth paragraph of section 3 of the Law. That provision provided that “where a notary fails to complete the certification of a property transaction for which income tax has been paid, the taxpayer shall have the right to reimbursement of the erroneously paid tax on the basis of his or her tax declaration for the respective year and the documents confirming such payment”. According to the authorities, as the notary had duly certified both the conclusion of the sales contract and its invalidation, there were no grounds for the refund. The applicant challenged that refusal before the courts. During the proceedings, the tax authorities further claimed that the applicant had not requested a refund in his tax declaration. In the first round of proceedings, the applicant’s claim was allowed by the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal, which found that he had taken all the necessary steps to claim reimbursement. It rejected the tax authorities’ argument that the applicant’s tax declaration for 2007 contained no claim for a tax refund as the declaration template did not contain a section for requesting tax refunds. The court also referred to the fifth paragraph of section 3 of the Law as being among the applicable legal provisions. The applicant’s claims were, however, ultimately rejected by the Higher Administrative Court of <COUNTRY> in a final judgment dated 1 April 2014. The court noted, first, that the payment of income tax in connection with a contract of sale with provision for payments to be made in instalments should be made on the standard basis, that is, at the time of the conclusion of the contract and based on the total price of the property in question. It further found that the tax authorities had rightly refused the applicant’s request for reimbursement as both the contract of sale and its invalidation had been certified by a notary; in that respect, it relied on the fifth paragraph of section 3 of the Law. Lastly, it stated that the applicant had not claimed a tax refund in his 2007 tax declaration.

Ukraine

3

The application concerns the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention that the domestic authorities failed to examine his claims that he would face a risk of ill-treatment if extradited to <COUNTRY>. 2 . The applicant was arrested and remanded in custody in <COUNTRY> in December 2019 on suspicion of the offences of aggravated robbery and illegal arms possession committed in the country. The Tajik authorities requested the applicant’s extradition on charges of involvement in the activities of the terrorist groups Islamic State of <COUNTRY> and the Levant and Al-Nusra Front, active in Syria. They provided assurances that the applicant would not be subjected to ill-treatment. 4 . While detained at the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Facility, the applicant filled in and signed a standard asylum application form, approved for use by the Ministry of the Interior. In it the applicant stated that he feared persecution in <COUNTRY> on the basis of his Salafist religious beliefs and practice, and that it was for that reason that criminal proceedings had been instituted against him in <COUNTRY>. On 4 May 2020 the police department in charge of investigating the Ukrainian criminal case in respect of the applicant sent the application form to the Kyiv Regional Office of the State Migration Service (“the Migration Service”). The Migration Service, without examining the asylum application on the merits, instructed the applicant (by letter of 3 June 2020) to submit the application in person or through the prison administration. It also sent him a new blank asylum application form. According to a letter from the prison administration, in June 2020 the applicant submitted a new asylum application form to the prison administration. The latter posted it to the Migration Service on 16 June 2020. It appears that the document was sent without any form of postal tracking. The applicant received no reply. According to the Government, the Migration Service did not receive the relevant letter and no record of its delivery could be obtained from the post office. The applicant lodged a claim before the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court, challenging the Migration Service’s failure to examine his application. The proceedings are pending. 9 . On 8 October 2020 the General Prosecutor’s Office of <COUNTRY> (“the GPO”) decided to extradite the applicant to <COUNTRY>. 10 . The applicant lodged an appeal against the extradition decision. He argued in particular that his asylum application had not been duly accepted and considered, and that he had been forced to initiate court proceedings in order to compel to examine his application. In a supplement to his appeal he also stated in general terms that he faced a risk in <COUNTRY> of ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. 11 . The appeal was refused by a final decision of the Kyiv Court of Appeal of 2 February 2021. The domestic courts ruled that the decision to extradite the applicant had been lawful, in particular given that, according to the information provided by the Migration Service, the applicant had not lodged an asylum application. The fact that the applicant had appealed to the administrative courts against the refusal to accept his asylum application was not a barrier to extradition under the law. 12 . On 12 February 2021 the GPO informed the Government Agent’s office that it had decided to postpone the applicant’s extradition until the delivery of a final decision in the Ukrainian criminal case against him, and until he served his sentence or was released from serving any possible sentence (under Article 592 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Before the Court the applicant presented the complaints set out in paragraph 1 above. 14 . The Government disputed the applicant’s allegations. They submitted in particular that the current rules governing the examination of asylum applications did not contain any provisions which would require the Migration Service officials to visit detention facilities to accept asylum applications. However, in practice, where a detainee submitted a duly formulated request for asylum, the Migration Service took measures to obtain permission from the relevant prosecutor’s office to visit the applicant in the detention facility and accept the application. In 2020 the applicant, through the prison administration, had sent a letter to the Migration Service but the Service had not received it. The Convention did not require the State to have a perfectly functioning postal system.

Tajikistan, Ukraine, Iraq

P7-1

The case concerns the alleged inability of the applicant to challenge evidence relied on by the domestic authorities in proceedings for her expulsion. 2 . The applicant, a Roma who fled Kosovo [1] in 1999, was granted refugee status in the respondent State and appears to have been living there ever since, currently with her partner and her five children. On 9 March 2017 the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”) issued a decision terminating the applicant’s refugee status on grounds of national security and ordering her to leave the country. The decision was preceded by an interview at which the applicant, who had been legally represented, had confirmed her family situation and her intention to marry her partner. She had also stated that she had not had any problems with the police authorities. Whether the applicant represented a security risk was not discussed at the interview. 3 . The applicant, through her lawyer, challenged the decision terminating her refugee status, arguing that there was no evidence that her presence in the respondent State represented a threat to national security. On 3 January 2018 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Ministry, noting, inter alia , that the Ministry had knowledge of information relevant to section 6(2) of the Asylum and Subsidiary Protection Act, which provided that an alien could not be granted asylum or subsidiary protection if he or she represented a threat to national security. The court also found that the statements made at the interview were insufficient for it to arrive at any other conclusion given the findings by the Ministry. In a final judgment of 7 June 2019, the Higher Administrative Court upheld the Ministry’s decision and found that, in any event, the legal prerequisites for granting the right to asylum had ceased to exist and it was open to the applicant to regularise her stay on different grounds. The court referred to information obtained by the Ministry about the human rights situation in Kosovo. In response to the applicant’s argument that she had not been able to challenge the evidence of her being a threat to the national security, it added that although such evidence had been assessed by the court, it had not been decisive for the judgment in her case. The applicant complained under Articles 3, 13 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention that she would be at risk of ill-treatment if expelled, that there was no effective review of her case domestically, and that she had not been given an opportunity to have knowledge of and to comment on the evidence in question.

5

The case concerns the allegedly unlawful continued detention and treatment in a psychiatric facility of the applicant since the end of 2012, which had been ordered by the courts despite the Hospital’s requests for his release. He relied on Article 3, Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 and Article 13 of the Convention. The applicant was held in continued compulsory psychiatric confinement as ordered by a domestic court in 2010 in the context of criminal proceedings against him on charges of murder, which he was found to have committed while lacking mental capacity. Until 24 July 2012 the applicant was held in a psychiatric facility with a strict supervision regime. On 24 July 2012, following a court decision, the applicant was transferred to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Psychiatric Hospital No.1 (“the Hospital”), a facility with an ordinary supervision regime. 3 . On 31 October 2012, 8 May and 5 December 2013, 14 May and 7 October 2014 the Ivano-Frankivsk City Court (“the City Court”) dismissed applications made by the Hospital for the applicant’s release so that he could undergo outpatient psychiatric treatment, finding that he still posed a danger to the public. The applicant’s appeal against the decision of 31 October 2012 was declared time-barred and he did not lodge an appeal against the decision of 8 May 2013. His appeals against the decisions of 5 December 2013, 14 May and 7 October 2014 were dismissed by the Ivano-Frankivsk Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) on 28 January, 11 June and 11 November 2014 respectively. He did not appeal in cassation against the decisions of 28 January and 11 June 2014. By a final decision of 14 April 2015, a cassation court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the decision of the Court of Appeal of 11 November 2014. 4 . On 30 March 2015 the Hospital, based on a medical examination of the applicant carried out by a commission of psychiatrists on 17 March 2015, requested the City Court to release the applicant for a compulsory course of outpatient psychiatric treatment noting that during the previous two years his mental condition had improved following medical treatment, and that he had become stable and unaggressive. 5 . On 9 July 2015 the City Court, having heard a psychiatrist from the Hospital and the applicant, dismissed the Hospital’s request finding that the report of the commission of psychiatrists of 17 March 2015 lacked proper reasoning justifying the need for a change to the coercive measures then in place. In particular, the conclusion in the 2015 report contradicted a report compiled by the same commission in 2013, in which it had been stated, based on the applicant’s behaviour at the Hospital, that the latter had remained unstable and aggressive. Noting further the short interval between the 2013 and 2015 reports and referring to the gravity of the charge against the applicant and the aggressive behaviour he had displayed during one of the court hearings, the City Court concluded that the applicant still posed a danger to the public and that there was a risk that the applicant would not comply with his treatment if released, and that he might reoffend. The applicant’s request that two other doctors from the Hospital be examined as expert witnesses was dismissed by the court as irrelevant. On 7 August 2015 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the above decision. In doing so, it largely upheld the reasoning given by the first-instance court. Regarding the applicant’s complaint that the first-instance court had lacked the expertise necessary to declare him mentally ill on the basis of his behaviour in the courtroom, the Court of Appeal noted that the court had not made a diagnosis but had only noted a fact. 7 . On 5 November 2015 the Higher Specialised Court of <COUNTRY> for Civil and Criminal Matters dismissed a request from the applicant’s lawyer for leave to appeal in cassation and upheld the findings of the lower courts. As regards a complaint by the applicant that the courts had failed to order a forensic psychiatric examination in order to have an alternative opinion about the state of his mental health, the cassation court noted that the power to order such an examination was a right and not an obligation of the courts. Arguments put forward by the applicant as to the irrelevance of the reports made in 2013 to the situation in 2015, given that the situation had evolved in the intervening period, remained unanswered. On 9 November 2017, following several rounds of proceedings and various appeals lodged by the applicant, the Ivano-Frankivsk Court allowed a subsequent request from the Hospital and released the applicant for compulsory outpatient psychiatric treatment which is, according to the Government, still underway.

Ukraine

6

The application concerns, in the main, the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the conduct and outcome of the civil proceedings leading to the allegedly unjustified deprivation of her right to a protected tenancy in a flat, eviction from there and loss of her ownership title to it. The applicant cohabited with a certain G. as an unregistered partner in his flat in Glyboka from 1985 until G.’s death in July 2005. In 1993 G., at the time the only registered tenant of the flat, privatised it and obtained an ownership certificate from the Glyboka Village Council. In 2003 G. drew up a will, bequeathing the flat to his grandson, A.G. 3 . In January 2006 the applicant brought an action in the Glybotskyy District Court of the Chernivtsi Region (“the Glybotskyy Court”) against A.G. and the Glyboka Village Council, asking the court to recognise that she had been living in G.’s flat as a member of his family and thus had the right to a protected tenancy (“the first set of proceedings”). As part of the same action, she also sought to invalidate the flat’s privatisation by G. in 1993, of which she allegedly had become aware only after his death. On 10 November 2006 the Glybotskyy Court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding that she had been living in the flat on a temporary basis, having acquired no right to a protected tenancy, and was officially registered in her mother’s house in another village – Kamyanka. On 25 January 2007 the Chernivtsi Regional Court of Appeal (“the appellate court”) quashed the Glybotskyy Court’s judgment and allowed the applicant’s action. On 10 October 2007 a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court rejected the parties’ cassation appeals against the appellate court’s decision of 25 January 2007. 4 . On 25 December 2008 the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court (“the CCSC”), sitting in camera allegedly without summoning the parties, allowed A.G.’s “appeal in the light of exceptional circumstances” of 22 May 2008, quashed the decisions of 25 January and 10 October 2007 and upheld the judgment of the Glybotskyy Court of 10 November 2006. The CCSC held that the contested judicial decisions in the applicant’s case had led to divergent application of the relevant legislation, referring to a case originating in Kyiv, in which the Supreme Court had held, according to the Government in its decision of 17 October 2007, that a plaintiff registered as residing at a different address at the time of privatisation could not be considered as having acquired the right to a protected tenancy regarding the flat where he or she had not been registered. 5 . Having been informed of the decision of the CCSC of 25 December 2008 in January 2009, on 12 February 2009 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court an “appeal in the light of exceptional circumstances” against it, arguing that it contravened other decisions of the Supreme Court and had led to divergent case-law. The Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s appeal. In the meantime, by the order of 3 December 2007 the Glyboka Village Council granted the applicant’s privatisation request regarding the flat. On that basis she received an ownership certificate in her name and continued living in the flat. 7 . In 2009 and 2010 A.G. instituted two sets of proceedings in the Glybotskyy Court, seeking the invalidation of the flat’s privatisation by the applicant in December 2007 and her eviction from the flat (“the second and third sets of proceedings”). Those claims were allowed by that court on 11 June 2009 and 23 November 2010 respectively. The judgment of 11 June 2009 was upheld by the appellate court on 14 October 2009 and no appeal on points of law was lodged with the Higher Specialised Court in Civil and Criminal Matters. The judgment of 23 November 2010 was partly amended and ultimately upheld by that court on 30 March 2011. 8 . On an unspecified date in 2011 the applicant was evicted from the flat and moved to the house in Kamyanka (see paragraph 3 above) which at the time was owned by her daughter. 9 . In her initial submissions in June 2009, the applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings on A.G.’s “appeal in the light of exceptional circumstances” had been conducted without her knowledge and involvement and had led to the unjustified quashing of the court decisions favourable to her, and that the judgment of the Glybotskyy Court of 10 November 2006 and the decision of the CCSC of 25 December 2008 lacked reasons. She also complained under Article 8 about the said quashing. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, she complained about the annulment of her ownership title to the flat by the judgment of the Glybotskyy Court of 11 June 2009 (see paragraph 7 above). 10 . In March 2018 the applicant submitted additional complaints: under Article 6 that the composition of the CCSC had not been in accordance with the law; under Article 8 about her eviction from the flat in question and the proceedings which led to it (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above); and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, she also complained that her property rights regarding the flat had been violated by the decision of the CCSC of 25 December 2008 (see paragraph 4 above).

P1-3

The case concerns the alleged breach of the applicant’s passive electoral right under Article 3 of Protocol No. The applicant stood as a candidate from the “Batkivshchyna” opposition party in the parliamentary elections of 28 October 2012 in single ‑ seat constituency no. She arrived second having lost the elections to a self-nominated candidate. The applicant brought administrative proceedings against the Constituency Election Commission (“the ConEC”) raising allegations of serious irregularities in the tabulation process (including tampering with a large number of ballots, which had initially been counted in her favour, during their storage in the ConEC and a subsequent recount without due safeguards against abuse). She submitted that the accurate voting results could be established on the basis of the original protocols from the Precinct Election Commissions (“the PECs”) [1] and that, according to them, she was the rightful winner. The administrative courts found against the applicant, having held that the recount had been in strict compliance with the law whereas the alternative method of establishing the voting results suggested by the applicant was not based on law. In so far as the applicant alleged any criminal offences, her allegations were dismissed as not confirmed by verdicts. The applicant’s administrative claim against the Central Election Commission (“the CEC”) in respect of the endorsement of the allegedly inaccurate voting results was equally unsuccessful. The observation mission report of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (“the OSCE/ODIHR”) published in January 2013 contained observations in respect of the tabulation process in the ConEC in question consistent with the applicant’s allegations. It noted, in particular, that the ConEC had “established during the recount of majoritarian PEC results that a large number of ballots initially counted in favour of [the] leading [candidate] were found to be marked for more than one candidate and were therefore invalid; these ballots had apparently been tampered with at the [ConEC] premises”. The OSCE/ODIHR also observed the vagueness of legal provisions concerning the recount. Namely, it was unclear whether the ConECs could undertake a recount only if the election material had been unsealed before being handed over to them or if complaints about irregularities during the count or the election material’s transfer had been filed no later than during that handover, or whether the ConECs were obliged to conduct a recount if there was any indication that the election material packs had been opened, even after the material had been packed properly at the time of receipt by the ConEC.

8

The case concerns the allegedly excessive length of proceedings in which the applicant had sought the return of his daughter, born in January 2018, from <COUNTRY>, where she had been living with her mother since June 2018 without the applicant’s consent, to <COUNTRY>, the country of the child’s habitual residence, pursuant to the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”), and the Ukrainian authorities’ alleged failure to enforce the domestic court’s interim order concerning contact arrangements while those proceedings were ongoing. The applicant complained of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 2 . The applicant submitted an application for his daughter’s return to the Ukrainian authorities in December 2018. Upon that application, in May 2019 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Department of Justice, acting on his behalf, brought proceedings in the Ordzhonikidzevskyi District Court of Zaporizhzhya (the first-instance court), which dismissed the application on 10 January 2020, having relied in particular on Article 13 of the Hague Convention and having found in the main that the child was entirely settled in <COUNTRY> living with her mother. On 14 July 2020 the Zaporizhzhya Court of Appeal (the appellate court) granted the applicant’s appeal and quashed the first-instance court’s judgment. Eventually, following several reconsiderations of the case, by the decisions of 29 April and 6 October 2021, the appellate court and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld the first ‑ instance court’s judgment of 10 January 2020. 3 . In the course of the judicial proceedings, on 1 July 2019 the first ‑ instance court issued an interim order that, among other things, obliged the mother to allow the applicant to meet with the child every day between 9 a.and 2 p.The meetings had to take place in the mother’s presence and to last no longer than two hours. The mother was also ordered not to change the child’s place of residence, which was at the mother’s registered address, until the proceedings ended. The interim order specified that it was subject to immediate enforcement and that any appeals lodged against it would have no suspensive effect. On 19 November 2019 the appellate court upheld those interim measures. By the decision of 15 February 2021, the same court dismissed the applicant’s application for a new interim order, noting, inter alia , that the contact arrangements set out by the interim order of 1 July 2019 as upheld by the appellate court on 19 November 2019 had not been cancelled. 4 . The child’s mother refused to comply with the interim order in question and obstructed the applicant’s contact with the child. His applications of 5 December 2019 and 18 June 2020 for the order’s compulsory enforcement were dismissed by decisions of the Khortytskyi District Bailiffs Service (“the Bailiffs Service”) of 6 December 2019 and 22 June 2020 respectively. The latter decision, partially upheld by the Khortytskyi District Court, refused to start the enforcement proceedings because the order contained no deadline for bringing it to be enforced. 5 . From 14 July 2020 onwards the child and her mother no longer lived at the mother’s registered address and their whereabouts were unknown. Following the applicant’s complaints, on 19 August 2020 the police opened a criminal case regarding the child’s alleged disappearance. By a decision of the Khortytskyi District Court of 25 September 2020, the mother was placed on a wanted list. On 16 October 2020 the police decided to close the criminal case, having noted that close relatives of the child’s mother had been unable to provide any information about the whereabouts of the child or her mother and that there was reliable information that the child was with her mother in an “orderly condition”. In that connection, the police referred to photos and videos of the mother and child that had been posted on the mother’s pages on various social media platforms and those sent by the mother to the police on various dates in September 2020, and to their participation in a programme broadcast by a Ukrainian television channel in October 2020. The police concluded that the mother was hiding with the child from the applicant. On 20 November 2020 the Khortytskyi District Court set aside the police’s decision of 16 October 2020 on the ground that the police had failed to comprehensively examine all the relevant circumstances. There is no information regarding any further developments in that criminal case.

Mexico, Ukraine

6

The case concerns the allegedly inconsistent and unpredictable manner in which the domestic courts ultimately refused to entertain the applicant’s claims for a recalculation of salary-related payments. The applicant complained of a lack of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. On 4 May 2011 the applicant lodged a claim with the Luhansk District Administrative Court (“the District Court”) against his former employer, the local Military Enlistment Office (“the Office”), challenging the latter’s refusal to recalculate salary-related payments. On 6 May 2011 the District Court returned the claim unexamined for having been submitted too late. On 7 October 2011 the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the above-mentioned ruling and sent the case to the District Court for reconsideration. It found that the applicant’s claim concerned conditions of remuneration and was not therefore subject to any limitation period, as provided for by Article 233 § 2 of the Labour Code. On 13 December 2011 the District Court partly allowed the claim, referring, in particular, to Article 233 § 2 of the Labour Code, and ordered the Office to recalculate various salary-related arrears and pay them to the applicant. On 15 February 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 13 December 2011 and returned the claim unexamined on the grounds that the applicant had missed the time-limit for lodging his claim. It held that the lower court’s reference to Article 233 § 2 of the Labour Code had been wrong as in its opinion that provision concerned only existing arrears and not disputed ones. It referred instead to Article 99 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Justice, which established a six-month limitation period for lodging administrative claims. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Higher Administrative Court (“the HAC”), arguing, in particular, that the finding by the Court of Appeal that Article 233 § 2 of the Labour Code had not been applicable had been wrong, in particular in view of its final ruling of 7 October 2011, in which it had found that that provision had been applicable in his case. He also relied on other similar cases in which the domestic courts, including the HAC, had not rejected claims as having been lodged outside the limitation period. In a summary ruling of 19 March 2012, the HAC refused to grant leave to the applicant’s cassation appeal, stating that there were no signs of incorrect application of the domestic law and that the applicant’s arguments did not allow for the conclusion that the relevant substantive or procedural law had been violated. 8 . On 15 October 2013 the Constitutional Court provided an official interpretation of Article 233 § 2 of the Labour Code on account of the inconsistency in its application by the courts, and found that it applied both to existing and to disputed salary-related payments. Article 233 § 2 of the Labour Code was substantially amended in July 2022 and no longer provides for the possibility of seeking recalculation of salary-related payments without any time-limits.

8

The case concerns the domestic courts’ alleged failure to establish a schedule providing sufficient contact for the applicant to be able to maintain and develop a relationship with his daughter, who was born in 2016 and lives with her mother (B.) separately from the applicant. The applicant complained of a violation of Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. 2 . Specifically, in December 2017 the applicant brought civil proceedings in the Pervomaisk Town Court (“the first-instance court”), contending that B. had prevented him from having contact with his daughter and asking the court to establish arrangements for regular contact with his child every Saturday and Sunday between 12 noon and 6 p.at the child’s place of residence, including outside walks with her between 2 and 4 p.without the presence of B. The guardianship authority, intervening in the proceedings as a third party, noted that the relationship between the applicant and B. was strained and opined that the applicant should be given the opportunity to meet with his daughter every Saturday and Sunday between 12 noon and 6 p.in the presence of both parents. B. agreed with the contact schedule recommended by the guardianship authority. She also submitted a psychologist’s report stating that the child had developed an attachment to her, had a “tense, emotionally traumatic and distrustful relationship” with the applicant and had suffered “psychological pressure” from him. The report contained no reference to any specific incidents. 3 . On 2 July 2019 the first-instance court ordered B. not to prevent the applicant’s contact with the child and ruled that he could meet with his daughter on the first and third Saturday and Sunday of every month between 12 noon and 6 p.at the child’s place of residence and could have outside walks with her between 2 and 4 p.in B.’s presence. 4 . The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia , that the first-instance court had failed to give any reasons for not allowing the requested frequency of meetings. On 11 September 2019 the Mykolaiv Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment, finding that the reduced frequency of meetings with the applicant’s daughter (compared to that recommended by the guardianship authority) had been ordered to ensure that the child communicated with the applicant in the presence of her mother, regard being had to the psychologist’s report (see paragraph 2 above) and the best interests of the child. 5 . The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing, inter alia , that the lower courts had disregarded the provisions of Article 19 of the Family Code, by which the courts deciding on disputes concerning parents’ participation in a child’s upbringing were entitled to disagree with the opinion of a guardianship authority – which the courts were obliged to involve in such proceedings – only if the authority’s opinion was insufficiently substantiated or if it was contrary to the interests of the child. On 8 April 2020 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded, holding that the first ‑ instance court had established the frequency of the applicant’s meetings with the child “in the light of the circumstances of the case and the interests of the child” and had given “due consideration” to the guardianship authority’s opinion.

10

The case concerns a refusal to provide journalists with information held by State authorities, allegedly in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The second applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings he had initiated to contest that refusal. At the time of the relevant events, the second applicant, Mr Torbich, was the editor-in-chief of the analytical and informational internet portal Chetverta Vlada (“The Fourth Estate”) and Ms Torbich, the first applicant, was his deputy. Both applicants lived in the town of Rivne. By law, as part of the registration process for standing in elections to Parliament, all candidates must submit to the Central Election Commission (“the CEC”) their biographical statements (hereafter “CV”), together with a photograph. Brief biographical information about the candidates (as defined by law, and for the publication of which the candidates have also given their consent), taken from the CVs provided, is then published on the CEC’s website. The CEC also disseminates the candidates’ campaign posters with their photographs and biographical information. Between August and September 2012, in the context of the parliamentary elections of that year, the applicants, presenting themselves as journalists, asked the CEC to provide them with the CVs and photographs of all single-mandate constituency candidates registered in the Rivne Region. The applicants’ requests stated that the relevant information was “open” according to the legislation, namely the Law on Information and the Law on Access to Public Information. The first applicant also noted in her request that the information was needed by voters in general to make an informed choice during the elections. The second applicant’s request stated that he as an individual voter was requesting the information in order to make an informed choice. In its replies to the requests dated 28 August and 26 September 2012 respectively, the CEC refused to provide the CVs on the grounds that they contained not only open information but also confidential personal information, namely the candidates’ addresses, telephone numbers and family composition. It added that the photographs could not be disseminated without the candidates’ consent. In its reply to the second applicant, the CEC also noted that when producing campaign posters, candidates were not required to use the same photograph that had been submitted to the CEC and that it did not control what biographical information was put on the posters. The applicants challenged those refusals before the courts in two separate sets of proceedings. The second applicant lodged a claim with the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court on 16 October 2012. That court initially refused to open proceedings on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, as complaints against the actions or decisions of the CEC fell to be examined by the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal sitting as a first-instance court. In that connection the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court referred to Article 172 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, which sets out the peculiarities of the examination of complaints against the actions and decisions of election commissions, including the rules of jurisdiction and the application of shortened deadlines. On 19 December 2012, following an appeal by the second applicant, the High Administrative Court found that the second applicant’s case was not an election-related dispute as the second applicant could not be considered a “subject of election process” and therefore the special rules prescribed by Article 172 did not apply. On that basis, on 14 January 2013 the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court eventually opened the proceedings and started its examination on the merits. Before the domestic courts, the applicants, emphasising their role as journalists, argued that even if certain information contained in the CVs might have been considered confidential, the CEC should still have provided them with the information classified as open. Given the CEC’s lack of control over the information included by the candidates on their posters, it was even more important to have access to their original CVs and photographs. The applicants argued that the information requested was important, as during elections there were often “technical candidates” or “doppelgangers” who had the same, or very similar, names, and by using this technique, political opponents sought to disperse the votes. In view of the above, access to the documents requested was important to inform the public. The applicants’ claims were rejected by the courts, which essentially endorsed the reasons given by the CEC, noting that the legislation provided that certain types of information about candidates were public and had to be disseminated by the CEC and that all other information was confidential. In that context the courts referred to the Law on Elections of People’s Deputies (“the Law on Elections”) and to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of <COUNTRY> of 1997 and 2012 which had essentially characterised all information about private and family life as confidential. The first applicant’s case was examined in abridged proceedings and the final judgment was adopted by the Zhytomyr Administrative Court of Appeal on 17 December 2012. The final judgment in the second applicant’s case, examined by way of the standard procedure, was given by the High Administrative Court on 9 December 2014. The elections took place on 28 October 2012.

Ukraine

6, 3

The case concerns allegations, under Article 3 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the applicant was ill-treated by officers of the Kramatorsk police, that her relevant complaint was not properly investigated and that her testimony given as a result of the ill-treatment was used to substantiate her criminal conviction. In October 2010 the police informed A.T., the applicant’s ex ‑ husband, that a certain A.Sh. had notified them that the applicant had asked him to arrange A.T.’s murder. A.T. then accepted the police’s proposal to be photographed with make-up simulating his violent death so that A.Sh. could provide the photographs to the applicant and obtain payment, in order to help police collect the evidence of her criminal intent. At about noon on 29 October 2010 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody after having handed a sum of money to A.Sh. A crumpled photograph of A.T.’s staged death was collected from a nearby lawn. 4 . From 50 to 40 p.that same evening, the applicant, questioned in the presence of P., her chosen lawyer, stated, in particular, that her ex ‑ husband was trying to sell their common property to finance his alcohol dependence. In order to protect her own and her children’s interests, she had requested A.Sh. to have a “man-to-man talk” with him in order to “bring him to his senses”. A.Sh. had told her that it would cost her 10,000 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH), which she had agreed to pay. She further noted that in mid ‑ October 2010 A.Sh. had approached her, claiming that her ex ‑ husband had been killed and that she owed him UAH 20,000 for arranging his death. When she had refused, he had started stalking and threatening her and her daughter. Fearing for her and her children’s well-being, the applicant had agreed to give him UAH 20,000 in exchange for him leaving her family alone. 5 . At 50 p.on the same evening the applicant was taken to the Kramatorsk hospital, where she was diagnosed with soft tissue contusions on her face [1] , which, according to her, she had sustained earlier that day as a result of a fall in the street. Later the same day the applicant, after having been taken to the Kramatorsk temporary detention facility (“the ITT”), changed her account of the events and explained to the ITT paramedics that she had been beaten during her arrest. The ITT forwarded that explanation to the Kramatorsk police for follow-up. At some point the case was further forwarded to the Donetsk regional prosecutor’s office and the applicant, questioned within the framework of the relevant inquiry, amended her account of the events, indicating that she had been kicked and punched during her arrest and then repeatedly hit on the head and slapped in the face at the police station while the police officers demanded that she confess to the murder. 6 . On 18 December 2010 the Donetsk regional prosecutor’s office decided that there was no need to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s injuries, as it appeared from the statements of the police officers working on her case and those of the attesting witnesses to the arrest operation that no physical force or psychological pressure had been applied in its course. It was noted in that decision, in particular, that the two officers who had effected the arrest had suggested that when they had taken the applicant by her hands, she had become hysterical and might have hit her head against the wall. Those officers also reported that they had seen some “insignificant redness” on the applicant’s face shortly after the arrest but had not paid it much attention. As regards the two attesting witnesses to the arrest, they denied seeing any injuries on the applicant’s face. On 20 December 2010 and on numerous other occasions the applicant, who was committed to stand trial on charges of attempted murder, complained to the Kramatorsk Court that she had been set up and that on 29 October 2010 she had been ill-treated physically and psychologically by the police officers, who had wanted her to plead guilty to the attempted murder or to pay them to close the case. The court forwarded those complaints to the Donetsk regional prosecutor’s office. On 1 November 2012 the latter took a new decision not to institute criminal proceedings, referring, essentially, to fresh statements by the police officers in which they had reiterated their previous factual submissions and denied having committed any ill-treatment or extortion. On 9 November 2012 the court found the applicant guilty of an attempt to murder A.T. and sentenced her to ten years’ imprisonment. It referred to an ample array of evidence, including, in particular, A.Sh.’s testimony; covert video- and audio-recordings made by him of his meetings with the applicant; and a forensic report indicating that the crumpled photograph seized from the lawn had contained epithelial cells possibly belonging to the applicant. The court also referred to the applicant’s testimony of 29 October 2010, in which she had acknowledged that she had solicited A.Sh. to put pressure on A.T. and had agreed to pay him for that service. It noted that her subsequently modified submissions during the trial, in which she had alleged that the money given by her to A.Sh. was unrelated to her request to “talk to her ex-husband” were inconsistent with other evidence. The court also dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated, referring to the fact that the prosecutor’s office had conducted an inquiry in that connection. On 22 February 2013 the Donetsk Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant against that judgment, in which she had alleged that the case had been fabricated by the police and challenged the authenticity of the recordings and the probative value of other evidence, and decided that there was no reason to uphold her allegations of ill-treatment. A further appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant was likewise dismissed by the Higher Specialised Court (on 26 August 2014), which, however, reclassified her actions as “preparation” of an offence and reduced her sentence to seven ‑ and ‑ a ‑ half years’ imprisonment. In the meantime, the applicant also appealed against the decision of the prosecutor’s office of 1 November 2012 not to institute criminal proceedings in respect of her alleged ill-treatment and extortion. Her appeal was dismissed by the Voroshylovskyi Court on 19 February 2013. That decision was quashed by the Court of Appeal, which noted that it had never been established how the applicant’s documented injuries had been sustained, and remitted the case back to the Voroshylovskyi Court. That court again dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 13 June 2013.

5, 5

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his arrest without a prior court order had been unlawful, under Article 5 § 4 that his complaints about the unlawfulness of that arrest had not been duly examined, and under Article 5 § 5 that he did not have an enforceable right to compensation in respect of the above complaints. In 2016 the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of <COUNTRY> (“the NABU”) started a criminal investigation into alleged large-scale embezzlement of public funds involving the inflation of procurement prices by the Ministry of Defence for fuel supplied by the T. company, in which the applicant was an investor (and, according to the NABU, its de facto principal owner). On 19 September 2017 the applicant’s alleged co-conspirators in the scheme, G. and (the latter being the managing director of T.), fled <COUNTRY>. On 16 October 2017 several individuals, including the applicant, held a press conference in Kyiv during which they denied the allegations of embezzlement. At 45 p.on the same day a NABU detective arrested the applicant under Article 208 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows arrest without a prior court order in cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person suspected of a serious corruption offence being investigated by the NABU may abscond. The detective also served on the applicant a notification of suspicion on charges of large-scale embezzlement of public funds. This was the first occasion on which the applicant was given any formal status in the investigation. 7 . On the same day the NABU detective lodged an application with the Kyiv Solomyanskyi District Court seeking to have the preventive measure of pre-trial detention imposed on the applicant. The detective argued that there was a risk that the applicant might abscond since he had four international travel passports, the locations of which were unknown, and that he had previously travelled to several specific foreign countries to which he could potentially flee. The fact that the applicant was facing a potential sentence of seven to twelve years’ imprisonment was another factor cited by the detective, as was the complexity of the criminal scheme in question and the scale of dissimulation it involved. The applicant had extensive connections in law-enforcement authorities, the Ministry of Defence and other State institutions. That indicated that, if at liberty, the applicant might interfere with the investigation by concealing evidence or influencing witnesses. Should the court be unwilling to order pre-trial detention, the NABU detective proposed that bail be set at 149,338,804 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH, approximately 4,715,403 euros) [1] and that a number of restrictions be imposed on the applicant. 8 . On 17 October 2017 the Kyiv Solomyanskyi District Court held a hearing during which it examined the application for the imposition of preventive measures and the applicant’s written objections. It also heard the parties. The applicant’s lawyer argued, in particular, that the applicant’s arrest without a prior court order had been unlawful (see paragraph 11 below). On the same day the court rejected the application for pre-trial detention and released the applicant subject to a personal undertaking not to abscond and to comply with a certain number of obligations (notably to abstain from communication with other suspects in the investigation, surrender his passports and wear an electronic tracking device). The court found that there was reasonable suspicion against the applicant and that the risks justifying the imposition of a preventive measure were proven. At the same time, the court did not consider it proven that detention was necessary to counteract those risks. On 21 November 2017 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal rejected appeals lodged by the prosecution and the applicant, and upheld the first-instance decision. In response to the applicant’s argument that his arrest without a prior court decision had been unlawful, the court stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure provided “for a separate appeal procedure” in respect of such alleged violations. The court did not elaborate as to what that procedure comprised. 11 . Separately, on 17 October 2017 the applicant had lodged a habeas corpus application with the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyi District Court under Article 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see Vadym Melnyk <COUNTRY> , nos. 62209/17 and 50933/18, § 57, 16 September 2022, and Kurochenko and Zolotukhin <COUNTRY> [Committee], nos. 20936/16 and 53257/16, §§ 79-82, 11 February 2021), [2] in which he sought to have his detention without a court order declared unlawful. The applicant argued, notably, that there had been no risk of his absconding and therefore no legal basis for his arrest without a court order under Article 208 § 1 (3). This was evidenced, in particular, by the fact that, even though the applicant had not yet had a formal status in the investigation, he had known about its existence and had not fled, but rather had publicly defended his company against the allegations. On the same day the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyi District Court rejected the application, holding that it was not competent to examine complaints about warrantless arrests and that such complaints should be examined during the preliminary hearing at the opening of the defendant’s criminal trial. As to the obligation under Article 206 to bring an allegedly unlawfully detained person to court, that provision could not be invoked since the applicant had been arrested specifically in order to bring him to court and under Article 211 a person arrested without a court order had to be brought to court automatically within sixty hours. That time-limit had not yet been exceeded. No appeal lay against that decision.

Ukraine

8, 6

This case essentially concerns the authorities’ failure to provide the applicant with appropriate redress for medical malpractice in State hospitals. It raises issues under Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention. The applicant has been registered as a disabled person since childhood and has suffered from a number of chronic diseases. In 2001 he was treated in three State hospitals after he had complained of poor health. He was misdiagnosed with Behçet’s syndrome, whereas he had actually been suffering from tuberculosis, and for about three months he received inappropriate medical treatment, including unregistered medicines, which caused his health to deteriorate considerably and intensified the progression of the tuberculosis. During his medical treatment in one of the hospitals, the applicant was exposed while undressed (against his will, according to him) to medical students and clinical interns as “a patient with a rare disease”. Criminal complaint against the hospitals’ staff 3 . In October 2003 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the hospitals’ staff in view of the above facts, but to no avail. On at least four occasions between 2006 and 2011, the Zakarpattya regional prosecutor’s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings following complaints by the applicant, having found no evidence of the doctors’ misconduct. Those decisions were subsequently quashed by higher prosecutors, who found that the inquiry conducted in respect of the applicant’s complaint had not been comprehensive. On 3 February 2012 the prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings against the hospitals’ officials for medical negligence and forgery of documents. It relied, in particular, on the results of a forensic medical examination conducted in civil proceedings instituted by the applicant against the hospitals’ officials (see paragraph 5 below). According to the applicant, those proceedings are still pending, while the criminal offences he had complained of have become time-barred. The applicant complained of a lack of activity on the part of the investigator, but was unsuccessful. Civil proceedings instituted by the applicant 5 . In August 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the hospitals, claiming 300,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 45,500 euros (EUR) at the time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and certain amounts in respect of pecuniary damage. The proceedings ended with a final decision given by the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court on 5 September 2012. In those proceedings the domestic courts, relying on a forensic medical report prepared by the main forensic medical examination bureau in Kyiv (report no. 109/109 A11), held that there had been medical negligence in respect of the applicant’s treatment in all three hospitals, which could have led to the worsening of the applicant’s health and protracted his recovery from tuberculosis, and awarded him the sum of UAH 10,000 (about EUR 965 at the time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, as well as an additional amount of UAH 12,199 (about EUR 1,172 at the time) in respect of costs and expenses. The applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage was dismissed because he had failed to support it with relevant evidence. In January 2016 the applicant applied to the court for a writ of execution in respect of the judgment delivered in his favour, and by January 2017 he had been paid the full amount of the compensation awarded to him in that judgment.

6

The application concerns an issue of fair trial raised under Article 6 of the Convention in relation to administrative-offence proceedings against the applicant, who was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. On 15 July 2013 the Svyatoshynskyy District Court of Kyiv convicted the applicant of breaching road traffic rules and suspended his driving licence for one year. The applicant appealed. On 15 August 2013 the registry of the Kyiv Court of Appeal drafted a summons to the appellate court hearing, to be held on 21 August 2013. The Government and the applicant disagree about the date when the above-mentioned summons was sent and received by the applicant. The applicant stated that the document had been sent by ordinary post on 20 August 2013 and he had received it on 22 August 2013. The Government stated that the summons had been “issued” on 15 August 2013 and had been sent by ordinary post, but it was not possible to verify the date of its receipt, as the relevant case file had been destroyed on account of the expiry of the limitation period for its storage. 5 . On 21 August 2013 the Kyiv Court of Appeal held the hearing in the applicant’s absence, examined the evidence which he had contested and upheld the first-instance court’s decision. The court re-examined the record of the administrative offence, the statements of two witnesses, the report of a police officer and a written description of the events by Mr A. The appellate court found it to be established that the applicant had not objected to the alcohol test results, whereas he had stated the contrary in his notice of appeal and submitted two written witness statements in that connection. The applicant also contended that the police officers had not observed the relevant rules and had failed to refer him to a hospital for examination. Moreover, he submitted that he had not consumed alcohol on the night in question. Those factual circumstances had been established without the applicant being present. In its decision, the appellate court did not verify whether the applicant had been informed of the hearing; it only observed that he had not appeared at the hearing. That decision was final.

P4-2, 8

The case mainly concerns the prosecution authorities’ access to the applicant’s banking documents, allegedly in breach of Article 8 of the Convention, and a ban on his travelling abroad, allegedly contrary to the requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. At the material time the applicant was a Member of Parliament (MP) enjoying, under the domestic law, immunity against any “measures restricting the MP’s rights and freedoms” without a prior consent of the Parliament to bringing him to criminal liability. Having lost a civil dispute [1] to his former spouse, Ms. O., the applicant was obliged, by the judgment of the Kyiv District Pecherskyy Court (“the Pecherskyy Court”) of 21 February 2012 (“the judgment”), which became final on 31 October 2012 [2] , to pay her 125,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) [3] . On 23 November 2012 the Pecherskyy Court, without informing the applicant, banned him from travelling abroad at the bailiff’s request, “with a view to ensuring the enforcement of the judgment and preventing [the applicant] from evading its enforcement by leaving the territory of <COUNTRY>” [4] . Relying on the above ruling, on 14 December 2012 the State Border Service did not allow the applicant to board a flight from Kyiv to Strasbourg, even though he invoked his MP immunity. On 18 December 2012 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of deliberate non-compliance with the judgment. 7 . On 26 December 2012 the applicant transferred the amount due under the judgment, plus the enforcement fees, to the Bailiffs Service’s bank account. By the final rulings of 16 and 23 January 2013, the investigating judge of the Pecherskyy Court granted the investigator’s applications for temporary access, for thirty days and fourteen days respectively, to virtually all banking documents of the applicant in two banks for the entire period of the existence of his accounts there. Referring to “sufficient grounds for considering that there was a real risk of modification or destruction of the required information”, the judge held that the matter was to be examined without summoning the applicant. Under Article 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), temporary access to items and documents constituting legally protected secrets meant that the person in whose possession they were provided a party to criminal proceedings with the possibility to study them, make copies or seize them if an investigating judge or a court decided so (§ 1). Such temporary access was provided on the basis of a ruling of an investigating judge or a court (§ 2). Article 162 of the CCP listed items and documents constituting legally protected secrets. Data protected by bank secrecy was among them (§ 5). Under Article 163 of the CCP, if a party to criminal proceedings applying for temporary access to items and documents constituting legally protected secrets proved the existence of sufficient grounds for considering that there was a real risk of modification or destruction of items and documents in question, an investigating judge could examine the application without summoning the person in whose possession they were (§ 2). That article also stipulated that an investigating judge or a court delivered a ruling granting temporary access to items and documents constituting legally protected secrets if the applying party proved that information contained in those items and documents was of evidential value for the proceedings and that it was impossible to use other evidence instead (§ 6). The applicant’s application, which he lodged on 21 January 2013, for a review of the 16 January 2013 ruling in the light of the fact that he had fully complied with the judgment, apparently remained disregarded. On 24 January 2013 the applicant was supposed to travel from Kyiv to Strasbourg as a member of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to the PACE. However, the State Border Service once again refused him the possibility to leave the Ukrainian territory, even though the applicant produced documentary evidence proving the payment of the debt by him. On 28 February 2013 the Bailiffs Service transferred the money paid by the applicant to Ms O.’s bank account. On 5 March 2013 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued for the absence of constituent elements of a crime in his actions. On 13 March 2013 the State Border Service did not allow him to board a flight to Brussels on the same grounds as before. On 5 April 2013 the Bailiffs Service issued a ruling to the effect that the enforcement had been completed, and on 9 April 2013 the Pecherskyy Court lifted the ban on the applicant’s travelling abroad.

Ukraine

10

The application concerns a refusal to provide a journalist with access to information held by public authorities, allegedly in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant is a journalist and the editor-in-chief of the Rivne Agency of Journalistic Investigations ( Рівненське агентство журналістських розслідувань ), an information agency (“the Agency”). In his first request to the Head of the Rivne State Administration (“the RSA”), the applicant, introducing himself as the editor-in-chief of the Agency, asked to be provided with information on the bonuses ( премія ) paid to the Head, his deputies and all other RSA staff members between 2009 and 2011. The applicant asked that the information be provided in an anonymised manner but with details as to each position, type of bonus and amount per month. He relied, in particular, on the Law on Access to Public Information, which provided that access to information on the use of budgetary funds could not be limited. The applicant received the information from some of the RSA entities as requested. From others, however, he received refusals to provide the information, or he was only provided with generalised or incomplete information (for example, without details of the position or the type of bonus), on the ground that disclosing further details would be in breach of the legislation on personal data protection. The applicant’s complaints about the refusals, which included references to the Court’s case-law under Article 10, were rejected by the local and appellate courts on 14 February and 11 June 2012 respectively. The courts reasoned that: (i) as the RSA’s official website and the information displayed on the RSA premises contained detailed lists of its staff members by department, providing the information requested by the applicant (that is, with details of each position) would make personal identification easy, in breach of the legislation on personal data protection; (ii) personal financial information could not be disseminated without the data subject’s prior consent, and only the income declarations of State officials were public; and (iii) the applicant had not submitted the request in his personal capacity but rather in his capacity as a representative of the Agency, and as such his individual rights had not been infringed. On 3 August 2012 the High Administrative Court refused to open cassation proceedings, finding that there was no evidence of a breach of either substantive or procedural legislation by the lower courts, and that the applicant’s cassation appeal, in which he had essentially restated his arguments, was ill-founded. In two further requests, the applicant, introducing himself as the editor-in-chief of the Agency, asked the Chairman of Parliament to provide him with copies of the income declarations of twenty-two members of parliament (MPs) for the year 2012. In reply the applicant was informed that providing him with the income declarations of MPs without their prior consent would be in breach of the legislation on personal data protection. The applicant was eventually provided with the declarations of eight MPs who had given their consent to disclosure, and he was informed that four more declarations had been published in the Official Gazette and were thus freely accessible. The applicant’s subsequent complaints, based on the Law on Access to Public Information and the Law on Preventing and Fighting against Corruption, pursuant to which access to the information contained in the declarations of public officials could not be restricted, were rejected by the courts. In its final judgment of 1 April 2014, the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal found that as the applicant had requested copies of the declarations (containing personal data not only of the MPs concerned but also of their family members), rather than specific information from the declarations, his request had been rightly rejected. That decision was final and was not subject to further appeal.

8

The case concerns the allegedly unlawful and unnecessary eviction of the applicants from a room in a communal flat. [1] The applicants relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In March 2010 the municipal company R., which managed the block of flats in which the applicants and Mr Y. (the first applicant’s spouse) resided, instituted proceedings seeking to evict them from a room which measured 10 square metres and which they occupied without having obtained an occupancy order ( ордер ) from the Sevastopol City State Administration (“the SCSA”). R. argued that pursuant to Article 116 of the 1983 Housing Code (“the HC”), the defendants were to be evicted, as they had acted arbitrarily in occupying the room. The applicants lodged a counterclaim, seeking to oblige the SCSA to issue an occupancy order in respect of them. They noted that prior to moving into the room in question, their family had lived in the neighbouring room, which measured 14 square metres and which they shared with Mr T. (the first applicant’s father) and two other relatives. In 2008 R.’s previous director had allowed the applicants’ family to renovate, at its own expense, a dilapidated vacant room, located in the same flat and used as a closet, and to move into it, which they had done. However, subsequently the SCSA had refused to issue an occupancy order in respect of them for the room in question, in spite of the fact that Article 54 of the HC provided that tenants of communal flats who needed a larger living space had a preferential right over any outsiders to occupy vacant rooms in those flats. The district childhood protection board ( Рада опіки ) joined the proceedings as a third party and supported the counterclaim, arguing that returning two minor children to Mr T.’s room would create an adverse environment for their upbringing in view of the extremely cramped conditions. On 23 December 2011 the Leninskyi District Court in Sevastopol dismissed R.’s eviction claim, allowed the defendants’ counterclaim and ordered the SCSA to issue the occupancy order in respect of them. The court found, in particular, that the defendants could not be considered to have occupied the disputed room arbitrarily, as R.’s previous director had given them prior permission to do so. The court further noted that the SCSA’s refusal to issue the occupancy order had been based, essentially, on a restrictive interpretation of the term “tenant” used in Article 54 of the HC, referring exclusively to tenants of social housing, whereas Mr T. had obtained ownership of the room he had been occupying and in which he had previously housed the first applicant and other relatives. The court noted that, regard being had to the date of the enactment of the HC (1983), the term “tenant” as used in Article 54 should be considered in its historical context. It was obvious from the text of Article 54 that its overall purpose had been to reduce, as far as practicable, the number of household units occupying communal flats by providing their occupants who were living in cramped conditions a preferential right to settle in vacant rooms in those flats as opposed to allocating them to non-occupants. Regard being had to the fact that the applicants’ and Mr T.’s households would enjoy only 1 square metres per person if the defendants were to return to Mr T.’s room, it would be artificial and overly formalistic to interpret Article 54 as denying the applicants’ family the opportunity to occupy a vacant 10-square-metre room renovated by them with R.’s permission. On 18 October 2012 the Sevastopol City Court of Appeal allowed an appeal lodged by the SCSA and ordered the eviction of the defendants. The court found that Article 116 of the HC applied in the case at hand since the defendants had moved into the disputed room without having received an occupancy order, which, pursuant to Article 58 of the HC, was the only document that could legitimise occupancy of the publicly owned residential premises. The defendants could, therefore, be evicted, as they had acted arbitrarily in occupying the room. The SCSA, for its part, could not be obliged to issue the occupancy order, as Article 54 of the HC gave the preferential right to occupy vacant rooms in communal flats to “tenants”, whereas Mr T., in whose room the applicants’ family had previously lived, was its “owner”. There were therefore no grounds for preferential allocation of the disputed room to the defendants. Although they had been on the social housing waiting list, they would have to wait for their turn. On 21 November 2012 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court rejected a request by the applicants for leave to appeal on points of law, in which they argued that the District Court had taken a correct decision. On 3 June 2013 it also refused a request by the applicants for leave to open extraordinary review proceedings in which they argued that there existed in practice divergent interpretations of the applicable provisions of the HC by the domestic courts.

6

The applicants alleged that the opening of appeal proceedings and the quashing of a judgment in their favour breached the principle of legal certainty under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant in application no. 42968/15 also alleged that the above-mentioned actions breached Article 1 of Protocol No. The Government contested those allegations. The relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

10

The case concerns defamation proceedings initiated against the applicant for the statements he had made in his complaints to the law-enforcement authorities and before the courts. It raises an issue under Article 10 of the Convention. 2 . The applicant, K.T. (wife of the then chairman of the High Council of Justice, K.) and Ch. (K.’s friend, according to the applicant) were co-founders of a company. In 2010, following decisions taken by K.T. and Ch., the applicant lost his shares in the company and was dismissed from his position as the company’s managing director. The applicant instituted proceedings against K.T. and Ch. and lodged complaints with the police and the prosecutor’s office in that connection. In his written submissions during the trial and his complaints to the law-enforcement authorities the applicant alleged that K.had used his high position and influence on others, including judges, to assist his wife and other persons in appropriating the company from the applicant. He submitted, inter alia , that “because the defendant is the wife of K., the head of the High Council of Justice, who .... is overseeing the illicit acquisition of [the applicant’s] assets”, “Such illegal behaviour on the part of the co-founders is directed by K.T.’s husband, who is the head of the High Council of Justice”, “K.gave instructions to [the presiding judge in the applicant’s case]”, “most likely, the wish of K.To my knowledge, [K.] is putting pressure on both the police and the prosecutor’s office and controlling the proceedings in the Uman Town Court. He is covering up the illegal actions of [the acting head of the company] and others”, “I believe that she signed the report while under pressure from the head of the High Council of Justice, K.”, “It follows from the above that R., in agreement with Ch., K.and ..., colluded in forgery”. In February 2012 K.initiated defamation proceedings against the applicant, arguing that the applicant had made insulting and false statements about him which had affected his reputation and daily life. The courts found against the applicant and ordered him to pay 160,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (about 15,000 euros (EUR) at the time) for having insulted the claimant. They noted in particular that the contested information had been “disseminated” by the applicant and contained factual allegations which had not been proven by the applicant to be true. The applicant’s arguments, including that his statements had not been made publicly, but rather had been expressed as written complaints to the courts and the law-enforcement authorities and therefore could not be the subject of defamation proceedings, were dismissed by the courts as unsubstantiated. The final decision in the defamation case was delivered on 31 August 2012 by the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court, which rejected the applicant’s request for leave to lodge a cassation appeal against the judgments of the lower courts. 4 . In order to enforce the judgment in K.’s favour the bailiffs attached the applicant’s property and accounts; as from December 2020, they have been withholding a part of the applicant’s pension. According to an information note of the State Bailiff’s Service dated 12 February 2021, which has been made available to the Court by the Government, a total amount of UAH 804,89 (about EUR 24 at the time) has been seized from the applicant within the enforcement proceedings.

2

The application concerns the alleged failure of the State authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the disappearance of the applicant’s brother, A. At the time of the events described below, the applicant was the owner and president of a private university based in Baku. On 13 October 2003 A., who was an official of the then Ministry of National Security (“the MNS”), left home and never returned. As the applicant had no information as to his brother’s whereabouts, on 14 October 2003 he lodged a criminal complaint with the Yasamal District Police Office (“the YDPO”) in relation to A.’s disappearance. On 24 October 2003 the YDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings, having concluded that A.’s disappearance had not involved any criminal activity. Following an appeal by the applicant against that decision, on 14 November 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 144.6 (kidnapping) of the Criminal Code by the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office in connection with A.’s disappearance. On 17 November 2003 A.’s abandoned car was found in Baku. On 24 January 2004 the applicant was granted victim status. On 6 January 2005 the criminal case was reclassified under Article 120.1 (murder) of the Criminal Code and its investigation was handed over to the Serious Crimes Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office. In reply to numerous letters and requests from the applicant concerning the ongoing criminal investigation in which he expressed suspicions that his brother had been kidnapped by an organised criminal group allegedly consisting of law-enforcement officials and protected by high-level State officials, the prosecuting authorities informed him, on various dates, that the documents he had submitted had been added to the case file and that he would be informed of the investigation’s results. On 24 September 2010 the applicant emigrated from <COUNTRY> to <COUNTRY>. In a letter dated 17 July 2012 the applicant’s lawyer asked the prosecuting authorities to provide the applicant with information about the progress of the investigation. In particular, the lawyer pointed out that the applicant had still not been informed of the progress of the investigation or of any decisions that had been taken. He also asked the investigating authorities to provide him with copies of the relevant documents. By a decision dated 27 July 2012, the investigator dismissed the request. In particular, relying on Articles 87 and 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”), the investigator found that a victim or his or her representative could only have access to a case file and the relevant documents following the termination of the preliminary investigation. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Nasimi District Court against the investigator’s decision, asking the court to order the investigator to provide him with the relevant documents. The complaint was lodged under the procedure established by Article 449 of the CCrP providing for the possibility to challenge the actions or decisions of the investigating authorities before the domestic courts. By a decision of 23 August 2012, the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, holding that that kind of decision of the prosecuting authorities could not be challenged before the courts. That decision was upheld by the appellate court. 16 . It appears that no active investigative steps were taken by the investigating authorities between June 2005 and May 2009 and between April 2010 and October 2012. On 4 October 2012, given that over a lengthy period of time the previous investigative bodies had failed to establish the circumstances of A.’s disappearance, an independent operational investigative group (“the investigative group”) was established under the authority of the Prosecutor General with a view to furthering the criminal investigation. It appears from the documents in the case file that at various times during the investigation the investigating authorities questioned multiple witnesses (in some cases, on a number of occasions) regarding the circumstances of A.’s disappearance. Those witnesses included A.’s relatives, friends and acquaintances, as well as people with whom he had had contact and telephone conversations. However, the authorities ultimately failed to establish the whereabouts of A. and the exact circumstances of his disappearance or alleged kidnapping and murder. 19 . According to the documents provided by the Government, the latest active investigative steps in respect of A.’s disappearance were taken by the investigative group in June 2013. The applicant complained under Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Convention of the allegedly ineffective investigation into his brother’s disappearance, particularly the authorities’ failure to establish who was behind the disappearance and to inform him about the progress of the investigation, as well as the excessive length of the criminal investigation. He also complained under Article 3 of the Convention of the suffering he had had to endure because of the uncertainty regarding his brother’s fate. In his observations, the applicant lodged a further complaint, arguing that there had been a hindrance to the exercise of his right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention as there had been a delay in the delivery of letters from the Court and one of his letters sent to the Court had been lost.

Azerbaijan, France

3, 3

The case concerns the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by law‑enforcement officers during his arrest and later while in police custody and the lack of an effective investigation in that respect. alleged ill-treatment of the applicant According to the applicant, on 23 October 2015 he had been in a café with an acquaintance, R.At around 11 p.plain-clothed police officers had entered the café and beaten them up and had then taken them to the Organised Crime Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of <COUNTRY> (“the OCU”), where the beatings continued. As a result of having been pressured and beaten, the applicant had signed a statement dictated to him by the police officers in which he confessed to drug-related offences. On 26 October 2015 the applicant was taken to the Narimanov District Court, where a judge authorised his pre-trial detention for four months. The applicant stated to his lawyer and the judge that he had been tortured by the police officers at the OCU. The judge mentioned that statement in the detention order and also sent a letter to the Prosecutor General’s Office ordering an investigation into the alleged ill-treatment. On 30 October 2015 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the detention order. investigation INTO the applicant’s alleged ill‑treatment As noted above, on 26 October 2015 the Narimanov District Court ordered the Prosecutor General’s Office to investigate the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment. On 29 October 2015 the applicant’s lawyer also wrote to the Prosecutor General’s Office asking that the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant be investigated. According to the records of the Baku pre-trial detention facility, when the applicant had been taken there on 3 November 2015, he had been examined by medical personnel, who had discovered bruises on both of his arms and on his right leg. On 4 November 2015 the prosecutor in charge of the investigation into the alleged ill-treatment ordered a medical examination of the applicant. On 20 November 2015 medical experts examined the applicant. According to their report of 23 November 2015, they found no signs of torture or ill-treatment on his body. The experts also examined the records of 3 November 2015, according to which bruises had been present on both of the applicant’s arms and on his right leg. They considered that those bruises could have been inflicted by a blunt object five to ten days before the medical examination on 3 November 2015. Since the records did not indicate the size, form and exact location of the bruises, the experts were unable to determine the exact circumstances and timing of their appearance. On 5 December 2015 the prosecutor decided not to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by the police officers. He relied on statements by the police officers, who submitted that the applicant had been apprehended in accordance with the law. The prosecutor also noted a statement by R.in which he had given a general account of the circumstances of his and the applicant’s arrest. The prosecutor concluded that during his questioning the applicant had confessed to the offences and had never raised any ill-treatment complaints and that, therefore, his allegations of ill-treatment by the police had not been confirmed. The prosecutor mentioned the medical experts’ report but did not address the bruises discovered on the applicant’s body. The applicant lodged an appeal with a court against the prosecutor’s decision. He complained, inter alia , that the police had kept him in the OCU for longer than was lawfully allowed, from 23 October to 3 November 2015, in order to prevent him from meeting with his lawyer and to delay his medical examination until his bruises had disappeared. On 18 January 2016 the Sabail District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, stating that the prosecutor had ordered a medical examination of the applicant and had questioned various witnesses. The court considered that those actions had been sufficient to confirm that the applicant had not been ill-treated. On 1 February 2016 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision, endorsing its reasoning. COmplaints The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by the police officers and that there had not been an effective investigation into the matter.

Azerbaijan

6

The application concerns a situation in which the applicant, being detained, deposited an appeal in a civil-law matter with the prison authorities on the last day of the period for appealing. However the prison authorities posted it only the next day, as a result of which the appeal was rejected as belated. The applicant then asked that the appeal be nevertheless examined, by way of a request for leave to appeal out of time (Article 122 of the Code of Civil Contentious Procedure), but that request was dismissed and his appeal remained unexamined on the merits. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about being denied access to court.

6

The present case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention regarding the State’s alleged failure to protect his property rights. The applicant had a 50% share in the ownership of a wedding hall in Sumgayit. On 4 September 2007 his nephew, S.F., concluded a loan agreement with Texnikabank OJSC (“the Bank”) for an amount of 450,000 Azerbaijani manats (AZN – approximately 350,000 euros (EUR) at the time). On the same date the applicant’s brother, Y.A., acting on the basis of a power of attorney (“the POA”) of 30 August 2007, which had allegedly been given to him by the applicant, concluded a mortgage agreement with the Bank in relation to the loan agreement signed by S.F. The terms of the mortgage agreement stipulated that the applicant’s 50% share in the wedding hall would serve as collateral for the loan taken out by S.F and the interest accrued on it. On 4 March 2009 S.F. repaid the first loan in full and concluded a second loan agreement with the Bank for an amount of 600,000 <COUNTRY> dollars, following which the mortgage agreement was amended to state that it also covered the new loan. According to the applicant, the loan and mortgage agreements were entered into only formally by his brother and nephew; in reality the loans had been organised by a government official who had managed to exert undue influence on the applicant’s brother and nephew and who had arranged the falsification of the POA by conspiring with and bribing officials from the Office of the Khizi District Public Notary (“the public notary”) and the Bank. By the time of the proceedings mentioned below, the official concerned had committed suicide. On 29 July 2010 the applicant lodged a claim with the Sumgayit City Court challenging the validity of the POA, the mortgage agreement and its subsequent amendment by arguing that Y.A. had acted on the basis of a forged POA as the applicant had been abroad on the date of its issuance and therefore could not have signed it. On 20 August 2010 the Bank lodged a counterclaim against the applicant and S.F. stating that the latter had defaulted on the loan agreement and requesting on that ground the sale of the applicant’s property at auction in accordance with the terms of the mortgage agreement. 9 . On 19 April 2011 the Sumgayit District Court, having examined both claims together, dismissed the applicant’s claim and upheld the Bank’s claim, finding that the applicant could not have been unaware of the fact that his property had been mortgaged since 2007. In its judgment the court did not touch upon the issue of the validity of the POA. The facts part of the judgment also mentioned a letter from the public notary stating that they had no record of such a POA being made. However, the court made no reference to that letter in its reasoning. 10 . The applicant appealed, arguing that since he had not given the POA, as demonstrated by the fact that he had been outside <COUNTRY> on the day of its issuance, the mortgage agreement concluded by his brother was void and could not be enforced. He specifically referred to the public notary’s letter and to a letter he had obtained from the State Border Service of the Republic of <COUNTRY> (“the SBS”) confirming that he had been outside the country from 28 August to 23 October 2007. On 6 September 2011 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal upheld the first ‑ instance court’s judgment, reiterating its reasoning. The appellate court’s judgment was silent as to the applicant’s specific submissions regarding the alleged falsification of the POA. On 9 February 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s judgment, agreeing with its argumentation. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of a violation of his right to a reasoned decision and of being deprived of his property as a result of the domestic courts’ manifestly unreasonable decisions.

Azerbaijan, United States

10

The applications concern two separate sets of proceedings resulting in two criminal convictions of the same applicant, a journalist who wrote under the pen name “Sardar Alibeyli”, on account of defamatory articles. At the material time the applicant was editor-in-chief of Nota , a newspaper published in <COUNTRY>. APPLICATION No . 34717/10 On 26 April 2009 the applicant published an article in Nota concerning T.N., the chairman of an NGO, about whom several other articles had previously been published in the same newspaper. The article was entitled “An apology piece about T.N., whose honour has been trampled and whose dignity has been humiliated”. The article in issue was published following a court judgment ordering the applicant to publish an apology for defaming T.N. in previous articles. The text of the article in issue did not appear to contain an actual apology, but instead criticised the court judgment ordering the publication of an apology and repeatedly stated that T.N. had been humiliated and had no honour and dignity, and that an apology could not repair that. T.N. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant under the private prosecution procedure. By a judgment of 22 July 2009 the Nizami District Court convicted the applicant under Article 148 of the Criminal Code (insult) and sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment, finding that the statements made in the article in respect of T.N. had amounted to an insult. After a series of appeals in which the applicant argued that there had been an unjustified and disproportionate interference with his freedom of expression, the applicant’s conviction and sentence were upheld by the Supreme Court in a final decision of 9 December 2009. APPLICATION No . 8791/11 In April 2009 the applicant also published a series of three articles concerning the allegedly corrupt activities of officers of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the first article it was stated, inter alia , that, according to information provided to the newspaper by an unnamed officer of the Internal Troops, several high-ranking officers of the Internal Troops, identified by name, had engaged in fraudulent and corrupt activities in the process of calling for and awarding tenders for goods purchased for the Troops, first by awarding the tenders to sham companies affiliated to themselves and then by buying goods from the latter at artificially high prices and pocketing the difference. In the second article it was stated, inter alia , that a high-ranking officer, identified by name, had requested a bribe from a commander of an unspecified military unit. In the third article, it was stated that several high-ranking officers, identified by name, had been embezzling funds by providing lower quantities and a lower quality of food to soldiers. A group of the officers named in the articles lodged a criminal complaint under Article 147.2 of the Criminal Code (slander by accusation of having committed a serious or especially serious criminal offence) against the applicant under the private prosecution procedure. During the court proceedings, the applicant argued that he had received an unsigned letter from an informant in the Internal Troops who was the source of the information published in the articles and whose identity he could not reveal; he submitted a copy of that letter to the court (no copy of the letter is available in the Court’s case file). By a judgment of 20 July 2009, the Nizami District Court convicted the applicant under Article 147.2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to seven months’ corrective labour and the deduction of 10% of his monthly income in favour of the State. It found that the applicant had slandered the private prosecutors by accusing them of having committed serious criminal offences, such as embezzlement of public funds, without providing any factual basis for his accusations. As to the applicant’s argument concerning his unnamed source, the court found that the letter submitted by the applicant was an unsigned photocopy and therefore could not be accepted as evidence demonstrating the existence of such an informant. Following an appeal, the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, but reclassified it under Article 147.1 of the Criminal Code (slander) and changed the sentence to four months’ imprisonment by way of merging it with the three-month imprisonment sentence imposed in the other set of proceedings (see application no. 34717/10 above). On 3 February 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence. COMPLAINTS In respect of both sets of proceedings, the applicant complained under Article 10 that there had been unjustified and disproportionate interferences with his right to freedom of expression.

Azerbaijan

6, P1-1

The applicants are lawyers who declared that they had advanced legal fees in respect of their clients ( avvocati antistatari ) and who were awarded legal fees through assignment orders ( ordinanze di assegnazione ) aimed at implementing decisions or judgments issued under Law no. 89 of 2001 (“the Pinto Act”). They complained of the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of such assignment orders. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. RELEVANT legal framework The domestic law concerning the Pinto Act is set out in the Cocchiarella <COUNTRY> judgment ([GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 23-31, ECHR 2006‑V). The Pinto Act was subsequently amended in 2012 (Law-Decree no. 83 of 2012, converted into Law no. 134 of 7 August 2012) and in 2015 (section 1, paragraph 777 of Law no. 208 of 28 December 2015). 4 . The relevant provisions of the Pinto Act, following the above amendments, are as follows: Section 5 sexies (terms of payment) “In order to receive the payment of the sums awarded pursuant to the present Act, the creditor shall issue a declaration [...] to the debtor authority, certifying that no sums have been paid in execution of the relevant domestic decision, indicating whether enforcement proceedings have been instituted for the judgment debt, the sum that the authorities are still required to pay and the preferred method of payment pursuant to paragraph 9 of the present section. The creditor shall also submit the necessary documents required under the decrees indicated in paragraph ... A model declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 and the documents to be submitted to the debtor authority shall be determined by decrees of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, to be issued before 30 October 2016. The authorities shall publish the forms and documents referred to in the latter sentence on their institutional websites. ... In the event of an absent, incomplete or irregular submission of the declaration or documentation referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the payment order may not be issued. The authority shall make the payment within six months from the date on which the obligations provided for in the preceding paragraphs are fully discharged. The time-limit referred to in the preceding sentence shall not begin to run in the event of absent, incomplete or irregular submission of the declaration or documentation referred to in the preceding paragraphs. ... The payment of the sums owed under the present Act is made crediting the sums to the creditors’ current or payment accounts. Payments in cash and through bills of exchange are only possible for sums not exceeding 1,000 euros.” By Decree no. 120738 of 28 October 2016, the Ministry of Economy and Finance adopted the model declaration required under paragraph 3 of section 5 sexies of the Pinto Act. 6 . As to the request of payment of legal fees awarded in the “Pinto” proceedings, the model declaration requires the creditor to indicate: (i) whether enforcement proceedings relating to “Pinto” decisions have been instituted; (ii) the reference of any assignment order issued in the context of those enforcement proceedings; (iii) whether the sums awarded by the assignment order have been paid by the debtor authority; and (iv) any outstanding amount which still needs to be paid.

Italy

P1-1, 13

The facts of this case are substantially the same as those described in Bartolo Parnis and Others <COUNTRY> ((dec.), nos. 49378/18 and 3 others, 24 March 2020), in relation to the application of Act XVIII of 2007 introducing Article 12A into the Housing Ordinance (Chapter 158 of the Laws of <COUNTRY>). The present applications concern other apartments owned individually by each of the applicant sisters, consequent to a deed of division of 7 October 2015. By several appeal judgments of the Constitutional Court, the latter confirmed a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the period 2007 onwards and awarded compensation, covering both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. In particular, in respect of apartment 10B it awarded 5,000 euros (EUR), and in respect of apartments 45D and 28C it awarded EUR 20,000 for each apartment. In the case of apartment 10B an agreement was reached with the tenant in respect of future rent, in that of apartment 45D it was considered that the applicant had an ordinary remedy to pursue after the 2018 amendments and in the case of apartment 28C the property had been vacated [1] . In respect of apartment 25C EUR 20,000 was awarded but the eviction order revoked, the Constitutional Court having considered that the applicant had an ordinary remedy to pursue under the 2018 amendments. In respect of apartment 35C EUR 5,000 was awarded and EUR 20,000 in respect of apartment 31C. In the former case an agreement had been reached between the applicant and the tenant. In respect of apartment 31C it was considered that the applicant had an ordinary remedy to pursue under the 2018 amendments. The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention that the violation of their property rights upheld by the domestic courts was not brought to an end and that they were not adequately compensated, in view of the value of the properties.

Malta

P1-1

The case concerns the applicant’s complaint that she was deprived of land through the application of an indirect form of expropriation (“ occupazione usurpativa ”) by the domestic courts. The applicant was the owner of a plot of land located in the Melendugno municipality, which was recorded in the land register as folio no. 24, parcel no. Without issuing any public-interest declaration or any formal expropriation order, the municipality occupied the land in 1973 to use it as a public square. On 19 November 1980, the applicant brought an action in the Lecce District Court arguing that the occupation of the land had been unlawful and seeking its restitution as well as damages. 5 . By a judgment of 22 July 1992, the Lecce District Court upheld the applicant’s complaints and found that the occupation of her land had been unlawful, but that the land had been irreversibly altered as a result of the public works which had been carried out on it since 1973. As a consequence, pursuant to the indirect-expropriation rule, the applicant was no longer the owner of the land. The Lecce District Court further ruled that the applicant was entitled to damages in respect of the loss of her property. 6 . The municipality appealed against that judgment. The applicant lodged a counter-appeal, asking the Lecce Court of Appeal to declare that, as a consequence of the irreversible alteration of the land, it had been acquired by the municipality, and to confirm the award of damages in that connection. 7 . By a judgment of 14 February 2002, the Lecce Court of Appeal found that the applicant’s complaints were subject to a five-year limitation period which had started to run from the date of the irreversible alteration of the land. As a result, the complaints were time-barred and she was not entitled to compensation. 8 . The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation, contesting the application of the limitation period and arguing that the indirect expropriation was contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. On 11 September 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the appeal judgment. The applicant complained that she had been unlawfully deprived of her land without compensation, in breach of her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

P1-1

The present case concerns the applicants’ inability to use their flats or to collect an adequate rent from their tenants. In particular, the applicants are the co-owners of two flats in Split with a surface area of 72 and 126.50 square metres occupied by protected lessees ( zaštićeni najmoprimci ). Under the Lease of Flats Act, which has been in force since 5 November 1996, such lessees are subject to a number of protective measures, such as the duty of landlords to enter into a lease of indefinite duration; the payment of protected rent, the amount of which is set by the Government and is significantly lower than the market rent; and better protection against termination of the lease. 3 . In 2009 the applicants brought a civil action seeking eviction of the protected lessees and the members of their households. On 18 May 2012 their action was dismissed by a judgment of the first-instance court, which was upheld on 10 January 2013 by a judgment of the second-instance court. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law ( revizija ), but the Supreme Court declared it inadmissible ratione valoris , whereupon they lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s decision. 5 . On 11 January 2017 the Constitutional Court declared their constitutional complaint inadmissible finding that the case did not raise a constitutional issue. Before the Court the applicants complained, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that they had been unable to use their flats or charge adequate rent.

13, P1-1

The case concerns a unilaterally imposed lease under Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of <COUNTRY> (hereinafter “the Ordinance”) affecting the applicants’ property no. 19, Ġuże Ellul Mercer Street, Sliema (which they inherited from their mother in 2017) as of 8 September 1999. At that time the rent payable was 382 euros (EUR), which as of 2013 increased to EUR 529 and as of 2016 to EUR 540. Its annual market rental value in 1999 according to the court-appointed expert was EUR 5,217 and in 2018 EUR 8,400. In 2014 the applicants and/or their predecessor in title, unsuccessfully lodged proceedings before the Rent Regulation Board (hereinafter “the RRB”) requesting it to declare that the tenant breached the obligations imposed by the lease and that he was not using the premises as his ordinary residence. On 12 April 2018 the applicants lodged constitutional redress proceedings claiming that the provisions of the Ordinance, as amended by Act XXIII of 1979 which granted tenants the right to retain possession of the premises under a lease, imposed on them as owners a unilateral lease relationship for an indeterminate time without reflecting a fair and adequate rent, in breach of, inter alia , Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They asked the court to award compensation for the damage suffered and an appropriate remedy including the eviction of the tenant. By a judgment of 21 November 2019, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as of 8 September 1999, bearing in mind that the applicants were receiving around 5% of the market rent according to the valuations of the court ‑ appointed expert which were accepted by the court. It awarded EUR 20,000 in pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage combined. Noting that the evidence had shown that the property was in dilapidated state and clearly not being used as a residence by the tenant, the court ordered his eviction within six months and that he pay a rent of EUR 700 per month until he vacates the property. No costs were to be paid by the applicants. None of the parties appealed. The applicants complained that they were still the victims of a violation of their property rights as well as a violation of their right to an effective remedy, invoking Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention.

Malta

P1-1

The case concerns the expropriation of the applicants’ land and the award of compensation based on the “average agricultural value” of the land. The applicants were the owners of a plot of land located in Giardini Naxos and recorded in the land register as folio no. 6, parcels nos. 57/b, 57/a, 58 and 855. The land, which is part of the Naxos archaeological park, was designated for archaeological purposes by the 1985 general land-use plan ( piano regolatore generale ) and was subject to the restrictions on the use of archaeological finds ( vincolo archeologico ) provided by Article 11 of Law no. 1089 of 1 June 1939. At the time, the applicants used some of the land for farming citrus and allowed for the land to be used for archaeological excavations. On 21 October 1993, the administration initiated a procedure for the expropriation of a part of the applicants’ land, measuring 8,375 square metres and corresponding to parcels nos. 57/a and 855, for archaeological purposes. On 7 April 1994, the administration authorised the immediate occupation of the land in question and, on 21 December 1996, it issued the expropriation order. The compensation offered to the applicants was based on a valuation conducted by the Messina Expropriation Commission, which considered that the land had building potential and determined its value at 1,507,500,000 Italian lire (ITL), corresponding to 778,559 euros (EUR). Nevertheless, based on the criteria contained in section 5 bis of Law 359/1992, the applicants were offered compensation in the lower amount of ITL 454,448,435 (EUR 234,703). The applicants instituted judicial proceedings, arguing that such compensation was insufficient, and the Messina Court of Appeal appointed an expert to carry out a valuation of the land. The expert noted that the restrictions on the use of archaeological finds did not entail an absolute prohibition on building but, rather, allowed for the possibility of other uses, provided that they were compatible with archaeological interests. It further noted that, in 1976, the administration had issued a note according to which building on part of the land was compatible with archaeological interests, whereas the remaining part was not constructible. On this basis, the expert concluded that 1,955 square metres of the land had to be valuated as constructible and determined their market value at ITL 508,300,000 (EUR 262,515). 7 . As to the remaining 6,420 square metres, they could be used for purposes other than agriculture, such as a camping area or other tourist facilities. Furthermore, the applicants could have obtained compensation in case of new archaeological finds on their land. Therefore, taking into account the price of similar land, the expert determined the market value of this part of the land at ITL 100,000 per square metres and, overall, at ITL 642,000,000 (EUR 331,565). 8 . On 18 February 1999, the Court of Appeal asked the expert to conduct a further valuation, by applying the average agricultural value ( valore agricolo medio ). The expert noted that the land was partially used for the cultivation of citrus and indicated the value of ITL 10,000 per square metre. 9 . By a decision of 4 November 2005, the Messina Court of Appeal considered that the entire plot of land was non-constructible and, by applying the average agricultural value, awarded compensation for the expropriation in the amount of ITL 83,750,000 (EUR 43,253). The Court further awarded ITL 18,901,909 (EUR 9,762) in compensation for the occupation of the land ( indennità di occupazione ), using as a starting point the same average agricultural value. 10 . The applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation which, by a judgment of 14 July 2009, confirmed the non-constructible nature of the land. In particular, it noted that the land was subject to the restrictions on the use of archaeological finds provided by Article 11 of Law no. 1089 of 1 June 1939, which only permitted construction insofar as it was compatible with archaeological purposes. In the case at hand, the court found that no construction was allowed, as the archaeological interest at issue was not confined to isolated finds but, rather, extended to a large area covered by the ruins of the ancient city of Naxos. As to the note issued in 1975, it was considered irrelevant, as it was merely a preliminary assessment and, in any event, in the twenty years that followed, further excavations had taken place. On these grounds, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of a disproportionate interference with their property rights on account of the allegedly inadequate amount of compensation they had received for the expropriation of their land and for the period of lawful occupation.

6

The present case concerns the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention about inconsistent practice of domestic courts. Between 3 October and 12 December 1991, during the war in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the applicant, then a Croatian soldier, was held as a prisoner of war in <COUNTRY>. In 2014 he instituted civil proceedings against the State seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by ill-treatment he had suffered there. On 9 February 2015 the Court of First Instance in Podgorica awarded him 9,199.77 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for “mental anguish and physical pain caused by torture, inhuman and degrading treatment”. That judgment became final on 23 April 2015. 3 . On 24 February 2017 the applicant instituted another set of civil proceedings seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage, inter alia , “for suffered and future physical pain, and for suffered fear” ( za pretrpljene i buduće fizičke bolove i za pretrpljeni strah ). He claimed EUR 4,000 in total in that regard. On 24 September 2018 the Court of First Instance in Cetinje found that the compensation awarded by the judgment of 9 February 2015 had included the compensation in question and rejected that part of the applicant’s claim as res iudicata . The High Court in Podgorica upheld this judgment on 17 March 2020. On 18 June 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal. On 30 June 2020 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to lodge an appeal on points of law as the value of his claim had not exceeded EUR 4,000, as required by the relevant statutory provision (see paragraph 10 below). 4 . Between 25 March 2017 and 21 January 2020 the first instance courts rejected the same kind of claims of at least ten other claimants on the same grounds. Those judgments were upheld by the High Courts in Podgorica and Bijelo Polje between 6 February 2019 and 20 October 2020. Between 18 May 2018 and 11 July 2019 the first-instance courts ruled in favour of four other claimants and awarded them the compensation in question, even though they had already obtained compensation for mental anguish and physical pain caused by the torture and ill-treatment suffered in the same camp. Those judgments were upheld by the High Courts in Podgorica and Bijelo Polje between 16 October 2018 and 6 March 2020. 6 . Between 17 June 2020 and 17 March 2021 the Supreme Court allowed and accepted the appeals on points of law in at least ten cases in which the claims had been rejected as res iudicata (see paragraph 4 above). The court quashed the relevant parts of the disputed High Court judgments and ordered re-opening in that regard. In all cases, the value of the relevant claims exceeded EUR 5,000. 7 . Between 5 November 2020 and 26 May 2021, following the Supreme Court’s rulings, the Court of First Instance ruled in favour of at least five claimants and awarded them the compensation in question. 8 . The applicant submitted, and the Government did not contest, that in about 150 similar cases in total, the claimants had obtained compensation in question even though they had been previously awarded compensation for mental anguish and physical pain caused by the torture and ill-treatment suffered in the camp. There is no information in the case file on how many claims were satisfied without the claimants making use of an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court and how many following a successful appeal on points of law. Article 124 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall ensure the uniform application of the law ( obezbjeđuje jedinstvenu primjenu zakona ). 10 . Section 397 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that an appeal on points of law is not allowed in cases in which the value of the disputed part of the claim does not exceed EUR 20,000. Section 397a provides that, exceptionally, an appeal on points of law can be allowed in cases where there is inconsistent case-law among the second-instance courts and the Supreme Court has not yet taken its position on the issue, but only if the value of the disputed part of the claim exceeds EUR 4,000. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the inconsistent practice of domestic courts in that only his claim in respect of suffered and future physical pain and suffered fear had been rejected.

Montenegro

11

The present application concerns the refusal by the domestic authorities to register an association established by the applicants. In 2012 the applicants established a non-governmental organisation called the Centre for Public Initiatives – Public Association ( “İctimai Təşəbbüslər Mərkəzi” Ictimai Birliyi ). They requested the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of <COUNTRY> (“the Ministry”) to register their association as a legal entity and submitted relevant documents. 3 . In a letter of 22 May 2012 addressed to the applicants, the Ministry indicated that, in contravention of Article 1 of the Law on Non ‑ Governmental Organisations (Public Associations and Funds) (“the Law on NGOs”), the name of the association did not reflect the character of its activity. Based on that alleged deficiency the Ministry returned the documents. Having received the above-mentioned letter, the applicants decided to resubmit their request for registration without making any changes in the name of the association as they considered that the allegation made in the Ministry’s rejection letter had been expressed in general terms and had not been clear. In a letter of 2 August 2012 addressed to the applicants, the Ministry repeated that the name of the association did not reflect the character of its activity and emphasised that the deficiency pointed out in the previous letter had not been rectified. Both letters of the Ministry concluded that based on Article 1 of the Law on State registration and the State register of legal entities (“the Law on State Registration”), the documents were “being returned” ( sənədlər geri qaytarılır ) or “being returned unexecuted” ( sənədlər icra olunmadan geri qaytarılır ). Having received the letter of 2 August 2012, the applicants lodged a complaint against the Ministry with Baku Administrative Economic Court No. They argued that the Ministry’s allegation was false and unlawful because it was clear both from the name and the charter of the association that the character of its activity was to participate in and promote various public (civil) initiatives and public advocacy. On 12 December 2012 the first-instance court dismissed the complaint, finding that the Ministry had acted lawfully by refusing to register the association. The first-instance court emphasised that the finding made by the Ministry as to the alleged deficiency (summarised in paragraph 3 above) had been lawful. The Baku Court of Appeal upheld that judgment on 12 February 2013, largely reiterating the first-instance court’s findings. On 5 June 2013 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the appellate court. In August 2014 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicants’ representative, Mr Aliyev. The investigating authorities seized many documents from his office, including the case file relating to the present application. The applicants complained before the Court that the Ministry’s actions had violated their right to freedom of association. 11 . They also complained that the seizure of their case file from their lawyer’s office had been in breach of Article 34 of the Convention. 12 . Lastly, the applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Supreme Court had examined their case in their absence, as they had not been notified about the court’s hearing.

Azerbaijan

8

The present application concerns enforcement of the applicant’s contact rights in respect of his daughter X, born in January 2010. The applicant, together with his son from a previous relationship, had lived with X’s mother, , for more than five years prior to X’s birth. He left soon after X was born, in March 2010. CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS In April 2010 requested the Kraków District Court to entrust her with sole custody of X and to limit the applicant’s parental authority. On 10 September 2010 her requests were granted. The applicant’s parental authority was limited to share in deciding, in particular, about the child’s place of residence, medical treatment and choice of school, nursery and kindergarten. In the meantime, in May 2010, the applicant requested that the District Court regulate his contact with X, due to ’s refusal to let him be involved in the child’s life. In December 2014 the District Court issued a decision which was subsequently amended by the Kraków Regional Court on 28 April 2015. The court granted the applicant contact with X for two hours on indicated days, without ’s presence and away from the child’s place of residence. He could also take X from her place of residence every second weekend, with a guardian appointed to protect X’s interests present, and spend 3 weeks of the summer holiday with her as well as certain days at Christmas and Easter The applicant had irregular contacts with his daughter, mainly at the kindergarten. On contact days, X refused to go with the applicant because, apparently, she was not emotionally prepared for the visits. From 8 September 2015 onwards, additional guardian supervision was implemented but, despite all efforts, the guardian also failed to persuade X to go to the contact meetings with the applicant. In July 2015 М.М. requested that the District Court alter the contact arrangements. On 22 December 2015 the court issued an interim measure for the duration of the proceedings, removing contact during weekends between the applicant and The applicant appealed and, on 7 March 2016, the Kraków Regional Court dismissed ’s request for an interim measure, holding that the difficulties in implementing the contact had been attributable to ’s attitude and that limitation of the applicant’s contact by interim measure was not advisable. The applicant continued to meet X irregular, on the first and third Saturdays of the month in the presence of a guardian, and in public places. These meetings were also attended by , even though from 7 March 2016 onwards contact were supposed to take place without her presence. On several occasions the applicant managed to persuade X to go out with him alone, to the cinema or shopping. 11 . On 8 February 2018 the District Court issued a fresh contact decision. The court pointed out that had not complied with previous orders concerning the child’s contact with the father and had been isolating the child from him. The court also threatened with a fine of 3,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) for each cancelled contact meeting. The court’s decision was issued on the basis of the opinion of a team of experts obtained on 28 September 2016 which indicated that X did not feel anxiety about meeting her father. However, she reproduced ’s negative attitude towards the applicant and, consequently, denied her natural need to establish and maintain contact with him. Upon appeal by the applicant, on 17 September 2019 the Kraków Regional Court obliged and the applicant to undergo regular family therapy at the Specialised Family Counselling Centre in Warsaw to establish correct parental attitudes and ensure the child’s contact with her father. The court also established the schedule for contact between X and the applicant. was again obliged to prepare the child for contact with the father and was threatened with a fine of PLN 3,000 for each time she breached her obligations. In the meantime, in April 2015 married and, in August 2016, moved with X from Kraków to Warsaw. She informed the applicant of this almost one month later, despite the fact that she was obliged to obtain the applicant’s prior consent to any change of the child’s place of residence. The applicant was not informed of his daughter’s new address in Warsaw until 7 September 2016. 14 . In 2014 the applicant married. He continued to live with his wife and children in Kraków. Because had moved with X to Warsaw, since August 2016 he had had to give up his attempts to have contact with his daughter, previously established for Wednesdays. Since 17 September 2019, the date of the most recent decision regulating contact, the applicant has managed to meet his daughter three times (once in 2019 and twice in 2022). None of these meetings took place in accordance with the court’s contact order and each lasted approximately one hour. ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS On 3 November 2015 the applicant requested that the District Court threaten with a fine for each cancelled contact meeting. On 7 June 2016 the District Court stayed the enforcement proceedings, holding that their outcome depended on another set of pending proceedings for contact arrangements. The applicant and the Ombudsman for Children, who had joined the proceedings and supported the applicant’s position, appealed. On 30 June 2016 the Kraków District Court quashed the challenged decision. On 9 August 2016 the District Court threatened with an order to pay the applicant PLN 1,500 for each further breach of her obligations. Despite the above-mentioned order, contact between the applicant and his daughter were not enforced. 18 . On 19 December 2016 the applicant filed an enforcement application to order to pay a designated sum of money for her continued failure to cooperate with his contact rights with 19 . On 3 October 2017 the District Court ordered to pay the applicant PLN 13,500 for violations she had committed and ordered her to reimburse expenses incurred by the applicant in preparing for contact with 20 . On 29 June 2018 the applicant filed a second enforcement application to impose an order of payment on for her continued failure to comply with her obligations for the period between 21 December 2016 and 6 January 2018. The first hearing in this case was set for 20 September 2018, but no evidence was taken. Subsequent hearings were cancelled. On 12 March 2019 the applicant asked the court to take action in his case. The next hearing was held on 23 May 2019. 22 . On 14 January 2020 the Kraków District Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings, holding that issuing a decision on the merits would be groundless. The reason for such decision was that the enforceable title, which was the final court order on contact issued by the Kraków Regional Court on 28 April 2015, and which was the basis for the applicant’s application in question, no longer existed since a new decision amending the contact arrangement had been issued on 17 September 2019. The applicant appealed and, on 29 June 2020, the Kraków Regional Court dismissed his appeal. complaint 24 . The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his right to have contact with his daughter had been violated.

3

The cases concern the applicants’ sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on parole once they have served a minimum term of between 30 and 40 years (see the appended table). The applicants complained that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. The

6

The case concerns legislative intervention in the course of ongoing civil proceedings. The applicants complained that the enactment of Law no. 296 of 27 December 2006 (“Law no. 296/2006”) had violated their right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The circumstances of the case are analogous to those described in D’Amico <COUNTRY> (no. 46586/14, 17 February 2022). Following their spouses’ death, the applicants received a survivor’s pension calculated as 60% of the pension originally paid to their late husbands. The applicants brought proceedings against the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (“INPS”) and the Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza per i Dipendenti dell’Amministrazione Pubblica (“INPDAP”, whose functions, following its abolition in 2011, are currently carried out by the INPS), complaining that a special supplementary allowance ( indennità integrativa speciale – “the IIS”) which formed part of their spouses’ pension should have been paid in its entirety, that is, as an ancillary allowance rather than as a percentage of the benefit originally paid. The applicants relied on the relevant laws applicable at the time their late husbands began to receive their pensions, according to which the pension paid to the survivor of a public-sector employee was calculated as a percentage of only the fixed salary element, and the ancillary allowances were paid in full. They considered that section 15(5) of Law no. 724/1994 had preserved arrangements already in place and, while Law no. 335/1995 had subsequently extended the rules governing survivors’ pensions to all forms of the general compulsory insurance scheme, the new system only applied to direct pensions which had been paid after 1 January 1995. While those proceedings were pending before the Lazio Court of Auditors, Law no. 296/2006 entered into force. Section 1(774) of that Law provided an authentic interpretation of section 1(41) of Law no. 335/1995, establishing that, in instances where survivors’ pensions were received after the entry into force of Law no. 335/1995, regardless of the date of the payment of the direct pension, the IIS had to be paid as a percentage, forming an integral part of the main pension. Pursuant to the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006, the Lazio Court of Auditors dismissed the applicants’ claims. The decisions were upheld by the Central Section of the Court of Auditors. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the enactment of Law no. 296/2006, which departed from well-established case-law while the proceedings in their case were still pending, had violated their right to a fair hearing.

Italy

3

The cases concern the applicants’ sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of release on parole. The applicants’ details are set out in the appendix. They complained that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The general principles concerning life imprisonment without the possibility for release on parole have been summarised in the case of T.P. and A.T. <COUNTRY> (nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14, § 38, 4 October 2016).

Hungary

P1-1

The case concerns the expropriation of the applicants’ land and the subsequent award of compensation based on the criteria established by section 5 bis of Law no. 359 of 8 August 1992 (“Law 359/1992”). The applicants were the owners of plots of land located, respectively, in Bassano del Grappa and in Agrigento (see the appended table). The national authorities adopted development plans which included portions of the applicants’ land and authorised the urgent occupation thereof. Subsequently, they issued expropriation orders and offered payment of compensation, which the applicants refused. The applicants instituted judicial proceedings claiming that the compensation offered by national authorities was insufficient. In each case, the national courts appointed experts to carry out an estimation of the value of the land and awarded compensation for the expropriation and compensation for the period during which the land had been occupied before the expropriation order ( indennità di occupazione ) had been issued. The calculation of those amounts was based on the criteria contained in section 5 bis of Law 359/1992, which had entered into force on 14 August 1992. Further details of the factual information on each application, as well as the compensation awarded, can be found in the appended table. The applicants complained to the Court, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, of a disproportionate interference with their property rights on account of the allegedly inadequate amounts of compensation they had received. In particular, in application no. 46306/06 the applicant (“the first applicant”) complained solely of inadequate expropriation compensation, whereas in application no. 24940/07 the applicant (“the second applicant”) also complained of insufficient compensation for the period of lawful occupation on account of the fact that it had been calculated pursuant to section 5 bis of Law 359/1992. 7 . Additionally, the first applicant complained, under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, of the restrictions imposed on her land since 1969 as a consequence of the prohibition on building on the land, of the repeated refusals and delays in the payment of compensation coupled with incorrect behaviour by national authorities in the course of friendly settlement negotiations at the national level, of legislative interference with pending proceedings, and of the lack of an effective remedy by which to complain of the alleged breach of her property rights.

P1-1

The case concerns the expropriation of the applicant’s land and the subsequent award of compensation based on the average agricultural value of the land. 2 . The applicant was the owner of a plot of land of 32,000 square meters located in the municipality of Collesalvetti and recorded in the land register as folio no. 27, parcels nos. 1135 and 1136. According to the 1976 general land-use plan ( piano regolatore generale ), the land was designated for agricultural use; subsequently, at an unspecified date, the designation of the land was altered to public green area ( verde pubblico ). On 14 November 1989, the municipality approved a project for the creation of a parc with public facilities ( verde pubblico attrezzato ). On 29 November 1989, it authorised the urgent occupation of the applicant’s land and subsequently offered payment of compensation in the amount of 31,200,000 Italian lire (ITL), which the applicant refused. On 11 August 1993, the municipality issued the expropriation order. The applicant instituted judicial proceedings claiming that the compensation offered by the municipality was insufficient and arguing that it should be based on the de facto building potential of the land ( vocazione edificatoria ). The expert appointed by the Florence Court of Appeal considered that the applicant’s land had a de facto building potential in light of the use and characteristics of the surrounding area and, on this basis, determined its market value to ITL 2,036,000,000. By a decision dated 26 July 2000, the Florence Court of Appeal stated that the determination of the market value of the land should be based on the legal and factual characteristics of the land, in light of its designation before the expropriation. The Court of Appeal therefore considered that, according to the general land-use plan in force before the beginning of the expropriation procedure, the land was designated as a public green area and thus subject to a building restraint ( vincolo conformativo ). 7 . On this ground the Court of Appeal determined, pursuant to section 5 bis of Law no. 359/1992, that the criteria for agricultural land were applicable and thus expropriation compensation should be based on the average agricultural value ( valore agricolo medio ). As a consequence, the compensation of ITL 31,200,000 (approximately EUR 16,100) was confirmed. The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation which, on 1 April 2004, dismissed the appeal. The applicant complained to the Court, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, of the disproportionate interference with his property rights on account of the amount of compensation received, which was allegedly inadequate.

6

The applicant is a passenger transport company. The application concerns the impossibility to challenge before judicial authorities the Croatian Chamber of Economy’s refusal to approve the applicant company’s itinerary schedule, which approval had to be obtained before it could apply for a transport permit. Under Croatian law, before applying for a permit from the relevant Ministry, passenger transport companies must undergo proceedings for harmonisation of itinerary schedules before a special commission of the Croatian Chamber of Economy and obtain approval of their proposed schedules. 3 . In 2013 the applicant company participated in such proceedings, but its itinerary schedule was not approved because the commission deemed that it overlapped with the schedule of another company. The applicant company lodged an objection against the commission’s report containing the list of approved itinerary schedules, specifically, objecting against the part of the report in which the commission approved the itinerary schedule of the other company but not the applicant company’s schedule. On 20 May 2013 the commission rejected the objection as ill-founded. 4 . The applicant company then brought an action for judicial review. By a decision of 25 April 2014, the Split Administrative Court declared that action inadmissible finding that the contested report of the Croatian Chamber of Economy was not an administrative act interfering with any right or legal interest of the applicant company. It added that the applicant company could “possibly obtain judicial protection of its rights in proceedings against a decision whereby, on the basis of the said report, a certain right was granted”, that is to say, against a decision granting a transport permit. 5 . On 23 May 2014 the applicant company lodged a constitutional complaint against the Administrative Court’s decision. It argued that if the reasons given by the Administrative Court were to be accepted, judicial review would only be available to those transport companies which obtained an approval of their proposed itinerary schedule and therefore satisfied the statutory conditions for applying for a transport permit. That view placed the applicant company in an impossible situation because, without having its schedule approved, it could not even apply for a transport permit, and hence could not obtain a decision which could be challenged before judicial authorities. On 10 September 2014 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible the applicant company’s constitutional complaint finding that the case did not raise any constitutional issue. Before the Court the applicant company complained, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the Administrative Court’s decision to declare its action for judicial review inadmissible had deprived it of access to a court. It argued that the refusal of the Croatian Chamber of Economy to approve its itinerary schedule, which it could not challenge before judicial authorities, had directly affected its right to obtain a transport permit and to carry out its business activities.

6

The case concerns the fairness of civil proceedings between private parties regarding the payment of a sum of money. 2 . On 8 July 2011 the applicant signed a preliminary contract for the sale of her flat for 107,000 euros (EUR) to K. In accordance with Article 3 § 2 of the contract, K. paid the applicant EUR 11,000. The relevant provision reads as follows: “In drawing up this preliminary contract, the buyer shall pay the seller a deposit [ kapara ] in the amount of EUR 11,000 ..., which the seller shall confirm by signing this preliminary contract.” K. was required to pay the remaining amount of EUR 96,000 within three months from the signing of the preliminary contract. As provided in section 303(1) of the Civil Obligations Act, if at the signing of a contract one of the parties gives an amount of money as a deposit ( kapara ; arrha ) indicating that the contract has been agreed with the other party, the contract is to be deemed binding from the moment the deposit is given, unless otherwise agreed. Furthermore, in accordance with section 304 of the Civil Obligations Act, where the depositing party is liable for the non ‑ performance of a contract, the other party is entitled to accept the deposit as satisfactory compensation. On the other hand, where a party that has received a deposit is liable for non-performance of a contract, the depositing party is entitled to request the recovery of double the amount of the deposit. On 15 July 2011 K. informed the applicant that the flat had defects because it had insufficient insulation. He considered that this constituted a hidden defect, as a result of which he refused to sign the main contract. He asked the applicant to return to him the amount paid. The applicant did not agree and asked for the execution of the preliminary contract. On 7 September 2011 K. brought a civil action against the applicant, seeking reimbursement of the amount paid and stating that he was terminating the contract. The applicant contested the claim, arguing that she had not hidden any relevant information and asking for the contract to be executed. During the proceedings, K. argued that, although the preliminary contract had stated that the buyer was to pay a deposit ( arrha ), the payment in question was in fact a portion of the purchase price (an advance payment), while the remainder of the price was to be paid within three months. Furthermore, had a deposit been agreed in the legal sense of the term, it would have been necessary to specify in the contract the consequences for both parties in the event of default. Accordingly, as his primary claim K. requested reimbursement of EUR 11,000, and, alternatively, that the applicant pay him double the amount of the deposit because it had been the applicant’s fault that the main contract had never been signed. 8 . At the hearing held on 31 March 2014, the applicant stressed that the sum of EUR 11,000 had been a deposit, as explicitly stated in the preliminary contract, and that she should not be obliged to pay it back because it was not her fault that the main contract had never been signed. On 8 May 2014 the Municipal Court dismissed K.’s civil claim in its entirety in accordance with section 304 of the Civil Obligations Act. Since the contract had not contained a requirement for any special insulation, the court did not find any hidden defects in the flat which would justify termination of the contract. K. appealed, arguing that the first-instance court had wrongly concluded that the parties had agreed on a deposit, since the amount paid had only been an advance payment. The applicant did not file a reply to the appeal. 11 . On 25 November 2014 the Zadar County Court reversed the first ‑ instance judgment and ordered the applicant to pay K. EUR 11,000. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows: “In this legal matter, the following facts are undisputed: - that the parties ... signed a preliminary contract ... and that, in accordance with Article 3 § 2 [thereof], the plaintiff, as buyer, paid the defendant, as seller, the amount of EUR 11,000, while undertaking to pay the remainder of the purchase price in the amount of EUR 96,000 within three months following the date of the signing of the preliminary contract and ... - that, by simple notice of the plaintiff dated 15 July 2011, the preliminary contract was terminated. From the facts of the case as presented in the claim, as well as the allegations of the plaintiff during these proceedings, by which the court is bound in accordance with section 186(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, it follows that this constituted a preliminary contract; however, the decisive circumstance in this legal matter is that there was a termination of the legal transaction within the meaning of section 360 of the Civil Obligations Act, so the question arises as to the legal consequences of such termination. This appellate court finds that the provisions of section 368(2) of the Civil Obligations Act should be applied to this specific case, namely that in a situation where one party has fulfilled the contract in full or in part, that party has the right to receive what it has given – in this instance, EUR 11,000 ...” On 2 January 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing that the second-instance judgment had violated her right to a fair trial. On 18 November 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as ill-founded. That decision was received by the applicant on 8 December 2015. The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the second-instance court’s judgment had lacked adequate reasoning and had been contrary to the Supreme Court’s case-law on the matter.

P1-1

The case concerns the deprivation of the applicants’ land through several expropriation proceedings and, ultimately, pursuant to Article 42 bis of Presidential Decree no. 327 of 8 June 2001 (“the Consolidated Law on Expropriation”). 2 . The applicants are the heirs of A., who was the owner of a plot of land in Rome, recorded in the land register as folio no. 841, parcel no. OCCUPATION OF THE LAND and initial expropriation proceedings 3 . On 26 February 1980, the Rome municipality approved a project for the construction of a road. On 12 October 1982 it authorised the immediate occupation of part of A.’s land and on 7 January 1983 it took physical possession of it. The construction works were completed on 16 May 1983. A.initiated proceedings before the Rome District Court, arguing that the occupation of the land had been unlawful and seeking compensation. He also initiated proceedings before the Latium Regional Administrative Court ( Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale , “TAR”), arguing that the municipality’s orders of 1980 and 1982 had been unlawful. On 10 July 1990 the municipality adopted a formal expropriation order, determining compensation at 146,700,000 Italian lire (ITL) (corresponding to 75,764 euros (EUR)). A.initiated a third set of proceedings before the Rome Court of Appeal, arguing that the compensation was inadequate. By judgment of 1 March 1993, the Rome District Court rejected A.’s first request, considering that the occupation of his land had been lawful. The applicant did not lodge an appeal and the judgment became final. On 27 July 1996, A.died and the applicants continued the proceedings in his stead. 8 . In the context of the proceedings concerning the amount of the expropriation compensation, by judgment of 15 April 2002, the Rome Court of Appeal awarded compensation based on the criteria contained in section 5 bis of Law no. 359 of 8 August 1992, in the amount of ITL 788,512,500 (EUR 407,232.72). The applicants appealed against that judgment. 9 . Between 2003 and 2004 the municipality enforced the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 10 . By judgment of 10 May 2004, the TAR annulled the municipality’s orders of 1980 and 1982. The municipality did not lodge an appeal and the judgment became final. 11 . By decision of 21 February 2006 the Court of Cassation took note of the annulment of the orders and, as a consequence, of the invalidity of the expropriation order. It therefore held that the applicants’ request for expropriation compensation had become inadmissible and annulled the 2002 Court of Appeal judgment. 12 . The applicants initiated new proceedings before the TAR, seeking the restitution of the land and damages for its occupation. On 5 March 2014, the TAR recognised that the occupation of the land had been unlawful and ordered the Rome municipality to return it and pay damages for its occupation; it noted, however, that the municipality had the opportunity to issue an acquisition order pursuant to Article 42 bis of the Consolidated Law on Expropriation. 13 . That judgment was, for the relevant part, confirmed by the Council of State on 29 February 2016. acquisition of the land pursuant to article 42 bis and subsequent proceedings On 21 January 2016 the municipality issued an order under Article 42 bis of the Consolidated Law on Expropriation (“Article 42 bis order”), acquiring part of the applicants’ land upon payment of compensation, which was set at EUR 742,485.On 11 August 2016 the municipality annulled that order. The applicants initiated proceedings before the Council of State for the enforcement of its judgment of 29 February 2016. On 13 May 2019 the Council of State ordered the administration to comply with its previous judgment. 17 . On 9 October 2019 the municipality issued a new Article 42 bis order, acquiring part of the applicants’ land upon payment of compensation amounting to EUR 73,223.Given that the municipality had already paid a higher sum (see paragraph 9 above), on 14 October 2020 it issued an injunction requesting the applicants to return the amount received in excess. 19 . The applicants initiated four sets of proceedings: (i) before the Rome Court of Appeal, arguing that the expropriation compensation determined by the Article 42 bis order was inadequate; (ii) before the Council of State, arguing that the administration had failed to comply with its 2016 judgment; (iii) before the TAR, seeking the annulment of the Article 42 bis order; and (iv) before the Rome District Court, opposing the payment injunction issued by the municipality. 20 . By judgment of 18 January 2022 the Rome Court of Appeal, relying on a new expert valuation of the land’s market value, found that the amounts awarded by the Article 42 bis order had been insufficient and granted EUR 3,649,749.28 as compensation for the loss of property, EUR 6,706,414.31 as compensation for the occupation of the land and EUR 364,974.93 as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It therefore awarded the overall amount of EUR 10,721,138.52, plus inflation adjustment and statutory interest. The Court of Appeal also clarified that the amounts already paid to the applicants in the past had to be deducted from that amount. 21 . The municipality appealed on points of law but, due to its subsequent inactivity, on 2 May 2022 the Court of Cassation declared the proceedings extinguished. 22 . As regards the other sets of proceedings initiated by the applicants (see paragraph 19 above), on 29 May 2020 the Council of State rejected the complaint concerning non-enforcement of its prior judgment. According to the most recent information provided to the Court by the parties, the two remaining sets of proceedings are still ongoing. 23 . The applicants further initiated proceedings for the enforcement of the judgment of the Rome Court of Appeal of 18 January 2022. On 23 October 2023 the TAR noted that part of the damages fell among the liabilities of the municipality’s ordinary administration and set a deadline for their payment. As to the remaining part, amounting to EUR 7,021,994.66, the TAR noted that it fell within the scope of Article 78 of Law Decree No. 112/2008, which established an extraordinary administration of the Rome municipality with a separate financial management, including all credits and liabilities predating 28 April 2008. According to the most recent information provided by the parties, neither of these amounts have yet been paid to the applicants, who have received only the amount awarded as costs and expenses. Complaints The applicants complained, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that they had been unlawfully deprived of their land and that they had not received adequate compensation. 26 . They further complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the adoption of Law no. 359/1992 had amounted to a legislative interference with pending proceedings and, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, of the lack of reasoning of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 15 April 2002. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK The