Daily Papers

Aligning AI agents to human intentions and values is a key bottleneck in building safe and deployable AI applications. But whose values should AI agents be aligned with? Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the key framework for AI alignment. RLHF uses feedback from human reinforcers to fine-tune outputs; all widely deployed large language models (LLMs) use RLHF to align their outputs to human values. It is critical to understand the limitations of RLHF and consider policy challenges arising from these limitations. In this paper, we investigate a specific challenge in building RLHF systems that respect democratic norms. Building on impossibility results in social choice theory, we show that, under fairly broad assumptions, there is no unique voting protocol to universally align AI systems using RLHF through democratic processes. Further, we show that aligning AI agents with the values of all individuals will always violate certain private ethical preferences of an individual user i.e., universal AI alignment using RLHF is impossible. We discuss policy implications for the governance of AI systems built using RLHF: first, the need for mandating transparent voting rules to hold model builders accountable. Second, the need for model builders to focus on developing AI agents that are narrowly aligned to specific user groups.

In this paper, we study the problem of establishing the accountability and fairness of transparent machine learning models through monotonicity. Although there have been numerous studies on individual monotonicity, pairwise monotonicity is often overlooked in the existing literature. This paper studies transparent neural networks in the presence of three types of monotonicity: individual monotonicity, weak pairwise monotonicity, and strong pairwise monotonicity. As a means of achieving monotonicity while maintaining transparency, we propose the monotonic groves of neural additive models. As a result of empirical examples, we demonstrate that monotonicity is often violated in practice and that monotonic groves of neural additive models are transparent, accountable, and fair.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

We present a method based on natural language processing (NLP), for studying the influence of interest groups (lobbies) in the law-making process in the European Parliament (EP). We collect and analyze novel datasets of lobbies' position papers and speeches made by members of the EP (MEPs). By comparing these texts on the basis of semantic similarity and entailment, we are able to discover interpretable links between MEPs and lobbies. In the absence of a ground-truth dataset of such links, we perform an indirect validation by comparing the discovered links with a dataset, which we curate, of retweet links between MEPs and lobbies, and with the publicly disclosed meetings of MEPs. Our best method achieves an AUC score of 0.77 and performs significantly better than several baselines. Moreover, an aggregate analysis of the discovered links, between groups of related lobbies and political groups of MEPs, correspond to the expectations from the ideology of the groups (e.g., center-left groups are associated with social causes). We believe that this work, which encompasses the methodology, datasets, and results, is a step towards enhancing the transparency of the intricate decision-making processes within democratic institutions.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

We consider a binary classification problem under group fairness constraints, which can be one of Demographic Parity (DP), Equalized Opportunity (EOp), or Equalized Odds (EO). We propose an explicit characterization of Bayes optimal classifier under the fairness constraints, which turns out to be a simple modification rule of the unconstrained classifier. Namely, we introduce a novel instance-level measure of bias, which we call bias score, and the modification rule is a simple linear rule on top of the finite amount of bias scores.Based on this characterization, we develop a post-hoc approach that allows us to adapt to fairness constraints while maintaining high accuracy. In the case of DP and EOp constraints, the modification rule is thresholding a single bias score, while in the case of EO constraints we are required to fit a linear modification rule with 2 parameters. The method can also be applied for composite group-fairness criteria, such as ones involving several sensitive attributes.

The moderation of content on online platforms is usually non-transparent. On Wikipedia, however, this discussion is carried out publicly and the editors are encouraged to use the content moderation policies as explanations for making moderation decisions. Currently, only a few comments explicitly mention those policies -- 20% of the English ones, but as few as 2% of the German and Turkish comments. To aid in this process of understanding how content is moderated, we construct a novel multilingual dataset of Wikipedia editor discussions along with their reasoning in three languages. The dataset contains the stances of the editors (keep, delete, merge, comment), along with the stated reason, and a content moderation policy, for each edit decision. We demonstrate that stance and corresponding reason (policy) can be predicted jointly with a high degree of accuracy, adding transparency to the decision-making process. We release both our joint prediction models and the multilingual content moderation dataset for further research on automated transparent content moderation.

This document serves as an overview of the different mechanisms and areas of governance in the BigCode project. It aims to support transparency by providing relevant information about choices that were made during the project to the broader public, and to serve as an example of intentional governance of an open research project that future endeavors can leverage to shape their own approach. The first section, Project Structure, covers the project organization, its stated goals and values, its internal decision processes, and its funding and resources. The second section, Data and Model Governance, covers decisions relating to the questions of data subject consent, privacy, and model release.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

Foundation models have rapidly permeated society, catalyzing a wave of generative AI applications spanning enterprise and consumer-facing contexts. While the societal impact of foundation models is growing, transparency is on the decline, mirroring the opacity that has plagued past digital technologies (e.g. social media). Reversing this trend is essential: transparency is a vital precondition for public accountability, scientific innovation, and effective governance. To assess the transparency of the foundation model ecosystem and help improve transparency over time, we introduce the Foundation Model Transparency Index. The Foundation Model Transparency Index specifies 100 fine-grained indicators that comprehensively codify transparency for foundation models, spanning the upstream resources used to build a foundation model (e.g data, labor, compute), details about the model itself (e.g. size, capabilities, risks), and the downstream use (e.g. distribution channels, usage policies, affected geographies). We score 10 major foundation model developers (e.g. OpenAI, Google, Meta) against the 100 indicators to assess their transparency. To facilitate and standardize assessment, we score developers in relation to their practices for their flagship foundation model (e.g. GPT-4 for OpenAI, PaLM 2 for Google, Llama 2 for Meta). We present 10 top-level findings about the foundation model ecosystem: for example, no developer currently discloses significant information about the downstream impact of its flagship model, such as the number of users, affected market sectors, or how users can seek redress for harm. Overall, the Foundation Model Transparency Index establishes the level of transparency today to drive progress on foundation model governance via industry standards and regulatory intervention.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

The FAIR Guiding Principles aim to improve the findability, accessibility, interoperability, and reusability of digital content by making them both human and machine actionable. However, these principles have not yet been broadly adopted in the domain of machine learning-based program analyses and optimizations for High-Performance Computing (HPC). In this paper, we design a methodology to make HPC datasets and machine learning models FAIR after investigating existing FAIRness assessment and improvement techniques. Our methodology includes a comprehensive, quantitative assessment for elected data, followed by concrete, actionable suggestions to improve FAIRness with respect to common issues related to persistent identifiers, rich metadata descriptions, license and provenance information. Moreover, we select a representative training dataset to evaluate our methodology. The experiment shows the methodology can effectively improve the dataset and model's FAIRness from an initial score of 19.1% to the final score of 83.0%.

Federated learning allows collaborative workers to solve a machine learning problem while preserving data privacy. Recent studies have tackled various challenges in federated learning, but the joint optimization of communication overhead, learning reliability, and deployment efficiency is still an open problem. To this end, we propose a new scheme named federated learning via plurality vote (FedVote). In each communication round of FedVote, workers transmit binary or ternary weights to the server with low communication overhead. The model parameters are aggregated via weighted voting to enhance the resilience against Byzantine attacks. When deployed for inference, the model with binary or ternary weights is resource-friendly to edge devices. We show that our proposed method can reduce quantization error and converges faster compared with the methods directly quantizing the model updates.

Over the recent years, Federated machine learning continues to gain interest and momentum where there is a need to draw insights from data while preserving the data provider's privacy. However, one among other existing challenges in the adoption of federated learning has been the lack of fair, transparent and universally agreed incentivization schemes for rewarding the federated learning contributors. Smart contracts on a blockchain network provide transparent, immutable and independently verifiable proofs by all participants of the network. We leverage this open and transparent nature of smart contracts on a blockchain to define incentivization rules for the contributors, which is based on a novel scalar quantity - federated contribution. Such a smart contract based reward-driven model has the potential to revolutionize the federated learning adoption in enterprises. Our contribution is two-fold: first is to show how smart contract based blockchain can be a very natural communication channel for federated learning. Second, leveraging this infrastructure, we can show how an intuitive measure of each agents' contribution can be built and integrated with the life cycle of the training and reward process.

This paper introduces the Fair Fairness Benchmark (FFB), a benchmarking framework for in-processing group fairness methods. Ensuring fairness in machine learning is critical for ethical and legal compliance. However, there exist challenges in comparing and developing of fairness methods due to inconsistencies in experimental settings, lack of accessible algorithmic implementations, and limited extensibility of current fairness packages and tools. To address these issues, we introduce an open-source, standardized benchmark for evaluating in-processing group fairness methods and provide a comprehensive analysis of state-of-the-art methods to ensure different notions of group fairness. This work offers the following key contributions: the provision of flexible, extensible, minimalistic, and research-oriented open-source code; the establishment of unified fairness method benchmarking pipelines; and extensive benchmarking, which yields key insights from 45,079 experiments. We believe our work will significantly facilitate the growth and development of the fairness research community. The benchmark, including code and running logs, is available at https://github.com/ahxt/fair_fairness_benchmark

Recent work has explored how to train machine learning models which do not discriminate against any subgroup of the population as determined by sensitive attributes such as gender or race. To avoid disparate treatment, sensitive attributes should not be considered. On the other hand, in order to avoid disparate impact, sensitive attributes must be examined, e.g., in order to learn a fair model, or to check if a given model is fair. We introduce methods from secure multi-party computation which allow us to avoid both. By encrypting sensitive attributes, we show how an outcome-based fair model may be learned, checked, or have its outputs verified and held to account, without users revealing their sensitive attributes.

The presence of decision-making algorithms in society is rapidly increasing nowadays, while concerns about their transparency and the possibility of these algorithms becoming new sources of discrimination are arising. In fact, many relevant automated systems have been shown to make decisions based on sensitive information or discriminate certain social groups (e.g. certain biometric systems for person recognition). With the aim of studying how current multimodal algorithms based on heterogeneous sources of information are affected by sensitive elements and inner biases in the data, we propose a fictitious automated recruitment testbed: FairCVtest. We train automatic recruitment algorithms using a set of multimodal synthetic profiles consciously scored with gender and racial biases. FairCVtest shows the capacity of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) behind such recruitment tool to extract sensitive information from unstructured data, and exploit it in combination to data biases in undesirable (unfair) ways. Finally, we present a list of recent works developing techniques capable of removing sensitive information from the decision-making process of deep learning architectures. We have used one of these algorithms (SensitiveNets) to experiment discrimination-aware learning for the elimination of sensitive information in our multimodal AI framework. Our methodology and results show how to generate fairer AI-based tools in general, and in particular fairer automated recruitment systems.

Decentralized reputation schemes present a promising area of experimentation in blockchain applications. These solutions aim to overcome the shortcomings of simple monetary incentive mechanisms of naive tokenomics. However, there is a significant research gap regarding the limitations and benefits of such solutions. We formulate these trade-offs as a conjecture on the irreconcilability of three desirable properties of the reputation system in this context. Such a system can not be simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil resistant. To handle the limitations of this trilemma, we propose MeritRank: Sybil tolerant feedback aggregation mechanism for reputation. Instead of preventing Sybil attacks, our approach successfully bounds the benefits of these attacks. Using a dataset of participants' interactions in MakerDAO, we run experiments to demonstrate Sybil tolerance of MeritRank. Decay parameters of reputation in MeritRank: transitivity decay and connectivity decay, allow for a fine-tuning of desirable levels of reputation utility and Sybil tolerance in different use contexts.