document: Computing stationary Nash equilibria of undiscounted single-controller stochastic games Given a two-person , nonzero-sum stochastic game where the second player controls the transitions , we formulate a linear complementarity problem LCP -LRB- q , M -RRB- whose solution gives a Nash equilibrium pair of stationary strategies under the limiting average payoff criterion . The matrix M constructed is of the copositive class so that Lemke 's algorithm will process it . We will also do the same for a special class of N-person stochastic games called polymatrix stochastic games
doc_bio_tags: O B I I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B I I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B I O O B I I I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B I I
extractive_keyphrases: stationary nash equilibria linear complementarity problem stationary strategies limiting average payoff criterion polymatrix stochastic games
abstractive_keyphrases: undiscounted single-controller stochastic games two-person nonzero-sum stochastic game copositive class matrix lemke algorithm n-person stochastic games