document: Does classicism explain universality ? Arguments against a pure classical component of mind One of the hallmarks of human cognition is the capacity to generalize over arbitrary constituents . Marcus -LRB- Cognition 66 , p. 153 ; Cognitive Psychology 37 , p. 243 , 1998 -RRB- argued that this capacity , called `` universal generalization '' -LRB- universality -RRB- , is not supported by connectionist models . Instead , universality is best explained by classical symbol systems , with connectionism as its implementation . Here it is argued that universality is also a problem for classicism in that the syntax-sensitive rules that are supposed to provide causal explanations of mental processes are either too strict , precluding possible generalizations ; or too lax , providing no information as to the appropriate alternative . Consequently , universality is not explained by a classical theory
doc_bio_tags: O B O B O O O O O B I I I O O O O O B I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B I O O B O O O O O O B I O O O B O O O O B I I O O O O O O O O O O O O B O O O O O B O O O O O O O O O O B I O B I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B O O O O O O O
extractive_keyphrases: classicism universality classical component of mind human cognition universal generalization connectionist models classical symbol systems causal explanations mental processes
abstractive_keyphrases: syntax-sensitive rules