document: Lob 's theorem as a limitation on mechanism We argue that Lob 's Theorem implies a limitation on mechanism . Specifically , we argue , via an application of a generalized version of Lob 's Theorem , that any particular device known by an observer to be mechanical can not be used as an epistemic authority -LRB- of a particular type -RRB- by that observer : either the belief-set of such an authority is not mechanizable or , if it is , there is no identifiable formal system of which the observer can know -LRB- or truly believe -RRB- it to be the theorem-set . This gives , we believe , an important and hitherto unnoticed connection between mechanism and the use of authorities by human-like epistemic agents
doc_bio_tags: O O O O O B I I O O O O O O O O B I I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
extractive_keyphrases: limitation on mechanism epistemic authority formal system
abstractive_keyphrases: lob theorem belief-set theorem-set human-like epistemic agents