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crs_RL33819

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5581 (Dodd) to S. 3001 , H.R. 6913 (Flake), and H.R. On May 21, 2008, the Senate passed S.Res. 573 (Martinez) by unanimous consent, which recognized Cuba Solidarity Day and the struggle of the Cuban people. Unless the regime changes, our policy will not. 2764 , the Senate approved S.Amdt. 707 (Rangel) to H.R. 2419 , the 2007 farm bill. It would fully fund the Administration's request for $45.7 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Cuba democracy programs. Political Conditions On February 24, 2008, Cuba's legislature selected Raúl Castro as President of the 31-member Council of State, a position that officially made him Cuba's head of government and state. For background, also see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba ' s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul Castro , and CRS Report RL33622, Cuba ' s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches , written in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's stepping down because of poor health in 2006. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial transactions. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. Under the current Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel has increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba have been tightened. In the first session of the 110 th Congress, two Senate Appropriations Committee reported-versions of appropriations bills had provisions that would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods, but ultimately these provisions were not included in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. H.R. Two bills that would have lifted overall economic sanctions— H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. In addition, as noted above, several initiative introduced in the aftermath of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike would temporarily ease U.S. embargo restrictions in several areas, including travel and remittances, but no action was taken on these measures. In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected (by a vote of 182-245) H.Amdt. Several other legislative initiatives introduced in the 110 th Congress would have eased restrictions on the sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, but none of these were considered: H.R. Two broader bills that would have lifted economic sanctions on Cuba— H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. In the 110 th Congress, five initiatives— H.R. 2819 (Rangel), S. 1673 (Baucus), and S. 1806 (Leahy)—had provisions that would have repealed the Section 211 trademark sanction from law, while two other initiatives— H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen), S. 876 (Martinez), and S. 2503 (Nelson, Bill)—would have imposed sanctions related to Cuba's offshore oil development on its northern coast, but no action was taken on the measures. In contrast, several legislative initiatives – S. 1268 (Dorgan), S. 2953 (Craig), H.R. Over the years, there have been varying levels of cooperation with Cuba on anti-drug efforts. Ultimately, none of these provisions were included in enacted measures. 110 - 161 ( H.R. H.R. Would facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba by providing for general license authority for travel-related expenditures for persons engaging in sales and marketing activities for agricultural products or in the transportation by sea or air of such products; authorizing a consular officer to issue a temporary visa for a Cuban national conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural goods, including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the "payment of cash in advance" term used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and prohibiting the President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA. H.R. 1306 (Wexler)/ S. 749 (Nelson). H.R. 2819 (Rangel)/ S. 1673 (Baucus). H.R. H.R. H.R. 3161 (DeLauro)/ S. 1859 (Kohl). H.R. 5627 (Diaz - Balart, Lincoln)/ S. 2777 (Martinez). Similar bills to award the congressional gold medal to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, in recognition of his courageous and unwavering commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba. H.R. S. 554 (Dorgan). Title I, Section 101 would terminate U.S. government-sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba and prohibit funding. S. 721 (Enzi). S. 3260 (Durbin). S. 3288 (Leahy). H.R. The House would have funded Cuba broadcasting in H.R. H.Res.

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the communist nation through economic sanctions, which the Bush Administration has tightened significantly. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. As in past years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 110th Congress was how to best support political and economic change in one of the world's remaining communist nations. Unlike past years, however, Congress examined policy toward Cuba in the context of Fidel Castro's departure from heading the government because of poor health. Raúl Castro, who had served as provision head of government since July 2006, was selected on February 24, 2008 by Cuba's legislature to continue in that role officially. In the first session of the 110th Congress, Congress fully funded the Administration's FY2008 request for $45.7 million for Cuba democracy programs in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected H.Amdt. 707 to H.R. 2419, the 2007 farm bill, that would have facilitated the export of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. In the second session, the Senate approved S.Res. 573 on May 21, 2008, which recognized the struggle of the Cuban people. In both sessions, there were Cuba provisions in several House and Senate appropriations measures (H.R. 2829, H.R. 3161, S. 1859, H.R. 7323, and S. 3260) that would have eased restrictions on travel and on U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, but none of these provisions were included in enacted measures. Numerous other legislative initiatives on Cuba were introduced in the 110th Congress, but were not considered. Several of these initiatives would have eased sanctions: H.R. 177 (educational travel); H.R. 216 (Cuban baseball players); H.R. 217 and H.R. 624 (overall sanctions); H.R. 654, S. 554, and S. 721 (travel); H.R. 757 (family travel and remittances); H.R. 1026 (sale of U.S. agricultural products); H.R. 2819/S. 1673 (sale of U.S. agricultural and medical products and travel); and S. 1268, S. 2953, H.R. 3182, and H.R. 3435 (development of Cuba's offshore oil). S. 554 would have terminated U.S.-government sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba. Several initiatives would have tightened sanctions: H.R. 525 (related to U.S. fugitives in Cuba), and H.R. 1679/S. 876 and S. 2503 (related to Cuba's offshore oil development). Two initiatives, H.R. 1306 and S. 749, would have amended a provision of law restricting the registration or enforcement of certain Cuban trademarks; five initiatives—H.R. 217, H.R. 624, H.R. 2819, S. 1673, and S. 1806—would have repealed the trademark sanction. H.R. 5627 and S. 2777 would have awarded the congressional gold medal to Cuban political prisoner Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. H.Res. 995 would have commemorated the 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes by Cuba. S. 3288 had a provision that would have funded U.S. work to establish anti-drug cooperation with Cuba. In the aftermath of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, several initiatives would have temporarily eased some U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 6913, H.R. 6962, and S.Amdt. 5581 to S. 3001. This report reflects legislative developments through the 110th Congress, and will not be updated. For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, and CRS Report RS22742, Cuba's Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul Castro

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Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency, and Green Jobs In the United States, growing awareness of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the possible implications for global climate change have combined with recent high energy prices and economic uncertainty to rekindle interest in renewable energy. Renewable energy technologies generate electricity from resources such as the sun, wind, or biomass, with essentially no net GHG emissions. President Obama has declared a goal for the United States to become the world's leading exporter of renewable energy technologies, setting out policy objectives for the development of related "green jobs" and the investment of $150 billion over 10 years in energy research and development (R&D) for the next generation of energy technologies. Although there is no consensus on the term's meaning, it often has been defined to include at a minimum jobs that result directly from increasing reliance on renewables for generating electricity and powering vehicles as well as jobs that result directly from achieving greater energy efficiency. Complicating the estimation of the number of green jobs is the absence of an authoritative data source. In the case of the utility industry, for example, NAICS disaggregates firms into the categories of hydro, fossil fuel, nuclear and "other" sources. For its part, the government agency responsible for labor force statistics, BLS, has requested funding for FY2010 to develop data on the number of green jobs and their characteristics (e.g., wages, training requirements) by industry and occupation. As a result of differences in definitions, assumptions, and methodologies, the analyses produce wide-ranging estimates of the number of green jobs. Most of the future growth in green jobs is generally envisioned as coming from the growth in deployment of renewable energy technologies. The timeframe under consideration is important in any discussion of the potential for renewable energy technologies to create jobs, for the technologies are at different stages in their development cycles and have attributes suited to different applications. As such, renewable energy deployment programs from state governments have had a great influence on the current deployment levels of renewable energy technologies and resultant jobs. Historically, the federal investment in renewable energy technologies in the United States has not been about creating jobs, but instead simply focused on developing the technologies to a point where they are considered ready for commercialization. It is important to recognize that as a specific renewable energy technology becomes more efficient, the number of jobs per Megawatt (MW) of output is likely to decrease. Companies must be capable of competing in the domestic market for renewable energy first and foremost, as the potential growth of U.S. renewable markets already has significant international participation. Incentivizing Domestic Production A key to maximizing U.S. green jobs growth from renewable energy is the domestic design and manufacturing of equipment and components. A renewable energy industry capable of serving the export market may create many more jobs than an industry which only serves domestic needs since production would necessarily be at internationally competitive prices. Given the growing international competition for renewable energy markets and green jobs, policy mechanisms and incentives may be necessary to encourage manufacturers to locate production of renewable energy products and components in the United States. Few doubt the potential of renewable energy to help address climate change concerns; the question is whether the desired benefits merit the investment. But developing the next generation of renewable energy technologies and building an internationally competitive industry may require a significant and sustained national investment. Without it, the majority of the solar panels, wind turbines, and components providing the clean energy of tomorrow may continue to be designed and built by workers overseas.

In the United States, growing awareness of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the possible implications for global climate change have combined with recent high energy prices and economic uncertainty to rekindle interest in renewable energy. Renewable energy technologies generate electricity from resources such as the sun, wind, or biomass, with essentially no net GHG emissions. President Obama has declared a goal for the United States to become the world's leading exporter of renewable energy technologies, setting out policy objectives for the development of related "green jobs". Green jobs have often been defined to include (at a minimum) jobs that result directly from renewables for generating electricity and powering vehicles as well as jobs that result directly from achieving greater energy efficiency. Studies of green job creation in the renewable energy industry vary greatly as a result of differences in definitions, assumptions, and methodologies, with the resulting analyses producing wide-ranging estimates of the number of green jobs. Complicating the estimation of the number of green jobs is the absence of an authoritative data source. The North American Industry Classification System disaggregates firms into the categories of hydro, fossil fuel, nuclear and "other" sources. Renewables are part of the "other" category. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has requested funding for FY2010 to develop data on the number of green jobs and their characteristics (e.g., wages, training requirements) by industry and occupation. Most of the future growth in green jobs is generally envisioned as coming from the growth in deployment of renewable energy technologies. Renewable energy deployment programs from state governments have had a great influence on the existing deployment levels of renewable energy technologies and resultant jobs. Historically, the federal investment in renewable energy technologies in the United States has not been about creating jobs, but was focused on developing the technologies to a point where they are ready for commercialization. The timeframe under consideration is thus important in any discussion of the potential for renewable energy technologies to create jobs, for the technologies are at different stages in their development cycles. It is also important to recognize that as a specific renewable energy technology becomes more efficient, the number of jobs per Megawatt of output is likely to decrease. A key to maximizing green jobs growth in the United States from renewable energy is the domestic design and manufacture of equipment and components. Given the growing international competition for renewable energy markets and green jobs, policy mechanisms and incentives may be necessary to encourage manufacturers to locate production in the United States. Companies must be capable of competing in the domestic market for renewable energy first and foremost, as the potential growth of U.S. renewable markets already has attracted significant international participation. A renewable energy industry capable of serving the export market may create many more jobs than an industry which only serves domestic needs. Few doubt the potential of renewable energy to help address climate change concerns; the question is whether the desired benefits merit the investment. But developing the next generation of renewable energy technologies and building an internationally competitive industry may require a significant and sustained national investment. Without it, the majority of the solar panels, wind turbines, and components providing the clean energy of tomorrow may continue to be designed and built by workers overseas.

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As U.S. Steps Taken By the United States to Advance Its Policy Goals The United States has been active in international efforts to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The United States continues to participate in international fora aimed at addressing various issues associated with the international small arms and light weapons trade.

This report provides general background on U.S. policy regarding the international trade in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). It outlines major questions associated with the international trade in these items, and reviews United States efforts to assist in controlling the illicit transfers of these items. This report will be revised as developments warrant.

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113-146 , enacted on August 7, 2014, creates new authority for removing an individual in a senior executive position in the Department of Veterans Affairs. Section 713(a)(1) authorizes the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to remove an individual employed in a Senior Executive Service (SES) position if the Secretary determines that the individual's performance or misconduct merits removal. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides, in relevant part, that, "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;.... " Some Supreme Court cases have interpreted this language to determine (1) whether a nonprobationary government employee who is removable for cause, as distinguished from at-will, has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued government employment; (2) whether due process applies to deprivation of such an interest; and (3) if due process applies, what kind of process is constitutionally sufficient? Because OEO's regulations and practice provided that a removed employee was entitled to a trial-type hearing a fter removal either at OEO or the Civil Service Commission, the predecessor to the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Court focused on whether a hearing before or after removal provided adequate due process under the Clause. Application to Section 713 Section 713 of Title 38, as added by Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, does not expressly provide for notice and an opportunity to respond. Nevertheless, the Department of Veterans Affairs has issued guidelines which mandate that an individual in a senior executive position whom it seeks to remove from federal service or from such a position pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §713 will receive prior notice of five days and an opportunity to respond to charges in writing in advance of removal. The implication is that the Fifth Amendment requires that this right cannot be deprived without due process. Section 713(d)(2)(A) of Title 38 provides that an individual whom the Secretary seeks to remove from federal service or transfer to a non-senior executive position may file an appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board within seven days after removal or transfer. The Board must assign this appeal to an administrative judge for a hearing. An administrative judge must decide the appeal within 21 days, that decision is final and not subject to further appeal. Section 713(e)(2)(3) states that if an administrative judge cannot issue an opinion in that period, the Secretary's decision becomes final. In the Manzo case cited in Loudermill , the Court said that a post-termination hearing must be provided not only at a meaningful time, but also in a meaningful manner. It allows an MSPB administrative judge, an employee who is not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to render a final decision of the United States without any review by the presidentially appointed, Senate- confirmed members of the Board or any other executive officer. In her principal brief filed on October 9, 2015, Helman argued that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review the decision of the MSPB administrative judge. She maintained that the MSPB administrative judge who approved the Secretary's removal decision lacked constitutional authority to preside at her removal hearing because he was not appointed in the manner prescribed in the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, relating to the appointment of principal and inferior officers who exercise significant authority of the United States. On January 22, 2015, after the administrative judge upheld the department's decision to remove Helman from federal service, she submitted a request for an extension of time to file an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. It provides that a decision of an administrative judge "shall be final and shall not be subject to any further appeal." Without judicial review, a senior executive who is removed pursuant to Section 713 would have no opportunity to challenge removal as a deprivation of a property right to continued employment without meaningful due process of law.

This report discusses selected legal issues relating to the authority for summary removal of individuals in senior executive positions at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act, P.L. 113-146, enacted on August 7, 2014, created this authority by adding Section 713 to Title 38 of the United States Code. It authorizes the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to remove an individual in a senior executive position from federal service or transfer him or her to a position in the General Schedule if the Secretary determines that the individual's performance or misconduct warrants removal. This report addresses whether this authority raises a constitutional question under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a deprivation of a property right to continued federal employment and whether a court would have jurisdiction to hear a case brought by a senior executive who had been removed pursuant to it. The Supreme Court has held that a nonprobationary government employee who is removable for cause, as distinguished from at-will, has a property right in continued employment. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that property may not be deprived without due process of law. According to the Court, an agency may not remove such an employee from government employment without due process rights of notice and an opportunity to respond to charges. The employee also is entitled to a hearing either before or after removal. A hearing must be provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Section 713 of Title 38 does not expressly provide for notice and an opportunity to respond, but the Department of Veterans Affairs has issued guidelines that grant advance notice of five days and an opportunity to respond to charges in writing. Section 713 provides for a hearing after removal by an administrative judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board if a decision can be issued in 21 days and that this decision is not subject to further appeal. If an administrative judge does not issue a decision in that period, the Secretary's removal or transfer is final. A senior executive whose removal from federal service pursuant to this authority was upheld by an administrative judge has filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This appeal alleges that these limited time periods for notice and an opportunity to respond to charges, as well as for an appeal to an administrative judge, do not provide meaningful due process. The court is considering whether to accept jurisdiction of this case because the Department of Veterans Affairs, citing the finality clause in Section 713, asserts that an administrative judge's decision is not subject to judicial review. In challenging the constitutionality of Section 713, the removed senior executive also maintains that granting an administrative judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board authority conclusively to determine whether or not to uphold a removal contravenes the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. She asserts that to comply with the Clause, an administrative judge's decision should be supervised or be subject to review by members of the Merit Systems Protection Board or another officer or officers who are principal officers of the United States whom the President appoints and the Senate confirms. An administrative judge is an employee who is not appointed in the manner that the Appointments Clause prescribes, she contends. This report will be updated to reflect later developments.

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Introduction Although a number of U.S. agencies and departments implement global health programs that might improve child survival and maternal health (CS/MH), this report focuses only on CS/MH programs conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from FY2001 to FY2008. In 2006, an estimated 9.7 million children in that age range died, representing a 60% drop in under-five mortality since 1960. The majority of child deaths occur in developing countries, and almost half of them in Africa. On average, nearly 90% of all child deaths are caused by neonatal infections and five infectious diseases: acute respiratory infections (mostly pneumonia), diarrhea, malaria, measles and HIV/AIDS ( Table 1 ). According to UNICEF, undernutrition is the underlying cause of up to half of these deaths. More than 500,000 women die each year due to pregnancy-related causes, and an additional 15-20 million more suffer debilitating long-term effects, such as obstetric fistula (discussed below). UNICEF estimates that 20% of all maternal deaths are linked to undernutrition and that about 75% of maternal deaths are caused by obstetric complications including hemorrhage, sepsis, hypertensive disorders (mostly eclampsia), prolonged or obstructed labor, and unsafe abortions. Low-cost interventions can prevent and treat the condition. From FY2004 through FY2008, Congress provided $19.7 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs. Issues for Congress Congress has consistently boosted appropriations to USAID's global health programs throughout the Administration of President George W. Bush, though mostly for specific diseases. While most health experts applaud the recent increase in U.S. commitment to countering the global spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS, many remained concerned that other health programs that offer life-saving interventions for women and children are overlooked and underfunded, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to proposing an increase in funding for CS/MH programs, some observers urge Congress to boost support for other health issues that affect child survival and maternal health.

Appropriations for child survival and maternal health programs (CS/MH) have grown by about 22% during the tenure of President George W. Bush. Most of that growth occurred in FY2008, when Congress provided $521.9 million for CS/MH programs, up from $361.1 million in FY2001. Although Congress provided support during this time for other global health initiatives that affect CS/MH, such as some $19.7 billion for international programs that prevent and treat human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis (TB), and malaria, other global health interventions are discussed only as they relate to USAID's CS/MH programs. According to latest estimates, 9.7 million children under the age of five died in 2006; some 26,000 each day. The majority of those deaths occurred in developing countries, and almost half of them in Africa. On average, nearly 90% of all child deaths are caused by neonatal infections and five other diseases: acute respiratory infections (primarily pneumonia), diarrhea, malaria, measles, and HIV/AIDS. Undernutrition contributes to more than half of these deaths. More than 500,000 women die each year due to pregnancy-related causes, and many more suffer debilitating long-term effects, such as obstetric fistula. Most of these deaths occur in developing countries. About 20% of global maternal deaths are linked to undernutrition, and about 75% result from obstetric complications, most often hemorrhage, sepsis, eclampsia, and prolonged or obstructed labor. While most health experts applaud the recent increase in U.S. commitment to global health, many remain concerned that funding is largely aimed at specific diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. Other health programs that offer life-saving interventions for women and children are overlooked and underfunded, they contend, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to proposing an increase in funding for CS/MH programs, some observers urge Congress to boost support for health systems so that countries can better address a wide range of health issues that affect child survival and maternal health. This report will be updated at the end of the 110th Congress.

crs_RL34131

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When the Mississippi River rose to near record levels in 2011, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) intentionally broke several levees along the river, thereby flooding normally protected areas in order to prevent greater damage elsewhere. The 2011 Mississippi River floods brought renewed attention to federal liability for floods, which has been the subject of ongoing litigation since Hurricane Katrina. Some of these structures were part of the federally authorized Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project (LPV), constructed by the Corps and maintained by local levee districts. By August 31, 2005, 80% of New Orleans was under water. In other instances, like that of the 2011 Mississippi River flooding, the Corps may flood certain lands in order to reduce damage to other areas. This report examines the legal issues resulting from flood damage in both instances. It analyzes the general framework of liability claims for flood damage and federal government immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA). The report specifically analyzes claims for federal liability for damage caused by Katrina. Sovereign immunity means that the government cannot be sued. Flood Control Act of 1928 Even if litigants are able to refute the discretionary function exception and sue the government under the FTCA, the FCA offers additional immunity to the federal government. Levee Failure and Hurricane Katrina Flooding In the aftermath of Katrina, numerous legal claims were filed against the government for flood damage. The legal defenses available to the federal government depend on the facts underlying the specific flooding incident. Failure of the Hurricane Protection System With respect to the failure of the Hurricane Protection System in New Orleans, a central question has been whether the design of the levees and floodwalls was exceeded or whether they were poorly designed, constructed, or maintained. However, any documented choice involving prioritization would likely be considered a discretionary action, exempting the government from liability. Floodway Operation and Immunity Under the FTCA and FCA The focus of legal challenges related to the 2011 Mississippi floods has focused on the Corps' authority with respect to the MRTP and the sufficiency of floodway easements. In the case of the 2011 floods, the waters causing damage are clearly floodwaters that were diverted through the floodway as a primary facet of the MRTP, one of the nation's largest flood control projects.

Over the past century, the federal government has undertaken a number of civil works projects to prevent widespread damage from flooding of various waterways. These flood control projects generally have been designed and constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Despite the existence of these flood control structures, floods have caused major damage to various regions of the country. Hurricane Katrina was the most costly natural disaster ever to hit the United States. Striking land in August 2005 as a Category 3 hurricane, Hurricane Katrina left 80% of New Orleans under water. Since Katrina, a number of major floods in the midwestern states have caused significant damage. In particular, heightened flows of the Mississippi River in 2011 have resulted in historic flooding and controversy over the use of floodways to redirect floodwaters. In the wake of these floods, the issue of federal liability for flood damage is receiving attention in the media and in Congress. The costly and unprecedented nature of recent flood damage has led to an upsurge in litigation over flood damage liability. Some lawsuits filed against the federal government, particularly after Katrina, assert government liability for damages resulting from the failure of levees and floodwalls designed and constructed by the Corps. Other lawsuits claim federal liability for damages resulting from the Corps' decision to activate floodways during the 2011 Mississippi River flooding. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA) may protect the government from liability for some flood-related claims. Under the FTCA, the federal government is exempt from liability for discretionary actions. Under the FCA, the government cannot be sued for damages resulting from federally supported damage reduction projects or floodwaters. This report examines federal liability for flood damage and analyzes legal defenses available to the federal government. Specifically, it provides an overview of the discretionary function exemption under the FTCA and immunity under the FCA as applied to Corps projects. The report also considers the Corps' potential liability for damages caused by levee failure during Hurricane Katrina and the activation of floodways during the 2011 Mississippi flooding.

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The professional experiences of judicial nominees are also of interest to interest groups, particularly professional organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA). In light of ongoing interest in the professional qualifications of those nominated to circuit court judgeships, this report seeks to inform Congress by providing statistics related to the professional qualifications or experiences of those currently serving on the bench as U.S. circuit court judges. Specifically, this report provides statistics and analysis related to (1) the percentage of active circuit court judges with judicial experience, as well as the type of judicial experience; (2) the percentage of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, as well as the length of time of such experience; and (3) the percentage of active circuit court judges by professional experience immediately prior to their appointment to a circuit court judgeship. Consequently, the statistics do not include circuit court judges who, prior to February 1, 2014, had assumed senior status, retired, or resigned. Altogether, 54.6% of U.S. circuit court judges who are currently serving had prior experience as another type of judge before their appointment to a circuit court (and 45.4% had no such experience). Of the judges with prior judicial experience, 22.7% served solely as another type of federal judge (e.g., a U.S. district court judge), while 20.9% served solely as a state judge and another 11.0% had both prior federal and state judicial experience. Although over half of active circuit court judges have prior judicial experience (54.6%), a greater percentage have at least some prior experience as attorneys in private practice (84.7%). Similarly, while 45.6% of active circuit judges do not have prior judicial experience, a much smaller percentage, 15.3%, have no prior experience in private practice. Figure 1 also shows that of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, a plurality (26.4%) had 15 or more years of experience as attorneys in private practice. Altogether, half (50.3%) of all active circuit court judges were serving as another type of judge (either a U.S. district court judge, another type of federal judge, or a state judge). Of circuit court judges currently serving on the bench, approximately one-quarter (25.8%) were working as attorneys in private practice prior to being appointed as a circuit court judge, with 22.1% having worked in private practice for 10 years or more. Additionally, of those working in private practice for 10 years or more, 80.6% had been working as an attorney in private practice for at least 15 years. Conclusion This report provides a statistical overview of the professional qualifications and experiences of active U.S. circuit court judges. Ongoing congressional interest in the professional background of those nominated to the federal bench reflects, in part, the role of Congress in evaluating the qualifications of those who are nominated by the President to life-tenure positions. There are, however, judges without either type of experience who have other types of professional experiences such as working as an attorney for the federal government or as a law professor.

This report provides an analysis of the professional qualifications and experiences of U.S. circuit court judges who are currently serving on the federal bench. Interest in the professional qualifications of those nominated to the federal judiciary has been demonstrated by Congress and others. Congressional interest in the professional experiences of those nominated by a President to the federal courts reflects, in part, the evaluative role of Congress in examining the qualifications of those who are nominated to life-tenure positions. Other organizations, such as the American Bar Association (ABA), also have an ongoing interest in the professional qualifications of those appointed to the federal judiciary. Additionally, scholars have demonstrated an interest in this topic by examining whether a relationship exists between the professional or career experiences of judges and judicial decision making. The analysis in this report focuses on the professional experiences of 163 active U.S. circuit court judges who were serving as of February 1, 2014. Active judges are those who have not taken senior status, retired, or resigned. Consequently, the statistics provided do not necessarily reflect all circuit court judges who are sitting on the bench (which include judges who have assumed senior status). Some of this report's findings include the following: A majority, 54.6%, of active circuit court judges had prior judicial experience at some point before being appointed as circuit court judges (and 45.4% had no such experience). Of the judges with prior judicial experience, 22.7% served solely as another type of federal judge (e.g., a U.S. district court judge), while 20.9% served solely as a state judge and another 11.0% had both prior federal and state judicial experience. A majority, 84.7%, of active circuit court judges had at least some prior experience as an attorney in private practice at some point prior to their appointment as a circuit judge. Of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, a plurality (26.4%) had 15 or more years of experience as an attorney in private practice. While 45.4% of active circuit judges do not have prior judicial experience, a much smaller percentage, 15.3%, have no prior experience in private practice. Circuit court judges without either prior judicial experience or experience as an attorney in private practice had other professional experiences such as working as an attorney for the federal government or as a law professor. Immediately prior to their appointment to the appellate bench, most circuit court judges were either serving as another type of judge or had been engaged in private practice for at least 10 years. Approximately half, 50.3%, of all active circuit judges were serving as another type of judge immediately prior to their appointment (i.e., serving as a district court judge, another type of federal judge such as a bankruptcy judge, or a state judge). Approximately one quarter, 25.8%, of active circuit court judges were working as attorneys in private practice immediately prior to being appointed as a circuit judge (with 22.1% having worked in private practice for 10 years or more).

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102-194 ), the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program is the primary mechanism by which the federal government coordinates its unclassified networking and information technology (NIT) R&D investments. The director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) appoints a director for the NCO. Budget, Funding, and Spending The President's FY2017 budget request for the NITRD Program is $4.54 billion, an increase of $0.05 billion, or approximately 1.11%, compared to the $4.49 billion FY2016 estimate. The NITRD budget is an aggregation of the IT R&D components of the individual budgets of NITRD participating agencies and is reported in the annual release of the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program Supplement to the President's Budget . The NITRD budget is not a single, centralized source of funds that is allocated to individual agencies. The NITRD budget is then calculated by aggregating the IT R&D components of the appropriations provided by Congress to each federal agency. Federal Technology Funding: Background and Context In the early 1990s, Congress recognized that several federal agencies had ongoing high-performance computing programs, but no central coordinating body existed to ensure long-term coordination and planning. To provide such a framework, Congress passed the High-Performance Computing Program Act of 1991 to improve the interagency coordination, cooperation, and planning of agencies with high-performance computing programs. In conjunction with the passage of the act, OSTP released Grand Challenges: High-Performance Computing and Communications . That document outlined an R&D strategy for high-performance computing and communications and a framework for a multi-agency program, the HPCC Program. In general, supporters of federal funding of IT R&D contend that it has produced positive results. The CSTB's observation was that the unanticipated results of research are often as important as the anticipated results. Additionally, the report noted that federally funded programs have played a crucial role in supporting long-term research into fundamental aspects of computing. Such "fundamentals" provide broad practical benefits but generally take years to realize. Another aspect of government-funded IT R&D is that it often leads to open standards, something that many perceive as beneficial, encouraging deployment and further investment. Industry, on the other hand, is more likely to invest in proprietary products and will typically diverge from a common standard if it sees a potential competitive or financial advantage; this happened, for example, with standards for instant messaging. Finally, proponents of government R&D support believe that the outcomes achieved through the various funding programs create a synergistic environment in which both fundamental and application-driven research are conducted, benefitting government, industry, academia, and the public. Supporters also believe that such outcomes justify government's role in funding IT R&D as well as the growing budget for the NITRD Program. Critics have asserted that the government, through its funding mechanisms, may set itself up to pick "winners and losers" in technological development, a role more properly residing with the private sector. For example, the size of the NITRD Program could encourage industry to follow the government's lead on research directions rather than selecting those directions itself. Legislative Activity in the 115th Congress There has been no legislative activity related to the NITRD Program in the 115 th Congress.

In the early 1990s, Congress recognized that several federal agencies had ongoing high-performance computing programs, but no central coordinating body existed to ensure long-term coordination and planning. To provide such a framework, Congress passed the High-Performance Computing and Communications Program Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-194) to enhance the effectiveness of the various programs. In conjunction with the passage of the act, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) released Grand Challenges: High-Performance Computing and Communications. That document outlined a research and development (R&D) strategy for high-performance computing and a framework for a multi-agency program, the High-Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC) Program. The HPCC Program has evolved over time and is now called the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program to better reflect its expanded mission. Current concerns are the role of the federal government in supporting information technology (IT) R&D and the level of funding to allot to it. Proponents of federal support of IT R&D assert that it has produced positive outcomes for the country and played a crucial role in supporting long-term research into fundamental aspects of computing. Such fundamentals provide broad practical benefits but generally take years to realize. Additionally, the unanticipated results of research are often as important as the anticipated results. Another aspect of government-funded IT research is that it often leads to open standards, something that many perceive as beneficial, encouraging deployment and further investment. Industry, on the other hand, is more inclined to invest in proprietary products and will diverge from a common standard when there is a potential competitive or financial advantage to do so. Proponents of government support believe that the outcomes achieved through the various funding programs create a synergistic environment in which both fundamental and application-driven research are conducted, benefitting government, industry, academia, and the public. Supporters also believe that such outcomes justify government's role in funding IT R&D as well as the growing budget for the NITRD Program. Critics assert that the government, through its funding mechanisms, may be picking "winners and losers" in technological development, a role more properly residing with the private sector. For example, the size of the NITRD Program may encourage industry to follow the government's lead on research directions rather than selecting those directions itself. The President's FY2017 budget request for the NITRD Program was $4.54 billion and the FY2016 NITRD budget estimates totaled $4.49 billion. The FY2018 budget is not yet available. The NITRD budget is an aggregation of the IT R&D components of the individual budgets of NITRD participating agencies and is reported in the annual release of the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program Supplement to the President's Budget. The NITRD budget is not a single, centralized source of funds that is allocated to individual agencies. Rather, it is calculated by aggregating the IT R&D components of the appropriations provided by Congress to each federal agency. There has been no legislative activity related to the NITRD Program in the 115th Congress.

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The National Commission on TerroristAttacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, was to make a full and complete accounting of thecircumstances surrounding the attacks, and the extent of the United States' preparedness for, andimmediate response to, the attacks; and…investigate and report to the President and Congress on itsfindings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent actsof terrorism. (3) The panel's July 22 report was the culmination of a series of hearings and investigations by the paneland its staff into the terrorist attacks. The proposal is relativelysparse on details, and implementing it would require the Senate to flesh out the plan substantially;however, it is clear that the recommended changes in the Senate's confirmation process wouldprovide a certain up-or-down vote by the full chamber on all National Security Team nomineeswithin a definitive time frame (30 days) after a nomination is made at the start of an administration. Congressional Response On October 6, the Senate passed, by a vote of 96-2, legislation ( S. 2845 ),introduced by Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Chair Susan Collins and Ranking MemberJoseph I. Lieberman, that would implement many of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. It states that the "Senate committees to which thesenominations are referred should, to the fullest extent possible, complete their consideration of thesenominations, and, if such nominations are reported by the committees, the full Senate should voteto confirm or reject these nominations within 30 days of their submission." This is, essentially, anaffirmation of the current confirmation process. President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on December17, 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ). A review of the data on the speed with which newadministrations have been able to get their National Security Team members in place suggests thisis an issue in a minority of cases. Historically, much of the regular order of business on the nomination and confirmationof presidential appointments has been regulated not by strict, formal rules, but rather by informalcustoms that can change (and have changed) over the years, as the relative balance of power betweenthe President and the Senate ebbs and flows. (20) Implementation of the 9/11 Commission's Recommendation Committee Proceedings The 9/11 Commission's proposal, and most likely the House-passed provision to S. 2845 , would presumably require that Senate committee chairs schedule confirmationhearings on the proposed members of the National Security Team. The power of committee chairs to control the agenda of their panels is longstanding. Means of Implementation The Senate could institute procedures to implement the 9/11 Commission's proposal or theHouse provision in several ways: by enacting an expedited procedures law, by amending the Senate'sstanding rules or its standing orders, through adoption of a unanimous consent agreement, or bypassage of a constitutional amendment. Expedited Procedures Statute. Constitutional Amendment. Standing Order. "The relationship between the executive and legislative branches has been and remainsessentially political. Conflict occurs in the appointment process for a verysimple reason. What would a new process mean for other presidential nominations,particularly those to the judiciary?

On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,known as the 9/11 Commission, issued its final report, detailing the events up to and including theSeptember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United States. The report contained 41recommendations on ways to prevent future catastrophic assaults, including a series of proposalsdesigned to improve the presidential appointments process as it relates to the top national securityofficials at the beginning of a new administration. On October 6, the Senate passed legislation( S. 2845 ) to implement many of the changes recommended by the 9/11 Commission. The House on October 8 passed its version of the legislation ( H.R. 10 ). The Presidentsigned the final version of the bill on December 17, 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ). Two other measuresdealing with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations ( S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 ) were introduced in early September. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the Senate adopt rules requiring hearings and votesto confirm or reject national security nominees within 30 days of their submission at the start of eachnew presidential administration. Implicit in the proposal is the assumption that there is a problemwith the process for nominating and confirming presidential appointees. Analysis of Senateconsideration of the initial nominations by Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush to theposts covered by the recommendation shows that the commission's proposed timetable was not metin 14 of the 49 cases, suggesting this is an issue in a minority of cases. The Constitution gives the Senate a role in the presidential appointments process, but theparameters of that role have never been clearly defined. The current process is regulated by amixture of formal rules and informal customs, as well as by political interactions between thePresident and Senators. Implementing the commission's proposal would presumably requireinstituting procedures that guarantee committee consideration of each nomination, at least at ahearing, and a final vote on each by the full Senate. Changes of this kind would involve newrestrictions on both the power of committee chairs to control the agenda of their committees and therights of Senators to delay or block nominations through holds and extended debate. These changeswould likely also alter the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, weakeningthe negotiating posture of the Senate in relation to the President, particularly if they were to beextended to additional nominations. Procedures adequate to implement the commission's recommendation would resemble anexpedited procedure, such as those used in resolutions of approval and disapproval of executiveactions. Procedural changes of this kind could be achieved by amending the Standing Rules of theSenate, changing the Standing Orders of the Senate, passing a Constitutional Amendment enactingan expedited procedures statute, or reaching a unanimous consent agreement. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Consequently, the secure operation of both the power grid and pipelines are national priorities. While physical threats to the U.S. power grid and pipelines have long worried policymakers, cyber threats to the computer systems that operate this critical infrastructure are an increasing concern. Furthermore, with ever greater physical interdependency between electricity generators and the natural gas pipelines which supply their fuel, many in Congress recognize that grid and pipeline cybersecurity are intertwined. The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency for the protection of electric power, oil, and natural gas infrastructure—cooperating with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the lead agency for pipelines. DOE's energy sector cybersecurity activities are led primarily by its Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE). In 2015, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (the FAST Act) provided the Secretary of Energy with additional authority to order measures to protect or restore the reliability of the power grid during a grid security emergency, including "a malicious act using electronic communication." The 115 th Congress is considering additional legislation to fund and expand DOE's cybersecurity programs, including appropriations in the Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy and Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 3219 ) and the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018 ( S. 1609 ). The Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017 (S. 1460) and the Enhancing State Energy Security Planning and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2017 ( H.R. 3050 ) would authorize additional DOE funding for cybersecurity research and assistance to states, respectively. OE Cybersecurity Program Structure The OE's cybersecurity program for energy delivery systems is structured around three areas: (1) cybersecurity preparedness; (2) cyber incident response and recovery; and (3) research, development, and demonstration. It would establish a program for energy sector cybersecurity RD&D to be carried out by DOE, in consultation with other agencies, states, and the energy sector, for advanced applications to identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. Given the ever-changing cybersecurity environment in the energy sector, Congress may continue to examine OE's cybersecurity resources to ensure that they are adequate and being deployed appropriately to address the most important energy delivery risks. With DOE-provided or independently provided information, Congress may have a more-informed basis for considering whether to adjust the provisions of the FAST Act or clarify, expand, or contract the authorizations it contains. Among its recommendations, the QER calls for assessment of natural gas and electricity infrastructure interdependencies to cybersecurity protection. How OE's cybersecurity programs and expertise in energy delivery systems could best be used to inform such analysis may be of interest to Congress. Congress may examine how OE's cybersecurity activities fit in, and coordinate with, the other various roles in energy cybersecurity for electricity, oil and natural gas pipelines, and other related energy infrastructure. In particular, Congress may examine how OE's RD&D programs and other work with the National Labs in electric power sector cybersecurity supports federal and private sector efforts in pipeline cybersecurity.

While physical threats to the U.S. power grid and pipelines have long worried policymakers, cyber threats to the computer systems that operate this critical infrastructure are an increasing concern. Cybersecurity risks against the power and pipeline sectors are similar, as both use similar control systems, and there appears to be a broad consensus that cyber threats to this infrastructure are on the rise. Furthermore, with ever-greater physical interdependency between electricity generators and the natural gas pipelines that supply their fuel, many in Congress recognize that grid and pipeline cybersecurity are intertwined. In 2015, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (the FAST Act) provided the Secretary of Energy with new authority to protect or restore the power grid during a grid security emergency, including a cyber incident. Congress is considering additional legislation to fund and expand the Department of Energy's cybersecurity programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency for the protection of electric power, oil, and natural gas infrastructure—cooperating with the Department of Homeland Security, the lead agency for pipelines. DOE's cybersecurity activities are led by its Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) and structured around three areas: (1) cybersecurity preparedness, (2) cyber incident response and recovery, and (3) research, development, and demonstration. Although nominally applicable to energy delivery systems across the electric power, oil and natural gas, and pipeline sectors, OE's cybersecurity activities to date appear to have been focused primarily on the grid. Publicly available examples of DOE-supported activities specifically focused on pipeline cybersecurity are limited. Rather, pipeline cybersecurity efforts appear to be included as part of broader national cybersecurity efforts. Several bills potentially affecting DOE's cybersecurity activities for power grid and pipeline infrastructure have been introduced in the 115th Congress. These include the Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy and Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3219) and the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018 (S. 1609), both of which would modestly increase funding for OE in FY2018. The Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017 (S. 1460) would establish and fund a DOE program for energy sector cybersecurity research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) to be carried out for advanced applications to identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. The Enhancing State Energy Security Planning and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2017 (H.R. 3050) would authorize DOE to provide financial and technical assistance to states for assessing cybersecurity threats to energy infrastructure. As federal cybersecurity oversight and legislative debate continue, Congress may focus on several key issues. Given the ever-changing cybersecurity environment in the energy sector, Congress may continue to examine OE's cybersecurity resources to ensure that they are adequate and being deployed appropriately to address the most important energy delivery risks. Congress may also seek a more-informed basis for considering whether to adjust the provisions of the FAST Act or clarify the authorizations it contains. How OE's programs and expertise could best be used to inform analysis of electric power and natural gas infrastructure interdependency from a cybersecurity perspective may also be of interest to Congress. Finally, Congress may examine how OE's cybersecurity activities fit in, and coordinate with, the other various roles in energy cybersecurity for electricity, oil and natural gas pipelines. In particular, Congress may examine how OE's RD&D programs and work with the National Labs in electric power sector cybersecurity supports federal and private sector efforts in pipeline cybersecurity.

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Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have a history of supporting programs that foster diversity of broadcast station ownership, in general, and minority and female ownership, in particular, as a means to achieve that goal. Structuring the programs narrowly may be necessary in order to survive a judicial challenge. To qualify for a tax certificate, the purchasing business had to be controlled by a minority. If the certificate was granted the selling corporation was allowed to defer paying taxes on any capital gain from the sale. However, to the extent that those programs are designed to benefit individuals based on their race, they will likely be subject to the standard of review described below. Judicial Review of Racial Classifications in Broadcast Ownership Policies In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Adarand Construction v. Peña , which held that all race-based classifications by the federal government must withstand strict scrutiny, as discussed in the following section. In the context of tax provisions and FCC programs that encourage SDBs to own broadcast properties, the government interest that has been articulated is to promote broadcast viewpoint diversity. Though Metro Broadcasting can provide some guidance as to the arguments that would be advanced in favor of finding that broadcast viewpoint diversity is a compelling government interest, because the Court applied a lower standard of scrutiny to what it termed a "benign racial classification," deeper analysis is required to determine if the interest is sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scrutiny.

Amidst growing media ownership consolidation and a significant decline in minority ownership of telecommunications businesses, there has been renewed interest in programs that foster diversity among telecommunications business owners. One potential avenue under consideration is to revive, in revised fashion, a tax program that would allow current owners who sell their broadcast properties to eligible purchasers to defer taxes on gains from the sale. That program had been available for sales to minority-owned firms, defined as socially and economically disadvantaged businesses (SDBs). It was abolished by Congress in 1995 amidst allegations of abuse. In that same year, the Supreme Court held that all government race-based classifications must meet the most exacting standard of review applied by the Court, meaning that all racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. To the extent that legislation or FCC programs seek to increase racial and ethnic minority ownership of broadcast stations, they are likely to be subjected to intense scrutiny if challenged in court. The analysis that may be conducted is discussed in detail in this report.

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The second are those MBSs that are packaged and issued by private market participants (i.e., mortgage companies, savings and loans, and commercial banks), known as private label MBSs. This report will provide an overview of the registration requirements for private label MBSs under the Securities Act. It outlines potential liability for fraud and/or material misstatements in the required disclosures and the consequences for failure to register when required by federal securities laws. Securities Act Registration for Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities The Securities Act requires issuers of all types of securities to register the offering with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or to qualify for an exemption from the registration requirements. Exemptions Certain offerings of private label MBSs may be exempt from registration under the Securities Act. The issuer has absolute liability under Section 11.

Mortgage-backed securities that are packaged and issued by private industry participants are required to comply with the Securities Act of 1933. Issuers of so-called private label mortgage-backed securities must either register these securities pursuant to the rules the Securities and Exchange Commission has set forth, or obtain an exemption from registration. Failure to register or fall under an exemption could result in liability for the issuer and other parties involved in the offering. Furthermore, material misstatements or omissions in the offering materials may also result in liability under the Securities Act. This report will provide an overview of the Securities Act of 1933 as it may be applied to mortgage-backed securities issued by private industry participants.

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The reconciliation instructions included in S.Con.Res. 1628 , the American Health Care Act (AHCA) of 2017. The House subsequently passed the AHCA with amendments on May 4, 2017, by a vote of 217 to 213. The House bill was received in the Senate on June 7, 2017, and the next day the Senate majority leader had it placed on the calendar, making it available for floor consideration. The Senate Budget Committee published on its website a "discussion draft" titled, "The Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017" (BCRA) on June 22, 2017, and updated the discussion draft on June 26 and July 13. On July 19, 2017, the Senate Budget Committee posted the "Obamacare Repeal Reconciliation Act of 2017" (ORRA) on its website as another draft reconciliation bill. Each of these draft bills is written in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute, meaning that it is intended to be considered by the Senate as an amendment to H.R. 1628 , as passed by the House, and that all of the House-passed language would be stricken and the language of the draft would be inserted in its place. ORRA is largely based off the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 ( H.R. 3762 ), which was vetoed by President Obama on January 8, 2016, and returned to the House. ORRA would repeal several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended), and it could restrict federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliates and clinics for a period of one year. The bill also would appropriate (1) an additional $422 million for FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund and (2) $750 million for each of FY2018 and FY2019 to award grants to states to address the substance abuse public health crisis or respond to urgent mental health needs. A number of the provisions in ORRA are also in the AHCA and/or BCRA. However, ORRA does not include the AHCA or BCRA provisions that would substitute the ACA's premium tax credit for premium tax credits with different eligibility rules and calculation requirements. ORRA also does not include the AHCA or BCRA provisions that would establish new programs and requirements that are not related to the ACA, for example, a new fund to provide funding to states for specified activities intended to improve access to health insurance and health care or provisions to convert Medicaid financing to a per capita cap model (i.e., per enrollee limits on federal payments to states) with a block grant option (i.e., a predetermined fixed amount of federal funding) for certain populations. This report provides summaries of each ORRA provision. In CY2018, CBO and JCT estimate that 17 million more people would be uninsured under ORRA than under current law, and CBO and JCT estimate that that figure would grow to 32 million in CY2026.

Per the reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution for FY2017 (S.Con.Res. 3), the House passed its reconciliation bill, H.R. 1628—the American Health Care Act (AHCA)—with amendments on May 4, 2017. The House bill was received in the Senate on June 7, 2017, and the next day the Senate majority leader had it placed on the calendar, making it available for floor consideration. The Senate Budget Committee published on its website a "discussion draft" titled, "The Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017" (BCRA) on June 22, 2017, and subsequently updated the discussion draft on June 26, July 13, and July 20. The Senate's draft legislation is written in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute, meaning that it is intended to be considered by the Senate as an amendment to H.R. 1628, as passed by the House, and that all of the House-passed language would be stricken and the language of the BCRA would be inserted in its place. On July 19, 2017, the Senate Budget Committee posted the "Obamacare Repeal Reconciliation Act of 2017" (ORRA) on its website as another draft reconciliation bill. ORRA is largely based off the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 (H.R. 3762), which was vetoed by President Obama on January 8, 2016, and returned to the House. ORRA would repeal several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), and it could restrict federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliates and clinics for a period of one year. The bill also would appropriate (1) an additional $422 million for FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund and (2) $750 million for each of FY2018 and FY2019 to award grants to states to address the substance abuse public health crisis or respond to urgent mental health needs. The Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimate that ORRA would reduce federal deficits by $473 billion from FY2017 through FY2026, and they estimate that 17 million more people would be uninsured under ORRA than under current law in FY2018, with that figure growing to 32 million in CY2026. A number of the provisions in ORRA are also in the AHCA and/or BCRA. However, ORRA does not include the AHCA or BCRA provisions that would substitute the ACA's premium tax credit for premium tax credits with different eligibility rules and calculation requirements. ORRA also does not include the AHCA or BCRA provisions that would establish new programs and requirements that are not related to the ACA, for example, a new fund to provide funding to states for specified activities intended to improve access to health insurance and health care or provisions to convert Medicaid financing to a per capita cap model (i.e., per enrollee limits on federal payments to states) with a block grant option (i.e., a predetermined fixed amount of federal funding) for certain populations. This report provides summaries of each ORRA provision.

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On June 24, 2016, Republicans released a tax reform blueprint, "A Better Way for Tax Reform." This blueprint proposes to consolidate the seven individual income tax brackets under current law into three, and to eliminate the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Statutory rates also provide limited information on the economic incentives created by the tax code. The analysis in this report relies on the 2010 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) individual public use file. The focus of this report is on the federal individual income tax. Statistics are provided to show how these rates vary for taxpayers at different income levels. Average Tax Rates A taxpayer's average tax rate is the percentage of total income that is paid in taxes. The average of average tax rates (or mean average tax rate) for taxpayers in the second income decile is less than the mean average tax rate for taxpayers in the lowest 10% of the income distribution, reflecting the phase-in of certain refundable credits (e.g., the EITC). For taxpayers in the top income decile, or those with incomes above $123,230 in 2010, the mean average tax rate was 13.6%. Effective Marginal Tax Rates Effective marginal tax rates are the amount paid in tax on the next dollar of income. In an uncomplicated tax system, the effective marginal rate would equal the statutory rate. While effective marginal tax rates tend to rise with income, there is substantial variation in the effective marginal tax rates faced by taxpayers within income groups. For low- and middle-income taxpayers, family composition explains much of the variation in average tax rates within income groups. Statutory Tax Rates Do Not Necessarily Reflect Tax Burden While statutory tax rates are often highlighted in tax reform debates, statutory tax rates are often not a good measure of either taxes paid on additional earnings or overall tax burden. Table 4 provides more information on the magnitude of differences between effective marginal and statutory rates, as well as average and statutory rates. Approximately 36% of taxpayers in the 10% bracket in 2010 faced effective marginal tax rates that were at least 5 percentage points higher than 10% (faced an effective marginal tax rate of at least 15%), while 20% of taxpayers in the 10% bracket faced effective marginal tax rates that were at least 10 percentage points higher than 10% (faced an effective marginal tax rate of at least 20%). Of the less than 1% of taxpayers in 2010 that filed returns that placed them in the top statutory bracket (the 35% bracket), nearly half of those taxpayers face an effective marginal tax rate that is less than the statutory rate, and for most of those taxpayers, the effective marginal tax rate was 30% or less. As a result, some higher-income taxpayers have average tax rates that are less than the average tax rate faced by lower-income taxpayers. Looking at Figure 8 , the distribution of average tax rates for single filers in the top income decile appears roughly similar to the distribution of average tax rates for married filers without children that are in the top 10% of that family type group. Since statutory tax rates provide limited information about tax burdens, questions of equity are often better addressed by using average rates. Since effective marginal tax rates do not equal statutory tax rates for a large proportion of taxpayers, statutory rates provide limited information on the incentives created by the tax code. In a progressive tax system, average tax rates rise with income. Exemptions, deductions, exclusions, credits, and other features of the tax code mean that, even for taxpayers with similar incomes, average tax rates can vary substantially. Further, controlling for family composition tends to expose differences in average tax burdens and effective marginal tax rates between taxpayers with and without children in the lower and middle parts of the income distribution. However, as illustrated in this report, under the current individual income tax system, there is substantial variation in tax burdens within income groups. Under the current system, however, a taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate often differs from the statutory rate. The most recent public use file available at the time this report was written was for tax year 2010.

Tax reform is a stated priority of the 115th Congress. In June 2016, Ways and Means Committee Republicans released the "Better Way" tax reform blueprint. The proposal seeks to make the individual income tax system "simpler, flatter, and fairer" by consolidating the number of individual income tax brackets. Looking at statutory tax rates alone, however, provides limited information regarding the simplicity or fairness of the tax system. Average tax rates and effective marginal tax rates are frequently used by economists and policy analysts to evaluate the fairness of the tax system, as well as various economic incentives created by the system. This report provides background information on alternative tax rate metrics, and discusses how these measures of the tax burden inform the tax reform debate. Under current law, there are seven statutory tax rate brackets in the federal individual income tax system. Very few taxpayers, less than 1% in 2014, face the top statutory rate. A taxpayer's average tax rate is the percentage of total income that is paid in taxes. This metric is useful when comparing tax burdens across taxpayers, as well as certain economic incentives created by the tax system. For nearly every taxpayer, average tax rates are less than the statutory rate. A taxpayer's effective marginal tax rate is the amount of income tax paid on the next dollar of earnings. Effective marginal tax rates are determined by statutory rates, as well as various other provisions. Effective marginal tax rates also provide information on the economic incentives created by the tax code for different taxpayers. As illustrated in this report, under the current system, statutory, average, and effective marginal tax rates can differ substantially for any given taxpayer. Since statutory tax rates provide limited information about tax burdens, questions of equity are often better addressed by using average rates. Since effective marginal tax rates do not equal statutory tax rates for a large proportion of taxpayers, statutory rates provide limited information on the incentives created by the tax code. One way to evaluate average tax rates is to examine them across the income distribution. This report uses the 2010 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) public use file, the most recent publicly available sample of individual taxpayer returns available when this report was written, to complete this analysis. When taxpayers are divided into income deciles (grouped such that there are 10 equal-sized groups of taxpayers, ranked by income), average tax rates are negative for the first four income deciles. Negative average tax rates are the result of refundable tax credits, generally provided to working families with children. For the top income decile, taxpayers with income above $123,210 in 2010, the average of the average tax rates was 13.6%. In an uncomplicated tax system, marginal tax rates would generally equal the statutory tax rate. For 46% of taxpayers in 2010, effective marginal tax rates differed from the statutory rate. Twenty-nine percent of taxpayers had an effective marginal tax rate that exceeded their statutory rate, while 16% had an effective marginal tax rate that was less than the statutory rate. Both average and effective marginal tax rates vary both across and within income groups. Average tax rates tend to rise with income, reflecting the overall progressivity of the tax system. However, the substantial variation of average tax rates within income groups illustrates that higher-income taxpayers do not necessarily face higher average tax rates. For lower- and middle-income taxpayers, family composition explains much of the difference in average tax rates for taxpayers with similar incomes. Unlike average tax rates, effective marginal tax rates do not always rise with income. The phase-ins and phaseouts associated with tax benefits for families with children mean that for these family types, effective marginal tax rates in the lower and middle parts of the income distribution are similar to those faced by taxpayers near the top of the income distribution.

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Energy Tax Policy from 1918 to 1970: Promoting Oil and Gas Historically, federal energy tax policy was focused on increasing domestic oil and gas reserves and production; there were no tax incentives for energy conservation or for alternative fuels. Relatively low oil prices encouraged petroleum consumption (as opposed to conservation) and inhibited the development of alternatives to fossil fuels, such as unconventional fuels and renewable forms of energy. Chief among the taxes on oil was the windfall profit tax (WPT) enacted in 1980 ( P.L. The third broad action taken during the 1970s to implement the new and refocused energy tax policy was the introduction of numerous tax incentives or subsidies (e.g., special tax credits, deductions, exclusions) for energy conservation, the development of alternative fuels (renewable and nonconventional fuels), and the commercialization of energy efficiency and alternative fuels technologies. Although the Reagan Administration's objective was to create a free-market energy policy, significant liberalization of the depreciation system and reduction in marginal tax rates—both the result of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA, P.L. President George H.W. 4 . The House bill proposed larger energy tax cuts, with some energy tax increases. It included about $5 billion in energy tax incentives. Energy Action in the 109th Congress The 109 th Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ), which included the most extensive amendments to U.S. energy tax laws since 1992, and the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, which extended the energy tax subsidies enacted under the 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPACT05). This bill was weighted almost entirely toward fossil fuels and electricity supply. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 provided for one-year extensions of these provisions. Energy Tax Policy in the 110th Congress Continued high crude oil and petroleum product prices and oil and gas industry profits, and the political realignment of the Congress resulting from the 2006 Congressional elections continued the energy policy shift toward increased taxes on the oil and gas industry, and the emphasis on energy conservation and alternative and renewable fuels rather than conventional hydrocarbons. On October 3, President Bush signed this legislation, the Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343 ), which includes $17 billion in energy tax incentives, primarily extensions of pre-existing provisions, but also including several new energy tax incentives: $10.9 billion in renewable energy tax incentives aimed at clean energy production, $2.6 billion in incentives targeted toward cleaner vehicles and fuels, and $3.5 billion in tax breaks to promote energy conservation and energy efficiency. The cost of the energy tax extenders legislation is fully financed, or paid for, by raising taxes on the oil and gas industry (mostly by reducing oil and gas tax breaks) and by other tax increases. The oil and gas tax increases comprise cutbacks in the IRC §199 manufacturing deduction for income attributable to oil and gas production, which will be frozen at 6% (rather than increasing to 9% as scheduled), reforming the foreign tax credit provisions, and by increasing the per-barrel tax rate on refinery crude oil under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund provisions.

Historically, U.S. federal energy tax policy promoted the supply of oil and gas. However, the 1970s witnessed (1) a significant cutback in the oil and gas industry's tax preferences, (2) the imposition of new excise taxes on oil, and (3) the introduction of numerous tax preferences for energy conservation, the development of alternative fuels, and the commercialization of the technologies for producing these fuels (renewables such as solar, wind, and biomass, and nonconventional fossil fuels such as shale oil and coalbed methane). The Reagan Administration, using a free-market approach, advocated repeal of the windfall profit tax on oil and the repeal or phase-out of most energy tax preferences—for oil and gas, as well as alternative fuels. Due to the combined effects of the Economic Recovery Tax Act and the energy tax subsidies that had not been repealed, which together created negative effective tax rates in some cases, the actual energy tax policy differed from the stated policy. The George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton years witnessed a return to a much more activist energy tax policy, with an emphasis on energy conservation and alternative fuels. While the original aim was to reduce demand for imported oil, energy tax policy was also increasingly viewed as a tool for achieving environmental and fiscal objectives. The Clinton Administration's energy tax policy emphasized the environmental benefits of reducing greenhouse gases and global climate change, but it will also be remembered for its failed proposal to enact a broadly based energy tax on Btus (British thermal units) and its 1993 across-the-board increase in motor fuels taxes of 4.3¢/gallon. The 109th Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), signed by President Bush on August 8, 2005, provided a net energy tax cut of $11.5 billion ($14.5 billion gross energy tax cuts, less $3 billion of energy tax increases) for fossil fuels and electricity, as well as for energy efficiency, and for several types of alternative and renewable resources, such as solar and geothermal. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432), enacted in December 2006, provided for one-year extensions of these provisions. The current energy tax structure favors tax incentives for alternative and renewable fuels supply relative to energy from conventional fossil fuels, and this posture was accentuated under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. On October 3, President Bush signed the Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343), which includes $17 billion in energy tax incentives, primarily extensions of pre-existing provisions, but also including several new energy tax incentives: $10.9 billion in renewable energy tax incentives aimed at clean energy production, $2.6 billion in incentives targeted toward cleaner vehicles and fuels, and $3.5 billion in tax breaks to promote energy conservation and energy efficiency. The cost of the energy tax extenders legislation is fully financed, or paid for, by raising taxes on the oil and gas industry (mostly by reducing oil and gas tax breaks) and by other tax increases. The oil and gas tax increases comprise cutbacks in the IRC §199 manufacturing deduction for income attributable to oil and gas production, which will be frozen at 6% (rather than increasing to 9% as scheduled), reforming the foreign tax credit provisions, and by increasing the per-barrel tax rate on refinery crude oil under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund provisions.

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Introduction In June 2008, the Supreme Court issued its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller , holding by a 5-4 vote that the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects an individual right to possess a firearm, unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes such as self-defense within the home. The decision in Heller marked the first time in almost 70 years that the Supreme Court addressed the nature of the right conferred by the Second Amendment. Although the Court conducted an extensive analysis of the Second Amendment to interpret its meaning, the decision left unanswered other significant constitutional questions, including the standard of scrutiny that should be applied to laws regulating the possession and use of firearms, and whether the Second Amendment applies to the states. Accordingly, this report first provides a historical overview of judicial treatment of the Second Amendment and a discussion of the Court's decision in Heller . It then examines the issue of incorporation, which was the focus of the McDonald decision. Lastly, this report concludes with an analysis that focuses on the potential impact of the Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald on such legislation pertaining to the use and possession of firearms at the federal, state, and local levels. Parker v. District of Columbia In Parker , six residents of the District of Columbia challenged three provisions of the District's 1975 Firearms Control Regulation Act: DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02(a)(4), which generally barred the registration of handguns, thus effectively prohibiting of possession of handguns in the District; § 22-4504(a), which prohibited carrying a pistol without a license (to the extent the provision would prevent a registrant from moving a gun from one room to another within his or her home); and § [phone number scrubbed].02, which required all lawfully owned firearms be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. The Court then declared that the inherent right of self-defense is central to the Second Amendment right, and that the District's handgun ban amounted to a prohibition of an entire class of arms that has been overwhelmingly utilized by American society for that purpose. Has the Supreme Court Addressed Incorporation of the Second Amendment via the Due Process Clause? Post-Heller Appellate Decisions and Incorporation of the Second Amendment After the Heller decision, three courts of appeals addressed whether the Second Amendment applies to the states, that is, via direct application or via incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit both held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states, whereas the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Nordyke v. King held that the Second Amendment is applicable to the states, though it later vacated its decision in light of McDonald . Similarly, in National Rifle Association v. City of Chicago , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit) held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states.

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in a 5-4 decision that the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects an individual right to possess a firearm, unconnected with service in a militia, and the use of that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. The decision in Heller affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which declared three provisions of the District of Columbia's Firearms Control Regulation Act unconstitutional. The provisions specifically ruled on were: DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02, which generally barred the registration of handguns; DC Code § 22-4504, which prohibited carrying a pistol without a license, insofar as the provision would prevent a registrant from moving a gun from one room to another within his or her home; and DC Code § [phone number scrubbed].02, which required that all lawfully owned firearms be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. In noting that the District's approach "totally bans handgun possession in the home," the Supreme Court declared that the inherent right of self-defense is central to the Second Amendment right, and that the District's handgun ban amounted to a prohibition of an entire class of arms that has been overwhelmingly utilized by American society for that purpose. The Court in Heller conducted an extensive analysis of the Second Amendment to interpret its meaning, but the decision left unanswered other significant constitutional questions, including the standard of scrutiny that should be applied to laws regulating the possession and use of firearms, and whether the Second Amendment is incorporated, or applies to, the states. After Heller, three federal Courts of Appeals addressed the question of incorporation. Two of these decisions, from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, held that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states, whereas the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment is incorporated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although this decision has since been vacated. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and held that the Second Amendment applies to the states. With respect to the Heller decision, this report provides an overview of judicial treatment of the Second Amendment over the past 70 years in both the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts. With respect to the McDonald decision, this report presents an overview of the principles of incorporation, early cases that addressed the application of the Second Amendment to state governments, and the federal appellate cases that addressed incorporation of the Second Amendment since the Heller decision. Lastly, this report provides an analysis of the Court's opinions in Heller and McDonald and the potential implications of these decisions for firearms legislation at the federal, state, and local levels.

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Introduction Introduced in various incarnations in every congressional session since the 103 rd Congress, the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA; H.R. 1755 / S. 815 in the 113 th Congress) would prohibit discrimination based on an individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity by public and private employers in hiring, discharge, compensation, and other terms and conditions of employment. The stated purpose of the legislation is "to address the history and persistent, widespread pattern of discrimination, including unconstitutional discrimination, on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity by private sector employers and local, State, and Federal Government employers," as well as to provide effective remedies for such discrimination. Patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the act would be enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

Introduced in various incarnations in every congressional session since the 103rd Congress, the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA; H.R. 1755/S. 815 in the 113th Congress) would prohibit discrimination based on an individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity by public and private employers in hiring, discharge, compensation, and other terms and conditions of employment. The stated purpose of the legislation is "to address the history and persistent, widespread pattern of discrimination, including unconstitutional discrimination, on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity by private sector employers and local, State, and Federal Government employers," as well as to provide effective remedies for such discrimination. Patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the act would be enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

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Main Points Russia will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) week-long series of senior-level meetings in Vladivostok on September 2-9, 2012. The main event for the week will be the 20 th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting to be held September 8-9, 2012. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will represent the United States. The November 2011 APEC Meetings in Honolulu On November 12-13, 2011, the United States hosted the 19 th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu. In addition, the nine leaders of the nations that were then negotiating the TPP agreement—Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam—met and announced what the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) described as "the broad outlines of an ambitious, 21 st century Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement." For the United States, another important outcome of the 2011 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting was the agreement to set a cap tariff rate on "environmental goods" of 5%, and to phase out tariffs on environmental goods by 2015. However, the 21 APEC members could not reach a final agreement on which goods would be considered "environmental goods." The Agenda for the 2012 Economic Leaders' Meeting As host for the 20 th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Russia has the lead in setting the agenda for the two-day event. According to the APEC 2012 webpage, the main priorities are: trade and investment liberalization and regional economic integration; strengthening food security; establishing reliable supply chains; and intensive cooperation to foster innovative growth. The United States has also enhanced relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by appointing the first resident U.S. The heightened U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region has raised questions about APEC's continued role and relevance in U.S. foreign policy, particularly given the growing number of alternative regional events or organizations at which the United States can present its views. Some Chinese scholars and officials have expressed considerable concern about U.S motivations behind fostering a comprehensive free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region, perceiving TPP as part of a U.S. containment policy aimed at China. Implications for Congress Congressional interest in APEC has generally focused on three issues—implications for U.S. trade policy in general, potential effects on relations with China, and budgetary matters. On occasion, the trade liberalization measures proposed to APEC by the United States in its Individual Action Plan (IAP) have required changes in U.S. trade laws (such as the lowering of tariff rates) or trade policy. Finally, as an APEC member, the United States must contribute to the annual budget of APEC to maintain the APEC Secretariat in Singapore and finance various APEC activities and programs. The Congressional Budget Justification for FY2013 includes a request for $1.028 million for APEC support.

Russia will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) week-long series of senior-level meetings in Vladivostok on September 2-9, 2012. The main event for the week will be the 20th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting to be held September 8-9, 2012. President Barack Obama will not attend the event; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will lead the U.S. delegation. As host for the 20th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Russia has set the main agenda items as: advancing trade and investment liberalization and regional economic integration; strengthening food security; establishing reliable supply chains; and promoting cooperation to foster innovative growth. The United States hopes to complete priorities established at last year's Economic Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu and support Russia's agenda in cases where the two nations share a common objective. On November 12-13, 2011, the United States hosted the 19th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu. While in Honolulu, the nine leaders of negotiating nations—Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam—met and announced the broad outline for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, which to the United States and some other APEC members may serve as a stepping stone for a broader Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific open to all APEC members. However, not all APEC members support such a vision for the TPP. Following the 19th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, the APEC leaders issued a declaration, reaffirming their opposition to protectionism and pledging to advance regional integration and the expansion of trade among APEC members. The leaders also agreed to set a cap tariff rate on "environmental goods" of 5%, and to phase out tariffs on environmental goods by 2015. However, they could not reach a final agreement on which goods would be considered "environmental goods." Given the growing number of alternative regional events or organizations at which the United States can present its views, the heightened U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region has raised questions about APEC's continued role and relevance in U.S. foreign policy. Since taking office, President Obama has strengthened ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asian Summit (EAS), raising questions about the roles of each of these groups in U.S. relations in the region. In addition, China has grown concerned about greater U.S. interest in the region, with some Chinese officials viewing it as part of a U.S. containment policy aimed at China. Congressional interest in APEC has generally focused on three issues—implications for U.S. trade policy in general, potential effects on relations with China, and budgetary matters. On occasion, the trade liberalization measures proposed to APEC by the United States have required changes in U.S. trade laws. As an APEC member, the United States must contribute to the annual budget of APEC. The Congressional Budget Justification for FY2013 includes a request for $1.028 million for APEC support.

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Introduction Although much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established more than 35 years ago to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to "point" source discharges of metals and organic and inorganic toxic substances from factories and sewage treatment plants. Since then, no comprehensive reauthorization legislation has been introduced, but beginning in the 106 th Congress, a number of bills dealing with specific water quality issues in the law have been enacted—especially, legislation to reauthorize several existing CWA programs. Since the 107 th Congress, one of the dominant CWA issues has been water infrastructure financing—that is, extension and modification of provisions of the act authorizing financial assistance for municipal wastewater treatment projects. However, there is less agreement about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the act have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. These factors partly explain why Congress has recently favored focusing legislative attention on narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, rather than taking up comprehensive proposals. Funding for water infrastructure projects, discussed next in this report, received early attention in the 111 th Congress in light of interest in utilizing increased investment in public works projects—including wastewater—in order to stimulate the faltering U.S. economy, but the Obama Administration did not present specific legislative proposals concerning water quality. Two bills amending the CWA were enacted and are discussed. One dealt with extending a moratorium for CWA permitting of certain vessels ( P.L. 111-215 ), and the other dealt with ensuring that federal agencies and departments pay localities for reasonable costs associated with managing stormwater pollution from federal properties ( P.L. At issue has been what the federal role should be in assisting states and cities, especially in view of such high projected funding needs. In that Congress, House and Senate committees approved bills to extend the act's SRF program and increase federal assistance ( H.R. The House passed a bill, and legislation was reported by a Senate committee. Several issues contributed to the fact that, once again, no legislation was enacted. 1262 On March 12, 2009, the House approved legislation to reauthorize the SRF program and several related programs in the CWA ( H.R. S. 1005 Companion legislation was approved by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in May 2009 ( S. 1005 , the Water Infrastructure Financing Act), but the Senate did not consider the bill. Regulatory Protection of Wetlands How best to protect the nation's remaining wetlands and regulate activities taking place in wetlands has become one of the most contentious environmental policy issues, especially in the context of the CWA, which contains a key wetlands regulatory tool, the permit program in Section 404. On June 18, 2009, the Environment and Public Works Committee approved, 12-7, an amended version of S. 787 , the Clean Water Restoration Act. 5088 , America's Commitment to Clean Water Act). 111-378 ). 111-5 ). President Obama signed the bill on October 30, 2009 ( P.L.

Although much progress has been made in achieving the ambitious goals that Congress established more than 35 years ago in the Clean Water Act (CWA) to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, long-standing problems persist, and new problems have emerged. Water quality problems are diverse, ranging from pollution runoff from farms and ranches, city streets, and other diffuse or "nonpoint" sources, to toxic substances discharged from factories and sewage treatment plants. There is little agreement among stakeholders about what solutions are needed and whether new legislation is required to address the nation's remaining water pollution problems. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the CWA have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. Congress has instead focused legislative attention on enacting narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, but not any comprehensive proposals. For several years, the most prominent legislative water quality issue has concerned financial assistance for municipal wastewater treatment projects. House and Senate committees have approved bills on several occasions, but, for various reasons, no legislation has been enacted. At issue has been how the federal government will assist states and cities in meeting needs to rebuild, repair, and upgrade wastewater treatment plants, especially in light of capital costs that are projected to be as much as $390 billion. In the 111th Congress, interest in increased investment in public works infrastructure—including wastewater—in order to stimulate the faltering U.S. economy brought greater attention to water infrastructure issues. Acting quickly, in February 2009, Congress passed and the President signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5). Among its provisions, the legislation appropriated $4.0 billion in additional CWA assistance for wastewater projects. In addition, in March 2009, the House passed legislation to reauthorize the CWA's State Revolving Fund (SRF) program to finance wastewater infrastructure and several related provisions of the act (H.R. 1262). A companion bill was approved by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee (S. 1005). No legislation was enacted. Programs that regulate activities in wetlands also have been of interest, especially CWA Section 404, which has been criticized by landowners for intruding on private land-use decisions and imposing excessive economic burdens. Environmentalists view this regulatory program as essential for maintaining the health of wetland ecosystems, and they are concerned about court rulings that narrowed regulatory protection of wetlands and about related administrative actions. Many stakeholders desire clarification of the act's regulatory jurisdiction, but they differ on what solutions are appropriate. In the 111th Congress, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved a bill that sought to clarify but not expand the CWA's geographic scope (the Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787). A companion bill was introduced in the House (H.R. 5088). Because some stakeholders believe that the bills would expand federal jurisdiction—not simply clarify it—the bills were controversial, and no legislation was enacted. The 111th Congress considered a number of water quality issues through oversight and legislation. Two bills amending the CWA were enacted and are discussed. One dealt with extending a moratorium for CWA permitting of certain vessels (P.L. 111-215), and the other dealt with ensuring that federal agencies and departments pay localities for reasonable costs associated with managing stormwater pollution from federal properties (P.L. 111-378).

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In one common usage, outsourcing simply means the use by a firm of inputs produced outside the firm, either by foreigners or unrelated domestic firms—the important fact is simply that someone else performs the function. The focus of this report, however, is the international economy; its analysis is confined to what might be termed "offshore" outsourcing. A second use of "outsourcing" has also referred to international trade, but to flows of goods rather than services. The basic analysis of taxes and trade is the same whether the trade is in services or goods; thus, it is important to look at the first two examples of outsourcing together, combining our assessment of the direct use of foreign labor with that of the importation of goods. In terms of the outsourcing debate, taxes do not affect the net amount of the first type of outsourcing identified above, the use of foreign labor services or inputs made by foreign firms. Current U.S. tax law poses a mix of incentives and disincentives towards overseas investment; its net result is uncertain. In part, this is because the focus of this report is on how taxes affect outsourcing, not how outsourcing, in turn, affects variables such as employment. Importantly, in this usage of the term "outsourcing" we rule out items produced by the U.S. firm's own foreign facilities. As applied to the outsourcing debate, theory thus indicates that taxes have little impact on the extent to which the economy as a whole engages in this type of outsourcing, at least as compared to the country's level of exports. The ETI benefit was designed to boost U.S. exports by cutting taxes on export income. Taxes will shift investment from foreign locations to the domestic economy if taxes are relatively lower on domestic investment, and taxes will have no impact on (will be "neutral" towards) the location of investment if their burden is the same in each location. The Impact of the Current System and Recent Legislation In the preceding section we saw how taxes can have an impact on the overall level and composition of trade, though not the trade balance; they can also alter the type of outsourcing that consists of overseas production by U.S. firms. We do not provide a detailed assessment here of the impact of the current tax system on the level and composition of trade (again, the system does not have a direct impact on the balance of trade). Tax Policy and Foreign Investment Economic theory also provides a framework for interpreting taxes' impact on foreign investment from the perspective of economic efficiency and economic welfare. Outsourcing and Domestic Employment The preceding economic analysis concluded that taxes best promote economic efficiency and economic welfare when they neither encourage nor discourage outsourcing, whether that outsourcing consists of imports of goods or services or exports of capital investment. Summary and Conclusions A recent focus of tax policy debate has been the impact of taxes on the extent to which firms use imported inputs rather than domestic goods and services and whether taxes encourage U.S. firms to establish operations abroad rather than in the United States. In terms of the outsourcing debate, theory holds that taxes best promote economic welfare when they do not distort the level or composition of outsourcing. With outsourcing that occurs through investment, theory similarly indicates taxes best promote world economic efficiency and economic welfare when they do not distort investment flows.

The impact of taxes on international trade and investment has been debated for decades. Most recently, a variety of bills addressing international taxation were introduced in the 110th Congress—some would have cut taxes for U.S. firms overseas, while others would have increased taxes on foreign investment. The debate over taxes and foreign outsourcing has tended to grow more heated during times of domestic economic weakness and high unemployment; questions arise over whether taxes contribute to such weakness by discouraging exports (or encouraging imports) or by encouraging U.S. firms to move abroad. The debate over international taxation has again become prominent as a part of the wider debate over "outsourcing." With taxes, the debate asks how the current system affects outsourcing, and whether policies designed to limit the phenomenon might be desirable. The precise meaning of the term "outsourcing" varies, depending on the context. In one usage, outsourcing simply refers to the use by domestic firms of inputs produced by other firms. Other usages, however, refer exclusively to the international sector. The analysis in this report focuses on two types of such "offshore" outsourcing: the use by domestic firms of imported foreign inputs, including both the use of foreign technical services and the use of foreign-made goods; and the shifting by U.S. firms of domestic operations abroad. The analysis of the first of these types of outsourcing focuses primarily on how taxes affect trade while investment is held constant. The assessment of the second type looks at how taxes affect investment. Taxes probably have little impact on the balance of trade (what might be termed "net" outsourcing), apart from indirect effects that may result from their impact on investment flows. In the language of the outsourcing debate, taxes likely do not change the extent to which the economy as a whole engages in the use of foreign, rather than domestic, inputs (compared to the extent the economy exports). In contrast, taxes can affect the flow of direct investment abroad—that is, the establishment of overseas production facilities by U.S. firms. Thus, if outsourcing is taken to mean the use by U.S. firms of foreign rather than domestic labor, taxes can have an impact. The current U.S. system, however, produces a variety of incentives, disincentives, and neutrality towards overseas investment, and the net impact of the system on the flow of investment is not clear. Similarly, the likely impact of recently enacted legislation is not clear. Economic theory provides frameworks for evaluating the efficiency effect of taxes on international trade and investment, and their subsequent impact on economic welfare. According to theory, taxes best promote economic efficiency—and thus best promote economic welfare—when they do not distort the level or composition of trade or alter the allocation of investment between foreign and domestic uses. In short, taxes best promote economic efficiency and aggregate economic welfare when they do not distort the level of outsourcing, in the sense it is used in this report. With respect to employment, outsourcing may cause sector-specific and near-term job losses but likely does not have a substantial long-run impact on overall employment. This report will be updated only when major legislative developments occur.

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Despite this, the Muslims of Asia are perceived to be on the periphery of the Islamic core based in the Arab Middle East. Some analysts believe that as long as the Muslim world views the U.S.-led war against terror as a war against Islam there will be significant limits on the extent to which Muslim states will be able to cooperate with the United States in the war against terror. The Islamic revival has a complex relationship to the level of extremism in Asia. While Islam in Southeast Asia has been moderate in character, it is undergoing a process of revivalist change in some segments of society. China is home to an estimated 17.5 to 36 million Muslims.

There exists much diversity within the Islamic world. This is particularly evident in Asia. This diversity is to be found in the different ethnic backgrounds and in the different practices of Islam. The Muslim world of Asia has been experiencing an Islamic revival. This has had an effect on moderate as well as radical Muslims. An understanding of the dynamics of Islam in Asia should help inform United States' policy to develop respect between America and Muslim peoples, to foster economic policies to encourage development of open societies, to support education in Muslim states, and to identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries in order to pursue more effectively the war against terror. This report will be updated.

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In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. This report identifies, for the 113 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) ( http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ ) , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). President Barack H. Obama submitted 273 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 273 nominations, 162 were confirmed; 8 were withdrawn; and 103 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. This report provides, for each executive department nomination confirmed in the 113 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). For confirmed nominations, a mean of 119.2 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 92.0.

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone, or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 351 full-time leadership positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate during the 113 th Congress for full-time positions in these 15 executive departments. Information for each department is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 15 executive departments appears in the Appendix. During the 113 th Congress, the President submitted 273 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 273 nominations, 162 were confirmed, 8 were withdrawn, and 103 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 119.2 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 92.0. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) ( http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ ) , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). This report will not be updated.

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Scope of the Agriculture Appropriations Bill The Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—provides funding for the following agencies and departments: all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (except the Forest Service, which is funded by the Interior appropriations bill), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services, and in the House, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In the House, appropriations jurisdiction for CFTC remains with the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee. Prior to 2008, it was with the Senate Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee. 1. 3. 4. Action on FY2011 Appropriations For the FY2011 Agriculture appropriations bill, no separate floor action and limited formal committee action occurred in the 111 th Congress. The full Senate Appropriations Committee reported an Agriculture appropriations bill ( S. 3606 , S.Rept. The House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its draft on June 30, 2010, but the bill did not see full committee action nor was it reported. 112-10 ) was enacted with many line-item changes on April 15, 2011. On February 19, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1 , a full-year continuing resolution for FY2011 covering all 12 regular appropriations bills (vote of 235-189). On March 9, 2011, the Senate voted on H.R. 1 , but failed to pass it by a vote of 44-56. Later on March 9, 2011, the Senate also voted on a substitute amendment to H.R. 1 , S.Amdt. It failed by a vote of 42-58. 111-221 ) on July 15, 2010. Full-Year Continuing Resolution P.L. 112-10 provided $19.9 billion in discretionary appropriations for accounts in the Agriculture appropriations bill, resulting in a $3.4 billion reduction from FY2010 levels (-15%) ( Table 2 ). Discretionary agriculture-related programs fell to $6.89 billion, 6% below FY2010; discretionary conservation programs fell to $889 million, 12% below FY2010; rural development fell to $2.64 billion, 11% below FY2010; discretionary nutrition assistance fell to $7.13 billion, 7% below FY2010; and foreign assistance fell to $1.89 billion, 9% below FY2010. CFTC increased to $202 million, 20% above FY2010 ( Table 3 ). Reductions in Short-Term Continuing Resolutions Before final agreement was reached on the full-year appropriation, seven short-term continuing resolutions (CRs) were enacted. The total amount is divided between discretionary domestic nutrition assistance programs and the rest of the bill. For FY2011, P.L. 149 ). Of the $3.4 billion total reduction in discretionary programs, about half of the cut ($1.7 billion) was the increase in the amount of rescissions and farm bill limitations.

The Agriculture appropriations bill provides funding for all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except the Forest Service, plus the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and, in some cases, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Appropriations jurisdiction for the CFTC is split between two subcommittees—the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee and the Senate Financial Services Appropriations Subcommittee. For the FY2011 Agriculture appropriations bill, no separate floor action and limited formal committee action occurred in the 111th Congress. The full Senate Appropriations Committee reported an Agriculture appropriations bill (S. 3606, S.Rept. 111-221) on July 15, 2010. The House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee marked up its draft on June 30, 2010, but the bill did not see full committee action nor was it reported. None of the 12 appropriations bills was enacted in 2010. In the 112th Congress, the House passed H.R. 1, a full-year continuing resolution for FY2011, by a vote of 235-189 on February 19, 2011. For Agriculture, H.R. 1 would have made $5.3 billion in cuts to discretionary programs (-23%), reducing them from $23.4 billion in FY2010 to $18.1 billion for FY2011. On March 9, 2011, the Senate voted on H.R. 1, but failed to pass it by a vote of 44-56. Later on March 9, 2011, the Senate also voted on a substitute amendment, S.Amdt. 149; it failed by a vote of 42-58. S.Amdt. 149 would have reduced discretionary Agriculture appropriations by $1.7 billion (-7%) from the FY2010 level of $23.4 billion to $21.7 billion. On April 15, 2011, a final, full-year continuing resolution was enacted as Division B of the Department of Defense appropriation, P.L. 112-10. Seven short-term continuing resolutions (CRs) were enacted in between, some with spending reductions, to prevent a government shutdown before the final agreement was reached for the full-year continuing resolution. P.L. 112-10 provides $19.9 billion of discretionary funding for Agriculture appropriations, a 15% reduction (-$3.4 billion) from FY2010 levels. Mandatory appropriations for farm programs and domestic nutrition increased a net 7% to $105.1 billion. Thus, the total Agriculture appropriation (mandatory plus discretionary) for FY2011 is $125.0 billion, 3% greater than FY2010. Discretionary agriculture-related programs fell to $6.89 billion, 6% below FY2010; discretionary conservation programs fell to $889 million, 12% below FY2010; rural development fell to $2.64 billion, 11% below FY2010; discretionary nutrition assistance fell to $7.13 billion, 7% below FY2010; and foreign assistance fell to $1.89 billion, 9% below FY2010. FDA increased to $2.46 billion, 4% above FY2010, and CFTC increased to $202 million, 20% above FY2010. Cuts to individual agricultural agencies' operating budgets would have been even bigger had it not been for usually large amounts of rescissions of unobligated prior-year balances and limitations on mandatory farm bill programs. Of the $3.4 billion total reduction in discretionary appropriations from FY2010, about half of the cut was the increase in the amount of rescissions and farm bill limitations.

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In the consolidated cases of Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States , decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus . The Court also found that § 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which limited judicial review of executive determinations of the petitioners' enemy combatant status, did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and therefore acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas . The immediate impact of the Boumediene decision is that detainees at Guantanamo may petition a federal district court for habeas review of the circumstances of their detention. For discussion of litigation challenging detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

In the consolidated cases of Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. The Court also found that § 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which limited judicial review of executive determinations of the petitioners' enemy combatant status, did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and therefore acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas. The immediate impact of the Boumediene decision is that detainees at Guantanamo may petition a federal district court for habeas review of the circumstances of their detention. This report summarizes the Boumediene decision and analyzes several of its major implications for the U.S. detention of alien enemy combatants and legislation that limits detainees' access to judicial review. For discussion of litigation challenging detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

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Background on the Blockade Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but retained control of the territory's borders. Some countries and organizations, including Turkey, consider Hamas a democratically elected, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Hamas remains in control of Gaza. In recent years, humanitarian aid groups have sent supply ships and activists to Gaza. However, Israel directs them to land at its port of Ashdod for inspection before delivery to Gaza. A six-ship flotilla then set sail for the Gaza Strip with the intent to deliver 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid and to break the Israeli blockade. On May 30, the ships refused Israel's offer to unload at the port of Ashdod so that their cargos could be inspected before delivery accompanied by representatives of the non-governmental organizations. Nine passengers were killed, including eight Turks and a Turkish-American; 24 were injured, including one American, and 10 commandos were injured. After Operation Cast Lead, however, Israel began intercepting Free Gaza Movement ships before they reached Gaza. It is not a U.S. State Department-designated terrorist group, although it is part of a Saudi-based, Hamas-created umbrella group of Muslim charities called Union of Good that the U.S. Treasury has designated as a terrorist organization. Israel's leaders appear to believe that the blockade of the Gaza Strip, the security barrier that Israel has constructed in the West Bank, the successes of the Palestinian security forces and economy in the West Bank, and what it views as enhanced deterrence in the aftermath of military campaigns against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas in the Gaza Strip from December 2008 to January 2009 have brought about a kind of quiet, if not peace. International Reactions There has been near-universal condemnation of Israel's actions. Investigations/Inquiries In response to international calls for an investigation of the incident, Israel has launched several probes. We believe that Israel, as a country which attacked on a civil convoy in international waters, will not conduct an impartial inquiry. He also said that "international participation in a commission established by Israel does not give it an international quality." Position Policy The United States is caught between two long-time allies—Israel and Turkey—and the Obama Administration seems interested in finding a path between them that will not antagonize either party. He also stated that the Administration had been "cajoling" Israel to allow building materials into Gaza. That slated in some way for Gaza includes $40 million to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency's (UNRWA) Emergency Appeal for Gaza and the West Bank to help improve educational and health services, increase job creation, and repair shelters in Gaza, while also addressing core humanitarian needs in the West Bank; $14.5 million for school rehabilitation, small-scale agriculture, the repair of a hospital and other community infrastructure in Gaza; $10 million for the construction of five new UNRWA schools in Gaza; and $5 million to complete five USAID-funded projects to repair water distribution and wastewater collection systems in Gaza. Yet, there was a dearth of ideas from those who called on Israel to end the blockade concerning creative ways for Israel to do that and to continue to prevent the arming of Hamas and its development as a more deadly threat to Israel. However, the naval blockade would not be lifted. Turkish-Israeli Relations The current crisis is undoubtedly a turning point in Turkish-Israeli relations. To prohibit the United States participation on the U.N. Human Rights Council and prohibit contributions to the U.N. for the purpose of paying for any U.N. investigation into the flotilla incident.

Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but retained control of its borders. Hamas, a U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and forcibly seized control of the territory in 2007. Israel imposed a tighter blockade of Gaza in response to Hamas's takeover and tightened the flow of goods and materials into Gaza after its military offensive against Hamas from December 2008 to January 2009. That offensive destroyed much of Gaza's infrastructure, but Israel has obstructed the delivery of rebuilding materials that it said could also be used to manufacture weapons and for other military purposes. Israel, the U.N., and international non-governmental organizations differ about the severity of the blockade's effects on the humanitarian situation of Palestinian residents of Gaza. Nonetheless, it is clear that the territory's economy and people are suffering. In recent years, humanitarian aid groups have sent supply ships and activists to Gaza. However, Israel directs them to its port of Ashdod for inspection before delivery to Gaza. In May 2010, the pro-Palestinian Free Gaza Movement and the pro-Hamas Turkish Humanitarian Relief Fund organized a six-ship flotilla to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza and to break Israel's blockade of the territory. The ships refused an Israeli offer to deliver the goods to Ashdod. On May 31, Israeli naval special forces intercepted the convoy in international waters. They took control of five of the ships without resistance. However, some activists on a large Turkish passenger vessel challenged the commandos. The confrontation resulted in eight Turks and one Turkish-American killed, more than 20 passengers injured, and 10 commandos injured. Israel considered its actions to be legitimate self-defense. Turkey, whose nationals comprised the largest contingent in the flotilla and among the casualties, considered them to be unjustifiable and in contravention of international law. There was near-universal international condemnation of Israel's actions. The U.N. Security Council in a U.S.-Turkish compromise condemned "the acts" that resulted in lost lives and called for an impartial inquiry. Several inquiries are underway in Israel, but Turkey will not be satisfied unless there is an international one under U.N. auspices. The Obama Administration tried to walk a fine line between two allies, Israel and Turkey, and not allow the incident to derail efforts to ameliorate relations with Israel in order to protect Israeli-Palestinian talks now underway. It urged Israel to include international participants in its probe of the incident, and announced an aid package for the Palestinians that does not require new appropriations. However, the Administration's reaction displeased Turkey, and may contribute to that country's ongoing pursuit of a more independent foreign policy course. Turkish-Israeli relations, which had been deteriorating for some time, have reached a low point. In the aftermath of the incident, Israel has eased restrictions on the passage of goods and people into Gaza, while continuing to prevent shipments of weapons and dual-use items to Hamas.

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Introduction The Trump Administration requested $75.1 billion for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2018, 2.6% ($2 billion) less than DOT received in FY2017. On July 21, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 3353 . The committee recommended $77.5 billion for DOT, a 0.5% ($430 million) increase over the comparable FY2017 amount and 3% ($2.4 billion) above the Administration request. On July 27, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1655 . It recommended a total of $78.6 billion in new budget authority for DOT for FY2018 ($78.5 billion after scorekeeping adjustments), 2% ($1.6 billion) above the comparable FY2017 amount and 4.7% ($3.5 billion) over the Administration request. Conflicts over funding levels and spending limits for federal agencies delayed action on final FY2018 appropriations until March 2018. Until that time, a series of continuing resolutions provided temporary funding for federal agencies. Finally, after passing legislation raising the spending limits for federal agencies for FY2018, Congress passed an omnibus spending bill, P.L. 115-141 , which included increased spending for most agencies. Title I of Division L, the DOT Appropriations Act, provided $86.2 billion, 11.8% ($9.1 billion) more than in FY2017. Two large trust funds, the Highway Trust Fund and the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, have typically provided around 90% of DOT's annual funding in recent years (92% in FY2017), but in FY2018 a significant increase in discretionary budget authority resulted in the proportion drawn from trust funds dropping to 83%, despite the actual amount increasing by $1 billion; see Table 2 . One reason for the shortfall in the fund is that the federal gas tax has not been raised since 1993. The Senate bill also recommended that the portion of funding allocated to projects in rural areas be increased from 20% to 30%; the same change was included in the Senate-passed DOT appropriations bills in FY2016 and FY2017, but was not enacted. Congress has continued to support the TIGER program through annual DOT appropriations. As Table 5 illustrates, the TIGER grant appropriation process has followed a pattern for several years, with the Obama Administration requesting as much as or more than Congress had previously provided; the House zeroing out the program or proposing a large cut; the Senate proposing an amount similar to the previous appropriation; and Congress agreeing on a final enacted amount similar to the previously enacted amount. Additional Infrastructure Funding The FY2018 enacted legislation included significant increases in funding for infrastructure for aviation, highways, passenger rail, and transit, in some cases beyond the authorized levels, in other cases provided in newly created accounts. The Trump Administration's FY2018 budget request did not include any funding for the cost of PTC implementation, nor did the House or Senate Appropriations Committees recommend any funding for this purpose. They contend that the higher federal share makes highway projects relatively more attractive than public transportation projects for communities considering how to address transportation problems. Since the new tunnel would carry both intercity and commuter rail traffic, it is eligible for DOT funding from both the intercity rail program and the public transportation Capital Investment Grants program.

Congress appropriated $86.2 billion for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2018. This represented a $9.1 billion (11.8%) increase over the amount provided in FY2017. The principal reason for the higher spending level was increases in funding from the general fund for highways, public transportation capital investments, and passenger rail projects. The appropriation was included in an omnibus spending bill, P.L. 115-141, Title I of Division L, the DOT Appropriations Act. The DOT appropriations bill funds federal programs covering aviation, highways and highway safety, public transit, intercity rail, maritime safety, pipelines, and related activities. Federal highway, transit, and rail programs were reauthorized in fall 2015, and their future funding authorizations were somewhat increased. The Trump Administration proposed a $75 billion budget for DOT for FY2018, including $16.4 billion in discretionary funding and $58.7 billion in mandatory funding. That was approximately $2 billion less than was provided for FY2017. The budget request reflected the Administration's call for significant cuts in funding for transit and rail programs. The annual appropriations for DOT are combined with those for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill. The House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 3353, the THUD FY2018 appropriations bill, in which Division A provided FY2018 appropriations for DOT. The committee recommended $77.5 billion in new budget authority for DOT, 0.5% ($400 million) more than ultimately approved for FY2017 and roughly 3% ($2.4 billion) more than the Administration requested. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out an FY2018 THUD bill, S. 1655, which was not taken up by the full Senate. The Senate committee recommended $78.6 billion in new budget authority, 2% ($1.6 billion) more than the comparable FY2017 amount and 4.7% ($3.5 billion) more than the Administration requested. Conflicts over funding levels and limits delayed action on final FY2018 appropriations until March 2018. Until that time, a series of continuing resolutions provided temporary funding for federal agencies. There is general agreement that more funding is needed for transportation infrastructure, and the Trump Administration has proposed an increase in spending on infrastructure, but Congress has not been able to agree on a source that could provide the additional funding. The federal excise tax on motor fuel, which is the primary funding source for federal highway and transit programs, has not been increased in over 20 years, and does not raise enough revenue to support even the current level of spending. To address this shortfall, Congress has transferred money from the general fund to the Highway Trust Fund on several occasions since 2008 to provide sufficient funding for the programs. Revenue estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggest that general fund transfers will continue to be required in future years to support the currently authorized level of highway and public transportation spending.

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Introduction In vitro diagnostic (IVD) devices, including genetic tests, provide information that is used to inform health care decision making. Federal oversight of IVDs spans several federal agencies, including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). The use of an IVD companion diagnostic device to select the best therapy, at the right dose, at the correct time for a particular patient is often referred to as personalized medicine. Traditionally, most genetic tests have not been subject to premarket review by the FDA. It has been noted that, in the past, genetic tests were developed mostly by academic or research laboratories primarily for in-house use—tests referred to as laboratory-developed tests (LDTs)—to diagnose rare diseases and were highly dependent on expert interpretation. In recent years, LDTs have been developed to assess relatively common diseases and conditions, such as various cancers. The extent to which all LDTs should be regulated by the FDA has been a subject of debate. On July 31, 2014, the FDA officially notified the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that it would be issuing draft guidance on LDT regulation; on October 3, 2014, the agency published a notice in the Federal Register announcing the availability of the guidance documents and requesting comments within 120 days to ensure their consideration in the development of final guidance. The agency announced in November 2016 that it would be delaying finalization of the draft guidance. In January 2017, FDA released a discussion paper on LDTs that included a possible approach to LDT oversight (for more detail, see " FDA's January 2017 Discussion Paper: A Possible Approach to LDT Oversight "). Genetic testing has become increasingly available for direct purchase by consumers, generally over the Internet. This report provides an overview of federal regulation of IVDs by FDA, through the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and by CMS, through the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) of 1988. FDA's Authority to Regulate In Vitro Diagnostic (IVD) Devices IVDs that are used in the clinical management of patients generally fall under the definition of medical device and therefore are subject to regulation by the FDA. The FDA derives its authority to regulate the sale and distribution of medical devices from the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA, P.L. Commercial Test Kits vs. Examples include tests for infectious disease, blood glucose tests, and pregnancy tests. FDA regulation "addresses the safety and effectiveness of the diagnostic tests themselves and the quality of the design and manufacture of the diagnostic tests." Agency Activity On July 31, 2014, the agency officially notified Congress of its intent to begin regulating LDTs in fulfillment of a statutory requirement in the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA, P.L. In the lead paragraph of the discussion paper, the agency states that it would not be issuing "a final guidance on the oversight of laboratory developed tests (LDTs) at the request of various stakeholders to allow for further public discussion on an appropriate oversight approach, and to give our congressional authorizing committees the opportunity to develop a legislative solution." On the other hand, some representatives of clinical laboratories and manufacturers of LDTs, such as the American Clinical Laboratory Association (ACLA), have asserted that LDTs should be outside of the FDA's regulatory purview. In June 2010, FDA announced it would hold a public meeting the following month to allow stakeholders the opportunity to discuss the agency's decision to exercise its regulatory authority over all LDTs. Section 1143 of FDASIA stipulates that the agency "may not issue any draft or final guidance on the regulation" of LDTs without, "at least 60 days prior to such issuance," first notifying Congress "of the anticipated details of such action." The framework generally identifies classes of LDTs that will be (1) exempt from regulation entirely; (2) only required to meet registration and listing (or notification) and adverse event reporting requirements; and (3) required to meet registration and listing (or notification), adverse event reporting, applicable premarket review (PMA or 510(k) notification), and quality system regulation requirements. Once classification has taken place, the FDA will enforce premarket review requirements, prioritizing the highest risk class III tests. The agency anticipates the entire process of bringing all LDTs into compliance will take nine years to complete.

In vitro diagnostic (IVD) devices are used in the analysis of human samples, such as blood or tissue, to provide information in making health care decisions. Examples of IVDs include (1) pregnancy test kits or blood glucose tests for home use; (2) laboratory tests for infectious disease, such as HIV or hepatitis, and routine blood tests, such as cholesterol and anemia; and (3) tests for various genetic diseases or conditions. More recently, a specific type of diagnostic test—called a companion diagnostic—has been developed that may be used to select the best therapy, at the right dose, at the correct time for a particular patient; this is often referred to as personalized or precision medicine. Federal agencies involved in the regulation of IVDs include the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). FDA derives its authority to regulate the sale and distribution of medical devices, such as IVDs, from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and the Public Health Service Act. CMS's authority to regulate IVDs is through the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988. FDA regulates the safety and effectiveness of the diagnostic test, as well as the quality of the design and manufacture of the diagnostic test. CMS regulates the quality of clinical laboratories and the clinical testing process. Traditionally, most genetic tests have not been subject to premarket review by the FDA. This is because in the past, genetic tests were developed by laboratories primarily for their in-house use—referred to as laboratory-developed tests (LDTs)—to diagnose mostly rare diseases and were highly dependent on expert interpretation. However, more recently, LDTs have been developed to assess relatively common diseases and conditions, thus affecting more people, and direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing has become more available over the Internet. The extent to which LDTs should be regulated by the FDA, in conjunction with CMS, has traditionally been a subject of debate. Some clinical laboratories and manufacturers of LDTs have maintained that LDTs should be outside of the FDA's regulatory purview. Legislation was introduced in the 110th and 112th Congresses with the aim of clarifying regulatory oversight and supporting innovation. In June 2010, FDA announced its decision to exercise its authority over all LDTs. A provision in the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 stipulates that the agency "may not issue any draft or final guidance on the regulation" of LDTs without, "at least 60 days prior to such issuance," first notifying Congress "of the anticipated details of such action." On July 31, 2014, in fulfillment of this statutory requirement, the FDA officially notified the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that it would issue draft guidance on the regulation of LDTs, and included the anticipated details of that regulatory framework. On October 3, 2014, the FDA formally issued these documents as draft guidance in the Federal Register, giving 120 days for comment. The draft guidance identifies groups of LDTs that would be (1) exempt from regulation entirely; (2) only required to meet notification and adverse event reporting requirements; and (3) required to meet notification, adverse event reporting, applicable premarket review, and other regulatory requirements. FDA would classify LDTs, based on risk, using information obtained through the notification process. Next FDA would enforce premarket review requirements, prioritizing the highest-risk tests. Bringing all LDTs into compliance was estimated to take nine years. However, in November 2016 the agency announced it will be delaying finalization of the guidance indefinitely "to allow for further public discussion on an appropriate oversight approach and to give our congressional authorizing committees the opportunity to develop a legislative solution." In January 2017, FDA released a discussion paper on LDTs that included a possible approach to LDT oversight.

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Natural phenomena—predators, droughts, floods, and fluctuating oceanic conditions—stress salmonids and contribute to the variable abundance of their populations. Currently, 28 distinct population segments of five salmonid species have been listed as either endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA, see Table 1 ), with three additional populations identified as "species of concern." While no species of anadromous trout or salmon is in danger of near-term extinction, individual distinct population segments (designated as "evolutionarily significant units" or ESUs) within these species have declined substantially or have even been extirpated. The American Fisheries Society considers at least 214 Pacific Coast anadromous fish populations to be "at risk," while at least 106 other historically abundant populations have already become extinct. Human activities—logging, grazing, mining, agriculture, urban development, and consumptive water use—can degrade aquatic habitat. Silt can cover streambed gravel, smothering eggs. Poorly constructed roads often increase siltation in streams where adult salmon spawn and young salmon rear. Removal of streamside trees and shade frequently leads to higher water temperatures. Grazing cattle remove streamside vegetation and exacerbate streambank erosion. Urbanization typically brings stream channelization and filled wetlands, altering food supplies and nursery habitat. Habitat alterations can lead to increased salmonid predation by marine mammals, birds, and other fish. Dams for hydropower, flood control, and irrigation substantially alter aquatic habitat and can have significant impacts on anadromous fish. Protection and Restoration Efforts The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, also popularly referred to as "NOAA Fisheries") in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, implements the ESA for anadromous salmonids. When a federal activity may harm an ESA-listed salmonid, the ESA requires the federal agency to consult with NMFS to determine whether the activity is likely to jeopardize the survival and recovery of the species or adversely modify its critical habitat. In the Columbia River Basin, the Northwest Power and Conservation Council took the lead under the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act ( P.L. 96-501 ), by attempting to protect salmon and their habitat while also providing inexpensive electric power to the region. Although federal agencies and public utilities have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on technical improvements for dams, habitat enhancement, and water purchases to improve salmon survival, some populations have continued to decline. Recent years have seen an increased interest by state governments and tribal councils in developing comprehensive salmon management efforts.

Along the Pacific Coast, 28 distinct population segments of Pacific salmon and steelhead trout are listed as either endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), with three additional populations identified as "species of concern." While no species of anadromous trout or salmon is in danger of near-term extinction, individual population segments within these species have declined substantially or have even been extirpated. The American Fisheries Society considers at least 214 Pacific Coast anadromous fish populations to be "at risk," while at least 106 other historically abundant populations have already become extinct. Human activities—logging, grazing, mining, agriculture, urban development, and consumptive water use—can degrade aquatic habitat. Silt can cover streambed gravel, smothering fish eggs. Poorly constructed roads often increase siltation in streams where adult salmon spawn and young salmon rear. Removal of streamside trees and shade frequently leads to higher water temperatures. Grazing cattle remove streamside vegetation and exacerbate streambank erosion. Urbanization typically brings stream channelization and filled wetlands, altering food supplies and nursery habitat. Habitat alterations can lead to increased salmonid predation by marine mammals, birds, and other fish. Dams for hydropower, flood control, and irrigation substantially alter aquatic habitat and can have significant impacts on anadromous fish. In addition, natural phenomena stress fish populations and contribute to their variable abundance. Current management efforts aim to restore the abundance of ESA-listed native northeast Pacific salmonids to historic, sustainable population levels. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, also popularly referred to as "NOAA Fisheries") in the Department of Commerce implements the ESA for anadromous salmonids. When a federal activity may harm an ESA-listed salmonid, the ESA requires the federal agency to consult with NMFS to determine whether the activity is likely to jeopardize the survival and recovery of the species or adversely modify its critical habitat. Prior to the listing of salmonid "evolutionarily significant units" (ESUs) under the ESA, the Northwest Power and Conservation Council took the lead in the Columbia River Basin under the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, by attempting to protect salmon and their habitat while also providing inexpensive electric power to the region. Under this effort, federal agencies and public utilities have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on technical improvements for dams, habitat enhancement, and water purchases to improve salmon survival. Recent years have seen an increased interest by state governments and tribal councils in developing comprehensive salmon management efforts. This report summarizes the reasons for ESA listings and outlines efforts to protect ESA-listed species.

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While not yet fully understood, the ecological and economic consequences of ocean acidification could be substantial. What Is Ocean Acidification? As increasing CO 2 from the atmosphere dissolves in seawater, seawater chemistry is altered. As the number of hydrogen ions increases, the pH of the ocean decreases, and the water becomes less alkaline. Scientists are concerned that this change in seawater pH could alter biogeochemical cycles, disrupt physiological processes of marine organisms, and damage marine ecosystems. This report does not discuss the effects of increasing thermal stress to marine organisms and ecosystems (e.g., coral bleaching) related to climate change. However, marine ecosystems are likely to be affected by the synergistic effects of factors involved in both thermal and chemical processes. The Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act of 2009 (FOARAM; P.L. In the 111 th Congress, FOARAM directed the Secretary of Commerce to establish an ocean acidification program within NOAA, established an interagency committee to develop an ocean acidification research and monitoring plan, and authorized appropriations through FY2012 for NOAA and the National Science Foundation. The only bill related to ocean acidification that has been introduced during the 113 th Congress is the Coral Reef Conservation Act Amendments of 2013 ( S. 839 ). S. 839 would include ocean acidification in the criteria used to evaluate project proposals for studying threats to coral reefs and developing responses to coral reef losses. On July 30, 2013, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation ordered S. 839 to be reported.

With increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, the extent of effects on the ocean and marine resources is an increasing concern. One aspect of this issue is the ongoing process (known as ocean acidification) whereby seawater becomes less alkaline as more CO2 dissolves in it, causing hydrogen ion concentration in seawater to increase. Scientists are concerned that increasing hydrogen ion concentration could reduce growth or even cause death of shell-forming animals (e.g., corals, mollusks, and certain planktonic organisms) as well as disrupt marine food webs and the reproductive physiology of certain species. While not yet fully understood, the ecological and economic consequences of ocean acidification could be substantial. Scientists are concerned that increasing hydrogen ion concentration in seawater could alter biogeochemical cycles, disrupt physiological processes of marine organisms, and damage marine ecosystems. This report does not discuss the effects of increasing thermal stress to marine organisms and ecosystems (e.g., coral bleaching) related to climate change. However, marine ecosystems are likely to be affected by the synergistic effects of factors involved in both thermal and chemical processes. Congress is beginning to focus attention on better understanding ocean acidification and determining how this concern might be addressed. In the 111th Congress, the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act of 2009 (Title XII, Subtitle D, of P.L. 111-11) directed the Secretary of Commerce to establish an ocean acidification program within NOAA, established an interagency committee to develop an ocean acidification research and monitoring plan, and authorized appropriations through FY2012 for NOAA and the National Science Foundation. The only bill related to ocean acidification that has been introduced during the 113th Congress is the Coral Reef Conservation Act Amendments of 2013 (S. 839). S. 839 would include ocean acidification in the criteria used to evaluate project proposals for studying threats to coral reefs and developing responses to coral reef losses. On July 30, 2013, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation ordered S. 839 to be reported.

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RS20995 -- India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions Updated February 3, 2003 Recap of Nuclear Tests Sanctions (1) In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted tests of nuclear explosive devices, triggering sweeping U.S. economic sanctions as required by the ArmsExport Control Act (AECA) and the Export-Import Bank Act. In theUnited States, the law required the President toimpose the following restrictions or prohibitions on U.S. relations with both India and Pakistan: termination of U.S.foreign assistance other than humanitarianor food assistance; termination of U.S. government sales of defense articles and services, design and constructionservices, licenses for exporting U.S.Munitions List (USML) items; termination of foreign military financing; denial of most U.S. government-backedcredit or financial assistance; U.S. oppositionto loans or assistance from any international financial institution; prohibition of most U.S. bank-backed loans orcredits; prohibition on licensing exports of"specific goods and technology"; and denial of credit or other Export-Import Bank support for exports to eithercountry. Throughout the first eight months of 2001, the Bush administration hadhinted that the United States would like to remove the sanctions imposed against India and, to a lesser extent,Pakistan. As a result, the President exercised the authority granted him in the Defense Appropriations Act, FY2000,on September 22, 2001, when he lifted allnuclear test-related economic sanctions against the two countries after finding that denying export licenses andassistance was not in the national securityinterests of the United States. (9) Today, the solevestige of the nuclear sanctions is the listing of four Indian and 20 Pakistani entities (and their subsidiaries) onthe Commerce Department's list of entities for which export licenses are required. By comparison, restricted entitiesnumbered in the hundreds in the wake ofthe 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistan's current leader, General PervezMusharraf seized power and overthrew a democratically elected government in October 1999. Pakistan wasalso denied most U.S. foreign assistance for falling into arrears in servicing its debt to the United States.

In 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted tests of nuclear explosive devices, drawingworld condemnation. TheUnited States and a number of India's and Pakistan's major trading partners imposed economic sanctions in response. Most U.S. economic sanctions werelifted or eased within a few months of their imposition, however, and Congress gave the President the authority toremove all remaining restrictions in 1999. The sanctions were lifted incrementally. President Bush issued a final determination on September 22, 2001,to remove the remaining restrictions, finding that denying export licenses and assistance was not in the national security interests of the United States. Today, four Indian and 20 Pakistani entities (and their subsidiaries) remain on the Commerce Department's listof entities for which export licenses arerequired. By comparison, restricted entities numbered in the hundreds in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests. Anexport license is still required to ship missiletechnology-controlled or nuclear proliferation-controlled items to users in either country, but the Department ofCommerce no longer views such licenseapplications with a presumption of denying their issuance. Apart from the sanctions imposed following the nuclear tests, the United States prohibited foreign aid toPakistan when that country fell into arrears in servicingits debt to the United States in late 1998, a prohibition reenforced when Pakistan's military forces overthrew thedemocratic government in late 1999. Post-September 11 cooperation between the United States and Pakistan included a rescheduling of the debt and newlegislation to waive the so-calleddemocracy sanctions. Pakistan thus became eligible to receive U.S. foreign assistance through FY2003 when, unlessit holds free and fair elections, restrictionson foreign aid could be reimposed.

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Overview The term "conflict minerals" is used to describe metal ores that, when mined, sold, or traded, are widely reported to play key roles in fueling armed conflict and human rights abuses in several far eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire). The main minerals at issue are columbite-tantalite (coltan, a source of tantalum and niobium), cassiterite (tin ore), wolframite (tungsten ore), and gold—and their derivatives. Multiple congressional hearings have investigated various aspects of the DRC's conflicts, and multiple resolutions and bills have been introduced to help end them or mitigate their effects. Several have become law. The most extensive U.S. law aimed at halting the trade in conflict minerals, specifically the 3TGs, is Section 1502 of Title XV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. 111-203 ). It is the subject of an ongoing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule-making process that is expected to lead to adoption of "final" Section 1502 implementing rules. Other donor-backed mining sector reform efforts also seek to reduce links between mining and conflict and boost legitimate trade. Minerals The main conflict minerals at issue are the 3TGs and their derivatives, which Section 1502 explicitly and formally defines as "conflict minerals." OECD Due Diligence System Most of a handful of initiatives that are being established or piloted (see Appendix B ) use as an operational standard a detailed set of conflict-free mineral sourcing due diligence guidelines crafted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 4173 , is the culmination of several prior congressional efforts to help break links between mineral trade and conflict in eastern DRC. At its core is a requirement that SEC-regulated firms that use the 3TGs in their products publicly report whether or not they obtain their supplies of these minerals from the DRC, and if so, what due diligence they exercise to ensure that these purchases do not benefit armed groups. Supporters of a phase-in cite the need for existing mineral certification pilot projects to mature and a need to build understanding of and compliance with traceability schemes among local actors in eastern DRC. Delays in Rule-Making The large volume of comments submitted to the SEC on Section 1502 and the complex prospective rule implementation issues that these comments have raised pose substantial challenges for the SEC, as do possible court suits. The SEC has proposed that such tools would likely not be affected, but has solicited feedback on this issue. Indirect "finance or benefit" to armed groups arising from association with a conflict mineral. U.S. Programs Responsible Minerals Trade Several programs designed to implement the U.S. conflict minerals strategy and the objectives of Section 1502 are under way. Ultimately, however, their potential for sustained success is likely to depend on efforts to ensure overall security and stability, to end impunity for human rights abuses and illicit activities, and to undertake reforms and related actions, such as Military and police training and broader security sector reform; Use of armed force by the state to seize and maintain control of mining sites and wider areas controlled by armed groups and, ultimately, neutralize these groups, including rogue elements of the national military; Political agreements and compromise over control of mining sites, and assured scope for civil society actors in the mineral sector to freely advocate reform policies and undertake investigations; National and international criminal prosecution for human rights violators and imposition of targeted international sanctions, in addition to U.N. sanctions already in place, possibly specifically directed at those who engage in conflict-related mineral transactions; Institutional capacity building for trade regulation, mining, and border control and related agencies in the DRC and neighboring countries; Targeted sustainable employment and working condition-focused assistance for artisanal miners and mining communities affected by externally driven due diligence initiatives and outcomes such as the de facto boycott; Reform of DRC mineral tax rates and revenue sharing formulas; Increased state and third party mineral sector and trade data reporting, as well as public and private sector adherence to international extractive sector transparency initiatives, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); and Reform of mining contracts and laws, taking into consideration multiple interest groups, including the state, large-scale mining concerns, and artisanal miners. Potential Prospective Congressional Role In the short to medium term, interested Members of Congress are likely to closely monitor Section 1502 rule-making and the effectiveness of any eventual rule and other conflict mineral-focused programs as they are implemented. Both SEC rule-making and prospective rule implementation are likely to continue to pose complex challenges, and may spur Congress, ultimately, to revisit the approach taken in the Section 1502 rule. While substantial financial and applied efforts are being invested in such activities, conflict in eastern DRC has long posed a complex set of intractable security, governance, and human rights challenges, which trade-focused efforts alone are unlikely to overcome. iTSCi has been in development since 2008.

"Conflict minerals" are ores that, when sold or traded, have played key roles in helping to fuel conflict and extensive human rights abuses, since the late 1990s, in far eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The main conflict minerals are the so-called the "3TGs": ores of tantalum and niobium, tin, tungsten, and gold, and their derivatives. Diverse international efforts to break the link between mineral commerce and conflict in central Africa have been proposed or are under way. Key initiatives include government and industry-led mineral tracking and certification schemes. These are designed to monitor trade in minerals to keep armed groups from financially benefitting from this commerce, in compliance with firm-level and/or industry due diligence policies that prohibit transactions with armed groups. Congress has long been concerned about conflicts and human rights abuses in the DRC. Hearings during successive Congresses have focused on ways to help end or mitigate their effects, and multiple resolutions and bills seeking the same goals have been introduced. Several have become law. The most extensive U.S. law aimed at halting the trade in conflict minerals, specifically the 3TGs, is Section 1502 of Title XV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). Among other ends, Section 1502 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue rules mandating that SEC-regulated businesses that use conflict minerals in their products report if they obtained their mineral supplies from the DRC or nearby countries; be permitted to label as "DRC conflict free" products that they can credibly demonstrate do not incorporate minerals sourced in a manner that directly or indirectly finances or benefits armed groups in DRC or adjoining countries; and publicly report to the SEC on those of their products which do incorporate minerals that are not "DRC conflict free"—and which may not be labeled as such—and on diligence measures used to obtain these minerals. Section 1502 raises complex rule design, compliance, cost estimate, and implementation questions, and Section 1502 advocates and critics—many politically influential—have been urging the SEC to issue rules favorable to their respective views and interests. The complexity of the matters at issue and diversity of interests affected have prompted the SEC to repeatedly delay issuance of a final rule, although it is expected to act on the matter in mid-August 2012. Key rule-making issues under debate include timing and a possible phase-in of rule implementation; and what due diligence standards are to be used. There is widespread support for use of due diligence guidelines developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in eventual Section 1502 rules, both to ensure complementarity between U.S. and international conflict mineral trade abatement efforts, most of which employ the OECD guidelines, and to enable these schemes to mature. The State Department has provided to Congress a strategy aimed at breaking the link between mineral trade and conflict and, together with the U.S. Agency for International Development, is implementing programs in central Africa to support tracking and certification schemes; local small-scale mining communities; anti-mining labor abuse efforts; and related ends. In the short to medium term, Congress is likely to closely monitor Section 1502 rule-making and the effectiveness of any eventual rule and other conflict mineral-focused programs as they are implemented. Implementation is likely to be complex. While substantial financial and applied efforts are being invested in such efforts, conflict in eastern DRC has long posed a complex set of intractable security, governance, and human rights challenges, which such efforts alone are unlikely to overcome—and may complicate. An example of a possible unintended consequence of Section 1502 is a de facto buyers' boycott of minerals from eastern DRC attributed to the delayed rule-making process and to other factors. It has generated a local economic crisis and increased smuggling of minerals, but also reportedly reduced conflict funding and spurred conflict mineral trade control efforts.

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Introduction The United Republic of Tanzania is an East African country of nearly 54 million people that is about twice as large as California. The country has substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential, however, and multiple socioeconomic development indicators have generally improved in recent years. President John Magufuli was elected in 2015 and is serving his first five-year term in office. Administrations. Such concerns have centered on the nullification of the 2015 election results (and the subsequent rerun in 2016) in the semiautonomous coastal region of Zanzibar, restrictions on civil liberties, and similar issues. Citing such concerns, in March 2016, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Board announced it would suspend its partnership with Tanzania, deferring a vote on the country's continued eligibility for a potential second large development compact; this effectively ended, for the time being, the development of a second MCC compact with Tanzania, following its completion of an initial compact between 2008 and 2013. How bilateral ties may proceed under the Trump Administration and during the 115 th Congress has yet to be determined, but they appear likely to remain on a positive track. In 2014 Tanzania was selected as one of six initial partner countries under the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). Background Tanzania, formed in 1964, is a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, which gained independence from Britain in 1961, and the Zanzibar archipelago. Despite a stated commitment to reform, corruption and poor service delivery have hampered Tanzania's efforts to curb widespread poverty and reduce reliance on subsistence agriculture. Politics and Governance Tanzania's ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Swahili for Party of the Revolution), was created by Nyerere in 1977 through the merger of the ruling parties of the mainland and Zanzibar. Still, opposition parties reportedly face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. Then-President Kikwete was constitutionally barred from running for a third term, but his CCM party was widely favored to win the polls, given its power of incumbency. Security Challenges and Human Rights Trends While Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, there are periodic, usually generally limited threats to state and public security. There have also been occasional bombings of Christian churches, among other targets, that analysts have speculatively attributed to Islamist radicals. Tanzania has occasionally arrested Islamic extremists, including 10 alleged members of the Somali Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab, in April 2015. This growth has been based largely on earnings from agricultural exports, such as coffee, tea, and cotton; tourism, which has steadily increased and is a key source of hard currency; and exports of gold, the price of which rose over the past decade and spiked in 2011, but has since declined. Energy and Mining Sectors Since 2010, the discovery of large reserves of natural gas off the southern coast, in a region near far larger reserves in Mozambican territory, has increased foreign investment and raised the prospect of export revenue. In addition to being a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations, with personnel deployed in multiple African countries and Lebanon, Tanzania hosts large numbers of refugees from the region, including from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Former President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with former President Obama after Obama took office in 2009. Trade Issues Tanzania is eligible for U.S. trade preferences, including apparel benefits, under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized under P.L. Bilateral Assistance U.S. assistance to Tanzania has focused primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, infrastructure, and environmental conservation. Security Cooperation U.S. security cooperation and assistance has grown since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, but it remains limited compared to that pursued with Tanzania's East African neighbors.

Tanzania is an East African country comprising a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, and the semiautonomous Zanzibar archipelago. The United States has long considered Tanzania a partner in economic development and, increasingly, in regional security efforts. With nearly 54 million people, Tanzania is one of the largest countries in Africa by population and is endowed with substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential. Over the past decade, it has experienced robust economic growth based largely on favorably high gold prices and tourism; growth has averaged nearly 7% annually. The ongoing development of large reserves of offshore natural gas discovered in 2010 has raised the prospect of substantial foreign investment inflows and export revenue. Nevertheless, corruption and poor service delivery have hindered efforts to curb widespread poverty, and extensive development challenges remain. Since 1977, Tanzanian politics have been dominated by the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Party of the Revolution), created through the merger that year of the single parties that had controlled the mainland and Zanzibar since 1964. Opposition parties face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. President John Magufuli, who leads the CCM, was elected in late October 2015 and is serving his first five-year term in office. His predecessor, Jakaya Kikwete, also of the CCM, assumed power in 2005 and won reelection in 2010, but was constitutionally barred from running for a third term. The 2015 polls featured a close contest between the CCM and a coalition of the leading opposition parties. Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, despite periodic threats to public safety. These include sporadic attacks on tourists in Zanzibar, several unattributed armed attacks on police, and occasional bombings of Christian churches and other targets. Tanzania has occasionally arrested suspected Islamic extremists, as in April 2015, when a group of 10 alleged members of the Somali Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab were taken into custody. U.S.-Tanzanian relations are cordial, but have suffered tensions over the contentious 2015/2016 election in Zanzibar, restrictions on civil liberties, and other issues. President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with former President Obama after the latter took office, and President Obama stated that a "shared commitment to the development and the dignity of the people of Tanzania" underpins bilateral ties. Tanzania also maintains close economic and political ties with China. Under the Obama Administration, aid cooperation was generally robust. How ties and assistance cooperation may proceed under the Administration of President Donald Trump and during the 115th Congress has yet to be determined. U.S. aid for Tanzania has focused primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, and infrastructure, largely under multiple major presidential initiatives. U.S. assistance has also supported Tanzania's hosting of large numbers of refugees from the region. Tanzania is eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade benefits and in 2013 completed a $698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact focused on poverty reduction and economic growth. The MCC has since suspended activity in support of a possible second compact, citing governance concerns. U.S. security assistance increased after the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania was one of six initial participants in the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), which aims to build the peacekeeping capacity of African militaries. Tanzania is a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations in multiple African countries and Lebanon.

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By and large in identical language, the two would amend existing mandatory minimum sentence provisions found in federal drug and firearms laws, by and large in identical language. The most obvious difference is that the Senate proposal, S. 2123 , the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, features an extensive corrections title, which the House proposal, H.R. 3713 , the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, lacks. 3713 would reduce the mandatory minimum sentences that must be imposed on repeat offenders. S. 2123 and H.R. 3713 would modify the safety valve in several respects. Third, the bills would create additional safety valve. The mini-safety valve would only apply to future convictions. One, the so-called three strikes provision, also known as the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on an offender convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm who has three prior convictions for a drug offense or a violent felony. S. 2123 and H.R. 3713 would reduce the mandatory minimum penalty from 15 years to 10 years. 3713 's retroactivity would only apply to defendants without a prior serious violent felony conviction. The mandatory minimums, imposed in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking, vary depending upon the circumstances: imprisonment for not less than 5 years, unless one of the higher mandatory minimums below applies; imprisonment for not less than 7 years, if a firearm is brandished; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is discharged; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; imprisonment for not less than 15 years, if the offense involves armor-piercing ammunition; imprisonment for not less than 25 years, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of §924(c); imprisonment for not less than 30 years, if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and imprisonment for life, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of §924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer. S. 2123 and H.R. S. 2123 and H.R. New Mandatory Minimums H.R. 3713 would create no new mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. S. 2123 , on the other hand, would establish two: one for interstate domestic violence offenses and another for certain violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Section 109 of the bill would direct the Attorney General to prepare and provide the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary an inventory of federal statutory crimes and of federal regulatory offenses.

As introduced, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, and the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 3713, use virtually identical language to reduce the impact of the mandatory minimum sentences which federal courts must now impose for certain drug trafficking and firearms offenses. Key Takeaways Existing law requires long minimum sentences for certain drug traffickers who have prior drug convictions. S. 2123 and H.R. 3713 would shorten the mandatory minimums, but apply them for both prior drug and violent felony convictions. The safety valve permits judges to ignore mandatory minimums for certain low-level, nonviolent drug traffickers with virtually no criminal record. The bills would make the safety valve available to traffickers with slightly more serious criminal records. The bills would establish a mini-safety valve which would permit judges to treat the 10-year drug trafficking mandatory minimums as if they were 5-year mandatory minimums for the benefit of nonviolent defendants with no prior serious drug or violent crime convictions. The proposals would permit retroactive application of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act crack/powder cocaine amendments under some circumstances. S. 2123 and H.R. 3713 would reduce the Armed Career Criminal mandatory minimum to 10 years from 15 years. The bills would increase to 15 years the maximum penalties for possession of a firearm by a felon and various other firearms offenses. H.R. 3713, but not S. 2123, would add a consecutive term of imprisonment for not more than five years to the mandatory minimums in drug trafficking cases which involve heroin or fentanyl (a heroin cutter and counterfeit). S. 2123, but not H.R. 3713, would establish new mandatory minimums for certain interstate domestic violence offenses and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) violations. S. 2123, but not H.R. 3713, would direct the Attorney General to prepare an inventory of federal statutory crimes and various federal agencies to prepare a comparable inventory of federal regulatory offenses.

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Background HIV/AIDS Revised Epidemic Estimates The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates that 33.2 million people are living with human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS); some 16% fewer people than it initially estimated in 2006 (about 39.5 million). UNAIDS predicts that 2.5 million people will contract HIV in 2007, compared to the estimated 3.2 million who became HIV-positive in 2001. In FY2006, Congress provided $3.4 billion for global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria programs ( Table 3 ). Policy Options for Congress In 2003, Congress authorized $3 billion for each fiscal year from 2004 through 2008 to support the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEFAR). The United States remains the largest single donor for global HIV/AIDS efforts in the world, providing nearly 50% of all donor funds. As Congress prepares to consider whether, and at what level, to reauthorize PEPFAR, there has been considerable debate about the effectiveness of PEPFAR. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-25 ), requires the President to submit annual reports to appropriation committees that describe how U.S. funds support efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria and provide care and treatment for those affected by the three diseases. However, since President Bush launched the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) in June 2005, the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) determined that it would no longer include malaria spending in its annual reports to Congress and that budgetary requests for the disease would be made separately from HIV/AIDS and TB requests. The Administration requests support for PMI through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as the coordinating agency. In 2001, about 240,000 people had access to anti-retroviral treatment (ARVs); in 2006, more than 2 million were treated. In 2006, 4.3 million people contracted HIV, 2.8 million of whom were African (65%), and 2.9 million people died of AIDS, 2.1 million of whom were African (72%). Increase Prevention of Mother to Child HIV Transmission (PMTCT) Initiatives Many health experts advocate greater spending on PMTCT initiatives. UNAIDS estimates that in 2005, just less than 8% of pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries had access to services that could prevent the transmission of HIV to their babies. The House and Senate included language in their reports ( H.Rept. The Administration asserted that WHO's prequalification process was inadequate, and that generic drugs purchased with PEPFAR funds had to be first inspected by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In March 2007, IOM found that in many of the Focus Countries, a number of those implementing HIV/AIDS programs complained that the U.S. treatment policy complicated national treatment efforts. According to WHO, Africa is the only region in the world where incidence of new TB infections continues to rise, due in large part to HIV/AIDS co-infection. The report also asserted that PEPFAR should increase support to the education of new health professionals. The Bank estimates that it has lent $15 billion in health, nutrition, and population funds from 1997 to 2006; an average of about $1.5 billion per year. Nearly 90% of all HIV-positive children live in sub-Saharan Africa. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 authorizes 10% of HIV/AIDS funds to be used to support children affected by the virus. According to UNAIDS, more than 2.5 million children and infants are living with HIV/AIDS worldwide, representing more than 7% of all cases; and some 420,000 children under 15 years are expected to contract the virus in 2007, almost 17% of all new HIV infections.

The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates that 33.2 million people are living with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). The U.N. organization believes that in 2007, some 2.5 million people will contract HIV and it will kill about 2.1 million. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most affected region, with about 68% of the world's HIV-positive population, 90% of all HIV-infected children, and more than 11 million children who have lost one or both parents to the virus. UNAIDS anticipates that in 2007, about 420,000 children will contract HIV, due in large part to inadequate access to drugs that prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission; about 8% of pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries have access to PMTCT services. In January 2003, President George Bush proposed that the United States spend $15 billion over five years to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The President proposed concentrating most of the resources ($9 billion) in 15 countries, where the Administration estimated 50% of all HIV-positive people lived. The proposal allotted $5 billion of the funds to research and other bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs, and $1 billion for contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). The President estimated that from FY2004 to FY2008, PEPFAR funds would support the purchase of anti-retroviral treatments (ARV) for 2 million people; the prevention of 7 million HIV infections; and care for 10 million people affected by HIV/AIDS, including children orphaned by AIDS. In May 2003, Congress passed the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25), which authorized funds for PEPFAR and created the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) to manage U.S. funds aimed at addressing the three diseases in 15 Focus Countries. As of March 31, 2007, PEPFAR has supported the treatment of 1.1 million people; and as of September 30, 2006, supported PMTCT service provision during more than 6 million pregnancies and facilitated care for nearly 4.5 million people, including more than 2 million orphans and vulnerable children. From FY2004 to FY2007, Congress provided nearly $13.5 billion for U.S. global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs. In FY2008, the President requested $5.8 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts; the House and Senate proposed spending almost $6.2 billion and nearly $6.1 billion, respectively. On May 30, 2007, President Bush requested that Congress authorize $30 billion to fund PEPFAR an additional five years. The President asserts that from FY2009 to FY2013, the plan would support treatment for 2.5 million people, prevent more than 12 million new infections, and care for more than 12 million people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children. Supporters of the Administration's plan applauded the President and congratulated him for leading global efforts to address HIV/AIDS. Critics asserted that PEPFAR could treat more than 2.5 million HIV-infected people and that PEPFAR's spending requirements should be eliminated. This report focuses on some of the key issues that Congress might consider as it faces the issue of whether, and at what level, to reauthorize PEPFAR.

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Regular and Special Elections of the Speaker The traditional practice of the House is to elect a Speaker by roll call vote upon first convening after a general election of Representatives. Customarily, the conference of each major party in the House selects a candidate whose name is formally placed in nomination before the roll call. A Member may vote for one of these nominated candidates or for another individual. In the great majority of cases, Members vote for the candidate nominated by their own party conferences, since the outcome of this vote in effect establishes which party has the majority and therefore will organize the House. Included in the table are not only the elections held regularly at the outset of each Congress but also those held during the course of a Congress as a result of the death or resignation of a sitting Speaker. On the more recent three, the same procedure was followed as at the start of a Congress. A candidate for Speaker may receive a majority of the votes cast, and be elected, while failing to obtain a majority of the full membership because some Members either are not present to vote or instead answer "present" rather than voting for a candidate. If no candidate obtains the requisite majority, the roll call is repeated. Thus the Republican was ultimately elected, although (as noted earlier) still with less than a majority of the full membership. Such action occurred in 11 of the 16 Congresses (63 rd -78 th ) that convened from 1913 through 1943. The demise of this movement in the House represented the final stage in the establishment of a two-party system at the national level. From 1945 through 1995 (79 th -104 th Congresses), only the official nominees of the two major parties received votes for Speaker. In 10 of the 13 speakership elections since then (1997-2019), at least one Member has voted for a candidate other than ones formally nominated by the major party conferences. During this period, only in the initial election of 2015 have the names of any candidates other than those of the party conferences been formally placed in nomination. The ballots in 1997, 2013, 2015 (both instances), and 2019 were also notable because votes were cast for candidates who were not Members of the House at the time. In the initial election in 2015, two of the votes cast were for sitting Members of the Senate; in 2019, one such ballot was cast. Although the Constitution does not require the Speaker (or any other officer of either chamber) to be a Member, the Speaker has always been so; it is not known that any votes for individuals other than Members to be Speaker had ever previously been cast in the history of the House.

Each new House elects a Speaker by roll call vote when it first convenes. Customarily, the conference of each major party nominates a candidate whose name is placed in nomination. A Member normally votes for the candidate of his or her own party conference but may vote for any individual, whether nominated or not. To be elected, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of all the votes cast for individuals. This number may be less than a majority (now 218) of the full membership of the House because of vacancies, absentees, or Members answering "present." This report provides data on elections of the Speaker in each Congress since 1913, when the House first reached its present size of 435 Members. During that period (63rd through 116th Congresses), a Speaker was elected five times with the votes of less than a majority of the full membership. If a Speaker dies or resigns during a Congress, the House immediately elects a new one. Five such elections occurred since 1913. In the earlier two cases, the House elected the new Speaker by resolution; in the more recent three, the body used the same procedure as at the outset of a Congress. If no candidate receives the requisite majority, the roll call is repeated until a Speaker is elected. Since 1913, this procedure has been necessary only in 1923, when nine ballots were required before a Speaker was elected. From 1913 through 1943, more often than not, some Members voted for candidates other than those of the two major parties. The candidates in question were usually those representing the "progressive" group (reformers originally associated with the Republican Party), and in some Congresses, their names were formally placed in nomination on behalf of that group. From 1945 through 1995, only the nominated Republican and Democratic candidates received votes, reflecting the establishment of an exclusively two-party system at the national level. In 10 of the 13 elections since 1997, however, some Members have voted for candidates other than the official nominees of their parties. Only in the initial election in 2015, however, were any such candidates formally placed in nomination. Usually, the additional candidates receiving votes have been other Members of the voter's own party, but in one instance, in 2001, a Member voted for the official nominee of the other party. In the 1997, 2013, 2015 (both instances), and 2019 elections, votes were cast for candidates who were not then Members of the House, including, in the initial 2015 election and the 2019 election, sitting Senators. Although the Constitution does not so require, the Speaker has always been a Member of the House. The report will be updated as additional elections for Speaker occur.

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First, preparedness and response are different. When there is a catastrophe in the United States, state and local governments take the lead in response activities. When the resources of states and localities are overwhelmed, the President can provide certain additional assets and personnel to aid stricken communities, and can provide funding to individuals and to government and not-for-profit entities to assist them in response and recovery. This assistance is provided under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act), upon a presidential declaration of an emergency (a lower level of assistance) or a major disaster (a higher level of assistance). Second, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) has authority under the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act) to draw upon a special fund to support departmental activities in response to unanticipated public health emergencies, but there is at present no money in the fund. This report focuses on incident response activities (versus preparedness activities) and examines (1) the statutory authorities and coordinating mechanisms of the President (acting through the Secretary of Homeland Security) and the Secretary of HHS in providing routine assistance, and in providing assistance pursuant to emergency or major disaster declarations and/or public health emergency determinations; (2) mechanisms to assure a coordinated federal response to public health and medical emergencies, and overlaps or gaps in agency responsibilities; and (3) existing mechanisms, potential gaps, and proposals to fund the costs of a response to public health and medical emergencies. This report will be updated as needed. A listing of these and other federal public health emergency authorities is provided in the Appendix . Would the Stafford Act Apply in a Flu Pandemic? Legislation introduced in the 110 th Congress ( H.R. 6569 / S. 3312 ) proposed to authorize the HHS Secretary, when he or she has made a Section 319 public health emergency determination, to use the PHEF to provide temporary emergency health care coverage for uninsured individuals affected by the emergency. There is no federal assistance program designed purposefully to cover the uninsured or uncompensated costs of individual health care that may be needed as a consequence of a disaster. Given that some U.S. uninsured health care needs go unmet under normal circumstances, there is not consensus that the costs of health care for these disaster victims should be a federal responsibility. Congress has provided intermittent appropriations to support the costs of medical treatment for some of these individuals, through treatment programs established after the terrorist attack. Following Hurricane Katrina, Congress defined in statute the roles of the two Secretaries with respect to the public health and medical response to catastrophes. Assistance to states: Pursuant to Section 311 of the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of HHS has broad authority to assist state and local governments in their disease control efforts, upon their request, as follows: "The Secretary may, at the request of the appropriate State or local authority, extend temporary (not in excess of six months) assistance to States or localities in meeting health emergencies of such a nature as to warrant Federal assistance.

When there is a catastrophe in the United States, state and local governments lead response activities, invoking state and local legal authorities to support them. When state and local response capabilities are overwhelmed, the President, acting through the Secretary of Homeland Security, can provide assistance to stricken communities, individuals, governments, and not-for-profit groups to assist in response and recovery. Aid is provided under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) upon a presidential declaration. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) also has both standing and emergency authorities in the Public Health Service Act, by which he or she can provide assistance in response to public health and medical emergencies. At this time, however, the Secretary of HHS has limited means to finance activities that are ineligible, for whatever reason, for Stafford Act assistance. The flawed response to Hurricane Katrina, and preparedness efforts for an influenza ("flu") pandemic, have each raised concerns about federal response mechanisms for incidents that result in overwhelming public health and medical needs. These concerns include the delegation of responsibilities among different federal departments, and whether critical conflicts or gaps exist in these relationships. In particular, there are some concerns about federal leadership and delegations of responsibility as laid out in the National Response Framework (NRF), published by the Department of Homeland Security. There is no federal assistance program designed purposefully to cover the uninsured or uncompensated costs of individual health care that may be needed as a consequence of a disaster. While there is not consensus that this should be a federal responsibility, Congress has provided such assistance to victims of some specific disasters in the past. For example, following Hurricane Katrina, Congress provided short-term assistance to host states, through the Medicaid program, to cover a portion of the uninsured health care costs of eligible evacuees. Congress has provided funding—and some have proposed establishing statutory authority—to cover certain uninsured health care costs for responders and others who are having health problems related to exposures at the World Trade Center site in New York City after the 2001 terrorist attack. Also, legislation introduced in the 110th Congress proposed to grant the Secretary of HHS the authority to use a special fund to provide temporary emergency health care coverage for uninsured individuals affected by future public health emergencies. This report examines, with respect to public health and medical incidents, (1) the authorities and coordinating mechanisms of the President and the Secretary of HHS in providing routine assistance, and assistance pursuant to the Stafford Act and/or the Public Health Service Act; (2) mechanisms to assure a coordinated federal response to these incidents, and overlaps or gaps in agency responsibilities; and (3) existing mechanisms, potential gaps, and proposals to fund the costs of a response to public health and medical incidents. A listing of federal public health emergency authorities is provided in the Appendix. This report will be updated as needed.

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It is in this context that the United States and other developed countries agreed both to reduce their own emissions to help stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gases when they ratified the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This global context raises two issues for S. 2191 : (1) whether S. 2191 ' s greenhouse gas reduction program and other provisions would be considered sufficiently credible by developing countries so that schemes for including them in future international agreements become more likely, and (2) whether S. 2191 ' s reductions meet U.S. commitments to stabilization under the UNFCCC and occur in a timely fashion so that global stabilization may occur at an acceptable level. Conclusion This report examines six studies that project the costs of S. 2191 to 2030 or 2050. It is difficult (and some would consider it unwise) to project costs up to the year 2030, much less beyond. The already tenuous assumption that current regulatory standards will remain constant becomes more unrealistic, and other unforeseen events (such as technological breakthroughs) loom as critical issues which cannot be modeled. Hence, long-term cost projections are at best speculative, and should be viewed with attentive skepticism . First, if enacted, the ultimate cost of S. 2191 would be determined by the response of the economy to the technological challenges presented by the bill. The potential for new technology to reduce the costs of S. 2191 is not fully analyzed by any of the cases examined, nor can it be. A considerable amount of low-carbon generation will have to be built under S. 2191 in order to meet the reduction requirement. The estimated amount of capacity constructed depends on the cases' assumptions about the need for new capacity and replacement/retirement of existing capacity under S. 2191 , along with consumer demand response to the rising prices and incentives contained in S. 2191 . Third, the cases suggest that the CCS bonus allowance allocation under S. 2191 is effective in encouraging deployment of CCS, accelerating development by 5-10 years. Fourth, the cases generally indicate that offsets could be a valuable tool for covered entities not only to potentially reduce costs, but perhaps more importantly, to buy time to further develop new, more efficient technologies. Cost could be lowered further by allowing greater availability of offsets and international credits and with a broader definition of eligible international credits. Fifth, the Carbon Market Efficiency Board could have an important effect on the cost of the program through its power to increase the availability of offsets and international credits. In this sense, the Board's powers could mesh with the previous insight about the importance of offsets and banking to the cost-effectiveness of S. 2191 . Sixth, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard could significantly raise fuel prices and limit supply. The effects will depend on what fuels are included in the LCFS, the level of emissions reductions achieved by alternatives, and the ability of suppliers to produce those alternatives. Seventh, S. 2191 ' s climate-related environmental benefit is best considered in a global context and the desire to engage the developing world in the reduction effort.

This report examines six studies that project the costs of S. 2191 (S. 3036) to 2030 or 2050. It is difficult to project costs up to the year 2030, much less beyond. The already tenuous assumption that regulatory standards will remain constant becomes more unrealistic, and other unforeseen events loom as critical issues which cannot be modeled. Long-term cost projections are at best speculative, and should be viewed with attentive skepticism. Despite models' inability to predict the future, cases examined here do provide insights on the costs and benefits of S. 2191. First, the ultimate cost of S. 2191 would be determined by the response of the economy to the technological challenges presented by the bill. The potential for technology to reduce S. 2191's costs is not fully analyzed by any of the cases, nor can it be. Technology development is not sufficiently understood currently for models to replicate with confidence. Likewise, it is difficult to determine if available incentives are directed in an optimal manner. The cases suggest that S. 2191's Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) bonus allowances would encourage deployment of CCS, accelerating development by 5-10 years. Second, a considerable amount of low-carbon generating capacity will have to be built under S. 2191 in order to meet the reduction requirement. How much capacity will be necessary depends on new and replacement capacity needs, along with consumer demand response to rising prices and incentives contained in S. 2191. Third, offsets could be a valuable tool not only to potentially reduce costs, but also to buy time to permit further development of new, more efficient technologies. Cost could be lowered further by greater availability of offsets and international credits and with a broader definition of eligible international credits. Fourth, the Carbon Market Efficiency Board could have an important effect on the cost of S. 2191 through its power to extend the availability of offsets and international credits. In this sense, the Board's powers could mesh with the previous insight about the potential effect of offsets on the bill's overall costs. Fifth, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard could significantly raise fuel prices and limit supply. The effects will depend on what fuels are included, the emissions reductions achieved by alternatives, and the ability to produce those alternatives. Finally, S. 2191's climate-related benefit is best considered in a global context and the desire to engage the developing world in the reduction effort. The United States and other developed countries agreed both to reduce their own emissions to help stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and to take the lead in reducing GHGs when they ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This context raises two issues for S. 2191: (1) whether S. 2191's GHG program would be considered sufficiently credible by developing countries so that schemes for including them in future international agreements become more likely, and (2) whether S. 2191's reductions meet U.S. commitments under the UNFCCC.

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The Senate passed the bill by 95 to 3 on November 12. The Administration agreed to a new benefit that provides concurrent receiptof military retirement and disability payments to all military retirees with disability ratings of 50%or higher as well as an expansion of those eligible under the "Purple Hearts Plus" program enactedlast year that provides benefits to military retirees with combat or combat-related disabilities. 1588 , the authorization bill, provide$400.5 billion for national defense programs, about $1.5 billion above the request of $399.7 billionthat the Administration submitted in February. The final version of DOD's FY2004 appropriations cushioned the programmatic impact ofthe $3.5 billion cut to the request by making an offsetting rescission of $3.6 billion from the $62.6billion in FY2003 supplemental appropriations that Congress approved in April. Major Issues in the FY2004 DOD Authorization Act After a conference that spanned over five months, the conferees reached agreement and fileda report on November 7, 2003, on H.R. 1588 , the FY2004 DOD Authorization Act( H.Rept. The President signed thebill on November 24, 2003 ( P.L. The conference report reached compromises on seven major issues that held up the authorization bill for several months: Buy American restrictions proposed by the House and opposed by the Senateand the Administration; proposals to provide costly concurrent receipt of military retirement andVeterans Administration (VA) disability benefits; proposals to allow the Air Force to initiate acquisition of a $29 billion programto lease and buy 100 Boeing KC767 tanker airplanes; fashioning of the new National Security Personnel System requested byDOD; expanding access to DOD's TRICARE health system to non-deployedreservists; exempting DOD from certain environmental statutes;and changing current restrictions on research on low-yield nuclearweapons. (8) Reflecting a compromise between the House's desire to expand protections for the defenseindustrial base and Senate's concerns about potential effects on U.S. trade relations, the conferenceversion dropped the new restrictions on certain items but required DOD to assess potential U.S.vulnerabilities. The bill also requires a study of the adequacy of U.S. producers in meeting defenseneeds for beryllium industrial base. The conference version wasreached when the Senate dropped its proposal for full concurrent receipt and the Administrationdropped its veto threat. Other Civilian Personnel Changes. New Exemption Authority. (61) The conference versionof the FY2004 DOD authorization bill provides access to this targeted version of the new benefitthrough December 31, 2004, three months longer than is provided in the FY2004 supplemental. (65) Maintaining Current Levels of Imminent Danger Pay and Family Separation Allowance One less controversial provision was included in H.R. Major Action On FY2004 DOD Appropriations Bills The FY2004 DOD Appropriations Act was signed into law ( P.L. 108-87 ) on September 30,2003, at the end of the fiscal year. Differences in funding levels were resolved. 2658 and S. 1382 . (74) Of the $399.7 billion requested for national defense in FY2004, $370.6 billion is forprograms covered by the defense appropriations bill, $9.0 billion by the military constructionappropriations bill, $17.3 billion for Department of Energy defense-related activities funded in theenergy and water appropriations bill, and the remaining $2.8 billion in other appropriations bills. 108-11 ). a. House and Senate Differences about DefenseSpending. a. Last year, and again this year, the Defense Department has tried to calculatethe amount that is being devoted to modernization programs that it regards asparticularly transformational. Congressional Action. 108-106 ; S.Rept.

With passage of the FY2004 DOD Authorization Act by the House on November 7 and bythe Senate on November 12, 2003, Congress completed action on this year's defense authorization( H.R. 1588 / H.Rept. 108-384 ). The President signed the bill on November 24, 2003( P.L. 108-384 ). On September 30, just in time for the new fiscal year, the President signed H.R. 2658 , the FY2004 DOD Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-87 ), completing action onFY2004 defense appropriations. The recently enacted FY2004 DOD authorization bill provides a total of $401.3 billion fordefense programs, including funds in the DOD and military construction appropriations as well asseveral other defense-related programs funded in other appropriations measures. The totalauthorized for these defense and defense-related programs that make up the national defense functionis $1.5 billion above the Administration's request and $9.3 billion above the FY2003 enacted level. The conference version of the FY2004 DOD authorization is the culmination of months ofnegotiation about several contentious issues: Buy American provisions, the Air Force's controversialtanker lease proposal, a new concurrent receipt benefit for military retirees, a new National SecurityPersonnel System, a new health benefit for reservists, and special exemptions for DOD to certainenvironmental regulations. Substantial differences about these issues between the houses and withthe Administration had stymied completion of the authorization bill. In conference, Buy American restrictions mandating that DOD rely exclusively on U.S.suppliers for certain items were dropped in favor of provisions that require DOD to assess the U.S.industrial base and possibly provide incentives to certain U.S. producers. In the case of the Boeing767 tanker aircraft, DOD accepted a Senate-proposed compromise allowing them to lease 20 and buy80 rather than lease100 aircraft. After the Administration dropped its veto threat, Congress passed a new concurrent receiptbenefit that is expected to provide about 200,000 military retirees with both their military retirementand disability benefits, reversing a prohibition in effect for over 100 years. DOD also received newauthority to design and implement its own civilian personnel system and new exemptions to certainenvironmental rules. The bill also provides access to DOD's TRICARE health care to unemployed, non-deployed reservists and maintains current higher levels of imminent danger pay and familyseparation allowance for eligible military personnel through December 2004. The FY2004 DOD Appropriations Act provides appropriations totaling $368.7 billion forthe defense programs it covers. That total is $3.5 billion below the Administration's request and $4.0billion above last year's enacted level. The programmatic impact of the cut is cushioned, however,because the bill receives credit for $3.5 billion rescinded from funds provided in the $62.6 billionFY2003 supplemental appropriations bill that Congress approved in April 2003. Key Policy Staff

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The proposal would change, for example, the way the Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is computed, as well as COLAs under other federal programs. Rather than using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) to compute the Social Security COLA, the proposal calls for basing the Social Security COLA on the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (Chained CPI-U or C-CPI-U). In general, the goal of the Chained CPI-U is to more accurately reflect how consumers alter their buying habits in response to changes in prices. The Chained CPI-U typically has risen more slowly than either the CPI-W or the traditional CPI-U, the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. Opponents of the proposal, however, view using the Chained CPI-U to adjust Social Security benefits for inflation as a backdoor way of reducing benefits. The current discussion of a potential change in the way the Social Security COLA is computed has raised questions about indexing provisions in other federal entitlement programs. The purpose of this report is to identify key indexing provisions in major federal entitlement programs under current law and present the information in a summary table (see Table 1 ). The report also provides a description of the measures of consumer price change used to index various elements of these programs under current law and the measure of consumer price change that has been proposed for making inflation adjustments to a range of federal entitlement programs (the Chained CPI-U). It is not intended to evaluate the best measure of consumer price change for inflation adjustments within a particular program or programs. Similarly, broader issues, such as the technical aspects of different measures of consumer price change and the indexing of other items (for example, the federal poverty threshold and parameters of the tax code), are beyond the scope of this report. For information on how the Chained CPI-U is constructed and reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), see CRS Report RL32293, The Chained Consumer Price Index: What Is It and Would It Be Appropriate for Cost-of-Living Adjustments? , by [author name scrubbed]. For information on how Social Security benefits could be affected by using the Chained CPI-U to compute annual COLAs, see CRS Report R43363, Alternative Inflation Measures for the Social Security Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) , by Noah P. Meyerson. Finally, indexing affects eligibility criteria for some programs, including Medicaid and the child tax credit. Generally, switching to the C-CPI-U to compute COLAs and index other elements of federal entitlement programs is considered as a cost-saving measure in an effort to reduce federal budget deficits. Also, the chained CPI may understate growth in the cost of living for some groups.

In recent years, various proposals have been discussed in the context of ways to reduce federal budget deficits. One of these proposals calls for the use of a different measure of consumer price change to index various provisions of federal programs, including cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). For example, under current law, the Social Security COLA is based on the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Under the proposal, the Social Security COLA would be based instead on the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (Chained CPI-U or C-CPI-U). Because the goal of the Chained CPI-U is to better reflect how consumers alter their buying habits in response to changes in prices, supporters of the proposal argue that it is a more accurate measure for computing COLAs and making other automatic program adjustments. Opponents, however, view the proposal as a backdoor way of reducing benefits because the Chained CPI-U typically has risen more slowly than either the CPI-W or the traditional CPI-U, the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. Some observers point out that the Chained CPI-U is published as a preliminary value that is subject to revision over a period of up to two years and that it may not accurately reflect the cost of living for certain groups, such as the elderly population. The current discussion of a potential change in the way the Social Security COLA is computed raises questions about indexing in other federal entitlement programs. The purpose of this report is to identify key indexing elements in major federal entitlement programs under current law and present the information in a summary table. As shown here, indexing affects more than benefit levels paid to individuals through COLAs. It also affects, for example, federal payments to providers and eligibility criteria for some programs. In addition, the report provides a brief description of the measures of consumer price change used to index various elements of these programs under current law, as well as the alternative measure of consumer price change (the Chained CPI-U) that has been proposed for computing Social Security COLAs and making inflation adjustments to other federal programs. This report does not evaluate the best measure of consumer price change for making automatic inflation adjustments in federal entitlement programs. In addition, broader issues, such as the technical aspects of different measures of consumer price change, potential implications of using an alternative measure of price change to index various elements of major federal entitlement programs, and the indexing of other items (for example, the federal poverty threshold and parameters of the tax code) are beyond the scope of this report. For technical information on how the Chained CPI-U is constructed and reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, see CRS Report RL32293, The Chained Consumer Price Index: What Is It and Would It Be Appropriate for Cost-of-Living Adjustments?, by [author name scrubbed]. For information on how Social Security benefits could be affected by using the Chained CPI-U to compute annual COLAs, see CRS Report R43363, Alternative Inflation Measures for the Social Security Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA), by Noah P. Meyerson.

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The revenues are deposited in the U.S. Treasury. By law, if Social Security revenues exceed expenditures, the "surplus" is credited to the Social Security trust funds in the form of U.S. government securities. Section 201 of the Social Security Act provides the following guidelines for trust fund investment. In recent years, however, the increasing role of interest income, as well as interest by some policy makers in preventing any surplus Social Security tax revenues from being used for other government spending purposes, have focused attention on alternative investment practices.

The Social Security Act has always required surplus Social Security revenues (revenues in excess of program expenditures) to be invested in U.S. government securities (or U.S. government-backed securities). In recent years, attention has been focused on alternative investment practices in an effort to increase the interest earnings of the trust funds, among other goals. This report describes Social Security trust fund investment practices under current law.

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Critics argue that these reforms went too far and that the burden of financial regulation now exceeds the benefits. Recent Congresses have debated legislation to amend the Dodd-Frank Act. Approaches for Congress Through legislation, Congress provides financial regulators with the authority that underpins the regulations they issue. Regulatory relief could be enacted through the normal legislative process. For example, H.R. 10 , a wide-ranging regulatory relief package, was passed by the House on June 8, 2017. In addition, two special legislative procedures are available that Congress may use in limited circumstances—the Congressional Review Act (CRA) and the reconciliation process. The 115 th Congress has considered changes to the CRA to make it easier to overturn rules. A provision is prohibited if it falls under one or more of the rule's six definitions of extraneous—that is, a provision is considered extraneous if 1. it does not produce a change in outlays or revenues or a change in the terms and conditions under which outlays are made or revenues are collected; 2. it produces an outlay increase or revenue decrease when the instructed committee is not in compliance with its instructions; 3. it is outside of the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted the title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure; 4. it produces a change in outlays or revenues that is merely incidental to the nonbudgetary components of the provision; 5. it would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond the "budget window" covered by the reconciliation measure; or 6. it recommends changes in Social Security. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act assesses fees on certain large financial institutions to finance losses to the Orderly Liquidation Fund, the budget of the Office of Financial Research, and the Federal Reserve's supervisory responsibilities under Title I of the act. The vast majority of agency rulemakings must comply with the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's; 5 U.S.C. Until new leadership is appointed, regulators may have little desire to revisit regulations that they have issued recently under current or previous leadership. After a rule has been finalized, ensuring that firms comply with the regulation involves judgment by regulators. Regulators can alter how a regulation is interpreted and enforced using their supervisory and enforcement powers. In addition, the Treasury Secretary plays a role in financial regulation as the chair of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). Executive Orders48 On February 3, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order entitled "Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System." This order directed the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with FSOC, to report to the President within 120 days to "identify any laws, treaties, regulations, guidance, reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and other Government policies that inhibit Federal regulation of the United States financial system in a manner consistent with the Core Principles." The order does not revise or repeal any specific regulation, which can be done only through the standard rulemaking process. Because financial regulators are independent regulatory agencies, they cannot be compelled to comply with executive orders such as Executive Order 13371 that direct agencies to provide regulatory relief. Regulations Issued by the Administration One notable postcrisis regulation issued by the previous Administration—as opposed to an independent regulatory agency—was the Department of Labor's (DOL's) 2016 fiduciary rule , which requires a uniform fiduciary standard for registered broker-dealers and investment advisers when giving financial advice on retirement accounts. On February 3, 2017, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum directing the DOL "to examine the Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine whether it may adversely affect the ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and financial advice." The Treasury Secretary has the opportunity to influence regulatory priorities through his position as chair of FSOC. FSOC has limited rulemaking authority, however. It can make recommendations to member agencies, but it cannot compel agencies to follow those recommendations. FSOC's most notable rulemaking authority is its ability to designate nonbank financial institutions as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Leadership Nominations All the leadership positions at the financial regulators have fixed terms and are appointed by the President following Senate confirmation. Instead, most financial regulators may be removed only if a higher "for cause" threshold is met. Over time, these positions will become vacant, allowing President Trump to nominate candidates to fill most, if not all, of them. At present, several positions are vacant, including the chairs of the OCC and the CFTC. Most, but not all, multimember boards or commissions have statutory political affiliation requirements that give the President's party a majority of seats but limit the number of board members from one party.

The 2007-2009 financial crisis led to significant changes in financial regulation, but critics argue that the burden these changes have imposed now exceeds their benefits. Congress and the Administration are considering financial regulatory relief from various postcrisis regulatory changes, including the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203). This report provides an overview of the options available to pursue that goal. Approaches for Congress Congress can mandate that regulators provide relief through legislation. Most relief legislation likely would follow the normal legislative process. For example, H.R. 10, a wide-ranging regulatory relief package, was passed by the House on June 8, 2017. Two special legislative procedures may be available in limited circumstances, however. The Congressional Review Act (CRA, 5 U.S.C. §§801-808) provides expedited procedures for Congress to overturn recently promulgated regulations. To date, the 115th Congress has used the CRA to overturn one Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking (disclosure requirements for resource-extraction firms). The reconciliation process provides for expedited consideration in the Senate, but is intended to be limited to provisions intended to change direct spending or revenues. Only a few of the funding provisions affecting financial regulators might meet these criteria. Approaches for Financial Regulators The vast majority of postcrisis regulatory reforms have been issued by independent financial regulators, not the Administration. In theory, the regulators issuing any regulation could issue new regulations modifying or repealing the original, provided they have authority under the authorizing statute to do so. But to overturn a final rule that has already been promulgated, regulators must initiate new rulemaking following the standard process, generally including notice and comment procedures. In addition, applying a regulation involves judgment by regulators. Regulators can alter how a regulation is interpreted and enforced using their supervisory (e.g., regulatory guidance and supervisory letters) and enforcement powers. Until new leadership is appointed, regulators may have little desire to revisit regulations that they have issued recently under current or previous leadership. Approaches for the Administration On February, 3, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order to "identify any laws, treaties, regulations, [and] guidance ... that inhibit Federal regulation of the United States financial system in a manner consistent with the Core Principles." One of the core principles is to "make regulation efficient, effective, and appropriately tailored." The order does not revise or repeal any specific regulation, which can be done administratively only through the standard rulemaking process. Because financial regulators are independent regulatory agencies, they cannot be compelled to comply with executive orders governing certain aspects of the rulemaking process. The Treasury Secretary has the opportunity to influence regulatory priorities through his position as chair of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a council made up predominantly of the federal financial regulators. FSOC has limited rulemaking authority, however. It can make recommendations to member agencies, but it cannot compel agencies to follow those recommendations. FSOC's most notable rulemaking authority is its ability to designate nonbank financial institutions as systemically important (SIFIs). One notable regulation issued by the previous Administration—as opposed to by an independent regulatory agency—was the Department of Labor's (DOL's) fiduciary rule, which requires a uniform fiduciary standard for registered broker-dealers and investment advisers when giving financial advice on retirement accounts. On February 3, 2017, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum directing the DOL to rescind or revise the rule if it "adversely affect(s) the ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and financial advice." All the leadership positions at the financial regulators have fixed terms and are appointed by the President following Senate confirmation. Although most of these individuals may be removed only "for cause," over time, these positions will become vacant, allowing President Trump to nominate candidates to fill most, if not all, of them. At present, President Trump has filled the chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), while several other positions are vacant, including the chairs of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Most, but not all, multimember boards or commissions have statutory political affiliation requirements that give the President's party a majority of seats but limit the number of seats that one party can hold.

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Introduction When a Senator introduces a bill or joint resolution, the measure is usually referred to committee, pursuant to provisions of Senate Rules XIV, XVII, and XXV. When the House informs the Senate that it has passed a bill or joint resolution that was introduced in the House, and the Senate receives the measure, the measure is also usually referred to a Senate committee. (Senate rules contain procedures for processing concurrent and simple resolutions (Rule XIV, paragraph 6), treaties (Rule XXX), and nominations (Rule XXXI), which are not covered in this report.) The Senate may, however, use provisions of Senate Rule XIV to bypass referral of a bill or joint resolution to a Senate committee in order to have the measure placed directly on the Senate Calendar of Business. Although placing a bill or joint resolution directly on the calendar does not guarantee that the full Senate will ever consider it, the measure is available for floor consideration and certain procedural steps, such as committee reporting or discharging a committee from a bill's consideration, and procedural requirements, such as the two-day availability of a committee report, may be obviated. (For a fuller examination of the Senate's use of the Rule XIV procedure and other procedures and actions to bypass committees, and also both to bypass committees and pass legislation, see CRS Report RS22299, Bypassing Senate Committees: Rule XIV and Unanimous Consent , by Michael L. Koempel.)

When a Senator introduces a bill or joint resolution, or a House-passed bill or joint resolution is received in the Senate from the House, the measure is often referred to committee, pursuant to provisions of Senate Rules XIV, XVII, and XXV. The Senate may, however, use provisions of Senate Rule XIV to bypass referral of a bill or joint resolution to a Senate committee, and have the measure placed directly on the Senate Calendar of Business. Although placing a bill or joint resolution directly on the calendar does not guarantee that the full Senate will ever consider it, the measure is available for floor consideration and certain procedural steps or requirements may be obviated. Such procedural steps include committee reporting or discharging a committee from a bill's consideration, and such procedural requirements include the two-day availability of a committee report. Senate rules contain procedures for processing concurrent and simple resolutions, treaties, and nominations, which are not covered in this report. A Senator may also offer a germane, relevant, or nongermane amendment to a measure pending on the Senate floor, in addition to or instead of introducing a bill or joint resolution. Amendments are also not covered in this report. This report will not be updated again in the 115th Congress unless Senate procedures change. For a fuller examination of the Senate's use of the Rule XIV procedure and other procedures and actions to bypass committees, and also both to bypass committees and pass legislation, see CRS Report RS22299, Bypassing Senate Committees: Rule XIV and Unanimous Consent, by Michael L. Koempel.

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While TSA strategies for all-cargo operations have focused most intensely on the hijacking threat, recent events suggest that terrorists may again be seeking to target U.S.-bound air cargo shipments by exploiting weaknesses in air cargo security overseas. One of the devices had traveled on two passenger flights, from Yemen to Qatar and then from Qatar to Dubai, before being prepared for loading on a U.S-bound all-cargo aircraft. Current Legislative Issues Following the October 2010 discovery of explosives in cargo originating in Yemen, there has been renewed interest in requiring that all air cargo, not just that placed on passenger aircraft, be subject to physical screening. Risk-Based Evaluations of Shipments Under the current air cargo security system, a number of risk-based strategies are being employed to evaluate the security risk of air cargo shipments. Vulnerability Assessments and Risk-Based Targeting Reflecting concerns over the logistics and costs associated with mandatory cargo screening, air cargo industry stakeholders have voiced considerable opposition to requiring 100% screening of passenger air cargo, urging Congress instead to "focus on realistic solutions based on a framework that identifies and prioritizes risks, works methodically to apply effective and practical security programs, and makes optimal use of federal and industry resources." While all domestic air cargo placed on passenger airplanes now undergoes physical screening, TSA employs random and risk-based assessments of inbound international shipments or domestic shipments carried on all-cargo aircraft. Following the October 2010 incidents, TSA applied additional screening measures to inbound international air cargo assessed to be high risk. Cargo Screening Procedures Whereas the air cargo industry has favored risk-based approaches for both cargo planes and cargo aboard passenger aircraft, some policymakers have argued that more comprehensive screening of cargo is needed to make cargo security comparable to that of passengers and baggage. The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-53 ), enacted in August 2007, required 100% physical screening and inspection of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft by August 2010, with an interim requirement to screen 50% of such cargo by February 2009. However, TSA recently indicated that 100% screening of all inbound international air cargo transported on passenger aircraft may not be achieved until August 2013. TSA is now assessing the performance of the various screening technologies and methods employed. In-Flight Security Measures In-flight air cargo security options address the primary perceived vulnerabilities of a potential hijacking of an all-cargo flight or the bombing of a passenger aircraft using an explosive device carried in a cargo shipment. Blast-resistant cargo containers are being considered as an option to protect passenger airliners from explosives.

The October 2010 discovery of two explosive devices being prepared for loading on U.S.-bound all-cargo aircraft overseas has heightened concerns over the potential use of air cargo shipments to bomb passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The incidents have renewed policy debate over air cargo security measures and have prompted some policymakers to call for comprehensive screening of all air cargo, including shipments that travel on all-cargo aircraft. U.S. policies and strategies for protecting air cargo have focused on two main perceived threats: the bombing of a passenger airliner carrying cargo and the hijacking of a large all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon to attack a ground target such as a major population center, critical infrastructure, or a critical national security asset. With respect to protecting passenger airliners from explosives placed in cargo, policy debate has focused on whether risk-based targeting strategies and methods should be used to identify those shipments requiring additional scrutiny or whether all or most shipments should be subject to more intensive physical screening. While the air cargo industry and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have argued for the implementation of risk-based approaches, Congress mandated 100% screening of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft using approved methods by August 2010 (see P.L. 110-53). While 100% of domestic air cargo now undergoes physical screening in compliance with this mandate, not all inbound international cargo shipments carried on passenger airplanes are scrutinized in this manner. TSA is working with international air cargo operators to increase the share of cargo placed on passenger flights that is screened, but 100% screening may not be achieved until August 2013. In the interim, TSA, along with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and international partners, is relying on risk-based targeting to increase screening of air cargo, particularly shipments deemed to be high risk. Amid renewed congressional interest on air cargo security, a number of policy issues may arise regarding the desirability of risk-based strategies as alternatives to 100% cargo screening and inspection; the adequacy of off-airport screening under the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) in conjunction with various supply chain and air cargo facility security measures; the costs and benefits of requiring blast resistant cargo containers to protect aircraft from in-flight explosions in cargo holds; the desirability of having air cargo screened by employees of private firms rather than TSA and CBP employees; and cooperative efforts with international partners and stakeholders to improve the security of international air cargo operations.

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Introduction The executive branch of the U.S. federal government has mandated for decades that developers of border crossing energy facilities must first obtain a Presidential Permit. However, controversy over the proposed Keystone XL oil pipeline—a project that would transport oil sands crude from Alberta, Canada, into the United States—has focused attention on federal permitting of energy infrastructure border crossings. Generally, the construction, operation, and maintenance of facilities that cross the U.S.-Mexico or U.S.-Canada border must be authorized by the federal government through the issuance of a Presidential Permit in accordance with requirements set forth in a series of executive orders. Executive Order 11423 provided that, except with respect to cross-border permits for electric energy facilities, natural gas facilities, and submarine facilities: The Secretary of State is hereby designated and empowered to receive all applications for permits for the construction, connection, operation, or maintenance, at the borders of the United States, of: (i) pipelines, conveyor belts, and similar facilities for the exportation or importation of petroleum, petroleum products, coal, minerals, or other products to or from a foreign country; (ii) facilities for the exportation or importation of water or sewage to or from a foreign country; (iii) monorails, aerial cable cars, aerial tramways and similar facilities for the transportation of persons or things, or both, to or from a foreign country; and (iv) bridges, to the extent that congressional authorization is not required. Natural Gas Pipelines and Electric Transmission Executive Orders 11423 and 13337 explicitly exclude cross-border natural gas pipelines and electric energy facilities (among others) from their reach. As described above, Presidential Permits authorize specific border crossing facilities. Applications for Presidential Permits are subject to these regulatory requirements. § 153.5 articulates "who should apply" for such FERC authorizations. 27 3 U.S.C. The defendant responded that the authority to issue permits for these border crossing facilities "does not derive from a delegation of congressional authority ... but rather from the President's constitutional authority over foreign affairs and his authority as Commander in Chief." The court also noted that these permits had been issued many times before and that "Congress has not attempted to exercise any exclusive authority over the permitting process. The January 24, 2017, Executive Memorandum issued by President Trump and the subsequent permitting of the Keystone XL pipeline border crossing facility by the State Department in accordance with that Memorandum appear to have obviated the need for the latter in this case. However, many in Congress still seek to overhaul the existing permitting framework, which was created entirely by the executive branch, in favor of a framework established by statute. Accordingly, on July 19, 2017, the House passed the Promoting Cross-Border Energy Infrastructure Act ( H.R. 2883 ). Among other provisions, the act would eliminate the Presidential Permit requirement for cross-border crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, and electric transmission infrastructure (§ 2(d)). Instead, developers would require "certificates of crossing" from FERC for cross-border oil, petroleum products, and gas pipelines, or from DOE for cross-border electric transmission (§ 2(a)(2)). However, the statute does not appear to apply to other hazardous liquids infrastructure—notably natural gas liquids (e.g., propane) pipelines—so the State Department would retain its traditional Presidential Permit authority for these facilities.

Controversy over the proposed Keystone XL pipeline project has focused attention on U.S. requirements for authorization to construct and operate pipelines and other energy infrastructure at international borders. For the most part, developers are required to obtain a Presidential Permit for border crossing facilities. The agency responsible for reviewing applications and issuing Presidential Permits varies depending on the type of facility. Oil and other hazardous liquids pipelines that cross borders are authorized by the U.S. Department of State. Natural gas pipeline border crossings are authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Electricity transmission facilities are authorized by the Department of Energy (DOE). CRS has identified over 100 operating or proposed oil, natural gas, and electric transmission facilities crossing the U.S.-Mexico or U.S.-Canada border. The authority for federal agencies to review applications and issue Presidential Permits for oil pipelines comes from a series of executive orders. These executive orders have been upheld by the courts as legitimate exercises of the President's constitutional authority over foreign affairs as well as his authority as Commander in Chief. It is worth noting, however, that Congress has enacted statutes applying to cross-border natural gas and electric transmission facilities that require developers of such projects to apply for authorization from executive branch agencies. In recent years, in the context of the Presidential Permit application for the proposed Keystone XL crude oil pipeline project, Congress has attempted to modify the permitting process for border crossing energy facilities. An Executive Memorandum issued on January 24, 2017, by President Trump inviting TransCanada Corp. to resubmit its Presidential Permit application for the Keystone XL border crossing facility, and the Administration's subsequent issuance of the Presidential Permit, reduced any need for legislative action in order to authorize the border crossing for that particular project. However, Congress remains interested in overhauling the existing permitting framework, which was created exclusively by the executive branch, in favor of a framework which would be established by statute. Accordingly, on July 19, 2017, the House passed the Promoting Cross-Border Energy Infrastructure Act (H.R. 2883), which would eliminate the Presidential Permit requirement for cross-border crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, and electric transmission infrastructure. Instead, developers would require "certificates of crossing" from FERC for cross-border oil, petroleum products, and gas pipelines, or from DOE for cross-border electric transmission. The statute does not appear to apply to other hazardous liquids infrastructure—notably natural gas liquids (e.g., propane) pipelines—so the State Department would retain its traditional Presidential Permit authority for these facilities.

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2673 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004. This represents a $1.4 billion, or a 7.4% reduction from the President'srequest, but $1.3 billion, or 7.9% higher than approved in regular Foreign Operationsspending for FY2003. Introduction The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislativevehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistancebudget and influences major aspects of executive branch foreign policy makinggenerally. (1) It contains the largest share -- abouttwo-thirds -- of total internationalaffairs spending by the United States (see Figure 1 ). 2800 . Foreign Operations Appropriations Request for FY2004 and Congressional Consideration Request Overview On February 3, 2003, President Bush asked Congress to appropriate $18.89 billion for FY2004 Foreign Operations. The budget proposal was $2.7 billion, or16.7% higher than regular Foreign Operations appropriations for FY2003, as enactedin P.L. If enacted, the President's recommendation would have resulted inone of the largest increases of regular (non-supplemental) Foreign Operationsfunding in several decades. Congress subsequently approved in mid-April anadditional $7.5 billion FY2003 supplemental foreign aid spending in P.L. 108-11 , forIraq reconstruction, assistance to coalition partners, and other activities supportingthe global war on terrorism. Including the supplemental brought Foreign Operationsappropriations in FY2003 to $23.67 billion. The FY2004 budget blueprint continued to highlight foreign aid in support of the war on terrorism as the highest priority. But a notable characteristic of thesubmission was the request for funding four new foreign aid initiatives whichtogether accounted for most of the $2.7 billion increase over regular FY2003 levels. Combined, the Millennium Challenge Account (a new structure for delivering foreignaid), the State Department's Global AIDS Initiative, and two new contingency funds(Famine and Complex Crises), totaled $2.05 billion. Other Foreign Operationsprograms were left with a more modest 4% increase. Fighting the War on Terrorism. New Initiative: The Global AIDS Initiative. House Consideration On July 23, the House passed (370-50) a $17.12 billion spending bill -- H.R. For overall "core" bilateral development programs, including HIV/AIDS, other non-health activities, and UNICEF contributions, the Senate measure was about $550million higher than the President's request and $415 million above the House bill.Besides increasing health programs, the Senate bill also added to the request for otherdevelopment activities, providing about $80 million more than requested and over$100 million more than the House. 2673 , with theSenate following on January 22, 2004. 2673 provides $17.48 billion for Foreign Operations, a figure that includes a 0.59% across-the-board rescissionand additional amounts for the Millennium Challenge Account specified in DivisionH of the bill. If Congress fully funds the President's MCA request and assuming that FY2003 will be the baseline from which to compare growth in foreign aid spending duringimplementation of the MCA, a $5 billion increase by FY2006, combined with otherannounced foreign aid initiatives, would result in a $19.3 billion foreign aid budget. International HIV/AIDS. International Family Planning and UNFPA Funding U.S. population assistance and family planning programs overseas have sparked continuous controversy during Foreign Operations debates for nearly two decades. (The Senate, on October 30, subsequently passed the legislation,approving the House bill, H.R. 2. 4. 7. 8. 10. 16. 18.

The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences executive branch foreign policymaking generally. It contains the largest share -- about two-thirds -- of total U.S. internationalaffairs spending. President Bush asked Congress to appropriate $18.89 billion for FY2004 Foreign Operations. The budget proposal was $2.7 billion, or 16.7% higher than regular (non-supplemental) ForeignOperations appropriations for FY2003. If enacted, the President's recommendation would haveresulted in one of the largest increases of regular Foreign Operations funding in at least two decades. Congress subsequently approved in mid-April an additional $7.5 billion FY2003 supplementalforeign aid spending in P.L. 108-11 , for Iraq reconstruction, assistance to coalition partners, andother activities supporting the global war on terrorism. Including the supplemental, ForeignOperations appropriations totaled $23.67 billion in FY2003. The FY2004 budget blueprint continued to make funding in support of the war on terrorism as the highest priority, with about $4.7 billion recommended. The submission also sought funding forfour new aid initiatives which together accounted for most of the $2.7 billion increase over regular FY2003 levels. Combined, the Millennium Challenge Account, a new foreign aid concept, the StateDepartment's Global AIDS Initiative, and two new contingency funds, totaled $2.05 billion. OtherForeign Operations programs were left with a more modest 4% increase. In total, the request included $1.2 billion for HIV/AIDS, about $350 million more than enacted for FY2003, and $7.1 billion for military and security-related economic aid, up nearly $650 millionor 10% from regular FY2003 appropriations. "Core" bilateral development assistance funding,however, would have fallen by 8%, although recipients of these accounts would be expected tobenefit significantly from the new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and Global AIDSInitiative. On July 23, the House passed H.R. 2800 , appropriating $17.12 billion. The Senate passed the legislation on October 30, providing $18.4 billion. Foreign Operations was merged into H.R. 2673 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, a bill that passed the House onDecember 8 and the Senate on January 22, 2004. The enacted measure provides $17.48 billion, atotal that includes a 0.59% across-the-board rescission. This is about $1.4 billion, or 7.4% less thanthe President requested. The enacted measure increases resources for international HIV/AIDS byabout $400 million and cuts the request for the MCA by $300 million. The FY2004 Foreign Operations debate has included discussion of several significant policy issues, including foreign aid as a tool in the global war on terrorism, the Millennium ChallengeAccount, programs to combat HIV/AIDS, international family planning programs, and Afghanreconstruction. Key Policy Staff

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In this paper, key policy components of the ecosystem restoration effort in the South Florida ecosystem, which includes the Everglades, are examined to provide potential lessons for other ecosystem restoration efforts. The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), authorized in the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (WRDA 2000); ( P.L. 106-541 ), was a major step toward coordinated, multi-agency ecosystem restoration. Restoration efforts in South Florida have several attributes similar to restoration elsewhere: multiple stakeholders are involved, including the federal, state, and local governments; water supply and distribution is a central issue; the effort is considered a solution to standing controversies or legal obligations; and environmental restoration is promoted as the main goal. Indeed, an examination of what has been effective and what has been less effective in restoration efforts in South Florida may give insights on how to proceed in the successful development of other ecosystem restoration projects. (See Table 1 for a description of agency tasks and funding history.) Florida is expected to provide half of the funding for restoration efforts under CERP as well as guarantee the allocation of water supplies (for each project and the entire restoration effort) and water quality standards under state laws. Lastly, CERP is an example of a restoration effort that attempts to be adaptive. A draft of the programmatic regulations was released in December 2001 for public comment, and a proposed version (revised from the draft) was published in the Federal Register, August 2, 2002. The final version is expected in December 2002. The draft version of the programmatic regulations generated considerable controversy. Monitoring and Adaptive Management Ecological systems are complex and understanding how they may respond to management efforts will always carry an expected level of uncertainty. DOI, along with the Governor of the State of Florida, has a concurring role in determining six guidance memoranda that establish guidelines for determining (1) the content and format of project implementation reports; (2) processes for developing cost effectiveness and impacts of alternatives to project implementation reports; (3) the process for evaluating project implementation reports; (4) the content of operating manuals; (5) guidelines for conducting assessment activities expected to be done by RECOVER; and (6) the process in project implementation reports for identifying the timing, quantity, and distribution of water. The programmatic regulations are expected to provide guidelines and mechanisms for incorporating adaptive management. To accomplish this, CERP must control the quantity, quality, distribution and timing of water deliveries to stakeholders. It is unclear how future agricultural and urban water demands will be met by CERP. Lack of quantitative assurances for water allocation in the programmatic regulations may create uncertainty in how much water is going to be allocated for urban, agricultural and environmental needs. The Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 ( P.L.

Several complex water resource systems are receiving increasing intergovernmental and private sector efforts to balance human and broader ecosystem values. Examples include the Florida Everglades, San Francisco Bay-Sacramento/San Joaquin River Delta, and the Chesapeake Bay, among others. The Florida Everglades is especially prominent because of its inclusion of Everglades National Park and because human impacts in and around the Park have caused a substantial erosion of the balance and diversity of the original ecosystem. Government and private sector efforts to mitigate the effects of large-scale human change in the broader Everglades ecosystem are complex and sometimes contradictory undertakings. Complexities and conflicts arise because of definitions and goals; because of uncertainty about achieving desirable goals; because of costs; and because of likely tradeoffs with established economic and business activities. The restoration initiative in the South Florida ecosystem (which includes the Everglades) is a recent intergovernmental effort that attempts to address the ecological and socio-economic factors involved with ecosystem restoration. An examination of what has been effective and what has been less effective in ecosystem restoration efforts in the Florida Everglades may give insights on how to proceed in the implementation of other restoration projects. After being reduced to half its original size by flood control projects, agriculture, and urban development, the Florida Everglades is now targeted for a large restoration effort by an unusual partnership among federal, state, tribal and local stakeholders. A major step in this restoration effort was the authorization of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) in the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 2000 (P.L. 106-541). The objective of CERP is to restore the quantity, quality, distribution and timing of water supplies to natural areas without disrupting existing sources of water for agricultural and human needs. There are several policy components within CERP that may be applicable to other ecosystem restoration efforts. They include multi-agency committees for coordination, programmatic regulations for project implementation, adaptive assessment and monitoring, assurances for water allocation, and funding. This report provides a description of each policy component as well as an analysis of its potential benefits and disadvantages in the restoration process. A proposed version of programmatic regulations is cited throughout this report. Programmatic regulations are expected to provide guidelines for project implementation, monitoring, adaptive management, and water allocation for restoration activities provided by CERP. A proposed version of the programmatic regulations was published in the Federal Register in August 2002; the final version is expected in December 2002. This report will be updated as warranted.

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A large majority of scientists and governments accept that stabilizing the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere and avoiding further GHG-induced climate change would require concerted effort by all major emitting countries. Toward this end, 195 governments attending the 21 st Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, France, adopted an agreement in 2015 outlining goals and a structure for international cooperation to address climate change and its impacts over decades to come. The "Paris Agreement" (PA) is subsidiary to the UNFCCC, a treaty that the United States ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate and that entered into force in 1994. On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the PA. He also stated that his Administration would seek to reopen negotiations on the PA or on a new "transaction." The PA creates a structure for nations to pledge to abate their GHG emissions, adapt to climate change, and cooperate toward these ends, including financial and other support. The PA is intended to be legally binding on Parties, though not all provisions are mandatory. For the first time under the UNFCCC, all Parties will participate in a common framework with common guidance, although some Parties will have flexibility in line with their capacities. The commonality largely supersedes the bifurcation into wealthier and developing countries that has held the negotiations in often-adversarial stasis for many years. The PA defines a quantitative (though collective) long-term objective to hold the GHG-induced increase in temperature to well below 2 o Celsius (C) and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 o C above the pre-industrial level. The PA establishes a process, with a "ratchet mechanism" in five-year increments, for countries to set and achieve GHG abatement targets until the long-term goal is met. To promote compliance, the PA works to balance accountability necessary to build and maintain trust (if not certainty) with the potential for public and international pressure ("name-and-shame"). A compliance mechanism is defined to be expert-based and facilitative rather than punitive. Many Parties and observers will closely monitor the effectiveness of this strategy. The PA also requires "as appropriate" that Parties prepare and communicate their plans to adapt to climate change. Adaptation communications, too, will be recorded in a public registry. The PA reiterates the obligation in the UNFCCC for developed country Parties to provide public and private financial support to assist developing country Parties with mitigation and adaptation efforts. It also urges scaling up of financing. Negotiators intended the PA to be a legal instrument, though not all provisions in it are mandatory. Some are recommendations or collective commitments to which it would be difficult to hold an individual Party accountable. In addition, the Parties to the COP agreed to set, prior to their 2025 meeting, a new collective quantified goal for mobilizing financial resources of not less than $100 billion annually to assist developing country Parties. On August 29, 2016, President Obama, on behalf of the United States, signed an instrument of acceptance of the PA, effectively providing U.S. consent to be bound by the PA. In 2015, Members of the 114 th Congress introduced several resolutions (e.g., S.Res. 329 , S.Res. 290 , H.Res. 544 , S.Con.Res. 25 ) to express the sense that the PA should be submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate. Additionally, resolutions were introduced in the House ( H.Con.Res. 97 , H.Con.Res. 105 , H.Res. 218 ) to oppose the PA or set conditions on its signature or ratification by the United States. None received further action. In the 115 th Congress, a number of resolutions have also been introduced to oppose or support U.S. participation in the PA (e.g., H.Con.Res. 55 , H.Res. 85 , H.Res. 390 , S.Con.Res. Some key issues that may attract oversight, should the United States proceed with the President's intent to withdraw from the agreement include: Options for withdrawing from the PA; The degree and content of U.S. participation in the PA activities while the United States is a Party and after withdrawal occurs; Objectives and options for renegotiation of the PA, or of a new "transaction," should other Parties be willing to engage; The possible implications for the United States of decisions Parties make following U.S. withdrawal (for example, regarding technology cooperation and trade); or Evaluation of bilateral cooperation in areas such as development of advanced technologies and information-sharing. As long as the United States remains a Party, issues include the following: Development of methods and guidance to which PA Parties will be expected to conform concerning reporting on and achievement of NDCs; Protection of intellectual property and opportunities for market access in technology-related provisions; Balancing and evaluating outcomes of appropriations, partnership programs, regulations, and other federal activities to advance technologies, inform the public, and influence GHG emissions and adaptation to climate change; Use and outcomes of any appropriated funding, such as for operations of the Secretariat, bilateral cooperation with other Parties, or the GCF; and Overall outcomes of Parties' actions in light of the objectives of the UNFCCC and PA and in view of domestic concerns about potential economic and trade implications and climate effectiveness of the agreement.

The Paris Agreement (PA) to address climate change internationally entered into force on November 4, 2016. The United States is one of 149 Parties to the treaty; President Barack Obama accepted the agreement rather than ratifying it with the advice and consent of the Senate. On June 1, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the agreement and that his Administration would seek to reopen negotiations on the PA or on a new "transaction." Following the provisions of the PA, U.S. withdrawal could take effect as early as November 2020. Experts broadly agree that stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere to avoid dangerous GHG-induced climate change would require concerted efforts by all large emitting nations. The United States is the second largest emitter of GHG globally after China. Toward this purpose, the PA outlines goals and a structure for international cooperation to slow climate change and mitigate its impacts over decades to come. The PA is subsidiary to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which the United States ratified in 1992 with the advice and consent of the Senate and which entered into force in 1994. The PA requires that nations submit pledges to abate their GHG emissions, set goals to adapt to climate change, and cooperate toward these ends, including mobilization of financial and other support. The negotiators intended the PA to be legally binding on its Parties, though not all provisions in it are mandatory. Some are recommendations or collective commitments to which it would be difficult to hold an individual Party accountable. Key aspects of the agreement include: Temperature goal. The PA defines a collective, long-term objective to hold the GHG-induced increase in temperature to well below 2o Celsius (C) and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5o C above the pre-industrial level. A periodic "global stocktake" will assess progress toward the goals. Single GHG mitigation framework. The PA establishes a process, with a ratchet mechanism in five-year increments, for all countries to set and achieve GHG emission mitigation pledges until the long-term goal is met. For the first time under the UNFCCC, all Parties participate in a common framework with common guidance, though some Parties are allowed flexibility in line with their capacities. This largely supersedes the bifurcated mitigation obligations of developed and developing countries that held the negotiations in often-adversarial stasis for many years. Accountability framework. To promote compliance, the PA balances accountability to build and maintain trust (if not certainty) with the potential for public and international pressure ("name-and-shame"). Also, the PA establishes a compliance mechanism that will be expert-based and facilitative rather than punitive. Many Parties and observers will closely monitor the effectiveness of this strategy. Adaptation. The PA also requires "as appropriate" that Parties prepare and communicate their plans to adapt to climate change. Adaptation communications will be recorded in a public registry. Collective financial obligation. The PA reiterates the collective obligation in the UNFCCC for developed country Parties to provide financial resources—public and private—to assist developing country Parties with mitigation and adaptation efforts. It urges scaling up of financing. The Parties agreed to set, prior to their 2025 meeting, a new collective quantified goal for mobilizing financial resources of not less than $100 billion annually to assist developing country Parties. Obama Administration officials stated that the PA is not a treaty requiring Senate advice and consent to ratification. President Obama signed an instrument of acceptance on behalf of the United States on August 29, 2016, without submitting it to Congress. In 2015, Members of the 114th Congress introduced several resolutions (e.g., S.Res. 329, S.Res. 290, H.Res. 544, S.Con.Res. 25) to express the sense that the PA should be submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate. Additionally, resolutions were introduced in the House (H.Con.Res. 97, H.Con.Res. 105,H.Res. 218) to oppose the PA or set conditions on its signature or ratification by the United States. None received further action. In the 115th Congress, a number of resolutions have also been introduced to oppose or support U.S. participation in the PA (e.g., H.Con.Res. 55, H.Res. 85, H.Res. 390, S.Con.Res. 17). Beyond the Senate's role in giving advice and consent to a treaty, Congress continues to exercise its powers through authorizations and appropriations for related federal actions. Additionally, numerous issues may attract congressional oversight, such as: procedures for withdrawal; foreign policy, technological, and economic implications of withdrawal; possible objectives and provisions of renegotiation of the PA or of a new "transaction" for cooperation internationally; international rules and guidance to carry out the PA; financial contributions and uses of finances mobilized; and assessment of the effectiveness of other Parties' efforts.

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Introduction Benefits and services for low-income families have received increased attention from policymakers in recent years. However, it is more challenging to identify how these programs interact with each other and how they cumulatively provide benefits to families and individuals. Specifically, this report provides information on eligibility and benefit receipt among individuals and households in 2012 from nine major need-tested programs for which adequate data were available, listed in the order of the amount of their FY2012 federal obligations: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); housing assistance provided through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, the public housing program, and the project-based rental assistance program (collectively referred to as "housing assistance"); Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC); special supplemental nutrition program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); cash assistance from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant; Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF); and Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). Eligibility for Selected Need-Tested Benefits In 2012, the total number of people who were estimated to be eligible for at least one of the need-tested programs examined in this report was 135 million, or more than 4 in 10 persons among the nation's non-institutionalized population. Of families with children with workers, 44.6% received need-tested aid in 2012. In 2012, the annual median benefit to families who received at least one need-tested benefit was estimated to be $3,300 (i.e., half the families who received at least $1 in aid received an amount less than or equal to $3,300, the other half received more than $3,300). About one-third of all persons were estimated to receive at least some benefit from the selected need-tested programs in 2012, and the rate of benefit receipt among some groups—such as those in families with an individual with disabilities or a family with a child—was even higher. As discussed earlier, 25% of all families that received any aid received benefits of $9,027 or more. Table 11 shows the estimated composition of all families, families receiving any need-tested benefit, and families that received $9,027 or more in benefits during 2012, by family type. Because families who have an individual with disabilities and families with children collectively account for the largest share of all families that receive relatively large benefits—and also account for a large share of total spending—they are the focus in the next sections of this report of detailed examination of characteristics associated with economic well-being. For example, an estimated 38% of families with children that included a full-time, full-year worker received at least some benefit from a need-tested program. Benefit Receipt by Program Total need-tested benefit amounts are typically higher for families that combine benefits from multiple programs than they are for families that receive benefits from only one program. Table 15 shows for families that received benefits from each of the nine programs, estimates of the median benefit total received from all programs and the median benefit from that specific program. However, not all persons eligible for need-tested benefits actually received them. Among the programs examined in this report, an estimated 70% of eligible families actually received SNAP and 65% of eligible families received WIC in 2012. However, the estimated rate of benefit receipt among eligible persons was 28% for TANF cash assistance, 22% for LIHEAP, 18% for subsidized housing, and 17% for CCDF (based on eligible children). In 2012, one in three people were estimated to have actually receive d benefits from at least one of these programs. Many of these families had characteristics not typically associated with economic disadvantage; a substantial portion of families that received aid had pre-welfare incomes above the poverty line in 2012.

Need-tested benefits have received increased attention from policymakers in recent years, as spending levels for these programs remain elevated well into the economic expansion that followed the 2007-2009 recession. While information is available on the number of people who receive benefits from individual programs, it is more challenging to examine how these programs interact and the cumulative benefits families receive from them. Case studies based on hypothetical families often show how much in benefits a family may potentially receive from multiple programs under federal and state policies. However, these case studies assume families receive all the benefits they are eligible for and receive them all year. This is often not true. This report examines estimated benefit receipt by families from nine major need-tested benefit programs in 2012. The nine programs are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); subsidized housing assistance; the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC); the special supplemental nutrition program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance; the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF); and the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). The estimates are derived from a combination of information from a Census Bureau household survey and a model that estimates program eligibility and participation based on information from that survey. An estimated 135 million persons, 4 in 10 persons in the noninstitutionalized population, were eligible for benefits from at least one of these programs in 2012. However, not all persons eligible for need-tested benefits actually received them. Among the programs examined in this report, an estimated 70% of eligible families actually received SNAP and 65% of eligible families received WIC in 2012. However, the estimated rate of benefit receipt among eligible persons was 28% for TANF cash assistance, 22% for LIHEAP, 18% for subsidized housing, and 17% for CCDF (based on eligible children). An estimated 106 million persons (1 in 3 persons in the population) actually received benefits from one of these programs in 2012. Benefits were concentrated among people in families with children and families with an individual with disabilities with those two groups accounting for an estimated 78% of total benefit dollars from the selected programs. Many families that received need-tested benefits had characteristics not typically associated with economic disadvantage; a substantial portion of families that received aid had pre-welfare incomes above the poverty line in 2012. Among families with children in 2012, an estimated 45% of those who had a worker and 38% with at least one adult working full-time all year received at least one need-tested benefit. The estimated median annual benefit amount from the nine programs in 2012 was $3,300 (i.e., half the families that received benefits received less than $3,300 and half received more). About 40% of families that received need-tested aid did so from only one of the nine selected programs. Some families received relatively large amounts of need-tested aid. In 2012, an estimated 25% of families that received benefits from one or more of the selected programs received a total of $9,027 or more. These families accounted for two-thirds of all spending for these programs in 2012. Families with children who received $9,027 or more had characteristics indicative of a more disadvantaged population: working less than full-time all year, lacking a high school diploma, being in a family headed by a single woman, being of a racial/ethnic minority (other than Asian-American), and being in a large family.

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Beyond the Internet content that many can easily access online lies another layer—indeed a much larger layer—of material that is not accessed through a traditional online search. The furthest corners of the Deep Web, known as the Dark Web, contain content that has been intentionally concealed. The Dark Web may be accessed both for legitimate purposes and to conceal criminal or otherwise malicious activities. It is the exploitation of the Dark Web for illegal practices that has garnered the interest of officials and policy makers. It is unclear, however, how much of the Deep Web is taken up by Dark Web content and how much of the Dark Web is used for legal or illegal activities. Users route their web traffic through other users' computers such that the traffic cannot be traced to the original user. Users often navigate Dark Web sites through directories such as the "Hidden Wiki," which organizes sites by category, similar to Wikipedia. In addition to the wikis, individuals can also search the Dark Web with search engines. These search engines may be broad, searching across the Deep Web, or they may be more specific. Other developers have created tools—such as Tor2web—that may allow individuals access to Tor-hosted content without downloading and installing the Tor software. While tools such as Tor aim to anonymize content and activity, researchers and security experts are constantly developing means by which certain hidden services or individuals could be identified or "deanonymized." Anonymizing services have been used for legal and illegal activities ranging from keeping sensitive communications private to selling illegal drugs. Illegal Activity and the Dark Web Just as nefarious activity can occur through the Surface Web, it can also occur on the Deep Web and Dark Web. A range of malicious actors leverage cyberspace, from criminals to terrorists to state-sponsored spies. The web can serve as a forum for conversation, coordination, and action. The actual percentage of these that serve a particular illicit market at any one time is unclear, and it is even less clear how much Tor traffic is going to any given site. Government Use of the Dark Web Because of the anonymity provided by Tor and other software such as I2P, the Dark Web can be a playground for nefarious actors online. Law Enforcement Just as criminals can leverage the anonymity of the Dark Web, so too can law enforcement. It may use this to conduct online surveillance and sting operations and to maintain anonymous tip lines. Military and Intelligence Anonymity in the Dark Web can be used to shield military command and control systems in the field from identification and hacking by adversaries. Tor software can be used by the military to conduct a clandestine or covert computer network operation such as taking down a website or a denial of service attack, or to intercept and inhibit enemy communications. Individuals, businesses, and governments may all rely upon the digital underground.

The layers of the Internet go far beyond the surface content that many can easily access in their daily searches. The other content is that of the Deep Web, content that has not been indexed by traditional search engines such as Google. The furthest corners of the Deep Web, segments known as the Dark Web, contain content that has been intentionally concealed. The Dark Web may be used for legitimate purposes as well as to conceal criminal or otherwise malicious activities. It is the exploitation of the Dark Web for illegal practices that has garnered the interest of officials and policy makers. Individuals can access the Dark Web by using special software such as Tor (short for The Onion Router). Tor relies upon a network of volunteer computers to route users' web traffic through a series of other users' computers such that the traffic cannot be traced to the original user. Some developers have created tools—such as Tor2web—that may allow individuals access to Tor-hosted content without downloading and installing the Tor software, though accessing the Dark Web through these means does not anonymize activity. Once on the Dark Web, users often navigate it through directories such as the "Hidden Wiki," which organizes sites by category, similar to Wikipedia. Individuals can also search the Dark Web with search engines, which may be broad, searching across the Deep Web, or more specific, searching for contraband like illicit drugs, guns, or counterfeit money. While on the Dark Web, individuals may communicate through means such as secure email, web chats, or personal messaging hosted on Tor. Though tools such as Tor aim to anonymize content and activity, researchers and security experts are constantly developing means by which certain hidden services or individuals could be identified or "deanonymized." Anonymizing services such as Tor have been used for legal and illegal activities ranging from maintaining privacy to selling illegal goods—mainly purchased with Bitcoin or other digital currencies. They may be used to circumvent censorship, access blocked content, or maintain the privacy of sensitive communications or business plans. However, a range of malicious actors, from criminals to terrorists to state-sponsored spies, can also leverage cyberspace and the Dark Web can serve as a forum for conversation, coordination, and action. It is unclear how much of the Dark Web is dedicated to serving a particular illicit market at any one time, and, because of the anonymity of services such as Tor, it is even further unclear how much traffic is actually flowing to any given site. Just as criminals can rely upon the anonymity of the Dark Web, so too can the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities. They may, for example, use it to conduct online surveillance and sting operations and to maintain anonymous tip lines. Anonymity in the Dark Web can be used to shield officials from identification and hacking by adversaries. It can also be used to conduct a clandestine or covert computer network operation such as taking down a website or a denial of service attack, or to intercept communications. Reportedly, officials are continuously working on expanding techniques to deanonymize activity on the Dark Web and identify malicious actors online.

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Court Cases It appears only two cases have addressed whether state laws taxing interest earned on bonds issued by other states while exempting interest earned on bonds issued by that state violate the Commerce Clause. Dep't of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis In the Davis case, the Kentucky court of appeals held that the state's bond taxing scheme violated the Commerce Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Davis case on November 5, 2007.

Most states exempt from state income taxes the interest earned on bonds issued by that particular state and its political subdivisions, while taxing the interest earned on bonds issued by other states and their political subdivisions. Some argue that these state tax schemes violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state bonds. Courts in two states have examined this issue. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in one of these cases, Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis.

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Recent changes in the way the program is funded have largely addressed concerns at the federal level about "spiraling costs"; however, the new funding structure has not reduced budget pressures for the local public housing authorities (PHAs) that administer the program. Noting these concerns, the Administration has argued in each of the past several years that the existing Section 8 voucher program should be dismantled and replaced with a new, broader-purpose grant program. Despite their differences, each proposal would alter several key features of the current program, which are discussed below. Reform Proposals Every year since 2003, the President has proposed eliminating the Section 8 voucher program and replacing it with a new initiative. Bills to enact the President's reform have been introduced in Congress, although no further action has been taken. In 2006, a bipartisan voucher reform bill, which would have modified the voucher program but largely retained its current structure, was approved by the House Financial Services Committee, but no further action was taken before the close of the 109 th Congress. Proposals from the 108th Congress Housing Assistance for Needy Families (HANF) The 2003 HANF program ( H.R. The FY2005 Flexible Voucher Program The President's Flexible Voucher Program (FVP), was first recommended in the second session of the 108 th Congress in the Administrative Provisions section of the FY2005 HUD budget request. The House Financial Services Committee, in their Views and Estimates of the President's FY2005 Budget, was critical of the President's FVP proposal. The FVP was not enacted before the end of the 108 th Congress. Proposals from the 109th Congress The State and Local Housing Flexibility Act of 2005 The Administration's State and Local Housing Flexibility Act of 2005 (SLHFA) was introduced in the first session of the 109 th Congress by Senator Allard on April 13, 2005, and by Representative Gary Miller on April 28, 2005, as S. 771 and H.R. Title I of SLHFA was similar to the Flexible Voucher Program proposed by the Administration as part of the FY2005 budget request. It would have replaced the current voucher program with a broader-purpose grant program. Hearings were held on the SLHFA in the House on May 11, 2005; hearings were not held in the Senate. The President's FY2007 budget request, introduced on February 6, 2006, reiterated HUD's support for the bill. The Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2006 On May 22, 2006, the Chairman of the Housing and Community Opportunity Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee introduced the Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2006 ( H.R. As noted earlier, the bill was not enacted before the close of the 109 th Congress.

The Bush Administration has proposed eliminating the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program and replacing it with a new program in each of the past several years. While the specifics have changed, each proposal would significantly alter key features of the current program, including its administration, funding distribution, tenant contributions toward rent, initial and ongoing eligibility of families, and the eligible uses of program funds. The first proposal was referenced in the President's FY2004 budget request and was later introduced in the 108th Congress (H.R. 1841/S. 947). Called the Housing Assistance for Needy Families Act of 2003, it would have created a new block grant administered by states—rather than the local public housing authorities (PHAs) that administer the current program—and eliminated many of the current rules governing the program. Hearings were held on the legislation, although no further action was taken. Language to enact the second proposal, called the Flexible Voucher Program (FVP), was included in the Administrative Provisions section of the President's FY2005 budget request. Under the FVP, PHAs would have retained administration of the new grant program, although most of the federal Section 8 voucher rules and regulations would have been eliminated. The Appropriations Committees did not include the language in their versions, nor the final version, of the FY2005 HUD budget, and authorizing legislation was not introduced before the close of the 108th Congress. The President's FY2006 budget request again called for enactment of a Flexible Voucher Program. During the first session of the 109th Congress, a modified version of the FVP was included as Title I of the State and Local Housing Flexibility Act of 2005 (H.R. 1999/S. 771). The President's FY2007 budget request reiterated the Administration's support for the bill. The House Financial Services Committee held hearings on the bill, although no further action was taken before the close of the 109th Congress. In the second session of the 109th Congress, the House Financial Services Committee approved a bipartisan Section 8 voucher reform bill, the Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2006 (H.R. 5443). While notably narrower in scope than the President's reform proposals, it would have represented the first major reform of the program since the Quality Housing and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-276). It was not enacted before the close of the 109th Congress. This report includes a table comparing the key features of the reform proposals from the 109th Congress. It will not be updated.

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These activities generally are categorized as fuel reduction, preparedness, suppression, and site rehabilitation. The federal government is responsible for responding to wildfires that begin on federal lands. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (FS) carries out wildfire response and management across the 193 million acres of national forests and national grasslands. Both FS and DOI receive annual discretionary appropriations for wildfire management activities through the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bills. Congress also provides funding for wildfire-related activities through the Federal Emergency Management Agency, such as emergency financial assistance for some nonfederal wildfires through Fire Management Assistance Grants and the Disaster Relief Fund; those funds and activities are discussed in other CRS products. The majority of wildfire management appropriations go to FS. Appropriations Accounts, Programs, and Activities DOI and FS each have two similarly structured accounts for wildfire funding: a Wildland Fire Management (WFM) account and a Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act (FLAME) account. Wildland Fire Management Account Of the two programs funded by both agencies' WFM accounts, Fire Operations receives the largest share of the funding, accounting for 64% of the combined WFM appropriation on average over the last 10 years. Since the budget restructuring, FS preparedness appropriations have averaged $1.05 billion annually (FY2012-FY2017). They are collectively discussed in the " Total Suppression Appropriations " section of this report. FS's Hazardous Fuels Management appropriation and DOI's Fuels Management appropriation are used for fuel reduction projects, or treatments , on federal lands and in high-priority areas in the wildland-urban interface, the area where structures are intermingled with—or adjacent to—vegetated wildlands such as forests or rangelands. Supplemental Appropriations Congress also has provided additional funds for suppression activities through supplemental legislation, including in the following fiscal year's annual appropriations law for the agencies. Annual Appropriations The Administration requested a total of $3.72 billion for wildfire management for FY2018 ($2.85 billion for FS and $874 million for DOI). This figure was a $460 million (12%) decrease from the FY2017 enacted level of $4.18 billion (see Table 2 ). The Administration also proposed several structural changes to both the FS and DOI's wildfire appropriations accounts. On September 14, 2017, the Housed passed H.R. 3354 , an omnibus measure covering all 12 appropriations bills, including the FY2018 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill. 3554 would accept nearly all of the Administration's proposed structural changes to the FS's and DOI's wildfire appropriations, including fully funding the Administration's suppression request in their respective WFM suppression activities and not appropriating any funds to their respective FLAME accounts. Issues Congress is debating several issues related to federal funding for wildfire management. Issues under debate include the level of federal spending on wildfire management as well as the effectiveness of that spending (e.g., whether the funding is allowing agencies to meet wildfire management targets). Congress also is debating the level of appropriations dedicated for certain wildfire management activities. After providing funds for wildland fire management for each fiscal year, Congress has enacted additional funds in 5 of the last 10 years. Wildfire suppression is complicated, and both the efficiency of resources used for wildfire suppression and the federal protocol for wildfire management have an impact on wildfire suppression costs.

The federal government's wildfire (or wildland fire) management responsibilities are fulfilled primarily by the Forest Service (FS, in the U.S. Department of Agriculture) and the Department of the Interior (DOI). These responsibilities include prevention, detection, response, and recovery related to fires that begin on federal lands. These responsibilities are accomplished through activities such as preparedness, suppression, fuel reduction, and site rehabilitation, among others. There are several ongoing concerns regarding federal wildfire management. These concerns include the total federal costs of wildfire management, the strategies and resources used for wildfire management, and the impact of wildfire on both the quality of life and the economy of communities surrounding wildfire activity. Many of these issues are of perennial interest to Congress, with annual wildfire management appropriations being one indicator of how Congress prioritizes and addresses certain wildfire management concerns. Congress provides annual appropriations to both FS and DOI for these activities through the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill, although the bulk of the appropriations go to FS. Wildfire activities are funded in two accounts for each agency: Wildland Fire Management (WFM) and Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act (FLAME) reserve accounts. Over the past 10 years (FY2008-FY2017), Congress has appropriated an average of $3.72 billion annually, with $4.18 billion combined to both FS and DOI in FY2017. The Administration requested a combined $3.72 billion in FY2018, a 12% decrease from FY2017 enacted levels. On September 14, 2017, the Housed passed H.R. 3354, an omnibus measure covering all 12 appropriations bills, including the FY2018 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill. This bill would provide $3.85 billion combined for wildfire purposes, an 8% decrease from FY2017 enacted levels and 3% above the Administration's requested levels. The Administration's FY2018 request also proposed restructuring FS and DOI's appropriations accounts, in some identical ways (e.g., eliminating funding for both the FLAME suppression accounts) but also in some different ways (e.g., moving funding for hazardous fuels management). These budget restructuring proposals may provide some benefits for FS or DOI, such as providing agency funds designated for the same activity in one account each instead of across two accounts. Restructuring the budget may have some potential drawbacks as well. For example, changing accounts may complicate analysis to inform future appropriations decisions or hinder the ability to evaluate FS's and DOI's performance. Congress is debating several issues related to federal funding for wildfire management. These issues include the level of federal spending on wildland fire management as well as the effectiveness of that spending (e.g., whether the funding is allowing agencies to meet wildfire management targets). In some years, Congress also faces requests from the agencies for additional appropriations during severe fire activity. Congress has frequently provided additional funding for wildfire management above the level in the annual appropriations bill, usually for suppression purposes. The recurring need for supplemental funds raises questions about the accuracy of the budgeting process for wildfire funding and how the agencies estimate wildfire suppression funding requirements, among other issues. This report provides an overview of the accounts that fund wildfire management activities and historical wildfire management appropriations data, as well as information on FY2018 appropriations.

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Endangered and threatened species—and the law that protects them, the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA, P.L. 93-205 , as amended; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543)—are controversial, in part, because dwindling species are often harbingers of resource scarcity. The most common cause of species' decline is habitat loss or alteration. ESA has been among the most contentious environmental laws because of its strict substantive provisions, which can affect the use of both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) may be listed as either endangered or threatened according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools, including penalties and citizen suits, are available to aid species recovery and protect habitat. ESA is administered by the U.S. 111-241 authorized the issuance of a Multinational Species Conservation Fund semi-postal stamp. Issues in the 111th Congress ESA reauthorization has been on the legislative agenda since the funding authorization expired in 1992, and bills have been introduced in each subsequent Congress to address various aspects of endangered species protection. Revised Regulations for Consultation On August 15, 2008, FWS and NMFS (i.e., services) issued proposed revisions to the Section 7 consultation regulations. In the 111 th Congress, Section 429 of P.L. 111-8 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw or reissue the December 2008 special rule that outlined protections afforded polar bears within 60 days of this measure's enactment; the Obama Administration took this action on May 4, 2009. 2998 ; Division A, Title III, Subpart C, Section 370, of S. 1733 ; and S. 1933 would have allocated funds to endangered species programs and to related funds to assist species' adaptation to climate change. 111-11 authorized the implementation of the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement, providing for the reintroduction of Chinook salmon. The species was listed as threatened under ESA in 1993 and, in recent years, its abundance has declined to the lowest ever observed. In the 111 th Congress several measures were introduced but not enacted. Additional Legislative Initiatives In the 111 th Congress, Section 9107 of P.L. 111-11 amended P.L. 106-392 to extend the authorizations for the Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basin endangered fish recovery programs through FY2023. Other introduced measures relating to ESA that were not enacted include: Section 30 of H.R. Under the authority of a continuing resolution ( P.L. 111-316 ), recommending about $281 million for FWS endangered species and related programs for FY2010. 111-88 . Earlier in the 111 th Congress, P.L. Under the authority of a continuing resolution ( P.L. 111-322 ) since no Commerce Department appropriations for FY2011 have yet been enacted, NMFS was allowed to operate with continued funding at FY2010 levels through March 4, 2011.

The Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543) has been one of the more contentious environmental laws. This may stem from its strict substantive provisions, which can affect the use of both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as endangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid its recovery and protect its habitat. ESA may also be controversial because dwindling species are usually harbingers of broader ecosystem decline. The most common cause of species listing is habitat loss. ESA is considered a primary driver of large-scale ecosystem restoration issues. The 111th Congress has considered whether to revoke ESA regulations promulgated in the waning days of the Bush Administration that would alter when federal agency consultation is required. In addition, legislation related to global climate change includes provisions that would allocate funds to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's endangered species program and/or to related funds to assist species adaptation to climate change. Other major issues concerning ESA in recent years have included the role of science in decision-making, critical habitat (CH) designation, protection by and incentives for property owners, and appropriate protection of listed species, among others. The authorization for spending under ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohibitions and requirements of ESA remain in force, even in the absence of an authorization, and funds have been appropriated to implement the administrative provisions of ESA in each subsequent fiscal year. Proposals to reauthorize and extensively amend ESA were last considered in the 109th Congress, but none was enacted. No legislative proposals were introduced in the 110th or 111th Congresses to reauthorize the ESA. Several measures related to ESA were enacted in the 111th Congress, including P.L. 111-8, containing language authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw or reissue (1) revisions to the ESA Section 7 consultation regulations promulgated by the Bush Administration and (2) a December 2008 special rule that outlined protections afforded polar bears; P.L. 111-11, including provisions (1) authorizing the implementation of the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement, providing for the reintroduction of Chinook salmon, and (2) amending P.L. 106-392 to extend the authorizations for the Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basin endangered fish recovery programs through FY2023; P.L. 111-88, appropriating about $281 million for U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service endangered species and related programs for FY2010 (under the authority of a continuing resolution (P.L. 111-322), ESA funding at FY2010 levels was extended through March 4, 2011); and P.L. 111-241, authorizing the issuance of a Multinational Species Conservation Fund semipostal stamp. This report discusses oversight issues and legislation introduced in the 111th Congress to address ESA implementation and management of endangered and threatened species.

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Environmental activities of the U.S. Coast Guard fall within the service's program for protection of natural resources, and consist of maritime oil spill prevention, marine debris, and pollution response preparedness. The Coast Guard's prevention/preparedness duties are based on international agreements and federal standards and regulations. The Coast Guard must approve the plans for a ship to operate legally in U.S. waters. The NPFC manages the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF). The OSLTF is primarily used to finance prompt responses to oil spills and to reimburse parties for applicable costs associated with oil spills (e.g., cleanup costs, natural resource damages, economic losses). Marine Debris Marine debris (e.g., discarded fishing lines or nets) can endanger birds and marine animals, and cause damage to coral reefs. The Coast Guard's approach to debris is preventive, promoting compliance by boarding and inspecting vessels, and working with local port agencies to ensure there are facilities to receive garbage from vessels. 1905 and 1915, as well as MARPOL Annex V. Marine and Environmental Science The Coast Guard has a history of scientific study of the oceans dating back to 1881, when it began Arctic cruises along the Alaska coast. Today the Coast Guard's role is that of a facilitator, supporting the scientific efforts of other groups. The Coast Guard operates three icebreakers in the Arctic and Antarctic, and provides supplies to remote stations. Environmental Compliance Coast Guard operations must comply with applicable environmental laws.

The U.S. Coast Guard's environmental activities focus on prevention programs, accompanied by enforcement and educational activities. A key component of the Coast Guard's environmental activities involves maritime oil spill prevention. As required by several environmental statutes, including the Clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act, the Coast Guard's pollution preparedness and response activities aim to reduce the impact of oil and hazardous substances spills. Related to this duty, the Coast Guard inspects U.S. and foreign-flagged ships to ensure compliance with U.S. laws and international agreements. In addition, the Coast Guard's National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) manages the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is primarily used to finance prompt responses to oil spills and to reimburse parties for applicable costs associated with oil spills (e.g., cleanup costs, natural resource damages, economic losses). The Coast Guard's approach to marine debris (e.g., discarded fishing lines or nets) is preventive, promoting compliance by boarding and inspecting vessels, and working with local port agencies to ensure there are facilities to receive garbage from vessels. With other agencies, the Coast Guard monitors and measures marine debris. The Coast Guard has a history of scientific study dating back to the 1880s, but its current role is that of a facilitator, supporting the scientific efforts of other groups. The Coast Guard operates three icebreakers in the Arctic and Antarctic, and provides supplies to remote stations. Coast Guard operations must comply with applicable environmental laws. Requirements include air emission standards and waste management.

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India has never shared U.S. assessments of Iran as an aggressive regional power. However, India-Iran relations have not evolved into a strategic alliance and are unlikely to derail the further development of a U.S.-India global partnership. At the same time, given a clear Indian interest in maintaining positive ties with Iran, especially in the area of energy commerce, New Delhi is unlikely to abandon its relationship with Tehran, or accept dictation on the topic from external powers. Many in Congress voice concern about India's relations with Iran and their relevance to U.S. interests.

India's growing energy needs and its relatively benign view of Iran's intentions will likely cause policy differences between New Delhi and Washington. India seeks positive ties with Iran and is unlikely to downgrade its relationship with Tehran at the behest of external powers, but it is unlikely that the two will develop a broad and deep strategic alliance. India-Iran relations are also unlikely to derail the further development of close and productive U.S.-India relations on a number of fronts. See also CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. This report will be updated as warranted by events.

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To some extent, a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program would produce similar effects: both are estimated to increase the price of fossil fuels, which would ultimately be borne by consumers, particularly households. In addition to the policy shift in the executive branch, a number of states have taken actions in recent years that directly address GHG emissions. In the context of these events and efforts, Members in the 111 th Congress have introduced several proposals that would use market-based approaches to reduce GHG emissions. This report focuses on these legislative proposals. H.R. H.R. H.R. 2454 would distribute allowances to both covered and non-covered entities at no cost to support various policy objectives. In addition, an increasing percentage (approximately 17% in 2016) of the allowances would be sold through auction. As with the distribution of no-cost allowances, auction revenues would be used to further various policy objectives. 2454 , S. 1733 would establish an economy-wide GHG cap-and-trade program, while addressing other energy-related matters through numerous energy policy provisions. Although the similarities outweigh the differences, six key distinctions include the following: (1) the Senate bill has a more stringent emissions cap between 2017 and 2029; (2) the two bills allocate emissions allowances and auction revenue to different recipients at different levels; (3) the bills would treat offsets differently; (4) the House bill would establish extensive carbon market regulation (the Senate bill currently has a placeholder for this topic); (5) the House bill would establish a requirement that importers purchase special emission allowances for certain imports from countries without greenhouse gas controls (the Senate bill currently has a placeholder for this topic); and (6) both bills would limit EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, although in different ways. 2454 and S. 1733 , see CRS Report R40896, Climate Change: Comparison of the Cap-and-Trade Provisions in H.R. H.R. H.R. The tax revenues would be used to support (1) a payroll tax rebate; (2) affected industry transition assistance; and (3) clean energy technology. H.R. The approach may be described as a dynamic carbon-content tax. Producers and importers of GHG emission substances—fossil fuels and other GHG emission inputs—would be required to purchase emission permits for each ton of emissions that would occur from the combustion or use of the GHG emission substance. H.R. H.R. S. 2877 , introduced December 11, 2009, by Senator Cantwell, would create a program that seeks to combine both emission and price control. The President would limit (or cap) the quantity of carbon shares available for submission each year, and the Department of Treasury would distribute all of the carbon shares through monthly auctions. The auctions would have a price floor and a price ceiling (i.e., safety valve). H.R. On May 12, 2010, Senators Kerry and Lieberman released a draft of new climate change legislation. A comprehensive energy and climate change policy proposal, the draft would set GHG reduction goals similar to those of H.R. 2454 . Employing a market-based cap-and-trade scheme for electric generators and industry with a separate set-price mechanism to allocate allowances to cover transportation fuels, the proposal allocates a substantial percentage of the allowances created for the benefit of energy consumers and low-income households. 2454 on June 26, 2009. On November 5, the committee approved Senator Boxer's "Manager's Amendment" as a substitute, and ordered S. 1733 reported.

As of the date of this report, Members in the 111th Congress have introduced nine stand-alone proposals that would control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The proposals offered to date would employ market-based approaches—either a cap-and-trade or carbon tax system, or some combination thereof—to reduce GHG emissions. The legislative proposals are varied in their overall approaches in controlling GHG emissions. Some control emissions by setting a quantity (or cap); others control emissions by setting a price (or tax/fee). In addition, the proposals differ in their inclusion of particular design elements, such as whether or not to allow offsets (emission reduction opportunities from economic sectors not directly addressed by the primary approach). H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman/Markey), and S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (Kerry/Boxer), have been the primary energy and climate change legislative vehicles in the 111th Congress. On June 26, 2009, the House passed H.R. 2454. On November 5, the committee approved Senator Boxer's "Manager's Amendment" as a substitute, and ordered S. 1733 reported. In addition to establishing a cap-and-trade system to regulate GHG emissions, both H.R. 2454 and S. 1733 would address energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other energy topics. Other proposals—H.R. 1862 (Van Hollen) and H.R. 1666 (Doggett)—would control emissions by limiting quantity, but would differ in their structure and implementation. Three of the proposals—H.R. 594 (Stark), H.R. 1337 (Larson), and H.R. 2380 (Inglis)—would use a carbon tax approach to address carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Other proposals do not fit precisely into either a price or quantity control category. H.R. 1683 (McDermott) would establish a program that may be described as a dynamic carbon tax: its tax rate would be linked with annual emission allocations (or caps). S. 2877 (Cantwell) would establish a CO2 emission control program on fossil fuel producers and importers. Although the bill would limit the number of carbon shares auctioned each year, the auctions would include a price safety valve, allowing for the purchase of additional shares. To counter the emissions from these additional shares (above the cap), the price safety-valve revenues would be used to support mitigation efforts outside of the emission control program. On May 12, 2010, Senators Kerry and Lieberman released a draft of new climate change legislation. A comprehensive energy and climate change policy proposal, the draft would set GHG reduction goals similar to those of H.R. 2454. The proposal would employ a market-based cap-and-trade scheme for electric generators and industry with a separate set-price mechanism to allocate allowances to cover transportation fuels. A key element in GHG emission reduction bills is how, to whom, and for what purpose the value of emission allowances or carbon tax revenue would be distributed. The distribution strategy is a critical policy decision, because it would affect (1) the overall cost of the program and (2) how program costs are distributed throughout the economy. In the early years of the program, H.R. 2454 and S. 1733 would distribute allowances at no cost to both covered and non-covered entities to support various policy objectives. In addition, an increasing percentage of the allowances would be sold through auction. As with the distribution of no-cost allowances, auction revenues would be used to further various policy objectives.

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Introduction As India's economy continues to grow, its energy needs, including for natural gas, will likely grow as well. Its population is expected to surpass China as the world's largest by 2022, reaching approximately 1.4 billion people, creating greater demand for energy. By 2050, India has the potential to overtake the United States as the world's second-largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). However, these changes likely will take significant investment and commitment from the Indian government to reach fruition. This consumption comes from domestically produced and imported LNG, which has been growing. Indian energy companies have also signed contracts to import U.S. LNG. Issues for Congress Some Members of Congress have been interested in enhancing energy cooperation between the United States and India since the mid-2000s. Bills were introduced in both houses that would support closer energy ties between the two countries; however, none were enacted into law. India's natural gas plans have implications for a number of issues in which Congress has expressed an interest. Those issues include the following: Prospects for U.S. natural gas exports; Prospects for U.S. energy companies' investments in India; Indian investment in the U.S. energy sector; India's ability to meet its global commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to combat climate change; India's ability to reduce its chronic air pollution problems, especially in New Delhi, where recently smog has reached 16 times levels deemed safe; and India's political and economic relationships with regions such as the Middle East, a major supplier of LNG, and Central Asia, a potential supplier of natural gas via pipelines. Background: Government Control of Natural Gas For years, oil and natural gas exploration in India was carried out only by state-owned companies like Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Oil India Limited (OIL). With India's energy use expected to double by 2040, in 2016 the Modi government introduced the Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy (HELP), a new scheme intended to enhance domestic oil and gas production, entice major investment into the sector, and increase employment. The GoI oversees four main ministries devoted to energy production, along with the Department of Atomic Energy. Within the MoPNG are 11 public sector undertakings (PSUs) focused on petroleum and natural gas; the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons (DGH), which largely manages the awarding and implementation of the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) scheme; the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, which is responsible for periodically revising natural gas prices under the guidelines set in 2014; and the Petroleum Conservation Research Association, which promotes policies and strategies aimed at reducing India's dependence on oil. A third state-run company, Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL), is India's largest commercial marketer and domestic distributor of natural gas. Petronet is now publicly traded on the National Stock Exchange of India and is a major player in India's growing LNG market, operating two of India's largest LNG import terminals. It is unclear if the government intends to change course and place greater emphasis on natural gas in India's energy mix or not. Indian companies are increasingly investing in U.S. gas projects in the hope of improving technical expertise that can eventually be used on the 17 potential shale oil and gas well sites along the coasts of India. India's total reserves are estimated to represent only 0.8% of the global total, but data are scarce for many of India's sedimentary basins and require additional scientific exploration in order to better assess their potential for producing natural gas. If India is to increase reliance on natural gas, it would also require improving existing infrastructure and building new infrastructure.

India's population is expected to surpass China as the world's largest by 2022, reaching approximately 1.4 billion people, creating greater demand for energy. India has the potential to be a much larger producer and consumer of natural gas. Competing political and economic factors have limited the government's effectiveness in changing the country's energy mix, which is heavily weighted toward coal and oil. Continually beset by high-profile environmental issues such as major air pollution and contaminated water supplies due to their reliance on coal and oil, the Indian government is now setting policies to increase lower-carbon energy use, but whether the government can overcome the economic and political hurdles remains a question. The portion of natural gas in India's energy mix, 7%, remains small compared to that of the United States, though it is comparable to similar emerging economies like Brazil, China, and South Africa. Despite India's intentions to double the proportion of natural gas consumption by 2022, achieving this goal would require major upstream, midstream, and downstream investments as well as the continued political will to enact the necessary changes to decrease reliance on coal and oil. India's natural gas plans have implications for a number of issues in which Congress has expressed an interest. Those issues include the prospects for U.S. hydrocarbon exports, U.S. energy companies' investments, Indian investments in U.S. natural gas production, India's ability to meet its international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to combat climate change, and India's plans for integrating itself into the growing South Asian energy market. In the mid-2000s, Members of both houses of Congress expressed interest to formalize closer energy ties between the United States and India, and legislation was introduced. The legislation was not enacted into law; however, the executive branch has implemented programs to further improve the energy partnership between the two nations. India's central government manages its energy sector mainly via four ministries: Power; Coal; Petroleum and Natural Gas; and New and Renewable Energy; along with the Department of Atomic Energy. Decades ago the Government of India created entities designated "Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs)" to ensure complete control of the petroleum logistics chain. These PSUs have become some of India's largest companies. The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL), and Indian Oil Corporation Limited are consistently ranked among the world's bigger energy companies. The PSUs are India's primary international and domestic energy actors, although some private sector companies have become key players as well. However, government control of the energy sector has stymied India's development of its domestic resources and hindered its efforts internationally. In the past decade, India has incentivized foreign access to its upstream sector as a way to increase domestic production. Some of India's energy companies are also investing more in U.S. energy projects and have signed contracts to import U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG). Due to limited drilling activity and available information, how much technically recoverable natural gas exists in India is unclear. However, India's current assessment of total reserves—resources that are economically and technically viable under existing market conditions—is estimated to represent less than 1% of the global natural gas total. As India attempts to shift away from coal and oil over the coming decades, natural gas production, especially from offshore resources, is seen as a way to increase domestic supply. Combined with improving infrastructure for imported LNG, India could become a bigger natural gas consumer in the future.

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Introduction In 2007, much higher than expected defaults and delinquencies in the "subprime" segment of the mortgage market, led to a significant slowdown of the housing market. Most of these mortgages were financed not by traditional banks, but by global capital markets through asset or mortgage-backed securities. Thus, rather than being confined to the institutions who made the loans initially, the losses caused by the unexpected volume of mortgage defaults have been felt throughout the financial system by any person or institution who bought such securities. In addition, financial guaranty insurance companies, often known as "monoline" insurers, have also been impacted because they provided insurance for various asset-backed bond issues. These insurers also insure a variety of other bonds. Although the federal government does not currently oversee insurers, various proposals for broad federal oversight of all insurers have been introduced, including S. 40 / H.R. The House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises held a hearing on "The State of the Bond Insurance Industry" on February 14, 2008, and the full Financial Services Committee is scheduled to examine "Municipal Bond Turmoil: Impact on Cities, Towns, and States" on March 12, 2008. This report will be updated as events warrant, particularly if and when Congress takes action on the issue. Derivatives known as credit default swaps (CDS) are one of these newer instruments. When monoline insurers expanded into offering guarantees for asset-backed securities, they apparently did so as protection sellers on CDSs rather than through selling more traditional insurance products. One important difference between CDS and traditional insurance is the accounting treatment. Multi-billion dollar paper losses have been reported, primarily from the value of the insurers' CDS contracts. As was noted above, monoline insurers expanded their business from providing insurance to municipal bonds to providing insurance to asset-backed securities/bonds, some of which were backed by mortgage loans. What may not be obvious, however, are the effects on other actors in the financial system, some of whom may never have even heard of the asset-backed securities and credit default swaps that are the catalyst for the current problems. Municipalities For the large majority of insured bonds that have already been sold, it makes essentially no difference to the issuing municipality whether or not the insurer is downgraded as the municipalities commitment to pay off the terms of the bond is unchanged. The turmoil in the market, including doubts about bond insurers, has caused many of these auctions to fail, resulting in higher immediate interest costs for municipalities issuing these bonds. To this point, the direct government intervention has been much less, than in the LTCM rescue. In addition to the question of how insurers should be regulated, the crisis also may raise questions about whether and how financial derivatives, such as the credit default swaps offered by the bond insurers, should be regulated.

Beginning in 2007, higher than expected defaults and delinquencies in "subprime" mortgages led to a significant slowdown of the housing market. Most of these mortgages were financed by capital markets through asset- or mortgage-backed securities, rather than by traditional banks. Thus, rather than being confined to the institutions that made the now-questionable loans, losses caused by unexpected mortgage defaults have been felt throughout the financial system by any entity who bought mortgage-backed securities. In addition, financial guaranty insurance companies, often known as "monoline" insurers, have also been affected because they insured the prompt payment of interest and return of principal for various securities that may now not be able to pay the promised amounts. With most possible insurance payouts still in the future, these insurers have yet to experience large real losses. Possible massive future losses, however, have caused financial turmoil for insurers, downgrades from rating agencies, and fears about further harm to other institutions, individuals, and municipalities. While the federal government does not currently oversee any insurers, various proposals for broad federal oversight have been introduced, including S. 40/H.R. 3200 in the 110th Congress. The House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises held a hearing entitled "The State of the Bond Insurance Industry" on February 14, 2008, and the full Financial Services Committee is scheduled to examine "Municipal Bond Turmoil: Impact on Cities, Towns, and States," on March 12, 2008. The financial guaranty insurance industry began less than four decades ago with insurance policies being offered on municipal bonds. Bond insurers became known as monoline insurers because they were limited by the regulators to offering financial guaranty insurance, and relatively few companies entered the business. While insuring municipal bonds has remained the majority of their business, bond insurers also expanded into offering insurance for international bonds and the aforementioned asset-backed securities. The insurance provided on the asset-backed securities has been offered through relatively new financial derivatives known as credit default swaps, rather than through traditional insurance policies. The coverage provided through such swaps has in most cases been essentially identical to that provided through traditional insurance policies, but the accounting treatment is different for these tradeable contracts. As the risk of default for the underlying securities has risen, the value of the credit default swaps to insurers has fallen, resulting in multi-billion dollar paper losses for bond insurers. With the possibility of wider financial damage spilling over from bond insurer difficulties, various market participants and government regulators have broached the idea of some sort of rescue for the troubled insurers. Uncertainty about the need for, and size of, such a rescue, as well as complexities in the bond insurer situation have stymied any such rescue to this point. In addition to the immediate demands of crisis management, the turmoil surrounding the bond insurers may also bring longer term regulatory issues to the fore, including questions about future federal oversight regulation of insurers and future federal oversight of derivatives, many of which are essentially unregulated. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Based on that perception, the Obama Administration waived most of the sanctions on Burma, particularly after Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy won the 2015 parliamentary elections and a new NLD-controlled Union Parliament took office in April 2016. Certain events since 2016, however, have led some Members of Congress and others to call for the reinstatement of some of the waived sanctions and/or the imposition of new restrictions on relations with Burma. One of the more prominent events was the "clearance operation" in northern Rakhine State in late 2017, during which Burma's security forces allegedly committed serious human rights abuses against the Rohingya including murder, torture, and rape. Burma's security forces have also been accused of committing crimes against humanity and war crimes against civilians in Kachin and Shan State between 2011 and 2018 as part of its ongoing conflict with various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Two bills have been introduced during the 115 th Congress, the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability (BURMA) Act of 2018 ( H.R. 5819 ) and the Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2018 ( S. 2060 ), that would redefine U.S. policy in Burma and impose greater restrictions on bilateral relations. On November 8, 2015, Burma held nationwide parliamentary elections, in which the NLD won nearly 80% of the contested seats. Aung San Suu Kyi was subsequently appointed to the newly created position of State Counselor, as well as Foreign Minister. On December 2, 2016, he issued Presidential Determination 2017-04, ending restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma as provided by Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997. In addition, Congress has set limits on bilateral relations in appropriations legislation. 13472 on October 7, 2016, and Presidential Determination 2017-04 on December 2, 2016, the restrictions on relations with Burma that remain in place consist of restrictions on the issuance of visas to certain Burmese nationals, limits on U.S. assistance to Burma contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ), and various restrictions on U.S. relations with Burma's military. Ban on the Provision of Visas to Military Leaders —Section 5(a)(1)(A) of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act; P.L. Among the specific objectives for U.S. policy in Burma that have been proposed by various human rights organizations and that Congress may choose to consider are supporting the peace process and national reconciliation to end the nation's civil war; addressing the plight of the Rohingya in Rakhine State, including investigating alleged genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes perpetrated by the Tatmadaw and other security forces, providing adequate and reliable humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Rakhine State, and addressing the citizenship status of the currently stateless Rohingya; responding to the allegations that Burmese security forces committed crimes against humanity and/or war crimes in Kachin and Shan States; promoting amendments to the 2008 constitution to establish a more democratic, civilian government; amending or repealing Burmese laws that are inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights, and promoting the protection of human rights in Burma; supporting the development of governmental institutions that are resilient enough to function during times of political change and natural disasters; and promoting economic growth and development to provide greater prosperity to the people of Burma. In addition, Congress may actively or passively permit the President and the executive branch to determine what restrictions, if any, should be placed on relations with Burma, and provide the necessary authority and appropriations to implement U.S. policy toward Burma. 5819 ) and the Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2018 ( S. 2060 )—were introduced.

Major changes in Burma's political situation since 2016 have raised questions among some Members of Congress concerning the appropriateness of U.S. policy in Burma in general, and the current restrictions on relations with Burma (Myanmar) in particular. During the 115th Congress, two bills were introduced—the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2018 (H.R. 5819; the BURMA Act of 2018) and the Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2018 (S. 2060)—that would reformulate U.S. policy and the restrictions on bilateral relations. In November 2015, Burma held nationwide parliamentary elections from which Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) emerged as the party with an absolute majority in both chambers of Burma's Union Parliament. The new government subsequently appointed Aung San Suu Kyi to the newly created position of State Counselor, as well as Foreign Minister. While the NLD controls the Union Parliament and the executive branch, the Burmese military, also known as the Tatmadaw, continues to exercise significant power under provisions of Burma's 2008 constitution. For example, 25% of the seats in both chambers of the Union Parliament are military officers appointed by the Tatmadaw's Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, creating a voting bloc that can prevent any changes in the constitution. On October 7, 2016, former President Obama revoked several executive orders pertaining to sanctions on Burma, and waived restrictions required by Section 5(b) of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-286), removing most of the economic restrictions on relations with Burma. On December 2, 2016, he issued Presidential Determination 2017-04, ending restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma as provided by Section 570(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997. Various noneconomic restrictions, however, remain in effect, including bans on providing visas to certain Burmese nationals and other restrictions on U.S. assistance to Burma. Certain events since 2016, however, have led some Members of Congress to call for the reinstatement of some of the waived sanctions and/or the imposition of new restrictions on relations with Burma. One of the more prominent events was the "clearance operation" in northern Rakhine State in late 2017, during which Burma's security forces allegedly committed serious human rights abuses against the Rohingya. A U.N. fact-finding mission (and other investigations) say the security force's actions may constitute genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes. Burma's security forces have also been accused of committing crimes against humanity and war crimes against civilians in Kachin and Shan State between 2011 and 2018 as part of its ongoing conflict with various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Congress will have various opportunities to weigh in on U.S. policy toward Burma, including what restrictions, if any, to include in such a policy. In recent years, Congress has restricted foreign assistance to Burma in annual appropriations acts, such as the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). In addition, Congress may consider whether to reexamine existing sanctions laws on Burma in light of recent developments, to determine if it is time to amend, modify, replace, and/or repeal provisions in those laws.

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Introduction Over the past several decades, U.S. household indebtedness has generally risen regardless of macroeconomic or financial conditions. Household debt reduction (or deleveraging) may have important implications for job creation and economic recovery. Deleveraging may translate into a reduction in near-term consumption, which typically accounts for approximately 70% of gross domestic product and likely an important source of economic recovery. 363 and its companion S. 170 , the Housing Opportunity and Mortgage Equity Act of 2011) is to facilitate the refinancing of mortgages. In addition, the Obama Administration announced an initiative to assist qualified homeowners, whose mortgages are not owned or guaranteed by any institution affiliated with the federal government, in lowering their mortgage rates. If refinancing activity results in lower mortgage payments, then households may have more discretionary income to spend and, therefore, spur economic stimulus. Some households, however, are choosing to pay down current debt obligations, which means any additional income that would have gone toward mortgage interest still may not be applied to new spending. Hence, policies aimed at stimulating near-term consumption may instead enhance future borrowing capacity and longer-term consumption if households continue to strengthen their balance sheets via near-term deleveraging. This report presents data illustrating household deleveraging since 2008 in comparison to previous trends in household credit use. Table 1 illustrates the percentage changes in household debt usage from the second quarter of 2008 through the third quarter of 2011 by loan type. Explanations for Household Deleveraging Household deleveraging may be explained by factors influencing both the demand for and supply of credit. Net worth (i.e., the difference between the value of assets and liabilities) fell for seven consecutive quarters beginning in the third quarter of 2007. Much of the decline in net worth is attributable to real estate assets that many households financed through borrowing.

Since the third quarter of 2008, U.S. household debt has steadily fallen. Household debt reduction is known as deleveraging, and such substantial and persistent deleveraging (reflected in Federal Reserve data) has been uncommon over the past several decades. Given that much household debt is used to finance consumption, which accounts for about 70% of gross domestic product, continued deleveraging implies slower consumption growth and economic recovery. Beginning in the third quarter of 2007, household net worth (i.e., the difference between the value of assets and liabilities) preceded the fall in household debt. The recent drop in household net worth has also been substantial and persistent relative to previous decades and, therefore, may arguably have precipitated such pronounced household deleveraging. Household deleveraging may dampen the immediate effectiveness of legislative efforts to generate economic stimulus. For example, H.R. 363 and its companion S. 170, the Housing Opportunity and Mortgage Equity Act of 2011, were introduced to facilitate the refinancing of mortgages held by the government-sponsored enterprises. In addition, the Obama Administration announced an initiative to assist qualified homeowners with privately held mortgages refinance into lower rate loans. If refinancing activity results in lower mortgage payments, then households may have more discretionary income to spend and, therefore, spur economic stimulus. Given the trend of household debt reduction, the additional income that would have gone toward paying mortgage interest still may not be applied to new spending. Households may prefer using the additional income to pay down current debt obligations. Hence, such legislative efforts may enhance future borrowing capacity and long-term consumption if households continue to strengthen their balance sheets via deleveraging, but the effect on near-term consumption activity may be modest. This report presents information on recent household debt usage patterns. It also discusses possible reasons for the reduction in household credit use. Consumers have reduced their indebtedness by accelerating repayment of outstanding debts and defaulting on loan obligations. Lenders have also tightened lending standards. Hence, both demand and supply factors can explain the decline in household credit usage.

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Introduction The National Security Agency (NSA), one of the largest components of the U.S. Intelligence Community, hasreached a major watershed in its history. Responsible for obtaining intelligence from international communications, (1) NSA's efforts are being challenged by the multiplicity of new types of communications links, bythe widespread availability of low-cost encryption systems, and by changes in the international environment inwhich dangerous security threats can come fromsmall, but well organized, terrorist groups as well as hostile nation states. Roles and Missions: The Growing Influence of Congress For decades Congress was content to consider the signals intelligence effort and the organization of NSAprimarily as the responsibility of the executive branch.For a quarter century after the end of the Second World War, NSA and the nation's other intelligence agenciesundertook their activities with little publicity andwith congressional interest limited to a handful of members of armed services and appropriations committees. Of greater enduring significance was theestablishment of select intelligence committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. As a result of the extreme sensitivity of much intelligenceinformation, the two intelligence committeescame to act essentially as surrogates for the Congress and the public in regard to intelligence agencies. Director Hayden's Initiatives Aware of the challenges facing the Nation's sigint effort and responsive to congressional concerns, the senior leadership of NSA has been moving to make drasticchanges in NSA's operations and organization. (20) The two sets of recommendations reflected a consensus by these advisory groups (and by congressional overseers) that NSA requires more centralizedmanagement, that separate divisions that had long enjoyed functional independence need greater coordination toreduce duplicative functions, and that there needsto be a strategic vision of how the Agency is to adapt to changed geopolitical and technological environments. Bothreports reflected confidence in the importanceof NSA's missions, but both were highly critical of NSA's management and personnel structures. Constitutional principles and statutes sharply distinguish betweeninformation gathering by foreign intelligence anddomestic law enforcement agencies and efforts to involve NSA in surveillance of U.S. persons have been sharplyrestricted. (33) NSA and counterpart agencies in a number of other countries, especially Great Britain, have come under much criticism in the European Parliament for allegedlymonitoring private communications of non-U.S. businessmen in a coordinated electronic surveillance effort knownas Echelon in order to support domesticcorporations. ThoughNSA has reassured congressional oversight committees that the Agency complies strictly with U.S. law, thesecontroversies will undoubtedly continue. Massive efforts were made to collect sigint dealing with military threats to the U.S. and its allies. NSA has long been the target of criticism from those who view intelligence agencies as inevitable threats to civil liberties. One account claims that It is the new Cold War.

The National Security Agency (NSA), one of the largest components of the U.S. Intelligence Community, has reached a major watershed in its history. Responsible for obtaining intelligence from international communications, NSA's efforts are being challenged bythe multiplicity of new types of communicationslinks, by the widespread availability of low-cost encryption systems, and by changes in the internationalenvironment in which dangerous security threats cancome from small, but well organized, terrorist groups as well as hostile nation states. NSA's efforts to adjust to the changing geopolitical and technological environment have been strongly encouraged by Congress and reflect a major shift incongressional oversight of the Agency. Although Congress has always approved funding for NSA, for decadesroutine oversight was limited to a few Membersand staff. In the 1970s, congressional investigations of intelligence agencies resulted in greater public attention toNSA and criticism of activities that infringed onthe civil liberties of U.S. persons. Subsequently, both the Senate and the House of Representatives establishedintelligence oversight committees that have closelymonitored NSA's operations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted in 1978 to regulatecollection by foreign intelligence agencies of thecommunications of U.S. persons. The end of the Cold War, the expansion of low-cost encryption and the explosionof communications systems led Congress totake a more public profile in overseeing the large and secretive Agency. Reacting in large measure to congressional concerns, NSA launched two separate management reviews, one by outside experts, the other by longtime Agencyofficials. Both made strong criticisms of Agency personnel policies, an outmoded organizational structure, and anunwillingness to utilize civilian practices thatmore effective than those available in-house. The current NSA Director, Lt. General Michael V. Hayden, USAF,has used these analyses to launch a series ofmajor initiatives designed to improve NSA's operations, to attract and reward more qualified people from outsideindustry, and is developing a major contract foroutside support of its non-sensitive Information Technology (IT) functions. A major renewal effort is underway, but observers believe many challenges lie ahead that will require congressional oversight. Many of the reforms in personnelpolicies recommended are difficult to implement in a government organization, especially in an extremely tightmarket for technical specialists. The technicalcomplexities of dealing with widespread and sophisticated encryption as well as the proliferation of communicationsdevices remain to be resolved. NSA is,along with other intelligence agencies, not well-positioned to analyze developments among the assortment ofterrorist groups and narcotics smugglers around theworld that can seriously affect U.S. interests. NSA has also come under heated criticism in the European Parliamentfor allegedly collecting, in cooperation withthe British, commercial intelligence to benefit U.S. corporations.

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Since the Chicago Convention, international civil aviation rights have developed primarily through a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and foreign countries. Stated another way, to operate in the United States as an air carrier, an entity must be a U.S. citizen and must be judged by the Secretary to comply with the statute and any other applicable regulations. In addition to the citizenship requirements, U.S. law also contains a general prohibition against cabotage activity. Finally, U.S. law has created an incentive program exclusively available to domestic air carriers; namely, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program (CRAF). "Open Skies" Agreements In August of 1992, the Department of Transportation (DOT) announced its "Open Skies" initiative, which was intended to continue the trend of liberalizing international civil aviation. However, because "Open Skies" is an executive branch initiative, policies that require legislative changes to U.S. law, such as foreign ownership and control, and cabotage are not included within its principles. On the other hand, it should be noted that U.S. law currently prevents European carriers from enjoying any type of cabotage rights within the U.S. domestic market. As a result of this decision, the legal status of the existing "Open Skies" Agreements has been questioned, and the EU Members have granted the Commission a mandate to negotiate a civil aviation agreement with the United States. Although a draft agreement is not yet publicly available, according to the State Department, the agreement, if implemented, would, inter alia, allow every EU and U.S. airline to fly between every city in the European Union and every city in the United States and would permit U.S. and EU airlines to determine the number of flights, their routes, and fares according to market demand. The Federal Aviation Act specifically defines the phrase "Citizen of the United States" as the following: (A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States; (B) a partnership each of whose partners is an individual who is a citizen of the United States; or (C) a corporation or association organized under the laws of the United States or a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States, of which the president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers are citizens of the United States, which is under the actual control of citizens of the United States and in which at least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons that are citizens of the United States. In these situations, air carriers seeking to be considered U.S. citizens will have to demonstrate that U.S. citizens exercise "actual control" only with respect to (1) organizational documentation, including such things as incorporation charters, corporate by-laws, stockholder agreements and other documents of a similar nature; (2) Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) commitments; (3) transportation security requirements as implemented by the Transportation Security Administration; and (4) safety requirements as implemented by the Federal Aviation Administration. H.R. 4542 and S. 2135 both contain provisions that would prevent the DOT from issuing a decision on the NPRM for a period of one year after the date of enactment. The House and Senate bills both require that at least 180 days prior to issuing a final decision, the DOT shall submit to Congress a report assessing the impact of the proposed rule on various aspects of domestic and international aviation law. Subsequently, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have included the following identical language into the Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia Appropriations Bill ( H.R. While it does not appear that the current draft "Open Skies" Agreement with the European Union requires the granting of more cabotage rights to foreign-owned or controlled carriers, it appears to remain a major issue in international civil aviation.

Much of the law regarding civil aviation has been developed through a combination of domestic laws and international agreements between the United States and other nations. In 1992, the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) introduced the "Open Skies" initiative and began negotiating and entering into modern civil aviation agreements with foreign countries, as well as individual members of the European Union (EU). As a result of a 2002 European Court of Justice ruling that several portions of these "Open Skies" Agreements violated EU law, the United States and the EU have been negotiating a new Open Skies Agreement. A tentative agreement appears to exist between the parties that if enacted would, among other things, allow every EU and U.S. airline to fly between every city in the European Union and every city in the United States and would permit U.S. and EU airlines to determine the number of flights, their routes, and fares according to market demand. Despite this development, there appears to remain several areas of international civil aviation law that the tentative agreement does not address. Among them are the issues of foreign ownership and control, participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program, and cabotage. Presently, U.S. law requires that to operate as an air carrier in the United States, an entity must be a citizen of the United States. To be considered a citizen for civil aviation purposes, an entity must be owned either by an individual U.S. citizen, a partnership of persons who are each U.S. citizens, or a corporation (1) whose president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers are U.S. citizens, (2) that is under the actual control of U.S. citizens, and (3) has at least 75 percent of its stock owned or controlled by U.S. citizens. Recently, however, the DOT released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would change its interpretation of what constitutes "actual control." If adopted, this new interpretation could have major implications for U.S. and international civil aviation. Several issues relating to this NPRM are currently being debated, including the consistency with the operative statutes and the viability of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program (CRAF), should more extensive foreign ownership be permitted. In addition, Members of Congress have taken a significant interest in this DOT rulemaking, both through direct participation in the rulemaking process and by introducing legislation ( H.R. 4542 and S. 2135 ) that would prohibit the adoption of a final rule for one year and require the DOT to submit reports and analysis on the impact of the new interpretation on the domestic industry and national security concerns. Furthermore, both the House and Senate have adopted amendments to the proposed Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 2007 ( H.R. 5576 ) that would effectively forestall the DOT from adopting a final rule. U.S. law also contains a general restriction on cabotage, defined as the transportation of passengers or cargo by foreign air carriers from one point in the United States to another. This report provides background on U.S. civil aviation agreements, updates the current status of U.S. "Open Skies" negotiations with the EU, and addresses the legal debate concerning both the foreign ownership and control rules and the cabotage laws. It will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is the nation's largest domestic food assistance program, serving about 42.2 million recipients in an average month at a federal cost of over $68 billion in FY2017. SNAP has typically been reauthorized in a farm bill approximately every five years; this occurred most recently in 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ). Policymakers have long been interested in reducing fraud and improving accuracy in the program, and provisions related to these goals are frequently included in farm bills. The report answers several questions around four main types of inaccuracy and misconduct: (1) trafficking SNAP benefits (by retailers and by recipients); (2) retailer application fraud; (3) errors and fraud in SNAP household applications; and (4) errors and fraud committed by state agencies (including a discussion of states' recent Quality Control (QC) misconduct). Certain key ideas that are fundamental to discussion of SNAP errors and fraud are explored further in the report: Errors are not the same as fraud. Fraud is intentional activity that breaks federal and/or state laws, but there are also ways that program stakeholders—particularly recipients and states—may inadvertently err, which could affect benefit amounts. Certain acts, such as trafficking, are always considered fraud, but other acts, such as duplicate enrollment, may be the result of either error or fraud depending on the circumstances of the case. SNAP fraud is relatively rare, according to available data and reports. There is no single data point that reflects all the forms of fraud in SNAP. The most frequently cited measure of fraud is a national estimate of retailer trafficking, which is a significant, but not the only, type of fraud in the program. While retailer trafficking and retailer application fraud are pursued primarily by a single federal entity, recipient violations are pursued by 53 different state agencies. The national payment error rate (NPER) is the most-often cited measure of nationwide SNAP payment accuracy, but it has limitations. It relies, in particular, on reports and data from the United States Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) as well as the published audits of the USDA's Office of the Inspector General (USDA-OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Errors and Fraud in Benefit Issuance to Households In addition to retailer trafficking and retailer application fraud, errors and fraud can arise in determining eligibility and benefit amounts for recipients. Roughly every three years, USDA-FNS publishes a study estimating the extent of retailer trafficking in SNAP over about three years of SNAP redemption data. The NPER is the most-often cited measure of payment accuracy in SNAP. The NPER estimates all overpayments and underpayments resulting from recipient errors, recipient application fraud, and agency error. For example, in FY2017, the NPER was 6.30%—which included a 5.19% overpayment rate and a 1.11% underpayment rate. Regardless of the cause of an overpayment, SNAP agencies are required to work towards recovering excess benefits from households that were overpaid. Applying the FY2017 NPER to total benefit issuance, in FY2017 an estimated $3.3 billion in benefits were overpaid, an estimated $710 million in benefits were underpaid. Recipient Fraud Unlike retailer trafficking, which is handled by one federal entity (USDA-FNS), recipient fraud is detected and punished by 53 different SNAP agencies (50 states, DC, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands) and, as noted in the September 2012 USDA-OIG report, "FNS cannot estimate a recipient fraud rate because it has not established how States should compile, track, and report fraud in a uniform manner." According to the FY2016 SNAP State Activity Report for every 10,000 households participating in SNAP, about 14 contained a recipient who was investigated and determined to have committed fraud that resulted in an overpayment that the state agency required the household to repay (30,274 claims established); for every $10,000 in benefits issued to households participating in SNAP, about $11 were determined by state agencies to have been overpaid due to recipient fraud and were required to be repaid by the overpaid household ($73,403,758 in fraud claims established); about 3% of the total number of claims established were established due to recipient fraud; about 11% of the total claims dollars established were established due to recipient fraud; for every 10,000 recipients participating in SNAP, about 13 were disqualified from the program for violating SNAP rules (e.g., committing fraud; 55,930 disqualified); about 1.5% of disqualification entries made into the USDA-FNS electronic Disqualified Recipient System (eDRS) in FY2016 were permanent disqualifications; and for every $10,000 in benefits issued to households participating in SNAP, about $21 were determined by state agencies to have been lost (overpaid due to recipient application fraud or trafficked) to recipient fraud associated with disqualified recipients ($136,475,242 in program loss associated with disqualified recipients). Recipient Errors According to the FY2016 SNAP State Activity Report for every 10,000 households participating in SNAP, about 181 were overpaid due to a recipient error and the state agency required the household to repay the overpaid amount (394,883 recipient error claims established); for every $10,000 in benefits issued to households participating in SNAP, about $63 were determined by state agencies to have been overpaid due to recipient errors and were required to be repaid by the overpaid household ($421,934,288 in recipient error claims established); about 45% of the total number of claims established were established due to recipient errors; about 62% of the total claims dollars established were established due to recipient errors; about 65% of FY2016 claims were established by four states; about 55% of FY2016 claims amounts were established by these four states; and these four states accounted for about 30% of SNAP participants. A retailer denied authorization to participate in SNAP is not generally subject to any penalties other than denial. Errors (i.e., recipient errors and agency errors) that occur during this process can result in underissuance or overissuance of SNAP benefits. Recipient fraud, like retailer fraud, can be detected through a variety of means, including the following: Analysis of EBT Transaction Data —Once USDA-FNS has completed the process of administratively penalizing a retailer for retailer trafficking, and the retailer has exhausted their appeal rights, then USDA-FNS provides the retailer trafficking case to the appropriate state agency including EBT card numbers which can be used to identify SNAP recipients who may be trafficking. Through this oversight, USDA-OIG and USDA-FNS identified concerns in state-reported Quality Control data. Combating Errors and Fraud: Issues and Strategies Over time, USDA-FNS, SNAP state agencies, USDA-OIG, GAO, and other stakeholders have identified issues that may complicate or impede the detection and correction of errors and fraud in SNAP. Changes that strengthen payment accuracy and punishments against fraud can be in tension with other policy objectives, such as preserving recipient access to the program, and may have unintended consequences such as incurring costs greater than their savings. Balancing program objectives such as these is always a consideration for policymakers in this area. Additional authority and resources to develop a recipient trafficking rate might allow USDA-FNS to do some or all of the following: conduct and publish a study of recipient trafficking of SNAP benefits using currently existing data, including a national recipient trafficking rate; determine and document what changes must be made to current regulations, forms, policies, and practices to standardize state agency reporting and calculation of recipient trafficking, including at minimum the definition of relevant terms (e.g., definition of "investigation"), the annual timeframes, and the data sources for compilation of recipient trafficking data; and implement the identified changes necessary to reliably and accurately document the national recipient trafficking rate. Receiving SNAP benefits is an entitlement for eligible individuals.

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is the nation's largest domestic food assistance program, serving over 42.1 million recipients in an average month at a federal cost of over $68 billion in FY2017. SNAP is jointly administered by state agencies, which handle most recipient functions, and the federal government—specifically, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS)—which supports and oversees the states and handles most retailer functions. In a program with diverse stakeholders, detecting, preventing, and addressing errors and fraud is complex. SNAP has typically been reauthorized in a farm bill approximately every five years; this occurred most recently in 2014 (P.L. 113-79). Policymakers have long been interested in reducing fraud and improving payment accuracy in the program. Provisions related to these goals have been included in past farm bill reauthorizations and may be considered for the next farm bill, expected in 2018. There are four main types of inaccuracy and misconduct in SNAP: Trafficking SNAP benefits is the illicit sale of SNAP benefits, which can involve both retailers and recipients. Retailer application fraud generally involves an illicit attempt by a store owner to participate in SNAP when the store or owner is not eligible. Errors and fraud by households applying for SNAP benefits can result in improper payments. Errors are unintentional, while fraud is the intentional violation of program rules. Errors and fraud by state agencies—agency errors can result in inadvertent improper payments; the discussion of agency fraud largely focuses on certain states' Quality Control (QC) misconduct. Certain key ideas are fundamental to any discussion of SNAP errors and fraud: Errors are not the same as fraud. Fraud is intentional activity that breaks federal and/or state laws, while errors can be the result of unintentional mistakes. Certain acts, such as trafficking SNAP benefits, are always considered fraud; other acts, such as duplicate enrollment, may be the result of either error or fraud depending on the circumstances of the case. SNAP fraud is relatively rare, according to available data and reports. There is no single measure that reflects all the forms of fraud in SNAP. There are some frequently cited measures that capture some parts of the issue, and there are relevant data from federal and state agencies' enforcement efforts. The most frequently cited measure of fraud is the national retailer trafficking rate, which, estimated that 1.5% of SNAP benefits redeemed from FY2012-FY2014 were trafficked. While the national retailer trafficking rate (which is issued roughly every three years) estimates the extent of retailer trafficking, there is not a standard recipient trafficking rate, nor is there an overall recipient fraud rate. USDA-FNS is responsible for identifying stores engaged in retailer trafficking—using transaction data analysis, undercover investigations, and other tools—and imposing penalties on store owners who commit violations. Retailers found to have trafficked may be subject to permanent disqualification from participation in SNAP, fines, and other penalties. USDA-FNS also works to identify fraud by retailers applying to accept SNAP benefits. Retailers found to have falsified their applications may be subject to denial, permanent disqualification, and other penalties. While retailer trafficking and retailer application fraud are primarily pursued by a single federal entity (USDA-FNS), recipient violations (i.e., recipient trafficking and recipient application fraud) are pursued by 53 different state agencies. Recipients found to have trafficked may be required to repay the amount trafficked and may be subject to disqualification from receiving SNAP benefits and other penalties. State agencies' efforts to reduce and punish recipient fraud vary, which is evident, for instance, in state-submitted data on recipient disqualification activities. The national payment error rate (NPER) is the most-cited measure of nationwide payment accuracy. Using USDA-FNS's Quality Control (QC) system, the NPER estimates states' accuracy in determining eligibility and benefit amounts. The NPER has limitations, though; for instance, it only reflects errors above a threshold amount ($38 in FY2017). After publishing a FY2014 NPER, USDA Office of the Inspector General (OIG ) and USDA-FNS identified data quality issues that prevented the publication of an NPER in FY2015 and FY2016, but USDA-FNS published a NPER for FY2017 in June 2018. For FY2017, it was estimated that 6.30% of SNAP benefit issuance was improper—including a 5.19% overpayment rate and a 1.11% underpayment rate. Regardless of the cause of an overpayment, SNAP agencies are required to work toward recovering excess benefits from households that were overpaid (this is referred to as "establishing a claim against a household"). Applying these rates to benefits issued in FY2017 (over $63.6 billion), an estimated $3.30 billion in benefits were overpaid, and about $710 million in benefits were underpaid. Overpayments and underpayments to households can be the result of recipient errors, recipient fraud, or agency errors during the certification process. State agencies rely on household-provided information in applications, but also employ a range of data matches—some required by federal law, some optional that vary by state—to promote accuracy and double-check information. According to the USDA-FNS FY2016 State Activity Report, of states' established claims for overpayment, approximately 62% of overpayment claim dollars were for recipient errors, about 28% were for agency errors, and about 11% were due to recipient fraud. In addition to inadvertent agency errors, state agencies and their agents have been involved in isolated instances of fraud. Beyond cases of fraud conducted by state agency employees for personal gain, in FY2017 the Department of Justice obtained False Claim Act settlements from three state agencies accused of falsifying their Quality Control data and unlawfully obtaining federal bonuses. Investigations into this matter, conducted by the USDA-OIG, are ongoing. Across all types of fraud, oversight entities such as the Government Accountability Office and USDA-OIG have identified issues and strategies relevant to combating errors and fraud in SNAP. USDA-FNS has also proposed related regulatory changes that were not finalized. On the retailer side, issues identified focus on opportunities to prevent and more promptly punish trafficking. On the recipient side, issues identified include the nonexistence of a recipient fraud rate, states'varied levels of anti-fraud efforts (which may be better incentivized), and improvements to data matching in the application process. During the 115th Congress, Members voted on farm bill proposals that contained some changes to SNAP program integrity policy; these proposals are summarized in CRS Report R45275, The House and Senate 2018 Farm Bills (H.R. 2): A Side-by-Side Comparison with Current Law. Changes that might strengthen payment accuracy and punishments against fraud can be in tension with other policy objectives such as preserving recipient access to the program, and may have unintended consequences such as incurring costs greater than their savings. Balancing program objectives such as these are considerations for policymakers in this area.

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Introduction Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability solely by reason of disability in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by an executive agency or the U.S. Postal Service. Section 504 was the first federal civil rights law generally prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. This report examines Section 504, the recent amendments to the definition of disability, Section 504's regulations, and Supreme Court interpretations. Section 504's differences with the ADA, and its relationship to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), are also discussed.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability solely by reason of disability in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by an executive agency or the U.S. Postal Service. Section 504 was the first federal civil rights law generally prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. This report examines Section 504, recent amendments to the definition of disability, Section 504's regulations, and Supreme Court interpretations. Section 504's differences with the ADA, and its relationship to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), are also discussed.

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In addition to the Medicaid state plan benefits, in 1981, Congress authorized HCBS waivers under Section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act (SSA). Home and Community-Based Services State Plan Option: Section 6086 of the Deficit Reduction Act Section 6086 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ) authorized a new optional benefit that allows states to cover limited HCBS without waivers. The requirements of this new optional benefit, Section 1915(i) of SSA, differ from other Medicaid state plan benefits (e.g., home health and personal care) and the Section 1915(c) HCBS-waivers. Table 2 compares key features of the new HCBS benefit with existing Medicaid program authorities. Section 1915(i) authorizes states to offer HCBS without a waiver beginning in January 2007.

Section 6086 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, (DRA, P.L. 109-171), established a optional Medicaid benefit giving states a new method with which to cover home- and community-based (HCBS) services for Medicaid beneficiaries, starting in January 2007. Prior to DRA's enactment, states needed HCBS waivers authorized in Section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act (SSA) to cover these services. The HCBS-state plan optional benefit, Section 1915(i), differs from both existing Medicaid state plan benefits and Section 1915(c) waivers. This report outlines requirements of the new 1915(i) benefit and compares key features of this benefit with other Medicaid state plan benefits and 1915(c) waivers. It will be updated periodically.

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RS21311 -- U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force Updated April 11, 2003 Background During the summer and fall of 2002, the question of the possible use of "preemptive" military force by the United States to defend its security was raised byPresident Bush and members of his Administration, including possible use of such force against Iraq. It examines and comments on military actionstaken by the United States that could bereasonably interpreted as preemptive in nature. For purposes of this analysis a preemptive use of military force isconsidered to be the taking of military actionby the United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumed military attack oruse of force by that nation against the United States. Thedeployment of U.S. military forces in support of U.S. foreign policy, without their engaging in combat, is not deemed to be a preemptive use of military force. U.S. military forces were permanently withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1933. (10) Iraq War of 2003.

This report reviews the historical record regarding the uses of U.S. military force ina "preemptive" manner, anissue that emerged during public debates prior to the use of U.S. military force against Iraq in 2003. It examinesand comments on military actions taken by theUnited States that could be reasonably interpreted as preemptive in nature. For purposes of this analysis apreemptive use of military force is considered to bethe taking of military action by the United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumedimminent military attack or use of force by thatnation against the United States. The deployment of U.S. military forces in support of U.S. foreign policy, withouttheir engaging in combat, is not deemed tobe a preemptive use of military force. This review includes all noteworthy uses of military force by the UnitedStates since the establishment of the Republic. A listing of such instances can be found in CRS Report RL32170, Instances of Use of United States ArmedForces Abroad, 1798-2003. For an analysis ofinternational law and preemptive force see CRS Report RS21314, International Law and the Preemptive Useof Force Against Iraq. This report will be updatedif significant events warrant.

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This Executive Order requires executive agencies to submit significant rules to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review; however, it does not require the independent regulatory commissions (IRCs) to comply with these requirements. This report discusses the constitutionality and the potential legal effects of extending centralized review of rulemaking to the IRCs. Furthermore, the President has issued executive orders and guidance documents establishing additional requirements and procedures that agencies must follow before a rule can be finalized. What Are Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRCs)? As mentioned earlier, the IRCs are exempt from submitting their regulatory actions for OIRA review under E.O. 12866. Authority to Subject Agency Rulemakings to Centralized Review Two factors have caused questions to arise when evaluating the President's authority to unilaterally require executive agencies to submit their rules to OIRA for review. 12866. Judicial Recourse for Noncompliance with Statute Although E.O. Conclusion Federal agencies regularly adopt rules pursuant to the APA, which have the force of law, to implement the statutes and programs authorized by Congress. Beginning with President Reagan and continued by President Clinton, the executive branch, through OIRA, has maintained a centralized review process for "significant regulatory actions."

Federal agencies regularly adopt rules, which have the force of law, to implement the statutes and programs authorized by Congress. Unless a statute directs otherwise, agencies generally must follow the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act to promulgate rules. However, beginning with President Reagan, Presidents have maintained a centralized review process for "significant regulatory actions." Currently, Executive Order (E.O.) 12866, issued by President Clinton, imposes additional procedures agencies must follow before a rule can be finalized. This includes requiring agencies to submit proposed regulatory action to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. Although E.O. 12866 applies to executive agencies, independent regulatory commissions (IRCs) are not required to submit their rules to OIRA for review. Debates have arisen among scholars and legislators as to whether the President has the authority to require both executive agencies and IRCs to submit their regulations for review by OIRA. In the 112th Congress, Senator Rob Portman introduced S. 3468, the Independent Regulatory Agency Analysis Act of 2012. Under this bill, the President could issue an executive order establishing centralized review procedures for IRCs. This report discusses the constitutionality and the legal effects of extending centralized review of rulemaking to IRCs.

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Introduction On January 13, 2012, President Barack Obama announced that he would ask Congress to reinstate so-called presidential reorganization authority, and a legislative proposal that would renew this authority was conveyed to Congress on February 16, 2012. Bills based on the proposed language were subsequently introduced during the 112 th Congress in the Senate ( S. 2129 ) and the House ( H.R. Evolution of the President's Reorganization Authority Between 1932 and 1981, Congress periodically delegated authority to the President that allowed him to develop plans for reorganization of portions of the federal government and to present those plans to Congress for consideration under special expedited parliamentary procedures. Under these procedures, the President's plan would go into effect unless one or both houses of Congress passed a resolution rejecting the plan, a process referred to as a "legislative veto." This process favored the President's plan because, absent congressional action, the default was for the plan to go into effect. In contrast to the regular legislative process, the burden of action under these versions of presidential reorganization authority rested with opponents rather than supporters of the plan. In 1984, the mechanism was amended to require Congress to act affirmatively in order for a plan to go into force. This arguably shifted the balance of power to Congress. The authority expired at the end of 1984 and subsequently has not been available to the President. Presidents used this presidential reorganization authority regularly, submitting more than 100 plans between 1932 and 1984. Presidents used the authority for a variety of purposes, from relatively minor reorganizations within individual agencies to the creation of large new organizations, including the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The terms of the authority delegated to the President varied greatly over the century. During some periods, Congress delegated relatively broad authority to the President, while during others the authority was more circumscribed. Should this authority be granted, the President indicated that his first submitted plan would propose consolidation of six business and trade-related agencies into one: U.S. Department of Commerce's core business and trade functions, the Export Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Small Business Administration, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. It appears that this plan would also involve the relocation of some subunits and functions that are not directly linked with business and trade. The Administration has stated, for example, that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration would be moved to the Department of the Interior. Congress might approach the question of whether, and how, to delegate this authority to the President in various ways. First, Congress could simply elect not to renew the authority, either by not acting on the President's proposal, or by actively rejecting it. In the event that Congress elects to renew presidential reorganization authority, it might do so in a number of different ways. For example, it could renew the authority (1) without modifications, (2) with the requested amendments to the scope of the authority, (3) with a different set of amendments to the scope of the authority, (4) with changes to the nature of the expedited congressional procedures, or (5) with some combination of these.

On January 13, 2012, President Barack Obama announced that he would ask Congress to reinstate so-called presidential reorganization authority, and his Administration conveyed a legislative proposal that would renew this authority to Congress on February 16, 2012. Bills based on the proposed language were subsequently introduced in the Senate (S. 2129) and the House (H.R. 4409) during the 112th Congress. Should this authority be granted, the President indicated that his first submitted plan would propose consolidation of six business and trade-related agencies into one: U.S. Department of Commerce's core business and trade functions, the Export Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Small Business Administration, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. It appears that this plan would also involve the relocation of some subunits and functions that are not directly linked with business and trade. The Administration has stated, for example, that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration would be moved to the Department of the Interior. Between 1932 and 1981, Congress periodically delegated authority to the President that allowed him to develop plans for reorganization of portions of the federal government and to present those plans to Congress for consideration under special parliamentary procedures. Under these procedures, the President's plan would go into effect unless one or both houses of Congress passed a resolution rejecting the plan, a process referred to as a "legislative veto." This process favored the President's plan because, absent congressional action, the default was for the plan to go into effect. In contrast to the regular legislative process, the burden of action under these versions of presidential reorganization authority rested with opponents rather than supporters of the plan. In 1984, the mechanism was amended to require Congress to act affirmatively in order for a plan to go into force. This arguably shifted the balance of power to Congress. The authority expired at the end of 1984 and therefore has not been available to the President since then. Presidents used this presidential reorganization authority regularly, submitting more than 100 plans between 1932 and 1984. Presidents used the authority for a variety of purposes, from relatively minor reorganizations within individual agencies to the creation of large new organizations, including the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The terms of the authority delegated to the President varied greatly over the century. During some periods, Congress delegated relatively broad authority to the President, while during others the authority was more circumscribed. Congress might approach the question of whether, and how, to delegate this authority to the President in various ways. First, Congress could simply elect not to renew the authority, either by not acting on the President's proposal or by actively rejecting it. In the event that Congress elects to renew presidential reorganization authority, it might do so in a number of different ways. For example, it could renew the authority without modifications, with the requested changes to the scope of the authority, with a different set of changes to the scope of the authority, with changes to the nature of the expedited congressional procedures, or with some combination of these.

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Drug trafficking has helped to perpetuate Colombia's conflict by providing earnings to both left- and right-wing armed groups. When President Santos was inaugurated on August 7, 2010, he pledged to continue the successful security strategies of his predecessor while pursuing democratic, economic, and social reforms. As a result, the national unity coalition backing President Santos was strained, his relations with Congress were weakened, and his popularity suffered. Uribe's criticism of the Santos government centers on what he sees as a conciliatory approach to the FARC and the government of Venezuela, but Uribe has also expressed negative views on the judicial reform that was initially backed by the Santos government, the law to compensate victims of the internal conflict, and the peace framework law passed by the Colombian Congress in June 2012. Foreign Affairs and Trade A hallmark of the Santos Administration has been improving relations with neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela. He later said that preliminary talks with FARC's leadership had been underway for about six months to establish a framework for the formal peace talks that would open in Norway in October and then move to Cuba. Today more than 377,000 victims have registered under the JPL. U.S. Policy Focus and Concerns Colombia and Global Drug Trends Colombia's prominence in the global production of cocaine and heroin has long been a U.S. focus of counternarcotics efforts in the Andean region. The conflict in Colombia and its associated drug trafficking have led to spillover effects in Colombia's neighboring countries, especially Venezuela and Ecuador. Following a diplomatic intervention, Venezuela restored relations. Ecuador has other issues with Colombia. Aerial eradication has been controversial both in Colombia and the United States. The USAID Mission in Colombia reports significant progress since funding started flowing for alternative development through Plan Colombia. The new strategy was intended to consolidate the gains of the Democratic Security policies that were successful in reducing violence in the first term and to consolidate state presence in marginal areas where insurgent activity by illegal armed groups, drug trafficking, and violence converged. Called "integrated action" and later the National Consolidation Plan (PNC), the strategy combines security, counternarcotics, and development in a sequenced approach targeting remote, but strategically important, areas where illegal armed groups continue to operate. Funding for Plan Colombia From FY2000 through FY2012, U.S. funding for Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies totaled over $8 billion in State Department and Defense Department programs. U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement On October 30, 2009, the United States and Colombia signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) to provide the United States access to seven military facilities in Colombia to conduct joint counternarcotics and anti-terrorism operations over a 10-year period. Human Rights Debate in the U.S. Congress has continued to focus on allegations of human rights abuses by the FARC and ELN, paramilitary groups, and the Colombian Armed Forces, and the extent of the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. Despite these measures, human rights organizations contend that the U.S. government often ignores questionable activities of Colombian security forces. Nearly five years later, the U.S. Congress approved implementing legislation for the CFTA ( H.R. Acknowledging that one of the key concerns of opponents of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement involved the status of labor rights in Colombia, on April 7, 2011, President Santos and President Obama announced they had agreed upon an Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (Action Plan). Some Members of Congress who opposed the CFTA concede that the Colombian government has made progress but maintain that continued violence against labor leaders and human rights defenders make it an unfit trade partner. Concluding Policy Perspectives With approval by the U.S. Congress of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement in 2011 and its entry into force in May 2012, the U.S.-Colombia partnership passed a major milestone. Colombia has also emerged as a regional leader, providing police and justice training to nations around the world including many in Latin America.

Colombia, a key U.S. ally, has made measurable progress in providing security despite having endured the longest internal armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere. It has long been a source for both cocaine and heroin. Drug trafficking has helped to perpetuate civil conflict by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. Over the years, Colombia and the United States forged a close partnership focused initially on counternarcotics and later counterterrorism. Building on that cooperation, the U.S.-Colombia partnership has broadened to include development, human rights, and trade. Colombia has emerged as a regional leader providing training in security and counternarcotics throughout the hemisphere and elsewhere. President Juan Manuel Santos, inaugurated in August 2010, has governed with the backing of almost 90% of the Colombian Congress in a "national unity" coalition. In a policy he calls "democratic prosperity," Santos has continued the mission of his popular predecessor of accentuating security, while promoting economic development, creation of jobs, and poverty reduction. He has repaired relations with Ecuador and Venezuela, which had been strained under the former government. He has promoted legislative reforms, including a landmark law to compensate victims of the internal conflict; a justice reform bill that ultimately failed; and controversial "peace framework" and military justice reforms that appeared to be laying the groundwork for an eventual peace settlement. In October 2012, formal peace talks opened with the dominant leftist guerrilla organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), following a surprise announcement that the government had been conducting secret exploratory talks for months. Colombia, in close collaboration with the United States, through a strategy known as Plan Colombia, has made significant progress in reestablishing government control over much of its territory, combating drug trafficking and terrorist activities, and reducing poverty. Between FY2000 and FY2012, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $8 billion in assistance to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies. As Colombia's security and development conditions improved, former U.S.-supported programs have been nationalized to Colombian control. Consequently, U.S. assistance with its counternarcotics, counterterrorism, judicial reform, economic development, humanitarian, and human rights components has gradually declined. The National Consolidation Plan, the current Colombian security strategy, updates Plan Colombia with a whole-of-government approach that integrates security, development, and counternarcotics by consolidating state presence in previously ungoverned areas. The 112th Congress has maintained a strong interest in Colombia's progress in trade, security, counternarcotics, and human rights. In October 2011, the U.S. Congress approved implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, which went into force on May 15, 2012. Members of Congress will continue to monitor the associated Action Plan Related to Labor Rights that addressed U.S. concerns related to labor rights and violence in Colombia. In addition to the larger debate about what role the United States should continue to play in Colombia's ongoing struggle with drug trafficking and illegal armed groups, Congress has expressed concern with a number of related issues. These include funding levels for Plan Colombia's follow-on strategies; continuing allegations of human rights abuses; and the effectiveness of counternarcotics policies such as aerial eradication and alternative development. Members will likely monitor Colombia's peace negotiations and their effect on security conditions in the country. For additional information, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues.

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Over the next few years, government security forces acted extremely aggressively to tamp down the range and scope of the insurgency by aggressively carrying out over a thousand counter-terrorism operations (termed "zachistki" or "cleaning-up" operations) in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus. During these operations, security forces surround a village and search the homes of the residents, ostensibly in a bid to apprehend terrorists. Critics of the operations allege that the searches are illegal and that troops frequently engage in pillaging and gratuitous violence and are responsible for kidnapping for ransom and "disappearances" of civilians. Through these sweeps, as well as through thousands of direct clashes, most of the masterminds of previous large-scale terrorist attacks were killed and such attacks became rarer, although they did not cease completely. Recent Changes in the Range and Scope of Violence Terrorist attacks in Russia's North Caucasus area appeared to greatly increase in numbers since 2007, according to many observers. Moreover, civilian and government casualties reached levels not seen in several years and large-scale terrorist attacks again took place outside the North Caucasus. Although the number of terrorist incidents may have leveled off or even declined slightly in 2010 in Chechnya and Ingushetia from the high levels of 2009 (see below), civilian and government casualties continue to increase throughout the North Caucasus and a rising number of terrorist incidents take place outside of Chechnya. Illustrative of the new level of violence, suicide bombings took place in Moscow on March 29, 2010—the first since 2004—resulting in over 40 deaths and dozens of injuries. Some observers suggest that the increasing scope of public discontent against zachistki and deep economic and social distress are contributing to growing numbers of recruits for terrorist groups and to increasing violence in the North Caucasus. Interethnic and religious tensions are also responsible for some of the increasing violence. The violence in the North Caucasus has spurred migration from the North Caucasus of some of the native population and most of the nonnative population. Interests The former Bush Administration appeared to increasingly stress the threat of terrorism in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, although there continued to be criticism of Russian government human rights abuses in the region. 111-8 ), signed into law on March 11, 2009, called for $9.0 million for the North Caucasus for humanitarian, conflict mitigation, human rights, civil society, and relief and recovery assistance. The conference agreement on Consolidated Appropriations for FY2010 ( H.R. The conference agreement also repeats language used for several years that directs that 60% of the assistance allocated to Russia will be withheld (excluding medical, human trafficking, and Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid) until the President certifies that Russia is facilitating full access to Chechnya for international nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian relief to displaced persons. 3288 , Congress has raised concerns about ongoing terrorism and human rights violations in the North Caucasus.

Terrorist attacks in Russia's North Caucasus—a border area between the Black and Caspian Seas that includes the formerly breakaway Chechnya and other ethnic-based regions—appeared to increase substantially in 2007-2009. Moreover, civilian and government casualties reached levels not seen in several years and terrorist attacks again took place outside the North Caucasus. Although the number of terrorist incidents may have leveled off or even declined slightly in 2010 from the high levels of 2009, the rate of civilian and government casualties continued to increase throughout the North Caucasus in 2010 and a rising number of terrorist incidents took place outside of Chechnya. Illustrative of the new range and scope of violence, the Moscow subway system was bombed in March 2010, resulting in over 40 deaths and dozens of injuries. Before the recent rise in terrorism, it seemed that government security forces had been successful in tamping down their range and scope by aggressively carrying out over a thousand sweep operations ("zachistki") in the North Caucasus. During these operations, security forces surround a village and search the homes of the residents, ostensibly in a bid to apprehend terrorists. Critics of the operations allege that the searches are illegal and that troops frequently engage in pillaging and gratuitous violence and are responsible for kidnapping for ransom and "disappearances" of civilians. Through these sweeps, as well as through thousands of direct clashes, most of the masterminds of previous large-scale terrorist attacks were killed. Some observers suggest that the increasing scope of public discontent against zachistki and deep economic and social distress are contributing to growing numbers of recruits for terrorist groups and to increasing violence in the North Caucasus. Interethnic and religious tensions are also responsible for some of the increased violence. Many ethnic Russian and other nonnative civilians have been murdered or have disappeared, which has spurred the migration of most of the nonnative population from the North Caucasus. Russian authorities argue that foreign terrorist groups continue to operate in the North Caucasus and to receive outside financial and material assistance. The United States generally has supported the Russian government's efforts to combat terrorism in the North Caucasus. However, successive Administrations and Congress have continued to raise concerns about the wide scope of human rights abuses committed by the Russian government in the North Caucasus. The conference agreement on Consolidated Appropriations for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117), calls for $7.0 million to continue humanitarian, conflict mitigation, human rights, civil society and relief and recovery assistance programs in the North Caucasus. It also repeats language used for several years that directs that 60% of the assistance allocated to Russia will be withheld (excluding medical, human trafficking, and Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid) until the President certifies that Russia is facilitating full access to Chechnya for international nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian relief to displaced persons.

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Among other things, the crisis has heightened concerns in the United States and in Europe about the future direction and scope of the transatlantic security relationship and the cornerstone of that relationship, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Some policy makers and analysts have called for a reassessment of the transatlantic community's progress in realizing its goal of a Europe "whole, free, and at peace," citing security concerns in some of NATO's Central and Eastern European member states and ongoing territorial disputes in countries on the alliance's borders, such as Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. Russia's actions in Ukraine have heightened these concerns. NATO's response to the crisis thus far has focused on demonstrating support for Ukraine and its territorial integrity; reaffirming the allied commitment to defensing Central and Eastern European allies; and rebuking Russia. Despite calls from some member states, NATO has thus far ruled out permanent troop deployments in the region. Although they have welcomed these measures, some allies in Central and Eastern Europe have called for a more robust demonstration of NATO's willingness and capacity to defend them. U.S. Reassurance Measures in Central and Eastern Europe – Operation Atlantic Resolve and the Proposed European Reassurance Initiative As well as being a key proponent of the NATO response thus far, the Obama Administration has taken additional military measures intended to reassure Central and Eastern European allies. According to the Department of Defense, these and other U.S. troops have participated in at least ten land-based military exercises with NATO Central and Eastern European and other allies this spring and summer. The Defense Department has also enhanced U.S. naval presence in the Black and Baltic Seas. Language issues have caused tensions between Russia and Latvia. On June 4, the Administration announced an additional $5 million in security assistance to Ukraine. Some Members of Congress have called on NATO to offer to purchase the Mistrals built for Russia from France. Prospects for NATO Enlargement Russian actions in Ukraine have prompted some U.S. observers and Members of Congress to call for a more concerted NATO effort to enlarge the alliance, particularly to the east. Montenegro has had a Membership Action Plan (MAP) since December 2009. Representatives of Ukraine's current government have said the country is not seeking NATO membership. In addition to the aforementioned U.S. military responses to the crisis in Ukraine, they note that the United States was a key proponent of NATO's drafting of contingency plans for the defense of Poland and the Baltic States in 2009, and they draw attention to recent U.S. calls for a new round of NATO contingency planning. While they have welcomed these steps, critics of the Administration's and NATO's response to Russian actions in Ukraine have argued that more should be done to support Ukraine, reassure allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and counter Russian aggression. Some have called for bolstered and possibly permanent NATO and/or U.S. troop deployments in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as more frequent military exercises, including in the Black Sea. As discussed above, the United States has provided the Ukrainian government with some nonlethal military aid but has thus far declined to provide lethal military aid. Some analysts, including a former NATO military commander, have argued that the United States and other allies should consider providing additional military assistance, including intelligence and surveillance capabilities and anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. Congress could continue to play an important role in shaping U.S. and NATO responses to Russia's actions in Ukraine.

Russia's actions in Ukraine and its alleged role in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 have caused observers and policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic, including Members of Congress, to reassess the role of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in upholding European security. The security concerns of NATO's Central and Eastern European member states and non-NATO member states such as Moldova and Ukraine are of particular concern. NATO has strongly condemned Russian actions in Ukraine and has taken steps aimed both at reassuring allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe and at deterring further Russian aggression. These include demonstrations of support for Ukraine and its territorial integrity; actions to demonstrate NATO's commitment to defending Central and Eastern European allies; and measures aimed at rebuking Russia. NATO members have said they will continue to conduct previously planned military exercises in Ukraine and elsewhere in the region. The United States has been a key driver of the NATO response and has taken additional military measures intended to reassure its allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe. These include the deployment of U.S. fighter jets and 600 paratroopers to Poland and the Baltic states, and U.S. naval vessels to the Black and Baltic Seas. In June, the Obama Administration requested congressional approval for $925 million in the Department of Defense's FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to fund a proposed European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Among other things, the ERI would enable augmented U.S. troop rotations and military infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe. The United States has supplied the Ukrainian government with some nonlethal military assistance, but has thus far ruled out providing lethal military aid. Although these actions have been welcomed by supporters of the United States and NATO, some analysts and allied governments have called for a more concerted military response. Among other things, critics have called for more robust forward or permanent deployment of U.S. and NATO forces in Central and Eastern Europe; additional military exercises in the region; and additional military assistance to Ukraine, including military training and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The U.S. Congress has played an active role in guiding the U.S. response to the Ukraine crisis, including by authorizing a $1 billion loan guarantee to the Ukrainian government, $150 million in financial assistance to Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European countries, and sanctions against Russia (P.L. 113-95). However, some Members of Congress have called on the Obama Administration and NATO to take additional military action to reassure allies and deter Russia. Some Members have also called for a more resolute demonstration of NATO's commitment to enlargement, including to Georgia, a former republic Soviet republic, with which Russia had a military conflict in 2008. For example, the proposed Forging Peace through Strength in Ukraine and the Transatlantic Alliance Act (H.R. 4433) calls for additional NATO and U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and calls for immediate NATO membership for Montenegro and the granting of a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia. This report addresses the NATO and U.S. military response to the crisis in Ukraine. It does not discuss political, economic, or energy policy responses. For information on these and other aspects of the crisis response, see CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction The United States Supreme Court recently held that the police may enter and search a home without the usually required warrant if they reasonably believe steps are being taken within the home to destroy the evidence they seek, Kentucky v. King . In doing so, the Court rejected limitations which some of the state and lower federal courts had imposed on the exigent circumstance exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. For some courts, inexcusable exigencies occurred when the police created them in order to avoid seeking a warrant. On the question of whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the apartment, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted a two-part test: First, courts must determine whether the officers deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement. Thus, the Court reasoned, where "the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed." It gave no credence to the suggestion that the exception should be unavailable if officers had sufficient probable cause and time to secure a warrant. The Kentucky Supreme Court had incorrectly held that the Fourth Amendment imposed a "foreseeability" limitation on warrantless searches conducted under exigent circumstances. Certiorari had been granted on the question of the permissible limits, if any, on police-created exigencies. The existence of a police-created exigency was assumed by both the Kentucky Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. The concern that gave rise to the "police-created exigency" doctrine in the lower courts may lead to a more demanding threshold of exigency in the future.

Authorities may enter and search a home without a warrant if they have probable cause and reason to believe that evidence is being destroyed within the home. So declared the United States Supreme Court in an 8-1 decision, Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011)(No. 09-1272). The Kentucky Supreme Court had overturned King's conviction for marijuana possession and drug dealing, because the evidence upon which it was based had been secured following a warrantless search which failed to conform with that court's restrictions under its "police-created exigencies" doctrine. The Fourth Amendment usually permits authorities to search a home only if they have both probable cause and a warrant. The warrant requirement may be excused in the presence of exigent circumstances, for instance, when it appears the occupants are attempting to flee or to destroy evidence. Leery lest authorities create exigent circumstances to avoid the warrant requirement, some state and lower federal courts had adopted one form or another of a police-created exigencies doctrine. The Court rejected each of these and endorsed searches conducted under the exigent circumstance exception, unless authorities had created the exigency by threatening to, or engaging in, activities which themselves violated the Fourth Amendment. In order to reach the question of limitations on police-created exigencies, the Court assumed the existence of exigent circumstances in King. The concerns from which the police-created exigencies doctrine emerged may now give rise to more stringent standards for what qualifies as an exigency.

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This report describes how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) deal with the issue of currency manipulation. The IMF can exercise "firm surveillance" but it cannot compel a country to change its exchange rate. Unique among the major international trade and finance organizations, the WTO has a mechanism for enforcing its rules. Countries are entitled, under WTO rules, to levy countervailing duties on imported products that receive subsidies from their national government. WTO dispute settlement panels are specifically excluded from this agreement to communicate, but the agreement says that the IMF shall inform the WTO (specifically including its dispute settlement panels) when the WTO is "considering exchange measures within the Fund's jurisdiction [in order to determine] whether such measures are consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund." As noted before, the IMF Articles of Agreement prohibit this currency manipulation for the purpose of gaining unfair trade advantage, but the Fund has no capacity to enforce that prohibition. If policymakers want to address this situation, several options might be considered. Amend the WTO Agreements Another possibility might be a formal change in the WTO agreements that would define currency manipulation as a prohibited form of export subsidy. Countries that manipulate their currencies could easily block the approval of the amendment. It seems more likely that any such change in the WTO rules will be the result of discussions during multilateral trade negotiations, in which restrictions on currency manipulation will be balanced by other changes desired by the countries that believe currency manipulation is an acceptable trade practice. Arguably, resolving the U.S.- China disagreement about exchange rates is a desirable objective. However, one might argue, a bilateral settlement of this dispute would be of only limited value. Congress is considering legislation ( H.R. No official action has been taken by the IMF on this issue. Adjusting the terms of the inter-agency agreement between the IMF and WTO, or re-interpreting the meaning of that agreement in the light of current practices, might be one option policy makers could use to address the trade implications of currency manipulation.

Congress has been concerned, for many years, with the possible impact that currency manipulation has on international trade. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has jurisdiction for exchange rate questions. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is responsible for the rules governing international trade. The two organizations approach the issue of "currency manipulation" differently. The IMF Articles of Agreement prohibit countries from manipulating their currency for the purpose of gaining unfair trade advantage, but the IMF cannot force a country to change its exchange rate policies. The WTO has rules against subsidies, but these are very narrow and specific and do not seem to encompass currency manipulation. Recently, some have argued that an earlier ruling by a WTO dispute resolution panel might be a way that currency issues could be included in the WTO prohibition against export subsidies. Congress is currently considering legislation to amend U.S. countervailing duty law, based on this precedent, that the proponents believe is consistent with WTO rules. Others disagree as to whether the previous case is a sufficient precedent. Several options might be considered for addressing this matter in the future, if policymakers deem this a wise course of action. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF or the WTO Agreements could be amended in order to make their treatment of currency manipulation more consistent. Negotiations might be pursued, on a multilateral as well as a bilateral basis, to resolve currency manipulation disputes on a country-by-country basis without changing the IMF or WTO treatment of this concern. Some countries might argue that the actions of another violate WTO rules and seek a favorable decision by a WTO dispute resolution panel. Finally, the IMF and WTO could use their interagency agreement to promote better coordination in their treatment of this concern. .

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109-449 ( S. 362 ), establishing NOAA and Coast Guard programs to manage marine debris and address its adverse effects on endangered species. Background and Analysis Overview The 1973 ESA ( P.L. 93-205 , as amended; 16 U.S.C. A stated purpose of the ESA is to protect the ecosystems of which listed species are a part. Under the ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) may be listed as either endangered or threatened according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. More limited protection is available for plant species under the ESA. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools, including penalties and citizen suits, are available to aid species recovery and protect habitat. 109-363 reauthorized and amended the Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation Act ( P.L. to increase the federal share of costs for projects funded (Title III) and reauthorized the Great Ape Conservation Act of 2000 ( P.L. Issues in the 109th Congress ESA reauthorization has been on the legislative agenda since the funding authorization expired in 1992, and bills have been introduced in each subsequent Congress to address various aspects of endangered species protection. Below are descriptions of some of the issues that were most commonly raised. 109-103 authorized certain activities related to the Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program (MRGESCP). 109-237 ), and the House passed it (amended) on September 29, 2005. Also in the 109 th Congress, §3 of H.R. 109-58 , the Energy Policy Act of 2005, established a pilot project in WY, MT, CO, UT, and NM to better coordinate certain actions among federal agencies, including consultations and the preparation of biological opinions under ESA §7. 109-294 ( S. 260 ) expanded the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to assist private landowners in restoring, enhancing, and managing endangered and threatened species habitat on private land through the Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program. A number of additional bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress: H.R. Proponents of both bills said that they were designed to make the ESA more effective by redefining the relationship between private and public property uses and species protection, implementing new incentives for species conservation, and removing what some see as undue land use restrictions. Critics argued that proposed changes would create gaps in the ESA safety net of protections and prohibitions. P.L. 109-183 ( S. 1578 ) reauthorized Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basin endangered fish recovery programs. P.L. 109-225 ( S. 1165 ) expanded Hawaii's James Campbell National Wildlife Refuge to protect habitat for endangered waterbirds. P.L. In addition, appropriations bills have served as vehicles for some changes in the ESA. Provisions in P.L. P.L.

The 109th Congress considered numerous proposals to amend the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543). Major issues in recent years have included changing the role of science in decision-making, modifying critical habitat (CH) procedures, incorporating further protection and incentives for property owners, and increasing protection of listed species, among others. In addition, many have advocated enacting as law some ESA regulations promulgated during the Clinton Administration. The ESA has been one of the more contentious environmental laws. This may stem from its strict substantive provisions, which can affect the use of both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Under the ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as endangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid its recovery and protect its habitat. The ESA may also be controversial because dwindling species are usually harbingers of broader ecosystem decline: the most common cause of listing species is habitat loss. The authorization for spending under the ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohibitions and requirements of the ESA remain in force, even in the absence of an authorization, and funds have been appropriated to implement the administrative provisions of the ESA in each subsequent fiscal year. In the 109th Congress, H.R. 3824 and S. 2110 proposed to extensively amend and reauthorize the ESA; the House passed H.R. 3824 (amended) on September 29, 2005. Proponents of both bills argued that they were designed to make the ESA more effective by redefining the relationship between private and public property uses and species protection, implementing new incentives for species conservation, and removing what some see as undue land use restrictions. However, critics argued that proposed changes created gaps in the ESA safety net of protections and prohibitions. The 109th Congress enacted legislation that (1) established a pilot project in Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico to better coordinate consultations and the preparation of biological opinions under ESA §7 (P.L. 109-58); (2) authorized certain activities related to the Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program (P.L. 109-103); (3) reauthorized Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basin endangered fish recovery programs (P.L. 109-183); (4) expanded a Hawaiian National Wildlife Refuge to protect habitat for endangered waterbirds (P.L. 109-225); (5) expanded the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to assist private landowners in restoring, enhancing, and managing endangered and threatened species habitat on private land through the Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program (P.L. 109-294); (6) reauthorized and amended the Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation Act and the Great Ape Conservation Act of 2000 (P.L. 109-363); and (7) established programs to manage marine debris and address its adverse effects on endangered species (P.L. 109-449). This report also identifies additional bills that were introduced in the 109th Congress to address specific concerns related to how the ESA is implemented and how endangered species are managed.

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The budget resolution creates enforceable parameters with which spending, revenue, and debt legislation must be consistent. Instead, its purpose is to establish a framework within which Congress considers legislation dealing with spending and revenue. The budget resolution is not intended to establish details of spending or revenue policy. The spending policies in the budget resolution encompass two types of spending legislation: discretionary spending and direct (or mandatory) spending. Discretionary spending is controlled through the appropriations process. Appropriations legislation provides funding for numerous activities such as national defense, education, and homeland security, as well as general government operations. Direct spending, alternately, is provided for in legislation outside of appropriations acts. Direct spending programs are typically established in permanent law that continue in effect until such time as they are revised or terminated by another law. Rather than including levels of spending for specific agencies or programs, the budget resolution establishes congressional priorities by dividing spending among the 20 major functional categories of the federal budget. These 20 functional categories do not correspond to the committee system by which Congress operates. As a result, the spending levels in the 20 functional categories are allocated, or "crosswalked," to the House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over discretionary spending (appropriations committees) and direct spending (legislative committees). These 302(a) amounts hold committees accountable for staying within the spending limits established by the budget resolution. Programmatic Assumptions It is inevitable that Members will consider the impact on particular programs or agencies when they consider a budget resolution. While the budget resolution does not allocate funds among specific agencies or programs, assumptions underlying the amounts set forth in the functional categories are frequently discussed in the reports accompanying the budget resolution. Budget resolutions often include procedural provisions, such as reserve funds or reconciliation instructions. These provisions often indicate underlying program assumptions or desires of Congress. Each of these subcommittees is responsible for reporting one regular appropriations bill. These suballocations are known as 302(b) subdivisions. For example, the budget resolution for FY2009 included the following language providing for a deficit-neutral reserve fund concerning San Joaquin River restoration and Navajo nation water rights settlements: In the House, the Chairman of the Committee on the Budget may revise the allocations, aggregates, and other appropriate levels in this resolution for any bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report that would fulfill the purposes of the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act or implement a Navajo Nation water rights settlement and other provisions authorized by the Northwestern New Mexico Rural Water Projects Act by the amounts provided in such measure if such measure would not increase the deficit or decrease the surplus for the period of fiscal years 2008 through 2013 or for the period of fiscal years 2008 through 2018.

The budget resolution sets forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, and public debt. It is not intended to establish details of spending or revenue policy and does not provide levels of spending for specific agencies or programs. Instead, its purpose is to create enforceable parameters within which Congress can consider legislation dealing with spending and revenue. The spending policies in the budget resolution encompass two types of spending legislation: discretionary spending and direct (mandatory) spending. Discretionary spending is controlled through the appropriations process. Appropriations legislation is considered each fiscal year and provides funding for numerous programs such as national defense, education, and homeland security. Direct spending, alternately, is provided for in legislation outside of appropriations acts. Direct spending programs are typically established in permanent law and continue in effect until such time as revised or terminated by another law. The budget resolution establishes congressional priorities by dividing spending among the 20 major functional categories of the federal budget. These 20 categories do not correspond to the committee system by which Congress operates, and as a result these spending levels must be "crosswalked" to the House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over both discretionary and direct spending. These amounts are known as 302(a) allocations and hold committees accountable for staying within the spending limits established by the budget resolution. Each Appropriations Committee is responsible for subdividing its 302(a) allocation among its 12 subcommittees. These allocations, referred to as 302(b) subdivisions, establish the maximum amount that each of the 12 appropriations bills can spend. It is inevitable that Members will consider the impact on particular programs or agencies when they consider a budget resolution. While the budget resolution does not allocate funds among specific agencies or programs, congressional assumptions or desires underlying the amounts set forth in the functional categories are frequently communicated through the budget resolution. Report language accompanying the budget resolution, as well as certain provisions in the budget resolution, can sometimes express non-binding programmatic assumptions and desires. Budget resolutions also often include procedural provisions such as reserve funds or reconciliation instructions. These provisions may also reflect underlying program assumptions or desires of Congress.

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Introduction The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States is at the highest level in U.S. history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population—12.6%—not seen since the early 20 th century. Of the 38 million foreign-born residents in the United States, approximately 16.4 million are naturalized citizens. According to the latest estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about 10.8 million unauthorized aliens were living in the United States in January 2009. The Pew Hispanic Center recently reported an estimate of 11.1 million unauthorized aliens in March 2009, down from a peak of 12 million in March 2007. Some observers and policy experts maintain that the presence of an estimated 11 million unauthorized residents is evidence of flaws in the legal immigration system as well as failures of immigration control policies and practices. There is, indeed, a broad-based consensus that the U.S. immigration system is broken. This consensus erodes, however, as soon as the options to reform the U.S. immigration system are debated. Addressing these contentious policy reforms against the backdrop of economic turbulence sharpens the social and business cleavages and may narrow the range of options. This report synthesizes the following components of the reform debate: legal immigration; legalization; immigration control; refugees, asylees, and humanitarian migrants; and alien rights, benefits, and responsibilities; and offers a roadmap to other Congressional Research Service reports that more fully analyze the policy options. Illustrative among these issues that might arise in the 111 th Congress are border security, worksite enforcement, document fraud, criminal aliens and the grounds for inadmissibility. During his time in the Senate, President Barack Obama supported comprehensive immigration reform legislation that included increased enforcement as well as a pathway to legal residence for certain unauthorized residents.

There is a broad-based consensus that the U.S. immigration system is broken. This consensus erodes, however, as soon as the options to reform the U.S. immigration system are debated. The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States is at the highest level in U.S. history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population—12.6%—not seen since the early 20th century. Of the 38 million foreign-born residents in the United States, approximately 16.4 million are naturalized citizens. According to the latest estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about 10.8 million unauthorized aliens were living in the United States in January 2009. The Pew Hispanic Center recently reported an estimate of 11.1 million unauthorized aliens in March 2009, down from a peak of 12 million in March 2007. Some observers and policy experts maintain that the presence of an estimated 11 million unauthorized residents is evidence of flaws in the legal immigration system as well as failures of immigration control policies and practices. The 111th Congress is faced with strategic questions of whether to continue to build on incremental reforms of specific elements of immigration (e.g., employment verification, skilled migration, temporary workers, worksite enforcement, and legalization of certain categories of unauthorized residents) or whether to comprehensively reform the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). President Barack Obama has affirmed his support for comprehensive immigration reform legislation that includes increased enforcement as well as a pathway to legal residence for certain unauthorized residents. This report synthesizes the multi-tiered debate over immigration reform into key elements: legal immigration; legalization; immigration control; refugees, asylees, and humanitarian migrants; and alien rights, benefits, and responsibilities. It delineates the issues for the 111th Congress on permanent residence, temporary admissions, border security, worksite enforcement, employment eligibility verification, document fraud, criminal aliens, and the grounds for inadmissibility. Addressing these contentious policy reforms against the backdrop of economic crisis sharpens the social and business cleavages and narrows the range of options. The report will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction In 1970, the K visa category was created for foreign national fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens. The first visa within the category, the K-1 visa, is a nonimmigrant visa that grants temporary admission to the United States for fiancé(e)s in order for them to marry their U.S. citizen petitioners. Since the visa's creation, Congress has passed additional legislation that has added protections for fiancé(e)s and their children. There were 35,925 K-1 visas issued by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) in FY2014. The K-1 visa has drawn increased attention due to a mass shooting in San Bernardino, CA, on December 2, 2015. Some members of Congress have also called for the inclusion of visa applicants' social media accounts as an added screening measure. Next, the report will cover the requirements of the visa and its application procedures, including the filing of a petition, the application for a visa, and the national security screening. Background P.L. 91-225 established the K nonimmigrant visa category in 1970 for fiancés, fiancées, and the derivative children of the fiancé(e). The K-1 visa is for noncitizens seeking to enter the United States to marry a U.S. citizen, and the K-2 visa is for their children. 109-162 ) requires the disclosure of the use of an international marriage broker and the petitioner's criminal convictions for certain crimes, notably sexual crimes. Requirements and Procedures In order for a foreign national to be issued a K-1 visa, the petitioner who is filing on the fiancé(e)'s behalf must be a U.S. citizen and must provide the following evidence: The parties have met in person within two years of the petition's filing, though the Secretary of DHS may waive this requirement. The parties have a bona fide intention to marry. The parties are legally able and willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within 90 days of the fiancé(e)'s arrival. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), along with supporting documents. Apply for a Visa After USCIS approves a petition, it is sent to the U.S. Embassy or Consulate in the home country of the foreign national to determine eligibility for a K-1 visa for admission to the United States. CCD links with other databases to flag problems that may have an impact on the issuance of the visa, which include DHS's Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). To screen K visa applicants, as well as all other visa applicants, consular officers use the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which has name-searching algorithms to ensure matches between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information contained in CLASS. If consular officials receive information about a K visa applicant that causes concern, they send a dedicated and secure communication to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). In June 2013, DOS began "Kingfisher Expansion" (KFE) in partnership with the NCTC for conducting interagency counterterrorism screening of all visa applicants. DHS initiated three pilot programs earlier in 2015 to specifically incorporate appropriate social media review into its vetting of applicants for certain immigration benefits. Once in the United States, the K-1 nonimmigrant is required to marry the U.S. citizen petitioner within 90 days. This status is conditional for two years.

The K nonimmigrant visa category was created in 1970 through P.L. 91-225, which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Within the K visa category, the K-1 visa is a visa for fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens and the K-2 visa is a visa for the fiancé(e)'s children. Congress later enacted legislation to provide protections for fiancé(e)s, specifically creating requirements around the use of international marriage brokers, the disclosure of the U.S. petitioner's criminal background, the provision of information to fiancé(e)s on their rights, and additional protections for minors. A mass shooting on December 2, 2015, in San Bernardino, CA, where one of the suspected shooters entered the United States on a K-1 visa, has drawn increased attention to the visa category. This tragedy has spurred questions surrounding the K-1 visa national security screening process and any possible gaps. Some Members of Congress have suggested including a review of K-1 applicants' social media accounts into the screening process. In order to qualify for a K-1 visa, a U.S. citizen must file on behalf of his/her fiancé(e) and provide evidence that (1) the parties have met in person within two years of the petition's filing, (2) the parties have a bona fide intention to marry, and (3) the parties are legally able and willing to be married in the United States within 90 days of the fiancé(e)'s arrival. The petitioner must first file a petition with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Once the petition is approved, it is sent to a U.S. Embassy or Consulate in the home country of the foreign national, where it is determined if the fiancé(e) is eligible for admission to the United States. Although the K-1 visa is a nonimmigrant visa, the fiancé(e) intends to remain in the United States and is therefore also subject to the admission requirements of immigrant visas. K visa applicants' national security screening entails the use of biographical, biometric, and photographic data. The data are entered into consular-based databases, such as the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) and Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which flag problems that may have an impact on the issuance of a visa or matches to any derogatory information. Consular offices send suspect individuals' applications for greater review to other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). In 2013, NCTC began conducting interagency counterterrorism screening of all visa applicants and in 2015, DHS began pilot programs to incorporate social media screening into its vetting of applicants for certain immigration benefits. Once visa applicants have been approved and their security clearances are completed, they can travel to the United States, where they must marry their U.S. citizen petitioners within 90 days of their arrival. Once married, the fiancé(e) adjusts to a conditional residency and after two years can become a lawful permanent resident. In FY2014, the U.S. Department of State issued 35,925 K-1 visas. Asia received the largest portion of K visas at 46%, with the Philippines being the country with the highest number of K visas at 8,525 visas.

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C riminal prosecutions involving classified information inherently create a tension between the government's legitimate interest in protecting sensitive national security information and a criminal defendant's rights under the United States Constitution and federal law. This tension was the primary factor leading to the 1980 enactment of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), which "provides pretrial procedures that will permit the trial judge to rule on questions of admissibility involving classified information before the introduction of the evidence in open court." First, issues may arise during the discovery phase, when the defendant requests and is entitled to classified information in the possession of the prosecution. CIPA also requires a defendant to notify the court and the prosecution of any classified information that he reasonably expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of. In some cases, protective orders may limit disclosure to individuals or attorneys, even from those who have received security clearances from the government. The defendant in this case argued that this restriction on communication violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the assistance of counsel. CIPA authorizes a court to permit the government to propose redactions to classified information provided to the defendant as part of discovery, but "does not give rise to an independent right to discovery" of classified information. Subsequently, this requirement was codified by the Jencks Act. Prior to the introduction of evidence at trial, a court may likewise permit the government to redact, summarize, or substitute classified information, but only so long as the substitution "provide[s] the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information." Similar confrontation issues may be raised by use of the "silent witness rule," a procedure that may be offered by the government as a substitution for classified information that would be otherwise admissible in a criminal defendant's trial. If the defendant is not allowed to personally review classified information in the same manner that it is made available to the jury, the use of the silent witness rule may violate the defendant's right to confront the evidence used against him. Sterling had argued that such exclusions would violate his right to have a public trial and to confront witnesses against him.

A criminal prosecution involving classified information may cause tension between the government's interest in protecting classified information and the criminal defendant's right to a constitutionally valid trial. In some cases, a defendant may threaten to disclose classified information in an effort to gain leverage. Concerns about this practice, referred to as "graymail," led the 96th Congress to enact the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to provide uniform procedures for prosecutions involving classified information. Examples of recent cases implicating CIPA have arisen in the context of prosecutions against alleged terrorists, as well as prosecutions involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by former intelligence officials. CIPA provides procedures that permit a trial judge to rule on the relevance or admissibility of classified information in a secure setting. The Act requires a defendant to notify the prosecution and the court of any classified information that the defendant may seek to discover or disclose during trial. During the discovery phase, CIPA authorizes courts to issue protective orders limiting disclosure to members of the defense team that have obtained adequate security clearances and to permit the government to use unclassified redactions or summaries of classified information that the defendant would normally be entitled to receive. If classified information is to be introduced at trial, the court may allow substitutes of classified information to be used, so long as they provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to present a defense and do not otherwise violate his constitutional rights. Among the rights that may be implicated by the application of CIPA in a criminal prosecution are the defendant's right to have a public trial, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and to have the assistance of counsel. Application of CIPA may also be implicated by the obligation of the prosecution to provide the defendant, under Brady v. Maryland, with exculpatory information in its possession and the separate obligation to provide the defendant with government witnesses' prior written statements pursuant to the Jencks Act.

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The Obama Administration's U.S. This report discusses the evolution of private sector involvement in U.S. foreign assistance programs over recent decades, how globalization has driven the modern approach to development partnerships, potential benefits and drawbacks of PPPs, and how partnerships are being used by other bilateral donors and multilateral development agencies. The report then discusses partnership-related issues that may be of interest to Congress as part of the foreign assistance authorization and reform process. Evolution of the Private Sector Role in U.S. Development Assistance USAID and other U.S. agencies have worked with the private sector for decades, but they have expanded their means of engaging the private sector over time. Government aid agencies work with private entities both as implementing partners and drivers of economic growth in which to invest. Globalization and Development The rise of PPPs in development assistance is closely related to significant changes in the flow of funds to developing countries in recent decades. In this changing context, PPPs are viewed by many policymakers as an opportunity to leverage private resources toward solving problems that hinder development and business interests alike. The agency has been the U.S. government leader on PPPs for development since establishment of the Global Development Alliance (GDA) Secretariat within USAID in 2001. The stated goal was to "expand the Department's use of partnerships that achieve policy, programmatic and management objectives by leveraging the resources, expertise and creative culture of private sector and non-governmental entities." Commonly cited advantages of PPPs include the following: Shared Risks and Resources. Market Access/Networks. Potential Concerns About Partnerships The advantages of partnerships from a business perspective are sometimes viewed as points of concern from the development perspective. Without a standard definition of PPP within and across government development agencies, meaningful evaluation of PPPs as a development tool has been difficult, and critics have asserted that development resources may be better directed toward more proven aid models. To guard against this, agencies often seek private sector participation in existing development programs and plans. Still, some argue that the use of PPPs, particularly those involving global corporate partners, can increase development disparities within countries by introducing international standards. Observers have expressed concern that PPPs may in some circumstances support the outsourcing of American jobs to developing countries. The Administration's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development initiated reforms related to aid efficiency and effectiveness that are ongoing. Public-private partnerships are one approach to foreign assistance that Congress is likely to consider as part of a broader review of foreign aid policies and activities. Budget and Procurement Issues Many development officials involved in partnerships report that the standard foreign assistance procurement rules and the unpredictability of future year budgets are significant obstacles to partnership formation.

The flow of private sector resources to developing countries has increased significantly in recent decades. Seeking opportunity in this changing environment, government development assistance agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department are working with private sector entities in unprecedented ways to determine when and if such partnerships can lead to improved development results. As explained in the Obama Administration's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), "private sector partners can add value to our missions through their resources, their capacity to establish presence in places we cannot, through the technologies, networks, and contacts they can tap, and through their specialized expertise or knowledge." Modern public-private partnerships (PPPs), characterized by joint planning, joint contributions, and shared risk, are viewed by many development experts as an opportunity to leverage resources, mobilize industry expertise and networks, and bring fresh ideas to development projects. Partnering with the private sector is also widely believed to increase the likelihood that programs will continue after government aid has ended. From the private sector perspective, partnering with a government agency can bring development expertise and resources, access to government officials, credibility, and scale. Now a decade after the formation of USAID's Global Development Alliance (GDA), PPPs for development have received mixed reviews. PPPs require significant effort to create and manage, and critics argue that inadequate data exist to demonstrate that these efforts are the most effective way to use limited development resources. Others have expressed concern about partnerships diverting resources away from proven development programs or recipients. Still others are concerned that PPPs, particularly those involving corporate partners and focusing on trade and economic growth, may lead to outsourcing of U.S. jobs. Partnership proponents have varying views as well. Some feel that the goal of mainstreaming the PPP model as a tool for development has been achieved, while others contend that the potential for using PPPs in development has only begun to be realized and that expanded partnerships are the future of development assistance. To date, the movement toward this modern concept of development partnership has been driven by successive administrations with limited congressional involvement. However, recent reviews of U.S. foreign assistance policy, together with increasing fiscal constraints, may spur congressional action on foreign assistance reauthorization or reform in the 113th Congress. As part of this effort, Congress may consider several issues that affect or are affected by the use of PPPs, including budget and procurement policies, interagency leadership, international commitments, and the role of aid within broader development policy. This report discusses the evolution of private sector involvement in U.S. foreign assistance programs over recent decades, how globalization has driven the modern approach to development partnerships, potential benefits and drawbacks of PPPs, and how partnerships are being used by other bilateral donors and multilateral development agencies. The report then discusses partnership-related issues that may be of interest to Congress as part of the foreign assistance authorization and reform process.

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Overview Medicaid is jointly financed by the federal and state governments, but each state designs andadministers its own version of the program under broad federal guidelines. The complexity ofMedicaid can present an enormous challenge in meeting the needs of Hurricane Katrina's victims,especially when evacuees cross state lines. State variation in eligibility, covered services, and thereimbursement and delivery of services is the rule rather than the exception. Furthermore, althoughMedicaid is targeted at individuals with low income, not all of the poor are eligible, and not all thosecovered are poor. This report begins with a discussion of Medicaid's rules on eligibility, benefits, and financingin the context of current questions and issues raised by Hurricane Katrina, many of which could arisein the wake of other emergency situations (e.g., Hurricane Rita). In addition, within federal guidelines, states set functional requirements forindividuals seeking Medicaid-covered long-term care services. Issues Raised by Hurricane Katrina Variation in Benefit Coverage Across States. Payment and Financing Background The Medicaid program is jointly financed by the federal government and the states. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, New York requested and receivedapproval for a Section 1115 waiver known as "Disaster Relief Medicaid." Below is a briefdescription of the information that is currently available regarding each of these waiver actions. The conference agreement would appropriate $2 billion (in addition to any funds madeavailable for the National Disaster Medical System under the Department of Homeland Security forhealth care costs related to Hurricane Katrina) for use by the Secretary of HHS to pay eligible states(those that have provided care to affected individuals or evacuees under a Section 1115 project) forthe following purposes: the non-federal share of expenditures for health care provided to affectedindividuals (those who reside in a major disaster area declared as a result of Hurricane Katrina andcontinue to reside in the same state) and evacuees (affected individuals who have been displaced toanother state) under approved multi-state Section 1115 demonstrationprojects; reasonable administrative costs related to such projects; the non-federal share of expenditures for medical assistance provided toindividuals under existing Medicaid and SCHIP state plans; and other purposes, if approved by the Secretary, to restore access to health carein affected communities.

Medicaid is jointly financed by the federal and state governments, but each state designs andadministers its own version of the program under broad federal guidelines. The complexity ofMedicaid can present an enormous challenge in meeting the needs of Hurricane Katrina's victims,especially when evacuees cross state lines. State variation in eligibility, covered services, and thereimbursement and delivery of services is the rule rather than the exception. Furthermore, althoughMedicaid is targeted at individuals with low income, not all of the poor are eligible, and not all thosecovered are poor. As a federal-state program that helps to finance health care services for people with limitedresources, Medicaid is an obvious avenue of quick response for support of victims in the aftermathof a disaster. The program's federal budgetary status as mandatory spending means that federalfunding is available to support coverage for all people who meet the program's eligibility criteria,without the need for a supplemental appropriation. However, the ability of Medicaid to respond to a disaster -- in terms of the numbers and typesof people who can rely on it for health care support -- may depend on a number of factors, includingcongressional action to modify statutory provisions (e.g., the level of federal Medicaidreimbursement offered to states), the Secretary of Health and Human Services' ability to waivecertain program requirements administratively (e.g., regarding eligibility and benefits), and actionsof the states (each of whom operates its own unique Medicaid program within federal guidelines). This report, which will be updated as events warrant, discusses the following: Medicaid's rules on eligibility, benefits, and financing in the context of currentquestions and issues raised by Hurricane Katrina. Recent state actions in response to Medicaid issues raised by thehurricane. Federal Medicaid waiver authority, including information on current activityin this area and the New York Disaster Relief Medicaid waiver granted in response to the September11 terrorist attacks. Current federal legislation related to Medicaid and Hurricane Katrina reliefefforts.

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T rade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) provides federal assistance to workers who involuntarily lose their jobs due to foreign competition. Workers may also be eligible for other benefits, including a tax credit equal to a portion of qualified health insurance premiums. After a brief discussion of the program's purpose and most recent reauthorization, this report describes TAA as reauthorized by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015 (TAARA, Title IV of P.L. 114-27 ). Administration TAA is jointly administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and cooperating state agencies. Individual benefits are provided through state workforce systems and state unemployment insurance systems. It is administered separately from the TAA program's other benefits and services. FY2018 Appropriation In FY2018, Congress appropriated $790 million for the TAA for Workers programs. First, a group of workers or their representative (e.g., firm, union, or state) must petition DOL to establish that their job loss was attributable to foreign trade and met statutory criteria. Private sector workers who produce goods ("articles" in the law) or services are eligible for TAA. The role of foreign trade can be established in one of several ways: An increase in competitive imports . Benefits for Certified Workers TAA benefits for individual workers include training and reemployment services and income support for workers who have exhausted their UC benefits and are enrolled in training. Training and Reemployment Services TAA-certified workers may receive several types of benefits and services to aid them in preparing for and obtaining new employment. Workers may also receive case management services and reimbursements for qualified job search and relocation expenses. Statute specifies that training for a worker shall be approved if all of the following conditions are met: there is no suitable employment available for an adversely affected worker, the worker would benefit from appropriate training, there is a reasonable expectation of employment following completion of such training, training approved by the Secretary is reasonably available to the worker from either governmental agencies or private sources, the worker is qualified to undertake and complete such training, and such training is suitable for the worker and available at a reasonable cost. A Relocation Allowance may be available to workers who have secured permanent employment outside their local commuting area. Trade Readjustment Allowance Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) is a weekly income support payment to certified workers who have exhausted their UC benefits and who are enrolled in training. TRA is funded by the federal government and administered by the states through their unemployment insurance systems. Individual TRA benefit levels are equal to a worker's final UC benefit. Reemployment Trade Adjustment Assistance RTAA is an entitlement that provides a wage supplement for workers age 50 and over who are certified for TAA benefits and obtain reemployment at a lower wage. The program provides a cash payment to an eligible worker equal to 50% of the difference between the worker's wage at the trade-affected job and the worker's wage at his or her new job. The maximum benefit is $10,000 over a two-year period. Health Coverage Tax Credit46 Workers who are receiving TRA, UC in lieu of TRA, or RTAA benefits may also be eligible for a tax credit that covers a portion of eligible health insurance premiums.

Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) provides federal assistance to workers who have involuntarily lost their jobs due to foreign competition. It was last reauthorized by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015 (TAARA; Title IV of P.L. 114-27). This report discusses the TAA program as enacted by TAARA. To be eligible for TAA, a group of workers must establish that they were separated from their employment either because their jobs moved outside the United States or because of an increase in directly competitive imports. Workers at firms that are suppliers to or downstream producers of TAA-certified firms may also be eligible for TAA benefits. Private sector workers who produce goods or services are eligible for TAA benefits. To establish eligibility for TAA benefits, a group of trade-affected workers (or their representative) must petition the Department of Labor (DOL) and a DOL investigation must verify the role of increased foreign trade in the workers' job losses. Once a petition is certified by DOL, covered workers may apply for individual benefits. Individual benefits are funded by the federal government and administered by state agencies through their workforce systems and unemployment insurance systems. Benefits available to individual workers include the following: Training and reemployment services are designed to assist workers in preparing for and obtaining new employment. Training subsidies are the largest reemployment services expenditure and support workers in developing skills for a new occupation. Workers may also receive case management services and job search assistance. In some cases, workers who pursue employment outside their local commuting area may be eligible for job search or relocation allowances. Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) is a weekly income support payment for TAA-certified workers who have exhausted their unemployment compensation (UC) and who are enrolled in an eligible training program. Weekly TRA payments are equal to the worker's final weekly UC benefit. Workers may collect UC and TRA for a combined maximum of 130 weeks, the final 13 of which are only available if necessary for the worker to complete a qualified training program. Reemployment Trade Adjustment Assistance (RTAA) is a wage insurance program available to certified workers age 50 and over who obtain reemployment at a lower wage. The wage insurance program provides a cash payment equal to 50% of the difference between the worker's new wage and previous wage, up to a two-year maximum of $10,000. The Health Coverage Tax Credit is a credit equal to 72.5% of qualified health insurance premiums. Eligibility is aligned with TRA. Unlike other TAA benefits, it is administered through the tax code. TAA is a mandatory program that is supported through annual appropriations. Appropriations for the program in FY2018 were $790 million.

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Many of the current programs have been reauthorized and redesigned periodically to meet changing economic conditions and national interests. The programs apply broadly to sectors ranging from industry to academia, and from state and local governments to rural communities. Since 2005, Congress has enacted several major energy laws: the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005; P.L. 109-58 ); the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140 ); the Energy Improvement and Extension Act (EIEA), enacted as Division B of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; P.L. 110-343 ); and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ). Each of those laws established, expanded, or modified energy efficiency and renewable energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D) programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) operates the greatest number of efficiency and renewable energy incentive programs. The Department of the Treasury and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) operate several programs. A few programs can also be found among the Departments of the Interior (DOI), Labor (DOL), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Small Business Administration (SBA). This report outlines current federal programs and provisions providing grants, loans, loan guarantees, and other direct or indirect incentives for energy efficiency, energy conservation, and renewable energy RDD&D. Incentives are summarized and indexed in the appendixes. Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Renewable Energy Biomass 1. Vehicle Technologies Program Other Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Programs 13. Summary of Federal Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Incentives/Index of Programs Appendix B.

Energy is crucial to the operation of a modern industrial and services economy. Concerns about the availability and cost of energy and about environmental impacts of fossil energy use have led to the establishment of a wide variety of federal incentives for renewable energy and energy efficiency. These incentives are aimed at the implementation of renewable energy and energy efficiency measures and the development and commercialization of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. Many of the existing energy efficiency and renewable energy programs have authorizations tracing back to the 1970s. Many of the programs have been reauthorized and redesigned repeatedly to meet changing economic factors. The programs apply broadly to sectors ranging from industry to academia, and from state and local governments to rural communities. Since 2005, Congress has enacted several major energy laws: the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005; P.L. 109-58); the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140); the Energy Improvement and Extension Act (EIEA), enacted as Division B of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; P.L. 110-343); and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). Each of those laws established, expanded, or modified energy efficiency and renewable energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D) programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) operates the greatest number of efficiency and renewable energy incentive programs. The Department of the Treasury and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) operate several programs. A few programs can also be found among the Departments of the Interior (DOI), Labor (DOL), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Small Business Administration (SBA). This report describes federal programs that provide grants, loans, loan guarantees, and other direct or indirect incentives for energy efficiency, energy conservation, and renewable energy. For each program, the report provides the administering agency, authorizing statute(s), annual funding, and the program expiration date. The appendixes provide summary information in a tabular format and also list recently expired programs.

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Introduction Electric utility generating facilities are a major source of air pollution. The objective would be to balance the environmental goal of effective controls across the pollutants covered with the industry goal of a stable regulatory regime for a period of years. The Bush Administration's Proposals In February 2002, the Bush Administration announced two air quality proposals to address the control of emissions of SO 2 , NOx, Hg, and CO 2 . The first proposal, called "Clear Skies," would amend the Clean Air Act to place emission caps on electric utility emissions of SO 2 , NOx, and Hg. Implemented through a tradeable allowance program, the emissions caps would be imposed in two phases: 2010 (2008 in the case of NOx) and 2018. Revised versions of Clear Skies legislation were introduced in the 109 th Congress as H.R. 227 and S. 131 . The second Administration proposal initiates a new voluntary greenhouse gas reduction program, similar to ones introduced by the earlier George H. W. Bush and Clinton Administrations. Instead, the plan focuses on improving the carbon efficiency of the economy, reducing 2002 emissions of 183 metric tons per million dollars of GDP to 151 metric tons per million dollars of GDP in 2012. Proposed Legislation and Legislative Action in the 110th Congress In the 110 th Congress, five bills have been introduced that would impose multi-pollutant controls on utilities. They are all four-pollutant proposals that include carbon dioxide. S. 1201 , introduced by Senator Sanders, and S. 1554 , introduced by Senator Collins, are similar but revised versions of S. 150 , introduced in the 109 th Congress. All of these bills involve some form of emission caps, beginning in 2009-2012 time frame. S. 1168 , S. 1177 , and S. 1201 include a second phase beginning in 2013-2015; H.R. They would employ a tradeable credit program to implement the SO 2 , NOx, and CO 2 caps while all but H.R. 3989 permit plant-wide averaging in complying with the Hg requirements. The provisions concerning SO 2 , NOx, and Hg in the five bills are generally more stringent than the comparable provisions of S. 131 of the 109 th Congress. It is difficult to compare the CO 2 caps contained in these bills with the Administration's proposal concerning CO 2 —both because the Administration's proposal is voluntary rather than mandatory and because it is broader (covering all greenhouse gas emissions rather than just utility CO 2 emissions). 3989 ). All except S. 1554 and H.R. Comparison of Multi-Pollutant Control Proposals

With the prospect of new layers of complexity being added to air pollution controls, and with electricity restructuring putting a premium on economic efficiency, interest is being expressed in finding mechanisms to achieve health and environmental goals in simpler, more cost-effective ways. The electric utility industry is a major source of air pollution, particularly sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury (Hg), as well as unregulated greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide (CO2). At issue is whether a new approach to environmental protection could achieve the nation's air quality goals more cost-effectively than the current system. One approach being proposed is a "multi-pollutant" strategy—a framework based on a consistent set of emissions caps, implemented through emissions trading. Just how the proposed approach would fit with the current (and proposed) diverse regulatory regimes remains to be worked out; they might be replaced to the greatest extent feasible, or they might be overlaid by the framework of emissions caps. In February 2002, the Bush Administration announced two air quality initiatives. The first, "Clear Skies," would amend the Clean Air Act to place emission caps on electric utility emissions of SO2, NOx, and Hg. Implemented through a tradeable allowance program, the emissions caps would generally be imposed in two phases: 2008 and 2018. "Clear Skies" was re-introduced in the 109th Congress as S. 131. The second initiative begins a voluntary greenhouse gas reduction program. This plan, rather than capping CO2 emissions, focuses on improving the carbon efficiency of the economy, reducing 2002 emissions of 183 metric tons per million dollars of GDP to 151 metric tons per million dollars of GDP in 2012. In the 110th Congress, five bills have been introduced that would impose multi-pollutant controls on utilities. They are all four-pollutant proposals that include carbon dioxide. S. 1168 and S. 1177 are revised versions of S. 2724, introduced in the 109th Congress. S. 1201 and S. 1554 are expanded and revised versions of S. 150, introduced in the 109th Congress, while H.R. 3989 is a new proposal. All of these bills involve some form of emission caps, beginning in the 2009-2012 time frame, with all but S. 1554 including a second phase in 2013-2015 (CO2 only for H.R. 3989). They would employ a tradeable credit program to implement the SO2, NOx, and CO2 caps; all but H.R. 3989 permit plant-wide averaging in complying with the Hg requirements. The provisions concerning SO2, NOx, and Hg in the 110th Congress bills are generally more stringent than the comparable provisions of S. 131 of the 109th Congress. It is difficult to compare the CO2 caps contained in these bills with the Administration's proposal concerning CO2—both because the Administration's proposal is voluntary rather than mandatory and because it is broader (covering all greenhouse gas emissions rather than just utility CO2 emissions).

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Other economists have expressed concerns that efforts by the Chinese government to control "hot money" inflows could have significant negative consequences for the U.S. and global economy in the form of slower growth, greater inflation, or both. Some Chinese experts reportedly predict that the amount of "hot money" in China will rise to $650 billion by the end of 2008. Impact of "Hot Money" on China's Economy The main concern in China over the influx of "hot money" has been that it may add to China's inflationary pressures. The large flow of "hot money" is causing a sharp rise in China's money supply, resulting in inflation.

China has experienced a sharp rise in the inflow of so-called "hot money," foreign capital entering the country supposedly seeking short-term profits, especially in 2008. Chinese estimates of the amount of "hot money" in China vary from $500 billion to $1.75 trillion. The influx of "hot money" is contributing to China's already existing problems with inflation. Efforts to reduce the inflationary effects of "hot money" may accelerate the inflow, while actions to reduce the inflow of "hot money" may threaten China's economic growth, as well as have negative consequences for the U.S. and global economy. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

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The rules provide individual Senators and numerical minorities with impressive means to influence the Senate's agenda and decisions. But this decision requires an extraordinary majority vote. Rule XXII provides that three-fifths of the entire Senate must vote to invoke cloture under most circumstances; on a proposal to amend Senate rules, the required majority is two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. The right to debate offers ample means to delay in the Senate. And a strategy of delay, even the threat of delay, can be used with telling effect to influence whether a measure will be considered or what happens to it while it is being considered. Furthermore, most amendments also are subject to being amended. Beyond the potent power to delay the Senate's proceedings through debate or these other tactics, a Senator or a group of Senators can try to promote their legislative goals by taking advantage of other parliamentary rights and opportunities that are provided by the Senate's formal procedures and customary practices. Under Rule XIV, bills may be referred to committee only after having been read twice by title.

The rules of the Senate emphasize the rights and prerogatives of individual Senators and, therefore, minority groups of Senators. The most important of these rules allows unlimited debate on a bill or amendment unless an extraordinary majority votes to invoke cloture. Senators can use their right to filibuster, and simply the threat of a filibuster, to delay or prevent the Senate from even considering a bill they oppose. The Senate's rules also are a source of other minority rights, including the right to propose non-germane amendments to most bills and to prevent bills from being referred to committees that might not consider and report them. This report will be revised when necessary to reflect significant changes in relevant Senate rules, precedents, and practices.

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Introduction Willie Davis was a passenger in a car stopped by police in Greenville, Alabama, for a traffic violation. The police arrested Davis for giving a false name. After handcuffing him and placing him in the back of a patrol car, the police searched the passenger compartment of the car in which Davis had been riding. The police found a gun inside Davis's jacket, and Davis was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. At the time of the search, the police were acting in conformity with Eleventh Circuit precedent. After Davis was convicted, however, the Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Gant that this type of suspicionless vehicle search incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Instead, the Supreme Court has described the rule as a pragmatic doctrine that only applies when the benefits of evidentiary suppression exceed its costs to the justice system. The Exclusionary Rule and Its Good-Faith Exception Courts apply the exclusionary rule to deter Fourth Amendment violations by suppressing unconstitutionally seized evidence. Arguably the good-faith exception is the most significant exception to the exclusionary rule. It permits the unconstitutionally obtained evidence to be introduced at trial when it was seized in "good-faith" by law enforcement officers. However, the Court wrote that "the flagrancy of the police misconduct" has always "constituted an important step in the calculus" of the exclusionary rule, and it characterized the exclusionary rule's evolution as a series of cases excluding evidence obtained as a result of flagrant or deliberate violations of suspects' rights. The case confirms that, under the Herring test, police culpability is now the sole relevant factor in determining whether the exclusionary rule applies. United States v. Davis Opinion of the Court In United States v. Davis , Davis contended that police culpability was only one relevant factor in determining whether the exclusionary rule applies. He contended that the exclusionary rule can also apply for other reasons, including (1) if doing so is constitutionally mandated under the retroactivity doctrine, which requires courts to apply recently announced Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules retroactively to certain cases on direct review, and (2) if its application would facilitate the development of Fourth Amendment law by incentivizing future appeals. One Justice concurred in the judgment and two dissented. Moreover, unlike the Eleventh Circuit, she rejected the view that an officer's culpability is dispositive of the exclusionary rule's applicability. Implications for Congressional Action Congress has occasionally considered supplementing the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence with legislation codifying the exclusionary rule or the good-faith exception. It is therefore widely accepted that Congress has broad authority to bar (or require) the exclusionary rule in federal cases, and the Court's opinion in Davis supports this position. Conclusion Davis v. United States was the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the "deliberate" and "culpable" Herring standard for the good-faith exception's application. The Supreme Court held that evidence seized in an unconstitutional search that, at the time it was conducted, complied with precedent is admissible because police do not act culpably when they conform with "binding appellate precedent."

In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court held that evidence seized in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights is admissible at trial when the police seized the evidence in good-faith reliance on "binding appellate precedent." The petitioner in that case, Willie Davis, was a passenger in a car that was stopped by police for a traffic violation. The police arrested the driver for driving while intoxicated and Davis for giving a false name. After handcuffing Davis and placing him in the back of a patrol car, the police searched the passenger compartment of the car in which Davis had been riding. The police found a revolver inside Davis's jacket, and Davis was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. At the time of the search, the police were acting in conformity with controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. However, after Davis was convicted and had filed an appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that this type of vehicle search incident to arrest was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, when Davis's appeal reached the Court, it held that even though the search was unconstitutional, the gun it produced was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search from being introduced at trial. The rule is a pragmatic doctrine intended to deter Fourth Amendment violations. It traditionally applies when (1) no exception, such as the good-faith exception, bars its operability; (2) exclusion will achieve "appreciable deterrence" of Fourth Amendment violations; and (3) the benefits of evidentiary suppression outweigh its burdens on the justice system. In 2009, the Supreme Court broadened the good-faith exception when it announced in Herring v. United States that unconstitutionally obtained evidence is admissible at trial unless the evidence was the product of "deliberate" and "culpable" police misconduct. Davis was the first Supreme Court case to apply the Herring standard. The case furthers the impression that police culpability is now the sole relevant factor in determining whether the exclusionary rule applies. The Court rejected Davis's contentions that other relevant factors include whether the exclusionary rule's application would facilitate the development of Fourth Amendment law and whether a recently announced Fourth and Fifth Amendment rule applies retroactively. Two Justices dissented from the Court's opinion. One Justice concurred in the judgment but rejected the Court's view that police culpability is the dispositive factor in an assessment of whether the exclusionary rule applies. Congress has occasionally considered legislation codifying the exclusionary rule or its good-faith exception. The scope of Congress's authority to enact or modify exclusionary rule jurisprudence depends on the extent to which the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required. The Supreme Court in Davis emphasized that the exclusionary rule's application is not constitutionally mandated by either the Fourth Amendment or the retroactivity doctrine. Accordingly, Davis supports the view that Congress has substantial authority to mandate the exclusionary rule's applicability or inapplicability in federal court cases.

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Overview Mongolia is a vast, sparsely populated, mineral-rich nation sandwiched between Russia and China. Formerly a Soviet satellite state, the country peacefully ended one-party Communist rule and launched democratic and free market reforms in 1990. Congress has shown strong support for Mongolia since that date through funding of assistance programs, approval for the transfer of excess defense articles, ratification of a bilateral investment treaty, extension of permanent normal trade relations, and House, Senate, and concurrent resolutions commending Mongolia on its development of democracy and expressing support for expanded U.S.-Mongolia relations. Mongolia is the only formerly Communist Asian nation to have transitioned to democracy, and regards itself as a potential role model for the nations of Central Asia, and even China and North Korea, as well as for nations in other regions of the world attempting democratic transitions. As a nation with diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea, Mongolia has sought to support peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. With a majority Tibetan Buddhist population and close ties to Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, Mongolia also has a strong interest in Tibet's future. Since then, Mongolia has held six direct presidential elections and six direct parliamentary elections. Congress has passed resolutions congratulating Mongolia on a series of largely free and fair elections, and the State Department said that in 2013, Mongolia "generally respected" freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. China is currently both Mongolia's largest foreign investor and its biggest trading partner. U.S.-Mongolia Transparency Agreement (TA) After years of negotiations, the United States and Mongolian governments in September 2013 signed what is formally known as the "Agreement on Transparency in Matters Related to International Trade and Investment between the United States of America and Mongolia." To the consternation of the U.S. government, however, a year later the Mongolian parliament has yet to ratify it. Mongolian troops continue to serve in Afghanistan, where they have been deployed since 2003 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Mongolia has been an active contributor of military personnel to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. The Mongolian and U.S. militaries jointly host Khaan Quest peacekeeping exercises in Mongolia each summer. Russia is Mongolia's largest source of energy products. Participation in International Organizations Mongolia is an active participant in a wide range of international organizations, where it has frequently been supportive of U.S. positions. Examples include the following: From 2011 to 2013, Mongolia held the rotating chairmanship of the Community of Democracies , an inter-governmental coalition of democratic countries dedicated to "promoting democratic rules and strengthening democratic norms and institutions around the world." In the summer of 2014, Mongolia took over the rotating chairmanship of the Freedom Online Coalition , which describes itself as "an inter-governmental coalition committed to advancing Internet freedom—free expression, association, assembly, and privacy online—worldwide." Relations with the United States Mongolia says it considers the United States to be the most important of Mongolia's "third neighbors," countries that do not share borders with Mongolia, but that Mongolia looks to for support of its independence and sovereignty and for balance against the influence of China and Russia. The P-5 have also supported seven UN General Assembly resolutions since 1992 inviting member states to support Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

Mongolia is a sparsely populated young democracy in a remote part of Asia, sandwiched between two powerful large neighbors, China and Russia. It made its transition to democracy and free market reforms peacefully in 1990, after nearly 70 years as a Soviet satellite state. A quarter of a century later, the predominantly Tibetan Buddhist nation remains the only formerly Communist Asian nation to have embraced democracy. Congress has shown a strong interest in Mongolia since 1990, funding assistance programs, approving the transfer of excess defense articles, ratifying a bilateral investment treaty, passing legislation to extend permanent normal trade relations, and passing seven resolutions commending Mongolia's progress and supporting strong U.S.-Mongolia relations. Congressional interest is Mongolia has focused on the country's story of democratic development. Since passing a democratic constitution in 1992, Mongolia has held six direct presidential elections and six direct parliamentary elections. The State Department considers Mongolia's most recent elections to have been generally "free and fair" and said that in 2013, Mongolia "generally respected" freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. It raised concerns, however, about corruption and lack of transparency in government affairs. On the economic front, Mongolia's mineral wealth, including significant reserves of coal, copper, gold, and uranium, offers investment opportunities for American companies. Foreign investors and the U.S. government have criticized Mongolia's unpredictable investment climate, however. In the fall of 2013, Mongolia passed a new investment law and, after years of negotiations, signed a transparency agreement with the United States. Both developments served to reassure investors, although the Mongolian parliament has yet to ratify the transparency agreement. Mongolia was among the first nations to join the coalition for the Iraq War and its troops have been deployed in Afghanistan since 2003. It is also an active contributor of troops to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and, with the United States, hosts an annual multinational peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia known as Khaan Quest. Mongolia is an active participant in many international organizations, in which it often supports U.S. positions. It has also been an active member of international groupings dedicated to promoting democracy, including the Community of Democracies, for which it held the rotating chairmanship from 2011 to 2013. In the summer of 2014, Mongolia took over the rotating chairmanship of the Freedom Online Coalition, which describes itself as "an inter-governmental coalition committed to advancing Internet freedom—free expression, association, assembly, and privacy online—worldwide." Mongolia is also in the process of joining the Open Government Partnership, a White House-backed multilateral initiative. Mongolia seeks to maintain "balanced relations" with its two immediate neighbors, China and Russia. China has emerged as Mongolia's largest trading partner and foreign investor. Russia is Mongolia's largest source of energy products. Mongolia has diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea and has sought to play a role in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. To ensure its continued independence and sovereignty, Mongolia has also prioritized the development of relations with so-called "third neighbors," countries that do not border Mongolia, but have close ties to Mongolia. That list includes the United States. In 1992, Mongolia declared itself a single-state nuclear-weapons-free zone; in 2012, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council each pledged to respect the designation.

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The action of voting in the House of Representatives appears to be a straightforward process, but it is an activity steeped in parliamentary complexity. Largely, voting procedures in the House and the Committee of the Whole have evolved to become similar since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (LRA). The first purpose of this report is to discuss the two momentous changes in record voting procedures that the House included in the LRA and to analyze the evolution of rules, precedents, and practices on record voting procedures since that time. The Standards of Official Conduct Committee and the House Administration Committee as well as a select committee have been called on formally or informally to investigate some controversies. 17654 to authorize the development of an electronic voting system to record votes. Rules, precedents, and practices related to votes requiring a supermajority are not generally included in this report. Postponed and Clustered Votes/Five-Minute Votes If a major procedural change of the LRA of 1970 was to allow record votes in the Committee of the Whole, thus increasing the opportunities to obtain a record vote, another important change to House rules since then has been to allow votes to be postponed and clustered and to allow voting time on clustered votes after the first 15-minute vote to be reduced to five minutes or even two minutes. He was also authorized to reduce to five minutes the duration of votes after the first 15-minute vote. The House also made three changes related to voting in other procedural situations. Second, the House amended Rule XXIII, cl. 5(b) the Speaker's authority to postpone votes. In his policy statement, the Speaker announced: how the electronic voting system operated, and what information would be available on the consoles at the party tables; how Members were to use their Vote-ID Cards at the voting stations to cast, change, or check their votes or to register their presence on a quorum call; that the presiding officer would instruct Members to "record their presence or votes by means of the electronic device," and that this instruction would initiate a 15-minute voting period, with time on the summary displays decreasing to 0:00 minutes from 15:00 minutes; that Members could cast, change, or check their votes until the presiding officer "declare[d] the vote to be closed and announce[d] the final result"; that voting stations would remain open until the presiding officer "declare[d] the vote to be closed and announce[d] the final result," at which time the voting stations would be closed and the summary panel would indicate "FINAL"; how a Member without his or her Vote-ID Card could vote by picking up in a cloakroom or the well a green ("yea"), red ("no"), or amber ("present") ballot card, filling in his or her name, state, and district, and handing the card to the tally clerk, who would then enter the Member's vote and deactivate use of the Member's Vote-ID Card on that vote; how a Member may pair (see Pairs, below); and that the presiding officer in his or her discretion would determine that recorded votes or quorum calls be taken by another procedure than electronic device. Malfunction of Electronic Voting System . The parliamentarian's notes to the rules of the 106 th Congress (1999-2001) stated, "At the organization of the House, the Delegates and Resident Commissioner are sworn...; but the Clerk does not put them on the roll...." In the 110 th Congress (2007-2009), a rules change again allowed Delegates and the Resident Commissioner to vote in the Committee of the Whole, with the possibility of an immediate revote in the House where their votes were decisive in the outcome of a question. There have also been four occasions where voting issues were elevated to investigations conducted on three occasions by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct and on one occasion by the specially created Select Committee to Investigate the Voting Irregularities of August 2, 2007. Options for Addressing Issues Related to Record Voting Electronic voting has been in use for 35 years in the House of Representatives. Members will be given a reasonable amount of time in which to accurately record their votes.

Record voting in the House of Representatives appears to be a straightforward process but is an activity steeped in parliamentary complexity. While this report analyzes the evolution of voting beginning with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (LRA), some House rules related to voting have existed since the First Congress. The House has had nearly 220 years of experience with voting that manifests itself in precedents relevant today. The LRA contained two major departures related to record voting. First, it authorized development of an electronic voting system. Second, it allowed record votes in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, the form in which the House usually operates to consider amendments to legislation. Since the LRA's enactment, there have been notable developments in record voting procedures in the House. In general, the House through rules changes and precedents has limited votes that might be viewed as dilatory rather than substantive, and has expanded opportunities for votes that might be viewed as substantive. Changes in rules have also authorized the presiding officer to postpone and cluster votes and to reduce voting time to five minutes; largely ended pairing; and allowed Delegates and the Resident Commissioner to vote in the Committee of the Whole. Policy announcements by the Speaker and rulings by presiding officers have ended the correction of Members' votes; sought to limit the duration of votes; and dictated the manner by which Members may change a vote once cast. Controversies have arisen on occasion. Some were related to the use of the electronic voting system, some to Members being able to cast or change a vote after the 15-minute minimum voting-time had expired. Others were related to a perception that a vote had been "held open" beyond a reasonable amount of time. Only a very few controversies have resulted in an investigation. The Standards of Official Conduct Committee has made three investigations. A select committee is currently investigating the manner by which a vote was ended. Should the House wish to address rules, precedents, or practices, or the sources of particular controversies, it has a number of possible vehicles and potential options. Vehicles include House and party rules, the Speaker's policies, and administrative policies. Changes might be made to the electronic voting system, operations on the Speaker's dais, Members' ability to vote after the 15-minute minimum, and other aspects of voting in the House. Complementary analyses to this report may be found in CRS Report RL34366, Electronic Voting System in the House of Representatives: History and Evolution, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report 98-396, Guide to Individuals Seated on the House Dais, by [author name scrubbed]. See also supplementary information at the CRS Congressional Processes website, /analysis/pages/congressionaloperations.aspx. This report will be updated after the Select Committee to Investigate the Voting Irregularities of August 2, 2007 issues its final report.

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The Obama Administration has emphasized in strategy documents that it views the NPT as the "centerpiece" of the nonproliferation regime and has pledged to strengthen the treaty. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, for example, says that progress on arms control is "a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure materials worldwide." The Nuclear Posture Review also says that the conditions for nuclear disarmament will not be possible without stronger proliferation controls. The ability of the Administration to garner international support for its proposals to strengthen the nonproliferation regime may be tested at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Overview of the NPT The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995, is the centerpiece of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The NPT recognizes five nations (the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China) as nuclear-weapon states, and 189 countries are parties to the NPT. India, Israel, and Pakistan have never signed the treaty and possess nuclear weapons. North Korea ratified the NPT but announced its withdrawal in 2003. Several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, suspended their nuclear weapons programs and joined the NPT in the 1990s. Others—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—gave up former Soviet nuclear weapons on their territories and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the 1990s. Iraq and Libya are now in full compliance with the NPT after their respective nuclear weapons programs were dismantled. Iran was found in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations in 2005, and the matter was referred to the UN Security Council. The IAEA has reported as recently as February 2010 that Syria has not fully cooperated with an investigation into its nuclear activities. There are three key dimensions, or "pillars," of the NPT: nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear- weapon states have different obligations under the NPT, often referred to as the "NPT bargain": In exchange for non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) pledging not to acquire nuclear weapons, they are guaranteed "the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." Events in the past decade have stressed the nonproliferation regime. Revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, advancements in India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, North Korea's nuclear tests, Iran's defiance of UN Security Council resolutions regarding its nuclear program and noncompliance with IAEA safeguards, and questions about the Syrian nuclear program have all contributed to uncertainty over the future of the regime. Moreover, there has been increased interest in nuclear power and an attendant increase in demands on the IAEA's safeguards resources. Furthermore, the United States and Russia continue formal efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Many see the 2010 NPT Review Conference as an important test of the viability of the treaty and how it will evolve to meet new challenges. Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the co-operation of a1l States in the attainment of this objective, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to further the casing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of an their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 3.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995, is the centerpiece of international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The NPT recognizes five nations (the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China) as nuclear-weapon states; 189 countries are parties to the NPT. India, Israel, and Pakistan have never signed the treaty and possess nuclear weapons. North Korea acceded to the NPT but announced its withdrawal in 2003. Several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, ended their nuclear weapons programs and joined the NPT in the 1990s. Others—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—gave up former Soviet nuclear weapons on their territories and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the 1990s. Iraq had a nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. UN inspectors subsequently oversaw the program's dismantlement, and Iraq is now in full compliance with the NPT. Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program after a 2003 agreement. Iran was found in noncompliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations in 2005, and the matter was referred to the UN Security Council. The IAEA has reported that Syria has not fully cooperated with an investigation into its nuclear activities. There are three key dimensions, or "pillars," of the NPT: nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In exchange for non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) pledging not to acquire nuclear weapons, they are guaranteed access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. For their part, the NPT nuclear-weapon states agree to pursue nuclear disarmament and not assist another country in developing nuclear weapons. The IAEA implements the treaty in as far as it is responsible for monitoring the peaceful use of nuclear energy and providing technical assistance to states. Events in the past decade have stressed the nonproliferation regime. Revelations about illicit procurement networks, advancements in India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, North Korea's nuclear tests, Iran's defiance of UN Security Council resolutions regarding its nuclear program and noncompliance with IAEA safeguards, and questions about the Syrian nuclear program have all contributed to uncertainty over the robustness of the regime. There has been increased interest in nuclear power, placing additional resource demands on the IAEA. The United States and Russia continue formal efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals. At the same time, several states have given up their nuclear weapons programs during the past decade, and countries have been working together to prevent illicit nuclear transfers and improve nuclear security. Many see the 2010 NPT Review Conference, beginning on May 3, 2010, as an important test of the viability of the treaty and how it will evolve to meet new challenges. History suggests that the United States plays a leadership role in all aspects of the nonproliferation regime. The Obama Administration has emphasized in strategy documents that it views the NPT as the "centerpiece" of the nonproliferation regime and has pledged to strengthen the treaty. The Administration sees a linkage between the disarmament and nonproliferation commitments under the treaty. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, for example, says that progress on arms control is "a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the nonproliferation regime and secure materials worldwide." The Nuclear Posture Review also says that the conditions for nuclear disarmament will not be possible without stronger proliferation controls. The ability of the Administration to garner international support for its proposals to strengthen the nonproliferation regime may be tested at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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In some cases, later legislation is enacted to extend these beginning and ending dates for the purpose of broadening eligibility for veterans' benefits. "periods of war" and those dates given in the declarations of war beginning and the proclamations, laws, or treaties terminating such conflicts. Moreover, armistice dates are also often confused with termination dates. Title 38, Part 3, Section 3.2 of the Code of Federal Regulations , dealing with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), lists official beginning and termination dates for most war periods from the Indian Wars to the present to be used in determining the availability of veterans' benefits. Also included are dates for the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For more information, see CRS Report R42324, Who Is a "Veteran"?—Basic Eligibility for Veterans' Benefits , by Scott D. Szymendera, and CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications , by Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed. 23 , "Authorization for Use of Military Force," on September 14, 2001. On December 15, 2011, U.S. Armed Forces in Baghdad marked the official end of the war in Iraq. Islamic State-Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Effective October 15, 2014, the DOD designated U.S. and coalition operations "Operation Inherent Resolve" against the terrorist group the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, another name for the Islamic State) along the Syrian-Iraqi border.

Many wars or conflicts in U.S. history have federally designated "periods of war," dates marking their beginning and ending. These dates are important for qualification for certain veterans' pension or disability benefits. Confusion can occur because beginning and ending dates for "periods of war" in many nonofficial sources are often different from those given in treaties and other official sources of information, and armistice dates can be confused with termination dates. This report lists the beginning and ending dates for "periods of war" found in Title 38 of the Code of Federal Regulations, dealing with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It also lists and differentiates other beginning dates given in declarations of war, as well as termination of hostilities dates and armistice and ending dates given in proclamations, laws, or treaties. The dates for the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are included along with the official end date for Operation New Dawn in Iraq on December 15, 2011, and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan on December 28, 2014. Operation Inherent Resolve continues along the Syrian-Iraqi border effective October 15, 2014. For additional information, see the following CRS Products: CRS In Focus IF10539, Defense Primer: Legal Authorities for the Use of Military Forces, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed.

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Introduction Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended), the definition of income for eligibility for certain Medicaid populations and premium credits in the exchanges is based on modified adjusted gross income (MAGI). The initial intent of using MAGI was to standardize the definition of income for Medicaid eligibility purposes to reduce some of the variability and complexity that exists under the current Medicaid program and to provide consistency between Medicaid and the health insurance exchange. The use of MAGI, however, has raised concerns among Congress and the Obama Administration, as it excludes some income categories either partially or altogether and is, thus, different than the income definition used in most other federal low-income programs, like Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits, which include most sources of income, taxable and nontaxable, when determining eligibility. Finally, the report raises some issues for Congress in considering changes to the definition of income for Medicaid eligibility and premium credits in the health insurance exchanges. 112-56 , which among other things, included non-taxable Social Security in the definition of MAGI. A number of issues might be considered in exploring the consequences of the change. An alternative definition may add complexity compared with MAGI. In addition, because adjusted gross income (on which MAGI is based) can be computed largely from information on an individual's federal tax return, verification of income is streamlined. If an alternative definition is used that is not based on tax return information, the administrative complexity of verifying nontaxable income from different sources comes into play. Finally, many of the current legislative proposals have focused largely on the inclusion of Social Security benefits in income definitions for eligibility purposes. However, most other low-income programs include other types of income (e.g., nontaxable pensions) and asset holdings that are also excluded from MAGI. However, because the MAGI definition of income is less inclusive than the definitions of income used in many social programs, it may result in permitting individuals and families with a higher percentage of total income relative to the federal poverty level to qualify for Medicaid. Consistency Between Medicaid and Premium Credit Definition of Income The definition of income in ACA (as amended by P.L. 112-56 ) was developed to be consistent between the Medicaid and premium credit provisions. The initial intent of using MAGI was to standardize the definition of income for Medicaid eligibility purposes in order to reduce some of the variability and complexity that exists under the current Medicaid program and to provide consistency between Medicaid and the health insurance exchange.

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), the definition of income for eligibility for certain Medicaid populations and premium credits in the exchanges is based on modified adjusted gross income (MAGI). The initial intent of using MAGI was to standardize the definition of income for Medicaid eligibility purposes to reduce some of the variability and complexity that exists under the current program and to provide consistency between Medicaid and the health insurance exchange. The use of MAGI, however, raised some concerns among Congress and the Obama Administration, as the definition in ACA excluded some types of income either partially or altogether. Of particular interest was the potential impact on eligibility for Medicaid and premium credits for early retirees (aged 62 through 64) receiving Social Security benefits, as some or all of their Social Security income may have been excluded from the MAGI definition of income. By excluding some types of income from the ACA definition, individuals and families with a higher percentage of total income relative to the federal poverty level may qualify for Medicaid and premium credits. To address these concerns, P.L. 112-56 was enacted into law on November 21, 2011, which among other things, amended the definition of income for these programs and included non-taxable Social Security in the definition of MAGI. The new law, however, does not address other forms of non-taxable income that are not currently in the MAGI definition (e.g., retirement plan contributions, gifts and inheritance). In evaluating the definition of MAGI, a number of issues might be considered. First, an alternative definition may add complexity compared with the use of MAGI. Specifically, because adjusted gross income (on which MAGI is based) can be computed largely from information on an individual's federal tax return, verification of income is streamlined. If an alternative definition is used that is not based on tax return information, the administrative complexity of verifying nontaxable income from different sources comes into play. Second, the definition was developed to ensure coordination between Medicaid and premium credits in the health insurance exchange. A change in the definition of income for Medicaid also would be necessary for premium credits to ensure consistency between Medicaid and the premium credit offered to selected individuals who purchase private health insurance through the exchanges. Finally, the enactment of P.L. 112-56 focused largely on the inclusion of Social Security benefits in income definitions for eligibility purposes. However, most other low-income programs include other types of income (e.g., nontaxable pensions) and asset holdings that are also excluded from MAGI.

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In less than 20 years, the entire nature of Member-constituent communication has been transformed, perhaps more than in any other period in American history. Electronic technology has reduced the marginal cost of Member-constituent communications; unlike postal letters, Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost, and constituents can reach Members at virtually no cost. The relay of information from Capitol Hill to the rest of the country (and vice versa) has been reduced to at times an instantaneous exchange. Members can now reach large numbers of citizens who are not their own constituents. These changes have wide-ranging implications for the work of Congress. How communication occurs, however, has changed significantly. Changes in congressional communications technology and use can be considered in three groups: 1. historical communications (e.g., postal mail, telephone calls, press releases, and face-to-face meetings), 2. electronic communications (e.g., email and websites), and 3. social media (e.g., web 2.0, Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms). In addition to the adoption and use of Facebook and Twitter, Members of Congress and committees have begun to use other social media services. Likewise, information gets from Capitol Hill to the rest of the country much more quickly, to the point that as soon as something happens in Congress, it can be known everywhere in real time. Representatives and Senators are given a fixed amount of money—known as the Members' Representational Allowance (MRA) in the House and the Senators' Official Personnel and Office Expense Account (SOPOEA) in the Senate—for the hiring of staff, travel expenses to and from their district or state, constituent communications, and other office expenses. Electronic Communications Interact with a Wider Audience Perhaps the greatest difference between traditional constituent communications and electronic communications is the change in the constituents reached. Traditionally, Members could only reach citizens who were actually their electoral constituents. Electronic communications, however, are not so limited. Challenges of Social Media for Members As was discussed above under " The Nature of Electronic Communications ," the decision to adopt and use social media as a constituent communications tool has important implications for Member office operations. These include challenges in the areas of office operations, communications strategies, and constituent representation. Consequently, Representatives and Senators choose to allocate staff in different ways. Posting and Responding Policies Over the past few years, many government agencies (especially in the executive branch) have adopted guidelines or rules for posting and responding to comments on social media platforms. These include the public nature of social media and further consequences for representation.

The mediums through which Members and constituents communicate have changed significantly over American history and continue to evolve today. Whereas most communications traditionally occurred through the media, via postal mail, or over a telephone, the adoption and use of electronic communications via email and social media technologies (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other sites) changes how Representatives and Senators disseminate and gather information, who they communicate with, and what types of information they share and receive from the general public, many not residing in their district or state. In less than 20 years, the entire nature of Member-constituent communication has been transformed, perhaps more than in any other period in American history. Over the last several years, the number of Representatives and Senators adopting social media and the number of different services being utilized has increased. In 2009, for example, Members of Congress were just beginning to adopt social media and only a small number were actively using Twitter, mostly as a dissemination tool. Today, all 100 Senators and almost all Representatives have adopted Twitter, Facebook, and other social media tools as a way to supplement their overall office communication strategies and disseminate information. Electronic communication and social media differ from traditional Member-constituent communication in three key ways. Electronic communication is inexpensive. Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost, and constituents can reach Members at virtually zero cost. Electronic communication is fast. The relay of information from Capitol Hill to the rest of the country (and vice versa) has been reduced, time-wise. As soon as something happens in Congress, it can be known everywhere in real time. Electronic communication reaches a wide audience. Members can reach large numbers of citizens who are not their own constituents. The cost, speed, and reach of social media have wide-ranging implications for the work of Congress. When Members choose to use electronic communication, they must consider many issues, including office operations (communications expectations and staff allocation); communications strategies (gathering and evaluating constituent opinions, content, interactivity, policies for posting and responding to content); and consequences for representation, including whether the office will respond to postings and, if so, how often. How an office evaluates and manages its social media presence varies from Member to Member.

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In March 2007, Prime Minister Margoyan died, and President Kocharyan appointed then-Defense Minister Serzh Sargisyan as the new prime minister. The political campaign was mostly calm. Implications for Armenia Since President Kocharyan is constitutionally limited to two terms, the parties showing well in the legislative election are expected to be best poised to put forth their candidates for a presidential election in 2008. Since the Republican Party of Armenia increased its number of seats to a near-majority in the legislature and the opposition parties lost seats, it is unlikely that the domestic and foreign policies of the government will change greatly, according to many observers. Implications for U.S. Interests The Bush Administration generally viewed the Armenian legislative election as marking progress in democratization.

This report discusses the campaign and results of Armenia's May 12, 2007, legislative election and examines implications for Armenian and U.S. interests. Many observers viewed the election as marking some democratization progress. The Republican Party of Armenia increased its number of seats to a near-majority and termed the results as a mandate on its policies. The party leader, Prime Minister Serzh Sargisyan, was widely seen as gaining stature as a possible candidate in the upcoming 2008 presidential election. This report may be updated. Related reports include CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests , by [author name scrubbed].

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It compares the President's request for FY2013 funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the enacted FY2012 appropriations for DHS, the House-passed and Senate-reported DHS appropriations legislation for FY2013, and the final DHS appropriations legislation included in Division D of P.L. Most Recent Developments February 13, 2012—President's FY2013 Budget Request Submitted For FY2013, the Administration requested $39.510 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS, as part of an overall budget request of $59.032 billion (including fees, trust funds and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the budget caps). This request amounts to a $90 million (0.2%) decrease below the $39.600 billion enacted for FY2012. March 26, 2013—President Signs the FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act On March 26, 2013, the President signed H.R. 933 into law as P.L. Division D of that act is the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013, which includes $39.646 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS. According to Office of Management and Budget calculations, two across-the-board cuts unrelated to the March 1 sequestration that were included in the final legislation to ensure the bill complies with discretionary budget caps reduced the thet discretionary budget authority by $52.4 million. $38.348 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority from P.L. The post-sequestration numbers in this report are derived from the FY2013 DHS operating plan, which only includes a breakdown of resources provided through P.L. 113-6 , prior to the impact of sequestration. Neither the part-year continuing resolution ( P.L. 112-25 ). 112-175 . 113-6 and the DHS Operating Plan for FY2013 After the across-the-board cuts but prior to applying sequestration, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013 ( P.L. The request included two major program increases. Because of the size of reduction in the OHA budget from FY2012, OHA did not face a further reduction in FY2013 as a result of sequestration. When Hurricane Sandy struck the northeastern United States in October 2012, the DRF had access to roughly $7.3 billion, as a result of P.L. 112-74 ).

This report describes the FY2013 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested $39.510 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2013, as part of an overall budget of $59.501 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the budget caps). The request amounted to a $90 million, or 0.2%, decrease from the $39.600 billion enacted for FY2012 through the consolidated appropriations act (P.L. 112-74). Congress did not enact final FY2013 appropriations legislation prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year. From October 1, 2012, through March 26, 2013, the federal government (including DHS) operated under the terms of P.L. 112-175, a part-year continuing resolution. While operating under this resolution, two major events impacted the DHS budget. First, Hurricane Sandy struck the east coast of the United States, which started a legislative process that resulted in enactment of legislation that provided $50.7 billion in disaster relief and emergency appropriations, including $12.072 billion for DHS, and $9.7 billion in additional borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program. Weeks later, On March 1, 2013, an across-the-board reduction in budget authority, or sequestration, was ordered as required under the terms of the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25). The Office of Management and Budget's sequestration report indicated that DHS would lose $3.191 billion as a result of sequestration. On March 26, 2013, the President signed into law P.L. 113-6, the FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act. Division D of that act is the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013, which includes $39.646 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS. Two across-the-board cuts unrelated to the March 1 sequestration that were included in the final legislation to ensure the bill complies with discretionary budget caps reduced this by $54 million to $39.592 billion. According to a DHS operating plan for FY2013, after the impact of sequestration, P.L. 113-6 provided $38.348 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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The bill contains the same text as S. 525 and H.R. Under current law, it is illegal for anyone to import a prescription drug other than its manufacturer. Permitted Countries Current law would allow the importation of prescription drugs from Canada, if the HHS Secretary were to certify that the program of importation would be safe and cost-effective to U.S. consumers. Administration of Importation Provisions S. 1232 would set up a fee mechanism to fund the administrative and regulatory tasks of the importation program.

Current law prohibits the importation of a prescription drug by anyone other than its manufacturer. S. 1232 would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to change that. It would allow commercial and personal-use importation. The legislation would create a detailed set of procedures to address concerns relating to the safety and effectiveness of imported drugs, cost savings to U.S. consumers, and administration of the program. S. 1232 contains the same text as previously introduced S. 525 and H.R. 1298.

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Federal water resource construction waned during the last decades of the 20 th century in response to fiscal constraints, interest in more local control of water and land resources, and requirements to assess environmental impacts of federal actions and to protect fish and wildlife. Even so, demand continues for traditional water resource development projects, such as locks and dams, levees, and other flood damage reduction works. Natural disasters such as the 2008 Midwest flooding, Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Ike, have raised questions about this role; in particular, these disasters bring attention to the trade-offs in benefits, costs, and risks of the current division of responsibilities among local, state, and federal entities for flood mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Background The 111 th Congress is faced with numerous water resource development and management issues: the federal role in the planning, construction, maintenance, inspection, and financing of water resource projects; federal investment in water resources research and data collection; management and operation of existing projects; environmental protection; and climate variability and change. The 111 th Congress is likely to consider authorizations and appropriations for numerous site-specific water resource development projects; management of existing projects and aging infrastructure; water resource protection and water rights issues; and regional aquatic ecosystem restoration programs (e.g., Great Lakes, San Joaquin River restoration, Everglades, and Chesapeake Bay). Consequently, Congress traditionally has pursued incremental changes through occasional Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) legislation for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Department of Defense (Corps) and project-specific legislation for the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) in the Department of the Interior. Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Ike, and 2008 Midwest flood oversight issues—such as how to better coordinate federal activities and how to respond or rebuild in the wake of severe damages—may be a particular focus, as might the examination of other areas of the country that may also be vulnerable. As noted earlier, the federal government is involved in several significant restoration initiatives ranging from the Florida Everglades to the California Bay-Delta. Instead, Reclamation projects are generally considered individually; although, occasionally individual project authorizations are rolled into an omnibus bill such as S. 22 in the 111 th Congress.

The federal government is involved in management of water resources throughout the country, primarily through construction, operation, and management of numerous infrastructure projects, such as dams, levees, and navigation works. Increasingly, the federal government is also involved in ecosystem restoration and protection of species and areas damaged by past construction and operations of federal projects, as well as restoration of other degraded ecosystems. This work involves restoration of some of the country's largest estuaries; for example, the California Bay-Delta and Chesapeake Bay. Management of federal water resource facilities often involves trade-offs among project purposes, as well as local, regional, and national interests. Water resources development is particularly controversial because of budgetary constraints, conflicting policy objectives, environmental impacts, and demands for local control. Hurricane Katrina, hurricane Ike, and the 2008 Midwest floods have brought to the forefront long-simmering policy disputes involving local control and federal financing of projects, environmental and social tradeoffs, and multi-level accountability and responsibility for flood damage reduction projects, such as levees. Construction, improvement, and management of other federal water resource projects face similar challenges. The 111th Congress faces numerous issues and trade-offs as it considers water resource development and protection legislation. These issues are likely to arise as Congress considers economic stimulus legislation, as well as other authorizations and appropriations for Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers projects. Some of these may be addressed as part of omnibus authorization bills such as S. 22 or potential Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) legislation), while others may be addressed via stand-alone legislation or as part of committee oversight of agency programs and policy changes. Congress will also likely play a role in overseeing federal responses to natural disasters such as droughts, hurricanes, and floods. Oversight issues related to the federal role in hurricane and flood protection, and levee construction and management, also are ongoing.

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Next, a time line for solving the problem should be determined. Should the event(s) be held in the Member's district or state, in Washington, or throughout the country? Outline for Project Goal What criteria are used to determine success? Legislative success? Has the project ever been tried in the past? Is the project still needed? A Cabinet Secretary? Sample Action Plan for Legislative Project Action plans embody the strategies employed to achieve goals. Usually each person in the office, whether they have specific responsibility for parts of the plan, should be provided a copy of the plan.

The Congressional Research Service frequently receives inquiries about legislative planning. Legislative and office action plans are often used by congressional offices for almost every significant project, from organizing an extensive conference in the district or state to introducing and guiding legislation. A major action plan requires a firm understanding of the project's goal, a research strategy, and a time line for completing the project. This report presents some of the factors usually considered in preparing an action plan. The information is provided in three sections. The first provides an overview that lays out summary considerations. The second raises questions to consider in preparing an outline for a project. The third details a sample action plan.

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The energy sector is the fastest-growing water consumer in the United States. Projections attribute to the energy sector 85% of the growth in domestic water consumption between 2005 and 2030. Much of the energy sector's growing water demand is concentrated in water-constrained regions. Whether the energy sector helps exacerbate or alleviate future water tensions is influenced by current energy policy and investment choices. These choices also may determine whether water limits or harms the nation's ability to reliably meet energy demand. Water already plays a significant role in the energy sector, and water use by the energy sector already shapes national water use. The energy sector is changing. Options for managing and meeting energy's water demand range from maintaining the current approach, with little federal action targeted at managing energy's water demand, to taking a variety of federal actions. This could be accomplished through changes to broad policies (e.g., energy demand management) or legislation specifically targeted at water use (e.g., promotion of water-efficient energy alternatives). Another option is to improve the energy sector's access to water. Access is generally a responsibility of the state, but some limited federal actions are possible. An additional option is investing in data and research to inform decision-making and expand water-efficient energy technologies. Legislation in the 111 th Congress proposed many of the above options; examples include H.R. 469 , H.R. 2454 , H.R. 3598 , H.R. 1145 , S. 1462 , S. 1733 , S. 3396 , and Subtitle IV of P.L. 111-11 ( H.R. 146 ), the Secure Water Act of 2009. During the 112 th Congress, energy's water use may arise in a variety of contexts, including during consideration of energy, agriculture, public land, and water legislation and oversight. Energy Sector's Vulnerability to Water Constraints The more freshwater used by the energy sector, the more the sector is vulnerable to water constraints. How much water will the energy sector use in the future? Will water constrain the transition to greater energy independence? Regional Significance of Energy's Water Demand Much of the anticipated growth in the energy sector's water demand is in water-constrained areas, potentially exacerbating competition and low flow condition for water during summer and droughts. That is, while energy's water demand is anticipated to rise across the United States, the West is likely to experience some of the more significant constraints and conflicts in meeting this demand. The following examples of regional water consumption concerns are discussed in more detail: shale gas production in Texas using hydraulic fracturing, solar electricity generation in the Southwest; and biofuel production in the High Plains. Shale gas formations occur in many areas of the United States. Historically the energy sector and the states have determined how water is used in the energy sector, but the significant role that current federal policies are playing in driving up energy's water demand is raising questions about the federal role in meeting and managing that demand. Who is responsible for the vulnerability of the nation's energy system to water availability? Congress is faced with deciding not only whether, and if so how, to alter current policies to respond to energy's water demand, but also who is the most appropriate entity to respond to energy's growing water demand. The issue of the energy sector's water use may arise during the 112 th Congress in a variety of contexts. Attempts can be made to minimize the growth in energy's freshwater use by adopting general energy policies that are less water intense and more sensitive to water constraints, or by specifically promoting activities that reduce energy's water use, such as incentives for adopting less water intense energy generation technologies. These options also represent different potential roles and costs for federal and state governments, the energy sector, and energy consumers. Current and evolving conditions also play a role: providing greater access to water for the energy sector (which is primarily up to the states) may be difficult and controversial in water-scarce, drought-prone, or environmentally sensitive areas, especially with climate change anticipated to affect the availability and reliability of water in some regions.

The energy choices before Congress represent vastly different demands on domestic freshwater because water is used in varying amounts in most aspects of the energy sector. Transitions in the energy sector, such as the pursuit of greater energy independence and security, produce changes in how much and where the energy sector uses water. The energy sector is the fastest-growing water consumer in the United States, in part because of energy policies. Whether the federal government addresses the energy sector's rising water demand, and if so how, is one of the many energy decisions that may be considered by the 112th Congress. Much of the growth in the energy sector's water demand is concentrated in regions with already intense competition over water. Whether the energy sector exacerbates or alleviates future water tensions is influenced by near-term energy policy and investment decisions. These decisions also may determine whether water will limit or harm U.S. capability to reliably meet the nation's energy demand. Part of the policy issue for Congress is identifying the extent of the federal role in responding to the energy sector's water use. Currently, the energy industry and states have the most responsibility for managing and meeting the energy sector's water demand. The energy sector's water consumption is projected to rise 50% from 2005 to 2030. Projections attribute to the energy sector 85% of the growth in domestic water consumption between 2005 and 2030. The drivers of the energy sector's increasing water use are rising energy demand, greater development of domestic energy, and shifts to more water-intense energy sources and technologies. The more water used by the energy sector, the more vulnerable the energy system is to water availability. Climate change alterations of historic water patterns may exacerbate this vulnerability in some regions. While the energy sector's water demand is anticipated to rise across the United States, the West is likely to experience some of the more significant constraints in meeting this demand. Examples of regional water use concerns related to energy are shale gas production using hydraulic fracturing in many regions across the nation, some solar electricity generation in the Southwest, and current biofuel feedstock production in the High Plains. The 112th Congress may see the issue of energy's water demand in a variety of contexts, including oversight and legislation on energy, infrastructure, environment, agriculture, public lands, climate, research, and water. Approaches for addressing energy's water demand range from maintaining the current approach to taking a range of actions. One set of available actions includes those that attempt to minimize the growth in energy's freshwater use (e.g., through promotion of water-efficient energy alternatives and energy demand management), which could be accomplished through changes to broad policies or legislation targeted at water use. Many of the possible actions to decrease water use come with energy cost, generation, and reliability penalties. Another set of actions includes measures that facilitate access to water for the energy sector. While water allocations and permits generally are a state responsibility, limited federal actions to provide water to the energy sector are possible (e.g., access to surplus water at federal reservoirs). An additional set of actions encompasses investments in data and research to inform decision making and to expand water-efficient energy technology choices. These approaches represent different potential roles and expenses for government, the energy sector, and energy consumers. Legislation in the 111th Congress proposed a variety of actions, including provisions in H.R. 469, H.R. 2454, H.R. 3598, H.R. 1145, S. 1462, S. 1733, S. 3396, and the Secure Water Act of 2009, Subtitle IV of P.L. 111-11 (H.R. 146). A significant challenge to a federal response to the energy sector's water demand is that the available options are not equally needed, attractive, or feasible across the United States.

crs_RL30878

crs_RL30878_0

Fossil fuel fired electric generating facilities are major emitters of gases (see table 1), with clean air controls currently directed at three pollutants: sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulates (PM). For many years the complexity of the air quality control regime has caused some observers to call for a simplified approach. This approach involves a mix of regulatory and economic mechanisms that would apply to utility emissions of up to four pollutants—SO 2 , NOx, Hg, and CO 2 . Title IV also required reductions in NOx emissions. Such an approach to powerplant emissions would have several tradeoffs. Overall, the primary tradeoff is exchanging regulatory and economic uncertainty for short to mid-term certainty. For industry, a cap and trade system could not only save costs directly, but would likely reduce uncertainties with respect to utility responsibilities and potential penalties, thus allowing the industry to plan for the future in the context of a more coherent regulatory regime. Finally, a flexible cap and trade program might open the door for reforming or replacing the current, sometimes burdensome, NSR/PSD permitting process. Reduction Requirements. Enforcement. Although the resulting development of the Act has resulted in a structure that some consider unwieldy, emissions of most air pollutants have substantially declined, and the number of persons living in areas where pollution exceeds standards has diminished. Arguably, the Act's success puts the burden of proof for revising the existing structure on those favoring change. The multi-pollutant proposals seek to bring more consistency and stability to the diverse elements of the Act, with the focus being on pollutants emitted by utilities, one of the largest emitting sectors. In a way, "multi-pollutant" may be misleading, as the proposals would not combine regulations or controls on several pollutants; rather, the proposals typically do several things: they would align pollution control processes and procedures for several currently regulated pollutants (SO 2 and NOx, and, indirectly, PM and ozone) so that both regulators and utility managers could anticipate requirements and integrate their decisions about how to control emissions; they would adopt the efficiency of economic mechanisms—most notably "cap and trade"—into the control of most or all of the pollutants; they would stabilize requirements over time; and they would anticipate incorporating potential future control requirements for other emitted gases (e.g., Hg, CO 2 ) into this more stable scheme.

Fossil fuel fired electric generating facilities are major sources of air pollutants, including particulate matter (PM), sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury (Hg), and of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). A patchwork of regulations to limit PM, SO 2 , and NOx emissions exists, with further requirements on the horizon. The piecemeal nature of the regulations and the uncertainty of future requirements impose not only direct costs on utilities, but also make planning difficult in an environment already characterized by industry restructuring, volatile energy prices, and technological changes. To bring some consistency and stability to the regulations affecting utility emissions, legislative initiatives have proposed a "multi-pollutant" strategy. Key elements of the strategy include: aligning pollution control processes and procedures for PM, SO 2 , and NOx so that both regulators and utility managers could anticipate requirements and integrate their decisions about how to control emissions; adopting efficient economic mechanisms—most notably "cap and trade" strategies—for the control of the pollutants; stabilizing requirements over time; and incorporating potential future control requirements for other emitted gases (e.g., Hg, CO 2 ) into this more stable scheme. This approach to controlling powerplant emissions would have several tradeoffs. Overall, it exchanges regulatory and economic uncertainty for short to mid-term certainty. For the environment, the current controversy that accompanies the setting of standards and the implementing of regulatory reduction requirements would be exchanged for a specific reduction target that would not change for 10-15 years. From an economic standpoint, implementing emission caps through emission trading would reduce costs, and the straightforward enforcement mechanism would also provide industry with certainty with respect to their responsibilities and potential penalties, and allow industry to plan for the future in the context of a consistent regulatory regime. Finally, the program might open the door for simplifying or replacing elements of the current piecemeal requirements. However, cap and trade systems could conflict with health standards to protect local areas from "hot spot" emissions. Although the Clean Air Act's evolution has resulted in a structure that some characterize as unwieldy, the number of persons living in areas where air pollution exceeds standards has diminished. Arguably, the Act's success puts the burden of proof concerning amendment on those favoring change. Amending the Act has always proved contentious; but for many, the opportunities for greater predictability of requirements, fixed emission reductions, and cost efficiency are enticing.

crs_R41169

crs_R41169_0

Introduction In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama said that nuclear terrorism is the "most immediate and extreme threat to global security," and announced "a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years." To mobilize world leaders to meet this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking—cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. The United States government has worked both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. The attendees represented a wide geographic range of states. The summit resulted in a joint statement with a pledge to improve nuclear security standards and share best practices, and confirmed agreement that international action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear security for the purpose of the summit, and in the International Atomic Energy Agency's usage, refers to a wide range of measures to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at civilian or military facilities. Funding for Nuclear Security Programs In its annual appropriations, Congress decides on funding for U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention. The Obama Administration's FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013 congressional budget requests proposed overall increases in funding for nuclear security-related accounts, with the stated purpose of ramping up programs to meet the President's four-year goal.

In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch "a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years." To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represented a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. A second summit will be held in South Korea in March 2012. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking—cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention. Congress is also likely to assess implementation of the Administration's efforts to secure nuclear materials by the end of 2013. The Obama Administration's FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013 congressional budget requests proposed overall increases in funding for nuclear security-related accounts, with the stated purpose of ramping up programs to meet the President's four-year goal.