diff --git "a/36_years1982-09.jsonl" "b/36_years1982-09.jsonl"
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+++ "b/36_years1982-09.jsonl"
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
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+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/90063f2d-c2de-4bfc-9f26-563c23cf00b7", "title": "WRITTEN QUESTION NO 1174/82 BY MR JENS-PETER BONDE TO THE COUNCIL: MEASURES REQUIRING THE CONSENT OF THE FOLKETING", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_written,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "BONDE,European Parliament", "date": "1982-10-01", "subjects": "Community budget,Denmark,budgetary procedure,national law,national parliament", "workIds": "celex:91982E001174", "eurovoc_concepts": ["Community budget", "Denmark", "budgetary procedure", "national law", "national parliament"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/90063f2d-c2de-4bfc-9f26-563c23cf00b7", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
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+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/432b57f6-4c75-4a6e-bcc2-9cad233b0f69", "title": "WRITTEN QUESTION NO 1181/82 BY MR BONDE TO THE COMMISSION: EXTERNAL NEGOTIATING POWERS", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_written,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "BONDE,European Parliament", "date": "1982-10-01", "subjects": "Council of the European Union,EU Member State,EU competence,EU law,European Community,European convention,environmental policy,foreign policy,national sovereignty", "workIds": "celex:91982E001181", "eurovoc_concepts": ["Council of the European Union", "EU Member State", "EU competence", "EU law", "European Community", "European convention", "environmental policy", "foreign policy", "national sovereignty"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/432b57f6-4c75-4a6e-bcc2-9cad233b0f69", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/579e7c09-deb9-4164-a8db-724c2e530ba3", "title": "WRITTEN QUESTION NO 1217/82 BY MR COUSTE TO THE COMMISSION: USE AND SITING OF THE SYNCHROTRON", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_written,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "COUSTE,European Parliament", "date": "1982-10-01", "subjects": "COST,France,applied sciences,research policy,siting of power stations", "workIds": "celex:91982E001217", "eurovoc_concepts": ["COST", "France", "applied sciences", "research policy", "siting of power stations"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/579e7c09-deb9-4164-a8db-724c2e530ba3", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/3ffaec52-d7cd-4770-9337-8f285b5636c0", "title": "WRITTEN QUESTION NO 1189/82 BY MR JENS-PETER BONDE TO THE COMMISSION: TREATY OF ROME", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_written,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "BONDE,European Parliament", "date": "1982-10-01", "subjects": "Denmark,EEC Treaty,EU competence,European Community,accession to the European Union,common market,foreign policy,national law,national parliament,political cooperation", "workIds": "celex:91982E001189", "eurovoc_concepts": ["Denmark", "EEC Treaty", "EU competence", "European Community", "accession to the European Union", "common market", "foreign policy", "national law", "national parliament", "political cooperation"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/3ffaec52-d7cd-4770-9337-8f285b5636c0", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/095de20e-d72f-4e3d-a9fc-db481334fe6d", "title": "WRITTEN QUESTION NO 1177/82 BY MR BONDE TO THE COUNCIL: TRANSFER OF DANISH SOVEREIGNTY TO THE COMMUNITY", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_written,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "BONDE,European Parliament", "date": "1982-10-01", "subjects": "Court of Justice of the European Union,Denmark,EAEC Treaty,ECSC Treaty,EEC Treaty,EU competence,case-law,national law,national sovereignty", "workIds": "celex:91982E001177", "eurovoc_concepts": ["Court of Justice of the European Union", "Denmark", "EAEC Treaty", "ECSC Treaty", "EEC Treaty", "EU competence", "case-law", "national law", "national sovereignty"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/095de20e-d72f-4e3d-a9fc-db481334fe6d", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/d9649cab-2980-47f2-8a4f-50197a95602d", "title": "Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/82 of 30 September 1982 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1575/80 laying down provisions for the implementation of Article 13 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1430/79 on the repayment or remission of import or export duties", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "html,pdfa1b,print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#legislation_secondary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#regulation,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "European Commission", "date": "1982-09-30", "subjects": "customs drawback,customs formalities,import refund", "workIds": "celex:31982R2640,oj:JOL_1982_279_R_0067_029", "eurovoc_concepts": ["customs drawback", "customs formalities", "import refund"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/d9649cab-2980-47f2-8a4f-50197a95602d", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["html", "pdfa1b", "print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/9b6d8e28-eaee-4e18-8c4e-3958e6e9d81d", "title": "ORAL QUESTION DOCUMENT 1-661/82 WITH DEBATE BY MR BONACCINI, MR CALVEZ, MR CHANTERIE, MR DIDO, MR HOFFMANN, MR MACARIO, MR MOREAU, MRS SALISCH AND MR VETTER TO THE COMMISSION: COMMUNITY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_oral,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "BONACCINI,CALVEZ,CHANTERIE,DIDO,European Parliament,HOFFMANN KARL HEINZ,MACARIO,MOREAU JACQUES,SALISCH,VETTER", "date": "1982-09-30", "subjects": "Community budget,EU Member State,European Investment Bank,European Parliament,Japan,United States,developing countries,economic growth,economic policy,economic recession,financial aid,industrialised country,inflation,investment,poverty,social policy,technology,unemployment,woman,young person", "workIds": "celex:91982O000083", "eurovoc_concepts": ["Community budget", "EU Member State", "European Investment Bank", "European Parliament", "Japan", "United States", "developing countries", "economic growth", "economic policy", "economic recession", "financial aid", "industrialised country", "inflation", "investment", "poverty", "social policy", "technology", "unemployment", "woman", "young person"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/9b6d8e28-eaee-4e18-8c4e-3958e6e9d81d", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/b23564a5-243a-4c3a-af36-079cd64f5b57", "title": "Additional Protocol to the European Agreement on the Exchange of Blood-grouping Reagents", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "fmx4,html,pdfa1b,print,xhtml", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#agreement_international,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#agreement_non-member-states,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "Austria,Belgium,Cyprus,Czechia,Denmark,Estonia,European Economic Community,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Latvia,Liechtenstein,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,Netherlands,Norway,Poland,Portugal,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,T\u00fcrkiye,United Kingdom", "date": "1982-09-29", "subjects": "European convention,biology,blood transfusion,multilateral agreement,mutual assistance,pharmaceutical product,protocol to an agreement", "workIds": "celex:21987A0207(06)", "eurovoc_concepts": ["European convention", "biology", "blood transfusion", "multilateral agreement", "mutual assistance", "pharmaceutical product", "protocol to an agreement"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/b23564a5-243a-4c3a-af36-079cd64f5b57", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["fmx4", "html", "pdfa1b", "print", "xhtml"], "text": "L_1987037EN. 01004401. xml\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n7. 2. 1987\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\n\n\nEN\n\n\nOfficial Journal of the European Communities\n\n\nL 37/44\n\n\n\n\n\nADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE EUROPEAN AGREEMENT\non the Exchanges of Blood-grouping Reagents\nTHE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE,\nContracting Parties to the European Agreement of 14 May 1962 on the exchanges of blood-grouping reagents (hereinafter called \u2018the Agreement\u2019);\nHaving regard to the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Agreement, according to which \u2018The Contracting Parties shall take all necessary measures to exempt from all import duties the blood-grouping reagents placed at their disposal by the other Parties\u2019;\nConsidering that so far as the Member States of the European Economic Community are concerned, the undertaking to grant this exemption falls within the competence of the Community, which possesses the necessary powers in this respect by virtue of the Treaty which instituted it;\nConsidering therefore that for the purpose of the implementation of Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Agreement, it is necessary for the European Economic Community to be able to become a Contracting Party to the Agreement,\nHAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:\nArticle 1\nThe European Economic Community may become a Contracting Party to the Agreement by signing it. In respect of the Community, the Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the month following such signature. Article 2\n1. This Additional Protocol shall be open for acceptance by the Contracting Parties to the Agreement. It shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the date on which the last of the Contracting Parties has deposited its instrument of acceptance with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. 2. However, this Additional Protocol shall enter into force on the expiration of a period of two years from the date on which it has been opened for acceptance, unless one of the Contracting Parties has notified an objection to the entry into force. If such an objection has been notified, paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply. Article 3\nFrom the date of its entry into force, this Additional Protocol shall form an integral part of the Agreement. From that date, no State may become a Contracting Party to the Agreement without at the same time becoming a Contracting Party to the Additional Protocol. Article 4\nThe Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States of the Council of Europe, any State having acceded to the Agreement and the European Economic Community of any acceptance or objection made under Article 2 and of the date of entry into force of this Additional Protocol in accordance with Article 2. The Secretary-General shall also notify the European Economic Community of any act, notification or communication relating to the Agreement. Done at Strasbourg, the 29th day of September 1982, in English and in French, and opened for acceptance the 1st day of January 1983. Both texts are equally authentic and shall be deposited in a single copy in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each Member State of the Council of Europe, to any State invited to accede to the Agreement and to the European Economic Community"}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/dadb520c-0dc6-4ac5-9e7f-57dd4584116e", "title": "Draft COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the methods of setting natural gas prices and tariffs in the Community (presented from the Commission to the Council)", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "pdfa1b", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#legislation_secondary", "authors": "European Commission", "date": "1982-09-29", "subjects": "common price policy,fixing of prices,natural gas,price of energy", "workIds": "celex:51982PC0603,comnat:COM_1982_0603_FIN", "eurovoc_concepts": ["common price policy", "fixing of prices", "natural gas", "price of energy"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/dadb520c-0dc6-4ac5-9e7f-57dd4584116e", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["pdfa1b"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/9d61f784-af31-46c1-a8d0-ae9a0feb154c", "title": "Additional Protocol to the agreement on the temporary importation, free of duty, of medical, surgical and laboratory equipment for use on free loan in hospitals and other medical institutions for purposes of diagnosis or treatment", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "fmx4,html,pdfa1b,print,xhtml", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#agreement_international,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#agreement_non-member-states,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "Austria,Belgium,Cyprus,Czechia,Denmark,Estonia,European Economic Community,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Iceland,Ireland,Italy,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,Netherlands,Norway,Poland,Portugal,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,T\u00fcrkiye,United Kingdom", "date": "1982-09-29", "subjects": "European Community,accession to an agreement,medical device,medical diagnosis,medical institution,multilateral agreement,protocol to an agreement,tariff exemption,temporary admission,therapeutics", "workIds": "celex:21986A0517(02)", "eurovoc_concepts": ["European Community", "accession to an agreement", "medical device", "medical diagnosis", "medical institution", "multilateral agreement", "protocol to an agreement", "tariff exemption", "temporary admission", "therapeutics"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/9d61f784-af31-46c1-a8d0-ae9a0feb154c", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["fmx4", "html", "pdfa1b", "print", "xhtml"], "text": "L_1986131EN. 01005001. xml\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n17. 5. 1986\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\n\n\nEN\n\n\nOfficial Journal of the European Communities\n\n\nL 131/50\n\n\n\n\n\nADDITIONAL PROTOCOL\nto the agreement on the temporary importation, free of duty, of medical, surgical and laboratory equipment for use on free loan in hospitals and other medical institutions for purposes of diagnosis or treatment\nTHE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Contracting Parties to the Agreement of 28 April 1960 on the temporary importation, free of duty, of medical, surgical and laboratory equipment for use on free loan in hospitals and other medical institutions for purposes of diagnosis or treatment (hereinafter called \u2018the Agreement\u2019),\nHAVING REGARD to the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement, according to which such equipment shall, under certain conditions, benefit from a system of temporary importation free of duty,\nCONSIDERING that so far as the Member States of the European Economic Community are concerned, the granting of such an exemption must in particular take account of the existence of the Common Customs Tariff established by these States and that any derogation from the Common Customs Tariff falls within the competence of the European Economic Community, which possesses the necessary powers in this respect by virtue of the Treaty which instituted it;\nCONSIDERING therefore that for the purposes of the implementation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement, it is necessary for the European Economic Community to be able to become a Contracting Party to the Agreement,\nHAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:\nArticle 1\nThe European Economic Community may become a Contracting Party to the Agreement by signing it. In respect of the Community, the Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the date of such signature. Article 2\n1. This Additional Protocol shall be open for acceptance by the Contracting Parties to the Agreement. It shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the date on which the last of the Contracting Parties has deposited its instrument of acceptance with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. 2. However, this Additional Protocol shall enter into force on the expiration of a period of two years from the date on which it has been opened for acceptance, unless one of the Contracting Parties has notified an objection to the entry into force. If such an objection has been notified, paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply. Article 3\nFrom the date of its entry into force, this Additional Protocol shall form an integral part of the Agreement. From that date, no State may become a Contracting Party to the Agreement without at the same time becoming a Contracting Party to the Additional Protocol. Article 4\nThe Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify the Member States of the Council of Europe, any State having acceded to the Agreement and the European Economic Community of any acceptance or objections made under Article 2 and of the date of entry into force of this Additional Protocol in accordance with Article 2. The Secretary-General shall also notify the European Economic Community of any act, notification or communication relating to the Agreement. Done at Strasbourg, the 29th day of September 1982, in English and in French, and opened for acceptance the 1st day of January 1983. Both texts are equally authentic and shall be deposited in a single copy in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each Member State of the Council of Europe, to any State invited to accede to the Agreement and to the European Economic Community"}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/b0b517a3-6267-46a8-8f29-8fa8a6757e53", "title": "Additional Protocol to the European Agreement on the Exchange of Therapeutic Substances of Human Origin", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "fmx4,html,pdfa1b,print,xhtml", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#agreement_international,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#agreement_non-member-states,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "Austria,Belgium,Cyprus,Czechia,Denmark,Estonia,European Economic Community,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Latvia,Liechtenstein,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,Netherlands,Norway,Poland,Portugal,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,T\u00fcrkiye,United Kingdom", "date": "1982-09-29", "subjects": "European convention,bio-ethics,biology,blood transfusion,multilateral agreement,mutual assistance,pharmaceutical product,protocol to an agreement,therapeutics", "workIds": "celex:21987A0207(03)", "eurovoc_concepts": ["European convention", "bio-ethics", "biology", "blood transfusion", "multilateral agreement", "mutual assistance", "pharmaceutical product", "protocol to an agreement", "therapeutics"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/b0b517a3-6267-46a8-8f29-8fa8a6757e53", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["fmx4", "html", "pdfa1b", "print", "xhtml"], "text": "L_1987037EN. 01002901. xml\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n7. 2. 1987\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\n\n\nEN\n\n\nOfficial Journal of the European Communities\n\n\nL 37/29\n\n\n\n\n\nADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE EUROPEAN AGREEMENT\non the exchange of therapeutic substances of human origin\nTHE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE,\nContracting Parties to the European Agreement of 15 December 1958 on the exchange of therapeutic substances of human origin (hereinafter called \u2018the Agreement\u2019),\nHaving regard to the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Agreement, according to which \u2018The Contracting Parties shall take all necessary measures to exempt from all import duties the therapeutic substances of human origin placed at their disposal by the other Parties\u2019;\nConsidering that so far as the Member States of the European Economic Community are concerned, the undertaking to grant this exemption falls within the competence of the Community, which possesses the necessary powers in this respect by virtue of the treaty which instituted it;\nConsidering therefore that for the purpose of the implementation of Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Agreement, it is necessary for the European Economic Community to be able to become a Contracting Party to the Agreement,\nHAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:\nArticle 1\nThe European Economic Community may become a Contracting Party to the Agreement by signing it. In respect of the Community, the Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the month following such signature. Article 2\n1. This Additional Protocol shall be open for acceptance by the Contracting Parties to the Agreement. It shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the date on which the last of the Contracting Parties has deposited its instrument of acceptance with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. 2. However, this Additional Protocol shall enter into force on the expiration of a period of two years from the date on which it has been opened for acceptance, unless one of the Contracting Parties has notified an objection to the entry into force. If such an objection has been notified, paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply. Article 3\nFrom the date of its entry into force, this Additional Protocol shall form an integral part of the Agreement. From that date, no State may become a Contracting Party to the Agreement without at the same time becoming a Contracting Party to the Additional Protocol. Article 4\nThe Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States of the Council of Europe, any State having acceded to the Agreement and the European Economic Community of any acceptance or objection made under Article 2 and of the date of entry into force of this Additional Protocol in accordance with Article 2. The Secretary-General shall also notify the European Economic Community of any act, notification or communication relating to the Agreement. Done at Strasbourg, the 29th day of September 1982, in English and in French, and opened for acceptance the 1st day of January 1983. Both texts are equally authentic and shall be deposited in a single copy in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each member State of the Council of Europe, to any State invited to accede to the Agreement and to the European Economic Community"}
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+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/a457da56-7862-4eb0-9b14-6f8c4d078b09", "title": "WRITTEN QUESTION NO 1143/82 BY MR BONDE TO THE COMMISSION: AUTONOMOUS AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_written,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "BONDE,European Parliament", "date": "1982-09-22", "subjects": "EEC Treaty,EU Member State,EU competence,EU law,foreign policy,international relations,national sovereignty,public administration,third country", "workIds": "celex:91982E001143", "eurovoc_concepts": ["EEC Treaty", "EU Member State", "EU competence", "EU law", "foreign policy", "international relations", "national sovereignty", "public administration", "third country"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/a457da56-7862-4eb0-9b14-6f8c4d078b09", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/4af00c25-426b-49a0-a108-af0202811163", "title": "WRITTEN QUESTION NO 1132/82 BY MR PIERRE-BERNARD COUSTE TO THE COMMISSION: TEXTILE IMPORTS FROM EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_written,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "COUSTE,European Parliament", "date": "1982-09-22", "subjects": "EU Member State,Eastern Bloc countries,anti-dumping measure,clothing industry,competition,import,statistics,textile industry,textile product,trade policy", "workIds": "celex:91982E001132", "eurovoc_concepts": ["EU Member State", "Eastern Bloc countries", "anti-dumping measure", "clothing industry", "competition", "import", "statistics", "textile industry", "textile product", "trade policy"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/4af00c25-426b-49a0-a108-af0202811163", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f562e685-1874-43e9-a516-b13f1b92371a", "title": "WRITTEN QUESTION NO 1144/82 BY MR BONDE TO THE COMMISSION: ROME TREATY", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_parliamentary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#question_written,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "BONDE,European Parliament", "date": "1982-09-22", "subjects": "Court of Justice of the European Union,EEC Treaty,EU law,case-law", "workIds": "celex:91982E001144", "eurovoc_concepts": ["Court of Justice of the European Union", "EEC Treaty", "EU law", "case-law"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f562e685-1874-43e9-a516-b13f1b92371a", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["print"]}
+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/8fe469a9-9ac3-11e6-868c-01aa75ed71a1", "title": "Documents relating to the European Monetary System.", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "pdf,print", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#publication_general,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "DG II \u2013 Economic and Financial Affairs", "date": "1982-09-22", "subjects": "Community budget,EU policy,Economic and Monetary Union,European Monetary System,economic analysis,economic convergence,economic growth,economic policy,economic reform,economic statistics,euro area,fiscal policy,institutional activity,own resources,report", "workIds": "genpub:2016.6113", "eurovoc_concepts": ["Community budget", "EU policy", "Economic and Monetary Union", "European Monetary System", "economic analysis", "economic convergence", "economic growth", "economic policy", "economic reform", "economic statistics", "euro area", "fiscal policy", "institutional activity", "own resources", "report"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/8fe469a9-9ac3-11e6-868c-01aa75ed71a1", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["pdf", "print"], "text": "ISSN 0379-0991\n\nEUROPEAN\nECONOMY\n\nCOMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES \u2022 DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS\n\nDocuments relating to the\nEuropean Monetary System\n\nN\u00ab 12 July 1982\n\n\f'EUROPEAN ECONOMY' appears three times a year, in March, July\nand November. The November issue contains the Commission's\nproposal for the annual report on the economic situation in the\nCommunity. This report, which the Council adopts in the fourth quarter\nof each year, establishes the economic policy guidelines to be followed by\nthe Member States in the year that follows. The November issue also\ncontains the Commission's annual economic review, the background\nanalysis to the proposed annual report. In March of each year, 'European\nEconomy' gives a review of the current economic situation in the\nCommunity and, in July, reports and studies on problems of current\ninterest for economic policy. Three series of supplements accompany the main periodical:\n\nSeries A \u2014 'Recent economic trends' appears monthly except in\nAugust and describes with the aid of tables and graphs the most\nrecent trends of industrial production, consumer prices, unemploy-\nment, the balance of trade, exchange rates, and other indicators. Series B \u2014 'Economic prospects: business survey results', gives the\nmain results (orders, stocks, production outlook, etc. ) of opinion\nsurveys of industrial chief executives in the Community. It also\nappears monthly, with the exception of September. Series C \u2014 'Economic prospects: consumer survey results', reports\non the consumer survey, which is carried out thrice yearly (in January,\nMay and October) throughout the Community (except Greece and\nLuxembourg) and measures consumers' opinion on the economic\nsituation and outlook. Subscription terms are shown on the back cover and the addresses of the\nSales Offices are shown on page 3 of the cover. Unless otherwise indicated the texts are published on the responsibility of\nthe Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the\nCommission of the European Communities, rue de la Loi 200, 1049\nBruxelles, to which enquiries other than those related to sales and\nsubscriptions, should be addressed. Commission of the European Communities\n\nEUROPEAN\nECONOMY\n\nJuly 1982 \n\nNumber 12\n\n\fThe manuscript was completed on 8 July 1982. Reproduction is subject to acknowledgement of the source, except in the case of commercial data-base networks, where the\nauthorization of the Commission is required. Printed in Belgium, 1982\n\nCatalogue number: CB-AR-82-012-EN-C\n\n\fDocuments relating to the\n\nEuropean Monetary System\n\n\fFrederic\nBOYER DE LA GlRODAY\n\nFrederic Boyer de la Giroday was born in September 1918 on the island of Mauritius. He\nstudied economics first in Paris and then at Oxford. In 1949 he entered the International\nMonetary Fund and left it in 1958 to join the Commission of the European Communities\nat the time when the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs was being\nformed. The whole of his professional career was from then on spent at the Directorate-General\nfor Economic and Financial Affairs, and was devoted to monetary questions. Having\nstarted in 1958 as a principal administrator, he was appointed Director in 1968 and at the\ntime of his departure in 1981 he was head of a Directorate of four divisions dealing with\nthe whole range of monetary and financial questions. In the intervening years, he took an\nactive part in each of the major debates or projects which marked the history of\ninternational monetary relations: he participated with people such as Ossola, Mundell,\nTrifTm, etc. in the great debates which marked the reform of the international monetary\nsystems, the creation of the special drawing right, the introduction of the general\narrangements to borrow. He made a special contribution, in his role of respected adviser\nto men directly involved such as Robert Marjolin, Raymond Barre or Francois-Xavier\nOrtoli to the Werner Plan, to the creation of the 'snake', to Community loans and to the\nEuropean Monetary System. Fascinated by economic history, he was a popular and respected lecturer at the Universite\nLibre de Bruxelles. He was an expert in the literature on international monetary questions,\n\nwas familiar with the classical authors on the subject, and took an active part in the\n\nrenewal of ideas and theories, persistent in communicating his taste for research to his\ncolleagues. His personality was strong, his temperament generous and communicative. His strength of character was equalled only by his soundness of judgment. Shortly before his death, on 29 December 1981 in Arosa, Switzerland, he had been\nappointed honorary Director-General and Special Adviser to Commission President\nThorn, He intended to devote his time to writing on subjects which had always interested\nhim, such as the European capital market, the Eurocurrency system, the Bank for\nInternational Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the future of\ninternational monetary relations. An earnest and enthusiastic supporter of European monetary integration, he never ceased\n\nto demonstrate its advantages. A lucid observer of the difficulties of this undertaking, he\nnever allowed himself to be discouraged by the interruptions, the false starts or the\nsetbacks in the monetary construction of Europe. For him, therefore, who had shared the\nhopes aroused by the Werner Plan, and the subsequent disappointments, the\nestablishment of the European Monetary System was a matter of great satisfaction. Foreword\n\nThis issue of 'European Economy' analyses how the EMS has functioned in its first three years and presents\na dossier of the studies and discussions which have taken place within the Community on the development\nof the system. It is built around three topics which are the product of the experience and reflection to date:\neconomic convergence in relation to the system in its existing form (Part One), the development of the\nsystem within its present institutional framework (Part Two), and the institutional phase of the system\n(Part Three). The public is thus given access to hitherto unpublished technical studies and documents. The three topics are treated in the logical order of the system's development, from the present phase to the\nfinal stage. Chronologically, the work on the institutional phase\u2014a task which'the European Council\nexplicitly assigned to the Community institutions\u2014preceded the studies which culminated in the\nproposals for non-institutional development, which were presented in March 1982. Except for those documents whose status is clearly defined (Commission communication, opinion of the\nCommittees, etc. ), the analyses and assessments presented in this issue of 'European Economy' are those of\nthe departments of the Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. They\ncannot be regarded as positions taken by the Commission. This is particularly true for Part Three, which is\na preliminary synthesis of the ideas put forward on the main areas of the institutional phase. The specific\nproposals have been discussed in detail by the Alternates of the Monetary Committee, but the preliminary\nsynthesis is the fruit of the work of Commission departments. Certain assessments may be modified in the\nlight of changing circumstances and of a more detailed analysis some time in the future. *\n\n* \n\n*\n\nThe EMS represents the most recent stage in the process, initiated by the Community in the late 1960s, of\nproviding itself with its own monetary identity and organization. The Treaties were devised and signed at a\ntime when the Community countries were integrated into a highly structured monetary system, that of\nBretton Woods. The organization provided by this system was a mainstay of the Community's\nconstruction and its existence was so taken for granted that it was not even mentioned in the Treaty. However once this support started to weaken, the Community realized that a monetary organization was a\nnecessary complement to a commercial and agricultural organization. With varying success, it launched a\nseries of initiatives to try to make good the deficiency. The EMS has been the most successful of these initiatives. It has maintained the unity of the Common\n\nMarket and has made a substantial contribution to closer monetary convergence in a period when\n\neconomic crisis and commercial strains have reached a degree of gravity unprecedented in the\nCommunity's history. It is nevertheless still insufficient; its structures not being strong enough to\nencompass national economic policies within a common monetary discipline, to free commercial\ncompetitiveness from monetary constraints, or to give the Community a role in international monetary\nrelationships commensurate with its industrial and commercial weight. Aware of these inadequacies, the system's originators from the beginning intended it to be dynamic,\ndestined to evolve and to grow in strength. This dynamism has been one of the strong points of the system's\noperation in its first three years. It also provided the driving force for the discussions and studies presented\nhere. The proposals put forward by the Commission in March 1982 mark an\u2014unfinished\u2014step along the road\nwhich leads eventually but inevitably towards European monetary inegration. *\n\n* \n\n*\n\nThis issue is dedicated to the memory of Frederic BOYER DE LA GIRODAY who, from his very earliest days\nat the Commission in 1958 until his untimely death in December 1981, placed his great erudition, his\n\nprofound idealism and his extraordinary capacity for work at the service of the monetary construction of\nEurope. The European Monetary System\n\nForeword\n\nPart One \u2014 Economic convergence and the European Monetary System \n\nChapter \n\nI \u2014 The links between economic convergence and exchange rate stability \n\nConvergence of living standards: long-term trends \nThe interactions between real and nominal developments and exchange rate stability \nThe need for, and implications of, exchange rate stability \n\n21\n\nChapter II \u2014 The convergence of economic and monetary policies under the EMS: the progress to be achieved \n\n23\n\nInsufficient convergence towards stability \nStronger action and a wider range of measures to control inflation \nCorrecting structural macro-economic disequilibria \nA suitable mix between adjustment and external financing \n\n33\n\n29\n\nChapter III \u2014 The realignments of February and June 1982: the system undermined or consolidated? \n\nOperations carried out consistently with the logic of the system \nConfirmation of the importance attached to greater convergence \n\n40\n\nChapter IV \u2014 Evaluation of the functioning of the EMS at 31 December 1981 \n\nPart Two\u2014The development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework \n\n39\n\nElements for assessment \nFunctioning of the system's mechanisms \n\nChapter V \u2014 Analysis of the possible areas in which the EMS can be developed \n\n48\n\nAssuring greater coherence of the mechanisms \nOpening the system \nEncouraging the private use of the ECU \nStrengthening policy convergence \nConclusions \n\n50\n\nChapter VI \u2014 Commission proposals for a non-institutional development of the EMS \n\n53\n\nDraft Resolution on the development of the European Monetary System \nDiscussion of some of the proposals \n\n59\n\nPart Three \u2014 Preliminary synthesis of ideas on the institutional stage of the European Monetary\n\nSystem \n\n63\n\n63\n\nThe ECU \nThe Fund \nExterior aspects of the EMS \nInstitutional questions \n\n13\n\n14\n14\n16\n\n23\n26\n\n35\n35\n36\n\n40\n42\n\n48\n49\n\n51\n51\n\n53\n\n55\n\n60\n61\n\n\fList of annexes\n\nAnnex A\n\nThe system narrowing the margins of fluctuation between the\n\nAnnex B\n\ncurrencies of the European Economic Community from April\n1971 to March 1979 \nMain features of the European Monetary System in its present\nphase \n\nAnnex C\n\n\u2014 Examination by the Monetary Committee of some aspects of\nthe non-institutional development of the European Monetary\nSystem\n\nC-l \u2014 Statement by Mr Jean-Yves Haberer, Chairman of the\nMonetary Committee, to the Economic and Financial Affairs\nCouncil of 14 December 1981, on the European Monetary\nSystem\n\nC-2 \u2014 Report on some aspects of the non-institutional development\nof the European Monetary System presented on 3 February\n1982 by the Alternates of the Monetary Committee\n\nC-3 \u2014 Supplementary report on some aspects of the non-insti-\n\ntutional development of the European Monetary System\npresented on 26 February 1982 by the Alternates of the\nMonetary Committee\n\n\u2014 Commission communication to the Economic and Financial\n\nAnnex D \n\nAffairs Council of 15 March 1982 on the development of the\nEuropean Monetary System\n\nAnnex E \n\nAnnex F\n\nF-l\n\n\u2014 Statement by the Chairman of the Monetary Committee on\n\nthe non-institutional development of the EMS to the Council\n(Economic and Financial Affairs) of 15 March 1972\nStatement and letter from the Committee of Governors on the\nfuture of the EMS\n\n\u2014 Oral statement from the Committee of Governors of the\n\ncentral banks of the Member States of the European\nEconomic Community to the Council (Economic and\nFinancial Affairs) of 15 March 1982 on the future of the EMS \n\nF-2 \u2014 Letter of 29 April 1982 from the Chairman of the Committee\n\nof Governors of the central banks of the Member States of the\nEuropean Economic Community to the President of the\nCouncil of the European Communities \n\n67\n\n70\n\n76\n\n77\n\n79\n\n86\n\n92\n\n93\n\n93\n\n95\n\nAnnex G \n\n\u2014 Oral statement of the Chairman of the Monetary Committee\non the development of the EMS to the informal meeting of\nEconomic and Finance Ministers on 17 May 1982 \n\n96\n\nAnnex H \n\n\u2014 Report from the Commission (of 20 March 1980) to the\n\nEuropean Council on the European Monetary Fund \n\n97\n\nAnnexes I to 1-6 \u2014 Preparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund \n\n100\n\n10\n\n\fList of tables\n\n1. Relative changes in per capita GDP \n2. Breakdown of subsidies and loans for structural purposes granted by the\n\nCommunity institutions \n\n15\n\n3. GDP price deflators and effective exchange rates from 1950to 1982, in relation\n\nto 17 major partners \n\n24\n\n24\n\n4. Price changes within the Community \n5. Changes in exchange rates within the EMS \n6. Monthly variability of major currencies against the ECU \n7. Adjustment of relative changes in costs and prices in relation to EMS partners \n8. Monetary aggregates: annual percentage changes \n9. Budget deficits and changes in money supply \n10. Compensation of employees \n11. Unemployment and growth \n12. Changes in the structure of GDP uses and current balance of payments\n\n27\n\n28\n\n25\n\nposition \n\n13. Balance of payments on current account \n14. Appreciation or depreciation of ECU central rates and bilateral central rates\n\nfrom 13 March 1979 to 5 October 1981 \n15. Appreciation or depreciation of ECU central rates and bilateral central rates\n\nfrom 5 October 1981 to 14 June 1982 \n\n36\n\n16. EMS calendar 1978 to 1981 \n17. Distribution of ECU between participants \n18. Net use or accrual of ECU as a percentage of ECU received through the swap\n\noperations \n\nList of graphs\n\n30\n\n32\n\n29\n\n43\n\n1. Per capita GDP \n\nl(a) at 1975 prices and purchasing power standards \nl(b) at current prices and exchange rates \n2. Relative price and cost movements in relation to 17 trading partners \n3. Operation of the exchange rate mechanism\n\n18\n\n14\n\n43\n\n(maximum spot spreads and divergence indicator) - graph incorporated in\nTable 16 \n\n16\n\n17\n\n25\n\n31\n\n35\n\n45\n\n46\n\n14\n\n14\n\n11\n\n\fAbbreviations and symbols used\n\nCountries\n\nF \n\nFrance\n\nB \nDK \nD \nOR \n\nIRL \nI \nL \nNL \nUK \n\nBelgium\nDenmark\nFederal Republic of Germany\nGreece\n\nIreland\nItaly\nLuxembourg\nThe Netherlands\nUnited Kingdom\n\nEC \nEC 9 \n\nTotal of the member countries of the European Community\n\nCommunity without Greece\n\nBLEU \n\nBelgo-Luxembourg Economic Union\n\nCurrencies\n\nBFR \n\nDanish krone\n\nBelgian franc\n\nDKR \nDM \nDR \n\nFF \n\nIRL \nLIT \nLFR \n\nUKL \nECU \nUSD \nSFR \n\nHFL \n\nSDR \n\nGerman mark\n\nGreek drachma\n\nFrench franc\n\nIrish pound (punt)\nItalian lira\nLuxembourg franc\n\nDutch guilder\n\n- Pound sterling\n\nEuropean currency unit\nUS dollar\nSwiss franc\nSpecial drawing right\n\nOther abbreviations, etc. Carriage, insurance and freight\nEuropean Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund\nEuropean Investment Bank\nEuropean Monetary Cooperation Fund\nEuropean Monetary Fund\nEuropean Monetary System\nEuropean System of Integrated Economic Accounts\nEuropean Atomic Energy Community\nStatistical Office of the European Communities\nFree on board (valuation basis for exports or imports of goods)\n\ncif \nEAGGF \nEIB \nEMCF \nEMF \nEMS \nESA \nEuratom \nEurostat \nfob \nGDP (GNP) Gross domestic (national) product\nGFCF \nIMF \nLDC \nMTFA \nOECD \nOPEC \nSOEC \nSTMS \nVSTF \n( \n) \n: \ns. a. , \nNot applicable\n\u2014 \n\nGross fixed capital formation\nInternational Monetary Fund\nLess-developed country\nMedium-term financial assistance\nOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development\nOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries\nStatistical Office of the European Communities\nShort-term monetary support\nVery short-term financing mechanism\nEstimate\nData not available\nSeasonally adjusted\nDecimal point\n\n12\n\n\fPART ONE '\n\nEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nConvergence of economic performance is one of the objectives of fye European Monetary\nSystem and is at the same time a basic precondition for its successful operation. This dual\nrelationship is clearly brought out in the documents which prepared the way for or set up the\nsystem. In particular, the final report' on the EMS, presented by the Monetary Committee\nto the Council and the Commission on 7 November 1978, said that, 'The European\nMonetary System ought to contribute to reducing divergences in economic performance,'\nadding immediately afterwards, 'The credibility of the new system depends on progressive\nconvergence of economic performance. ' It is this very relationship which is at the heart of\nthe present discussions on the appraisal of the system a little over three years after its\ninception and the possible ways of developing it further. The complexity of the links\nbetween economic convergence and exchange rate stability needs to be examined closely,\nparticularly in the light of past experience, if the objectives and the operations of the EMS in\nthis area are to be viewed in a proper perspective and the progress to be achieved properly\nmeasured. It is similarly against this background that the recent realignments between\nvarious participating currencies should be assessed. Annex 1 to the Twentieth report on the activities of the Monetary Committee, OJ C 240, 25. 9. 1979. 13\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nThe links between economic convergence and\nexchange rate stability\n\nThe very concept of convergence is ambiguous, depending as\nit does on the economic variables that are taken as objectives\nand on the rate at which such objectives are to be achieved. In\nview of the twin concerns jointly underlying the establish-\n\nment of the EMS, monetary stability and progress towards\neconomic integration, a distinction should be made between\non the one hand the immediate need to ensure a convergence\nof nominal variables\u2014a downward alignment of cost and\nprice trends\u2014and on the other the longer-term pursuit of a\nconvergence of real variables, i. e. alignment upwards of\nliving standards and the quality of life. This distinction,\nwhich is convenient for the purposes of analysis, does not,\nhowever, obviate the need to take account of the interactions\nbetween nominal and real developments in determining the\ndesirable degree of exchange rate stability. Similarly,\nemphasizing the urgency of the need to combat inflation does\nnot mean that less importance is attached to growth and\nemployment or that the two types of measures should not be\npursued jointly. GRAPH 1 (a): Per capita GDP at 1975 prices and purchasing\npower standards\n\nIndex: EC 10 in 1975 = 100\n\nUSA\n\n150\n\n100\n\nSO\n\n20\n\n80\n1950 \n75 \n70 \n65 \n60 \n55 \n\nSection 1 \u2014 Convergence of living standards:\n\nlong-term trends\n\nGRAPH 1 (b): Per capita GDP at current prices and exchange\nrates \nIndex: EC 10 in 1975 = 100\n\n-. A detailed comparison of the performance of each economy\nin relation to the other member countries and their main\nindustrialized trading partners is beyond the scope of this\nstudy. Such an analysis would require a large number of\ninterdependent factors to be taken into account (endowment\nin natural resources, demographic trends, technological\nprogress, etc. ), and the results might be subject to different\ninterpretations depending on the criteria applied. Table 1\n\nand Graphs l(a) and l(b) simply show the development of\n\naverage living standards during the past few decades, by\ntracing the relationship between per capita GDP in each\ncountry and the Community as a whole. This indicator may\nbe measured, first, in terms of the purchasing power parities\nestablished by the Statistical Office of the European\nCommunity. 1 Subject to statistical imperfections, per capita\n\nGDP is measured here in terms of domestic purchasing\n\npower. Alternatively, the indicator may be calculated on the\nbasis of current exchange rates, thus reflecting the external\npurchasing power of each currency. It will, however, then be\naffected by movements in real exchange rates which are\nsometimes excessive relative to the basic economic situation\nof each country. Eurostat - National Accounts ESA - Aggregates - 1982. 14\n\nUSA\n\n300\n\n200\n\n100\n\n50\n\n10\n\n1950\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n70\n\n75\n\n80\n\n85 \n\nI. j\n\n\fThe links between economic convergence and exchange rate stability\n\nTable 1\n\nRelative changes in per capita GDP\n\nAt current prices and\npurchasing power standards\n\nIndices EC 10 = 100\n\nAt current prices\nand exchange rates\n\nI960 \n\n1965\n\n1970\n\n1975\n\n1978\n\n1980\n\n1982 '\n\ni960\n\n1965\n\n1970\n\n1975\n\n1978\n\n1980 \n\n1982 l\n\nB \nDK \n\nD \n\nGR \nF \nIRL \nI \nL \nNL \nUK \nEC 10 \nDispersion\n\nEC 10 2 \n\nUSA \nJapan \n\n98,0 100,3\n114,8 118,7\n\n113,4 113,7\n\n37,3 44,4\n\n99,2 102,2\n62,2 61,1\n78,7 81,3\n152,6 133,5\n104,8 103,1\n116,7 109,3\n100 \n\n100\n\n101,7\n117,9\n112,6\n50,4\n105,1\n61,7\n87,9\n137,7\n104,9\n99,9\n100\n\n22,7 19,4\n165,4 160,4\n(53) 3 68,7\n\n18,0\n146,4\n93,1\n\n1 \n\nCommission extrapolation based on the economic bud\n\n- \n\nAverage of absolute differences from the mean. Commission estimate. J \nSource: Eurostat and Commission departments. 106,7\n113,6\n110,5\n56,2\n110,5\n63,0\n85,3\n126,5\n104,8\n98,7\n100\n\n16,9\n142,8\n97,1\n\n105,6\n112,5\n112,6\n57,7\n110,7\n63,6\n84,2\n121,1\n108,2\n96,9\n100\n\n16,8\n146,0\n99,0\n\n106,2\n110,7\n114,8\n57,0\n110,1\n61,7\n87,7\n119,6\n104,9\n92,9\n100\n\n16,7\n138,4\n103,1\n\n104,3\n113,1\n114,8\n55,5\n111,0\n61,6\n88,1\n116,3\n104,3\n92,2\n100\n\n16,7\n135,1\n106,1\n\ngets (May\n\n1982). 107,0\n113,4\n113,9\n36,9\n115,2\n54,7\n64,8\n144,8\n84,0\n119,1\n100\n\n103,0\n124,9\n114,9\n41,1\n117,8\n54,8\n70,6\n124,2\n89,4\n107,3\n100\n\n27,3\n244,8\n(40,1)3\n\n23,6\n207,8\n53,5\n\n107,1\n131,2\n125,0\n46,3\n113,4\n53,9\n76,6\n130,3\n99,3\n90,0\n100\n\n24,1\n197,2\n80,5\n\n120,8\n142,5\n130,2\n44,1\n123,0\n49,7\n65,9\n125,7\n116,1\n79,3\n100\n\n31,9\n137,9\n85,7\n\n128,0\n146,9\n138,6\n44,8\n118,2\n49,7\n61,3\n130,3\n130,6\n74,8\n100\n\n36,2\n129,2\n111,6\n\n114,3 98,9\n125,3 123,9\n128,7 321,8\n40,6 45,9\n117,4 118,0\n50,2 58,9\n66,8 69,7\n121,6 101,3\n114,6 109,0\n90,2 97,0\n100\n100 \n\n27,4 20,4\n109,7 145,2\n86,1 \n\n103,1\n\nAmong the 10 present members of the Community, average\nliving standards measured in terms of purchasing power\nparities showed significant convergence between 1960 and\n1975. After that date, as a result of the divergent economic\n\nrise in living standards coincided during the 1960s with a\nperiod of sharp inflation and monetary turbulence and did\nnot come to a halt until 1978 with the return to greater\nmonetary discipline. and monetary policies pursued since 1972-73 and of differing\nreactions to the economic crisis, this measure of convergence\n\nshowed only very modest progress. If average living\nstandards are measured in terms of current exchange rates,\nthe slowdown in the convergence process was more marked\n\nand began earlier, reflecting from 1970 onwards the\n\nweakening in the discipline previously imposed by the\nBretton Woods system. The process resumed with the\nintroduction of the EMS. This overall pattern has been\naccompanied by considerable changes in the relative\npositions of each country. Germany, the Netherlands and\nIreland have, at very different levels, more or less maintained\ntheir initial positions, measured in terms of purchasing\npower parities. Belgium, France and, particularly, Greece\nimproved their positions distinctly at least up to the middle of\n\nthe 1970s. By contrast, there has been an appreciable\n\ndeterioration, in relative terms, in average living standards in\nthe United Kingdom and in Luxembourg (where the figure is\nof limited significance because of the weight of the steel\nindustry in that small economy). Denmark and Italy have\nseen a slight deterioration in their relative positions as from\n1975-78. It is interesting to note, in the case of Italy, that the\n\ntowards the end of the 1970s. In relation to the Community's two major industrialized\ntrading partners, the same phenomenon of rapid conver-\ngence in living standards can be observed, even more\n\nmarkedly, up to 1970, followed by some subsequent\n\nslowdown. In 1960, per capita GDP in the United States,\nmeasured in terms of purchasing power parities, was about\n65% above the Community average; the difference has\nnarrowed today to only 35%. Japan, whose living standards\nin 1960 were only half those of the Community, caught up\nwith and overtook the Community in spectacular fashion\n\nIt would be dangerous to draw hard and fast conclusions\nfrom such a brief survey. However, the above facts do justify\na number of general observations. In the first place, it was\nduring the 1960s, when the growth of the world economy was\nsustained and relative exchange rate discipline maintained,\nthat the clearest progress towards convergence was achieved. Secondly, convergence of real variables is a very long-term\nprocess which, while benefiting considerably from lasting\nstability in international monetary relationships, is also\n\n15\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\ndependent on the development strategies pursued by each\ncountry. For example, the different growth rates between the\nvarious areas may be attributable, among many other\nfactors, to significant long-term differences in investment\nratios as between the Community (from 20% to 23%), the\nUnited States (17% to 19%) and Japan (30% to 35%). The\nscale of these differences and, above all, their persistence over\nseveral decades provides a measure of what convergence\nimplies in terms of allocation of resources, the functional\ndistribution of incomes, and the formation and use of\nsavings. There are many ways in which the Community as such can\ncontribute to achieving gradual alignment in living stan-\ndards. One obvious way is in freedom of trade. Another more\n\nmodest but not insignificant way is in the financial area. As\n\nmay be seen from Table 2, the Community's financial\ninstruments, in the form of subsidies or loans for structural\npurposes, are beginning to become significant at macroecon-\nomic level. The aid granted amounted in 1981 to 1,1% of\nGDP in Italy, 1,4% in Greece and 4,7% in Ireland. In Ireland,\nit represented some 15% of fixed capital formation. Section 2 \u2014 The interactions between real and\nnominal developments and\nexchange rate stability\n\nThe degree of exchange rate stability depends on the\ncombined effect of the economic performances of the various\ncountries and their relative price trends, with these two\nfactors being able either to offset or to reinforce one another. Clearly, underlying economic trends such as those briefly\ndescribed above, which are based on differing levels of\nproductivity, the discovery or exhaustion of natural\nresources and lasting changes in the terms of trade, cannot\nbut be reflected sooner or later in exchange rates. This long-\nterm phenomenon may be illustrated by two significant\nexamples. The first example is provided by the devaluation of sterling in\n1967. As a result in particular of the strict monetary policy\npursued, the rise in prices in the United Kingdom had\nfollowed a trend that was very close to those of its main\npartners (see Table 3 and Graph 2). During the 17 years\npreceding the devaluation, the total cumulative differential\nin prices was less than 5%. The devaluation was due therefore\nnot so much to a lack of nominal convergence as to real\ndivergences between the United Kingdom economy and\nthose of its trading partners. With its investment ratio being\ndistinctly below those of its partners (17% of GDP between\n1958 and 1966 as against 21,5% for the Community as a\nwhole), it was not possible for the modernization and\nextension of productive capacity to keep pace. Any attempt\n\n16\n\nto reflate the economy came up against the weakness of the\nproductive apparatus and resulted in considerable external\ndeficits (1951, 1955, 1960 and 1964), obliging the authorities\n\nto adopt a restrictive stance once again (stop-go policies). It is\n\nonly recently, with the advent of North Sea oil and the efforts\nto achieve structural stabilization of the United Kingdom\neconomy, that these trends have been reversed. Table 2\n\nBreakdown of subsidies ' and loans 2 for structural\npurposes granted by the Community institutions\n\nCountry\n\nB\nDK\nD\nGR\nF\nIRL\nI\nL\nNL\nUK\n\nEC 10\n\nB\nDK\nD\nF\nIRL\nI\nL\nNL\nUK\n\nEC 9\n\nAs % of GDP\n\nAs%ofGFCF\n\nSubsi-\ndies\n\nLoans\n\nTotal\n\nSubsi-\ndies\n\nLoans\n\nTotal\n\n0,05\n0,12\n0,04\n0,90\n0,09\n2,32\n0,45\n0,14\n0,04\n0,16\n\n0,16\n\n0,05\n0,08\n0,03\n0,05\n0,50\n0,10\n0,05\n0,04\n0,06\n\n0,05\n\n0,47\n0,28\n0,02\n0,48\n0,09\n2,33\n0,60\n0,00\n0,00\n0,07\n\n0,17\n\n0,06\n0,07\n0,08\n0,12\n0,80\n0,24\n0,02\n0,06\n0,13\n\n0,13\n\n1981\n\n1974\n\n0,52\n0,40\n0,06\n1,38\n0,18\n4,65\n1,05\n0,14\n0,04\n0,23\n\n0,33\n\n0,11\n0,15\n0,10\n0,17\n1,30\n0,34\n0,07\n0,10\n0,19\n\n0,18\n\n0,25\n0,76\n0,17\n4,42\n0,42\n7,58\n2,14\n0,49\n0,21\n0,98\n\n2,42\n1,72\n0,07\n2,36\n0,44\n7,60\n2,82\n0,01\n0,00\n0,43\n\n2,67\n2,48\n0,24\n6,78\n0,86\n15,18\n4,56\n0,50\n0,2!\n1,41\n\n0,80\n\n0,84\n\n1,64\n\n0,21\n0,33\n0,12\n0,19\n2,00\n0,43\n0,20\n0,18\n0,27\n\n0,23\n\n0,26\n0,30\n0,35\n0,51\n3,22\n1,07\n0,08\n0,26\n0,65\n\n0,55\n\n0,47\n0,63\n0,47\n0,70\n5,22\n1,50\n0,28\n0,44\n0,92\n\n0,78\n\nEAGGF (Guidance Section), Social Fund and, for 1981, Regional Fund and EMS\ninterest rate subsidies. E1B, ECSC and, for 1981, Euratom and NC1. 2 \nSource: Commission departments. 1\n \n\fThe links between economic convergence and exchange rate stability\n\nTable 3\n\nGDP price deflators and effective exchange rates from 1950 to 1982, in relation to 17 major partners\n\nRelative\nprices\n(Indices)\n\n3 = 1 :2\n\n(a)\n\n1960 in relation to 1950\n\nEffective\nexchange\nrate1\n(Indices)\n\nReal exchange\nrate\n(Indices)\n\n4\n\n5 = 3 x4\n\nMovement of prices\n(in national currency)\n\nin partner\ncountries\n\n2\n\n4,0\n4,0\n3,9\n3,3\n4,3\n3,8\n3,4\n3,8\n\nCountry\n\nB\nDK\nD\nF\nIRL\nI\nNL\nUK\n\nB\nDK\nD\nF\nI R L2\nI\nNL\nU K2\n\nB\nDK\nD\nF\nIRL3\nI\nNL\nUK 3\n\nB\nDK\nD\nF\nIRL\nI\nNL\nUK\n\nin each\ncountry\n(% Pa. )\n\n1\n\n1,8\n3,6\n3,1\n6,6\n4,6\n3,4\n3,7\n4,3\n\n3,2\n6,0\n3,1\n3,9\n4,7\n4,3\n4,9\n3,7\n\n7,1\n9,5\n5,4\n8,5\n11,2\n12,2\n7,9\n10,3\n\n5,3\n9,1\n4,4\n11,6\n15,9\n17,2\n5,3\n13,4\n\n80,3\n97,0\n92,1\n137,4\n102,7\n96,2\n103,6\n104,2\n\n94,9\n120,1\n93,6\n102,7\n106,9\n106,7\n111,1\n100,5\n\n(b)\n\n1968 in relation to 1960\n\n3,9\n3,6\n4,0\n3,6\n3,6\n3,5\n3,5\n3,6\n\n7,8\n8,3\n8,3\n8,1\n8,7\n7,4\n7,5\n7,2\n\n(c)\n\n1978 in relation to 1968\n\n93,1\n111,8\n76,0\n103,7\n131,1\n154,8\n103,5\n141,0\n\n<d)\n\n1982 in relation to 1978 4\n\n8,2\n9,0\n9,0\n8,5\n10,8\n7,8\n7,7\n8,6\n\n89,7\n100,3\n84,2\n111,8\n119,7\n139,8\n91,5\n118,8\n\nExport weighting, variable from year to year until 1977. 1 \n2 UK and Ireland: 1966/60. 3 UK and Ireland: 1978/66. 1982 effective exchange rate using June 1982 central rates for EMS countries and forecasts for other countries appearing in economic budgets (May 1982). Source: Eurostat and Commission departments. 106,7\n103,8\n106,1\n73,3\n102,0\n107,2\n104,4\n102,9\n\n99,1\n95,3\n105,6\n100,1\n100,4\n100,1\n105,8\n99,6\n\n115,8\n109,9\n159,1\n83,4\n75,7\n52,5\n118,0\n54,1\n\n87,8\n81,0\n107,2\n87,1\n86,9\n76,9\n104,2\n116,0\n\n85,7\n100,6\n97,6\n100,7\n104,8\n103,1\n108,1\n107,2\n\n94,0\n114,5\n98,9\n102,7\n107,3\n106,8\n117,5\n100,0\n\n107,9\n122,9\n120,9\n86,5\n99,2\n81,3\n122,2\n76,4\n\n78,7\n81,3\n90,3\n97,4\n104,0\n107,5\n95,3\n137,8\n\n17\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nGRAPH 2: Relative price and cost movements in relation to 17 trading partners\n\n(Indices: 1970 = 100) 1\n\n(a) in national currency\n\nFR of Germany\n\n(b) in common currency\n\nFR of Germany\n\n\u2014 ^_x\u2014 ->^\n\n>\n\n\"\u2122^ ULC\n\n65 \n\n70\n\nFrance\n\n65 \n\nTO\n\nFrance\n\n\"ULC\n\nEXR\n\n50 \n\n55 \n\n60 \n\n65 \nItaly\n\n70 \n\n75 \n\n80 \n\n85\n\n50 \n\n55 \n\n60. ULC\n\n70 \n\n75 \n\n80 \n\n85\n\n65 \nItaly\n\n60 \n\n65 \n\n70 \n\n75\n\n85\n\n50 \n\n55 \n\n60 \n\n65 \n\n70 \n\n75 \n\n80 \n\n85\n\nThe Netherlands\n\nThe Netherlands\n\n70\n\n65 \n\n60 \n\n55 \n\n50 \n\n75\n\n85\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n70\n\n75\n\n= GDP deflator (total unit costs). P \nULC = Unii labour costs for the whole economy (= ratio between wages and salaries per employee and overall productivily per person employed, in indices). EXR = Effective exchange rale. = GDP deflator, in common currency. PC \n\n: Export weighting, variable from year to year. ULCC = Unit labour cosls for the whole economy in common currency. 1 \n1981-82-83: Economic budgets of 8. 6. 1982. Exchange rates: from June 1982 onwards, ceniral rates as at 14. 6. 1982. 18\n\n\fThe links between economic convergence and exchange rate stability\n\nGRAPH 2 (continued): Relative price and cost movements in relation to 17 trading partners\n\n(Indices: 1970 = 100) 1\n\n(a) in national currency \n\nBelgium\n\n(b) in common currency\n\nBelgium\n\n50 \n\n55 \n\n60 \n\n65 \n\n70 \n\n75 \n\n80 \n\n85\n\n50 \n\n55 \n\n60 \n\n65 \n\n70 \n\n75 \n\n80 \n\n85\n\nUK\n\nUK\n\nSO \n\n55 \n\n60 \n\n65 \nIreland\n\n70 \n\n75 \n\n80 \n\n85\n\n75\n\n70 \n\n65 \n\n60 \n\nIreland\n\n75\n\n80 \n70 \n65 \n60 \n\n85\n\n75 \n\n70 \n\n65 \n\n60 \n\n55 \n\n50 \n\nDenmark\n\nDenmark\n\n160\n\n140\n120\n\n100\n\n80\n\n60\n\n50\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n70\n\n75\n\n85\n\nSO\n\n55\n\n60\n\n65\n\n70\n\n75\n\n60\n\n= GDP deflator (toial unit costs). P \nULC = Unit labour costs for the whole economy (= ratio between wages and salaries per employee and overall productivity per person employed, in indices). EXR = Effective exchange rate. = GDP deflator, in common currency. PC \n\nULCC = Unit labour costs for the whole economy in common currency. 1 \n: Export weighting, variable from year (o year. 1981-82-83: Economic budgets of 8. 6. 1982. Exchange rates: from June 1982 onwards, central rates as at 14. 6. 1982. PC\nULCC\n\n19\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nGRAPH 2 (continued): Relative price and cost movements in relation to 17 trading partners\n\n(Indices: 1970 = 100)'\n\n(a) in national currency\n\nUSA\n\n(b) in common currency\n\nUSA\n\nJapan\n\nJapan\n\n= GDP deflator, in common currency. = GDP deflator (total unit costs). P \nULC = Unit labour costs for the whole economy (= ratio between wages and salaries per employee and overall productivity per person employed, in indices). EXR = Effective exchange rate. PC \nULCC = Unit labour costs for the whole economy in common currency. 1 \n: Export weighting, variable from year to year. 1981-82-83: Economic budgets of 8. 6. 1982. Exchange rales: from June 1982 onwards, central rates as at 14. 6. 1982. Japan provided a different illustration of the long-term effect\nof basic economic variables on exchange rates. The rapid\nestablishment of an industry characterized by high produc-\ntivity and high profitability allowed the Japanese economy,\nwhere the growth rate of real GDP rose from the already high\nlevel of 7,2%ayear in the early 1950s(1952 to 1955) to 12,9%\ntowards the end of the 1960s (1966 to 1969), to cover most oif\nthe gap in living standards which separated it from the\nUnited States and the Community. Throughout this period,\nthe effective exchange rate of the yen remained remarkably\nstable (see Graph 2). The high level of growth did not lead to\nan external deficit: the productivity gains allowed the\nnecessary resources to be made available for the development\nof exports and prevented a rate of inflation higher than those\n\nof its trading partners (a difference of 1,6% a year during the\nperiod on average) from harming its competitiveness. A\nsimilar, though less dramatic, development occurred in the\nNetherlands in the process of the country's rapid indus-\ntrialization and of the exploitation of natural gas and the rise\nin its price. Differences in relative economic performance may thus fully\njustify changes in exchange rates. Deferring them too long\nresults in costly distortions in the allocation of resources. This was no doubt the case in the example of the United\nKingdom cited above, where the overvaluation of sterling, in\nconnection with its initial status as a reserve currency under\nthe Bretton Woods system, considerably reduced growth\n\n20\n\n\fThe links between economic convergence and exchange rate stability\n\npotential. Conversely, such differences in economic perform-\nance may allow price divergences to continue without having\nan impact on current accounts and exchange rates. It should\nbe emphasized, however, that the exchange rate shifts and\nthe inflation differentials implied by the movements in the\nreal economy are by their nature of limited size. As stated\npreviously, the long-term growth path of an economy is\ndetermined by long-run policy options and by fundamental\nfactors. Changes in the long-term growth path can only be\ngradual, barring severe economic or political shocks. Moreover, at least during a transitional period and within\ncertain limits, compensatory capital flows may facilitate the\nnecessary restructuring and reduce pressure on exchange\nrates (see Chapter 2, Section 4 below). In the search for\nstable exchange rates, the main effort in the short and the\nmedium term must therefore be concentrated on the\nconvergence of prices; the fact of the matter is that, at\npresent, divergences of costs and prices within the EMS are\nwell in excess of what might be expected from the real\nphenomena described above. Section 3 \u2014 The need for, and implications of,\nexchange rate stability\n\nThe development of international trade, and in particular of\n\nintra-Community trade, has been based to a large extent on\nexchange rate stability. It is difficult to imagine how frontiers\ncould have been opened up and common policies established\nat European level if there had not been a substantial degree of\ncertainty about economic variables as important as the\nrelative prices of currencies. This achievement must be\nsafeguarded and reinforced. The adoption of protectionist\npolicies and the fragmentation of capital markets would turn\nthe present stagnation into a deep depression aggravated by\n\nan international financial crisis. Growing commercial and\n\nfinancial interdependence is an enormous asset, but it implies\nresponsibilities, which are themselves growing, towards\nother countries, especially in the area of exchange rates. The need for stable exchange rates derives not only from the\nrequirements of economic integration. Recent experience\nshows that attempts to shake off the policy constraints\nimposed on economic policies by the need to maintain\ncurrency parities may rapidly prove fruitless, and indeed\nharmful. The switch to a system of floating exchange rates\ngave national authorities greater freedom in the conduct of\neconomic and monetary policy. This room for manoeuvre\nwas used in very different ways by Member States,\nparticularly when they faced major problems of domestic\nadjustment and of restoring external balances following the\nfirst oil price shock. A look at Graph 2 shows the extent of\nthe resultant divergences in terms of relative prices and\nexchange rates. Some countries, such as Italy and the United\nKingdom, thought they could tolerate greater monetary\n\nand of increasing their cost by delaying them. The cost and\n\nexpansion and price increases than their partners, in the hope\nthat they could thus underpin their growth and prevent a fait\nin employment. In the Federal Republic of Germany and, to\n\na lesser extent, in the other countries making up the 'snake', it\n\nwas thought preferable to contain monetary expansion and\ninflationary pressures, in the belief that more moderate price\ntrends provided a better basis for investment, growth and\nemployment. France for its part adopted a middle course. The result of these differing options was that nominal\ndivergences steadily increased and fed on themselves; a\ncumulative process involving exchange rates, prices and costs\nbecame established and contributed nothing to the solution\nof the underlying problems. At least, the establishment of\n'virtuous circles' of revaluation and price stabilization had\n\nthe advantage of bringing such problems out into the open;\n\nconversely, countries that allowed themselves to get caught\nin a spiral of devaluation and revaluation were in danger of\nmasking the scale and urgency of the adjustments required\n\nprice divergences resulting from these differing economic\n\nand monetary options have proved extremely difficult to\n\nreduce, and their effect is still felt today within the EMS. The fact that such wide divergences have developed since the\nabandonment of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system\nand the move to floating exchange rates raises the question as\nto which system served better to promote the convergence of\neconomic policy, while avoiding excessive rigidity. In\nexamining this question, practical arrangements governing\nthe application of such systems are more important than the\nprinciples which led to their introduction. Clearly, exchange\nrate fluctuations since 1973 have been erratic and on a larger\nscale than the advocates of floating exchange rates had\nanticipated. The introduction of that system did not in itself\nmean the abandonment of the disciplines that were necessary\nfor stability. Experience has shown, however, that people\nseriously underestimated the danger that certain trends\nwhich corrected in many cases a back-log of delayed and\nnecessary adjustment would be magnified. The exchange rate system established at Bretton Woods was\naccompanied by fairly remarkable stability and convergence\nof prices (see Table 2 and Graph 2). Divergences in relative\nprices between 1950 and 1968 above or below an average\nCommunity inflation rate of less than 4% were rarely in\nexcess of an annual rate of 2%, the average divergence being\nclose to 1%. Nevertheless, the accumulation of such small\ndivergences led, because of the relative rigidity of nominal\nexchange rates, to the undervaluation or overvaluation of\ncurrencies over long periods. The persistence of such\nsituations produces disequilibria: the export industries in\ncountries with undervalued currencies develop too fast while\ncountries with overvalued currencies, failing adjustment\nthrough a fall in relation to prices, are forced to restrict their\ngrowth so as to prevent their external deficits from growing. 21\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\novercome must not be underestimated. The nature and scale\n\nof the problems to be solved will be examined in greater detail\n\nin Chapter II. It is, however, possible at this point to outline\nin broad terms the measures to be pursued. The defence of stable exchange rates rests primarily with\nnational monetary policies and their close coordination. To\n\nput an extreme case, monetary policy may successfully be\n\nused to defend the parity of a currency even where an\nunfavourable inflation differential has built up vis-a-vis\ntrading partners. In such circumstances, the pressures on the\nexchange rate will require an ever more restrictive stance of\nmonetary policy. Such a tightening is beneficial, and indeed\nessential, in thwarting inflationary expectations and reveal-\ning the need for domestic adjustment. However, just as a\nrelaxation of monetary discipline cannot in itself generate a\nlasting resumption of growth, so a tightening of monetary\npolicy, unaccompanied by budgetary rigour and moderation\nin the growth of nominal incomes, will not be sufficient to\nestablish a secure process of disinflation, save through a\nrenewed depression in economic activity. These general\nconsiderations explain why the pursuit of convergence is\noften seen as incompatible with the requirements of growth\nand employment. In point of fact, it is not so much in the\nstance to be adopted by policy as in the formation of the mix\nof the various measures that the risks of incompatibility arise\n\nat present. The floating of currencies should have allowed gradual\ncorrection of such situations. The differing options chosen\nfor economic and monetary policy, though not an inevitable\nby-product of floating currencies, contributed greatly to the\nphenomenon of overadjustment. However, the risk of\nexchange rate instability would have been there even if there\nhad been greater convergence. In the absence of fixed\nmargins of fluctuation, the markets were led to adopt a very\nshort-term view of economic performance and to overreact\nto the signals given by the direction of economic and\nmonetary policies. Graph 2 show that in many cases,\nparticularly in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom,\nexchange rate fluctuation went well beyond the point\njustified by inflation differentials\u2014great as these were\u2014and\nby the correction of unsatisfactory initial positions. The\ndisadvantages of excessive exchange rate rigidity were\nreplaced by the undoubtedly graver disadvantages of\ndisorderly movements around highly divergent medium-\nterm trends. Despite recent experience, and whatever the exchange rate\nsystem operated, it is entirely feasible that nominal variables\nshould converge towards greater price stability. The success\nof a number of countries within and outside the Community\nin the fight against inflation proves this, as does the\nsatisfactory convergence of prices and costs during the 1950s\nand 1960s. However, the extent of the difficulties to be\n\n22\n\n\fThe convergence of economic and monetary policies under the EMS: the progress to be achieved\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nThe convergence of economic and monetary\n\npolicies under the EMS: the progress to be\nachieved\n\nThe setting up of the EMS was a defensive reaction designed\nto ward off the dangers of disintegration posed in the late\n1970s by monetary disorder and growing uncertainty in the\ninternational economic environment. It was a positive\nreaction, since it did not mean a return to isolation, but a\ndifficult effort to establish jointly a zone of stability. It was a\nrealistic reaction, because past experience prompted a certain\ndegree of modesty in its declared ambitions. ' The first task\nwas to redefine intervention rules and credit mechanisms,\nadapting them or broadening them as the case might be, so as\nto achieve greater symmetry between the obligations of the\n'strong' currencies and those of the 'weak' currencies. There\nwas above all a need to reaffirm in practice the principle\nalready laid down in the Treaty whereby policies with regard\n\nto rates of exchange must be treated as a matter of common\n\nconcern (Article 107) and to draw from this principle the\nfullest conclusions for the convergence of economic policies. By rejecting fixed parities and deciding to make changes in\ncentral rates a matter of mutual agreement rather than the\nautomatic application of pre-established economic criteria, a\npragmatic approach was adopted based on the coordination\nof national policies and aimed at endowing the system with\nsufficient flexibility. Such an approach was necessary,\nbecause trends as divergent as those which had recently\ndeveloped could not be changed immediately, while the\nBretton Woods system had shown the disadvantages of\nexcessive exchange rate rigidity. Price rises in 1981 and those anticipated for 1982 (see\nTable 4(a) and (b) indicate only a modest change in the\ninflation rate for the Community as a whole. In 1982, the\nCommunity consumer price deflator will have risen again by\n10%, whereas the increase will have slowed down distinctly in\nthe United States (6,4% as against 8,3% the previous year)\nand will have stayed at a low level in Japan (4,3%). The\npersistence of these differentials may be expected to affect the\ncompetitiveness of European products on export markets\nand to mean that the European currencies will show a\ncontinued tendency to weaken, thus limiting the scope for a\nfall in interest rates, even if they were to fall in the United\nStates. This mediocre performance for the Community as a whole is\nthe result of the very uneven performance achieved in this\narea in the various Member States. Price differentials within\n\nthe Community are today wider than those recorded on\naverage during the period 1974-78 following the first oil price\nshock. In 1981, taking only the Member States effectively\n\nparticipating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism, there\n\nwas a difference of close to 15 percentage points between the\n\nmost stable country, Germany, and the country in which\ninflation was highest, Ireland. The inflation rate in France is\n\ntwice, and in Italy three times, the rate in Germany. The\n\nforecasts for 1982 indicate that the Member States with a low\nlevel of inflation, such as Germany and the Netherlands, will\nimprove their performances. In the other Member States,\nprogress will be uneven. In Italy and Ireland, though there\nwill be an appreciable improvement, the rise in prices will still\n\nbe in excess of 15%. In the United Kingdom, the inflation\n\nrate will fall below 10%. There will be no major deceleration\nin France and Denmark, and Belgium will feel the effect of\nthe devaluation of the Belgian franc which occurred early in\nthe year. Section 1 \u2014 Insufficient convergence towards\n\nstability\n\nRecent assessments of the operation of the EMS from its\n\nintroduction on 13 March 1979 up to the end of 19812\n\nhighlight the fact that the greater exchange rate stability and\nimproved monetary management attributable to it have not\nresulted in increased convergence in the area of costs and\nprices. The available forecasts for 1982 confirm-the\npersistence of a high average inflation rate for the\nCommunity and marked divergences between Member\nStates. 1 On the setting up of the EMS, see European Economy No 3, July 1979. ,\n2 \nSee Chapter 5 of the Annual Economic Review 1981-82, European\nEconomy No 10. November 1981, and Part Two below entitled \"The\ndevelopment of the EMS in its present institutional framework'. Beyond a certain threshold such divergences in inflation rates\nwill inevitably have an impact on the nominal exchange rates\n\nof the EMS currencies. During the three and a half years of\n\nits operation, the EMS has seen six concerted realignment\noperations, the main features of which are set out in\nTable 5(a). Taking the last two realignments (of February\n\nand June this year) into account, the variations in effective\n\nexchange rates between the participating currencies have\nbeen close on average to those which occurred between 1973\nand 1979 (see Table 5(b). At first sight, this might prompt\ndoubts as to the capacity of the system to establish greater\nexchange rate stability. The recent trend towards more\nfrequent and more extensive realignments provided serious\ncause for concern (see Chapter III below). However, taking\n\nthe period of operation as a whole, the results achieved may\nbe seen to be positive. First, there has been a reduction in the very short-term\nvariability of exchange rates between currencies participat-\n\n23\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nTable 4\n\nPrice changes within the Community: annual rates of\n\nchange (%)\n\n1968\n1960\n\n1974\n1968\n\n1978\n1974\n\n1979\n1978\n\n1980\n1979\n\n1981\n1980\n\n1982,\n1981\n\n(a) Consumer prices\n7,6\n3,9\n7,9\n10,7\n9,6\n9,9\n5,9\n4,0\n4,5\n24,4\n17,7\n12,6\n10,9\n9,8\n12,5\n13,4\n20,5\n15,1\n15,0\n19,0\n16,7\n4,3\n7,4\n6,7\n14,3\n15,6\n10,7\n\n6,5\n11,5\n5,3\n23,7\n13,2\n18,3\n20,4\n6,6\n15,5\n\n10,2\n10,1\n4,7\n24,0\n13,3\n18,5\n15,0\n5,8\n9,5\n\n,9\n5\n,6\n8\n,4\n5\n,3\n8\n7\n,2\n10\n,3\n,7\n8\n7\n,8\n,7\n8\n\n7\n\n,3\n\n10,4\n\n9,7\n\n12,1\n\n11,0\n\n10,0\n\n3,2\n5,3\n2,9\n2,3\n3,9\n3,8\n3,8\n3,9\n3,5\n\n3,5\n\n0,4\n\n1\n\n,2\n\n4,1\n\n4,3\n\n4,9\n\n3,7\n\n3,6\n\nB\nDK\nD\nGR\nF\nIRL\nI\nNL\nUK\n\nEC : mean 2\nEC : weighted disper-\nsion 3\n\nB\nDK\nD\nGR\nF\nIRL\nI\nNL\nUK\nEC: mean2\nEC : weighted disper-\nsion 3\n\n3,2\n5,7\n3,0\n3,0\n4,0\n4,5\n4,3\n(4,9)\n3,7\n\n3,8\n\n0,5\n\n(b) GDP deflator\n\n6\n,8\n,2\n9\n,1\n6\n9\n,0\n7\n,2\n10\n,6\n9\n,0\n,9\n7\n8\n,7\n\n7\n\n,6\n\n7,6\n10,2\n4,3\n13,4\n10,5\n16,2\n17,1\n7,9\n16,5\n\n10,8\n\n4,3\n7,7\n3,9\n18,7\n10,6\n12,4\n15,7\n4,2\n15,1\n\n4,4\n8,4\n4,7\n18,4\n11,5\n14,1\n20,4\n5,3\n18,9\n\n5,0\n9,6\n4,3\n20,2\n11,8\n18,1\n17,6\n6,0\n11,8\n\n8,2\n10,6\n4,4\n23,2\n12,7\n18,6\n15,8\n6,2\n8,5\n\n9,9\n\n11,8\n\n10,2\n\n9,6\n\n1\n\n,1\n\n4,3\n\n4,5\n\n5,6\n\n4,1\n\n3,9\n\nForecasts: economic budgets, May\n2 Weighted by GDP valued at 1975 purchasing power parities. 3 Weighted averages of absolute differences from the mean (see Note 2). Source; Eurostal and Commission departments. 1982. have experienced more rapid inflation than the other\ncountries, has been constrained within narrower limits\nduring the period of operation of the EMS than the previous\nperiod. The adjustments in central rates have only partly\ncompensated for the movement in relative costs and prices. This has resulted in a gradual real appreciation of these\ncurrencies, particularly the Irish pound (see Table 7). The\nestablishment of the EMS has thus put an end to the\nphenomena of overadjustment previously observed and has\nmade for a return to more normal conditions and a less\ntolerant approach to inflation. This same concern to correct\ninitial situations which were not sustainable in the long run\njustified the downward adjustments in the central rates for\nthe Danish krone and the Belgian franc. On the other hand,\nthe relative positions of Germany and the Netherlands\naltered little between 1978 and 1982, protecting these\ncountries against imported inflation and preserving a\nnecessary pole of stability within the system as a whole. Table 5\n\nChanges in exchange rates within the EMS\n\n(a) Realignments in central rates,\n\npercentage change against the group of currencies\nwhose bilateral parities were not changed\n\nDates of realignments\n\n30 \nSeptember November \n\n24 \n\n22 \n\n22 \nMarch October February \n\n5 \n\n14\nJune\n\n1979 1979 1981 1981 1982 1982\n\nBFR/LFR\nDKR\nDM\nFF\nIRL\nLIT\nHFL\n\u2014 +5,5\n\u2014 \n\n-2,9 -4,8 \u2014 \u2014\n+ 2 \n__ \n\n\u2014 +5,5\n_ -3\n__ \n\n\u2014 \n__ \n\n\u2014\u2014 \n\n\u2014\u2014 \n\n\u2014\u2014 \n\n\u2014\u2014\n\n\u2014 \u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n- 6 -3\n\n(b) Variations in effective exchange rates 1\nrelative to EMS partners,\nannual percentages\n\n-8,5 \u2014\n-3 \u2014\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n+4,25\n-5,75\n\u2014\n- 2,75\n+4,25\n\ning in the system, including the Italian lira, which enjoys a\nwider margin of fluctuation about its central rate (see\nTable 6). By contrast, the exchange rates of the non-\nparticipating currencies have remained highly volatile and\nand this short-term instability has been part of very large\nlong-term fluctuations: since the middle of 1980, the yen has\nappreciated by some 50% against the ECU, following a\nsimilar fall during 1979 and early 1980; in June 1982,1 ECU\nwas worth less than USD 1 as against USD 1,45 in July 1980,\nequivalent to a depreciation of the order of 50% in the ECU\nagainst the dollar. 1979\n1973\n\n+ 1,3\n\n-1,1\n+ 4,6\n-3,0\n-6,1\n-9,4\n+ 1,7\n-4,9\n\n1 982 2\n1979\n\n-3,1\n-3,9\n+ 4,7\n-2,2\n+ 0,2\n-4,8\n+ 2,6\n+ 6,5\n\n1980\n1979\n-0,1\n-6,8\n+ 1,2\n+ 1,0\n+ 0,1\n-3,5\n+ 0,7\n+ 9,9\n\n1981\n1980\n\n1982 2\n1981\n\n-0,4\n+ 0,1\n+ 3,0\n-1,1\n-0,5\n-5,0\n+ 0,7\n+ 9,9\n\n- 9,1\n- 4,7\n+ 10,0\n-\u20226,4\n+ 0,9\n-5,9\n+ 6,5\n-0,0\n\nB\nDK\nD\nF\nIRL\nI\nNL\nUK 3\n\n1 \n\nExport weightinj\n\n;, variable from year to year until\n\n1977. Secondly, Table 5(b) shows that the fall in effective exchange\nrates in countries such as France, Italy and Ireland, which\n\n24\n\n1982 is taken into account. In relation to Community countries. 3 \nSource: Eurostat and Commission departments. 1\n \n\fThe convergence of economic and monetary policies under the EMS: the progress to be achieved\n\nBFR/LFR\nDKR\nDM\nFF\nIRL\nLIT\nHFL\n\nEMS average\n\nUKL\nUSD\nYen\n\nTable 6\n\nMonthly variability of major currencies against the\nECU'\n\nIt may be concluded that despite the instability of the\ninternational monetary environment, the disruptions caused\nby the second oil price shock and persistent divergences in\nnominal variables, the EMS has succeeded in reestablishing a\nmore orderly structure of exchange rates between particip-\nants and in reducing volatility. This achievement, the fruit of\n\nan initial phase during which order was restored, will be\n\nseriously compromised if greater convergence in economic\npolicies is not established. Greater exchange rate stability\nrequires more moderate and more closely aligned growth of\nnominal variables, and this achievement cannot without\ndamage be put off any longer. Failing this, the EMS would\ngradually change in nature to become something similar to a\ncrawling peg system of parities. 1976 \n\n1977\n\n1978\n\n1979 \n\n1980\n\n1981\n\n38,5\n33,8\n42,7\n30,1\n63,5\n55,5\n39,0\n\n6,2\n32,4\n11,6\n9,6\n11,3\n2 1 , 1. 5,7\n\n11,4\n7,7\n11,7\n18,0\n23,8\n24,8\n11,3\n\n8,4\n32,7\n8,6\n7,4\n7,7\n9,8\n9,0\n\n9,0\n4,5\n9,6\n6,1\n9,2\n17,9\n4,4\n\n8,3\n8,4\n19,7\n13,8\n6,3\n21,8\n21,0\n\n43,3 13,9 15,5 11,9 8,7 14,2\n\n11,3 23,8 32,2 44,7 40,3\n\n63,2 \n20,1 24,9 49,1 28,1 34,4 62,3\n34,1 39,2 70,8 87,5 82,2 25,9\n\nThe measures to be taken towards this end are in no way\ninconsistent with the efforts which, irrespective of the EMS,\nmust be made in all the Member States to promote\nemployment and growth. Appropriately applied, they are on\nthe contrary likely to reinforce them. 1 \n\nCoefficient of variation (standard deviation of end-of-month rates foreach currency in\nECU, divided by the annual average of such rates). Results multiplied by 1 000. 2 Unweighted average. Source: Commission departments. Table 7\n\nAdjustment of relative changes ' in costs and prices in relation to EMS partners\n\n{a) Relative change in unit labour costs 2\n\u2014 whole economy; indices\nin common currency\n\nRelative level\n\u2022in 1978\n(<= available margins\nrelative to\ndifferent base\nperiods = 100)\n\nRelative level\nin 19823\n(= margins still\navailable relative\n\nto different base\nperiods = 100)\n\n(b) Relative change in GDP price:\nindices in common currency\n\nRelative level\nin 1978\n\n;ins\n\n(= available marf\nrel alive to\ndifferent base\nperiods = 100)\n\nRelative level\nin 1982 3\n\n( = margins still\navailable relative\nlo different base\nperiods = 100)\n\n1978 \n1970 061-70 \n\n1978\n\n1978\n(\nZ 68-72\n\n1982\n1970\n\n1982\n061-70\n\n1982\n0 68-72\n\n1978\n1970\n\n1978\n0 61-70\n\n1978\n0 68-72\n\n1982\n1970\n\n1982\n0 61-70\n\n1982\n0 68-72\n\n117,8 \n111,4\n102,7 104,8\n99,1 106,4\n92,6 81,1\n77,9 74,8\n82,7 81,4\n112,9 121,7\n76,3 69,8\n\n115,1\n102,7\n103,0\n89,3\n82,2\n82,7\n111,5\n77,7\n\n99,0\n90,3\n94,6\n103,0\n103,0\n95,7\n112,6\n112,2\n\n93,9\n92,1\n102,0\n90,2\n99,0\n94,2\n121,3\n102,6\n\n96,9\n90,3\n98,8\n99,3\n106,2\n95,8\n111,2\n114,2\n\n105,6\n110,2\n104,0\n92,9\n82,6\n77,6\n119,1\n80,1\n\n102,5\n112,5\n111,2\n83,3\n80,1\n76,5\n123,2\n73,4\n\n105,7\n110,3\n107,2\n89,9\n83,4\n78,0\n116,3\n80,6\n\n87,8\n100,7\n101,9\n98,6\n110,4\n90,9\n121,2\n117,8\n\n85,2\n102,9\n109,0\n88,4\n107,0\n89,6\n125,2\n107,9\n\n87,9\n100,8\n105,0\n95,4\n111,5\n91,4\n118,3\n118,5\n\nCountry \n\nB\nDK\nD\nF\nIRL\nI\nNL\nU K4\n\nExport weighting, variable from year to year until 1977,\nIndex of compensation of employees per employee divided by the index of productivity per person employed. Forecasts: economic budgets. May 1982. The realignments of 14 June 1982 are taken into account. 1 \n2 \n4 Change relative to Community countries. Sources: Euros la t and Commission departments. 25\n\n3\n\n \n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nSection 2 \u2014 Stronger action and a wider range\n\nof measures to control inflation\n\nAs earlier reviews show,' the EMS has provided a major\nincentive to improved coordination of monetary policies. First, domestic monetary conditions have been adjusted on\nseveral occasions, in an orderly and carefully judged way, to\nenable the margins to be respected. In this day-to-day\nmanagement, interest rates were often changed to avoid\nbreaches of fluctuation margins or a need for substantial\nintervention. Moreover, in spite of occasional strains, the\nextreme volatility of US interest rates has not been reflected\nin the nominal interest rates for EMS currencies, which have\nbeen approximately parallel even though at different levels\nbecause of differences in rates of inflation. Secondly, in the\nlonger-term perspective adopted in this study, policies to\nregulate monetary aggregates have been more closely\nconvergent than in the past. Between 1979 and 1981, most of the Member States reacted\nto the inflationary strains resulting from, the further rise in\nthe price of oil products by considerably reducing the rate of\nexpansion of the money supply. During those three years, the\ngrowth of the broadly-defined money supply (M2-M3) was\nmuch slower in most of the Member States than it had been\n\nfrom 1974 to 1978, and about the same as it was in the 1960s\n\n(see Table 8). The slowdown was particularly marked in\nBelgium, Germany and the Netherlands. It was less marked\n\nin the other Member States, especially in Ireland and Italy,\n\nwhere the money supply continued to expand by over 15% a\nyear. In present conditions, monetary policy has very little room\nfor manoeuvre. Germany, the Netherlands and the United\nKingdom have already taken advantage of the scope for a\ngradual reduction in interest rates opened up by lower\ninflation and improved external balance. In the other\nmember countries, however, although the slower rate of\nmonetary expansion was reflected in stable or declining\nliquidity ratios, the regulation of monetary aggregates has on\nbalance been fairly accommodating towards inflation, to\njudge by the trend of the money supply per unit of output (see\nTable 8), which has continued to expand at the same rate as\n\npreviously or only slightly less. In these countries, any easing\n\nof quantitative monetary policy could only lead to further\ninflationary surges. On the other hand, a marked decline in\nthe rate of monetary growth would lead to a significant\ndecline in the rate of inflation only at the cost of a further,\ndamaging fall in economic activity. Monetary policy cannot bear the burden of the fight against\ninflation alone. If the constraints on monetary policy are to\n\nand in Ireland, and to a lesser extent in Italy, the financial\n\nSee note 2 on page 23. 1 \n\n26\n\nbe loosened and a fall of interest rates is to get under way,\nthen support must come from other types of action. Convergence must be sought in two other areas of economic\npolicy, where progress has been more modest and results very\nvaried: the control of budget deficits and the moderation of\nwage costs. In 1981 and 1982, the general government borrowing\nrequirement for the Community as a whole reached 5% of\nGDP, a figure previously recorded only in 1975, after the first\noil shock. None of the Member States can boast a general\ngovernment surplus, but the deficits vary from less than 2%\nof GDP in the United Kingdom to over 14% in Ireland. These large budget deficits make it much more difficult to\ncontrol monetary expansion, since rising interest rates or\nstricter credit controls have adverse effects on private\ninvestment expenditure and real growth. The longer these\ndeficits last, the less likely it is that the public will believe that\na stabilizing monetary policy will be persisted in. Quite apart\nfrom the bad effect of the budget deficit on the current\naccount of the balance of payments, these expectations\naggravate the downward pressure on the exchange rate and\npush interest rates still higher. The increase in the cost of\nservicing the debt then further swells budgetary expenditure. Table 9 shows, for the various Member States, the ratio of\nthe absolute value of the general government borrowing\nrequirement to that of the annual change in the money\nsupply. These ratios are not directly comparable from one\ncountry to another, since they depend also on the structural\nliquidity ratio of each economy. However, the changes of the\nratio in any given country can serve as an indicator of the\nrestrictiveness of monetary policy in relation to changes in\nfiscal balance. It is a more significant indicator than a\nbreakdown of the means of financing the budgetary deficit\ninto categories of lenders (banking sector, non-banking\n\nsector and external sector); it allows for compensatory\n\nmovements between the various counterparts of the money\nsupply and the banks' opportunities for developing non-\nmonetary commitments. From 1979-80, the general government borrowing require-\nment increased in relation to the extra monetary financing\n\nput at the disposal of the economy each year in all the\n\nMember States except the United Kingdom. The increase\nwas particularly large in Belgium, where a marked expansion\nof the public deficit coincided with a substantial slowdown in\nthe rate of increase of monetary financing. The phenomenon\nwas less noticeable in Germany and the Netherlands, where\nthe general government borrowing requirement has re-\nmained fairly stable as a percentage of GDP. In Denmark\n\npressure resulting from fast-growing or very large budget\ndeficits was partly offset because the rate of monetary\nexpansion slowed down less. In France, the rate of monetary\n\n\fThe convergence of economic and monetary policies under the EMS: the progress to be achieved\n\nTable 8\n\nMonetary aggregates: annual percentage changes\n\n1968\nI960\n\n1974\n1968\n\n1978 1979\n1974 1978\n\n1980\n1979\n\n!981\n1980\n\njgSja\n1981\n\n1968\n1960\n\n1974\n1963\n\n1978 1979\n1974 1978\n\nBelgium\n\nDenmark\n\n1980 \n1979 1980\n\n1981\n\n1982;\n1981\n\n7,9\n\n1. Money supply '\n2. Liquidity ratio\n3. Money supply per unit\n\nof output\n\n8,3\n0,4\n\n3,6\n\n12,7 \n11,8\n2,2\n2,9 \n-0,6\n\n4,3\n-2,5\n\n1,0\n\n6,1\n\n10,7 \n\n5,4\n\n1,8\n\nFR of Germany\n\n5,4\n1,6\n\n6,6\n\n6,5\n2,1\n\n6,5\n\n7,4\n-1,2\n\n6,9\n\n5,6\n0,2\n\n4,6\n\n10,5\n0,2 \n-0,5\n\n13,6 \n0,8 -1,6\n\n9,8\n-2,6\n\n9,3\n\n5,2\n\n6,3\n\n8,6 12,0\n11,1 \n\n6,1\n\n8,4 11,8\n\n12,0\n-1,6\n\n8,8\n\n13,7\n3,8\n\n7,9\n\nFrance\n14,9 13,5\n1,0 -0,4\n\n- 1,0 0,5\n\n11,8 12,6\n\n14,1\n-0,8\n\n14,1\n0,9\n\n8,1\n\n11,6 10,1\n\n10,4 12,4\n\n11,8\n\nItaly\n\n21,5\nLI\n\n17,5\ni i\n\u2014 j, i\n\n13,6\n3,0\n\n16,2\n2,0\n\n22,4 22,8\n2,8 \n\n1,2\n\n19,9 17,9\n-4,2 \n\n0,5\n\n15,8\n-1,8\n\n10,3\n2,7\n\n10,9\n0,1\n\n9,2 \n2,2 \n\n9,6\n1,1\n\n5,3\n-1,4\n\n5,8\n\n6,2\n\n6,7 \n\n5,0\n\n3,2\n\n9,2\n0,3\n\n15,2\n-0,4\n\nIreland\n17,7 29,2\n-3,0 12,2\n\n14,5\n-1,5\n\n4,8\n\n10,2\n\n12,8 26,1\n\n12,4\n\n19,4\n\n15,0\n\n7,4\n\n11,1\n\n20,4 17,1\n\n15,3 18,1\n\n13,7\n\n8,5\n-1,4\n\n13,7\n0,3\n\nThe Netherlands\n10,6 \n0,2 -1,1\n\n4,8\n\n8,0\n2,0\n\n3,5\n\n8,3\n\n8,1 \n\n3,0\n\n7,4\n\n6,6\n2,0\n\n8,1\n\n6,8\n0,0\n\n6,2\n\n5,4\n-1,4\n\n13,7\n2,1\n\nUnited Kingdom\n9,9 12,8\n\n-7,3 -3,4\n\n14,9 15,6\n- 2,0 4,7\n\n12,4\n2,3\n\n2,3\n\n11,0\n\n7,9 \n\n11,2\n\n16,5 17,0\n\n11,0\n\n1. Money supply '\n2. Liquidity ratio\n3. Money supply per unit\n\nof output\n\n1. Money supply '\n2. Liquidity ratio\n\n3. Money supply per unit\nof output\n\n1. Money supply '\n2. Liquidity ratio\n3. Money supply per unit\nof output\n\nAverage money supply,\nDK, F. NL: M2\n\nD, 1, IRL: M3\n\nB; M2H\nU K : U K L M3\n\n- \nCommission staff forecast,\nSource: Commission departments. expansion has followed the changes in the fiscal balance\n\nThe limits encountered in the implementation of stability-\n\nfairly closely, and only at the end of the period did signs of\n\ncrowding out rrbegin to appear on the capital markets. In the\nUnited Kingdom, in contrast to other member countries, the\ncapital market pressure coming from general government\nhas been progressively reduced, without any relaxation of\nmonetary policy, since fiscal deficits are gradually being\neliminated. This schematic analysis demonstrates that\nreducing government deficits, or at least keeping them under\ncontrol, could make monetary stabilization easier; in the\ncountries where the rate of monetary expansion is suf-\n\nficiently low and where inflation rates are beginning to\n\ndecline, such action could restore a margin for real growth;\nin the other countries, it would make it possible to slow down\nthe rate of monetary expansion without creating intolerably\nrestrictive effects. oriented monetary policies and the varying degree of success\nattained are also due to the difficulty of containing nominal\nincreases in income, particularly wages. The simultaneous\nachievement of lower inflation and rising levels of employ-\nment depends in fact on a shift in the functional distribution\nof incomes which changed markedly in the first half of the\n1970s. After increasing rapidly during this period, the real\nwage gap (the gap between changes in real wages and changes\n\nin productivity adjusted for changes in the terms of trade)\n\nafterwards narrowed only very slowly in the Community as a\nwhole (see Table 10). This general tendency covers divergent\ntrends in the different Member States. In Belgium, the fairly\nsatisfactory development of prices was not accompanied by\nan equivalent slowdown in nominal wages. In France, Italy\n\nand Ireland, the real wage gapp was wider in 1981 than in\n\n27\n\n1\n \n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nTable 9\n\nBudget deficits and changes in money supply '\n\n1973\n\n1974\n\n1975\n\n1976\n\n1977 \n\n1978\n\n1979\n\n1980\n\n1981\n\n1982 2\n\n1. 2. 3. D / A M (1 = 2:3)\nD/Y (as %)\nAM/Y {as %)\n\nD / A M (1 = 2:3)\n\n1. D/Y (as %)\n2. 3. AM/Y (as %)\n\n1. 2. 3. D / A M (1 = 2:3)\nD/Y (as %)\nAM/Y (as %)\n\nD/AM (I = 2:3)\n\n1. D/Y (as %)\n2. 3. AM/Y (as %)\n\n9,7\n\n1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. D / A M (1 = 2:3)\nD/Y {as %)\nAM/Y (as %)\n\nD/AM{1 = 2:3)\nD/Y (as %)\nAM/Y (as %)\n\n1. 2. 3. D / A M (1 = 2:3)\nD/Y (as %)\nAM/Y (as %)\n\n1. 2. 3. D/AM{1 = 2;3)\nD/Y (as %)\nAM/Y (as %)\n\n32,8\n3,0\n9,2\n\n31,0\n2,0\n6,8\n\n-115,0\n-5,9\n5,1\n\n-48,8\n-1,8\n3,7\n\n38,2\n1,4\n3,6\n\n\u20148,8\n-0,6\n7,1\n\n59,9\n7,2\n12,0\n\n-28,5\n-1,2\n4,2\n\n-14,1\n-0,9\n6,7\n\n29,1\n3,9\n13,2\n\n37,2\n7,0\n18,8\n\n-18,2\n-1,1\n6,1\n\n38,0\n3,5\n9,2\n\n41,2\n4,3\n10,6\n\n19,9\n2,0\n10,0\n\n154,6\n5,8\n3,7\n\n27,1\n2,2\n8,3\n\n60,5\n5,1\n8,6\n\n16,1\n0,8\n4,9\n\n97,6\n3,6\n3,7\n\n8,1\n0,5\n6,0\n\nBelgium\n81,2 86,7\n5,3 \n6,7 \n\n5,7\n6,8\n\n170,7\n7,0\n4,2\n\nDenmark\n\n40,3 78,7\n\n77,5\n3,1\n4,0\n\n1,7 \n4,3 \n\n2,2\n2,9\n\nFR of Germany\n\n49,2 54,5\n2,4 \n5,0 \n\n2,8\n5,1\n\n106,8\n3,0\n2,8\n\nFrance\n\n12,4 31,2\n0,8 \n6,5 \n\n1,8\n5,7\n\n12,4\n0,8\n6,6\n\nIreland\n79,8 56,2\n7,1 \n\n8,6\n\n108,0\n11,9\n11,0\n\n46,1\n9,5\n20,7\n\n105,6\n11,3\n10,7\n\n97,0\n7,7\n9,0 15,2\n7,9\n\nItaly\n\n56,1\n8,0 \n7,0\n12,5\n\n48,3\n9,0\n18,6\n\n60,2\n11,7\n19,4\n\n40,4 46,0\n\n19,7 21,2\n\n1,5\n0,1\n6,0\n\n97,3\n3,8\n3,9\n\n144,5\n2,7\n1,9\n\n223,9\n4,9\n2,2\n\nThe Netherlands\n\n116,7 160,1\n\n1,4 \n1,2 \n\n2,2\n1,4\n\nUnited Kingdom\n\n118,7 103,8\n\n3,4 \n2,9 \n\n4,3\n4,1\n\n139,3\n3,1\n2,2\n\n94,1\n3,3\n3,4\n\n34,5\n2,4\n6,8\n\n172,9\n5,0\n2,9\n\n515,9\n9,4\n1,9\n\n130,4\n5,9\n4,5\n\n118,9\n3,5\n2,9\n\n-9,9\n-0,5\n4,5\n\n124,1\n12,8\n10,3\n\n56,3\n8,4\n14,9\n\n248,7\n3,4\n1,4\n\n72,9\n2,5\n4,9\n\n297,8\n13,1\n4,5\n\n244,6\n12,4\n5,2\n\n163,8\n7,2\n4,4\n\n189,1\n4,5\n2,4\n\n36,7\n-1,9\n5,2\n\n144,9\n15,1\n10,4\n\n84,3\n11,9\n14,1\n\n288,0\n4,6\n1,6\n\n62,6\n2,4\n3,8\n\n171,2\n8,8\n5,2\n\n151,1\n3,9\n2,6\n\n47,9\n-2,9\n6,1\n\n166,5\n14,4\n8,6\n\n84,7\n11,1\n13,1\n\n261,9\n4,2\n1,6\n\n65,8\n1,9\n2,9\n\n1 D: General government borrowing requirement ( + ) or financial surplus (-). Y: GDP at current prices. A M: Change in money supply during the year (absolute value). The money supply is defined as in Table 8, Note 1. Forecasts by Commission departments (economic budgets for May-June 1982). 2 \nSource: Euros tat and Commission departments. 1975, when it was already very wide compared to the average\nlevel of the 1960s. The forecasts for 1982, however, indicate\nan improvement in these countries, especially in Ireland and,\nthanks to the recovery plan introduced after the realignment\n\nof the Belgian franc, in Belgium. In the other Member States,\nthe real wage gap should continue to improve. There is no alternative but to persevere in the attempt to\n\n28\n\n\fThe convergence of economic and monetary policies under the EMS: the progress to be achieved\n\ncontrol wage costs, and to support such restraint by\nmeasures to promote saving, if the foundations of a\n\nsustainable recovery of investment are to be laid and the rise\nin unemployment held back. Table 10\n\nCompensation of employees\n\nDK\n\n5,0\n3,5\n0,9\n-0,4\n-2,9\n-0,7\n1,7\n\n100,0\n111,1\n103,0\n101,8\n98,7\n97,6\n96,2\n\n4,1\n6,2\n3,9\n1,8\n1,3\nI. I\n-2,6\n\n100. 0\n116,6\n119,6\n120,4\n121,8\n124,3\n119,3\n\n1960-1968\n1968-1974\n1974-1978\n1979\n1980\n1981\n19823\n\n1961-1970\n1975\n1978\n1979\n1980\n1981\n19823\n\n1RL\n\nNL\n\nUK\n\n(a) Per capita compensation ': annual change as %\n\n4,7\n6,3\n2,7\n1,5\n1,2\n-0,6\n0,0\n\n100,0\n110,5\n106,9\n106,1\n107,7\n107,4\n104,9\n\n6,6\n5,7\n2,9\n2,4\n1,3\n0,7\n2,1\n\n5,1\n4,6\n4,1\n2,4\n0,9\n1,3\n0,7\n\n4,6\n5,5\n4,3\n3,9\n1,9\n-1,9\n-2,1\n(b) Real wage gap2: annual average 1961-70\n100,0\n108,2\n102,9\n108,4\n113,4\n109,7\n102,9\n\n100,0\n107,1\n108,2\n107,3\n108,6\n110,7\n110,2\n\n100,0\n117,8\n117,5\n115,6\n114,5\n117,5\n118,1\n\n6,0\n5,6\n2,3\n1,5\n-1,1\n-2,7\n-0,1\n\n100,0\n115,3\n114,0\n116,7\n116,6\n113,5\n110,0\n\n100\n\n2,7\n3,9\n0,9\n3,0\n4,1\n2,7\n-0,6\n\n100,0\n116,4\n104,8\n106,5\n109,3\n107,4\n104,5\n\nEC\n\n4,5\n5,3\n2,5\n2,1\n1,4\n0,4\n0,1\n\n100,0\n112,5\n109,1\n109,0\n107,9\n108,0\n106,2\n\n! \n2 \n\nCompensation of employees per employee divided by retail price index,\nCompensation of employees per employee divided by retail price index and aggregale productivity (real GDP per person employed) adjusted for changes in the terms of trade. Forecasts; Economic budgets, May 1982. Source: Eurosiat and Commission departments. Section 3 \u2014 Correcting structural macro-\neconomic disequilibria\n\nApart from a brief pause in 1978-79 following a moderate\nrecovery of economic activity, unemployment has been rising\nsteadily in the Community since 1973. As a percentage of the\nlabour force, the average rate of unemployment in 1982 will\nbe twice as high as that observed from 1975 to 1978 (see\nTable 11). The deterioration of the labour market began\nearlier and was more gradual in Belgium, France, Italy and\nIreland; it began later but was even more brutal in other\ncountries and it now affects all the Member States. Cyclical\nrecovery alone will not reverse so strong and persistent a\ntrend and such a recovery appears uncertain at present in\nview of the international economic and monetary environ-\n\nment. The restoration of a durable growth vigorous enough\nto reduce unemployment depends on an internal adjustment\nwhich will require great effort. To achieve this aim, all the\ninstruments of economic policy must be deployed to a single\nend. The specific measures needed in areas as varied as\nindustrial policy, employment and the improvement of\nfinancial flows must be part of a general macroeconomic\napproach designed to correct the growing structural\ndisequilibria which have gradually come to disfigure the\nEuropean economies. A comparison of the present breakdown of the uses of GDP\nwith that prevalent from 1968 to 1972, when growth,\nemployment and the current balance of payments position\nwere satisfactory in most of the Member States, shows how\n\n29\n\n3\n \n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nTable 11\n\nUnemployment and growth\n\n1960- \n1968 1974\n\n1969-\n\n1975-\n1978\n\n1979 19801981\n\n1982 '\n\n1968\n1960\n\n1974\n1968\n\n1978\n1974\n\n1979\n1978\n\n1980\n1979\n\n1981\n1980\n\n1982,\n1981\n\n6,2\n\nB\nDK\nD\nGR\nF\nIRL\nI\nL\nNL\nUK\n\nEC\n\n(a) Rate of unemployment\n\nas\n\n% of labour force 2\n9,4\n6,3\n4,7\n3,7\n\n8,7 \n\n2,7\n1,3\n1,1\n\n2,2 \n1,2 \n0,9 \n\n5,3 \n\n3,4\n\n3,4 \n(2,2) (2,8)\n6,0 \n7,4 \n7,5 \n0,7 \n4,1 \n5,3 \n\n6,4\n8,3\n8,0\n0,7\n4,8\n6,9\n\n11,5\n8,5\n4,8\n(3,1)\n7,6\n8,7\n8,8\n1,0\n7,5\n10,6\n\n0,8 \n4,4 \n5,6 \n0,1 \n0,8 \n1,8 \n\n1,6\n5,4\n4,8\n0,0\n1,8\n2,7\n\n4,1\n8,3\n5,8\n0,3\n3,9\n4,6\n\n2,13 \n\n2,43\n\n4,63\n\n5,4 \n\n6,0\n\n7,9\n\n(b) Annual growth rate\n\nof real GDP (as %)\n\n4,5\n5,0\n4,2\n7,3\n5,4\n4,2\n5,7\n2,7\n4,8\n3,0\n\n4,5\n\n5,3\n3,5\n4,3\n6,2\n5,4\n4,3\n4,5\n5,2\n5,0\n2,5\n\n4,2\n\n1,8\n2,5\n2,3\n5,5\n2,8\n4,1\n1,6\n-0,2\n2,3\n2,0\n\n2,4\n\n2,3\n3,0\n4,3\n3,8\n3,0\n2,4\n4,9\n4,1\n1,8\n1,4\n\n3,3\n\n2,5\n-0,2\n2,0\n1,7\n1,3\n1,9\n4,0\n0,7\n0,6\n-1,4\n\n-1,1\n-0,2\n0,0\n-0,7\n0,2\n1,8\n-0,2\n-2,4\n-1,4\n-1,2\n\n1,4\n\n-0,3\n\n0,5\n2,9\n1,0\n0,8\n2,2\n2,2\n1,8\n0,6\n0,5\n1,3\n\n1,5\n\n13,4\n8,9\n6,7\n(3,6)\n8,7\n10,8\n9,6\n1,3\n9,9\n11,7\n\n9,2\n\nForecasts by Commission departments: Economic budgets\nSOEC definition. Excluding Greece. 1 \n2 \n3 \nSource: Eurosiat and Commission departments. May 1982. the allocation of resources has become distorted (see\nTable 12). the deterioration of the trade balance may be regarded as\nacceptable or at least as not yet out of control. improvement in external positions is essential, to allow for\n\nThe figures show that the adjustments made after external\nshocks were insufficient to keep the current account of the\nCommunity as a whole in surplus. The expansion in the\nvolume of exports of goods and services served only partially\n\nto offset the deterioration in the terms of trade and the\n\ngrowing debt service payments caused by rising interest rates\nand the expansion of foreign borrowing. During this period, the United Kingdom and the Nether-\nlands managed to improve their balance of payments\npositions on goods and services, by developing their oil and\ngas and obtaining higher prices for them. In Denmark also\nthe balance on goods and services improved, but this was not\nreflected in an improved current balance, because of the cost\nof servicing the external debt. With the exception of these\ncountries and of Germany, where the deficit is shrinking, the\nbalance on goods and services in the Member States was in\ndeficit in 1981. In particular, foreign trade has deteriorated\nconsiderably in recent years in Belgium and Ireland. The\ndeficits of these countries reached disproportionate levels in\n1981. Belgium is the only Member State where the balance on\ngoods and services, adjusted for changes in the terms of\ntrade, has not improved since 1968-72. In France and Italy,\n\n30\n\nPresent forecasts for the current account of the balance of\npayments in 1982 (see Table 13) indicate that the Com-\nmunity as a whole will achieve a sustainable balance close to\nzero, if oil prices and the dollar exchange rate remain fairly\nsteady. However, there will still be considerable differences\nbetween the Member States. The improvement in the\nexternal balance should be maintained in Germany and the\nNetherlands, but achievements will be more modest in most\nof the other Member States. In France and Denmark, present\ncurrent deficits may well increase slightly. A more marked\n\ninterest payments and the gradual redemption of external\ndebt. To reinforce the competitiveness of the European economies\n\nwhile at the same time improving the employment situation,\nnot only must internal absorption of resources be reduced,\nbut there must be at the same time a reallocation of resources\ntowards productive uses. The share of total consumption in Community GDP has\n\nincreased considerably (almost 5 percentage points of GDP). The relative expansion of consumption expenditure was\n\n\fThe convergence of economic and monetary policies under the EMS: the progress to be achieved\n\nTable 12\n\nChanges in the structure of GDP uses and current balance of payments position (as a % of GDP)\n\n(a) Average 1968-72 \n\n(b) 1982\n\nConsumption\n\nPrivate\n\nPublic\n\nTotal\n\n61,4\n64,9\n+ 3,5\n\n56,9\n56,1\n-0,8\n\n54,8\n55,4\n+ 0,6\n\n70,1\n70,9\n+ 0,8\n\n60,7\n65,1\n+ 4,4\n\n70,7\n63,4\n-7,3\n\n63,4\n64,2\n+ 0,8\n\n56,8\n60,5\n+ 3,7\n\n62,5\n60,3\n-2,2\n\n60,8\n62,6\n+ 1,8\n\n14,1\n19,6\n\n+ 5,5\n\n20,0\n28,0\n+ 8,0\n\n16,4\n21,0\n+ 4,6\n\n12,6\n17,2\n+ 4,6\n\n13,4\n15,8\n+ 2,4\n\n14,4\n21,5\n+ 7,1\n\n15,3\n18,1\n+ 2,8\n\n16,3\n17,9\n+ 1,6\n\n17,8\n22,1\n+ 4,3\n\n14,6\n17,7\n+ 3,1\n\n75,5\n84,5\n+ 9,0\n\n76,9\n84,1\n+ 7,2\n\n71,2\n76,4\n+ 5,2\n\n82,7\n88,1\n+ 5,4\n\n74,1\n80,9\n+ 6,8\n\n85,1\n84,9\n-0,2\n\n78,7\n82,3\n+ 3,6\n\n73,1\n78,4\n+ 5,3\n\n80,3\n82,4\n+ 2,1\n\n75,4\n80,3\n+ 4,9\n\nB\n\nDK\n\nD\n\nGR\n\nF\n\nIRL\n\n1\n\nNL\n\nUK\n\nEC\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(b)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n-(a)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(a)\n(b)\n- (a)\n\n(b)\n\n(b)\n\n(b)\n\n(b)\n\n(b)\n\n(b)\n\n(b)\n\n(b)\n\n(b)\n\nGross capital\nformation\n\nBalance on goods\nand services\n\nFixed\ncapita!\n\n21,4\n19,5\n-1,9\n\n24,3\n15,6\n-8,7\n\n24,8\n22,8\n-2,0\n\n24,9\n20,8\n-4,1\n\n23,5\n21,1\n-2,4\n\n22,9\n30,1\n+ 7,2\n\n20,6\n20,3\n-0,3\n\n25,3\n19,0\n-6,3\n\n18,5\n16,2\n-2,3\n\n22,5\n20,2\n-2,3\n\nSlocks\n\nTotal\n\nExporis \n\nImports\n\nBalance\n\n1,3\n0,3\n-1,0\n0,7\n-0,3\n-1,0\n\n1,5\n-0,1\n-1,6\n\n2,5\n2,8\n+ 0,3\n\n2,1\n-0,1\n-2,2\n\n1,4\n-0,1\n-1,5\n\n0,7\n0,9\n+ 0,2\n\n1,5\n-1,3\n-2,8\n\n0,7\n-1,8\n-2,5\n\n1,4\n-0,3\n-1,7\n\n22,7\n19,8\n-2,9\n\n25,0\n15,3\n-9,7\n\n26,3\n22,7\n-3,6\n\n27,4\n23,6\n-3,8\n\n25,6\n21,0\n-4,6\n\n24,3\n30,0\n+ 5,7\n\n21,3\n21,2\n-0,1\n\n26,8\n17,7\n-9,1\n\n19,2\n14,4. -4,8\n\n23,9\n19,9\n-4,0\n\n42,3 40,6\n64,0 68,4\n\n+ 21,7 +27,8\n\n+ 1,7\n-4,4\n-6,1\n\n25,5 27,4\n36,8 36,3\n+ 11,3 +8,9\n\n-1,9\n+ 0,5\n+ 2,4\n\n21,1 \n29,5 28,7\n\n18,6\n\n+ 8,4 +10,1\n\n8,1 18,2\n14,7 26,4\n\n+ 6,6 +8,2\n\n+ 2,5\n+ 0,8\n-1,7\n\n-10,1\n-11,7\n-1,6\n\n14,8 14,4\n22,2 24,0\n+ 7,4 +9,6\n\n+ 0,4\n-1,8\n-2,2\n\n32,1 41,5\n53,2 68,1\n\n-9,4\n-14,9\n-5,5\n\n+ 21,1 +26,6\n\n16,0 16,0\n24,7 28,2\n+ 8,7 +12,2\n\n0,0\n-3,5\n\n__ 1C\n\n46,1 46,0\n58,9 54,9\n\n+ 12,8 +8,9\n\n0,1\n4,0\n+ 3,9\n\n21,7 21,3\n27,1 \n23,9\n+ 5,4 + 2,6\n\n+ 0,4\n+ 3,8\n+ 2,8\n\n21,0 20,3\n29,9 30,1\n+ 8,9 +9,8\n\n+ 0,7\n-0,2\n-0,9\n\nGDP \n\ngoods and\n\nChange in\nbalance on\n\nservices at\nconstant prices\n\n100\n100\n0\n\n100\n100\n0\n\n100\n100\n0\n\n100\n100\n0\n\n100\n100\n0\n\n100\n100\n0\n\n100\n100\n0\ntoo\n100\n0\n\n100\n100\n0\n\n100\n100\n0\n\n0,0\n\n+ 8,3\n\n+ 1,6\n\n+ 4,1\n\n+ 1,5\n\n+ 4,9\n\n+ 2,4\n\n+ 7,9\n\n+ 2,4\n\n+ 2,8\n\nSvum>: 1968-72: Euroslat,\n1981 : Economic bu\n\nexcept B, D, NL: National Accounts. dgets. Commission departments, May-June\n\n1982. For EC: extrapolation of 1980 data on the basis of rates of growlh given in economic budgets. greatest in Belgium, Denmark and France. The rate of\n\nthe rate of investment and stockbuilding, particularly in\n\nexpansion is close to the Community average in Germany,\n\nGreece and the Netherlands. The impact of this trend on the\nexternal balance was attenuated by a considerable decline in\n\nDenmark and the Netherlands, where the decline was so\n\nmarked as to result in an improvement in the balance on\ngoods and services. The degradation of the pattern of\n\n31\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nTable 13\n\nBalance of payments on current account (as % of GDP)\n\nB\nDK\nD\nGR\nF\nIRL\nI\nL\nML\nUK\n\nEC 10\n\n1959-1963\n\n1964-1968\n\n1969-1973\n\n1974-1978\n\n0,02\n\n-1,1\n\n0,9\n2,2 2\n1,1\n-2,2\n0,7\n6,P\n2,1\n0,1\n\n0,6\n\n0,4\n\n-2,0\n\n0,7\n-3,6\n0,0\n\n-1,9\n\n2,7\n6,4\n\n-0,4\n-0,6\n\n0,3\n\n2,3\n-2,2\n0,8\n-2,7\n0,0\n\n-3,6\n\n1,1\n13,9\n1,0\n0,4\n\n0,5\n\n-0,7\n-3,2\n\n1,3\n\n-3,0\n-0,8\n-3,7\n-0,6\n25,2\n1,6\n\n-1,6\n\n-0,2\n\n1979\n\n-2,9\n-4,5\n-0,6\n-2,9\n-0,1\n-10,1\n1,6\n28,1\n-1,2\n0,0\n\n-0,5\n\n1980\n\n-5,2\n-3,4\n-1,8\n-0,9\n-1,3\n-8,4\n-2,5\n22,2\n-1,4\n1,4\n\n1,3\n\n1981\n\n1982'\n\n-6,3\n'3,1\n-1,0\n-2,2\n-1,5\n-12,8\n-2,3\n20,3\n2,5\n2,9\n\n0,6\n\n-4,8\n-3,5\n0,6\n\n-2,1\n-1,9\n-10,2\n-1,6\n18,4\n4,4\n1,0\n\n-0,5\n\nForecasts: Economic budgets, May 1982. 1960-63. 2 \nSources: 1959 to 1980: Eurostat and OECD national accounts; 1981 and 1982: Economic budgets (May 1982). domestic uses of GDP was less marked in Italy, where\ninvestment declined little in relative terms,' and in the\nUnited Kingdom, where gross capital formation nevertheless\nfell further from an initial level which was already rather low. Ireland was an exception among the Member States in that\nthe marked deterioration of its external position was mainly\nassociated with rapidly expanding investment. The share of\nconsumption in GDP has remained stable, although at a\nhigher level than in the Community as a whole, and the\nsubstantial increase in public consumption has been entirely\noffset by the relative decline in private consumption. The inadequacy of investment is further aggravated by the\nfact that some proportion \u2014 difficult to quantify \u2014 of\nproductive capacity has become obsolete as a result of cost\nchanges and technical development. Since the stock of\ncapital is expanding too slowly in relation to the growth of\nthe labour force, an insufficient number of new jobs has\nappeared and cyclical unemployment has given way to\nstructural unemployment. By holding back productivity\ngains, this process reduces the competitiveness of European\nproducts both in terms of price and in terms of technological\ncontent. In the Community as a whole the decline in the rate of\n\ninvestment as a proportion of GDP is an imperfect indicator\nof the weakness of capital formation in the Community as a\nwhole. The growth of GDP, \nitself declined considerably; and part of the flow of gross\ninvestment is destined simply to renew plant and equipment. In fact, at constant prices, net investment (i. e. after deduction\n\nthe other term in the ratio, has\n\nof the consumption of fixed capital as estimated in national\naccounts) has contracted in the Community as a whole by\nalmost 3 % a year on average since 1973. Between 1960 and\n1973, it had increased at an annual average rate of 5,6 %. The rate of investment observed in Italy during the reference period 1968-\n\n72 was already considerably lower than during the period prior to 1964. Practically all the Member States face the dual requirement,\nmore pressing in some than in others, of improving the\nexternal balance while shifting domestic demand from\nconsumption to investment. At macroeconomic level, such\nadjustment requires the same type of measure as those which\n\nmust be undertaken to moderate the trend of costs and\n\nprices. Lasting export growth must be based on the control of\nrelative price changes. The reestablishment of surpluses\nwhich can be devoted to the internal financing of firms and\nthe reinforcement of profitability, which are essential\nconditions for a recovery of business investment, requires a\ngradual adjustment in the functional distribution of incomes. It is moreover unlikely that easier credit would constitute an\nefficient incentive for this purpose, since the effects of any\neasing of interest rates that was not based on a parallel\n\n32\n\n1\n \n\fThe convergence of economic and monetary policies under the EMS: the progress to be achieved\n\ndecline in inflation rates would probably be rapidly annulled\nby the reinforcement of inflationary anticipations and a\ndownward pressure on exchange rates. The stabilization of\npublic finance should contribute to slowing down the\nexpansion of public consumption, and, by attenuating\npressures on interest rates, help to avoid such crowding out\non the capital markets as may result from budget deficits. conditions. To restore the confidence of the markets, the\nborrowing country will have to accept a greater increase in\ninterest rates than could be economically justified in relation\nto the domestic economy, or call on conditional official\nfinancing. Basically the need to adjust will merely have been\nevaded and when it can be avoided no longer the adjustment\nwill be the more severe for having been so long delayed. Section 4 \u2014 A suitable mix between\n\nadjustment and external financing\n\nThe rate at which the required adjustments can be made will\ndepend mainly on the rate of growth of the European\neconomies, and will vary widely from one Member State to\nanother. In view of the limited availability of official reserves\nand the economic cost of any brutal adjustment, external\nborrowing can help as a transitional device temporarily to\nprevent a serious current payments deficit from leading to a\nspiral of devaluation and inflation, the undesirable effects of\nwhich have already been stressed. Otherwise, there is a risk\nthat protectionist measures aimed directly at reducing the\nflow of payments abroad will multiply. Apart from the fact\nthat such measures are usually effective only partially and for\n\na short period, they seriously disturb the working of the\n\nCommunity itself. External borrowing does not involve the\nsame risk of market distortion and the accumulation of\ninternal strains, at least in the short term. The Member States and the Community itself have some\nroom for manoeuvre in their borrowing. Although the\nsurpluses of the oil-producing countries are at present very\nsmall, the volume of funds available on the international\nmarkets is very large, and investors are more than ever in\nsearch of financial assets issued by borrowers with a good\ncredit rating. Finally, in a broader context, adjustment in the\nindustrialized countries must not be so rapid as to transfer\ncurrent deficits to the developing countries, which have much\nmore limited access to external financing. Nevertheless, as in\nany borrowing process, prolonged recourse to external\nfinancing brings increasing risks and costs, and a gradual loss\nof independence. Foreign borrowing cannot, therefore, be\nconsidered a permanent subsitute for policies aimed at\nadjustment. Thus, external financing of a large budget deficit makes it\n\npossible in the early stages to reconstitute the external\n\nreserves required to support exchange rates and to prevent\ncrowding out on the national financial market. If the flow of external financing is mainly channelled into\nproductive uses which fit in with the general adjustment\nprocess, it will continually add to the productive capacity\nwhich will provide the means of repayment. Even in such\ncases, the volume of debt and, particularly, its rate of increase\ncannot exceed certain limits, imposed by the need to service\nthe debt before the investments become fully productive,\nand, ultimately, to produce a current account surplus with\nwhich gradually to reduce the volume of debt. Recent changes in current deficits and their present size (see\nTable 13) give, for the various Member States,' a summary\nindication of the external borrowing requirement and the\navailable margins for manoeuvre. Apart from the United\nKingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, which have\nrestored a current surplus, the Member States require foreign\nfinancing obtained either by encouraging capital to enter the\ncountry, or by foreign borrowing in the name of public\ndepartments and undertakings. External financing should\nremain fairly small in France and Italy. In Denmark and\nGreece, although there has been no marked deterioration in\nthe current payments position over the past few years,\nrepeated deficits have resulted in a level of outstanding debt\n\nThe same is true in Belgium, where current deficits have\nincreased considerably since 1976, leading to a very rapid\nbuild-up of foreign debt and eventually to devaluation and\nthe introduction of a recovery programme. In relation to the\nsize of its economy, Ireland is the country with the largest\nforeign debt in the Community. However, recourse to\nexternal financing is closely linked in Ireland with the\nnecessary accumulation of capital. In view of the require-\nments of economic development, massive redemptions\nwould probably not be in order, and the possibility of\nsupporting the investment effort through a regular flow of\nexternal financing should be preserved. While implementing common policies and ensuring closer\ncoordination of the economic policies of the Member States,\nthe Community can make a specific contribution to\ndetermining the right mix of adjustment and financing\nthrough its borrowing and lending instruments. such as to set a severe limit to the scope for future borrowing. However, assuming that the proceeds of the borrowings are\nnot sterilized by the central bank, the effects are identical to\nthose of monetary financing of the government deficit. As\ndebt grows, and with it the cost of servicing, lenders will tend\nto withdraw from the market, or to lend only on stricter\n\nFirst of all, the Community lending instruments with a\nstructural purpose (European Investment Bank, ECSC, New\nCommunity Instrument, Euratom) enable the recipient\ncountries to obtain the necessary supplementary financing\nfor the development of priority sectors and regions on the\n\n33\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nmost advantageous market conditions without directly\ncommitting their own credit. This external financing, which\nis partly subsidized, must be accompanied by an effort to\nmobilize and channel- national savings so that they can\ngradually take over. The volume of Community loans\ngranted to some countries has, in view of its relative size,\nreached macroeconomic dimensions (see Table 3). Further\nsubstantial development of these operations should perhaps\nbe based on a global adjustment programme which the\nreceipient countries would undertake to implement in\naddition to the microeconomic criteria specific to each\nproject. Secondly, the Member States have at their disposal balance\nof payments support mechanisms either with the other\nMember States (medium-term financial aid) or with the\nCommunity (Community loan mechanism). Because of their\npurpose, these mechanisms cannot be used directly to cover\nimmediate and specific needs of the domestic economy, such\nas a budget deficit. It is nevertheless essential to use these\nmechanisms in good time, in order to ensure that adjustment\nis gradual, to maintain confidence on the capital markets and\nthus to prevent a balance of payments crisis which would be\ncostly both for the country concerned and for its trading\npartners. 34\n\n\fThe realignments of February and June 1982: the system undermined or consolidated?\n\nCHAPTER III\n\noperation of 14 June resembled that of October of last year,\nalthough the widest bilateral change, that between the mark\n\nand the French franc, was slightly larger: the mark and the\n\nThe realignments of February and June 1982:\nthe system undermined or consolidated?\n\nSince the beginning of the year, the monetary authorities of\nthe member countries have twice realigned parities between\nthe currencies participating in the EMS. These two\noperations give serious cause for concern, since the frequency\nand the size of the adjustments threaten a gradual erosion of\nthe system's credibility. The conditions surrounding these\nrealignments\u2014both the decision-taking processes and the\neconomic programmes adopted at national level\u2014make it\nquite clear, however, that the participating countries wish the\n\nEMS to function well and that there is a common\n\ncommitment to achieve a higher degree of convergence\ntowards stability. Section 1 \u2014 Operations carried out\nconsistently with the logic of the\nsystem\n\nThe last realignments were separated by an interval of only\nfour months. On 22 February 1982, the central rate of the\nBelgian and Luxembourg francs was devalued by 8,5% with\nrespect to the other participating currencies, much the largest\nEMS adjustment up to that time. The Danish krone was\nreadjusted downwards by 3% at the same time. The\n\nDutch guilder were revalued by 4,25% in relation to the\ngroup of currencies whose bilateral rates remained un-\nchanged, while the French franc was devalued by 5,75% and\nthe Italian lira by 2,75% in relation to the same group of\ncurrencies. The four earlier realignments since the EMS was\nset up in March 1979 were separated by longer intervals\u2014\ntwo of them, indeed, by a period of stability of almost\n16 months. An examination of Tables Hand 15 shows how\nthe accumulated change in bilateral central rates resulting\nfrom the latest two readjustments compares with changes\nprior to 1982. In relation to the mark, the currency which has\nappreciated most within the system since its inception, the\nlargest central rate change (12,2%) was that of the Belgian\nfranc. The French franc depreciated over the same period by\napproximately the same amount in relation to the mark as it\ndid between March 1979 and the end of 1981, a little under\n10%. The other currencies participating in the EMS,\nparticularly the Danish krone and the Italian lira, de-\npreciated much less in relation to the mark as a result of the\nlast two realignments than they had over the preceding two\nand a half years. Although changes in central rates have undoubtedly become\nlarger and more frequent, the cohesion of the system and the\ndiscipline it requires have been preserved. As before, the two\nrecent realignments were decided by mutual agreement at\nmeetings of the Ministers of Finance and the Governors of\nthe central banks, and the Community nature of these\ndecisions was less than ever a matter of pure form. Indeed,\n\nthe direction and the size of adjustments were the subject of\n\nTable 14\n\nAppreciation (+ ) or depreciation (-) of ECU central rates and bilateral central rates from 13 March 1979 to 5 October 19811\n\nBFR/LFR\nDKR\nDM\nFF\nIRL\nLIT\nHFL\n\nECU\n\nBruxelles\nin\nBFR/LFR\n\nKabenhavn\nin\nDKR\n\n\u2014\n-7,5\n+ 7,6\n-3,0\n\u2014\n-8,8\n+ 5,5\n\n+ 3,3\n\n\u2022\n\n+ 8,1\n\u2014\n+ 16,3\n+ 4,8 \n+ 8,1\n-1,4\n+ 14,0\n\n+ 11,7\n\nFrankfurt\nin\nDM\n\n-7,1\n-14,0\n\u2014\n-9,9\n-7,1\n-15,3\n-2,0\n\n-4,0\n\nParis\nin\nFF\n\n+ 3,1\n-4,6\n, +10,9\n\u2014\n+ 3,1\n-6,0\n+ 8,8\n\n+ 6,5\n\nDublin\nin\nIRL\n\n_\n-7,5\n+ 7,6\n-3,0\n\u2014\n-8,8\n+ 5,5\n\n+ 3,3\n\nRoma\nin\nLIT-\n\nAmsterdam\nin\nHFL\n\n+ 9,7\n+ 1,5\n+ 18,0\n+ 6,4\n+ 9,7\n\u2014\n+ 15,7\n\n+ 13,3\n\n-5,2\n-12,3\n+ 2,0\n-8,1\n-5,2\n-13,6\n\u2014\n\n-2,1. I \n\nThe table is to be read horizontally. For example, the central rate of the Belgian franc appreciated by 8,1% over the reference period against the Danish krone in Copenhagen and\ndepreciated 7,1% in that period against the German mark in Frankfurt. 35\n\n\fEconomic convergence and the European Monetary System\n\nTable 15\n\nAppreciation (+) or depreciation (-) of ECU central rates and bilateral central rates from 5 October 1981 to 14 June 1982\n\nItruxcllcs\nin\nBFR/LFR\n\nKobe aha vn\nin\nDKR\n\n+ 6,0\n+ 13,9\n+ 3,0\n+ 9,3\n+ 6,3\n+ 13,9\n\n+ 10,3\n\n-5,7\n\n+ 7,5\n-2,8\n+ 3,1\n+ 0,3\n+ 7,5\n\n+ 4,1\n\nFrankfurt\nin\nDM\n\n-12,2\n-7,0\n\n-9,6\n-4,1\n-6,7\n\u2014\n\n-3,2\n\nParis\nin\nFF\n\n-2,9\n+ 2,9\n+ 10,6\n\u2014\n+ 6,1\n+ 3,2\n+ 10,6\n\n+ 7,1\n\nDublin\nin\nIRL\n\n-8,5\n-3,0\n+ 4,3\n\u2014 5 7\n\u2014\n-2,8\n+ 4,3\n\n+ 1,0\n\nRoma\nin\nLIT\n\n-5,9\n-0,3\n+ 7,2\n-3,1\n+ 2,9\n\u2014\n+ 7,2\n\n+ 3,8\n\nAmsterdam\nin\nHFL\n\n-12,2\n-7,0\n\n-9,6\n-4,1\n-6,7\n\u2014\n\n\u20223,2\n\nBFR/LFR\nDKR\nDM\nFF\nIRL\nLIT\nHFL\n\nECU\n\n1 \n\nSec Note l lo Table 14. discussions which became intense and at times difficult\nbefore unanimous consensus could be reached on a balanced\nrearrangement of the parity grid. At the same time, as we\nhave already stressed (see Chapter II, Section 1), the\nadjustments have preserved the stabilizing influence of the\nin the sense that the changes in central rates were\nEMS, \nsmaller than the inflation rate differentials which had\naccumulated between the participating countries. currencies were devalued, stabilization policies are now\nbeing applied. The French Government has introduced\nmeasures intended rapidly to reduce the rate of inflation, and\n\nto encourage the recovery of investment. The measures\n\ninclude a four-month prices and incomes freeze, at the end of\nwhich the rate of inflation should have declined con-\nsiderably, the control of public finances, with a budget deficit\n\nkept down to 3% of GDP, and a return to a balanced budget\n\nSection 2 \u2014 Confirmation of the importance\n\nattached to greater convergence\n\nAt each of the last two realignments, the countries most\n\naffected agreed to implement accompanying policies which\nwould enhance the beneficial effects and neutralize the\nperverse effects of the changes in parity. In Belgium, the\nFebruary devaluation was an integral part of a recovery plan\ndesigned to resolve the1 structural problems in the economy. Apart from a temporary price freeze and specific measures in\nfavour of employment, the measures taken by the Belgian\nGovernment were mainly intended to improve profitability\nin the productive sector by combining the mechanical effects\nof devaluation with a loosening of wage indexation, while\ncontrolling developments in public finance. In this perspec-\ntive, the devaluation should be seen as an important part of\nthe measures taken and as making them easier to apply. The\nprogramme should progressively alleviate external imbal-\nance and the budget deficit, while improving the employment\nsituation. The June realignment is also indicative of a concern to\nestablish greater convergence. In the countries whose\n\n36\n\nfor the social security funds. The countries whose currencies\nwere revalued have recognized that the readjustment could\nmake it easier for them to apply policies. which would\npromote economic recovery. The Commission has for its\npart actively encouraged the process of convergence. It has\nnot confined itself simply to following through as effectively\nas possible the coordination procedures for economic\npolicies provided for in Community texts. It has tried to spell\nout what convergence should mean in practice. In the middle of 1981, the Commission was led to make its\n\nposition clear on several occasions and in varying circum-\nstances. On 22 July 1981, the Commission, as authorized by\nthe Council Decision of February 1974 on the attainment of\na high degree of convergence of the economic policies of the\nMember States, took the initiative and addressed a\nrecommendation to the Belgian Government. This recom-\nmendation stressed the need to restore external and\nbudgetary equilibrium while pursuing a rigorous monetary\npolicy and holding back the expansion of real incomes. The\nsummary given earlier of the recovery measures taken when\n\nthe Belgian franc was devalued in February 1982 shows that\n\nthe Belgian authorities have now stepped up the already\nsubstantial efforts devoted to achieving the objectives of this\nrecommendation. On 22 July 1981 the Commission also sent\n\n\fThe realignments of February and June 1982: the system undermined or consolidated?\n\nthe Council a communication on the principles of indexation\nin the Community, warning against the risk that general and\nexcessively rigid index-linking of prices and incomes would\nspread the inflationary process and block necessary adjust-\nments. The earlier decision taken in May 1981 by the Italian\nauthorities to introduce a compulsory deposit for the\npurchase of foreign currency had led the Commission to\nexamine the economic and financial situation in Italy. On\n1 July 1981, it addressed to the Government of Italy a\nrecommendation pursuant to Article 108(1) of the Treaty, in\nwhich it expressed its concern about the risk of protectionist\nchain reactions that could be provoked by such measures\n(which were in fact gradually relaxed, and finally dis-\ncontinued in February 1982). The Commission, stressing\n\nthat measures to hamper trade can only delay the correction\nof basic factors, also recommended an effort to reduce the\ngovernment deficit and restrain the growth of nominal\nincomes, in particular through a less automatic application\nof the mechanism linking pay to prices. Finally, at the time when the Council was fixing its annual\nbudget guidelines, the Commission adopted, on 1 July 1982,\na communication on budget discipline and economic\nconvergence which sought to bring the Member States into a\ndiscussion in depth of the fiscal and budgetary means to be\nadopted in order to correct developments considered to be\nextremely disquieting in a number of Member States. 37\n\n\fPART TWO\n\nThe development of the European Monetary System in its present\ninstitutional framework\n\nAs a result of circumstances\u2014cyclical and more structural in nature\u2014the EMS could not be\n\ndefinitively consolidated in the two years originally planned, the Commission therefore\n\ntook the initiative in proposing a non-institutional development of the system, after\n\nevaluating the results achieved from 1979 to 1981 (see Chapter IV). The areas in which progress can be envisaged are set out in Chapter V while Chapter VI\n\npresents and comments on the proposed resolution presented to the Council by the\nCommission on the transition from the system's initial stage to its second phase. 39\n\n\fThe development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nSection 1 \u2014 Elements for assessment\n\nThe report which follows, adopted in February 1982 and\n\n7 and 10% against the other currencies apart from the guilder\n\nEvaluation of the functioning of the EMS at\n\n31 December 1981\n\nAt the start of 1982, Commission departments, at the request\n\nof the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs) held on\n\n14 December 1981, prepared an initial evaluation of the\nfunctioning of the EMS, the successor to the agreement on\nthe narrowing of margins which was in force from 1972 to\n1979 and which is briefly described in Annex A. The studies in question were chiefly intended to clarify the\ndiscussions of the European Council of March 1982, and\nwere made with a view to proposing improvements to the\nsystem. '\n\nalready communicated to the Monetary Committee and the\nCommittee of Governors by the Commission,2 examines\nhow the EMS has worked for almost three years, in the light\nof its objectives and the changes which have taken place in\nthe economic environment since its establishment. in Europe'. Stability should be interpreted as\n\nThe objective of the system, clearly defined by the European\nCouncil at Bremen, is to devise 'a scheme for the creation of\ncloser monetary cooperation leading to a zone of monetary\nstability \nextending over the whole range of prices, exchange rates,\ninterest rates and other monetary variables. The degree of\nsuccess should be measured with reference to various criteria,\nincluding the previous performance of the EMS economies, the\ncomparative performance of non-participating countries and\nthe amount of economic and monetary cooperation induced by\nthe system. Part One of this report first examines the main elements for an\nassessment of the performance of the participating economies. Part Two then goes on to discuss the operation of the system's\nmechanisms. See Annex B: Main features of the European Monetary System in its\npresent phase. 2 The texts already circulated by the Commission are printed in italics. 1 \n\n40\n\n1. Central rates\n\nSince the start of the EMS, the participating currencies have\n\nachieved among themselves a greater degree of exchange rate\nstability than during the previous period. This stability also\ncontrasted with the volatility of non-Community currencies,\nthe dollar and yen, and of the non-participating Community\ncurrencies, sterling and the drachma. Over the period, there have been four changes of central rates,\nonly two of which have involved more than one currency. All\nhave been made by mutual agreement in orderly market\nconditions, and a common procedure has been developed. Between the start of the system and the October realignment\nthe maximum bilateral change, 18%, has been between the\nGerman mark and the lira. The German mark has revalued by\nnearly as much against the Danish krone, and by between about\n\nagainst which it has revalued by only 2%. These amounts are\nalmost exactly half its appreciation against the lira and French\nfranc respectively over the previous three-year period. The\nchanges have in all cases been in the direction suggested by\nprice and cost movements, and no central rate change has\nsubsequently been reversed. exchange rates preserving \n\nThe central rate adjustments have not led to large movements\nin Community effective \ntrade\nbetween EMS countries. This stability contrasts with the\nstrongly divergent exchange rate movements recorded within\nthe Community in the period 1973-78, and is an important\npositive factor for an area in which trade amongst member\ncountries in 1980 amounted to over 50% of their total trade. However, in view of the persistent inflation differentials \n(see\nbelow) between the participants, this development also means\nthat currencies having relatively high inflation have imported\nstability through the mechanism of direct price interdepend-\nence, while countries having less inflation have gained in terms\nof export potential. The relative stability within the EMS contrasts strongly with\nthe volatility of sterling, the drachma, the dollar and yen\nagainst the participating currencies. The dollar's movements\nhave been dominated by the reversal of the US balance of\npayments position and by interest rate differentials. The\npolicies of the US administration have not prevented saw-\ntoothed movements of interest rates, nor the resultant short-\nterm capital inflows and outflows. Until mid-1980 the ECU\nrate of the dollar fluctuated widely around a slight downward\ntrend. There was then a steady rise to a peak in August 1981\nabout 45% above the level of July 1980. Since then the rate of\nthe dollar declined somewhat, again fluctuating around its\ntrend. Over the whole period these dollar fluctuations have\nconsiderably added to the uncertainties for international trade. Evaluation of the functioning of the EMS at 31 December 1981\n\nThe two non-participating Community currencies, sterling and\nthe drachma rose by 20% and fell by 18% against the ECU\nexcluding sterling, respectively since March 1979. The\ndepreciation of the drachma in 1979 and 1980 has partially\nfollowed the inflation differential. Sterling's evolution has been\nmuch more erratic and has reflected1 interest rate differentials\nof from 3,5 to 5,5 points against the average for participating\n\ncurrencies in 1979 and 1980; and again in mid-November 1981,\n\nwhen sterling benefited from a favourable differential after the\nfall in US rates. Added to this was the current account surplus\nbetween 1978 and 1981, attributable to North Sea oil and the\nrecession. the 2,25% band has caused some inertia in the movement of the\n\nindicator, despite the corrections made. to maintain the\nThe amount of intervention necessary \nfluctuation margins has at times been substantial but has not\ncaused problems for monetary targets or depletion of reserves. The currencies supported by interventions were at different\ntimes the French and Belgian francs and the Danish krone. Speculative bouts have generally been contained, and in only\none case was extensive intervention activity followed by a\nrealignment of central rates. 2. Exchange rate management\n\nThe basic texts of the EMS \ninterventions will be in the currencies of the participating\ncountries'. In practice, however, dollar interventions, which\n\n'in principle\n\nspecify \n\nthat \n\nmay be addressed either at curbing fluctuations against that\n\nBetween realignments full use has been made of the limited\nfluctuation margins. The maximum permissible spread\nbetween two currencies has repeatedly been taken up. In 1979,\n\nthe Belgian franc was at its lower limit against the German\n\nmark in late May and early June and then against the Danish\n\nkrone in October. At the start of 1980, it was again at its lower\nlimit but against the French franc and guilder. The German\nmark was weak for a large part of 1980, several times falling to\nits lower limit against the French franc. Their positions were\n\nhowever reversed in early 1981, following interest rate moves\n\nby the Bundesbank, implying a total bilateral movement of\n\n4 '/2% in a relatively short period. ' Such reversibility within\n\nthe margins weakens the impact of short-term interest rate\n\ndifferentials on capital movements, thus when there are no\nexpectations of central rate changes reducing the need for\nintervention. currency or be primarily for currency management within the\nEMS, still predominate. In part, this is because a number of\ncountries prefer to maintain their currency near the centre of\nthe fluctuation band. This has been true particularly for Italy,\nwhose currency has a wider band (6%). For intra-marginal\nintervention, agreement must be obtained to use another\nparticipant's currency, which is not the case for the dollar. 3. Interest rates and monetary aggregates\n\nWhen the markets do not anticipate, a change in exchange\nrates, short-term capital movements are dominated by nominal\ninterest rate differentials, which makes these, together with\ninterventions, an important instrument of currency manage-\nment. There have been a few examples of policy conflict\nbetween domestic and external objectives in the area of interest\nrates. Shortly after the start of the system both Denmark and\n\nItaly had to lower their interest rates, because of capital\n\nThe divergence indicator has on the whole been a useful\nadditional element to the arrangements. Given the underlying\ninflationary situation, it is consistent with the aims of the\nsystem that it has been systematically activated only by weak\ncurrencies although this was probably also influenced by the\nstrength of the dollar. When the threshold has been reached or\noverstepped, the necessary measures have normally been taken\nto redress the situation, although there is still some difference\nof opinion over the interpretation of a 'presumption to act'. The\ncurrency most frequently divergent was the Belgian franc: it\ncrossed its divergence threshold from May to July 1979, in\nFebruary and March 1980, from February to April 1981 and\nagain in December 1981. The Danish krone and French franc\nhave also crossed their thresholds. The most frequent policy\nreaction has been to raise interest rates. There have, however,\nbeen a number of occasions on which bilateral limits have been\nreached before any currency has crossed its divergence\n\nthreshold and the movement of sterling and of the lira beyond\n\n1 \n\nSee the calendar of events on page 43 for a graph of maximum spot spreads\nbetween currencies participating in the narrow-band system and\nindicating which currencies crossed their upper or lower divergence\n\nthreshold for more than five days. inflows, when relative domestic conditions would have\nsuggested the contrary. While in most Community countries there were domestically\ngenerated reasons for relatively high interest rates, peaks in\nUS rates may have led, in a number of member countries, to\nhigher interest rates than generally warranted by purely\ndomestic considerations. But as with interventions, it is\ndifficult \nand those in response to changing outside circumstances. There\n\nto distinguish between measures inspired by the system\n\nhas been a steady rise in interest rates between 1978 and 1981. For domestic reasons, European monetary authorities neither\nfollowed the fall of transatlantic rates after March 1980, nor\ntheir spectacular rise in the second half of 1980. But the high\nexternal deficit and persistent inflation, which was likely to be\nfurther aggravated by the strong rise in the US dollar, made\nfurther upward movement of interest rates inevitable in 1981 in\nEurope, despite the low level of activity and high unemploy-\nment. Since 1979, the stance of quantitative monetary policy has\nbecome more restrictive in practically all Community\n\n41\n\n\fThe development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\ncountries. This change has been prompted by the need to\ncombat inflation generally and in particular by the desire to\nprevent the emergence of secondary \nfollowing \nmaintaining central rates and adhering \nmonetary objectives have been avoided. Furthermore the very\n\neffects\nthe rise in the price of oil. Conflicts between\nto quantitative\n\ninflationary \n\nexistence of the EMS has provided a strong incentive to\n\nimprove de facto coordination of monetary policies. 4. Costs and prices\n\nin national\n\nIn 1978, the average of the Community GDP price deflators,\nwhich reflect the overall change in domestic costs, had fallen to\n8,5%, compared with an average over the previous three years\nof 11%. The dispersion between Member States had also\ndeclined. Following the second oil shock, however, both the\naverage and the dispersion have again increased. In 1979, the\nCommunity average was nearly 10% and in 1980 over 11,5%,\nwith a range from 4,3% in Germany to 20,3% in Italy. Exchange rate stability and satisfactory monetary manage-\nment have not therefore been matched by a greater conver-\ngence of costs and prices. When expressed \ncurrencies, average annual divergences in cost and price trends\nbetween EMS partners were, in many cases, quite substantial. Over the period 1979-81, the average annual consumer price\ninflation rate has been 16,3% in Italy whereas that in Germany\nhas been 5,6%. In contrast the lira/German mark bilateral\ncentral rate varied by only 18% over the whole period\nFurthermore aggregate variations in the relative levels of unit\nlabour costs in national currency have ranged from \u2014 14,5% to\n+ 32,7%. Such a large change in competitive positions in a\nrelatively short period, is the result both of previous\nmovements, in the reverse direction, accumulated mainly\nthrough excessive nominal exchange rate movements during\nthe pre-EMS period; and of the policies tailored to maintain-\ning nominal exchange rates. In the future, maintaining\nexchange rate stability requires decreasing the divergence of\ncost and price trends. The shift from a low to a high relative cost and price level in a\ncountry with a stable exchange rate should serve to exert\npressure to implement appropriate policies to ensure domestic\nstability. Maintaining exchange rate stability is often the only\nway in which the real problems of domestic adjustment are\nforced into the open. These problems would otherwise be\nobscured by the spiral of devaluation and inflation; with the\ndevaluations doing nothing to resolve the basic problems. This\nwas the experience of the United Kingdom and Italy between\n1973 and 1978. It is important that the EMS stabilization\nmechanism should work fully in those countries where inflation\nor the level of relative costs is still too high; this not only means\nthat monetary policy must defend the exchange rate but also\nthat domestic adjustment, notably in the areas of incomes and\npublic finances, must be encouraged and speeded up through\nother appropriate measures. Quite independently from the\nexistence of the EMS, such internal adjustment is necessary in\n\n42\n\norder to increase possibilities of economic growth in conditions\nof stability and higher employment. The EMS highlights the\nneed for adjustment and provides one of the necessary\ningredients to help its realization. Section 2 \u2014 Functioning of the system's\n\nmechanisms\n\nIn summary, in its first three years of life, \n\nthe European\n\nMonetary System has been remarkably successful in assuring\nexchange rate stability through a period of great world\nmonetary turbulence. It has provided a monetary environment\nfavourable to the orderly development of intra-Community\ntrade; and has succeeded in avoiding the excessive exchange\nrigidities that eventually led to the collapse of the Bretton\nWoods parity system. The system has been managed in a\nrealistic way, avoiding on the one side full or over-\naccommodation of cost and price trends and on the other\nstubborn defence of unrealistic exchange rates. Although the\nsituation would have been worse without it, the EMS has\nhowever failed to produce the desirable degree of convergence\ntowards price stability. Since 1978 inflation rates have become\nhigher and more divergent because of the second oil shock, the\nextraordinary appreciation of the dollar, and insufficient\ndomestic discipline in the areas of costs and public finance. The\npolitical commitment underlying the EMS, and the mechan-\nisms created by the system itself, have been an essential, albeit\ninsufficient, factor pushing for stability-orientated policies in\nmember countries in which monetary stability was most\nneeded. A stronger impulse in this direction can only come from\na strengthened EMS. The critical appraisal of the functioning\nof the system's mechanisms, which is made in the following\nparagraphs, can show the appropriate ways to achieve such a\nstrengthening. 1. ECU creation\n\nThere has been a dramatic increase in the total quantity of\nECU created from about 27000 million, resulting from the\ninitial swap operations at the start of the system, to nearly\n\n50 000 million in April 1981. ' This amount subsequently has\ndeclined to 42 000 million ECU. Taking the swap operations of July 1979 and January 1981 as\n\nan example, it can be seen that against almost exactly the same\n\namount of gold, 15 800 and 38 300 million ECU were\nrespectively created, because of an increase in the price of gold\nused in the swap operations of over 140% between the two\nperiods. ECU created against dollars fell only from 11600\nmillion to 10 900 million because the decline of 6% in the\namount of dollars transferred was not entirely offset by the\nappreciation of the dollar in terms of ECU. Annex B shows the ECU creation resulting from the swap operations. ly: E\nDecem\nResolu\n\nC\nop\n\nI\n\nI^\n\nati\nrn\n\nEven\ntwee\n\november: the US authorities announce\nthat they will actively intervene on the\nexchange markets\n\nl\n\nB\nh\n-\nC\n\ng\no\n\n8\n-\no\n\ntuations around a dow\nown\nits rate against the ECU\nCU\nin\nmber\n\nagain to 1,40 in Septe\n\nward\nrises\nMay,\nand\n\nflu\nen\nnd:\nor\nm 1\n,35 in March to 1,32 in\nal\nlling\n3 in\n\nDecember\n\n\u2022\n-\n+ \n\u2022\n- \n\nc\n\nbe\n\nc t o b: the Fe\nederal Reserv\ne\ndecides to pursue\nue a strictly qu\na\nmonetary policy\ny and to allo\nrates to fluctuate\ne\n\nBoar\nitati\nntere. \u2022\n\n-\n\n3\nt\n\u00ab\n\n\u2014 \n,\no\n\nU\n\nu\n\n>\n\n,\n\no\n\nu\n\nD\nE. E\nv\na\nl\nu\na\nt\ni\no\nn\n\no\nf\n\nt\nh\ne\n\nf\nu\nn\nc\nt\ni\no\nn\ni\nn\ng\n\no\nf\n\nt\nh\ne\n\nE\nM\nS\n\na\nt\n\n3\n1\n\nD\ne\nc\ne\nm\nb\ne\nr\n\n1\n9\n8\n1\n\nE\n\n\u00a3\n\u2014\n\u00ab. c\n2\n\nt\n\n\u2022\n-\n\n>\n\no\n\nc\n\nc\n\n\"\n\nE\n\nB\n\n,\n\no\no\nl\n\n4\n3\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\fThe development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\nThe key to the growth in ECU has therefore been the rule\ndetermining the price of gold used for the swap operations. The\nautomatic link between the price of gold and the quantity of\nECU determines, outside the control of the system, the degree\n\nhas had a net positive position. The total of the negative or\n\nto which gold is mobilized. The gold price rule used in the swap\n\narrangements (whichever is lower between the six month\naverage and the latest market price) did moderate the increase\nin supply of ECU somewhat over the period when gold prices\nwere rising rapidly. The swap price reached a maximum of\n\n447 ECU per ounce whereas the market price went above\n\n670 ECU per ounce. As the participants transfer gold and dollars in very different\nproportions the number of ECU that they have each received at\nsuccessive swap renewals, and hence the distribution of the\nquantity of ECU between them, has been highly affected by the\nchanges in the prices of these two assets. '\n\nIn contrast, the use of ECU or the effect on ECU creation of\nthe loss or gain of dollar reserves has had little effect on the\ndistribution of ECU. For example, the amount of ECU\nreceived through the swap operations by the Netherlands and\nDenmark, which have both seen a similar reduction in the\namount of dollars that they transfer, has respectively increased\nby nearly 90% and decreased by 11% between July 1979 and\nOctober 1981 because the increase in the price of gold has\naffected \nthese two countries. in very different proportions the allocation of ECU to\n\nECU creation is determined by a rule in which the three key\n\nvariables (the price of gold, the dollar exchange rate and the\nrespective proportions of these two assets) are outside the\ncontrol of the system. Under these circumstances, the quantity\n\nof ECU created cannot be expected necessarily to be consistent\n\nwith the aims of the system, and hence a wider use of the ECU\n\nas a means of settlement and as a reserve asset could not\n\n4% of its ECU holdings. Denmark and Belgium have\nconsistently had substantial net negative positions, and France\n\npositive positions has reached 8% of the quantity of ECU\ncreated through the swap arrangements (see Table 18,\npage 46). Interest on these net ECU positions is calculated as the\nweighted average of the official discount rates of the currencies\nof which the ECU is composed. There is therefore no scope for\ndiscretionary decisions that would affect \nthe attractiveness of\nthe ECU relative to the dollar. Both its value and its yield are\ngiven. Furthermore market interest rates can at times deviate\nconsider ably from official discount rates which can result in an\neven greater variation in its relative attractiveness than in its\nprice relationship vis-a-vis the dollar. Debtors have been reluctant to buildup large negative net ECU\npositions because of the uncertainty over what will happen at\nthe end of the transitional phase, when, unless there is a\ndecision to the contrary, they would be required to clear their\n\nECU positions by acquiring ECU from other participants. Creditors have not encouraged the use of ECU both because\nthe interest rate rules have generally not been favourable to\nthem and because the creation method is unlikely to limit the\nvolume of ECU thereby being an element of restraint on\npotential debtors. With the limited use reflecting both inadequate inducements\nand provisions within the system as well as the reticence of the\nparticipants, it would be inadvisable simply to increase the use\n\nof the ECU by abolishing the acceptance limit or by enlarging\n\nthe categories of transactions over which one of the parties had\n\nthe right to use ECU without amending other parts of the\n\ncontribute towards achieving greater monetary stability. system in such a way as to make the quantity and the yield of\n\n2. The use of ECU\n\nthe ECU the result of stability-orientated decisions. Only a\n\nscarce currency can induce discipline. Participants have a right to use ECU for settlement at the\nmaturity of a very short-term financing operation 'with the\nproviso that a creditor central bank shall not be obliged to\naccept settlement by means of ECU of an amount more than\n\n50% of its claim which is being settled'. 2 With the agreement of\n\nthe creditor, ECU may however be used for any settlement\nbetween participating central banks. In practice, ECU use has been limited. Italy, Ireland and the\nNetherlands have practically never had a net ECU position ;\nand when they have it has been a very low percentage of the\nthat they received through the swap operations. Germany's net position has changed from being positive to\nnegative and then positive again, but at the maximum reached\n\nECU \n\nMoreover, and for reasons indicated below, it is unlikely that\n\nthe ECU can become an element inducing stability when its use\n\nis in addition to, rather than as an alternative to, other reserve\nassets and settlement instruments. It is for these reasons that\n\nthe Commission in its report of 20 March 1980 to the\n\nEuropean Council suggested that the possibility of adopting the\n\nECU as an exclusive instrument of settlement between the\n\nCommunity's central banks should be considered. 3. Credit mechanisms\n\nSubstantial use has been made at times of the very short-term\nfinancing. For marginal intervention in Community currencies,\n\nthe facility is automatically available at the demand of the\n\nintervening central bank. With agreement from the creditor, it\n\nSee Table 17, page 45\n\nParagraph 16. 1 of the Agreement of 13 March 1979 between the central\nbanks. 44\n\n\fEvaluation of the functioning of the EMS at 31 December 1981\n\nTable 17\n\nDistribution of ECU between participants\n\nBanque Nationals de Belgique\nDanmarks Nationalbank\nDeutsche Bundesbank\nBanque de France\nCentral Bank of Ireland\nBanca d'ltalia\nNederlandsche Bank\nBank of England\n\nShare of lotal ECU issued\n\nProportion of ECU\n\nreceived against gold\n\nChange in dollar\nreserves between\n\nInitial '\n\nOctober 1981\n\nInitial l\n\nOctober 1981\n\nand October 1981\n\n6,9\n2,1\n36,9\n17,6\n0,7\n16,3\n9,3\n10,3\n\n8,9\n1,0\n32,7\n21,0\n0,3\n18,2\n10,7\n7,1\n\n100,0\n\n100,0\n\n78,3\n12,1\n40,8\n73,3\n9,1\n64,9\n75,1\n31,7\n\n85,8\n36,1\n65,0\n87,1\n28,6\n81,7\n91,9\n59,4\n\n+ 17,8\n-49,8\n-25,7\n-19,7\n-53,5\n-18,3\n-47,4\n-43,2\n\n1 \n\nThe initial positions were established over the period March lo April 1979 (July 1979 for the Bank of England). The proportion of each national central bank's ECU which it receives in return for swapping 20% of its gold varies because of changes in its dollar holdings. Gold holdings have remained\n\n2 \n\nvirtually unchanged over the period. may also be used to finance intra-marginal interventions. In\nboth 1979 and 1980, about 2 000 million ECU of financing was\nobtained by activation of the mechanism. In 1981 use has\namounted to about 7 000 million. The overwhelming majority\nof these operations have been repaid in the creditor's currency,\n\nand the balance has resulted in transfers of ECU and other\n\nreserves. Both the short-term and medium-term credit mechanisms were\nincreased substantially at the start of the EMS. The granting\nof medium-term financial assistance is discretionary: it is\nsubject to a Council decision, which lays down economic policy\nconditions. In the case of the short-term monetary support,\ncredit can be granted to a central bank automatically on the\ndemand of a debtor up to its limited quota, beyond which it\nbecomes discretionary. Neither of these mechanisms nor the\nCommunity loan facility for balance of payments needs has\nbeen used since the start of the EMS, but in contrast there has\nbeen considerable use of unconditional credit from \ninternational capital markets to finance external imbalances. Following the second oil price shock, the Community as a\nwhole went into substantial deficit, for which financing was\nnecessary while domestic adjustments and an increase in\nOPEC absorption \ntook place. The deficits have differed\nconsiderably between Member States as a percentage ofGDP,\n\nthe\n\nThe EMS has an important role to play in the existing\n\nas have the amount and changes in amount of official external\n\ndebt. The imbalances have been financed with little change in overall\nreserve positions. In 1980, the Community's 31 000 million\nECU current account deficit was financed by capital inflows of\n28 000 million and a reserve fall of only 3 000 million. In these circumstances the EMS credit mechanisms cannot on\n\ntheir own contribute towards imposing a tighter monetary\n\ndiscipline \nin the Community, without general provisions\nregarding the official recourse to external financing. 4. Exterior aspects of the system\n\ninternational monetary relationships. Since the late 1960s and\nagain even more obviously throughout 1981, the dialogue with\nthe American authorities has been hampered by the lack of a\nstrong Community monetary organization comparable to that\nexisting in the areas of trade and agriculture. This dialogue\nbecomes increasingly important both with the development of a\nmulti-currency reserve system and since the US monetary\nauthorities have changed their method of monetary manage-\n\n45\n\n \n2\n\fThe development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\nTable 18\n\nNet use ( - ) or accrual ( + ) of ECU as a percentage of ECU\n\nreceived through the swap operations\n\nEnd of month\n\nBelgium\n\nDenmark\n\nFRof\nGermany\n\nFrance \n\nUK\n\nIreland \n\nThe \n\nItaly \n\nNelherlands\n\n\u2014\n\n\u2014 \n\n\u2014 \n\n1979 April\nMay\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\n\n1980 January\n\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\n\n1981 January\nFebruary\nMarch\nApril\nMay\nJune\nJuly\nAugust\nSeptember\nOctober\nNovember\nDecember\n\n-8,2\n\u2014 \n-14,7\n-15,0\n\u2014\n-13,9\n\u201414,0\n-14,2\n-12,9\n-13,5\n- 25,2\n\n\u2014 \n\n+ 27,4\n+ 33,2\n-1,8\n-1,9\n\u20141,9\n-1,9\n-2,3\n-26,9\n-5,6\n\n-27,9\n-39,7\n-54,1\n-43,3\n-37,6\n-31,2\n- 24,8\n-25,0\n-24,8\n-24,4\n-25,7\n-30,8\n\n-31,6\n-50,0\n-69,9\n-67,0\n-67,2\n-68,1\n-71,7\n-72,3\n-72,9\n-78,0\n-78,7\n-79,4\n\n\u2014\n\n\u2014\n\n_ \n\n-9,8\n-21,1\n-29,1\n-45,7\n-46,1\n-46,5\n-38,8\n-39,1\n-39,5\n-33,6\n-33,8\n-34,1\n\n-30,1\n-30,4\n-30,6\n_\n-30,6\n-30,9\n-31,2\n-31,5\n-31,8\n-36,4\n-41,7\n-42,1\n\u2014\n-42,5\n\n\u2014 \n\n\u2014 \n\n_ \n\n\u2014 \n\n\u2014\n\n_\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n_\n\n_\n\n__\n\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n\u2014\n\u2014\n\u2014\n\u2014\n\u2014\n\n\u2014 \n\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 +0 ,9 \n\n\u2014 \n\u2014 + 0 ,8 \n+ 3 ,5 +6 ,2 \u2014\n+ 2 ,6 +1,6 \u2014\n\n\u2014 \n\n\u2014\n\n+ 0,2 \n\u2014 \n+ 0,2 \n\n_\n+ 0,8\n+ 2,8\n+ 2,8\n+ 2,9\n+ 2,9\n+ 2,7\n+ 3,8\n+ 4,2\n\n+ 2,8\n+ 3,9\n+ 0,8\n-1,4\n-1,5\n\u2014 \n-1,5\n\u2014 \n-1,5\n-1,5\n-1,5\n-3,0\n-3,0\n-3,1\n\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n\u2014 \n+ 0 ,2 \n+ 0,2 \n+ 0,2 \n+ 0,2 \n+ 0,2 \n+ 2,5 \n\n+ 4,8 \n+ 9,6 \n+ 15,4 \n+ 17,2 \n+ 17,4 \n+ 15,8 \n\u2014 \n+ 13,6 \n\u2014 \n+ 13,7 \n+ 13,6 \n+ 15,6 \n+ 16,0 \n+ 17,4 \n\n_\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n_\n\n_\n\n__\n\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n_ \n_ \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n\u2014\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014\n+3 ,0 \u2014\n\n+2 ,2 \u2014\n+3,4 \u2014\n\n_ \n_ \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n_\n_\n\u2014\n\u2014\n\u2014\n\u2014\n\u2014\n\n\u2014 \n\n\u2014\n\u2014 \n\n+1,8 \n\n-3,1\n_ -11\n+ 0^6\n_ \n+ 1,1\n+ 1,1\n+ 1,1\n+ 1,6\n+ 2,2\n+ 2,3\n+ 3,1\n+ 3,2\n\u2014 \n+ 3,2\n\n\u2014 \n\n_ \n\n+ 17,6 \n\u2014 \n+ 25,0 \n+ 27,0 \n+ 27,3 \n+ 27,5 \n+ 27,7 \n+ 29,2 \n+ 28,6 \n+ 28,9 \n+ 30,2 \n+ 30,5 \n+ 30,8 \n\n\u2014. +2,0 \u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n_ \n_ \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\u2014 \n\n\u2014\n\n\u2014\n\nTola!\n\n\u00b10,6\n+ 1,1\n+ 1,2\n\u00b11,0\n\u00b11,0\n\u00b11,0\n\u00b11,0\n\u00b11,4\n\u00b11,9\n\n\u00b12,3\n\u00b13,3\n\u00b14,5\n\u00b14,3\n\u00b13,8\n\u00b13,8\n\u00b13,0\n\u00b13,0\n\u00b13,0\n\u00b13,4\n\u00b13,5\n\u00b14,0\n\n\u00b14,0\n\u00b15,7\n\u00b16,4\n\u00b16,3\n\u00b16,3\n\u00b16,4\n\u00b16,8\n\u00b16,9\n\u00b17,0\n\u00b17,4\n\u00b17,4\n\u00b17,5\n\nment and have concentrated heavily on domestic policy\nobjectives. A multi-currency reserve system needs more, not less,\nmanagement than an international monetary system based on\nonly one currency, and as Europe will inevitably, in one form or\nanother, be one of the reserve issuing centres, it should be able\nto discuss monetary matters productively with the United\nStates. Over the last 20 years, the relative position of the United States\nin the world economy has profoundly changed and a tripolar\n\n46\n\nsystem has emerged. Not only in terms of industry, agriculture\nand per capita income, but also as a trade partner and as a\nholder of international reserves, the Community has become\none of the three great areas of the industrial world. An appropriately developed EMS could be a useful way of\n\nthe creation of a common and stable\n\norganizing the European pole of the international monetary\nsystem. Through \nmonetary identity for the Community, it would help the orderly\nevolution of the multi-currency reserve system, both through\nhelping to limit the number of currencies that play a reserve\nrole and through putting greater economic weight and depth of\n\n\fEvaluation of the functioning of the EMS at 31 December 1981\n\nfinancial markets behind the ECU. Internally, it would help\ncohesion within the EMS spreading over several European\nshoulders the responsibilities of an international currency role\nthat have proved quite heavy even for politically and\neconomically great powers. A fundamental part of the exterior aspects of the system is the\nexchange rate relationships vis-a-vis third currencies. The\ninternal exchange rate arrangements of the EMS are\nsomewhat facilitated when the dollar is strong relative to the\nEMS currencies. When the opposite is true, short-term funds\ntend to flow into the German mark in preference \nto other\nCommunity currencies thereby accentuating any tensions\nalready existing in the system. Just such a movement was the\ncatalyst for the September 1979 realignment. In theory, in a system with one dominant currency, (he exterior\nposition could be determined as two-step procedure in which\nthe dominant currency manages its exchange rate vis-a-vis the\noutside and the others manage theirs against it. In practice, this\nprocedure is not suitable to any of the EMS partners. Nor can\n\nthe problem be ignored. Even when the US monetary\n\nauthorities are pursuing a policy of allowing the dollar to find\n\nThe basic EMS texts mention that European economies with\nespecially close ties to the Community could participate in the\nsystem in some way. Some countries already maintain very\nclose exchange rate links with one of the EMS currencies, but\nnothing has been done to integrate these relationships within\nthe EMS or to extend the use of the ECU to this wider zone. The Community has been in deficit to the OPEC countries,\nwho in turn are looking for ways of diversifying their reserves. A move towards allowing them to hold ECU together with\ninvoicing of their exports \nadvocated by some as beneficial to both sides and could again\nextend the use of the ECU. to Europe in ECU has been\n\nThe expression of a monetary identity cannot however be\nconfined to official holders; private use of, and markets for, the\nECU will have to develop. The international financial\ncommunity has started to use ECU for a number of credit\noperations including opening of deposit accounts, issuing of\ndeposit certificates, granting of loans and issuing bonds. The\nlast of these took off in 1981. There have been six bond issues\ntotalling nearly 250 million ECU, which may be a small figure\ncompared with the total in all denominations over the same\nperiod (USD 18 000 million), but it nevertheless amounts to\n\nits own level in the exchange markets, that level is a matter\n\nabout 5% of the total of public issues in currencies other than\nindifferent \n\nthe dollar: a remarkable percentage for a start. Three of the\n\nabout which the Community \nnor\ncompletely impotent. On the other hand, it is not a question on\nwhich any rigid guidelines can be pre-specified. As stipulated in\nthe Bremen Annex and the Brussels Resolution, any actions on\n\nis neither \n\nissues have been made by Community institutions, two by the\nEIB and one by Euratom. Other Community institutions use\n\nthe ECU for accounting purposes and have opened ECU\n\naccounts for the relevant transactions with a number of banks. Today, there are still a number of obstacles, as well as\nunfamiliarity, \nECU. The syndicate leaders of the ECU denominated bonds\n\nto this development of the private use of the\n\nare banks from those Member States whose authorities have\n\nallowed the use of the ECU through giving it the same status as\n\nthe dollar should therefore be subject to a common procedure\n\nwhich would result in some compromise between the different\nnational positions and the aims of the system. 5. Wider use of the ECU\n\nAll ECU created by the EMCF, whatever their creation\nmethod, have the same characteristics of being 'official' sight\nliabilities usable only between participants in the system. On\nthe other hand, as the ECU becomes the expression of the\nCommunities' emerging monetary identity, deeper and broader\nfinancial markets operating in ECU will develop and a broader\ncategory of holders will have access to it. Both these facts pose\n\nthe problem of a wider use of the ECU. a foreign currency. In other Member States, the ECU is still\ndisadvantagedby its hybrid nature. As seen from any individual\ncountry, it is composed partly of national currency and partly\nof foreign currencies. The national currency part naturally falls\nunder any regulations directed at domestic monetary policy\nand the foreign currency part is subject to any exchange control\ntype regulations. The result is that the ECU is disadvantagedas\ncompared to either domestic or foreign currency. 47\n\n\fThe developmentj)f the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nAnalysis of the possible areas in which the EMS\n\ncan be developed\n\nThe evaluation of the way in which the EMS has functioned\ndemonstrates that there are a number of areas in which the\nsystem could be improved. The possible areas for the development proposed by the\nCommission,1 which tend to respect the present balance\nbetween strictness and solidarity, derive from an analysis of\nthe areas in which progress could be made within the present\nlegal framework, and consequently without recourse to\nArticle 236 of the Treaty of Rome. further developments are\n\nThe analysis made in Chapter IV has shown that despite the\nundeniable successes of the EMS, \nnecessary; and they are likely to become more necessary as the\nexternal environment worsens: its achievements have been the\nresult of a combination of favourable external circumstances\nand its own internal strengths. Similarly its disappointments, in\nterms of convergence towards stability, stem from hostile\nexternal factors and from certain shortcomings in the system\nitself. Its mechanisms, relying excessively on prespecified\nrules, have not always worked cohesively \nunderlying objectives, and have not been broad-ranging enough\nto induce a satisfactory level of price stability. towards the\n\nThe aims therefore should be to develop the system: to make\nthe mechanisms more responsive to changes in environment,\nendow them with a greater disciplinary effect; \npublic and private economic agents to model their behaviour\nmore closely on necessity of monetary stability; and to\norganize \nin a more orderly and effective manner (he\nCommunity's role in the multiple reserve currency system. to encourage\n\nPossible developments, based on technical analysis and on\nextensive discussions both within the Commission departments\nand in the competent Committees as well as on the above\nassessment, are briefly described in the following paragraphs. ECU creation eliminated, the use of the ECU should be\n\nThey can be grouped around four main areas for action:\n\n(i) coherence of the mechanisms;\n\n(ii) opening the system;\n\n(Hi) use of the ECU on the markets;\n\n(iv) policy convergence. Annex C-2 presents a technical study by the Alternates of the Monetary\nCommittee on some of the problems which could be posed by non-\ninstitutional development of the EMS. 48\n\nSection 1 \u2014 Assuring greater coherence of the\n\nmechanisms\n\nThree years' experience suggests that when the system was\ndesigned and put into effect, excessive confidence wasplacedin\n\nthe virtues of the automatic mechanisms which did not prove\n\njustified. The effect of discipline, inducing rigour and stability,\nwhich was expected to be induced by the operation of the\nmechanisms, has not been sufficiently marked. Adjustments\ncould therefore be made by improving the control over and\ncoherence of the main constituent parts of the system. 1. 1. The ECU\n\nThe ECU used within the system has two defects: its creation is\nunmanaged, and it is little used. Within the swap system, the creation of ECU can only be fully\ncontrolled by introducing more discretionary decisions. It is\npossible to moderate the effects of erratic movements of the\nprice of gold or the dollar exchange rate on the quantity of\nECU created,\n by increasing the duration of each swap or\nlengthening the reference period over which averages are\ntaken. The consequence of these methods however is that the\ninternal valuation of the assets and the market valuation will\ndiverge, with adverse consequences for the use of the ECU. A\nmore efficient method is to keep the quantity of ECU fixed and\nmake the necessary quarterly adjustments to the amounts of\nreserve assets transferred according to variation in their ECU\nprice. This has been called the 'closed pool' and would mean\ndetermining, (i) t he initial pool of ECU, and (ii) the procedure\nfor any subsequent alterations to the pool. It should not be\npossible for such a decision to be taken except solemnly and at\nfairly long intervals. One possibility would be for the central\nbanks or the Board of Governors of the EMCF to agree each\nyear on the volume of ECU to be created. Another would to be\nto set an annual rate of growth for the volume of ECU (linked,\nfor example, to the growth of the Community's external trade\nor of intra-Community trade), a rule from which the central\nbanks could not depart except by unanimous decision. With the inflationary danger involved in the present method of\n\nencouraged. The abolition of the ECU's present acceptance\nlimit in the settlement of operations covered by the very short-\nterm financing would enable the debtor to clear his debt in full\nby surrendering ECU. In return, the creditor would receive a\nhigher remuneration on his net ECU position (the rate of\ninterest could be set each month by the Board of Governors of\nthe EMCF at a level derived from the market level) 3 and could\n\n2 \n\n3 \n\nSee Annex C-2: Severing the link between the volume of ECU issued and\nthe price of gold or the exchange rate of the dollar. E. g. the average of three-month interbank rates on the internal market of\nvarious EMS currencies, or the three-month Euro-ECU rate. 2\n\fAnalysis of the possible areas in which the EMS can be developed\n\nbe authorized to mobilize his net ECU credit position on the\nbasis of formulae to be agreed. 1\n\nAdopting all the above provisions would appreciably enhance\n\nthe ECU's properties, by reaffirming \nsettlement instrument and as an instrument based on stability. its role both as a\n\nAt the same time the balance of rights and obligations between\n\ncreditors and debtors would be respected. 1. 2. The mechanisms. In the same way as the ECU's properties can be improved and\n\nwith the same object in view, certain gaps in the existing\nmechanism could be. filled. and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York by a single credit\n\namount of undesirable dollar interventions, but without\neliminating the problem which the dollar represents for the\nsystem as a whole. The sharp fluctuations of the dollar\nexchange rate over the last three years and the large fund\nmovements which they produced, represent so great a threat to\nthe cohesion of the EMS that they call for active efforts for the\ndefinition of a common attitude towards the dollar on the part\nof the EMS currencies. This common attitude would be defined\nby the central banks at short and regular intervals, as part of an\nassessment exercise resulting in a quantitative formulation of a\n'zone of probability'for \nlater stage, the same exercise might moreover be contemplated\nfor the ECU/yen exchange rale. Such a zone, which would have\nto be fairly wide (\u00b1 10-15% around an ECU/dollar exchange\nrate), would serve as a point of reference for the Community\ncentral banks, which would be expected to act on their interest\nrates or to intervene in order to stop the dollar} ECU rate from\nleaving the zone. The markets could be informed of it in order\n\nthe ECU/dollar exchange rate. At a\n\nto benefit from an announcement effect. The Community monetary authorities represented by the\nEMCF should also use their influence to persuade the US\nauthorities to reconsider their laissez-aller exchange rate and\ninterest rate policy: the moves made by the Community would\ngain in credibility if they were supported by the same methods\non the American side. In this connection, the start of talks with\nthe US authorities with a view to replacing the existing\nnetwork of swaps between certain Community central banks\n\nline between the latter and the EMCF would provide tangible\nevidence of the European determination to close ranks vis-a-vis\nthe United States. Third, a step would be taken towards the consolidation of credit\nmechanisms\u2014planned for a later stage\u2014if it was decided to\nmake the EMCF responsible for the short-term monetary\nsupport mechanism. This would strengthen the EMCF's\nfunctions and act as a signal of the determination to organize\nthe existing institutions in function of the needs of the workings\nof the EMS. No legal difficulty would be involved, since the\nprovision is contained in the Council Regulation of 3 April\n1973 establishing the EMCF and was subsequently confirmed\nby the Bremen and Brussels European Councils. Section 2 \u2014 Opening the system\n\nThe EMS is at present a closed system in which only the central\n\nbanks of certain Member States participate, whereas the\nCommunity is open to the outside world. 4 If the EMS were\nopened up to the central banks of certain third countries, by\nauthorizing them to acquire and hold ECU, the Community\ncould strengthen the system (by extending its geographical\n\n4 See Annex C-2: The external role of the ECU. 49\n\n At present, a central bank's use of a\n\nFirst, organization of the use of Community currencies in intra-\nmarginal interventions. Community currency for intervention inside the margins is\nsubject to the goodwill of the central bank whose currency is\nrequested. Although interventions of this kind might prevent a\ncurrency's movement towards its margin, interventions are\ninstead made in dollars and this often has the effect of\nundermining the coherence of the participating central banks'\nattitudes towards that currency. Alternatively, if no interven-\ntion is made inside the margins, the currency under threat slides\nuntil it reaches its bilateral margin, at which point the\nintervention amounts may be far greater than those that would\nhave been necessary to reverse the trend earlier. Both so as to\nprevent the latter situation from occurring\u2014in order to\neconomize as much as possible on intervention funds\u2014and to\nreduce the predominance of dollar interventions, which tends to\nplace thai currency at the centre of the system, the use of\nCommunity currencies in intra-marginal interventions must be\norganized by defining guidelines within the spirit and the letter\n\nof the system. One possibility would be to authorize the central\n\nbank whose currency had crossed the divergence threshold or\nhad gone beyond a given bilateral limit to intervene, at its\ndiscretion, in Community currencies. ^ These interventions,\nwhich could benefit from the very short-term financing facility,\nwould nevertheless be subject to a ceiling. the purpose of. intra-marginal\n\nAnother possibility would be to limit solely the availability of\nCommunity currencies for \nintervention, without making provisions as above, for specific\ncases where they would be allowed. In this case, provision could\nbe made for the central bank, whose currency is used, to have\nthe right to request suspension of interventions in its currency. Second, relations with the dollar. The organization of intra-\nmarginal intervention in Community currencies will reduce the\n\nSee Annex C-3: Mobilization of net ECU creditor positions. See Annex C-2: Intra-marginal interventions - eligibility for the VSTF\nfacility. The choice of intervention currencies would then relate to the currencies\nwhose premium or discount over the divergent currency was the greater. 2\n\fThe development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\narea and increasing the possibilities for mobilizing the ECU),\nand could protect it from international monetary instability\n(by channelling at least part of the tendencies of reserve\ndiversification towards the ECU): at the same time it could\nhelp with the financing of an overall external payments deficit. Hence the importance of planning and organizing this kind of\ninternationalization of the ECU. A general principle should govern the opening of the system:\nthird holders should be subject to substantially the same rights\nand obligations concerning use of and remuneration in ECU as\nthe participants. Extending its role beyond the Community\nshouldnot destroy the single nature of the ECU. The conditions\n\nfor acquiring ECU will accordingly have to reflect \nits\nprecarious existence, so long as the swap system is used for its\ncreation. 2. 1. A first possibility would be to extend the ECU's\nnegotiability by permitting designated third holders to acquire\nexisting ECU assets from participating central banks. A third\nholder arrangement setting out in detail \nconditions for acquiring, mobilizing and restituting ECU would\nbe necessary. Participating central banks could thus mobilize\ntheir ECU against dollars, offer ECU as a settlement of a debt\nor satisfy a demand for \nwithout affecting \n\nthe total volume of ECU in circulation. temporary reserve diversification,\n\nthe terms and\n\ncontrol the use of the ECU on the markets. Community loans mechanism could thus be handed over to the\nEMCF. the Community would have an interest in\n\nSince the EMCF has little room for manoeuvre in the field of\ndiversification, \npromoting the private market of the ECU, thus making\navailable to third country monetary authorities, wishing to\ntheir reserves, a wide range of instruments in ECU. diversify \n\nSection 3 \u2014 Encouraging the private use of the\n\nECU\n\nAlongside the official ECU circuit and unconnected with it, a\ngenuine private ECU circuit is now developing. It is natural for\noperators and markets to be interested in the monetary\nexpression of a vast economic area in the process of\nintegration. The Community can nevertheless- not be in-\ndifferent \nonly promote, but also monitor, and even guide this expanding\nprivate use of the ECU so as to turn it to the greatest\nadvantage. Whence the importance of proposals designed to\nsupplement \n\nto this use of its monetary 'image', and it should not\n\nthe existing provisions and to encourage and\n\nto existing participants, i. e. against a swap of\n\n2. 2. A second possibility would be to permit the EMCF to\nissue ECU to third countries under the same conditions as those\napplying \nreserves. This formula, which would imply the creation of\nadditional ECU, would seem most suitable for those European\ncountries 'with particularly close economic and financial ties\nwith the Community' wishing to be associated in the exchange\nrate mechanism. The association agreement would have to set\nout the conditions for acquiring and using ECU on terms\nanalogous to those applied to member central banks. 2. 3. In a broader perspective another possibility would be for\nthe EMCF to issue ECU for reserve diversification by non-\nCommunity institutions. The purpose of this kind of suggestion\nis as a contribution to shelter the EMS from strains possible as\n\na result of the (rend towards diversification when it is directed\n\noverwhelmingly towards one or other Community currency. In\nview of both the problems which would be posed if the EMCF\nwere to shoulder an exchange risk and of the ECU's\ncharacteristics, notably the absence of institutional convert-\nibility, it would seem that the possibilities, in the present state\nof affairs, are limited. However, certain 'substitution account'\nformulae might be envisaged, based either on increasing the\nECU's negotiability (e. g. by designation formulae), or on the\nEMS members directly shouldering the exchange risk. This\nwould be the case if the EMCF, having issued ECU against\n\nreserve assets, re-lent the latter to those of its members which\nhad an external deficit to finance. Seen from this angle, the\n\n50\n\n3. 1. It is important to define a sort of ECU 'trademark' so that\nthe term and the instrument 'ECU' is used correctly by the\nmarkets. For example, contracts referring to an 'ECU' defined\n\nas a closed basket should be avoided because the ECU is by\n\nconstruction open to the currencies of future Community\nmembers. The necessary Community \nadopted to ensure that the ECU is not deflected. Thus, for\nexample, prohibiting the insertion of an indexation clause in an\nECU contract would ensure that it remains an instrument of\nstability which is its purpose. The overall purpose would be that\nthe wider private use of the ECU would be solidly based. legislation should be\n\n3. 2. The EIB and the other Community institutions, which use\n\nthe capital markets for raising funds, should set an example by\nlaunching ECU issues and systematically expanding \nECU borrowings. Greater use of the ECU by various\nCommunity institutions would strengthen the ECU's role on\n\ntheir\n\nthe markets and at the same time reaffirm \n\nits role as the\n\nCommunity monetary identity. 3. 3. Other steps should be taken to promote the wider use of\nthe ECU by the financial markets. First the discriminations\ncurrently applying to the ECU in national regulations should\nbe removed (being neither a national nor a foreign currency, it\nis subject to any regulation applying to either). The ECU\nshould be given the status of a foreign currency\u2014a privileged\none\u2014as it is an infant future common currency. The principle\nof free movement within the Community of ECU-denominated\ncapital should also be established, and finally \n\nthe EMCF\n\n\fAnalysis of the possible areas in which the EMS can be developed\n\naddressed primarily at the technical and policy management\n\nshould be empowered to monitor ECU operations and issues\n(calendar, endorsement or joint authorization by the EMCF\nand the national authorities, etc. ). The adoption of a regulation containing the above proposals\n\nwould provide a stable foundation for the expansion of the\nprivate use of the ECU, and would make it an instrument\ncapable of developing the Community's ultimate objectives. Section 4 \u2014 Strengthening policy convergence\n\nThe development of the EMS will not be a real success without\ngreater convergence of economic and monetary policies. Three\nyears' experience have shown that monetary policies were\nconducted largely on the basis of the system's requirements,\nwhich helped to make it a success, but that price and cost trends\ncontinued to diverge. The persistence of these divergences\nimperils the very nature of the EMS, which is in danger of\ngradually being transformed into a crawling peg system. Even\nthe measures to strengthen the system discussed above could\nprove useless or ineffective \nif not backed by real progress\ntowards convergence. New efforts \nnation and convergence must therefore be made. to improve policy coordi-\n\nAll dimensions of economic policy should be considered, and\napproached anew from a single view-point, that of their\ncontribution to convergence towards stability. It is clearly a\nlong and difficult exercise. This problem should always be\nborne in mind when economic policies are formulated. Some\nconcrete decisions should be taken at the Community level and\nbe rapidly implemented, indicating a unerring determination to\nmove towards convergence. These could be:\n\n4. 1. phasing-out or modifying restrictions on capital move-\nments at present authorized under safeguard clauses;\n\n4. 2. discussion, guided by the operating requirements of the\nEMS, of the intermediate objectives of national monetary and\ninterest rate policy;\n\n4. 3. regular examination of the instruments of national\nmonetary policy and their use, and laying down a list of internal\nand external monetary policy measures and instruments which\nare incompatible with participation in the EMS and the\ncustoms union;\n\n4. 4. establishing a system of mutual information and a\nmonitoring procedure\nindebtedness (with a view to encouraging early recourse to\nconditional Community financing). on balances of payments and external\n\nAs agreed by the Monetary Committee in its October 1980 report on\n\nrecycling (\u00a7 3. 4). Most of the necessary decisions relate to a more active\nconcertation of monetary policies. It cannot be claimed that by\nthemselves they could remedy \nthe inadequate degree of\nconvergence, but only that they could help to do so: they\ntherefore only represent a number of small steps forward. Section 5 \u2014 Conclusions\n\nThe possibilities for developing, strengthening and consolidat-\ning the EMS, presented above, form a balanced whole. They\nmaintain the system's existing degree of solidarity and\nstrictness while extending its scope; and, as has been shown in\n\nthe report of the Alternates of the Monetary Committee of 3\n\nFebruary 1982, putting them into effect would not generally\ngive rise to any insurmountable technical problems. They are\n\ndomains; and are within the limits of the existing institutional\nframework. They represent a necessary step forward. The\nanalysis of nearly three years of operation has shown that the\nsuccesses are fragile. The system must be strengthened from\nwithin and its ability to resist outside shocks must be increased. In summary the possibilities for development discussed above\namount to:\n\n(1) Making the system more coherent:\n\n- by reinforcing the ECU role as the centre of the system\nthrough establishing some degree of control over the\nprocess of creating ECU which, together with removing\nits acceptance limit modifying the interest rate formula\n\nand increasing its negotiability, will encourage an\nincreased use within the system;\n\n- by removing certain imperfections and filling some gaps\n\nin the system mechanisms through:\n\n- organizing the use of Community currencies for infra-\n\nmarginal interventions and extending the very short-\nterm financing to these interventions;\n\n- coordinating relations vis-a-vis the dollar by defining\na common attitude, with a quantitatively expressed\n'zone of probability', and by cooperating over interest\nrates;\n\n- taking a step \n\ntowards consolidating the credit\n\nmechanisms by making the EMCF responsible for the\nshort-term monetary support. (2) Opening the system towards the outside by permitting third\ncountry monetary authorities to hold and use the ECU. (3) Encouraging the use of the ECU on the financial markets\n\nby protecting its image of stability, by increasing the ECU\n\nborrowing and lending activity of Community institutions,\nby minimizing restrictions on the use of the ECU by\n\n51\n\n \nl\n\fThe development ofthe European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\nprogressively \nnominated capital. liberalizing the movement of ECU de-\n\n(4) Reinforcing policy convergence by fully utilizing the\n\nexisting framework and by improving the follow-up to\nmeasures taken. the narrowing to 2,25% of the Italian lira's present margins)\n\nwould bring the system to full fruition and would act as a signal\nto the markets and to public opinion of the determination to\npursue in common the attempt\u2014accepted and recognized by\nall\u2014to establish a zone of monetary stability in Europe. As well as these technical improvements, there are others, with\nmore political content. These are, in particular, the full\nparticipation of sterling and the lira, and the issue of an ECU\ncoin which would circulate freely throughout the Community. The European Monetary System will not assume its full\nsignificance and will not achieve its full potential until it\norganizes, on an equal footing, the exchange rate relationships\nof all the Community currencies: sterling's, and later the\ndrachma's, participation in the exchange rate mechanism (and\n\nFrom another point of view, the issue of an ECU coin ' would\nstrike public opinion just as hard, though in a different way: by\nbringing the ECU out ofthe specialists' circle (central banks,\nexchange dealers, capital market operators) to which it is now\nconfined, and putting it in the pocket ofthe man in the street,\nthe ECU's destiny as the monetary symbol ofthe Community\nwould be fully affirmed. See Annex C-2: Minting an ECU coin. 52\n\n\fCommission proposals for a non-institutional development of the EMS\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n2. The ECU\n\nCommission proposals for a non-institutional\ndevelopment of the EMS\n\nIn the spring of 1982, as a result of the postponement of the\ninstitutional phase and the Council's manifest intention\nnevertheless to develop the EMS to some extent, the\nCommission presented the Council (Economic and Financial\nAffairs) of 15 March 1982 with proposals for action that\ncould be implemented without it being necessary to amend\nthe Treaties. Section I below reproduces the text of the Draft Resolution\nsubmitted to the Council' by the Commission, while\nSection II reviews the principal arguments put forward when\n\nthe text was examined by the Community bodies concerned. It will be remembered that the Council, meeting in informal\nsession on 15 May 1982, was unable to agree on the draft, but\nthat it instructed the Monetary Committee and the\nCommittee of Governors to keep these questions under\nreview. 2. 1. 1. At the next quarterly swap, the base volume of ECU will\n\nbe set at 40 000 million 2. This base volume will remain until\nthe end of the present period of swaps. During this period, quarterly value adjustments will relate to\nthe quantities of gold and dollars transferred to the EMCFby\n\nthe central banks. Volume adjustments will continue to be\n\nmade according to the existing system. A new base volume will be fixed when the decision is to be taken\n\non the renewal of (he swap system (15 March 1983). Alternatively, the reference period to be used for gold valuation\nwill be extended to two years. 2. 1. 2. The acceptance limit on ECU is raised to 100%. 2. 1. 3. The remuneration of ECU net credit positions will be\nfixed by the Central Bank Governors on the basis of market\nexchange rates. 2. 1. 4. Any participant whose net positive position has\nexceeded 5Q\u00b0/\nthese ECU against dollars for \nperiod of swaps. Mobilization should not be done for the sole\npurpose of changing the composition of reserves. of its ECU allocation may, on demand, mobilize\n\u2022 duration of the existing\n\nt: \n\nSection 1 \u2014 Draft Resolution on the\n\ndevelopment of the European\nMonetary System\n\n1. Introduction\n\n1. 1. At the Council meeting of 15 March 1982, the Ministers\n\nof Economics and Financial Affairs of the Member States\nexamined the Commission's communication on strengthening\nof the European Monetary System and listened to reports on\nthis subject from the chairmen of the Monetary Committee and\nCommittee of Central Bank Governors. carry out operations in ECU. ECU bond issues will be the\n\nits determination to continue\n\n1. 2. The Council confirms \nstrengthening the system until its transition to the institutional\nstage at the appropriate time. It agreed to keep under review\nthe work on the transition to the final stage of the system and\nthe creation of the European Monetary Fund already\nundertaken by the Commission and the competent committees. 1. 3. The Council is determined to move forward \nestablishing the final phase of the system by adopting the\nfollowing provisions and measures. towards\n\nThe draft was preceded by a communication to the Council (see Annex D). 2. 2. Private use of the ECU\n\n2. 2. 1. The ECU will be the subject of a basic Community text\n\nwhich will lay down its characteristics and the way in which it is\nused. 2. 2. 2. The ECU will have the status of a foreign currency in all\nMember States. National monetary authorities will permit the\nfinancial institutions under their control to open accounts and\n\nsubject of a Community mutual information procedure. 2. 2. 3. Indexation clauses will not be permitted to apply, apart\nfrom by exception, to claims, values or prices expressed in\nECU. 2. 2. 4. The various Community institutions, and the EIB will\nbe invited to do the same, shall, with the active collaboration of\nthe Member States, undertake to promote the widest possible\nuse of the ECU in the areas for which they are responsible; in\nparticular:\n\n- \n\nthe ECU will be progressively used for borrowing and\nlending operations as far as is compatible with its sound\n\nThis number corresponds approximately to the amount of ECU which\nwould be created if the existing rules were applied at the start of the next\nswap period (April 1982). 53\n\n0\n\fThe development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\nestablishment on the financial markets, the object in view\nbeing for it to account for a similar proportion of such\noperations as do those national currencies which are most\nused;\n\n- Community institutions' accounts in national currencies\nwill, in principle, be replaced by accounts in ECU;\n\n- \n\nthe financial rights and obligations of these institutions will,\nas far as possible, be denominated and settled in ECU. 3. Measures to develop convergence\n\n3. 1. The actual conduct of the economic policies of Member\nStates must be assessed, as regards its results and its methods,\nby reference to the objectives laid down by common agreement. The Commission is invited, in this context, to make full use of\nthe existing consultation and recommendation procedure. 3. 2. The Council of Ministers ECO/FIN will regularly\ndiscuss, on the basis of a report by the Monetary Committee\n\nand the Committee of Governors, the intermediate monetary\n\ntargets and the level of interest rates in the Community\ncountries in the light of their compatibility with the objectives\nof economic policies. Where the intermediate monetary targets\nare concerned, the discussion will take place at least once a\nyear during the fourth quarter. 3. 3. Measures which are incompatible with the proper\nfunctioning of the EMS must be avoided. The Council will, on a\nproposal of the Commission, draw up a list of measures which\nimpede current transactions; implementation of such measures\nwill be prohibited, in the absence of a decision made at the\nCommunity level and for a limited period. relation to the EMS can be acted upon. 3. 4. Except for derogations granted under the Treaty, there\nwill be free movement of ECU-denominated capital. Liberaliz-\nation of other capital movements currently subject \nrestrictions will be sought through an examination of the\nrestrictions in force. to\n\n3. 5. A mutual information and monitoring procedure will be\nestablished on the balance of payments situation and the\nexternal indebtedness of the Member States, in line with the\nsuggestions of the Monetary Committee of October 1980. Early use of Community credit will be encouraged when it is\ncomplementary to a policy aimed at external balance. 4. Organization of the exterior aspects of the system\n\n4. 1. The competent Community institutions will propose to the\n\nUS and Japanese authorities that their regular discussions on\nmonetary problems of common interest should be reinforced. These consultations should also take place when the foreign\nexchange market appears to be unrelated to the underlying\neconomic data\u2014i. e. where rates are obviously outside the\n\n54\n\nlimits that economic likelihood would suggest\u2014or when\ninterest rate differentials \ncause excessive and undesirable\nstrains on the Community's money and financial markets. 4. 2. The European authorities will continue to request the\nUnited States to abandon the principle of not intervening on the\nforeign exchange markets. Cooperation with Community\ncentral banks will be facilitated by the establishment of a single\n\ncredit line between the FED and the EMCF. 4. 3. Coordination of Community central banks' interventions\nin third currencies will be increased. Interventions wilt be based\non a common assessment of the ECU's exchange relationships\n\nand bearing in mind the average level of interest rates desirable\n\nin the Community. of its bilateral rate is more than 85% of the\n\n4. 4. When a currency crosses its divergence threshold\n(lowered to 50% for wider band currencies) or when the\ndifference \nmaximum permitted fluctuation margin against another\nparticipating currency, the central bank of the currency in\nquestion is presumed to be able to intervene in Community\ncurrency and to have access to the very short-term financing. The issuing central banks of currencies used for interventions\nhave the possibility of refusing \nthe continued use of their\ncurrency if this causes problems for their internal monetary\npolicy. Nevertheless, the dollar will continue to be used for\nintra-marginal interventions in cases where, by use of this\ncurrency, the cohesion of the EMS can be maintained and, at\n\nthe same time, an undesirable movement of the dollar in\n\n4. 5. The central banks of countries which seek to have special\neconomic and financial ties with the European Communities\nwill be able to obtain ECU, either by acquiring them from the\nparticipating central banks, or against transfers of reserves, in\nthe form of swaps, from the EMCF. 5. Further procedure\n\n5. 1. So as to implement the provisions of point 2. 2. above, the\nCouncil notes the Commission's intention to submit, to the\nextent this is necessary, the appropriate modifications \nRegulation (EEC) No 3180/78. to\n\n5. 2. The Council invites the central banks to modify \ntheir\nagreement of 13 March 1979 laying down the operating\nprocedures for the European Monetary System to take account\nof points 2. 1. 1. , 4. 4. and 4. 5. above. 5. 3. The Council invites the Commission, in close cooperation\nwith the Monetary Committee and the Committee of\nGovernors, to report in time for \nits July meeting on the\nimplementation of the measures and procedures set out in\nparagraphs 3 and 4 above. Commission proposals for a non-institutional development of the EMS\n\nSection 2 \u2014 Discussion of some of the\n\nproposals\n\ninto consideration in the present transitional stage, where\n\nECU are created precariously through a system of swaps\n\nunder which the EMCF does not have unrestricted freedom\n\nThe Commission's suggestions formally presented in the\nabove draft Resolution were discussed in detail, first by the\nspecialist committees (the Monetary Committee and the\nCommittee of Governors: see Annex E and Annex F), and\nthen by the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs)\nmeeting in February and April 1982. to use the reserves against which the ECU are created. In\n\nthese circumstances, it is both legally and technically\nimpossible for the EMCF to guarantee the convertibility of\nthe ECU. This section summarizes the discussions and deals with the\nmain objections to the Commission's proposals. in ECU at the settlement date for drawings on the very short-\n\n1. Must greater convergence precede any development of the\n\nsystem ?\n\nSome governments believe that the lack of convergence\nbetween the Community economies poses the main threat to\nthe EMS. The most pressing requirement is therefore for\npolicies that will increase convergence rather than for\ntechnical improvements that would\u2014however desirable in\nthemselves\u2014distract attention from the real problem. The Commission, too, thinks that the achievement of a\nsatisfactory degree of convergence is essential to prevent an\nundesirable change in the character of the EMS. Indeed, its\nproposals are largely concerned with this matter. But the\nCommission feels that convergence and the development of\nthe system must be pursued simultaneously because each\nreinforces the other. The EMS has undeniably helped to\nstabilize exchange rates and has supported the anti-\ninflationary policies implemented in several countries. There\nis little doubt that, without the EMS, divergence would have\nbeen even greater. Consequently, it is desirable to strengthen\nall aspects of the EMS; this would provide the markets with\ntangible proof of the monetary authorities' commitment to\nthe system, and by this very fact would exert a stabilizing\ninfluence. 2. Link between the acceptability and convertibility of the\n\nECU\n\nSecondly, there is little evidence from past experience to\nsupport the fear of an excessive accumulation of ECU. Such\naccumulation could only derive from settlement operations\n\nterm financing facility, as this is the only instance in which\ncentral banks are entitled to use ECU (up to a limit of 50%) to\ndischarge their debt. All other transfers of ECU must be\nmade by mutual agreement. In the three years of existence of\n\nthe EMS, total repayments of very short-term financing\namounted to the equivalent of 7 300 million ECU, only 9% of\nwhich (660 million ECU) was actually settled in ECU. This\nwas because debtors preferred, and still prefer, to discharge\nas much as possible of their debt by purchasing the creditor's\ncurrency (80 % in this instance) on the market, rather than to\nlose reserves, whether ECU or dollars. Nevertheless, the Commission is aware that future develop-\nments are not necessarily a continuation of past experience,\nand it has attached several other suggestions to its proposal\nthat the ECU be made fully acceptable: control of ECU\ncreation so as to reduce the risk of an inflationary expansion\n\nof the volume; increase in the remuneration on the ECU in\n\norder to enhance its attractiveness to creditors; and the right\nto mobilize ECU when the outstanding amount of ECU held\nby a participant exceeds a certain ceiling (exercise of this right\nbeing perhaps subject to some monitoring of the need for\nconvertible reserves). All in all, the proposed system seems all the more balanced\nsince in the present system the 50% acceptance limit applies\nto each claim and not to the total amount of ECU held by\neach participant. Assuming that, in order to defend their\ncurrencies, several Community countries became debtors of\n\nthe same Community central bank under the very short-term\n\nSome Member States link unlimited acceptability with\ninstitutional convertibility of the ECU. Their main argument\nis that the ECU is only a regional instrument of settlement,\nwhile the international role of certain Community currencies\nmeans that the authorities issuing these currencies need to\nhave a stock of reserve assets that will be accepted by all\ncountries. If acceptability is increased, there is a greater risk\nthat quantities of ECU will be accumulated. These Member\nStates do not therefore think that any increase in accept-\nability can be considered unless the ECU is fully convertible\ninto other assets. This argument calls for two remarks:\n\nFirst, the requirement for a convertible ECU cannot be taken\n\nfinancing facility, that bank would, according to present\nrules, have to accept settlement in ECU for 50% of each of its\nclaims. Contrary to what one might think, the acceptance\nlimit therefore offers no real guarantee against the accumu-\nlation by a central bank of a relatively large amount of ECU\nrelative to the initial stock of ECU acquired against the\ntransfer of reserves. The Commission's proposal would change the present\nsituation by offering potential creditor countries an\nassurance that the net ECU credit positions which they might\nbuild up could be mobilized beyond a certain threshold; at\npresent, the system's creditors can trade in their ECU for\nother exchange assets only through mutually agreed\ntransactions. 55\n\n\fThe development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\nIn the debate, some countries moreover considered the\n\namendment proposed by the Commission too favourable to\nthe system's potential creditors. 3. Reservations about extending the private use of the ECU\n\nIn principle, the Member States are in favour of extending\nthe private use of the ECU, but not all are prepared to follow\nthe Commission's proposals: these aim at promoting and\ngiving a framework to such use by the means of a single basic\ntext giving an official basis to the private use and prescribing\nmethods of use. The basic text would stipulate, among other things, that the\nECU should have the status of a foreign currency. This status\nis in fact already largely granted to it by the monetary\nauthorities in most of the Member States which, dejure or de\nfacto, treat transactions in ECU as foreign currency\ntransactions for the purposes of their exchange regulations. These regulations authorize resident banks to use ECU for a\nwide range of transactions, comparable with those usually\ncarried out in foreign currency. The absence of a genuine European capital market (one of\nthe objectives of economic and monetary union), has been\npartly compensated by the development of the Euromarket. However, this is not enough. So, in order to facilitate the\nemergence of a European capital market, the Commission\nhas proposed establishing the principle of the free movement,\nwithin the Community, of ECU-denominated capital. The Member States with exchange controls find it difficult to\naccept this principle, which could breach their systems of\nprotection; for it would be easy to get round the rules\nforbidding certain exports of capital by denominating\ntransactions in ECU. However, it seems that agreement\nmight be possible on progressive liberalization, starting with\nthe financial operations of the Community institutions,\nwhich are already exempt from exchange controls in most of\n\nthe Member States. It would also be conceivable to free ECU\n\nissues for Community residents within an annual ceiling that\ncould be raised periodically. The Commission's proposals on developing the use of the\nECU for the Community institutions' borrowing and\nlending activities have been well received. However, its\n\nsuggestions for the ECU to be used, first for keeping the\n\nCommission's accounts with the financial institutions of the\nMember States and second for denominating the rights and\nobligations which the Commission contracts met with some\nmisgiving. Modelling itself on the rules in force in some countries (e. g. Germany) for claims and prices expressed in national\ncurrencies, the Commission has proposed that claims, values\nand prices expressed in ECU may not, except by way of\nderogation, carry indexation clauses; it feels that such\n\n56\n\nclauses could damage the good reputation of the ECU, which\nis intended to be an instrument of stability and should\ntherefore be based on solid foundations. Discussion has\nshown that formulation of such a principle applying\nspecifically to the ECU did not seem essential to a number of\nMember States which felt that the treatment of the ECU in\nthis respect should conform to the general rules applicable in\nthose countries. 4. Objections to the organization of intra-marginal interven-\n\ntions\n\nIn the present system, intra-marginal interventions in an\n\nEMS currency, like the acquisition of an EMS currency\n\nthrough the very short-term financing facility, requires the\nprior agreement of the issuing bank. For some of the central\nbanks, the Commission's proposals for improving the\norganization of these transactions are unacceptable, as they\ncould interfere with national autonomy as regards monetary\npolicy. The strong-currency countries, i. e. those likely to be\nsupplying the intervention currencies, point out- that the use\nof the VSTF facility for intra-marginal interventions would\nbe inflationary in that it would increase the volume of money\nsupply during the facility's period of activation. The same central banks also feel it undesirable to embark on\n\nthe de facto reduction of the 2,25% fluctuation margins since\nthis would mean a systemization of procedures relating to\nintra-marginal interventions. The Commission supports its position by pointing to two\nfacts. First, since the EMS was introduced central banks\nhave intervened within margins, mainly in order to keep the\noverall cost of intervention down; second, the present prior\nagreement procedure has frequently turned out in practice to\nbe too lengthy in view of the requirements of rapidly\nchanging markets, so that monetary authorities have tended\nto save time by intervening in dollars rather than in the\nCommunity currencies. Consequently, the Commission thinks the intervention\nprocedure should be improved by giving the central banks a\nlimited power of initiative, while ensuring that there is no\nadverse effect on the conduct of internal monetary policy in\nthe country whose currency is used. The implementation of\nthe Commission's proposals could lead to better balance\nbetween interventions in Community currencies and inter-\nventions in dollars, allowing the choice to depend on the\nrespective movements of the currencies in question. This\nwould prevent dollar interventions being used to maintain\nthe cohesion of the EMS, when such intervention would\nmove the dollar in an undesired direction. Conversely, the\ndollar, and not Community currencies, would be used when\nuse of the dollar would help both the cohesion of the EMS\nand the stabilization of its exchange rate. In concrete terms,\nthis would mean that weakening Community currencies\nwould be supported by the sale of other Community\ncurrencies rather than dollars when it was obvious that the\nexchange rate of the dollar ought not to fall further. Commission proposals for a non-institutional development of the EMS\n\nHowever, if the dollar exchange rate was too high, weak\nCommunity currencies would have to be supported,\nprimarily by sales of dollars. This improvement in the\ncoordination of interventions as a whole would not interfere\nwith the requirements of national monetary policies since the\namounts of national currency automatically available would\n\nbe small, and since the central banks involved would be able\nto suspend recourse to their currencies. 5. External aspects: acquisition of ECU by third countries\n\nMost of the Community countries think that, in the non-\ninstitutional stage, the use of the ECU can be extended\nbeyond the Community frontiers only with great caution. It\nwould be advisable, in particular, to authorize only the\ntransfer to third countries of pre-existing ECU by the\nCommunity central banks. For so long as the system for\ncreating the ECU makes it a precarious asset which cannot\nbe converted through the EMCF, any creation of new ECU\nfor non-Community countries is out of the question. Although its own proposal goes further, the Commission is\nprepared to accept this argument, which would enable the\narea of use of the ECU to be extended and would therefore\nconstitute some progress. 6. Legal problems raised by the non-institutional development\n\nof the EMS\n\nThe Commission considers that the changes to the present\nsystem could be made on the basis of Article 235 of the\nTreaty of Rome,' and by amending the Agreement of\n13 March 1979 between the central banks: numerous\nCouncil statements have clearly established that the\ndevelopment of the EMS is necessary to achieve the\nCommunity's objectives of promoting continuous and\nbalanced expansion, an increase in stability and closer\nrelations between the Member States (see Article 2 of the\nEEC Treaty). Furthermore the substance of the Commission\nproposals is in keeping with the logic of the Resolutions of\nthe Bremen and Brussels European Councils which are\nthemselves the basis of the present system. Although most of the Community Member States take the\nsame view as the Commission, there is not unanimity. Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome:\n'If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the\ncourse of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the\nCommunity and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the\nCouncil shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission\nand after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures. '\n\nThe need to resort to Article 2362 (i. e. to amend the Treaty)\nis upheld by the countries in which domestic monetary order\nis based on the Constitution and the central bank's\nindependence from government. In these circumstances, and\ngiven the effects of the Commission's proposals on the\ndomestic monetary policies in Member States, they feel that\nsuccessive changes to the EMS based on Article 235 would\ngradually undermine the sovereignty Member States have\nover monetary matters without there having been a debate\nbeforehand in national parliaments. Such a debate\u2014and\nwith it recourse to Article 236\u2014is thought to be essential, as\nis detailed consideration of the development of the EMS by\nthe legislative authorities would provide the system with a\nclear legal basis and place it firmly on democratic found-\nations. Although aware of the validity of the arguments put forward\nby the supporters of recourse to Article 236, the Commission\nfeels that a revision of the Treaty would not be essential for\nthe development of the EMS in the way in which'it proposes. Recourse to Article 235, can, at this stage of the discussion,\nprovide an adequate legal basis for making technical\nimprovements to a system itself based on that Article. Conclusion\n\nAfter a series of discussions during the first four months of\n1982, the Monetary Committee, which concentrated initially\non the system's mechanisms, tried to devise a compromise\nwhich might be based on the following points:\n\n(i) raising the acceptance limit of the ECU from 50% to\n\n60% or 70% (instead of 100%, as suggested by the\nCommission);\n\n(ii) allowing the VSTF facility to be used to finance intra-\nmarginal interventions, while maintaining, under\ncertain conditions, the right of veto of the creditor\ncentral bank; (the Commission had proposed automatic\naccess to the VSTF facility for intra-marginal interven-\ntion, unless the central banks issuing the intervention\ncurrencies proved that the use of their currencies\nimpeded the conduct of domestic monetary policy);\n\nArticle 236 of the Treaty of Rome:\n\"The government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to\n\nthe Council proposals for the amendment of this Treaty. If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and, where appropriate, the\nCommission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of\nrepresentatives of the governments of the Member States, the conference\nshall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of\ndetermining by common accord the amendments to be made to this\nTreaty. The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the\nMember States in accordance with their respective constitutional\nrequirements. '\n\n57\n\n\fThe development of the European Monetary System in its present institutional framework\n\n(iii) lengthening the reference period to be used for the\nvaluation of gold from six months to one year; (the\nCommission had proposed an extension to two years);\n\nHowever, a consensus could not be reached on these\nproposals, chiefly because it was impossible to overcome the\nobjections to the proposals concerning the acceptability of\nthe ECU and intra-marginal interventions. (iv) opening up the System to the outside world by\nauthorizing the central banks of European countries\nhaving particularly close links with the Community to\nacquire ECU from EEC issuing institutions; (the\nCommission had proposed that third countries would\nalso be able to acquire ECU against transfers of reserves\nin the form of swaps with the EMCF). The difficulties in reaching a technical consensus were\ncompounded by the prevailing feeling, expressed in the oral\nstatements of the Chairmen of the Monetary Committee and\nof the Committee of Governors on 17 May 1982 (see\nAnnexes E and F), that given the economic and monetary\nsituation in the Community, absolute priority should be\ngiven to improving the convergence of economic policies. 58\n\n\fPART THREE\n\nPreliminary synthesis of ideas on the institutional stage of the European\nMonetary System\n\nTransition to the final stage of the EMS, which will be a decisive step in the progress towards\neconomic and monetary union in the Community, will be achieved only if sustained efforts\n\nare made to promote economic convergence (cf. Part One) and if a genuine political resolve\n\nis forthcoming. By definition, final consolidation of the EMS means that Member States\nmust relinquish at least some of their national policy-making powers and that there must be\nan active search for common solutions to the main problems with which the Community is\ngenerally confronted. Consequently, this European construction would have to have a tangible effect at the day-\nto-day operational level, and have to make its impact felt as a means of creating at the\nCommunity level broader and more effective potential for action than in each individual\nMember State. The interdependence of Member States, which is already a fact of life,\nshould be positively exploited as a source of strength and so as to enable the Community to\nbecome a pole of monetary attraction in its own right in international relations. If there were a real desire to make headway, the legal problems would not be an\ninsurmountable obstacle, and a start could be made in the process of monetary integration\ninvolving the transfer to the Community of prerogatives hitherto exercised by each\nindividual country's monetary authorities. In March 1980 the Commission sent to the European Council a report concerning the\n\nEuropean Monetary Fund. l All the subsequent work up until now has been inspired by the\nideas in that document. During 1980 and 1981, the Commission prepared for the Monetary\nCommittee a number of working papers which examined direct transition from the initial\nstage to the institutional stage of the EMS, and did not envisage any intermediate stage for\ndeveloping the system (cf. Part Two). Although these papers no longer necessarily reflect, in\nall their points, the arguments that could currently be developed, nevertheless, it was felt\nuseful to attach them as an annex. The crucial feature of the institutional phase is the establishment of a decision-making\nbody, the European Monetary Fund, which is entrusted and empowered to pursue the\nobjective of creating a stable European monetary standard. As the way in which this\nobjective is achieved will depend upon the Fund s decisions in response to prevailing\nconditions, it is neither necessary nor possible to lay down in detail a specification for the\ninstitutional phase of the EMS. It is, however, necessary and possible to specify a number of\npreconditions and likely features. This is done below through some brief considerations on:\n\n(i) the ECU;\n\n(ii) the Fund;\n(iii) the exterior aspects of the EMS;\n\n(iv) institutional questions. 1 \n\nSee Annex H. 59\n\n\fPreliminary synthesis of the ideas on the institutional stage of the European Monetary System\n\nSection 1 \u2014 The ECU\n\nThe ECU will be the sight liability of the Fund and as such\n\nwill be used by the participating central banks. It will also be\n\nused progressively by the private sector to denominate the\nwhole range of financial transactions. The conditions\n\nsurrounding the use of the Fund's sight liability within the\n\nsystem is a matter between the participants; they may have\nconventions, rules and ad hoc agreements as discussed below. position of ECU use will only gradually be achieved, but an\nobvious first step is the removal of the 50% acceptance limit. The purpose is to ensure that there is a demand for the asset\n\nwhich is under the control of the system and which can\ntherefore exert a disciplinary effect. The more it is used, the\nmore other instruments are effectively demonetized within\nthe system. At present the relatively easy availability of\nsettlement instruments, especially the dollar, through the\ninternational markets allow countries to delay necessary\nadjustments to external imbalances. In the institutional\n\nphase of the EMS, the ECU will play an important role in\n\ntransactions cannot be forced upon parties to contracts but it\ncan be permitted and encouraged by legislation and more\nimportantly by ensuring that the ECU is attractive. For both\nthe official and the private roles, it is essential that the ECU's\nfundamental characteristics allow the Fund to develop it in\nsuch a way that it is associated with stability. and in the light of its use by the participants. ensuring that timely adjustments are made. For cases where\nadditional financing is needed the credit mechanisms will be\nconsolidated in the Fund. Decisions on credit will therefore\nbe made as a complement to the decisions on ECU creation\n\nThe use of the ECU to denominate private financial\n\nThe present definition of the ECU as a basket ties it to the\nnational currencies. It can be neither more nor less stable\nthan the best or worst of them. This is a prudent formula and\ngives support to the ECU in its formative stage. It uses the\njoint identity of the component currencies while it is\nacquiring its own. The purpose of the EMS is to ensure that\nthe component currencies are stable; and as it succeeds, the\nECU, defined in terms of them, will also become more stable. It might also however be desirable at some stage that it is\nmore stable than their average, in which case the existing\nbasket definition would have to be modified. Eventually\nwhen a single stable monetary standard is achieved the\ndefinition becomes irrelevant as there will then be no\nfundamental difference between the national currencies or\nbetween them and the ECU. Within the system the supply and demand conditions for the\nECU should be developed in such a way as to be conducive to\nstability. The method chosen for ECU creation must reflect\nthe fact that any money can only exert a disciplinary effect\nthrough scarcity. The present method of ECU creation\nagainst a swap of gold and dollars suffers from the overriding\ndisadvantage that the decision on the quantity of ECU in the\nsystem has been abandoned to a formula based on the\nmarket price of two assets which are not in the control of the\nparticipants. In the institutional phase, the Fund should have\nthe power to control the quantity of ECU and should do so in\nthe interests of the aims of the system. This has clear\nimplications for the way in which gold and dollars are\ntransferred to the system as will be discussed below. The\ntransfers must allow the creation of a permanent ECU and\nfull control over the quantity. As well as being the system's settlement instrument, the\nECU's qualities as a reserve asset must be ensured. It must be\nas attractive as other assets held as reserves, i. e. as dollars,\n\ngold, SDR etc. Given the very different qualities of each of\n\nthese, the implications for the ECU are not immediately\n\nclear, but it is true that special measures for the ECU may be\n\nnecessary because its use is confined to a regional block. The\nparticipants will continue to need and hold other reserve\nassets and it is important to consider how one asset can be\ntransformed into another, and especially how dollars may be\nacquired with ECU. Two complementary procedures are\nnecessary. The ECU should be both negotiable and\nconvertible. Negotiability is the regulated possibility to exchange ECU\nfor dollars with other participants of the system. The\npossibility already exists in the present phase of the EMS and\n\nhas been used to a limited extent. Although the transactions\n\nmay be recorded by the Fund they essentially involve a\nvoluntary agreement of two central banks. There is now a\nprovision that such transactions shall not be done for the sole\npurpose of reserve diversification. Potential net ECU\naccumulators may fear that even if this provision was\nremoved their access to dollars would be too limited given the\nsmall number of ECU holders. It would be possible to\nsupplement the voluntary negotiability with a designation\nscheme. This would involve some participants being\ndesignated to supply dollars to another participant in given\ncircumstances determined by the Fund. They would then\nhave to supply dollars either according to a pre-arranged key\nor according to their ability as judged by the Fund. Such a\nscheme has great similarities with the short-term monetary\nsupport and is a form of credit arrangement. All settlements between participating central banks would\nnormally be made fully and exclusively in ECU. Changes in\nthe amount of other reserve assets held by the participants\nand the Fund would occur only in relation to exterior\nimbalances which will be discussed below. Moving to this\n\nConvertibility is also necessary. Institutional convertibility\nmeans that under certain circumstances the Fund would be\nobliged to provide dollars to members in return for ECU\nwhich should thus be destroyed. The main questions posed\nby convertibility are associated with the circumstances in\n\n60\n\n\fPreliminary synthesis of the ideas on the institutional stage of the European Monetary System\n\nwhich, and the price at which these operations would be done\nand the possible effect on the Fund's liquidity. The degree to\nwhich institutional convertibility is necessary depends upon\nthe size of the potential imbalances within the system and the\nresultant net ECU positions as well as on the extent to which\nparticipants need other reserve assets. The Fund must be\ngiven powers to influence these factors as well as being in a\nposition to use the dollars that have been transferred, or\nother assets, to acquire dollars, to the extent necessary to\nensure the required degree of institutional convertibility. The major difference between convertibility and negoti-\nability is that the former involves the destruction of ECU\nwhereas the latter only involves a redistribution between\nparticipants. It is therefore natural that whereas the Fund\nmust be directly involved in convertibility it need not\nnecessarily be involved in negotiability, although there\nwould be cases in which it was desirable that it should be\nbecause the distribution of ECU could be an important\nelement in overall control. When reserve assets are being held in considerable amounts\n\nand for long periods of time, a supplementary factor to their\n\ncharacteristics as a store of value is any income that can be\nearned. The growth of dollar holdings during the Bretton\nWoods System was certainly associated with the fact that it\nwas better than gold in that it could be converted into gold\nand held in a form which carried an interest payment. Given\nthe very different proportions in which its central banks hold\ngold and dollars it is clear either that they do not decide\nreserve composition using portfolio optimizing techniques or\nthat they have very different views about the future. Considering this and the fact that interest payments have\noften been swamped by capital movements, the importance\nof interest-type payments on ECU should not be exag-\ngerated. A return is available on dollars because central\nbanks hold their dollars in the form of bonds and obligations\nmainly of the US Government. The same procedure is not\navailable for official ECU as long as no official authority\nissues ECU-denominated securities, but the Fund will have\nsome income from its assets which could be used to\nremunerate ECU. The remuneration per ECU will depend\nupon the quantity of ECU created on the income available to\nthe Fund. This latter is based on the actual income on dollars,\nany income available on gold, and any income from credit. Section 2 \u2014 The Fund\n\nTo ensure the development of a common and stable\nmonetary standard for the Community, the Fund will\neventually have to make decisions over the whole range of\nmonetary policy dimensions: exchange rates, external\nfinancing, domestic monetary developments. The instru-\n\nments which it can use will depend upon its power to\n\ninfluence the monetary policy in Member States. Initially,\nthe Fund will concentrate on the exchange rate and financing\ndimensions of monetary policy while the adjustment\ndimensions will remain primarily the responsibility of\nnational authorities. Exchange rates\n\nThe exchange rate mechanism includes both day-to-day\ninterventions and changes in central rates. The exterior\naspects of the system are examined below and so here only\ninterventions in Community currencies are considered. Without large quantities of national currencies the Fund\ncould not itself undertake interventions. Member central\nbanks have both the market size and the skills to be the active\noperators in this area for their own currencies. There is no\nneed to change this situation in the institutional phase. The very short-term financing facility has proved a useful\n\naddition to the intervention mechanisms, and the Fund\n\nwould continue to play its accounting role for these\noperations. However, the mechanisms would also be made\nless rigid by making: (i) the financing period variable below\na maximum rather than fixed; (ii) the interest rate set\ndiscretionally, and (iii) credit available also for intra-\nmarginal interventions under circumstances and conditions\nto be determined. The Fund would have to make decisions\non these questions in the light of the prevailing circum-\nstances. Parity changes are already decided by mutual agreement\nthrough a common procedure. In the institutional phase, it\nwould be natural to incorporate realignments into the\nFund's decision-making structure. No rules about the\nappropriate size or time of parity changes can be prespeci-\nfied, but guidelines may help both technical judgment and\npolicy decisions. In this sense, the divergence indicator can\ncontinue to be used as a method of monitoring developments\non the exchange markets, but other monetary markets\nshould also be followed, as well as the underlying economic\ndevelopments. The Fund will have to develop extensive\ntechnical capacities in these fields so that it can provide a\nmajor input into the overall decision-making process. Although they are the necessary final point of a process of\nmonetary integration, irreversibly fixed parities should not\nbe rigidly planned in advance. As long as central rates are the\nresult of a common decision through the Fund they could\ncontinue to be adjustable after the establishment of the\ninstitutional phase without undermining the objective of\nstability. The Fund's balance sheet\n\nThe Fund's decisions will be reflected in its balance sheet,\n\nand to a considerable extent its powers are determined by its\n\n61\n\n\fPreliminary synthesis of the ideas on the institutional stage of the European Monetary System\n\nasset transformation ability within the balance sheet. The\nliability side of the ECU was discussed above; it is now\nnecessary to consider the asset side. (a) Initial transfer\n\nThe present swap system has various defects: the number of\nECU created is mechanically determined by the transfer; this\nnumber is unstable, depending upon the price of gold and the\ndollar exchange rate; and it is unrelated to the needs of either\nthe system as a whole or of individual participants. Furthermore, as the participants have the right to the return\nof exactly the gold and dollars which they transfer, the ECU\ncreated are nothing more than a transient denomination of\nthe particular gold and dollars transferred by each individual\nparticipant. The transfer of assets in the institutional phase\nshould avoid these problems. Along with delicate political questions, the definitive transfer\nof reserves poses economic problems because gold and\ndollars have very different characteristics and a highly\nvolatile price relationship, which makes the decision on the\ninitial price or valuation method difficult. It would be wise to\nseparate the problem of transfer of assets as much as possible\nfrom that of the initial volume of ECU and its distribution\nbetween participants. Through their transfer of gold and\ndollars, the members of the system would participate in the\nFund. As a separate action the Fund would then issue an\ninitial quantity of ECU without specifying an ECU price for\nthe two assets. The total amount of gold and dollars\ntransferred would then take into account the need for the\n\nFund to be a credible financial institution and its potential\n\noperational role inside and outside the system. The gold\nproportion of this total amount would depend upon the\nextent to which it is thought desirable to mobilize gold. (b) Subsequent operations\n\nOnce the Fund is established with an initial quantity of assets\nand a set of decision-making procedures, its main task, apart\n\nfrom exchange rate policy, will be to control the total\nquantity of ECU consistently with its policy objectives. It will\ndo so by exchanging assets against ECU, such assets being\n'external' (gold and dollars) or 'internal' ones (credit). ECU creation (or destruction) against other reserve assets\n\nwill occur through the obligation of participants to hold in\n\nECU not less than a given percentage of their reserves and/or\n\nthrough conversion permitted under certain circumstances. For the latter case possibilities will depend not only on the\n\nextent of institutional convertibility as discussed above but\nalso on dispositions enabling members to obtain ECU\nagainst dollars. As to credit, the present mechanisms have been largely taken\nover from pre-EMS arrangements and do not necessarily\n\n62\n\nand the foreign exchange needed for intervention purposes\n\ngive rise to ECU creation or assets in ECU except in the case\nof the very short-term financing facility. Instead, ECU\n\n(created from gold or dollars) are partly used for reimburse-\nment. At present, although the short-term mechanism is\nmeant to be a mechanism of 'first resort' it has hardly been\nused, simply because access to international capital markets\n\nhas been so free. In the next stage, private access would\nremain unchanged but official access would be less as ECU\nrather than dollars would be needed for Community\nsettlements. Credit could then become a significant policy\ninstrument in the hands of the Fund. The establishment of the institutional stage would un-\ndoubtedly imply consolidation within the EMS of the\nexisting Community credit mechanisms: the very short-term\nfinancing, \nmedium-term financial mechanism. the short-term monetary support and the\n\nConsolidation of the VSTF facility raises two issues:\nprovision of the currency requested and the settlement and\nfinancing procedures. As for the first point, there is room for\nimprovement on two fronts: intra-marginal interventions\ncould, if not already eligible, qualify for the VSTF facility,\n\ncould be supplied by the European Monetary Fund and not,\nas at present, on a bilateral basis by the banks participating in\nthe exchange-rate mechanism. An innovation could also be\nintroduced in the settlement procedures under the VSTF\nfacility whereby the creditor central bank could have its\ndebts settled immediately in ECU created by the Fund. In\nreturn, the latter would acquire a claim, also in ECU, on the\ndebtor bank. As concerns the consolidation of the STMS and\nMTFA it would have to be accompanied by a revision of the\namount of credit available and of the conditionality both in\nthe light of the Fund's responsibilities in the adjustment\nprocess. The credit instruments available in the Fund would probably\n\nnot be the same as those now in existence which are largely\nautomatic and which are separated by duration. It is\nnecessary to consider credit generally from a functional point\nof view and ask what overall limitations on amount and\nduration are necessary. Within any such limits, the Fund\nshould make discretionary decisions about whether credit\nshould be granted in a particular instance or not, and if so on\nwhat conditions as to duration, interest rate, etc. A decision\nto grant credit would thus be parallel to one on exchange\nrates. It would be natural in both cases that general policies\nof the member countries are reviewed and recommendations\nmade. Situations may arise when there are too many ECU, with the\nresult that credit becomes an irrelevant policy instrument. In\nthese circumstances, the Fund would be incapable of\npursuing its objectives if it could not take measures to\ndecrease the amount of liquid ECU. This could be done by a\n\n\fPreliminary synthesis of the ideas on the institutional stage of the European Monetary System\n\nratio type method which would require members (a member)\nunder certain circumstances to hold a given percentage of its\ntotal ECU in a term deposit rather than as sight ECU. Alternatively the Fund could vary the attractiveness of term\ndeposits relative to sight ECU through the interest rate. Normally only a low interest rate at most would be payable\non sight ECU and participants could be encouraged to hold\nless sight ECU and more term deposits through an increase in\nthe interest rate on the latter. repartition of the change in reserves among the member\ncentral banks. From an operational point of view there\nwould be no need for the Fund itself to undertake the task of\nintervening on the exchange markets. This could continue to\nbe done by member central banks, once they act in execution\nof a commonly defined policy line. Such a common dollar\npolicy would be consistent with the idea outlined above that\nsettlements within the system would be made exclusively in\nECU, and hence that dollars would have a purely external\nrole. Section 3 \u2014 Exterior aspects of the EMS\n\nIn its institutional stage, the EMS will have to develop in a\nway consistent with the main features of the post-Bretton\nWoods era. International monetary relationships are no\nlonger organized by one dominant currency. Various new\nreserve centres have emerged. Managed floating has become\nthe prevailing exchange rate regime. Private financial\ninstitutions have largely outgrown official ones in the role of\ncreating international liquidity and of intermediating\nbetween surplus and deficit countries. Domestic monetary\ntargets have to a large extent replaced gold as the anchor of\nthe money creation process. The institutional phase must satisfy three requirements. First, it must help the effective conduct of external monetary\npolicy by the Community. Second, it must promote\ncooperation with outside monetary authorities. Third, it\nmust contribute to the evolution towards a new world\nmonetary order. Regardless of the attitude of the American authorities vis-a-\nvis their exchange rates and intervention, member countries\nof the Community have since 1971 always individually\nfollowed a policy of managed floating vis-d-vis the dollar but\nhave never accepted common management. This is inef-\nficient because it allows internal policy differences to be\nconcealed; it lets the dollar/German mark relationship\nmagnify the EMS/dollar relationship, with the result of\nsometimes reducing and sometimes amplifying the intra-\nEMS tensions generated by internal factors; and it may lead\nto contradictory actions on the exchanges such as simul-\ntaneous buying and selling of dollars by different particip-\n\nants. For the institutional phase, a truly 'common dollar\n\npolicy' should consist in handling dollar interventions by\ncommon decision through the Fund. Collective decisions on\n\nthe necessary amount of intervention would, like individual\ndecisions taken today, be based on a judgment about the\ndesirable combination of exchange rate and reserve object-\nives. There is no technical difficulty in stating such objectives\nin terms of an ECU/dollar exchange rate and of the desirable\nchange of dollar reserves for the system as a whole. In contrast to intervention policy, monetary cooperation\nwith other authorities outside the EMS requires agreement\nand participation by other parties. Such parties are not only\nthe US authorities, but also the authorities of other\nimportant monetary centres, such as Japan and the oil-\nproducing countries. Monetary cooperation may take\nseveral forms in the areas of exchange rate management and\nof financing payments imbalances. The common definition\nof some kind of exchange rate target among key world\n\ncurrencies seems unlikely today, but could be considered\nagain in the future. Actions are possible in the field of\nfinancing, such as activation of swap lines between monetary\nauthorities or official borrowing or lending like the 'Carter\nBonds' as in 1978. A well developed EMS could have\nconsidered an equivalent action in 1981, when exchange rates\nclearly moved out of line but when market pressures were too\nstrong for interventions alone to be effective. Similarly, the\nCommunity could finance protracted oil deficits with its own\nliability, thus also meeting the desire of OPEC countries to\nhold non-dollar denominated assets. A full development of\nboth common intervention policy and of a common policy of\nfinancing payments imbalances by the EMS would require\nthat ECU-denominated assets of different maturities be\nissued to non-members of the system. Finally, the European Monetary System will have a role in\npromoting the evolution of the international monetary\nsystem. If the ECU and the EMS were fully developed, the\nnatural consequence would be for them to replace the\nexisting currencies and their authorities in international\nmonetary relationships. The ECU would have a larger role to\nplay than the sum of national currencies would have in its\nabsence. The ECU would thus be one of the few currencies of\nwhich the multi-reserve currency system was composed. Such a system would be simpler and less difficult to manage\nthan one in which the European pole had failed to give itself\nthe necessary organization. Section 4 \u2014 Institutional questions\n\nThe difficulty is much more the political one of defining an\n\nappropriate decision-making procedure and a key for the\n\nThe problem of the institutional phase has three facets: the\nfunctional, the institutional, and the legal. The functional\n\n63\n\n\fPreliminary synthesis of the ideas on the institutional stage of the European Monetary System\n\nfacet, to which most of the above has been devoted, is the\nbasis for identifying institutional and legal arrangements. The institutional aspect essentially consists of defining the\nappropriate charter of the Fund. The legal aspect is the\nproblem of approving the charter by a satisfactory pro-\ncedure. These three facets are different but related, and the\nsystem will be able to achieve its objectives only if efficient\n\nand mutually consistent solutions are found for all of them. from majority decisions which are in fact the rule in all\nmultilateral monetary and financial institutions, whether at\nworld or at Community level. In designing the details of\nvoting procedures careful consideration should be given to\npossible formulae such as: the number of board members\ndetermined by the importance of the country; voting powers\nproportional to the capital-quota position; voting powers\ndependent to some extent on credit positions. Some of these\nformulae are used in existing institutions e. g. EIB and IMF. The heart of the institutional problem is giving the Fund the\n\ninstrument and organization that are necessary to assure that\nit not only can but also that it is obliged to pursue the\nnecessary policies to reach the objective of'creating a zone of\nmonetary stability in Europe1 in the sense of both prices and\nexchange rates. In a world in which floating is managed and\nconditions are continuously and unpredictably changing,\nthis requires the possibility to take decisions that are both\ndiscretionary and rapid. In the monetary field there can be no\n'stopping the clock' or 'delaying the campaign year'. An important question is the interdependence between the\nFund and other national and Community institutions. It is\ngenerally agreed that a money-creating institution must\nbenefit from a certain degree of independence if it is to be able\nto resist pressures for excessive liquidity creation that would\ninevitably lead to inflation. Independence has its basis not\nonly on legal provisions, but also on prestige and tradition. In member countries institutional arrangements vary widely\nfrom great to very limited independence of the central bank,\nalthough in no country is independence pushed to the point\nof permitting the central bank to overtly oppose the general\npolicy orientation of the elected government. At the\nCommunity level it is of the greatest importance to properly\nformulate the terms of the problem. the general objective of\n\nIndependence means that the power to create money should\nbe sufficiently separated from the power to spend so as to\nensure that decisions satisfy \nmonetary stability rather than the particular needs of\nindividual spenders. In today's national contexts, this\nessentially means the autonomy of the central bank from the\nbudgetary authority, which is at the same time the largest\nspender and the interpreter of popular will. In a Community\ncontext, the budgetary authority (the Commission, the\nCouncil and the European Parliament) is unlikely to be the\nmajor source of inflationary pressures, as the budget is small\n\nand balanced by law. The 'money spenders' are not only the budgetary authority\n\nbut also, and perhaps more, deficit countries. Seen in this\nlight, the issue of independence is not so much one of\ndetermining which authorities will sit in the organs of the\nFund, as one of defining the decision-making rules, such as\nmajority rules, within such organs. In an institution like the\nEMF, which will have to take decisions, and often to take\nthem very quickly, it is hard to imagine anything different\n\n64\n\nA further category of problems concerns the structure of the\nFund. Different types of institutions have been outlined in\nthe studies discussed by the Alternates of the Monetary\nCommittee: an accounting type, a central bank type, a\nregional IMF type and a suigeneris institution. This typology\nresults from different hypotheses about the attribution to the\nFund of functions that in the present arrangements belong\nalternatively to central banks, ministers, etc. This distinction\nis useful but it should not be carried too far. It is clear from\nthe discussion of the functional aspects that the Fund would\nbe incapable of pursuing its objectives if its responsibilities\ndid not envelop the three dimensions of monetary policy:\nexchange rates, financing and adjustment. These three\ndimensions are part of a whole and yet, in the existing\nnational arrangements, they are split between different\nauthorities (central banks, treasury, other organs and\nagencies) and split in a way that differs from country to\ncountry. A last aspect of the institutional problem is related to the\nevolutionary character of the institutional phase. Although\nthe full potential of the EMS will be realized in a gradual way,\nthe fundamental characteristics of the final form of the\nsystem should be defined from the outset. In other words, the\ndirection of the movement should be stated without\nambiguity from the beginning, but the movement would then\nbe gradual. If this is so, provisions will be needed to assure\nthat the dynamic process will actually occur. The Com-\nmunity knows this kind of problem being itself a dynamic\ninstitutional system. Indeed it has always needed 'a motor',\nalthough through the years this function has been success-\nively performed in very different ways. satisfy different requirements: the need for discretionary and\nrapid decisions; autonomy from actual and potential money-\nspenders ; competence over the full range of dimensions of\nmonetary policy; clearly defined position in the constellation\nof national and Community institutions; provisions to\nassure the evolution of the system. In practice, if the political\nwill develops for a transition to the institutional phase, all\nthese problems may prove less difficult to solve than might at\nfirst sight appear. Existing Community and non-Community\ninstitutions offer a wealth of suggestions to the ingenuity of\nlegislators. To sum up, an appropriate institutional setting will have to\n\n\fAnnexes\n\n\fANNEX A\n\nThe system narrowing the margins of fluctuation\nbetween the currencies of the European Economic Community\nfrom April 1971 to March 1979\n\nSuch possible variations (9%) between the Community\ncurrencies were incompatible with the Werner Plan object-\nives. So, after a Council resolution of 21 March 1972, the\nCommunity central banks agreed, in the Basle Agreement\nsigned on 10 April 1972 which entered into force on 24 April\n1972, to reduce the margins of fluctuation of Community\ncurrencies around their reciprocal parities to + 2,25%, i. e. to\nthe same level as the margins applicable to the US dollar. So that these new margins could be respected (they\ndenoted\u2014and still do\u2014the points for interventions in\nCommunity currencies), the Community's issuing insti-\ntutions agreed (the agreement is still in force) to grant each\nother an unlimited amount of very short-term financing\nfacilities (VSTF) in their currencies; these facilities are\nadministered by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund\n(EMCF). 2. Participating countries and functioning of the snake in the\n\ntunnel\n\nThe system for narrowing the fluctuation margins between\nthe currencies of the European Economic Community from\nApril 1972 to March 1979 (the 'snake') was the precursor to\nthe European Monetary System, which retains some of its\nfeatures. The history of the snake can be split into two periods: April\n1972 to February 1973 and March 1973 to March 1979. I. April 1972 to February 1973: the narrowing\n\nof margins between the European currencies\nin a system of fixed parities (the snake in the\ntunnel)\n\n1. Origin: the Basle Agreement\n\nThe main achievement of the Community's first ten years\n\nwas the establishment of a customs union; at the start of its\nsecond decade the Werner Plan was the first step in an\nattempt to achieve economic and monetary union by stages. In compliance with this plan, the Council, on 22 March 1971,\n\ninvited the central banks of the Member States 'from the\nbeginning of the first stage, and on an experimental basis, to\nhold exchange rate fluctuations between the currencies of\nMember States within margins narrower than those resulting\nfrom the application of the margins in force for the US\ndollar, by means of concerted action with respect to that\ncurrency'. At the end of May 1972, ten countries implemented the\n\nAgreement to reduce margins: the six founder members of\n\nthe EEC (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,\n\nFrance, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands), the three\ncountries which were to accede on 1 January 1973 (Denmark,\nIreland and the United Kingdom) and Norway (see below;\n\nChronology of the 'snake1). The Basle Agreement, as it functioned from April 1972 to\nFebruary 1973, is generally known from the way it looks on a\ngraph, as the 'snake in the tunnel' (see Graph 1). The axis of the tunnel was represented by the parity of the\nCommunity currencies against the US dollar and its two\nouter extremes were formed by the fluctuation limits (i. e. a\n\nNevertheless, speculation against the US dollar in May 1971\nand the deepening crisis culminating in the suspension of the\ndollar's convertibility into gold on 15 August 1971 ' meant\nthat the European monetary authorities were unable to\nimplement these provisions. ceiling of + 2,25% and a floor of - 2,25%) against the dollar\n\nparity. After the Washington Agreement of 18 December 1971,2 the\n\nmaximum spot spread of the EEC currencies around their\nparities, expressed in dollars, were in fact widened to\n\u00b12,25% (as against \u00b10,75% previously). Over time, the\nmaximum fluctuation margins of these currencies were thus\nincreased to 4,50% vis-a-vis the dollar and to 9% vis-a-vis any\nother currency. Within the tunnel\u2014which therefore had a diameter of\n4,50%\u2014the European currencies participating in the Basle\nAgreement moved within a Community band\u2014usually\ncalled the 'Community snake'\u2014which was necessarily\nnarrower than the tunnel since the maximum spread of rates\nwhich two European currencies could show in relation to\ntheir reciprocal parity was limited to 2,25%. The suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold transformed the\ninternational monetary system from an exchange rate system pegged to\ngold (nevertheless a somewhat hybrid system since only the dollar was\nconvertible into gold) into an exchange rate system pegged to the US\ndollar. The main points of the Agreement were:\n\n(i) a general realignment of parities and notably a 7,89% devaluation of\nthe US dollar against gold, the official gold price rising from USD 35\n\nthe 'snake in the tunnel' worked\n\nUp to the start of 1973, \nrelatively well apart from three exceptions. Three Com-\nmunity currencies had to withdraw from the snake and allow\ntheir exchange rates to float: the pound sterling and the Irish\npound, on 23 June 1972, and the Italian lira at the beginning\nof 1973. to USD 38 per ounce;\n\n(ii) a widening of the fluctuation margins from 1% (0,75% for the EEC\n\ncurrencies) to 2,25%. The 1972 Basle Agreement remained in force until the implementation of\n\nthe European Monetary System on 13 March 1979. 67\n\n3\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nII. March 1973 to March 1979: the joint\n\nfloating of the European currencies (the\n'snake outside the tunnel')\n\n1. The abolition of the tunnel and the start of joint floating of\n\nthe European currencies\n\nAt the beginning of 1973, developments on the foreign\n\nexchange market showed that the general parity realignment\ndecided in December 1971 had not ushered in a new period of\nstability for the international monetary system. In fact, February 1973 saw an increase in speculation against\nthe US dollar to the benefit of the German mark and the yen. On 12 February 1973 the dollar was devalued for the second\ntime (10% against the official price of gold which rose from\nUSD 38 to USD 42,22 per ounce). But despite the dollar's\ndevaluation, the foreign exchange markets remained unset-\ntled and had to be closed at the beginning of March 1973. In this crisis situation, the Community Finance Ministers\n\nmet in Brussels on 11 and 12 March 1973 and decided among\n\nother things to keep the maximum spread between six\nCommunity currencies at 2,25% (see below) and to cease\ntheir systematic intervention at the maximum fluctuation\nmargins of the United States dollar. For the European currencies these arrangements marked the\n\nend of the system of fixed parities and the birth of the system\n\nof the joint float, which has been in existence ever since\n\n(though in a modified form since the establishment of the\nEuropean Monetary System on 13 March 1979). To use a metaphor, it can be said that the decision of\n12 March did away with the 'tunnel'\u2014since the maximum\nmargins of fluctuation against the dollar were no longer\ndefended\u2014but retained the snake since the maximum spread\nbetween Community currencies remained fixed at 2,25%. 2. The functioning of the joint float\n\nEight currencies were originally involved in the joint float:\nsix EEC currencies (the Danish krone, the Dutch guilder, the\nFrench franc, the Belgian and Luxembourg francs, and the\nGerman mark) and two other currencies (the Norwegian\nkrone which had been associated since 23 May 1972 and the\nSwedish krona which had entered the joint float on\n19 March 1973). 68\n\nThe six years from March 1973 to March 1979 saw a fall in\n\nthe number of currencies participating in the joint float\n\nmainly because of tensions due to the oil price shocks, the\nvariety of responses to the energy crisis and the lack of\nsuccess of Community policies to reduce economic and\nmonetary divergences. Apart from numerous adjustments of central rates (see\nchronology), the following were the main events:\n\n(i) the French franc, which had withdrawn from the snake\non 19 January 1974, re-entered the joint float system on\n10 July 1975 only to leave it again on 15 March 1976;\n\n(ii) the Swedish krona ceased to be associated with the\n\nsnake on 28 August 1977;\n\n(iii) shortly after the conclusion of negotiations on the\nEuropean Monetary System which provided for the\nimplementation of a new exchange rate mechanism,\nNorway, on 12 December 1978, announced \nits\nwithdrawal from the snake. Thus by the beginning of 1979, only a mini-snake was left,\ncontaining five Community currencies: the Danish krone,\nwhich had maintained its participation in the joint float at\nthe cost of several devaluations, and four 'stronger'\ncurrencies (the Dutch guilder, the Belgian and Luxembourg\nfrancs and the German mark). The other European currencies (French franc, Italian lira,\npound sterling and Irish pound) practised a 'dirty' float. *\n\n* \n\n*\n\nThe European Councils in 1978 (Copenhagen on 7 and 8\n\nApril, Bremen on 6 and 7 July and Brussels on 4 and\n\n5 December) were to reintroduce into the EEC a unified joint\nfloat system vis-a-vis other countries, grouping together eight\nof the EEC countries within the framework of the European\nMonetary System (see Annex B). The effective implementation of the EMS, on 13 March\n\n1979, was accompanied by the abrogation of the Basle\nAgreement signed in 1972 and by the implementation of new\nprovisions. 1\n\n1 Basle Agreement of 13 March 1979 between the central banks of the\n\nMember States of the EEC laying down the operating procedures for the\nEuropean Monetary System. Annex A\n\nChronology of the 'snake'\n\n1974\n\n(April 1972 to March 1979)\n\n7972\n\n24 April \n\nEntry into force of the Basle Agreement of 10\nApril 1972 establishing a fluctuation system\nlimited to 2,25% between Community cur-\nrencies (the snake in the tunnel). The countries\ntaking part were Belgium, France, the Federal\nRepublic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg\nand The Netherlands\n\n19 January \n\nThe French franc leaves the snake\n\n1975\n\n10 July \n\nThe French franc rejoins the snake\n\n1976\n\n15 March \n\nThe French franc again leaves the snake\n\n1 May \n\nThe pound sterling, the Irish pound and the\nDanish krone join the snake\n\n17 October \n\nThe Norwegian krone is associated with the\n\n23 May \n\nsnake\n\n'Frankfurt realignment' of exchange rates\nagainst the EMUA, with the German mark\nbeing revalued by 2%, the Danish krone being\ndevalued by 4% and the Norwegian krone and\nSwedish krona being devalued by 1%\n\n23 June \n\nThe pound sterling and the Irish pound leave\nthe snake\n\n7977\n\n27 June \n\nThe Danish krone leaves the snake\n\n10 October The Danish krone rejoins the snake\n\n7973\n\n13 February The Italian lira leaves the snake\n\n12 March \n\n3% revaluation of the German mark against\n\nthe EMUA1 and announcement by the\n\nCouncil of a joint float of EEC currencies\nwithin margins of fluctuation of 2,25%\nagainst one another, with the exception of the\npound sterling, the Irish pound and the Italian\nlira, which continue to float independently\n\n14 March \n\nThe Swedish krona is associated with the\nsnake\n\n29 June \n\n5,5% revaluation of the German mark against\n\nthe EMUA\n\n1 April \n\n6% devaluation of the Swedish krona and 3%\ndevaluation of both the Danish and the\nNorwegian kroner against the EMUA\n\n28 August \n\nThe Swedish krona leaves the snake, 5%\ndevaluation of both the Danish and the\nNorwegian kroner against the EMUA\n\n1978\n\n13 February 8% devaluation of the Norwegian krone\n\nagainst the EMUA\n\n17 October \n\n4% revaluation of the German mark and 2%\n\nrevaluation of both the Dutch guilder and the\nBelgian franc against the EMUA\n\n4-5 December European Council in Brussels: adoption of a\n\nresolution on the establishment of the Eu-\nropean Monetary System\n\n77 September 5% revaluation of the Dutch guilder against\n\nthe EMUA\n\n12 December The Norwegian krone leaves the snake\n\n16 November 5% revaluation of the Norwegian krone\n\nagainst the EMUA\n\n7979\n\n' \n\nEMUA: European monetary unit of account created on 3 April 1973 and\ndefined by a weight of fine gold (1 EMUA = 0,88867088 grams of fine\ngold, i. e. the gold parity of the dollar from 1934 to 1971). The EMUA was\nthe European Monetary Cooperation Fund's unit of account from 3 April\n1973 (the date on which this body was established) to 31 December 1978. 13 March \nand by the members of the Board of Gover-\n\nSigning by the Governors of the central banks\n\nnors of the EMCF of instruments relating to\nthe implementation of the EMS\n\n69\n\n\fANNEX B\n\nMain features of the European Monetary System\nin its present phase\n\nThe European Monetary System (EMS) was established by\n\nthe Resolution of the Brussels European Council of\n5 December 1978 and implemented on 13 March 1979 after\nthe conclusion of an arrangement on the progressive\nreduction of the monetary compensatory amounts. Table 1\n\nComposition of the ECU\n\nThe ECU is at present equal to the sum of the following amounts\n\nThe Brussels Resolution provided for an initial phase, which\noriginally was to have lasted two years, but which was\nprolonged. In due course, on transition to the definitive\nphase, all the elements of the system will be consolidated, and\nthe European Monetary Fund (EMF) will be set up. All the EEC countries, at the different levels of responsibility\nconcerned, are signatories of the instruments constituting the\nEMS. However, the United Kingdom and Greece do not\nparticipate in the system's exchange rate mechanism and\nItaly's currency benefits from special arrangements which\nwill be described below. Since its creation, numerous commentaries have been\ndevoted to the EMS, including one in particular in European\nEconomy. ' The system will therefore not be described again\nhere; instead a simple reminder of its main features at the\npresent time is given below in two sections \u2014 one relating to\n\nthe ECU and the other to the exchange rate and credit\nmechanisms. I. The ECU\n\nThe ECU is at the centre of the EMS. Its definition, the way in which it is issued and its use are\ndescribed below. A. Definition\n\nThe ECU is defined as a 'currency basket' type of numeraire. A procedure exists for periodically re-examining its com-\nposition and for revising the latter, if necessary. 1. Present situation\n\nThe composition of the ECU and the way in which its value is\ndetermined are identical to those of the European unit of\naccount (EUA) created in March 1975. The ECU is therefore equal to the sum of fixed amounts of\nnine Community currencies (see Table 1). The tenth EEC\ncurrency \u2014 the Greek drachma \u2014 is, according to the Greek\nTreaty of Accession, due to be introduced into the ECU by\n31 December 1985 at the latest. See European Economy. No 3. July 1979. 70\n\nof the currencies of the EEC Member Slates\n(except Greece):\n\n0,828\n0,0885\n1,15\n\n109\n\n0,286\n3,66\n0,14\n0,217\n0,00759\n\nGerman mark\npound sterling\nFrench francs\nItalian lire\nDutch guilder\nBelgian francs\nLuxembourg franc\nDanish krone\nIrish pound\n\nBecause each currency accounts for a fixed amount in the\ncomposition of the ECU, the relationship between these\namounts and the value of the ECU or, in other words, the\nrespective weight of each of the currencies in the ECU, varies\nin line with exchange rate movements between the Com-\nmunity currencies. These weights have changed appreciably\nsince 1975 (see Table 2). 2. Revision of the ECU's composition\n\nThe Brussels Resolution laid down that the weights of the\ncurrencies in the ECU would be re-examined and if necessary\nrevised 'every five years or, on request, if the weight of any\ncurrency has changed by 25%'. 'Revisions have to be mutually accepted; they will, by\nthemselves, not modify the external value of the ECU. They\nwill'be made in line with underlying economic criteria. '\n\nThe circumstances in which the ECU's composition can be\naltered must be laid down by the Council, acting unani-\nmously on a proposal from the Commission and after an\nopinion from the Monetary Committee and the EMCF's\nBoard of Governors. B. Issue of ECU reserves\n\nECU reserves are created by the EMCF for the EEC central\n\nbanks against the transfer, by these banks, in the form of\nthree-month revolving swaps, of 20% of their gold assets and\n20% of their dollar reserves; under the present provisions,\nthe swaps are to be unwound in March 1983, save in the event\nof a unanimous decision to the contrary by the Governors of\nthe central banks. Annex B\n\nTable 2\n\nWeighting of the various currencies in the ECU\n\nthe currencies\n\nReminder of\n\nthe initial\n\nweightings of\n\nin the EUA\n(March 1975)\n\nWeightings on the basis of the ECU central rates\n\nin force on\n\n13\nMarch\n1979\n\n24\nSeptember\n1979\n\n30\nNovember\n1979\n\n23\nMarch\n1981\n\n5 \nOctober \n1981 \n\n22\nFebruary\n\n1982\n\n14\nJune\n1982\n\nBelgian and Luxembourg francs\nDanish krone\nGerman mark\nFrench franc\nIrish pound\nItalian lira\nDutch guilder\nPound sterling\n\n8,2\n3-\n27,3\n19,5\n1,5\n14-\n9 -\n17^5\n\n9,63\n3,06\n32,98\n19,83\n1,15\n9,50\n10,51\n13,34\n\n9,54\n2,95\n33,31\n19,64\n1,13\n9,40\n10,41\n13,62\n\n9,55\n2,81\n33,36\n19,67\n1,14\n9,41\n10,42\n13,64\n\n9,31\n2,74\n32,54\n19,18\n1,11\n8,63\n10,17\n16,32\n\n9,32\n2,74\n34,36\n18,63\n1,11\n8,38\n10,74\n14,72\n\n8,50\n2,65\n34,24\n18,56\n1,11\n8,35\n10,70\n15,89\n\n8,45\n2,63\n35,48\n17,39\n1,10\n8,07\n11,09\n15,79\n\nTotal\n\n100-\n\n100\u2014 \n\n100\u2014 100\u2014 100\u2014 100\u2014 100\u2014 100 \u2014\n\nEntry into force of the EMS on 13 March 1979. On 30 November 1979, the Danish krone was devalued by 5% against the other EEC currencies participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. On 22 March 1961 (with effect from 23 March), ihe Italian lira was devalued by 6% against the other EEC currencies participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. On 24 September 1979, the German mark was revalued by 5% againstthe Danish krone and by 2% against the other EEC currencies participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. On 4 October 1981 (with effect from 5 October), the German mark and the Dutch guilder were revalued by 5,5% against the Danish krone, the Belgian franc, the Luxembourg franc and\n(he Irish pound; the French franc and the Italian lira were devalued by 3% against these same currencies. On 21 February 1982 (with effect from 22 February), the Belgian franc and the Luxembourg franc were each devalued by 8,5% and the Danish krone by 3% against the other currencies\n\nparticipating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. On 12 June 1982 (with effect from 14 June), the German mark and the Dutch guilder were revalued by 4,25% against the Belgian franc, the Luxembourg franc, the Danish krone and the\nIrish pound; the French franc and the Italian lira were devalued by 5,75% and 2,75% respectively against the same currencies. Table 3\n\nThe creation of ECU by swap operations\n\nstarting in\n\nSwap operations\n\nApril 1979\nJuly 19791\nOctober 1979\nJanuary 1980\nApril 1980\nJuly 1980\nOctober 1980\nJanuary 1981\nApril 1981\nJuly 1981\nOctober 1981\nJanuary 1982\nApril 1982\n\nUS dollar\nGold\ntransfers\n(million\nounces)\n\ntransfers\n('000-\nmillion)\n\nGold\nprice\n(ECU per\nounce)\n\nUSD1 =. ECU\n\nCounterpart in ECU\n\n('000 million)\n\nGold\n\nUS dollars\n\n80,7\n85,3\n85,3\n85,5\n85,6\n85,6\n85,6\n85,6\n85,7\n85,7\n85,7\n85,7\n85,7\n\n13,4\n15,9\n16,0\n15,5\n14,4\n13,7\n13,9\n14,5\n14,2\n12,7\n11,5\n11,7\n10,5\n\n165\n185\n211\n259\n370\n419\n425\n447\n440\n406\n402\n368\n327\n\n0,75\n0,73\n0,70\n0,69\n0,77\n0,70\n0,71\n0,75\n0,84\n0,97\n0,91\n0,92\nI _\n\n13,3\n15,8\n18,0\n22,2\n31,7\n35,9\n36,4\n38,3\n37,7\n34,8\n34,5\n31,6\n28,1\n\n10,0\n11,6\n11,3\n10,7\n11,1\n9,6\n9,9\n10,9\n12,0\n12,3\n10,5\n10,7\n10,5\n\n1 \nThe Bank of England transferred 20% of its gold and dollar reserves from July 1979. The Bank of Greece has made no transfer. Source. - Monthly reports of the agent of the EMCF. Total\n\n23,3\n27,4\n29,3\n32,9\n42,8\n45,5\n46,3\n49,2\n49,7\n47,1\n45,0\n42,3\n38,6\n\n71\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nAs a result, at present, the creation of ECUs is not definitive. Furthermore, the amount of ECUs issued \u2014 at present\n38 600 million (see Table 3) \u2014 varies every three months for\ntwo reasons:\n\n(i) first, the swap system itself means that the volume of gold\n\nand dollar transfers made by the issuing institutions\n\nfluctuates in line with the volume of official gold and\ndollar reserves held by these institutions;\n\n(ii) second, the rates at which the transfers are valued are\nthemselves fluctuating. The conversion rate for gold is\nequal to the average of the prices recorded daily at the two\nLondon fixings during the previous six calendar months\n\nbut not exceeding the average price of the two fixings on\n\nthe penultimate working day of the period; the rate used\nfor the dollar is the market rate two working days prior to\nthe value date of the swap operation. C. Use of the ECU\n\nThe use of the ECU by the official authorities\u2014national or\n\nCommunity\u2014and by the private sector, is now examined. from April 1979, the ECU was introduced into the common\nagricultural policy, but with specific conversion rates ('green\nrates'). Lastly, since January 1981, the ECU has replaced the\nEUA in all the sectors in which the latter had been used and\nhas thus become the sole unit of account used by the\nCommunity authorities. As a general rule, two principles, whose degree of application\ndepends on the sectors concerned, govern the use of the ECU\nfor the administrative needs of the Community: the first\nconcerns the recording in ECU of operations in national\ncurrencies; the second aims at the denomination, wherever\npossible, of claims and debts of the Community authorities in\nECUs. 2. The private use of the ECU\n\nBefore examining the expansion in the use of the ECU by the\nprivate sector, it must be pointed out that there is no\nconnection (except for the ECU's definition and the use of\nidentical exchange rates \u2014 the latter being determined by the\nforeign exchange market) between the use of the ECU within\nthe official framework of the EMS and its use by the private\nsector; in the former case, we are referring to an agreement\nbetween the authorities of the Member States and to\nCommunity decisions; in the latter, each operation gives rise\n\nto a contract under private law. 1. The 'official' use of the ECU\n\nThis said, the use of the ECU by the private sector, after\n\n(a) The use of ECU reserves is specified in one case only: a\n\ngetting off to a fairly slow start, is now expanding. debtor is entitled to use the ECU in order to repay at the\nsettlement date a debt under the very short-term financing\narrangement. However, the creditor central bank is not\nobliged to accept settlement by means of ECUs of an amount\nmore than 50% of its claim. In other cases, the use of the ECU\nbetween central banks takes place by mutual agreement. (b) Apart from its role as a reserve asset, the ECU is also\nused as a numeraire for the exchange rate mechanism, as the\nbasis for establishing the divergence indicator, and as the\ndenominator for operations in both the intervention and the\ncredit mechanisms. (c) Lastly, as a unit of account, the ECU has been\nprogressively introduced into all the Community's areas of\nactivity. From 1975 to 1978, it was used first of all \u2014in the initial\n\nEUA form \u2014 by various institutions (the EIB since\n\n18 March 1975; the EOF \u2014 under the Lome Convention \u2014\nsince 21 April 1975; the ECSC since 24 April 1975) and for a\nvariety of purposes (the general budget since 21 April 1978;\nin customs matters since 23 November 1978). With effect\n\n72\n\n(a) The first operations in EUA, the initial form of the\n\nCommunity's currency unit, were chiefly concerned with the\nkeeping of current accounts opened mainly on behalf of the\nCommunity authorities. However, the ECU really started to\nbe introduced into private contracts as a monetary\ninstrument only from 1979 onwards, when it became a\ncurrency of settlement for operations within the EMS, and\noperations did not really start until April 1981 with the\nlaunching of the first public ECU issue. Since then several\nissues have followed and, at the end of June 1982, they\ntotalled some 1 000 million ECU. (b) At present, the private use of the ECU is expanding\nsignificantly for two main reasons. First, the majority of the\nCommunity's issuing institutions now grant the ECU, de\nfacto or dejure, the status of a currency, and second, since the\nstart of their ECU operations, the banks themselves have\nused the ECU not only as a simple unit of account, the use of\nwhich would have required a currency of settlement, but also\nas an instrument of settlement, at least between final\noperators. This approach has led the banks to extend all the\nservices normally available on convertible currencies to the\nECU. Annex B\n\nadequate measures even before the compulsory intervention\npoints are reached. These measures may be diversified\nintervention, measures of economic or monetary policy, or\nchanges in central rates. 2. The adjustments\n\nThe inadequacy of economic policy convergence means that\nadjustments of central rates are inevitable with varying\nfrequency. Adjustments were made even under the Bretton\nWoods system which is sometimes called \u2014not quite\naccurately \u2014 a system of fixed parities. The originality of the EMS is that it organizes the\nadjustments to take place in the best possible conditions. Thus the Brussels Resolution states: 'Adjustments of central\nrates will be subject to mutual agreement by a common\nprocedure which will comprise all countries participating in\n\nthe exchange rate mechanism and the Commission. There\n\nwill be reciprocal consultation in the Community framework\nabout important decisions concerning exchange rate policy\nbetween countries participating and any country not\nparticipating in the system. '\n\nSince the entry into force of the EMS, six adjustments of\ncentral rates have taken place (see Table 2, notes 2 to 7); the\nchanges in bilateral central rates, resulting from these\nrealignments, are indicated in Table 5. B. The credit mechanisms\n\nThe existing credit mechanisms \u2014 which are to be con-\nsolidated into a single fund, in the final phase of the EMS \u2014\nhave been reinforced and supplemented by measures to assist\n\nthe less prosperous countries of the Community. At present, the ECU is thus dealt-in in on-the-spot and\nforward foreign markets (up to one year); it can also be kept\nin an interest-earning current account or be placed on a time\ndeposit. There are also short-term overdrafts and syndicated\nbank loans for up to seven years. In future, the establishment of a clearing house should\nfacilitate operations for small and medium-sized banks\nwhich will thus operate directly on an ECU market without\nany longer having to break down their operations into the\ndifferent component currencies. II. The exchange rate and credit mechanisms\n\nA. The exchange rate mechanism\n\nThe EMS exchange rate mechanism organizes exchange rate\nrelationships between the Community currencies according\n\nto a system of stable, but adjustable when necessary, parities. 1. The stability of exchange rates\n\nWith the exception of the United Kingdom and Greece, the\nother EEC countries have joined or rejoined a system of\nstable parities, consisting of limited margins of fluctuation\nbased on a common numeraire \u2014 the ECU \u2014 and on\nintervention rules. All the currencies participating in the EMS have an ECU-\nrelated central rate. The central rates as a whole serve to\ndetermine the grid of bilateral central rates (see Table 4). Fluctuation margins of \u00b1 2,25% are established around the\nbilateral central rates, except for the Italian lira which\ntemporarily observes \u00b16% margins. Once a currency reaches its lower or upper bilateral\nintervention point vis-a-vis another currency, the central\nbanks of the countries concerned are required to intervene. Interventions at the margins must be made in the currency at\n\n1. The reinforcement of the credit mechanisms\n\nthe opposite bilateral limit. These intervention rules, which are similar to those used in\n\nthe snake, have been supplemented in the EMS by an original\n\nmechanism: the 'divergence indicator'. As its name indicates,\nthe divergence indicator, which is based on the ECU,\nidentifies the currencies whose exchange rate performance\ndiverges from the 'Community average'. A 'threshold of\ndivergence' is fixed at 75% of the maximum spread of\ndivergence for each currency and when a currency crosses the\nthreshold, this results in a presumption that the country\nconcerned will act. We shall consider in turn very short-term financing, short-\nterm monetary support and medium-term financial assist-\nance. (a) Very short-term financing (VSTF) is designed to\nfacilitate respect of the maximum margins of fluctuation. All\nthe central banks of the countries belonging to the EMS\nexchange rate mechanism are eligible for it. Under the VSTF arrangement, the participating central\nbanks open for each other unlimited credit facilities through\n\nThe indicator in fact works as an early warning system and is\ndesigned to encourage the monetary authorities to take\n\nthe EMCF in their respective currencies for a very short\n\nperiod. 73\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nWith the establishment of the EMS, the VSTF arrangement\nwas changed in two important respects: the initial credit\nperiod was extended from 30 to 45 days from the end of the\nmonth in which the debt was incurred, and the debtor central\n\nbank was enabled to make settlement by transferring ECUs,\n\nwith the proviso that the creditor central bank is not obliged\nto accept a settlement by means of ECUs of an amount more\nthan 50% of its claim. The balance of the debt is settled by the\ntransfer of other reserve components. (b) Like the VSTF, the short-term monetary support system\n(STMS) is an agreement between central banks. Unlike the\nVSTF, reserved solely for participants in the exchange rate\nmechanism of the EMS, all EEC countries may request\nshort-term monetary support. The granting of short-term monetary support is linked to the\nneed for short-term financing caused by a temporary\nbalance-of-payments deficit. Table 4\n\nBilateral central rates and intervention margins for currencies participating in the EMS exchange rate mechanism\n\nAmsterdam\nin HFL\n\nBrussels\nin BFR/LFR\n\nFrankfurt\nin DM\n\nCopenhagen\nin DKR\n\nLondon \nin UKL \n\nDublin\nin IRL\n\nParis\nin FF\n\nRome\nin LIT\n\n(rales in force as from 14 June 1982)\n\nHFL 100\n\nBFR/LFR 100\n\nDM 100\n\nDKR 100\n\n+ f>25\"/\n~ *\u2022**\u2022\u2022* /a\ncentral rate\n-2,25%\n\n+ 2,25%\ncentral rate\n-2,25%\n\n+ 2,25%\ncentral rate\n-2,25%\n\n+ 2,25%\ncentral rate\n-2,25%\n\n100\n\nI 782,85\n1 743,23\n1 704,45\n\n92,525\n90,4673\n88,455\n\n326,45\n319,183\n312,08\n\n5,8670\n5,73646\n5,6090\n\n100\n\n5,308\n5,18961\n5,074\n\n18,726\n18,3098\n17,903\n\n113,05\n110,537\n108,0775\n\n1 970,85\n1 926,93\n1 884,00\n\n100\n\n360,83\n352,817\n344,97\n\n32,0425\n31,33\n30,6325\n\n558,60\n546,154\n534,00\n\n28,990\n28,3433\n27,715\n\n100\n\ni \n\n' \n\n1 \n\n' \n\n27,3975\n26,7864\n26,1915\n\n262,21\n256,380\n250,67\n\n55 577,0\n52341,9\n42 296,0\n\n1,57155\n1,53659\n1,50241\n\n15,042\n14,7072\n14,380\n\n3 188,0\n3 002,58\n2 828,0\n\n30,2845\n29,6090\n28,9520\n\n289,85\n283,396\n277,09\n\n61 433,0\n57 857,4\n54 490,0\n\n8,58300\n8,39216\n8,20550\n\n82,150\n80,3239\n78,535\n\n17412,0\n16 398,7\n15444,0\n\nUKL\n\ncentral rate\n\nI RL 1\n\nFF 100\n\nLIT 1 000\n\n+ 2,25%\ncentral rate\n-2,25%\n\n+ 2,25 %\ncentral rate\n- 2,25 %\n\n+ 6%\ncentral rate\n-6%\n\n3,8180\n3,73324\n3,6500\n\n66,56\n65,0792\n63,6315\n\n3,454\n3,37736\n3,302\n\n12,187\n11,9159\n1 1 ,6509\n\n1 \n\n1\n\n2 074,80\n\n9,7890 \n9,57129 1 954,05\n1 840,32\n9,3585 \n\n39,8925\n39,0045\n38,1375\n\n695,40\n679,941\n664,80\n\n36,090\n35,2863\n34,500\n\n127,33\n124,496\n121,73\n\n2. 02850\n1,91051\n1,79925\n\n35,360\n33,3047\n31,365\n\n1,835\n1,72839\n1,628\n\n6,475\n6,09804\n5,743\n\n1 \n\n' \n\n10,6855\n10,4479\n10,2155\n\n100 \n\n21 677,0\n20415,7\n19 227,0\n\n0,54338\n0,511758\n0,48197\n\n5,2010\n4,89818 \n4,6130\n\nI 000\n\n1 ECU\n\ncentral rate\n\n2,57971 \n\n44,9704 \n\n2,33379 \n\n8,234 \n\n(0,560453) \n\n0,691011 \n\n6,61387 1 350,27\n\nDoe*, no! participate in the exchange mechanism. 74\n\n\fAnnex B\n\nTable 5\n\nAppreciation or depreciation of the bilateral central rates of EMS participant currencies from 13 March 1979 to 14 June 1982'\n\nBelgian and Luxembourg francs\nDanish krone\nGerman mark\nFrench franc\nIrish pound\nItalian lira\nDutch guilder\n\nBelgian and\nLuxembourg\nfranc\n\n\u2014\n-1,9\n+ 22,6\n-0,1\n+ 9,3\n-3,1\n+ 20,2\n\nDanish\nkrone\n\nGerman\nmack\n\nFrench\nfranc\n\nIrish\npound\n\nItalian\nlira\n\n+ 2-\n\u2014\n+ 25,-l\n+ 1,9\n+ 11,4\n-1,2\n+ 22,6\n\n-18,4\n-20-\n\u2014\n-18,5\n-10,9\n-21-\n\u2014 2 \u2014\n\n+ 0,1\n-1,8\n+ 22,7\n\u2014\n+ 9,4\n-3-\n+ 20,3\n\n-8,5\n-10,3\n+ 12,2\n-8,6\n\u2014\n-11,3\n+ 10,-\n\n+ 3,2\n+ 1,2\n+ 26,5\n+ 3,1\n+ 12,8\n\u2014\n+ 24,-\n\nDutch\nguilder\n\n-16,8\n-18,4\n+ 2-\n-16,9\n-9,1\n-19,4\n\u2014\n\nThe table reads horizontally {for example, the Belgian franc has appreciated 2 % against the Danish krone and the Danish krone has depreciated 1,9% against the Belgian franc). The amount actually available for short-term monetary\n\n2. - Transfers of resources to less prosperous countries\n\nsupport has been more than doubled and increased to 14 000\nmillion ECU. In addition, the duration of the facility,\npreviously fixed at six months (three months, renewable\nonce) was extended to nine months (three months, renewable\ntwice). The less prosperous countries of the Community which do in\nfact participate in the exchange rate and intervention\nmechanism \u2014 at present, Italy and Ireland \u2014 are eligible for\nloans on special terms. (c) Medium-term financial assistance (MTFA) is granted by\nthe Member States of the EEC, for a period of between two\n\nThe Community institutions and the European Investment\n\nand five years, where a Member State is in serious balance-\nof-payments difficulties. The credit amount actually available was more than doubled\n\nat the start of the EMS and at present stands at 11 000 million\n\nECU. Bank are empowered to make available to them, for a period\nof five years with effect from the establishment of the EMS,\nloans of up to 1 000 million ECU per year; these loans are\neligible for an interest rate subsidy of 3%, limited to an\nannual cost of 200 million ECU. 75\n\n\fANNEX C\n\nExamination by the Monetary Committee\nof some aspects of the non-institutional development\n\nof the European Monetary System\n\nAt the end of 1981, it was clear that the introduction of the\n\nThe first report (Annex C-2) examines four questions:\n\ninstitutional phase would take some time, and a relatively\nlong time at that. (i) how to break the link between the volume of ECUs\n\nThe Monetary Committee therefore felt it useful to pin-point\n\nthe areas in which progress could be made in the less distant\n\nfuture. issued and the price of gold and the exchange rate for the\ndollar;\n\n(ii) the eligibility of intra-marginal interventions for the\n\nvery short-term financing facility;\n\nIn this connection, the Chairman of the Monetary Commit-\ntee, at the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs) held on\n14 December 1981, suggested a number of points for\nconsideration (see Annex C-l). (iii) the external role of the ECU;\n\n(iv) the minting of an ECU coin. In addition, the Alternates of the Monetary Committee\n\u2014 on a mandate from the Committee and in the reports\nwhich follow \u2014 studied some of the problems posed by the\nnon-institutional development of the EMS. The supplementary report (Annex C-3) examines the\nproblem of the mobilization of net ECU credit positions. 76\n\n\fANNEX C-l\n\nStatement by Mr Jean-Yves Haberer, Chairman of the Monetary Committee,\n\nto the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 14 December 1981,\n\non the European Monetary System\n\nI. Progress report on the work assigned to the\n\nexperts\n\nII. The successes of the EMS\n\nOn 13 March 1982 \ncelebrate three years of official existence. the European Monetary System will\n\nThe Monetary Committee has complied with the wish\nexpressed on several occasions by the European Council and\n\nthe Council of Ministers for Economic and Financial Affairs,\n\nand in 1980 and 1981 devoted numerous studies to the\nreinforcement of the EMS until its transition, at the\nappropriate \ntime, to the institutional phase. With the\ninvaluable assistance of its alternates, a report was produced\ncontaining six documents prepared by Commission depart-\nments and revised after discussions with the experts of the\nMonetary Committee. The report was submitted to the\nMonetary Committee which took it into consideration in\npresenting the broad options which I am about to mention. the technical\n\nthe renewal and reinforcement of the credit arrange-\n\nIn accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Luxem-\nbourg European Council of 2 December 1980, \nwork centred on the gradual development of the use of the\nECU, \nments, and the coordination of monetary policies and exchange\nrate policies pursued in relation to third countries. In the course\nof \ndocuments I have mentioned, brought out the importance of the\nproblems and options connected with :\n\ntheir work on these subjects, the experts, in the six\n\n(i) the status of the ECU and its acceptability as a means of\n\nsettlement;\n\nAs the European Council has several times noted, theEMShas\n\nworked remarkably successfully for three years. 1. First, it has provided a satisfactory response to the central\nproblem of a common market, i. e. of a zone the purpose of\nwhich is to promote the interdependence of its economies by\ntrade, the movement of capital and individuals, and free\ncompetition; this problem is the stabilization of exchange rates\nwithout which it becomes far \ntoo hazardous to calculate\nprofitability and to devise marketing strategies. Despite the existence of a wide fluctuation margin and the four\n\n\u2014 albeit moderate \u2014 realignments which have taken place\n\nwithin the EMS, \n\ntrade between the countries participating in\n\nthe exchange rate and intervention mechanism has benefited\ngreatly from \nthe security of transactions created by the\nforeseeable nature of exchange rates. By reducing the\nuncertainties involved in intra-Community trading operations,\nthe EMS has thus made it possible to cut their cost and speed\ntheir development. 2. This success has been confirmed despite the turmoil in the\ninternational environment: the three years of the European\nMonetary System's existence have seen a very serious oil price\nshock succeeded by a monetary shock which was no less\ndisruptive because of the sudden and erratic variations in the\ndollar interest rate and exchange rate. During this period, the\ninterest rate on the major international currency doubled and\nits exchange rate appreciated by over 40% against the major\n\nEuropean currencies, but without any lasting effect on the\ninternal cohesiveness of the EMS. (ii) the liquidity of the central monetary institution;\n\n(in) the arrangements for \n\nEuropean Monetary Fund;\n\ntransferring reserves to the\n\n3. The four currency realignments which occurred during the\n\n(iv) \n\nthe consolidation of Community credits in the EMF;\n\n(v) the external role of the ECU;\n\n(vi) and lastly, the institutional aspects of the EMF. It is certainly true that, when the time comes, certain points will\nhave to be examined in even greater detail. These include, for\nexample, the questions of the return paid on the ECU and the\nlegal status which the period of transition to the institutional\nphase of the EMS will have by reference to the Treaty of Rome\nand the member countries'constitutional rules. Nevertheless, it\nseems to me that the detailed and comprehensive technical\nstudies already made provide, as from now, a sufficient basis\nfor exploring the directions in which the EMS can go forward,\nand in particular for responding to the call of the recent London\nEuropean Council. I therefore have the honour of asking the\nCouncil to recognize that we have acquitted ourselves of the\npreliminary work carried out at its request. period, among which the only real general realignment was that\nof October 1981, were carried out calmly and remained within\nreasonable limits. They showed the ability of the countries\nparticipating in the EMS to anticipate market movements and\nto regulate them without allowing undue disruption of the\nforeign exchange markets to develop. In this respect,\ninterventions were clearly consistent with their natural purpose\nsince they were for the most part reversible. Net transfers of\nreserves between participants remained limited. 4. Contrary to the fears expressed by some at the moment of\n\nthe establishment of the system, the mechanisms providing for\na very large amount of credit (a total of 25 000 million ECU\nfor medium-term financial assistance and short-term monetary\nsupport) did not have to be activated. The corrective measures\nwhich were needed were taken early enough for any momentary\ndivergences on the foreign exchange markets to be amply\ncovered by very short-term financing between central banks. But the credibility of the EMS was greatly enhanced by the\nexistence of a generously endowed credit system. 77\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n5. Even if the economic policies of the Member States are\noften very diverse, the constraint of having to respect the\ncentral rates established within the EMS has been important\nand has favoured the'convergence of monetary policies, and\nthrough them, of economic policies: the general rejection of a\npermissive interpretation of the European monetary rules has\nbeen an active element in bringing economic policies closer\ntogether, and a number of Member States are a well-known\ndemonstration of this development. 2. Improved technical cooperation between the central banks\nparticipating in the exchange rate and intervention mechanism. Thus, very short-term financing could be activated not only for\nobligatory interventions at the bilateral limits, but also for\npreventive intra-marginal interventions designed to promote\nthe stability of the system; the divergence indicator mechanism\ncould be improved; and acceptance of the ECU as a means of\nsettlement between the participating central banks could be\nincreased from 50% to 100%\n\n6. The success of the EMS has been assisted by the prospects it\n\noffers for Europe's progress towards genuine economic and\n\nmonetary union, and by the technical and political rendez-vous\nwhich it has set itself from the outset. The existence of the\nEuropean Economic Community's monetary ambition has, in\n\nits way, been crucial for the credibility of the EMS and has\n\n3. Greater credibility for the ECU. The ECU's success must\nfirst be ensured in the Community itself; \ninstitutions should set an example by using it for their accounts\nand for their market borrowings. The central banks of the\nEuropean countries with an exchange rate policy linked to the\n\nthe Community\n\nEMS could be authorized to hold ECUs obtained either by\n\naroused manifest interest from the banks and the international\nmarkets. deposits of reserves with the EMCF or by settlements with\n\nIII. Scope for a non-institutional development of\n\nthe EMS\n\nIn line with the conclusions of the recent European Council in\n\nLondon, I believe it is essential to mark the third anniversary of\nthe EMS by real and meaningful progress. In this area, as in\n\nany other, but perhaps even more so in view of the momentum\ncreated and the expectations inherent in the system, we cannot\n\nafford \nto stand still, for fear of losing what we have already\nachieved. Nevertheless, we must not be unrealistic. My\ncolleagues and I myself feel that it would be inappropriate, in\nthe present circumstances, to embark on the final phase, which,\nbecause of its scale, would require ratification by the national\nparliaments in long and complex procedures. It therefore seems\nthat at this stage we must set on one side the question of the\ninstitutional framework of the EMS, \nfundamental questions which also involve parliamentary\nprocedures, e. g. the definitive \ntransfer of foreign exchange\nreserves to a European Monetary Fund. together with other\n\nThat said, I have made use of the opportunities for personal\ndiplomacy enjoyed by the Chairman of the Monetary\nCommittee to form a personal opinion, which reflects many\n\nothers, on the points which could permit, with a satisfactory\n\ndegree of coherence, a non-institutional development of the\nif this were to find favour with the political authorities of\nEMS, \n\nthe Community. These points are the following, in increasing\n\norder of importance :\n\nEMS central banks. The central banks of oil exporting\n\ncountries which had agreed to financial cooperation with the\nborrowing Community institutions could also be allowed to\nhold ECUs on the same terms. 4. The regrouping of the credit mechanisms. The present short\nor medium-term mechanisms would be incorporated into the\nEMCF itself where they would become credit lines, and this\nwould confirm the Community's ultimate intention of setting\nup a genuine European Monetary Fund. 5. Stabilization of the volume of ECUs issued. A re-\nexamination might concentrate on the relationship between the\nvolume of ECUs, which deserves to be under control, and the\ngold and dollar prices, which have the disadvantage of\ncontinually fluctuating. 6. Closer convergence of monetary policies. Interest rate\npolicies in particular could be concerted more frequently. 7. The determination of a 'zone of probability'for \nThere is a clear need for a common approach to third currencies\nand to the dollar in particular. An attempt should be made to\ndetermine a zone of probability for European exchange rates\nvis-a-vis the dollar, in consultation with the US authorities. the dollar. I have ventured on a list which is in no way restrictive: in taking\nadvantage of the opportunity provided by my presentation to\n\nthe Council of the Monetary Committee's work on the EMS,\n\nmy purpose is none other than to express the feeling that\nprogress is possible in certain areas which are consistent with\neach other, and hence necessarily interconnected. The Council of Ministers may call on the Monetary Committee\n\n1. A signal to public opinion: each of the member countries,\nfollowing its customary national procedure, should mint an\nECU-denominatedmetal coin of'standarddesign, which would\ncirculate freely in the Community. at any time to translate the guidelines of the London European\n\nCouncil into concrete proposals. 78\n\n\fANNEX C-2\n\nReport on some aspects of the non-institutional development\nof the European Monetary System presented on 3 February 1982\nby the Alternates of the Monetary Committee\n\nA i its meeting of 13 January 1982, the Monetary Committee\ndiscussed various proposals for the non-institutional develop-\nment of the European Monetary System (EMS) and requested\nthe Alternates to examine and report on the following\nquestions :\n\n(i) How can the volume ofECUs issued be divorced from the\n\ntwo widely fluctuating variables, the market price of gold\nand the exchange rate for the US dollar?\n\n(ii) How is the extension of the very-short term facility to the\n\nfinancing of intra-marginal interventions to be circum-\nscribed (either by attaching conditions, imposing a\nceiling, or limiting its duration) ?\n\n(Hi) How can the option open to non-Community institutions\n\nto hold ECUs be organized?\n\n(iv) How would the problems of legal tender arise in relation\n\nto the free circulation of an ECU coin minted according\nto national procedures ?\n\ntheir examination to the feasibility,\n\nThe Alternates accordingly met on 25-26 January and on 3\nFebruary 1982 and herewith submit their report \nto the\nCommittee. In conformity with the mandate received, the\nAlternates confined \ntechnical implementation and implications of the four courses\nof action mentioned above, without taking a position on their\no verall merits or otherwise; nor did they examine the links with\nother proposals affecting \nrelated aspects of the system (e. g. ECU acceptability, remuneration, etc. ). Finally, their exami-\nnation remained within the confines of a non-institutional\ndevelopment of the EMS, although views as to the precise\nlimits of such a development differed. peak of almost 50000 million ECU in April 1981, with a\nsubsequent fall to 42 000 million ECU at present. The key to\nthese developments lies almost exclusively in changes in the\nprice of gold. The volume of ECUs created against gold\ntransfers rose from 16 000 million ECU at the start of the\nsystem to 32 000 million ECU at present (i. e. from 58% to 75%\nof total ECU creation). The amount of ECUs issued against\nthe transfer of dollars has, on the contrary, remained generally\nstable, ranging between 10 000 and 12 000 million ECU since\nthe start of the system, because o/ volume declines which\nalmost totally offset \nation. the rise caused by the dollar's appreci-\n\n2. Before examining automatic formulae acting either on the\nvaluation rules or on the volume of reserves transferred, the\nAlternates considered an alternative approach: endowing the\nBoard of Governors of the EMCF with some discretionary\npowers over the adjustments to be made on the occasion of the\nswap renewals. These powers could be limited to the possibility\nof overriding the agreed rule under well-defined circumstances\n\n1979 were left to an agreement between central banks). Such a\nstep could be justified by the consideration that, in the existing\nsystem, there is an over-reliance on automatisms, which always\nrisk producing unforeseen results, and an insufficient scope for\nstability-oriented discretionary decisions. Under these circum-\nstances, the growth in ECU volume and its distribution between\nparticipants cannot be expected to always reflect the overall\nobjectives of the system. Such a step is, however, generally seen\nas moving into institutional ground; one should furthermore\nnot underestimate the contribution that automatic and clear\nrules have made to the overall credibility of the system,\navoiding potentially difficult discussions at periodic intervals. and on specific items (e. g. valuation rules, which already in\n\n3. The Alternates examined the possibility of reducing the\n\nvolatility of ECU creation by acting through the valuation\n\nrules. Central banks would still swap 20% of their gold and\ndollar reserves, but the valuation method would be changed\nand/or, in the same line of thinking, the duration of each swap\nwould be extended. In this respect, the Alternates agreed that\n\nany solution which would lead to disregarding the market price\n\nof the reserve assets for any extended period of time would be\n\nI. How can the volume of ECUs issued be\n\ndivorced from the two widely fluctuating\nvariables, the market price of gold and the\nexchange rate for the dollar?\n\n/. Since the inception of the EMS, the rules governing ECU\ncreation against swaps of gold and dollars have led to marked\nfluctuations in the total volume of ECUs issued. The amount\nrose from an initial 27 000 million ECU in July 1979 ' to a\n\nundesirable. Renewing swaps at unchanged prices would mean\nthat over time the value of the ECU issued could diverge\nmarkedly from the current value of the underlying assets, with\nthe ECU assets thus becoming much more (or less) valuable\nthan their backing, which could in either case adversely affect\nthe use of the ECU. ft could furthermore give the impression of\nan attempt to peg the price for gold, in contrast to\ncommitments under the IMF Articles of Agreement. On the above grounds, the Alternates would tend to reject\nproposals aimed at stabilizing ECU creation through a 'freeze'\non the gold and dollar price for future swap renewals. 1 \n\nJuly 1979 is taken as (he point of departure for comparisons as it is the date\nat which (he IJniled Kingdom joined other members in transferring 20% of\niis gold and US dollar holdings (o the EMCF. 3. 1. The Alternates did, however, consider three possibilities\n\nfor moderating the effects of erratic price movements:\n\n79\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n(i) a lengthening of the duration of the swaps from the\n\n(i) a 'uniform shares' rule: central banks would transfer\n\ngold and dollars according to a uniform proportion, say\n\n20% of their holdings of each asset. At subsequent swap\n\npresent 3 months to say 6 or 12 months. This would\nreduce the frequency of the adjustments and therefore\nsomewhat dampen the short-term volatility in ECU\ncreation, but would not avoid large movements when the\nadjustments eventually \nencounter legal difficulties \n\nin certain member countries;\n\ntook place, and would also\n\n(ii) a lengthening of the reference period for the valuation of\ngold, with the existing caveat of using whichever is lower\nbetween the average price and the latest market price. This would of course moderate the growth ofECUs in a\nperiod of rapid gold price increases, albeit to a limited\nextent (see attached graph) ; the effect could be more\nsignificant only if the reference period were much longer\nthan 12 months;\n\n(Hi) an alternative proposal is to value gold conservatively by\n\ncomparison with present market rates, for example by\napplying a discount of 10 or 20% in the current price. This\nwould have a once-and-for-all effect \nin reducing the\nvolume of ECUs created, but would not eliminate\nsubsequent volatility, unless the discount varied pro-\nportionately to price movements. 3. 2. The above methods are not mutually exclusive and could\nperhaps be combined. In all cases, to the extent to which they\nsucceed in dampening the effects of unstable market variables\non ECU supply, they necessarily lead to a divergence between\nthe internal and the market's valuation of the underlying\nreserve assets. These methods would thus all require a\ncompromise between the objective of moderating the volatility\nin ECU creation and the principle, stated in point 3 above, that\nany prolonged or marked departure from market rates should\nbe avoided. 4. The Alternates finally examined various \n'closed pool'\nsystems for controlling the volume of ECUs issued. In such\nsystems the quantity ofECUs would in principle be fixed and\nthe volume of reserves transferred by each participant at a\nswap renewal would be adjusted in accordance with the price\nevolution of the assets. The percentage of reserves transferred\nwould accordingly change at each swap, i. e. the 20% rule would\nno longer be applicable. 4. 1. The first issue arising in this context relates to the\ndecision-making process for fixing the initial volume ofECUs\nto be created and for subsequent periodic reviews (annual or\nbiennial). The Alternates did not discuss this point as it falls\nbeyond their mandate. renewals, the adjustments \nchanges (while maintaining constant the total volume of\nECUs created) would be made in such a way as to ensure\nthat each central bank continued to transfer an equal\n\nto take account of price\n\nproportion of its holdings of the two reserve assets, e. g. 18% of each if the price of the reserve assets had risen or\n22% of each if it had fallen. The current proportion under\nthis system (if ECU creation had been kept at its original\nlevel) would be 12% of central banks' gold holdings and\n12% of their dollar reserves, instead of the initial 20%\n(see Table 1). This system would, however, have the\ndrawback of making the amount of dollar transfers vary\nalso in relation to the gold price;\n\n(ii) an alternative system would be one where gold transfers\n\ninversely to movements in the dollar\n\nwould vary inversely to movements in the gold price and\ndollar transfers \nexchange rate. This system could work as follows: to\nestablish the initial quantity of ECUs, a given proportion\nof gold and dollars would be transferred. At subsequent\nswap renewals, gold or dollars would be returned to or\nrequiredfrom each participant in proportion to price rises\nor falls of these assets in terms of the ECU. With this\nsystem, the total amount of ECUs created remains\nconstant, as does the share of this total allocated to each\nparticipant, whereas under the present arrangements\nthese factors vary in relation both to market prices and to\nvolume changes. The system would in fact function as\nthough a constant ECU allocation had been made to each\nparticipant until a new decision was taken. Its operation\ncould possibly have adverse effects on liquidity for dollar\nholders. Had such a system been applied during the\nperiod since July 1979, the subsequent price movements\nin gold and dollars would have resulted in sizeable\nreductions in the share of gold deposited and increases,. for most members, in the share of dollars deposited (as a\nproportion of their holdings of these assets \u2014 see Table\n2);\n\n(Hi) given that the main cause of the fluctuations in ECU\n\ncreation has been changes in the price of gold, another\npossibility would be to maintain the 20% rule for dollar\nthe volume of gold transfers\ntransfers but to adjust \ninversely to movements in the price of gold and in the\n\nECU creation against dollars, so as to keep the total\n\nvolume of ECU supply constant (see Table 3). This\nwould, however, mean that the two assets were treated\nvery differently \n\nin the process of ECU creation;\n\n4. 2. The second point relates to the technical functioning of a\n'closed pool' mechanism. Various possibilities were con-\nsidered:\n\n(iv) \n\n80\n\nthe two latter systems could be modified to take account\nalso of volume changes in participants' reserves, with a\ncountry which had used some of its dollar reserves\ndecreasing proportionately \n\nthe dollars \n\ntransferred. Annex C-2\n\nTable 1\n\nShare of assets transferred to the EMCF in % of gold and dollar holdings\nunder a 'uniform shares' rule\n\nHI-1979\n\n11-1980\n\n1-1981\n\nI-I9B2\n\nGold Dollars Total\n\nGold Dollars Total\n\nGold Dollars Total\n\nGold Dollars Total\n\n20\n\n20\n\n20\n\n128 \n\n128 \n\n12\n\n12,9 \n\n129 \n\n129\n\n20\n\n20\n\n20\n\n12,8 12,8 12,8 11,1 11,1 11,1\n\n12,9 12,9 12,9\n\n27,3\n15,8\n11,6\n\n185,064\n\n1,37653\n\n27,3\n20,3\n7,1\n\n370,546\n\n1,29517\n\n27,3\n21,3\n6,1\n\n446,958\n\n1,33166\n\n27,3\n20,4\n6,9\n\n368,025\n\n1,08806\n\nBelgium\nDenmark\nFR of Germany\nFrance\nIreland\nItaly\nThe Netherlands\nUnited Kingdom\n\nAmount of ECUs created\n\n(thousand millions)\nagainst gold\nagainst dollars\n\nConversion rates\n\nECU/ounce of gold\nUSD/ ECU\n\nTable 2\n\nShare of assets transferred to the EMCF in % of gold and dollar holdings\nunder the 'rule of proportionate volume adjustments for gold and dollars1\n\nBelgium \nDenmark\nFR of Germany\nFrance\nIreland\nItaly\nThe Netherlands\nUnited Kingdom \n\nAmount of ECUs created\n\n(thousand millions) \nagainst gold \nagainst dollars \n\nConversion rates\n\nECU/ounce of gold \nUSD/ECU \n\n111-1979 \n\n11-1980\n\n1-1981\n\n1-1982\n\nGold Dollars Total \n\nGold Dollars\n\nTotal\n\nGold\n\nDollars\n\nTotal\n\nGold\n\nDollars\n\nTotal\n\n9,7 54,2\n\n19,7\n18,2\n\n10,0 \n10,0 \n10,6 19,7\n10,0 23,7\n10,0 22,4\n9,8 19,2\n\n27,3\n15,8\n11,6\n\n370,546\n\n1,29517\n\n20 \n\n20 \n\n20 \n\n27,3\n15,8\n1 1,6\n\n185,064 \n\n1,37653 \n\n11,4\n32,8\n13,6\n11,3\n17,7\n12,7\n11,3\n14,7\n\n8,3\n8,1\n8,3\n8,3\n8,8\n8,3\n8,3\n8,1\n\n15,3\n26,6\n21,5\n16,8\n12,5\n26,9\n21,3\n21,2\n\n9,1\n20,0\n12,4\n9,5\n11,8\n11,2\n9,5\n14,0\n\n10,0\n9,8\n10,0\n10,0\n10,6\n10,0\n10,0\n9,7\n\n12,5\n29,8\n20,5\n20,2\n15,5\n22,6\n21,1\n29,0\n\n10,4\n23,0\n13,8\n11,5\n14,6\n12,7\n11,3\n17,7\n\n27,3\n15,8\n11,6\n\n446,958\n\n1,33166\n\n27,3\n15,8\n11,6\n\n368,025\n\n1,08806\n\nUnlike the adjustments made in relation to price changes,\nthese adjustments would change the total quantity of\nECUs created (except in the unlikely case of precisely\noffsetting \nvolume movements in the participants' re-\nserves). The system would thus reduce volatility in ECU\ncreation but would not operate as a pure 'closed pool'. 4. 3. A third issue is whether in all the above systems there\nshould be a fixed rule regarding the proportion of reserves to be\nswapped or whether, given that each country may differ \nappreciation of what constitutes the most appropriately\nbalanced portfolio of gold and dollar reserves, countries could\nbe given some latitude (e. g. \u00b15%) in the distribution as\n\nin its\n\n81\n\n20 \n\n20 \n\n10,0 28,1\n\n20 \n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n20 13,7 10,5\n\n10,2 20 \n\n8,6 \n\n20 \n\n20 \n\n15,3 \n\n20 \n\nTable 3\n\nShare of assets transferred to the EMCF in % of gold and dollar holdings\nunder the 'role of volume adjustments of gold only*\n\nBelgium \nDenmark \n\nFR of Germany \nFrance \nIreland \nItaly \nThe Netherlands \nUnited Kingdom \n\nAmount of ECUs created\n(thousand millions) \nagainst gold \nagainst dollars \n\nConversion rates\n\nECU/ounce of gold \nUSD/ECU \n\nIII-1979\n\nII-1980\n\n1-1981\n\n1-1982\n\nGold Dollars Total\n\nGold Dollars Total\n\nGold Dollars Total\n\nGold Dollars Total\n\n20 \n\n20 \n\n20 \n\n10,2 20 11,0 \n\n1 5,3\n\n13,9\n\n1 1 ,8\n17,9\n12,2\n11,3\n\n86 \n\n20 \n\n9,9 \n\n15,9\n12,1\n10,2\n18,0\n10,4\n9,6\n\n10,5\n\n20 12,0\n16,8\n14,0\n11,9\n18,3\n12,5\n11,6\n20 14,5\n\n27,3 \n15,8 \n11,6 \n\n27,3 \n16,2 \n11,1 \n\n27,3 \n16,4\n10,9\n\n185,064 \n\n1,37653 \n\n370,546 \n\n1,29517 \n\n446,958 \n\n1,33166\n\n27,3\n6,6\n0,7\n\n368,025\n\n1,08806\n\nECU/GOLD RATES (ECU per fine ounce)\n\n520\n\n480\n\n440\n\n400\n\n360\n\n320\n\n280\n\n240\n\n200\n\n160\n\n82\n\nRate used for swap\noperations with Ihe EMCF\n\nPrice on penultimate working\nday of previous monlh\n\nAverage price over\nsix previous months\nAverage price over \ntwelve previous months. M A M J\n\nJ A\n1979\n\nS O N DJ F M AM\n\nJ\n\nJ \n\nA S O N DJ F M AM\n\nJ\n\nJ \n\nA S O N D\n\n1980\n\n1981\n\n\fAnnex C-2\n\nbetween gold and dollars, which would help to overcome some\ntechnical difficulties for the monetary authorities. This would\nintroduce an element of flexibility, but also of arbitrariness, in\nthe system. rigid rules, there should be a presumption that the financing of\nintra-marginal interventions through the VSTF would be\njustified, for example, when a given bilateral spread (say 2%)\nis reached or when the divergence threshold is crossed. 4. 4. In conclusion, a 'closed pool' system would allow ECU\ncreation to be controlled and divorced from market variables. It would, however, mean departing from the 20% rule set out in\nthe European Council Resolution of 5 December 1978, and\nthough market variables would no longer influence the volume\nthe volume of reserves\nof ECUs created, they would affect \ntransferred. In some cases, the different \ntreatment of gold and\ndollar assets would be accentuated. II. How is the extension of the very short-term\nfacility to the financing of infra-marginal\n\ninterventions to be circumscribed (either by\nattaching conditions, imposing a ceiling, or\nlimiting its duration)?\n\n5. The Brussels Resolution states that in principle interven-\n\ntions in the EMS will be made in participating currencies and\nprovides for diversified interventions when a currency crosses\nits divergence threshold. The Agreement of 13 March 1979\nbetween the central banks, however, makes no specific\narrangements for \nintra-marginal interventions or their\nfinancing; such interventions are carried out on an ad hoc basis\nwithin the framework of concertation among EEC central\nthen depends on bilateral\nbanks. Currency availability \nagreements on either credit lines or using working balances\n(limited in principle by Article 15 of the central banks'\nAgreement). Intra-marginal \ninterventions in Community\ncurrencies have nevertheless been considerable, amounting to\nover 20 000 million dollars or some 55% of total interventions\nin Community currencies since the inception of the system. '\nNo intra-marginal intervention sales in EMS currencies were\ncovered by very short-term financing through the EMCF. The Alternates have confined their examination to the general\norientations which might govern the possible extension of the\nVSTF to intra-marginal interventions; it would be the task of\ncentral bank experts to eventually define the technical details\nof its implementation. 6. It is the general view that, if access to the VSTFfor \nmarginal interventions were to be made automatic or semi-\nautomatic as discussed below, such access could be made\nsubject to a trigger related to the situation on the exchange\nmarkets (a presomption de declenchementj. Without fixing\n\nintra-\n\nThe significance of this figure should, however, be qualified: it includes\nrepurchases of the currency previously sold as well as the sale of proceeds\nof official borrowing. 7. The Alternates felt that the extension of very short-term\nfinancing to intra-marginal interventions should in any event, if\nthey were to be automatic, be circumscribed by imposing a\nceiling for each participating currency. It would be necessary to\nfix rules determining the amount of this ceiling (e. g. related to\nquotas in the short-term monetary support mechanism), on\nhow it would apply to debtor and creditor central banks, on how\na ceiling would be reopened, etc. Within such a ceiling, cover of\nintra-marginal interventions by means of the VSTF could be\neither completely automatic or semi-automatic, in the sense\nthat the central bank issuing the currency of intervention could\nobject only in the case of special and concrete circumstances\n(such as conditions on the exchange markets or on domestic\nmonetary markets) which it would be required to illustrate to\nthe other authorities in the framework of concertation or in the\nappropriate Community bodies. The making available of\namounts in excess of the ceiling to finance intra-marginal\nintervention would continue to be a matter for concertation\n\nbetween central banks on an ad hoc basis. 8. Apart from fixing a ceiling, one could envisage altering the\n\nother elements of the VSTF (duration, interest rate, means of\nsettlement, etc. ) when extending the facility to intra-marginal\ninterventions. This would, however, be tantamount to creating\na new facility and could not be described as an 'extension' of the\nexisting VSTF. 9. In this context the question arises whether the conditions\n\nunder which intra-marginal interventions can take place should\nbe altered. The Alternates agree that it is of fundamental\nimportance for the proper functioning of the exchange rate\nmechanism that intra-marginal interventions should continue\n\nThis being said, it has been suggested that central banks should\nbe given more leeway in their on-the-spot decisions for\ninterventions in participating currencies, by making available a\nlimited amount of individual Community currencies for intra-\nmarginal interventions. This amount could be used automati-\ncally, in case of emergencies, on the intervening central bank's\nown initiative and on the understanding that the issuing central\nbank and the other central banks should be informed without\ndelay. This proposal relates to the availability of currencies for\ninterventions and does not touch upon the question of financing. 10. Some Alternates consider that if automatic facilities for\nlimited amounts were accepted, \ncurrency was being used might be expected to discourage intra-\nmarginal interventions beyond those limits; thus the present\nflexibility would be reduced rather than increased. These\nAlternates are furthermore of the opinion that the use of the\n\nthe central bank whose\n\n83\n\nto be the subject of close concertation among central banks. Documents relating to the European Monetary System\n\nVSTF for intra-marginal interventions is justifiable only if\nthere is a sufficient probability that these interventions will\nreduce the total of interventions otherwise needed. Thus, the\npresumption should not relate to a currency becoming\ndivergent but rather to the causes of the imbalance and the\nmeasures being taken to remedy it. In the view of the other Alternates however, the application of\nsuch principles would not represent a significant departure\nfrom present practices. III. How can the option open to non-Community\n\ninstitutions to hold ECUs be organized?\n\n11. The Alternates examined the above question in relation to\n\nthe external use of ECUs. issued by the EMCF, i. e. not in\n\nrelation to ECU-denominated paper which might be issued by\nother Community entities or by private financial institutions. The possible interest of third parties in holding ECUs has also\nnot been examined. 12. A general principle governing the external role of the ECU\nshould be that third holders of ECUs should be subject to\nsubstantially the same rights and obligations concerning the\n\nECU (use, remuneration, etc. ) as those of participant central\n\nbanks: the single nature of the ECU should not be\ncompromised in extending its role beyond the Community. The\nconditions for acquiring ECUs will accordingly also have to\nreflect the ECU's present precarious existence. 13. A first possibility would be to permit designated third\nholders to freely acquire existing ECU assets from EMS\nmembers. ' For example, a member central bank could swap\nECUs for dollars with a third country central bank in order to\nmobilize its ECU holdings. This swap could not be allowed to\noverlap the underlying swap of the member central bank with\n\nthe EMCF. Such transactions would not imply an increase in\n\nsurrender its ECU assets, if necessary, to allow EEC members\nto settle their obligations at the swap renewals and in (he event\nof a definitive unwinding of the swap mechanisms. 14. A second possibility would be for the EMCF to issue ECUs\nto third countries against the contribution of reserve assets, as\nit does with member central banks. The present legal texts\nempower the EMCF to issue ECUs against the transfer of\nreserves by the monetary authorities of the Member States\nalone. To authorize it to issue newly-created ECUs against the\ncontribution of reserve assets by non-Community institutions\nwould \nthe relevant\nRegulation (EEC No 3181/78). Unlike the first case, new\nECUs would be created by this operation and third countries\nwould furthermore be given the possibility of mobilizing part of\ntheir gold holdings through the Fund, thereby increasing\nmobilizable international liquidity. require a modification of \n\ntherefore \n\nThis formula would seem particularly, if not exclusively,\nsuitable for those European countries with particularly close\neconomic and financial ties with the Community wishing to be\n\nassociated to the EMS exchange rate and intervention\n\nmechanism. The association agreement would have to set out\nthe conditions for acquiring and using ECUs on terms\nanalogous to those applied to member central banks. It is\ndoubtful thai such an extension of the ECU would appeal to\nthird countries unless the ECU were established as a full means\nof settlement within the system. 15. In a broader perspective, an external role for the ECU\ncould be envisaged as a reflection of a demand for reserve\ndiversification by non-Community institutions. A possibility of\nthis kind is examined in more detail in the note by the\nCommission departments on the external role of the ECU, 2\nalready discussed in depth by the Alternates. In the majority\nview of the Alternates, such a development would presuppose\ninter alia, that the ECU were already a fully-fledged means of\nsettlement and reserve asset for EMS participants, that it had a\nless precarious existence than that deriving from the present\nrevolving swap mechanisms, and that \ntransformed into an institution able to support an exchange\n\nthe EMCF were\n\nrate risk and to offer real possibilities of substitution. The\n\n'substitution\n\nthe total volume of ECUs in circulation; there would merely be\ncontrary view is that one could envisage a \na transfer, in the EMCF's books, of ECUs held by members to\nthird holders. Such a transfer could also take the form\nofficial \nof a sale rather than a swap, provided a prior 'third holder\narrangement' had been concluded between the EMCF and the\nthird party concerned, setting out in detail the terms and\nconditions for acquiring, mobilizing and restituting ECU\nassets. The third holder would in particular be required to\n\naccount' without institutional convertibility: its attractiveness\nwould obviously be reduced, but the conversion of ECUs into\nthird currencies could be ensured at a market rate, in the\nframework of a negotiability formula between member central\nbanks and third holders. There is therefore scope for a non-\ninstitutional development in this regard and, according to this\nview, the matter deserves to be studied further. Allowing third parties to acquire ECUs in this way would entail a\nmodification of the composition of their reserves as well as of those of the\nmember central banks concerned. This would run counter to the limitation\nof Article 18(4) of the 13 March 1979 Agreement which rules out\noperations having the sole purpose of altering the composition of a central\nbank's reserves. The question of lifting this limitation for third holders or\nof abolishing it altogether would need to be further examined. 84\n\nSee Annex I -5: Preparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund -\n\nExternal role of Ihe ECU. Annex C-2\n\nIV. How would the problems of legal tender\n\narise in relation to the free circulation of an\nECU coin minted according to national\nprocedures?\n\nwould be of negligible size vis-a-vis the Community money\nsupply and as such would not raise significant problems with\nrespect to the likelihood of additional infra-Community capital\nflows. 16. The Alternates examined this question in full awareness of\n\nthe limits of their competence as regards the legal implications\nof such a step and the more technical aspects of the mint. These\naspects, whose importance and potential difficulties should not\nbe underestimated, would haw to be studied by the competent\nexperts at the appropriate time. value to be set at the level of the participating currencies'\n\n17. From a legal point of view, it appears that adaptation of\n\nnational legislation concerning the minting and circulation of\ncoins will be required in most or all countries, whether the ECU\ncoin is granted full legal tender (i. e. compulsory acceptability\nby all economic agents within a certain amount, as with\nnational coins) or whether it enjoys voluntary acceptability\nbetween agents. The question of the issuing authorities'\ncommitment to repurchase the coins at a given rate would arise\nin both cases. 19. Doubts were raised as to whether the coin would effectively\nremain in circulation, given also past experience with certain\nnational coinages issued in small amounts. Doubts were also\nexpressed as to whether the coin would be used in transactions. The rules governing its conversion rate into national currencies\nwould be an important element in determining its effective\ncirculation. A first possibility would be for the ECU coin's\n\ncentral rates, rounded off to an appropriate figure. This would\nconfer a certain stability to its value between two realignments,\nbut would raise a number of difficulties: \nthe central rate rule\ncould not be applied for conversion into pounds sterling or into\nGreek drachmas, nor into Belgian francs, given the existence of\na dual exchange market; it would introduce a distinction\nbetween the ECU coin converted at the central rate and ECU-\ndenominated deposits to which market rates are applied; it\nwould create arbitrage possibilities, in so far as national\ncurrencies could be exchanged at their central rates through the\n\nECU coin. It should be noted, however, that the practical\n\n18. As to the amount of the issue, the Alternates suggested that\n\na global ceiling should be fixed for the Community as a whole,\nwith quotas per member country based on some appropriate\n\nkey (weight in the ECU, quota in the STMS, etc. ). If the\n\namount were a modest proportion of total coin circulation, it\n\nsignificance of these difficulties would be limited by the small\ndenomination of the coin (which s'muldbe of I ECU) and the\nmodest amount of the issue in relai n to total coin circulation. A second possibility would be for \n\nthe ECU coin to be\n\nexchanged at market rates, though this would raise practical\ndifficulties \n\nin transactions given the fluctuations in daily rates. 85\n\n\fANNEX C-3\n\nSupplementary report on some aspects of the non-institutional development\n\nof the European Monetary System presented on 26 February 1982\n\nby the Alternates of the Monetary Committee\n\nAt the Monetary Committee meeting of 11 February 1982, the\nAlternates were invited to examine the following question:\n\n'In the context of the abolition of the ECV's acceptance limit,\n\nII. Mobilization through the EMCF\n\n3. The technical considerations concerning a scheme by which\n\nwhat technical arrangements could ensure that holders of ECU\nnet credit positions could mobilize such positions against other\nassets?'\n\nECU mobilization is assured by the EMCF are mainly\n\nThe Alternates met on 23 February 1982 and herewith submit\ntheir report to the Committee. As in their previous report, the\nAlternates refrained from discussing the desirability of\namending the existing provisions of the system and confined\ntheir examination to technical aspects in the context of a non-\ninstitutional development of the EMS. The first section of this report recalls the existing provisions for\nmobilizing ECUs and their limitations. The second and third\nsections discuss possible new schemes for ensuring such\nmobilization. The last section offers some concluding com-\nments regarding, inter alia, the difference \nschemes and full institutional convertibility. 1\n\nbetween such\n\nI. Preliminary remarks\n\n1. According to the existing provisions of the Agreement of\n13 March 1979, a central bank may acquire dollars against\nECUs either from \nthe EMCF, by unwinding a swap\ntransaction, or from another central bank. In the first case,\nmobilization can in practice only be used in the case afafall \nin\ndollar reserves; it does not apply to the mobilization of ECU\nnet credit positions. In the second case, the transaction is\nsubject to mutual agreement. In both cases, mobilization is at\npresent restricted by Article I8(4)of \nthe Agreement stating\nthai the operations referred to above 'shall not be carried out\n\nfor the sole purpose of altering the composition of a central\nbank's reserves'. 2. Although mobilization could conceivably be allowed more\nfreely by removing this provision, it would not ensure that\nholders of ECU net credit positions could at any time mobilize\nsuch positions. Therefore, two types of schemes are examined\nbelow, which could be devised to offer this possibility, subject to\namendments in the present arrangements. Under both schemes, the right to mobilize an ECU net credit\nposition might either be unconditional, or be subject to some\nrequirement of need, or be restricted to net credit positions\nexceeding a specified \nthreshold. Any limitation on ECU\nmobilization wouldlessen liquidity problems for the system but\nwould on the other hand restrict the degree of effective\nconvertibility of net credit positions. circumscribed by the swap system through which reserve assets\n\nare transferred. 4. ECUs are created against both gold and dollars but\nmobilization would presumably only be against dollars. Depending therefore on the stringency of the conditions under\nwhich mobilization is possible and/or on the possible ability of\nthe Fund to acquire currencies from outside the system, there\ncould be a liquidity problem if large net credit positions arose\nand the central banks concerned sought to mobilize them,\nespecially as the majority of ECUs are created against gold. 5. The swap method of transfer limits the way in which dollars\n\ncan be made available through the EMCF and mobilization\ncould only be accomplished through a swap in the other\ndirection between the Fund and the central bank concerned,\nthereby temporarily destroying ECUs. Such a swap would\ninitially have to match the duration of the swap in force and\nwould from then on be open for renewal on a quarterly basis\nunder the same conditions as the original mobilization. 6. The EMCF under existing arrangements returns the\n\nmanagement of transferred assets to the participating central\nbanks. These dollars are invested in various maturities\naccording to the central bank's preferences, and the remuner-\nation is retained by them. It would. therefore be necessary to\nspecify criteria under which the dollar assets to be used for\nmobilization would be selected, and provide compensation for\n\nthe loss of remuneration, including the possible costs of\n\nunwinding investments before maturity. These costs would\nhave to be charged to the central bank mobilizing ECUs. III. Mobilization with the other participants in\n\nthe system\n\n7. This scheme provides for mobilization with the other\nparticipants according to a designation plan. It would allow the\nECU to be mobilized not only into dollars but also into SDKs. Mobilization in Community currencies could also be envisaged\nbut this possibility should be assessed in the context of\nenhancing the scope for intra-marginal intervention or for\nreimbursement before maturity of ECU debts in the VSTF. The convertibility issue was discussed by the Alternates in the context of\nthe institutional phase of the system when assisting the Commission in its\n\nstudies for the European Monetary Fund (see Annex 1-5). (a) criteriafor the designation of the potential ECU recipients. Possible criteria are the following :\n\n86\n\n8. The scheme raises the following issues:\n\n\fAnnex C-3\n\n(i) \n\nthe balance of payments and the foreign reserves\nsituation ;\n\nIV. Concluding remarks\n\n(ii) the composition of reserves;\n\n(Hi) \n\nthe credit or debit position in ECUs in the VSTF;\n\n(iv) some quota system such as that in the STMS;\n\n(b) the mobilization technique: the actual mobilization could\neither take the form of a swap transaction or of a straight\ntransfer;\n\n(c) constraints on the operation of the scheme: a major\n\nconstraint would arise when all or most participants were\nsimultaneously in a deficit position with the rest of the\nworld. A possible solution to this problem might be found\n\nby the EMCF borrowing currencies outside the Com-\n\nmunity under conditions consistent with its present status,\ne. g. borrowing with the BIS. 9. It was observed that, given its basic regional character, this\n\nscheme differs from the SDK designation system: first of all\nthe present method of ECU creation implies that the ECU\nsystem is not a zero-sum mechanism, as is the SDK scheme. Moreover, the EMCF\u2014unlike the IMF with the SDRs\u2014\ncannot become a holder of net creditor positions in ECUs. 10. The view was expressed that, irrespective of the mainten-\n\nance or abolition of the 50% rule, a designation scheme would\n\nimply another acceptance limit beyond which a central bank\nwould not be obliged to accumulate ECUs by virtue of\ndesignation. from a technical point of view from full\n\n11. The Alternates examined the extent to which the above\nformulae differ \ninstitutional convertibility for net ECU credit positions. In the\nfirst place, unless there were recourse to assets from outside the\nsystem, the potential of mobilization would be limited,\naccording to the formulae, either by the size of the Fund's\ndollar holdings or by the volume of assets which could be\nactivated under a designation scheme. Secondly, the formula of\nmobilization with the EMCF would satisfy short-term liquidity\nneeds, but would still leave the central bank with a net forward\n\nECU position. Thirdly, mobilization with other participants\n\nthrough a designation scheme would, if done by transfer, have\nthe same immediate result for the mobilizing central bank as\ninstitutional convertibility. However, the central bank con-\ncerned might at a later stage find itself subject to obligations\nunder the designation scheme. Furthermore, given the limited\nnumber of participants, the operation of such a scheme could be\nconstrained if all members were in balance-of-payments\n\ndeficit. For designated central banks with ECU net debtor\n\npositions it would be tantamount to a reconstitution obligation. 12. In conclusion, none of the above formulae would seem to\npose insurmountable technical difficulties. They are, from this\npoint of view, feasible. They would, however, require rather\nelaborate rules and procedures, which could give the impression\nthat there is some unwillingness to keep or acquire ECUs and\nmight do a disservice to a system which should remain largely\nbased on mutual cooperation and flexibility. Against this, the\nschemes described could go some way to increase possibilities\n\nfor central banks accumulating large ECU net creditor\n\npositions to mobilize these positions. 87\n\n\fANNEX D\n\nCommission communication to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council\n\nof 15 March 1982 on the development of the European Monetary System\n\nConsideration of the system's future began in May 1979. The\nsubject was taken up by the Commission in dose consultation\nwith the Monetary Committee and the Committee of\nGovernors. The discussions took into consideration and were\nmodified by developments \nin the Community's economic\nsituation and by upheavals in the international environment. On several occasions there were Council declarations on the\nsubject and in March 1980 the Commission presented the\nEuropean Council with a report on the European Monetary\nFund. before and generally adapted to the requirements of the system,\neven though hindered by the steep rise in US interest rates,\nwhich led to a level of interest rates in Europe incompatible\nwith the low economic activity and the scale of unemployment. The system, however, has not led to a sufficient convergence of\ninflation rates: from 1979 to 1981, the inflation rate average\nrose, and the spread widened under the combined impact of the\nsecond oil price shock, the soaring dollar and insufficient\ninternal discipline as regards costs and public finance. At its meeting on 15 February 1982, at the end of a wide-\nranging debate, the Council found that a number of measures\ncould be taken to develop the EMS in the following four areas :\nimproving (he system's mechanisms, opening up the EMS to\nthe exterior, promoting the private use of the ECU and\nreinforcing convergence. On this occasion, the Council took\n\nnote of the Commission's intention to put forward specific\n\nproposals, in good time for its meeting on 15 March. The present communication is in response to that undertaking. In it, the Commission proposes the adoption of a group of\nmeasures to consolidate and develop the system; it insists on\ntheir importance by recalling the actual words of the foreword\n\nto the draft fifth medium-term economic policy programme:\n'With the European Monetary System, the Community has\n\nembarked on an ambitious, albeit gradualist, venture aimed at\nstabilization and convergence. The contribution made by the\nsystem \u2014greater certainty in economic activity, a strong\nincentive to keep the key economic aggregates in balance, a\nstimulus to policy convergence and the added weight it gives to\nEurope in international monetary cooperation \u2014 should be a\nmajor factor in the success of the strategy set out in the fifth\nprogramme. ' In other words, the Commission considers its\nproposed measures for developing the system to be a necessary\nand realistic step towards the institutional and final phase,\nwhich is still the ultimate objective of the European monetary\nedifice. A. The ECU\n\nThe successes attributable to the EMS are therefore fragile,\n\nand the object of the Commission proposals is to strengthen and\n\nconsolidate the system from within so that its contribution to\nstability and its ability to resist outside shocks are increased. the EMS do not \n\nimpinge on the re-\n\nThe following proposals, which are expressed in a text based on\nthe format of the resolution of 5 December 1978 on the\nestablishment of \nsponsibilities of the various Member States, over their\nmonetary policies. Their implementation will stimulate the\nsystem towards its objectives and increase its contribution\ntowards improving the general economic situation in Europe,\nsince monetary stability, more certain prospects and increased\nemployment are closely linked. The proposals respect the\nexisting institutional framework and form a balanced whole,\nboth from the viewpoint of creditors' and debtors' rights and\n\nobligations and of the elements of solidarity and strictness on\n\nwhich the system has been based. Further, as demonstrated by\nthe work undertaken in close consultation with the competent\ncommittees, their adoption is technically possible. The role of the official ECU as the very centre of the system\nshould be reinforced. Also the current extension of the private\nuse of the ECU should be facilitated and organized. (a) ECU creation and use in the system\n\nThe purpose of the system, clearly defined when it was\n\nlaunched, is to establish 'closer monetary cooperation leading\nto a zone of. monetary stability in Europe'. Three years of\noperation have shown that the EMS has succeeded in\n\nstabilizing the exchange rate relationships of the participating\n\nThe monetary nature of the ECU flows from its characteristics\nconcerning: method of issue, convertibility and acceptability. currencies, whereas the exchange rates of the major third\ncurrencies (the dollar and the yen) and of the non-participating\nCommunity currencies have been very unstable. Altogether,\nfive realignments of central rates have taken place, but two of\nthem have involved one currency only; all have been made by\nmutual agreement in orderly market conditions, on the basis of\na common procedure which has avoided competitive devalu-\nations. Throughout these three years, exchange rate manage-\nment has drawn heavily on the possibilities offered by the\nsystem's exchange rate and intervention mechanism; national\nmonetary policies have been more closely coordinated than\n\nfor the ECU in the EMS. The widest acceptability for the ECU\n\nIn this respect the present system is less than satisfactory. Experience has proved the method of issuing the ECU not to be\nfully rational, and its convertibility has remained embryonic. Thus the limits imposed on its acceptability have, somewhat\nparadoxically, looked like a protective measure. The perspect-\nive must be reversed, so that it conforms with the role planned\n\nmust be sought, and the corollary must be some degree of\ncontrol over the process of creating ECUs and the organization\nof arrangements for mobilizing it. 88\n\n\fAnnex D\n\nThe creation of ECUs against transfers of reserves has in fact\nbeen disorderly and potentially inflationary: as a result of the\nquarterly swaps, the 27 000 million ECU created in March\n1979 became almost 50 000 million in April 1981; the figure\nhas now fallen to 42 000 million. Although these variations are\nprimarily linked to the variations in the price of gold, the\nvolume of ECUs issued should be divorced from the two widely\nfluctuating variables, the price of gold and the dollar exchange\nrale, so (hat ECU creation can be controlled. At present, at\neach quarterly swap renewal, volume adjustments are made to\nlake account of the variations in reserves held by each central\nbank, and value adjustments are made to take account of the\nvariations in the ECU price of the assets transferred. The\nCommission proposes that ECU creation should be brought\nunder control by retaining the same volume adjustments, but by\napplying the value adjustments to the quantities of gold and\ndollars transferred to the EMCF by the central banks, instead\nof to the outstanding amount of ECUs issued. Another less satisfactory possibility would be to dampen the\neffects of erratic gold price movements on the quantity of\nECUs by lengthening the reference period used to calculate the\naverage gold price from six months to two years. This would,\nhowever, entail the disadvantage of a difference between the\nprice of gold on the market and that used within the system. importance of proposals designed to supplement the existing\nprovisions and to encourage and control the use of the ECU on\nthe markets. It is important to define a sort of 'ECU trademark' so that the\nterm and the instrument 'ECU' is used correctly by the\nmarkets. The necessary Community \nlegislation should\ntherefore be adopted to protect the ECU 'trademark' and to\ndefine it. Such legislation would also have to set out the rules\nfor its use, in order to ensure that the ECU is not deflected:\nthus, for example, prohibiting the attaching of an indexation\nclause to an ECU-denominated pecuniary liability would\nensure that the ECU remained the instrument of stability which\nis its purpose. In this way the wider private use of the ECU\n\nwould be solidly based. The various Community institutions and the EIB would have to\npromote the widest possible use of the ECU for \ntheir\naccounting and their operations. Further, they should set an\nexample by developing the use of the ECU in their borrowing\nand lending operations to the full extent compatible with the\nECU's proper establishment on the financial markets. Greater\nuse of the ECU by issues which each represent another facet of\nthe Community's institutional edifice would strengthen the\nECU's role on the markets. would be set by the Governors of the central banks at a level\n\nWith the inflationary danger involved in the present method of\nECU creation eliminated, the use of the ECU should be\nencouraged. The abolition of the ECU's present acceptance\nlimit for settlement of operations covered by the very short-\nterm financing would enable the debtor to clear his debt in full\n\nby using ECUs. In return, the creditor should receive a higher\n\nremuneration on his net ECU position (the rate of interest\n\nderived from the market levels) and be authorized to mobilize a\nnet ECU credit position beyond 50% of its allocation, on the\nunderstanding that this mobilization possibility would not be\nused for the sole purpose of changing the composition of its\nreserves. Other steps should be taken to promote the wider use of the\n\nECU and to make it a factor in the integration of the financial\n\nmarkets in Europe. First, the discriminations currently\napplying to the ECU in national regulations should be removed\n(being neither a national nor a foreign currency, it is subject to\nany regulation applying to either). In the Community countries\n\nthe ECU should be given the status of a foreign currency and\n\neven a privileged one. The principle of free movement, within\n\nthe Community, of ECU-denominated capital should also be\n\nestablished. Finally, the EMCF should be empowered to\nmonitor ECU operations and issues. The above modifications to the existing rules together with\nthose proposed concerning intra-marginal interventions (see\npoint C(d) below) make up, in the Commission's view, a\nbalanced package which would ensure a larger circulation for\nthe ECU while, respecting the interests of both debtors and\ncreditors. (b) Private use of the ECU\n\nAlongside the official ECU circuit and unconnected with it, a\nprivate ECU circuit is now developing. It is natural for\noperators and markets to be interested in the monetary\nexpression of a vast economic area in the process of\nintegration. The Community should take care of its monetary\nimage; it should not only promote, but also monitor, and even\nguide this expanding private use of the ECU. Whence the\n\nB. Convergence\n\nOn an annual average over the last three years, and expressed\nin national currencies, movements of costs and prices in the\ncountries participating in the EMS have diverged substan-\ntially : consumer price rises range from 5,6% to 16,3% and\nvariations in the relative unit costs of labour range from\n\u2014 14,5% to +32,7%. What is more, the deviations from the\nmean are increasing, ft is true that these movements would have\nbeen even more unfavourable without the EMS, but the\npersistence of these divergences imperils the very nature of the\nsystem. The measures to strengthen the system would be\nuseless if they too did not contribute to the convergence of\neconomic and monetary policies. 89\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nAll dimensions of economic policy should be reconsidered from\n\nthe viewpoint of their contribution to convergence towards\n\nstability. It is clearly a long and difficult exercise. This goal\nshould always be borne in mind when economic policies are\nformulated. Some concrete decisions should be taken at\nCommunity level and be implemented rapidly. The main\nobjective would be to arrange for policies to be concerted more\nactively:\n\n(a) by the regular discussion of the national intermediate\n\nmonetary policy targets, and the level of interest rates, in\nrelation to their compatibility with the economic policy\nobjectives pursued in common, without however affecting\nessential national responsibilities, especially those of the\ncentral banks;\n\n(b) by enumerating the economic and monetary policy\n\nmeasures and instruments which are incompatible with the\nproper functioning of the EMS; the use of these should be\navoided;\n\n(c) by establishing the principle of the free movement ofECU-\ndenominated capital, and by reconsidering the restrictions\n\non movements of capital currently authorized under\n\nsafeguard clauses;\n\n(d) by \n\nimproving \n\nthe effectiveness \n\nof \n\nthe monitoring of\n\nto a set of\n\nMember States' economic policies. Their results and\nmethods will be assessed by reference \ncomparative indicators and to objectives laid down by\ncommon agreement. Once they started to diverge signifi-\ncantly, the Commission would have to make full use of the\nexisting consultation and recommendation procedures;\n\n(e) by establishing a mutual information and monitoring\n\nprocedure on the balance-of-payments situation and the\nexternal indebtedness of the Member States; in this\ncontext, an assessment could be made of the desirability of\nearly recourse to Community financing. C. External relations of the system\n\nIn the field of international monetary relations, the Com-\nmunity lacks the organization needed for it to play the role\nasked of it as one of the poles of the developing multiple reserve\ncurrency system. As a result, it is handicapped in the dialogue\nwith the authorities responsible for the major third currencies,\n\nthe US dollar and the yen, at a time when such a dialogue is\n\nessential in order to promote the orderly evolution of the\ninternational monetary system. The cohesion of the system might not withstand the repetition\nof shocks comparable to those caused, in the last two years, by\nthe sudden and erratic changes in US interest rates (whichhave\ndoubled) and the dollar exchange rate (which has appreciated\n\n90\n\nby over 50% against the major European currencies). Circumstances demand a common attitude to third currencies\n\u2014particularly the dollar\u2014 and an expression of this by\nCommunity bodies. Actions in four areas could be foreseen:\n\n(a) Reinforcing the regular consultations should be proposed\nto the US and Japanese authorities. The various Com-\nmunity bodies (Council, Commission and specialist\ncommittees) should take part in these consultations. These\nwould provide a regular forum, with periodicity to be\ndecided, for an exchange of views on financial and\nmonetary problems of common interest. The procedure\nshould also be able to be activated at the request of one of\nthe parties when the situation on the foreign exchange\nmarket appeared \nto be unrelated to the underlying\neconomic data \u2014 i. e. manifestly outside the limits that\neconomic likelihood would suggest \u2014 or when interest rate\ndifferentials caused excessive and undesirable strains on\nthe Community's money and financial markets. (b) The Community monetary authorities should encourage\n\nthe American and Japanese monetary authorities to\nparticipate in meaningful cooperation on exchange and\ninterest rates. The US authorities in particular should be\ninvited to abandon their laissez-aller exchange rate and\ninterest rate policy. Also discussions with the US\nauthorities should be started with a view to replacing the\nexisting network of swaps between certain Community\ncentral banks and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York\n\nby a single credit line between the latter and the EMCF. This would provide tangible evidence of European\ndetermination to avoid appearing disunited from \nthe\nUnited States point of view. (c) The coordination of Community central banks' interven-\n\ntions in third currencies should be improved. The central\nbanks should make regular and frequent common assess-\nments of the ECU's exchange relationships, paying regard\nto the average level of interest rates desirable in the\nCommunity. Their intervention policy should be based on\nthis assessment. (d) With the same objective in view, it is important to organize\n\nthe use of Community currencies in intra-marginal\n\ninterventions. At present, a central bank's use of a\nCommunity currency for intervention inside the margins is\nsubject to the good will of the central bank whose currency\nis requested. Interventions are instead made in dollars and\nthis often has the effect of emphasizing an undesired\nmovement of the US currency or of undermining the\ncoherence of the participating central banks' attitudes\ntowards that currency. Alternatively, if no intervention is\nmade inside the margins, the currency under threat slides\nuntil it reaches its bilateral margin, at which point the\nintervention amounts may be far greater than those that\nwould earlier have been necessary to reverse the trend. Annex D\n\nThe use of Community currencies for intra-marginal interven-\ntions would conform \nto the spirit of the system if it were\nspecified that a central bank intervening inside the margins was\npresumed to be able to do so in Community currencies with\naccess to the very short-term financing when its currency\ncrossed the divergence threshold (lowered to 50% for wider\nband currencies) or when the difference of its bilateral rate vis-\na-vis another participant was more than 85% of the permitted\nfluctuation margin. The central banks of currencies used for\ninterventions would for their part have the right of refusing the\ncontinued use of their currencies if such use were causing\nproblems for their internal monetary policy. Nevertheless, the\ndollar would continue to be used for intra-marginal interven-\ntions in cases where, by use of this currency, the cohesion of the\nEMS could be maintained and, at the same time, an\nundesirable movement of the dollar in relation to the EMS\ncould be acted upon. Determined action in line with the above could allow the\nCommunity the degree of autonomy necessary for it to be able\nto react, in a unified and coherent way, to tensions from the\noutside which have a large and excessive effect on European\ninterest rates. The EMS is at present a closed system in which only the central\nbanks of certain Member States participate, whereas the\nCommunity is open to the outside world. Opening it to third\ncountries in the spirit of the European Council of Brussels and\ngiving them access to ECUs would extend the system's zone of\nstability and increase the possibilities for using and mobilizing\nECUs. Central banks of countries which seek to have special economic\nand financial ties with the European Communities should be\nauthorized to acquire existing ECUs freely from \nparticipating central banks, and the EMCF should be\nempowered to create ECUs for them on the same conditions as\nthose for the participants, i. e. against reserve transfers in the\nform of swaps. But first, agreements would have to be\nconcluded specifying \nthe terms and conditions for acquiring,\nmobilizing and restituting ECUs. the\n\nThe adoption of the measures proposed above to develop,\nstrengthen and consolidate the EMS is technically feasible. While they respect the institutional framework, they represent\na necessary step forward for the system. In devising them, care\nhas been taken to preserve the balance between the principles of\nstrictness and solidarity \ninherent in the system, and the\nmeasures form a whole in which the component parts reinforce\neach other. Following the method employed when the EMS was set up in\nDecember 1978 the Council decisions or guidelines could be the\nsubject of a resolution. A draft resolution based on the\nsuggestions of this communication is attached. '\n\n1 The draft resolution can be found in Chapter VI. 91\n\n\fANNEXE\n\nStatement by the Chairman of the Monetary Committee\non the non-institutional development of the EMS to the Council\n(Economic and Financial Affairs) of 15 March 1972\n\nFollowing the request of the Council of 15 February 1982, the\nMonetary Committee continued its work on the non-\ninstitutional development of the European Monetary System. Its work centred on the four areas indicated by the Council, i. e. the mechanisms of the system, the private use of the ECU, the\n\nstrengthening of convergence and the system's external\nrelations. The Committee concentrated in the first instance on the\ntechnical aspects of the system, in the expectation that if\nagreement could be reached on these, agreement might well be\nattainable on the other points also. It therefore attempted to\nassemble the elements of a package on the technical aspects to\nsee whether these could command general acceptance. The\nproposals discussed in detail in the Committee were as follows :\n\n(i) raising the acceptance limit to a figure between 60 and\n\n70% and improving ECU remuneration by relating it to\n\nmarket interest rates for future debtor positions;\n\n(ii) supplementing the current possibilities for intra-marginal\ninterventions in Community currencies by means of a\npresumption that such interventions would be generally\njustified, and access to the very short-term facility\npossible, when a given bilateral spread were reached or\nwhen the divergence threshold were crossed, while\nmaintaining\u2014under certain conditions\u2014a right of veto\nfor the creditor central bank ;\n\n(Hi) \n\nlengthening the reference period for gold valuation from\nthe present six months to one year, in order to dampen the\neffects of an unstable gold price on ECU supply. Changes\nin the gold price have been the main cause of the marked\ngrowth and fluctuations in ECU volume;\n\n(iv) giving the system an external dimension by allowing\n\ncentral banks of European countries with particularly\nclose economic and financial ties with the European\nCommunity to obtain ECUs by acquiring them from\nparticipant central banks. It was recognized that any set of proposals would have to strike\n\na balance between the interests of potential creditor and debtor\n\ncountries in the system. However, no general agreement proved\npossible on this group of proposals as a result of \nthe\nCommittee's discussion. Moving to another area indicated by the Council, that of the\nprivate use of the ECU, the Committee agreed that an\nexemplary use of the ECU in the borrowing and lending\nactivities of the Community institutions should continue and be\n\nexpanded as far as market conditions permit. ECU-de-\nnominated issues by Community institutions should con-\nsequently be exempt from exchange controls where these exist. The Committee also supported the general direction of the\nother proposals regarding the private use of the ECU, but noted\nthat these are largely a matter for the private sector itself and\nthat the ECU has already come to be used substantially in the\nprivate sector without the need for official \nCommittee has furthermore not examined the technical and\nlegal questions which might arise from the implementation of\nthe various proposals on the private use of the ECU. intervention. The\n\nAs regards the strengthening of convergence, I already stressed\n\nat the last Council meeting the top priority which the\nCommittee considers should be given to achieving progress in\nthis area, both in terms of economic policies and performances\nand of rectifying existing imbalances between member\ncountries. The Committee therefore welcomes the Com-\nmission 's intention to make full use of the existing consultation\nand recommendation procedures. Although the Committee has\nnot addressed itself in full on the subject of convergence since\nthe Council's last meeting, it has placed the issue at the centre\nof its work programme. It has agreed, for example, to regularly\nprepare and update a dossier on the 'fundamentals' of our\neconomies, which would allow a better appraisal of the conduct\nof economic policies and performances and also be useful for\nrealignment discussions. I already stressed the importance of a\ngreater freedom of capital movements in my statement to the\nlast Council meeting: in this regard the Committee will explore\nthe scope for action, keeping in mind the interrelation between\n\nthe advancement of convergence and the liberalization of\n\ncapital movements. As regards the final chapter indicated by the Council, that of\n\nthe system's external relations, I have already mentioned one\ntechnical aspect, i. e. that of allowing central banks of certain\nEuropean countries to acquire ECUs from participants. On the\nmore general point of the system's relations with the dollar and\nother major currencies, the Committee\u2014while acknowledging\nthat our own policies have an important part to play in these\nrelations\u2014considers that it is also necessary to convince the\nUS authorities to pursue policies which take full account of the\nimportance of the US economy and of the dollar at world level. The Monetary Committee has on several occasions formulated\na Community position on these issues and keeps the matter\nunder constant review. During its meeting of 5 March, for\nexample, members agreed to pass on to their national\nauthorities a note by the Commission departments, prepared in\nresponse \nto a ministerial request, on the international\nimplications of US fiscal and monetary policies. 92\n\n\fANNEX F \u2014 Statement and letter from the Committee of Governors on the future of the\n\nEMS\n\nANNEX F-l\n\nOral statement from the Committee of Governors of the central banks of the\nMember States of the European Economic Community to the Council\n(Economic and Financial Affairs) of 15 March 1982 on the future of the EMS\n\nI. Following the meeting on 15 February 1982 of the Council\nof \nthe European Communities (Economic and Financial\nAffairs) \nthe Committee of Governors has continued its studies\non the future development of the EMS and has examined in\nparticular the four areas which have been enumerated in the\nconclusions of that Council session, i. e. (i) the mechanisms of the system,\n\n(ii) opening the system to the outside world,\n\n(Hi) private use of the ECU,\n\n(iv) strengthening convergence. The Committee of Governors wishes to reiterate that the\n\nsystem so far has worked well; it must nevertheless be\n\nrecognized that this was partly due to the realistic central rates\nselected at the start of the system and to the weakness of the\nGerman mark over prolonged periods. More generally, the\ngood functioning owed much to the high degree of cooperation\nbetween central banks in managing the system. The lack of\ncon vergence of economic policies and of fundamental economic\nvariables in participating countries means, however, that, at\npresent, conditions are not appropriate for major institutional\nchanges in the EMS. the strengthening of convergence is a\n\n2. Accordingly, \nprerequisite for any significant future development of the\nEMS. Such strengthening of convergence should apply to all\neconomic policy areas (in particular budgetary policy) and be\nachieved by implementing coordinated domestic and Com-\nmunity policies designed to rectify existing imbalances within\nand between EEC countries. The ultimate success of these\npolicies will, however, depend more on the determination of\nnational authorities to ensure the attainment of economic\nobjectives than on consultation procedure. The EMS itself can assist this process because, notably, the\nexchange rate constraints which it imposes have doubtless\ninfluenced participant countries'monetary and other policies in\nthe direction of greater discipline. But that is not enough. If\ndivergences in other areas are building up, then monetary\npolicies in individual countries ultimately cannot withstand the\npressure. Nor can exchange rate realignments be counted upon\n\nto relieve the strains: if they are too frequent or too large they\n\ndetract from \naccentuating diverging developments. the system's credibility and risk further\n\nIn these circumstances, technical improvements to particular\nelements of the system cannot be regarded as a viable\nalternative to closer convergence of economic policies. Progress in this area is of crucial importance for the continued\nexistence of the EMS. Concerning monetary policies, the Committee of Governors\nwill continue to monitor developments in the Member States of\n\nthe EEC, as well as their compatibility with one another and\n\nwith the objectives of achieving greater domestic and external\nstability. To this end, the Committee of Governors evaluates\nregularly the adaptations that may be required to foster the\ncohesion of monetary and exchange rate developments within\nthe Community. In particular, the Governors are analysing the\nrecent growth in borrowing abroad by EEC members and its\nimplications for the pursuit of monetary policy. 3. The Governors have carefully examined a number of\npossible adaptations to the mechanisms of the EMS, which fall\nwithin their sphere of competence. These adjustments relate to:\n(i) intervention and financing within the system, and (ii)\ncreation and acceptability of ECUs. The Governors, however, did not reach a consensus on the\nintroduction of amendments to existing arrangements and\nagreements at the present time. They wish to point out that\ntheir in-depth review of the operation of the EMS in its first\nthree years has led to the conclusion that the system is\nfunctioning satisfactorily from a technical point of view. The Committee of Governors will continue to monitor closely\nthe performance of the EMS and stand ready to introduce\nthose adaptations \nappropriate as circumstances develop. to its mechanisms that might become\n\n4. With regard to the relations of the EMS with the outside\nworld, the Committee of Governors focused its attention on the\ndesirability of obtaining a higher degree of exchange rate\nstability, in particular between the EMS and the US dollar. However, this cannot be achieved merely through exchange\nmarket intervention. Rather, the solution of present problems\nrequires increased coordination of economic policies within the\nCommunity and also between EEC countries and the United\nStates of America. It should be recalled in this respect that\nEEC central banks already have adequate opportunity for\nconstant communication with their American colleagues both\nthrough the concertation procedure and through their monthly\nmeetings. The extension of the use ofECUs issued by the EM CF outside\n\nthe circle of EMS member central banks is difficult \n\nto envisage,\n\ngiven the precarious nature of the ECU and the fact that its\nconvertibility into third currencies has not been defined. This\ndoes not exclude the possibility of central banks of 'European\ncountries with particularly close economic and financial ties\nwith the European Communities' obtaining ECUs by acquiring\nthem from an EMS central bank. The legal implications of this\nchange, however, would have to be examined. 93\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n5. EEC central banks do not have objections to the\ndevelopment of the use of ECUs in private markets, and,\nindeed, progress in this field is taking place in several countries. Care must, however, be taken lo prevent developments which\nwould interfere with the proper conduct of domestic monetary\npolicies. ments, this step would create segmentation within the\nnational capital market as long as these restrictions\npersisted; efforts must therefore be made to facilitate the\n\nissue of ECU loans through a progressive removal of\n\ncapital controls. The Governors specifically wish to draw attention to the\nfollowing issues:\n\n(i) There is a danger that, if Community institutions were\n\nforced to borrow in ECUs beyond the possibilities offered\n\nby the developing ECU market, these institutions might\nsuffer a financial burden. (ii) Although there would be advantages in exempting ECU-\ndenominated loans from restrictions on capital move-\n\nBy permitting the opening of ECU-denominated bank\n\naccounts by residents there is the danger of circumventing\nexchange control measures where they are still in force. Difficulties for monetary control would also arise. The nature of these problems and their implications for legal\nand structural conditions in individual EEC countries, in the\nGovernors' view, mean that appropriate measures fall to be\ntaken by individual countries. 94\n\n\fANNEX F-2\n\nLetter of 29 April 1982 from the Chairman of the Committee of Governors of\nthe central banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community\nto the President of the Council of the European Communities\n\nDear Mr President,\n\nI refer to my letter of 30 March in which I confirmed\nthat, in response to the Economic and Financial Affairs\nCouncil's request, the Committee of EEC Governors would\nundertake discussions in April about the European Monetary\nSystem. meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council. During their discussion, the Governors confirmed the position\ntaken in the attached note verbale ' that I presented to the\nEconomic and Financial Affairs Council in March 1982. Furthermore, developments, and in particular the tensions, of\nthe past weeks only underline further the need to give priority\n\nto strengthening the convergence of national economic policies\n\nand to coordinating these policies with Community policies. Indeed, action to improve convergence appears necessary to\npreserve the very viability of the European Monetary System. A t its meeting of 20 April 1982 the Committee of\n\nGovernors re-examined the question, with particular regard to\nthe four areas specified in the conclusions to the February 1982\n\nYours sincerely. 1 \n\nSee Annex F-l. 95\n\n\fANNEX G\n\nOral statement of the Chairman of the Monetary Committee\n\non the development of the EMS to the informal meeting\n\nof Economic and Finance Ministers on 17 May 1982\n\n/. On 21 April and 5 May 1982, pursuant to the Council's\nrequest, the Monetary Committee again examined the\nCommission's proposal for a draft Council resolution on the\ndevelopment of the European Monetary System. '\n\nexchange rate and interest rate developments, where it insists\non the need to persevere in our efforts \nto persuade the US\nauthorities to pursue policies which take full account of their\nresponsibilities to the world economy. improvement in convergence and the system's development. The EMS has in fact already become an increasingly\n\n4. There was general agreement within the Committee that the\ntop priority area for our future efforts must be the\nstrengthening of convergence, both in terms of economic\npolicies and performances and of reducing existing imbalances\nbetween member countries. It is clear that the system's\nprospects hinge crucially on our ability to make progress in this\narea, and that there is thus a parallelism between an\n\nimportant part of our economic policy framework. In its three\nyears of existence, the coordination and consultation process at\nCommunity level has been intensified; at national level, the\nsystem has promoted the adoption of stability-oriented policies\nin a number of member countries, and notably in those where\nthey were most needed. But disappointing results in the\nfundamental areas of domestic cost and price trends and of\npublic finances, underlying \nthe recent tensions within the\nsystem, indicate the urgent need for a renewed and incisive\neffort. It is along this road, in the daily implementation of our\neconomic policies and in our capacity to direct them towards\nstability, that the system can continue to give its support and\nmust progress further. Such progress is not a question of new\nprocedures, but of resolute and forceful cooperation at all\nlevels, and especially \nin the ' bodies where views may be\nexchanged most frankly and confidentially. intention of members to actively use the forum provided by the\nMonetary Committee to this end, and to keep matters having a\nbearing on convergence at the centre of our work programme. It is the firm\n\n5. In conclusion, therefore, although the proposals contained\nin the draft resolution do not appear to be acceptable in their\ntotality at the present stage, notably for \nagreement on a technical package which is at the same time\nsignificant and balanced, there are possibilities and scope for\npragmatic progress on a number of issues, and most notably\nthat of convergence. It is my intention that the Monetary\nCommittee play its full part in contributing to such progress. the absence of\n\ninterventions and the external\n\n2. With regard to the propositions covering the technical\naspects of the system (i. e. ECU creation, acceptance and\nremuneration, infra-marginal \nrole of the ECU), the Committee continues to find that no\ngeneral agreement proves possible at present, either on the\nproposals as they stand in the draft resolution or on an\nalternative group of proposals as set out, for example, in my\nprevious statement to the Council of 15 March 1982. You will\nrecall that the Committee had attempted to assemble the\nelement sofa package on the technical aspects of the system to\nsee whether these could command general acceptance, in the\nexpectation that if agreement could be reached on these,\nagreement might well be attainable on the other points of the\ndraft resolution as well. That had not been the case at the time,\nand today I cannot but confirm thai outcome. The Committee\nfelt that under these circumstances a continuation of the\ndiscussion would not alter the situation. 3. As to the other group of proposals, covering the private use\n\nof the ECU, the measures to enhance convergence, and the\n\nexternal aspects of the system, the Committee's Alternates\nhave examined their technical implications and, although they\nfound that technical problems persist in some cases, the\nCommittee's view is that the general direction of several of the\nproposals should be supported and encouraged. The Commit-\ntee expressed, for example, its support for the promotion of the\n\nprivate use of the ECU. This is an area where developments are\n\nlargely spontaneous and can proceed at a pace of their own:\nthus, for example, the ECU is already treated as a foreign\n\ncurrency in the majority of Member States. The Committee\n\nalso agreed that the use of the ECU for the borrowing and\nlending activities of the Community institutions should be\nexpanded as far as market conditions permit. As regards\nexternal relations, the Committee has often contributed to a\ncommon Community position, for example in the field of\n\nSee Chapter VI. 96\n\n\fANNEX H\n\nReport from the Commission (of 20 March 1980)\nto the European Council on the European Monetary Fund V\n\n/. At the Dublin meeting on 29 and 30 November 1979, the\n\nEuropean Council invited the Commission to submit, for the\nmeeting in March 1980, a report setting out the progress made\nin studying the establishment of the European Monetary Fund\nand pointing out any difficulties. The studies on the European Monetary Fund were started by\n\nthe Commission as early as May 1979. Since then, the\n\nMonetary Committee and the Committee of Governors have\nlooked into this question, and their respective chairmen have\nreported to the Council on the progress of work. This work has\nnot yet been completed; rather than producing specific\nguidelines, it has so far made it possible to identify problems\nand possible choices between solutions. However, as can be\nseen from the analysis below, the preliminary technical work\n\nhas shown that, if it is to make a real extra contribution, the\n\ntransition to the institutional stage of the European Monetary\n\nSystem can be carried out only if certain basic questions have\n\nbeen resolved which have not yet been fully clarified. II. Current work is based on three main elements:\n\nA. The first is the desire expressed by the European Council in\nBremen and Brussels, to transform the European Monetary\nSystem into a 'durable scheme' guaranteeing the creation of a\nzone of monetary stability in Europe. For the purpose of\nattaining this objective, the European Council defined \noperating rules of the system in the first stage and indicated\ncertain characteristics of the 'final stage'. the\n\nB. The second is the lessons to be learnt from the first year of\noperation of the European Monetary System and from\nmonetary and exchange-rate developments in the Community\nsince 13 March 1979. The assessment of the operation of the European Monetary\nSystem in its first year is largely positive. The procedures for\nconsultation between the authorities of the Member States in\nthe various Community bodies have been improved. Despite\nsharp economic and monetary disturbances which entailed\ninterest rate increases ranging from 3 to 5 points according to\nthe country, the group of participating currencies maintained a\ngreater degree of cohesion than that recorded since 1972. Two\nadjustments of central rates in September and'November 1979\nwere carried out in good time and fairly smoothly. Lastly, the\nmonetary compensatory amounts were reduced appreciably,\nreflecting progress towards the objective of uniform prices on\nthe European agricultural market. In stressing the positive factors, the Commission is expressing\nits conviction that it would have been much more difficult \nachieve these results if there had been no European Monetary\nSystem. However, between the end of 1978 and the end of 1979,\n\nto\n\n1 \n\nPreviously published in European Economy Number 7, November 1980:\nChapter 6 of the Annual Economic Review 1980-81. the average rate of inflation in the Community rose from 6,9%\n\nto 9,0%, and the spread between the lowest and the highest rate\nof inflation in the Member States widened from 10 to 17 points. Although progress has thus been made towards exchange-rate\nstability, the same has not been the case in the field of prices. Consequently, the European Monetary System must be\nconsolidated and strengthened so as to make its own active\ncontribution to better economic equilibrium in Europe. Economic policies for their part will have to be brought to\nconverge more closely to ensure the stability of the monetary\nsystem. C. The third element is the developments in the international\neconomic, financial and monetary situation. In 1978, the\nserious disruption of exchange rates, payments balances, prices\nand financial markets caused by the 1971-74 monetary and\nenergy crises, seemed to be about to ease. Today, the threat of\nrenewed disequilibria in international payments relations is\ngrowing. The future development of the European Monetary System\nmust therefore be such as to contribute actively to the overall\nstability of the international financial and monetary system\nandtomeet the Community's general interests in the tradeand\nfinancial fields\u2014both \nits own interests and those of the\ncountries with which it has particularly close relations. III. The Commission and the committees concerned have\n\norganization of the credit mechanisms in the European\nMonetary Fund. They have examined the institutional aspects,\nwhich will be largely governed by the solutions adopted to the\nquestions of substance discussed above. 1. The credit mechanisms\n\nTwo features of the credits granted under present agreements\nshould be noted: to a large extent they are bilateral credits, the\naccounting procedures for which are handled by a Community\nbody, the EMCF; and since the body which issued the ECUs\u2014\nthe EMCF\u2014is only an accounting intermediary in the credit\noperations, these do not give rise to the direct creation of\nECUs. Two problems have been studied in particular; first, the\nconsolidation of existing credits (short-term and medium-\nterm) and of very short-term credit facilities. It became clear\nthat, whatever solution is adopted, this is not a fundamental\nproblem in the transition to the institutional stage of the\nEuropean Monetary Fund. Second, the EMF's ability to create ECUs against credits,\nwhich is a crucial issue. This ability raises the problem of the\nlimits and conditions under which these ECUs could be created\n\n97\n\nprimarily concentrated on the role of the ECU and on the\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nor the credits could be granted, and therefore that of the means\nwhich would be available to the European Monetary Fund to\nimpose tighter monetary discipline in the Community. The\nsolutions to this problem will depend to a large extent on the\n\nrole of the ECU in the institutional stage of the European\n\nMonetary System. 2. The ECU\n\n(a) In the present system, the ECV serves as the numeraire/or\nthe\nthe exchange-rate mechanism, as the basis for \ndivergence indicator, as the denominator for intervention\noperations and as a means of settlement between the\nCommunity's monetary authorities. However, the ECU lacks the principal features of a\ncurrency: it is not an instrument of payment; there can be\nno autonomous creation of ECUs through the credit\noperations; and though it appears in the central bank's\nbalance-sheets, this does not mean that it is a genuine\nreserve instrument, since it is merely the expression in the\naccounts of the assets (dollars and gold) against which it\nhas been issued and whose movements it reflects automati-\ncally. (b) The decisions taken at Bremen and Brussels, certain\n\nfundamental considerations and recent monetary trends\ntogether mean that the development of the ECU will be the\nlocomotive for transition to the institutional stage of the\nEuropean Monetary System: it is by expanding the role of\n\nthe ECU that the Community will be able to organize\n\ninternally the coordinated action necessary to achieve a\ngreater degree of monetary stability and establish its\nmonetary identity at international level. (c) The full and complete use of the ECU as a means of\npayment and the regulation of the creation of ECUs to\n\nserve the objective of monetary stability raise the question\nwhether, to what extent and under what conditions the\nfuture Monetary Fund could possess an independent power\nof money creation. If it were given such power, the future European Monetary\nFund could create ECUs \ncontribution of reserves (as is done under the present\n\nin two ways: against a\n\nagreements), or through credit operations; these two\n\nmethods could even be combined. The full use of the ECU as a means of payment or reserve\n\ninstrument within the Community would require that\nseveral conditions be met:\n\n(i) certain legislative measures would have to be taken to\n\nabolish the limits to the acceptability of ECUs to the\n\n98\n\ncentral banks, to provide that a certain percentage of\nreserves must be held in the form of ECUs, and possibly to\n\nimpose the exclusive use of the ECU as an instrument of\n\nsettlement between the Community's central banks;\n\n(ii) if the limits to the acceptability of the ECU were abolished,\nthe ECUs inherent characteristics (convertibility and\nyield) would have to be strengthened to make it as\nattractive as the other possible reserve instruments;\n\n(d) Apart from the role to be performed by the ECU in the\n\nareas described above, a secondmajor decision of principle\nwill have to be taken; this concerns the wider use of the\nECU outside the system of Community central banks, both\non the private financial markets and by the authorities of\nnon-Community countries, so as to ensure the full\nnegotiability of the ECU and to enhance its status as a\nreserve asset. In this context, the question arises as to\nwhether the strengthening of the role of the ECU might\nallow it to play a part in recycling the surpluses of the oil-\nproducing countries. IV. Once the European Monetary System enters into its\ninstitutional stage, consistency between domestic monetary\npolicies, credit mechanisms and exchange-rate agreements will\nhave to be ensured within a single system of procedures, so as to\nprovide a full and proper basis for the smooth operation of the\nsystem and the achievement of monetary stability. \u2022\n\nThis raises the questions firstly, of the institutional powers with\nwhich the Fund will be endowed in order to administer the\nsystem itself and, secondly, of the back-up measures which will\nhave to be taken so as to ensure the smooth working of the\nsystem, including measures such as the coordination of\nexchange-rate policies vis-a-vis non-Community currencies\nand the achievement of a sufficient degree of convergence in the\neconomic and monetary policies pursued in the Member States. Examination of the institutional aspects has already begun. It\nhas started from the principle that a Fund endowed with\nincreased powers should be integrated into the institutional\nsystem of the Community and of the existing international\nmonetary organizations on the basis of clear precise legal\narrangements. Fuller examination of the institutional aspects\nmust necessarily be carried out in parallel with the basic\nquestions raised above; it is on the solutions arrived at with\nregard to these basic questions that the powers of the European\nMonetary Fund and the nature of the bodies running it will to a\nlarge extent depend. It will at all events be necessary to work\nout a balanced system of tasks, responsibilities and safeguards\nfor the European Monetary Fund; this is essential to the\nexercise of any function of a monetary nature. A balanced\nsystem of this kind is, moreover, to be found in all the Member\nStates, though the features of each system differ \nwith national legal and institutional circumstances. in accordance\n\n\fAnnex H\n\nSome of the functions or tasks allotted to the European\nMonetary Fund once it is established will probably have to be\ntaken up only gradually depending on how the relevant political\nauthorities assess the way in which the situation is developing\nand on whether they find the mechanisms suitable. In conclusion, the Commission proposes that the European\n\nCouncil request the relevant Community bodies to pursue their\nwork along the lines set out in this report. The Commission is\nready to provide the European Council with further inform-\nation on the progress achieved and difficulties encountered in\nsetting up the European Monetary Fund proposed in the texts\nthat were released after the meetings of the European Council\nin July and December 1978. 99\n\n\fANNEX I\n\nPreparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund\n\nNotes prepared by Commission departments in 1980 and 1981\n\nThe papers in this annex were drafted \nin execution of the \nmandate given by the Monetary Committee on 26 February\n1980 on the study of different aspects of the transition to the \ninstitutional phase of the European Monetary System. Though \nthey have been discussed in depth by the Alternates, they\nremain technical notes of the Commission departments. In \naccordance with the Committee's request, each topic is treated\n\nin a separate paper which develops the different options which \nmay be envisaged. (4) consolidation of Community credits in the European\n\nThe subjects studied are the following :\n\nt1) acceptability and convertibility I negotiability of the ECU;\n(2) (he Uquidity or the Fund. (3) arrangements for transferring reserves to the EMF;\n\nMonetary Fund;\n\n(5) external role of the ECU;\n\n(6) the EMF\u2014institutional aspects. 100\n\n\fANNEX 1-1\n\nPreparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund\n\n\u2014 Acceptability and convertibility/negotiability of the ECU\n\nContents\n\n/. Introduction\n\n1. Nature of the paper\n2. Definitions\n\nII. The present situation\n\n1. Acceptabilityjexclusivity\n\n2. Convertibility or negotiability\n\nHI. The institutional stage of the EMS\n\n1. Acceptabilityjexclusivity\n\n2. Convertibility or negotiability\n\nIV. Implications for the Fund\n\nThe findings of this paper should be regarded as tentative both\nbecause the characteristics examined are not exhaustive and\nalso because existing currencies and reserve assets can only\nshed some light on what qualities should be given to the ECU,\nwhich will necessarily be a new and to some extent different\ntype of instrument, issued by an institution, the EMF, whose\nrole and characteristics remain to be agreed upon. 2. Definitions\n\nWithin a currency area transactions are normally denominated\n\nand settled in the national currency, which has the qualities of\n\nboth acceptability and exclusivity. In general, the national\ncurrency is the only instrument recognized by the law; a\ncreditor must accept it in discharge of a debt. Although two\nparties could in principle agree on something else, there are in\nmany countries restrictions on residents acquiring or holding\nother currencies. These concepts cannot be directly applied to\nthe ECU, but it is convenient in what follows to call the degree\nto which creditors are obliged to accept ECUs in settlement,\nthe degree of acceptability; and to employ the word exclusive\nwhen a debtor must use ECUs in settlement. Between currency areas there is a limited number of settlement\ninstruments that are normally used. For any transaction the\ndenomination and the means of payment are generally part of\nthe contract, and important elements in the choice are the\n\nconvertibility or negotiability of the instrument. As the\n\nI. Introduction\n\n1. Nature of the paper\n\nThe purpose of this paper is to raise some questions for\ndiscussion of the development of the ECU towards its full\nutilization as a reserve asset and settlement instrument as\noutlined in the Resolution of \nthe European Council of\n5 December 1978. The approach adopted is to consider in a\nfirst section some particular characteristics of existing\ncurrencies, reserve assets and settlement instruments and to\nconsider whether implications can be drawn for the develop-\nment of the ECU. The characteristics examined are accept-\nability, exclusivity, convertibility and negotiability, chosen\nmainly because it is thought that there are limitations on the\nECU in these areas in the existing phase of the EMS. These\nwill be examined in the second section of the paper. The third\nsection will examine possible developments for the next stage\nand the final section attempts to identify possible links between\nthe choices to be made and the role of the Fund. meaning of the term convertibility has changed along with\ndevelopments over time in the international monetary system,\nsome definitions are necessary. Until August 1971, the US\ndollar, the major reserve currency, was said to be convertible\nbecause it could be officially converted through its issuing\nauthority into gold at a known and fixed price. Although\nneither the dollar nor the European currencies now possess this\nquality,' they are still said to be convertible because, for\neligible transactions with other currency areas, domestic\nnationals may sell their own currency to purchase the necessary\nforeign currency on an organized market but not necessarily at\na fixed price, and foreign nationals with balances in that\ncurrency may sell these balances on the same market. As these\nare market rather than official \ntransactions, the currencies\ncould be said to be negotiable rather than convertible. The\n\nexisting currencies. In transposing these concepts to the ECU\nin what follows the word convertibility will be reserved for\ntransactions through the Fund: and the word negotiability for\ntransactions in ECUs between participants. The EMS to some extent restores the previous situation for transactions\nbetween the participating currencies for which price fluctuations are\nlimited to a narrow band. 101\n\nECU will not necessarily develop into either an instrument\nexactly like the dollar was nor with all the characteristics of\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nII. The present situation\n\nIII. The institutional stage of the EMS\n\n1. Acceptability /exclusivity\n\n1. Acceptabilityjexclusivity\n\nIn the present transitional phase, as well as being used by\nagreement between participants, the use of the ECU as a\ndenominator for claims and liabilities and its use as a\nsettlement and reserve instrument is prescribed in specific\ninstances. Each central bank must transfer at least 20% of its\ngold and dollar holdings to the Fund. Against these transfers it\nreceives ECUs which can be used as follows. When an\nintervention is made at the margin, the debtor may choose\nwhether or not to activate the very short-time financing\n(VSTF). If he chooses to do so, the debt is denominated in\nECUs but settlement may be made at any time before the\nfinancing opera lion falls due in the currency of the creditor. If\nthere is no advance repayment the creditor is not obliged to\naccept settlement by means of ECUs of an amount more than\n50% of the claim. In cases where the financing mechanism is\nnot activated, the transaction is not denominated in ECUs but\n\nthe two banks can agree that all or some part of the settlement\n\nshould be made in ECUs. When infra-marginal intervention\ntakes place, the debtor has no right to the VSTF, but it may be\ngranted with the agreement of the creditor in which case the\nabove settlement rules would again apply. These types of\ntransactions give rise to net ECU positions, the interest on\nwhich is fully settled in ECUs. The settlement arrangements\nusing ECUs do not therefore involve absolute exclusivity since\nthe provisions are without prejudice to other mutually agreed\nforms of settlement; and as indicated above acceptability is\nlimited to 50% of a claim at the end of the financing period of\n\nthe VSTF. 2. Convertibility or negotiability\n\nThe present arrangements for the transitional period exclude\nthe possibility of ECU convertibility by the Fund into other\nreserve assets, except \nto the extent that swaps may be\nunwound. The initial allocation of ECU is made against three-\nmonth swaps of gold and reserves. This system, together with\n\nthe arrangement that the management of the assets is entrusted\nto the contributing central banks, does not allow the Fund any\ndiscretionary powers or control over \nMoreover, since participants may reobtain their assets by\nunwinding the swaps at two working days' notice, it is\nimpossible for the Fund to convert any net ECU position by\nspot buying and selling operations. the \u2022 reserve assets. The ECU would be given the characteristics of acceptability\nand exclusivity if debts and claims between the central banks\nhad to be denominated and settled in ECUs. Denomination and\nsettlement are closely linked. Normally a transaction will be\nsettled in the instrument in which it is denominated, although\nthis is not always true and is not true in the existing\narrangements for \nthe VSTF. These arrangements were,\nhowever, substantially taken over from the previous system in\n\nwhich it was not possible for settlement to be made in EMU As\n\nin which the debts were denominated. In the EMS however, the\n\nECU is to be fully used as a settlement instrument which can be\n\ntaken to imply that more transactions should be denominated\nand settled in ECUs. It is not foreseen at this stage that the\nECU itself will be used for interventions but it would still be\npossible for these transactions in national currencies to be\ndenominated in ECU, as they would be if they were to pass\nthrough the Fund. For acceptability, it is necessary to specify not only the type of\nobligation requiring settlement but also the extent to which a\nparticipating bank is obliged to accept ECU. In the present\nsystem, as seen above, there is a 50% lower acceptance limit on\neach settlement. Consideration could also be given to other\npercentages or the abandoning of all limits as well as to\ndifferent \nacceptance until a central bank holds more than a given\npercentage of its reserves in ECUs. types of limits. An example of the latter is full\n\nIt is evident that a monetary instrument cannot usefully be\ngiven the qualities of exclusivity and acceptability if its supply\nis not regulated. The monopoly power of central banks is\nclosely connected with their responsibilities for their currency. The implication for the ECU is that questions of exclusivity\n\nand acceptability cannot be determined without reference to\n\nthe way in which it is created, its supply regulated and the\n\nthe Fund or through transactions with other\n\nfacilities by which participants may obtain more either through\ncredit from \nparticipants. Important elements in these topics are the\nconvertibility/negotiability of the ECU to which this note now\nturns. 2. Convertibility or negotiability\n\nSubject to the restriction that the transactions should not be\nmade solely with a purpose of altering the composition of\nreserves, the ECU is however negotiable between central\nbanks. This implies that when two central banks agree, ECUs\n\ncan be used in spot transactions to acquire other reserve assets\n\nor Community currencies, and that these currencies and assets\ncan be used to acquire ECUs. There are two basic approaches to the questions of how\nparticipants can acquire more ECUs when needed or exchange\nECUs for other reserve assets when they consider that they\nhold too many ECUs. One is that these transactions should be\nmade mainly through the Fund by emphasizing the convert-\nibility of the ECU through its issuing authority. The other is\nthat the transactions should be made mainly with other\n\n102\n\n\fAnnex 1-1\n\nparticipants, i. e. by putting the emphasison negotiability. The\ntwo approaches are, however, not mutually exclusive. The\nfollowing considerations should be taken into account in\nconsidering the correct balance between the approaches. (i) In the existing system each participant acquires an initial\n\nThe negotiability approach would imply that participants\nwould rely predominantly on each other rather than on the\nFund for acquiring more ECU or for disposing of ECU in case\nit was thought that net balances in either direction were too\nlarge. With this approach considerations of what assets can be\nacquired against a positive position or used to replenish stocks\n\nof ECU and the rules and conditions under which it can be done\n\nare relatively unimportant beyond the parties concerned when\ntransactions are voluntary. If there are two central banks\nwilling to make the transaction there would seem to be no\npurpose in restricting them. The principal question to be asked\nabout the approach is whether the 'market', which at this stage\nis composed only of the participating central banks, is large\nenough relative to the supply of ECUs to ensure that the ECU\nis sufficiently negotiable to be a fully usable asset. It is also\nworth noting that with this approach the yield characteristics of\nthe ECU become very important because, with its value being\nfixed by a formula, changing its attractiveness depends upon\nvarying the yield. It will not be used in a negotiability approach\n\nif it is either too attractive or not attractive enough as it will not\n\nbe possible to find two willing sides to a transaction. In the case that it was thought that the 'market'composedonly\nof the participants was too restricted it would be possible to\nsupplement negotiability with a designation scheme. In this\ncase, when a participant required dollars, it could call on the\nFund to raise them from the other members. This could be done\nthrough a designation plan. Once a key had been agreed upon,\nparticipants would be required to supply dollars. The key could\neither be prespeci/ied or determined on an ad hoc basis\naccording to circumstances. For the former, experience with\nthe IMF would suggest that the procedure risks being rather\nrigid; whereas for the latter, the Fund would have to have\npowers to impose its decisions on participants. This type of\nscheme would be available in cases where a participant could\nshow that it had a need for dollars. In a regional scheme, it is\npossible that the provision of dollars under a designation plan\ncould pose difficulties for the participants at a time when the\nFund's holdings of dollars had not been tapped. In such cases, it\nwould then be possible for the Fund to use its own resources to\nsupply dollars on a temporary basis. In a later stage, if the\ninternational role of the ECU is developed, this possibility\ncould be extended through operations in which non-EEC\nmonetary authorities acquired ECUs against \ncurrencies or other reserve assets. their own\n\nallocation of ECUs against gold and dollars through the\nswap operations. For the next phase it will be necessary to\nconsider arrangements for issues against these and other\nreserve assets and also perhaps for allocations against\nnational currency. The way in which any subsequent ECUs\ncan be acquired through the Fund will be influenced by\nthese arrangements. For example, if the original arrange-\nments involve all banks transferring a similar proportion of\ntheir contributions in gold, so that exchange risks are\nequalized, any subsequent acquisitions of ECUs would\nrequire a transfer of the same proportion of gold if the\nexchange risk position was not to be changed. The degree\nto which excess balances of ECUs can be converted into\nreserve assets could also be influenced by the way in which\nthe initial allocation of ECUs was created. Furthermore,\n\nconvertibility into gold would be likely to raise many\nproblems such as those regarding any conditions based on\nneed (see below). Convertibility into dollars raises the\nquestions of whether the Fund has enough in a sufficiently\nliquidform, and if not, how it can use, either through selling\nor by borrowing against, any other of its assets (especially\ngold) to supplement its dollar holdings. This is of course\nlinked with the question of the way in which assets are\ntransferred to the Fund. (ii) Two types of conditions can be considered, quantitative or\n\nqualitative. With quantitative type conditions, participants\nwould have the right to convert other reserves into ECUs\nwhen their ECU holdings fell below a certain percentage,\nand to convert ECUs into other reserves when their ECU\nholdings rose above a certain percentage. The two\npercentages should neither be the same nor be permanently\nfixed. With qualitative type conditions, participants would\nhave the right to convert ECUs into reserve assets or vice\nversa when they could show that the transaction was\nin some way. Whether the\njustified by need, defined \nconditions are qualitative or quantitative the role of the\nFund remains to be determined. For quantitative con-\nditions if the percentages are fixed, and for qualitative\nconditions if the criteria areprespeci/ied, the Fund's role is\nlimited to that of managing its assets to ensure a\nsatisfactory rate of return and sufficient \nother extreme the Fund could have extensive powers over\nvarying the percentages or over specifying conditions\ndepending upon circumstances. liquidity. At the\n\nIV. Implications for the Fund\n\nECU convertibility through the Fund raises two important\nissues: (i) into what should the ECU be convertible and with\nwhat ECUs can be acquired, and (ii) according to what rules\nand conditions ?\n\nThe characteristics of the ECU cannot be determined in\nisolation from the role that the Fund is expected to play and the\nwhole monetary environment developed by the system. Some\nimplications for the ECU can be drawn from \n\nthe charac-\n\n103\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nlike its valuation and yield as well as its convertibility or\nnegotiability. Convertibility and negotiability are to some extent alternatives\nand so a choice has to be made over the degree of emphasis to be\ngiven to one or the other. This choice has important\nimplications both for the Fund and for the ECU. With a\nconvertibility-type approach the question has to be settled as to\nwhether the Fund has the power to set and vary \nthe\n(quantitative or qualitative) rules or whether these are\nprespecified and fixed. In the case that they are fixed the\nFund's powers are limited to surveillance and to managing its\nassets. The Fund's degree of control over the quantity and use\nto which\nis also influenced by the extent \nthe ECU \nof \nparticipants have the right to convert ECUs. With the\nconvertibility approach therefore any possible powers confer-\n\nred to the Fund over the control of ECU supply would be\n\nlimited by prefixing rules for automatic convertibility. A\nnegotiability approach could be compatible with a swap system\n\nif the Fund could mobilize the reserves by some designation\n\nplan. To the extent that ECUs cannot be exchanged for reserve\nassets not restricted to regional use, it would, however, increase\n\nthe importance of any powers that the Fund has to determine\n\nthe quantity of ECUs in circulation. teristics of acceptability, exclusivity, convertibility and\nnegotiability present in national currencies but these must be\nregarded as tentative because the ECU may at least for the\nin some very important ways\nforeseeable future be'different \nfrom national currencies: it has a limited number of users who\nare all official authorities, as a basket of currencies its value is\nnot directly determined by supply and demand, it is not used for\ninterventions, etc. Acceptability and exclusivity are complementary charac-\nteristics related to the use of a currency within its own domain. The more the ECU possesses these qualities the more it will be\nequivalent to a national currency, and to the extent that the\nFund is endowed with discretionary powers over ECU supply,\n\nthe greater will be the potential of this institution to act in a way\n\nsimilar to that of a national central bank. The important issue\nis the domain of the ECU, i. e. the range of transactions over\n\nwhich the ECU will be used and within this the degree of\n\nprescriptive use. This question cannot be settled without taking\ninto consideration other important characteristics of the ECU\n\n104\n\n\fANNEX 1-2\n\nPreparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund\n\n\u2014 The liquidity of the Fund\n\nContents\n\nIntroduction\n\nI. Liquidity and convertibility\n\nA, Conversion demand\n\nB. The Fund's ability to satisfy the demand for assets\n\nII. Liquidity and negotiability\n\nHI. Conclusions\n\nIntroduction\n\nGenerally speaking, a financial institution's liquidity relates to\nits ability to meet its liabilities on demand or at an agreed date ;\nit is therefore dependent both on the quality of its assets and the\nmaturity profile of its assets and liabilities alike. In the context of the EMF, \n\nthe concept of liquidity should be\n\nassessed in the light of the system's special characteristics. When used as an instrument of settlement between participants\nin the EMS, the ECU does not pose any direct liquidity\nproblem for the Fund, since an ECU settlement is simply an\naccounting exercise, namely transfer by the Fund, in its books,\nof ECU liabilities vis-a-vis one central bank to another. The\noperation does not in itself involve a call on the Fund's assets. However, as well as being a regional settlement instrument, the\nECU is a reserve asset, and reserves are normally held as a\ncushion against any payment imbalances, not merely those\narising out of intra-Community operations. Since the ECU is\nacceptable in the settlement of debt only within the EMS, any\nsolution adopted with a view to acquiring other, more widely\nused assets against ECUs could confront \nliquidity problem since, in certain circumstances, it would be\nobliged to repurchase its liabilities against its assets. The\nextent of this obligation will depend largely on the choice made\nin the matter of the convertibility and negotiability of the ECU. the Fund with a\n\nsufficiently negotiable to be a fully utilizable asset. l The ECU's\nnegotiability could be supplemented by a designation formula\nand by temporary mobilization with the Fund. Here too, if the\nFund were obliged to lend some of its assets to members who\nwished to mobilize their ECU assets temporarily, a liquidity\nproblem might arise, even though it would be temporary and\nless acute. Below we examine these two cases in turn, although obviously\n\nthe convertible ECU is dealt with in more detail. I. Liquidity and convertibility\n\nIn the case of a convertible ECU, the Fund's liquidity\nrequirement would be determined, first, by the demand for\nconverting ECUs into reserve assets and, second, by the Fund's\nability to supply the assets required. A. Conversion demand\n\nThe demand for conversion would depend on the following\nfactors:\n\n1. Total volume of ECUs outstanding\n\nSince all ECUs, whether issued against reserves or against\ncredit operations, will have the same characteristics, the\nmaximum potential conversion demand will be well below the\ntotal volume of ECUs outstanding. It will partly depend on the\ndistribution of surpluses and deficits within the EMS, and also\non the balance of payments of the Community as a whole with\nthe rest of the world. Potential conversion demand will\ntherefore vary over a period with circumstances, but the Fund\nwill naturally have to conduct its affairs \nable, easily to satisfy all potential demand. in such a way as to be\n\n2. Degree of convertibility of the ECU\n\nThe secondfactor affecting \nconvertibility of the ECU. 2\n\nthe Fund's liquidity is the degree of\n\nThere are two possible alternatives:\n\nIf the ECU were convertible, and if the Fund were obliged to\nexchange it for other assets, a liquidity problem could arise. If the ECU were negotiable, there could be no demand on the\nFund's assets from holders of its liability and hence, strictly\nspeaking, no liquidity problem. In this case, the question would\nthen be whether the 'market' formed by the participating\ncentralbanks (and, possibly, by associated central banks) was\nwide and flexible enough to ensure \n\nthat the ECU was\n\n(i) convertibility on demand or convertibility in case of need:\nthe right to convert ECUs may be unconditional or\n\nAs discussed in the paper 'Acceptability and convertibility/negotiabiiity of\n\nthe ECU' (Annex 1-1). This document discusses only the convertibility of the ECU within the\nCommunity; the problems arising in connection with ECU holdings built\nup by other holders are dealt with in Annex 1-5 on the external role of the\nECU. 105\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nsubject either to the existence of need arising from\nbalance-of-payments difficulties, or to other rules to be\nagreed. Existence of such a need could be recognized with\nfull benefit of the doubt being given or could be\nchallenged. The right to convertibility might also be made\ndependent on whether or not ECU assets exceeded a\npredetermined threshold defined either as a proportion of\nthe initial allocation or as a percentage of total reserves ;\n\n(ii) convertibility subject to predetermined rules or insistence\n\non the general principle of Fund responsibility:\n\n(c) the possibilities of acquiring new dollar assets. In theory, these would include :\n\n(i) the sale of gold against dollars. This possibility will depend on the formula adopted\n\nfor the transfer of gold in the Fund. However, even if\n\nthe Fund enjoyed full control over its gold assets, it\nwould probably be as reluctant as its members to sell\nthem;\n\nunder the first solution, the emphasis is on the right of\n\nconversion for holders ofECUs or on the limits to these\nrights; the second solution places emphasis on the\nresponsibility of the Fund for the smooth working of the\nsystem, including the quality of the ECU as a duly\nmobilizable reserve instrument. 3. Attractiveness of the ECU\n\nA convertible ECU would entitle, but not oblige, a holder of this\ninstrument to obtain other reserve assets. Whether or not this\nright \nis actually exercised will depend mainly on the\nattractiveness of the ECU, which itself is dependent on a\nvariety of factors, such as its acceptability, \nits movement\nagainst the dollar, its remuneration and the fact that the ECU\n\nis the monetary expression of a region in the process of\n\nintegration. B. The Fund's ability to satisfy the demand for assets\n\nFirst, it is important to determine the assets into which the\nECU could be converted. Liquidity is not the same as solvency,\nand the Fund might possess assets which do not correspond to\nits members' needs. Thus, if ECU convertibility were to be used\nto satisfy the need to finance an external deficit, the participant\nin question would want to convert his ECUs into dollars andnot\ninto gold. Then again, even if ECU convertibility were\nintroduced in order to prevent an excessive accumulation of\nECUs, this formula would also have to take account of the\nneeds flowing from any external imbalances. In the light of the above considerations, a convertible ECU\nwould impose on the Fund the burden of providing primarily\ndollars. The Fund's ability to satisfy any demand for dollars\nwould depend mainly on :\n\n(a) the size of the Fund's dollar holdings. Under the present arrangements for transferring reserves\nto it, the Fund holds close on 80\u00b0/0 of its assets in gold and\n\nonly 20% in dollars;\n\n(b) the Fund's ability to dispose of its assets. is feasible only \n\nA convertible ECU \ntransferred to the Fund in such a way that the Fund enjoys\nfull control over all or some of its assets, including the right\nof sale ;\n\nif reserves are\n\n106\n\n(ii) mobilization of its assets. The Fund could conclude swap agreements with the\nFederal Reserve, and by activating them, temporarily\nmobilize its assets;\n\n(in) borrowing directly from countries in surplus and\nborrowing on the Eurodollar market. The source, the form and the maturity of such\nborrowing would have to be consistent with the\nprospects for reconstituting the Fund's stock of\ndollars ;\n\n(iv) new transfers of reserves to the Fund. Such new transfers could take place under rules\nrequiring the maintenance of a minimum percentage\nof reserves with the Fund, as is the case at present,\nunder an obligation to reconstitute ECU assets or\nunder a designation formula allowing the Fund to\npurchase dollars from its members against ECUs. This would not always be possible, however, par-\nticularly if the Fund's liquidity problems arose from\nexcessive creation of ECUs. II. Liquidity and negotiability\n\nIn the case of a negotiable ECU, the conversion ofECUs into\ndollars would not, in theory, be the responsibility of the Fund\nbut would essentially be a matter for the participants in the\nEMS. The Fund could, however, contribute to the proper\nfunctioning of this system by placing at its members' disposal\nthe dollars they required. These dollars could be supplied by\nother participants through the Fund according to a designation\nformula or by the Fund directly if members were allowed to\nmobilize their ECUs \ntantamount to the Fund lending its dollars \naccording to a formula to be determined (e. g. dollar-ECU\nswaps). through its of/ices. This would be\n\ntemporarily\n\nUse of this mobilization facility could present the Fund with a\nliquidity problem, depending on the extent of its mobilization\nobligation. As distinct from the problem of liquidity that arises\nwith a convertible ECU, this problem would be temporary since\nthe Fund would merely be engaging in a lending operation ;\nmoreover, it would be less serious and less likely to arise. Annex 1-2\n\nIn this context, since priority ought to be given to the smooth\nworking of the EMS, the Fund would, in the management of its\nassets, have to take account not only of the yield on its portfolio\nbut also of the need to maintain a certain margin of liquidity in\nthe interests of its members. In the case of a convertible ECU, (he Fund's liquidity would\n\ndepend on its ability to satisfy the demand for conversion of its\nliability, the ECU, into more commonly used international\nreserve assets. The main factors affecting \nwould be :\n\nthe Fund's liquidity\n\n(ii) the quantity of ECU s created;\n\n(i) the attractiveness of the ECU in relation to other assets;\n\nIII. Conclusions\n\n(Hi) the terms on which conversion took place;\n\n(iv) the types of asset into which conversion would be\n\nguaranteed;\n\n(v) the ability of the Fund to acquire further amounts of these\n\nThe matter of liquidity cannot be considered independently of\nthe choices to be made as regards convertibility or negotiability\nof the ECU. It would also be closely linked to the arrangements\nfor transferring reserves to the Fund and to regulation of the\nissue and circulation of ECUs. If the ECU were to be negotiable rather than convertible, the\n\nliquidity problem would be replaced by a management problem. assets. It should also be noted that, as the ECU becomes established as\n\na means of settlement and international reserve asset, the\npotential demand for assets other than the ECU\u2014mainly\ndollars\u2014will tend to fall relative to the Fund's total balance\nsheet, thereby reducing the threats to the Fund's liquidity. 107\n\n\fANNEX 1-3\n\nPreparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund\nArrangements for transferring reserves to the EMF\n\nContents\n\nIntroduction\n\n(a) Transfer of reserves under the existing system\n\n(b) Transfer of reserves in the institutional phase\n\nI. Formulae for initial transfer\n\nA. Retention of the swap system in a modified form\n\nB. Definitive surrender of reserves transferred \n\nFund\n\n(a) Transformation of present swaps into the sale of\n\nreserves to the Fund\n\nto the\n\nof the ECU precarious;\n\n(b) Transfer of gold and dollars in standard propor-\n\ntions\n\nC. Ad hoc formulae based on the specific character of\n\ngold assets\n\n(a) Transfer of gold as capital\n\n(b) Gold \ncertificates of deposit\n\ntransfer against issues of mobilizable\n\nagreed that these swaps will be renewed until 13 March 1983\nunless transition to the institutional phase before that date\nleads to the adoption of another transfer formula. Any volume\nor price adjustments needed are made at each quarterly\nrenewal. On 13 March 1983, if no unanimous decision to the\ncontrary has been taken, the swaps will be unwound. This system is marred by serious limitations, notably the\nfollowing :\n\n(i) the fact that the system reverts to its starting point at the\nend of the transitional period tends to make the existence\n\n(ii) the quarterly value adjustments, and in particular those\ncarried out for ECUs created against gold swaps, have\nproduced substantial automatic variations in ECU\nliquidity;\n\n(in) the transfer of reserves is not definitive;\n\n(iv) the EMCF plays a passive role and has no discretionary\n\npower either over the amount of ECUs created or over the\nuse of reserves deposited with it. These limitations are not compatible with the full utilization of\n\n(c) Transfer of gold with preservation of rights over\n\nthe ECU as a reserve asset and a means of settlement as had\n\nrevaluation profits\n\nbeen laid down by the European Council of 5 December 1978\nfor the institutional phase of the EMS. II. Links to be established between the volume of reserves\ntransferred to the Fund and the stock of ECUs outstand-\ning\n\n(b) Transfer of reserves in the institutional phase\n\nA. Retention of volume adjustment\n\nB. Imposition of a ratio for ECU holdings\n\nC. Non-automatic subsequent transfers\n\nIII. The return payable on the ECU and the various formulae\nfor transferring reserves\n\nIntroduction\n\n(a) Transfer of reserves under the existing system\n\nUnder the existing system, the central banks transfer to the\nEMCF20% of their gold assets and 20% of their dollar assets\nin the form of three-month swaps against ECUs. It has been\n\n108\n\nformulae for\n\nIt must first be stressed that the different \ntransferring reserves to the EMF cannot be looked at in\nabstracto; the basis must be the solutions envisagedfor a whole\nrange of more general problems relating more particularly to\nthe functions of the Fund and to the characteristics of the\nECU. 1\n\nHowever, the different assumptions possible in this connection\nhave one feature in common: they all lead to the idea of\n'permanence'for \nfollowing considerations are behind this conclusion, those of:\n\nthe transfers of reserves to the Fund. The\n\n(i) etting up apermanent ECU system with no automatic and\n\nparallel increase in liquidity;\n\n(ii) enabling the Fund to help finance and adjust \n\nthe\n\ndisequilibria which exist between the Community and the\n\nrest of the world;\n\nSee The EMF: institutional aspects' - Annex 1-6, 'Acceptability and\nconvertibility/negotiability of the ECU' - Annex 1-1. Annex 1-3\n\nB. Definitive surrender of reserves transferred to the Fund\n\nThe gold and dollar reserves would be definitively surrendered\nto the Fund, which would have full control over them. ' This\ncould take. place by sale/purchase, although other legal\nformulae are also possible. (a) Transformation of present swaps into the sale of reserves\n\nto the Fund\n\nThe purchase of reserves against ECUs by the Fund is an\noperation similar to that carried out by a central bank when it\nissues its currency by, for example, purchasing foreign\ncurrencies on the exchange markets. Both operations are\ndefinitive and irreversible. The bank becomes the owner of the\nassets purchased and, unless the operation in question resulted\nfrom an intervention at the bilateral limits in accordance with\nthe EMS exchange rate mechanism, it is not required to buy\nback its currency. Likewise, the Fund, after selling ECUs\nagainst reserves, would become the owner of these reserves in\nexchange for ECUs definitively acquired by their purchasers;\nthis arrangement would result in the setting-up of a permanent\nECU system. This formula calls for the following comments:\n\n(Hi) providing the Fund with a guarantee vis-a-vis third\nparties; this would be necessary should the Fund be\nauthorized to contract loans on the international capital\nmarket and if ECU holdings were built up by other official\nholders. Below, we deal first with the various formulae for initial\ntransfer; we then discuss the problems connected with the\nperiodic adjustment in the volume of these transfers, and end by\nconsidering the questions raised by the return on the ECU. I. Formulae for initial transfer\n\nA. Retention of the swap system in a modified form\n\nThe first question to ask is the following: could the swap\nto\nsystem as it operates at the moment be modified sufficiently \nremedy its deficiencies? The idea has been mooted in this\ncontext \nthat the swaps be accompanied by a renewal\nobligation, until an agreement has been reached on a definitive\nformula for transferring reserves. The precarious nature of the\nECU could be reduced without, however, implying a definitive\nsurrender of reserves. (i) By the sale, the central banks would definitively surrender\n\nConsideration might also be given to either a 'freeze' on the\ngold and dollar price for the duration of the system, while\nretaining the volume adjustment, or non-automatic dis-\ncretionary adjustments to either the volume alone or to volume\nand prices. A midway solution might be to reduce the frequency\nof the price adjustment. In a 'closedpool' context, the reverse procedure might also be\ncontemplated: price adjustments would no longer be reflected\nin the amount of ECUs outstanding but in the volume of\nreserves swapped. This method would have the effect of\nimposing a tight ceiling on the overall amount of ECUs\noutstanding. Even so, introduction of a modified swap arrangement would\nnot resolve the problem of the permanent nature of the ECU. This is because the swaps would have to be unwound at the time\nof the changeover to a definitive system. The prospect of the\nFund reverting to its starting point would not completely\n\neliminate the precarious nature of the ECU and the Fund would\n\nhave control over its assets only to the extent of holding them\nitself in the form of swaps. The situation would, in principle, be\ndifferent \nif it were agreed at the outset to consolidate the ECU\npositions when the changeover to a definitive arrangement took\nplace. A commitment of this kind would, however, be difficult\nto reconcile with the actual concept of a 'swap'. a fraction of their reserves to the Fund. For some of them\nthis solution would have the disadvantage of severing, too\nsharply, all links with the gold which had been sur-\nrendered. In any event, they would all have to be sure of\nacquiring in return for the definitive transfer of assets, an\nasset with similar characteristics, including the one of\nbeing itself fully and easily usable and exchangeable\nagainst other assets. The sale would give the EMF full\ncontrol over its assets, so that the Fund would be able\n\u2014 but not obliged \u2014 to confer a measure of convertibility\n\non the ECU. (ii) By the sale, transferors of gold and dollars would be\npassing over to the Fund the risk of losses or gains\nresulting from variations in the price of the surrendered\nassets. Then again, if the arrangements laid down in 1978\nat Bremen were to be adopted for reserve transfers to the\nFund, the central banks would be contributing in differing\nproportions, to the constitution of the Fund's gold and\ndollar assets, and consequently, they would also be\ncontributing in differing proportions to the Fund's income\nand to the return on the ECU to the extent that the Fund\ndistributed its income between all the ECUs. 1 The transfer of other reserve assets (SDRs) is not discussed, but this is a\n\nproblem on which a decision would have to be taken. 109\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n(b) Transfer of gold and dollars in standard proportions\n\nIt is conceivable that, while the 20% figure would be retained\n\nfor calculating transfers, this figure would no longer apply to\ngold and dollars separately but to the whole of the reserves\n(gold and dollars) of each participant, expressed in ECU. With each participant's overall contribution having thus been\ndetermined, a standard percentage would be fixed indicating\nthe share of the transfer to be made in gold. With this transfer\ntechnique, some countries would have to add to their gold\ntransfer and reduce their dollar transfer, while other countries\nwould be in the reverse situation. The result would be changes in\nthe composition of national reserves; the scale of the changes\nwould depend on the key used. At first sight, the advantage of this formula would be that each\nparticipant would retain a right of recovery over the assets\ntransferred \nto the Fund, and that the profits from any\nrevaluation would be reserved for that participant. On closer examination, however, the situation is not so clear-\ncut. (i) The holder of a title representing a participation in capital\ncan, in theory, exercise his right only if the organization is\nwound up. In the event of the Fund being wound up, the\nclaim would be exercised over the net assets of the Fund;\nthere would therefore be no guarantee that the initial\ndeposit of gold would be recovered. The advantage of this formula over the one discussed above is\nthat it would establishfor each participant equality between his\nshare in the constitution of the Fund's assets and his share in the\nFund's income. But this advantage would be temporary, in that\nthe application of this solution, in the event of subsequent\ntransfers of reserves, would pose considerable problems. C. Ad hoc formulae based on the specific character of gold\n\nassets\n\nGiven the specific problems linked to the transfer of gold, it\nseemed useful to examine the alternative options for transfer-\nring gold to the Fundl which leave the transferor of gold with\nrights over his transfer. In each of these cases, dollar transfers\nwould take the form of a surrender pure and simple. (a) Transfer of gold as capital\n\nUnder this formula, gold transfers made by the central banks\nwould represent participation in the Fund's capital. The\ntransferor of gold would receive a title of ownership, not\ntransferable, expressed in gold weight, and not a means of\nsettlement. The Fund would also allocate simultaneously to the\nparticipating central banks an amount of money in ECUs\nproportionate to their capital participation; these ECUs would\nbe permanent in character. In order to maintain the accounting\nequilibrium of the EMF's balance sheet, the latter operation,\nwhich would increase the Fund's liabilities, would require the\nentry of an equivalent amount on the assets side. This formula thus consists of two separate, albeit coordinated\noperations: a transfer of reserves as capital and the creation ex\nnihilo of a quantity of ECUs which might be equal to, or\ndifferent from, the countervalue of the reserves transferred. 1 The retention of swaps for gold transfers alone could also be regarded as\n\nan ad hoc formula, but this would not really eliminate the precarious\nnature of the ECU. '\n\n110\n\n(ii) The guarantee of recovery also depends on the extent of\nthe Fund's control over the assets received as capital. This\nis a grey area. According to the reasoning behind the\n'capital' formula, the Fund could lend its assets, i. e. contribute to mobilization of the ECU, but would not be\nable to ensure its convertibility since the latter operation\ncould be interpreted as an indirect recovery by the\nparticipants of their capital contribution. It could here be\nargued that this would not be the case, however, where a\nparticipant wished to convert ECUs accumulated over and\nabove his initial allocation. Because of the difficulties of\ninterpretation raised by the question of the extent of the\nFund's control over its assets, there would seem to be a\nneed for \nsupplemented by precise statutory clauses. 'capital' formula, in any event, to be\n\nthe \n\n(Hi) The link between participation in the capital and the\n\ncreation of money in ECUs should be clarified. More than\none hypothesis is possible:\n\n- ECU issue equal to the entire capital; money creation\n\nwould occur to the extent that the capital was not fully\npaid up;\n\n~ ECU issue independent of the amount of capital; the\n\nFund would have the right to decide, depending on\ncircumstances, on the amount of ECU to be created. (b) Gold transfer against issues of mobilizable certificates of\n\ndeposit\n\nThe gold transfer would give rise to the issue of a non-interest-\nbearing certificate of deposit, expressed in gold weight; the\nrisks on gold would continue to be borne by the depositing\ncentral bank. For the certificate of deposit to be converted into an instrument\nof settlement\u2014 the ECU\u2014 it would have to be mobilized; at\nthe holder's request, the Fund would 'rediscount' the gold\n\ncertificate. This mobilization, which could be automatic and\n\n\fAnnex 1-3\n\nparticipants record an increase in their reserves after the initial\nthem to make further\ndeposit, there is an obligation for \n\ntransfers; in the opposite case, they would receive a refund. The adjustment in the volume of the reserves deposited and,\nconsequently, the stock of ECUs outstanding takes place when\nthe swaps are renewed each quarter. In the institutional phase, several formulae can be considered\nfor new transfers and the final choice will be influenced by the\nmethod of transfer used initially and by the option chosen as\nregards the control of ECU creation. The possible formulae are\nbased on the following principles:\n\nA. Retention of volume adjustment\n\nThe retention of the existing formula for adjusting the volume\nof reserves transferred would continue to link the stock of\nECUs outstanding to changes in the participants' gold assets\nand to their exchange rate policy vis-a-vis third currencies; it\nwould involve agreement on the price at which the new transfers\nwere made. Consequently, the rate of ECU creation, as well as\nthe rate of new transfers of reserves, would continue to be\nhighly automatic in character. Assuming a convertible ECU,\nthis formula would be something of a brake on the conversion of\n\nECUs on the sole gounds of reserve diversification. B. Imposition of a ratio for ECU holdings\n\nInstead of the requirement to keep a minimum percentage of\n\nreserves (gold and dollars) with the Fund, participants would\n\nbe required to hold a certain percentage of their reserves in the\n\nform of ECUs. Such a rule would establish a degree of\n\nfor an indeterminate period, would entail the payment of\n\ninterest. Being a liquid instrument, the gold certificate would be\nrecorded as a reserve asset in central bank balance sheets while\nthe gold deposited would be shown among the Fund's assets. This option, while ensuring that the gold was mobilized, would\nreserve for \nthe transferor of gold the profits from any\nrevaluation. However, since it would only be the holder of the gold, the Fund\ncouldnot release it: this could have implications for the Fund's\nliquidity assuming that it had to ensure a fairly high degree of\nECU convertibility. This solution would also mean that the creation of ECUs\nagainst gold would keep pace with the mobilization of these\ncertificates. As a result, the volume of ECUs created at the\nstart of the final phase would be smaller than the amount in\ncirculation at the end of the transitional period, unless there is a\nsubstantial (and perhaps temporary) increase in the propor-\ntion of dollar transfers. Although this formula achieves a\nrelatively satisfactory solution with regard to the return, it does\nnot lead to a genuine transfer of reserves. For this reason, it\nmight be agreed that the participants would have the right to\nconvert gold certificates into a definitive surrender. Such an\noperation would have to be done collectively at an agreed time,\n\nif it is considered necessary to avoid any problems that might\narise from the coexistence of several formulae for the transfer\nof gold. (c) Transfer of gold with preservation of rights over\n\nrevaluation pro/its\n\nUnder this option, the transfer of gold against ECUs would be\naccompanied by the preservation of a right to the profit from\nany revaluation of the gold. Since the Fund would pay interest\non all ECUs held by the participants, and since gold does not\nproduce interest, each member country would have to pay back\ncompensatory interest on its share of ECUs received against\ngold. Like the previous formula, this form of transfer would not\n\ntransfer; it would pose scarcely any\n\namount to a definitive \naccounting problems. Nor would it show up a reduction in the\namount of ECUs outstanding at the time of transition to the\ninstitutional phase. II. Links to be established between the volume\n\nof reserves transferred to the Fund and the\n\nstock of ECUs outstanding\n\nUnder the present system, participants are required to keep at\nleast 20% of the volume of their gold and dollar reserves\npermanently with the EMCF. This means that, when the\n\nparallelism between the use of the ECU and the use of national\n\nreserves. From this point of view, it would moderate the\npossible convertibility of the ECU as, when a participant's\n\nECU holdings fell to the level determined by the ratio, any\n\nconversions of ECUs would have to be accompanied by a\nproportional reduction in the reserves held on own account by\nthe participant in question. However, this rule would inhibit the\nuse of the ECU for Community settlements since it would\nrequire the user to reconstitute them. Although the period for\nreconstitution could, by agreement, vary in length, the effect of\nsuch a rule would be to make the ECU more like a credit\ninstrument than an instrument of settlement. C. Non-automatic subsequent transfers\n\nIn this case, there would be no subsequent automatic transfers. They would either be decided collectively by the Fund\nauthorities or made, with the agreement of the Fund, on the\ninitiative of the participants who wished to reconstitute or to\nincrease their ECU assets. This practice would be the one most\ncompatible with an effective control of ECU liquidity. I ll\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nIII. The return payable on the ECU and the\nvarious formulae for transferring reserves\n\nA close link exists between the problem of the return payable\nand the problem of transferring reserves. The return on the\nECU is in essence a distribution of the Fund's income; the level\nof this income, as well as the amount of ECU liabilities on\nwhich a return had to be paid, depends on which of the various\ntransfer formulae is chosen. The return paid on the ECU would be relatively low if it were to\nbe based on the Fund's current income alone (interest received\non its dollar investments and on its loans). This return might,\nhowever, be considered satisfactory \nif it were borne in mind\nthat the ECU enabled a relatively illiquid, non-interest-bearing\nasset, i. e. gold, to be mobilized. A higher return could be paid if not only current income but\nalso the revaluation profits on the Fund's gold and dollar assets\nwere taken into account. The return payable on the Fund's ECU liabilities is one of the\nfactors which will determine the attractiveness of this\ninstrument as a reserve asset. The return would be paid in\nECUs. If the return were topped up in this way, this would presuppose\n\nWithout embarking on inflationary ECU creation, the return\n\npayable on the Fund's ECU liabilities as a whole can in no way\n\nbe greater than the income obtained by the Fund on its own\nassets, i. e. the reserve assets transferred by the participants and\nthe credits granted by the Fund. In other words, with regard to\nyield, the ECU cannot be better than the assets backing it. Within (he limits of its own income, the Fund will be able to\nmodify the return on the ECU. However, its power to influence\nits income is more restricted: it is non-existent as regards\nrevaluation gains and very limited for dollar income, but the\ninterest rates for the credits granted (Community credits,\nmobilization of gold certificates) are fixed discretionally by\nthe Fund. The main questions raised by the distribution of the Fund's\nincome, and consequently the return payable on the ECU, are\nthe following:\n\n(i) What income will the Fund possess and what will be the\n\namount of liabilities on which a return has to be paid?\n\n(ii) Given the heterogeneous nature of the assets transferred to\n\nthe Fund against ECUs, how could the income arising from\nthese different kinds of assets be fairly redistributed by the\nFund in the form of a return which ought to be identical for\nall ECUs?\n\nThe answers provided by the different \nbriefly reviewed below. transfer formulae are\n\n1. Sale of gold and dollars against ECUs\n\nUnder this formula, the Fund would possess the following types\nof resources:\n\n(i) current income: interest received on dollar investments and\n\non credits granted to members ;\n\n(H)potential gains (or losses): gold or dollar revaluation\n\nprofits. 112\n\n(a) that there were capital gains on the assets transferred\n(which willdependon the transfer prices of the gold and dollars\nand on subsequent changes in them) and (b) that agreement\nhas been reached on the arrangements for realizing and\ndistributing these capital gains. If the Fund were to effect\n\npayment of the return in ECUs, the problem arises, in\n\nconnection with the equilibrium of its balance sheet, of the\ncontra-entry on the assets side for some portion of the interest\npaid. Several solutions can be envisaged:\n\n(i) the Fund would make these interest payments by imputing\npurely accounting gains. Such a formula, which wouldnot\ninvolve realizing such gains, could in particular be adopted\nin the event of an official price for gold being reintroduced,\nor of the central banks regularizing rates; in this system,\n\nthe payment of a return in ECUs would result in the\n\nFund's liabilities being inflated against assets which were\nunchanged in volume but revalued in value;\n\n(ii) the Fund would realize its capital gains by the sale of gold\nanddollars to the participants. It would acquire the ECUs\nneeded to pay the return; the effect of this formula would\nbe to reduce the volume of the Fund's assets, while leaving\nthe stock of ECU outstanding unchanged;\n\n(Hi) the Fund would realize its capital gains by the sale of gold\n\nand dollars on the market. In this case, the Fund would\n\nacquire Community or third currencies against which\nECUs would be created when the return was paid. Whatever the formula adopted for this payment, the continuity\nof a high remuneration on the ECU cannot be assured in all\ncircumstances and the Fund's solvency would require the\n\nparticipants to guarantee the Fund against a turn-round in the\n\nsituation, i. e. against capital losses. It therefore follows that a\ndistribution of interest payments to the Member States is liable\nto involve them in incurring expenditure at a later stage. 2. Transfer of gold as capital\n\nShould the Fund create ECU ex nihilo, in parallel with\ntransfers of gold as capital, the return payable on these ECUs\nwould have to be the same as that payable on ECU created in\nother ways. As in the case of the formula discussed above,\n\n\fAnnex 1-3\n\ndistribution of the Fund's current income alone would provide a\n\nlow return on the ECUs. If, moreover, any exchange-rate\n\nprofits on the gold capital were reserved for the shareholders\nalone, their distribution would not represent a topping up of the\nreturn on the ECUs. Large transferors of gold would receive a\nreturn on the ECUs createdex nihilo, while retaining a right to\nthe revaluation pro/it on their gold transfer. For their part,\nparticipants who had made a greater transfer of dollars \u2014 an\nasset whose income and exchange rate gains would be spread\nover all the ECU\u2014 would be at a disadvantage. 3. Transfer of gold against issues ofmobilizable certificates of\n\ndeposit\n\nThe gold certificates would not constitute ECUs; con-\nsequently, no return would be paid on them. As a result, the\nFund's obligation to pay a return would be limited, at the\noutset, to the ECUs it had created against the acquisition of\n\nassets generating current income (dollars and Community\nloans). Since interest would have to be paid on the creation of\nadditional ECUs by the mobilization of gold certificates, the\nin any event, for it to pay a\nFund's income would be sufficient, \nrelatively high return on the ECUs. 4. Transfer of gold with preservation of rights over revaluation\n\nprofits\n\nThe transfer of gold would give rise to the immediate creation\nof ECUs on which the Fund would be required to pay the same\nreturn as on ECUs created in other ways. However, gold\ntransferors would have to pay the Fund interest in order to\nreserve any revaluation profits for \nwould give the Fund substantial current income. The\naccounting implications of this formula are comparable to\nthose of solution 3 above since all the gold certificates would\nhave been permanently mobilized. themselves alone. This\n\n113\n\n\fANNEX 1-4\n\nPreparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund\n\n\u2014 Consolidation of Community credits in the European Monetary Fund\n\nContents\n\nIntroduction\n\nI. Role of the EMCF in the mechanisms in force\n\n1. Very short-term financing\n\n2. Short-term monetary support\n\n3. Medium-term financial assistance\n\n4. Community loans for balance-of-payments support\n\nII. Consolidation of the credit mechanisms and role of the\n\nFund\n\nA. Powers of the different \n\ntypes of Fund as regards credit\n\nB. Very short-term financing\n\n1. Provision of the currency\n\n2. Financing procedures\n\nC. Other financing operations\n\n1. Financing procedures\n\n2. Principles for determining the credit amounts\n\n3. Automatic nature of the credit and discretionary\n\npower of the Fund\n\n4. Conditionally and cost of the credit\n\nIII. Problems raised by the consolidation of credits\n\n1. Choice of the credits to be consolidated\n\n2. Method of financing consolidated credits\n\n3. Checks and balances\n\nIntroduction\n\nThis note analyses the consolidation of the credit mechanisms\n\nin the Fund. It does not prejudge the range of mechanisms to be\n\nincluded in such consolidation, either from the start of the\ninstitutional phase or at a later stage depending on the way in\nwhich the EMS develops. 114\n\nThe note begins by recalling the main characteristics of the\nmechanisms in force and the EMCF's role in these mechan-\nisms. It then goes on to analyse the possible role of the Fund in\nthe consolidation of these mechanisms; lastly, it comments on\n\nsome of the major problems which such consolidation would\nraise. I. Role of the EMCF in the mechanisms in force\n\nUnder the present credit system, the. EMCF's role varies\naccording to the type of credit, but, in any event, its role is a\nminor one. 1. Very short-term financing\n\nThis is not strictly speaking a credit at all, but a reciprocal cash\nfacility between central banks in the context of interventions in\nCommunity currencies. This type of financing is automatic and\nunlimited when it relates to interventions made at \nthe\nfluctuation margins, such interventions themselves being\nobligatory and unlimited in nature. However, interventions\nwithin the margins are subject to agreement by the bank issuing\nthe currency sold; the agreement on making the currency\navailable also relates to other arrangements: immediate\nsettlement or recourse to very short-term financing. Although the system is a strictly bilateral one (central bank\nmaking the currencies lent directly available to central bank,\nagreement between the parties concerned as regards intra-\nmarginal interventions), the EMCF fits into it as a mandatory\nbut purely formal intermediary, being both creditor and debtor\n\nfor identical amounts. It also keeps the accounts for these\n\noperations. 2. Short-term monetary support\n\nThis is a reciprocal credit system between the EEC central\n\nbanks under which each of the members is assigned a creditor\nthe proportion of support which it\nquota determining \nundertakes to finance and a debtor quota determining the\namount of support which it may receive on application. This\nquota system is supplemented by non-individualized creditor\nand debtor rallonges which enable the volume of such support\nto be increased. Support, which is for a period of three months\n(renewable twice), can be obtained almost automatically and\nis unconditional within the limits of the debtor quota, but\nsubject to the discretion of the Committee of Governors when\nthe amount requested necessitates recourse to a rallonge. The\ncreditor central banks exercise a certain power of assessment\nas to their individual ability (balance of payments and reserves\nsituation) to participate in a credit operation. The support is\ndenominated in the currency actually supplied; \nit is de-\nnominated in ECUs in the case of an operation which replaces a\nvery short-term financing arrangement. Annex 1-4\n\nIn raising the amount of short-term monetary support \nto\n14 000 million ECU, the Brussels Resolution introduced the\nnew concept, accepted by the central banks, of the maximum\navailable credit: the quotas and\namount of effectively \nrallonges were adapted accordingly. The role of the EMCFis limited to keeping the accounts of this\nmechanism. 3. Medium-term financial assistance\n\nThe principle of these mechanisms, or at least some of them,\nbeing taken over by a Community body has been laid down by\nthe following instruments:\n\n(i) as regards the EMCF: Article 3 of the Council Regulation\n\nof 3 April 1973 establishing the EMCF made the Fund\n\nthe administration of very short-term\n\nresponsible for \nfinancing and of short-term monetary support and for the\nregrouping of these mechanisms in a renewed mechan-\nism ; '\n\nthe\n\nThe Brussels Resolution set at 11 000 million ECU \nmaximum amount of effectively available credit under this\nform of assistance: it is granted by Council decision and carries\neconomic policy conditions laid down by the Council. The\ncredit, which is normally granted in successive tranches, is\ndenominated in ECUs and paid up in a national currency. This\n\nis a reciprocal credit system, but the credit is granted by the\n\nMember States instead of (he central banks. (ii) as regards the EMF: the Annex to the Conclusions of the\n\nPresidency of the Bremen European Council provides for\nthe creation of ECUs for credit purposes against the\ncontribution of national currencies and for the existing\narrangements and institutions to be consolidated in a\nEuropean Monetary Fund. The Brussels European\nCouncil confirmed \n\nthese conclusions, giving particular\n\nemphasis to short and medium-term credit. The EMCF has no role in operating this mechanism. 4. Community loans for balance-of-payments support\n\nThis mechanism, established by specific Council decisions in\n1975, has just been modified and renewed. Its purpose is to raise\ncapital, either directly from \n\nthird countries and financial\n\ninstitutions, or on the capital markets, with the aim ofrelending\n\nthe funds raised to Member States, in order to help them\novercome balance-of-payments \ndirectly or in-\ndirectly related to an increase in prices of petroleum products. The funds lent carry economic conditions fixed by the Council. The outstanding amount of borrowings authorized has been set\nat 6 000 million ECU in principal. difficulties \n\nThe funds are borrowed by the Commission on behalf of the\n\nEEC after authorization by the Council. The financial\n\noperations pass through the accounts of the EMCF, which is\nresponsible for managing the borrowings. However, the\noperations are self-balancing: \noperations are carried out on the same terms and with the same\nvalue dates, with the result that the EMCFis never required to\nmanage cash funds. the borrowing and lending\n\nII. Consolidation of the credit mechanisms and\nrole of the Fund\n\nThe term consolidation is interpreted, in this note, as the\nregrouping of disparate mechanisms, introduced at different\ntimes by different authorities, into a single and definitive\nstructure. The advantages to be gained from consolidation\nwould be that a more effective mechanism better suited to\nrequirements would be established, the status of the ECU\nwould be enhanced and the economic convergence of Member\nStates would be furthered. (i) The transition to a system in which the Fund had a central\n\nrole would be equivalent to effectively putting Community\ncredits on a multilateral basis. It would necessarily mean a\nrevision of at least some of the rules governing the present\nmechanisms and would result in an important change in\nthe nature of the system of Community credits: the\nmechanisms in force \u2014 which are, in fact, a network of\nbilateral relationships\u2014 would be replaced by a Com-\nmunity institution granting a range of credits in its own\nname: the comprehensiveness of the range would depend\n\non the option chosen. This would allow the duration and\n\namount of credit as well as its terms to be adapted to the\nspecific requirements of each Member State. (ii) The fact that the Fund granted credits in ECUs would\nenhance the role of the ECU as a means of settlement\nbetween participants in the EMS; consequently, the\nCommunity could gradually switch to using its reserve\nassets other than ECUs solely for external settlements. The above exposition shows that the EMCF has no significant\nrole in the Community credit mechanisms: even though it is a\nnecessary intermediary for very short-term financing, this is a\nlegal device of no real consequence; in fact its role is confined\nto tasks of managing the accounts, and these are, moreover,\ncarried out by the agent on the Fund's behalf. (in) Through its role both on exchange markets and in defining\n\nthe conditions attached to the credits it grants, the Fund\ncould increasingly help to foster economic convergence\nbetween the Member States. 1 This task has not been carried out. 115\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nA. Powers of the different types of Fund as regards credit\n\nConsolidation of the credit mechanisms within the EMF would\nconstitute only one of the functions attributed to this new\ninstitution. It is consequently clear that the decision to choose\none or other of the credit options will flow from \nthe\nfundamental choice which will be made between the different\noptions concerning the nature and purpose of the Fund. Other notes addressed to the Monetary Committee have\ndistinguished four possible types for the European Monetary\nFund:\n\nmonths to jive years. However, if it were felt important to\nretain the principles at present governing these two credit\nmechanisms, the Fund would grant short-term monetary\nsupport to the central banks, as under the present rules;\nmedium-term credit (over one year) would be granted to\nTreasuries and would carry economic and monetary\npolicy conditions. (iv) A 'sui generis' Fund with both economic and monetary\nin a homogeneous structure, all\n\npowers could unify, \ncredits, ranging from the very short-term financing to\nmedium-term financial assistance and, possibly, Com-\nmunity loans. These credits are complementary in purpose\n\n(i) an 'accounting' type Fund similar to the present EMCF;\n\nbut up to now they have been separated and are the\n\n(ii)a \n\n'central bank' type Fund, which would be assigned\n\nmonetary powers;\n\n(Hi) a 'regional IMF' type Fund, which would be essentially an\n\neconomically-oriented institution ;\n\n(iv) a 'sui generis' Fund: whereas in the two preceding\n\noptions, either the monetary function or the economic\nfunction predominates, a 'sui generis' Fund would be\nendowed with both monetary and economic powers. The choice between the different \nthe nature and extent of this body's power as regards credit. types of Fund would govern\n\n(i) The sole task of an EMCF-type Fund would be to\nadminister all the mechanisms; its powers would vary\naccording to the interpretation given to this administrat-\nive function which, moreover, had already been laid down\nin Articles of the Council Regulation of 3 April 1973\nestablishing the EMCF. The powers of the EMF would\nenable it as a minimum to administer the accounts of all\ncredit mechanisms, from very short-term financing to\nCommunity loans. can either be settled on the spot, or be the subject of a financing\n\nauthorities; if \n\nresponsibility of different \nthey were\nconsolidated, credit could, without any break in con-\ntinuity, be tailored to the specific needs of each\nparticipant, both in terms of duration and amount and in\nterms of conditions. types of Fund in turn,\n\nInstead of taking each of these different \nand studying their powers as regards credit \u2014 which would be\nrepetitious\u2014 we propose, in the paragraphs which follow, to\ndiscuss the consolidation of very short-term financing\nseparately from the consolidation of the other credits. The\nproblems raised by very short-term financing are different from\n\nthe problems concerning the consolidation of the other credits\n\nwhich, whatever the option contemplated, are similar and can\ntherefore be examined together. B. Very short-term financing\n\nThere are two aspects to very short-term financing: the first is\nthe provision of the currency requested, and the second the\npossible financing operation involved; the currency provided\n\noperation. It is important to distinguish between these two\naspects in analysing consolidation. (ii) A central bank type Fund would in its own name take over\n\nresponsibility for the credits of a monetary nature which\n\n1. Provision of the currency\n\nthe central banks grant each other in the event of\ndifficulties considered to be temporary: cash credit for\nvery short-term financing, credit lasting some months for\nshort-term monetary support. It could also be responsible\nfor administering the accounts of the other credits. (Hi) Under a regional IMF \n\ntype Fund, very short-term\n\nfinancing would remain the responsibility of the central\nbanks, ' and short and medium-term credit would be\nconsolidated in a single mechanism ranging from three\n\n Except for the renewing of such financing which wouid be regarded as\n\nforming part of short-term monetary support. 1\n116\n\nTwo solutions are possible as regards consolidation. LI. In line with current practice, the bank issuing the currency\nrequested would supply it directly and compulsorily to the\nintervening bank when interventions at the margin were\ninvolved. It might be possible to envisage extending the\nobligation to supply national currency (up to a certain\namount) to intramarginal interventions justified in particular\nby a currency crossing the divergence threshold; at the request\nof the intervening central bank, these interventions would be\nthe subject of a financing operation. Annex 1-4\n\nsee mopped up from the market. Thus, the procedure in force\nunder the present bilateral arrangements could be extended to\nall the participants in the system. 2. 2. If it were thought that ECU creation for very short-term\nfinancing would not offer any real advantages over the present\nsituation and would even be a source of difficulties \ncontrolling the amount of the overall issue of ECU, one could\nfall back on a solution whereby the creditor acquired a claim in\nECU on the Fund, with the debtor settling the EMF at the\nsettlement date, either by remitting the currency previously\nsurrendered (andpossibly repurchased in the meantime), or by\n\nfor\n\nsupplied the currency requested, and in so far as this operation\ngave rise to a claim in ECUs instead of a settlement, a system\nwould still exist under which the Fund fulfilled only a formal\nrole, with the very short-term financing mechanism then\n\n1. 2. Alternatively, in order to establish a genuinely multilate-\nralized mechanism, the intervening central bank ought to be\nable to obtain directly from the EMF the foreign exchange\nrequired for interventions, whether these were interventions at\nthe margins or interventions made after \nthe divergence\nthreshold had been crossed. One way by which the EMF could obtain this foreign exchange\ncould be through swap facilities, automatic and unlimited in\namount, at least for interventions at the margins, between the\nFund and each of the Community central banks, whereas the\npresent arrangements operate bilaterally between all the\ncentral banks concerned. remitting ECUs. In so far as the issuer, and not the Fund,\n\n2. Financing procedures\n\nremaining the responsibility of the central banks alone. A choice is also possible between two financing procedures\ndepending on whether or not the Fund creates ECUs for\nfinancing interventions. 2. 1. In the first case, the central bank supplying the currency\nwould immediately be settled in ECUs by the Fund, ' on the\ndebtor's behalf, unless the parties had agreed otherwise. The\nFund would create the ECUs delivered to the creditor against a\nclaim in ECUs on the debtor central bank. the present practice\nThe proposed system would not affect \nwhereby the debtor repurchases the currency sold and refunds\nit to the issuer as an advance repayment. The interest of the\ndebtor would, as previously, continue to lie in limiting, as far as\npossible, the definitive loss of reserves. Only the procedure\nthe debtor, having repurchased \nwould be different: \ncurrency previously sold, would exchange it against ECUs with\nthe issuer; with the ECUs obtained in this way, he would clear\nhis debt with the Fund. So as to reinforce the present practice of\nrepurchase, it could also conceivably be extended, under the\n\nthe\n\nauspices of the Fund, to all the partners wishing, in connection\n\nwith the ECU's negotiability, to obtain this reserve asset\nagainst remittance of the currency which the issuer wanted to\n\nIn the proposed system, the central bank issuing the currency sold, instead\nof holding a very short-term claim in ECUs on the Fund, would\nimmediately be settled by a transfer of ECUs which would be recorded as\n\nan increase in the heading 'ECU'. The outstanding amount of this heading\n\ncould then decrease rapidly to the extent that the central bank concerned\nre-entered into possession of the national currency previously issued. Some central banks already group ECUs held as reserves or as claims in\nrespect of very short-term financing together in their balance sheets under\na single heading 'ECU' or 'claims on the EMCF'. For these banks,\nimmediate settlement in ECUs would involve no change in the way in\nwhich their balance sheets were presented. But those central banks which\nnow divide these operations into two separate headings in their present\nbalance sheets, would have to merge them into a single heading, 'ECU'. 2. 3. Each of the two financing procedures outlined above is\ncompatible with one or other of the two methods of providing\ncurrency, i. e. directly by the central bank (point 1. 1. above) or\nindirectly through the Fund (point 1. 2. above). C. Other financing operations\n\nThe mechanisms involved are the following; short-term\nmonetary support, medium-term financial assistance and\npossibly Community loans raised for the purpose of giving\nbalance-of-payments support. their simple\n\nExamination of the consolidation of these mechanisms cannot\nto the questions flowing from \nbe confined \njuxtaposition within the Fund, but extends to certain connected\nquestions \u2014 in particular, the amounts, cost and duration of\nthe credit. This approach must not be considered as going\noutside the problem of credit consolidation; on the contrary, it\nis justified by the concern to merge mechanisms which up to\n\nnow have not really been linked. 1. Financing procedures\n\nWhile starting from the principle that credits are denominated\nin ECUs, the financing procedure differs depending on whether\nthe liquidity is created through the issue of ECUs or through\nthe lending of existing assets: the adoption of one or other of\nthese options will flow from the choice made between the\ndifferent \n\ntypes of Fund. 1. 1. Financing by ECU creation\n\nIn so far as the Fund has a role to play in the financing of\n\ncredits, it is logical for it to finance them by means of ECUs it\ncreates itself. 117\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n1. 2. Financing by the redistribution of existing assets\n\nThere are several possibilities here:\n\n(i) redistribution of the Fund's assets. Under the operation, the Fund would temporarily make its\nassets available to participants; such financing would be\n\ncarried out by putting back into circulation assets held as\na result of the transfer of reserves;\n\n(ii) redistribution of central bank assets. This procedure would make no change to the present\n\nsituation with regard to the financing of the various credit\nmechanisms, and the Fund would create no liquidity of its\nown: the credits, although denominated in ECUs, would\nbe paid in monetary instruments which already exist\n(dollars, ECUs or SDRs) and which would be drawn from\nthe reserves of the participating central banks. However, it should be noted that such redistribution would\nitself generate new liquidity, unless the creditor renounced\nthe liquidity of his claim. This method of financing would\nmean that the concept of creditor quotas would have to be\nretained;\n\n(Hi) redistribution of international assets. The Fund could make available to its members assets\nwhich it had itself borrowed, either under swap agree-\n\nments or on the international markets. 2. Principles for determining the credit amounts\n\nThe principles governing the determination of the overall or\nindividual credit amount do not depend on the option chosen,\n\nbut the solutions envisaged would differ according to whether\n\nor not the credit were financed by ECU creation. 2. 1. Overall credit amount\n\nsource. In that case, however, assuming that very short-term\nfinancing gave rise to immediate settlement with the creditor in\nECUs, the ceiling should not include the volume of ECUs\ncorresponding to the outstanding amount of very short-term\nfinancing, which should remain unlimited. If financing were\ncarried out through the redistribution of the central banks'\nassets on the basis of creditor quotas, the overall amount of\navailable credit would vary with the circumstances (particular\ndifficulties of potential lenders) and the borrower, while not\nexcluding providing some of the credit through a rallonge as in\nthe current arrangements. 2. 2. Individual credit amount\n\nSeveral formulae are possible, but whether or not the individual\ncredit amount is determined, the potential beneficiary would in\nall cases have to be guaranteed being able, as under the present\nsystem, to count on a virtually automatic minimum credit\namount. Perhaps the total individual amount might not be\ndetermined, for example if an amount were set for the overall\nvolume of credit which could be granted by the EMF. The\nabsence of a ceiling set in advance would in no way mean that a\nbeneficiary could run up unlimited debt, but on the contrary\nwould give the Fund discretionary power over the conditions\nand procedures for granting the credit. If, however, the creditor quota solution were adopted, one\nmight consider whether it would not be necessary, in return, to\nassign to each Member State an overall debtor quota which\ndetermined the maximum ceiling on the credit which that State\ncould receive. If a system o/rallonges were retained, this would\nintroduce an element of flexibility. 3. Automatic nature of the credit and discretionary power of\n\nthe Fund\n\nThe system at present in force for short-term monetary support\ncomprises an automatic part, the quotas, and a discretionary\npart, the rallonges. It is proposed that, under the consolidated\nsystem, each participant be guaranteed the availability of a\ncredit that would be virtually automatic, though limited in\namount and duration. If the Fund were to take over financing by means of ECU\ncreation, this would lead to the ending of creditor quotas: since\nthey determine individual contributions, they would become\npointless. It would then be possible to fix a maximum amount\nfor the volume of credit and medium-term financial assistance. Another approach might conceivably be to determine no ceiling\nthe volume of credit, which would be\nin advance for \nincorporated into a general ceiling set for the issue of ECUs\nwhether they were created against the transfer of reserves or\ncredit. This is because the danger that monetary discipline in\n\nthe system might be weakened lies not so much in an excess of\n\ncredit as in an excessive creation of ECUs, whatever the\n\nAccording to the circumstances, this virtually automatic credit\nwould either be apart of its debtor quota, under the new system,\nor the guaranteed part of an indeterminate credit potential left\n\nto the Fund's discretion. The discretionary power of the Fund\n\nwould be exercised from the outset if the amount which could be\ngranted automatically was exceeded, and on renewal of a credit\ngranted automatically. The sum of these individual amounts which could be obtained\nautomatically within the overall credit \u2014fixed in advance or\nnot\u2014 would determine a credit amount: the Fund would,\nwhatever the circumstances, have to be sure of having the\nnecessary resources available to finance this credit amount. 118\n\n\fAnnex 1-4\n\n4. Conditionality and cost of the credit\n\nBeyond narrow limits of amount and duration, within which a\ncredit could be obtained automatically, the granting of\nassistance would justify an examination of the monetary\nsituation similar to that currently made for the granting of\nshort-term monetary support. For longer periods and greater\namounts, should consolidation extend to medium-term credits,\nwhether or not they are part of debtor quotas, economic policy\nconditions would be imposed as is now the case for 'medium-\nterm financing assistance and Community loans. For very short-term financing, the present rules impose an\ninterest rate based on the average of national discount rates,\nweighted in accordance with the weight of each currency in the\nECU. By contrast, interest rates on short and medium-term\ncredit are left to the discretion of the authorities granting the\ncredit. If the Fund were given discretionary power, it would be\nlogical for it also to be able to set the rates at which it lends. Although a regional IMF type Fund is more an economic than a\nmonetary institution, it would, however, be conceivable for\nsuch a Fund to assume certain monetary functions such as the\nissue of liquidity in ECUs or the administration of reserves and\nfor it thus to be able to finance the credits it grants by creating\nECUs. However, problems could be created by such an institution\ncreating ECUs to finance medium-term financial assistance:\nthe duration of medium-term assistance exceeds that generally\naccepted for monetary financing and as a rule needs to be\nfinanced by redistribution of pre-existing assets. The sui generis Fund would be structured so as to possess\nmonetary powers, like the 'central bank' Fund, and economic\npowers, like the 'regional IMF' Fund. These closely associated\npowers by definition ought to open the way to the financing in\nECU of these credits as a consolidated whole. III. Problems raised by the consolidation of\n\ncredits\n\nThe consolidation of credits raises the following \nproblems :\n\nthree\n\n1. Choice of the credits to be consolidated\n\nThe answer to this problem will depend on the choice made in\ninstitutional terms between the different \nquestion was examined in Chapter H. A. types of Fund. This\n\n2. Method of financing consolidated credits\n\nto this problem,\nTwo types of solution may be applied \ndepending on whether or not financing is carried out through\nthe issue of ECUs created for this purpose. The problem differs according to the type of Fund:\n\nIt should be recalled that if a credit were financed by ECU\ncreation, there would be no difference between the ECUs\ncreated against the transfer of reserves and those created\nthrough a credit operation. In both cases, they would be\n'money' ECUs. For transactions between partners, the origin\nof these ECUs would not be known and they would all enjoy the\nsame characteristics of acceptability, convertibility/negoti-\nability and remuneration. Because it would be impossible to identify the origin of such an\nECU, a central bank could not avoid accumulating them by\nseeking to limit its contribution to the financing of the credit in\nthe form of a creditor quota. A country accumulating too many\nECUs for its liking would find itself in a surplus payment\nsituation and its monetary authorities could not settle this\nproblem by limiting their contribution to a credit which would\nnow be granted by the Fund; they would have to find other\nsolutions so as not to have to bear the burden of financing\ndeficit partners: opportunities for converting the ECU and, in\nthe last resort, exchange rate adjustments. An accounting type Fund could finance a credit only by\nredistribution of existing assets. 3. 'Checks and balances'\n\nA central bank type Fund should logically finance the credits it\ngrants in its own monetary instrument, the ECU. The issue of ECU for short-term financing \u2014 which theoreti-\ncally can be unlimited\u2014 is liable to be permanent if the debtor,\nwhen the credit matures, repays the Fund in reserve assets other\nthan ECUs. However, it must be stated that this would not\nincrease the overall volume of credit but would add to the\nbalance sheet of the Fund, since the counterpart of these\npermanently created ECUs would not then be the credits\ngranted, but an additional deposit of reserves. For credit to cease to be granted on the basis of individual\n\ncontributions and to be granted by a central institution with the\npower of money creation would be a major change, which would\n\npose the problem of checks and balances, i. e. of the\n\ndemarcation and interaction of the competent authorities'\nrespective powers as regards money creation. These questions\nare part of the larger group of institutional problems posed by\nthe establishment of the Fund. Consequently, we confine\nourselves below to studying the problems posed for institutional\n\nequilibrium by the disappearance of the link existing in the\n\npresent system between creditor quotas and liquidity creation. 119\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\nIn this connection, it is felt by some that the existence of\ncreditor quotas is an adequate answer to the problem of checks\nand balances. Changes in these quotas, made in response to a\nrequest by the political authorities, require the individual\nassent of each participating central bank. It is these quotas as a\nwhole which determine the potential scale of liquidity which can\nbe activated by (he system. ' Fears have been expressed that\nthis balance may be disturbed in the context of a Fund which as\nitself to\nregards the financing of the credit did not confine \nredistributing the liquidity available within the quotas agreed\n\nby the central banks, but which itself granted these credits by\nmeans of EC Us created for the purpose. It can, however, be argued that an institutional balance similar\nto the one which exists at present could be introduced into such\n\nthe credit ceiling requested by \n\na system. The practicalities of creating this balance would\nclearly vary according to the type of Fund chosen. Thus, for\nexample, in a central bank type Fund, it is conceivable that any\nraising ,of \nauthorities couldnot take place until it was agreed by the body\nmanaging the Fund, i. e. all the central banks. However, the\ndecision to raise the ceiling would be a collective one taken\nwithin the Fundandno longer the adding together of individual\ndecisions. Consequently, the decision-making procedure within\n\nthe political\n\n1 However, when such activation takes place, the central banks record, in\ntheir balance sheets, the corresponding claims as the maintenance of their\navailable reserves. the Fund (unanimity or majority) would determine the degree\n\nof influence which each central bank, taken separately, would\ncontinue to exercise in this area. 120\n\n\fANNEX 1-5\n\nPreparatory studies on the European Monetary Fund\n\n\u2014 External role of the ECU\n\nContents\n\nIntroduction\n\nI. Interests of those involved and areas of application\n\nA. The Community\n\nB. Third countries\n\nC. Coincidence of interests\n\nII. Techniques by which third countries could acquire and use\n\nECU claims on the Fund\n\nA. Criteria for enlarging the 'ECU zone'\n\nB. Origin of the ECU\n\ncountries\n\nD. Implications for the characteristics of the ECU\n\nE. Implications for the functioning of the EMS\n\nIntroduction\n\n2. The external use of the ECU will in the first instance result\nfrom a decision by the Fund, but in the end, it will depend on\nhow the instrument will be received by third countries. The task\nof the Community authorities, if they were to decide to give the\n\nECU an external role, would be that of creating favourable\n\nconditions for enlarging the circle of official ECU holders. 3. There already \n\nis, moreover, a certain use of ECU\nis\ndenomination by the private sector; the development \nspontaneous, and independent of the ECUs issued by the\nEMCF. It consists particularly \nin ECU bank deposits,\ncertificates and issues. The possible holding of such assets by\nmonetary authorities cannot, however, be assimilated to\nreserve asset-ECUs proper. 4. The first part of the note examines the interest which the\n\nCommunity and third countries might have in extending the\n\nenvisaged. Next, it deals with the techniques by which third\ncountries would acquire and use ECU claims on the Fund and\nthe implications of such techniques for the characteristics of the\nECU and the functioning of the EMF. I. Interests of those involved and areas\n\nof application\n\n5. The question of the external role of the ECU must first be\nthe viewpoint of the interest which the\nconsidered from \nCommunity might have in such a development, while also\ntaking into account the possible effects on the functioning of\n\nC. Techniques for the acquisition of the ECU by third\n\nrole of the ECU and the areas of application which can be\n\nI. This note is a preliminary attempt to present and analyse\nthe objectives and the technical implications of conferring an\nexternal role on the ECU issued by the Fund. the international monetary system. The internationalization of\nthe ECU must also be placed in the context of an international\n\nmonetary system evolving towards a multipolar system. The ECU will have an external role as a reserve asset and\nmeans of settlement when it will be used by the monetary\nauthorities of countries outside the Community, and when, in\norder to do so, they will hold ECU in an account with the Fund. Whether these ECUs are drawn from the ECU reserves of\nCommunity central banks, or whether they are issued directly\n\nby the EMF to third countries, they would in essence be reserve\n\nasset-ECUs. This extension. of the ECU's role presupposes that it would\nalready have become a fully-fledged reserve asset and means of\nsettlement for EMS participants, i. e. the extension of the\n\nexternal role of the ECU is dependent on the strengthening of\n\nits internal role: consequently, extension belongs to the\ninstitutional phase of the system. Having said that, certain\nforms of use of the ECU can be envisaged in a nearer future, in\nthe Fund's relations with third country central banks, e. g. the\nuse of the ECU as a simple unit of account. The Community\n\n6. The possibilities of mobilizing the ECU would be increased\nby extending its zone of transferability. If the EMF were to\nempower authorities other than the Community, central banks\nto acquire and hold ECU, the question of \nthe con-\nvertibility/negotiability of the ECU held by the Community\ncentral banks might no longer arise in the same terms: the\nCommunity central banks would be able to obtain dollars\nagainst ECU from sources other than the Fund or EMS\nparticipating banks. With the development of the ECU's\nexternal role, the demand to convert or mobilize the ECU with\nthe Fund would tend to decrease, since the main reason for such\noperations\u2014the regional nature of the ECU's acceptability\u2014\nwould tend to disappear. The Fund would, however, have to\ncontinue to guarantee, in the last resort, the convertibility or\npossibility of mobilizing the ECU. 121\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n7. The Community might have an interest in an extension of\n\n'European\n\nthe zone of exchange rate stability, in accordance with the\nBrussels Resolution of 5 December 1978, to \ncountries with particularly close economic and financial ties\nwith the European Communities'. Furthermore, to the extent\nthat the Community might wish to favour a moderation in the\nfluctuations of major third currencies, it could accept certain\nforms of association with other central banks, authorizing\nthem to intervene in Community currencies. The techniques of\nassociation would be varied, ranging from the accounting\ncentralization by \ncurrencies to avoid accentuating the undesiredfluctuations in\nthird currencies' exchange rates, to participation \nexchange rate and intervention mechanism on an equal footing\nwith Community central banks. The ECV's role would differ\naccording to which formula was proposed: a unit of account if\nthe agreement was for operations in Community currencies to\nbe centralized and recorded in ECUs with the EMF; a reserve\nasset and\" means of settlement if these operations were to be\nsettled in ECUs and if, for this purpose, the EMF were to\nempower third country central banks to acquire and hold\nECUs. the EMF and the use of Community\n\nin the\n\n8. The tendencies toward reserve diversification, which have\nbeen evident for some years, add to the instability of\ninternational monetary relations. The Community would\ntherefore have an interest, in order to preserve the cohesiveness\nof the EMS, to give third countries which were holders of large\nreserves and wanted to diversify into Community currencies the\npossibility of acquiring and holding ECUs. Such a possibility\nwould in fact help to avoid the destabilizing effects on the\nexchange markets provoked by massive purchases and sales of\ncertain Community currencies and the unsettling consequences\nof such transactions on the domestic monetary policy of the\ncountries issuing the currencies concerned. The ECU can,\nhowever, fulfil this role only if it is competitive in comparison to\nthe national currencies one would wish to substitute it to. The third country acquisition and holding of ECUs would also\nmake it possible to finance a current account deficit, if one\nexisted, of the Community as an entity, by the EMF becoming\nindebted in ECU. The ECU would thus gradually become an\nofficial reserve instrument, and the Community \u2014 the EMF\u2014\nwould administer this instrument, and become a reserve centre. An internationalization of the ECU in this way is not without\nits dangers, both for \nmonetary policy and for the control of international liquidity. However, with its progressive emergence as the monetary\nsymbol of a vast economic area in the process of integration,\n\nthe autonomy of the Community's\n\nthe ECU will, like all major currencies, spontaneously begin to\nplay an international role. Third countries\n\nfluctuations of major \nthird currencies. Certain European\ncountries with very close economic and financial ties with the\nCommunity might wish to participate de jure in the EMS\nexchange rate and intervention mechanism, in order to form\npart of the zone of exchange rate stability which it defines. Yet\nother countries might wish to have access to the ECU\u2014 and to\nextend its zone of transferability \u2014 and to have ECU accounts\nwith the EMF in order to use them as a reserve instrument, or\neven as a means of settlement with member and associated\ncountries. 10. Third countries holding large reserves might also be\ninterested in the ECU as a diversification medium. In\nparticular, the surplus OPEC countries, whose reserves are\nmainly in dollars, might wish to match the composition of their\nreserves more closely to the structure of their imports, of which\nCommunity products represent a large share. Their decision to\nhold ECU reserves will, however, be influenced by the yield and\nexchange risk of the ECU. Coincidence of interests\n\n11. The areas in which the external role of the ECU applies\nwill be defined by the conjunction of the Community's interests\nwith those of third countries. A preliminary examination\nsuggests that these interests coincide where the extension of the\nECU's zone of transferability or the zone of stability of EMS\nexchange rates are concerned; and, although different, \nseem to meet in seeing the ECU as an answer to the wish for\ndiversification. For the Community, the decision to promote\nthe external role of the ECU would not be taken until a more\nthorough analysis had been made of its advantages and costs:\n\nthey\n\nits characteristics to make them more attractive. 11. Techniques by which third countries could\nacquire and use ECU claims on the Fund\n\n12. Giving authority to third countries to acquire and use\nECUs means, in effect, giving the Fund the right to open ECU\naccounts for these countries. for the extension of the role of the ECU might involve changing\n\n13. In the present situation, the EMCF is not empowered to\n\nissue ECUs, as a means of settlement, except to and for the use\nof Member State central banks alone. ' However, not all\nclaims on the Fund are by nature ECU reserve assets. Thus,\ninterventions in Community currencies can give rise to ECU\nclaims to be settled at least partially in other reserve assets than\nthe ECU. In this case, the ECU is used as an instrument of\n\n9. Outside the Community, certain third countries may have\nthe same interest in reducing the effects of the exchange rate\n\n1 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3181/78 of 18 December 1978 relating to\n\nthe European Monetary System. 122\n\n\fAnnex 1-5\n\ndenomination only and not as a means of settlement. Such third\n\ncountry use of the ECU would pose legal and technical\n\nproblems less complex than the ones raised by the holding of\nreserve ECUs. 14. The third country acquisition and use of ECUs which\nwould be a means of settlement raises a number of questions\nconcerning the criteria to be used to define the external role of\nthe ECU, the origin of the ECU acquired by third countries, the\ntechniques for acquiring them and the implications for the\nECU's characteristics and the functioning of the Fund. These\nquestions are briefly examined below. A. Criteria for enlarging the 'ECU zone*\n\n/5. Any enlargement of the 'ECU zone' for official holders\nrequires, at the very least, the Fund's assent, for not only is the\nFund the sole authority entitled to create ECUs but, since there\nis no market in ECUs, the transfer of ECUs between\nparticipants must be carried out by debit or credit entries in the\nFund's books. Consequently, the Fund is in a monopoly\nposition which enables it to lay down the criteria which the\nextension of the ECU's role should satisfy. These criteria\nmight cover:\n\n(i) the demarcation of the geographical area: the Fund could,\nfor example, limit the circulation of the ECU to the\ncountries associated with the exchange rate mechanism;\n\n(ii) the laying-down of general terms on which third country\nofficial authorities or international monetary organiz-\nations could acquire, hold and use ECUs. and third countries. This would be the case if, for example, the\npresent swap network between EC central banks and the FED\nwere replaced by a single dollar/ECU swap between the FED\nand the Fund; or if the Fund contributed directly to the\ndiversification process by buying dollars against ECU, or\ncontributed to recycling for \nthe purposes of balance-of-\npayments financing, by issuing ECU-denominated securities\nagainst, for example, dollars for on-lending to Member States. The significance of these operations would differ since, for\nsome of them, ECU creation would be only \n(swaps), while for others (diversification), \nlasting. it could be more\n\ntemporary\n\nC. Techniques for the acquisition of the ECU by third\n\ncountries\n\n18. In exchange for 'what'will the official third country holder\nbe able to acquire the ECU? The answer is obvious for ECUs\nsurrendered by another participant in the context of the wider\nnegotiability of the ECU: the counterpart would be the one\nagreed between the parties. 19. For ECUs issued to third countries by the Fund, the\ncounterpart could vary according to the circumstances\nsurrounding such an operation. Thus, the issue of ECUs to\nthird countries or the offer of ECU-denominated investment\ninstruments is conceivable:\n\n(i) against surrender of reserve assets;\n\n(ii) against surrender of Community currencies;l\n\n(Hi) in the form of credits. In the absence of general criteria, the Fund could authorize, on\n\nan ad hoc basis, a third country to acquire ECUs. B. Origin of the ECU\n\nD. Implications for the characteristics of the ECU\n\n16. One possibility would be to permit third countries to\nacquire ECUs from EMS members. In this case, the stock of\nECUs would remain unchanged since no new ECUs would be\nissued; there would merely be a transfer, in the Fund's books,\nof ECUs held by members to official \nexample, a central bank could 'swap' ECUs for dollars with a\nthird country central bank; this would improve the possibilities\nof mobilizing the ECU. Or a member country whose currency is\nused by third official holders as a reserve currency could buy it\nback outside the market in exchange for ECUs which would\nhelp to regulate the diversification of reserves. Or again, an\nEMS member could surrender ECUs to associated countries in\nsettlement for their interventions to support its currency. third holders. For\n\n17. A second, wider-ranging alternative, would be for the Fund\nto issue ECUs to third countries. Unlike the first solution, new\nECUs would be createdby a direct operation between the Fund\n\n20. Conferring an external role on the ECU means that the\n\nECU, as it exists within the EMS, will be made available to\n\nofficial \nthird holders. This should not, in theory, have much\ninfluence on the unity of the ECU. A monetary instrument does\nnot change its nature just because it changes hands. 21. Nevertheless, the extension of the ECU's role beyond the\nCommunity, or the mere prospect of it being so extended,\nshould perhaps be taken into consideration from the start of\ntransition to the institutional phase. The areas likely to be\naffected are the following :\n\nThe possibility of a third country acquiring ECUs against the surrender of\nCommunity currencies should not be dismissed out of hand if only in order\nto avoid the case of a third country which held Community currencies\nexchanging them for dollars on the foreign exchange market, since this\nwould have the effect of upsetting exchange rates. In this case, steps would,\nhowever, have to be taken to prevent the financing of a Member State's\nexternal deficit by its own currency: the central bank issuing the currency\nin question could be required to buy back against ECUs the amounts of its\ncurrency acquired by the Fund. 123\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n4. Tasks in the field of exchange rate policy:\n\n(i) coordination of intra-marginal and third-currency inter-\n\nventions;\n\n5. Granting on own account and financing of the credits\navailable under the system. 6. Definition of (i) monetary or (ii) economic conditions\n\n(ii) coordination and multilateralization of relations with\n\nthat may be attached to Fund credits, and monitoring of\n\nnon-member countries;\n\n(Hi) Fund intervention on the foreign exchange market, where\n\nappropriate against ECUs, which would presuppose the\nexistence of an ECU market. compliance. 7. Implementation of enabling clauses; in other words, action\nto ensure that the Fund's development is endogenous. Functions\n\n(1) Accounting and executive functions:\n\n(i) \n\nrecording debts and claims arising from interventions in EEC currencies and from\nactivating the STMS mechanism\n\n(ii) creating ECUs against the temporary deposit of reserves (present swap system)\n(iii) managing the MTFA mechanism and Community loan operations to support\n\nMember States' balances of payments\n\nType of Fund:\n\ncentral\nbank\n\nregional\nIMF\n\nEMCF\naccounting\nagent\n\n(2) Management of reserves held on own account:\n(i) \nin the case of reversible transfers (amended swap system)\nin the case of definitive transfers to the Fund\n(ii) \n\n(3) Regulation of the issue and circulation of ECUs:\n\n(i) among EMS members\n(ii) in relations with official other holders\n\n(iii) for use by the private sector\n\n(4) Tasks in the field of exchange rate policy:\n\n(i) coordination of intra-marginal and third-currency interventions\n(ii) coordination and multilateralization of relations with third countries\n(iii) Fund intervention on the foreign exchange market\n\n(5) Granting and financing of credits available under the consolidated system:\n\n(i) very short-term and short-term\n(ii) short-term and medium-term\n\n(iii) all three types of credit\n\n(6) Definition and administration of loan conditionality:\n\n(j) monetary conditionality\n(ii) monetary and economic conditionality\n\n(7) Implementation of enabling clauses\n\n(8) Issuing of Community loans to give Member States balance-of-payments support\n\n\fAnnex 1-6\n\nan appropriate \ninstitutional set-up, say a multi-tier\nstructure, within which all the participants, i. e. central\nbanks and national Treasuries, would be able to play their\nrespective roles. The table on the preceding page relates the four types of Fund\n\nto the different \n\nspheres of activity listed above, making it\n\npossible to identify the powers that could be exercised by each\ntype of Fund. III. General observations on institutional\n\nmatters\n\nIn view of the evolving nature of the European Monetary Fund,\nthe functions listed above could be assigned to it only gradually. Leaving aside the 'accounting agent' Fund, the institutional\nstructures of all the other types of Fund would have to reflect\nthe division of powers and responsibilities that exists at the\nnational level between central banks and governments. Since\npowers and responsibilities are allocated quite differently from\none country to another, a compromise will have to be found\n\nbalances' that are encountered in relations between the\ndifferent decision-making centres both at national and at\nCommunity \nappropriate national and Community legislation. level can be resolved only on the basis of\n\nwhen this new body is set up. The problems of 'checks and\n\n8. Issuing of Community loans to give Member States\nbalance-of-payments support. 9. Decision-making centre for adjustments of central rates\nand amendments to the definition of the ECU. 10. Tasks in the monetary policy field:\n\n(i) coordination of domestic monetary policies;\n\n(ii) formulation of a Community monetary policy;\n\n(Hi) Fund intervention on national money markets. B. Respective functions of the different types of Fund\n\nThe Committee earlier distinguished four broad types of Fund. is necessarily a rough but none the less useful\nThis \nclassification in that it provides a reference framework for the\nCommittee's future work. The four types of Fund were as\nfollows :\n\n(i) an 'accounting agent' Fund along the lines of the present\n\nEMCF. Since such a Fund would perform merely an\naccounting function, \nit would not require any new\ninstitutional structure;\n\n(ii) a 'central bank' type Fund. Such a Fund would be assigned\nmonetary powers and its governing bodies would basically\nbe modelled on those of central banks. However, since\nparticipation by the political authorities in the exercise of\nmonetary powers differs from one country to another, it\nwould be necessary to determine what place and what role\nthese authorities would have in such a Fund. A variant of this would be an institution which, while\nproviding support for the general course of Community\neconomic policy, would be completely independent of the\npolitical authorities, at least as regards the means used to\nachieve its statutory objectives;\n\nThe EMF would be the common decision-making body, and its\nactions could not but reflect \nthe joint resolve of the EMS\nparticipants. Two points should be emphasized here: first, the\nFund would operate within a framework in which the general\npolicy choices remained the responsibility of the government\nauthorities; second, as regards the exercise by the Fund of its\nown powers, one needs to stress the importance of its internal\ndecision-making process. Questions that may arise in this\nrespect concern the following points in particular:\n\n(Hi) a 'regional IMF' type Fund. The functions assigned to\nsuch a Fund would be those currently carried out by\ngovernment authorities (exchange rate regime and\nbalance-of-payments financing normally with conditions\nattached), the implication being that it would be largely\ngoverned by those same authorities. Since a Fund of this\ntype could also assume certain monetary functions\n(liquidity creation in ECUs, reserve management), the\ncentral banks would have to be represented on its\ngoverning bodies;\n\n(i) the balance to be struck between prescribed rules and\n\ndiscretionary powers. When conferring powers on the\nFund, the national authorities could also spell out how\nthese powers should be exercised. If, as a result, it did not\npossess any powers of appraisal, the Fund would have no\ncompetence of its own; its role would be restricted to that\nof a managing body;\n\n(iv) a sui generis Fund. Whereas monetary or economic\n\nfunctions would be predominant in the two preceding types\nof Fund, a sui generis Fund would have both monetary and\neconomic functions. The problem would then be to create\n\n(ii) general direction of the Fund's activities. The Fund will\nhave to assist in framing and in giving expression to a\nCommunity policy in the monetary and economic field. Whatever type of Fund is chosen, its activities will have to\nfurther the objectives set at Community level;\n\n127\n\n\fDocuments relating to the European Monetary System\n\n(Hi) unanimity or majority. Although unanimity may be\nrequired for the most important decisions, it ought not to\nbe the rule. In view of the need to strike a balance between\nthe collective interest and the individual interest, decisions\ncould be taken, depending on their purpose, either\nunanimously, by a qualified majority or by a simple\nmajority; furthermore, the nature of this distinction could\n\nIf a decision-making procedure were adopted for the Fund that,\n\nat least in certain matters, did not require unanimity, it would\n\nhave to be accepted that action by the Fund would not always\nmeet with the approval of all its members. A unanimity\nrequirement would downgrade the Fund's functions to those of\na managing body or would make it impossible in practice for\nthe Fund to take any decisions. itself evolve: as time went by and the Fund developed, a\n\ndecision for which unanimity had been required at the\nbeginning could subsequently be taken by a majority. 128"}
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+{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/0a48e01c-ae3e-427a-8f0d-0126b80df157", "title": "Council Regulation (EEC) No 2613/82 of 21 September 1982 on the conclusion of the Framework Agreement for cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "fmx4,html,pdfa1b,print,xhtml", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#legislation_secondary,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#regulation,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "Council of the European Union", "date": "1982-09-21", "subjects": "Brazil,cooperation agreement (EU),economic cooperation,framework agreement", "workIds": "celex:31982R2613", "eurovoc_concepts": ["Brazil", "cooperation agreement (EU)", "economic cooperation", "framework agreement"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/0a48e01c-ae3e-427a-8f0d-0126b80df157", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["fmx4", "html", "pdfa1b", "print", "xhtml"], "text": "L_1982281EN. 01000101. xml\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n4. 10. 1982\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\n\n\nEN\n\n\nOfficial Journal of the European Communities\n\n\nL 281/1\n\n\n\n\n\nCOUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2613/82\nof 21 September 1982\non the conclusion of the Framework Agreement for cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil\nTHE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,\nHaving regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Articles 113 and 235 thereof,\nHaving regard to the proposal from the Commission,\nHaving regard to the opinion of the European Parliament\u00a0(1),\nWhereas the Community should approve, for the attainment of its ends in the sphere of external economic relations, the Framework Agreement for cooperation with the Federative Republic of Brazil; whereas certain forms of economic cooperation provided for by the Agreement exceed the powers of action specified in the field of the common commercial policy,\nHAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:\nArticle 1\nThe Framework Agreement for cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil is hereby approved on behalf of the Community. The text of the Agreement is attached to this Regulation. Article 2\nPursuant to Article IX of the Agreement, the President of the Council shall give notification that the procedures necessary for the entry into force of the Agreement have been completed on the part of the European Economic Community\u00a0(2). Article 3\nThis Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 21 September 1982. For the Council\n\n\nThe President\n\nU. ELLEMANN-JENSEN\n\n\n\n\n(1)\u00a0\u00a0OJ No C 28, 9. 2. 1981, p. 69. (2)\u00a0\u00a0The date of entry into force of the Agreement will be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities by the General Secretariat of the Council"}
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