| the amounts used for taxation purposes. The amount of deferred tax provided is based on the expected manner of realisation or settlement of | by the",
- "page_start": 70,
- "page_end": 70,
- "source_file": "ASX_KCN_2013.pdf"
- },
- {
- "text": "The accounting pronouncements we adopted that had an impact on \nour financial results or require further explanation are explained as \nfollows: \n(cid:129)*IFRS 10, Consolidated Financial Statements (IFRS 10)*– As a result of \nthe adoption of \nIFRS 10, we have changed our approach to \ndetermining whether we have control over and consequently \nwhether we consolidate our investees. IFRS 10 introduces a new \ncontrol model that is applicable to all investees. Among other things, \nit requires the consolidation of an investee if we control the investee \non the basis of de facto circumstances. \nIn accordance with the \ntransitional provisions of \nIFRS 10, we re-assessed the control \nconclusion for our investees at January 1, 2013. We made no \nchanges in the current or comparative period as a result of this \nassessment. \n\n(cid:129)*IFRS 11, Joint Arrangements (IFRS 11)*– As a result of the adoption of \nIFRS 11, we have changed how we evaluate our interests in joint \narrangements. Under IFRS 11, we classify our interests in joint \narrangements as either joint operations or joint ventures depending \non our right to the assets and obligations for the liabilities of the \narrangements. When making this assessment, we consider \nthe \nform of any separate \nstructure of \nvehicles, the contractual terms of the arrangements and other facts \nand circumstances. We have re-evaluated our involvement in our \njoint arrangements and have accounted for these either using the \nproportionate \nequity method \ndepending on whether the investment is defined as a joint operation \nor a joint venture, respectively. The adoption of IFRS 11 was not \nmaterial to the current or comparative year. \n\nthe arrangements, the legal \n\n*Instruments: Presentation (IAS 32)*– In December \n2011, the IASB amended IAS 32 to clarify the meaning of when an \nset-off. The \nentity has a current \namendments are effective for annual periods beginning on or after \nJanuary 1, 2014 and are required to be applied retrospectively. We \ndo not expect this to have a significant impact on our consolidated \nfinancial statements. \n\nlegally enforceable right of \n\n(cid:129)*IAS 39,*\n\n*Instruments: Recognition and Measurement*\n*(IAS 39)*– In June 2013, the IASB amended IAS 39 to provide relief \nfrom discontinuing an existing hedging relationship when a novation \nthat was not contemplated in the original hedging documentation \nmeets specific criteria. The amendments are effective for annual \nperiods beginning on or after January 1, 2014 and are required to be \napplied retrospectively. We are assessing the impact of \nthis \namendment on our consolidated financial statements. \n\n*Financial*",
- "page_start": 104,
- "page_end": 104,
- "source_file": "NYSE_RCI_2013.pdf"
- }
- ]
- },
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- "references": {
- "source_file": "uksi_20200438_en.pdf",
- "query": "Under which conditions can the funds of a non-registered pension arrengements be obtained before the age of 55 ?",
- "target_page": 2,
- "target_passage": "non-registered pension arrangements where the annual contributions are limited to £50,000 and funds contributed cannot be accessed before the age of 55 except in circumstances of serious ill health",
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- "text": "(a) “new account” means a financial account maintained by a reporting financial \n\ninstitution(**a**) opened on or after 13th May 2020; \n\n(b) “pre-existing account” means— \n\n(i) a financial account maintained by a reporting financial institution as of 12th \n\nMay 2020, or \n\n(ii) a financial account within Section VIII(C)(9)(b) of Annex 1 of the DAC(**b**), \nbut in the application of that provision the references to “subparagraph \nC(9)(a)” are to be read as references to paragraph (i) of this sub-paragraph. \n\n(4) The accounts are— \n\n(a) non-registered pension arrangements where the annual contributions are limited to \n£50,000 and funds contributed cannot be accessed before the age of 55 except in \ncircumstances of serious ill health; \n\n(b) Premium Bonds issued by the UK National Savings and Investments; \n\n(c) Fixed Interest Savings Certificates issued by the UK National Savings and \n\nInvestments; and \n\n(d) Index Linked Savings Certificates issued by the UK National Savings and \nInvestments.”. \n\n(5) In Schedule 2, omit paragraphs 2, 6, 8 and 9. \n\n**Transitional provision**\n\n**3.**—(1) For the purposes of the International Tax Compliance Regulations 2015, in relation to an \naccount that by virtue of regulation 2(5) ceases to be an excluded account, the calendar year 2020 \nis treated as beginning on 13th May 2020 and ending on 31st December 2020. \n\n(2) Where in consequence of paragraph (1) it is necessary to apportion an amount for the \ncalendar year 2020 to the period ending immediately before 13th May 2020 and the period \nbeginning with that date, it is to be apportioned— \n\n(a) on a time basis according to the respective length of the periods, or \n(b) if that method would produce a result that is unjust or unreasonable, on a just and \n\nreasonable basis. \n\n*David Rutley*\n*Maggie Throup*\nTwo of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury 20th April 2020 \n\n**EXPLANATORY NOTE**\n\n*(This note is not part of the Regulations)*\n\nThe Regulations amend the International Tax Compliance Regulations 2015 (“the principal \nRegulations”) which give effect to agreements and arrangements reached between the United \nKingdom and other jurisdictions to improve international tax compliance. \n\nRegulation 2(2) extends the application of the principal Regulations to arrangements entered into \nby the United Kingdom for the exchange of financial account information with other jurisdictions \nup to 19th April 2020, the date before the Regulations are made. \n\nRegulation 2(5) omits various accounts from the category of excluded accounts. Regulation \n2(4)(b) amends the definitions of “new account” and “pre-existing account” in relation to those \n\n(**a**) “Financial account” and “reporting financial institution” are defined in the table in regulation 24(2) of the principal \nRegulations. \n(**b**) “The DAC” is defined in regulation 1(3)(a) of the principal Regulations.",
- "page_start": 1,
- "page_end": 1,
- "source_file": "uksi_20200438_en.pdf"
- },
- {
- "text": "**116. Power of Commissions in relation to pensions, etc.**\n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| decide whether or not any persistens benefits shall be granted or withfrold, reduce in amcunt or suspend any such benefits that have been anded, filts shall be granted and may not be withheild, reduced in amount or unless the appropriate Co | | , as the case may be, in the decision to withhold them, reduce them in amountI them. | | Where the amount of any persions benefits that may be granted to any fived by lare, the amount of the benefits to be granted to him or her shall be amount for which he or she is eligible unless the appropriate Commission his or her being granted b | | The appropriate Commission shall not concur under subsection ( 1 ) or ( 2 ) of this section in action taken on the ground that any person who holds or effice of a judge of the Cout of Appeal or of the High Court or the Auditor - Director of Prosecuti | | In this section “ the appropriate Commission ” means the cases of benefits for which any person may be eligible in respect of the environment in the public service of a person who, immediately better he or she assed to be a public stiffican, wa | | any sther case, the Public Service Commission. In this section “ persons benefit ” means ary persons, compensation, a child ” was alwances to persons in respect of their service as public officers, and appending to personal interviews. As | | Solidated Fund | | Prevenues or cher monitys ratioed or received for the purposes of their distaxeans ( not being reversues or other moneys that are payuble by or law into some other fund established for a specific purpose or that may by or law be retained by the | | abnoredish from Gonsolidation # under other public hundships within the public human providers and expertised more assigned / use that is charged upon the Fund by the Constitution or term the supportise that is changed spon the Fund by tha | |
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\n \n\n(a) \n(b) \n\n(3) If in any financial year it is found- \n\n(a) \n\nthat the amount appropriated by the Appropriation Act for the purposes included \nin any organisation of expenditure is insufficient or that a need has arisen for \nexpenditure for a purpose for which no amount has been appropriated by the \nAppropriation Act; or \nthat any moneys have been expended on any organisation of expenditure in \nexcess of the amount appropriated for the purposes included in that \norganisation by the Appropriation Act or for a purpose for which no amount has \nbeen appropriated by the Appropriation Act, \n\n(b) \n\na supplementary estimate showing the sums required or spent shall be laid before the \nNational Assembly and the organisations of expenditure shall be included in a \nsupplementary Appropriation Bill, or in a motion or motions approving such expenditure, \nwhich shall be introduced or moved in the Assembly. \n\n(4) Where any supplementary expenditure has been approved in a financial year \nby a resolution of the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of subsection \n(3) of this section, a supplementary Appropriation Bill shall be introduced in the National \nAssembly, not later than the end of the financial year next following, providing for the \nappropriation of the sums so approved. \n**120. Authorization of expenditure in advance of appropriation**",
- "page_start": 50,
- "page_end": 50,
- "source_file": "Botswana-constitution.pdf"
- },
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- "text": "NOTE 22: PENSIONS \n\nWe have contributory and non-contributory defined benefit pension \nplans that are made available to most of our employees. The plans \nprovide pensions based on years of service, years of contributions and \nearnings. We do not provide any non-pension post-retirement benefits. \nWe also provide unfunded supplemental pension benefits to certain \nexecutives. \n\nThe assets of the defined benefit pension plans are held in segregated \naccounts isolated from our assets. We administer the defined benefit \npension plans pursuant to applicable regulations, the Statement of \nInvestment Policies and Procedures and to the mandate of the Pension \nCommittee of the Board of Directors. The Pension Committee of the \nBoard of Directors oversees our administration of the defined benefits \npension plans, which includes the following principal areas: \n(cid:129) overseeing the funding, administration, communication and \ninvestment management of the plans \n(cid:129) selecting and monitoring the performance of all \n\nthird parties \nperforming duties in respect of the plans, including audit, actuarial \nand investment management services \n(cid:129) proposing, considering and approving amendments to the defined \nbenefit pension plans \n(cid:129) proposing, considering and approving amendments of the Statement \nof Investment Policies and Procedures \n(cid:129) reviewing management and actuarial reports prepared in respect of \nthe administration of the defined benefit pension plans \n(cid:129) reviewing and approving the audited financial statements of the \ndefined benefit pension plan funds.",
- "page_start": 121,
- "page_end": 121,
- "source_file": "NYSE_RCI_2013.pdf"
- },
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- "text": "Parliament may make provision under which, if the Appropriation Act in respect \nof any financial year has not come into operation by the beginning of that financial year, \nthe President may authorize the withdrawal of moneys from the Consolidated Fund for \nthe purpose of meeting expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the \nGovernment until the expiration of four months from the beginning of that financial year \nor the coming into operation of the Appropriation Act, whichever is the earlier. \n**121. Contingencies Fund**\n\n(1) Parliament may make provision for the establishment of a Contingencies \n\nFund and for authorizing the President, if satisfied that there has arisen an urgent and \nunforeseen need for expenditure for which no other provision exists, to make advances \nfrom that Fund to meet that need. \n\n(2) Where any advance is made from the Contingencies Fund, a supplementary \nestimate shall be laid before the National Assembly as soon as possible for the purpose \nof replacing the amount so advanced.",
- "page_start": 51,
- "page_end": 51,
- "source_file": "Botswana-constitution.pdf"
- },
- {
- "text": "Commission and published on the website indicated below, applicable on the day when it \nissues the payment order. \n\nThe contractor makes any conversion between the euro and another currency at the \nmonthly accounting exchange rate, established by the Commission and published on the \nwebsite indicated below, applicable on the date of the invoice. \n\nhttp://ec.europa.eu/budget/contracts_grants/info_contracts/inforeuro/inforeuro_en.cfm \n\n**II.21.4. Costs of transfer**\n\nThe costs of the transfer are borne as follows: \n\n(a) the contracting authority bears the costs of dispatch charged by its bank; \n(b) the contractor bears the costs of receipt charged by its bank; \n(c) the party causing repetition of the transfer bears the costs for repeated transfer. \n\nII.21.5. Pre-financing, performance and money retention guarantees \n\nIf, as provided for in Article I.6*,*a financial guarantee is required for the payment of pre- \nfinancing, as performance guarantee or as retention money guarantee, it must fulfil the \nfollowing conditions: \n\n(a) the financial guarantee is provided by a bank or a financial institution approved by \nthe contracting authority or, at the request of the contractor and with the \nagreement of the contracting authority, by a third party; and \n\n(b) the guarantee shall have the effect of making the bank or financial institution or the \nthird party provide irrevocable collateral security, or stand as first-call guarantor of \nthe contractor's obligations without requiring that the contracting authority has \nrecourse against the principal debtor (the contractor). \n\nThe contractor bears the cost of providing such guarantee. \n\nPre-financing guarantees must remain in force until the pre-financing is cleared against \ninterim payments or payment of the balance. Where the payment of the balance takes the \nform of a debit note, the pre-financing guarantee must remain in force for three months \nafter the debit note is sent to the contractor. The contracting authority must release the \nguarantee within the following month. \n\nPerformance guarantees cover compliance with substantial contractual obligations until the \ncontracting authority has given its final approval for the service. The performance \nguarantee must not exceed 10 % of the total price of the specific contract. The contracting \nauthority must release the guarantee fully after final approval of the service, as provided \nfor in the specific contract. \n\nRetention money guarantees cover full delivery of the service in accordance with the \nspecific contract including during the contract liability period and until its final approval by \nthe contracting authority. The retention money guarantee must not exceed 10 % of the \ntotal price of the specific contract. The contracting authority must release the guarantee \nafter the expiry of the contract liability period as provided for in the specific contract. \n\nThe contracting authority must not request a retention money guarantee for a specific \ncontract where it has requested a performance guarantee.",
- "page_start": 33,
- "page_end": 33,
- "source_file": "EN-Draft FWC for services 0142.pdf"
- },
- {
- "text": "Tenure of office of Director of Public Prosecutions \nTenure of office of Auditor-General \nPensions laws and protection of pensions rights \nPower of Commissions in relation to pensions, etc. \n\nCHAPTER VIII \nFinance \n\nConsolidated Fund \nWithdrawals from Consolidated Fund or other public funds \nAuthorization of expenditure \nAuthorization of expenditure in advance of appropriation \nContingencies Fund \nRemuneration of certain officers \nPublic debt \nAuditor-General \n\nCHAPTER IX \nMiscellaneous \n\nResignations \nReappointments and concurrent appointments \nInterpretation \n\nFirst Schedule - Election of Specially Elected Members of the National \nAssembly \nSecond Schedule - Division of Districts into regions for the purpose of \nselecting Members of Ntlo ya Dikgosi \n\nL.N. 83, 1966, \nAct 30, 1969, \nAct 43, 1969, \nAct 25, 1970, \nAct 28, 1972, \nAct 24, 1973, \nAct 28, 1978, \nS.I. 25, 1980, \nAct 32, 1982, \nAct 1, 1983, \nAct 22, 1987, \nS.I. 37, 1991, \nAct 27, 1992, \nS.I. 51, 1993, \nS.I. 119, 1993, \nAct 16, 1997, \nAct 18, 1997, \nAct 1, 1999, \nAct 2, 2002, \nAct 12, 2002, \nAct 9, 2005, \nS.I. 91, 2006.",
- "page_start": 3,
- "page_end": 3,
- "source_file": "Botswana-constitution.pdf"
- },
- {
- "text": "**Pension Obligations**\nOur retiree pension plans had a funding deficit of approximately $172 \nmillion at December 31, 2013. We have been making special minimum \nmonthly payments in addition to our regular contributions to eliminate \nthe pension liability. During 2013, our funding deficit was reduced by \n$162 million. \n\naccrued obligations in the future. See*Critical accounting estimates*for \nmore information. \n\n*Purchase of Annuities*\nFrom time to time we have made additional lump-sum contributions to \nour pension plans, and the pension plans have purchased annuities \nfrom insurance companies to fund the pension benefit obligations for \ncertain groups of \nretired employees in the plans. Purchasing the \nannuities relieves us of our primary responsibility for that portion of \nthe accrued benefit obligations for the retired employees and eliminates \nthe significant risk associated with the obligations. \nThe special payments, including contributions associated with benefits \npaid from the plans, were approximately $7 million in 2013. We expect \nour total estimated funding requirements to be $96 million in 2014 and \nto be adjusted annually thereafter, based on various market factors \nsuch as interest rates and expected returns and staffing assumptions. \n\nWe did not make any additional lump-sum contributions to our pension \nplans in 2013 or 2012, and the pension plans did not purchase \nadditional annuities. \nChanges in factors such as the discount rate, increase in compensation \nand the expected return on plan assets can affect the accrued benefit \nobligation, pension expense and the deficiency of plan assets over \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Categories | The risk it manages | Types of derivative instruments | | Debt Derivatives | • Impact of fluctuations in foreign exchange rates on principal and interest payments for US denominated long - term debt | • Cross - currency interest rate exchange agreements • Forward foreign exchange agreements ( from time to time, as applicable ) | | Expenditure Derivatives | • Impact of fluctuations in foreign exchange rates on forecasted US dollar denominated expenditures | • Forward foreign exchange agreements | | Equity Derivatives | • Impact of fluctuations in share price on stock - based compensation expense | • Total return swap agreements | \n \n\n*New Debt Derivatives to Hedge Senior Notes Issued In 2013*\n\nUS$ Hedging effect \n\nUS$ Principal/ \nnotional amount \n(millions) \nFixed \nhedged Cdn.$ \nCdn$ \nequivalent \n(millions) Maturity \ndate Coupon \nrate Effective date interest rate 1 \nMarch 7, 2013 US$ 500 2023 3.00% 3.60% $ 515 \nMarch 7, 2013 US$ 500 2043 4.50% 4.60% $ 515 \n\nWe also manage our exposure to fluctuating interest rates and we have \nfixed the interest rate on 95.3% of our debt including short-term \nborrowings at December 31, 2013 (2012 – 100%). \nAll of our Debt Derivatives currently outstanding have been designated \nas effective hedges against \nforeign exchange risk for accounting \npurposes as described below and in note 20 to the consolidated \nfinancial statements. \n\n**Debt Derivatives**\nWe use cross currency interest exchange agreements (Debt Derivatives), \nto hedge the foreign exchange risk on all of the principal and interest \nobligations of our US dollar denominated senior notes and debentures. \nAt December 31, 2013 we used Debt Derivatives to hedge the foreign \nexchange risk on 100% of the principal and interest obligations on all \nour US dollar denominated debt. We use Debt Derivatives for risk \nmanagement purposes only. \nSubtotal US$ 1,000 $ 1,030",
- "page_start": 65,
- "page_end": 65,
- "source_file": "NYSE_RCI_2013.pdf"
- },
- {
- "text": "Significant estimates are involved in determining pension related \nbalances. Actuarial estimates are based on projections of employees’ \ncompensation levels at the time of retirement. Maximum retirement \nbenefits are primarily based on career average earnings, subject to \ncertain adjustments. The most \nrecent actuarial valuations were \ncompleted as at January 1, 2013.",
- "page_start": 121,
- "page_end": 121,
- "source_file": "NYSE_RCI_2013.pdf"
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- "text": "\n \n \n \n \n [html] | provide these benefits for our funded plans at December 31.2013 and 2012. | 2013 | | 2012 | Plan assets, at fair value | $ | | 37 | $ | 833 | | Accrued benefit obligations | Table | ≥ 09 | | 1.167 | Deficiency of plan assets over accrued benefit obligationsEffect of asset ceiling limit | ( 172 ) | | ( 334 ) | Net deferred pension liability | $ | | ( 181 ) | $ | ( 334 ) | | Consists of : | Deferred pension asset | $ | | 8 | $ | 9 | Deferred pension liability | ( 189 ) | ( 343 ) | Net deferred pension liability | | $ | ( 181 ) | $ | | ( 334 ) | The table below shows our pension fund assets for the years ended 2013 and 2012. | 2013 | | 2012 | Plan αossets, January 1 | $ | | 833 | $ | 684 | | Interest income | 40 | 40 | | Remeasurements, return on plan assets recognized in other | comprehensive income and equity | 65 | | 37 | Contributions by employees | 26 | | 22 | Contributions by employer | 101 | | 85 | Benefits paid | ( 26 ) | ( 33 ) | Administrative expenses paid from plan assets | ( 2 ) | ( 2 ) | | Plan assets, December 31 | $ | 1.037 | | $ | 833 | The table below shows the accrued benefit obligations arising from | | funded obligations for the years ended December 31.2013 and 2012. | 13 ar | 12.1 | | 2013 | 2012 | Accrued benefit obligations, January 1 | | $ | 67 | $ | | 817 | Service cost | 71 | | 46 | Interest cost | 52 | | 45 | Benefits paid | ( 26 ) | ( 33 ) | Contributions by employees | 26 | 23 | | Remeasurements, recognized in other comprehensive | income and equity | ( 81 ) | | 269 | Accrued benefit obligations, December 31 | $ | | 1.209 | $ | . 167 | \n \n\nThe assets of the defined benefit pension plans are invested and \nmanaged following all applicable regulations and the Statement of \nInvestment Policies and Procedures, and reflect the characteristics and \nasset mix of each defined benefit pension plan. Investment and market \nreturn risk is managed by: \n(cid:129) contracting professional \n\nto execute the \ninvestment strategy following the Statement of Investment Policies \nand Procedures and regulatory requirements \n\ninvestment managers \n\n(cid:129) specifying the kinds of investments that can be held in the plans and \nmonitoring compliance \n\n(cid:129) using asset allocation and diversification strategies, and \n(cid:129) purchasing annuities from time to time. \n\nThe funded pension plans are registered with the Office of \nthe \nSuperintendent of Financial Institutions and are subject to the Federal \nPension Benefits Standards Act. The plans are also registered with the \nCanada Revenue Agency and are subject to the Canada Income Tax \nAct. The benefits provided under the plans and the contributions to the \nplans are funded and administered in accordance with all applicable \nlegislation and regulations.",
- "page_start": 121,
- "page_end": 121,
- "source_file": "NYSE_RCI_2013.pdf"
- },
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- "text": "Provided that the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial \n\nService Commission, may permit a person whose appointment to act as a Justice of \nAppeal has expired or been revoked to continue to act as such a judge for such period \nas may be necessary to enable him or her to deliver judgment or to do any other thing in \nrelation to proceedings that were commenced before him or her previously thereto. \n**101. Tenure of office of judges of Court of Appeal**\n\n(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person holding the office of a judge \n\nof the Court of Appeal shall vacate that office on attaining the age of 70 years or such \nother age as may be prescribed by Parliament: \n\nProvided that- \n\n(i) \n\nthe President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service \nCommission, may permit a judge who has attained that age to continue in office \nfor such period as may be necessary to enable him or her to deliver judgment \nor to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were commenced before \nhim or her before he or she attained that age;",
- "page_start": 42,
- "page_end": 42,
- "source_file": "Botswana-constitution.pdf"
- }
- ]
- },
- {
- "references": {
- "source_file": "1001.2538.pdf",
- "query": "What metrics are good indicators of the coverage of gas molecules on carbon nanotubes ?",
- "target_page": 1,
- "target_passage": "the bind- ing energy and scattering resistance of the molecules",
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- "text": "∗ Electronic address: juanmaria.garcia@ehu.es [18] C. S. Yeung, L. V. Liu, and Y. A. Wang, \n\n“Adsorption \nof small gas molecules onto Pt-doped single-walled carbon \nJ. Phys. Chem. C 112(19), 7401 (Apr. 2008), \nnanotubes”, \ndoi:10.1021/jp0753981. \n[1] Gas Sensing Materials, MRS Bull., vol. 24 (1999). \n[2] J. C. Chalier, X. Blase, and S. Roche, “Electronic and transport \nproperties of nanotubes”, Rev. Mod. Phys. 79(2), 677 (May \n2007), doi:10.1103/RevModPhys.79.677. [19] T. Vo, Y.-D. Wu, R. Car, and M. Robert, \n\n“Structures, in- \nteractions, and ferromagnetism of Fe-carbon nanotube sys- \nJ. Phys. Chem. C 112(22), 400 (May 2008), \ntems”, \ndoi:10.1021/jp0761968. \n\n[3] J. Kong, N. R. Franklin, C. Zhou, M. G. Chapline, S. Peng, \n“Nanotube molecular wires as \nScience 287(5453), 622 (Jan. 2000), \nK. Cho, and H. Dai, \nchemical sensors”, \ndoi:10.1126/science.287.5453.622. \n\n[20] J. A. F¨urst, M. Brandbyge, A.-P. Jauho, and K. Stokbro, “Ab \ninitio study of spin-dependent transport in carbon nanotubes \nwith iron and vanadium adatoms”, Phys. Rev. B 78(19), 195405 \n(Nov. 2008), doi:10.1103/PhysRevB.78.195405. \n\n[4] P. G. Collins, K. Bradley, M. Ishigami, and A. Zettl, \n\n“Ex- \ntreme oxygen sensitivity of electronic properties of car- \nScience 287(5459), 1801 (Mar. 2000), \nbon nanotubes”, \ndoi:10.1126/science.287.5459.1801. \n\n[21] A. V. Krasheninnikov, P. O. Lehtinen, A. S. Foster, \nP. Pyykk¨o, and R. M. Nieminen, \n“Embedding transition- \nmetal atoms in graphene: Structure, bonding, and mag- \nPhys. Rev. Lett. 102(12), 126807 (Mar. 2009), \nnetism”, \ndoi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.102.126807. \n\n[5] C. Hierold, Carbon Nanotube Devices: Properties, Modeling, \nIntegration and Applications (Wiley-VCH, Weinheim, 2008). \n[6] F. Villalpando-P´aez, A. H. Romero, E. Mu˜noz-Sandoval, \nL. M. Mart´ınez, H. Terrones, and M. Terrones, \n“Fabrica- \ntion of vapor and gas sensors using films of aligned CNx \nnanotubes”, Chem. Phys. Lett. 386(1-3), 137 (Mar. 2004), \ndoi:10.1016/j.cplett.2004.01.052. \n\n[22] J. J. Mortensen, L. B. Hansen, and K. W. Jacobsen, \n“Real-space grid implementation of the projector augmented \nPhys. Rev. B 71(3), 035109 (Jan. 2005), \nwave method”, \ndoi:10.1103/PhysRevB.71.035109. [7] A. R. Rocha, M. Rossi, A. Fazzio, \n\nJ. R. \n“Designing real nanotube-based gas \nsen- \nPhys. Rev. Lett. 100(17), 176803 (May 2008), \n\nand A. \n\n[23] J. P. Perdew, K. Burke, and M. Ernzerhof, “Generalized gradi- \nent approximation made simple”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77(18), 3865 \n(Oct. 1996), doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.77.3865. da Silva, \nsors”, \ndoi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.100.176803. \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | \n ",
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- "source_file": "1001.2538.pdf"
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- "text": "Computational Design of Chemical Nanosensors: Metal Doped Carbon Nanotubes \n\nJ. M. Garc´ıa-Lastra1,2,∗ D. J. Mowbray1,2, K. S. Thygesen2, A. Rubio1,3, and K. W. Jacobsen2 \n1Nano-Bio Spectroscopy group and ETSF Scientific Development Centre, \nDpto. F´ısica de Materiales, Universidad del Pa´ıs Vasco, \nCentro de F´ısica de Materiales CSIC-UPV/EHU- MPC and DIPC, Av. Tolosa 72, E-20018 San Sebasti´an, Spain \n2Center for Atomic-scale Materials Design, Department of Physics, \nTechnical University of Denmark, DK-2800 Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark \n3Fritz-Haber-Institut der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Berlin, Germany \n\nWe use computational screening to systematically investigate the use of transition metal doped carbon nan- \notubes for chemical gas sensing. For a set of relevant target molecules (CO, NH3, H2S) and the main components \nof air (N2, O2, H2O), we calculate the binding energy and change in conductance upon adsorption on a metal \natom occupying a vacancy of a (6,6) carbon nanotube. Based on these descriptors, we identify the most promis- \ning dopant candidates for detection of a given target molecule. From the fractional coverage of the metal sites \nin thermal equilibrium with air, we estimate the change in the nanotube resistance per doping site as a function \nof the target molecule concentration assuming charge transport in the diffusive regime. Our analysis points to \nNi-doped nanotubes as candidates for CO sensors working under typical atmospheric conditions. \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Cancer | tectors of | Cases | | both for i [ 9 ] | ____________ | Patients | | Cases | PTistin error | States | | Post - rate (%) | Control | its, electri | | Table | tive for s | the | | tionalizat | Patients | sidewall 1 | | ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ | hP_115Pd_1 | Patients | | the select | Cancer | 1.10 ( 0.01 ) | |
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\n \n\nchange in CNT resistivity may then be obtained from the cal- \nculated coverages and single impurity conductances. \n\nWe find that oxidation of the active metal site passivates \nthe sensor in the case of doping by Ti, V, Cr, and Mn un- \nder standard conditions (room temperature and 1 bar of pres- \nsure). Among the remaining metals, we identify Ni as is the \nmost promising candidate for CO detection. For this system \nthe change in resistance per active site is generally significant \n(>1 Ω) for small changes in CO concentration in the relevant \nrange of around 0.1–10 ppm. Our approach is quite general \nand is directly applicable to other nanostructures than CNTs, \nother functionalizations than metal doping, and other back- \ngrounds than atmospheric air.",
- "page_start": 0,
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- "source_file": "1001.2538.pdf"
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- "text": "[8] S. Brahim, S. Colbern, R. Gump, and L. Grigorian, “Tailoring \nJ. Appl. Phys. \ngas sensing properties of carbon nanotubes”, \n104(2), 024502 (Jul. 2008), doi:10.1063/1.2956395. \n[9] C. Morgan, Z. Alemipour, and M. Baxendale, \n\n“Variable \nrange hopping in oxygen-exposed single-wall carbon nanotube \nnetworks”, Phys. Stat. Solidi A 205(6), 1394 (May 2008), \ndoi:10.1002/pssa.200778113. \n\nTo our knowledge, controlled doping of CNTs with transi- \ntion metal atoms has so far not been achieved. It has, how- \never, been found that metal atoms incorporated into the CNT \nlattice during catalytic growth are afterwards very difficult to \nremove [30]. Furthermore, it has been shown that CNT vacan- \ncies, which are needed for the metallic doping, may be formed \nin a controlled way by irradiation by Ar ions [31]. This sug- \ngests that metallic doping of CNTs should be possible. \n\n[10] D. J. Mowbray, C. Morgan, and K. S. Thygesen, \n\n“In- \nfluence of O2 and N2 on the conductivity of carbon nan- \notube networks”, Phys. Rev. B 79(19), 195431 (May 2009), \ndoi:10.1103/PhysRevB.79.195431. \n\n[11] L. Valentini, F. Mercuri, I. Armentano, C. Cantalini, S. Picozzi, \nL. Lozzi, S. Santucci, A. Sgamellotti, and J. M. Kenny, “Role of \ndefects on the gas sensing properties of carbon nanotubes thin \nfilms: experiment and theory”, Chem. Phys. Lett. 387(4-6), 356 \n(Apr. 2004), doi:10.1016/j.cplett.2004.02.038. \n\n[12] Z. Zanolli and J.-C. Charlier, “Defective carbon nanotubes for \nsingle-molecule sensing”, Phys. Rev. B 80(15), 155447 (Oct. \n2009), doi:10.1103/PhysRevB.80.155447. \n\n[13] J. M. Garc´ıa-Lastra, K. S. Thygesen, M. Strange, and \n´Angel Rubio, \n“Conductance of sidewall-functionalized \ncarbon nanotubes: Universal dependence on adsorption \nPhys. Rev. Lett. 101(23), 236806 (Dec. 2008), \nsites”, \ndoi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.101.236806. \n\nIn summary, we have presented a general model of nanos- \ntructured chemical sensors which takes the adsorption en- \nergies of the relevant chemical species and their individual \nscattering resistances as the only input. On the basis of this \nmodel we have performed a computational screening of tran- \nsition metal doped CNTs, and found that Ni-doped CNTs are \npromising candidates for detecting CO in a background of air. \nThe model may be applied straightforwardly to other nanos- \ntructures than CNTs, other functionalizations than metal dop- \ning and other gas compositions than air. \n\n[14] S. B. Fagan, R. Mota, A. J. R. da Silva, and A. Fazzio, “Ab \ninitio study of an iron atom interacting with single-wall car- \nbon nanotubes”, Phys. Rev. B 67(20), 205414 (May 2003), \ndoi:10.1103/PhysRevB.67.205414. \n\n[15] Y. Yagi, T. M. Briere, M. H. F. Sluiter, V. Kumar, A. A. Farajian, \nand Y. Kawazoe, “Stable geometries and magnetic properties of \nsingle-walled carbon nanotubes doped with 3d transition met- \nals: A first-principles study”, Phys. Rev. B 69(7), 075414 (Feb \n2004), doi:10.1103/PhysRevB.69.075414. \n\nThe authors acknowledge financial support from Span- \nish MEC (FIS2007-65702-C02-01), “Grupos Consolidados \nUPV/EHU del Gobierno Vasco” (IT-319-07), e-I3 ETSF \nproject (Contract Number 211956), “Red Espa˜nola de Super- \ncomputaci´on”, NABIIT and the Danish Center for Scientific \nComputing. The Center for Atomic-scale Materials Design \n(CAMD) is sponsored by the Lundbeck Foundation. JMG-L \nacknowledges funding from Spanish MICINN through Juan \nde la Cierva and Jos´e Castillejo programs. \n\n[16] S. H. Yang, W. H. Shin, J. W. Lee, S. Y. Kim, S. I. Woo, and \nJ. K. Kang, “Interaction of a transition metal atom with intrinsic \ndefects in single-walled carbon nanotubes”, J. Phys. Chem. B \n110(28), 13941 (Jun. 2006), doi:10.1021/jp061895q. \n\n[17] K. T. Chan, J. B. Neaton, and M. L. Cohen, “First-principles \nstudy of metal adatom adsorption on graphene”, Phys. Rev. B \n77, 235430 (Jun. 2008), doi:10.1103/PhysRevB.77.235430. \n\n∗ Electronic address: juanmaria.garcia@ehu.es [18] C. S. Yeung, L. V. Liu, and Y. A. Wang,",
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- "text": "FIG. 2: Calculated (a) adsorption energy Eads in eV and (b) change in \nconductance ∆G in units of G0 =2e2/h for N2, O2, H2O, CO, NH3, \nand H2S on 3d transition metals occupying a monovacancy (top), \ndivacancy I (middle), and divacancy II (bottom) in a (6,6) carbon \nnanotube. \nFIG. 1: Structural schematics and formation energy for a 3d tran- \nsition metal occupied monovacancy (black), divacancy I (gray), or \ndivacancy II (white) in a (6,6) carbon nanotube. Formation energies \nof the empty vacancies are indicated by dashed lines. \n\nEform[VC] = E[VC] + nE[C] − E[NT], (2) \n\nwhere E[VC] is the total energy of the nanotube with a va- \ncancy of n atoms. \n\nis the total energy of the pristine nanotube with a physisorbed \ntransition metal atom. We have considered the monovacancy \nand two divacancies shown in Fig. 1. The energy required to \nform an empty vacancy is obtained from where E[X@M@VC] is the total energy of molecule X on \na transition metal atom occupying a vacancy, and E[X] is the \ngas phase energy of the molecule. \n\nFrom the adsorption energies plotted in Fig. 2(a), we see \nthat the earlier transition metals tend to bind the adsorbates \nstronger than the late transition metals. The latest metals in \nthe series (Cu and Zn) bind adsorbates rather weakly in the \ndivacancy structures. We also note that O2 binds significantly \nstronger than any of the three target molecules on Ti, V, Cr, \nand Mn (except for Cr in divacancy I where H2S is found to \ndissociate). Active sites containing these metals are therefore \nexpected to be completely passivated if oxygen is present in \nthe background. Further, we find H2O is rather weakly bound \nto most of the active sites. This ensures that these types of \nsensors are robust against changes in humidity. \n\nThe calculated formation energies for the 3d transition met- \nals are shown in Fig. 1. From the horizontal lines we see that \nboth divacancies are more stable than the monovacancy. This \nmay be attributed to the presence of a two-fold coordinated C \natom in the monovacancy, while all C atoms remain three-fold \ncoordinated in the divacancies. When a transition metal atom \noccupies a vacancy, the strongest bonding to the C atoms is \nthrough its d orbitals [26]. For this reason, Cu and Zn, which \nboth have filled d-bands, are rather unstable in the CNT. For \nthe remaining metals, adsorption in the monovacancies leads \nto quite stable structures. This is because the three-fold coor- \ndination of the C atoms and the CNT’s hexagonal structure are \nrecovered when the metal atom is inserted. On the other hand, \nmetal adsorption in divacancies is slightly less stable because \nof the resulting pentagon defects, see upper panel in Fig. 1. A \nsimilar behaviour has been reported by Krasheninnikov et al. \nfor transition metal atoms in graphene [21]. \n\nIn thermodynamic equilibrium [27], the coverage of the ac- \ntive sites follows from \n\nK[X]C[X] \nΘ[X] = , (4) \n1 + (cid:80) \nY K[Y ]C[Y ] \n\nwhere K = k+/k− is the ratio of forward and backward rate \nconstants for the adsorption reaction, \n\n(cid:20) (cid:21) \n\nEads[X] + T S[X] \nkBT \n\nThe adsorption energies for N2, O2, H2O, CO, NH3, and \nH2S on the metallic site of the doped (6,6) CNTs are shown in \nFig. 2(a). The adsorption energy of a molecule X is defined \nby \n\nK[X] = exp − . (5) \n\nIn these expressions C[X] is the concentration of species X, \nS[X] is its gas phase entropy and T is the temperature. Ex- \nperimental values for the gas phase entropies have been taken \nfrom Ref. [28]. Eads[X@M@VC] = E[X@M@VC] − E[X] − E[M@VC], \n(3)",
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- "text": "3 \n\nconductances, i.e. G = (G↑ + G↓)/2. \n\nNext, we estimate the resistance of a CNT containing sev- \neral impurities (a specific metal dopant with different molecu- \nlar adsorbates). Under the assumption that the electron phase- \ncoherence length, lφ, is smaller than the average distance be- \ntween the dopants, d, we may neglect quantum interference \nand obtain the total resistance by adding the scattering resis- \ntances due to each impurity separately. The scattering resis- \ntance due to a single impurity is given by \n\nRs(X) = 1/G(X) − 1/(2G0), (6) \n\nwhere G(X) is the Landauer conductance of the pristine CNT \nwith a single metal dopant occupied by molecule X and \n1/(2G0) is the contact resistance of a (6,6) CNT. \n\nWe may now obtain the total resistance per dopant site rel- \native to the reference background signal as a function of the \ntarget molecule concentration \n\nFIG. 3: Fractional coverage Θ in thermal equilibrium of Ni in a (a) \nmonovacancy, (b) divacancy I, (c) divacancy II and (d) change in \nresistance ∆R per dopant site as a function of CO concentration in \na background of air at room temperature and 1 bar of pressure. The \nreference concentration of CO is taken to be C0 =0.1 ppm. Note the \nchange from linear to log scale on the y-axis at ∆R =10 Ω. \n\n(7) \n\nwhere N is the number of dopants, Θ[X, C] is the fractional \ncoverage of species X at concentration C of the target and C0 \nis the reference concentration. Notice that the contact resis- \ntance drops out as we evaluate a change in resistance. \n\nFor a given background composition we may thus estimate \nthe fractional coverages for each available adsorbate for a \ngiven type of doping. As an example, Fig. 3(a)-(c) shows the \nfractional coverage of a Ni atom occupying a monovacancy, \ndivacancy I, and divacancy II, versus CO concentration in a \nbackground of air at room temperature and 1 bar of pressure. \nDue to the relatively small binding energy of N2 and H2O as \ncompared to O2 and CO, all Ni sites will be either empty or \noccupied by O2 or CO. In particular, Ni in a monovacancy \n(top panel of Fig. 3) will be completely oxidized for all rel- \nevant CO concentrations. For the Ni occupied divacancy II \nstructures we find the coverage of CO changes significantly \naround toxic concentrations (∼10 ppm). \nIn Fig. 3(d) we show the change in resistance calculated \nfrom Eq. (7) as a function of CO concentration for Ni occu- \npying the three types of vacancies. The background reference \nconcentration of CO is taken to be C0 = 0.1 ppm. For the \nmonovacancy there is very little change in resistivity. This is \nbecause most active sites are blocked by O2 at relevant CO \nconcentrations, as shown in the upper panel of Fig. 3. For Ni \nin the divacancies there is, however, a change in resistance on \nthe order of 1Ω per site. For concentrations above ∼1 ppm, \nthe CO coverage of Ni in the divacancy II increases dramati- \ncally and this leads to a significant increase in resistance.",
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- "text": "For the climate change discourse, the second-largest cluster (34%) is indicated in red and focuses \non the responsibility to tackle climate change, where several global action hashtags are included, such \nas “un”, “parisagreement”, “cop21”, and “cop24”. The theme of the third largest cluster (20%) in \nthe climate change discourse was energy (in blue). The smallest cluster (6%) in yellow sits in the \ncentral part of the network with a mixed theme composed of three highly ranked hashtags, including \n“environment” (No. 2), “climateaction” (No. 3), and “energy” (No. 6).",
- "page_start": 7,
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- "text": "All total energy calculations and structure optimizations \nhave been performed with the real-space density functional \ntheory (DFT) code GPAW [22] which is based on the projector \naugmented wave method. We use a grid spacing of 0.2 ˚A for \nrepresenting the density and wave functions and the PBE ex- \nchange correlation functional [23]. Transport calculations for \nthe optimized structures have been performed using the non- \nequilibrium Green’s function method [24] with an electronic \nHamiltonian obtained from the SIESTA code [25] in a dou- \nble zeta polarized (DZP) basis set. Spin polarization has been \ntaken into account in all calculations. \n\nMetallic doping of a (6,6) CNT has been modeled in a su- \npercell containing six repeated minimal unit cells along the \nCNT axis (dimensions: 15 ˚A×15 ˚A×14.622 ˚A). For this size \nof supercell a Γ-point sampling of the Brillouin zone was \nfound to be sufficient. The formation energy for creating a \nvacancy (VC) occupied by a transition metal atom (M) was \ncalculated using the relation \n\nEform[M@VC] = E[M@VC] + nE[C] − E[M@NT] (1) \n\nwhere E[M@VC] is the total energy of a transition metal \natom occupying a vacancy in the nanotube, n is the number \nof carbon atoms removed to form the vacancy, E[C] is the en- \nergy per carbon atom in a pristine nanotube, and E[M@NT]",
- "page_start": 0,
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- "text": "FIG. 4: (Colour online) Density profiles for the situation where the substrate is covered by nanoparticles \n\nwith average density ρav \n\nn = 0.3. The top row are the nanoparticle density profiles and the bottom row are \nl σ2. \nthe corresponding liquid density profiles at the times t/tl = 8 (left) and 80 (right), where tl = 1/kT M nc \n\nThe parameters are kT /εll = 0.8, εnl/εll = 0.6, εnn = 0, α = 0.4M nc \nl σ4, M c l = 0, ρl(t = 0) = 0.9 ± ξ \n\n(where ξ represents white noise of amplitude 0.05) and (µ − µcoex)/kT = −0.88, where the liquid exhibits \n\nspinodal decomposition-evaporation. \n\nalso diffuse over the substrate (conserved dynamics). The conserved part is treated along the lines \n\ndeveloped above for the nanoparticles. For the non-conserved part we assume a standard form \n\n[85], i.e., the change in time of ρl is proportional to −(µsurf(r, t) − µ) = −δF [ρn, ρl]/δρl(r) \n\nwhere µsurf(r, t) is the local chemical potential of the liquid at the point r on the surface at time t. \n\nThis gives the evolution equation for the liquid density \n(cid:21) (cid:20) \n\n∂ρl \n∂t \nδF [ρn, ρl] \nδρl δF [ρn, ρl] \nδρl \nM c − M nc = ∇ · \nl ρl∇ \n, \nl \n\nwhere we assume that the coefficients M c \nl and M nc \nl \nare constants. \n\n16",
- "page_start": 15,
- "page_end": 15,
- "source_file": "1001.2669.pdf"
- },
- {
- "text": "In the global warming network, politics was the second-largest discourse cluster (20% of the \nnetwork), where “tcot”, short for “Top Conservatives on Twitter”, was the node ranked highest, \nand “p2”, short for “Progressives 2.0”, is also included. Several political figures, such as Obama and Al \nGore, are frequently mentioned. Action toward the global climate issue was the third-largest cluster \n(16%), including both domestic efforts, such as “us”, “trump”, “climatechangeisreal”, “climateaction”, \nand “epa”, and two international items, like “china” and “india”. The fourth cluster (in blue) referred \nto emissions, including hashtags like “co2”, “green”, and “carbon”. The smallest cluster (8%) was \ncomposed of “snow”, “winter”, “heatwave”, and “summer”, referring to the temperature abnormalities \non the earth. \n\n4.3. Temporal Analysis of the Associations in the Two Discourses \n\nThe online presentations of the climate change and global warming discourses are dynamic. \nAs shown in Table 2, for the global warming discourse, 11 key concepts remained in the top 50 central \nhashtags each year for all 10 years, with 16 for the climate change”discourse. By comparing the 11 \nnodes of the global warming discourse and the 16 nodes of the climate change discourse, we found that \nthe two lists shared nine concepts. We found “pollution” and “earth” were unique to the keyword list \nof the global warming discourse, and “economy”, “water”, “china”, “coal”, “solar”, “sustainability”, \nand “food” only occurred on the critical list for the climate change discourse. \n\n**Table 2.**Hashtags that remained on the top 50 list for the climate change or the global warming \ndiscourse from 2009 to 2018. \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html] | Unique | Shared | | # climatechange | china, solar, water, food, economy, coal, sustainability | co2, news, carbon, green, climate, | | # globalwarming | pollution, earth | us, energy, science, environment | \n \n\nFigures 3 and 4 show the overall evolution of critical hashtags’ associations in the 10-year period, \nwhere the nodes in the 10 graphs are located in the same position but the strength of associations varies \nacross longitudinal time. Vector graphics with the label of nodes are provided in the Supplementary \nMaterials. Four themes were identified in each discourse according to the nodes’ associations. To more \nexplicitly demonstrate the relative importance of each cluster in each year, we calculated the sum of \nthe degree centrality of all the nodes belonging to each cluster and their change in centrality over the \n10 years, as shown in Figure 5.",
- "page_start": 9,
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- "text": "[24] M. Strange, I. S. Kristensen, K. S. Thygesen, and K. W. Ja- \ncobsen, “Benchmark density functional theory calculations for \nnanoscale conductance”, J. Chem. Phys. 128(11), 114714 (Mar. \n2008), doi:10.1063/1.2839275. \n\ning theory put into practice: First-principles modeling of trans- \nport in doped silicon wires”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 99(7), 076803 \n(Aug. 2007), doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.99.076803. \n\n[30] M. Ushiro, K. Uno, T. Fujikawa, Y. Sato, K. Tohji, F. Watari, \nW.-J. Chun, Y. Koike, and K. Asakura, “X-ray absorption fine \nstructure (XAFS) analyses of Ni species trapped in graphene \nsheet of carbon nanofibers”, Phys. Rev. B 73(14), 144103 (Apr. \n2006), doi:10.1103/PhysRevB.73.144103. \n[25] J. M. Soler, E. Artacho, J. D. Gale, A. Garcia, J. Junquera, P. Or- \ndej´on, and D. S´anchez-Portal, “The SIESTA method for ab ini- \ntio order-n materials simulation”, J. Phys.: Condens. Matter \n14(11), 2745 (Mar. 2002), doi:10.1088/0953-8984/14/11/302. \n[26] J. S. Griffith, The Theory of Transition-Metal Ions (Cambridge \n\n[31] C. Gomez-Navarro, P. J. de Pablo, J. Gomez-Herrero, B. Biel, \nF. J. Garcia-Vidal, A. Rubio, and F. Flores, “Tuning the con- \nductance of single-walled carbon nanotubes by ion irradiation \nin the Anderson localization regime”, Nature Materials 4, 534 \n(Jun. 2005), doi:10.1038/nmat1414. \n\nUniversity Press, London, 1961). \n[27] P. Atkins and J. de Paula, Physical Chemistry, 8th ed. (Oxford \nUniversity Press, London, 2006). \n[28] D. Lide, Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 87th ed. (CRC- \nPress, 2006–2007). \n[29] T. Markussen, R. Rurali, A.-P. Jauho, and M. Brandbyge, “Scal-",
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- "references": {
- "source_file": "1001.2648.pdf",
- "query": "What is the source of inaccuracy of the MSA3 model at high ionic concentrations ?",
- "target_page": 3,
- "target_passage": "At high concentration (about 1 mol l−1), the MSA3 overestimates the free energy",
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- "text": "4 \n\nof the BIMSA3 appears to be negligible compared to the \n1. The \nreference term for concentrations less than 1 mol l− \nperturbation can then be omitted to obtain a fully ana- \nlytical theory, determined by the hard sphere diameters \nand the pair fraction given by LPT; with the free energy \nand the RDF given in terms of the BIMSA and MSA so- \nlutions, as described above. While the procedure we have \nfollowed uses two different approximations for the refer- \nence and perturbation terms (MSA vs BIMSA), these are \nknown to be accurate for the systems under consideration \nand do not appear to be inconsistent with each other. \n\nTo conclude, we have combined MD simulations with \nLPT to construct simple models of electrolyte solutions \nwhich account for the molecular nature of the solvent. \nThe final result is fully analytical and it yields the ther- \nmodynamic and structural properties of the solution, in \nagreement with the original molecular description. The \nmethodology can in principle be adapted to any molecu- \nlar description of the system (MD simulations involving \ninteraction potentials accounting for polarization effects \nor Car-Parrinello MD simulations for example) as long \nas the ion-ion RDF are known. It can also be generalized \nto study interfaces. The method appears to be a promis- \ning approach toward the description of the specific effects \nof ions, especially for complex systems whose modeling \nrequires an analytic solution. \n\n8 \n\nFIG. 5: (Color online) RDF obtained from MC simulations \n(diamond), BIMSA3 (solid line), and MSA-fit (dot dashed) \nat two concentrations. \n\nThe RDF obtained within BIMSA3 are compared with \nthe MC and MSA-fit results in Fig. 5. Our BIMSA3 \nmodel accounts for the strong molecular peak of the CIP \nand provides the correct distances of minimal approach; \nwhereas the naive MSA-fit procedure ignores the former \nand gives poor estimates for the latter. At larger sep- \narations, the BIMSA3 results do not reproduce the os- \ncillations observed in the MC simulations, but the cor- \nresponding energy oscillations in the effective potentials \nIn addition, the perturbation term \nare less than kBT . \n\n[1] W. G. McMillan and J. E. Mayer, J. Chem. Phys. 13, [12] D. Horinek and R. R. Netz, Phys. Rev. Lett. 99, 226104 \n276 (1945). (2007). \n\n[2] J. M. G. Barthel, H. Krienke, and W. Kunz, Physical \nChemistry of Electrolyte Solutions (Springer, 1998). \n[3] L. Blum, in Theoretical Chemistry: Advances and Per- \nspectives, edited by H. Eyring and D. Henderson (Aca- \ndemic Press, 1980), vol. 5, pp. 1–66. \n\n[13] M. Lund, P. Jungwirth, and C. E. Woodward, Phys. Rev. \nLett. 100, 258105 (2008). \n\n[14] S. Van Damme et al., J. Phys. Chem. B 113, 3105 (2009). \n[15] J.-P. Hansen and I. R. McDonald, Theory of Simple Liq- \n\nuids (Academic Press, 1986). \n\n[4] L. Blum and O. Bernard, J. Stat. Phys. 79, 569 (1995). \n[5] J.-F. Dufrˆeche et al., J. Phys. Chem. B 109, 9873 (2005). \n[6] P. Jungwirth and D. J. Tobias, Chem. Rev. 106, 1259 \n\n[16] J. C. Rasaiah and R. M. Lynden-Bell, Philos. Trans. R. \nSoc. London, Ser. A 359, 1545 (2001). \n[17] A. P. Lyubartsev and S. Marcelja, Phys. Rev. E 65, \n(2006). 041202 (2002). \n[7] W. Kunz, P. LoNostro, and B. W. Ninham, Curr. Opin. \nColloid Interface Sci. 9, 1 (2004). \n[8] B. Hess, C. Holm, and N. van der Vegt, Phys. Rev. Lett. \n96, 147801 (2006). \n\n[18] V. M. M. Lobo, Electrolyte Solutions, Data on Thermo- \ndynamic and Transport Properties, vol. I-II (Coimbra Ed- \nitora, Lisbon, Portugal, 1984). \n[19] G. Ciccotti, P. Turq, and F. Lantelme, Chem. Phys. 88, \n[9] I. Kalcher and J. Dzubiella, J. Chem. Phys. 130, 134507 333 (1984). \n(2009). [20] J.-F. Dufrˆeche, T. O. White, and J.-P. Hansen, Mol. \n[10] S. Gavryushov and P. Linse, J. Phys. Chem. B 110, Phys. 101, 1741 (2003). \n10878 (2006) [21] The average contact distance between a symmetric \n[11] A. P. Lyubartsev and A. Laaksonen, Phys. Rev. E 52, dumbbell and an infinite plane at β = 0. \n3730 (1995).",
- "page_start": 3,
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- "text": "-0.5 \n) \n1 \n- \nPair Fraction \nL \n\n. \nl \no \nm \n-1 \n( \n0.2 \nx \ne \nv \nf \nβ \n0.1 \n\n-1.5 \n0 1 0.5 \n\n3 \n\n2 \n\n1 \n\n0 \n\n(b) \n3 \n\n2 \n\n1 \n\n0 \n\n4 8 6 10 \nr (Å) \n\nFIG. 3: Effective pair potentials derived for MSA3 and \nBIMSA3. (a) Cation anion (dashed line: without taking the \npair into account), (b) pair cation, (c) pair anion, and (d) pair \npair. The internal potential of the pair β eVint(r) is set equal \nto βV eff ij (r) for distances less than 4 ˚A. \n\n0 0.5 \n1/2 \nc \n\n(Color online) Excess free-energy density βf ex \nv \n\nFIG. 4: \nas \na function of the square root of the concentration √c. (dia- \nmond) MC simulations, (dot dashed) MSA2, (dashed) MSA3, \n(solid) BIMSA3, (dot) DHLL, and (cross) experiments. The \ninset gives the fraction of pairs (MSA3, BIMSA3) as a func- \ntion of √c. \n\ntrapolating the original potential at the barrier separat- \ning pairs from free ions (as shown in Fig. 3). We assume \nthat the interaction potential is averaged over the rota- \ntional degrees of freedom of the CIP and thus pairwise \nadditive. Hereafter, the quantities referring to such a \nthree-component model are written with a tilda symbol. \nThe short-range potentials involving the pair can be de- \nrived, in the infinite dilution limit, from an average of \nthe contributing ion interactions. In Fourier space, \n\n3i (k) = \nV SR \n33 (k) = \nV SR \ne \ne \nwhere \n\n(k), \nw(k/2) \n1i + V SR \nV SR \n2i \n(cid:3) \n(cid:2) \nw(k/2)2 \n22 + 2V SR \n11 + V SR \nV SR \ne \n12 \n(cid:2) \ni = 1, 2 \n(k) \n\n(2a) \n\n(2b) \n(cid:3) \ne \nw(r) is the pair probability distribution \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Table | Patients | Table | 1. | | Parameters | . | Figure | P | | Patients | Patients | Table | Table | | Table | = | Table | Table | |
\n \n\nwe have no additional information, we consider only sym- \nmetric dumbbells. Furthermore, since analytic expres- \nsions for the RDF within BIMSA are not known, we ap- \nproximate the dumbbell as a hard sphere when comput- \ning the perturbation term (this is not necessary for the \nreference term, since an expression for the free energy \nis available). Let \nσc be the diameter of the cation (an- \nion) within the dumbbell, the diameter of the hard sphere \ne \nσc[21]. \nrepresenting this dumbbell is taken to be \nthree- \ne \ncomponent MSA3 and BIMSA3, we obtain results in \nmuch better agreement with the MC simulations, as \nshown in Fig. 4. The diameters obtained for species 1, \n2, and 3 are 3.65, 4.79, and 5.76 ˚A for MSA3 and 3.69, \n4.75 and 6.19 ˚A for BIMSA3. The free ion diameters are \nsimilar for MSA2, MSA3, and BIMSA3. The pair diam- \neter is smaller when modeled as a hard sphere (MSA3) \nthan when modeled as a dumbbell (BIMSA3). At high \n1), the MSA3 overestimates \nconcentration (about 1 mol l− \nthe free energy, because the excluded volume repulsion \nbecomes too important for the pairs to be represented as \nhard spheres. The BIMSA3 model is the closest to the \nMC simulation results. It is worth noting that even at \nthe lowest concentration considered, the fraction of pairs \n(shown in the insert of Fig. 4), although less then 5%, \nhas a non-negligible effect on the thermodynamics of the \nsystem. \n\nσ3 = 4√2 \nπ \nthe Using these two reference \nsystems, \ne \n\nw(k) (1 − δij ) + \nρ3 \nw(k/2) \ng3j \nρj \ng3i + \nρi \nρ3 \ne \ne \ne \ne \n(cid:2) \nw(k/2)]2 \ng33(k) \nρ 2 \n3 [ \ne \ne \ne \ne \ne \ngij(k) \n(k) \ne \n(cid:3) \n\nρi ρj \n\ne \n\nThe excess free-energy density of the original system \nf ex \nv plus a \nβf ex \nv \ncorrection term \nis that of the three component mixture β \n\ne",
- "page_start": 2,
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- "text": "ρi ρj \n\ne \n\nThe excess free-energy density of the original system \nf ex \nv plus a \nβf ex \nv \ncorrection term \nis that of the three component mixture β \n\ne \n\nThis procedure also provides an accurate description of \nthe structure over the whole range of concentrations. A \ndevelopment similar to the one that leads to Eq. (2) de- \nrives the average unpaired RDF from the corresponding \npaired quantities: \n\nβf ex \n\nf ex \nv − \ne \n\nv = β ρ3 ln K0, (4) \n\ne \n\nwhich is due to the change in standard chemical potential \nbetween the two component and three component mod- \nels. It should be noted that the fraction of pairs is now an \nadditional parameter in the minimization scheme, which \nserves to ensure chemical equilibrium. Within this rep- \nresentation, the pair can be modeled as a hard sphere \n(MSA3) or as a dumbbell-like CIP (BIMSA3) [4]. Since \n\nρiρjgij(k) = \n+ (5) \n\n+ \n\ne e e",
- "page_start": 2,
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- "source_file": "1001.2648.pdf"
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- "text": "Models of electrolyte solutions from molecular descriptions: The example of NaCl \nsolutions \n\nJohn Jairo Molina1,2,3,∗ Jean-Fran¸cois Dufrˆeche1,2,3,† Mathieu \nSalanne1,2, Olivier Bernard1,2, Marie Jardat1,2, and Pierre Turq1,2 \n1 UPMC-Universit´e Paris 06, UMR 7195, PECSA, F-75005 Paris, France \n2 CNRS, UMR 7195, PECSA, F-75005 Paris, France \n3 Institut de Chimie S´eparative de Marcoule (ICSM), \nUMR 5257 CEA–CNRS–Universit´e Montpellier 2, Site de Marcoule, \nBˆatiment 426, BP 17171, 30207 Bagnols-sur-C`eze Cedex, France \n\nWe present a method to derive implicit solvent models of electrolyte solutions from all-atom \ndescriptions; providing analytical expressions of the thermodynamic and structural properties of \nthe ions consistent with the underlying explicit solvent representation. Effective potentials between \nions in solution are calculated to perform perturbation theory calculations, in order to derive the \nbest possible description in terms of charged hard spheres. Applying this method to NaCl solutions \nyields excellent agreement with the all-atom model, provided ion association is taken into account. \n\n0 \n1 \n0 \n2 \n\nn \na \nJ \n\n5 \n1 \n\nSince the pioneering works of Debye, H¨uckel, and \nOnsager, electrolyte solutions have been commonly \ndescribed by continuous solvent models, \nfor which \nthe McMillan-Mayer theory [1] provides a rigorous \nstatistical-mechanical foundation. Within that level of \ndescription, simple phenomenological models such as the \nprimitive model (PM), for which the ions are assimi- \nlated to charged hard spheres [2], can lead to explicit \nformulas for the thermodynamic and structural proper- \nties (e.g., with the help of the mean spherical approxima- \ntion (MSA) [3] or the binding MSA (BIMSA) [4]). These \nmodels are the most practical to use [5], since they allow \nfor a direct link between the experimental measurements \nand the microscopic parameters of the system. Never- \ntheless, they ignore the molecular structure of the sol- \nvent. Consequently, they cannot properly account for \nthe complex specific effects of the ions, which appear in \nnumerous biological, chemical, and physical interfacial \nphenomena [6, 7], without further developments. \n\nmolecular dynamics (MD) results. Different approxima- \ntions of the PM are employed for the case of NaCl elec- \ntrolyte solutions: a two component model (MSA2), that \nonly takes free ions into account, and two different three \ncomponent models (MSA3 and BIMSA3), which include \na third species (the contact ion pair). As we proceed \nto show, LPT allows us to select the best simple model \nwhich accurately accounts for the thermodynamics and \nthe physical-chemistry of the system. \n\nThe first stage consists in calculating the McMillan- \nMayer effective ion-ion interaction potentials V eff \nij (r), by \ninverting the radial distribution functions (RDF) gij(r) \nobtained by MD. The simulations were carried out on \na box of 2000 water molecules and 48 NaCl pairs us- \ning the same interaction potentials as in reference [16]. \n1. \nThis setup corresponds to a concentration of 0.64 mol l− \nNPT ensemble sampling at standard pressure and tem- \nperature was enforced, with a time step of 1 fs and a \npressure bath coupling constant of 1 ps. An equilibration \nrun of 0.25 ns was followed by a production run of 0.6 ns \nfor five different initial configurations. The averages of \nthe resulting RDF were then used for the potential inver- \nsion via the HNC closure [15]. These effective potentials \nare assumed to be concentration independent and will be \nused for simulations at all concentrations. \n\n] \nh \np \n- \nm \ne \nh \nc \n. \ns \nc \ni \ns \ny \nh \np \n[ \n\n1 \nv \n8 \n4 \n6 \n2 \n. \n1 \n0 \n0 \n1 \n: \nv \ni \nX \nr \na",
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- "text": "5 \n) \nÅ \n4 \n( \nσ \n3 \n\n0 8 \nr (Å) \n\nFIG. 1: Effective McMillan-Mayer short-range pair potentials \nextracted from explicit solvent simulations using the HNC \nclosure. (a) Cation anion, (b) cation cation, (c) anion anion, \n(d) cation anion RDF obtained from explicit solvent MD and \nimplicit solvent MC simulations. \nFIG. 2: \n(Color online) (a) Osmotic coefficient Φ in the \nMcMillan-Mayer frame of reference. (diamond) MC simula- \ntions, (dot dashed) MSA2, (dot) Debye H¨uckel Limiting law \n(DHLL), (cross) experiments (Ref. [18] with the McMillan- \nMayer to Lewis Randall conversion). (b) Minimization diam- \neters. (dot dashed) MSA2 and (diamond) MSA-fit. \n\npute all ion thermodynamic properties through implicit \nsolvent MC simulations. \n\nThe second stage of our coarse-graining procedure con- \nsists in applying LPT, in order to deduce the best ana- \nlytical model of electrolyte solutions which reproduces \nthis molecular description. The principle of LPT is to \ndescribe the properties of a given system in terms of \nthose of a well known reference system, with the differ- \nence between them treated as a perturbation in the ref- \nerence potential. Assuming pairwise additive potentials, \nVij = V (0) \nij + ∆Vij , a first-order truncated expression for \nthe free energy density of the system βfv is obtained, \n\n1 \n2 \nXi,j \n\nWe first used LPT for a two-component system (Na+ \nand Cl− free ions) within the MSA (model MSA2), for \n1. The mini- \nconcentrations ranging from 0.1 to 2.0 mol l− \nmization leads to almost constant diameters on the whole \nrange of concentration: σ1 = 3.67 ˚A and σ2 = 4.78 ˚A. \nAs shown in Fig. 2, these parameters yield osmotic co- \nefficients close to MC calculations only at very low con- \n1 (experimental values are \ncentration, i.e., c ≤ 0.1 mol l− \ngiven for indicative purposes only, since a perfect model \nwill exactly match the MC results). For molar solutions, \nthe LPT results differ considerably from MC calculations. \nThis discrepancy can easily be understood by comparing \nthe diameters found within the MSA2 calculation with \nthe effective potentials given in Fig. 1. The anion/cation \ncontact distance obtained within the MSA2 calculation \nis 4.2 ˚A, which is in the region of the second minimum of \nthe effective potential and corresponds to the situation \nwhere there is a single layer of water molecules between \nthe ions. The first minimum of the potential, which cor- \nresponds to the contact ion pair (CIP) is thus completely \nignored by the MSA2 calculation. If the MSA diameters \nare directly fitted to reproduce the MC osmotic pres- \nsure, much smaller values are obtained. These MSA-fit \nhydrated diameters, which are compared to the MSA2 \ndiameters in the bottom part of Fig. 2, are averages of \nthe CIP and the solvent-separated ion pair. \n\nwhich depends only on the free-energy density f (0) \nand \nv \nRDF g(0) of the reference fluid, with β = (kBT )− \n1 and \nρi the concentration of species i. The Gibbs-Bogoliubov \ninequality [15] ensures that the right-hand side of Eq. (1) \nis actually a strict upper bound. Once a reference system \nhas been chosen, the expression on the right-hand side of \nEq. (1) must be minimized with respect to the parameters \ndefining the reference. This procedure yields the best \nfirst-order approximation to the free energy of the system \nunder consideration. \n\nFor a system of charged particles in solution, the nat- \nural reference is the PM, defined in terms of the charge \nand diameter (σi) of each species. In this case, the per- \nturbing potentials are just the short-range effective po- \ntentials computed above (∆Vij = V SR \nij ). We use the \nMSA [3] solution to the PM, since it provides analyti- \ncal expressions for both the free energy and the RDF. \nThe perturbation term is evaluated using an exponential \napproximation to the RDF obtained within the MSA, \ng(r) = exp [gMSA(r) − 1], which removes any unphysical \nnegative regions and improves the comparison with HNC \ncalculations.",
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- "text": "To overcome this difficulty, we have explicitly intro- \nduced the CIP in our model (species 3). Straightforward \ncalculations, based on a characteristic-function formal- \nism, allow us to define an equivalent model in which \nthe free ions and the CIP are explicitly taken into ac- \ncount [19, 20]. We apply this formalism by defining a \npair as an anion and a cation at a distance less than \n4 ˚A, which corresponds to the position of the effective \npotential maximum. The interaction between free, like \ncharges in this new system remains unchanged, and the \ncation-anion interactions are easily approximated by ex-",
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- "text": "16 M. Ortolani, P. Calvani and S. Lupi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, B 68, 024504 (2003). \n\n41 T. Valla et al., Phys. Rev. Lett 85, 828(2000). \n42 Kaminski et al., Phys. Rev. B 71, 014517 (2005). \n43 Robert Haslinger and Andrey V. Chubukov, Phys. Rev. B \n\n067002 (2005). \n\n17 A.F. Santander-Syro, R.P.S.M. Lobo, and N. Bontemps, \nPhys. Rev. B 70, 134504(2004), A. F. Santander-Syro, R. \nP. S. M. Lobo, N. Bontemps, Z. Konstantinovic, Z. Z. Li \nand H. Raffy, Europhys. Lett. 62, 568 (2003). \n67, 140504(2003). \n44 C. Castellani, C. DiCastro, and M. Grilli, Phys. Rev. Lett. \n18 P. F. Maldague, Phys. Rev. B 16 2437 (1977); E. H. Kim, \n\n75, 4650 (1995). \n45 Ar. Abanov, A. Chubukov, and J. Schmalian, Adv. Phys. Phys. Rev. B 58 2452 (1998). \n\n19 J. Hirsch, Physica C, 201, 347 (1992) and Ref 4. \n20 for a review see F. Marsiglio, J. Superconductivity and \n52, 119 (2003). \n46 Dessau et al., Phys. Rev. Lett 66, 2160(1991), Norman et \nal, Phys. Rev. Lett. 79, 3506(1997). Novel Magnetism 22, 269 (2009). \n21 F. Marsiglio, E. van Heumen, A. B. Kuzmenko, Phys. Rev. \n47 M.R. Norman and H. Ding, Phys. Rev. B 57, 11089(1998). \n48 C. Timm, D. Manske and K. H. Bennemann, Phys. Rev. B 77 144510 (2008). \nB 66, 094515(2002). \n49 A.V. Chubukov, M.R. Norman, Phys. Rev. B 70, \n\n22 M. R. Norman, A. V. Chubukov, E. van Heumen, A. B. \nKuzmenko, and D. van der Marel, Phys. Rev. B 76, 220509 \n(2007). 174505(2004). \n23 J. E. Hirsch and F. Marsiglio, Physica C 331, 150 (2000) 50 In this respect, our results are consistent with the analysis",
- "page_start": 14,
- "page_end": 14,
- "source_file": "1001.0764.pdf"
- },
- {
- "text": "Finally, there is a third essential element that determines the \naccuracy of the inference: precision control. In predictive cod- \ning, the influence of prediction errors on inference is weighted \nby their precision, i.e. inverse variance (pink triangles in Fig. 1). \nThis weighting would ensure that very reliable sensations have \nmore impact on inference than unreliable sensations. However, \nprecision (like all other variables) needs to be estimated, but this \nmight be incorrect. An incorrect setting of precisions has been \nassociated with various psychopathological conditions, such as \npsychosis (Adams et al. 2013), eating disorders (Barca and Pezzulo \n2020), panic disorders (Maisto et al. 2021), symptom perception \n(Pezzulo et al. 2019), depression (Barrett et al. 2016), and many \nothers (Khalsa et al. 2018, Paulus et al. 2019). Intuitively, assign- \ning excessively high weight to noisy sensations yields an incorrect These simple examples of Bayesian inference illustrate two \nthings. First, sensory observations that are unpredictable given",
- "page_start": 5,
- "page_end": 5,
- "source_file": "pubmed1.pdf"
- },
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- "text": "[24] M. Strange, I. S. Kristensen, K. S. Thygesen, and K. W. Ja- \ncobsen, “Benchmark density functional theory calculations for \nnanoscale conductance”, J. Chem. Phys. 128(11), 114714 (Mar. \n2008), doi:10.1063/1.2839275. \n\ning theory put into practice: First-principles modeling of trans- \nport in doped silicon wires”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 99(7), 076803 \n(Aug. 2007), doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.99.076803. \n\n[30] M. Ushiro, K. Uno, T. Fujikawa, Y. Sato, K. Tohji, F. Watari, \nW.-J. Chun, Y. Koike, and K. Asakura, “X-ray absorption fine \nstructure (XAFS) analyses of Ni species trapped in graphene \nsheet of carbon nanofibers”, Phys. Rev. B 73(14), 144103 (Apr. \n2006), doi:10.1103/PhysRevB.73.144103. \n[25] J. M. Soler, E. Artacho, J. D. Gale, A. Garcia, J. Junquera, P. Or- \ndej´on, and D. S´anchez-Portal, “The SIESTA method for ab ini- \ntio order-n materials simulation”, J. Phys.: Condens. Matter \n14(11), 2745 (Mar. 2002), doi:10.1088/0953-8984/14/11/302. \n[26] J. S. Griffith, The Theory of Transition-Metal Ions (Cambridge \n\n[31] C. Gomez-Navarro, P. J. de Pablo, J. Gomez-Herrero, B. Biel, \nF. J. Garcia-Vidal, A. Rubio, and F. Flores, “Tuning the con- \nductance of single-walled carbon nanotubes by ion irradiation \nin the Anderson localization regime”, Nature Materials 4, 534 \n(Jun. 2005), doi:10.1038/nmat1414. \n\nUniversity Press, London, 1961). \n[27] P. Atkins and J. de Paula, Physical Chemistry, 8th ed. (Oxford \nUniversity Press, London, 2006). \n[28] D. Lide, Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 87th ed. (CRC- \nPress, 2006–2007). \n[29] T. Markussen, R. Rurali, A.-P. Jauho, and M. Brandbyge, “Scal-",
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- "page_end": 4,
- "source_file": "1001.2538.pdf"
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- "text": "10 \n\nout first deriving the normal state self-energy microscop- \nically (this is what we will do in the next section). The \nresults of the calculations for the modified MFLI model \nare presented in Figs. 15 and 16. We clearly see that the \nbehavior is now different and ∆WK < 0 for all Γ. This \nis the same behavior as we previously found in BCSI \nand EB models. So we argue that the ‘unconventional’ \nbehavior exhibited by the original MFLI model is most \nlikely the manifestation of a particular modeling incon- \nsistency. Still, Ref. 30 made a valid point that the fact \nthat quasiparticles behave more close to free fermions in \na SCS than in a NS, and this effect tends to reverse the \nsigns of ∆WK and of the kinetic energy 43. It just hap- \npens that in a modified MFLI model the optical integral \nis still larger in the NS. \n\nWe now turn to a more microscopic model- the CB \nmodel. The model describes fermions interacting by ex- \nchanging soft, overdamped collective bosons in a partic- \nular, near-critical, spin or charge channel31,44,45. This \ninteraction is responsible for the normal state self-energy \nand also gives rise to a superconductivity. A peculiar \nfeature of the CB model is that the propagator of a col- \nlective boson changes below Tc because this boson is not \nan independent degree of freedom (as in EB model) but \nis made out of low-energy fermions which are affected by \nsuperconductivity32. \n\n0 \n\nFIG. 15: Top – σ(ω) in the NS and the SCS in the ‘corrected’ \nMFLI model with the feedback from SC on the quasiparticle \n√−ω2+∆2 . In the SCS σ \ndamping: iΓ term transforms into \nnow begins at Ω = 2∆. The parameters are same as in Fig. \n10. Bottom – the behavior of Kubo sum with Γ. Observe \nthat W (ωc) in the NS is larger than in the SCS. \n\nΓ \n\n) \n10 \nc \nω \n( \n\nS \nN \nW \n− \n) \nc \n0 ω \n( \n\nC \nS \nW \n∆ W \nK \n\n−10 \n0.2 \n0.4 \nω \n in eV \nc \n0.6 0.8 \n\nFIG. 16: Evolution of the difference of the optical integrals \nbetween the SCS and the NS with the upper cut-off ωc for \nthe “corrected” MFLI model. Now ∆W (ωc) is negative above \nsome frequency. Parameters are same as in the Fig 15. \n\nThe most relevant point for our discussion is that this \nmodel contains the physics which we identified above as \na source of a potential sign change of ∆WK . Namely, \nat strong coupling the fermionic self-energy in the NS \nis large because there exists strong scattering between \nlow-energy fermions mediated by low-energy collective \nbosons. In the SCS, the density of low-energy fermions \ndrops and a continuum collective excitations becomes \ngaped. Both effects reduce fermionic damping and lead \nto the increase of WK in a SCS. If this increase exceeds a \nconventional loss of WK due to a gap opening, the total \n∆WK may become positive. \n\nThe CB model has been applied numerous times to the \ncuprates, most often under the assumption that near- \ncritical collective excitations are spin fluctuations with \nmomenta near Q = (π, π). This version of a CB bo- \nson is commonly known as a spin-fermion model. This \nmodel yields dx2 \ny2 superconductivity and explains in a \nquantitative way a number of measured electronic fea- \ntures of the cuprates, in particular the near-absence of \nthe quasiparticle peak in the NS of optimally doped and \nunderdoped cuprates39 and the peak-dip-hump structure \nin the ARPES profile in the SCS31,32,46,47. In our analy- \nsis we assume that a CB is a spin fluctuation. \n\n− \n\nmodel, where WK is larger in the NS for all Γ (see Fig. \nIn other words, the original MFLI model does not \n4). \nhave the BCSI theory as its limiting case. \n\nWe modified the MFLI model is a minimal way by \nΓ \nchanging the damping term in a SCS to \nω2+∆2 to be \nconsistent with BCSI model. We still use Eq. (18) for \nthe MFL term simply because this term was introduced \nin the NS on phenomenological grounds and there is no \nway to guess how it gets modified in the SCS state with- \n\n√ \n−",
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- "query": "In the health regulation regarding coronavirus, what is considered a \"device\" ?",
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- "target_passage": "means an in vitro diagnostic medical device within the meaning given in regulation 2(1) of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002",
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- "text": "(2) The coronavirus exception applies where it is not reasonably practicable for the local \nauthority to meet the requirement specified in regulation 11(2)(a) for a reason relating to the \nincidence or transmission of coronavirus.”. \n\n**Amendment of the Special Educational Needs and Disability (Detained Persons) Regulations**\n**2015**\n\n**18.**The Special Educational Needs and Disability (Detained Persons) Regulations 2015(**a**) are \n\namended as follows. \n\n**19.**In regulation 2(1) (interpretation), at the appropriate place insert— \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Therapeutic and the participants with to expression | | 2A —( 1 ) Where the consuctive exception applies, any requirement in any of the regulations specified in paragraph ( 3 ) for action to be takes within a specified period of time or by a certain day is to be read instead as a requirement for such ac | | ( 2 ) The coronavimus exception apples where it is not reasonably practicable for a person to meet a requirement referred to in paragraph ( 1 ) for a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of coronavirus. | | ( 3 ) The following regulations are specified for the purposes of paragraphs ( 1 ) and ( 2 )— | | ( a ) regulation 15 ( 1 ) and ( 4 ) ( needs assessments which are not completed ); | | ( b ) regulation 16 ( 2 ), ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) ( transfer of a kept EHC plan ); | | ( c ) regulation I7 ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) ( restriction on disclosure of EHC plans ); | | ( d ) regulation 19 ( requirement to consider mediation ); | | ( e ) regulation 20 ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) ( where the appropriate person does not wish to or fails to pursue mediation ); | | ( f ) regulation 21 ( mediation ); | | ( g ) regulation 24 ( 1 ) and ( 3 ) ( mediation certificate under section 55 ( 5 ) of the Act ); | | ( h ) regulation 27 ( 3 ) ( steps to be taken by a home authority ); | | ( i ) regulation 29 ( 2 ) and ( 6 ) ( compliance with the orders of the First - tier Tribunal ); and | | ( j ) regulation 30 ( 3 ) and ( 6 ) ( unopposed appeals ).*. | | 21. In regulation 4 ( determination whether or not special educational provision may be necessary ), after paragraph ( 2 ) insert — | | “( 3 ) The local authority need not comply with the time limit referred to in paragraph ( 1 ) if it is impractical to do so because of a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of coronavirus.” | | 22. In regulation 5 ( 4 ) ( decision whether or not to conduct a detained person ’ s EHC needs assessment )— | | ( a ) at the end of sub - paragraph ( b ) omit “ or ”; and | | ( b ) at the end of sub - paragraph ( c ) insert — | | “, or | | ( d ) of a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of coronavirus *. | |
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- "text": "time or by a certain day is to be read instead as a requirement for such action to be taken as \nsoon as reasonably practicable. \n\n(2) The coronavirus exception applies where it is not reasonably practicable for a person \nto meet a requirement referred to in paragraph (1) for a reason relating to the incidence or \ntransmission of coronavirus. \n\n(3) The following regulations are specified for the purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2)— \n\n(a) regulation 15(2) (transfer of EHC plans) (in relation to the second reference to 15 \nworking days), (4), (5), (7) (in relation to the second reference to 15 working days) \nand (8); \n\n(b) regulation 16(2) and (3) (change of responsible commissioning body); \n\n(c) regulation 20(9) and (10) (review where the child or young person attends a school \n\nor other institution); \n\n(d) regulation 21(7), (8) and (9) (review of EHC plan where the child or young person \n\ndoes not attend a school or other institution); \n\n(e) regulation 25(1) (notification of decision whether it is necessary to re-assess \n\neducational, health care and social care provision); \n\n(f) regulation 27(4) (amending or replacing an EHC plan following a re-assessment); \n\n(g) regulation 33 (requirement to consider mediation); \n\n(h) regulation 34(1) and (2) (where a parent or young person does not wish to or fails \n\nto pursue mediation); \n\n(i) regulation 35(2), (3) and (4) (mediation – health care issues); \n\n(j) regulation 36(2) (mediation - no health care issues); \n\n(k) regulation 39(1) and (3) (mediation certificate under section 55(5)); \n\n(l) regulation 42(3) and (4) (steps to be taken by a local authority); \n\n(m) regulation 44(2)(d), (e), (f) and (h) (compliance with the orders of the First-tier \n\nTribunal); \n\n(n) regulation 45(4), (5) and (6A) (unopposed appeals); \n\n(o) regulation 47 (disclosure of EHC plans in relation to higher education); and \n\n(p) regulation 56(3) (publication of comments on the local offer).”. \n\n**6.**In regulation 4 (determination whether or not special educational provision may be \n\nnecessary), after paragraph (2) insert— \n\n“(3) The local authority need not comply with the time limit referred to in paragraph (1) if \nit is impractical to do so because of a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of \ncoronavirus.”. \n\n**7.**In regulation 5(4) (decision whether or not to conduct an EHC needs assessment)— \n\n(a) at the end of sub-paragraph (c) omit “or”; and \n(b) at the end of sub-paragraph (d) insert— \n\n“; or \n\n(e) of a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of coronavirus”. \n\n**8.**In regulation 8(2) (duty to co-operate in EHC needs assessments)— \n\n(a) at the end of sub-paragraph (b) omit “or”; and \n(b) at the end of sub-paragraph (c) insert— \n\n“; or \n\n(d) of a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of coronavirus”. \n\n**9.**In regulation 10(4) (decision not to secure an EHC plan)— \n\n2",
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- "text": "The Secretary of State makes the following Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by \nsections 45B, 45F(2) and 45P(2) of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984(**a**). \n\nPART 1 \n\nIntroductory \n\n**Citation, commencement, extent and application**\n\n**1.**—(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International \n\nTravel and Operator Liability) (England) Regulations 2021. \n\n(2) These Regulations come into force at 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021. \n(3) These Regulations extend to England and Wales and apply in relation to England only. \n\n**Interpretation and introduction of Schedules 1 to 4**\n\n**2.**—(1) In these Regulations— \n\n“category 1 arrival” means person who has arrived in England from a category 1 country or \nterritory, and has not been in a category 2 country or territory or a category 3 country or \nterritory in the period beginning with the 10th day before the date of their arrival in England; \n\n“category 1 country or territory” means a country or territory, or part of a country or territory, \nspecified in Schedule 1(**b**); \n\n“category 2 country or territory” means a country or territory or part of a country or territory \nspecified in Schedule 2(**c**); \n\n“category 3 country or territory” means a country or territory or part of a country or territory \nspecified in Schedule 3(**d**); \n\n“child” means a person under the age of 18; \n\n“the common travel area” has the meaning given in section 1(3) of the Immigration Act \n1971(**e**); \n\n“coronavirus” means severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2); \n\n“coronavirus disease” means COVID-19 (the official designation of the disease which can be \ncaused by coronavirus); \n\n“designated port” means a port designated for the purposes of Schedule 11; \n\n“device” means an in vitro diagnostic medical device within the meaning given in regulation \n2(1) of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002(**f**); \n\n“disability” has the meaning given in the Equality Act 2010(**g**) (see section 6 of, and Schedule \n1 to, that Act); \n\n“immigration officer” means a person appointed by the Secretary of State as an immigration \nofficer under paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971(**h**); \n\n“managed self-isolation package” has the meaning given in paragraph 8 of Schedule 11; \n\n“operator” except in regulation 18, means an operator of a relevant service; \n\n(**a**) 1984 c. 22. Part 2A was inserted by section 129 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (c. 14). \n(**b**) Category 1 countries and territories are referred to colloquially and in guidance as “Green List” countries and territories. \n(**c**) Category 2 countries and territories are referred to colloquially and in guidance as “Amber List” countries and territories. \n(**d**) Category 3 countries and territories are referred to colloquially and in guidance as “Red List” countries and territories. \n(**e**) 1971 c. 77; section 1(3) provides that the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland \nare collectively referred to in that Act as “the common travel area”. \n\n(**f**) S.I. 2002/618. \n(**g**) 2010 c. 15. \n(**h**) Paragraph 1 was amended by paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to the Health Protection Agency Act 2004 (c. 17), and by S.I. \n1993/1813.",
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- "text": "**23.**In regulation 8(2) (duty to co-operate in a detained person’s EHC needs assessment), at the \n\nend of sub-paragraph (d) insert— \n\n“; or \n\n(e) of a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of coronavirus”. \n\n**24.**In regulation 10(4) (decision not to secure an EHC plan)— \n\n(a) at the end of sub-paragraph (b) omit “or”; and \n(b) at the end of sub-paragraph (c) insert— \n\n“; or \n\n(d) of a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of coronavirus”. \n\n**25.**In regulation 13(3) (timescales for EHC plans), for “(c)” substitute “(d)”. \n\n**26.**In regulation 29 (compliance with the orders of the First-tier Tribunal)— \n\n(a) after paragraph (6) insert— \n\n“(6A) The home authority need not comply with the time limits specified in paragraph (3) \nif it is impractical to do so because the circumstances referred to in regulation 10(4)(d) \napply.”. \n\n(b) in paragraph (7)(c) after “10(4)(a)” insert “or (d)”. \n\n**27.**In regulation 30(7)(c) (unopposed appeals), after “10(4)(a)” insert “or (d)”. \n\n**Amendment of the Special Educational Needs and Disability (First-tier Tribunal**\n**Recommendations Power) Regulations 2017**\n\n**28.**The Special Educational Needs and Disability (First-tier Tribunal Recommendations Power) \n\nRegulations 2017(**a**) are amended as follows. \n\n**29.**In regulation 2 (interpretation), at the appropriate place insert— \n\n““coronavirus” means severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2); \n”. \n\n**30.**After regulation 2 (interpretation) insert— \n\n“**Relaxation of time periods due to coronavirus exception**\n\n**2A.**—(1) Where the coronavirus exception applies, any requirement in any of the \nregulations specified in paragraph (3) for action to be taken within a specified period of \ntime or by a certain day is to be read instead as a requirement for such action to be taken as \nsoon as reasonably practicable. \n\n(2) The coronavirus exception applies where it is not reasonably practicable for a person \nto meet a requirement referred to in paragraph (1) for a reason relating to the incidence or \ntransmission of coronavirus. \n\n(3) The following regulations are specified for the purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2)— \n\n(a) regulation 6(3) and (6) (responding to health care recommendations); and \n\n(b) regulation 7(1) and (4) (responding to social care recommendations).”.",
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- "text": "United Kingdom and, if so— \n(i) the location at which they will depart from in the United Kingdom, \n(ii) their final destination country or territory, \n(iii) the operator they are travelling with or through which their booking was made for \n\ntheir onward journey, \n\n(iv) the seat number for their onward journey, \n(v) the flight number or vessel name for their onward journey, \n(vi) the coach number for their onward journey. \n\n**3.**Where the passenger is travelling with a child for whom they have responsibility— \n\n(a) the full name and date of birth of that child; \n(b) the relationship of the passenger to that child. \n\n**4.**Where the passenger is a person required by regulation 9(2) to self-isolate, and intends to \n\nundertake a test in accordance with Schedule 10 (optional tests)— \n\n(a) the name of the test provider; \n(b) the test reference number provided to them by the test provider in accordance with \nparagraph 4(d) of that Schedule. \n\n**5.**Where regulation 6 (requirement to book and undertake tests) requires a testing package— \n\n(a) the name of the test provider; \n(b) the test reference number provided to them by the test provider in accordance with \nparagraph 10(5) of Schedule 8. \n\nSCHEDULE 7 Regulation 4 \n\nTesting before arrival in England \n\n**Compliant tests**\n\n**1.**A test complies with this paragraph if— \n\n(a) it is a test for the detection of coronavirus undertaken using a device which the \n\nmanufacturer states has—",
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- "text": "**Day 2 tests: general test requirements**\n\n**6.**—(1) For the purposes of regulation 6(12)(a), a day 2 test complies with this paragraph \n\nwhere— \n\n(a) it is a test provided by a public provider; or \n(b) it is a test provided by a private provider— \n\n(i) in respect of— \n\n(aa) a non-Schedule 11 passenger, on or after 1st March 2021; \n(bb) a Schedule 11 passenger, on 1st or 2nd March 2021, \n\n(ii) where the test complies with sub-paragraph (2), and \n(iii) where the private provider complies with paragraph 7. \n\n(2) A test complies with this sub-paragraph where— \n\n(a) it is a semi-quantitative test for the detection of coronavirus which— \n\n(i) targets a minimum of two distinguishable SARS-CoV-2 genes other than the S gene \nand performance reference controls, \n\n(ii) includes routine in silico assurance against every variant of concern, and \n(iii) produces a test solution that provides extracted nucleic acid that is suitable for whole \n\ngenome sequencing using a specified method; \n\n(b) it is, in relation to a Schedule 11 passenger, a test that can be self-administered; \n(c) the manufacturer of any device used for the purposes of the test states that the device— \n\n(i) uses an established molecular detection method, \n(ii) has a specificity and a sensitivity greater than 99% (with a 95% two-sided \nconfidence interval entirely above 97%), \n\n(iii) has a limit of detection of less than or equal to 1000 SARS-CoV-2 copies per \n\nmillilitre, and \n\n(iv) is suitable for identifying every variant of concern; and \n\n(d) any device used for the purposes of the test— \n\n(i) can be put into service in accordance with Part 4 of the Medical Devices Regulations \n\n2002, other than solely by virtue of regulation 39(2) of those Regulations, and \n(ii) has been validated no more than 18 months before the test is administered or \n\nprovided to P. \n\n(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)— \n\n(a) “specified method” means a targeted sequence method specific to SARS-CoV-2 or an \n\nequivalent— \n(i) amplicon method, or \n(ii) sequence bait capture method; \n\n(b) “validated”, in relation to a device, has the meaning given by paragraph 2(2) of Schedule \n\n10; \n\n(c) “variant of concern” means a variant of SARS-CoV-2 identified in a designation made by \nthe Secretary of State for the purposes of this paragraph and published in a manner as \nappears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate.",
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- "text": "(3) In regulation 4ZA— \n\n(a) in the heading, for “the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) \nRegulations 2020” substitute “the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel \nand Operator Liability) (England) Regulations 2021”; \n\n(b) in paragraph (1)(a), for “regulation 3B of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, \nInternational Travel) (England) Regulations 2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”)” substitute \n“regulation 6 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator \nLiability) (England) Regulations 2021 (“the International Travel and Operator Liability \nRegulations”)”; \n\n(c) in paragraph (1)(c), for “paragraph 7(1)(f) of Schedule 2C to the 2020 Regulations” \nsubstitute “paragraph 7(1)(g) of Schedule 11 to the International Travel and Operator \nLiability Regulations”; \n\n(d) in paragraph (3), for “paragraph 7(1)(f) of Schedule 2C to the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “paragraph \n7(1)(g) of Schedule 11 to the International Travel and Operator Liability Regulations”. \n\n**2.**—(1) The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Self-Isolation) (England) Regulations \n2020(**a**) are amended as follows. \n\n(2) In regulation 2D(1)(c), for “regulation 4 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International \nTravel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “regulation 9 of the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator Liability) (England) Regulations 2021”. \n\n(3) In regulation 6(1)— \n\n(a) in the definitions of “designated place”, “isolation requirements” and “self-isolating \nworker”, for “regulation 4” substitute “regulation 9”; \n\n(b) in the definition of “International Travel Regulations”, for “the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “the Health \nProtection (Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator Liability) (England) \nRegulations 2021”. \n\nSCHEDULE 16 Regulation 26(3) \n\nTransitional provision \n\n**1.**Passenger information provided before 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021 by a person pursuant to \nregulation 3 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations \n2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”) in advance of arrival in England is treated as passenger information \nprovided for the purposes of these Regulations where the person arrives in England on or after that \ndate. \n\n**2.**Confirmation given by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office that a person is \nnot required to comply with regulation 3B of the 2020 Regulations is treated as confirmation that \nthe person is not required to comply with regulation 6 of these Regulations where the person \narrives in England on or after 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021. \n\n**3.**A designation by the Secretary of State of a person as an authorised person under regulation \n5(7) of the 2020 Regulations has effect as a designation of that person as an authorised person \nunder of regulation 11(11)(c) of these Regulations. \n\n**4.**Regulation 5A of the 2020 Regulations continues to have effect in relation to a constable who \nexercises the powers in that regulation in relation to a person who arrived in England before 4.00 \na.m. on 17th May 2021.",
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- "text": "**33.**—(1) Any of the following— \n(a) a person (“P”) who— \n\n(i) before travelling to the United Kingdom has made arrangements with a provider in \nthe United Kingdom to receive healthcare (or, where P is a child, on whose behalf \nsuch arrangements have been made), \n\n(ii) is in possession of written confirmation of the arrangements from the provider, \n(iii) has travelled to the United Kingdom to receive that healthcare, and \n(iv) is attending a place to receive that healthcare or is travelling directly between that \nplace and the place where they are self-isolating; \n\n(b) a person who— \n\n(i) is accompanying P for the purpose of providing necessary care or support to P in the \n\ncircumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(a)(iv), or \n\n(ii) is travelling, for the purpose of so accompanying P, directly between the place where \nthey are self-isolating and either of the places referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(a)(iv), \n\nwhere that person has travelled to the United Kingdom for that purpose and is in \npossession of the confirmation referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(a)(ii) or a copy of it; \n(c) an accompanying child who is accompanying P or, where P is a child, is accompanying a \n\nperson referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(b); \n\n(d) a live donor who is attending a place for the purpose referred to in the definition of “live \ndonor” or is travelling directly between that place and the place where they are self- \nisolating. \n\n(2) For the purposes of this paragraph— \n\n(a) “accompanying child”, in relation to P, means a child who has arrived in England with P \nand for whom P has responsibility, or where P is a child, a child who has arrived in \nEngland with the person referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(b) and for whom that person has \nresponsibility; \n\n(b) “healthcare” means all forms of healthcare provided for individuals, whether relating to \n\nmental or physical health, including healthcare in connection with giving birth; \n\n(c) “live donor” means a person who— \n\n(i) has travelled to the United Kingdom for the purpose of donation of material which \nconsists of or includes their human cells pursuant to arrangements made with a \nprovider in the United Kingdom before travelling to the United Kingdom, and which \nare to be used by the provider for the purpose of providing healthcare, and \n(ii) is in possession of written confirmation of the arrangements from the provider; \n\n(d) “provider” means a provider of healthcare; \n(e) references to a place where a person is self-isolating are to a place where they are \nrequired to self-isolate, or permitted to be at, by virtue of regulation 9. \n\n**34.**—(1) A person who has travelled to the United Kingdom for the purpose of transporting \nmaterial which consists of, or includes, human cells or blood and which is to be used for the \nprovision of healthcare by a provider. \n\n(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)— \n(a) “blood” includes blood components; \n(b) “healthcare” and “provider” have the meanings given in paragraph 33(2). \n\n**35.**A person who is an “inspector” within the meaning given in regulation 8(1) of the Human \nMedicines Regulations 2012(**a**), or who has been appointed as an inspector under regulation 33 of",
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- "text": "**18.**Guidance issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 2D to the \n2020 Regulations has effect as guidance issued pursuant to paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 9 to these \nRegulations. \n\n**EXPLANATORY NOTE**\n\n*(This note is not part of the Regulations)*\n\nThese Regulations replace the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) \nRegulations 2020 (“the International Travel Regulations”), the Health Protection (Coronavirus, \nPublic Health Information for International Passengers) (England) Regulations 2020 and the \nHealth Protection (Coronavirus, Pre-Departure Testing and Operator Liability) (England) \n(Amendment) Regulations 2021. \n\nThey impose requirements on certain categories of person to provide information upon arrival in \nEngland, to take coronavirus tests before and after arrival and to self-isolate in order to prevent the \nspread of infection or contamination from coronavirus or coronavirus disease. They also impose \nobligations on operators to ensure that passengers receive information and comply with the \nrequirements. \n\nAn impact assessment has not been produced for this instrument. An explanatory memorandum \nhas been published alongside this instrument at www.legislation.gov.uk. \n\n© Crown copyright 2021 \n\nPrinted and published in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited under the authority and superintendence of Jeff James, \nController of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and Queen’s Printer of Acts of Parliament. \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | \n ",
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- "text": "(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(d) and (e), a person or laboratory (as the case may be) \nmeets the relevant requirements for accreditation to a standard where the person who is the \noperator of the laboratory complies with the requirements of regulation 6 of the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, Testing Requirements and Standards) (England) Regulations 2020 as if— \n\n(a) a reference to an applicable test were a reference to a day 2 test; \n(b) a reference to a test provider were a reference to a private provider. \n\n**Day 8 tests: general test requirements**\n\n**8.**—(1) For the purposes of regulation 6(12)(b), a day 8 test complies with this paragraph \n\nwhere— \n\n(a) it is a test provided by a public provider; or \n(b) it is a test provided by a private provider— \n\n(i) in respect of— \n\n(aa) a non-Schedule 11 passenger, on or after 1st March 2021; \n(bb) a Schedule 11 passenger, on 1st or 2nd March 2021, \n\n(ii) where the test complies with sub-paragraph (2), and \n(iii) where the private provider complies with paragraph 9. \n\n(2) A test complies with this sub-paragraph where— \n\n(a) it is a semi-quantitative test for the detection of coronavirus which targets a minimum of \ntwo distinguishable SARS-CoV-2 genes other than the S gene and performance reference \ncontrols; \n\n(b) it is, in relation to a Schedule 11 passenger— \n\n(i) a test which requires laboratory processing, and \n(ii) a test which can be self-administered; \n\n(c) the manufacturer of any device used for the purposes of the test states that the device— \n\n(i) uses an extracted molecular method, \n(ii) has a specificity and a sensitivity greater than 95% (with a 95% two-sided \nconfidence interval entirely above 90%), and \n\n(iii) has a limit of detection of less than or equal to 1000 SARS-CoV-2 copies per \n\nmillilitre; and \n\n(d) any device used for the purposes of the test— \n\n(i) can be put into service in accordance with Part 4 of the Medical Devices Regulations \n\n2002, other than solely by virtue of regulation 39(2) of those Regulations, and \n(ii) has been validated no more than 18 months before the test is administered or \n\nprovided to P. \n\n(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) “validated”, in relation to a device, has the meaning \n\ngiven by paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 10. \n\n**Day 8 tests: private provider requirements**\n\n**9.**—(1) For the purposes of paragraph 8(1)(b)(iii), a private provider complies with this \n\nparagraph where— \n\n(a) they comply with the requirements of paragraph 3(1)(a) and (e) to (h) of Schedule 10 as if \nany reference in those provisions to an appropriate test were a reference to a day 8 test; \n(b) if the provider is a laboratory that conducts diagnostic test evaluation for testing in \naccordance with this Schedule, they have made a declaration to the Department of Health \nand Social Care that they meet the minimum standards for private sector-provided testing \nat https://support-covid-19-testing.dhsc.gov.uk/InternationalTesting; \n\n(c) they have provided the Department of Health and Social Care with a list of all \norganisations that they work with (whether by sub-contract or otherwise) to carry out the \ntesting service or to carry out genomic sequencing, indicating the nature of the service \nthat each organisation is providing and kept that list updated as appropriate; \n\n(d) in relation to a test which requires laboratory processing— \n\n(i) the person responsible for the taking of samples meets the relevant requirements for \naccreditation to ISO standard 15189 or ISO/IEC standard 17025 in respect of the \ntaking of samples, and \n\n(ii) the laboratory used by the test provider for the processing of samples meets the \nrelevant requirements for accreditation to ISO standard 15189 or ISO/IEC standard \n17025 in respect of the processing of samples; \n\n(e) in relation to a point of care test, they meet the relevant requirements for accreditation to \nISO Standard 15189 and ISO standard 22870; \n\n(f)",
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- "references": {
- "source_file": "uksi_20210582_en.pdf",
- "query": "Regarding the regulation of Enforcement of requirement to self-isolate concerning travel and coronavirus, who are considered an \"authorised persons\" ?",
- "target_page": 19,
- "target_passage": "For the purposes of this regulation, “authorised person” means— (a) a constable; (b) for the purposes of paragraphs (2) and (3) only, an immigration officer; or (c) a person designated by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this regulation.",
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- "text": "(4) In this regulation— \n\n“authorised person” means— \n(a) a constable, \n(b) the Civil Aviation Authority, \n(c) the Secretary of State, or \n(d) a person authorised by the Civil Aviation Authority or the Secretary of State under the \nAir Navigation Order 2016(**a**); \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]“ operator ” has the meaning given in article 4 of the Air Navigation Order 2016 ; “ pilot in command ” und “ private aircraff ” have the meanings given in the Air Navigation Order 2016 ( see Schedule 1 to that Order ); “ relevant transport service ”, in relation to an operator, means a transport service provided by or on behalf of that operator ; | “ transport service ” means — | ( a ) a relevant service, | | ( b ) a shuttle service, | ( c ) a service ( other than a relevant service ) which — | | ( i ) is carrying passengers travelling to England from outside the common travel area ( whether for payment or valuable consideration or otherwise ), and | ( ii ) is provided by means of an aircraft ( other than a private aircraft ), or | | ( d ) a flight which — | ( i ) is carrying passengers travelling to England from outside the common travel area ( whether for pasment or valuable consideration or otherwise ), and | | ( ii ) is provided by means of a private aircraft. | PART 5 | | Offences, proceedings and information | Offences and penalties | | I9 —( 1 ) A person (“ P ”) commits an offence where — | ( a ) without reasonable excuse P contravenes a requirement in regulation 3 ( requirement to provide information ); | | ( b ) without reasonable excuse P contraveness a requirement in regulation 4 ( requirement to possess notification of negative test result ); | ( c ) without reasonable excuse P contravenes a requirement in regulation 6 ( requirement to book and undertake tests ); | | ( d ) without reasonable excuse P contravenes a requirement in regulation 7 ( requirement to undertake workforce tests ); | ( e ) without reasonable excuse P contravenes a requirement in regulation 8 ( requirement for offsbore installation workers to take tests ); | | ( f ) P contravenes a requirement in regulation 9 ( requirement to self - isolate ); | ( g ) without reasonable excuse P contraveness a requirement in or imposed under regulation 11 ( enforcement of requirement to self - isolate ) apart from paragraph ( 2 ) of that regulation ; | |
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\n ",
- "page_start": 22,
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- "text": "**16.**—(1) Any person who the relevant Department has certified as meeting the description in \n\nsub-paragraph (a), (b) or (c)— \n\n(a) a Crown servant or government contractor who is required to undertake essential policing \nor essential government work in the United Kingdom within the period during which they \nwould, but for this paragraph, have had to self-isolate in accordance with regulation 9; \n(b) a person returning from conducting essential state business outside of the United \n\nKingdom; \n\n(c) a person returning to the United Kingdom where this is necessary to facilitate the \nfunctioning of a diplomatic mission or consular post of Her Majesty or of a military or \nother official posting on behalf of Her Majesty. \n\n(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)— \n\n(a) “consular post” means any consulate-general, consulate, vice-consulate or consular \n\nagency; \n\n(b) “Crown servant” has the meaning given in section 12(1)(a) to (e) of the Official Secrets \nAct 1989(**a**); \n\n(c) “essential government work” means work which has been designated as such by the \nrelevant Department, and includes, in particular, work related to national security, the \nwork of the National Crime Agency in pursuance of its statutory functions, and work \nrelated to immigration, the coronavirus disease or any other crisis response, but does not \ninclude work of the description in paragraph 2 of this Schedule (essential work related to \nthe United Kingdom border); \n\n(d) “essential policing” means policing which has been designated as such on behalf of the \n\nrelevant chief officer or chief constable; \n\n(e) “essential state business” means activity which has been designated as essential to the \nUnited Kingdom or Her Majesty’s Government by the relevant Department, and includes, \nin particular, bilateral or multilateral discussions with another state or international \norganisation and visits to another state on behalf of the United Kingdom or Her Majesty’s \nGovernment; \n\n(f) “government contractor” has the meaning given in section 12(2) of the Official Secrets \n\nAct 1989. \n\n**17.**—(1) A person returning from undertaking essential or emergency work outside of the \nUnited Kingdom, which has been certified by the relevant Department as necessary to facilitate \nessential government work or essential state business. \n\n(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) “essential government work” and “essential state \n\nbusiness” have the same meaning as in paragraph 16. \n\n**18.**A person designated by the relevant Minister under section 5(3) of the Repatriation of \n\nPrisoners Act 1984(**b**). \n\n**19.**A person responsible for escorting a person sought for extradition pursuant to a warrant \nissued under Part 3 of the Extradition Act 2003(**c**) or sought for extradition pursuant to any other \nextradition arrangements. \n\n**20.**A representative of any territory travelling to the United Kingdom in order to take into \ncustody a person whose surrender has been ordered pursuant to any provision of the Extradition \nAct 2003. \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| ( b ) | 1984 c. 47. | | ( c ) | 2003 c. 41. | \n \n\n39",
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- "text": "(f) \n\nin paragraph 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13(2)(c)(ii), 14, 18, 19, 20 or 27 of Schedule 4 and is— \n(i) ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, P is not required to comply with this \n\nregulation, \n\n(ii) not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, P is not required to comply with this \nregulation while undertaking the work or activity described in the relevant paragraph \nof that Schedule; \n\n(g) in paragraph 10 of Schedule 4, is engaged in work relating to the carriage of passengers \n\nby way of the tunnel system and is— \n(i) ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, P is not required to comply with this \n\nregulation, \n\n(ii) not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, P is not required to comply with this \nregulation while undertaking that work; \n\n(h) in paragraph 13(2)(c)(i) of Schedule 4 (driver of a goods vehicle) and is ordinarily \nresident in the United Kingdom, P is only required to comply with this regulation while \nundertaking the work described in that paragraph; \n\n(i) \n\nin paragraph 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 or 45 of \nSchedule 4, P is not required to comply with this regulation while undertaking the work \nor activity described in the relevant paragraph of that Schedule; \n\n(j) \n\nin any other paragraph of Schedule 4, including paragraph 10 in so far as it relates to \nwork other than the carriage of passengers by way of the tunnel system, P is not required \nto comply with this regulation. \n\n(16) P ceases to be required to comply with this regulation, where P— \n\n(a) has undertaken a test in accordance with Schedule 10; and \n(b) is notified in accordance with paragraph 5(2) of that Schedule that the result of that test is \nnegative, \n\nfrom the time P is so notified. \n\n(17) The full or partial disapplication of the requirement to self-isolate under this regulation that \n\nis provided for in paragraphs (15) and (16) does not apply to person who is both— \n\n(a) described in paragraph (1)(a)(iii) of this regulation; and \n(b) described in paragraph 1(1)(a) to (h) or (k) of Schedule 4. \n\n**Further requirements on arrivals from category 3 countries or territories**\n\n**10.**—(1) This regulation applies to a person (“P”) where P is a Schedule 11 passenger. \n(2) P must remain in isolation from others in accordance with, and otherwise comply with the \n\nrequirements in, Schedule 11. \n\n(3) The address specified by P in the Passenger Locator Form pursuant to paragraph 2(a) of \nSchedule 6 must be the designated accommodation which is part of the managed self-isolation \npackage booked by or on behalf of P. \n\nPART 3 \n\nEnforcement \n\n**Enforcement of requirement to self-isolate**\n\n**11.**—(1) Where an authorised person has reasonable grounds to believe that a person (“P”) has \nleft, or is outside of, the place where P is self-isolating in contravention of regulation 9, Schedule \n8 or Schedule 11, the authorised person may— \n\n(a) direct P to return to the place where P is self-isolating; \n\n(b) where the authorised person is a constable, remove P to the place where P is self- \nisolating; \n\n(c) where the authorised person is a constable and it is not practicable or appropriate in the \ncircumstances to take the action in sub-paragraph (a) or (b), remove P to accommodation \nfacilitated by the Secretary of State for the purposes of P’s self-isolation. \n\n(2) Where an authorised person has reasonable grounds to believe that P is a Schedule 11 \npassenger, an authorised person may do any of the following for the purpose of ensuring that P \ncomplies with the requirements in Schedule 11— \n\n(a) give a direction to P, including a direction— \n\n(i) that P remain in a particular area of a port to await transportation to accommodation \n\ndesignated for the purposes of Schedule 11, \n\n(ii) that P move to a particular place to board transportation designated for the purposes \n\nof Schedule 11,",
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- "text": "designated for the purposes of Schedule 11, \n\n(ii) that P move to a particular place to board transportation designated for the purposes \n\nof Schedule 11, \n\n(iii) that P board transportation designated for the purposes of Schedule 11 to travel to \naccommodation designated for the purposes of Schedule 11, \n\n(iv) that P remain in the place where P is self-isolating; \n\n(b) remove P to accommodation designated for the purposes of Schedule 11. \n\n(3) Where an authorised person has reasonable grounds to believe that P is a Schedule 11 \npassenger and that P has committed an offence under regulation 19(1)(a) or (6), the authorised \nperson may— \n\n(a) require P to produce their passport or travel document for examination; \n(b) detain P for up to three hours; \n(c) search P and any baggage belonging to P or under P’s control, or any vehicle in which P \nhas travelled, for evidence, other than items subject to legal privilege, that relates to the \npossible commission of an offence under regulation 19(6); and \n\n(d) seize and retain any document or article recovered by a search under sub-paragraph (c). \n\n(4) Paragraph (3) does not confer a power— \n\n(a) to detain or search an unaccompanied child; or \n(b) to conduct an intimate search. \n\n(5) Any search under paragraph (3) must be conducted by an authorised person of the same \n\ngender as P. \n\n(6) Paragraphs (1)(b) and (c), (2) and (3) do not apply where P is a person described in \nparagraph 1 of Schedule 4 (diplomats, members of international organisations etc). \n\n(7) An authorised person exercising the power in paragraph (1)(b) or (c), (2)(b) or (3) may use \n\nreasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power. \n\n(8) Where P is a child, and has left or is outside of, the place where they are self-isolating and is \naccompanied by an individual who has responsibility for them— \n\n(a) an authorised person may direct that individual to take P to the place where P is self- \n\nisolating; and \n\n(b) that individual must, so far as reasonably practicable, ensure that P complies with any \n\ndirection given by an authorised person to P. \n\n(9) Where P is a child, and an authorised person has reasonable grounds to believe that P is \nrepeatedly failing to comply with regulation 9 or Schedule 11, the authorised person may direct \nany individual who has responsibility for P to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, that P so \ncomplies. \n\n(10) An authorised person may only exercise a power in paragraph (1), (2), (8) or (9) if the \nauthorised person considers that it is a necessary and proportionate means of ensuring compliance \nwith regulation 9 or Schedule 11.",
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- "text": "(3) In regulation 4ZA— \n\n(a) in the heading, for “the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) \nRegulations 2020” substitute “the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel \nand Operator Liability) (England) Regulations 2021”; \n\n(b) in paragraph (1)(a), for “regulation 3B of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, \nInternational Travel) (England) Regulations 2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”)” substitute \n“regulation 6 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator \nLiability) (England) Regulations 2021 (“the International Travel and Operator Liability \nRegulations”)”; \n\n(c) in paragraph (1)(c), for “paragraph 7(1)(f) of Schedule 2C to the 2020 Regulations” \nsubstitute “paragraph 7(1)(g) of Schedule 11 to the International Travel and Operator \nLiability Regulations”; \n\n(d) in paragraph (3), for “paragraph 7(1)(f) of Schedule 2C to the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “paragraph \n7(1)(g) of Schedule 11 to the International Travel and Operator Liability Regulations”. \n\n**2.**—(1) The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Self-Isolation) (England) Regulations \n2020(**a**) are amended as follows. \n\n(2) In regulation 2D(1)(c), for “regulation 4 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International \nTravel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “regulation 9 of the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator Liability) (England) Regulations 2021”. \n\n(3) In regulation 6(1)— \n\n(a) in the definitions of “designated place”, “isolation requirements” and “self-isolating \nworker”, for “regulation 4” substitute “regulation 9”; \n\n(b) in the definition of “International Travel Regulations”, for “the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “the Health \nProtection (Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator Liability) (England) \nRegulations 2021”. \n\nSCHEDULE 16 Regulation 26(3) \n\nTransitional provision \n\n**1.**Passenger information provided before 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021 by a person pursuant to \nregulation 3 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations \n2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”) in advance of arrival in England is treated as passenger information \nprovided for the purposes of these Regulations where the person arrives in England on or after that \ndate. \n\n**2.**Confirmation given by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office that a person is \nnot required to comply with regulation 3B of the 2020 Regulations is treated as confirmation that \nthe person is not required to comply with regulation 6 of these Regulations where the person \narrives in England on or after 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021. \n\n**3.**A designation by the Secretary of State of a person as an authorised person under regulation \n5(7) of the 2020 Regulations has effect as a designation of that person as an authorised person \nunder of regulation 11(11)(c) of these Regulations. \n\n**4.**Regulation 5A of the 2020 Regulations continues to have effect in relation to a constable who \nexercises the powers in that regulation in relation to a person who arrived in England before 4.00 \na.m. on 17th May 2021.",
- "page_start": 88,
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- "text": "**Prosecutions**\n\n**21.**—(1) Proceedings for an offence under these Regulations, apart from an operator offence, \nmay be brought by the Crown Prosecution Service and any person designated by the Secretary of \nState. \n\n(2) Proceedings for an operator offence may be brought by an authorised person. \n(3) In this regulation— \n\n(a) “authorised person” means— \n\n(i) in relation to passengers arriving by sea, the Secretary of State for Transport, \n(ii) in relation to passengers arriving by air, the Civil Aviation Authority, \n(iii) in relation to passenger arriving by rail, the Office of Rail and Road; \n\n(b) “operator offence” means an offence— \n\n(i) under regulation 19(7), \n(ii) under regulation 19(13), \n(iii) under regulation 19(14) (obstruction) in relation to a function relating to an offence \nunder regulation 19(7), or \n\n(iv) under paragraph 2(1) or 3(1) of Schedule 13. \n\n**Power to use and disclose information**\n\n**22.**—(1) This regulation applies to a person (“A”) who holds information described in paragraph \n(2) (“relevant information”), including where A holds that information as a result of disclosure \nmade in accordance with paragraph (4). \n\n(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) is— \n\n(a) information provided on the Passenger Locator Form; \n(b) DA information received for a purpose described in paragraph (4)(a)(i); \n(c) the result of any test undertaken in accordance with Schedule 10 and any information A \n\nobtained under paragraph 4(b) or (c) of that Schedule; \n\n(d) where a person (“P”) is required to self-isolate under these Regulations— \n\n(i) the details of any such period of self-isolation (including the start and end dates of \n\nthat period and the reason it was imposed), \n\n(ii) a copy of any notice given to P which contains information about the requirement to \nself-isolate, \n\n(iii) information generated where P books, or attempts to book, accommodation as part of \n\na managed self-isolation package, \n\n(iv) the details of any location in which P undertakes any period of managed self- \nisolation (including the name and address of the location), \n\n(v) information relating to P obtained by A in the course of providing accommodation to \nB pursuant to a managed self-isolation package (including P’s room number, the \npersonal details of any of P’s co-habitants, and the details of any absence of P, \nauthorised or otherwise, from the place where P is self-isolating), \n\n(vi) information relating to P obtained by A in the course of providing transport to a \nlocation at which P undertakes, or is due to undertake, any period of managed self- \nisolation, \n\n(vii) information relating to P obtained by A in the course of providing any service in \n\nconnection with a managed self-isolation package;",
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- "text": "United Kingdom and, if so— \n(i) the location at which they will depart from in the United Kingdom, \n(ii) their final destination country or territory, \n(iii) the operator they are travelling with or through which their booking was made for \n\ntheir onward journey, \n\n(iv) the seat number for their onward journey, \n(v) the flight number or vessel name for their onward journey, \n(vi) the coach number for their onward journey. \n\n**3.**Where the passenger is travelling with a child for whom they have responsibility— \n\n(a) the full name and date of birth of that child; \n(b) the relationship of the passenger to that child. \n\n**4.**Where the passenger is a person required by regulation 9(2) to self-isolate, and intends to \n\nundertake a test in accordance with Schedule 10 (optional tests)— \n\n(a) the name of the test provider; \n(b) the test reference number provided to them by the test provider in accordance with \nparagraph 4(d) of that Schedule. \n\n**5.**Where regulation 6 (requirement to book and undertake tests) requires a testing package— \n\n(a) the name of the test provider; \n(b) the test reference number provided to them by the test provider in accordance with \nparagraph 10(5) of Schedule 8. \n\nSCHEDULE 7 Regulation 4 \n\nTesting before arrival in England \n\n**Compliant tests**\n\n**1.**A test complies with this paragraph if— \n\n(a) it is a test for the detection of coronavirus undertaken using a device which the \n\nmanufacturer states has—",
- "page_start": 55,
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- "text": "**5.**A designation by the Secretary of State of a person as a designated officer under regulation \n7(2) of the 2020 Regulations has effect as a designation of that person as a designated officer \nunder regulation 20(9)(c)(i) of these Regulation. \n\n**6.**A designation by the Secretary of State of a person as an authorised person under regulation \n7(10)(c) of the 2020 Regulations has effect as a designation of that person as an authorised person \nunder regulation 20(9)(a)(iii) of these Regulations. \n\n**7.**A designation by the Secretary of State under regulation 8 of the 2020 Regulations as a person \nwho may bring proceedings for an offence has effect as a designation under regulation 21(1) of \nthese Regulations. \n\n**8.**A confirmation from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office or other UK \nGovernment Department that a person is not required to comply with Schedule B1A to the 2020 \nRegulations is treated as confirmation that a person is not required to comply with Schedule 11 of \nthese Regulations where the person arrives in England on or after 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021. \n\n**9.**A booking of a managed self-isolation package made before 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021 \nwhich satisfies the requirements of Schedule B1A to the 2020 Regulations is treated as satisfying \nthe requirements of Schedule 11 to these Regulations where the person to whom the booking \nrelates arrives in England after 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021. \n\n**10.**A designation by the Secretary of State under paragraph 9 of Schedule B1A to the 2020 \nRegulations as a person who may impose a charge under that Schedule has effect as a designation \nunder paragraph 9 of Schedule 11 to these Regulations. \n\n**11.**Authorisation by the Secretary of State under paragraph 13(2)(a) of Schedule B1A to the \n2020 Regulations as a person who may give a permission under that paragraph has effect as \nauthorisation under paragraph 13(2)(a) of Schedule 11 to these Regulations. \n\n**12.**A designation by the Secretary of State of accommodation or transportation under paragraph \n15 of Schedule B1A to the 2020 Regulations has effect as designation of accommodation or \ntransportation, as the case may be, under paragraph 15 of Schedule 11 to these Regulations. \n\n**13.**Confirmation by the Secretary of State that paragraph 18 of Schedule B1A to the 2020 \nRegulations applies to a person is treated as confirmation that paragraph 18 of Schedule 11 to \nthese Regulations applies to that person where the person arrives in England after 4.00 a.m. on \n17th May 2021. \n\n**14.**Confirmation by a sponsor that paragraph 19 of Schedule B1A to the 2020 Regulations \napplies to a person is treated as confirmation that paragraph 19 of Schedule 11 to these \nRegulations applies to that person where the person arrives in England after 4.00 a.m. on 17th \nMay 2021. \n\n**15.**Confirmation by a UK Government Department under paragraph 1(1A)(d) of Schedule 2 to \nthe 2020 Regulations that a person is of the description in that paragraph, is treated as \nconfirmation that the person is of the description in paragraph 1(2)(d) of Schedule 4 to these \nRegulations where the person arrives in England after 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021. \n\n**16.**Certification by a UK Government Department under paragraphs 13 or 13A of Schedule 2 to \nthe 2020 Regulations that a person is of the description or is undertaking work of the description \nin those paragraphs, is treated as certification that the person is of the description or is undertaking \nwork of the description in paragraphs 16 or 17 of Schedule 4 to these Regulations where the \nperson concerned arrives in England after 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021 (and accordingly such a \nperson is not required to comply with regulation 4 of these Regulations).",
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- "text": "\n \n \n \n \n [html]| “ passenger information ” has the meaning given in regulation 3 ( 1 ); | | “ Passenger Locator Form ” means the form published electronically by the Secretury of State for the provision of passenger information ( a ); | | “ port ”, except where the context otherwise requires, means — | | ( a ) any port ( including a seaport, airport or heliport ), or | | ( b ) a place which is an authorised terminal control point for international services for the purposes of sections 11 and 12 of the Channel Tumel Act 1987 / by ; | | “ qualifying test ” means a test that is a qualifying test for the purposes of regulation 4 ; | | “ relevant service ” means a commercial transport service carrying passengers travelling to England from outside the common travel area, other than a shuttle service ; | | “ Schedule 11 passenger ” means a passenger to whom Schedule 11 ( additional measures applicable to arrivals from category 3 countries or territories ) applies ; | | “ self - isolate ” has the meaning given in regulation 9 ( 2 ), and “ self - isolation ” and “ self - isolating ” are to be construed accordingly. | | “ the Self - Isolation Regulations ” means the Health Protection ( Coronavirus, Restrictions ) ( Self - Isolation ) ( England ) Regulations 20206 ( t ) | | “ sensitivity ”, in relation to a device, means how often the device correctly generates a positive result ; | | “ shuttle service ” has the meaning given in section 1 ( 9 ) of the Channel Tumnel Act 1987 ; | | “ specificity ”, in relation to a device, means how often the device correctly generates a negative result ; | | “ tunnel system ” has the meaning given in section 1 ( 7 ) of the Channel Tumnel Act 1987. | | r2 ) For the purposes of these Regulations, an individual has responsibility for a child if the dividual — | | ( a ) has custody or charge of the child for the time being, or | | ( b ) has parental responsibility for the child within the meaning given in section 3 of the Children Act 1989 / d ). | | ( 3 ) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (? P ) is not treated as departing from or unsing through a country or tertions, or part of a country or territory, if P artives in and leaves at country, territory of part thereof by air, rail o | | ( a ) remains on the aircraft or vessel upon which P arrived and no other passenger is permitted to be taken on board ; or | | ( b ) remains on the train upon which P arrived and no other passenger is permitted to be taken on bourd the carriage in which P is travelling : or | | ( c ) is kept separated from passengers who did not arrive on the same aircraft, train or vessel as P, and no such passengers are permitted to be taken on board the aircraft, train or vessel on which P leaves that country, termitted to be taken or | |
\n ",
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- "text": "**Charge for managed self-isolation package**\n\n**9.**The Secretary of State or a person designated by the Secretary of State may impose a charge \nin relation to the accommodation, transport and testing package mentioned in the definition of a \n“managed self-isolation package” and the Secretary of State may recover any sum owed by P \npursuant to such a charge as a debt. \n\n**Duty to self-isolate and period of self-isolation**\n\n**10.**Unless P leaves the common travel area where P is permitted to do so under these \nRegulations, P must self-isolate in the place in the accommodation designated in the managed self- \nisolation package until whichever is the later of— \n\n(a) the end of the period of 10 days beginning with the day after P’s arrival in England; \n(b) the end of the period for which P is required to self-isolate under Schedule 8 (mandatory \n\ntesting after arrival in England). \n\n**Exceptions from duty to self-isolate**\n\n**11.**Paragraph 10 does not require P to remain in self-isolation— \n\n(a) from any person with whom they were travelling when they arrived in England and who \n\nis also self-isolating in the place where P is self-isolating; \n\n(b) from any person who is staying in the place where P is self-isolating whose assistance P \n\nreasonably requires by reason of— \n(i) P being a child, or \n(ii) any disability of P’s. \n\n**12.**Paragraph 10 does not require P to remain in self-isolation from a person (“V”) when V is at \n\nthe place where P is self-isolating in exceptional circumstances such as— \n\n(a) to provide emergency assistance; \n(b) to provide care or assistance, including relevant personal care within the meaning of \nparagraph 1(1B) or 7(3B) of Schedule 4 to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act \n2006(**a**); \n\n(c) to provide medical assistance to P or to any other person who is staying in the place \nwhere P is self-isolating where this is required urgently or on the advice of a registered \nmedical practitioner; \n\n(d) to provide veterinary services where this is required urgently or on the advice of a \n\nveterinary surgeon; \n\n(e) to provide critical public services including social services or services provided to victims \n(such as victims of crime). \n\n**Permitted reasons to leave or be outside place of self-isolation**\n\n**13.**—(1) During the period of their self-isolation P may not leave or be outside of the place \n\nwhere P is self-isolating except— \n\n(a) to travel directly to a port to leave the common travel area; \n(b) to fulfil a legal obligation, including attending court or satisfying bail conditions or to \n\nparticipate in legal proceedings; \n\n(c) to take exercise; \n\n(**a**) 2006 c. 47 paragraph 1(1B) was inserted by section 64 the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (c. 9) and paragraph 7(3B) was \ninserted by section 66 of that Act.",
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- "query": "What is the expiracy date of the regulation regarding travel during the coronavirus pandemic made in 2021 ?",
- "target_page": 31,
- "target_passage": "These Regulations expire at the end of 16th May 2022.",
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- "text": "PART 6 \n\nFinal provisions \n\n**Review of need for requirements**\n\n**24.**The Secretary of State must review the need for the requirements imposed by these \n\nRegulations by 14th June 2021 and at least once every 28 days thereafter. \n\n**Expiry of Regulations**\n\n**25.**These Regulations expire at the end of 16th May 2022. \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]Revocations, transitional provision consequential amendments and savings | 26.—( 1 ) The following Regulations are revoked — | | ( a ) | | Passengers ) ( England ) Regulations 2020 ( a ); | | Health | | Information | | for International | | ( b ) | | the Health Protection ( Coronavirus, International (“ the International Travel Regulations ”)( b ); and | | Travel ) | | ( England ) | | Regulations 2020 | \n ",
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- "text": "(3) In regulation 4ZA— \n\n(a) in the heading, for “the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) \nRegulations 2020” substitute “the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel \nand Operator Liability) (England) Regulations 2021”; \n\n(b) in paragraph (1)(a), for “regulation 3B of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, \nInternational Travel) (England) Regulations 2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”)” substitute \n“regulation 6 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator \nLiability) (England) Regulations 2021 (“the International Travel and Operator Liability \nRegulations”)”; \n\n(c) in paragraph (1)(c), for “paragraph 7(1)(f) of Schedule 2C to the 2020 Regulations” \nsubstitute “paragraph 7(1)(g) of Schedule 11 to the International Travel and Operator \nLiability Regulations”; \n\n(d) in paragraph (3), for “paragraph 7(1)(f) of Schedule 2C to the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “paragraph \n7(1)(g) of Schedule 11 to the International Travel and Operator Liability Regulations”. \n\n**2.**—(1) The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Self-Isolation) (England) Regulations \n2020(**a**) are amended as follows. \n\n(2) In regulation 2D(1)(c), for “regulation 4 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International \nTravel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “regulation 9 of the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator Liability) (England) Regulations 2021”. \n\n(3) In regulation 6(1)— \n\n(a) in the definitions of “designated place”, “isolation requirements” and “self-isolating \nworker”, for “regulation 4” substitute “regulation 9”; \n\n(b) in the definition of “International Travel Regulations”, for “the Health Protection \n(Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020” substitute “the Health \nProtection (Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator Liability) (England) \nRegulations 2021”. \n\nSCHEDULE 16 Regulation 26(3) \n\nTransitional provision \n\n**1.**Passenger information provided before 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021 by a person pursuant to \nregulation 3 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations \n2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”) in advance of arrival in England is treated as passenger information \nprovided for the purposes of these Regulations where the person arrives in England on or after that \ndate. \n\n**2.**Confirmation given by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office that a person is \nnot required to comply with regulation 3B of the 2020 Regulations is treated as confirmation that \nthe person is not required to comply with regulation 6 of these Regulations where the person \narrives in England on or after 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021. \n\n**3.**A designation by the Secretary of State of a person as an authorised person under regulation \n5(7) of the 2020 Regulations has effect as a designation of that person as an authorised person \nunder of regulation 11(11)(c) of these Regulations. \n\n**4.**Regulation 5A of the 2020 Regulations continues to have effect in relation to a constable who \nexercises the powers in that regulation in relation to a person who arrived in England before 4.00 \na.m. on 17th May 2021.",
- "page_start": 88,
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- "text": "**18.**Guidance issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 2D to the \n2020 Regulations has effect as guidance issued pursuant to paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 9 to these \nRegulations. \n\n**EXPLANATORY NOTE**\n\n*(This note is not part of the Regulations)*\n\nThese Regulations replace the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) \nRegulations 2020 (“the International Travel Regulations”), the Health Protection (Coronavirus, \nPublic Health Information for International Passengers) (England) Regulations 2020 and the \nHealth Protection (Coronavirus, Pre-Departure Testing and Operator Liability) (England) \n(Amendment) Regulations 2021. \n\nThey impose requirements on certain categories of person to provide information upon arrival in \nEngland, to take coronavirus tests before and after arrival and to self-isolate in order to prevent the \nspread of infection or contamination from coronavirus or coronavirus disease. They also impose \nobligations on operators to ensure that passengers receive information and comply with the \nrequirements. \n\nAn impact assessment has not been produced for this instrument. An explanatory memorandum \nhas been published alongside this instrument at www.legislation.gov.uk. \n\n© Crown copyright 2021 \n\nPrinted and published in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited under the authority and superintendence of Jeff James, \nController of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and Queen’s Printer of Acts of Parliament. \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | Table | \n ",
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- "text": "\n \n \n \n \n [html] | The | Special Educational Needs and Disability ( Coronavirus ) ( Amendment ) Regulations 2020 | | Made | - | - | | - | - | 28th April 2020 | | Laid before Parliament | 30th April 2020 | Coming into force | | - | - | 1st May 2020 | \n \n\nThe Secretary of State makes the following Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by \nsections 30(8), 31(4), 36(11), 37(4), 44(7)(b) and (c), 47, 49(3), 51(4), 56(1), 71(11), 73(4), 74(3) \nand 135(2) and (3) of the Children and Families Act 2014(**a**) and sections 29(3) and 569(4) of the \nEducation Act 1996(**b**). \n\n**Citation and commencement**\n\n**1.**These Regulations may be cited as the Special Educational Needs and Disability \n\n(Coronavirus) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 and come into force on 1st May 2020. \n\n**Review and expiry**\n\n**2.**—(1) The Secretary of State must review the effectiveness of these Regulations during the \nperiod for which they have effect. \n\n(2) These Regulations cease to have effect on 25th September 2020. \n\n**Amendment of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Regulations 2014**\n\n**3.**The Special Educational Needs and Disability Regulations 2014(**c**) are amended as follows. \n\n**4.**In regulation 2(1) (interpretation), at the appropriate place insert— \n\n““coronavirus” means severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2); \n”. \n\n**5.**After regulation 2 (interpretation) insert— \n\n“**Relaxation of time periods due to coronavirus exception**\n\n**2A.**—(1) Where the coronavirus exception applies, any requirement in any of the \nregulations specified in paragraph (3) for action to be taken within a specified period of \n\n(**a**) 2014 c.6. Section 30(8) was amended by Schedule 2, Part 1, paragraph 4 to the Children and Social Work Act 2017 (c.16). \n(**b**) 1996 c.56. Section 29(3) was amended by Schedule 30, paragraph 67 and Schedule 31 to the School Standards and \nFramework Act 1998 (c.31) and S.I. 2010/1158 and section 569(4) was amended by section 8(1) and (5) of the Education \n(Wales) Measure 2009. \n(**c**) S.I. 2014/1530, relevant amending instruments are S.I. 2014/2096, S.I. 2015/359 and S.I. 2017/1306.",
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- "text": "\n \n \n \n \n [html]2021 No. 582 PUBLIC HEALTH, ENGLAND The Health Protection ( Coronavirus, International Travel and Operator Liability ) ( England ) Regulations 2021 | Made | - | | | - | - | | | at 10.32 a. m. on 14th May 2021 | Laid before Parliament | | | at 2.30 p. m. on 14th May 2021 | Coming into force | - | - | at 4.00 a. m. on 17th May 2021CONTENTS | | PART 1 | Introductory | 1. | Citation, commencement, extent and application | | 3 | 2. | Interpretation and introduction of Schedules 1 to 4 | 3PART 2 | | Requirements on persons arriving in England | 3.Requirement on passengers to provide information | | 5 | 4.Requirement to possess notification of negative test result | | 6 | 5.Requirements relating to tests | | 7 | 6.Requirement to book and undertake tests | | 9 | 7.Requirement to undertake workforce tests | | 10 | 8.Test requirements : offshore installation workers | | 12 | 9Further requirements on arrivals from category 2 countries and territories | | 13 | 10. | Further requirements on arrivals from category 3 countries or territories | 17PART 3 | | Enforcement | 11.Enforcement of requirement to self - isolate | | 17 | | 12. | Power of entry | 19PART 4 | | Requirements on operators | 13.Passenger information requirement | \n ",
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- "text": "The Secretary of State makes the following Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by \nsections 45B, 45F(2) and 45P(2) of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984(**a**). \n\nPART 1 \n\nIntroductory \n\n**Citation, commencement, extent and application**\n\n**1.**—(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International \n\nTravel and Operator Liability) (England) Regulations 2021. \n\n(2) These Regulations come into force at 4.00 a.m. on 17th May 2021. \n(3) These Regulations extend to England and Wales and apply in relation to England only. \n\n**Interpretation and introduction of Schedules 1 to 4**\n\n**2.**—(1) In these Regulations— \n\n“category 1 arrival” means person who has arrived in England from a category 1 country or \nterritory, and has not been in a category 2 country or territory or a category 3 country or \nterritory in the period beginning with the 10th day before the date of their arrival in England; \n\n“category 1 country or territory” means a country or territory, or part of a country or territory, \nspecified in Schedule 1(**b**); \n\n“category 2 country or territory” means a country or territory or part of a country or territory \nspecified in Schedule 2(**c**); \n\n“category 3 country or territory” means a country or territory or part of a country or territory \nspecified in Schedule 3(**d**); \n\n“child” means a person under the age of 18; \n\n“the common travel area” has the meaning given in section 1(3) of the Immigration Act \n1971(**e**); \n\n“coronavirus” means severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2); \n\n“coronavirus disease” means COVID-19 (the official designation of the disease which can be \ncaused by coronavirus); \n\n“designated port” means a port designated for the purposes of Schedule 11; \n\n“device” means an in vitro diagnostic medical device within the meaning given in regulation \n2(1) of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002(**f**); \n\n“disability” has the meaning given in the Equality Act 2010(**g**) (see section 6 of, and Schedule \n1 to, that Act); \n\n“immigration officer” means a person appointed by the Secretary of State as an immigration \nofficer under paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971(**h**); \n\n“managed self-isolation package” has the meaning given in paragraph 8 of Schedule 11; \n\n“operator” except in regulation 18, means an operator of a relevant service; \n\n(**a**) 1984 c. 22. Part 2A was inserted by section 129 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (c. 14). \n(**b**) Category 1 countries and territories are referred to colloquially and in guidance as “Green List” countries and territories. \n(**c**) Category 2 countries and territories are referred to colloquially and in guidance as “Amber List” countries and territories. \n(**d**) Category 3 countries and territories are referred to colloquially and in guidance as “Red List” countries and territories. \n(**e**) 1971 c. 77; section 1(3) provides that the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland \nare collectively referred to in that Act as “the common travel area”. \n\n(**f**) S.I. 2002/618. \n(**g**) 2010 c. 15. \n(**h**) Paragraph 1 was amended by paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to the Health Protection Agency Act 2004 (c. 17), and by S.I. \n1993/1813.",
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- "text": "If you have not had symptoms of coronavirus, you must self-isolate for 10 days from the day after \nyour test date. If you have symptoms of coronavirus, you must self-isolate for 10 days from the \nday your symptoms started, if earlier than when you took your test. \n\nYou must, by law, continue self-isolating for the remainder of your self-isolation period as an \ninternational arrival travelling to the UK from an amber-list country, territory or region. You may \nbe contacted to check that you are self-isolating. \n\nIf you want to shorten your self-isolation period you will need to take another test for international \narrivals from amber list countries, territories or regions. For more information, go to \nhttps://www.gov.uk/guidance/coronavirus-covid-19-test-to-release-for-international-travel. \n\n(4) The test provider must, on request, provide a constable or any other person employed in or \nfor the purposes of any police force, with— \n\n(a) P’s passport number, or travel document reference number (as appropriate); \n(b) P’s test result; \n(c) the date on which P undertook the test; \n(d) the date on which the test result was notified or made available to P or X in accordance \n\nwith sub-paragraphs (2) and (3). \n\n(5) Where— \n\n(a) regulation 4 or 4A of the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010(**a**) applies in \nrelation to the test provider; or \n\n(b) if the test provider arranges with another person (“X”) for X to carry out any element of \nthe single end-to-end testing service on their behalf, either of those regulations applies to \nX in the carrying out of that element, \n\n(**a**) S.I. 2010/659; regulation 4 was amended by S.I. 2013/235, 2020/1175, 2020/764, 2021/150 and regulation 4A was inserted \nby S.I. 2020/1175.",
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- "text": "United Kingdom and, if so— \n(i) the location at which they will depart from in the United Kingdom, \n(ii) their final destination country or territory, \n(iii) the operator they are travelling with or through which their booking was made for \n\ntheir onward journey, \n\n(iv) the seat number for their onward journey, \n(v) the flight number or vessel name for their onward journey, \n(vi) the coach number for their onward journey. \n\n**3.**Where the passenger is travelling with a child for whom they have responsibility— \n\n(a) the full name and date of birth of that child; \n(b) the relationship of the passenger to that child. \n\n**4.**Where the passenger is a person required by regulation 9(2) to self-isolate, and intends to \n\nundertake a test in accordance with Schedule 10 (optional tests)— \n\n(a) the name of the test provider; \n(b) the test reference number provided to them by the test provider in accordance with \nparagraph 4(d) of that Schedule. \n\n**5.**Where regulation 6 (requirement to book and undertake tests) requires a testing package— \n\n(a) the name of the test provider; \n(b) the test reference number provided to them by the test provider in accordance with \nparagraph 10(5) of Schedule 8. \n\nSCHEDULE 7 Regulation 4 \n\nTesting before arrival in England \n\n**Compliant tests**\n\n**1.**A test complies with this paragraph if— \n\n(a) it is a test for the detection of coronavirus undertaken using a device which the \n\nmanufacturer states has—",
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- "text": "**Day 2 tests: general test requirements**\n\n**6.**—(1) For the purposes of regulation 6(12)(a), a day 2 test complies with this paragraph \n\nwhere— \n\n(a) it is a test provided by a public provider; or \n(b) it is a test provided by a private provider— \n\n(i) in respect of— \n\n(aa) a non-Schedule 11 passenger, on or after 1st March 2021; \n(bb) a Schedule 11 passenger, on 1st or 2nd March 2021, \n\n(ii) where the test complies with sub-paragraph (2), and \n(iii) where the private provider complies with paragraph 7. \n\n(2) A test complies with this sub-paragraph where— \n\n(a) it is a semi-quantitative test for the detection of coronavirus which— \n\n(i) targets a minimum of two distinguishable SARS-CoV-2 genes other than the S gene \nand performance reference controls, \n\n(ii) includes routine in silico assurance against every variant of concern, and \n(iii) produces a test solution that provides extracted nucleic acid that is suitable for whole \n\ngenome sequencing using a specified method; \n\n(b) it is, in relation to a Schedule 11 passenger, a test that can be self-administered; \n(c) the manufacturer of any device used for the purposes of the test states that the device— \n\n(i) uses an established molecular detection method, \n(ii) has a specificity and a sensitivity greater than 99% (with a 95% two-sided \nconfidence interval entirely above 97%), \n\n(iii) has a limit of detection of less than or equal to 1000 SARS-CoV-2 copies per \n\nmillilitre, and \n\n(iv) is suitable for identifying every variant of concern; and \n\n(d) any device used for the purposes of the test— \n\n(i) can be put into service in accordance with Part 4 of the Medical Devices Regulations \n\n2002, other than solely by virtue of regulation 39(2) of those Regulations, and \n(ii) has been validated no more than 18 months before the test is administered or \n\nprovided to P. \n\n(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)— \n\n(a) “specified method” means a targeted sequence method specific to SARS-CoV-2 or an \n\nequivalent— \n(i) amplicon method, or \n(ii) sequence bait capture method; \n\n(b) “validated”, in relation to a device, has the meaning given by paragraph 2(2) of Schedule \n\n10; \n\n(c) “variant of concern” means a variant of SARS-CoV-2 identified in a designation made by \nthe Secretary of State for the purposes of this paragraph and published in a manner as \nappears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate.",
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- "text": "**EXPLANATORY NOTE**\n\n*(This note is not part of the Regulations)*\n\nThese Regulations make amendments to secondary legislation relating to special educational \nneeds and disability in order to provide exceptions to time limits set out in that legislation where \nthey cannot be met because of a reason relating to the incidence or transmission of coronavirus. \n\nRegulation 2 contains review and expiry provisions. The Secretary of State is required to review \nthe effectiveness of the Regulations during the period in which they have effect. The Regulations \ncease to have effect on 25th September 2020. \n\nRegulations 3 to 14 amend the Special Educational Needs and Disability Regulations 2014 (‘the \nSEND Regulations 2014’). \n\nRegulation 5 inserts a glossing provision into the SEND Regulations 2014 which relaxes certain \nrequirements in those Regulations for actions to be taken within specified time limits where it is \nnot reasonably practicable for a person to meet those requirements for a reason relating to the \nincidence or transmission of coronavirus. Instead, any such requirement is to be read as a \nrequirement for such action to be taken as soon as reasonably practicable. \n\nRegulations 6 to 14 make textual amendments to the SEND Regulations 2014 to relax time limits. \n\nRegulations 15 to 17 amend the Special Educational Needs (Personal Budgets) Regulations 2014 \n(‘the Personal Budgets Regulations 2014’). \n\nRegulation 17 inserts a similar glossing provision into the Personal Budgets Regulations 2014 as \nregulation 5 does in respect of the SEND Regulations 2014. \n\nRegulations 18 to 27 amend the Special Educational Needs and Disability (Detained Persons) \nRegulations 2015 (‘the Detained Persons Regulations 2015’). \n\nRegulation 20 inserts a glossing provision into the Detained Persons Regulations 2015 similar to \nthe ones in regulations 5 and 17 in relation to the SEND Regulations 2014 and the Personal \nBudgets Regulations 2014 respectively. \n\nRegulations 21 to 27 make textual amendments to the Detained Persons Regulations 2015 to relax \ntime limits. \n\nRegulations 28 to 30 amend the Special Educational Needs and Disability (First-tier Tribunal \nRecommendations Power) Regulations 2017 (‘the First-tier Tribunal Regulations 2017’). \n\nRegulation 30 inserts a glossing provision into the First-tier Tribunal Regulations 2017 similar to \nthose in regulations 5, 17 and 20. \n\nAn impact assessment has not been produced for this instrument as this is a temporary, emergency \nmeasure and no significant impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies is foreseen. \n\nAn Explanatory Memorandum is published alongside this instrument on www.legislation.gov.uk. \n\n© Crown copyright 2020 \n\nPrinted and published in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited under the authority and superintendence of Jeff James, \nController of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and Queen’s Printer of Acts of Parliament.",
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- "query": "Who first suggested the notions of \"hard\" and \"easy\" problems regarding consciousness ?",
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- "target_passage": "The terms \"hard problem\" and \"easy problems\" were coined by the philosopher David Chalmers",
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- "text": "\n \n \n \n \n [html]| — | 1.1 ( 1.1 ) | | Table | Statement of completely intervention | | Table | with the | \n \n\n\n\nProponents of the hard problem argue that it is categorically different from the easy problems since no \nmechanistic or behavioral explanation could explain the character of an experience, not even in principle. \nEven after all the relevant functional facts are explicated, they argue, there will still remain a further \nquestion: \"why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?\"[1] To bolster their \ncase, proponents of the hard problem frequently turn to various philosophical thought experiments, \ninvolving philosophical zombies (which, they claim, are conceivable) or inverted qualia, or the claimed \nineffability of colour experiences, or the claimed unknowability of foreign states of consciousness, such \nas the experience of being a bat. \n\nThe terms \"hard problem\" and \"easy problems\" were \ncoined by the philosopher David Chalmers in a 1994 talk \ngiven at The Science of Consciousness conference held in \nTucson, Arizona.[4] The following year, the main talking \npoints of Chalmers' talk were published in*The Journal of*\n*Consciousness*\ngained \nsignificant attention from consciousness researchers and \nbecame the subject of a special volume of the journal,[5][6] \nwhich was later published into a book.[7] In 1996, \nChalmers published*The Conscious Mind*, a book-length \ntreatment of the hard problem, in which he elaborated on \nhis core arguments and responded to counterarguments. His \nuse of the word*easy*is \"tongue-in-cheek\".[8] As the \ncognitive psychologist Steven Pinker puts it, they are about as easy as going to Mars or curing cancer. \n\"That is, scientists more or less know what to look for, and with enough brainpower and funding, they \nwould probably crack it in this century.\"[9] \n\n*Studies*.[1] The publication \n\nChalmers on stage for an Alan Turing Year \nevent at De La Salle University, Manila, 27 \nMarch 2012 \n\nThe existence of the hard problem is disputed. It has been accepted by some philosophers of mind such as \nJoseph Levine,[10] Colin McGinn,[11] and Ned Block[12] and cognitive neuroscientists such as Francisco \nVarela,[13] Giulio Tononi,[14][15] and Christof Koch.[14][15] On the other hand, its existence is denied by \nother philosophers of mind, such as Daniel Dennett,[16] Massimo Pigliucci,[17] Thomas Metzinger, \nPatricia Churchland,[18] and Keith Frankish,[19] and by cognitive neuroscientists such as Stanislas \nDehaene,[20] Bernard Baars,[21] Anil Seth,[22] and Antonio Damasio.[23] Clinical neurologist and skeptic",
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- "text": "Steven Novella has dismissed it as \"the hard non-problem\".[24] According to a 2020 PhilPapers survey, a \nmajority (62.42%) of the philosophers surveyed said they believed that the hard problem is a genuine \nproblem, while 29.72% said that it does not exist.[25] \n\nThere are a number of other potential philosophical problems that are related to the Hard Problem. Ned \nBlock believes that there exists a \"Harder Problem of Consciousness\", due to the possibility of different \nphysical and functional neurological systems potentially having phenomenal overlap.[12] Another \npotential philosophical problem which is closely related to Benj Hellie's vertiginous question, dubbed \n\"The Even Harder Problem of Consciousness\", refers to why a given individual has their own particular \npersonal identity, as opposed to existing as someone else.[26] \n\n**Overview**\n\nCognitive scientist David Chalmers first formulated the hard problem in his paper \"Facing up to the \nproblem of consciousness\" (1995)[1] and expanded upon it in*The Conscious Mind*(1996). His works \nprovoked comment. Some, such as philosopher David Lewis and Steven Pinker, have praised Chalmers \nfor his argumentative rigour and \"impeccable clarity\".[27] Pinker later said, in 2018, \"In the end I still \nthink that the hard problem is a meaningful conceptual problem, but agree with Dennett that it is not a \nmeaningful scientific problem. No one will ever get a grant to study whether you are a zombie or whether \nthe same Captain Kirk walks on the deck of the Enterprise and the surface of Zakdorn. And I agree with \nseveral other philosophers that it may be futile to hope for a solution at all, precisely because it is a \nconceptual problem, or, more accurately, a problem with our concepts.\"[28] Daniel Dennett and Patricia \nChurchland, among others, believe that the hard problem is best seen as a collection of easy problems that \nwill be solved through further analysis of the brain and behaviour.[29][30] \n\nConsciousness is an ambiguous term. It can be used to mean self consciousness, awareness, the state of \nbeing awake, and so on. Chalmers uses Thomas Nagel's definition of consciousness: \"*the feeling of what*\n*it is like to be something.\"*Consciousness, in this sense, is synonymous with*experience.*[31][27] \n\n**Chalmers' formulation**\n\n. . .even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions \nin the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal \nreport—there may still remain a further unanswered question:*Why is the performance of these*\n*functions accompanied by experience?*\n\n— David Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of consciousness \n\nThe problems of consciousness, Chalmers argues, are of two kinds: the*easy problems*and the*hard*\n*problem*. \n\n**Easy problems**\n\nThe easy problems are amenable to reductive inquiry. They are a logical consequence of lower-level facts \nabout the world, similar to how a clock's ability to tell time is a logical consequence of its clockwork and \nstructure, or a hurricane being a logical consequence of the structures and functions of certain weather",
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- "text": "The philosophers Glenn Carruthers and Elizabeth Schier said in 2012 that the main arguments for the \nexistence of a hard problem—philosophical zombies, Mary's room, and Nagel's bats—are only persuasive \nif one already assumes that \"consciousness must be independent of the structure and function of mental \nstates, i.e. that there is a hard problem.\" Hence, the arguments beg the question. The authors suggest that \n\"instead of letting our conclusions on the thought experiments guide our theories of consciousness, we \nshould let our theories of consciousness guide our conclusions from the thought experiments.\"[64] \n\nThe philosopher Massimo Pigliucci argued in 2013 that the hard problem is misguided, resulting from a \n\"category mistake\".[17] He said: \"Of course an explanation isn't the same as an experience, but that's \nbecause the two are completely independent categories, like colors and triangles. It is obvious that I \ncannot experience what it is like to be you, but I can potentially have a complete explanation of how and \nwhy it is possible to be you.\"[17] \n\nIn 2017, the philosopher Marco Stango, in a paper on John Dewey's approach to the problem of \nconsciousness (which preceded Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem by over half a century), noted \nthat Dewey's approach would see the hard problem as the consequence of an unjustified assumption that \nfeelings and functional behaviors are not the same physical process: \"For the Deweyan philosopher, the \n'hard problem' of consciousness is a 'conceptual fact' only in the sense that it is a*philosophical mistake*: \nthe mistake of failing to see that the physical can be had as an episode of immediate sentiency.\"[65] \n\nThe philosopher Thomas Metzinger likens the hard problem of consciousness to vitalism, a formerly \nwidespread view in biology which was not so much solved as abandoned.[66] Brian Jonathan Garrett has \nalso argued that the hard problem suffers from flaws analogous to those of vitalism.[67] \n\nThe philosopher Peter Hacker argues that the hard problem is misguided in that it asks how consciousness \ncan emerge from matter, whereas in fact sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms.[68] He \nstates: \"The hard problem isn’t a hard problem at all. The really hard problems are the problems the \nscientists are dealing with. [...] The philosophical problem, like all philosophical problems, is a confusion \nin the conceptual scheme.\"[68] Hacker's critique extends beyond Chalmers and the hard problem, being \ndirected against contemporary philosophy of mind and neuroscience more broadly. Along with the \nneuroscientist Max Bennett, he has argued that most of contemporary neuroscience remains implicitly \ndualistic in its conceptualizations and is predicated on the*mereological fallacy*of ascribing psychological \nconcepts to the brain that can properly be ascribed only to the person as a whole.[69] Hacker further states \nthat \"consciousness studies\", as it exists today, is \"literally a total waste of time\" and that \"the conception \nof consciousness which they have is incoherent\".[68] \n\n**Eliminative materialism / Illusionism**\n\nEliminative materialism or eliminativism is the view that many or all of the mental states used in folk \npsychology (i.e., common-sense ways of discussing the mind) do not, upon scientific examination, \ncorrespond to real brain mechanisms.[59] According the 2020 PhilPapers survey, 4.51% of philosophers \nsurveyed subscribe to eliminativism.[25] \n\nWhile Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland have famously applied eliminative materialism to \npropositional attitudes, philosophers including Daniel Dennett, Georges Rey, and Keith Frankish have \napplied it to qualia or phenomenal consciousness (i.e., conscious experience).[59] On their view, it is \nmistaken not only to believe there is a hard problem of consciousness, but to believe phenomenal \nconsciousness exists at all.[19][61]",
- "page_start": 7,
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- "text": "66. Harris, Sam. \"Making Sense #96\" (https://samharris.org/subscriber-extras/96-nature-conscio \nusness/).*SamHarris.org*. Sam Harris. Retrieved 27 August 2020. \"(25.45) TM:I think it will \nnot be a mystery. Life is not a mystery anymore, but a hundred and fifty years ago many \npeople thought that this is an irreducible mystery. (25:57) Harris:So you're not a fan \nanymore, if you ever were, of the framing by David Chalmers of the Hard Problem of \nConsciousness? Metzinger: No, that's so boring. I mean, that's last century. I mean, you \nknow, we all respect Dave [Chalmers], and we know he is very smart and has got a very fast \nmind, no debate about that. But conceivability arguments are just very, very weak. If you \nhave an ill-defined folk psychological umbrella term like \"consciousness\", then you can pull \noff all kinds of scenarios and zombie thought experiments. It doesn't really… It helped to \nclarify some issues in the mid 90's, but the consciousness community has listened to this \nand just moved on. I mean nobody of the serious researchers in the field thinks about this \nanymore, but it has taken on like a folkloristic life of its own. A lot of people talk about the \nHard Problem who wouldn't be able to state what it consists in now.\" \n\n67. Garrett, Brian Jonathan (May 2006). \"What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About \n\nConsciousness and the 'Hard Problem' \".*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.**72**\n(3): 576–588. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00584.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1933-1 \n592.2006.tb00584.x). \n\n68. Hacker, Peter (2010). \"Hacker's challenge\" (http://philpapers.org/rec/HACHC).*The*\n\n*Philosophers' Magazine*.**51**(51): 23–32. doi:10.5840/tpm2010517 (https://doi.org/10.5840% \n2Ftpm2010517). \n\n69. Schaal, David W. (2005). \"Naming Our Concerns About Neuroscience: A Review of Bennett \nand Hacker's*Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*\" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pm \nc/articles/PMC1389787).*Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior*.**84**(3): 683–692. \ndoi:10.1901/jeab.2005.83-05 (https://doi.org/10.1901%2Fjeab.2005.83-05). PMC 1389787 \n(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1389787). PMID 16596986 (https://pubmed. \nncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16596986). \n\n70. Dennett, Daniel C. (1979). \"On the Absence of Phenomenology\". In Gustafson, Donald F.; \nTapscott, Bangs L. (eds.).*Body, Mind, and Method*. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 93– \n113. \n\n71. Dennett, Daniel C. (1991).*Consciousness Explained*. Penguin Books. \n72. Dennett, Daniel C. (2003). \"Explaining the 'magic' of consciousness\".*Journal of Cultural and*\n*Evolutionary Psychology*.**1**(1): 7–19. doi:10.1556/jcep.1.2003.1.2 (https://doi.org/10.1556% \n2Fjcep.1.2003.1.2). S2CID 144560246 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:14456024 \n6). \n\n73. Dennett, Daniel C. (1991).*Consciousness explained*(https://archive.org/details/consciousne \n\nssexp00denn). Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 978-0316180658. \n\n74. Anthis, Jacy (2022). \"Consciousness Semanticism: A Precise Eliminativist Theory of \nConsciousness\" (https://philarchive.org/rec/ANTCSA).*Biologically Inspired Cognitive*\n*Architectures 2021*. Studies in Computational Intelligence. Vol. 1032. pp. 20–41. \ndoi:10.1007/978-3-030-96993-6_3 (https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-030-96993-6_3). \nISBN 978-3-030-96992-9. Retrieved 7 August 2022. \n\n75. Irvine, Elizabeth (2013).*Consciousness as a scientific concept: a philosophy of science*\n\n*perspective*. Studies in brain and mind. Vol. 5. Dordrecht; New York: Springer-Verlag. p. 167 \n(https://books.google.com/books?id=jO4HNB7OoUgC&pg=PA167). ISBN 9789400751729. \n76. Chalmers, David (2018). \"The Meta-Problem of Consciousness\" (http://consc.net/papers/me \n\ntaproblem.pdf) (PDF).*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**25**(9–10): 6–61. Retrieved \n6 February 2019. \n\n77. Graziano, Michael (2013).*Consciousness and the social brain*. Oxford; New York: Oxford \n\nUniversity Press. ISBN 978-0190263195.",
- "page_start": 22,
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- "text": "Today there is a strong tendency to simply*equate*consciousness with the qualia. Yet there is \nclearly something not quite right about this. The \"itchiness of itches\" and the \"hurtfulness of \npain\" are qualities we are conscious*of*. So philosophy of mind tends to treat consciousness as \nif it consisted simply of the contents of consciousness (the phenomenal qualities), while it \nreally is precisely*consciousness*of contents, the very givenness of whatever is subjectively \ngiven. And therefore the problem of consciousness does not pertain so much to some alleged \n\"mysterious, nonpublic objects\", i.e. objects that seem to be only \"visible\" to the respective \nsubject, but rather to the nature of \"seeing\" itself (and in today’s philosophy of mind \nastonishingly little is said about the latter).[129] \n\n**Relationship to scientific frameworks**\n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Specimens | Table | Patients | Table | Table | Table | Development | Table | Table | Since | State | \n \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Solved. | Statestics | Table | Table | Table | Maximum | Temperature ( mm ) | Table | Since 15 | Data | Adjusted | Species | \n \n\nOne can always ask why these processes of availability should give rise to consciousness in \nthe first place. As yet we cannot explain why they do so, and it may well be that full details \nabout the processes of availability will still fail to answer this question. Certainly, nothing in \nthe standard methodology I have outlined answers the question; that methodology assumes a \nrelation between availability and consciousness, and therefore does nothing to explain it. [...] \nSo the hard problem remains. But who knows: Somewhere along the line we may be led to \nthe relevant insights that show why the link is there, and the hard problem may then be \nsolved.[132] \n\nThe neuroscientist and Nobel laureate Eric Kandel wrote that locating the NCCs would not solve the hard \nproblem, but rather one of the so-called easy problems to which the hard problem is contrasted.[133] \nKandel went on to note Crick and Koch's suggestion that once the binding problem—understanding what \naccounts for the unity of experience—is solved, it will be possible to solve the hard problem \nempirically.[133] However, neuroscientist Anil Seth argued that emphasis on the so-called hard problem is \na distraction from what he calls the \"real problem\": understanding the neurobiology underlying",
- "page_start": 14,
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- "text": "g%7CHard) \n\n5. JCS vol. 4, pp. 3-46, 1997 \n6. Chalmers, David (1997). \"Moving forward on the problem of consciousness\".*Journal of*\n\n*Consciousness Studies*.**4**(1): 3–46. \n\n7. Shear, Jonathan (1997).*Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem*. MIT Press. \n\nISBN 978-0262692212. \n\n8. \"Episode 83, The David Chalmers Interview (Part I - Consciousness)\" (https://thepanpsycas \n\nt.com/panpsycast2/episode83-1).*The Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast*. 19 July 2020. \nRetrieved 2020-09-05. \n\n9. Pinker, Steven (29 January 2007). \"The Brain: The Mystery of Consciousness\" (http://conten \nt.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580394-1,00.html).*Time*. Retrieved 19 December \n2018. \n\n10. Levine, Joseph (2009-01-15). \"The Explanatory Gap\" (https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/vi \new/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199262618-e-17).*The*\n*Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*: 281–291. \ndoi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0017 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9 \n780199262618.003.0017). ISBN 978-0199262618. \n\n11. McGinn, Colin (20 February 2012). \"All machine and no ghost?\" (http://www.newstatesman. \ncom/ideas/2012/02/consciousness-mind-brain).*New Statesman*. Retrieved 27 March 2012. \n12. Block, Ned (2002). \"The Harder Problem of Consciousness\" (https://philpapers.org/rec/BLO \nTHP).*The Journal of Philosophy*.**99**(8): 391–425. doi:10.2307/3655621 (https://doi.org/10. \n2307%2F3655621). JSTOR 3655621 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655621). \nS2CID 111383062 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:111383062). \n\n13. Varela, F.J. (1 April 1996). \"Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard \n\nproblem\" (https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1996/00000003/00000004/718). \n*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**3**(4): 330–349.",
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- "text": "patterns. A clock, a hurricane, and the easy problems, are all the sum of their parts (as are most \nthings).[27] \n\nThe easy problems relevant to consciousness concern mechanistic analysis of the neural processes that \naccompany behaviour. Examples of these include how sensory systems work, how sensory data is \nprocessed in the brain, how that data influences behaviour or verbal reports, the neural basis of thought \nand emotion, and so on. They are problems that can be analyzed through \"structures and functions\".[27] \n\n**Hard problem**\n\nThe hard problem, in contrast, is the problem of*why*and*how*those processes are accompanied by \nexperience.[1] It may further include the question of why these processes are accompanied by this or that \nparticular experience, rather than some other kind of experience. In other words, the hard problem is the \nproblem of explaining why certain mechanisms are accompanied by conscious experience.[27] For \nexample, why should neural processing in the brain lead to the felt sensations of, say, feelings of hunger? \nAnd why should those neural firings lead to feelings of hunger rather than some other feeling (such as, \nfor example, feelings of thirst)? \n\nChalmers argues that it is conceivable that the relevant behaviours associated with hunger, or any other \nfeeling, could occur even in the absence of that feeling. This suggests that experience is irreducible to \nphysical systems such as the brain. This is the topic of the next section. \n\n**How the easy and hard problems are related**\n\nChalmers believes that the hard problem is irreducible to the easy problems: solving the easy problems \nwill not lead to a solution to the hard problems. This is because the easy problems pertain to the causal \nstructure of the world while the hard problem pertains to consciousness, and facts about consciousness \ninclude facts that go beyond mere causal or structural description.[32] \n\nFor example, suppose someone were to stub their foot and yelp. In this scenario, the easy problems are \nmechanistic explanations that involve the activity of the nervous system and brain and its relation to the \nenvironment (such as the propagation of nerve signals from the toe to the brain, the processing of that \ninformation and how it leads to yelping, and so on). The hard problem is the question of why these \nmechanisms are accompanied by*the feeling of pain*, or why these feelings of pain feel the particular way \nthat they do. Chalmers argues that facts about the neural mechanisms of pain, and pain behaviours, do not \nlead to facts about conscious experience. Facts about conscious experience are, instead, further facts, not \nderivable from facts about the brain.[27][32] \n\nAn explanation for all of the relevant physical facts about neural processing would leave unexplained \nfacts about what it is like to feel pain. This is in part because functions and physical structures of any sort \ncould conceivably exist in the absence of experience. Alternatively, they could exist alongside a different \nset of experiences. For example, it is logically possible for a perfect replica of Chalmers to have no \nexperience at all, or for it to have a different set of experiences (such as an inverted visible spectrum, so \nthat the blue-yellow red-green axes of its visual field are flipped).[32] \n\nThe same cannot be said about clocks, hurricanes, or other physical things. In those cases, a structural or \nfunctional description is a complete description. A perfect replica of a clock is a clock, a perfect replica of \na hurricane is a hurricane, and so on. The difference is that physical things are nothing more than their",
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- "text": "physical constituents. For example, water is nothing \nmore than H2O molecules, and understanding everything \nabout H2O molecules is to understand everything there is \nto know about water. But consciousness is not like this. \nKnowing everything there is to know about the brain, or \nany physical system, is not to know everything there is to \nknow about consciousness. Consciousness, then, must \nnot be purely physical.[27] \n\n\n\n**Implications for physicalism**\n\n\n\nThe hard problem is often illustrated by \nappealing to the logical possibility of inverted \nvisible spectra. If there is no logical \ncontradiction in supposing that one's colour \nvision could be inverted, it follows that \nmechanistic explanations of visual processing \ndo not determine facts about what it is like to \nsee colours. \n\nChalmers's \nidea contradicts physicalism, sometimes \nlabelled materialism. This is the view that everything that \nexists is a physical or material thing, so everything can \nbe reduced to microphysical things. For example, the \nrings of Saturn are a physical thing because they are \nnothing more than a complex arrangement of a large \nnumber of subatomic particles interacting in a certain way. \nAccording to physicalism, everything, including consciousness, \ncan be explained by appeal to its microphysical constituents. \nChalmers's*hard problem*presents a counterexample to this view \nand to other phenomena like swarms of birds, since it suggests that \nconsciousness, like swarms of birds, cannot be reductively \nexplained by appealing to their physical constituents. Thus, if the \nhard problem is a real problem then physicalism must be false, and \nif physicalism is true then the hard problem must not be a real \nproblem. \n\nA swarm of birds showing high \norder structure emerging from \nsimpler physical constituents \n\n**Historical precedents**\n\nThe hard problem of consciousness has scholarly antecedents considerably earlier than Chalmers. \nChalmers himself notes that \"a number of thinkers in the recent and distant past\" have \"recognised the \nparticular difficulties of explaining consciousness.\"[33] He states that all his original 1996 paper \ncontributed to the discussion was \"a catchy name, a minor reformulation of philosophically familiar \npoints\".[33] \n\nAmong others, thinkers who have made arguments similar to Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem \ninclude Isaac Newton,[34] John Locke,[35] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,[36][34] John Stuart Mill,[37] and \nThomas Henry Huxley.[38][34] Likewise, Asian philosophers like Dharmakirti and Guifeng Zongmi \ndiscussed the problem of how consciousness arises from unconscious matter.[34][39][40][41]",
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- "text": "In other words, the 'strong line' holds that the solution to the meta-problem would provide an explanation \nof our beliefs about consciousness that is independent of consciousness. That would debunk our beliefs \nabout consciousness, in the same way that explaining beliefs about god in evolutionary terms may \nprovide arguments against theism itself.[144] \n\n**In popular culture**\n\nTom Stoppard's play*The Hard Problem*, first produced in 2015, is named after the hard problem of \nconsciousness, which Stoppard defines as having \"subjective First Person experiences\".[145] \n\n**See also**\n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| • Animal consciousness | • Binding problem • | | • Blindsight • Chinese room | • Cogito_ergo_sum • Cognition | | • Free will • Ideasthesia • Introspection | |
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\n \n\n**Notes**\n\n1. \"But, without any delusive representations of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I \nam, and that I know and delight in this. In respect to these truths I am not at all afraid of the \narguments of the Academians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I \nam. For he who is not, cannot be deceived...\" \n\n2. There has been debate over how best to characterize James' position. The*Stanford*\n*Encyclopedia of Philosophy*states: \"James’s commitment to panpsychism remains \nsomewhat controversial, since he also advanced a cogent set of objections against a \nversion of the view, which he labelled the 'mind dust' theory, in chapter six of The Principles \nof Psychology ([1890] 1981). These objections are the inspiration for the so-called \n'combination problem', around which much of the twenty first century literature on \npanpsychism focuses.\"",
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- "text": "Attitudes towards physicalism also differ among professionals. In the 2009 PhilPapers survey, 56.5% of \nphilosophers surveyed subscribed to physicalism and 27.1% of philosophers surveyed rejected \nphysicalism. 16.4% fell into the \"other\" category.[51] In the 2020 PhilPapers survey, 51.93% of \nphilosophers surveyed indicated that they \"accept or lean towards\" physicalism and 32.08% indicated that \nthey reject physicalism. 6.23% were \"agnostic\" or \"undecided\".[25] \n\nDifferent solutions have been proposed to the hard problem of consciousness. The sections below \ntaxonomizes the various responses to the hard problem. The shape of this taxonomy was first introduced \nby Chalmers in a 2003 literature review on the topic.[52] The labelling convention of this taxonomy has \nbeen incorporated into the technical vocabulary of analytic philosophy, being used by philosophers such \nas Adrian Boutel,[53] Raamy Majeed,[54] Janet Levin,[55] Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg,[56] Roberto \nPereira,[57] and Helen Yetter-Chappell.[58] \n\n**Type-A Materialism**\n\nType-A materialism (also known as*reductive materialism*or*a priori physicalism*) is a view characterized \nby a commitment to physicalism and a full rejection of the hard problem. By this view, the hard problem \neither does not exist or is just another easy problem, because every fact about the mind is a fact about the \nperformance of various functions or behaviours. So, once all the relevant functions and behaviours have \nbeen accounted for, there will not be any facts left over in need of explanation.[52] Thinkers who \nsubscribe to type-A materialism include Paul and Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Keith Frankish, \nand Thomas Metzinger. \n\nSome type-A materialists believe in the reality of phenomenal consciousness but believe it is nothing \nextra in addition to certain functions or behaviours. This view is sometimes referred to as*strong*\n*reductionism*.[43][52] Other type-A materialists may reject the existence of phenomenal consciousness \nentirely. This view is referred to as eliminative materialism or illusionism.[59][60][61] \n\n**Strong reductionism**\n\nMany philosophers have disputed that there is a hard problem of consciousness distinct from what \nChalmers calls the easy problems of consciousness. Some among them, who are sometimes termed*strong*\n*reductionists*, hold that phenomenal consciousness (i.e., conscious experience) does exist but that it can \nbe fully understood as reducible to the brain.[43] \n\nBroadly, strong reductionists accept that conscious experience is real but argue it can be fully understood \nin functional terms as an emergent property of the material brain.[43] In contrast to weak reductionists \n(see above), strong reductionists reject ideas used to support the existence of a hard problem (that the \nsame functional organization could exist without consciousness, or that a blind person who understood \nvision through a textbook would not know everything about sight) as simply mistaken intuitions.[43][52] \n\nA notable family of strong reductionist accounts are the higher-order theories of consciousness.[62][43] In \n2005, the philosopher Peter Carruthers wrote about \"recognitional concepts of experience\", that is, \"a \ncapacity to recognize [a] type of experience when it occurs in one's own mental life,\" and suggested that \nsuch a capacity could explain phenomenal consciousness without positing qualia.[63] On the higher-order \nview, since consciousness is a representation, and representation is fully functionally analyzable, there is \nno hard problem of consciousness.[43]",
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- "text": "g%7CHard) \n\n5. JCS vol. 4, pp. 3-46, 1997 \n6. Chalmers, David (1997). \"Moving forward on the problem of consciousness\".*Journal of*\n\n*Consciousness Studies*.**4**(1): 3–46. \n\n7. Shear, Jonathan (1997).*Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem*. MIT Press. \n\nISBN 978-0262692212. \n\n8. \"Episode 83, The David Chalmers Interview (Part I - Consciousness)\" (https://thepanpsycas \n\nt.com/panpsycast2/episode83-1).*The Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast*. 19 July 2020. \nRetrieved 2020-09-05. \n\n9. Pinker, Steven (29 January 2007). \"The Brain: The Mystery of Consciousness\" (http://conten \nt.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580394-1,00.html).*Time*. Retrieved 19 December \n2018. \n\n10. Levine, Joseph (2009-01-15). \"The Explanatory Gap\" (https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/vi \new/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199262618-e-17).*The*\n*Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*: 281–291. \ndoi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0017 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9 \n780199262618.003.0017). ISBN 978-0199262618. \n\n11. McGinn, Colin (20 February 2012). \"All machine and no ghost?\" (http://www.newstatesman. \ncom/ideas/2012/02/consciousness-mind-brain).*New Statesman*. Retrieved 27 March 2012. \n12. Block, Ned (2002). \"The Harder Problem of Consciousness\" (https://philpapers.org/rec/BLO \nTHP).*The Journal of Philosophy*.**99**(8): 391–425. doi:10.2307/3655621 (https://doi.org/10. \n2307%2F3655621). JSTOR 3655621 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655621). \nS2CID 111383062 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:111383062). \n\n13. Varela, F.J. (1 April 1996). \"Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard \n\nproblem\" (https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1996/00000003/00000004/718). \n*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**3**(4): 330–349.",
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- "text": "Steven Novella has dismissed it as \"the hard non-problem\".[24] According to a 2020 PhilPapers survey, a \nmajority (62.42%) of the philosophers surveyed said they believed that the hard problem is a genuine \nproblem, while 29.72% said that it does not exist.[25] \n\nThere are a number of other potential philosophical problems that are related to the Hard Problem. Ned \nBlock believes that there exists a \"Harder Problem of Consciousness\", due to the possibility of different \nphysical and functional neurological systems potentially having phenomenal overlap.[12] Another \npotential philosophical problem which is closely related to Benj Hellie's vertiginous question, dubbed \n\"The Even Harder Problem of Consciousness\", refers to why a given individual has their own particular \npersonal identity, as opposed to existing as someone else.[26] \n\n**Overview**\n\nCognitive scientist David Chalmers first formulated the hard problem in his paper \"Facing up to the \nproblem of consciousness\" (1995)[1] and expanded upon it in*The Conscious Mind*(1996). His works \nprovoked comment. Some, such as philosopher David Lewis and Steven Pinker, have praised Chalmers \nfor his argumentative rigour and \"impeccable clarity\".[27] Pinker later said, in 2018, \"In the end I still \nthink that the hard problem is a meaningful conceptual problem, but agree with Dennett that it is not a \nmeaningful scientific problem. No one will ever get a grant to study whether you are a zombie or whether \nthe same Captain Kirk walks on the deck of the Enterprise and the surface of Zakdorn. And I agree with \nseveral other philosophers that it may be futile to hope for a solution at all, precisely because it is a \nconceptual problem, or, more accurately, a problem with our concepts.\"[28] Daniel Dennett and Patricia \nChurchland, among others, believe that the hard problem is best seen as a collection of easy problems that \nwill be solved through further analysis of the brain and behaviour.[29][30] \n\nConsciousness is an ambiguous term. It can be used to mean self consciousness, awareness, the state of \nbeing awake, and so on. Chalmers uses Thomas Nagel's definition of consciousness: \"*the feeling of what*\n*it is like to be something.\"*Consciousness, in this sense, is synonymous with*experience.*[31][27] \n\n**Chalmers' formulation**\n\n. . .even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions \nin the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal \nreport—there may still remain a further unanswered question:*Why is the performance of these*\n*functions accompanied by experience?*\n\n— David Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of consciousness \n\nThe problems of consciousness, Chalmers argues, are of two kinds: the*easy problems*and the*hard*\n*problem*. \n\n**Easy problems**\n\nThe easy problems are amenable to reductive inquiry. They are a logical consequence of lower-level facts \nabout the world, similar to how a clock's ability to tell time is a logical consequence of its clockwork and \nstructure, or a hurricane being a logical consequence of the structures and functions of certain weather",
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- "text": "\n \n \n \n \n [html]| rec ( SCAUAA - 2 ). Journal of the American Philosophical Association B [ 1 ]. 52 – 71. doit LEL1L1L1L1L1L1L1H27 / ispa - 203347 ( Potpa :// doicorga ' s31.1117962F : spaa. 2033.47 ). S2CO3 Z286727.29 ( Mpr5.57api. semanticschrobiat. organg | | 80. Augustine of Hippo. \" Book 11, Chapter 26 \". City of God. | | 81. Descartes, Rene ( 1637 ). \" 4 \". Discourse on the Method. | | 82. Descartes, Rene ( 1641 ), \" Second Meditation \". Meditations on First Philosophy. | | 83. Chalmers, David ( 2020 ), “ Debunking Argumerts for Illusionion ” ( https :// philpapers. org / ec / CHADAF - 2 ), Journal of Concousness Studies. If ( 5 – 6 ): 258 – 261. | | 84 Chalmers, David ( 2002 ), \" Debunking Arguments for Illusionion \" [ https :// philpapers. org / ec / CHADAF - 2 ), Journal of Corocousness Studies. ZY ( 5 – 6 )]. ZSI - 201. | | 85. Strawson, C - ( 20124 ), “ The Consciousness Deniers ” [ https :// www. mybooks. com / daily / 2018 / 03.3 / 39e - consciousness - demiers $). The New York Review of Books. | | 86. Koch, Christof ( 20159 ). The Feeling of Life itself : Why Consciousness is Everywhere But Can ’ t be Computed MIT Press. p. 2 | | 87. Koch, Christal ( 20159 ). The Feeling of Life Itself : Why Consciousness is Everywhere But Can ’ t be Computed MIT Press. p. 3. | | 88. Balmer, A ( 2020 ), “ Soft - Wired Illusionism vs. the Meta - Problem of Consciousness ”,( https :// ohjlpapers. org / rec / BanLSIV ). Journal of Consoousness Studies : zf ( p - 6 ). 26 – 37. | | 89. Chalmers, David ( 2020 ), ' Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?\". Journal of Contoossness Studies : Zf ( 5 – 6 ): 221 – 257. | | 90.91 Papineau, D ( 20159, “ Response to Chalmers ” The Meta - Problem of Consciousness ” ( https :// philgapers. org / res :/ PPTC -( 5 ). Journal of Consciousness Studies : 86 ( 0 – 10 ): 170 – 121. | | 92... ILevine, \" Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap \" in Stuart R. Hameroff, Affed W. Kazaniak and David Chalmers ( eds.). Towards a Science of Corsciousness III : The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, The MIT Peess, 24 | | 92. Gennaro, Rocco. 3 “ Consciousness ” ( https :// www. ep. utm. edu / consciou ). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. | | ISE, Brick, Next ’, Stabilitaker, Publishti, CDERS, Conceptual Anglobiological, Qualitary, and the Ecytopatory Color ’, PrtqcHewernyu edu / goacildeptibilitie / faculty / brock - bropers / EcoplanatoryGag adily ( PSF ), The Phitosps | | 94 Stallgar, Dariel ( 2005 ), “ Physicalesm and Phenomenal Concepter ”, Mind & Languager, 20 ( 5 ). 490 – 494 ( 00 : 111111111111111111110259 : 3394.33055.0029Ex ( Pitprc / l9bri. orga10.1111111942F ), 02939 :. 0094.2 : 00296.4 ). | | 55. Chalmers, Devid ( 2006 ), \" Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Ctg /\" ( http :// corocc. ne | \n \n\n96. Wierzbicka, A. (2019). \"From 'Consciousness' to 'I Think, I Feel, I Know': A Commentary on \n\nDavid Chalmers\".*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**26**(9–10): 257–269. \n\n97. Lau, Hakwan; Michel, Matthias (2019). \"A Socio-Historical Take on the Meta-Problem of \n\nConsciousness\".*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**26**(9–10): 136–147. \n\n98. \"Is the hard problem of consciousness really that hard? | Brian Greene and Pat Churchland \nlock horns\" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hru5d_wsu7g).*YouTube*. 9 July 2022. \n\n99. \"Abiogenesis\" (https://www.allaboutscience.org/abiogenesis.htm).",
- "page_start": 23,
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- "text": "66. Harris, Sam. \"Making Sense #96\" (https://samharris.org/subscriber-extras/96-nature-conscio \nusness/).*SamHarris.org*. Sam Harris. Retrieved 27 August 2020. \"(25.45) TM:I think it will \nnot be a mystery. Life is not a mystery anymore, but a hundred and fifty years ago many \npeople thought that this is an irreducible mystery. (25:57) Harris:So you're not a fan \nanymore, if you ever were, of the framing by David Chalmers of the Hard Problem of \nConsciousness? Metzinger: No, that's so boring. I mean, that's last century. I mean, you \nknow, we all respect Dave [Chalmers], and we know he is very smart and has got a very fast \nmind, no debate about that. But conceivability arguments are just very, very weak. If you \nhave an ill-defined folk psychological umbrella term like \"consciousness\", then you can pull \noff all kinds of scenarios and zombie thought experiments. It doesn't really… It helped to \nclarify some issues in the mid 90's, but the consciousness community has listened to this \nand just moved on. I mean nobody of the serious researchers in the field thinks about this \nanymore, but it has taken on like a folkloristic life of its own. A lot of people talk about the \nHard Problem who wouldn't be able to state what it consists in now.\" \n\n67. Garrett, Brian Jonathan (May 2006). \"What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About \n\nConsciousness and the 'Hard Problem' \".*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.**72**\n(3): 576–588. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00584.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1933-1 \n592.2006.tb00584.x). \n\n68. Hacker, Peter (2010). \"Hacker's challenge\" (http://philpapers.org/rec/HACHC).*The*\n\n*Philosophers' Magazine*.**51**(51): 23–32. doi:10.5840/tpm2010517 (https://doi.org/10.5840% \n2Ftpm2010517). \n\n69. Schaal, David W. (2005). \"Naming Our Concerns About Neuroscience: A Review of Bennett \nand Hacker's*Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*\" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pm \nc/articles/PMC1389787).*Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior*.**84**(3): 683–692. \ndoi:10.1901/jeab.2005.83-05 (https://doi.org/10.1901%2Fjeab.2005.83-05). PMC 1389787 \n(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1389787). PMID 16596986 (https://pubmed. \nncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16596986). \n\n70. Dennett, Daniel C. (1979). \"On the Absence of Phenomenology\". In Gustafson, Donald F.; \nTapscott, Bangs L. (eds.).*Body, Mind, and Method*. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 93– \n113. \n\n71. Dennett, Daniel C. (1991).*Consciousness Explained*. Penguin Books. \n72. Dennett, Daniel C. (2003). \"Explaining the 'magic' of consciousness\".*Journal of Cultural and*\n*Evolutionary Psychology*.**1**(1): 7–19. doi:10.1556/jcep.1.2003.1.2 (https://doi.org/10.1556% \n2Fjcep.1.2003.1.2). S2CID 144560246 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:14456024 \n6). \n\n73. Dennett, Daniel C. (1991).*Consciousness explained*(https://archive.org/details/consciousne \n\nssexp00denn). Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 978-0316180658. \n\n74. Anthis, Jacy (2022). \"Consciousness Semanticism: A Precise Eliminativist Theory of \nConsciousness\" (https://philarchive.org/rec/ANTCSA).*Biologically Inspired Cognitive*\n*Architectures 2021*. Studies in Computational Intelligence. Vol. 1032. pp. 20–41. \ndoi:10.1007/978-3-030-96993-6_3 (https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-030-96993-6_3). \nISBN 978-3-030-96992-9. Retrieved 7 August 2022. \n\n75. Irvine, Elizabeth (2013).*Consciousness as a scientific concept: a philosophy of science*\n\n*perspective*. Studies in brain and mind. Vol. 5. Dordrecht; New York: Springer-Verlag. p. 167 \n(https://books.google.com/books?id=jO4HNB7OoUgC&pg=PA167). ISBN 9789400751729. \n76. Chalmers, David (2018). \"The Meta-Problem of Consciousness\" (http://consc.net/papers/me \n\ntaproblem.pdf) (PDF).*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**25**(9–10): 6–61. Retrieved \n6 February 2019. \n\n77. Graziano, Michael (2013).*Consciousness and the social brain*. Oxford; New York: Oxford \n\nUniversity Press. ISBN 978-0190263195.",
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- "text": "physical constituents. For example, water is nothing \nmore than H2O molecules, and understanding everything \nabout H2O molecules is to understand everything there is \nto know about water. But consciousness is not like this. \nKnowing everything there is to know about the brain, or \nany physical system, is not to know everything there is to \nknow about consciousness. Consciousness, then, must \nnot be purely physical.[27] \n\n\n\n**Implications for physicalism**\n\n\n\nThe hard problem is often illustrated by \nappealing to the logical possibility of inverted \nvisible spectra. If there is no logical \ncontradiction in supposing that one's colour \nvision could be inverted, it follows that \nmechanistic explanations of visual processing \ndo not determine facts about what it is like to \nsee colours. \n\nChalmers's \nidea contradicts physicalism, sometimes \nlabelled materialism. This is the view that everything that \nexists is a physical or material thing, so everything can \nbe reduced to microphysical things. For example, the \nrings of Saturn are a physical thing because they are \nnothing more than a complex arrangement of a large \nnumber of subatomic particles interacting in a certain way. \nAccording to physicalism, everything, including consciousness, \ncan be explained by appeal to its microphysical constituents. \nChalmers's*hard problem*presents a counterexample to this view \nand to other phenomena like swarms of birds, since it suggests that \nconsciousness, like swarms of birds, cannot be reductively \nexplained by appealing to their physical constituents. Thus, if the \nhard problem is a real problem then physicalism must be false, and \nif physicalism is true then the hard problem must not be a real \nproblem. \n\nA swarm of birds showing high \norder structure emerging from \nsimpler physical constituents \n\n**Historical precedents**\n\nThe hard problem of consciousness has scholarly antecedents considerably earlier than Chalmers. \nChalmers himself notes that \"a number of thinkers in the recent and distant past\" have \"recognised the \nparticular difficulties of explaining consciousness.\"[33] He states that all his original 1996 paper \ncontributed to the discussion was \"a catchy name, a minor reformulation of philosophically familiar \npoints\".[33] \n\nAmong others, thinkers who have made arguments similar to Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem \ninclude Isaac Newton,[34] John Locke,[35] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,[36][34] John Stuart Mill,[37] and \nThomas Henry Huxley.[38][34] Likewise, Asian philosophers like Dharmakirti and Guifeng Zongmi \ndiscussed the problem of how consciousness arises from unconscious matter.[34][39][40][41]",
- "page_start": 3,
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- "text": "134. Blackmore, Susan (2014). \"The Neural Correlates of Consciousness\" (https://www.edge.org/ \n\nresponse-detail/25457).*Edge.org*. Retrieved 22 April 2018. \n\n135. Krohn, Stephan; Ostwald, Dirk (2017). \"Computing integrated information\" (https://www.ncbi. \nnlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6007153).*Neuroscience of Consciousness*.**2017**(1): nix017. \ndoi:10.1093/nc/nix017 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fnc%2Fnix017). PMC 6007153 (https://ww \nw.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6007153). PMID 30042849 (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.ni \nh.gov/30042849). \n\n136. Cerullo, Michael A. (September 2015). Kording, Konrad P. (ed.). \"The Problem with Phi: A \n\nCritique of Integrated Information Theory\" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC45 \n74706).*PLOS Computational Biology*.**11**(9): e1004286. Bibcode:2015PLSCB..11E4286C \n(https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2015PLSCB..11E4286C). \ndoi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004286 (https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1004286). \nPMC 4574706 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4574706). PMID 26378789 \n(https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26378789). \n\n137. Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2017). \"The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness\" (http \n\ns://philosophynow.org/issues/121/The_Integrated_Information_Theory_of_Consciousness). \n*Philosophy Now*. Retrieved 22 April 2018. \n\n138. Oizumi, Masafumi; Albantakis, Larissa; Tononi, Giulio (May 2014). \"From the \n\nPhenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0\" \n(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4014402).*PLOS Computational Biology*.**10**\n(5): e1003588. Bibcode:2014PLSCB..10E3588O (https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2014PL \nSCB..10E3588O). doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 (https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pcb \ni.1003588). PMC 4014402 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4014402). \nPMID 24811198 (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24811198). \n\n139. Mindt, Garrett (2017). \"The Problem with the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory\" \n\n(http://newdualism.org/papers/G.Mindt/Mindt-JCS2017.pdf) (PDF).*Journal of*\n*Consciousness Studies*.**24**(7–8): 130–154. Retrieved 22 February 2022. \n\n140. Baars, Bernard J. (2005). \"Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive \nneuroscience of human experience\".*The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and*\n*Neuropathology*. Progress in Brain Research. Vol. 150. pp. 45–53. \nCiteSeerX 10.1.1.456.2829 (https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.456. \n2829). doi:10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50004-9 (https://doi.org/10.1016%2FS0079-6123%280 \n5%2950004-9). ISBN 9780444518514. PMID 16186014 (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/1 \n6186014). \n\n141. Dehaene, Stanislas; Naccache, Lionel (2001). \"Towards a cognitive neuroscience of \n\nconsciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework\" (http://zoo.cs.yale.edu/classes/ \ncs671/12f/12f-papers/dehaene-consciousness.pdf) (PDF).*Cognition*.**79**(1–2): 1–37. \ndoi:10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2 (https://doi.org/10.1016%2FS0010-0277%2800%2900 \n123-2). PMID 11164022 (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11164022). S2CID 1762431 (http \ns://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:1762431). Retrieved 5 April 2019. \n\n142. Dalton, J. W. (1997). \"The unfinished theatre\".*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**4**(4): \n\n316–318. \n\n143. Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1997). \"Why don't we know what Mary knows? Baars' reversing the \n\nproblem of qualia\".*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**4**(4): 319–324. \n\n144.*The Meta-Problem of Consciousness | Professor David Chalmers | Talks at Google*(https:// \n\nwww.youtube.com/watch?v=OsYUWtLQBS0), 2 April 2019, retrieved 2022-01-11 \n145. Stoppard, Tom (28 January 2015). \"First Person\".*Programme notes*. London: Royal \n\nNational Theatre.",
- "page_start": 26,
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- "text": "34. Chalmers, David (2020). \"Is the hard problem of consciousness universal?\" (http://consc.ne \n\nt/papers/universal.pdf) (PDF).*Journal of Consciousness Studies*.**27**(5–6): 227–257. \nRetrieved 22 February 2022. \n\n35. Locke, John (1722).*The works of John Locke: in three volumes*. Vol. 1. London: Printed for \n\nA. Churchill, and A. Manship, and sold by W. Taylor in Pater-noster-Row. p. 293 (https://book \ns.google.com/books?id=0BfmAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA293). \n\n36. Leibniz,*Monadology,*17, as quoted by Aranyosi, Istvan (2004). \"Chalmers's zombie \n\narguments\" (http://www.personal.ceu.hu/students/03/Istvan_Aranyosi/Chapter%20IV.pdf) \n(PDF) (draft ed.). Central European University Personal Pages. \n\n37. Mill, John Stuart.*A System of Logic*(1843), Book V, Chapter V, section 3 \n38. Huxley, Thomas Henry; Youmans, William Jay (1868).*The elements of physiology and*\n*hygiene: a text-book for educational institutions*. New York: D. Appleton and company. \np. 178 (https://books.google.com/books?id=aVUAAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA178). \n\n39. Arnold, Dan (2021). \"Philosophy of Mind's \"Hard Problem\" in Light of Buddhist Idealism\". In \nEmmanuel, Steven M. (ed.).*Philosophy's Big Questions: Comparing Buddhist and Western*\n*Approaches*. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 97–128. ISBN 978-0231174879. \n40. Bryan Van Norden,*Buddhism Comes to China*(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1xv3H \n\nmUddY), 17 March 2021, retrieved 2021-12-29 \n\n41. Tiwald, Justin; Van Norden, Bryan W. eds. (2005),*Readings in Later Chinese Philosophy,*p. \n\n101. Hackett Publishing. \n\n42. Levine, J. 1983. “Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap”.*Pacific Philosophical*\n\n*Quarterly*, 64: 354–361. \n\n43. Weisberg, Josh. \"The Hard Problem of Consciousness\" (https://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/). \n\n*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. \n\n44. Seager, William. \"Are Zombies Logically Possible?\" (https://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/z",
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- "text": "Today there is a strong tendency to simply*equate*consciousness with the qualia. Yet there is \nclearly something not quite right about this. The \"itchiness of itches\" and the \"hurtfulness of \npain\" are qualities we are conscious*of*. So philosophy of mind tends to treat consciousness as \nif it consisted simply of the contents of consciousness (the phenomenal qualities), while it \nreally is precisely*consciousness*of contents, the very givenness of whatever is subjectively \ngiven. And therefore the problem of consciousness does not pertain so much to some alleged \n\"mysterious, nonpublic objects\", i.e. objects that seem to be only \"visible\" to the respective \nsubject, but rather to the nature of \"seeing\" itself (and in today’s philosophy of mind \nastonishingly little is said about the latter).[129] \n\n**Relationship to scientific frameworks**\n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Specimens | Table | Patients | Table | Table | Table | Development | Table | Table | Since | State | \n \n\n\n \n \n \n \n [html]| Solved. | Statestics | Table | Table | Table | Maximum | Temperature ( mm ) | Table | Since 15 | Data | Adjusted | Species | \n \n\nOne can always ask why these processes of availability should give rise to consciousness in \nthe first place. As yet we cannot explain why they do so, and it may well be that full details \nabout the processes of availability will still fail to answer this question. Certainly, nothing in \nthe standard methodology I have outlined answers the question; that methodology assumes a \nrelation between availability and consciousness, and therefore does nothing to explain it. [...] \nSo the hard problem remains. But who knows: Somewhere along the line we may be led to \nthe relevant insights that show why the link is there, and the hard problem may then be \nsolved.[132] \n\nThe neuroscientist and Nobel laureate Eric Kandel wrote that locating the NCCs would not solve the hard \nproblem, but rather one of the so-called easy problems to which the hard problem is contrasted.[133] \nKandel went on to note Crick and Koch's suggestion that once the binding problem—understanding what \naccounts for the unity of experience—is solved, it will be possible to solve the hard problem \nempirically.[133] However, neuroscientist Anil Seth argued that emphasis on the so-called hard problem is \na distraction from what he calls the \"real problem\": understanding the neurobiology underlying",
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- "text": "This stance has recently taken on the name of*illusionism*: the view that phenomenal consciousness is an \nillusion. The term was popularized by the philosopher Keith Frankish.[60] Frankish argues that \n\"illusionism\" is preferable to \"eliminativism\" for labelling the view that phenomenal consciousness is an \nillusion. More substantively, Frankish argues that illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is \npreferable to realism about phenomenal consciousness. He states: \"Theories of consciousness typically \naddress the hard problem. They accept that phenomenal consciousness is real and aim to explain how it \ncomes to exist. There is, however, another approach, which holds that phenomenal consciousness is an \nillusion and aims to explain why it seems to exist.\"[19] Frankish concludes that illusionism \"replaces the \nhard problem with the illusion problem—the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality \narises and why it is so powerful.\"[19] \n\nThe philosopher Daniel Dennett is another prominent figure associated with illusionism. After Frankish \npublished a paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies titled*Illusionism as a Theory of*\n*Consciousness,*[60] Dennett responded with his own paper with the spin-off title*Illusionism as the*\n*Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness.*[61] Dennett has been arguing for the illusory status of \nconsciousness since early on in his career. For example, in 1979 he published a paper titled*On the*\n*Absence of Phenomenology*(where he argues for the nonexistence of phenomenal consciousness).[70] \nSimilar ideas have been explicated in his 1991 book Consciousness Explained.[71] Dennett argues that the \nso-called \"hard problem\" will be solved in the process of solving what Chalmers terms the \"easy \nproblems\".[16] He compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary \nillusions out of ordinary things.[72] To show how people might be commonly fooled into overstating the \naccuracy of their introspective abilities, he describes a phenomenon called change blindness, a visual \nprocess that involves failure to detect scenery changes in a series of alternating images.[73] He \naccordingly argues that consciousness need not be what it seems to be based on introspection. To address \nthe question of the hard problem, or how and why physical processes give rise to experience, Dennett \nstates that the phenomenon of having experience is nothing more than the performance of functions or the \nproduction of behavior, which can also be referred to as the easy problems of consciousness.[16] Thus, \nDennett argues that the hard problem of experience is included among—not separate from—the easy \nproblems, and therefore they can only be explained together as a cohesive unit.[72] \n\nEliminativists differ on the role they believe intuitive judgement plays in creating the apparent reality of \nconsciousness. The philosopher Jacy Reese Anthis is of the position that this issue is born of an \noverreliance on intuition, calling philosophical discussions on the topic of consciousness a form of \n\"intuition jousting\".[74] But when the issue is tackled with \"formal argumentation\" and \"precise \nsemantics\" then the hard problem will dissolve.[74] The philosopher Elizabeth Irvine, in contrast, can be \nread as having the opposite view, since she argues that phenomenal properties (that is, properties of \nconsciousness) do not exist in our common-sense view of the world. She states that \"the hard problem of \nconsciousness may not be a genuine problem for non-philosophers (despite its overwhelming obviousness \nto philosophers).\"[75]",
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- "text": "impossible within the bounds of nature but possible within the bounds of logic.[47] This would imply that \nfacts about experience are not logically entailed by the \"physical\" facts. Therefore, consciousness is \nirreducible. In Chalmers' words, \"after God (hypothetically) created the world, he had more work to \ndo.\"[48] Daniel Dennett, a philosopher of mind, criticised the field's use of \"the zombie hunch\" which he \ndeems an \"embarrassment\"[49] that ought to \"be dropped like a hot potato\".[29] \n\n**Knowledge argument**\n\nThe knowledge argument, also known as*Mary's Room*, is another common thought experiment: A \nhypothetical neuroscientist named Mary has lived her whole life in a black-and-white room and has never \nseen colour before. She also happens to know everything there is to know about the brain and colour \nperception.[50] Chalmers believes[48] that when Mary sees the colour red for the first time, she gains new \nknowledge — the knowledge of \"what red looks like\" — which is distinct from, and irreducible to, her \nprior physical knowledge of the brain or visual system. A stronger form of the knowledge argument[50] \nclaims not merely that Mary would lack subjective*knowledge*of \"what red looks like,\" but that she \nwould lack knowledge of an objective*fact*about the world: namely, \"what red looks like,\" a non-physical \nfact that can be learned only through direct experience (qualia). Others, such as Thomas Nagel, take a \n\"physicalist\" position, disagree with the argument in its stronger and/or weaker forms.[50] For example, \nNagel put forward a \"speculative proposal\" of devising a language that could \"explain to a person blind \nfrom birth what it is like to see.\"[31] The knowledge argument implies that such a language could not \nexist. \n\n**Philosophical responses**\n\nDavid Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem of consciousness provoked considerable debate within \nphilosophy of mind, as well as scientific research.[43] \n\nis considered a problem primarily for \nThe hard problem \nphysicalist views of the mind (the view that the mind is a physical \nobject or process), since physical explanations tend to be \nfunctional, or structural. Because of this, some physicalists have \nresponded to the hard problem by seeking to show that it dissolves \nupon analysis. Other researchers accept the problem as real and \nseek to develop a theory of consciousness' place in the world that \ncan solve it, by either modifying physicalism or abandoning it in \nfavour of an alternative ontology (such as panpsychism or \ndualism). A third response has been to accept the hard problem as \nreal but deny human cognitive faculties can solve it. \nA diagram showing the relationship \nbetween various views concerning \nthe relationship between \nconsciousness and the physical \nworld \n\nPhilPapers is an organization that archives academic philosophy \npapers and periodically surveys professional philosophers about their views. It can be used to gauge \nprofessional attitudes towards the hard problem. As of the 2020 survey results, it seems that the majority \nof philosophers (62.42%) agree that the hard problem is real, with a substantial minority that disagrees \n(29.76%).[25]",
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- "text": "' s role is to assist the Board onsibilities associated with the ounts, its external financial tiemal control structure, risk | annual declaration of their independence to the Audit Committee. |