Issue_URL,Issue_ID,Issue_ Title,Issue_Body,Class_Txt,Privacy Yes/No,Remark https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/11275,1147073347,Prevent tagsinput select element to be submitted without a value when they are required,"Fixes #11274 Additionally, we now perform the same validity check when sending a private message than we do when compiling the list of valid recipients for display in the new message page.","Prevent tagsinput select element to be submitted without a value when they are required Fixes #11274 Additionally, we now perform the same validity check when sending a private message than we do when compiling the list of valid recipients for display in the new message page.",No,Discusses a bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/twilio/twilio-video-ios/issues/225,1130649011,Smart cover on iPad running iOS 15 may cause audio issue by audio interruptions,"### Description On iPads running iOS 15, while in a live video call, if you use smart cover, the remote participant may observe no audio. This is an iOS behavior where it interrupts audio capture from the microphone for VoIP calls when smart cover is used. ### Steps to Reproduce 1. iPad running iOS 15 having smart cover 2. Connect to a Room and observe the bi-direction audio 3. Use smart cover and close the screen. 4. No audio is observed on the remote side. ### Over writing the audio interruption behavior Use [overrideMutedMicrophoneInterruption](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/avfaudio/avaudiosession/categoryoptions/3727255-overridemutedmicrophoneinterrupt/) AVAudioSession Category Option. Here is an example code snippet on how to set the category options using DefaultAudioDevice. ``` try if #available(iOS 14.5, *) { let audioDevice = DefaultAudioDevice() TwilioVideoSDK.audioDevice = audioDevice audioDevice.block = { do { DefaultAudioDevice.DefaultAVAudioSessionConfigurationBlock() let audioSession = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance() audioSession.setCategory(AVAudioSession.Category.playAndRecord, mode: AVAudioSession.Mode.videoChat, options: [AVAudioSession.CategoryOptions.allowBluetooth, AVAudioSession.CategoryOptions.overrideMutedMicrophoneInterruption] ) } catch let error as NSError { print(""Fail: \(error.localizedDescription)"") } } audioDevice.block(); } ``` #### iOS Version iOS 15 #### iOS Device iPad ","Smart cover on iPad running iOS 15 may cause audio issue by audio interruptions ### Description On iPads running iOS 15, while in a live video call, if you use smart cover, the remote participant may observe no audio. This is an iOS behavior where it interrupts audio capture from the microphone for VoIP calls when smart cover is used. ### Steps to Reproduce 1. iPad running iOS 15 having smart cover 2. Connect to a Room and observe the bi-direction audio 3. Use smart cover and close the screen. 4. No audio is observed on the remote side. ### Over writing the audio interruption behavior Use [overrideMutedMicrophoneInterruption](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/avfaudio/avaudiosession/categoryoptions/3727255-overridemutedmicrophoneinterrupt/) AVAudioSession Category Option. Here is an example code snippet on how to set the category options using DefaultAudioDevice. ``` try if #available(iOS 14.5, *) { let audioDevice = DefaultAudioDevice() TwilioVideoSDK.audioDevice = audioDevice audioDevice.block = { do { DefaultAudioDevice.DefaultAVAudioSessionConfigurationBlock() let audioSession = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance() audioSession.setCategory(AVAudioSession.Category.playAndRecord, mode: AVAudioSession.Mode.videoChat, options: [AVAudioSession.CategoryOptions.allowBluetooth, AVAudioSession.CategoryOptions.overrideMutedMicrophoneInterruption] ) } catch let error as NSError { print(""Fail: \(error.localizedDescription)"") } } audioDevice.block(); } ``` #### iOS Version iOS 15 #### iOS Device iPad ",No,HW fix https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/21025,1130137319,Right panel widgets can remain alive unexpectedly,"_Originally noticed by @HarHarLinks in https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/20929#issuecomment-1030632554_ Right panel widgets are no longer tearing down the widget frame when unmounted, and so can remain running in the background. This is unrelated to the widget permission to remain on screen: it happens for all widgets viewed in the right panel. Likely regressed by https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-react-sdk/pull/7575","Right panel widgets can remain alive unexpectedly _Originally noticed by @HarHarLinks in https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/20929#issuecomment-1030632554_ Right panel widgets are no longer tearing down the widget frame when unmounted, and so can remain running in the background. This is unrelated to the widget permission to remain on screen: it happens for all widgets viewed in the right panel. Likely regressed by https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-react-sdk/pull/7575",No,Discusses a bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/commons-app/apps-android-commons/issues/4779,1120173120,Send in-app feedback to wiki page instead of email,"Currently, the `Feedback` button (in the app's main menu) opens an email editor. For privacy reasons, let's switch to a form that posts the same information to the top of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback For logged-in users: 1. Show a form: - 4-lines high text area where the user must write a custom message. - Checkboxes for each line of debug information (for instance `API level: 30`, `Android version: 11`, etc). The user can unselect the debug information that will be sent. For instance, if the user does not want others to know that they are using a SM-G986B phone (for privacy reasons), they can uncheck the checkbox at the `Device model: SM-G986B` line. 2. Post the content as a new section at the top of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback . Adding a new section to a wiki article is already implemented by the app in other places, such as peer review, so it should be rather easy to implement. The probability of two users sending feedback at the exact same time is very low, but please just try to minimize the time between reading the content of the page and posting the updated content. If the user is not logged in, just open the user's browser at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback (rationale: _once there the user will be able to add a new section, and will receive the WMF's official disclaimers regarding their confidentiality_)","Send in-app feedback to wiki page instead of email Currently, the `Feedback` button (in the app's main menu) opens an email editor. For privacy reasons, let's switch to a form that posts the same information to the top of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback For logged-in users: 1. Show a form: - 4-lines high text area where the user must write a custom message. - Checkboxes for each line of debug information (for instance `API level: 30`, `Android version: 11`, etc). The user can unselect the debug information that will be sent. For instance, if the user does not want others to know that they are using a SM-G986B phone (for privacy reasons), they can uncheck the checkbox at the `Device model: SM-G986B` line. 2. Post the content as a new section at the top of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback . Adding a new section to a wiki article is already implemented by the app in other places, such as peer review, so it should be rather easy to implement. The probability of two users sending feedback at the exact same time is very low, but please just try to minimize the time between reading the content of the page and posting the updated content. If the user is not logged in, just open the user's browser at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback (rationale: _once there the user will be able to add a new section, and will receive the WMF's official disclaimers regarding their confidentiality_)",Yes,The user can select what debug information will be sent https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/20806,1118262580,Extend widget privacy information before accepting it,"### Your use case #### What would you like to do? With https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/11262#issuecomment-554131235 we got the information about what data might get transmitted to a widget. ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/2803622/151668583-c38b14cd-657f-43e4-9b8b-5ad524249e63.png) I would like to see this extended for privacy concerns: 1. It would be good if this warning could determine in advance not what data could, but actually will be transmitted to the widget. 2. The warning says ""might transmit data to XY"", and store cookies. In above screenshot I tried adding several different widgets using a self hosted dimension integration manager. It will always say dimension, even if you embed a totally different page. With dev tools we can see that e.g. `""data.url"": ""https://framadate.org/somehashhere""`. I would like to be able to preview what actually is embedded based on the actual content that's loaded. (I'm not sure however, some of this might be specific to how dimension works.) #### Why would you like to do it? 1. More fine grained control/expectation about what data you're willing to expose 2. Can decide if I want to share above info to that specific site. This is important because I might trust things hosted by my homeserver or reputable organizations, but not others. Further, this doesn't depend on the widget title being set and trusted to tell me what this is. #### How would you like to achieve it? 1. Think similar to installing an app on android: This widget requires the following: mxid, roomid, etc. This might eventually need some spec about how to define those requirements. 2. Maybe just display said url field? ### Have you considered any alternatives? _No response_ ### Additional context _No response_","Extend widget privacy information before accepting it ### Your use case #### What would you like to do? With https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/11262#issuecomment-554131235 we got the information about what data might get transmitted to a widget. ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/2803622/151668583-c38b14cd-657f-43e4-9b8b-5ad524249e63.png) I would like to see this extended for privacy concerns: 1. It would be good if this warning could determine in advance not what data could, but actually will be transmitted to the widget. 2. The warning says ""might transmit data to XY"", and store cookies. In above screenshot I tried adding several different widgets using a self hosted dimension integration manager. It will always say dimension, even if you embed a totally different page. With dev tools we can see that e.g. `""data.url"": ""https://framadate.org/somehashhere""`. I would like to be able to preview what actually is embedded based on the actual content that's loaded. (I'm not sure however, some of this might be specific to how dimension works.) #### Why would you like to do it? 1. More fine grained control/expectation about what data you're willing to expose 2. Can decide if I want to share above info to that specific site. This is important because I might trust things hosted by my homeserver or reputable organizations, but not others. Further, this doesn't depend on the widget title being set and trusted to tell me what this is. #### How would you like to achieve it? 1. Think similar to installing an app on android: This widget requires the following: mxid, roomid, etc. This might eventually need some spec about how to define those requirements. 2. Maybe just display said url field? ### Have you considered any alternatives? _No response_ ### Additional context _No response_",Yes,Select what data will be transmitted to the widget https://api.github.com/repos/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1506,1117209822,Impossible to disable the Privacy Statement / End-user Agreement,"**Describe the bug** On DSpace 7, a new feature has been added to include a privacy statement and a end-user agreement: https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 Some institutions do not want to use these (especially as the users are forced to accept the end-user agreement at their first login), but there is no configurable way to disable them. Note that there is another ongoing issue about privacy statement / end-user agreement, but it is more about providing a better default text: https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080 **To Reproduce** Login for the first time with a user and get to the end-user agreement. OR Click the privacy policy or end-user agreement links in the footer. **Expected behavior** 2 new configurations should be added in order to allow repository administrators to : - Enable / Disable the end-user agreement - Enable / Disable the privacy statement **Related work** https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080 **Estimate** 5 hours","Impossible to disable the Privacy Statement / End-user Agreement **Describe the bug** On DSpace 7, a new feature has been added to include a privacy statement and a end-user agreement: https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 Some institutions do not want to use these (especially as the users are forced to accept the end-user agreement at their first login), but there is no configurable way to disable them. Note that there is another ongoing issue about privacy statement / end-user agreement, but it is more about providing a better default text: https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080 **To Reproduce** Login for the first time with a user and get to the end-user agreement. OR Click the privacy policy or end-user agreement links in the footer. **Expected behavior** 2 new configurations should be added in order to allow repository administrators to : - Enable / Disable the end-user agreement - Enable / Disable the privacy statement **Related work** https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080 **Estimate** 5 hours",Yes,Configurability of privacy statement https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/11185,1114193740,Issue 10906: prevent personal notes from being altered,Fixes #10906,Issue 10906: prevent personal notes from being altered Fixes #10906,No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/20589,1105951121,Enhance user-informed-ness about data collection,"![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/22740616/149570577-65d11b0f-a3f7-4e7e-8180-e82682424cbb.png) Element Web recently revamped its ""learn more"" panel (under Security & Privacy -> Privacy -> Analytics) to the above, it's very good, however, compared to the old panel, it loses all of the ""positive"" acknowledgements of data collection (""We will connect X""), while introducing ""negative"" ones (""We will not collect Y"")
Old Panel ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/22740616/149570904-d2634c11-3689-4a15-9bf5-f9f6f19c6091.png)
I think that this is not adequate enough, as only people who are familiar with data collection in general will be able to draw conclusions from these negative acknowlegements. Thus, I'm asking for more detailed *positive* acknowledgements as to what data is collected in above panel. Suggestions for this include; 1. grabbing those definitions from [matrix-analytics-events](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-analytics-events), and displaying these in this panel in a fashion (such as under a expansion dropdown) 2. prefixing ""negative"" acknowledgements with red/cross icons. 3. describing intentions, ""We will use data about the number of rooms you've joined to prioritise room performance optimisation, and provide the best average experience"". 4. providing a visual readout of the current live data, so that the user can double-check for themselves what data the local client is actually sending out. 5. in patch notes, include new types of data to be collected through analytics 6. provide toggles on a data-type basis for users to opt-in/out of specific analytics data. Above is in decreasing order of suggested urgency, the main thing i want to get across is that the user is informed at any time as to what data is being collected from them, that they're able to keep up-to-date with this information, and that they have complete agency over this fact, plus their participation. --- (Copied verbatim from https://github.com/vector-im/element-meta/issues/110)","Enhance user-informed-ness about data collection ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/22740616/149570577-65d11b0f-a3f7-4e7e-8180-e82682424cbb.png) Element Web recently revamped its ""learn more"" panel (under Security & Privacy -> Privacy -> Analytics) to the above, it's very good, however, compared to the old panel, it loses all of the ""positive"" acknowledgements of data collection (""We will connect X""), while introducing ""negative"" ones (""We will not collect Y"")
Old Panel ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/22740616/149570904-d2634c11-3689-4a15-9bf5-f9f6f19c6091.png)
I think that this is not adequate enough, as only people who are familiar with data collection in general will be able to draw conclusions from these negative acknowlegements. Thus, I'm asking for more detailed *positive* acknowledgements as to what data is collected in above panel. Suggestions for this include; 1. grabbing those definitions from [matrix-analytics-events](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-analytics-events), and displaying these in this panel in a fashion (such as under a expansion dropdown) 2. prefixing ""negative"" acknowledgements with red/cross icons. 3. describing intentions, ""We will use data about the number of rooms you've joined to prioritise room performance optimisation, and provide the best average experience"". 4. providing a visual readout of the current live data, so that the user can double-check for themselves what data the local client is actually sending out. 5. in patch notes, include new types of data to be collected through analytics 6. provide toggles on a data-type basis for users to opt-in/out of specific analytics data. Above is in decreasing order of suggested urgency, the main thing i want to get across is that the user is informed at any time as to what data is being collected from them, that they're able to keep up-to-date with this information, and that they have complete agency over this fact, plus their participation. --- (Copied verbatim from https://github.com/vector-im/element-meta/issues/110)",Yes,The title is informative https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/11125,1091035104,Potential directory registration consent violation,We've received [a report on the Friendica Directory repository](https://git.friendi.ca/friendica/friendica-directory/issues/83) that a node meant to be private ended up registered in the official directory and as a result got overwhelmed by tens of thousands of requests from remote nodes suddenly aware of its existence. I'm not sure how this could happen but I'd like us to make sure that this can't happen again.,Potential directory registration consent violation We've received [a report on the Friendica Directory repository](https://git.friendi.ca/friendica/friendica-directory/issues/83) that a node meant to be private ended up registered in the official directory and as a result got overwhelmed by tens of thousands of requests from remote nodes suddenly aware of its existence. I'm not sure how this could happen but I'd like us to make sure that this can't happen again.,Yes,Content was disclosed https://api.github.com/repos/covidpass-org/covidpass/issues/143,1089835702,Data Protection/Security: Document details on new ג€žEnlarge QR codeג€œ feature,"https://github.com/covidpass-org/covidpass/releases/tag/v0.5.0 made it possible to click on ""Enlarge QR-Code"" on the back of the Wallet card. When clicking on this link, one is transferred to an page like https://covidpass.marvinsextro.de/pass#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 (this is **not** my QR code but just a test one) With this feature, some questions come to my mind: - Has the data privacy note been updated? - How safe is the storage on the server? How is the link generated? What if the server is attacked, is it possible that the attackers steals all the data? - How long is the QR code stored on the page - Is it possible to remove the QR code from the page when the user wants this? - Would it make sense to ask the user whether this is wanted during the generation of the pass? - Is there a solution which works offline?","Data Protection/Security: Document details on new ג€žEnlarge QR codeג€œ feature https://github.com/covidpass-org/covidpass/releases/tag/v0.5.0 made it possible to click on ""Enlarge QR-Code"" on the back of the Wallet card. When clicking on this link, one is transferred to an page like https://covidpass.marvinsextro.de/pass#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 (this is **not** my QR code but just a test one) With this feature, some questions come to my mind: - Has the data privacy note been updated? - How safe is the storage on the server? How is the link generated? What if the server is attacked, is it possible that the attackers steals all the data? - How long is the QR code stored on the page - Is it possible to remove the QR code from the page when the user wants this? - Would it make sense to ask the user whether this is wanted during the generation of the pass? - Is there a solution which works offline?",Yes,Questions regrading the privacy protection of the app https://api.github.com/repos/simonsdave/cloudfeaster/issues/61,1087161965,need process to ensure using current rev of Alpine for runtime-lite docker image,- Alpine releases are listed [here](https://alpinelinux.org/releases/) - runtime-lite docker file is [here](https://github.com/simonsdave/cloudfeaster/blob/master/dockerfiles/runtime-lite/Dockerfile) - docker image versions are [here](https://hub.docker.com/_/alpine?tab=tags) although not sure these are needed,need process to ensure using current rev of Alpine for runtime-lite docker image - Alpine releases are listed [here](https://alpinelinux.org/releases/) - runtime-lite docker file is [here](https://github.com/simonsdave/cloudfeaster/blob/master/dockerfiles/runtime-lite/Dockerfile) - docker image versions are [here](https://hub.docker.com/_/alpine?tab=tags) although not sure these are needed,No,Discusses a bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/20212,1081379164,Calling turns on video without participant consent.,"### Steps to reproduce 1. In a group chat, start or join a jitsi call (even when clicking the ""voice call"" button). 2. Your camera is now on, without consent or warning, and visible to anyone connecting to your call. ### Outcome #### What did you expect? I expected that there would at least be a warning if it were to turn on, and if anything, hitting ""voice call"" wouldn't have turned on my camera. #### What happened instead? My camera was immediately turned on. ### Operating system _No response_ ### Application version Element version: 1.9.7 Olm version: 3.2.8 ### How did you install the app? https://community.chocolatey.org/packages/element-desktop ### Homeserver yiff.social ### Will you send logs? No","Calling turns on video without participant consent. ### Steps to reproduce 1. In a group chat, start or join a jitsi call (even when clicking the ""voice call"" button). 2. Your camera is now on, without consent or warning, and visible to anyone connecting to your call. ### Outcome #### What did you expect? I expected that there would at least be a warning if it were to turn on, and if anything, hitting ""voice call"" wouldn't have turned on my camera. #### What happened instead? My camera was immediately turned on. ### Operating system _No response_ ### Application version Element version: 1.9.7 Olm version: 3.2.8 ### How did you install the app? https://community.chocolatey.org/packages/element-desktop ### Homeserver yiff.social ### Will you send logs? No",Yes,Turns on camera without consent https://api.github.com/repos/RickBarretto/PreviewGram/issues/4,1071638101,Block non preview links,### Block non preview links The app must not open telegram.org or t.me without /s/...,Block non preview links ### Block non preview links The app must not open telegram.org or t.me without /s/...,No,Not specifically related to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/RickBarretto/PreviewGram/issues/3,1071595783,Block Fav Icon Request,### נŸƒ Run away from favicon trackers: Why block it? > Because it can track you! Look: נŸ‘€ **נŸ” Sources:** - [Browser Tracking using Fav-Icon - Shneie](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/browser-tracking-using-favicons.html) - [Favicons may be used to track users - G Hacks](https://www.ghacks.net/2021/01/22/favicons-may-be-used-to-track-users/) - [Super Cookie on Github](https://github.com/jonasstrehle/supercookie),Block Fav Icon Request ### נŸƒ Run away from favicon trackers: Why block it? > Because it can track you! Look: נŸ‘€ **נŸ” Sources:** - [Browser Tracking using Fav-Icon - Shneie](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/browser-tracking-using-favicons.html) - [Favicons may be used to track users - G Hacks](https://www.ghacks.net/2021/01/22/favicons-may-be-used-to-track-users/) - [Super Cookie on Github](https://github.com/jonasstrehle/supercookie),Yes,Blocks tracking attempts https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29877,1062256116,[stable23] Hide user status on profile from public,backport of #29869,[stable23] Hide user status on profile from public backport of #29869,Yes,Hide private data https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29869,1061828855,Hide user status on profile from public,See title נŸ‘†,Hide user status on profile from public See title נŸ‘†,Yes,Hide private data https://api.github.com/repos/microsoftgraph/microsoft-graph-explorer-v4/issues/1216,1055759070,Sovereign Clouds Privacy review,**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** Privacy Assessment for Graph Explorer - Privacy of Graph Explorer Production Service and App Assessment required so that work done to support soverign clouds can be released Tasks to be done are listed under: [353431 ](https://o365trustcompliance.visualstudio.com/Trust/_workitems/edit/353431) ,Sovereign Clouds Privacy review **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** Privacy Assessment for Graph Explorer - Privacy of Graph Explorer Production Service and App Assessment required so that work done to support soverign clouds can be released Tasks to be done are listed under: [353431 ](https://o365trustcompliance.visualstudio.com/Trust/_workitems/edit/353431) ,Yes,Privacy in the cloud https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/19745,1052789536,Element contacts Posthog before user has agreed,"### Steps to reproduce 1. Sign in to Element Nightly desktop app ### Outcome #### What did you expect? Element shouldn't attempt to connect to telemetry until it has been enabled by the user #### What happened instead POST request to https://posthog.hss.element.io/decide/?ip=X&_=XXXXXXXXXX is sent before user has made a decision on this dialog: ### Operating system macOS ### Browser information _No response_ ### URL for webapp _No response_ ### Application version Element Nightly version: 2021111301 ### Homeserver _No response_ ### Will you send logs? No","Element contacts Posthog before user has agreed ### Steps to reproduce 1. Sign in to Element Nightly desktop app ### Outcome #### What did you expect? Element shouldn't attempt to connect to telemetry until it has been enabled by the user #### What happened instead POST request to https://posthog.hss.element.io/decide/?ip=X&_=XXXXXXXXXX is sent before user has made a decision on this dialog: ### Operating system macOS ### Browser information _No response_ ### URL for webapp _No response_ ### Application version Element Nightly version: 2021111301 ### Homeserver _No response_ ### Will you send logs? No",Yes,Performing actions without consent https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/3036,1050492954,[MINOR] updated comment and added link to generateId code in Tessera,Signed-off-by: Sally MacFarlane Added link to relevant Tessera code for generating privacy group ID ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog).,[MINOR] updated comment and added link to generateId code in Tessera Signed-off-by: Sally MacFarlane Added link to relevant Tessera code for generating privacy group ID ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog).,Yes,A general privacy feature request https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/3030,1049330780,remove Orion acceptance tests,"Orion will be deprecated at the end of Nov. We can then stop running the Acceptance tests. See `ParameterizedEnclaveTestBase` Would be interesting to observe if this reduces the time for ATs to run, and if so, how much. ","remove Orion acceptance tests Orion will be deprecated at the end of Nov. We can then stop running the Acceptance tests. See `ParameterizedEnclaveTestBase` Would be interesting to observe if this reduces the time for ATs to run, and if so, how much. ",No,Discusses a bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29559,1045403387,Respect user enumeration settings on profile,"The `shareapi_*` user enumeration settings are already respected and hide profile entrypoints (if needed) in the contacts menu, Avatar menu, and other areas which pass through `filterContacts` https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/e1c2c13585d5417db2ed490b2986c1ea04cd808d/lib/private/Contacts/ContactsMenu/ContactsStore.php#L150 This PR is for when users navigate to a user's profile page directly by the `/u/{userId}` URL and respects the user enumeration settings listed below. - `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_full_match` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_phone` The user's profile will not be displayed and instead show the ""Profile not found"" error page if restricted by any of these settings. Contributes to https://github.com/nextcloud/server/issues/28139","Respect user enumeration settings on profile The `shareapi_*` user enumeration settings are already respected and hide profile entrypoints (if needed) in the contacts menu, Avatar menu, and other areas which pass through `filterContacts` https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/e1c2c13585d5417db2ed490b2986c1ea04cd808d/lib/private/Contacts/ContactsMenu/ContactsStore.php#L150 This PR is for when users navigate to a user's profile page directly by the `/u/{userId}` URL and respects the user enumeration settings listed below. - `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_full_match` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_phone` The user's profile will not be displayed and instead show the ""Profile not found"" error page if restricted by any of these settings. Contributes to https://github.com/nextcloud/server/issues/28139",Yes,Hiding user profile https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-talk/issues/13,1052208802,"For talk.brave.com, make the ""Remember My Decision"" dialog very prominent","This issue overtakes brave/brave-together#185 ... it originally suggested we maintain a ""allowed"" list of sites that included talk.brave.com, so the user wouldn't have the friction of having to allow A/C for confabs, nor the confusion if they ""fat-fingered"" the response. rather than make a precedent for the ""allowed"" list, it is suggested that the permissions dialog be very prominent. i'm not sure what such a design would entail, but that's the current thinking.","For talk.brave.com, make the ""Remember My Decision"" dialog very prominent This issue overtakes brave/brave-together#185 ... it originally suggested we maintain a ""allowed"" list of sites that included talk.brave.com, so the user wouldn't have the friction of having to allow A/C for confabs, nor the confusion if they ""fat-fingered"" the response. rather than make a precedent for the ""allowed"" list, it is suggested that the permissions dialog be very prominent. i'm not sure what such a design would entail, but that's the current thinking.",No,Discusses permissions and not privacy https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2987,1041867748,"change ""privacyGroupId"" from being a base64 encoded String to a proper class","Using a PrivacyGroupId class has many benefits, one being that as a developer I don't have to remember that the Id is base64 encoded. ","change ""privacyGroupId"" from being a base64 encoded String to a proper class Using a PrivacyGroupId class has many benefits, one being that as a developer I don't have to remember that the Id is base64 encoded. ",No,Bug fix for a PrivacyGroupID class https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/4436,1041077811,Persist private tabs,mini spec TBA Intent review https://github.com/brave/security/issues/641,Persist private tabs mini spec TBA Intent review https://github.com/brave/security/issues/641,No,"From the title + body - not related to privacy, the link to GitHub is broken" https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2961,1037359303,Remove code duplication TODO in OnchainPrivacyPrecompiledContract,Remove code duplication TODO in OnchainPrivacyPrecompiledContract Search for any others and remove. ,Remove code duplication TODO in OnchainPrivacyPrecompiledContract Remove code duplication TODO in OnchainPrivacyPrecompiledContract Search for any others and remove. ,No,Bug fix of code duplication https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2960,1037358210,Clean up naming of flexible privacy groups,"`flexible` and `onchain` both used. Where possible, standardise on `flexible` Do we want to change / add alternate names for: - [ ] Besu CLI option --privacy-onchain-groups-enabled - [ ] RPC methods PRIVX_FIND_PRIVACY_GROUP(""privx_findOnChainPrivacyGroup""), - [ ] web3js-quorum https://consensys.github.io/web3js-quorum/latest/module-flexiblePrivacyGroup.html#~findOnChainPrivacyGroup","Clean up naming of flexible privacy groups `flexible` and `onchain` both used. Where possible, standardise on `flexible` Do we want to change / add alternate names for: - [ ] Besu CLI option --privacy-onchain-groups-enabled - [ ] RPC methods PRIVX_FIND_PRIVACY_GROUP(""privx_findOnChainPrivacyGroup""), - [ ] web3js-quorum https://consensys.github.io/web3js-quorum/latest/module-flexiblePrivacyGroup.html#~findOnChainPrivacyGroup",No,Not sure https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2959,1037356596,Performance testing for onchain privacy groups,"Use current quorum-performance (artillery) results as a baseline. Less interested in specific TPS number, more interested in if any particular parameters affect performance (eg does adding a new group member slow things down considerably). - [ ] Sending a simple contract to a single user (self) Performance test scenario: - [x] Recommend sending to multiple users - create a group with 2,3,5 members - [ ] Sending a sequence of transactions (includes check group membership) - [x] Adding a user to the group after eg 10, 100, 1000 tx Caliper is not the right tool for this. ","Performance testing for onchain privacy groups Use current quorum-performance (artillery) results as a baseline. Less interested in specific TPS number, more interested in if any particular parameters affect performance (eg does adding a new group member slow things down considerably). - [ ] Sending a simple contract to a single user (self) Performance test scenario: - [x] Recommend sending to multiple users - create a group with 2,3,5 members - [ ] Sending a sequence of transactions (includes check group membership) - [x] Adding a user to the group after eg 10, 100, 1000 tx Caliper is not the right tool for this. ",No,Addresses performance issues https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2958,1037353680,Move onchain privacy groups to production,Complete work required to move onchain privacy groups to production. ,Move onchain privacy groups to production Complete work required to move onchain privacy groups to production. ,No,Moving from dev to prod https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29429,1034823443,Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists,"Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer jonas@freesources.org","Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer jonas@freesources.org",Yes,Handling user enumeration issues https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29428,1034811486,Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists,"Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer jonas@freesources.org","Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer jonas@freesources.org",Yes,Handling user enumeration issues https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29427,1034808187,Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists,"Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer jonas@freesources.org","Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer jonas@freesources.org",Yes,Handling user enumeration issues https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2937,1033071992,remove deprecated field: privateTransaction.hash ,"This field has been deprecated for some time: // Caches the hash used to uniquely identify the transaction. // This field will be removed in 1.5.0 @Deprecated(since = ""1.4.3"") protected volatile Hash hash; - [ ] confirm it can safely be removed - [ ] changelog entry ","remove deprecated field: privateTransaction.hash This field has been deprecated for some time: // Caches the hash used to uniquely identify the transaction. // This field will be removed in 1.5.0 @Deprecated(since = ""1.4.3"") protected volatile Hash hash; - [ ] confirm it can safely be removed - [ ] changelog entry ",Yes,Removes identification data https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10906,1031441832,Personal Notes Shared to Forum," - [X ] I have searched open and closed issues for duplicates ### Bug Description Personal notes are shared when using `!` address. ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Draft a personal note 2. Include `!admins@forum.friendi.ca` 3. Save Actual Result: Personal note is shared with the public. Expected Result: That personal notes are NOT shared with anyone. Use case: saving a draft of a post that is intended to be shared in the future. ### Screenshots https://friendica.hubup.pro/display/f3ad7b1c-1261-701b-a168-070845120860 ### Platform Info Friendica Version: 2021.09 ","Personal Notes Shared to Forum - [X ] I have searched open and closed issues for duplicates ### Bug Description Personal notes are shared when using `!` address. ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Draft a personal note 2. Include `!admins@forum.friendi.ca` 3. Save Actual Result: Personal note is shared with the public. Expected Result: That personal notes are NOT shared with anyone. Use case: saving a draft of a post that is intended to be shared in the future. ### Screenshots https://friendica.hubup.pro/display/f3ad7b1c-1261-701b-a168-070845120860 ### Platform Info Friendica Version: 2021.09 ",Yes,Personal note is shared to public https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10881,1028136489,Switch available contact selection to private-supporting networks in ACL,Fixes #10872 This switch also prevents users to send private message to OStatus contacts even though there's no support for private conversations.,Switch available contact selection to private-supporting networks in ACL Fixes #10872 This switch also prevents users to send private message to OStatus contacts even though there's no support for private conversations.,Yes,"Selecting private contact, restriction on private messages" https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29260,1027449718,Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists,"So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (`shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` and `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` is unset or `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/27879#pullrequestreview-753655308 for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` is unset or `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer ","Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (`shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` and `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` is unset or `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/27879#pullrequestreview-753655308 for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` is unset or `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer ",Yes,Handling user enumeration issues https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/19294,1016509281,Multiple Audio tracks (old ones are not closing) in web and client,### Steps to reproduce Running Arch Linux kernel 5.14.9 DE: KDE Plasma Sound: pipewire. 1. Launch Element in web or in native client. 2. Take a call. -> in Sound Manager applications new Chromium pipes appear. 3. Close the call -> The Tracks are still here. 4. Take a call again and even more tracks open. ### Outcome #### What did you expect? A call opens 1 or 2 tracks maybe an option for selection channel count. After call closes the tracks disconnect/close #### What happened instead? Element opens multiple tracks and dont close them afterwards ### Operating system Linux ### Browser information Chromium: 94.0.4606.61 ### URL for webapp 1.8.5-1 ### Homeserver matrix.archgang.xyz ### Will you send logs? Yes,Multiple Audio tracks (old ones are not closing) in web and client ### Steps to reproduce Running Arch Linux kernel 5.14.9 DE: KDE Plasma Sound: pipewire. 1. Launch Element in web or in native client. 2. Take a call. -> in Sound Manager applications new Chromium pipes appear. 3. Close the call -> The Tracks are still here. 4. Take a call again and even more tracks open. ### Outcome #### What did you expect? A call opens 1 or 2 tracks maybe an option for selection channel count. After call closes the tracks disconnect/close #### What happened instead? Element opens multiple tracks and dont close them afterwards ### Operating system Linux ### Browser information Chromium: 94.0.4606.61 ### URL for webapp 1.8.5-1 ### Homeserver matrix.archgang.xyz ### Will you send logs? Yes,No,Bug fix - call tracks don’t close after call close https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10805,1014191919,Switch uid with nickname in user picture URLs,Closes #10725,Switch uid with nickname in user picture URLs Closes #10725,Yes,Hiding UID https://api.github.com/repos/amareensaleh/basic-java-instant-messenger/issues/4,1013647434,NFR2: Protecting Personal Information,"|NFR2: Protecting Personal Information | |----------------------| | **Estimate:** 3 | | **Priority:** Should have | |**Story**: As a User, I want that the application does not use any of my personal chats for any purposes without my concern so that I can feel comfortable that my privacy is respected. | | **Acceptance criteria:** | |1. a user uses the chat application | |2. a user can chat with other users.| |3. the application must not misuse personal chats for any purposes without usersג€™ consent nor should it give access to any other users except the sender and the receiver.|","NFR2: Protecting Personal Information |NFR2: Protecting Personal Information | |----------------------| | **Estimate:** 3 | | **Priority:** Should have | |**Story**: As a User, I want that the application does not use any of my personal chats for any purposes without my concern so that I can feel comfortable that my privacy is respected. | | **Acceptance criteria:** | |1. a user uses the chat application | |2. a user can chat with other users.| |3. the application must not misuse personal chats for any purposes without usersג€™ consent nor should it give access to any other users except the sender and the receiver.|",Yes,Protection of personal info https://api.github.com/repos/vladimiry/ElectronMail/issues/446,1011157618,Add tor browser fingerprints to browser identity ,"Hi i think its great this app adds ability to disguise itself as a different browser. It's worth noting that on the Tor network it is highly irregular for a user to be using anything other than a tor browser user agent. they are pretty standardized for purpose of not letting anyone stand out. i think it should be an option to use tor browser fingerprints only especially when setting up an account that accesses protonmail over its tor hidden service. as i said in opening statement using other browser identities is highly irregular, attracts attention and makes a user more unique all things that mute the value of using tor in the first place. ","Add tor browser fingerprints to browser identity Hi i think its great this app adds ability to disguise itself as a different browser. It's worth noting that on the Tor network it is highly irregular for a user to be using anything other than a tor browser user agent. they are pretty standardized for purpose of not letting anyone stand out. i think it should be an option to use tor browser fingerprints only especially when setting up an account that accesses protonmail over its tor hidden service. as i said in opening statement using other browser identities is highly irregular, attracts attention and makes a user more unique all things that mute the value of using tor in the first place. ",Yes,Browser disguise https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/19141,1004661859,clear or delete chat history feature request,"### Your use case #### What would you like to do? > I would like to be able to delete the chat history #### Why would you like to do it? > Since this is a pretty private chatting app, I believe that history deletion is a fair request. #### How would you like to achieve it? > there are three ways come to my mind, one is a button or something that delete all chat history, second is to let user choose the time period that they want to delete or user can choose certain messages that they want to delete. ### Have you considered any alternatives? _No response_ ### Additional context _No response_","clear or delete chat history feature request ### Your use case #### What would you like to do? > I would like to be able to delete the chat history #### Why would you like to do it? > Since this is a pretty private chatting app, I believe that history deletion is a fair request. #### How would you like to achieve it? > there are three ways come to my mind, one is a button or something that delete all chat history, second is to let user choose the time period that they want to delete or user can choose certain messages that they want to delete. ### Have you considered any alternatives? _No response_ ### Additional context _No response_",Yes,Deleting the history of private chats https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10687,993361289,Joseph Hogan please read this,"Here's the private message I received this morning from Joseph Hogan (`joe@social.mmaj.ca`): > Hello Hypolitel, > > This is Joseph, the person from Montreal, Canada. I've been a little silent since I've been super busy. I tried upgrading my friendica with no success. > > I have decided to reinstall Friendica with the latest version. and, a friend of mine showed me how git works, so I will be using GIT to install and upgrade. > > But, I have a couple of questions, and when posting on the friendica support forum, I have gotten no replies. No sure if no one sees my messages, or they just are not showing up. > > I am hoping to get some help and get active again. > > Can yo let me know that yo get this email and if you see my message on the support forum? > > Thanks! > > Joseph I tried to reply to them with the following answer: > Hi Joseph, I received your private message loud and clear. However I can't see any recent message from you in the Friendica Support forum. Did you reinstall Friendica from scratch on the same domain by wiping the database out by any chance? > > In this case you could have federation problems as your node's cryptographic keys have changed so its indistinguishable from an impersonation attempt. But the message sending didn't work, I assume because Joseph Hogan's account on their new node with the same username on the same domain is failing the security check. I'm getting the following error pop-ups: - ""Unable to locate contact information"" - ""Message not available."" Unfortunately I have no other way to contact Joseph, hence the title. Beyond this inconvenience, it seems like we're accepting private messages from anyone without checking their cryptographic keys which isn't great. I understand I can't reply to them, but I shouldn't have received the message in the first place, or with a privacy warning about the potential impersonation.","Joseph Hogan please read this Here's the private message I received this morning from Joseph Hogan (`joe@social.mmaj.ca`): > Hello Hypolitel, > > This is Joseph, the person from Montreal, Canada. I've been a little silent since I've been super busy. I tried upgrading my friendica with no success. > > I have decided to reinstall Friendica with the latest version. and, a friend of mine showed me how git works, so I will be using GIT to install and upgrade. > > But, I have a couple of questions, and when posting on the friendica support forum, I have gotten no replies. No sure if no one sees my messages, or they just are not showing up. > > I am hoping to get some help and get active again. > > Can yo let me know that yo get this email and if you see my message on the support forum? > > Thanks! > > Joseph I tried to reply to them with the following answer: > Hi Joseph, I received your private message loud and clear. However I can't see any recent message from you in the Friendica Support forum. Did you reinstall Friendica from scratch on the same domain by wiping the database out by any chance? > > In this case you could have federation problems as your node's cryptographic keys have changed so its indistinguishable from an impersonation attempt. But the message sending didn't work, I assume because Joseph Hogan's account on their new node with the same username on the same domain is failing the security check. I'm getting the following error pop-ups: - ""Unable to locate contact information"" - ""Message not available."" Unfortunately I have no other way to contact Joseph, hence the title. Beyond this inconvenience, it seems like we're accepting private messages from anyone without checking their cryptographic keys which isn't great. I understand I can't reply to them, but I shouldn't have received the message in the first place, or with a privacy warning about the potential impersonation.",No,Installation issues https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2750,992875262,Unify onchain and onChain to onchain," ### Description We decided to treat onchain as a single word. In the codebase we use both onchain/Onchain and onChain/OnChain. To make names more predictable, all instance of onChain/OnChain should be renamed to onchain/Onchain.","Unify onchain and onChain to onchain ### Description We decided to treat onchain as a single word. In the codebase we use both onchain/Onchain and onChain/OnChain. To make names more predictable, all instance of onChain/OnChain should be renamed to onchain/Onchain.",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2722,989636197,Unexpected FROM value in private transaction receipt when transaction gas is not zero.,"### Description An unexpected `from` value is present on the *private* transaction receipt when the `gas` value in the transaction is not zero. When `gas` is omitted the expected `from` value is present on the private transaction receipt. ### Acceptance Criteria `from` value on the private transaction receipt should match the `from` on the private transaction. This value is not expected to change with the `gasLimit`. ### Steps to Reproduce (Bug) 1. Run Besu (v20.10.4) with the following config: ``` /opt/besu/bin/besu public-key export --to=/tmp/bootnode_pubkey; /opt/besu/bin/besu \ --config-file=/config/config.toml \ --p2p-host=$$(hostname -i) \ --genesis-file=/config/genesis.json \ --node-private-key-file=/opt/besu/keys/key \ --min-gas-price=0 \ --privacy-enabled \ --privacy-url=$${ORION_CLIENTURL} \ --privacy-public-key-file=/config/orion/orion.pub \ --privacy-onchain-groups-enabled=false \ --rpc-http-api=EEA,WEB3,ETH,NET,PRIV,PERM,IBFT \ --rpc-ws-api=EEA,WEB3,ETH,NET,PRIV,PERM,IBFT ; ``` 2. Send a transaction with `gas` set to a value (eg. 900000). 3. Retrieve the private transaction receipt. 4. Send a transaction with `gas` omitted. 5. Retrieve the private transaction receipt. **Expected behavior:** [What you expect to happen] The `from` value on both receipts should be the same. **Actual behavior:** [What actually happens] The `from` value on the transaction without gas has the expected value, the `from` value on the transaction with gas has an unexpected value. ","Unexpected FROM value in private transaction receipt when transaction gas is not zero. ### Description An unexpected `from` value is present on the *private* transaction receipt when the `gas` value in the transaction is not zero. When `gas` is omitted the expected `from` value is present on the private transaction receipt. ### Acceptance Criteria `from` value on the private transaction receipt should match the `from` on the private transaction. This value is not expected to change with the `gasLimit`. ### Steps to Reproduce (Bug) 1. Run Besu (v20.10.4) with the following config: ``` /opt/besu/bin/besu public-key export --to=/tmp/bootnode_pubkey; /opt/besu/bin/besu \ --config-file=/config/config.toml \ --p2p-host=$$(hostname -i) \ --genesis-file=/config/genesis.json \ --node-private-key-file=/opt/besu/keys/key \ --min-gas-price=0 \ --privacy-enabled \ --privacy-url=$${ORION_CLIENTURL} \ --privacy-public-key-file=/config/orion/orion.pub \ --privacy-onchain-groups-enabled=false \ --rpc-http-api=EEA,WEB3,ETH,NET,PRIV,PERM,IBFT \ --rpc-ws-api=EEA,WEB3,ETH,NET,PRIV,PERM,IBFT ; ``` 2. Send a transaction with `gas` set to a value (eg. 900000). 3. Retrieve the private transaction receipt. 4. Send a transaction with `gas` omitted. 5. Retrieve the private transaction receipt. **Expected behavior:** [What you expect to happen] The `from` value on both receipts should be the same. **Actual behavior:** [What actually happens] The `from` value on the transaction without gas has the expected value, the `from` value on the transaction with gas has an unexpected value. ",Yes,Unexpected valus is presented https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/685,983218899,[Requirements] Data Retention Requirements,"### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. With MDS 1.2 and the Requirements API, it is possible for the first time for Agencies to specify which data they need,ֲ and which data should not be shared. This is a major step forward for Data Minimization by allowing for the creation of best practices and example Requirements files that describe how to make minimal data requests for common use cases. A related step I'd love to see MDS take is to describe data retention practices. This could cover some or all of the following capabilities: - Allowing Agencies to specify a minimum duration for data retained on operators' systems - Allowing Agencies to specify a maximum duration for data retained on their own (or a chosen aggregators') systems - Allowing operators to specify a maximum duration that they retain data _and/or_ - Allowing Agencies to specify a maximum duration for data retained on operators' systems These requirements could be expressed at the API, endpoint and perhaps even the field level. Here are some example use cases: - An agency specifies that they require status events to be retained by operators (ie queryable) for at least 6 months - An agency specifies that they will hold onto metrics data for up to five years, but will only hold onto disaggregate trip data for 1 month. - An agency interested in trying [Geography Driven Events](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/blob/main/general-information.md#geography-driven-events) specifies that they will hold onto GDE event data for up to one year, and they will hold onto full event data for one month (to allow for the verification and evaluation of GDE data). _A note on aggregate data_ My intention with this issue is to allow for explicit requirements around the retention of _raw_ (particularly sensitive) data being delivered via MDS. This seemed like a good place to draw the line for now, but aggregate data can also sometimes be sensitive. It's an open, related question whether and how MDS might someday attempt to describe the retention of data that has been aggregated, analyzed etc. ### Describe the solution you'd like I'm imagining this as an extension to the Requirements API. ### Is this a breaking change Probably, insofar as it might allow for the creation of breaking requirements on operator implementations. Possibly this could be avoided with a conditional period, as we allowed for with Requirements in 1.2. ### Impacted Spec For which spec is this feature being requested? * `requirements` ### Additional context See also the #608 and #646. ","[Requirements] Data Retention Requirements ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. With MDS 1.2 and the Requirements API, it is possible for the first time for Agencies to specify which data they need,ֲ and which data should not be shared. This is a major step forward for Data Minimization by allowing for the creation of best practices and example Requirements files that describe how to make minimal data requests for common use cases. A related step I'd love to see MDS take is to describe data retention practices. This could cover some or all of the following capabilities: - Allowing Agencies to specify a minimum duration for data retained on operators' systems - Allowing Agencies to specify a maximum duration for data retained on their own (or a chosen aggregators') systems - Allowing operators to specify a maximum duration that they retain data _and/or_ - Allowing Agencies to specify a maximum duration for data retained on operators' systems These requirements could be expressed at the API, endpoint and perhaps even the field level. Here are some example use cases: - An agency specifies that they require status events to be retained by operators (ie queryable) for at least 6 months - An agency specifies that they will hold onto metrics data for up to five years, but will only hold onto disaggregate trip data for 1 month. - An agency interested in trying [Geography Driven Events](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/blob/main/general-information.md#geography-driven-events) specifies that they will hold onto GDE event data for up to one year, and they will hold onto full event data for one month (to allow for the verification and evaluation of GDE data). _A note on aggregate data_ My intention with this issue is to allow for explicit requirements around the retention of _raw_ (particularly sensitive) data being delivered via MDS. This seemed like a good place to draw the line for now, but aggregate data can also sometimes be sensitive. It's an open, related question whether and how MDS might someday attempt to describe the retention of data that has been aggregated, analyzed etc. ### Describe the solution you'd like I'm imagining this as an extension to the Requirements API. ### Is this a breaking change Probably, insofar as it might allow for the creation of breaking requirements on operator implementations. Possibly this could be avoided with a conditional period, as we allowed for with Requirements in 1.2. ### Impacted Spec For which spec is this feature being requested? * `requirements` ### Additional context See also the #608 and #646. ",Yes,Data retention policies https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2693,982463553,Flexible Privacy Group can not unlock.,"# summary - This occurs when flexiblePrivacyGroup is used. - If the lock is acquired with setLockState, it cannot be unlocked. # Steps to Reproduce - Launches the besu container, which is available in flexible privacy group mode. - create a privacy group. - get the lock with lock function. - release the lock with unlock function, but it can't release the lock. ## sample script ``` const Web3 = require(""web3""); const EEAClient = require(""web3js-quorum""); const { tessera, besu } = require(""../config/keys.js""); const node1 = new EEAClient(new Web3(besu.node1.url)); const privacyProxyAbi = require(""./PrivacyProxy.json"").output.abi // https://github.com/ConsenSys/web3js-quorum/blob/master/solidity/PrivacyProxy.json module.exports = async () => { const onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult = await node1.eth.flexiblePrivacyGroup.create( { participants: [tessera.node1.publicKey, tessera.node2.publicKey], enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ); console.log(""Created new on-chain privacy group:""); console.log(onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId); console.log(""-- canExecute before lock--"") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) console.log(""-- get lock --"") await setLockState(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey, lock: true } ) console.log(""-- canExecute after lock--"") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) console.log(""-- get unlock --"") await setLockState(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey, lock: false } ) console.log(""-- canExecute after unlock--"") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) } async function setLockState(web3, options) { const contract = new web3.eth.Contract(privacyProxyAbi); const functionAbi = contract._jsonInterface.find((e) => { return e.name === (options.lock ? ""lock"" : ""unlock""); }); const functionCall = { to: ""0x000000000000000000000000000000000000007c"", data: functionAbi.signature, privateFrom: options.enclaveKey, privacyGroupId: options.privacyGroupId, privateKey: options.privateKey, }; let transactionHash = await web3.priv.generateAndSendRawTransaction(functionCall) let transactionReceipt = await web3.priv.waitForTransactionReceipt(transactionHash); console.log(""TransactionReceipt.status: "", transactionReceipt.status) console.log(""TransactionReceipt.output: "", transactionReceipt.output) } async function canExecute(web3, options) { const contract = new web3.eth.Contract(privacyProxyAbi); const functionAbi = contract._jsonInterface.find((e) => { return e.name === (""canExecute""); }); const functionCall = { to: ""0x000000000000000000000000000000000000007c"", data: functionAbi.signature, privateFrom: options.enclaveKey, privacyGroupId: options.privacyGroupId, privateKey: options.privateKey, }; let transactionHash = await web3.priv.generateAndSendRawTransaction(functionCall) let transactionReceipt = await web3.priv.waitForTransactionReceipt(transactionHash); console.log(""TransactionReceipt.status: "", transactionReceipt.status) console.log(""TransactionReceipt.output: "", transactionReceipt.output) } if (require.main === module) { module.exports(); } ``` ## console log ``` Waiting for transaction to be mined ... Created new on-chain privacy group: bHPtl5dGLKn/hOUv5Uq7h7VRSJNPe8IT07Kk1H9kcEI= -- canExecute before lock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x1 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 -- get lock -- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x1 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- canExecute after lock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- get unlock -- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- canExecute after unlock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x ``` # Versions - BESU: besu/v21.7.2/linux-x86_64/adoptopenjdk-java-11 - web3js-quorum: 21.7.0-rc1","Flexible Privacy Group can not unlock. # summary - This occurs when flexiblePrivacyGroup is used. - If the lock is acquired with setLockState, it cannot be unlocked. # Steps to Reproduce - Launches the besu container, which is available in flexible privacy group mode. - create a privacy group. - get the lock with lock function. - release the lock with unlock function, but it can't release the lock. ## sample script ``` const Web3 = require(""web3""); const EEAClient = require(""web3js-quorum""); const { tessera, besu } = require(""../config/keys.js""); const node1 = new EEAClient(new Web3(besu.node1.url)); const privacyProxyAbi = require(""./PrivacyProxy.json"").output.abi // https://github.com/ConsenSys/web3js-quorum/blob/master/solidity/PrivacyProxy.json module.exports = async () => { const onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult = await node1.eth.flexiblePrivacyGroup.create( { participants: [tessera.node1.publicKey, tessera.node2.publicKey], enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ); console.log(""Created new on-chain privacy group:""); console.log(onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId); console.log(""-- canExecute before lock--"") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) console.log(""-- get lock --"") await setLockState(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey, lock: true } ) console.log(""-- canExecute after lock--"") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) console.log(""-- get unlock --"") await setLockState(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey, lock: false } ) console.log(""-- canExecute after unlock--"") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) } async function setLockState(web3, options) { const contract = new web3.eth.Contract(privacyProxyAbi); const functionAbi = contract._jsonInterface.find((e) => { return e.name === (options.lock ? ""lock"" : ""unlock""); }); const functionCall = { to: ""0x000000000000000000000000000000000000007c"", data: functionAbi.signature, privateFrom: options.enclaveKey, privacyGroupId: options.privacyGroupId, privateKey: options.privateKey, }; let transactionHash = await web3.priv.generateAndSendRawTransaction(functionCall) let transactionReceipt = await web3.priv.waitForTransactionReceipt(transactionHash); console.log(""TransactionReceipt.status: "", transactionReceipt.status) console.log(""TransactionReceipt.output: "", transactionReceipt.output) } async function canExecute(web3, options) { const contract = new web3.eth.Contract(privacyProxyAbi); const functionAbi = contract._jsonInterface.find((e) => { return e.name === (""canExecute""); }); const functionCall = { to: ""0x000000000000000000000000000000000000007c"", data: functionAbi.signature, privateFrom: options.enclaveKey, privacyGroupId: options.privacyGroupId, privateKey: options.privateKey, }; let transactionHash = await web3.priv.generateAndSendRawTransaction(functionCall) let transactionReceipt = await web3.priv.waitForTransactionReceipt(transactionHash); console.log(""TransactionReceipt.status: "", transactionReceipt.status) console.log(""TransactionReceipt.output: "", transactionReceipt.output) } if (require.main === module) { module.exports(); } ``` ## console log ``` Waiting for transaction to be mined ... Created new on-chain privacy group: bHPtl5dGLKn/hOUv5Uq7h7VRSJNPe8IT07Kk1H9kcEI= -- canExecute before lock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x1 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 -- get lock -- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x1 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- canExecute after lock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- get unlock -- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- canExecute after unlock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x ``` # Versions - BESU: besu/v21.7.2/linux-x86_64/adoptopenjdk-java-11 - web3js-quorum: 21.7.0-rc1",No,Bug Fix https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/18776,979375629,Guest option in private spaces is alarming,"### Your use case 1. Create a private space. 2. Go to space settings. 3. Observe that guest access is enabled in Settings. This is scary and alarming. ### Suggested quick fix Default this to 'off' when creating a private space.","Guest option in private spaces is alarming ### Your use case 1. Create a private space. 2. Go to space settings. 3. Observe that guest access is enabled in Settings. This is scary and alarming. ### Suggested quick fix Default this to 'off' when creating a private space.",Yes,Guest access is enabled by default in private spaces https://api.github.com/repos/microsoftgraph/microsoft-graph-explorer-v4/issues/1068,977115867,Deliver support for soverign clouds, [AB#10824](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/10824),Deliver support for soverign clouds [AB#10824](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/10824),No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/microsoftgraph/microsoft-graph-explorer-v4/issues/1052,965198877,Extend OCV feedback button & NPS feedback pop to be compliant,"**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** Extending the existing OCV button feedback & NPS pop up to be privacy compliant **Describe the solution you'd like** For AAD users, GE to check the set tenant admin policy to determine if the CES feedback button is displayed to users. For MSA users, GE to check age-group information **Scenarios** - Unauthenticated on main and GE - Unauthenticated on Main and Authenticated AAD user on GE - Unauthenticated on Main and Authenticated MSA user on GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and Unauthenticated GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and Authenticated MSA user on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Unauthenticated on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Authenticated AAD user on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Authenticated MSA user on GE [AB#10613](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/10613)","Extend OCV feedback button & NPS feedback pop to be compliant **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** Extending the existing OCV button feedback & NPS pop up to be privacy compliant **Describe the solution you'd like** For AAD users, GE to check the set tenant admin policy to determine if the CES feedback button is displayed to users. For MSA users, GE to check age-group information **Scenarios** - Unauthenticated on main and GE - Unauthenticated on Main and Authenticated AAD user on GE - Unauthenticated on Main and Authenticated MSA user on GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and Unauthenticated GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and Authenticated MSA user on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Unauthenticated on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Authenticated AAD user on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Authenticated MSA user on GE [AB#10613](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/10613)",Yes,Privacy compliance https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/4019,964543511,iPhone closed tab stuck as a tab navigation background ," ### Description: - After closing the tab, it flashes for a while during the tab switches or creating a new tab. ### Steps to Reproduce - Not sure how to reproduce each time. But faced this issue whenever following settings are made. 1. Disabled Brave rewards 2. Search engine suggestions-> On. 3. Appearance-> Automatic 4. Show background Images, Default Images only. 5. Show tabs bar in landscape only. 6. Show bookmarks shortcut 7. Hide rewards ico - Left other settings to default **Actual result:** [Link to video](https://imgur.com/kHOnn7O) **Device Information** - iPhone XR running iOS 14.7.1 - Brave browser version : Version 1.29 (21.8.3.10) ","iPhone closed tab stuck as a tab navigation background ### Description: - After closing the tab, it flashes for a while during the tab switches or creating a new tab. ### Steps to Reproduce - Not sure how to reproduce each time. But faced this issue whenever following settings are made. 1. Disabled Brave rewards 2. Search engine suggestions-> On. 3. Appearance-> Automatic 4. Show background Images, Default Images only. 5. Show tabs bar in landscape only. 6. Show bookmarks shortcut 7. Hide rewards ico - Left other settings to default **Actual result:** [Link to video](https://imgur.com/kHOnn7O) **Device Information** - iPhone XR running iOS 14.7.1 - Brave browser version : Version 1.29 (21.8.3.10) ",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/18464,964210031,Option to disable voice messages,"#### Is your suggestion related to a problem? Please describe. I don't use voice messages so I consider the possibility of accidentally sending an audio recording of my environment to a room where it's impossible for me to delete it a security risk. #### Describe the solution you'd like. A setting somewhere that completely disables voice messages for me. Preferably (but possibly optionally?) saved to my account data and respected by all my sessions in all Element clients across all platforms. #### Describe alternatives you've considered. - Deny microphone access to the Element clients and apps. Though this is not an ideal solution as I would have to explicitly enable mic access before and disable again after a call. - Disable the feature on the Synapse or reverse proxy level. Tho I can't immediately think of a way to do this. But if this is possible, it is also not a good solution in case I do need voice messages some day and this is not available to people that are not running their own server.","Option to disable voice messages #### Is your suggestion related to a problem? Please describe. I don't use voice messages so I consider the possibility of accidentally sending an audio recording of my environment to a room where it's impossible for me to delete it a security risk. #### Describe the solution you'd like. A setting somewhere that completely disables voice messages for me. Preferably (but possibly optionally?) saved to my account data and respected by all my sessions in all Element clients across all platforms. #### Describe alternatives you've considered. - Deny microphone access to the Element clients and apps. Though this is not an ideal solution as I would have to explicitly enable mic access before and disable again after a call. - Disable the feature on the Synapse or reverse proxy level. Tho I can't immediately think of a way to do this. But if this is possible, it is also not a good solution in case I do need voice messages some day and this is not available to people that are not running their own server.",Yes,A privacy feature of disabling voice messaging https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/18456,963903134,Stopping the camera whilst screensharing does not turn the webcam LED off on my mac,"### Steps to reproduce 1. Start a VoIP call with camera on 2. Start screensharing 3. Stop camera ### What happened? Camera has stopped, but the ""green"" LED that indicate that the webcam is active is still on ### What did you expect? I would expect that LED to switch off and the camera to stop recording ### Operating system macOs ### Browser information Chromium Version 92.0.4515.131 ### URL for webapp app.element.io / Element Desktop","Stopping the camera whilst screensharing does not turn the webcam LED off on my mac ### Steps to reproduce 1. Start a VoIP call with camera on 2. Start screensharing 3. Stop camera ### What happened? Camera has stopped, but the ""green"" LED that indicate that the webcam is active is still on ### What did you expect? I would expect that LED to switch off and the camera to stop recording ### Operating system macOs ### Browser information Chromium Version 92.0.4515.131 ### URL for webapp app.element.io / Element Desktop",No,"Bug fix, not specifically related to privacy" https://api.github.com/repos/revoltchat/revite/issues/36,962967357,Add DuckDuckGo-style privacy warnings for special embeds.,"Don't automatically load external embeds, ask the user first and allow them to permanently allow a website to be embedded. ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/38285861/149661481-c1cabbca-7ca3-4c44-bd8b-47c7fa5f9cc2.png) ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/38285861/149661488-7af82a64-b7e2-46c8-a573-10182efdeef5.png) ","Add DuckDuckGo-style privacy warnings for special embeds. Don't automatically load external embeds, ask the user first and allow them to permanently allow a website to be embedded. ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/38285861/149661481-c1cabbca-7ca3-4c44-bd8b-47c7fa5f9cc2.png) ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/38285861/149661488-7af82a64-b7e2-46c8-a573-10182efdeef5.png) ",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/revoltchat/revite/issues/5,962718853,External link warning.,"Add a modal which warns a user that the link they just clicked on does not match what the URL says. Similarly, also open the warning if a user opens an external image link.","External link warning. Add a modal which warns a user that the link they just clicked on does not match what the URL says. Similarly, also open the warning if a user opens an external image link.",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2613,959798169,[Spike] Investigate better separation of private tx processing logic from public,"Review the branching of execution of public vs private transactions in an effort to better isolate their differences. The ideal scenario would be that, when running on public networks, none of the private tx logic would be ever in the code execution path. See https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/issues/2606 for context - [ ] add more tests that utilise chainId of 1 (mainnet) - need to make sure tests are totally isolated from Mainnet - [ ] maybe we need a GoQuorumTransactionValidator - similar idea to GoQuorumBlockProcessor - instead of having code in MainnetTransactionValidator - [ ] ensure sufficient testing - acceptance tests Problem The scope of this problem is limited to: Value transfer public transactions received via JSON-RPC Value transfer public transactions received via DevP2P When receiving a value transfer tx via JSON-RPC, Besu was considering it a private tx and enforcing a validity check that prevents private transactions from transferring value. That's why it was returning the error message ether value is not supported for private transactions. When receiving value transfer tx via DevP2P, Besu was considering those transactions invalid, not propagating them further. Luckily, the logic for block validation and import wasn't using the same code path. This means that Besu would still successfully synchronise with Mainnet and be up-to-date. This bug won't cause a fork. It is worth mentioning that this bug was caused by a specific combination of factors, related to the chainId value being 1. Unfortunately, our tests do not cover scenarios with specific chainIds. ","[Spike] Investigate better separation of private tx processing logic from public Review the branching of execution of public vs private transactions in an effort to better isolate their differences. The ideal scenario would be that, when running on public networks, none of the private tx logic would be ever in the code execution path. See https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/issues/2606 for context - [ ] add more tests that utilise chainId of 1 (mainnet) - need to make sure tests are totally isolated from Mainnet - [ ] maybe we need a GoQuorumTransactionValidator - similar idea to GoQuorumBlockProcessor - instead of having code in MainnetTransactionValidator - [ ] ensure sufficient testing - acceptance tests Problem The scope of this problem is limited to: Value transfer public transactions received via JSON-RPC Value transfer public transactions received via DevP2P When receiving a value transfer tx via JSON-RPC, Besu was considering it a private tx and enforcing a validity check that prevents private transactions from transferring value. That's why it was returning the error message ether value is not supported for private transactions. When receiving value transfer tx via DevP2P, Besu was considering those transactions invalid, not propagating them further. Luckily, the logic for block validation and import wasn't using the same code path. This means that Besu would still successfully synchronise with Mainnet and be up-to-date. This bug won't cause a fork. It is worth mentioning that this bug was caused by a specific combination of factors, related to the chainId value being 1. Unfortunately, our tests do not cover scenarios with specific chainIds. ",Yes,Differentiate private and public transactions https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2587,954421052,Smart Contracts for Validator Selection: Create github repo,### Description Create a github repository for the smart contracts used for validator selection ### Acceptance Criteria Repository has been created,Smart Contracts for Validator Selection: Create github repo ### Description Create a github repository for the smart contracts used for validator selection ### Acceptance Criteria Repository has been created,No,smart contracts https://api.github.com/repos/twilio/twilio-video-ios/issues/195,950441407,"Microphone indicator is flashing, when someone else starts talking.","### Description We see an issue, where participant is muted and someone else start talking, system microphone indicator flashes for a brief moment. It could be similar to this issue: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/58194401/status-bar-shows-mic-icon-for-a-moment-when-pausing-stopping-avaudioengine-in-io But hard to guess ### Steps to Reproduce 1. create a room 2. Connect at least two participant 3. Mute one and the other one starts producing audio 4. Muted participant can see a microphone icon #### Expected Behavior Muted participant don't see a microphone icon at all #### Actual Behavior Muted user can see system microphone indicator in a status bar for a brief moment. #### Reproduces How Often Always #### Logs I don't have logs but there is nothing visible either. But I can try to provide them if needed. ### Versions All relevant version information for the issue. #### Video iOS SDK 4.4 #### Xcode 12.5.1 #### iOS Version 14.7 #### iOS Device iPhone 12 ","Microphone indicator is flashing, when someone else starts talking. ### Description We see an issue, where participant is muted and someone else start talking, system microphone indicator flashes for a brief moment. It could be similar to this issue: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/58194401/status-bar-shows-mic-icon-for-a-moment-when-pausing-stopping-avaudioengine-in-io But hard to guess ### Steps to Reproduce 1. create a room 2. Connect at least two participant 3. Mute one and the other one starts producing audio 4. Muted participant can see a microphone icon #### Expected Behavior Muted participant don't see a microphone icon at all #### Actual Behavior Muted user can see system microphone indicator in a status bar for a brief moment. #### Reproduces How Often Always #### Logs I don't have logs but there is nothing visible either. But I can try to provide them if needed. ### Versions All relevant version information for the issue. #### Video iOS SDK 4.4 #### Xcode 12.5.1 #### iOS Version 14.7 #### iOS Device iPhone 12 ",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/vladimiry/ElectronMail/issues/422,947797692,[Question] Some kind of new mail notification cross-platform,"What I mean: Right now, on macOS I see a Notification like ""Protonmail[x] has received a new mail"" for every new mail. - If there will be a title for every added account, it will be more readable like ""Shopping account has new mails"" - If this app will have an option to specify for example a shell script, and execute it with the message from first option as argument, there will appear a possibility to send this arguments where you want, to other email or chat. ","[Question] Some kind of new mail notification cross-platform What I mean: Right now, on macOS I see a Notification like ""Protonmail[x] has received a new mail"" for every new mail. - If there will be a title for every added account, it will be more readable like ""Shopping account has new mails"" - If this app will have an option to specify for example a shell script, and execute it with the message from first option as argument, there will appear a possibility to send this arguments where you want, to other email or chat. ",No,a feature request https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/27879,940032113,Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists,The functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (`shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` and `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` core app settings). Fixes: #27122 ,Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists The functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (`shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` and `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` core app settings). Fixes: #27122 ,Yes,Handling user enumeration issues https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2509,938936881,[Privacy] Allow users to provide a private genesis ,"Add an option to allow the provision of a private genesis using a plugin-able interface. [![](https://mermaid.ink/img/eyJjb2RlIjoiZ3JhcGggVERcbiAgICBBW0FsaWNlXSAtLT58ZWVhX3NlbmRSYXdUcmFuc2FjdGlvbnwgQntyZXNvbHZlTGFzdFN0YXRlUm9vdH1cbiAgICBCIC0tPnxlbXB0eXwgRFthcHBseVByaXZhdGVHZW5lc2lzXVxuICAgIEIgLS0-fGhhc1N0YXRlfCBQW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV1cbiAgICBEIC0tPiBFe09uQ2hhaW5Qcml2YWN5fVxuICAgIEUgLS0-IHx5ZXN8IEZbYXBwbHlNYW5hZ2VtZW50Q29udHJhY3RzXVxuICAgIEUgLS0-IHxub3wgR1tyZXR1cm4gc3RhdGVdXG4gICAgRiAtLT4gSFtyZXR1cm4gc3RhdGVdIiwibWVybWFpZCI6eyJ0aGVtZSI6ImRlZmF1bHQifSwidXBkYXRlRWRpdG9yIjpmYWxzZSwiYXV0b1N5bmMiOnRydWUsInVwZGF0ZURpYWdyYW0iOmZhbHNlfQ)](https://mermaid-js.github.io/mermaid-live-editor/edit##eyJjb2RlIjoiZ3JhcGggVERcbiAgICBBW0FsaWNlXSAtLT58ZWVhX3NlbmRSYXdUcmFuc2FjdGlvbnwgQntyZXNvbHZlTGFzdFN0YXRlUm9vdH1cbiAgICBCIC0tPnxlbXB0eXwgRFthcHBseVByaXZhdGVHZW5lc2lzXVxuICAgIEIgLS0-fGhhc1N0YXR8IFBbcmV0dXJuIHN0YXRlXVxuICAgIEQgLS0-IEV7T25DaGFpblByaXZhY3l9XG4gICAgRSAtLT4gfHllc3wgRlthcHBseU1hbmFnZW1lbnRDb250cmFjdHNdXG4gICAgRSAtLT4gfG5vfCBHW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV1cbiAgICBGIC0tPiBIW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV0iLCJtZXJtYWlkIjoie1xuICBcInRoZW1lXCI6IFwiZGVmYXVsdFwiXG59IiwidXBkYXRlRWRpdG9yIjpmYWxzZSwiYXV0b1N5bmMiOnRydWUsInVwZGF0ZURpYWdyYW0iOmZhbHNlfQ) ### Problems There is no way to prevent nodes from having a different private genesis file. Currently, there is no private consensus to prevent this from happening. As such, there is the possibility for nodes to have inconsistent states. ### Implementation On the `PrivacyPluginService` a method has been added to allow registration of a `PrivacyGroupGenesisProvider`. The provider must return a `PrivacyGenesis`. This currently only allows you to define genesis accounts/allocs. ","[Privacy] Allow users to provide a private genesis Add an option to allow the provision of a private genesis using a plugin-able interface. [![](https://mermaid.ink/img/eyJjb2RlIjoiZ3JhcGggVERcbiAgICBBW0FsaWNlXSAtLT58ZWVhX3NlbmRSYXdUcmFuc2FjdGlvbnwgQntyZXNvbHZlTGFzdFN0YXRlUm9vdH1cbiAgICBCIC0tPnxlbXB0eXwgRFthcHBseVByaXZhdGVHZW5lc2lzXVxuICAgIEIgLS0-fGhhc1N0YXRlfCBQW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV1cbiAgICBEIC0tPiBFe09uQ2hhaW5Qcml2YWN5fVxuICAgIEUgLS0-IHx5ZXN8IEZbYXBwbHlNYW5hZ2VtZW50Q29udHJhY3RzXVxuICAgIEUgLS0-IHxub3wgR1tyZXR1cm4gc3RhdGVdXG4gICAgRiAtLT4gSFtyZXR1cm4gc3RhdGVdIiwibWVybWFpZCI6eyJ0aGVtZSI6ImRlZmF1bHQifSwidXBkYXRlRWRpdG9yIjpmYWxzZSwiYXV0b1N5bmMiOnRydWUsInVwZGF0ZURpYWdyYW0iOmZhbHNlfQ)](https://mermaid-js.github.io/mermaid-live-editor/edit##eyJjb2RlIjoiZ3JhcGggVERcbiAgICBBW0FsaWNlXSAtLT58ZWVhX3NlbmRSYXdUcmFuc2FjdGlvbnwgQntyZXNvbHZlTGFzdFN0YXRlUm9vdH1cbiAgICBCIC0tPnxlbXB0eXwgRFthcHBseVByaXZhdGVHZW5lc2lzXVxuICAgIEIgLS0-fGhhc1N0YXR8IFBbcmV0dXJuIHN0YXRlXVxuICAgIEQgLS0-IEV7T25DaGFpblByaXZhY3l9XG4gICAgRSAtLT4gfHllc3wgRlthcHBseU1hbmFnZW1lbnRDb250cmFjdHNdXG4gICAgRSAtLT4gfG5vfCBHW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV1cbiAgICBGIC0tPiBIW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV0iLCJtZXJtYWlkIjoie1xuICBcInRoZW1lXCI6IFwiZGVmYXVsdFwiXG59IiwidXBkYXRlRWRpdG9yIjpmYWxzZSwiYXV0b1N5bmMiOnRydWUsInVwZGF0ZURpYWdyYW0iOmZhbHNlfQ) ### Problems There is no way to prevent nodes from having a different private genesis file. Currently, there is no private consensus to prevent this from happening. As such, there is the possibility for nodes to have inconsistent states. ### Implementation On the `PrivacyPluginService` a method has been added to allow registration of a `PrivacyGroupGenesisProvider`. The provider must return a `PrivacyGenesis`. This currently only allows you to define genesis accounts/allocs. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/commons-app/apps-android-commons/issues/4495,937442265,Remove EXIF coordinates per-picture,"I am happy to share EXIF coordinates of 90% of the pictures I take (landscapes, mountains, landmarks). Without EXIF coordinates these pictures would lose most of their encyclopedic/usability value. On the other hand, I often don't want to share EXIF coordinates of the remaining 10%: Picture of a rare fruit at my friend's house, pictures of tools at a relative's workplace, pictures of super-old out-of-copyright documents at my grandmother's place, etc. I think many contributors share the same problem. While #181 addresses ""at my home"", I think we need a more **case-by-case** way to remove coordinates. This could be a dedicated button on the newly-implemented coordinates modification screen.","Remove EXIF coordinates per-picture I am happy to share EXIF coordinates of 90% of the pictures I take (landscapes, mountains, landmarks). Without EXIF coordinates these pictures would lose most of their encyclopedic/usability value. On the other hand, I often don't want to share EXIF coordinates of the remaining 10%: Picture of a rare fruit at my friend's house, pictures of tools at a relative's workplace, pictures of super-old out-of-copyright documents at my grandmother's place, etc. I think many contributors share the same problem. While #181 addresses ""at my home"", I think we need a more **case-by-case** way to remove coordinates. This could be a dedicated button on the newly-implemented coordinates modification screen.",Yes,Location privacy https://api.github.com/repos/covidpass-org/covidpass/issues/17,932617072,Add random data into the pass payload,"Hi, I'm not an Apple Wallet expert (and not even an Apple user at all), so please correct me if any of my assumptions are incorrect. This app sends to the back-end a SHA-1 hash of a payload built from the DGC data. I think the use of SHA-1 is acceptable here (and probably a requirement of Apple Wallet anyways נŸ˜’). Still, if I'm not mistaken, the payload is deterministic for a given DGC: https://github.com/covidpass-org/covidpass/blob/888c40c9894b803d40c4eef5b3869691465bd6c4/src/pass.js#L98. So this hash could be used by a modified back-end as a unique identifier for a DGC and could be used for instance to determine how many times a given DGC was scanned or if a DGC you had by another mean has already been processed in the past by the back-end. While I don't think it's very bad, I don't think it is intended and IIUC could easily be avoided at minimum cost by adding some randomly generated bits to the pass payload. As a result, it would leak even less info from the DGC to the back-end and provide even more guarantees to the users. WDYT?","Add random data into the pass payload Hi, I'm not an Apple Wallet expert (and not even an Apple user at all), so please correct me if any of my assumptions are incorrect. This app sends to the back-end a SHA-1 hash of a payload built from the DGC data. I think the use of SHA-1 is acceptable here (and probably a requirement of Apple Wallet anyways נŸ˜’). Still, if I'm not mistaken, the payload is deterministic for a given DGC: https://github.com/covidpass-org/covidpass/blob/888c40c9894b803d40c4eef5b3869691465bd6c4/src/pass.js#L98. So this hash could be used by a modified back-end as a unique identifier for a DGC and could be used for instance to determine how many times a given DGC was scanned or if a DGC you had by another mean has already been processed in the past by the back-end. While I don't think it's very bad, I don't think it is intended and IIUC could easily be avoided at minimum cost by adding some randomly generated bits to the pass payload. As a result, it would leak even less info from the DGC to the back-end and provide even more guarantees to the users. WDYT?",Yes,Privacy in Apple wallet https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2387,915254883,Besu + Private transaction manager Performance problems,"HI At @iobuilders we are working with several clients, including Allfunds (on their custom transaction manager). On out latest smart contract set, we are using structs as params, return value, arrays etc. with the new abiencoderv2 We use pragma solidity ^0.7.5; pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2; We use a standard hyperledger besu network, with maxContractSize to 48k, because our main contract are around 38kb. (4gb 2vcpus, 4 validators, 2 regular nodes) Deploying smart contracts at the public state works perfectly fine. Once we deploy de same smart contract, and do the same transactions on the privacy group, and private state level, performance bottlenecks appears, increasing the heap consumption for one single rpc call ( not tx ) to 3GB. Added to rocks db thread blocked traces Having similar issues in the past with public state, and having reported rocks db performance issues in the past(https://pegasys1.atlassian.net/browse/PAN-3245?atlOrigin=eyJpIjoiYTUxYTI2MDQ3MTZkNDY2NGIwZTNjZTU4MjcxNmFlMWEiLCJwIjoiaiJ9), having known that private state has no log bloom cache, our guess and feeling, is that: - Private state performance for complex SC and transactions needs to be tuned - Root cause could be state read at rocks db level, and no cache existence Can you help us, give support on this? Does the new tessera based implementation focus on this perfomance, cache topic? Kind regards Genesis File { ""config"": { ""chainId"": 2021, ""muirglacierblock"": 0, ""ibft2"": { ""blockperiodseconds"": 1, ""epochlength"": 30000, ""requesttimeoutseconds"": 2 }, ""contractSizeLimit"": 2147483647, ""evmStackSize"": 4096 }, ""nonce"": ""0x0"", ""gasLimit"": ""0x1fffffffffffff"", ""difficulty"": ""0x1"", ""timestamp"": ""0x58ee40ba"", ""extraData"": ---","Besu + Private transaction manager Performance problems HI At @iobuilders we are working with several clients, including Allfunds (on their custom transaction manager). On out latest smart contract set, we are using structs as params, return value, arrays etc. with the new abiencoderv2 We use pragma solidity ^0.7.5; pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2; We use a standard hyperledger besu network, with maxContractSize to 48k, because our main contract are around 38kb. (4gb 2vcpus, 4 validators, 2 regular nodes) Deploying smart contracts at the public state works perfectly fine. Once we deploy de same smart contract, and do the same transactions on the privacy group, and private state level, performance bottlenecks appears, increasing the heap consumption for one single rpc call ( not tx ) to 3GB. Added to rocks db thread blocked traces Having similar issues in the past with public state, and having reported rocks db performance issues in the past(https://pegasys1.atlassian.net/browse/PAN-3245?atlOrigin=eyJpIjoiYTUxYTI2MDQ3MTZkNDY2NGIwZTNjZTU4MjcxNmFlMWEiLCJwIjoiaiJ9), having known that private state has no log bloom cache, our guess and feeling, is that: - Private state performance for complex SC and transactions needs to be tuned - Root cause could be state read at rocks db level, and no cache existence Can you help us, give support on this? Does the new tessera based implementation focus on this perfomance, cache topic? Kind regards Genesis File { ""config"": { ""chainId"": 2021, ""muirglacierblock"": 0, ""ibft2"": { ""blockperiodseconds"": 1, ""epochlength"": 30000, ""requesttimeoutseconds"": 2 }, ""contractSizeLimit"": 2147483647, ""evmStackSize"": 4096 }, ""nonce"": ""0x0"", ""gasLimit"": ""0x1fffffffffffff"", ""difficulty"": ""0x1"", ""timestamp"": ""0x58ee40ba"", ""extraData"": ---",Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2385,914719076,[Discussion] Private Genesis State,"### Description As a user of unrestricted privacy, I want to be able to specify the initial genesis state for private transactions. There are a couple of options on how to implement this: 1. separate private genesis config e.g `private-genesis.json` 2. add an option into genesis.config e.g ```json ""alloc"": { ""0x0ffd23af8eebc60b3cfdeed6f814988757237314"": { ""private"": true, ""code"": ""0x6080..."", } } ``` ","[Discussion] Private Genesis State ### Description As a user of unrestricted privacy, I want to be able to specify the initial genesis state for private transactions. There are a couple of options on how to implement this: 1. separate private genesis config e.g `private-genesis.json` 2. add an option into genesis.config e.g ```json ""alloc"": { ""0x0ffd23af8eebc60b3cfdeed6f814988757237314"": { ""private"": true, ""code"": ""0x6080..."", } } ``` ",Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/pymedphys/pymedphys/issues/1534,907754457,Unexpose pseudonymise,Hopefully just a temporary measure to address https://github.com/pymedphys/pymedphys/issues/1455,Unexpose pseudonymise Hopefully just a temporary measure to address https://github.com/pymedphys/pymedphys/issues/1455,Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/27192,903994312,Block Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC),A new technology is currently being rolled out to browsers to replace third party tracking cookies. This technology is named Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) and you can read more about it [here](https://github.com/WICG/floc) and [here](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/03/googles-floc-terrible-idea).,Block Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) A new technology is currently being rolled out to browsers to replace third party tracking cookies. This technology is named Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) and you can read more about it [here](https://github.com/WICG/floc) and [here](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/03/googles-floc-terrible-idea).,Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/646,897007601,Policy Requirements,"This pull request is written to fulfill the needs of the discussions started in Issue #608 around agencies expressing data sharing requirements more clearly. ## Explain pull request This would add a new endpoint Requirements under the Policy API that allows agencies to digitally express only the data they need for their jurisdiction and operating permit. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `policy` ## Additional context The initial PR is a draft that will require feedback and edits from the MDS community before becoming part of the release, including external guidance documents and a new OMF repo to host requirement files for some agencies. ","Policy Requirements This pull request is written to fulfill the needs of the discussions started in Issue #608 around agencies expressing data sharing requirements more clearly. ## Explain pull request This would add a new endpoint Requirements under the Policy API that allows agencies to digitally express only the data they need for their jurisdiction and operating permit. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `policy` ## Additional context The initial PR is a draft that will require feedback and edits from the MDS community before becoming part of the release, including external guidance documents and a new OMF repo to host requirement files for some agencies. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/infoderm/patients/issues/276,896447935,Warn when multiple tabs edit the same patient or consultation,"Should be generic enough that it can be extended to anything. A robust idea would be to have a editing collection that keeps track of `{userId, itemCollection, itemId}`. This would allow anybody to see what others are editing. Should evaluate whether this is OK as long as itemCollection and itemId do not leak any information other than an editing histogram. This would also allow to display a list of items currently open for edition. An extension of this idea would be to enforce `{itemCollection, itemId, owner}` constraints when querying this new collection. Maybe it would be better to implement a proper permissions system. A scalable solution is again a similar idea as above where we store either `{userId, permission, itemCollection, itemId}` or `{userId, read, write, itemCollection, itemId}` if the only permissions are `read` and `write`. These solutions seems nice since we will mostly run permission testing code on the server. The only occasions where we might need testing on the client is for UX considerations (like hiding an edit button). With the first solution we would query `find({userId: this.userId, permission: 'write'})` and the second solution `find({userId: this.userId, write: 'true'})` with appropriate indices for uniqueness and search performance. NOTE: should write imply read? ","Warn when multiple tabs edit the same patient or consultation Should be generic enough that it can be extended to anything. A robust idea would be to have a editing collection that keeps track of `{userId, itemCollection, itemId}`. This would allow anybody to see what others are editing. Should evaluate whether this is OK as long as itemCollection and itemId do not leak any information other than an editing histogram. This would also allow to display a list of items currently open for edition. An extension of this idea would be to enforce `{itemCollection, itemId, owner}` constraints when querying this new collection. Maybe it would be better to implement a proper permissions system. A scalable solution is again a similar idea as above where we store either `{userId, permission, itemCollection, itemId}` or `{userId, read, write, itemCollection, itemId}` if the only permissions are `read` and `write`. These solutions seems nice since we will mostly run permission testing code on the server. The only occasions where we might need testing on the client is for UX considerations (like hiding an edit button). With the first solution we would query `find({userId: this.userId, permission: 'write'})` and the second solution `find({userId: this.userId, write: 'true'})` with appropriate indices for uniqueness and search performance. NOTE: should write imply read? ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/17405,895869238,element-web runs offsite javascript from vector.im and riot.im,"app = element-web version = 1.7.28 When using a selfhosted element talking to a sellfhosted server, enabling the Spaces feature establishes connections to `vector.im`, and when trying to view a jitsi video call inline fails with a ""JavaScript is disabled. For this site to work you have to enable JavaScript."" error when JS is permitted on the selfhosting domain but denied on others (and it shows it's trying to exec remote javascript from `riot.im` and `vector.im` domains). What's the point of having both a server app and a client app that can be selfhosted if it has to phone home to the developers to download remote executable code from an untrusted server to work right?","element-web runs offsite javascript from vector.im and riot.im app = element-web version = 1.7.28 When using a selfhosted element talking to a sellfhosted server, enabling the Spaces feature establishes connections to `vector.im`, and when trying to view a jitsi video call inline fails with a ""JavaScript is disabled. For this site to work you have to enable JavaScript."" error when JS is permitted on the selfhosting domain but denied on others (and it shows it's trying to exec remote javascript from `riot.im` and `vector.im` domains). What's the point of having both a server app and a client app that can be selfhosted if it has to phone home to the developers to download remote executable code from an untrusted server to work right?",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/146,895350443,"As a user, I want to toggle Kill Switch",### Description: Implement rule that forces system to send all network traffic over the tunnel. ,"As a user, I want to toggle Kill Switch ### Description: Implement rule that forces system to send all network traffic over the tunnel. ",Yes,Sending network traffic over a tunnel in order to hide it https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2268,886308035,PrivateTransactionReceipt.toString() prints misleading info,"PrivateTransactionReceipt.toString() is missing info eg https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8743/workflows/acf097ba-2e00-4288-9c38-5c26aedbc9f1/jobs/44907 ``` Expecting: to be equal to: when recursively comparing field by field, but found the following difference: ``` eg field from - toString() is implemented on superclass TransactionReceipt but PrivateTransactionReceipt also has a private final String from; ","PrivateTransactionReceipt.toString() prints misleading info PrivateTransactionReceipt.toString() is missing info eg https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8743/workflows/acf097ba-2e00-4288-9c38-5c26aedbc9f1/jobs/44907 ``` Expecting: to be equal to: when recursively comparing field by field, but found the following difference: ``` eg field from - toString() is implemented on superclass TransactionReceipt but PrivateTransactionReceipt also has a private final String from; ",No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/15,884350359,Informed consent,### Summary Collate together a document such that participants can provide informed consent to the interview,Informed consent ### Summary Collate together a document such that participants can provide informed consent to the interview,Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/11,884350158,Recording (Zoom) interviews,"### Summary Interviews will be conducted over Zoom and will be recorded. These will be saved locally, **not** to the cloud. Once the recordings have been combined with the automated transcription #10 and anonymised, the recordings will be deleted.","Recording (Zoom) interviews ### Summary Interviews will be conducted over Zoom and will be recorded. These will be saved locally, **not** to the cloud. Once the recordings have been combined with the automated transcription #10 and anonymised, the recordings will be deleted.",Yes,Interview recordings not to be saved to the cloud https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/10,884350123,Automated transcription,"### Summary Draft transcriptions will be generated using an automated tool such as otter.ai. These will be saved locally and not live-streamed anywhere. Once the automated transcription has been corrected/updated (with the help of the zoom recordings #11 ) and anonymised, the automatically generated transcriptions will be deleted.","Automated transcription ### Summary Draft transcriptions will be generated using an automated tool such as otter.ai. These will be saved locally and not live-streamed anywhere. Once the automated transcription has been corrected/updated (with the help of the zoom recordings #11 ) and anonymised, the automatically generated transcriptions will be deleted.",Yes,Transciptions to be saved only locally https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/9,884350068,Storage of ephemeral results,### Summary - Local downloads preferred over cloud recording.,Storage of ephemeral results ### Summary - Local downloads preferred over cloud recording.,Yes,Local saving instead of cloud https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/8,884350016,Collating transcriptions,"### Summary - Full transcripts should be generated by combining outputs of the automatically generated transcriptions #10 and interview recordings #11 - These transcripts should then be anonymised - Remove/redact any specific mention of names, programmes and teams - Modify/reword quotes to anonymise further","Collating transcriptions ### Summary - Full transcripts should be generated by combining outputs of the automatically generated transcriptions #10 and interview recordings #11 - These transcripts should then be anonymised - Remove/redact any specific mention of names, programmes and teams - Modify/reword quotes to anonymise further",Yes,Transciptions to be anonimized https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/6,884349923,Long-term storage/sharing of transcriptions,### Summary Long(er)-term storage of the aggregated transcripts #8 should be hosted on the Turing's Sharepoint. This has been vetted for security by the Turing's IT department and has configurable access control (for new researchers joining the project etc.),Long-term storage/sharing of transcriptions ### Summary Long(er)-term storage of the aggregated transcripts #8 should be hosted on the Turing's Sharepoint. This has been vetted for security by the Turing's IT department and has configurable access control (for new researchers joining the project etc.),Yes,Transcriptions storage https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/2,884349607,Write a Data Management Plan,"### Summary Write a data management plan which will outline the safe storage, access, and reusability of the interview transcripts https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk/public_plans <-- Check for public DMPs from Yo","Write a Data Management Plan ### Summary Write a data management plan which will outline the safe storage, access, and reusability of the interview transcripts https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk/public_plans <-- Check for public DMPs from Yo",Yes,Data retention policies https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/1,884348641,Write a Data Management Plan,"### Summary Write a data management plan which will outline the safe storage, access, and reusability of the interview transcripts https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk/public_plans <-- Check for public DMPs from Yo","Write a Data Management Plan ### Summary Write a data management plan which will outline the safe storage, access, and reusability of the interview transcripts https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk/public_plans <-- Check for public DMPs from Yo",Yes,Data retention policies https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/browser-sdk/issues/823,872329896,Automatic metadata scrubbing,"There's currently no automatic/manual way to instruct the SDK to scrub potentially sensitive properties. ```javascript import { datadogLogs } from '@datadog/browser-logs' datadogLogs.logger.info('Button clicked', { name: 'buttonName', id: 123, password: 'myPlainTextPassword' }) ``` Would it be possible to add a configuration or do it even automatically similar to e.g. Rollbar? https://docs.rollbar.com/docs/rollbarjs-configuration-reference ``` Default scrubbed fields for servers: [""pw"", ""pass"", ""passwd"", ""password"", ""password_confirmation"", ""passwordConfirmation"", ""confirm_password"", ""confirmPassword"", ""secret"", ""secret_token"", ""secretToken"", ""secret_key"", ""secretKey"", ""api_key"", ""access_token"", ""accessToken"", ""authenticity_token"", ""oauth_token"", ""token"", ""user_session_secret"", ""request.session.csrf"", ""request.session._csrf"", ""request.params._csrf"", ""request.cookie"", ""request.cookies""] Default scrubbed fields for browsers: [""pw"", ""pass"", ""passwd"", ""password"", ""secret"", ""confirm_password"", ""confirmPassword"", ""password_confirmation"", ""passwordConfirmation"", ""access_token"", ""accessToken"", ""secret_key"", ""secretKey"", ""secretToken"", ""cc-number"", ""card number"", ""cardnumber"", ""cardnum"", ""ccnum"", ""ccnumber"", ""cc num"", ""creditcardnumber"", ""credit card number"", ""newcreditcardnumber"", ""new credit card"", ""creditcardno"", ""credit card no"", ""card#"", ""card #"", ""cc-csc"", ""cvc2"", ""cvv2"", ""ccv2"", ""security code"", ""card verification"", ""name on credit card"", ""name on card"", ""nameoncard"", ""cardholder"", ""card holder"", ""name des karteninhabers"", ""card type"", ""cardtype"", ""cc type"", ""cctype"", ""payment type"", ""expiration date"", ""expirationdate"", ""expdate"", ""cc-exp""] ``` This could be extended to the existing scrubbable properties as well: https://docs.datadoghq.com/real_user_monitoring/browser/advanced_configuration/?tab=npm#scrub-sensitive-data-from-your-rum-data so that emails, passwords, tokens will be automatically scrubbed from `urls`, error stacks, etc.","Automatic metadata scrubbing There's currently no automatic/manual way to instruct the SDK to scrub potentially sensitive properties. ```javascript import { datadogLogs } from '@datadog/browser-logs' datadogLogs.logger.info('Button clicked', { name: 'buttonName', id: 123, password: 'myPlainTextPassword' }) ``` Would it be possible to add a configuration or do it even automatically similar to e.g. Rollbar? https://docs.rollbar.com/docs/rollbarjs-configuration-reference ``` Default scrubbed fields for servers: [""pw"", ""pass"", ""passwd"", ""password"", ""password_confirmation"", ""passwordConfirmation"", ""confirm_password"", ""confirmPassword"", ""secret"", ""secret_token"", ""secretToken"", ""secret_key"", ""secretKey"", ""api_key"", ""access_token"", ""accessToken"", ""authenticity_token"", ""oauth_token"", ""token"", ""user_session_secret"", ""request.session.csrf"", ""request.session._csrf"", ""request.params._csrf"", ""request.cookie"", ""request.cookies""] Default scrubbed fields for browsers: [""pw"", ""pass"", ""passwd"", ""password"", ""secret"", ""confirm_password"", ""confirmPassword"", ""password_confirmation"", ""passwordConfirmation"", ""access_token"", ""accessToken"", ""secret_key"", ""secretKey"", ""secretToken"", ""cc-number"", ""card number"", ""cardnumber"", ""cardnum"", ""ccnum"", ""ccnumber"", ""cc num"", ""creditcardnumber"", ""credit card number"", ""newcreditcardnumber"", ""new credit card"", ""creditcardno"", ""credit card no"", ""card#"", ""card #"", ""cc-csc"", ""cvc2"", ""cvv2"", ""ccv2"", ""security code"", ""card verification"", ""name on credit card"", ""name on card"", ""nameoncard"", ""cardholder"", ""card holder"", ""name des karteninhabers"", ""card type"", ""cardtype"", ""cc type"", ""cctype"", ""payment type"", ""expiration date"", ""expirationdate"", ""expdate"", ""cc-exp""] ``` This could be extended to the existing scrubbable properties as well: https://docs.datadoghq.com/real_user_monitoring/browser/advanced_configuration/?tab=npm#scrub-sensitive-data-from-your-rum-data so that emails, passwords, tokens will be automatically scrubbed from `urls`, error stacks, etc.",Yes,Scrubbing sensitive data https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2198,869498741,private state bug: invalid block,"297 and 309 (ATs using single contracts) succeed 298/307/308 (ATs using multiple contracts) end up with invalid block (state mismatch) ``` 2021-04-28 14:51:29.884+10:00 | vert.x-worker-thread-2 | DEBUG | JsonRpcHttpService | JSON-RPC request -> eth_getTransactionReceipt 2021-04-28 14:51:30.011+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | DEBUG | IbftRound | Received a proposal message. round=ConsensusRoundIdentifier{Sequence=214, Round=0} 2021-04-28 14:51:30.029+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Invalid block: state root mismatch (expected=0x36059c0c152ecd69a19d92c9d8986c1306a63307e4befa9ceb32fcef38224271, actual=0xd6bf6eb0fa4ef33b07a691396dd60533eeadc714b4030ec0970a9497b3855b37 ) 2021-04-28 14:51:30.030+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Invalid block RLP : 0xf90320f90277a07b79a5f4d6cb42658ecb843f1b90a2f159e67afe7f63cec697fdd1bb454f8e25a01dcc4de8dec75d7aab85b567b6ccd41ad312451b948a7413f0a142fd40d4934794545bbfad3764a1ca38 e095fbc76bcbfb02bb70e3a036059c0c152ecd69a19d92c9d8986c1306a63307e4befa9ceb32fcef38224271a0c6e4bfbeed9c706f34239d63a939ba5af20c2a962f53c7e88fa140bd37724ae0a0b64408da6b8fe39ab764af88ece1e8cca1c35fd988db57806e99138c629365a0b901000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000181d684ffffff0080846088e9d2b880f87ea00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000f85494068b5905cc03cba91efb5289fced160d98e75108940f8b0ab1c6e605d3e4558bca571e3b3f4e7e5ae794545bbfad3764a1ca38e095fbc76bcbfb02bb70e394e5f20844e7071ca28198a48de5375583e07e3d33808400000000c0a063746963616c2062797a616e74696e65206661756c7420746f6c6572616e 6365880000000000000000f8a3f8a10a808347b7609480bd481146703bb1ddb67a8184c34c84ee91f9df80b840c71fc33f39d19cf50c85f08246808c7b08a580313fb48567066fc6541855e3147401a4a618a6aa25835e62c30eb93ab6fd8cd7343b1207c4374c784b6f6f4b1725a0b5474018126a3705e24023ca494f9f505fe96dca743bb524a1 849d61741b1893a00606c50afc6a8570416c207afde4e778c898d5f49566e1e0cf641b21c7fa9bc4c0 2021-04-28 14:51:30.034+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Transaction receipt found in the invalid block TransactionReceipt{stateRoot=null, cumulativeGasUsed=0, logs=[], bloomFilter=0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000, status=1, transactionReceiptType=STATUS} 2021-04-28 14:51:30.034+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | INFO | MessageValidator | Invalid Proposal message, block did not pass validation. ```","private state bug: invalid block 297 and 309 (ATs using single contracts) succeed 298/307/308 (ATs using multiple contracts) end up with invalid block (state mismatch) ``` 2021-04-28 14:51:29.884+10:00 | vert.x-worker-thread-2 | DEBUG | JsonRpcHttpService | JSON-RPC request -> eth_getTransactionReceipt 2021-04-28 14:51:30.011+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | DEBUG | IbftRound | Received a proposal message. round=ConsensusRoundIdentifier{Sequence=214, Round=0} 2021-04-28 14:51:30.029+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Invalid block: state root mismatch (expected=0x36059c0c152ecd69a19d92c9d8986c1306a63307e4befa9ceb32fcef38224271, actual=0xd6bf6eb0fa4ef33b07a691396dd60533eeadc714b4030ec0970a9497b3855b37 ) 2021-04-28 14:51:30.030+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Invalid block RLP : 0xf90320f90277a07b79a5f4d6cb42658ecb843f1b90a2f159e67afe7f63cec697fdd1bb454f8e25a01dcc4de8dec75d7aab85b567b6ccd41ad312451b948a7413f0a142fd40d4934794545bbfad3764a1ca38 e095fbc76bcbfb02bb70e3a036059c0c152ecd69a19d92c9d8986c1306a63307e4befa9ceb32fcef38224271a0c6e4bfbeed9c706f34239d63a939ba5af20c2a962f53c7e88fa140bd37724ae0a0b64408da6b8fe39ab764af88ece1e8cca1c35fd988db57806e99138c629365a0b901000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000181d684ffffff0080846088e9d2b880f87ea00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000f85494068b5905cc03cba91efb5289fced160d98e75108940f8b0ab1c6e605d3e4558bca571e3b3f4e7e5ae794545bbfad3764a1ca38e095fbc76bcbfb02bb70e394e5f20844e7071ca28198a48de5375583e07e3d33808400000000c0a063746963616c2062797a616e74696e65206661756c7420746f6c6572616e 6365880000000000000000f8a3f8a10a808347b7609480bd481146703bb1ddb67a8184c34c84ee91f9df80b840c71fc33f39d19cf50c85f08246808c7b08a580313fb48567066fc6541855e3147401a4a618a6aa25835e62c30eb93ab6fd8cd7343b1207c4374c784b6f6f4b1725a0b5474018126a3705e24023ca494f9f505fe96dca743bb524a1 849d61741b1893a00606c50afc6a8570416c207afde4e778c898d5f49566e1e0cf641b21c7fa9bc4c0 2021-04-28 14:51:30.034+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Transaction receipt found in the invalid block TransactionReceipt{stateRoot=null, cumulativeGasUsed=0, logs=[], bloomFilter=0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000, status=1, transactionReceiptType=STATUS} 2021-04-28 14:51:30.034+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | INFO | MessageValidator | Invalid Proposal message, block did not pass validation. ```",No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2191,868266088,Flaky test: PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest,"April 16 failure: `org.hyperledger.besu.tests.acceptance.privacy.PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest > blockParamShouldBeApplied FAILED` and `org.hyperledger.besu.tests.acceptance.privacy.PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest > nodesInGroupShouldHaveSameStateRoot FAILED` Have just failed on a Circle CI build https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8277/workflows/81e00426-bd7d-418d-b158-cf9f0ff1d809/jobs/41843 Failed again yesterday: https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8453/workflows/44ac2e16-9568-4c80-8edf-d301eeee1b14/jobs/43042 The failure is because the tx receipt is not populated ``` Expecting: to be equal to: when recursively comparing field by field, but found the following difference: field/property 'from' differ: - actual value : ""0xfe3b557e8fb62b89f4916b721be55ceb828dbd73"" - expected value : ""0x91240f5b6994c7ed80f9f94b1aa847880ad3b150"" ```","Flaky test: PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest April 16 failure: `org.hyperledger.besu.tests.acceptance.privacy.PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest > blockParamShouldBeApplied FAILED` and `org.hyperledger.besu.tests.acceptance.privacy.PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest > nodesInGroupShouldHaveSameStateRoot FAILED` Have just failed on a Circle CI build https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8277/workflows/81e00426-bd7d-418d-b158-cf9f0ff1d809/jobs/41843 Failed again yesterday: https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8453/workflows/44ac2e16-9568-4c80-8edf-d301eeee1b14/jobs/43042 The failure is because the tx receipt is not populated ``` Expecting: to be equal to: when recursively comparing field by field, but found the following difference: field/property 'from' differ: - actual value : ""0xfe3b557e8fb62b89f4916b721be55ceb828dbd73"" - expected value : ""0x91240f5b6994c7ed80f9f94b1aa847880ad3b150"" ```",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/640,864402964,Carshare Support,"### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Background: Ride Report is working with a variety of carshare operators on MDS and is looking to develop the spec to support carshare specific use cases we have identified. **Use Cases:** - **Flexible Rates:** Carshare rentals allow users to rent vehicles by the minute, hour, or by days. Currently, MDS Provider shows vehicle rental per minute and API consumers are unable to differentiate between users who selected per minute pricing vs. per day vs. per hour. - **Fleet Info:** Carshare providers utilize a variety of makes and models of cars. From sedans to SUVs, from ICE vehicles to electric or hybrid powertrains. All the vehicles have different cargo and passenger capacities. It would be helpful to get a snapshot of a providers fleet mix breakdown, to evaluate the type of vehicles people are utilizing. - **Service Area Exit:** The carshare mode inherently offers shared mobility users flexibility to take different length (distance, duration) trips. It would be helpful to get some sort of data about a trip when it exits the service area in privacy preserving manner. Are cars going far away? Are cars going out of the larger metro area? Are cars going out-of-state? - **Vehicle Idle Time:** Cars sit idle and take up a substantial amount of space. Cities would like to know how long cars sit idle on the PROW for a variety of reasons: to understand utilization, pricing, loss parking revenue, etc. With MDS Provider we can measure how long a vehicle is sitting based on the `unavailable` vehicle state, however with carshare a user can rent a vehicle for up to a week at a time and there is no state representing a reserved vehicle that is parked. - **Other Vehicle Data:** Odometer data to aid in accuracy of trip metrics and routing. - **Policy:** new Policy capabilities that are specific to car share, like parking parking Policy that refers to specific signage (i.e. 2hr zones) instead of just geofences. ### Describe the solution you'd like TBD, We are working on a more formal technical proposal. ### Is this a breaking change * I'm not sure, but this will become more clear as we determine the technical solution. ### Impacted Spec For which spec is this feature being requested? * `provider` * `policy` ","Carshare Support ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Background: Ride Report is working with a variety of carshare operators on MDS and is looking to develop the spec to support carshare specific use cases we have identified. **Use Cases:** - **Flexible Rates:** Carshare rentals allow users to rent vehicles by the minute, hour, or by days. Currently, MDS Provider shows vehicle rental per minute and API consumers are unable to differentiate between users who selected per minute pricing vs. per day vs. per hour. - **Fleet Info:** Carshare providers utilize a variety of makes and models of cars. From sedans to SUVs, from ICE vehicles to electric or hybrid powertrains. All the vehicles have different cargo and passenger capacities. It would be helpful to get a snapshot of a providers fleet mix breakdown, to evaluate the type of vehicles people are utilizing. - **Service Area Exit:** The carshare mode inherently offers shared mobility users flexibility to take different length (distance, duration) trips. It would be helpful to get some sort of data about a trip when it exits the service area in privacy preserving manner. Are cars going far away? Are cars going out of the larger metro area? Are cars going out-of-state? - **Vehicle Idle Time:** Cars sit idle and take up a substantial amount of space. Cities would like to know how long cars sit idle on the PROW for a variety of reasons: to understand utilization, pricing, loss parking revenue, etc. With MDS Provider we can measure how long a vehicle is sitting based on the `unavailable` vehicle state, however with carshare a user can rent a vehicle for up to a week at a time and there is no state representing a reserved vehicle that is parked. - **Other Vehicle Data:** Odometer data to aid in accuracy of trip metrics and routing. - **Policy:** new Policy capabilities that are specific to car share, like parking parking Policy that refers to specific signage (i.e. 2hr zones) instead of just geofences. ### Describe the solution you'd like TBD, We are working on a more formal technical proposal. ### Is this a breaking change * I'm not sure, but this will become more clear as we determine the technical solution. ### Impacted Spec For which spec is this feature being requested? * `provider` * `policy` ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10151,860447645,Disable Googles FLoC,Please disable Googles Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) by adding `Permissions-Policy: interest-cohort=()` to the header files. See e.g. https://cleanuptheweb.org/ for some more information. ,Disable Googles FLoC Please disable Googles Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) by adding `Permissions-Policy: interest-cohort=()` to the header files. See e.g. https://cleanuptheweb.org/ for some more information. ,Yes,Permisions https://api.github.com/repos/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080,846150327,Provide a default privacy statement and end-user agreement,"**Describe the bug** We added components for a privacy statement and end-user agreement in #862. However, currently they contain filler, lorem ipsum text. Before 7.0 we should preferably replace that filler text with a good default for both documents, or if we can't do that, disable the components by default. **To Reproduce** Click the privacy policy or end-user agreement links in the footer. **Expected behavior** Out of the box, DSpace should not show any filler text that has to be replaced in order to be usable. **Related work** https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/pull/862 https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/issues/2808 ","Provide a default privacy statement and end-user agreement **Describe the bug** We added components for a privacy statement and end-user agreement in #862. However, currently they contain filler, lorem ipsum text. Before 7.0 we should preferably replace that filler text with a good default for both documents, or if we can't do that, disable the components by default. **To Reproduce** Click the privacy policy or end-user agreement links in the footer. **Expected behavior** Out of the box, DSpace should not show any filler text that has to be replaced in order to be usable. **Related work** https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/pull/862 https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/issues/2808 ",Yes,Privacy policy https://api.github.com/repos/vladimiry/ElectronMail/issues/387,844796768,Improve unread messages notification format,"It would be great to have the unread messages notification that pops up whenever there's a new mail to: - actually show the subject line and either the sender or a preview of that mail (instead of ""x unread messages"") - automatically open/expand the mail when clicked (instead of just displaying the inbox) That way one won't have to neccessarily click the notification to know what the mail is about.","Improve unread messages notification format It would be great to have the unread messages notification that pops up whenever there's a new mail to: - actually show the subject line and either the sender or a preview of that mail (instead of ""x unread messages"") - automatically open/expand the mail when clicked (instead of just displaying the inbox) That way one won't have to neccessarily click the notification to know what the mail is about.",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2081,841395277,legacy privacy groups are created with duplicate members,"This might be an issue with Besu, or with Orion, Running the web3js-eea/concurrentPrivateTransactions - a privacy group is created with ""one"" member but they are in there twice - privateFrom = privateFor ``` // options used to create a privacy group with only one member const privacyOptions = { privateFrom: orion.node1.publicKey, privateFor: [orion.node1.publicKey], privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey }; ``` as in, if I run it with Besu/Orion, and then do ``` { ""jsonrpc"": ""2.0"", ""method"": ""priv_findPrivacyGroup"", ""params"": [ [ ""GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY="" ] ], ""id"": 1 } ``` the result is a privacy group with the same member in there twice ``` { ""jsonrpc"": ""2.0"", ""id"": 1, ""result"": [ { ""privacyGroupId"": ""MC4aHjApHsGb0j5glU2iAj5KcR5LId52S0BU9mtdeuY="", ""name"": ""legacy"", ""description"": ""Privacy groups to support the creation of groups by privateFor and privateFrom"", ""type"": ""LEGACY"", ""members"": [ ""GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY="", ""GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY="" ] } ] } ```","legacy privacy groups are created with duplicate members This might be an issue with Besu, or with Orion, Running the web3js-eea/concurrentPrivateTransactions - a privacy group is created with ""one"" member but they are in there twice - privateFrom = privateFor ``` // options used to create a privacy group with only one member const privacyOptions = { privateFrom: orion.node1.publicKey, privateFor: [orion.node1.publicKey], privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey }; ``` as in, if I run it with Besu/Orion, and then do ``` { ""jsonrpc"": ""2.0"", ""method"": ""priv_findPrivacyGroup"", ""params"": [ [ ""GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY="" ] ], ""id"": 1 } ``` the result is a privacy group with the same member in there twice ``` { ""jsonrpc"": ""2.0"", ""id"": 1, ""result"": [ { ""privacyGroupId"": ""MC4aHjApHsGb0j5glU2iAj5KcR5LId52S0BU9mtdeuY="", ""name"": ""legacy"", ""description"": ""Privacy groups to support the creation of groups by privateFor and privateFrom"", ""type"": ""LEGACY"", ""members"": [ ""GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY="", ""GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY="" ] } ] } ```",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2046,835371974,Possible race condition in flexible privacy,"When sending a private transaction using flexible privacy the information about the members of the groups and the version of the privacy group is done with two seperate calls to the on-chain management contract. The two calls are both made against the chain head, but if the head changes in between the two calls and the group membership has changed the result would be inconsistent. To fix that we could: - make sure the two calls are happening against the same block (less changes) - return the version of the group and the members from the management contract in one call (more changes incl. management contracts, but makes sure that there cannot be a race condition)","Possible race condition in flexible privacy When sending a private transaction using flexible privacy the information about the members of the groups and the version of the privacy group is done with two seperate calls to the on-chain management contract. The two calls are both made against the chain head, but if the head changes in between the two calls and the group membership has changed the result would be inconsistent. To fix that we could: - make sure the two calls are happening against the same block (less changes) - return the version of the group and the members from the management contract in one call (more changes incl. management contracts, but makes sure that there cannot be a race condition)",Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/Ride-The-Lightning/RTL/issues/631,833589744,Plausible Deniability,"**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** We need a way to protect our node history, like a plausible deniability feature. Like Bluewallet is having, a fake wallet **Describe the solution you'd like** We need a SHTF backup plan. Use cases are many: robbery at gun point, police raid, stealing node from home etc. I also want to hide my LN transactions, I know is not possible to delete them from history, but in some way to not be visible. That wallet history in wrong hands could be dangerous. We need ways to protect that. A simple alternative login, that show up an empty or limited account with no history. Can be even fake data, dummy txs, from testnet. ","Plausible Deniability **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** We need a way to protect our node history, like a plausible deniability feature. Like Bluewallet is having, a fake wallet **Describe the solution you'd like** We need a SHTF backup plan. Use cases are many: robbery at gun point, police raid, stealing node from home etc. I also want to hide my LN transactions, I know is not possible to delete them from history, but in some way to not be visible. That wallet history in wrong hands could be dangerous. We need ways to protect that. A simple alternative login, that show up an empty or limited account with no history. Can be even fake data, dummy txs, from testnet. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/pymedphys/pymedphys/issues/1455,832386466,DICOM Pseudonymisation appears to be reversible in some cases,"Not sure if the DICOM Pseudonymisation streamlit function was meant to leave date of birth and gender unchanged, just thought I would mention it as I thought they needed to be replaced also.","DICOM Pseudonymisation appears to be reversible in some cases Not sure if the DICOM Pseudonymisation streamlit function was meant to leave date of birth and gender unchanged, just thought I would mention it as I thought they needed to be replaced also.",Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10049,831292880,Blocked contacts still able to receive public posts and comment on their node,"This is less a bug report than an unpleasant experience report. I've been able to find on their node a comment on one of my public posts from a contact I blocked. After the unpleasant surprise, I realized that, as a public post, it is impossible to limit who can have access to it, but the fact that I was surprised feels like we probably aren't explaining the negative interaction between blocking a contact and public posts correctly. I don't know where to put this particular bit of information, maybe in the permission screen in the ""Public"" box?","Blocked contacts still able to receive public posts and comment on their node This is less a bug report than an unpleasant experience report. I've been able to find on their node a comment on one of my public posts from a contact I blocked. After the unpleasant surprise, I realized that, as a public post, it is impossible to limit who can have access to it, but the fact that I was surprised feels like we probably aren't explaining the negative interaction between blocking a contact and public posts correctly. I don't know where to put this particular bit of information, maybe in the permission screen in the ""Public"" box?",Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/16609,823001244,We should have a way to display the list of all the messages we sent since the beginning of times,"**Is your suggestion related to a problem? Please describe.** Several countries make it a legal obligation for service providers to let users find out exactly what data is stored from them. Matrix already offers APIs for that (i.e. /sync with filters) but there's no UX for this purpose. Consequently, the only way for end-users to get this information is currently to get in touch with their homeserver admin. I believe that we should add a UX for this. **Describe the solution you'd like** One possibility: somewhere in our ""Privacy"" tab, we should have an entry, e.g. ""See all my messages"" that opens a pseudo-room to see all the messages we have sent since the beginning of time (loaded lazily), with the ability to edit/remove them as usual. ","We should have a way to display the list of all the messages we sent since the beginning of times **Is your suggestion related to a problem? Please describe.** Several countries make it a legal obligation for service providers to let users find out exactly what data is stored from them. Matrix already offers APIs for that (i.e. /sync with filters) but there's no UX for this purpose. Consequently, the only way for end-users to get this information is currently to get in touch with their homeserver admin. I believe that we should add a UX for this. **Describe the solution you'd like** One possibility: somewhere in our ""Privacy"" tab, we should have an entry, e.g. ""See all my messages"" that opens a pseudo-room to see all the messages we have sent since the beginning of time (loaded lazily), with the ability to edit/remove them as usual. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/microsoftgraph/microsoft-graph-explorer-v4/issues/868,816643331,Enable Graph Explorer to support sovereign/national clouds,**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** A clear and concise description of what the problem is. Ex. I'm always frustrated when [...] **Describe the solution you'd like** A clear and concise description of what you want to happen. **Describe alternatives you've considered** A clear and concise description of any alternative solutions or features you've considered. **Additional context** Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. [AB#8314](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/8314),Enable Graph Explorer to support sovereign/national clouds **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** A clear and concise description of what the problem is. Ex. I'm always frustrated when [...] **Describe the solution you'd like** A clear and concise description of what you want to happen. **Describe alternatives you've considered** A clear and concise description of any alternative solutions or features you've considered. **Additional context** Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. [AB#8314](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/8314),No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/blockonomics/woocommerce-plugin/issues/237,816095759,Order id should be encrypted like WHMCS plugin,It may be possible to view other order information by changing order id in order info URLs. We should either encrypt order information or use a separate column in table with a unique id,Order id should be encrypted like WHMCS plugin It may be possible to view other order information by changing order id in order info URLs. We should either encrypt order information or use a separate column in table with a unique id,Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/vladimiry/ElectronMail/issues/375,815499472,cannot attach file: file manager Nemo issue in Cinnamon desktop environment,"When trying to add attachment and opening the default file manager nemo 4.8.4 in Cinnamon DE 4.8.6, then only Downloads folder is visible and no other folder in $HOME. So, cannot attach file. Only drag-and-drop is the way, how currently we can attach file, using Cinnamon DE and Nemo in Linux Mint 20.1. Actually Desktop choice on navigation bar is visible, but desktop will NOT be opened and actually that Desktop choice on navigation bar cannot be activated. When trying manually via CTRL+L enter location, the window will be closed and no location will be opened. EDIT: looks like even drag-and-drop to attach file doesn't work :( Only via that Downloads folder is currently still possible to attach file.","cannot attach file: file manager Nemo issue in Cinnamon desktop environment When trying to add attachment and opening the default file manager nemo 4.8.4 in Cinnamon DE 4.8.6, then only Downloads folder is visible and no other folder in $HOME. So, cannot attach file. Only drag-and-drop is the way, how currently we can attach file, using Cinnamon DE and Nemo in Linux Mint 20.1. Actually Desktop choice on navigation bar is visible, but desktop will NOT be opened and actually that Desktop choice on navigation bar cannot be activated. When trying manually via CTRL+L enter location, the window will be closed and no location will be opened. EDIT: looks like even drag-and-drop to attach file doesn't work :( Only via that Downloads folder is currently still possible to attach file.",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1942,815054653,Nonce of private transaction not incrementing when private transaction reverts,"[Raised in RocketChat](https://chat.hyperledger.org/channel/besu?msg=3gsQR3svKFEp5gq4i): Hi community, We have noticed that if a private tx reverts (e.g, when a require condition fails), then the private nonce is not incremented. On the other hand, the public nonce, that of the privacy marker tx, do increment. So my question is: ֲ¿is there any way to change this behaviour, allowing the private nonce to increment? We have found this situation problematic when leading with concurrent private tx, because if tx n fails, then n+1, n+2, etc will also fail. Thank you very much in advance community! - [x] Confirm behaviour is inconsistent with public transaction behaviour - [ ] Document current behaviour as a known issue - [ ] (longer term) If yes, fix. Fix will require a CLI option or preferably something better (something in the database possibly) to not break backwards compatibility. -> this might be support for forks in privacy - and this is also a way to deprecate privacy methods in future","Nonce of private transaction not incrementing when private transaction reverts [Raised in RocketChat](https://chat.hyperledger.org/channel/besu?msg=3gsQR3svKFEp5gq4i): Hi community, We have noticed that if a private tx reverts (e.g, when a require condition fails), then the private nonce is not incremented. On the other hand, the public nonce, that of the privacy marker tx, do increment. So my question is: ֲ¿is there any way to change this behaviour, allowing the private nonce to increment? We have found this situation problematic when leading with concurrent private tx, because if tx n fails, then n+1, n+2, etc will also fail. Thank you very much in advance community! - [x] Confirm behaviour is inconsistent with public transaction behaviour - [ ] Document current behaviour as a known issue - [ ] (longer term) If yes, fix. Fix will require a CLI option or preferably something better (something in the database possibly) to not break backwards compatibility. -> this might be support for forks in privacy - and this is also a way to deprecate privacy methods in future",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/NeonGeckoCom/NeonCore/issues/61,814691366,feat/libretranslate_detect,"- adds libretranslate for language detection - adds support for api_key (optional) in libretranslate translator - makes libretranslate the default engine, its free, can be self hosted, its accurate, supports most common languages and has no additional dependencies I did not realize earlier that there was a language detection option Neon will probably want to distribute keys for the paid options under the system level mycroft.conf , libretranslate should be considered a demo/fallback ","feat/libretranslate_detect - adds libretranslate for language detection - adds support for api_key (optional) in libretranslate translator - makes libretranslate the default engine, its free, can be self hosted, its accurate, supports most common languages and has no additional dependencies I did not realize earlier that there was a language detection option Neon will probably want to distribute keys for the paid options under the system level mycroft.conf , libretranslate should be considered a demo/fallback ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/3331,812781385,add CI script to check for rewards requests before rewards opt-in ,see https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/14278 for details. this issue is to do the equivalent CI testing on iOS.,add CI script to check for rewards requests before rewards opt-in see https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/14278 for details. this issue is to do the equivalent CI testing on iOS.,No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/NeonGeckoCom/NeonCore/issues/56,811169101,feat/apertium translate,adds the option to use https://www.apertium.org which can be self hosted https://github.com/apertium/apertium,feat/apertium translate adds the option to use https://www.apertium.org which can be self hosted https://github.com/apertium/apertium,No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/NeonGeckoCom/NeonCore/issues/55,811164168,feat/libretranslate_engine,"adds a text translation option for libretranslate, can be self hosted","feat/libretranslate_engine adds a text translation option for libretranslate, can be self hosted",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/infoderm/patients/issues/185,806659963,Implement HIPAA-like access/update log,Existing implementation: - https://github.com/awatson1978/deprecated-clinical-hipaa-audit-log,Implement HIPAA-like access/update log Existing implementation: - https://github.com/awatson1978/deprecated-clinical-hipaa-audit-log,Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1872,800081875,GoQuorum privacy private receipts,- fix nonce problem - remove not needed method on GoQuorumPrivateStorage - make receipts work as they work in GoQuorum Signed-off-by: Stefan Pingel ,GoQuorum privacy private receipts - fix nonce problem - remove not needed method on GoQuorumPrivateStorage - make receipts work as they work in GoQuorum Signed-off-by: Stefan Pingel ,No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/76,798527896,Add NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription text in Info.plist,"## PR type What kind of change does this PR introduce? - [ ] Bugfix - [x] Feature - [ ] Code style update - [ ] Refactoring (no functional changes, no api changes) - [ ] Build related changes - [ ] Documentation content changes ## What is the current behavior? iOS presents the default text in the ""#app name# would like to find and connect to devices on your local network."" iOS 14 privacy alert. ## What is the new behavior? Added `NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription` text in Info.plist: ""We need to use your Local Network to obtain IVPN servers latency."" ## Does this PR introduce a breaking change? - [ ] Yes - [x] No ","Add NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription text in Info.plist ## PR type What kind of change does this PR introduce? - [ ] Bugfix - [x] Feature - [ ] Code style update - [ ] Refactoring (no functional changes, no api changes) - [ ] Build related changes - [ ] Documentation content changes ## What is the current behavior? iOS presents the default text in the ""#app name# would like to find and connect to devices on your local network."" iOS 14 privacy alert. ## What is the new behavior? Added `NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription` text in Info.plist: ""We need to use your Local Network to obtain IVPN servers latency."" ## Does this PR introduce a breaking change? - [ ] Yes - [x] No ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/73,798243664,Implement a message that tells the user why the app is requesting access to the local network,"## Description The current implementation of the ping Ping Service requires access to the local network because it is implemented using [`CFSocket`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corefoundation/cfsocket-rg7) (a low level communications channel implemented with a BSD socket) and this is one of the operations which will trigger this access request. Until we can implement the Ping Service in a way that does not require access to the local network, we want to describe to users why the app requires this. This is done by adding [`NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information_property_list/nslocalnetworkusagedescription) in the Info.plist. This issue is relevant only for **iOS 14+** devices. ## QA notes Instead iOS default alert message, now the alert contains a custom message describing why IVPN app requires access to user's local network - to obtain servers latency. To get this alert presented by iOS consistently, follow these steps: 0. Make sure to be connected to WiFi/local network 1. Delete IVPN app (if installed) 2. Reboot the device 3. Install the IVPN app 4. Launch the app - in most cases at this point the alert should appear 5. Go to servers screen and refresh servers latency times every 15 seconds, after a couple of times the alert should appear if it didn't at the app launch","Implement a message that tells the user why the app is requesting access to the local network ## Description The current implementation of the ping Ping Service requires access to the local network because it is implemented using [`CFSocket`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corefoundation/cfsocket-rg7) (a low level communications channel implemented with a BSD socket) and this is one of the operations which will trigger this access request. Until we can implement the Ping Service in a way that does not require access to the local network, we want to describe to users why the app requires this. This is done by adding [`NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information_property_list/nslocalnetworkusagedescription) in the Info.plist. This issue is relevant only for **iOS 14+** devices. ## QA notes Instead iOS default alert message, now the alert contains a custom message describing why IVPN app requires access to user's local network - to obtain servers latency. To get this alert presented by iOS consistently, follow these steps: 0. Make sure to be connected to WiFi/local network 1. Delete IVPN app (if installed) 2. Reboot the device 3. Install the IVPN app 4. Launch the app - in most cases at this point the alert should appear 5. Go to servers screen and refresh servers latency times every 15 seconds, after a couple of times the alert should appear if it didn't at the app launch",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/72,795848108,Rewrite Ping Service to not require access to the local network,"The current implementation of the ping Ping Service requires access to the local network because it is implemented using [`CFSocket`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corefoundation/cfsocket-rg7) (a low level communications channel implemented with a BSD socket) and this is one of the operations which will trigger this access request. Ideally, we want to implement the Ping Service in a way that does not perform operations that require access to the local network. **Local Network Privacy FAQ:** https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663858 **What operations require local network access?:** https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663874","Rewrite Ping Service to not require access to the local network The current implementation of the ping Ping Service requires access to the local network because it is implemented using [`CFSocket`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corefoundation/cfsocket-rg7) (a low level communications channel implemented with a BSD socket) and this is one of the operations which will trigger this access request. Ideally, we want to implement the Ping Service in a way that does not perform operations that require access to the local network. **Local Network Privacy FAQ:** https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663858 **What operations require local network access?:** https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663874",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1849,795671596,[Spike] Investigate atomic commit for public and quorum private data ,Find out how we might resolve this.,[Spike] Investigate atomic commit for public and quorum private data Find out how we might resolve this.,No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1848,795670384,GoQuorumPrivateStorage: remove storage of data not needed,"Storing of the transaction receipt in the GoQuorumPrivateStorage is not needed, as it is stored in place of the PMT receipt.","GoQuorumPrivateStorage: remove storage of data not needed Storing of the transaction receipt in the GoQuorumPrivateStorage is not needed, as it is stored in place of the PMT receipt.",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1847,795664403,Add blooms for quorum style private transactions,"In GoQuorum, the blooms for private transactions are stored separately stored from the public blooms. For operations that use blooms the public and the private bloom are always ored to get a combined bloom. see eth/bloombits.go line 123","Add blooms for quorum style private transactions In GoQuorum, the blooms for private transactions are stored separately stored from the public blooms. For operations that use blooms the public and the private bloom are always ored to get a combined bloom. see eth/bloombits.go line 123",No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/62,790818286,"Investigate iOS 14 privacy alert - ""IVPN would like to find and connect to devices on your local network.""","## Description A new iOS 14 privacy alert is presented when new installed apps require access/try to interact with the local network. First we need to investigate which part of the app/app's logic triggers this alert, and then resolve the issue in 2 possible ways: 1. Remove the logic that triggers the privacy alert, if possible 2. Add a custom description in Info.plist that describes exactly why IVPN app requires access to local network (instead iOS presenting a default alert text) More info: ג€¨https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663858","Investigate iOS 14 privacy alert - ""IVPN would like to find and connect to devices on your local network."" ## Description A new iOS 14 privacy alert is presented when new installed apps require access/try to interact with the local network. First we need to investigate which part of the app/app's logic triggers this alert, and then resolve the issue in 2 possible ways: 1. Remove the logic that triggers the privacy alert, if possible 2. Add a custom description in Info.plist that describes exactly why IVPN app requires access to local network (instead iOS presenting a default alert text) More info: ג€¨https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663858",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-site-specific-scripts/issues/41,788429646,Defer Publisher Lookups Until User Opts-in to Brave Rewards,"When you visit a Twitter profile, Brave attempts to lookup publisher info for the author. These calls happen even if the Brave profile is brand new, and its user hasn't fully opted-in to Brave Rewards. We should not make these calls unless that user has opted-in. ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/815158/104944872-7bef5a80-597d-11eb-93c7-175351ba0a4c.png) _Originally posted by @jonathansampson in https://github.com/brave/brave-site-specific-scripts/issues/40#issuecomment-762374529_","Defer Publisher Lookups Until User Opts-in to Brave Rewards When you visit a Twitter profile, Brave attempts to lookup publisher info for the author. These calls happen even if the Brave profile is brand new, and its user hasn't fully opted-in to Brave Rewards. We should not make these calls unless that user has opted-in. ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/815158/104944872-7bef5a80-597d-11eb-93c7-175351ba0a4c.png) _Originally posted by @jonathansampson in https://github.com/brave/brave-site-specific-scripts/issues/40#issuecomment-762374529_",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/16167,787241959,Separate discovery from recovery contact information,"**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** I would like to be discoverable via my phone number and work email but I don't want to use them as recovery options. Right now, I need to first add contact information for recovery before I can use them for discovery. **Describe the solution you'd like** I want to set an email or phone number for discovery without using it for recovery. **Describe alternatives you've considered** None ","Separate discovery from recovery contact information **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** I would like to be discoverable via my phone number and work email but I don't want to use them as recovery options. Right now, I need to first add contact information for recovery before I can use them for discovery. **Describe the solution you'd like** I want to set an email or phone number for discovery without using it for recovery. **Describe alternatives you've considered** None ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/613,786181522,"[Provider API] - Include crash data as part of the `/status_changes` endpoint, `event_type` = `accident`","### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Several cities are inquiring about crash data. We have been supporting them in linking this data with street usage and existing infrastructure. Crash data are today issued from manual reporting at hospitals. It provides timestamp, location and type of vehicles. This data however is not of high quality, and it is difficult to make meaningful statistics out of it and hence support decision-making on infrastructure or policies. ### Describe the solution you'd like I believe it could be valuable to add this to the `/status_changes` endpoint. For example, I would see a transition from `on_trip` to `unavailable` with `event_type` = `accident/crash`. I don't know to which extent providers can obtain this information ""live"". Clearly a survey just after a crash is difficult. Some providers have reporting process through the website. I wonder whether the (next generation) vehicles are (will be) able to detect crash with accelerometer & speed data. A good question to operators. Ideally this would be part of the `/status_changes` endpoint. However we could also imagine a separate reporting but it may add complexity. Today, this would be very useful as historical data to get analytics on crash for shared micro-mobility and link it to street segment. However, tomorrow, in a broader context, I believe this is a great step for connected vehicles to report 'live' crash to roadway authorities and emergency services. ### Is this a breaking change I don't believe this is breaking. ### Impacted Spec Provider ### Describe alternatives you've considered An alternative could again be separate monthly reporting in csv by providers where we would see the number of crashes. However this would be left to goodwill reporting by users & providers. ","[Provider API] - Include crash data as part of the `/status_changes` endpoint, `event_type` = `accident` ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Several cities are inquiring about crash data. We have been supporting them in linking this data with street usage and existing infrastructure. Crash data are today issued from manual reporting at hospitals. It provides timestamp, location and type of vehicles. This data however is not of high quality, and it is difficult to make meaningful statistics out of it and hence support decision-making on infrastructure or policies. ### Describe the solution you'd like I believe it could be valuable to add this to the `/status_changes` endpoint. For example, I would see a transition from `on_trip` to `unavailable` with `event_type` = `accident/crash`. I don't know to which extent providers can obtain this information ""live"". Clearly a survey just after a crash is difficult. Some providers have reporting process through the website. I wonder whether the (next generation) vehicles are (will be) able to detect crash with accelerometer & speed data. A good question to operators. Ideally this would be part of the `/status_changes` endpoint. However we could also imagine a separate reporting but it may add complexity. Today, this would be very useful as historical data to get analytics on crash for shared micro-mobility and link it to street segment. However, tomorrow, in a broader context, I believe this is a great step for connected vehicles to report 'live' crash to roadway authorities and emergency services. ### Is this a breaking change I don't believe this is breaking. ### Impacted Spec Provider ### Describe alternatives you've considered An alternative could again be separate monthly reporting in csv by providers where we would see the number of crashes. However this would be left to goodwill reporting by users & providers. ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1793,785253456,Make PrivacyReorgTest Not Depend on Hardcoded State Roots,The `PrivacyReorgTest` is brittle with respect to anything that changes where in `BlockDataGenerator`'s random stream it gets its values from. ### Acceptance Criteria * It determines what should be the correct state roots at test time or otherwise tests the properties so that the changes to the random stream don't affect it. ,Make PrivacyReorgTest Not Depend on Hardcoded State Roots The `PrivacyReorgTest` is brittle with respect to anything that changes where in `BlockDataGenerator`'s random stream it gets its values from. ### Acceptance Criteria * It determines what should be the correct state roots at test time or otherwise tests the properties so that the changes to the random stream don't affect it. ,No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1782,783127779,Go quorum interop,## PR description Make Besu interop with Quorum privacy,Go quorum interop ## PR description Make Besu interop with Quorum privacy,No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9696,772668083,Use correct request parameter type for poke privacy,Fixes #9306 Blocked by #9694 for test fix,Use correct request parameter type for poke privacy Fixes #9306 Blocked by #9694 for test fix,No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9690,771852952,Append author's contact id to allowed contacts to prevent empty ACL for private items,Fixes #9672,Append author's contact id to allowed contacts to prevent empty ACL for private items Fixes #9672,Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9672,770406590,Private Messages are sent to the public," ### Bug Description Sending a private posting to an empty list plus some CC e-mails results in a message sent to all my followers (at least). This has been discussed also here: https://nerdica.net/display/a85d7459-365f-d92d-643a-321844968468 ### Steps to Reproduce #### Actual Result: The above results in a posting to followers. #### Expected Result: The posting should be sent by e-mail to the addresses in the CC list **only**. ### Platform Info Friendica Version: Diese Friendica-Instanz verwendet die Version 2020.12-dev, sie ist unter der folgenden Adresse im Web zu finden https://nerdica.net. Die Datenbankversion ist 1382/1382 und die Post-Update-Version 1349/1350.","Private Messages are sent to the public ### Bug Description Sending a private posting to an empty list plus some CC e-mails results in a message sent to all my followers (at least). This has been discussed also here: https://nerdica.net/display/a85d7459-365f-d92d-643a-321844968468 ### Steps to Reproduce #### Actual Result: The above results in a posting to followers. #### Expected Result: The posting should be sent by e-mail to the addresses in the CC list **only**. ### Platform Info Friendica Version: Diese Friendica-Instanz verwendet die Version 2020.12-dev, sie ist unter der folgenden Adresse im Web zu finden https://nerdica.net. Die Datenbankversion ist 1382/1382 und die Post-Update-Version 1349/1350.",Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1718,768452511,Go quorum configuration,When using the GoQuorum compatibility mode in besu make the configuration available.,Go quorum configuration When using the GoQuorum compatibility mode in besu make the configuration available.,No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/608,768376981,[Requirements] Ability to express data sharing requirements in Policy,"### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. It has come up in a number of contexts that it would be useful to allow agencies to express data sharing requirements in MDS. I'm probably forgetting a few use cases, but here are some I have heard: - In #607, allow agencies to state which geographies they would like aggregate metrics or reports for - In #507, allow certain fields or endpoints to become ""optional"" in the sense of not being required by the spec, but still allow them to be ""required"" in the sense of the city explicitly requiring them of providers - In #503, allow agencies to explicitly opt int to new optional or beta endpoints - In #585, allow agencies to invite transparency and public accountability around the data they collect and why - Improve data security by allowing operators to allocate access properly so that a city that does not request a given field/endpoint does not in fact have access to it - Improve system efficiency by allowing operators to know in advance which fields/endpoints need to be stored and/or computed in advance ### Describe the solution you'd like I think of MDS Policy as the digital representation of a City's mobility program policies ג€“ֲ we are digitalizing their program PDF, in a sense. Data sharing requirements, including the requirement to provide MDS, are common in nearly any such policy. Hence, I think this belongs in MDS and in Policy specifically. One possibility that might meet some of the uses cases above would be adding a new rule type or set of rule types within the Policy endpoint that describe a city data sharing need. ### Is this a breaking change I think this could probably be done in a non-breaking way. ### Impacted Spec Policy. ### Describe alternatives you've considered There has also been discussion of this living in a new endpoint. I'm open to that, but I like the simplicity of having a single (public!) endpoint return everything about a city's policy. In addition, there are often direct relationships between rules and data sharing needs (cities need data to assess compliance with a rule). I think these relationships might be made more clear and explicit through a carefully considered augmentation of MDS Policy. ","[Requirements] Ability to express data sharing requirements in Policy ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. It has come up in a number of contexts that it would be useful to allow agencies to express data sharing requirements in MDS. I'm probably forgetting a few use cases, but here are some I have heard: - In #607, allow agencies to state which geographies they would like aggregate metrics or reports for - In #507, allow certain fields or endpoints to become ""optional"" in the sense of not being required by the spec, but still allow them to be ""required"" in the sense of the city explicitly requiring them of providers - In #503, allow agencies to explicitly opt int to new optional or beta endpoints - In #585, allow agencies to invite transparency and public accountability around the data they collect and why - Improve data security by allowing operators to allocate access properly so that a city that does not request a given field/endpoint does not in fact have access to it - Improve system efficiency by allowing operators to know in advance which fields/endpoints need to be stored and/or computed in advance ### Describe the solution you'd like I think of MDS Policy as the digital representation of a City's mobility program policies ג€“ֲ we are digitalizing their program PDF, in a sense. Data sharing requirements, including the requirement to provide MDS, are common in nearly any such policy. Hence, I think this belongs in MDS and in Policy specifically. One possibility that might meet some of the uses cases above would be adding a new rule type or set of rule types within the Policy endpoint that describe a city data sharing need. ### Is this a breaking change I think this could probably be done in a non-breaking way. ### Impacted Spec Policy. ### Describe alternatives you've considered There has also been discussion of this living in a new endpoint. I'm open to that, but I like the simplicity of having a single (public!) endpoint return everything about a city's policy. In addition, there are often direct relationships between rules and data sharing needs (cities need data to assess compliance with a rule). I think these relationships might be made more clear and explicit through a carefully considered augmentation of MDS Policy. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/607,762983530,Provider Reports - Static,"## Explain pull request This is a beta implementation of the #569 special groups aggregate metrics issue. It adds a /reports endpoint within the Provider API that handles returning monthly trip counts of special groups, in this case just low income groups. The response served up is a pre-generated CSV file of all data. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking (new feature) ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `provider` ## Additional context See PR #606 for a version that is dynamic and not static like this one. ","Provider Reports - Static ## Explain pull request This is a beta implementation of the #569 special groups aggregate metrics issue. It adds a /reports endpoint within the Provider API that handles returning monthly trip counts of special groups, in this case just low income groups. The response served up is a pre-generated CSV file of all data. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking (new feature) ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `provider` ## Additional context See PR #606 for a version that is dynamic and not static like this one. ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/Jasmine-liang/gitblog/issues/2,762508880,ו› ה½¿ח”¨ה¸€ה¸×ו·¥ו…·ו₪±ט´¥ט€ŒזŽ¢ח´¢וˆ°חš„ו…³ה÷Žיšח§ה¿זŠ₪חš„י—®י¢˜,"## ה½¿ח”¨[WechatMomentScreenshot](https://github.com/TransparentLC/WechatMomentScreenshot) ט¿™ז˜¯ה¸€ה¸×ו¼€ז÷חš„זœ‹ו‹וœˆט½¬ו‘זˆ×ו›¾ח”Ÿזˆו™¨ן¼Œי€‚ח”¨ה÷Žו½“ה½ ט¢«ט¿«ט½¬ו‘ז–‡ז¡ˆי›†טµžז‰טƒ½ה½¿ח”¨זŸח§ה÷§ו“חš„זƒ…ז™¯ד€‚זˆ‘וœ¨Chromeו’ŒFirefoxיƒ½ח®€ו•ז‰‹וŠ¨זµ‹ט¯•ה÷†ה¸€ה¸‹וŠŸטƒ½ד€‚ו‘חŽ°וœ¨Chromeה¸Šח”Ÿזˆה¸ה÷†ו›¾ח‰‡ד€‚זˆ‘ו°±וŽ»י¡¹ח›®חš„issueי€›ה÷†ה¸€ה¸‹חœ‹וˆ°זœ‰ה÷÷ז˜¯ו› ה¸÷ה½¿ח”¨ו¹¿ו‘Šז‹¦זˆ×ז’ה»¶ט€Œחœ‹ה¸וˆ°ח”Ÿזˆחš„ו›¾ח‰‡ד€‚זˆ‘זŠŠז³¨ז„ח‚¹ט½¬ו‘ה÷†Chromeה¸Šו®‰ט£…חš„ז’ה»¶נŸ₪” ## ז‰¾וˆ°ה½ ה÷†ן¼ CanvasFingerprintBlockז’ה»¶ יžו¸¸ח²—זš´וœ°זŠŠז¯ה¸×ז’ה»¶יƒ½ט¯•ה÷†ה¸€ין¼Œזœ€וŽו‘חŽ°ז˜¯ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶וœ¨טµ·ה½œח”¨ד€‚וŽ»Chrome web storeחœ‹ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶חš„ה»‹ח»ן¼Œו†ח»“וˆי¡¹ח›®main.jsי‡Œו¯¹toDataURL() חš„ה½¿ח”¨ן¼ŒוŸ÷זœ¬ה¸Šט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶ז˜¯וœ¨י˜²ז­¢ח”Ÿזˆחš„canvasו‘ח½‘ח«™ו‘י€ח”¨זˆ·חš„ה¸×ה÷÷ז•°ז®ד€‚ > Such websites do this by painting an image on a hidden HTML element and then taking a snapshot of it and posting the snapshot back to themselves. Because the exact pixel values in the drawn canvas can differ subtly from one set of hardware to another, these websites can use those differences to distinguish between visitors as well as to recognize specific visitors from one visit to the next. זˆ‘ו°±ו¾ˆו¥½ו¥‡ז˜¯ז€Žה¹ˆה»Žח”Ÿזˆחš„canvasה¸­חš„ט¿™ה÷›pixel valuesז¥ט¾¨וˆ«ח”¨זˆ·חš„ד€‚ה÷Žז˜¯ן¼Œזˆ‘ז‰¾וˆ°ה÷†ה¸€ה÷›ט§£י‡Šד€‚ ## Canvas fingerprintingחš„וŸ÷זœ¬וŽŸח† > Canvas fingerprinting works by exploiting the HTML5 canvas element: when a user visits a website their browser is instructed to ג€œdrawג€ a hidden line of text or 3D graphic that is then rendered into a single digital token, a potentially unique identifier to track users without any actual identifier persistence on the machine. Variations on installed GPU model, operating system and overall system performances cause the variations in the rendered digital token. ו‚ט€ƒן¼š - https://blokt.com/guides/browser-fingerprinting - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint זˆ‘ט¿˜ה»Ž https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/ ט¿™ה¸×ח½‘ו€ה¸Šזµ‹ט¯•ו‡÷זˆ‘חš„Timezone, BrowserPlugin detailsן¼ˆו­˜וœ¨ז’ה»¶ז¼ז´žט¢«וˆ©ח”¨י£Žי™©ן¼‰, Device memoryח­‰ו¾ˆו₪šה¸×ה÷÷ה¿¡ז¯ו‘¢:( ## ו¯ה»¥וšח‚¹ו°ו°זŠµזŠ— י™₪ה÷† [Coveryyourtracks](https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/learn) ט¿™ח¯‡ז–‡ח« זוˆ°חš„זŽ×ז–½ו₪–ן¼Œה¾ז®ה¸וŒחš„יœ€ז±‚וˆ†ו¼€ה½¿ח”¨זµט§ˆו™¨ה¹Ÿז˜¯ה¸×וŠžז³•ד€‚","ו› ה½¿ח”¨ה¸€ה¸×ו·¥ו…·ו₪±ט´¥ט€ŒזŽ¢ח´¢וˆ°חš„ו…³ה÷Žיšח§ה¿זŠ₪חš„י—®י¢˜ ## ה½¿ח”¨[WechatMomentScreenshot](https://github.com/TransparentLC/WechatMomentScreenshot) ט¿™ז˜¯ה¸€ה¸×ו¼€ז÷חš„זœ‹ו‹וœˆט½¬ו‘זˆ×ו›¾ח”Ÿזˆו™¨ן¼Œי€‚ח”¨ה÷Žו½“ה½ ט¢«ט¿«ט½¬ו‘ז–‡ז¡ˆי›†טµžז‰טƒ½ה½¿ח”¨זŸח§ה÷§ו“חš„זƒ…ז™¯ד€‚זˆ‘וœ¨Chromeו’ŒFirefoxיƒ½ח®€ו•ז‰‹וŠ¨זµ‹ט¯•ה÷†ה¸€ה¸‹וŠŸטƒ½ד€‚ו‘חŽ°וœ¨Chromeה¸Šח”Ÿזˆה¸ה÷†ו›¾ח‰‡ד€‚זˆ‘ו°±וŽ»י¡¹ח›®חš„issueי€›ה÷†ה¸€ה¸‹חœ‹וˆ°זœ‰ה÷÷ז˜¯ו› ה¸÷ה½¿ח”¨ו¹¿ו‘Šז‹¦זˆ×ז’ה»¶ט€Œחœ‹ה¸וˆ°ח”Ÿזˆחš„ו›¾ח‰‡ד€‚זˆ‘זŠŠז³¨ז„ח‚¹ט½¬ו‘ה÷†Chromeה¸Šו®‰ט£…חš„ז’ה»¶נŸ₪” ## ז‰¾וˆ°ה½ ה÷†ן¼ CanvasFingerprintBlockז’ה»¶ יžו¸¸ח²—זš´וœ°זŠŠז¯ה¸×ז’ה»¶יƒ½ט¯•ה÷†ה¸€ין¼Œזœ€וŽו‘חŽ°ז˜¯ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶וœ¨טµ·ה½œח”¨ד€‚וŽ»Chrome web storeחœ‹ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶חš„ה»‹ח»ן¼Œו†ח»“וˆי¡¹ח›®main.jsי‡Œו¯¹toDataURL() חš„ה½¿ח”¨ן¼ŒוŸ÷זœ¬ה¸Šט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶ז˜¯וœ¨י˜²ז­¢ח”Ÿזˆחš„canvasו‘ח½‘ח«™ו‘י€ח”¨זˆ·חš„ה¸×ה÷÷ז•°ז®ד€‚ > Such websites do this by painting an image on a hidden HTML element and then taking a snapshot of it and posting the snapshot back to themselves. Because the exact pixel values in the drawn canvas can differ subtly from one set of hardware to another, these websites can use those differences to distinguish between visitors as well as to recognize specific visitors from one visit to the next. זˆ‘ו°±ו¾ˆו¥½ו¥‡ז˜¯ז€Žה¹ˆה»Žח”Ÿזˆחš„canvasה¸­חš„ט¿™ה÷›pixel valuesז¥ט¾¨וˆ«ח”¨זˆ·חš„ד€‚ה÷Žז˜¯ן¼Œזˆ‘ז‰¾וˆ°ה÷†ה¸€ה÷›ט§£י‡Šד€‚ ## Canvas fingerprintingחš„וŸ÷זœ¬וŽŸח† > Canvas fingerprinting works by exploiting the HTML5 canvas element: when a user visits a website their browser is instructed to ג€œdrawג€ a hidden line of text or 3D graphic that is then rendered into a single digital token, a potentially unique identifier to track users without any actual identifier persistence on the machine. Variations on installed GPU model, operating system and overall system performances cause the variations in the rendered digital token. ו‚ט€ƒן¼š - https://blokt.com/guides/browser-fingerprinting - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint זˆ‘ט¿˜ה»Ž https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/ ט¿™ה¸×ח½‘ו€ה¸Šזµ‹ט¯•ו‡÷זˆ‘חš„Timezone, BrowserPlugin detailsן¼ˆו­˜וœ¨ז’ה»¶ז¼ז´žט¢«וˆ©ח”¨י£Žי™©ן¼‰, Device memoryח­‰ו¾ˆו₪šה¸×ה÷÷ה¿¡ז¯ו‘¢:( ## ו¯ה»¥וšח‚¹ו°ו°זŠµזŠ— י™₪ה÷† [Coveryyourtracks](https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/learn) ט¿™ח¯‡ז–‡ח« זוˆ°חš„זŽ×ז–½ו₪–ן¼Œה¾ז®ה¸וŒחš„יœ€ז±‚וˆ†ו¼€ה½¿ח”¨זµט§ˆו™¨ה¹Ÿז˜¯ה¸×וŠžז³•ד€‚",No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/606,760836672,Provider Reports - API,"## Explain pull request This is a simplified, beta implementation of the #569 special groups aggregate metrics issue. It adds a /reports endpoint within the Provider API that handles returning monthly trip counts of special groups, in this case just low income groups. The structure is similar to the Metrics API, but reduced in scope (no duration specifications, no measures besides counts of trips). ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking (new feature) ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `provider` ## Additional context Measures and durations could be added back into the PR. See PR #607 for a static version of this solution. ","Provider Reports - API ## Explain pull request This is a simplified, beta implementation of the #569 special groups aggregate metrics issue. It adds a /reports endpoint within the Provider API that handles returning monthly trip counts of special groups, in this case just low income groups. The structure is similar to the Metrics API, but reduced in scope (no duration specifications, no measures besides counts of trips). ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking (new feature) ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `provider` ## Additional context Measures and durations could be added back into the PR. See PR #607 for a static version of this solution. ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9641,760409415,Misattributed Diaspora reply becomes top-level post ,Original thread: https://friendica.mrpetovan.com/display/735a2029-745f-d0d9-92b8-25a575390980 Diaspora reply: https://nerdpol.ch/posts/735a2029-745f-d0d9-92b8-25a575390980#1a5b49401c58013960bc52540039b762 Misattributed comment as a top-level post: https://social.yl.ms/display/e18176ef-945f-d0e1-b4c1-589737649409 This is a really weird occurence I've never seen before. A comment from one of my remote contact (A) on one of my top-level posts became a top-level post by me on another contact's (B) node. Apparently these two contacts cannot communicate with each other as A's posts don't appear on B's server and B's posts don't appear on A's server. But it still doesn't justify the comment misattribution. I believe the reply by A was delivered to B because I liked it. Then something really wrong happened and it got transformed into a top-level post attributed to me.,Misattributed Diaspora reply becomes top-level post Original thread: https://friendica.mrpetovan.com/display/735a2029-745f-d0d9-92b8-25a575390980 Diaspora reply: https://nerdpol.ch/posts/735a2029-745f-d0d9-92b8-25a575390980#1a5b49401c58013960bc52540039b762 Misattributed comment as a top-level post: https://social.yl.ms/display/e18176ef-945f-d0e1-b4c1-589737649409 This is a really weird occurence I've never seen before. A comment from one of my remote contact (A) on one of my top-level posts became a top-level post by me on another contact's (B) node. Apparently these two contacts cannot communicate with each other as A's posts don't appear on B's server and B's posts don't appear on A's server. But it still doesn't justify the comment misattribution. I believe the reply by A was delivered to B because I liked it. Then something really wrong happened and it got transformed into a top-level post attributed to me.,No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/eclipse/vorto/issues/2729,758290680,Consider whether feasible to automatically set a user's e-mail with the information from the OAuth provider login at first signup,"This would help in situations where Vorto is integrated with other services, e.g. when a Vorto user creates a namespace and integrates with the Bosch IoT suite to give access to a technical user. In that case, it would help that the original user has their e-mail address set up automatically upon first signup - otherwise they will have to go do that manually once they start using the access request form if they assumed it would work automatically. That may require some addendum to our privacy policy. ","Consider whether feasible to automatically set a user's e-mail with the information from the OAuth provider login at first signup This would help in situations where Vorto is integrated with other services, e.g. when a Vorto user creates a namespace and integrates with the Bosch IoT suite to give access to a technical user. In that case, it would help that the original user has their e-mail address set up automatically upon first signup - otherwise they will have to go do that manually once they start using the access request form if they assumed it would work automatically. That may require some addendum to our privacy policy. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1642,754036687,add sendSignedTransaction method to QuorumEnclave,Signed-off-by: Stefan Pingel This method is needed to use the to be implemented eth_sendRawPrivateTransaction.,add sendSignedTransaction method to QuorumEnclave Signed-off-by: Stefan Pingel This method is needed to use the to be implemented eth_sendRawPrivateTransaction.,No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1600,748526684,GoQuorumEnclave,"### Description Enclave that supports /send, /receive, and /upcheck. This is needed to support the GoQuorum compatible privacy mode. ### Acceptance Criteria - [ ] GoQuorumEnclave can be used to send, receive and upcheck private transactions from Tessera. - [ ] Send/Receive methods covered by unit/integration (?) tests - [ ] PR merged - [ ] See it working (demo Besu being able to talk to Tessera - even if not actually processing/sending a private tx) ","GoQuorumEnclave ### Description Enclave that supports /send, /receive, and /upcheck. This is needed to support the GoQuorum compatible privacy mode. ### Acceptance Criteria - [ ] GoQuorumEnclave can be used to send, receive and upcheck private transactions from Tessera. - [ ] Send/Receive methods covered by unit/integration (?) tests - [ ] PR merged - [ ] See it working (demo Besu being able to talk to Tessera - even if not actually processing/sending a private tx) ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1599,748473159,Go quorum enclave,Add an enclave that uses Tessera to send and receive private transactions. This implementation supports the functionality necessary for the Besu privacy mode that is compatible with GoQuorum standard privacy.,Go quorum enclave Add an enclave that uses Tessera to send and receive private transactions. This implementation supports the functionality necessary for the Besu privacy mode that is compatible with GoQuorum standard privacy.,Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/simonsdave/cloudfeaster/issues/45,743379954,eliminate warning message in CircleCI logs,The following message appears in CircleCI logs. ``` WARNING! Your password will be stored unencrypted in /root/.docker/config.json. Configure a credential helper to remove this warning. See https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credentials-store ``` Some references that might be useful * [8 Jun '20 - Encrypted Credentials for Docker Login](https://leimao.github.io/blog/Docker-Login-Encrypted-Credentials/) * [15 Sep '20 - Docker pass Credential Helper on Ubuntu](https://geoffhudik.com/tech/2020/09/15/docker-pass-credential-helper-on-ubuntu/) * [```pass``` = the standard unix password manager](https://www.passwordstore.org/) * [Docker login command](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/) * [Docker Credentials Store](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credentials-store),eliminate warning message in CircleCI logs The following message appears in CircleCI logs. ``` WARNING! Your password will be stored unencrypted in /root/.docker/config.json. Configure a credential helper to remove this warning. See https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credentials-store ``` Some references that might be useful * [8 Jun '20 - Encrypted Credentials for Docker Login](https://leimao.github.io/blog/Docker-Login-Encrypted-Credentials/) * [15 Sep '20 - Docker pass Credential Helper on Ubuntu](https://geoffhudik.com/tech/2020/09/15/docker-pass-credential-helper-on-ubuntu/) * [```pass``` = the standard unix password manager](https://www.passwordstore.org/) * [Docker login command](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/) * [Docker Credentials Store](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credentials-store),Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/15703,740658695,Jitsi widget doesn't release camera after removing the widget, ,Jitsi widget doesn't release camera after removing the widget ,No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9522,740552079,Prevent ActivityPub message transmission to blocked followers,"That's, huh, an oversight. Related to #9464 Discovered while working on #9515","Prevent ActivityPub message transmission to blocked followers That's, huh, an oversight. Related to #9464 Discovered while working on #9515",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9515,739163548,Reject replies when author is blocked by thread owner,"Closes #9464 This change will only apply to future messages. I was able to test that a public reply from a blocked Mastodon contact was rejected twice: - Once as ""Author is blocked by user"" for the private copy of the item that should have appeared in my network feed (existing behavior) - Once as ""Author is blocked by parent user"" for the public copy of the item that should have appeared in the community pages for example. (new behavior)","Reject replies when author is blocked by thread owner Closes #9464 This change will only apply to future messages. I was able to test that a public reply from a blocked Mastodon contact was rejected twice: - Once as ""Author is blocked by user"" for the private copy of the item that should have appeared in my network feed (existing behavior) - Once as ""Author is blocked by parent user"" for the public copy of the item that should have appeared in the community pages for example. (new behavior)",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9500,738410551,[dbstructure 1373] Replace contact.blocked with user.blocked in owner-view,"Fixes #9326 - It was falsely reporting blocked users as unblocked since we don't block the public self contact Fortunately, the `owner-view` view isn't used much through the modules yet so the privacy impact has been low.","[dbstructure 1373] Replace contact.blocked with user.blocked in owner-view Fixes #9326 - It was falsely reporting blocked users as unblocked since we don't block the public self contact Fortunately, the `owner-view` view isn't used much through the modules yet so the privacy impact has been low.",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1530,735745577,Presentation Orion -> Tessera,### Description Create a presentation that gives an overview of what needs to be done to enable us to replace Orion with Tessera.,Presentation Orion -> Tessera ### Description Create a presentation that gives an overview of what needs to be done to enable us to replace Orion with Tessera.,No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/eclipse/vorto/issues/2681,734575567,Allow comment moderation,"Spin off of #2675 . In cases when the user cannot delete a comment (not the author / formerly the author but comment anonymized / not namespace administrator), it would be good to have an additional button to report a comment to the namespace administrator, for moderation. An e-mail would then be sent to the administrator with the given recommendations from the user, pointing at the ""offending"" comment. Given the very sporadic usage of the feature at large, this is very low priority at the time of writing. ","Allow comment moderation Spin off of #2675 . In cases when the user cannot delete a comment (not the author / formerly the author but comment anonymized / not namespace administrator), it would be good to have an additional button to report a comment to the namespace administrator, for moderation. An e-mail would then be sent to the administrator with the given recommendations from the user, pointing at the ""offending"" comment. Given the very sporadic usage of the feature at large, this is very low priority at the time of writing. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/eclipse/vorto/issues/2675,733051122,Allow users to delete their own comments / Allow namespace administrators to moderate (delete) comments in their NS,"As the title implies, there doesn't seem to be any functionality implemented to delete comments (the closer thing is comment anonymization when a user deletes their account). It would be a good improvement to allow users to delete their own comments, and namespace admins to do the same for all users in their namespace. Aside from the self-moderation capability, that would also make it easier to fix privacy issues, e.g. if private data has been put in a model comment by mistake. ","Allow users to delete their own comments / Allow namespace administrators to moderate (delete) comments in their NS As the title implies, there doesn't seem to be any functionality implemented to delete comments (the closer thing is comment anonymization when a user deletes their account). It would be a good improvement to allow users to delete their own comments, and namespace admins to do the same for all users in their namespace. Aside from the self-moderation capability, that would also make it easier to fix privacy issues, e.g. if private data has been put in a model comment by mistake. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/594,732012957,Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch,"--- name: Default about: Suggest changes to MDS title: Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch --- # MDS Pull Request Thank you for your contribution! Please review our OMF [contributing page](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) to understand guidelines and policies for participation, and our [Code of Conduct page](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). To avoid complications and help make the Review process as smooth as possible, make sure to: 1. Target [**`dev`**](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/tree/dev) branch. Please ensure you are targeting **`dev`**, not **`main`**. 1. Keep the *""Allow edits from maintainers""* button checked to help us resolve some issues for you. 1. Be ready to resolve any merge conflicts before we approve your Pull Request. 1. Have an up to date profile, per our Github [community profile](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#community-profile) guildance. ## Explain pull request Updates requested by @schnuerle for features-metrics. Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch. ## Is this a breaking change A breaking change would require consumers or implementors of the API to modify their code for it to continue to function (ex: renaming of a required field or the change in data type of an existing field). A non-breaking change would allow existing code to continue to function (ex: addition of an optional field or the creation of a new optional endpoint). * Yes, breaking * No, not breaking * I'm not sure ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `metrics` ## Additional context Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. ","Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch --- name: Default about: Suggest changes to MDS title: Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch --- # MDS Pull Request Thank you for your contribution! Please review our OMF [contributing page](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) to understand guidelines and policies for participation, and our [Code of Conduct page](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). To avoid complications and help make the Review process as smooth as possible, make sure to: 1. Target [**`dev`**](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/tree/dev) branch. Please ensure you are targeting **`dev`**, not **`main`**. 1. Keep the *""Allow edits from maintainers""* button checked to help us resolve some issues for you. 1. Be ready to resolve any merge conflicts before we approve your Pull Request. 1. Have an up to date profile, per our Github [community profile](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#community-profile) guildance. ## Explain pull request Updates requested by @schnuerle for features-metrics. Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch. ## Is this a breaking change A breaking change would require consumers or implementors of the API to modify their code for it to continue to function (ex: renaming of a required field or the change in data type of an existing field). A non-breaking change would allow existing code to continue to function (ex: addition of an optional field or the creation of a new optional endpoint). * Yes, breaking * No, not breaking * I'm not sure ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `metrics` ## Additional context Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/2972,724310881,Implement Global Privacy Control,More details here: https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/11917,Implement Global Privacy Control More details here: https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/11917,Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/587,723480111,Metrics - Feature Branch,"## Explain pull request This PR is to see what changes between the Metrics feature branch and the dev branch, and prepare it for merger once it's ready. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking ## Impacted Spec * `agency` * `policy` * `provider` ## Additional context PRs #486 and #487 were merged to a 'feature branch' in the MDS repo so we can see how it fits into the larger spec, allow the community and staff to do PRs against it, merge other related PRs into it, and see how it will fit into dev when it's ready with this PR. ","Metrics - Feature Branch ## Explain pull request This PR is to see what changes between the Metrics feature branch and the dev branch, and prepare it for merger once it's ready. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking ## Impacted Spec * `agency` * `policy` * `provider` ## Additional context PRs #486 and #487 were merged to a 'feature branch' in the MDS repo so we can see how it fits into the larger spec, allow the community and staff to do PRs against it, merge other related PRs into it, and see how it will fit into dev when it's ready with this PR. ",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/15461,721427545,We should have a setting to disable P2P for Jitsi,"It's not helpful that we have a 'Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls' setting to allow users to disable P2P and thus shield their IP when doing 1:1 calls - but no equivalent for Jitsi. Jitsi's P2P mode is disableable, and we should provide Element users with a way to do so if they don't want to leak their IP to the other party when there are only 2 people on the call","We should have a setting to disable P2P for Jitsi It's not helpful that we have a 'Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls' setting to allow users to disable P2P and thus shield their IP when doing 1:1 calls - but no equivalent for Jitsi. Jitsi's P2P mode is disableable, and we should provide Element users with a way to do so if they don't want to leak their IP to the other party when there are only 2 people on the call",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/15460,721426140,'Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls' setting does not make it clear that P2P shares your IP,...and that the reason for disabling P2P is to avoid sharing your IP with the other party,'Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls' setting does not make it clear that P2P shares your IP ...and that the reason for disabling P2P is to avoid sharing your IP with the other party,Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/585,718437299,Make Policy/Geography API Endpoints Optionally Public,"## Explain pull request The value of having Policy API endpoints be public has come up in several different contexts. In particular, in the development of #503, it has been pointed out that a hypothetical ""bad actor"" at a city could create arbitrarily small or specific Policy regions that undermine the stated goal of protecting rider privacy. For example, this bad actor could create policy regions around a political protest and the home of a specific individual and receive events that reveal the trips of this individual to/from a protest. In this hypothetical example, the value of a public Policy API endpoint is clear: anyone could see what is happening and ask the bad actor to account for creating such targeted policy regions. In less specific and hypothetical cases, there is public benefit from making Policy data ""open data"". For example, residents could monitor the vehicle caps over time and enterprising developers could add speed limits and no parking zones to their apps. This change may raise concerns that vehicle caps and other such data are proprietary data. There may be competitive concerns here, but I don't think they should overrule the public benefit of publishing this data. There are no individual privacy concerns or trade secrets in this data, and it is unlikely that cities could shield this data from a records request. ## Is this a breaking change No. ## Impacted Spec Policy. ","Make Policy/Geography API Endpoints Optionally Public ## Explain pull request The value of having Policy API endpoints be public has come up in several different contexts. In particular, in the development of #503, it has been pointed out that a hypothetical ""bad actor"" at a city could create arbitrarily small or specific Policy regions that undermine the stated goal of protecting rider privacy. For example, this bad actor could create policy regions around a political protest and the home of a specific individual and receive events that reveal the trips of this individual to/from a protest. In this hypothetical example, the value of a public Policy API endpoint is clear: anyone could see what is happening and ask the bad actor to account for creating such targeted policy regions. In less specific and hypothetical cases, there is public benefit from making Policy data ""open data"". For example, residents could monitor the vehicle caps over time and enterprising developers could add speed limits and no parking zones to their apps. This change may raise concerns that vehicle caps and other such data are proprietary data. There may be competitive concerns here, but I don't think they should overrule the public benefit of publishing this data. There are no individual privacy concerns or trade secrets in this data, and it is unlikely that cities could shield this data from a records request. ## Is this a breaking change No. ## Impacted Spec Policy. ",Yes,Location privacy https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1424,716599557,[1404] Fixed NPE when executing eth_estimateGas with privacy enabled.,"Signed-off-by: Mark Terry ## PR description Addresses a bug where an NPE could be encountered when `eth_estimateGas` is executed when privacy is enabled. ## Fixed Issue(s) Fixes #1404 ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog).","[1404] Fixed NPE when executing eth_estimateGas with privacy enabled. Signed-off-by: Mark Terry ## PR description Addresses a bug where an NPE could be encountered when `eth_estimateGas` is executed when privacy is enabled. ## Fixed Issue(s) Fixes #1404 ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog).",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1422,716210277,Add ATs for on chain privacy with multi tenancy,## PR description Adding acceptance test for on-chain privacy with multi-tenancy ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog).,Add ATs for on chain privacy with multi tenancy ## PR description Adding acceptance test for on-chain privacy with multi-tenancy ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog).,Yes,Privacy in the cloud https://api.github.com/repos/commons-app/apps-android-commons/issues/3946,712588446,Use a different setting for Mapbox telemetry opt-out,"**Summary:** I believe ""Telemetry Opt Out"" is kind of a contradictory name for the option as it contradicts the option description by conveying that enabling the setting means the user has **opted out** of telemetry while that is not the case. To my understanding, enabling the setting means telemetry would be sent to Mapbox. So, we should use a better name for the setting too. My suggestion would be ""Mapbox Telemetry"". **Device and Android version:** Samsung SM-J111F running Android 5.1.1. **Commons app version:** 2.13.1.793~66f6e2e *Note*: First reported in #3943 ","Use a different setting for Mapbox telemetry opt-out **Summary:** I believe ""Telemetry Opt Out"" is kind of a contradictory name for the option as it contradicts the option description by conveying that enabling the setting means the user has **opted out** of telemetry while that is not the case. To my understanding, enabling the setting means telemetry would be sent to Mapbox. So, we should use a better name for the setting too. My suggestion would be ""Mapbox Telemetry"". **Device and Android version:** Samsung SM-J111F running Android 5.1.1. **Commons app version:** 2.13.1.793~66f6e2e *Note*: First reported in #3943 ",No,Bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/jonathanvdc/res-publica/issues/13,711154185,Move HTTP request arguments to request body,"Some of the HTTP request arguments we send to the server are sensitive and should be ephemeral. They should be placed somewhere where they will not end up in the log. The HTTP request body, for example.","Move HTTP request arguments to request body Some of the HTTP request arguments we send to the server are sensitive and should be ephemeral. They should be placed somewhere where they will not end up in the log. The HTTP request body, for example.",No,General feature https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/2909,710496918,[hackerone] #992204 - IndexedDB,https://hackerone.com/bugs?subject=brave&report_id=992204,[hackerone] #992204 - IndexedDB https://hackerone.com/bugs?subject=brave&report_id=992204,No,Cannot relate to privacy https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/2907,710190530,Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well," ### Description: Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Visit sites in tabs 2. Open settings and clear data 3. Tab history is not cleared **Actual result:** Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well **Expected result:** Tab history should be cleared **Reproduces how often:** [Easily reproduced, Intermittent Issue] Easy **Brave Version:** 1.20/1.21 **Device details:** All **Website problems only:** - did you check with Brave Shields down? NA - did you check in Safari/Firefox (WkWebView-based browsers)? NA ### Additional Information ","Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well ### Description: Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Visit sites in tabs 2. Open settings and clear data 3. Tab history is not cleared **Actual result:** Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well **Expected result:** Tab history should be cleared **Reproduces how often:** [Easily reproduced, Intermittent Issue] Easy **Brave Version:** 1.20/1.21 **Device details:** All **Website problems only:** - did you check with Brave Shields down? NA - did you check in Safari/Firefox (WkWebView-based browsers)? NA ### Additional Information ",Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9306,709966277,Poking ACL selection for private pokes is wrong,"### Bug Description When poking some contact privately, the poke should be delivered only to that account. Instead it is delivered to the ACL _default_ group of contacts. Also the poked person is not mentioned it seems. Here is the source of the poke. ``` [url=https://social.diekershoff.de/profile/tobias]Tobias[/url] stupste [url=]Michael Vogel[/url] ``` ### Steps to Reproduce 0. Define a default contact group for your postings in the settings, maybe... I have one 1. Start to poke somebody 2. Limit the audience to private 3. Do the poking Actual Result: The poke is posted to the default ACL group. Expected Result: Having the poke only distributed to the poked contact. ### Screenshots ![friendica-poke](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/433490/94396169-aa90bd80-0161-11eb-9c9e-4f80783d9bf5.png) ### Platform Info Friendica 2020.12-devf","Poking ACL selection for private pokes is wrong ### Bug Description When poking some contact privately, the poke should be delivered only to that account. Instead it is delivered to the ACL _default_ group of contacts. Also the poked person is not mentioned it seems. Here is the source of the poke. ``` [url=https://social.diekershoff.de/profile/tobias]Tobias[/url] stupste [url=]Michael Vogel[/url] ``` ### Steps to Reproduce 0. Define a default contact group for your postings in the settings, maybe... I have one 1. Start to poke somebody 2. Limit the audience to private 3. Do the poking Actual Result: The poke is posted to the default ACL group. Expected Result: Having the poke only distributed to the poked contact. ### Screenshots ![friendica-poke](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/433490/94396169-aa90bd80-0161-11eb-9c9e-4f80783d9bf5.png) ### Platform Info Friendica 2020.12-devf",Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/returntocorp/semgrep-action/issues/66,708486059,Remove privacy-sensitive findings fields from backend post,"We should omit fields that are both: - sensitive - not necessary for backend operation Specifically, the `syntactic_context` field falls in this category.","Remove privacy-sensitive findings fields from backend post We should omit fields that are both: - sensitive - not necessary for backend operation Specifically, the `syntactic_context` field falls in this category.",Yes,Privacy bug fix https://api.github.com/repos/tianhaoz95/check-group/issues/26,706594137,Privacy Policy,https://tianhaoz.com/check-group/#/privacy Description,Privacy Policy https://tianhaoz.com/check-group/#/privacy Description,Yes,Privacy feature https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9230,704467741,Remove tracking pixels when importing feeds,I discovered that one of the feeds that I'm mirroring on one of my systems does contain some tracking pixel. So now pixels width the width and height of eine pixel will be removed.,Remove tracking pixels when importing feeds I discovered that one of the feeds that I'm mirroring on one of my systems does contain some tracking pixel. So now pixels width the width and height of eine pixel will be removed.,No,Bug fix